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THE HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL LEGISLATURES

Where is the power? Students of politics have pondered this question, and social
scientists have scrutinized formal political institutions and the distribution of power
among agencies of the government and the state. But we still lack a rich bank of
data measuring the power of specific governmental agencies, particularly national
legislatures.
This book assesses the strength of the national legislature of every country in the
world with a population of at least a half-million inhabitants. The Legislative Powers
Survey (LPS) is a list of thirty-two items that gauges the legislatures sway over the
executive, its institutional autonomy, its authority in specific areas, and its institutional capacity. Data were generated by means of a vast international survey of experts,
extensive study of secondary sources, and painstaking analysis of constitutions and
other relevant documents. Individual country chapters provide answers to each of the
thirty-two survey items, supplemented by expert commentary and relevant excerpts
from constitutions.

M. Steven Fish is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. He is author of Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics (2005),
which was the recipient of the Best Book Award of 2006 presented by the Comparative Democratization Section of the American Political Science Association. He is also
author of Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution (1995) and a coauthor of Postcommunism and the Theory of Democracy (2001). His
articles have appeared in World Politics, Comparative Political Studies, Journal of Democracy, Post-Soviet Affairs, and other journals. He served as a Senior Fulbright Fellow and
Visiting Professor at Airlangga University, Surabaya, Indonesia, in 2007 and at the
European University at St. Petersburg, St. Petersburg, Russia, in 20001. In 2005 he
was the recipient of the Distinguished Social Sciences Teaching Award of the College
of Letters and Science, University of California, Berkeley.
Matthew Kroenig is Assistant Professor in the Department of Government and the
Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. His articles
have appeared in Security Studies, Foreign Policy, Democratization, and other journals.
He has held fellowships from the National Science Foundation, the Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, the Center for International
Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, and the Institute on Global Conflict
and Cooperation at the University of California. He has also served as a strategist on
the policy-planning staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, where he was the
principal author of the first-ever U.S. government-wide strategy for deterring terrorist
networks. For his work he received the Office of the Secretary of Defenses Award for
Outstanding Achievement.

For our parents,

Michael Fish and Cherrie Robinson
and
Mark Kroenig and Barb Kroenig

The Handbook of
National Legislatures
A GLOBAL SURVEY
M. Steven Fish
University of California, Berkeley

Matthew Kroenig
Georgetown University

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, So Paulo

Cambridge University Press
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK
Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521514668
M. Steven Fish and Matthew Kroenig 2009
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the
provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part
may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published in print format 2009

ISBN-13

978-0-511-50825-7

eBook (NetLibrary)

ISBN-13

978-0-521-51466-8

hardback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy

of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication,
and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain,
accurate or appropriate.

CONTENTS

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . page 1
Conventional Categories of Constitutional Systems
The Legislative Powers Survey
The Survey Items
The Parliamentary Powers Index
The Use of Constitutions
Use of the Data
Debts and Acknowledgments

2
3
4
13
15
16
16

Country Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
National Assembly of Afghanistan
Assembly of Albania
Parliament of Algeria
National Assembly of Angola
Argentine National Congress
Armenian National Assembly
Parliament of Australia
Austrian Parliament
Parliament of Azerbaijan
National Assembly of Bahrain
Bangladesh Parliament
National Assembly of Belarus
Federal Parliament of Belgium
National Assembly of Benin
National Assembly of Bhutan
Bolivian National Congress
Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina
National Assembly of Botswana
National Congress of Brazil
National Assembly of Bulgaria
National Assembly of Burkina Faso
Parliament of Burundi
National Assembly of Cambodia
National Assembly of Cameroon
Parliament of Canada
National Assembly of the Central African Republic
National Assembly of Chad
Congress of Chile
Chinese National Peoples Congress
Congress of Colombia
Assembly of Comoros
Parliament of Congo-Brazzaville (Republic of Congo)
National Assembly of Congo-Kinshasa (Democratic Republic
of Congo)
Legislative Assembly of Costa Rica

18
22
27
31
36
40
44
48
52
56
61
65
70
74
78
81
86
89
94
98
103
107
112
117
121
125
130
135
140
144
150
155
159
165
v

vi

Contents

National Assembly of C
ote dIvoire
Parliament of Croatia
National Assembly of Peoples Power of Cuba
House of Representatives of Cyprus
Parliament of the Czech Republic
Parliament of Denmark
National Congress of the Dominican Republic
National Congress of Ecuador
Peoples Assembly of Egypt
Legislative Assembly of El Salvador
National Assembly of Eritrea
Parliament of Estonia
Parliament of Ethiopia
Parliament of Fiji
Parliament of Finland
Parliament of France
Parliament of Gabon
National Assembly of The Gambia
Supreme Council of Georgia
Parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany
Parliament of Ghana
Parliament of Greece
Congress of Guatemala
National Assembly of Guinea
National Peoples Assembly of Guinea-Bissau
National Assembly of Guyana
National Assembly of Haiti
National Congress of Honduras
National Assembly of Hungary
Parliament of India
House of Representatives of Indonesia
Islamic Consultative Assembly of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Council of Representatives of Iraq
Parliament of Ireland
Parliament of Israel
Parliament of Italy
Parliament of Jamaica
National Diet of Japan
National Assembly of Jordan
Parliament of Kazakhstan
National Assembly of Kenya
Supreme Peoples Assembly of the Democratic Peoples Republic
of Korea (North Korea)
National Assembly of the Republic of Korea (South Korea)
National Assembly of Kuwait
Legislative Assembly of Kyrgyzstan
National Assembly of Laos
Parliament of Latvia
National Assembly of Lebanon
Parliament of Lesotho
National Assembly of Liberia
General Peoples Congress of Libya
Parliament of Lithuania
Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia
National Assembly of Madagascar

169
173
178
182
187
191
195
199
205
210
214
218
224
229
235
240
245
250
255
261
266
272
278
283
287
292
297
301
305
311
316
320
325
330
334
338
343
348
353
357
362
366
370
374
379
384
388
392
397
402
406
409
414
418

Contents

National Assembly of Malawi

Parliament of Malaysia
National Assembly of Mali
Parliament of Mauritania
National Assembly of Mauritius
Mexican Congress
Parliament of Moldova
Great State Assembly of Mongolia
Parliament of Morocco
Assembly of Mozambique
Peoples Assembly of Myanmar (Burma)
National Assembly of Namibia
Parliament of Nepal
States-General of the Netherlands
Parliament of New Zealand
National Assembly of Nicaragua
National Assembly of Niger
National Assembly of Nigeria
Parliament of Norway
Council of Oman
Parliament of Pakistan
National Assembly of Panama
National Parliament of Papua New Guinea
Congress of Paraguay
Congress of Peru
Congress of the Philippines
Parliament of Poland
Assembly of Portugal
Consultative Council of Qatar
Parliament of Romania
Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation
Parliament of Rwanda
Consultative Council of Saudi Arabia
National Assembly of Senegal
National Assembly of Serbia
Parliament of Sierra Leone
Parliament of Singapore
National Council of the Slovak Republic
Parliament of Slovenia
Transitional Federal Assembly of Somalia
Parliament of South Africa
The General Courts of Spain
Parliament of Sri Lanka
National Legislature of Sudan
Parliament of Swaziland
Parliament of Sweden
Federal Assembly of Switzerland
Peoples Assembly of Syria
Legislative Yuan of Taiwan, Republic of China
Supreme Assembly of Tajikistan
National Assembly of Tanzania
National Assembly of Thailand
National Parliament of Timor-Leste
National Assembly of Togo
Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago

vii

423
428
432
436
441
447
451
456
460
465
469
470
475
481
484
487
491
495
501
505
508
514
519
524
529
534
539
545
550
554
560
565
570
574
578
584
590
595
600
604
605
610
616
621
626
631
636
640
644
648
652
659
666
671
676

viii

Contents

National Parliament of Tunisia

Turkish Grand National Assembly
Peoples Council of Turkmenistan
National Assembly of Uganda
Supreme Council of Ukraine
Federal National Council of the United Arab Emirates
Parliament of the United Kingdom
Congress of the United States of America
Uruguayan General Assembly
Supreme Assembly of Uzbekistan
National Assembly of Venezuela
National Assembly of Vietnam
Parliament of Yemen
National Assembly of Zambia
Parliament of Zimbabwe

Comprehensive Lists of Country Scores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 754

Parliamentary Powers Index Scores by Country, in Alphabetical
Order
Parliamentary Powers Index Scores by Country, in Order
of Scores

681
685
692
696
702
708
713
716
720
725
729
734
739
744
748

754
756

List of Expert Consultants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 758

Select Bibliography

765

Index

797

Introduction

This book is the product of a lot of curiosity and

a bit of dissatisfaction. The curiosity focuses on
a matter that interests anyone who studies politics: Where is the power? The dissatisfaction arises
from the shortage of information that addresses
that question in a global framework. We are particularly interested in where official power that
is, the power vested in the government and the
organs of state resides. In our research on a variety of topics, each of us one a student of comparative politics, the other a specialist in international
relations consistently encounters a shortage of
information. In our many conversations with colleagues both inside and outside the academy, we
have come to realize that demand for information
on where power resides exceeds supply. For millennia, students of politics have analyzed power,
and for at least a century, social scientists have
scrutinized formal political institutions and the
distribution of power among agencies of government and the state. But we still do not have a rich
bank of data measuring the power of this or that
agency, and information on legislatures is in especially short supply. For many countries one is hardpressed to find any relevant information at all. In
recent decades, pioneering scholars, particularly in
political science, have taken up the challenge of
studying legislatures outside the advanced industrialized countries. Still, writings on legislatures in
many parts of the world remain negligible, even
if the quality of available studies is often high. As
we found as we scoured the scholarly literature,
articles on the newly resurrected Scottish parliament, which was established in 1999 to handle
matters that the parliament of the United Kingdom devolved to it, outnumber articles on the legislatures of all African countries combined.
We therefore set out to assess the powers of the
central representative institution of national politics, and to do so for all countries of the world. We
knew and at the end of our efforts are even more
acutely aware that measuring the powers of legislatures perfectly is a vain hope. We nevertheless
decided that an attempt to measure those powers,
even if the results were imperfect, promised to generate useful data, which is the aim of this volume.

We expect that this information will be of interest primarily to social scientists, but we hope that
government officials, political activists, journalists,
staffers in nongovernmental organizations, businesspeople, lawyers, and indeed anyone interested
in politics will find it useful as well.
This study is not the first to attempt to measure the powers of legislatures, but it encompasses
a richer array of dimensions of power and includes
a larger number of countries than the handful of
other available studies. To the best of our knowledge, moreover, no work on the powers of any
other official bodies presidencies, judiciaries, militaries, particular ministries, or other agencies
provides the depth or breadth of coverage that the
present work furnishes on legislatures.1
Our main tool is the Legislative Powers Survey
(LPS). The LPS is a list of thirty-two items that
gauge thirty-two separate indicators of the legislatures strength. We administered the LPS as a
survey to country experts. We complemented the
survey findings with our own analysis of national
constitutions and other relevant sources. We then
used the LPS as the basis for generating a Parliamentary Powers Index (PPI). The PPI, which ranges
from zero (least powerful) to one (most powerful), is a score that reflects a legislatures aggregate
strength.
The present chapter, an introduction to the
study, places our effort in the context of contemporary writings on constitutional systems, examines the survey on which our study is based, discusses each item in the survey, presents the index
that was created using the survey, explains how
constitutional excerpts are adduced, and ruminates
on how the study might be used. It closes by
1

For other efforts to measure the powers of official bodies, see, for example, Matthew Soberg Shugart and John
M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design
and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Timothy Frye, A Politics of Institutional Choice: Post-Communist Presidencies, Comparative Political Studies 30, 5 (October 1997), pp. 52352; and
Andre Krouwel, Measuring Presidentialism and Parliamentarism: An Application to Central and East European
Countries, Acta Politica 38, 4 (2003), pp. 33364.

The Handbook of National Legislatures

acknowledging the assistance of those who have

made a special contribution to the project. Chapter
2, which forms the heart of the book, presents the
country studies. There is one study on each country. Each begins with a brief narrative overview,
followed by the results of the survey. The answer to
each item in the survey for the country is provided.
Along with each answer, we include commentary
as well as the relevant excerpt from the countrys constitution where appropriate. Chapter 3
furnishes lists of the data generated by the survey.
Chapter 4 presents a list of the experts who participated in the survey. The book concludes with a bibliography, which, while extensive, is incomplete.
We could not provide a comprehensive list of relevant works, but merely listed those that we found
especially useful in creating the present volume.
CONVENTIONAL CATEGORIES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS

The tripartite classification of parliamentary,

semipresidential, and presidential systems, as
well as the expanded typology of parliamentary,
premier-presidential, president-parliamentary, and
presidential systems, has long guided scholars.
Yet these typologies have obvious limitations.
They produce categorical rather than ordinal data,
which limits their usefulness for empirical analysis. Furthermore, classifying countries is often
problematic. Scholars agree that if elements of the
legislature form the government, the prime minister exercises considerable executive power and
answers to the legislature, and there is no president
or one who is elected by the legislature, the system is parliamentary. Yet that is where easy agreement ends. Some analysts hold that any system in
which the president is elected directly cannot be
classified as parliamentary, but should be considered semipresidential (or presidential), even if the
president has only ceremonial functions. Others,
embracing Maurice Duvergers classic conceptualization of semipresidentialism, hold that the president must have substantial power for the system to
qualify as semipresidential (or presidential); otherwise it is parliamentary.2 Thus, some scholars consider Irelands system semipresidential; others say
it is parliamentary. Some classify Bulgarias system
as semipresidential; others say it is parliamentary.
Analysts also differ over the boundary between semipresidential and presidential systems.
2

Maurice Duverger, A New Political System: SemiPresidential Government, European Journal of Political
Research 8, 1 (June 1980), pp. 16587.

Duverger considered a system semipresidential if

the president is directly elected and has considerable power but there is also a prime minister who
is accountable to the legislature. Yet in some countries that formally meet these requirements, the
legislatures instruments for controlling the government are paltry. In such cases some scholars see
semipresidentialism, whereas others see presidentialism. Kazakhstan and Russia are examples.
In sum, the conventional distinctions among
constitutional systems do not fully specify where
power resides. And where power resides is what
matters for real-life politics and government.
The data presented in this volume suggest that
even within each of the major types of constitutional systems there is wide variation in the
capacity of legislatures. The Parliamentary Powers
Index scores show that in some parliamentary systems, the legislature is, in fact, very powerful. In
Germany and Macedonia, it is the main stage of
national politics. In other parliamentary systems,
the legislature is strong but nevertheless shares substantial power with extra-parliamentary agencies,
be they monarchs, militaries, presidents, dominant
prime ministers, Governors General, or someone
else. Australia and Thailand (even before the latter
countrys 2006 coup) are examples. These countries scores on the PPI are markedly lower than
those of Germany and Macedonia. In still other
countries with parliamentary systems, despite formal provisions for parliamentarism, the legislature is subordinated to a prime minister whose
power depends less on parliament than on a hegemonic party, the military, or some other extraparliamentary agency. Ethiopia and Malaysia fit
this description.
Great variation in the actual powers of the legislature is also indeed, especially found among
semipresidential systems. Some semipresidential
systems have weak legislatures, as in Russia and
Kazakhstan. Others have commanding legislatures
and highly constrained presidents, as in Austria
and Mongolia. Some countries with semipresidential systems fall in between, meaning that the legislature has substantial but not vast power, as in
France and Taiwan.
Variation in the legislatures powers is also
conspicuous among presidential systems. Some
countries have an overpowering presidency and
a marginal legislature, as in Belarus, Kenya, and
Uzbekistan. Some include a legislature that is not
a commanding force but that is still influential,
for example, Honduras, Indonesia, and Namibia.
Yet other presidential systems, such as those of
Georgia and South Korea, include still more potent

Introduction

legislatures. The data presented in this volume

show that the national legislatures of Nicaragua,
Ukraine, the United States, and Uruguay, with their
presidential systems, are as potent or nearly as
potent as their counterparts in Australia, Jamaica,
Japan, and South Africa, which have parliamentary
systems.
THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS SURVEY

We realized that if we wanted to gauge how much

power is actually lodged in the legislature, we
would have to grapple with issues that are not
always encoded in law. For example, after engaging in preliminary canvassing of experts and parliamentarians, and relying on simple common sense,
we decided that whether or not legislators have
support staff might affect the legislatures institutional capacity. Yet this matter is rarely addressed
in constitutions; often it is not addressed in any law
at all. A second example is found in the question
of whether or not the legislature has a substantial
voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
Influence over the media is a matter that is of consequence for the legislatures power, yet the law is
often silent or ambiguous on this issue.
The inclusion of such matters in our assessments clarified for us the need to consult experts.
The indispensability of expert opinion became
more obvious when we realized that even some
questions that seemed exceedingly straightforward
are not always so simple to answer in practice.
Thus we embarked upon the long, trying,
rewarding endeavor of administering the Legislature Powers Survey as a questionnaire to specialists
who have expert knowledge of specific countries.
The questionnaire consisted of the thirty-two items
(which we also call questions here) used in this
volume with the following introductory material:3
3

As we compiled and examined the completed questionnaires and other sources, we realized that our wording of
three of the items had not reflected precisely what we were
trying to assess, and we slightly modified the wording of
the item in the final product. The first of those items is
number 7, which was originally stated as The legislatures
approval is required to confirm the appointment of individual ministers; or the legislature itself appoints ministers. Here we deleted the word individual in the final
analysis. The second item is number 9. Here, in its original formulation, the item read: The legislature can vote
no confidence in the government without jeopardizing its
own term (that is, without the threat of dissolution). We
subsequently realized that we were concerned with the
right to vote no confidence alone, and we deleted without jeopardizing its own term (that is, without the threat of
dissolution). The third item is question 12. The item originally read: Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof

3
ITEMS FOR CONSTRUCTION OF AN INDEX MEASURING
THE POWERS OF THE NATIONAL LEGISLATURE
EXPERT SURVEY
The authors have attempted to phrase each statement such
that affirmation of the statement indicates greater rather
than lesser power for the national legislature. Thus, affirmation of each statement (one could also think in terms of
a check mark next to each statement) would produce a
score of 32, indicating an all-powerful legislature. A very low
score would indicate a weak legislature. Please simply place
a plus sign just to the left of the number of the statement if it
applies to the country you are evaluating. Please indicate the
name of the country at the top of the survey, and please use
a different copy of this survey for each country you evaluate.
If you believe that the statement cannot be said to apply or
not apply without some qualification, please write the basis
for your qualification in on the survey.

We asked the experts to affirm or negate the statement made in each item. We realized that such an
up-or-down answer may fail to capture complexity, and we invited the experts to provide comments on any item they wished. Many experts did
write remarks, often extensive, in response to specific items. Their comments provided a trove of
precious information that we tapped in preparing
this book.
Aware that people make mistakes and that some
items in the survey require judgment calls, we
solicited answers from numerous specialists on
each country. We set the goal of obtaining five
completed questionnaires for each country. After
launching the quest for experts, we saw the advantages of offering the survey in multiple languages,
so we had it translated into Spanish and French.
The survey is very much the product of the
Internet age: It would have been impossible before
the advent of the World Wide Web, which we used
to hunt for specialists. We sought experts primarily
from academia, but we also raided the ranks of parliamentarians and parliamentary staffers, jurists,
diplomats, and journalists. We also sought out
leaders of think tanks, nongovernmental organizations, and international organizations. In most
instances we sent the survey by e-mail, and
received the completed survey back by e-mail.
or essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden
by a simple majority in the legislature. We found that an
ambiguity between the common and technical meaning
of simple majority caused confusion, and we deleted the
word simple. Furthermore, the order of the questions
in the questionnaires differed a bit from what we present
here as the final survey. As we assessed responses and prepared this volume, we saw that we could slightly improve
the presentation for readers by changing the placement of
a handful of items, which we did.

Occasionally a respondent mailed us a paper copy,

or answered the survey in face-to-face meetings
in which we posed the questions and received
answers orally.
For some countries, everyone we asked to participate responded positively, and five requests
yielded five completed surveys. But such magical moments were rare. Much more frequently,
some of those we contacted declined, and our hunt
for experts continued. Many people who declined
kindly put us in touch with colleagues; we thus
used experts to find other experts. We offered no
compensation. People participated solely out of
graciousness and dedication to advancing knowledge. Given our determination to secure at least
five responses per country, and that we cover every
country in the world that had a population of a
half-million or more inhabitants as of 2000, our
efforts stretched on for nearly half a decade. We
began contacting experts in late 2002. In late 2006
we finally had all the responses we needed.
Yet we failed to get all the responses we wanted.
Although we averaged over five responses per
country for the world as a whole, for some countries no amount of canvassing would yield five
completed surveys. Unsurprisingly, most of these
countries do not have functioning legislatures, and
their legislatures are rarely, if ever, the object of
scholarly or public inquiry. In some of these countries, the state itself is falling apart or has already
disintegrated; in some, the state is new and is still
in formation; in still others, the political order does
not include a place for a bona fide legislature. The
countries for which we failed to obtain the desired
five respondents are Bhutan, Chad, Comoros, C
ote
dIvoire, Cuba, Eritrea, Haiti, Iraq, Jamaica, North
Korea, Laos, Liberia, Myanmar, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam.
In these cases we did the best we could with the
expertise available to us.
THE SURVEY ITEMS

The LPS, which the experts answered as a survey, consists of thirty-two items. The first nine
items gauge the legislatures influence over the executive. They ask whether the legislature can oust
the executive, have its own members serve in the
government, question officials from the executive,
investigate the executive, oversee the agencies of
coercion, appoint the prime minister (if there is
one), appoint or at least confirm ministers, elect
the president (if there is one), and express no confidence in the government. Items 1018 evaluate the
legislatures institutional autonomy. They ask whether the legislature is immune from dissolution by

The Handbook of National Legislatures

the executive, vested with exclusive lawmaking authority, free from the threat of an effective executive veto, free from the threat of judicial review,
able to legislate on any issue, in charge of government expenditures, in control of its own finances,
composed of members who are immune from arrest, and free from executive appointees. The third
group of items, numbers 1926, focuses on specified powers. Items in this category inquire about
whether the legislature is vested with powers to
change the constitution, authorize war, ratify treaties, grant amnesty, grant pardon, influence judicial appointments, appoint the head of the central
bank, and influence the state-owned media. The
final group, numbers 2732, measures the legislatures institutional capacity. It assesses whether legislators meet regularly, have staff, are eligible for reelection, seek re-election, and number among their
own a significant cohort of experienced colleagues.
Each survey item is dichotomous. If the legislature possesses the power in question, the item is
scored in the affirmative. If the legislature lacks the
power in question, the item is scored in the negative. The use of an identical, dichotomous scoring
system for each question provides the benefits of
consistency across the questions and allows for the
aggregation of the individual items into the larger
index. Of course, some of the items measured in
this survey could be conceived of as having more
than two categories. For example, question 7 asks
whether The legislatures approval is required to
confirm the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself appoints ministers. This item is scored
in the affirmative if either of the above statements
is true. Alternatively, this item could have been
scored as having three separate categories (the legislature appoints, the legislature confirms, or the
legislature has no appointment power) in rank
order. This alternative scoring system might have
provided greater precision, but would also have
made it exceedingly difficult to present the data,
to compare items to one another, and to aggregate
the items into a broader index. We believe that the
gain in the consistency of a yes/no answer to every
question outweighs the potential loss of precision.
To capture the varieties of power within any particular item, we note the range of categories that
potentially exist for each item in the discussion of
the items below and in the country chapters. In
this way we hope to provide anyone interested in
developing a more fine-grained measure of any specific item with the information necessary to do so.
Some of the items may appear to be strictly applicable only to parliamentary or, alternatively,
presidential or semipresidential systems. Indeed,
framing the survey items in language that makes

Introduction

sense in the context of every country in the world,

across all conceivable types of constitutional systems, was challenging. Nevertheless, we believe
that we have succeeded. By disregarding the distinction among types of systems and focusing
instead on specific powers, moreover, we may have
uncovered a blind spot in political science. Many
scholars trained in the West are understandably
accustomed to thinking in terms of the idealtypical systems represented by, say, the United
Kingdoms Westminster model and the United
States presidential model, but such pure types
are rare. Outside of Western Europe and North
America it is difficult to find pure parliamentary, semipresidential, or presidential systems. As
the present study reveals, many of the worlds legislatures are, in a sense, hybrids. For example, many
countries in Africa have a directly elected president
and a prime minister accountable to parliament,
as well as a mechanism for impeachment and a
vote of no confidence. Moreover, one sometimes
finds answers that are especially illuminating in
cases in which at first glance there might appear
to be a poor fit between the survey item and the
countrys constitutional system. For example, executive veto power (addressed in item 12) might seem
irrelevant to parliamentary systems, where executive and legislative powers are fused. Why, after
all, would the executive veto its own legislation?
Yet some parliamentary systems have a president
or a monarch who wields veto power. One even
finds an example of parliamentarism in which the
executive has what we consider an effective veto,
meaning that the veto can be overridden only by
a supermajority in the legislature. In Thailand a
two-thirds majority vote is required to override
the monarchs veto. Furthermore, questions on the
appointment of the prime minister (item 6) and
the executives dissolution powers (item 10) might
seem to be irrelevant to presidential systems. In
the classic paradigm of presidentialism, such as one
finds in the United States, there is no prime minister, and the legislature has a fixed term. But numerous countries with presidential systems actually
also have a prime minister and/or provisions for
presidential dissolution of the legislature. The presidential systems of Armenia, Belarus, Burkina Faso,
and Mali, for example, all have prime ministers,
and the legislatures in each lack fixed terms and
are subject to dissolution by the president.
In sum, in many polities legislatures hold a grab
bag of powers rather than neat sets of prerogatives
typically associated with a distinct type of constitutional system. Thus, the notion that any given
item in the survey is relevant only for a certain
type of constitutional system is unsound.

Below we list the items and further explicate

how we answered them.
1. The legislature alone, without the
involvement of any other agencies, can impeach
the president or replace the prime minister.
Can the legislature control executive power by
unseating, or threatening to unseat, the executive? The answer focuses on the legislatures power
over the leading executive in the system. The
item includes the phrase impeach the president
or replace the prime minister (emphasis added).
We word the item the way we do in order to make
it applicable to either presidential or parliamentary systems. The potentially ambiguous wording
of the item may create the impression that the
answer is affirmative if either one of the two is
true. This is not the case; what we mean to gauge is
whether the legislature can change the most powerful executive in the system, be he or she the president,
prime minister, or someone else. In monarchies we
treat the monarch as the executive of concern if
he or she rules. If he or she reigns but does not
rule, some other actor (typically the prime minister) is the executive of concern. Fortunately, the
difference between monarchs who rule and those
who merely reign is usually quite obvious, and
determining whether the prime minister or the
monarch is the predominant executive is unproblematic. In most systems that are commonly identified as parliamentary, the leading executive is the
prime minister, and the legislature may dispatch
him or her without the involvement of other agencies. For these countries the item is answered in
the affirmative. In several countries whose constitutions are often classified as parliamentary, the
prime minister is a de facto dictator whose power
rests on his or her independent control of the agencies of coercion, rather than on parliament per se.
In such cases it is impossible to imagine the prime
minister being replaced by the parliament alone.
In this event the answer is negative. In presidential and most semipresidential systems in which
acts of the legislature alone can dislodge the president, the answer is affirmative. In those in which
the participation of a high court, the public voting in a referendum, or some other actor is also
required, the answer is negative. The only grounds
for ambiguity arise in a handful of semipresidential
systems in which both the prime minister and
the president clearly wield substantial authority. In
most of these cases we base the answer on whether
the legislature can impeach the president rather
than on whether it can replace the prime minister,
although in several semipresidential systems the

The Handbook of National Legislatures

prime minister is clearly the dominant executive,

and in these cases the answer is based on parliaments sway over the prime minister. Where feasible and appropriate, we include information on
the legislatures power over several executives (e.g.,
the president and the prime minister, the Governor
General and the prime minister, the prime minister and the monarch). In all such cases, in the discursive portion of the answer we address first the
executive of concern for answering the item, and
only then the other executive. Thus, if the king
merely reigns and the prime minister is the executive of concern, we first mention whether or not
the legislature can dismiss the prime minister, and
only then if at all what the legislature may do
with the monarch. If, on the other hand, the royal
palace really rules and the prime minister is its servant, we mention the crown first and then if at
all the prime minister. A caveat is in order: We
present the constitutional excerpts in the order in
which they appear in the constitution. Thus, sometimes the portion of the constitution that deals
with the executive of central concern appears first
in the constitutional excerpts, and sometimes it
appears second or, in rare cases, not at all.
2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as
members of the legislature.
May legislators staff the cabinet themselves? We
are aware that there is a debate over whether the
recruitment of ministers from the legislature bolsters the legislatures power.4 We agree with Max
Webers contention, explicated in his polemic in
favor of parliamentary government in Germany,
that the legislature is more powerful if parliamentarians head the ministries. In systems in which the
ministers come from the ranks of the legislatures
members, the legislature is fully the fount of executive as well as legislative power. In such systems
the results of elections for the legislature largely
determine the partisan composition of the executive. Furthermore, the legislature may have more
consistent influence over the governments operations where the ministers are themselves working parliamentarians, and members of parliament
are the ministers colleagues. Where ministers are
recruited from outside the legislature or where they
may be drawn from it but must resign their seats
upon receiving a ministerial post, the ministers
work at a distance from the legislature, and their
4

Geoffrey Smith and Nelson W. Polsby, British Government

and Its Discontents (New York: Basic Books, 1981); and
Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb, eds., The Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

jobs are only indirectly, or not at all, dependent

upon the will and composition of the legislature.5
An affirmative answer is therefore an indication
of a stronger rather than a weaker legislature. The
answer to this item is affirmative if a person may
simultaneously serve as a member of the legislature
and a member of the cabinet or government. The
answer is negative if a person may not so serve. It
is also negative if a parliamentarian may serve as a
minister but forfeits his or her voting rights in the
legislature upon assuming a ministerial position.
Such an institution, sometimes called a sleeping
mandate, effectively withdraws the minister from
the legislative setting and separates the government from the legislature.
3. The legislature has powers of summons over
executive branch officials and hearings with
executive branch officials testifying before the
legislature or its committees are regularly held.
Can the legislature question the executive and
force it to explain its policies? For the item to be
answered in the affirmative, the legislature must
be capable in practice of calling officials from the
executive to testify, and it must exercise that right.
Usually legislatures that enjoy the power in practice also enjoy it on paper. But even if the right
is not encoded in law, the answer is affirmative
if the practice exists. The item is also answered
in the affirmative if the polity has the practice
of question time, in which ministers must regularly answer queries posed by legislators. In constitutional jargon, interpellate is often used to mean
question, and that august verb occurs often in
discussion of this item. The item is answered in the
negative if the legislature does not regularly question executive branch officials. In some cases the
constitution provides the power of summons, but
the power exists only on paper, and the legislature
rarely or never actually gets to exercise its formal
rights. In such an instance the item is answered in
the negative.
4. The legislature can conduct independent
investigation of the chief executive and the
agencies of the executive.
Can the legislature probe the executive? This
item states that the legislature can, not just may,
investigate the executive, meaning that the legislature has the ability to do so. One would not
5

Max Weber, Parliament and Government in a Reconstructed Germany, in Max Weber, Economy and Society,
vol. 2 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978),
pp. 13811469.

Introduction

necessarily expect investigations, even where they

are possible, to be as frequent as ordinary hearings with executive branch officials. Thus, unlike
in item 3, in which we stipulate that hearings must
be held regularly to elicit an affirmative answer,
we do not stipulate in item 4 that investigations
must be held regularly. If investigation is merely
possible, the answer is affirmative. Yet the executive must really have grounds to fear parliamentary
scrutiny for the item to be affirmed. Moreover, the
chief executive must be subject to investigation;
the mere right to probe a subordinate agency in
the executive branch is not enough to merit an
affirmative answer. If the legislature cannot investigate the chief executive, the answer is negative.
5. The legislature has effective powers of
oversight over the agencies of coercion (the
military, organs of law enforcement, intelligence
services, and the secret police).
Can the legislature monitor the states coercive
agencies? If the police, military, and intelligence
agencies report directly to the legislature, or the
legislature has the ability to oversee these agencies with, for example, powers to question, investigate, regulate, and fund these agencies, the answer
is affirmative. If, on the other hand, the agencies
of coercion are under the exclusive control of the
executive branch and there is little or no legislative
oversight of their operations, the answer is negative. Even in some cases in which the legislature
has such power on paper, it does not have it in
practice. We are concerned with whether the legislature really has such authority, which is reflected
in the wording effective powers of oversight.
Obviously, deciding on what counts as effective
requires a judgment call. In actual practice in the
contemporary world, legislatures ability to control
the agencies of coercion is rarely extensive, even
in systems with powerful parliaments. But here, as
with other items in this survey, everything is relative. In some countries legislatures do at least have
some powers of oversight, and in others they do
not. In the event of uncertainty or lack of consensus, we corroborated experts judgments with
extensive research of our own in press and secondary sources.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Does the legislature appoint the head of the government? Where the legislature itself elects the
prime minister, the answer is affirmative. If the
head of state (usually a president, Governor General, or monarch) is charged with appointing the

prime minister, but is obliged to select the candidate who enjoys the support of parliament, the
answer is also affirmative. In such cases the head
of state typically selects the leader of the party or
coalition that won parliamentary elections or the
candidate who enjoys majority support in parliament (or who at least can form a government).
Here the composition of the legislature predetermines the decision, and the presidents, Governor
Generals, or monarchs right of appointment of
the prime minister is largely a formality. The item
is therefore scored as affirmative. In other cases the
president, Governor General, or monarch selects
the prime minister, and the decision does not
depend on the will of the legislature. Here extraparliamentary appointment power is not a mere
formality, and the answer is therefore negative. To
receive an affirmative answer, the country must
have a prime minister; countries that lack a prime
ministerial post (or its equivalent) receive a negative answer on this item.
7. The legislatures approval is required to
confirm the appointment of ministers; or the
legislature itself appoints ministers.
Does the legislature influence the composition of
the cabinet? If the legislature makes the ministerial appointments, the answer is affirmative. The
answer is also affirmative if the prime minister
appoints the ministers but the cabinet must subsequently be confirmed by a vote of the legislature in
order to assume office. Further, the answer is affirmative if the president (or monarch) appoints the
ministers and the legislatures approval is needed
to confirm the appointments. The answer is negative if the executive appoints the ministers and
the appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or
there is a presidency, but the president is elected
by the legislature.
Does the legislature select the president or need it
not even contend with one? If there is no president,
the answer is affirmative. If there is a president but
he or she is elected by the legislature, the answer
is affirmative. The answer is negative if there is a
directly elected president.
9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Can legislators express their opposition to the government with a vote of no confidence? If it is

possible to vote no confidence (sometimes referred

to as a motion of censure), the answer is affirmative; if not, it is negative. In some countries the
legislature has the ability to vote no confidence in
individual ministers, but not in the government
as a whole. This provision allows the legislature
to express displeasure with a specific minister, but
renders it virtually impossible for the legislature to
remove the entire government. If the legislature
may vote no confidence in, or censure, individual
ministers but not the government as a whole, the
answer is negative.
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution
by the executive.
Is the legislatures term fixed even in the event of
executive displeasure? If the legislature is free from
the danger of dissolution, the answer is affirmative. The answer is also affirmative if the legislature can vote to dissolve itself but is still immune
from dissolution by the executive. There is wide
variation across countries in the conditions under
which the executive can dissolve the legislature.
In some countries powerful presidents can dissolve
the legislature at will. In other countries the executive can dissolve the legislature only under narrowly specified conditions, such as immediately
following multiple votes of no confidence in the
government by the same legislature. Even in situations in which the conditions for dissolution are
constrained and partly in the control of the legislature, however, the legislature is still potentially
subject to dissolution, and the legislatures powers are constrained. If the executive may dissolve
the legislature, under any conditions, the answer
is negative.
11. Any executive initiative on legislation
requires ratification or approval by the
legislature before it takes effect; that is, the
executive lacks decree power.
Does the legislature have a monopoly on lawmaking authority? If the legislature is in fact a participant in the making of all laws, the answer is affirmative. If the executive can make laws by decree,
the legislature in practice shares lawmaking power
with the executive, and the answer is negative. Regulatory decrees and executive orders to implement
laws do not count as decrees as we define them
here. If the executive can issue regulatory decrees
or executive orders but not decrees that have the
force of law, we do not regard the executive as
having decree power, and the answer to the item
is affirmative. The answer is also affirmative if the

The Handbook of National Legislatures

legislature has the right but is not compelled to

delegate temporary decree powers to the executive
in some specified areas of authority. Furthermore,
the answer is affirmative if decree powers are limited to emergencies; we do not consider emergency
powers to be genuine decree powers unless they
are regularly and habitually abused. If the executive may make laws without the prior permission
of the legislature in nonemergency situations, the
answer is negative. Executive decree power takes a
variety of forms. In the most constrained case, the
executive may issue decrees, but their force automatically lapses after some specified interval if the
legislature does not approve them. In a less limited scenario, the legislatures active approval is not
needed, but the legislature still enjoys the right to
annul decrees if it so desires. Here the executives
decrees stand unless the legislature rescinds them.
The most robust decree power is found where the
executives decrees enjoy the force of law regardless
of the legislatures will; here the legislature does not
have the right to rescind. All these varieties of executive lawmaking authority count as decree power;
if any is present, the answer to the item is negative.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof
or essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive
lacks veto power, or has veto power but the
veto can be overridden by a majority in
the legislature.
Can the legislature make laws without great concern for executive defiance? If a bill automatically
becomes law once the legislature passes it, the executive lacks veto power, and the answer is affirmative. The answer is also affirmative if the executive
has a veto but the legislature can override it with
a majority vote. Such a veto may signal executive
disapproval and may retard the passage of legislation, but it is not normally a weighty check on the
legislature. If a supermajority is required to override, the veto has teeth. In this event the legislature
can override the veto only by mustering a larger
majority than was necessary to pass the legislation
to begin with, and the answer therefore is negative.
The threshold for override where a supermajority is
required is typically two-thirds, although in some
cases it is three-fifths or four-fifths.
A word is in order about our conception of
majority: We mean either a vote of 50 percent
plus one of present members (sometimes referred
to as a simple majority) or a vote of 50 percent
plus one of total members (sometimes called an
absolute majority). There may be a significant
practical difference between these thresholds, especially in situations of chronically high absenteeism

Introduction

among legislators. But in either case, that is, if the

legislature can override an executive veto with a
simple majority or an absolute majority, we score
the answer as affirmative. The distinction that
determines the answer to the item is between the
need for a mere majority (either of present members or of all members) override, on the one hand,
and a supermajority override, on the other.
13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not
subject to judicial review.
Are the legislatures laws the final word? This item
is scored as affirmative if the legislatures laws cannot be rejected by the judiciary. If the judiciary
has the right to rule on the constitutionality of
laws and void those it determines to be unconstitutional, the item is scored as negative. If the
legislature does not itself pass laws, as is the case
in, for example, some of the advisory bodies in
the Gulf States, it cannot be said that the legislatures laws are supreme, and the answer is also
negative.
14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills
in all policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks
gatekeeping authority.
May the legislature make laws in any area it wishes?
This answer is affirmative if the legislature may discuss and pass laws in any domain. In some countries the right to introduce legislation in some areas
is reserved for the executive. Common areas in
which the executive can engage in such gatekeeping over the legislative process are the domains
of law on taxation, public expenditures, and government debt. In such cases the executive is said
to have gatekeeping authority, and the answer to
the item is negative. In some countries the right to
introduce the budget is reserved for the executive.
Such power is fairly common and is not considered an instance of executive gatekeeping for the
purposes of this survey. If this is the only power
reserved for the executive, the answer is still affirmative. Yet, if once the budget is passed, the legislature alone cannot introduce measures that alter
revenues or expenditures, executive control over
budgetary matters extends beyond the mere right
to introduce the budget. Such a restriction may
have wide ramifications for the legislatures right
to legislate. In this event the answer is negative. In
federal systems in which some powers are reserved
for subnational units, the answer is affirmative provided that the legislature may initiate legislation in
all policy areas that are under the jurisdiction of the
national government.

In all events, the answers on this item depend

on whether the legislature can initiate bills in all
policy jurisdictions rather than on whether legislation usually does originate with the legislature.
In many countries legislation normally originates
with the government, and the role of the legislature
as a whole is often limited in practice to accepting
or rejecting such initiatives. If the leading party
or coalition of parties that make up the government is usually the source of legislation, and it
is difficult for rank-and-file members to introduce
bills that have a good chance of passage without
the governments backing, one might say that the
executive holds informal gatekeeping authority. In
fact, this is the way legislative politics normally
works in parliamentary systems. But such informal power does not count as gatekeeping authority here. The answer to the item is affirmative so
long as the legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the
legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks
the power to impound funds appropriated by
the legislature.
Must the government spend the money the legislature appropriates? If the legislatures appropriations must be spent in the manner that the legislature specifies, the answer is affirmative. If the
legislature appropriates funds but the executive can
then block, redirect, or otherwise manipulate their
actual expenditure, the executive is often said to
have impoundment power. An executive who
can impound funds has substantial if hidden
and unofficial budgetary authority. Impoundment power is rarely specified in constitutions, but
in practice is present in some systems with powerful executives. If the executive can impound funds
or otherwise substantially manipulate the expenditures that the legislature authorizes, the item is
scored as negative.
16. The legislature controls the resources that
finance its own internal operation and provide
for the perquisites of its own members.
Does the legislature enjoy financial autonomy? A
legislature that controls its own resources enjoys
an important measure of autonomy from the executive. In the event, the answer is affirmative. An
executive who controls the resources that fund the
legislatures operation (such as those that provide
for the legislators perks) may use that leverage to
influence legislators behavior. If the executive has
such authority, the item is scored as negative.

10

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Are legislators free from fear of punishment?
Immunity enables legislators to work without worrying that the executive will use the organs of
law enforcement to punish them. If legislators are
immune, the answer is affirmative. In almost every
country legislators who are caught flagrante delicto
(meaning in the act of a crime) may be apprehended. If this is the only exception to legislative
immunity, we still score the item in the affirmative. So too is the item affirmed if legislators enjoy
immunity but the legislature, and only the legislature, has the power to lift it. In such cases the
legislature as an institution can still shield its own
members from executive abuse. If legislators lack
any type of immunity from arrest and prosecution, the item is negated. Where legislators have
immunity but it can be revoked by an agency other
than the legislature itself, the item is also scored as
negative. Where only official parliamentary business is covered by immunity, where legislators are
immune only while they are in, or traveling to and
from, the grounds of the legislature, or where legislators are immune only when the legislature is in
session, the item is scored as negative as well. In
such cases a force external to the legislature may
still use arrest or the threat of it to intimidate legislators. The item is also scored as negative if legislators enjoy immunity on paper but are habitually
persecuted anyway in defiance of the law.
18. All members of the legislature are elected;
the executive lacks the power to appoint any
members of the legislature.
Is the legislature free of executive appointees? If
the legislature contains no executive appointees,
the answer is affirmative. The answer is also affirmative if the executive appoints members of an
upper chamber, provided that the upper chamber is largely ceremonial and possesses little or no
real legislative power. The answer is affirmative as
well if the executive may appoint a mere handful
of members, which we define as no more than 2
percent of total members, or if the executive may
appoint some members but these appointees lack
voting rights. In the latter two cases, executives
enjoy the right to make appointments, but these
appointments are symbolic and usually honorific
and do not appreciably shape the legislatures
composition. For example, in Italy the president
can appoint up to five Senators for life from
the social, scientific, artistic, and literary fields.

The Handbook of National Legislatures

At any given time, there are only a handful of

appointed members in the Italian Senate. On the
other hand, in Afghanistan the president appoints
one-third of the members of the upper house of
the legislature. The 2 percent cutoff point distinguishes between countries in which the executive
has symbolic, but politically insignificant, appointment powers and countries in which the executive
shapes the composition of the legislature through
political appointments. There is nothing magic in
the 2 percent cutoff we impose, but we do find a
natural break in the data between this very low
number of appointees, such as one finds in Italy
(as well as in, for example, India), and the substantially higher number of appointees one finds in
Afghanistan (as well as in, for example, Kazakhstan). If the executive may appoint a substantial number (more than 2 percent) of total members and if these members have voting rights, the
answer is negative.
19. The legislature alone, without the
involvement of any other agencies, can change
the Constitution.
Can the legislature by itself change the fundamental law? The right to alter the constitution carries
the power to reshape political life and the political
regime. If the legislature can do so alone, the answer is affirmative. The legislature need not be the
only actor that can change the constitution in
order for the answer to be affirmative. If some other
actor can do so, the answer is still affirmative, provided that the legislature also has such power. If
the legislature does not play a part, or if it does
play a role but a referendum, court ruling, or executive assent is also necessary, the answer is negative.
In some countries the legislature has the power to
amend parts of the constitution, but other parts of
the constitution can be changed only by referendum or some other means. If the legislature can
alter the majority of the constitutions provisions,
the answer is affirmative. If the legislature is barred
from changing a large and highly substantial portion of the fundamental document, the answer is
negative.
20. The legislatures approval is necessary for
the declaration of war.
Is action by the legislature needed to declare war?
The right to declare war, or at least to confirm or
reject the declaration of war, is crucial to the legislatures influence on the countrys security and external relations. If action by the legislature is needed

Introduction

to declare war, the answer is affirmative; if not,

it is negative. In many countries the legislatures
approval is necessary to declare war, although the
president or monarch has the right to declare war
without consulting the legislature in the event of
invasion or the immediate threat thereof. If the
legislatures approval is normally needed, even if
the executive can declare war without the legislatures approval in the case of an attack or imminent attack, the answer is still affirmative. If the
executives scope for unilateral action is wider,
the answer is negative. For example, if the executive may declare war without the legislatures
approval under special circumstances or other
such vaguely specified conditions, the answer is
negative. The need for retroactive approval by the
legislature is not sufficient to merit an affirmative
answer unless the executives war-declaration powers are limited to the case of foreign attack. Some
countries lack a formal provision for the declaration of war, but instead have a procedure for declaring a state of defense, siege, emergency, martial
law, or other such extraordinary circumstance. In
these cases we analyze the power to declare such
an extraordinary condition.
21. The legislatures approval is necessary to
ratify treaties with foreign countries.
Is action by the legislature needed to ratify treaties?
The right to accept or reject treaties negotiated by
the government is central to the legislatures influence on foreign policy and international relations.
If the legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
treaties, the answer is affirmative; if not, it is negative. In some cases the legislatures approval is
necessary to enact some, but not other, types of
treaties. If the need for the legislatures ratification
is not limited to insubstantial agreements, the item
is answered in the affirmative.
22. The legislature has the power
to grant amnesty.
May the legislature grant amnesty? The power to
grant amnesty carries the potential to influence the
administration of justice on a large scale. If the
legislature can grant amnesty, the answer is affirmative; if not, it is negative. If, according to the
constitution, the legislature has the power to grant
amnesty, but in practice it would be unthinkable
for the legislature to grant amnesty without the
executives approval, the answer is also negative.
Amnesty and pardon are sometimes confused.
According to common usage, amnesty applies to

11

political offenses and pardon to nonpolitical criminal offenses. In another usage, amnesty applies to
a class of people and pardon to individuals. There
is considerable overlap between these two usages,
since political crimes, such as taking part in human
rights abuses or participating in an insurgency, are
usually committed by a class of people and nonpolitical criminal offenses by people as individuals.
Conceptions of amnesty and pardon vary somewhat from country to country.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
May the legislature grant pardon? If so, the answer
is affirmative; if not, it is negative. If, according to
the constitution, the legislature has the power of
pardon, but in practice it would be unthinkable for
the legislature to grant pardon without the executives approval, the answer is also negative. See also
comments on item 22.
24. The legislature reviews and has the right to
reject appointments to the judiciary; or the
legislature itself appoints members
of the judiciary.
Does the legislature have a hand in the appointment of members of the judiciary? The right to
influence the composition of the judiciary carries the potential to affect the legal system and
the administration of justice. Where the legislature appoints members to the judiciary or the legislatures approval has a role in judicial appointments, the answer is affirmative. Where it lacks
a role in either appointment or confirmation, the
answer is negative. The threshold for an affirmative answer here is not high. Purely token responsibility, such as the right to appoint or confirm
only a single member of the judiciary, is not sufficient for an affirmative answer, but if the legislature has responsibilities that extend beyond a
single appointment, the answer is affirmative. We
focus on appointments to national-level courts,
often referred to as the Supreme Court, the High
Court, and/or the Constitutional Court. Although
constitutional courts are sometimes separate from
the judiciary proper, we consider them part of the
judiciary for the purposes of this item. Thus, if the
legislature is involved in appointments to a constitutional court, the answer is affirmative.
25. The chairman of the central bank is
appointed by the legislature.
Does the legislature appoint the chief of the
central bank? This power may afford clout over

12

The Handbook of National Legislatures

administration of the economy. If the legislature

appoints, the answer is affirmative; if not, it is negative. In some countries there is no dedicated chairman of the central bank, and responsibility for running the central bank rests with a cabinet minister,
often the minister of finance. In these countries,
if the legislature appoints the minister that heads
the central bank, the answer is affirmative. If not,
the answer is negative. In countries that lack a
national central bank because they are members of
a multinational monetary authority, the answer is
negative.

bers of the legislature have help with their work.

Students of the U.S. Congress are accustomed to
thinking of a seat in the legislature as including a
personal staff of dozens as well as access to armies
of committee staff. Such a circumstance, however,
is rare in the global context. In most countries legislators are happy to have even a handful of assistants. The availability of staff may influence legislators effectiveness, and legislators effectiveness
may affect the legislatures capacity. If each member has a secretary to assist him or her, the item is
affirmed; if not, it is negated.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the

operation of the state-owned media.

29. Each legislator has at least one

non-secretarial staff member with
policy expertise.

Does the legislature influence the state-owned

media? A say in the provision of public information is a say in shaping public opinion, as well as an
opportunity to counterbalance the dominance of
the executive that often prevails in the state-owned
media. If the legislature itself governs state-owned
media, or the legislature appoints members to the
body that governs state-owned media, the answer
is affirmative. If legal provisions guarantee parliamentarians the right to supervise (or, perhaps in
the eyes of critics, interfere in) the operation of
the public media, the answer is also affirmative.
If the legislature lacks these means of obtaining a
voice in the operation of the state-owned media,
the answer is negative.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Is the legislature regularly in session? A body that
meets frequently will normally have greater ability
to exercise its authority than one that does not. In
the wording of the item, we do not set a threshold for what counts as regularly in session. Our
intention is to assess whether the legislatures sessions are lengthy enough to enable it to handle the
load of a responsible, working assembly. As we conducted our research, we came to understand that
six months per year was a meaningful threshold
dividing legislatures that are regularly in session
and those that are not, and we use it as the basis
for answering the item. The answer is affirmative
if the legislature is in session for six months or
more, and negative if it is in session for less than
six months.
28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.
Does each member of the legislature have a secretary? This item and item 29 gauge whether mem-

Does each member of the legislature have at least

one staffer who helps with policy matters? Having such a person tends to boost legislators effectiveness and bolster the legislatures capacity. The
answers to this item and, less commonly, item
28 are not always straightforward. In some places
funds are available to hire staff, but members are
not obliged to use them for a staffer with policy expertise. In some countries members have
access to staff employed by committees or party
groups, and members may draw on the expertise of what amount to common pool personnel
resources. Sometimes committee chairs or other
prominent members have staff but other members do not. We score the answer as affirmative
if each member effectively has use of at least one
person with policy expertise, whether that staffer
is employed by the members office, a committee,
or a party. If each member does not have such a
resource, the answer is negative.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election
without any restriction.
Are legislators free from the restrictions of term
limits? A legislative body in which politicians can
make careers will be more likely to attract brighter
talent than one in which members may spend only
one or several terms before moving on to other
jobs. More talented legislators make for a stronger
legislature. Furthermore, politicians who are committed to a career or at least an open-ended stint
in the legislature are more likely to be devoted to
the institution and jealous of its prerogatives. If
legislators need not fear term limits, the answer
is affirmative; if there are term limits, the answer
is negative. This item refers to term limits (or their
absence). It does not deal with informal or political

Introduction

obstacles to re-election such as might be encountered by an opponent of the government or one

who has lost the support of his or her party.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive
enough position that legislators are generally
interested in and seek re-election.
Do legislators sincerely hope to keep their jobs? In
most countries, a seat in the legislature is a prestigious position that attracts qualified talent. In
some countries, however, a seat in the legislature is
not highly esteemed and is seen as a mere stepping
stone to another, more attractive position. More
highly valued jobs attract and retain better political talent, and the rate at which legislators seek reelection is higher when they value their positions.
Members may value their positions for perks rather
than power. But legislators who do not value their
jobs enough to desire re-election find that both
power and perks are in short supply. If, according
to the judgment of our country experts, legislators
are normally interested in keeping their jobs, the
answer is positive; if not, it is negative.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is
common enough that at any given time the
legislature contains a significant number of
highly experienced members.
Does the legislature have a cohort of members who
know the ropes? The presence of a sizable group
of long-serving members tends to bolster the legislatures capacity. Legislators may, of course, be
experienced without being qualified or effective.
Still, the sum total of expertise in the assembly
on policy matters, legislative procedure, and how
to resist executive encroachment depends in part
on how much experience members have. If, in
the judgment of our country experts, the legislature includes a significant number of experienced
members, the answer is affirmative; if not, it is negative. If multiple elections for the legislature have
not been held, re-election cannot be common, and
if the legislature is relatively new, it cannot, by
definition, contain highly experienced members.
In countries with very young legislatures and legislatures for which there have not been multiple
rounds of elections, the answer is also negative.
THE PARLIAMENTARY POWERS INDEX

We determined the answer to each item for

each country by studying the expert consultants
completed questionnaires, the constitution, and

13

relevant press and secondary sources. In general,

the experts answers were consistent with what one
finds in constitutions and other published sources.
Sometimes constitutions did not provide many
clues. Items 15, 26, 28, 29, 31, and 32 were usually
not addressed in constitutions; items 3, 5, 16, and
27 were sometimes addressed but often were not.
For these items we had to rely especially heavily on
our experts.
Sometimes practice regularly and blatantly contravenes legal formalities, as the experts often
noted in their responses. In such instances we
favored practice in answering the item. Where
such a discrepancy between the law and practice
exists, we note it in our discussion of the answer to
the item. In the relatively rare instances in which
constitutions were silent or inconclusive and the
experts were split, we undertook further research,
including further consultation with experts, before
answering the item.
To arrive at the Parliamentary Powers Index for
each country, we divide the total number of affirmative answers by the total number of items in
the survey. This procedure is simple and cannot
provide anything more than a rough guide to the
power of the legislature.
Assigning equal weight to each item obviously
has its costs. Yet weighting the items would involve
difficult and arbitrary distinctions. We are aware
that each item cannot be equally important. But
the importance of an item may vary from country
to country and from time to time. Several examples
may illustrate the point. In a polity that has a long
history of protection for rights and few opportunities for politicians to trump up charges in order
to punish or intimidate foes, whether or not parliamentarians enjoy immunity from prosecution
(item 17) may have little practical effect on the
legislatures institutional autonomy. But in a country that lacks long-standing protections for rights
and that has an executive who may be tempted to
sic law enforcement agencies on recalcitrant legislators, immunity from prosecution may be a precious protection that strengthens the legislature. In
countries where a dictatorial executive controls the
parliament through a hegemonic party, whether
the executive has effective veto power (item 12)
may be of little consequence. But if political life
is competitive, whether the executive has a veto
may be highly consequential. In a polity that has
little recent history of violent civil conflict, the
right to grant amnesty (item 22) may be of little moment. But if a country has a recent history
of human rights abuses, coup attempts, or insurgency, amnesty may be a burning issue. Who is

14

The Handbook of National Legislatures

vested with the right to grant it may be a matter of

utmost importance. The weight of an item might
also vary from time to time within a country. For
example, veto power (item 12) might be of greater
importance when the president and the legislature
are rivals than when a single party or coalition controls both the presidency and the legislature.
Some weighting of issues is built into the survey
itself. Items 19 focus on the legislatures influence
on executive power, 1018 inquire about the institutional autonomy of the legislature, 1926 address
an array of specific powers, and 2732 measure the
legislatures institutional capacity. Thus, 9/32 of
the survey is about sway over the executive, 9/32
about autonomy, 8/32 about specific powers, and
6/32 about capacity.
The answers to the survey items and the overall country scores reflect the state of affairs in
2006 and 2007, when we wrote this book. The
answers to the survey items may, of course, change
over time. Coding the answers to every item for
every country was in itself a challenge; we were
unable to record how the answers to each item
may have changed within each country throughout history. We did our best, however, to note any
major changes that have occurred in recent years.
At the beginning of each country chapter, we list
the date of the legislatures founding and discuss
the most notable changes that affect items in the
survey. This information should help readers who
are interested in, for example, how a legislatures
powers have changed over time or whether specific
powers granted to the legislature have had the time
to be tested in practice. We intend to update the
present work with subsequent editions to capture
future changes.
One of the authors (Fish) has published an
article and a book, both on the postcommunist
region, which tapped some of the preliminary
data drawn from the present project.6 Some of
the data presented in those publications differ
from those furnished in this volume. One reason
is the author used the survey in part to assess
conditions at an earlier point in time (namely, the
late 1980s through the mid-1990s), and some of
the scores have changed since the earlier period.
Furthermore, we have more systematically analyzed the findings over the last few years, slightly
altered three of the survey items and preliminary

M. Steven Fish, Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure

of Open Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2005), and Stronger Legislatures, Stronger Democracy,
Journal of Democracy 17, 1 (January 2006), pp. 520.

assessments that Fish drew upon, and arrived at

more complete and precise data.
The data presented in this volume supersede
anything related to this project published earlier.
The data and information presented here, and not
in any earlier publications, provide our final, corrected assessments.
Given that we cover the whole world, including
many legislatures about which up-to-date, detailed
information is exceedingly hard to obtain, we cannot exclude the possibility that we have overlooked
a relevant change here and there. Nor can we rule
out the possibility of errors more generally. We
have endeavored to obtain the best quality information available, relying upon nearly 800 consultants as well as our own analysis of constitutions,
the press, and the secondary literature. But the
data we present here may contain some inaccuracies. We cover 158 countries, including many
whose legislatures have been the subject of little
or no attention in social science. At thirty-two
items for each country, there are 5,056 answers.
The number of countries covered and the considerable detail we present on each probably make
error unavoidable. We prize our experts evaluations, and we take satisfaction in having secured a
large number of responses from such distinguished
analysts. At the same time, years of poring over
constitutions, books, articles, press sources, and
completed surveys have sensitized us to the possibility of mistakes and differences of interpretation.
Even some items that one might expect to elicit
straightforward affirmative-or-negative answers are
often complicated in practice.
Indeed, in a work that aims to create data
that are comparable across an enormous variety
of cases, some ambiguity is unavoidable even on
basic matters. The identity of the national legislature is generally unproblematic, although formal
distinctions among the meanings of parliament,
legislature, congress, and assembly are often
blurred in practice, and we do not attempt to draw
distinctions among these terms. We use them interchangeably here. Such nomenclature is not
problematic. Each country included in this study
has a body that is universally recognized as the national legislature, although several countries, most
notably the monarchies of the Persian Gulf region,
have advisory councils that serve the monarch
rather than legislatures in the traditional sense.
But in some cases the identity of even such a
basic agency as the executive is not self-evident.
In presidential or semipresidential systems the
matter is usually straightforward. In some constitutional monarchies, however, the prime minister

Introduction

is the most powerful executive, but the monarch is

the head of state and has some relevant functions.
In some former British colonies the Governor General has substantial authority. We identify the relevant executive in cases where his or her identity
might be ambiguous.
Try though we do to overcome ambiguities, our
efforts can be only imperfect. Answering the same
questions for cases that span the entire world, as
we do here, always involves complications, but,
we hope, it also provides the benefits of addressing
a single, unified set of questions in a truly global
setting.
In the studies that follow, many countries rank
where one would expect. No one will be surprised
to see that Italy and Israel have strong legislatures
whereas Zambia and Egypt do not. But there are
some surprises. The legislatures of Fiji, with its parliamentary system, and France, with its semipresidential one, score lower on the PPI than many
might expect. In some other countries, the numbers suggest that the legislature might be a sleeping (or a quiet) giant. For example, although presidents and militaries often overshadow parliaments
in writings on Bangladesh, Colombia, El Salvador,
Indonesia, South Korea, Panama, and Peru, the legislature in each of these countries has clout. In
some countries that have legislatures that receive
little attention, the legislature may not be a giant,
even a sleeping one, but it nevertheless has some
capacity. The legislatures of, for example, Azerbaijan, China, Iran, and Kuwait stand closer to the
sidelines than to the center of national politics,
but they are not entirely devoid of power. They differ notably from their counterparts in, say, Algeria,
Belarus, and Cameroon, which are indeed impotent. This state of affairs potentially holds relevance for present-day politics and government, as
well as for legislatures potential to assert themselves in the future.
THE USE OF CONSTITUTIONS

Throughout the country studies presented in chapter 2, we adduce relevant passages from constitutions in the answer to each survey item where such
passages exist.7 We always present the constitutional excerpts in the order in which they appear
in the constitution. If the excerpt seems to contradict the answer to the survey item, we note
7

We relied upon two sources for constitutions: Constitutions of the Countries of the World, from Oceana
Law (available online at www.oceanalaw.com); and
International Constitutional Law, available online at
http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/index.html.

15

the reason for the discrepancy, which usually is

a gap between the letter of the law and actual
practice. Even where such a gap exists, we cite
the relevant passage from the constitution, so in
some places the constitutional excerpt will appear
to contradict the answer. As noted above, where
the law is a dead letter, we go with practice in our
answers.
Instances of disparity between the law and
actual practice are not uncommon, but as the
reader will see, neither are they the norm. Indeed,
we were surprised at the regularity with which
the law at least roughly matches practice. We
expected at the onset of the project to find a
plethora of instances in which the law formally
vests in the legislature a power that the legislature lacks in actual practice. In fact, we found that
where legislatures lack power in practice, they usually lack it on paper as well even if the constitutions language strains to present a semblance of
modernity and democracy.
We draw on several sources for translations of
constitutions that were not penned in English. For
each country except Comoros, an adequate English
translation was readily available. Here and there,
even in the best translations, one often finds awkward moments in the prose. We left these passages
as they are. Where we found a misspelling or where
the clarity of the prose was compromised by the
accidental omission of a preposition, we corrected
the inaccuracy; we saw little to be gained from leaving mistakes in place and inserting sic. We never
made any substantive alterations.
Whether the constitution was originally
penned in English or another language, in the
excerpts one encounters bits of jargon that may
be unfamiliar. Interpellate appears frequently, especially in entries under item 3 in the survey. It
means to interrogate a government official about
policy, action, or personal behavior. It is a fancy
word for the verb to question. Puisne is mainly
a British term that means lower or of lesser
rank and is found here mostly in reference to
judges in excerpts from constitutions cited under
item 24. Prorogue means to discontinue a session
of a legislature and occasionally appears in reference to executive powers to dissolve parliament.
Flagrante delicto means caught in the act. This
phrase appears frequently in passages under item
17, which addresses legislators immunity from
arrest and/or prosecution. In many cases in which
legislators enjoy immunity, an exception is made
for flagrante delicto. In effect this rule means that
legislators may be apprehended if, and only if, they
are caught red-handed.

16

USE OF THE DATA

The survey presented here is richer than anything

done to date on the powers of national legislatures.
As such, it undoubtedly will elicit objections. Some
scholars will see the inclusion of this or that item
as unjustified. They might view the survey as too
lengthy and involved and wish it were more compact and included only the items they regard as
most significant. Others may wish that some items
were weighed more heavily than others in the creation of the PPI. Some scholars will think that the
survey overlooked this or that important question;
they may want to add items of their own.
Analysts who wish to use only parts of the survey or to add items of their own, perhaps to construct their own indexes, are, of course, free to do
so. We hope that publishing the answer to every
item for every country will facilitate the work of
other scholars.
The data may be of use not only to those who
desire a comparative measure of legislatures overall powers, but also to those who seek particular
pieces of information. Any one item or group of
items may be extracted and treated as a set of data.
For example, the reader who seeks information on
where legislators enjoy immunity from prosecution and where they do not may refer to item 17.
The reader interested in legislatures institutional
autonomy more generally may focus on items 10
18 or some subset of these items.
The data may help advance understanding of
how particular facets of the legislatures power
affect this or that outcome. For example, what
aspect of the legislatures power has the greatest
effect on political stability or civil war? Employing
some indicator for political stability and treating
it as the dependent variable, the analyst may use
particular items or groups of items from the LPS as
independent variables and test their influence. One
might also assess how the legislatures sway over
the executive affects the economy. Here one could
draw on the first nine items of the LPS and test
their effect on economic growth, macroeconomic
stability, or some other indicator of economic performance. Partisans of democratization might use
the data to assess whether strengthening legislatures is a better or worse investment than other
endeavors. If the overall strength of the legislature
is a good predictor of the success of democratization, bolstering legislatures is a good investment.
If it is not a good predictor, perhaps training civil
servants or funding independent media is a better use of resources. Or perhaps one or another of
the legislatures powers or some combination of

The Handbook of National Legislatures

powers is important for democratization, whereas

other powers are of little consequence.
The value of the PPI to future research is not limited to students of comparative politics. International relations scholars could potentially use the
PPI to study urgent questions in their own field.
Scholars may wish to assess the effect of legislative
power on international conflict. Are countries with
powerful legislatures more or less likely to go to
war? Could the findings of the democratic peace
literature really be masking an underlying parliamentary peace? Scholars could also test the relationship between the PPI and trade openness: Are
countries with powerful legislatures more or less
open to international trade?
Alternatively, the data presented here might be
treated as a dependent variable. What determines
cross-national variation in the PPI? How, if at all,
do economic development, historical experience,
or other factors influence the powers of national
legislatures in comparative perspective? Scholars
could perform descriptive analyses of the PPI data.
How and why do legislatures powers vary across
world regions? What accounts for gaps, where they
are found, between the formal powers of the legislature and powers exercised by the legislature in
practice?
We do not expect that the data presented here
will supplant the traditional distinctions among
parliamentary, semipresidential, and presidential
systems; indeed, we use these categories ourselves
and do not regard them as obsolete. But we do
hope that the present study will help overcome the
limitations of the conventional categories. At the
very least, the information we present may facilitate a more differentiated understanding of legislative bodies around the world.
DEBTS AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Our greatest and most obvious debt is to the experts

who participated in the survey that underpins the
data presented in this book. The experts are really
our coauthors, although at nearly 800 strong, they
cannot be named as such on the books cover.
Each expert completed the survey for one or more
countries, and many provided discursive commentary as well. We drew on these enormously helpful
comments while composing the country studies
that follow. Many consultants endured a stream
of entreaties for completed surveys, requests for
further information, and (undoubtedly often irritating) follow-up questions that arose out of our
curiosity and desire to investigate this or that piece
of data further. The consultants for each country

Introduction

are noted in the appropriate country studies, and

chapter 4 provides a comprehensive list.
All our consultants went above the call of duty.
All lent their valuable expertise gratis; we provided
no compensation. Some colleagues in one way or
another or in numerous ways went even farther above the call of duty. They offered comments on the survey in its early stages of development, completed the survey for more than one
country, and/or both completed a survey themselves and helped us locate other experts to participate in the survey as well. On this score we would
like especially to recognize Sener Akt
urk, Leslie
Anderson, Elisabete Azevedo, Robin Brooks, JeanPierre Cabestan, John Carey, Ernesto Castaneda,
Irina Chernykh, John Clark, Harold Crouch,
Robert Elgie, Alain Faupin, Jan Fidrmuc, Natalia
Ajenjo Fresno, Venelin Ganev, Theocharis Grigoriadis, Anna Grzymaa-Busse, Carlos Guevara Mann,
Jonathan Hartlyn, Michael Herb, Percy Hintzen,
Barrie Hofmann, Maiah Jaskoski, Niraja Gopal
Jayal, David Kang, Mujeeb Khan, Andrej Krickovic, David Leonard, Peter Lewis, Staffan Lindberg, Pauline Jones Luong, Ellen Lust-Okar, Eleanor
Marchant, Edward McMahon, Andreas Mehler,
Amer Mohsen, Fatima Mojaddedi, Conor ODwyer,
Gerard Roland, Mark Rosenberg, Abdoulaye Saine,
Aqil Shah, Nicholas Shaxson, William Stanley, L.
Sumati, Lucan Way, Richard Weisfelder, and Alan
Zuckerman.
We are also indebted to the colleagues who
did not complete the survey themselves but who
helped us locate experts who did complete it.
They include Farda Asadov, Gloria Atiba-Davies,
Owolabi Bjalkander, Marie-Ange Bunga, Fernando
Coronil, Elizabeth C
ote, Irene Csokay, Brittany
Danisch, Sinclair Dinnen, Juris Dreifelds, Ulf Engel,
Peter Fiamor, Kenneth Greene, Barbara Groeblinghoff, Danica Fink Hafner, Mark Hallerberg,
Aileen Hanel, Franz Heimer, Luz Maria Helguero,
Terry Hoverter, Donald Kaniaru, David Karol, Darlene Laule, Manfred Lohmann, Chris Lovelace,
Vicki Luker, Christian Lund, Stjepan Malovic, Rytis
Martikonis, Cathie Jo Martin, Shelley McConnell,
Wilfredo Mendez, Katy Mudge, Turi Munthe,
Emma Murphy, Dorina Nastase, Collins Odote,
Rene Otayek, Wynie Pankani, A. J. Panos, Claire
Perez, Melissa Phillips, Jacqueline Pomeroy, Kourtney Pompi, Jon Quah, Sergio Rivas, Roland Roblain, Kristen Sample, Peter Sanchez, David Scott,
Erwin Schweisshelm, Ulrich Storck, Paul Sutton,
Ilona Tip, Balefi Tsie, Nicole Velasco, Rachel Wax,
Mui Teng Yap, and Peter Zinoman.

17

So too are we grateful to colleagues who did

not complete the survey themselves but who
reviewed drafts for certain countries and/or offered
comments on country conditions. The input of
these colleagues saved us from numerous errors.
We would like especially to acknowledge Neven

Andeli
c, Betsy Carter, Kathleen Collins, Jonathan
Harder, David Karol, William Liddle, Stephen McGinness, Rachel Neild, Magda Stepanyan, Robert
Templer, and Jakub Wrzesniewski.
In a work such as the present book, where we
identify the contributing consultants at every step
along the way, more than the usual absolution of
helpful colleagues for shortcomings in the final
product is in order. In no case should the appearance of an experts name be taken to suggest that
that expert concurred with the specifics of the
information that we present. In some instances
an experts answers on specific items were overridden by other experts, by our own scoring rules
and research, and/or by a recent turn of events.
The final decisions on the answers to each of
the survey items for each country were exclusively our own. We alone are responsible for any
errors.
We have benefited from the talents of gifted
research assistants, including Pilar Gonzales and
Nonna Gorilovskaya. Among our research assistants, we owe a special debt of gratitude to Neva
Tassan and Stephen Lee, who became full partners
in the project during the last two years of its execution. Nevas expertise in law and her painstaking
research in secondary sources and Stephens work
on constitutions were essential to bringing the volume to fruition.
For the Spanish translation of the survey we are
indebted to Maricio Benitez; for the French version,
to Ivan Ascher.
For valuable financial support, we are grateful to the Institute for International Studies, the
Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, the
Institute of Governmental Studies, the Committee on Research, the Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies, and the Department
of Political Science, all of the University of California, Berkeley. We are also indebted to the Center
for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, the Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs at Harvard University, and the
National Science Foundation.
We dedicate this book to our parents, Michael
Fish and Cherrie Robinson, and Mark Kroenig and
Barb Kroenig, with love and gratitude.

Country Studies

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF AFGHANISTAN (JIRGA)

Expert consultants: Ahmad Behzad, Pietro Calogero, Shahnaz Hemmati, Mohammad Isaqzadeh,
Qayyum Kochai, Fatima Mojaddedi, Michael Schoiswohl, Roshanak Wardak
Score: .38
Influence over
executive (2/9)

Institutional
autonomy (4/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Specified
powers (3/8)
X

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon
X

24. judiciary

25. central bank

26. media

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

18. all elected

The National Assembly (Jirga) of Afghanistan was

established in 2003 following the United States
led invasion and overthrow of the Taliban government. The bicameral Assembly consists of a lower
house, the House of Representatives (Wolesi Jirga),
and an upper house, the House of Elders (Meshrano
Jirga). Afghanistan held presidential elections in
2004 and legislative elections in 2005. Constitutional government is still young, and it is too early
to say with any certainty how the legislature will
function.
The constitution grants the Assembly a bit of
control over the executive, in the form of the right
to establish a special commission of investigation
and to confirm or reject the presidents choice
of ministers. Otherwise, the legislature lacks sway
over the executive. The legislature also lacks a great

18

19. amendments
20. war

Institutional
capacity (3/6)

deal of institutional autonomy. The constitution

grants the president a number of powers that circumscribe the legislatures institutional autonomy;
for example, the executive has decree power and
gatekeeping authority over financial bills. The president also appoints one-third of the members of the
legislatures upper house. The Assembly has several
specific powers; its assent is needed for declarations
of war, the ratification of foreign treaties, and the
confirmation of some presidential appointments
to the judiciary. It is too early to assess the Assemblys institutional capacity, although the constitutions provisions for regular sessions lasting nine
months each year, the presence of secretarial staff
for members of the Assembly, and the absence of
term limits indicate the presence of some institutional capacity.

National Assembly of Afghanistan (Jirga)

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of a special court.
Article 69
(2) Accusations of crime against humanity, national
treason or crime can be leveled against the President
by one-third of the members of the House of Representatives.
(3) If two-thirds of the House of Representatives votes
for charges to be brought forth, the House of Representatives shall convene a Grand Council within one
month.
(4) If the Grand Council approves the accusation
by a two-thirds majority of votes the President is
then dismissed, and the case is referred to a special
court.
(5) The special court is composed of three members of
the House of Representatives and three members of the
Supreme Court appointed by the Grand Council and
the Chair of the Senate.
(6) The lawsuit is conducted by a person appointed by
the Grand Council.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 73
(2) If a member of the National Assembly is appointed
as a minister, he loses his membership in the National
Assembly, and is replaced by another person in accordance with the provisions of law.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
No. Formally, the legislature can interpellate officials from the executive, but the practice of doing
so has not been established.

19

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. According to the constitution, the legislature
can establish a special commission to investigate
the executive. How effectively this power will be
used remains to be seen.
Article 89
(1) The House of Representatives has the authority to
set up a special commission if one-third of its members put forward a proposal to inquire about and study
government actions.
(2) The composition and procedure of this commission shall be specified by the internal regulations of
the House of Representatives.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The constitution lacks provisions granting the
legislature powers of oversight over the agencies of
coercion, and there is not yet sufficient evidence to
conclude that the legislature enjoys these powers
in practice.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. There is no prime minister.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to confirm the presidents ministerial appointments.
Article 71
(1) The government consists of the ministers who work
under the Chairmanship of the President.
(2) Ministers are appointed by the President and shall
be introduced for approval to the National Assembly.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.

Article 92
(1) House of Representatives based on a proposal by
one-tenth of all members, can interpellate each of the
Ministers.

Article 61
(1) The President is elected by receiving more than 50%
of the votes cast through free, general, secret, and direct
voting.

Article 93
(1) Any commission of both Houses of the National
Assembly can question each of the Ministers about specific topics.
(2) The person questioned can provide verbal or written response.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature may vote no confidence in individual ministers, but not in the government as a
whole.

20
Article 92
(1) House of Representatives based on a proposal by
one-tenth of all members, can interpellate each of the
Ministers.
(2) If the responses given are not satisfactory, House of
Representatives shall consider the issue of vote of no
confidence.
(3) Vote of no confidence on a Minister should be
explicit, direct, and on the basis of well founded reasons.
(4) This vote should be approved by a majority of all
members of the House of Representatives.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.
11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The executive can issue decrees when the legislature is in recess. The decrees lapse if they are not
subsequently approved by the legislature.
Article 79
(1) In cases of recess of the House of Representatives,
the government can adopt legislation in an emergency
situation on matters other than those related to budget
and financial affairs.
(2) The legislative decrees become laws after they are
signed by the President.
(3) The legislative decrees should be submitted to the
National Assembly in the course of thirty days beginning from the first session of the National Assembly.
(4) In case of rejection by the National Assembly, the
legislations become void.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority in the House of Representatives is needed to override a presidential veto.
Article 94
(2) In case the President does not agree to what the
National Assembly approves, he or she can send the
document back with justifiable reasons to the House of
Representatives within fifteen days of its submission.
(3) With the passage of this period or in case the House
of Representatives approves a particular case again with
a majority of two-thirds votes, the bill is considered
endorsed and enforced.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Supreme Court can review the constitutionality of laws.

National Assembly of Afghanistan (Jirga)

Article 121
The Supreme Court upon request of the Government
or the Courts can review compliance with the Constitution of laws, legislative decrees, international treaties,
and international conventions, and interpret them, in
accordance with the law.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. The legislature is prohibited from introducing
legislation related to financial affairs.
Article 96
Proposals for budget and financial affairs are initiated
only by the government.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The constitution does not formally grant the
executive impoundment power, and there is not
yet sufficient evidence to conclude that the president exercises impoundment power in practice.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The constitution establishes some basis for
financial autonomy for the legislature.
Article 155
For . . . members of the National Assembly . . . appropriate salaries shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of law.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto, here expressed as evident crime.
Article 101
No member of the National Assembly is legally prosecuted due to expressing his views while performing his
duty.
Article 102
(1) When a member of the National Assembly is
accused of a crime, the law enforcement authority
informs the house, of which the accused is member,
about the case, and the accused member can be prosecuted.
(2) In case of an evident crime, the law enforcement
authority can legally pursue and arrest the accused
without the permission of the house, which the accused
is a member of.
(3) In both cases, when legal prosecution requires
detention of the accused, law enforcement authorities
are obligated to inform the respective house, about the
case immediately.

National Assembly of Afghanistan (Jirga)

(4) If the accusation takes place when the assembly is
in recess, the permission of arrest is obtained from the
administrative board of the respective house and the
decision of this board is presented to the first session of
the aforementioned house for a decision.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
No. The president appoints one-third of the members of the House of Elders. All members of the
House of Representatives are elected.
Article 83
(1) Members of the House of Representatives are elected
by the people through free, general, secret, and direct
elections.
Article 84
(1) Members of the Senate are elected and appointed as
follows:
(4) The President from among experts and experienced
personalities including two representatives from the
disabled and impaired and two representatives from the
Kochis appoints the remaining one-third of the members for a period of five years.
(5) The president appoints 50% of these people from
among women.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. The constitution can be amended only by a
Grand Council made up of members of the legislature and chairpersons of provincial and district
councils.
Article 111
Grand Council is convened in the following situations:
To amend the provisions of this Constitution.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for presidential war declarations.
Article 64
[The president can issue a] declaration of war and ceasefire with the approval of the National Assembly.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 90
The National Assembly has the following powers:
Ratification of international treaties and agreements,
or abrogation of the membership of Afghanistan to
them.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

21

No. Pardon and amnesty are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The president has the power to grant pardon.
Article 64
The powers and duties of the President are as follows:
Reducing and pardoning penalties in accordance with
law.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The House of Representatives approval is
needed to confirm the presidents appointments
to the Supreme Court.
Article 117
(1) The Supreme Court is composed of nine members
who are appointed by the President for a period of ten
years with the approval of the House of Representatives.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the director of the Central Bank.
Article 64
The powers and duties of the President are as follows:
Appointing . . . the Director of the Central Bank . . .
with the approval of the House of Representatives.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. According to the constitution, the media will
be regulated by law. In practice, the National
Assembly has yet to gain a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
Article 34
(4) Directives related to printing house, radio, television, press, and other mass media, will be regulated by
the law.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session for
about nine months each year.
Article 107
(1) The National Assembly convenes two ordinary sessions each year.
(2) The term of the National Assembly in each year is
nine months.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.

22

National Assembly of Afghanistan (Jirga)

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
No. It is too early to tell. There has only been one
election for the National Assembly and thus inadequate opportunity to observe how legislators may
behave with regard to re-election.

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
No. About a quarter of the members of the legislature had formal political experience prior to
their election in 2005. The fledgling legislature
includes some prominent actors, including warlords, heads of clan networks, and leaders from
the era of communist rule during the 1980s. But
Afghanistan has had only a single parliamentary
election, in 2005, and the legislature does not yet
have a significant number of experienced members.

ASSEMBLY OF ALBANIA (KUVENDI)

Expert consultants: Jennifer L. Butz, Elda Hysenllari, Altin Ilirjani, Remzi Lani, Artur Nura, Shinasi A.
Rama
Score: .75
Influence over
executive (8/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Institutional
autonomy (7/9)

Specified
powers (5/8)

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

26. media

18. all elected

X
X

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

The Assembly (Kuvendi) of Albania was established

in its present form in Albanias 1998 constitution.
Albania was ruled by a communist-party dictatorship from the end of World War II until the early
1990s. In 1991 an interim constitution, the Law
on Major Constitutional Provisions, revoked the
communist-era constitution and established a system for more open politics. The 1998 constitution
made changes to the interim constitutional document that strengthened the legislatures hand. The

1998 document formalizes the legislatures role in

choosing the prime minister. Previously the power
was reserved for the president, but the 1998 constitution stipulates that the president is required
to nominate a candidate with majority support in
parliament. The new constitution also narrows the
conditions under which the president may exercise decree power, from urgent cases in the 1991
document to the more precise during the state of
war in the 1998 version.

Assembly of Albania (Kuvendi)

Yet the 1998 constitution also weakened the

legislature in several ways. Prior to 1998, the legislature had the authority to interpret the constitution and the constitutionality of laws; since
1998 the Constitutional Court has exercised this
power. The 1998 document also removed language granting the legislature control over official
media.
The legislatures oversight powers over the executive increased in 2002 with the establishment of
a new parliamentary committee to investigate the
property holdings of government officials.
The legislatures overall level of power is very
high. It exercises a good deal of control over the
executive. It has substantial institutional autonomy and enjoys several enumerated powers. Its
institutional capacity is limited by the lack of parliamentary staff.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can replace the prime minister
with a vote of no confidence. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of the Constitutional Court. Prior to the 1998 constitutional
changes, the parliament acting alone could remove
the president from office.
Article 93
(2) The President of the Republic may be discharged for
serious violations of the Constitution. In these cases,
a proposal for the discharge of the President may be
made by not less than one fourth of the members of
the Assembly and shall be supported by not less than
two thirds of all its members.
(3) The decision of the Assembly is sent to the Constitutional Court, which, when it verifies the guilt of the
President of the Republic, declares his discharge from
office.
Article 108
(1) If a motion of confidence presented by the Prime
Minister is refused by a majority of all the members of
the Assembly, the Assembly elects another Prime Minister within 15 days.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Legislators may serve simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 70
(2) A deputy may be a member of the Council of Ministers.

23

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 80
(1) The Prime Minister and any other member of the
Council of Ministers is obligated to answer interpellances and questions of the deputies within three
weeks.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can establish committees to
investigate the executive.
Article 77
(2) The Assembly has the right, and with the request
of one-fourth of its members is obliged, to designate investigatory committees to examine a particular
issue.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. Since 1998, the president has been required to
name as prime minister the candidate with majority support in the parliament. Before the 1998 constitutional revision, the president could select his
or her own choice for prime minister.
Article 99
(1) The President of the Republic, at the beginning of
a legislature, as well as in every case of vacancy, names
as Prime Minister the candidate presented by the party
or coalition of parties that have the majority of seats in
the Assembly.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The president appoints ministers on the recommendation of the prime minister, and the parliaments approval is necessary to confirm the
appointments. In practice, moreover, the president
allocates ministerial portfolios as instructed by the
leading parliamentary groups.

24
Article 102
(1) A minister is appointed and dismissed by the President of the Republic, on the proposal of the Prime
Minister, within 7 days.
(2) The decree is approved within 10 days by the Assembly.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The legislature elects the president.
Article 90
(2) The President of the Republic is elected by secret
vote and without debate by the Assembly by a majority
of three-fifths of all its members.

Assembly of Albania (Kuvendi)

periods of emergency. The decrees lapse if they are

not subsequently approved by the legislature.
Article 167
When the Assembly cannot be assembled during the
state of war, the President of the Republic, with the
proposal of the Council of Ministers, has the right to
issue acts that have the force of the law, which have to
be approved by the Assembly in its first meeting.
Article 28
19. [The president] issues decrees of individual character and decisions, and in urgent cases issues even
decrees of normative character, which are submitted for
approval to the Peoples Assembly in its nearest session.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the

government.

Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto

by a majority vote of its total membership.

Article 108
(1) If a motion of confidence presented by the Prime
Minister is refused by a majority of all the members of
the Assembly, the Assembly elects another Prime Minister within 15 days.

Article 85
(1) The President of the Republic has the right to return
a law for review only once.
(2) The decree of the President for the review of a law
loses its effect when a majority of all the members of
the Assembly vote against it.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 90
(7) If even in the fifth voting (for president) neither of
the two candidates has received the required majority,
the Assembly dissolves and within 60 days new general
elections take place.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. Since 1998 the Constitutional Court has had
the power to review the constitutionality of laws.
Prior to 1998 the legislature itself was responsible
for interpreting the constitution.
Article 168
(1) The Constitutional Court guarantees respect for the
Constitution and makes final interpretations of it.
(2) The Constitutional Court is subject only to the Constitution.

Article 100
(1) If the Prime Minister named is not approved, the
Assembly elects a new Prime Minister within 15 days
from the voting.
(2) If the election does not take place within this time
period, the Assembly within the next 7 days does a new
election of the Prime Minister.
(3) If the one elected receives the votes of a majority of
all the members of the Assembly, the President of the
Republic shall appoint him within seven days.
(4) When this majority is not achieved, the President
of the Republic dissolves the Assembly within seven
days.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.

Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound

funds appropriated by the legislature.

Yes. The executive lacks decree power. During a

state of war, however, the president may issue acts
that have the force of law. The prime minister also
can issue decrees that have the force of law during

Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy

jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.

16. The legislature controls the resources that finance

its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.

Assembly of Albania (Kuvendi)

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto, here
expressed as caught during or immediately after
the commission of a serious crime.
Article 73
(1) A deputy does not bear responsibility for opinions expressed in the Assembly and votes given. This
provision is not applicable in the case of defamation.
(2) A deputy may not be detained or arrested without
the authorization of the Assembly.
(3) He may be detained or arrested in the act without authorization only when he is caught during or
immediately after the commission of a serious crime.
In these cases, the General Prosecutor immediately
notifies the Assembly, which when it determines that
the proceeding is out of place, shall decide to lift the
measure.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 64
(2) 100 deputies are elected directly in single-member
electoral zones with approximately the same number
of voters.
(3) Supplemental mandates are given to the parties or
coalition of parties from their multi-name lists in proportion to the votes won by the respective candidates
on the national scale in the first round.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The Assembly can change the constitution
with a two-thirds majority vote. Still, there is some
ambiguity concerning whether a popular referendum is, or should be, needed to approve constitutional changes made by parliament. The issue is
currently under discussion in Albania.
Article 178
(1) Initiative for revision of the Constitution may be
undertaken by not less than one-fifth of the members
of the Assembly.
(4) The draft law is approved by not less than two-thirds
of all members of the Assembly.
(7) The President of the Republic does not have the
right to return for review the law approved by the
Assembly for revision of the Constitution.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

25

Yes. The legislature itself declares war with the

common exception for cases of foreign invasion. In
cases of armed aggression against the country, the
president, on the recommendation of the Council
of Ministers, can declare war without the legislatures approval.
Article 162
(1) In case of armed aggression against the Republic
of Albania, the President of the Republic upon request
of the Council of Ministers can declare the state of
war.
(2) In case of external threat, or when a common
defense obligation derives from an international agreement, the Assembly, upon proposal of the President
of the Republic, declares the state of war, decides the
state of general or partial mobilization or demobilization.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties on most major issues.
Article 124
(1) The ratification and denunciation of international
agreements by the Republic of Albania is done by law
in cases that have to do with:
a) territory, peace, alliance, political and military
issues;
b) freedoms, human rights and obligations of citizens as are provided in the Constitution;
c) membership of the Republic of Albania in international organizations;
d) the undertaking of financial obligations by the
Republic of Albania;
e) the approval, amendment, supplementing or
repeal of laws.
(2) The Assembly may, with a majority of all its
members, ratify other international agreements that
are not contemplated in Paragraph (1) of this article.
(3) The Prime Minister notifies the Assembly whenever
the Council of Ministers is going to sign an international agreement that is not ratified by law.
(4) The principles and procedures for ratification and
denunciation of international agreements are provided
by law.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature can grant amnesty by a threefifths majority vote. The Council of the Assembly, a body within the Assembly that consists of
the speaker, deputy speakers, and leaders of parliamentary groups, typically convenes in advance of
a vote to ensure that the required supermajority is
in place.

26
Article 81
(2) The following are approved by the majority specified in article 87:
h) the law on amnesty.
Article 87
(1) The Council of the Assembly:
a) reviews preliminarily draft laws contemplated in
Article 81 (2) of the Constitution.

Assembly of Albania (Kuvendi)

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the state-owned media. The 1991 constitution granted the legislature control over official media. This provision, however, was stripped
from the 1998 constitution.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 95
b) [The president] exercises the right of pardon according to the law.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The Assemblys consent is required for the
presidents judicial appointments.
Article 128
(1) The Chairman and the members of the High Court
are appointed by the President of the Republic with the
consent of the Assembly.
(3) Other judges are appointed by the President of the
Republic upon the proposal of the High Council of Justice.
Article 169
(1) The Constitutional Court is composed of 9 members, which are appointed by the President of the
Republic with the consent of Assembly.
(4) The Chairman of the Constitutional Court is
appointed from the ranks of the members by the President of the Republic with the consent of the Assembly
for a 3 year term.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the governor of the
Bank of Albania with the approval of the legislature.
Article 152
(2) The Bank of Albania is directed by its Board, which
is chaired by the Governor. The Governor is elected by
the Assembly for 7 years, upon proposal of the President
of the Republic.

Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.

Article 74
(1) The Assembly conducts its annual work in two sessions. The first session begins on the third Monday of
January and the second session on the first Monday of
September.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Albanias most recent rounds of parliamentary elections were held in 1997, 2001, and 2005.
Turnover in 2001 was not high, but was considerably higher in 2005; half of all deputies entering
parliament in 2005 were new members. Still, about
one-sixth of all members have been re-elected at
least twice and have served since 1997, giving a
legislature a significant, albeit not large, cohort of
highly experienced members.

Parliament of Algeria (Barlaman)

27

PARLIAMENT OF ALGERIA (BARLAMAN)

Expert consultants: Abdallah Bedaida, Youcef Bouandel, Lazhar Chine, E. G. H. Joffe,
Robert Mortimer, Robert Peri, Megan Reif
Score: .25
Influence over
executive (1/9)

Institutional
autonomy (2/9)

Specified
powers (1/8)

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
X

23. pardon

24. judiciary

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

25. central bank

26. media

18. all elected

In 1976, with the militarys support, a new constitution was approved that established the unicameral National Peoples Assembly (Al-Majlis EchChaabi Al-Watani) and granted sweeping powers to the president. A 1996 amendment added
an upper house to the legislature, the Council
of the Nation, to create a bicameral Parliament
(Barlaman) of Algeria.
The 1976 constitution was revised in 1986,
1989, and 1996. The 1989 reforms liberalized the
political system to some degree, but the 1996
amendments, along with creating the Council of
the Nation, aggrandized the already overwhelming
powers of the president. After an Islamist party won
the first round of parliamentary elections in 1991,
the government annulled the elections, sparking a
gruesome, protracted civil war. The violence has
largely subsided, although the country officially
remains in a state of emergency. Since 1996 the
president has had the power to rule by decree
when the legislature is in recess. Another amendment expanded presidential appointment power to
include magistrates and the central bank governor.
The legislature has little power. It has very little influence over the executive, minimal institutional autonomy, and only one of the specified
powers assessed in this survey. It has some institutional capacity deriving from the fact that a posi-

tion in the legislature is still seen as attractive,

the legislature is regularly in session, legislators
may serve consecutive terms, and the legislature
includes many long-serving members.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. The legislature cannot impeach the president.
The legislature can replace the prime minister with
a motion of censure.
Article 136
The motion of censure must be approved by a vote
taken by a majority of two-thirds of the deputies. The
vote cannot be held until three days after the introduction of the motion of censure.
Article 137
After the motion of censure is approved by the National
Peoples Assembly, the Head of the Government must
present the resignation of his government to the President of the Republic.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Ministers are prohibited from serving simultaneously in the legislature.

28

Parliament of Algeria (Barlaman)

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.

Article 79
The Head of the Government presents the members of
the government, which he has chosen, to the President
of the Republic for appointment.

No. While the legislature enjoys the formal right

to question the prime minister and government,
this power is strictly limited to paper; it has no
substance in practice.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.

Article 133
The members of the Parliament can interpellate the
government on a question of current concern.
The commissions of the Parliament may hear the members of the Government.
Article 134
The members of the Parliament may address orally or
in written form any question to any member of the
government. The written question must receive a reply
on the same form within a maximum period of thirty
days.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. According to the constitution, the legislature
can establish commissions of inquiry. In practice,
it is unthinkable that the legislature would investigate the president.
Article 161
Each of the two chambers may, at any time, establish
within the framework of its powers a commission of
inquiry on any matter of general interest.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The agencies of coercion report to the president and are not subject to legislative oversight.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister.
Article 77
5. [The president] appoints the Head of the Government
and puts an end to its function.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 78
The President of the Republic appoints:
3. To designations determined in the Council of Ministers.

No. The president is directly elected.

Article 71
The President of the Republic is elected by universal,
direct and secret suffrage.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 81
In case of non-approval of his program by the National
Peoples Assembly, the Head of the Government
presents the resignation of his government to the President of the Republic who appoints another Head of the
Government in accord with the same provisions.
Article 84
The Head of the Government may demand a vote of
confidence from the National Peoples Assembly. If the
motion of confidence is not voted, the Head of the Government presents the resignation of his Government.
Article 136
The motion of censure must be approved by a vote
taken by a majority of two-thirds of the deputies. The
vote cannot be held until three days after the introduction of the motion of censure.
Article 137
After the motion of censure is approved by the National
Peoples Assembly, the Head of the Government must
present the resignation of his government to the President of the Republic.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The president can issue decrees that have the
force of law when the legislature is not in session. The decrees lapse if they are not subsequently
approved by both houses of the legislature.
Article 77
6. [The president] signs presidential decrees.
Article 85
4. [The head of government] signs executive decrees.

Parliament of Algeria (Barlaman)

Article 124
In case of vacancy of the National Peoples Assembly or
in periods of intersession of the Parliament, the President of the Republic can legislate by ordinance. The
President of the Republic submits the texts which he
has framed for the approval of each of the chambers
of Parliament, at their next session. Ordinances not
adopted by the Parliament are null. In case of a state of
exception defined in Article 93 of the Constitution, the
President of the Republic may legislate by ordinances.
The ordinances are framed in the Council of Ministers.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority vote of the total membership of the National Peoples Assembly is
needed to override a presidential veto. Furthermore, in 1996 an upper house of parliament,
the Council of the Nation, was established. A
three-fourths majority vote in the upper house is
required to pass legislation not just to override a
presidential veto, but to pass any legislation. Since
the president appoints one-third of the members
of the upper house, legislative proposals have little
chance of becoming law without presidential backing. The arrangement has the effect of furnishing
the president with an absolute veto.
Article 127
The President of the Republic can demand a second
reading of a voted law, within thirty days following its
adoption. In that case, a majority of two-thirds of the
members of the National Peoples Assembly is required
for the adoption of the law.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Council can review the
constitutionality of laws.
Article 165
Aside from the other functions which are expressly
conferred by other provisions of the Constitution, the
Constitutional Council rules on the constitutionality of
treaties, laws and negotiations, either by an opinion, if
these are not rendered executory, or by a decision, in
the opposite case.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.

29

Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound

funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
No. The constitution grants the legislature control
over its own operations, but in practice, the legislature is dependent on the president for the resources
that finance its own operations.
Article 115
The organization and the functioning of the National
Peoples Assembly and of the Council of the Nation, as
well as the functional relations between the chambers
of the Parliament and the Government are determined
by an organic law. The budget of the two chambers,
as well as the remuneration of the deputies and the
members of the Council of the Nation are determined
by the law. The National Peoples Assembly and the
Council of the Nation elaborate and adopt their internal
regulations.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Despite constitutional provisions to the contrary, legislators are subject to arrest. For example,
legislators were arrested in 2004 and 2005 for participating in demonstrations in support of a candidate who opposed the president.
Article 109
Parliamentary immunity is granted to the deputies and
to the members of the Council of the Nation during the
term of their mandate. They may not be prosecuted,
arrested, or in general be the object of civil or criminal
action nor all forms of pressure, on account of opinions expressed, speeches delivered or votes cast in the
exercise of their mandate.
Article 110
The prosecutions for a delinquent act against a deputy
or a member of the Council of the Nation may not
be initiated except by express renunciation of the concerned or upon authorization in each case by the
National Peoples Assembly or the Council of the Nation which decides by a majority of its members the
lifting of their immunity.
Article 111
In case of a flagrant offense or flagrant crime by the
deputy or a member of the Council of the Nation,
the arrest can proceed. The bureau of the National
Peoples Assembly or the Council of the Nation must
be informed immediately. The pertinent bureau may
demand the suspension of the prosecutions and the
release of the deputy or the member of the Council of
the Nation. He is to be treated in conformity with the
provisions of Article 110 above.

30

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
No. The president appoints one-third of the members of the upper house.
Article 101
One-third of the members of the Council of the Nation
is designated by the President of the Republic among
the personalities and national competencies in the
scientific, cultural, professional, economic and social
fields.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments require approval
in a popular referendum.
Article 174
A constitutional revision is decided upon on the initiative of the President of the Republic. It is voted on
equal terms by the National Peoples Assembly and the
Council of the Nation under the same conditions as a
legislative text. It is submitted by referendum for the
approval by the people in fifty days following its adoption. The constitutional revision, approved by the people, is promulgated by the President of the Republic.
Article 177
Three-fourths of the members of the two chambers of
the Parliament, meeting in joint session, may propose
a constitutional revision and present it to the President
of the Republic, who can submit it in a referendum. If
its approval is obtained, it is promulgated.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. The president must consult with the legislature
before declaring war, but the legislatures approval
is not required.
Article 95
Having assembled the Council of Ministers, and heard
the High Council of Security, and having consulted the
President of the National Peoples Assembly and the
President of the Council of the Nation, the President of
the Republic declares war in case of effective or imminent aggression in conformity with the pertinent provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties on most major issues.
Article 77
9. [The president] concludes and ratifies international
treaties.
Article 131
Armistice accords, treaties of peace, of alliances and
union, the treaties concerning the frontiers as well

Parliament of Algeria (Barlaman)

as treaties concerning the status of person and those
which involve expenditures not foreseen in the budget
of the State are ratified by the President of the Republic
after explicit approval by each of the two chambers of
Parliament.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 77
7. [The president] has the right of pardon, the reduction
or the commutation of penalties.
Article 156
The High Council of the Judiciary provides preliminary
consultative opinion to the President of the Republic
concerning the exercise of the right of pardon.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The president appoints members of the judiciary and judicial appointments do not require legislative approval. In 2000 the president undertook
a major purge of the judiciary and replaced the vast
majority of leading judges.
Article 78
The President of the Republic appoints . . . the Magistrates.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the governor of the
Bank of Algeria.
Article 78
The President of the Republic appoints . . . the Governor
of the Bank of Algeria.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. Public broadcasters are created and governed
by presidential decree.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.
Article 118
The Parliament meets in two ordinary sessions each
year, each with a minimum duration of four months.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No. Each party has only two paid assistants. Nearly
all deputies have full-time jobs other than their

National Assembly of Angola (Assembleia Nacional )

31

legislative responsibilities, many as lawyers or doctors, and some use external sources of income to
hire parliamentary staff.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.

Yes. A seat in the legislature comes with benefits,

including pensions, diplomatic passports, a generous salary, housing benefits, free phone calls, and
travel.

No. See item 28.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
Article 105
The mandate of deputy and of the member of the Council of the Nation . . . is renewable.

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature contains a significant number of highly experienced members.
Yes. The re-election rate is high, although this state
of affairs is due largely to the manipulation of election outcomes by the ruling party and the military.

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF ANGOLA (ASSEMBLEIA NACIONAL)

Expert consultants: Inge Amundsen, Hermenegildo Avelino, Armando Marques Guedes,
Andre de Oliveira Sango, Nicholas Shaxson
Score: .44
Influence over
executive (2/9)

Institutional
autonomy (3/9)

Specified
powers (6/8)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

24. judiciary

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

18. all elected

Institutional
capacity (3/6)
X

X
X

25. central bank

X

26. media

The unicameral National Assembly (Assembleia

Nacional) of Angola was established in the 1991
constitution. From independence in 1975 until
1991, Angola was engulfed in civil war, and a passive Peoples Assembly existed as part of a singleparty communist system. A respite in the fighting
in the early 1990s led to the new constitution, the
establishment of the National Assembly, and parliamentary elections in 1992. A quick return to civil
war meant that many deputies elected in 1992 did
not take their seats until 1997.

Despite these setbacks, the National Assembly

is still operating on the basis of the 1992 elections. Since 2002 a more stable peace appears to
have emerged, and the National Assembly has
begun to exercise more of its formal powers. In
January 2004 a new draft constitution was presented to the National Assembly. Preparations are
under way for new elections. They may or may
not lead to the adoption of the new constitution
and the emergence of meaningful constitutional
politics.

32

As presently constituted, the legislature has negligible control over the executive. It has some institutional autonomy. It derives much of its authority
from specified powers; it holds six of the eight such
powers assessed here. Its institutional capacity is
modest.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of the Supreme Court.
Article 65
(1) The President of the Republic shall not be responsible for acts carried out during the discharge of his
duties, except in the case of bribery or treason.
(2) Proceedings shall be initiated by the National
Assembly, on the proposal of one-fifth and a decision
approved by a two-thirds majority of Members present,
and the trial shall be conducted by the Supreme Court.
(3) Sentencing shall imply dismissal from the post and
impossibility of standing as a candidate for another
term of office.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 82
(1) The term of office of a Member shall be incompatible with . . . a ministerial post.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 83
Members of the National Assembly shall have the right,
in accordance with the Constitutional Law and the Regulations of the National Assembly, to question the Government or any of the members thereof, and to obtain
from all public bodies and enterprises the cooperation
needed to discharge their duties.
Article 99
(2) The Prime Minister and members of the Government shall appear before the Assembly plenum at meetings the regularity of which shall be set out in the Regulations of the National Assembly to reply to Members
questions and requests for clarification, made verbally
or in writing.

National Assembly of Angola (Assembleia Nacional )

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. According to the constitution, the legislature
can establish commissions of inquiry to investigate
the executive, but in practice, the legislature lacks
investigatory powers.
Article 101
(1) Members of the National Assembly may constitute
parliamentary commissions of inquiry to examine acts
of the Government and administration.
(2) A commission of inquiry shall be requested by any
Member and, on a mandatory basis, comprise one-fifth
of Members present, and shall be limited to one per
Member per legislative session.
(3) Parliamentary commissions of inquiry shall have
the investigating powers of judicial bodies.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The agencies of coercion are responsible to the
president and are not subject to legislative oversight.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister.
Article 66
The President of the Republic shall have the following
powers:
(a) To appoint the Prime Minister, after hearing the
political parties represented in the National Assembly.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 76
The Council of the Republic shall be presided over by
the President of the Republic and shall be composed of
the following members:
(a) The President of the National Assembly;
(b) The Prime Minister;
(c) The President of the Constitutional Court;
(d) The Attorney General;
(e) Former President of the Republic;
(f) The Presidents of Political Parties represented in the
National Assembly;
(g) Ten citizens appointed by the President of the
Republic.

National Assembly of Angola (Assembleia Nacional )

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 57
(1) The President of the Republic shall be elected by
universal, direct, equal, secret and periodic suffrage by
citizens resident in the national territory, in accordance
with the law.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 88
The National Assembly shall:
(n) Vote motions of confidence or no confidence in the
Government.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 66
(e) [The president has the power to] decree the dissolution of the National Assembly after consultation with
the Prime Minister, the President of the National Assembly and the Council of the Republic.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The president and the government issue
decrees that have the force of law.
Article 70
After they have been signed by the Prime Minister, the President of the Republic shall sign Government decrees thirty days after receiving them and shall
inform the Government of the reasons for refusing to
sign them.
Article 74
In the exercise of his powers, the President of the Republic shall issue presidential decrees and dispatches that
shall be published in the Dario da Republica.
Article 88
(l) The national assembly shall . . . ratify decrees.
Article 114
(3) In the discharge of their duties, the Prime Minister,
Ministers and Secretaries of State shall issue executive
decrees and dispatches that shall be published in the
Dario da Republica.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.

33

No. A two-thirds majority vote is needed to override a presidential veto.

Article 69
(2) Within this period, the President of the Republic
may request the National Assembly to consider the law
or any of its provisions.
(3) If after reconsideration a two-thirds majority of
the Members of the National Assembly are in favor of
approving the law, the President of Republic shall promulgate the law within fifteen days of receiving it.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 134
The Constitutional Court shall in general administer
justice on legal and constitutional matters, and shall:
(a) Prevent unconstitutionality.
(b) Consider whether laws, executive laws, ratified
international treaties and any rules are unconstitutional.
(c) Verify and consider non-compliance with the Constitutional Law owing to failure to take the requisite
measures to make constitutional rules executable.
(d) Consider appeals in respect of the constitutional
nature of all decisions of other courts that refuse to
apply any rule on the grounds that it is unconstitutional.
(e) Consider appeals in respect of the constitutional
nature of all decisions of other courts that apply a rule
the constitutional nature of which has been evoked during the trial.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. The legislature is prohibited from introducing
legislation related to the national plan, which
involves a bundle of issues related to economic and
social policies that extend well beyond purely budgetary matters.
Article 88
The National Assembly shall:
(b) Approve laws on all matters, except those reserved
by the Constitutional Law for the Government;
(d) Approve, on the proposal of the Government, the
National Plan and the General State Budget;
(e) Approve, on the proposal of the Government, the
reports on the execution of the National Plan and the
General State Budget.
Article 112
In the discharge of its administration duties, the Government shall:
(a) Draft and promote implementation of the countrys
economic and social development plan;

34

National Assembly of Angola (Assembleia Nacional )

(b) Draft, approve and direct the execution of the State

Budget.

(2) Acts provided for in Article 88 (a) shall take the

form of a law on constitutional amendment or amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of Angola.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power
to impound funds appropriated by the legislature.

Article 158
(1) The National Assembly may review the Constitutional Law and approve the Constitution of the Republic of Angola on the decision of two-thirds of Members
present.
(2) No less than ten Members or the President of the
Republic may propose amendment of the Constitution.
(3) The Constitutional Law may be amended at any
time.
(4) The National Assembly shall determine the manner
of proposing the drafting of the Constitution of the
Republic of Angola.
(5) The President of the Republic shall not refuse to
promulgate the Law Amending the Constitution of the
Republic of Angola adopted in accordance with the first
paragraph of the present article.

Yes. The executive does not impound funds authorized by the legislature, but this is partly because
the executive operates a parallel budgetary structure beyond the legislatures control.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
No. The legislature is dependent on the executive
for the resources that finance its own operations.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto.
Article 84
(1) No Member of the National Assembly shall be
detained or arrested without authorization by the
National Assembly or the Standing Commission
thereof, unless caught in flagrante delicto committing
a felony punishable by imprisonment.
(2) Members shall not be held responsible for views
they express in the discharge of their duties.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 79
(1) The National Assembly shall be composed of two
hundred and twenty-three Members elected by universal, equal, direct, secret and periodic suffrage for a fouryear term of office.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
with a two-thirds majority vote.
Article 88
The National Assembly shall:
(a) Amend the current Constitutional Law and approve
the Constitution of the Republic of Angola.
Article 92
(1) The National Assembly shall, in the exercise of its
powers, issue laws for the constitutional amendment
of the Constitution of the Republic of Angola, organic
laws, laws, motions and resolutions.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for presidential war declarations.
Article 66
[The president has the power] to declare war and make
peace, after hearing the Government and following
authorization by the National Assembly.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties on most major issues.
Article 88
The National Assembly shall:
(k) approve international treaties on matters within its
absolute legislative powers, as well as treaties on peace,
Angolas participation in international organizations,
the rectification of borders, friendship, defense, military matters and any others submitted to it by the Government.
Article 110
In the discharge of the political duties, the Government
shall:
(c) Negotiate and conclude international treaties and
approve treaties that do not fall within the sole competence of the National Assembly or have not been submitted thereto.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant
amnesty.
Article 88
The national assembly shall:
(h) Grant amnesties and general pardons.

National Assembly of Angola (Assembleia Nacional )

35

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes. The legislature has the power of pardon.

Yes. The legislature is in session for about eight

months each year.

Article 88
The national assembly shall:
(h) Grant amnesties and general pardons.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislature makes appointments to the
High Council of the Judicial Bench and the Constitutional Court.
Article 132
(2) The High Council of the Judicial Bench shall be
presided over by the President of the Supreme Court
and shall be composed of the following:
(b) Five lawyers nominated by the National Assembly.
Article 135
(1) The Constitutional Court shall be composed of
seven judges, nominated from among lawyers and
judges as follows:
(b) Three judges elected by the National Assembly by a
two-thirds majority of Members present.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president, on the recommendation of
the prime minister, appoints the governor of the
National Bank of Angola.
Article 66
The President of the Republic shall have the following
powers:
(b) To appoint and dismiss . . . the Governor of the
National Bank of Angola, on the proposal of the Prime
Minister.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The executive controls the state-owned media.

Article 96
(3) The normal period in which the National Assembly
shall function shall be eight months and shall start on
15 October, without prejudice to intervals provided for
in the Regulations of the National Assembly and suspensions determined by a two-thirds majority of Members present.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No. Party groups provide legislative staff, but on
average there is less than one staff person for each
legislator.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No. See item 28.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes. A spot in the legislature provides a steady job
in a very poor country.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
No. The opportunity for re-election has not
occurred under the extant constitutional order.
Legislative elections last occurred in 1992 immediately before the political process collapsed into civil
war. New elections are now scheduled for September 2008.

36

Argentine National Congress (Congreso)

ARGENTINE NATIONAL CONGRESS (CONGRESO)

Expert consultants: Leslie E. Anderson, Natalia Ferretti, Gretchen Helmke, Mark P. Jones,
Ana M. Mustapic, Anbal S. Perez-Li
na n, Erik Wibbels, Rodrigo Zarazaga
Score: .50
Influence over
executive (3/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)
X

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

Specified
powers (4/8)
X

12. no veto
13. no review
14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

19. amendments
20. war

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

23. pardon
24. judiciary

25. central bank

26. media

Argentinas present constitution, adopted in 1853,

established the bicameral Argentine National
Congress (Congreso). In the subsequent century
and a half the legislature has endured periods of
marginalization, first due to civil violence in the
late nineteenth century and later as a result of
military rule in the second half of the twentieth century. In 1949 constitutional amendments
augmented presidential power and enabled Juan
Domingo Peron
to be re-elected president, but by
1956 Perons amendments were rescinded, and the
1853 constitution was reinstated by the successor
government. Congress was suspended from 1966
to 1973 and completely dissolved by a military
junta in 1976. A return to civilian rule in 1983
once again granted the legislature independent
decision-making power.
Although Congress has the exclusive right to
create laws, over the course of the twentieth century Argentine presidents have sometimes invoked
emergency powers allowing them to rule by
decree. This de facto presidential decree power was
recognized by the Supreme Court in 1990 and formally institutionalized by a constitutional amendment in 1994.
Another constitutional amendment was passed
in 1994 with the aim of rebalancing the playing field between Argentinas historically powerful
executive and the other branches of government.
A separate executive branch position, the Chief of

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

27. sessions
28. secretary

X
X

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

the Ministerial Cabinet, was created in order to

make the executive branch more accountable to
Congress. The Chief of the Ministerial Cabinet is
appointed and can be dismissed by the president,
but can also be removed by a vote of censure from
Congress. To date, however, this official has served
as little more than an assistant to the president.
Overall, Congress has a moderate level of power.
It enjoys some influence over the executive and
some institutional autonomy. It holds several enumerated powers. It has some institutional capacity, but that capacity is limited by the relatively
diminutive number of experienced legislators.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The House of Deputies can impeach the president by a two-thirds majority vote of its present
members. The proceedings then move to the Senate for a public trial. Even though the trial is
presided over by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, the president can be declared guilty by a
two-thirds majority vote of the Senates present
members. Argentina lacks a prime minister. The
Chief of the Ministerial Cabinet can be removed
by the legislature, although to date the holder of

Argentine National Congress (Congreso)

this office has functioned as a mere assistant to the

president.
Section 53
Only the House of Deputies has the power to impeach
before the Senate the President . . . in such cases of
responsibility as are brought against them for misconduct or crimes committed in the fulfillment of their
duties; or for ordinary crimes, after having known about
them and after the decision to bring an action had
been voted by a majority of two-thirds of its members
present.
Section 59
The Senate is empowered to judge in public trial those
impeached by the House of Deputies, its members
being on oath for the case. When the President of the
Nation is impeached, the Senate shall be presided by
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. No person shall
be declared guilty without the majority of two-thirds of
the members present.
Section 101
The Chief of the Ministerial Cabinet . . . may be interpellated for the purpose of considering a vote of censure,
by the vote of the absolute majority of all the members
of either House, and he may be removed by the vote of
the absolute majority of the members of each House.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Ministers are prohibited from serving simultaneously in the legislature.
Section 105
Ministers shall be neither senators nor deputies without
resigning their offices as ministers.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature has summons power, and hearings are regularly held.
Section 101
The Chief of the Ministerial Cabinet shall attend Congress at least once a month, alternating between each
House, to report on the progress of the government.
Section 71
Either House shall summon the Ministers of the Executive Power to receive such explanations or reports as it
may deem necessary.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.

37

No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over these agencies.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. There is no prime minister. The Chief of the
Ministerial Cabinet holds a title that may sound
like that of a prime minister, but the holder of this
office in practice is little more than a spokesperson
for and assistant to the president.
Section 99
7. [The president] appoints and removes . . . the Chief of
the Ministerial Cabinet.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Section 99
7. [The president] appoints and removes . . . the Ministers.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Section 94
The President and Vice-President of the Nation shall be
directly elected by the people, by second ballot, according to this Constitution.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in
the government, although since 1994 the legislature has had the power to censure and remove the
Chief of the Ministerial Cabinet.
Section 101
The Chief of the Ministerial Cabinet . . . may be interpellated for the purpose of considering a vote of censure,
by the vote of the absolute majority of all the members of either House, and he may be removed by the
vote of the absolute majority of the members of each
House.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.

Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).

No. The president issue decrees that have the force

of law in exceptional circumstances. The 1853
constitution allowed presidents to rule by decree
as an emergency power. In 1990 the Supreme

38

Court accepted the legality of decree-laws in normal political circumstances, and this power was
formally recognized in the constitution in 1994.
The constitution stated that the decrees would
have to go to the legislature for approval within
ten days to become effective. It also mandated
that within a year from the signing of the new
constitution the legislature issue a law regulating
the decree procedures. After a long delay, in 2006
Congress enacted a law that regulates decree procedures, and it established a sixteen-member congressional commission that scrutinizes decrees. Presidential decree power is the subject of extensive
debate in Argentina. The threshold that constitutes the exceptional circumstances that justify
the presidents making what are known as necessity and urgency decrees is at the center of the
controversy. Between 1853 and the end of the
1980s, the threshold was high; only twenty-five
decrees were issued during this time. But President Carlos Menem changed the norm radically
by issuing some 260 decrees during his decade in
power, which spanned the 1990s. Menems successors have followed his example; on average, they
issued more than one decree per week between
2000 and 2006. Some activists and scholars in
Argentina recently have challenged the legal justification for such action, asserting that in the
vast majority of cases conditions do not meet the
test of exceptional circumstances that allow for
presidential decree.
Section 99
Only when due to exceptional circumstances the ordinary procedures foreseen by this Constitution for the
enactment of laws are impossible to be followed, and
when rules are not referred to criminal issues, taxation,
electoral matters, or the system of political parties, [the
president] shall issue decrees on grounds of necessity
and urgency, which shall be decided by a general agreement of ministers who shall countersign them together
with the Chief of the Ministerial Cabinet. Within the
term of ten days, the Chief of the Ministerial Cabinet
shall personally submit the decision to the consideration of the Joint Standing Committee of Congress,
which shall be composed according to the proportion of
the political representation of the parties in each House.
Within the term of ten days, this committee shall submit its report to the plenary meeting of each House for
its specific consideration and it shall be immediately
discussed by both Houses. A special law enacted with
the absolute majority of all the members of each House
shall regulate the procedure and scope of Congress participation.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.

Argentine National Congress (Congreso)

No. A two-thirds majority vote in both houses is

required to override a presidential veto.
Section 83
If a bill is totally or partially rejected by the Executive
Power, it shall return with the objections to the originating House; the latter shall reconsider it and if it
is confirmed by a majority of two-thirds of the votes, it
shall be sent again to the revising House. If both Houses
approve it by such majority, the bill becomes a law and
is sent to the Executive Power for promulgation.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Supreme Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all
policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The legislature must approve the general budget, but the president is in full control of the operations of the public sector. In August 2006 Congress enacted laws that allowed the Chief of the
Ministerial Cabinet to make changes in the budget at the will of the executive. This act of
interbranch delegation enhanced the presidents
already formidable control over the public purse.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,
including control over members remuneration.
Section 74
The senators and deputies shall receive remuneration
for their services, to be ascertained by law, and paid out
of the Treasury of the Nation.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto.
Section 68
No member of Congress shall be accused, judicially
examined, or disturbed for opinions expressed or
speeches delivered by him while holding office as legislator.
Section 69
No senator or deputy shall be arrested as from the
day of his election until the expiration of his term,
except when flagrantly surprised committing a crime

Argentine National Congress (Congreso)

deserving capital punishment or other infamous or
serious punishment, in which case a summary report
of the facts shall be submitted to the corresponding
House.
Section 70
When a written complaint is filed before the ordinary
courts against any senator or deputy, once examined if
there is enough evidence in a public trial, each House
may, with the concurrence of two-thirds of the votes,
suspend the accused party from his office and place
him under the jurisdiction of the competent court to
be judged.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of Congress are elected.

39

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Section 75
Congress is empowered:
22. To approve or reject treaties concluded with other
nations and international organizations, and concordats with the Holy See.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. A general amnesty may be passed only through
congressional legislation.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

Section 45
The House of Deputies shall be composed of representatives directly elected by the people of the provinces, of
the City of Buenos Aires, and of the Capital City in case
of its moving, which for this purpose are considered as
constituencies of a single state, and by simple plurality
of votes.

No. The president has the power of pardon.

Section 54
The Senate shall be composed of three senators for each
province, and three for the City of Buenos Aires, jointly
and directly elected, corresponding two seats to the
political party obtaining the majority of votes, and the
other seat to the political party following in number of
votes.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments require the establishment of a special assembly for the purpose. The
legislature calls for the special assembly and specifies the aspects of the constitution that the special
assembly is permitted to discuss and change.
Section 30
The Constitution may be totally or partially amended.
The necessity of reform must be declared by Congress
with the vote of at least two-thirds of the members;
but it shall not be carried out except by an Assembly
summoned to that effect.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Section 99
5. [The president] may grant pardons or commute punishments for crimes subject to federal jurisdiction, after
the report of the corresponding court, except in cases
of impeachment by the House of Deputies.

Yes. The Senates consent is required for the presidents judicial appointments.
Section 99
4. [The president] appoints the justices of the Supreme
Court with the consent of the Senate by two-thirds of
its members present, in a public meeting convoked to
this effect.
He appoints the other judges of the lower federal courts
according to a binding proposal consisting of a list of
three candidates submitted by the Council of Magistracy, with the consent of the Senate in a public meeting, in which the qualifications of the candidates shall
be taken into account.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the governor of the
Central Bank of Argentina with the Senates
approval.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for presidential war declarations.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

Section 75
Congress is empowered:
25. To authorize the Executive Power to declare war or
make peace.

No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the

operation of the public media.

Section 99
15. [The president] declares war and orders reprisals
with the consent and approval of Congress.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes. Congress is in regular session for about nine
months each year.

40

Argentine National Congress (Congreso)

Section 63
Both Houses shall assemble, on their own account,
every year in ordinary legislative session from March
1 until November 30. The President of the Nation may
convoke to extraordinary legislative session or extend
the ordinary one.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes. Legislators are given a staffing budget.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
Yes. See item 28.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
Section 50
Deputies shall hold office for a term of four years and
may be re-elected.

Section 56
Senators shall hold office for a term of six years and
may be indefinitely re-elected.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
No. Most legislators cannot obtain access to the
ballot because it is controlled by party leaders. Parties are reluctant to renominate incumbents in the
lower chamber, so only about one-quarter of sitting legislators are included in lists for re-election,
and not all of these are re-elected. Congress often
is not an attractive place for rising stars. The best
and brightest frequently prefer to seek positions in
the provincial or national executive branches or to
win the mayoralty of a major city.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
No. See item 31.

ARMENIAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (AZGAYIN ZHOGHOV)

Expert consultants: Artur Atanesyan, Alexander Markarov, Boris Navasardian, Ellie Valentine, Darren
Wagner
Score: .56
Influence over
executive (3/9)

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)

Specified
powers (6/8)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

12. no veto
13. no review

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

26. media

18. all elected

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

In 1995 the Armenian National Assembly (Azgayin

Zhoghov) was formally established in Armenias
first constitution following the collapse of the
Soviet Union. The fledgling body endured tragedy
in October 1999, when armed gunmen stormed
the parliament building and assassinated the prime

minister and six other members of parliament

with the alleged purpose of inciting a popular
revolt.
A referendum on constitutional amendments
was rejected by voters in February 2003. The
sweeping changes would have altered over

Armenian National Assembly (Azgayin Zhoghov)

three-fourths of the constitutions articles. The

amendments were advertised as an effort to redistribute powers from the presidency to the other
branches of government. Critics argued that the
reforms would have actually further enhanced
already-formidable presidential power.
The Assembly enjoys some control over the
executive by dint of its powers of oversight,
although electoral manipulation by sitting presidents has reduced the legislatures ability to challenge the executive branch. The legislatures institutional autonomy is limited by the presidents
powers of dissolution and decree, though the legislature can override a presidential veto with a majority vote. The legislature enjoys numerous specified
powers and has some institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires action by
the Constitutional Court.
Article 57
The President may be removed from office for state treason or other high crimes. In order to request a determination on questions pertaining to the removal of
the President of the Republic from office, the National
Assembly must appeal to the Constitutional Court by
a resolution adopted by the majority of the deputies. A
decision to remove the President of the Republic from
office must be reached by the National Assembly by a
minimum two thirds majority vote of the total number
of deputies, based on the determination of the Constitutional Court.
Article 100
The Constitutional Court, in accordance with the law:
5) shall determine whether there are grounds for the
removal of the President of the Republic.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 65
A Deputy may not hold any other public office.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. Ministers are questioned in biweekly questionand-answer sessions and can be called to committee hearings.

41
Article 80
Deputies are entitled to ask questions to the Government. For one sitting each week during the regular
sessions of the Assembly, the Prime Minister and the
members of the Government shall answer questions
raised by the Deputies. The National Assembly shall not
pass any resolutions in conjunction with the questions
raised by the Deputies.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. The legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister.
Article 55
4) [The president] shall appoint and remove the Prime
Minister.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 55
4) The President shall appoint and remove the members of the Government upon the recommendation of
the Prime Minister.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 50
The President of the Republic shall be elected by the
citizens of the Republic of Armenia for a five year term
of office.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 55
The President of the Republic:
4) In the event that the National Assembly adopts a
vote of no confidence against the Government, the

42
President shall, within twenty-one days accept the resignation of the Government, appoint a Prime Minister
and form a Government.
Article 74
Within twenty days of the formation of a newly elected
National Assembly or of its own formation, the Government shall present its program to the National Assembly for its approval, thus raising the question of a vote
of confidence before the National Assembly . . . If a vote
of no confidence is passed, the Prime Minister shall submit the resignation of the Government to the President
of the Republic.
Article 84
The National Assembly may adopt a vote of no confidence toward the Government by a majority vote of the
total number of Deputies.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 55
The President of the Republic:
3) may dissolve the National Assembly and designate
special elections after consultations with the President
of the National Assembly and the Prime Minister.
Article 63
The National Assembly may be dissolved in accordance
with the Constitution.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The president issues decrees that have the force
of law. The legislature can also delegate temporary decree power to the president on specific issue
areas.
Article 56
The President of the Republic may issue orders and
decrees which shall be executed throughout the Republic. The orders and decrees of the President of the Republic shall not contravene the Constitution and the laws.
Article 78
In order to ensure the legislative basis of the Governments program, the National Assembly may authorize the Government to adopt resolutions that have
the effect of law that do not contravene any laws in
force during a period specified by the National Assembly. Such resolutions must be signed by the President
of the Republic.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote of its total membership.

Armenian National Assembly (Azgayin Zhoghov)

Article 72
The National Assembly shall deliberate on a priority
basis any law which has been remanded by the President.
Should the National Assembly decline to accept the recommendations and objections presented by the President of the Republic, it shall pass the remanded
law, again with a majority vote of the number of
Deputies.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 100
The Constitutional Court, in accordance with the law:
1) shall decide on whether the laws, the resolutions
of the National Assembly, the orders and decrees of
the President of the Republic and the resolutions of
Government are in conformity with the Constitution.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
Article 79
The President of the National Assembly shall chair the
sittings, manage its material and financial resources,
and shall ensure its normal functioning.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Despite constitutional provisions to the contrary, legislators are subject to arrest. For example, during a 2004 nationwide public vote of confidence in the president, some opposition legislators
were arrested and alleged to have been beaten by
police.
Article 66
A Deputy shall not be prosecuted or held liable for
actions arising from the performance of his or her
status, or for the expression of his or her opinions
expressed in the National Assembly, provided these are
not slanderous or defamatory. A Deputy may not be

Armenian National Assembly (Azgayin Zhoghov)

arrested and subjected to administrative or criminal
prosecution through judicial proceedings without the
consent of the National Assembly.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 68
Regular elections to the National Assembly shall be held
within sixty days prior to the expiration of the term of
the current Assembly. Procedures for elections to the
National Assembly shall be prescribed by law.

43
Article 81
Upon the recommendation of the President of the
Republic, the National Assembly:
1) may declare an amnesty.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 55
17) [The president] may grant pardons to convicted
individuals.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.

Yes. The Assembly appoints five of nine members

of the Constitutional Court.

No. Constitutional amendments require approval

in a popular referendum.

Article 99
The Constitutional Court shall be composed of nine
members, five of whom shall be appointed by the
National Assembly and four by the President of the
Republic.

Article 111
The Constitution shall be adopted or amended by referendum which may be initiated by the President of the
Republic or the National Assembly.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislature declares war on the recommendation of the president.
Article 55
13) [The president] shall decide on the use of the armed
forces. In the event of an armed attack against or of an
immediate anger to the Republic, or a declaration of war
by the National Assembly, the President shall declare a
state of martial law and may call for a general or partial
mobilization.
Article 81
Upon the recommendation of the President of the
Republic, the National Assembly:
3) may declare war.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 55
7) [The president] shall . . . sign international treaties
that are ratified by the National Assembly.
Article 81
Upon the recommendation of the President of the
Republic, the National Assembly:
2) shall ratify or revoke the international treaties signed
by the Republic of Armenia.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant
amnesty.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
Yes. The Assembly, on the recommendation of the
president, appoints the chairman of the Central
Bank of Armenia.
Article 83
The National Assembly:
1) shall appoint the Chairman of the Central Bank
upon the recommendation of the President of the
Republic.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
Yes. The legislature has a voice in the operation of
the state-owned newspaper, Hayastani Hanrapetutyun (Republic of Armenia).
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature is in regular session for about
seven months each year.
Article 69
The regular sessions of the National Assembly shall convene twice per year from the second Monday of September to the second Wednesday of December and from the
first Monday of February to the second Wednesday of
June.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No. Legislators are allowed voluntary staff, but on
average there is less than one staff person for each
legislator. There are about one or two secretaries
and two to four experts for each standing commission of the parliament. Each standing commission
contains roughly twenty legislators.

44

Armenian National Assembly (Azgayin Zhoghov)

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.
No. See item 28.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election of incumbent legislators is common. The total number of experienced legislators has been decreasing, however, because of the
reduction in the size of the Armenian parliament
from 190 members before 1995 to 131 members
after 1995.

Yes.

PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA
Expert consultants: John Chesterman, Peter Hallahan, Jeremy Moon, Andrew Parkin, Bruce Stone,
David Sullivan
Score: .63
Influence over
executive (8/9)

Institutional
autonomy (6/9)

Specified
powers (0/8)

Institutional
capacity (6/6)

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

X
X

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

X
X

26. media
X

The Parliament of Australia in its present form

was established with the constitution of 1900, but
it was not until 1942 and the Statute of Westminster that Australia received effective independence from Great Britain. Complete legal separation occurred only with the Australia Act of
1986, which abolished all remaining provisions
that allowed appeals from Australian courts to be
heard in London.
The Australian constitution is a thin document
with a substantial portion devoted to rules for electing legislators. Many of the institutions specified in
other constitutions, if discussed at all in the Australian constitution, are mentioned only to stipulate that their features are to be determined by

law. The lacunae in the Australian constitution

are filled by a century of conventions, precedents,
and custom.
Australia operates a Westminster-style system.
The basic Westminster structure is complicated by
the position of the Governor General. Australias
official head of state is still the Queen of England,
and Australias functional head of state remains the
queens representative in Australia, the Governor
General, who is appointed by the queen on the
recommendation of the Australian prime minister.
The Australian parliament shares some executive
powers with the Governor General.
Australias most unusual constitutional feature
is the double dissolution mechanism (Section 57)

Parliament of Australia

for resolving a deadlock between the two houses of

the bicameral legislature. This provision allows for
the dissolution of both houses if the Senate twice
rejects a bill passed by the House of Representatives.
In general, parliament enjoys a high level of
control over executive power and substantial institutional autonomy. Remarkably, however, it holds
none of the specified powers and prerogatives
assessed in this survey. It has formidable institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can remove the prime minister
with a vote of no confidence.
2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of
the legislature.
Yes. Ministers are required to serve simultaneously
in the legislature.
Section 64
No minister of state shall hold office for a longer period
than three months unless he is or becomes a senator or
a member of the House of Representatives.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly questions officials of
the executive. Summons power is particularly evident in the annual round of public hearings held
by Senate committees considering the proposed
expenditure of public funds.
4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. The legislature and a statutory body, the Auditory General, have effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. The prime minister is formally appointed by
the Governor General, but the Governor General

45

by convention must appoint the parliamentary

leader of the party, or coalition of parties, that has
the support of the House of Representatives.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. Ministers are appointed by the Governor General on the recommendation of the prime minister,
and the appointments do not require the legislatures approval.
Section 62
There shall be a Federal Executive Council to advise the
Governor-General in the government of the Commonwealth, and the members of the Council shall be chosen
and summoned by the Governor-General and sworn as
Executive Councillors, and shall hold office during his
pleasure.
Section 67
Until the Parliament otherwise provides, the appointment and removal of all other officers of the Executive
Government of the Commonwealth shall be vested in
the Governor-General in Council.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The country lacks a presidency. The Governor
General is the head of state.
9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.
Yes. No confidence votes, while rare, are possible.
In February 2003 the Senate passed its first-ever
vote of no confidence in a serving leader against
Prime Minister John Howard over his handling of
the Iraq crisis.
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the
executive.
No. The Governor General can dissolve the legislature. Australias peculiar double dissolution
mechanism also allows the Governor General to
dissolve both houses of parliament to break legislative deadlock. Double dissolution is an option
if the House of Representatives passes the same
bill twice and has it rejected by the Senate both
times.
Section 5
(1) The Governor-General may . . . in like manner dissolve the House of Representatives.
Section 28
Every House of Representatives shall continue for three
years from the first meeting of the House, and no
longer, but may be sooner dissolved by the GovernorGeneral.

46
Section 57
(1) If the House of Representatives passes any proposed
law, and the Senate rejects or fails to pass it, or passes
it with amendments to which the House of Representatives will not agree, and if after an interval of three
months the House of Representatives, in the same or
the next session, again passes the proposed law with
or without any amendments which have been made,
suggested, or agreed to by the Senate, and the Senate rejects or fails to pass it, or passes it with amendments to which the House of Representatives will not
agree, the Governor-General may dissolve the Senate
and the House of Representatives simultaneously. But
such dissolution shall not take place within six months
before the date of the expiry of the House of Representatives.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. In practice, there is no executive veto in Australia. Formally, the Governor General and the
queen have veto power, in that they may withhold their assent from a law. In practice, however,
it would be unthinkable for them to exercise this
power.
Section 58
(1) When a proposed law passed by both Houses of the
Parliament is presented to the Governor-General for the
Queens assent, he shall declare, according to his discretion, but subject to this Constitution, that he assents in
the Queens name or that he withholds assent, or that
he reserves the law for the Queens pleasure.
(2) The Governor-General may return to the house in
which it originated any proposed law so presented to
him, and may transmit therewith any amendments
which he may recommend, and the Houses may deal
with the recommendation.
Section 59
The Queen may disallow any law within one year from
the Governor-Generals assent, and such disallowance
on being made known by the Governor-General by
speech or message to each of the Houses of the Parliament, or by Proclamation, shall annul the law from
the day when the disallowance is so made known.
Section 60
A proposed law reserved for the Queens pleasure
shall not have any force unless and until within two
years from the day on which it was presented to the
Governor-General for the Queens assent the GovernorGeneral makes known, by speech or message to each of

Parliament of Australia
the Houses of the Parliament, or by Proclamation, that
it has received the Queens assent.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. Laws can be challenged in the High Court.
14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all
policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions under the jurisdiction of the national
government.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. Once legislation appropriating funds is passed,
the funds must be spent for the purposes specified,
although specified purposes are often fairly broad.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislative immunity extends to official parliamentary business only. Legislators are subject to
arrest for common crimes.
Section 49
The powers, privileges, and immunities of the Senate
and of the House of Representatives, and of the members and the committees of each House, shall be such as
are declared by the Parliament, and until declared shall
be those of the Commons House of Parliament of the
United Kingdom, and of its members and committees,
at the establishment of the Commonwealth.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Section 7
The Senate shall be composed of senators for each State,
directly chosen by the people of the State.
Section 24
The House of Representatives shall be composed of
members directly chosen by the people of the Commonwealth.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments require approval
in a popular referendum.

Parliament of Australia
Section 128
This Constitution shall not be altered except in the following manner:
(1) The proposed law for the alteration thereof must be
passed by an absolute majority of each House of the
Parliament, and not less than two nor more than six
months after its passage through both Houses the proposed law shall be submitted in each State and Territory
to the electors qualified to vote for the election of members of the House of Representatives.
(2) But if either House passes any such proposed law
by an absolute majority, and the other House rejects
or fails to pass it, or passes it with any amendment to
which the first-mentioned House will not agree, and if
after an interval of three months the first-mentioned
House in the same or the next session again passes the
proposed law by an absolute majority with or without any amendment which has been made or agreed
to by the other House, and such other House rejects
or fails to pass it or passes it with any amendment to
which the first-mentioned House will not agree, the
Governor-General may submit the proposed law as last
proposed by the first-mentioned House, and either with
or without any amendments subsequently agreed to by
both Houses, to the electors in each State and Territory qualified to vote for the election of the House of
Representatives.
(4) And if in a majority of the States a majority of
the electors voting approve the proposed law, and if
a majority of all the electors voting also approve the
proposed law, it shall be presented to the GovernorGeneral for the Queens assent.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. The government can declare war without the
legislatures approval.
21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
treaties with foreign countries.
No. The government can conclude international
treaties without the legislatures approval. A parliamentary committee was established in the mid1990s to vet international treaties before they are
signed, but its role is purely advisory.
22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.
No. The government has the power to grant
amnesty.

47

No. Members of the judiciary are appointed by the

Governor General, and the legislatures approval is
not required.
Section 72
The Justices of the High Court and of the other courts
created by the Parliament
(i) Shall be appointed by the Governor-General.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The treasurer, a cabinet minister whose functions in some respects resemble those associated
with a minister of finance, appoints the governor
of the Reserve Bank of Australia.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislatures ordinary sessions are spread
over nine months each year, which keeps the legislature in regular working session. It merits note,
however, that sittings are spread quite thinly over
this time.
28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.
Yes. Each legislator has a personal secretary. Most
legislators have someone who manages appointments and travel as well an office manager.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
Yes.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.

No. The government has the power of pardon.

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.

Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

48

Austrian Parliament (Parlament)

AUSTRIAN PARLIAMENT (PARLAMENT)

Expert consultants: David Campbell, Ursula Dorfinger, Christian H
utterer, Wolfgang C. M
uller,
Hubert Sickinger, Leo Stollwitzer, Peter Ulram
Score: .72
Influence over
executive (5/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Institutional
autonomy (7/9)

Specified
powers (6/8)

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

26. media

18. all elected

Institutional
capacity (5/6)

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

X
X
X

The Austrian Parliament (Parlament) was established in the 1920 constitution. The Austrian Parliament consists of the popularly elected National
Council (Nationalrat) and the Federal Council
(Bundesrat), whose members are elected by the
state legislatures. A constitutional amendment in
1929 provided for direct presidential elections. The
amendment also gave the president the power
to appoint the chancellor and, on the chancellors recommendation, to appoint the government.
Prior to 1929 the legislature elected the president,
the chancellor, and the government.
The constitution was suspended during 1934
45 in the face of two consecutive domestic authoritarian rulers and the Anschluss that brought
Austria under the control of Nazi Germany. In
1945 the 1920 constitution, complete with the
1929 amendments, was reinstated, thereby establishing a semipresidential system for postwar
Austria.
Parliament enjoys a broad scope of authority.
Although it plays a limited role in the formation of
the government, it wields effective oversight powers and can remove individual ministers or the government as a whole with a vote of no confidence.
The National Council is subject to dissolution by
the president and its laws are subject to judicial
review, but otherwise it enjoys full institutional

autonomy. The executive has no gatekeeping or

decree power. The legislature also enjoys substantial powers and prerogatives and has a high level
of institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of the Constitutional Court. The
National Council can replace the prime minister
(chancellor) with a vote of no confidence.
Article 74
(1) If the National Council passes an explicit vote of
no confidence in the Federal Government or individual members thereof, the Federal Government or
the Federal Minister concerned shall be removed from
office.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. According to law, ministers may also serve in
the legislature. For the past three decades, however, no minister has served simultaneously in the
legislature.

Austrian Parliament (Parlament)

Article 70
(2) Only persons eligible for the National Council can
be appointed Federal Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor, or
Federal Minister; members of the Federal Government
need not belong to the National Council.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 52
(1) The National Council and the Federal Council are
entitled to examine the administration of affairs by
the Federal Government, to interrogate its members
about all subjects of its execution, and to demand
all relevant information as well as to ventilate in resolutions their wishes about exercise of the executive
power.
(2) Every member of the National Council and the
Federal Council is entitled during the sessions of the
National Council and the Federal Council to address
brief oral questions to members of the Federal Government.
(3) The detailed regulations respecting the right of
interrogation will be settled by the federal law on the
National Councils Standing Orders as well as in the
Federal Councils Standing Orders.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can establish committees of
inquiry to investigate the executive.
Article 53
(1) The National Council can, by resolution, set up
committees of inquiry.
(3) The courts and all other authorities are obliged to
comply with the request of these committees to take
evidence; all public departments must on demand produce their files.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. Legislative committees have effective powers
of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the chancellor. The
president generally chooses, but is not required,
to appoint the candidate who enjoys the support
of the National Council.

49
Article 70
(1) The Federal Chancellor and, on his recommendation, the other members of the Federal Government are
appointed by the Federal President.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints the ministers on
the recommendation of the chancellor, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 70
(1) The Federal Chancellor and, on his recommendation, the other members of the Federal Government are
appointed by the Federal President.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 60
(1) The Federal President is elected by the nation on
the basis of equal, direct, secret, and personal suffrage.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 74
(1) If the National Council passes an explicit vote of
no confidence in the Federal Government or individual
members thereof, the Federal Government or the Federal Minister concerned shall be removed from office.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the National Council, although he or she may not do so twice for the
same reason.
Article 29
(1) The Federal President can dissolve the National
Council, but he may avail himself of this prerogative
only once for the same reason.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks veto power.

50

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 140
(1) The Constitutional Court pronounces on application by the Administrative Court, the Supreme Court,
or a competent appellate court whether a Federal or
State law is unconstitutional, but ex officio in so far as
the Court would have to apply such a law in a pending
suit. It pronounces . . . on application by a State Government or by one third of the National Councils members
whether Federal laws are unconstitutional.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Members of the National Council are immune
with the common exception for cases of flagrante
delicto. The immunity of members of the Federal
Council is determined by the laws of the state they
represent.
Article 57
(1) The members of the National Council may never
be made responsible for votes cast in the exercise of
their function and only by the National Council on the
grounds of oral or written utterances made in the course
of their function.
(2) The members of the National Council may, on
the ground of a criminal offence except for apprehension in flagrante delicto be arrested only with
the consent of the National Council. Searches of the
home of National Council members likewise require
the National Councils consent.
(3) Other legal action on the ground of a criminal offence may be taken against members of the
National Council without the National Councils consent only if it is manifestly not connected to the political activity of the member in question. The authority

Austrian Parliament (Parlament)

concerned must seek a ruling by the National Council on the existence of such a connection if the member in question or a third of the members belonging
to the Standing Committee entrusted with these matters so demands. Every act of legal process shall in the
case of such a demand immediately cease or be discontinued.
Article 58
The members of the Federal Council enjoy for the whole
duration of their tenure of office the immunity of the
members of the State Parliament which has delegated
them.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 26
(1) The National Council is elected by the nation in
accordance with the principles of proportional representation on the basis of equal, direct, secret, and personal suffrage.
Article 35
(1) The members of the Federal Council and their substitutes are elected by the State Parliaments for the duration of their respective legislative periods in accordance
with the principle of proportional representation.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The National Council can change the constitution with a two-thirds majority vote. A total
revision of the constitution, however, requires
approval in a popular referendum.
Article 44
(1) Constitutional laws or constitutional provisions
contained in simple laws can be passed by the National
Council only in the presence of at least half the members and by a two thirds majority of the votes cast, they
shall be explicitly specified as such.
(2) Any total revision of the Federal Constitution
shall . . . be submitted to a referendum by the entire
nation, whereas any partial revision requires this only
if one third of the members of the National Council or
the Federal Council so demands.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislature declares war.
Article 38
The National Council and the Federal Council meet,
together building the Federal Assembly, in public
session at the seat of the National Council for the affirmation of the Federal President as well as for the adoption of a resolution on a declaration of war.

Austrian Parliament (Parlament)

Article 40
(2) The resolutions of the Federal Assembly upon a declaration of war shall be officially published by the Federal Chancellor.

51
substitute members and the Federal Council those for
three members and one substitute member.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.

No. The president appoints the head of the Austrian National Bank.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

international treaties.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

Article 50
(1) Political treaties, and others in so far as their
contents modify or complement existent laws, may
only be concluded with the sanction of the National
Council.

Yes. The operation of the state-owned television

and radio network is regulated by law, and some
members of the media supervisory committee are
appointed by the legislature.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature can make laws that grant
amnesty.
Article 93
[Amnesties] for acts punishable by the courts are
extended by federal law.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.
Article 28
(1) The Federal President convokes the National Council each year for an Ordinary session which shall not
begin before 15 September and not last longer than 15
July the following year.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Article 65
(2) Furthermore, the following powers notwithstanding the powers assigned to him by other provisions of
this Constitution are vested in the President:
c) in individual cases to pardon persons sentenced
without further resources of appeal, to mitigate and
commute sentences pronounced by the courts, as an
act of grace to annul sentences and to grant remission
from their legal consequences, and moreover to quash
criminal proceedings in actions subject to prosecution
ex officio.

Yes. Members of parliament are allocated funds for

personal secretarial staff and have access to staff
provided by their parties.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.

Yes. Nine of the twenty members of the Constitutional Court are appointed by the president from a
slate of candidates that the legislature presents.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.

Article 147
(2) The President, the Vice-President, six additional
members, and three substitute members [of the
Constitutional Court] are appointed by the Federal President on the recommendation of the Federal Government . . . The remaining six members and three substitute members are appointed by the Federal President on the basis of recommendations listing three
candidates for each vacancy, the National Council submitting those for three members and two

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.
No. Legislators have access to staff with policy
expertise. See item 28. On average, however, there
is less than one staff member with policy expertise
for each legislator.

Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

52

Parliament of Azerbaijan (Milli Majlis)

PARLIAMENT OF AZERBAIJAN (MILLI MAJLIS)

Expert consultants: Shain Abbasov, Intigam Aliyev, Gorkhmaz Askerov, Akbar Noman, Fuad
Suleymanov
Score: .44
Influence over
executive (1/9)

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Specified
powers (4/8)

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
X

18. all elected

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

19. amendments
20. war

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

23. pardon

24. judiciary

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

25. central bank

X

26. media

The Parliament (Milli Majlis) of Azerbaijan was

formally established in Azerbaijans 1992 constitution, following the collapse of the Soviet
Union. Due to post-independence instability,
which included a military coup, the first postSoviet parliamentary elections were not held until
1995.
In July 2002 the legislature amended the constitution in a bid to reign in the powers of the
executive branch. One change formally required
the cabinet to provide parliament with an annual
report of the previous years dealings. Another
amendment empowered parliament to question
individual cabinet ministers and to vote no confidence in the government. In practice, however,
parliament has not yet exercised these powers and
exerts little oversight over the executive branch.
In fact, the legislature exerts practically no sway
over the executive. Legislative autonomy is eroded
by constitutional provisions that grant the president decree powers. The legislature does enjoy
some prerogatives. Declaration of war, international treaties, and appointments to the judiciary
all require the legislatures approval. The legislature
also enjoys a fair amount of institutional capacity.
Legislators are interested in re-election, and parliament contains a significant number of experienced
members.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Impeachment of the president requires the
involvement of the Constitutional Court.
Article 95
(1) The following questions fall under the competence
of the Parliament [Milli Majlis] of the Azerbaijan Republic:
12. dismissal of the President of the Azerbaijan Republic
by way of impeachment based on recommendation of
Constitutional Court of the Azerbaijan Republic.
Article 107
(1) In case of grave crime done by the President of
the Azerbaijan Republic the question of dismissal
of the President may be submitted to the Parliament of
the Azerbaijan Republic on initiative of Constitutional
Court of the Azerbaijan Republic based on conclusions
of Supreme Court of the Azerbaijan Republic presented
within 30 days.
(2) The President of the Azerbaijan Republic may be
dismissed from his post by decree of the Parliament of
the Azerbaijan Republic taken by majority of 95 votes of
deputies. This decree is signed by the Chairman of Constitutional Court of the Azerbaijan Republic. If Constitutional Court of the Azerbaijan Republic fails to sign
said decree within one week it shall not come into force.

Parliament of Azerbaijan (Milli Majlis)

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 89
(1) The deputy of the Parliament of the Azerbaijan
Republic looses his/her mandate in the following cases:
3. on taking position in state bodies.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
No. Parliament does not regularly question ministers.
4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. A 2002 amendment granted parliament the
legal right to investigate the executive, but no
investigations have occurred, and there is little evidence to suggest that they could occur.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The agencies of coercion report directly to the
president and are not subject to legislative oversight.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister
and submits the candidate to the parliament for
approval. If the parliament rejects three consecutive candidates for the position of prime minister,
the president can appoint the prime minister of his
or her choice.
Article 118
(1) Prime-minister of Azerbaijan Republic is appointed
by the President of the Azerbaijan Republic on consent
of the Parliament of the Azerbaijan Republic.
(3) The Parliament of the Azerbaijan Republic takes
decision concerning the candidate to the post of Primeminister of the Azerbaijan Republic not later than
within one week from the day when such candidature has been proposed. Should said procedure be
violated, or candidatures proposed by the President
of the Azerbaijan Republic for the post of Primeminister of the Azerbaijan Republic be rejected three
times, then the President of the Azerbaijan Republic
may appoint Prime-minister of the Azerbaijan Republic
without consent of the Parliament of the Azerbaijan Republic.

53

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 109
The President of the Azerbaijan Republic:
5. appoints and dismisses members of Cabinet of Ministers of the Azerbaijan Republic.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 101
(1) The President of the Azerbaijan Republic is elected
for a 5-year term by way of general, direct and equal
elections, with free, personal and secret ballot.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 95
(1) The following questions fall under the competence
of the Parliament [Milli Majlis] of the Azerbaijan Republic
14. taking decision regarding a vote of confidence in
the Cabinet of Ministers of the Azerbaijan Republic.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.
11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The president can issue decrees that have the
force of law as long as the decrees do not contravene the constitution or laws.
Article 113
Acts of the President of the Azerbaijan Republic
(1) Establishing general procedures the President of the
Azerbaijan Republic issues decrees, as per all other questions he issues orders.
(2) If not specified otherwise in decrees and orders of
the President of the Azerbaijan Republic they become
valid from the day of their publication.
Article 149
(4) Decrees of the President of the Azerbaijan Republic
should not contradict the Constitution and laws of the
Azerbaijan Republic. Use and implementation of published decrees is obligatory for all citizens, executive
power bodies, legal entities.

54
(5) Decrees of Cabinet of Ministers of the Azerbaijan
Republic should not contradict the Constitution, laws
of the Azerbaijan Republic and decrees of the President
of the Azerbaijan Republic. Use and implementation of
published decrees of the Cabinet of Ministers is obligatory for citizens, central and local executive power bodies, legal entities.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A supermajority vote in the legislature is
required to override a presidential veto.
Article 110
(1) If the President of the Azerbaijan Republic has
objections against a law he may return it to the Parliament of the Azerbaijan Republic within specified term
without signing, together with his comments.
(2) If the Parliament of the Azerbaijan Republic accepts
by majority of 95 votes laws that have been accepted
previously by majority of 83 votes, and by majority of
83 votes the laws that have been accepted previously
by majority of 63 votes, said laws come into force after
repeated voting.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 130
(3) Constitutional Court of the Azerbaijan Republic . . . takes decisions regarding the following:
correspondence of laws of the Azerbaijan Republic . . . [and] decrees of the Parliament of the Azerbaijan Republic . . . to [the] Constitution of the Azerbaijan
Republic.
(4) Constitutional Court of the Azerbaijan Republic
gives interpretation of the Constitution and laws of the
Azerbaijan Republic based on inquiries of the President
of the Azerbaijan Republic, the Parliament of the Azerbaijan Republic, Cabinet of Ministers of the Azerbaijan
Republic, Supreme Court of the Azerbaijan Republic,
Procurators Office of the Azerbaijan Republic and Ali
Majlis of Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.

Parliament of Azerbaijan (Milli Majlis)

16. The legislature controls the resources that finance

its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
No. The legislature is dependent on the executive
for the resources that finance its own operations.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto, here
expressed as caught in the act of crime.
Article 90
(1) A deputy of the Parliament of the Azerbaijan Republic enjoys immunity during the whole term of his
powers. Except cases when the deputy may be caught
in the act of crime, the deputy of the Parliament of
the Azerbaijan Republic may not be called to criminal
responsibility during the whole term of his/her authority, arrested, disciplinary measures may not be applied
to him by law court, he may not be searched. The
deputy of the Parliament of the Azerbaijan Republic
may be arrested only if he/she has been caught at a
place of crime. In such case the body which detained
the deputy of the Parliament of the Azerbaijan Republic must immediately notify General Procurator of the
Azerbaijan Republic about the fact.
(2) Immunity of deputy of the Parliament of the Azerbaijan Republic might be stopped only by decision of
the Parliament of the Azerbaijan Republic based on
application of General Procurator of the Azerbaijan
Republic.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 83
Deputies of the Parliament of the Azerbaijan Republic
are elected based on majority and proportional voting
systems and general, equal and direct elections by way
of free, individual and secret voting.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments require the presidents approval.
Article 110
(2) Should the President of the Azerbaijan Republic fail
to sign Constitutional laws they will not come into
force.
Article 156
(1) Amendments to the Constitution of the Azerbaijan
Republic are taken in the form of Constitutional laws in
the Parliament of the Azerbaijan Republic, by majority
of 95 votes.
(2) Constitutional laws on amendments to Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic are put to the vote in
the Parliament of the Azerbaijan Republic twice. The

Parliament of Azerbaijan (Milli Majlis)

second voting shall be held 6 months after the first
one.
(3) Constitutional laws on amendments to Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic are submitted to the
President of the Azerbaijan Republic for signing in an
order envisaged in the present Constitution for laws,
both after the first and after the second voting.
(4) Constitutional laws and amendments to the Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic become valid after
they have been signed by the President of the Azerbaijan Republic after the second voting.
(5) Constitutional laws on amendments are integral
part of Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic and
should not contradict main text of Constitution of the
Azerbaijan Republic.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for presidential war declarations.
Article 95
(1) The following questions fall under the competence
of the Parliament of the Azerbaijan Republic:
17. based on request of the President of the Azerbaijan
Republic giving consent for announcement of war
and conclusion of peace treaty.
Article 109
The President of the Azerbaijan Republic:
30. on consent of the Parliament of the Azerbaijan
Republic announces a war and concludes peace agreements.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 94
(1) The Parliament of the Azerbaijan Republic establishes general rules concerning the following matters:
22. ratification and denunciation of international
treaties.
Article 95
(1) The following questions fall under the competence
of the Parliament of the Azerbaijan Republic:
4. ratification and denunciation of international
agreements.
Article 109
The President of the Azerbaijan Republic:
17. presents interstate agreements to the Parliament of
the Azerbaijan Republic for ratification and denunciation.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant
amnesty.
Article 95
(1) The following questions fall under the competence
of the Parliament of the Azerbaijan Republic:
6. Amnesty.

55

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 109
The President of the Azerbaijan Republic:
22. grants pardon.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislature appoints members of the Constitutional Court, the Economic Court, and the
Supreme Court, upon recommendation by the
president.
Article 95
(1) The following questions fall under the competence
of the Parliament of the Azerbaijan Republic:
10. based on recommendation by the President of the
Azerbaijan Republic appointment of judges of Constitutional Court of the Azerbaijan Republic, Supreme
Court of the Azerbaijan Republic and Economic
Court of the Azerbaijan Republic.
Article 109
The President of the Azerbaijan Republic:
9. submits proposals to the Parliament of the Azerbaijan Republic about appointment of judges of Constitutional Court of the Azerbaijan Republic, Supreme Court
of the Azerbaijan Republic and Economic Court of the
Azerbaijan Republic.
Article 130
(1) Constitutional Court of the Azerbaijan Republic
consists of 9 judges.
(2) Judges of Constitutional Court of the Azerbaijan
Republic are appointed by the Parliament of the Azerbaijan Republic on recommendation by the President
of the Azerbaijan Republic.
Article 131
(2) Judges of Supreme Court of the Azerbaijan Republic are appointed by the Parliament of the Azerbaijan
Republic on recommendation of the President of the
Azerbaijan Republic.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. Formally, the legislature, on the recommendation of the president, appoints the board of the
National Bank of Azerbaijan, but in practice, the
appointment power rests wholly with the president.
Article 95
(1) The following questions fall under the competence
of the Parliament of the Azerbaijan Republic:
15. based on recommendation by the President of the
Azerbaijan Republic appointment and dismissal of
members of Administration Board of National Bank
of the Azerbaijan Republic.

56

Parliament of Azerbaijan (Milli Majlis)

Article 109
The President of the Azerbaijan Republic:
10. submits recommendations to the Parliament of the
Azerbaijan Republic about appointment and dismissal
of members of Administration Board of National Bank
of the Azerbaijan Republic.

No. Some, but not all, legislators have personal

staff.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.

No. The executive branch controls the public

media.

Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.

Yes. The legislature is in session for about seven

months each year.
Article 88
(1) Every year two sessions of the Parliament [Milli
Majlis] of the Azerbaijan Republic are held.
Spring session begins on 1 February and continues until
31 May.
Autumn session begins on 30 September and continues
until 30 December.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.
No. See item 28.

Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF BAHRAIN (MAJLIS AS-SHURA)

Expert consultants: Colin S. Cavell, Camille Edmond, Michael Herb, Abd al-Hadi Khalaf, Laurence
Louer, Jean-Francois Seznec
Score: .19
Influence over
executive (2/9)

Institutional
autonomy (0/9)

Specified
powers (0/8)

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

24. judiciary

X
X

X
X

25. central bank

26. media

18. all elected

The National Assembly (Majlis as-Shura) of Bahrain

was established in 1973 in Bahrains first postindependence constitution. The unicameral assembly was dissolved by the monarch in 1975, and
the al-Kahlifa family ruled without the National

Assembly for over a quarter century. In 2002 a new

constitution reestablished the National Assembly
as a bicameral body comprising an upper house,
the Consultative Council, and a lower house, the
Chamber of Deputies.

National Assembly of Bahrain (Majlis as-Shura)

Bahrains new constitution, while resurrecting

the National Assembly, did little to breathe life
back into it. Although the legislature has become
a forum for political contestation, particularly
following the 2006 elections, royal dominance
remains entrenched. The king is the official head
of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches,
and his dominance over legislation is nearly complete. The king can legislate by decree and alone
chooses the prime minister and the government.
The executive enjoys absolute gatekeeping authority; the legislature cannot even introduce a bill in
the Assembly without first securing formal permission from the government. The entire upper house
is also appointed by the king, and because the
approval of both houses is required to pass legislation, legislation opposed by the king has virtually
no chance of becoming law.
The National Assembly does enjoy a few
scattered powers. For example, the Chamber of
Deputies can interrogate ministers, and has done
so. Any institutional independence, however, is stifled by the constant threat of dissolution, a power
that the king can exercise at will.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. The legislature cannot impeach the monarch,
nor can it replace the prime minister without
action by the king.
Article 67
a. The subject of confidence in the Prime Minister shall
not be raised in the Chamber of Deputies.
b. If, two-thirds of members of the Chamber of Deputies
consider it not possible to cooperate with the Prime
Minister, the matter will be referred to the National
Assembly to consider it.
c. The National Assembly cannot issue its decision on
the lack of possibility of cooperating with the Prime
Minister prior to seven days from the date the matter
was referred to it.
d. If the National Assembly decides by a majority of
two thirds of its members that it is not possible to
cooperate with the Prime Minister, the matter is submitted to the King for a decision, either by relieving the
Prime Minister of his post and appointing a new Government, or by dissolving the Chamber of Deputies.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Ministers are prohibited from serving simultaneously in the legislature.

57
Article 48
b. While in charge of his Ministry, a Minister may not
assume any other public office.
Article 97
Membership of the Consultative Council and Chamber
of Deputies may not be combined, nor may membership of either chamber be combined with the assumption of public office.
Other cases of non-combination shall be prescribed by
law.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 65
(1) Upon an application signed by at least five members
of the Chamber of Deputies, any Minister may be questioned on matters coming within his sphere of competence.
Article 91
(1) Any member of the Consultative Council or the
Chamber of Deputies may direct written questions at
Ministers to clarify matters coming within their sphere
of competence, and only the questioner may comment once on the reply. If the Minister adds anything new, the member shall be further entitled to
comment.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature cannot investigate the king,
although investigations of some executive agencies
have been conducted.
Article 69
(1) The Chamber of Deputies may at any time form
commissions of inquiry or delegate one or more of its
members to investigate any matter coming within the
powers of the Chamber stated in the Constitution, and
the commission or member is to present the findings of
the inquiry not later than four months from the date
of commencement of the inquiry.
(2) Ministers and all State employees are to provide
such testimony, documents and statements as are asked
of them.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The agencies of coercion report directly to the
monarch and are not subject to legislative oversight.

58

6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

No. The king appoints the prime minister.
Article 33
d. The King appoints and dismisses the Prime Minister
by Royal Order, and appoints and dismisses Ministers
by Royal Decree as proposed by the Prime Minister.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The king appoints ministers on the recommendation of the prime minister, and the appointments do not require the legislatures approval.
Article 33
d. The King appoints and dismisses the Prime Minister
by Royal Order, and appoints and dismisses Ministers
by Royal Decree as proposed by the Prime Minister.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The country lacks a presidency. The king is the
chief executive.
9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.
No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in
the government. It can notify the king that it is
unable to cooperate with the prime minister, and
the king can decide to remove the prime minister
or dissolve the legislature.
Article 67
d. If the National Assembly decides by a majority of two
thirds of its members that it is not possible to cooperate
with the Prime Minister, the matter is submitted to the
King for a decision, either by relieving the Prime Minister of his post and appointing a new Government, or
by dissolving the Chamber of Deputies.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The king can dissolve the Chamber of
Deputies.
Article 42
c. The King is entitled to dissolve the Chamber of
Deputies by a Decree that states the reasons for the
dissolution. The Chamber cannot be dissolved for the
same reasons once again.

National Assembly of Bahrain (Majlis as-Shura)

not subsequently approved by the Chamber of

Deputies.
Article 38
(1) If between the convening of both the Consultative
Council and the Chamber of Deputies sessions, or during the period in which the National Assembly is in
recess, any event should occur that requires expediting
the adoption of measures that brook no delay, the King
may issue relevant Decrees that have the force of law,
provided they do not contravene the Constitution.
(2) Such Decrees must be referred to both the Consultative Council and the Chamber of Deputies within one
month from their promulgation if the two chambers
are in session, or within a month of the first meeting of
each of the two new chambers in the event of dissolution or if the legislative term had ended. If the Decrees
are not so referred, their legal force shall abate retrospectively without a need to issue a relevant ruling. If they
are referred to the two chambers but are not confirmed
by them their legal force shall also abate retrospectively.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority vote is needed to override the kings veto.
Article 35
c. With due regard for the provisions pertaining to
amendment of the Constitution, if within the interval
prescribed in the preceding clause the King returns to
the Consultative Council and the Chamber of Deputies
for reconsideration the draft of any law by way of a
Decree in justification, he shall state whether it should
be reconsidered in that same session or the next.
d. If the Consultative Council and the Chamber of
Deputies, or the National Assembly, re-approve the
draft by a majority of two-thirds of their members, the
King shall ratify it, and shall promulgate it within one
month of its approval for the second time.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 106
(1) A Constitutional Court shall be established . . . The
courts area of competence is to watch over the constitutionality of laws and statutes.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.

No. The king can issue decree-laws when the legislature is in recess. The decrees lapse if they are

No. The government has complete gatekeeping

authority. The National Assembly is prohibited

National Assembly of Bahrain (Majlis as-Shura)

59

from pursuing lawmaking at all, except with the

permission of the government.

No. The Consultative Council is entirely appointed

by the king.

Article 81
The Prime Minister shall present bills to the Chamber
of Deputies, which is entitled to pass, amend or reject
the bill.

Article 52
The Consultative Council is composed of forty
members appointed by Royal Order.

Article 92
a. Any member of the two chambers is entitled to propose laws. Each proposal shall be referred to the relevant committee in the chamber in which the proposal
was made for an opinion. If the chamber sees fit to
accept the proposal, it shall refer it to the Government
to formulate it . . . as a draft law and present it to the
Chamber of Deputies during the same or succeeding
period.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. In practice, the king is firmly in charge of all
expenditures.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
No. The legislature is dependent on the executive
for the resources that finance its own operations.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.

Article 56
The Chamber of Deputies comprises forty members
elected by direct, secret general ballot in accordance
with the provisions of the law.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments require the kings
approval.
Article 120
a. For any provision of this Constitution to be amended
the amendment must be approved by a two-thirds
majority of the members of whom both the Consultative Council and Chamber of Deputies are composed,
and the amendment must be approved by the King.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. The king can declare war without the legislatures approval.
Article 36
a. Aggressive war is forbidden. A defensive war is
declared by a Decree which shall be presented to the
National Assembly immediately upon its declaration,
for a decision on the conduct of the war.

No. Legislators can be prosecuted for the expression of any opinion that is prejudicial to the fundamentals of the religion or the unity of the nation,
or the mandatory respect for the King, or is defamatory of the personal life of any person.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.

Article 89
b. No member of the Consultative Council or the
Chamber of Deputies shall be called to account for
expressing his opinions or ideas in the Council or its
committees unless the opinion expressed is prejudicial
to the fundamentals of the religion or the unity of the
nation, or the mandatory respect for the King, or is
defamatory of the personal life of any person.
c. Other than in a case of flagrante delicto, it shall
be impermissible during the convening period for any
detention, investigation, search, arrest or custodial procedures or any other penal action to be taken against a
member except with the permission of the chamber of
which he is a member. Outside the convening period,
permission must be sought from the President of the
relevant chamber.

Article 37
(1) The King shall conclude treaties by Decree, and shall
communicate them to the Consultative Council and
the Chamber of Deputies forthwith accompanied by
the appropriate statement. A treaty shall have the force
of law once it has been concluded and ratified and published in the Official Gazette.
(2) However, peace treaties and treaties of alliance,
treaties relating to State territory, natural resources,
rights of sovereignty, the public and private rights of
citizens, treaties pertaining to commerce, shipping and
residence, and treaties which involve the State Exchequer in non-budget expenditure or which entail amendment of the laws of Bahrain, must be promulgated by
law to be valid.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.

No. The king concludes treaties by decree. Treaties

that require promulgation by law can also be
decreed by the king. See item 11.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Formally, a total amnesty may be granted only
by law. In practice, only the king has the power to
grant amnesty.

60
Article 41
The King may abate or commute a sentence by Decree.
A total amnesty may be granted only by law, and shall
apply to offences committed before the amnesty was
proposed.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The king has the power of pardon (commute a
sentence).
Article 41
The King may abate or commute a sentence by Decree.
A total amnesty may be granted only by law, and shall
apply to offences committed before the amnesty was
proposed.

National Assembly of Bahrain (Majlis as-Shura)

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes. The legislature meets for at least seven months
each year.
Article 72
The normal convening period for both the Consultative
Council and the Chamber of Deputies shall last for at
least seven months, and this convening period may not
be closed before the budget is approved.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes. Each legislator receives funds for office staff.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.

No. Each legislator receives funds for office staff,

but generally these funds are not large enough to
cover policy staff as well as secretaries.

No. The king appoints judges, and judicial appointments do not require the legislatures approval.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.

Article 33
h. The King chairs the Higher Judicial Council. The King
appoints judges by Royal Orders, as proposed by the
Higher Judicial Council.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The king appoints the head of the Central Bank
of Bahrain.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.

Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
No. In 2002 the National Assembly convened for
the first time in twenty-five years; none of the legislators is highly experienced.

Bangladesh Parliament ( Jatiya Sangsad)

61

BANGLADESH PARLIAMENT ( JATIYA SANGSAD)

Expert consultants: Q. K. Ahmad, Jamshed S. A. Choudhury, Sabine Mietzner, Atiur Rehman, Nadia
Shafiullah
Score: .59
Influence over
executive (8/9)

Institutional
autonomy (4/9)

Specified
powers (3/8)
19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

X
X

23. pardon
24. judiciary
X

Institutional
capacity (4/6)
X

X
X
X

25. central bank

26. media

The Bangladesh Parliament (Jatiya Sangsad) was

established in 1972 in the countrys first postindependence constitution following separation
from Pakistan. The unicameral parliament was in
existence for only three years before it was dissolved and the government was overthrown in
a military coup. Sweeping constitutional changes
in 1975 transformed the country from a parliamentary to a presidential system. Legislative elections were held in 1978, but more instability followed. Civilian rule again gave way to a coup in
1981 and the imposition of martial law in 1985.
In 1991 Bangladesh experienced a return to civilian rule and constitutional changes that restored
a Westminster-style parliamentary system. Parliamentary elections scheduled for early 2007 were
postponed after weeks of protests and violence in
which opposition groups claimed that the polls
were rigged in the governments favor. The elections originally were rescheduled for April 2007,
but that date was subsequently pushed back by an
emergency military-backed government, which as
of this writing promises new elections by the end
of 2008.
The parliament, at least during times when it
is allowed to function normally, enjoys substantial
power, including broad oversight authority over
the executive branch. Furthermore, the Bangladesh
Parliament is one of a few legislatures in the world

whose laws are supreme and not subject to judicial

review.
Still, the presence of a strong presidency distinguishes Bangladesh from a typical Westminsterstyle system. For example, the president has some
gatekeeping authority and may rule by decree
when parliament is not in session, circumscribing
the legislatures institutional autonomy. The legislature possesses a few enumerated powers and has
a moderate amount of institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can impeach the president by
a two-thirds majority vote of its total membership
and can replace the prime minister by a majority
vote of its total membership.
Article 52
(1) The President may be impeached on a charge of
violating this Constitution or of grave misconduct, preferred by a notice of motion signed by a majority of the
total number of members of the Parliament.
(2) The Conduct of the President may be referred by
Parliament to any court, tribunal or body appointed
or designated by Parliament for the investigation of a
charge under this article.

62
(3) The President shall have the right to appear and to
be represented during the consideration of the charge.
(4) If after the consideration of the charge a resolution
is passed by Parliament by votes of not less than twothirds of the total number of members declaring that
the charge has been substantiated, the President shall
vacate his office on the date on which the resolution is
passed.
Article 57
(2) If the Prime Minister ceases to retain the support
of a majority of the members of Parliament, he shall
either resign his office or . . . the President shall, if he
is satisfied that no other member of Parliament commands the support of the majority of the members of
Parliament, dissolve Parliament accordingly.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. At least 90 percent of the ministers must be
chosen from parliament.
Article 56
(2) The appointments of the Prime Minister and other
Ministers and of the Ministers of State and Deputy
Ministers, shall be made by the President: Provided
that not less than nine-tenths of their number shall be
appointed from among members of Parliament and not
more than one-tenth of their number may be chosen
from among persons qualified for election as members
of Parliament.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 76
(2) In addition to the committees referred to in clause
(1), Parliament shall appoint other standing committees, and a committee so appointed may, subject to this
Constitution and to any other law
(c) in relation to any matter referred to it by Parliament
as a matter of public importance, investigate or inquire
into the activities or administration of a Ministry and
may require it to furnish, through an authorized representative, relevant information and to answer questions, orally or in writing.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).

Bangladesh Parliament ( Jatiya Sangsad)

Yes. The legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. The president is obliged to appoint as prime
minister the member of parliament who commands majority support in the parliament.
Article 56
(3) The President shall appoint as Prime Minister the
member of Parliament who appears to him to command the support of the majority of the members of
Parliament.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. Ministers are appointed by the president on
the recommendation of the prime minister, and
the appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 56
(1) There shall be Prime Minister, and such other Ministers, Ministers of State and Deputy Ministers as may
be determined by the Prime Minister.
(2) The appointments of the . . . Ministers and of the
Ministers of State and Deputy Ministers, shall be made
by the President.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The legislature elects the president.
Article 48
(1) There shall be a President of Bangladesh who shall
be elected by members of Parliament in accordance
with law.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 57
(2) If the Prime Minister ceases to retain the support
of a majority of the members of Parliament, he shall
either resign his office or . . . the President shall, if he
is satisfied that no other member of Parliament commands the support of the majority of the members of
Parliament, dissolve Parliament accordingly.
Article 58
(4) If the Prime Minister resigns from or ceases to hold
office each of the other Ministers shall be deemed also
to have resigned from office but shall, subject to the
provisions of the Chapter, continue to hold office until
his successor has entered upon office.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.

Bangladesh Parliament ( Jatiya Sangsad)

No. The president can dissolve the legislature. See

item 9.
11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The president can issue decree-laws when parliament is not in session. The decrees lapse if
they are not subsequently approved by the legislature.
Article 93
(1) At any time when Parliament stands dissolved or is
not in session, if the President is satisfied that circumstances exist which render immediate action necessary,
he may make and promulgate such Ordinances as the
circumstances appear to him to require, and any Ordinance so made shall, as from its promulgation have the
like force of law as an Act of Parliament:
(2) An Ordinance made under clause (1) shall be laid
before Parliament at its first meeting following the promulgation of the Ordinance and shall, unless it is earlier repealed, cease to have effect at the expiration of
thirty days after it is so laid or, if a resolution disapproving of the Ordinance is passed by Parliament
before such expiration, upon the passing of the resolution.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote of its present members.
Article 80
(3) The President, within fifteen days after a Bill is presented to him shall assent to the Bill or, in the case of a
Bill other than a money Bill may return it to parliament
with a message requesting that the Bill or any particular
provisions thereof by reconsidered.
(4) If the President so returns the Bill Parliament shall
consider it together with the Presidents message, and
if the Bill is again passed by Parliament with or without
amendments, it shall be presented to the President for
his assent.

63
Article 82
(1) In this Part Money Bill means a Bill containing
only provisions dealing with all or any of the following
matters
(a) the imposition, regulation, alteration, remission
or repeal of any tax;
(b) the borrowing of money or the giving of any guarantee by the Government, or the amendment of any
law relating to the financial obligations of the Government;
(c) the custody of the Consolidated Fund, the payment of money into, or the issue or appropriation of
moneys from, the Fund;
(d) the imposition of a charge upon the Consolidated Fund, or the alteration or abolition of any such
charge;
(e) the receipt of moneys on account of the Consolidated Fund or the Public Account of the Republic, or
the custody or issue of such moneys, or the audit of
the accounts of the Government;
(f) any subordinate matter incidental to any of the
matters specified in the foregoing sub-clauses.
Article 82
No Money Bill, or any Bill which involves expenditure
from public moneys, shall be introduced into Parliament except on the recommendation of the President.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The president can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,
including control over members allowances.
Article 68
Members of Parliament shall be entitled to such
allowances and privileges as may be determined by Act
of Parliament or, until so determined, by order made
by the President.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.

Yes. The legislatures laws are supreme as the constitution does not empower the judiciary to engage
in review of legislation.

No. Legislative immunity extends to official parliamentary business only. Legislators are subject to
arrest for common crimes.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.

Article 78
(3) A member of Parliament shall not be liable to proceedings in any court in respect of anything said, or any
vote given, by him in Parliament or in any committed
thereof.
(4) A person shall not be liable to proceedings in any
court in respect of the publication by or under the

No. The legislature is prohibited from introducing

legislation related to taxation, public expenditures,
and government debt.

64
authority of Parliament of any report, paper, vote or
proceeding.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.

Bangladesh Parliament ( Jatiya Sangsad)

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Pardon and amnesty are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.

Article 65
(2) Parliament shall consist of three hundred members
to be elected in accordance with law from single territorial constituencies by direct election.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can amend the constitution
with a two-thirds majority vote. Select articles of
the constitution, including those related to fundamental principles and the constitutional amendment process itself, require approval in a popular
referendum.
Article 142
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution
(a) any provision thereof may by amended by way of
addition, alteration, substitution or by Act of Parliament:
Provided that
(ii) no such Bill shall be presented to the President for
assent unless it is passed by the votes of not less than
two-thirds of the total number of members of Parliament.
(1A) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause
(1), when a Bill, passed as a aforesaid, which provides
for the amendment of the Preamble or any provisions
of articles 8, 48, 56, 94, 95 or this article, is presented
to the President for assent, the President, shall within
the period of seven days, after the Bill is presented to
him, cause to be referred to a referendum the question
whether the Bill should or should not be assented to.

No. The president has the power to grant pardon.

Article 49
The President shall have power to grant pardons,
reprieves and respites and to remit, suspend or commute any sentence passed by any court, tribunal or
other authority.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The president makes appointments to the judiciary, and the appointments do not require the legislatures approval.
Article 95
(1) The Chief Justice and other Judges shall be
appointed by the President.
Article 98
Notwithstanding the provisions of article 94, if the President is satisfied that the number of the Judge of a division of the Supreme Court should be for the time being
increased, the President may appoint one or more duly
qualified person to be Additional Judges of that division.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the governor of the
Bangladesh Bank.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the

operation of the public media.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for the

declaration of war.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Article 63
(1) War shall not be declared and the Republic shall
not participate in any war except with the assent of
Parliament.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 145A
All treaties with foreign countries shall be submitted to
the President, who shall cause them to be laid before
Parliament.

Yes. Parliament determines its own schedule and is

regularly in session.
Article 72
(5) The sittings of Parliament shall be held at such times
and places as Parliament may, by its rules of procedure
or otherwise determine.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.

National Assembly of Belarus (Natsionalnoe Sobranie)

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.

65

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

Yes.

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF BELARUS (NATSIONALNOE SOBRANIE)

Expert consultants: Arkady Cherepansky, Elena A. Korosteleva-Polglase, Yury Likhtarovich,
Alexander Lukashuk, David R. Marples, Rodger Potocki, Alaksandar Salajka, Lucan A. Way
Score: .25
Influence over
executive (2/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Institutional
autonomy (0/9)

Specified
powers (3/8)

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon
24. judiciary

Institutional
capacity (3/6)

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

25. central bank

26. media

18. all elected

The National Assembly (Natsionalnoe Sobranie) of

Belarus was established in a 1996 constitutional
amendment. The National Assembly is a bicameral legislature with a directly elected House
of Representatives (Palata Predstavitelei) and an
upper house, the Council of the Republic (Sovet
Respubliki), made up of elected representatives and
presidential appointees.
The amendments that created the National
Assembly reshaped Belaruss first post-Soviet constitution, which was adopted in 1994. They
replaced the previous legislature, the unicameral
Supreme Council, with the National Assembly and
greatly enhanced presidential power.
While the president was, in practice, the
preeminent force in Belarusian politics between
1994 and 1996, the constitutional amendments
of 1996 encoded presidential dominance. The

1996 amendments gave the president the power

to appoint some members of parliament; previously the legislature had been entirely elected.
Whereas the 1994 constitution provided the legislature with broad appointment powers, the new
system gives the president free reign to appoint
ministers without legislative approval. The legislatures previous independence in lawmaking
was also circumscribed by changes that provide
the president with some gatekeeping authority.
Furthermore, under the 1994 constitution the
legislature was immune from dissolution; the
revised system grants the president dissolution
powers.
The parliament is left with precious little power,
although it retains the authority to grant amnesty,
appoint some members of the Constitutional
Court, and declare war.

66

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Formally, the parliament, acting alone, can
impeach the president. In practice, presidential
impeachment is unthinkable.
Article 88
The President may be removed from office for acts of
state treason and other grave crimes. The decision to
file a charge against the President shall be supported
by a majority of the whole House of Representatives
on behalf of no less than one-third of the number
of deputies. The investigation of the charge shall be
exercised by the Council of the Republic. The President shall be deemed to be removed from office if the
decision is adopted by no less than two-thirds of the
full composition of the Council of the Republic, and
no less than two-thirds of the full House of Representatives . . . Where the President is removed in connection with the commission of a crime, the case shall be
examined on the merits of the charge by the Supreme
Court.
Article 97
The House of Representatives shall:
9) be entitled with a majority of the full composition
of the House of Representatives to forward charges of
treason or of some other grave crime against the President; on the basis of the decision of the Council of the
Republic and with no less than a two-thirds majority of
the full composition of the House take the decision to
remove the President from office.
Article 98
The Council of the Republic shall:
7) consider charges of treason or of some other grave
crime forwarded by the House of Representatives
against the President and take decision on its investigation. Given the presence of substantial evidence take
the decision to remove the President from office with
no less than two-thirds of the full composition of the
House.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Deputies in the House of Representatives may
serve simultaneously as ministers; members of the
Council of the Republic, however, are prohibited
from serving simultaneously as ministers.
Article 92
A deputy of the House of Representatives may simultaneously be member of the Government . . . A member of
the Council of the Republic may not be simultaneously
a member of the Government.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive

National Assembly of Belarus (Natsionalnoe Sobranie)

branch officials testifying before the legislature or its

committees are regularly held.
No. Formally, the government is required to hold
a monthly question time. At other times the legislature may submit inquires to the government,
and the government is required to respond within
twenty days. In practice, even this limited degree
of oversight is not exercised.
Article 103
One sitting monthly shall be reserved for question time
to the Government for the deputies of the Houses of
Representatives and members of the Council of the
Republic. A deputy of the House of Representatives or
member of the Council of the Republic shall have the
right to make an inquiry to the Prime minister or members of the Government and the heads of state bodies
which are formed or elected by Parliament. The inquiry
shall be included in the agenda of the chamber. The
answer to the inquiry shall be given within twenty days
of the current session to the order determined by the
chamber of the Parliament.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive. Prior to the 1996 amendments, the legislature
had the formal power to set up investigatory commissions.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The agencies of coercion are controlled by the
president and are not subject to legislative oversight.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister. The
appointment requires the approval of the House of
Representatives.
Article 84
The President of the Republic of Belarus shall:
6) appoint the Prime minister of the Republic of Belarus
with the consent of the House of Representatives.
Article 106
The Prime minister shall be appointed by the President
of the Republic of Belarus with the consent of the House
of Representatives.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers and the
appointments do not require the legislatures

National Assembly of Belarus (Natsionalnoe Sobranie)

approval. Prior to the 1996 amendments, ministerial appointments, at least formally, required the
legislatures approval.
Article 84
The President of the Republic of Belarus shall:
7) appoint and dismiss the deputy Prime ministers,
ministers and other members of the Government.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 81
The President shall be elected directly by the people of
the Republic of Belarus for a term of office of five years
by universal, free, equal, direct and secret ballot.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 97
The House of Representatives shall:
5) consider the report of the Prime minister on the policy of the Government and approve or reject it; a second
rejection by the House of the policy of the Government
shall be deemed as an expression of non-confidence to
the Government;
6) consider on the initiative of the Prime minister a call
for a vote of confidence;
7) on the initiative of no less than one-third of the full
composition of the House of Representatives express a
non-confidence vote to the Government.
Article 106
The Prime minister may request from the House of Representatives a vote of confidence with regard to the governmental Programme or any other issue submitted to
the House. If a non-confidence vote is passed by the
House of Representatives, the President shall be entitled to accept the resignation of the Government, or
dissolve the House of Representatives within ten days,
and call on holding new elections. If the resignation of
the Government is rejected the latter shall continue to
discharge its duties.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Prior to the 1996 amendments, the legislature was
immune from dissolution.
Article 94
The powers of the House of Representatives may be terminated prematurely where no confidence is expressed
or a non-confidence vote is expressed to the Government, or where the House fails twice to give its consent
for the appointment of the Prime Minister. The powers
of the House of Representatives or the Council of the

67
Republic may be prematurely terminated in accordance
with the conclusion of the Constitutional Court due to
systematic and gross violation of the Constitution by
the chambers of the Parliament.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The president issues decrees that have the force
of law. The presidents decree powers are extraordinarily robust: Decrees remain in force unless they
are rejected by a two-thirds majority vote of both
chambers of parliament.
Article 101
In instances of necessity the President may personally
initiate or to the proposal of the Government may issue
temporary decrees which have the power of law. If such
decrees are issued on the initiative of the Government,
they shall be signed by the Prime minister. Temporary
decrees shall be submitted for further approval within
three days of their adoption to the House of Representatives, and then to the Council of the Republic.
These decrees shall be valid if they are not rejected by
a majority of no fewer than two-thirds of votes of the
full composition of both chambers.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority vote in both houses is
required to override a presidential veto.
Article 100
If the President does not agree with the text of the
bill, he shall return it together with his objections to
the House of Representatives, which shall consider it
with the Presidents objections within thirty days. If
the bill has been adopted by the House of Representatives by no less than two-thirds of its full composition,
it together with the Presidents objections and within
five days shall be submitted to the Council of the Republic, which shall consider it for a second hearing within
twenty days. The bill shall be deemed to have been
approved if no less than two-thirds of the full composition of the Council of the Republic has voted for it. The
bill, after the House of Representatives and the Council
of the Republic have overrun the Presidents objections,
shall be signed by the President within five days. The
bill shall become a law even if it is not signed by the
President within the assigned time.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 116
The Constitutional Court . . . shall produce a ruling on:
the conformity of laws . . . to the Constitution.

68

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. The legislature is prohibited from introducing legislation related to the reduction of state
resources, the increase of public expenditures, or
constitutional amendments. Prior to 1996 the legislature had the right to initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
Article 99
Draft laws the adoption of which may reduce state
resources, or increase expenditures may be introduced
in the House of Representatives only with the consent
of the President or to his assignment by the Government.
Article 138
The issue of amending and supplementing the Constitution shall be considered by the chambers of the
Parliament on the initiative of the President or of no
fewer than 150,000 citizens of the Republic of Belarus
who are eligible to vote.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The president can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
No. The legislature is dependent on the executive
for the resources that finance its own operations.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. By law, legislators are immune except for cases
of slander and insult. In practice, this exception
has been used to persecute members of parliament.
For example, in 2004 two opposition leaders were
charged with public slander against the president
and sentenced to two years in a labor camp.
Article 102
The deputies of the House of Representatives and members of the Council of the Republic shall enjoy immunity in the expression of their views and execution of
their powers. This shall not refer to charges of slander
and insult. During the period they exercise their powers
the deputies and the members of Council of the Republic may be arrested or deprived of personal liberty in
other manner only with the prior consent of the appropriate chamber with the exception of instances of high
treason, or some other grave crime, as well as detention
at the site where the crime was committed. A criminal
case involving a deputy of the House of Representatives

National Assembly of Belarus (Natsionalnoe Sobranie)

or a member of the Council of the Republic shall be
tried by the Supreme Court.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
No. Eight members of the Council of the Republic
are appointed by the president. Prior to the 1996
amendment all members of the legislature were
elected.
Article 91
The election of deputies to the House of Representatives
shall be carried out in accordance with the law on the
basis of universal, equal, free, direct electoral suffrage
and by secret ballot . . . Eight members of the Council
of the Republic shall be appointed by the President of
the Republic of Belarus.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments can only be initiated by the president or the citizenry. Prior to
1996 the legislature alone could change the constitution.
Article 138
The issue of amending and supplementing the Constitution shall be considered by the chambers of the
Parliament on the initiative of the President or of no
fewer than 150,000 citizens of the Republic of Belarus
who are eligible to vote.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The constitution grants the House of Representatives the formal power to declare war. There
is not a sufficient evidentiary basis on which to
conclude that this provision does not hold in practice.
Article 97
The House of Representatives shall:
2) consider draft laws, including the guidelines of the
domestic and foreign policy of the Republic of Belarus;
declaration of war and conclusion of peace.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
No. In practice, the president concludes international treaties. According to the constitution, the
legislatures approval is necessary to ratify international treaties, but the president generally refuses
to submit international agreements to parliament.
Article 97
The House of Representatives shall:

National Assembly of Belarus (Natsionalnoe Sobranie)

2) consider draft laws, including the guidelines of
the domestic and foreign policy of the Republic of
Belarus; ratification and denunciation of interstate
treaties.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant
amnesty.
Article 97
The House of Representatives shall:
2) consider draft laws, including the guidelines of the
domestic and foreign policy of the Republic of Belarus;
issues of criminal responsibility and amnesty.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 84
The President of the Republic of Belarus shall:
19) grant pardons to convicted citizens.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The Council of the Republic appoints six of
the twelve judges on the Constitutional Court
and must approve the presidents appointment for
chairperson of the Constitutional Court.
Article 98
The Council of the Republic shall:
2) give its consent for the appointment by the President of the Chairperson of the Constitutional Court,
Chairperson and judges of the Supreme Court, the
Chairperson and judges of the Supreme Economic
Court, the Chairperson of the Central Commission
on Elections and National Referenda, the ProcuratorGeneral, the Chairperson and members of the National
Bank;
3) elect six judges of the Constitutional Court.
Article 116
Six Judges of the Constitutional Court shall be
appointed by the President of the Republic of Belarus
and six elected by the Council of the Republic. The
Chairperson of the Constitutional Court shall be
appointed by the President with the consent of the
Council of the Republic. The term of the members of
the Constitutional Court shall be 11 years, and the permissible age limit shall be 70 years.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the chairman of the
National Bank of Belarus with the approval of the
legislature.

69
Article 84
The President of the Republic of Belarus shall:
9) appoint with the consent of the Council of the
Republic . . . the Chairperson and members of the Governing Board of the National Bank.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The president controls the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature meets for a maximum of 170
days each year. In practice, including special sessions, the legislature meets for more than six
months each year.
Article 95
The chambers shall hold their regular sessions twice
a year. The first session shall open on October 2; its
duration may not exceed 80 days. The second session
shall open on April 2 and its duration may not exceed
90 days.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
No. During the 1990s the president intervened
aggressively in the legislatures affairs, pushing
through constitutional changes that reshaped the
legislature and enabled him to rid the body of his
political opponents. The presidents actions, combined with the relative youth of the post-Soviet
legislature, have left the National Assembly short
of highly experienced legislators.

70

Federal Parliament of Belgium (Federale Parlement/Parlement federal)

FEDERAL PARLIAMENT OF BELGIUM (FEDERALE PARLEMENT VAN BELGIE/

ERAL

PARLEMENT FED
DA LA BELGIQUE)
Expert consultants: Sam Depauw, Kris Deschouwer, Koen Muylle, Gerard Roland, Marc Swyngedouw
Score: .75
Influence over
executive (8/9)

Institutional
autonomy (6/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

Specified
powers (5/8)
X

Institutional
capacity (5/6)

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

26. media

X
X

X
X
X

The Federal Parliament (Federale Parlement/

Parlement federal) of Belgium was established in
the constitution of 1831. The bicameral legislature
consists of a directly elected House of Representatives (Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers/Chambre
des representants) and a Senate (Senaat/Senat),
whose members are partly elected and partly appointed by local representative bodies. The constitution was amended in 1893, 1920, 1970, 1980,
1988, and 1993. The amendments expanded
suffrage and devolved power to linguistic communities, but did not greatly alter the powers of parliament.
The legislature enjoys considerable clout. It
has effective control over the executive. Parliament chooses the prime minister, interpellates and
investigates the government, and can remove the
government with a vote of no confidence. The legislatures own institutional operations are largely
autonomous. The legislature can introduce legislation in any policy jurisdiction, its laws are vetoproof, and it is largely immune from dissolution by
the king. It is also vested with a number of specified
powers and equipped with significant institutional
capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can replace the prime minister
with a vote of no confidence.
Article 96
(2) The Federal Government offers its resignation to
the King if the House of Representatives, by an
absolute majority of its members, adopts a motion
of disapproval, proposing to the King the nomination of a successor to the Prime Minister, or proposes to the King the nomination of a successor to
the Prime Minister within three days of the rejection of a motion of confidence. The King names
the proposed successor as Prime Minister, who takes
office the moment the new federal Government is
sworn in.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in a ministerial position.

Federal Parliament of Belgium (Federale Parlement/Parlement federal)

71

Article 50
Any member of one of the two Houses, appointed by
the King as a minister and who accepts this nomination,
ceases to sit in the House and takes up his mandate
again when the King has put an end to his functions as
a minister.

a vote of confidence before entering office, but

by custom the crown and the prime minister are
required to obtain such a vote from the legislature.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.

Yes. Ministers regularly attend the meetings of parliament and answer questions.
Article 100
(2) The House of Representatives may demand the presence of ministers.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
Article 56
Each House has the right to hold an enquiry.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. Legislative committees have effective powers
of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. The king appoints as prime minister the candidate who enjoys the support of the House of Representatives.
Article 96
(1) The King appoints and dismisses his ministers.
(2) The Federal Government offers its resignation to
the King if the House of Representatives, by an absolute majority of its members, adopts a motion of disapproval, proposing to the King the nomination of a
successor to the Prime Minister, or proposes to the King
the nomination of a successor to the Prime Minister
within three days of the rejection of a motion of confidence. The King names the proposed successor as Prime
Minister, who takes office the moment the new federal
Government is sworn in.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The king appoints ministers on the recommendation of the prime minister and with the
approval of the legislature. The law does not explicitly stipulate that the government must receive

Article 96
(1) The King appoints and dismisses his ministers.

Yes. The country lacks a presidency.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.
Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 46
(1) The King has only the right to dissolve the House of
Representatives if the latter, with the absolute majority
of its members:
1) either rejects a motion of confidence in the federal
Government and does not propose to the King, within
three days from the day of the rejection of the motion,
the nomination of a successor to the Prime Minister;
2) or adopts a motion of disapproval with regard to
the federal Government and does not simultaneously
propose to the King the nomination of a successor to
the Prime Minister.
Article 96
(2) The Federal Government offers its resignation to
the King if the House of Representatives, by an absolute majority of its members, adopts a motion of disapproval, proposing to the King the nomination of a
successor to the Prime Minister, or proposes to the King
the nomination of a successor to the Prime Minister
within three days of the rejection of a motion of confidence. The King names the proposed successor as Prime
Minister, who takes office the moment the new federal
Government is sworn in.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The king can dissolve the legislature.
Article 46
(1) The King has only the right to dissolve the House of
Representatives if the latter, with the absolute majority
of its members:
1) either rejects a motion of confidence in the federal
Government and does not propose to the King, within
three days from the day of the rejection of the motion,
the nomination of a successor to the Prime Minister;
2) or adopts a motion of disapproval with regard to
the federal Government and does not simultaneously
propose to the King the nomination of a successor to
the Prime Minister.

72

Federal Parliament of Belgium (Federale Parlement/Parlement federal)

(4) The dissolution of the House of Representatives

entails the dissolution of the Senate.
Article 195
(1) The federal legislative power has the right to declare
a warranted constitutional revision of those matters
which it determines.
(2) Following such a declaration, the two Houses are
dissolved by full right.

16. The legislature controls the resources that finance

its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
Each chamber of parliament provides for its own
financial needs in the state budget. The perquisites
of members of the House of Representatives are
also encoded in the constitution.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.

Article 60
Each House determines, by its regulations, the way in
which it exercises its duties.

Yes. The king and the prime minister lack decree

power. The legislature can, and on occasion has,
passed legislation authorizing the government to
rule temporarily by decree. For example, such
decree power was authorized in the 1980s to grapple with an economic recession.

Article 66
(1) Each member of the House of Representatives benefits from an annual indemnity of twelve thousand
francs.
(2) He also has the right to free travel on all the means
of communication operated or contracted out by the
State.
(3) The law determines the means of transport that the
representatives can use free of charge apart from those
mentioned above.
(4) An annual indemnity to be deducted from the allocation destined to cover the expenditure of the House
of Representatives can be attributed to the President of
this assembly.
(5) The House determines the amount of the deductions that can be applied to the indemnity by way of a
contribution to the pension funds that it judges necessary to establish.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. In theory, the king could refuse assent to a law
passed by the legislature. In practice, however, the
king almost always promulgates laws. When he has
refused to do so, his objections have been ignored.
For example, in 1990, when the king refused to
assent to legislation legalizing abortion, the government promulgated the measure itself, and it
became law.
13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Court of Arbitration can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 142
(1) There is, for all of Belgium, a Court of Arbitration, the composition, competencies, and functioning
of which are established by law.
(2) This court statutes by means of ruling on:
3) the violation through a law, a decree, or through a
ruling . . . of constitutional articles determined by law.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.

Article 71
(1) Senators do not receive a salary.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislators are immune only while the legislature is in session.
Article 58
No member of either of the two Houses can be prosecuted or pursued with regard to opinions and votes
given by him in the exercise of his duties.
Article 59
(1) No member of either of the two Houses can, during
the duration of a session, be arrested or prosecuted for
repression, except with the authorization of the House
of which he is a member, except in cases of flagrante
delicto.
(2) No imprisonment for debt can be undertaken
against a member of either of the two Houses during
a session, except with the same authorization.
(3) The detention of or a lawsuit against a member of
either of the two Houses is suspended during a session
and for its entire duration, if the House so requires.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.

Federal Parliament of Belgium (Federale Parlement/Parlement federal)

Yes. The government and the crown lack the right

to appoint members of the legislature, although
members of the royal family in the line of succession are guaranteed a seat in the Senate.
Members of the House of Representatives are
directly elected, and members of the Senate are
either elected or appointed by local representative
bodies.
Article 61
(1) The members of the House of Representatives are
elected directly by citizens who have completed the age
of eighteen and who do not fall within the categories
of exclusion stipulated by law.
Article 67
(1) Without prejudice to Article 72, the Senate is made
up of seventy-one senators, of whom:
1) twenty-five senators elected in conformity with Article 61, by the Dutch electoral college;
2) fifteen senators elected in conformity with Article
61, by the French electoral college;
3) ten senators appointed by and within the Council of
the Flemish Community, named the Flemish Council;
4) ten senators appointed by and within the Council
of the French Community;
5) one senator appointed by and within the Council of
the German-speaking Community;
6) six senators appointed by the senators referred to in
1) and 3);
7) four senators appointed by the senators referred to
in 2) and 4).

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
through a complicated procedure. The sitting legislature can propose a constitutional amendment,
and then, following an election, the subsequent
legislature can approve the change with a twothirds majority vote.
Article 195
(1) The federal legislative power has the right to declare
a warranted constitutional revision of those matters
which it determines.
(2) Following such a declaration, the two Houses are
dissolved by full right.
(3) Two new Houses are then convened, in keeping
with the terms of Article 46.
(4) These Houses statute, of common accord with the
King, on those points submitted for revision.
(5) In this case, the Houses may debate only provided
that two-thirds of the members composing each House
are present; and no change may be adopted unless voted
upon by a two-thirds majority.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

73

No. The king declares war on the recommendation

of the government, and war declarations do not
require the legislatures approval.
Article 167
(1.2) The King commands the armed forces, and determines the state of war and the cessation of hostilities.
He notifies the Houses as soon as State interests and
security permit and he adds those messages deemed
appropriate.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 167
(1.3) Territorial transfers, exchanges, and additions
may take place only by virtue of a law.
(2) The King concludes treaties . . . These treaties may
take effect only following approval of the Houses.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. Amnesty can be granted through legislation
only.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The king has the power of pardon.
Article 110
The King has the right to annul or to reduce sentences
pronounced by judges, except for that which is statuted
relative to ministers and members of Community and
Regional Governments.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The constitution does not specify rules for the
composition of the Court of Arbitration (Constitutional Court). According to Article 32 of the Special Court of Arbitration Act, the Senate proposes
a slate of nominees, whose appointment is then
formalized by the king.
Article 142
(1) There is, for all of Belgium, a Court of Arbitration, the composition, competencies, and functioning
of which are established by law.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The king, acting on the behest of the government, appoints the governor of the National Bank
of Belgium.

74

Federal Parliament of Belgium (Federale Parlement/Parlement federal)

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.

Yes. Parliamentary group appoints some members

of the state media board.

No. See item 28.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes. The legislature is in session for about ten
months each year, from the beginning of October
until the end of July.
Article 44
(1) The Houses meet by right each year on the second Tuesday of October, unless they have been called
together prior to this by the King.
(2) The Houses must meet each year for at least forty
days.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes. Each member of parliament receives the
resources to hire one staff person. The legislator
can choose to hire a personal secretary or a staff
member with policy expertise.

Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

NATIONALE)
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF BENIN (ASSEMBLEE
Expert consultants: John R. Heilbrunn, Bruce A. Magnusson, Cedric Mayrargue, Linda Trudel,
Leonard Wantchekon
Score: .56
Influence over
executive (2/9)

Institutional
autonomy (8/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

24. judiciary

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

25. central bank

26. media

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

X
X

18. all elected

Specified
powers (4/8)

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

X
X
X

The National Assembly (Assemblee nationale) of

Benin was established in the constitution of 1990.
Benin achieved independence in 1960 and was
ruled by one military leader after another in a series
of coups detat. Major Mathieu Kerekou seized

power in 1972 and managed to stay in power until

1990. Kerekou adopted communism as an ideological mantle and established a powerless legislature,
the National Revolutionary Assembly. In 1990, in
the midst of domestic unrest, Kerekou assented

National Assembly of Benin (Assemblee nationale)

to a national conference that opened the way for

multiparty politics and the 1990 constitution,
which remains in effect today.
The National Assembly has considerable power,
although its capabilities are unevenly distributed.
It has precious little control over the executive. Yet
while the legislature has little ability to influence
executive power, it has a great deal of institutional
autonomy. Among other sources of autonomy, it is
immune from dissolution by the executive, it can
initiate bills in all policy jurisdictions, and its laws
are virtually veto-proof. The legislature also enjoys
a number of powers and prerogatives.
Partly as a result of economic underdevelopment, the institutional capacity of the legislature
is restricted. Legislators salaries are very low, and
a lack of funds for support personnel means that
legislators must operate without staff.

75

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 71
The President of the Republic or any member of his
Government in the exercise of his governmental office
may be interpellated by the National Assembly.
The President of the Republic shall respond to these
interpellations in the presence of the National Assembly in person or by one of his ministers that he shall
especially delegate.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires action by
the Constitutional Court.
Article 76
There shall be an insult to the National Assembly when,
to questions posed by the National Assembly concerning governmental activity, the President of the Republic
shall not furnish any response within a period of thirty
days.
Article 77
After this deadline, the President of the National Assembly shall submit this grave shortcoming to the Constitutional Court for constitutional action. The Constitutional Court shall decide within three days. The President of the Republic shall be required to furnish the
responses to the National Assembly within the shortest
period of time, and in all cases before the end of the
current session.
At the expiration of this period, if there has been no
follow-up given by the President of the Republic to the
decision of the Court, the President of the Republic shall
be impeached before the High Court of Justice for insult
to the National Assembly.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 92
Any Deputy appointed to a ministerial post shall automatically lose his parliamentary mandate.

Article 113
The Government shall be obliged to furnish to the
National Assembly all explanations which shall be
demanded of it concerning its management and its
activities.
The means of information and of control of the
National Assembly on governmental action shall be:
The interpellation in accordance with Article 71;
The written question;
The oral question with or without debate, and not
followed by a vote;
The parliamentary committee of inquiry.
These means shall be exercised under the conditions
determined by the Rules of Procedure of the National
Assembly.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The agencies of coercion report directly to the
president and are not subject to legislative oversight.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. Benin does not have a prime minister.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers after seeking
the opinion of the National Assembly, but ministerial appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.

76

National Assembly of Benin (Assemblee nationale)

Article 54
The President of the Republic . . . shall appoint, after an
advisory opinion of the National Assembly, the members of the Government.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.

Article 114
The Constitutional Court . . . shall be the judge of the
constitutionality of the law.

No. The president is directly elected.

Article 42
The President of the Republic shall be elected by direct
universal suffrage for a mandate of five years, renewable
only one time.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in
the government.

No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.

Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.

Yes. The executive cannot impound funds appropriated by the legislature. On occasion the president has, however, increased the states budgetary
appropriations.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.

16. The legislature controls the resources that finance

its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.

Yes. The executive lacks decree power. The president can exercise degree power only when specifically authorized to do so by the legislature.

Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,

including control over members salaries.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.

Article 102
The Government may, for the execution of its program,
request the National Assembly to vote a statute authorizing it to issue by edict, during a limited period of
time, measures which are normally in the domain of
the statute. This authorization may be granted only by
a two-thirds majority of the members of the National
Assembly.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote of its total membership.
Article 57
The President of the Republic shall be able . . . to
demand of the National Assembly a second deliberation
of the law or of certain of its articles. This second deliberation may not be refused . . . The vote for this second
deliberation shall be acquired by the absolute majority
of members composing the National Assembly. If, after
this last vote, the President of the Republic shall refuse
to promulgate the law, the Constitutional Court upon
a submission by the President of the National Assembly
shall declare the law enforceable if it is in accordance
with the Constitution.

Article 91
Deputies shall collect the parliamentary salaries which
shall be fixed by law.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Members of the legislature are immune with
the common exception for cases of flagrante delicto.
Article 90
The members of the National Assembly shall enjoy parliamentary immunity. As a consequence, no Deputy
may be followed, searched, arrested, detained or judged
for opinions or votes issued by him during the exercise of his duties. A Deputy may, during the duration of the sessions, be followed or arrested in a criminal or correctional matter only with the authorization
of the National Assembly except in the case of a flagrant offense. A Deputy outside of the session may be
arrested only with the authorization of the Office of
the National Assembly, except in the case of a flagrant
offense, of authorized legal actions or of final conviction.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.

National Assembly of Benin (Assemblee nationale)

Article 80
The Deputies shall be elected by direct universal suffrage.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
with a four-fifths majority vote.
Article 154
The initiative for the revision of the Constitution shall
belong concurrently to the President of the Republic,
after a decision taken in the Council of Ministers, and
to the members of the National Assembly. In order
to be taken into consideration, the draft or proposal
of revision must be voted by a three-fourths majority of the members composing the National Assembly.
Article 155
The revision shall be agreed to only after having been
approved by referendum, unless the draft or the proposal involved shall have been approved by a fourfifths majority of the members composing the Assembly.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. The president can declare war without the
legislatures approval under exceptional circumstances.
Article 101
Declaration of war shall be authorized by the National
Assembly.
When, following exceptional circumstances, the
National Assembly cannot sit expediently, the decision
of a declaration of war shall be taken before the Council
of Ministers by the President of the Republic who shall
immediately inform the nation of it.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties on most major issues.
Article 145
Peace treaties, treaties or agreements relating to international organization, those which involve the finances of
the State, those which modify the internal laws of the
State, those which allow transfer, exchange or addition
of territory may be ratified only in accordance with a
law.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature may grant amnesty through
legislation.
Article 97
The law shall be passed by the National Assembly by a
simple majority.

77
Article 98
Under the domain of the law are the rules concerning . . . amnesty.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 60
The President of the Republic shall have the power of
pardon.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The Office of the National Assembly, which is
composed of the president of the National Assembly and his or her staff, appoints four of the seven
members of the Constitutional Court.
Article 115
The Constitutional Court shall be composed of seven
members, four of whom shall be appointed by the
Office of the National Assembly and three by the President of the Republic for a term of five years renewable
only one time.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. Benin is a member of the Central Bank of West
African States, whose governor is selected by the
member states.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The president appoints the head of the High
Commission of Audio-Visuals and Communications, the body that oversees the public media. The
legislature has little say in the commissions operation.
Article 56
The President of the Republic . . . after advice from the
President of the National Assembly . . . shall appoint the
President of the High Authority of Audio-Visuals and
Communications.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes. Since the adoption of the constitution in 1990,
the National Assembly has met each year for sessions that total six months, with occasional extra
sessions as well.
Article 87
The Assembly shall convene in its own right in two
special sessions per year.
The first session shall open during the first fortnight of
the month of April.

78

National Assembly of Benin (Assemblee nationale)

The second session shall open during the second fortnight of the month of October.
Each of the sessions may not exceed three months.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
Article 80
The Deputies shall be elected by direct universal suffrage . . . They may be re-elected.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes. A seat in the legislature is attractive despite
a general problem of underemployment and low
pay.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Party leaders invariably return to the legislature, and, along with other experienced incumbents, they form a core of experienced legislators.

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF BHUTAN (TSHOGDU)

No expert consultants
Score: .22
Influence over
executive (4/9)

Institutional
autonomy (2/9)

1. replace

10. no
dissolution
11. no decree

2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review
14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

Specified
powers (0/8)

Institutional
capacity (1/6)

19. amendments

27. sessions

20. war

28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

23. pardon
24. judiciary

25. central bank

26. media

18. all elected

The National Assembly (Tshogdu) of Bhutan was

established by a 1953 royal order. For fifteen years
the legislature served as a mere advisory body,
but in 1968 the king amended the royal order to
empower the legislative branch. The king rolled
back his own absolute veto power and granted
the Assembly the power to override his veto with
a two-thirds majority vote. The reforms of 1968
also gave parliament responsibility for confirming
the kings appointments to the government and

gave parliament a vote of no confidence in the

king. The power to vote no confidence was abolished in 1973, only to be reintroduced in another
round of reforms in 1998. The 1998 reforms also
gave the legislature the power to elect the government, known as the Council of Ministers, although
in practice nominations still originate with the
king, and transferred the head of government role
from the king to the chairman of the Council of
Ministers.

National Assembly of Bhutan (Tshogdu)

79

Even after these reforms, the Assemblys powers remain diminutive. The Assembly does have
some power over the executive: Its members serve
in government, it can question government officials, and its confirmation is needed for the kings
ministerial appointments. Its institutional autonomy, however, is sharply circumscribed by, among
other factors, the kings powers of decree, veto, and
impoundment. The kings right to appoint roughly
a quarter of the Assemblys members further compromises the legislatures autonomy. The legislature has none of the enumerated powers assessed
in this survey. Finally, it has negligible institutional
capacity: members lack staff, and the Assembly
lacks a sizable cohort of experienced lawmakers.
The countrys first full constitution currently
awaits approval in a nationwide referendum. The
new constitution proposes a ceremonial monarchy
and invests executive powers in a government chosen by the National Assembly. Elections for the
new National Assembly took place in March 2008,
although the new constitution has not yet been
adopted and the monarch has not yet transferred
power to the legislature.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).

SURVEY

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.

1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. From 1968 to 1973, and since 1998, the
National Assembly has had the formal power to
remove the king with a vote of no confidence.
In practice, a vote of no confidence in the king
is almost inconceivable.
2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of
the legislature.
Yes. Ministers are chosen from, and required to
serve simultaneously in, the National Assembly.
3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The National Assembly regularly interpellates
officials from the executive.
4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive.

No. The agencies of coercion report to the king

and are not effectively overseen by the legislature. Although the king transferred the head-ofgovernment function to the Council of Ministers,
he still holds ultimate authority on security issues.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The head of government is elected for a oneyear term by the Council of Ministers itself. The
position rotates every year to a different member
of the Council of Ministers.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The National Assemblys approval is required
to confirm the kings ministerial appointments. In
1998 the formal power to nominate and appoint
ministers was transferred to the National Assembly,
but in practice, the nominations still originate with
the king.

Yes. The country lacks a presidency.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.
No. The legislature can vote no confidence in individual ministers, but not in the government as a
whole.
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the
executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.
11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The king issues decrees that have the force of
law.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. Prior to 1968 the king had absolute veto power.
Since 1968 a two-thirds majority is required to
override the kings vetoes. The king can also reverse

80

National Assembly of Bhutan (Tshogdu)

legislation that, in his opinion, does not conform

to the countrys legal code.

No. The king can conclude international treaties

without the legislatures approval.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Both the High Court and the king can reverse
legislation that in their opinion does not conform
to the principles of the legal code.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The king can impound funds appropriated by
the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
No. The legislature is dependent on the king for
the resources that finance its own operations.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislators are subject to arrest and criminal
prosecution. Legislators who contravene the rules
and regulations set down for the conduct of Assembly members are to be punished with a fine or a
three-month prison sentence.
18. All members of the legislature are elected; the
executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
No. Prior to March 2008 thirty-seven members of
the 154-member legislature were appointed by the
king, and twelve members were appointed by a religious body representing monks. Since March 2008
the king appoints five of the eighty members of
parliament.
19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. To date, all amendments to the fundamental
law have been made by royal decree.

No. The king has the power to grant amnesty.

No. The king has the power of pardon.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject
appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. A single member of the five members of the
High Court is elected by the National Assembly. The rest are appointed by the king, and
the appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by
the legislature.
No. The Royal Monetary Authority of Bhutan is
led by the finance minister, who is, like the other
cabinet members, appointed by the king with the
legislatures approval.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The king controls the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
No. Each year, the legislature convenes for two
ordinary sessions, each lasting about four weeks.
28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.
No. Legislators do not have personal secretaries,
although there have been recent discussions about
the possible creation of an independent legislative
staff.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No. See item 28.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.

No. The king retains authority on security matters and can declare war without the legislatures
approval.

No. The country has only held one round of elections, so Council members have not had the opportunity to seek re-election.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature

Bolivian National Congress (Congreso Nacional)

81

contains a significant number of highly experienced

members.
No. The level of experience remains low among
lawmakers in Bhutan. Even longtime legislators are

only now gaining real lawmaking experience as the

National Assembly begins to acquire more legislative power.

BOLIVIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (CONGRESO NACIONAL)

Expert consultants: Gloria Ardaya, Alvaro Galvez, Fabrice E. Lehoucq, Rene Mayorga, Maggy Morales,
Gabriel Negretto, Mara T. Zegada
Score: .44
Influence over
executive (2/9)

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

X
X

Specified
powers (5/8)
19. amendments
20. war

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

18. all elected

X
X

Institutional
capacity (2/6)
27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

26. media
X

The Bolivian National Congress (Congreso Nacional) was established in the 1826 constitution. The
constitution called for a tricameral Congress with
an upper house whose members served for life.
From 1826 to 1880 a series of strongmen governed Bolivia, and each brought a new constitutional order. Constitutions were promulgated in
1839, 1843, 1851, 1861, 1868, and 1871.
In 1880 a more enduring constitution and a
bicameral legislature, formed from a House of
Deputies (Camara de Diputados) and a House of
Senators (Camara de Senadores), were introduced.
Constitutional reforms in 1938, 1944, 1947, and
1961 brought some substantial changes in a number of areas but did not formally reshape Congresss
power.
Bolivias present constitution and bicameral
legislature were unveiled in 1967, but because of
a military coup and subsequent military rule, the
new legal system did not come into force until
civilian political control returned in the 1980s.
According to the constitution, the president is
directly elected, but in the event that no can-

didate wins an absolute majority of the popular

vote, Congress chooses the president. In 1985 and
2002 presidents were chosen in a congressional
runoff.
Amendments in 1994 established a constitutional tribunal to review the constitutionality of
laws. Prior to 1994 laws were not subject to judicial review.
Another round of statutes in 2002 further
altered the legislatures powers. Prior to 2002 only
Congress could decide to lift a legislators immunity. Since 2002 immunity can be lifted by the
Supreme Court of Justice upon the request of the
attorney general. Another change requires a popular referendum to change the constitution. Before
2002 the legislature acting alone had the power to
amend the constitution.
Generally speaking, Congresss control over the
executive is highly circumscribed, although it does
have some oversight authority. Congress has a
moderate amount of institutional autonomy. It
enjoys some enumerated powers and modest institutional capacity.

82

At the time of this writing, a Constituent Assembly is in session and in the process of drawing
up a new fundamental law. The new document
is expected to increase indigenous rights and state
control over the economy. It may also change the
role of the legislature. Some supporters of President Evo Morales seek to increase executive power
at the expense of Congress. Still, how the new constitution may alter the powers of the legislature,
and when and whether the new document will be
adopted, remain to be seen.

Bolivian National Congress (Congreso Nacional)

Article 70
I. At the initiative of any Parliamentarian, the Chambers may request verbal or written information from the
Ministers of State for legislative purposes, for inspection
or scrutiny.
II. At the initiative of any Parliamentarian, either
Chamber may interpellate the Ministers of State, individually or collectively.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires action by
the Supreme Court.
Article 68
The chambers shall meet in joint session of Congress
for the following purposes:
11. To authorize the trial of the President and Vice President of the Republic.
Article 118
I. The powers of the Supreme Court are:
5. To decide charges of responsibility against the President and the Vice President of the Republic . . . for
crimes committed in exercising their functions, at the
request of the Attorney General of the Republic, upon
previous authorization of the National Congress,
juridically founded and granted by a two-thirds vote
of its total members, in which case the indictment
is the responsibility of the Penal Chamber; if this is
pronounced for impeachment, the decision shall be
substantiated by the other Chambers without further
appeal.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 49
Any Senator or Deputy may be . . . designated Minister
of State . . . but he shall be suspended from his legislative functions for the time that he holds such position.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.

Article 67
The following are the functions of each Chamber:
6. To undertake such investigations as are necessary in
conformity with its constitutional function, for which
it may appoint committees from among its members in
order to facilitate this task.
Article 70
I. At the initiative of any Parliamentarian, the Chambers may . . . propose investigations concerning all subjects of national interest.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The agencies of coercion report to the president and are not subject to legislative oversight.
Article 210
I. The Armed Forces are subordinate to the President of the Republic and receive their orders from
him on administrative matters, through the Minister of Defense; and on technical matters, through the
Commander-in-Chief.
Article 216
The forces of the National Police are subordinate to
the President of the Republic through the Minister of
Government.

6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

No. The country lacks a prime minister.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 99
A decree of the President of the Republic shall be sufficient for [ministers] appointment or removal.

Bolivian National Congress (Congreso Nacional)

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected. If no candidate wins an absolute majority of the popular vote,
however, the president is elected by Congress. In
1985 and 2002 presidents were elected in a congressional runoff.
Article 86
The President of the Republic shall be elected by direct
suffrage.
Article 90
I. If, in the general elections, none of the slates for President and Vice President of the Republic has obtained
an absolute majority of valid votes, Congress shall elect
them by an absolute majority of valid votes, through
oral roll call voting, from between the two lists which
had obtained the greatest number of valid votes.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in
the government. It can, however, censure individual ministers, although censure does not necessarily result in the removal of the minister in question.
Article 70
II. At the initiative of any Parliamentarian, either
Chamber may . . . censure [ministers] acts by an absolute majority of votes of National Representatives
present.
III. The purpose of censure is to modify the impugned
policies and procedures; [censure] implies the resignation of the censured Minister or Ministers, which may
be accepted or rejected by the President of the Republic.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.
11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power. Only in
a state of siege does the president have limited
decree authority. In an emergency the president
can decree that taxes will be collected ahead of
schedule.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.

83

No. A two-thirds majority vote is needed to override a presidential veto.

Article 77
I. The objections of the executive shall be addressed to
the chamber of origin.
II. If both chambers, by a majority of two-thirds of the
members present, find the objections to be unfounded,
the President of the Republic shall promulgate it as law
within a further period of ten days.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Tribunal can review the
constitutionality of laws.
Article 116
IV. Control over constitutionality is exercised by the
Constitutional Tribunal.
Article 119
I. The Constitutional Tribunal is the highest controlling
organ of constitutionality.
Article 120
The Constitutional Tribunal shall have the power to
[decide]:
1. In one instance, matters of pure right against the
unconstitutionality of laws, decrees and any kind of
non-judicial resolution.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. The legislature is prohibited from introducing legislation related to taxation or development
plans.
Article 59
The following are the functions of the legislative power:
2. Upon the initiative of the executive power, to impose
taxes of any nature or kind, abolish existing ones, and
determine their national, departmental, or university
character, as well as to fix fiscal expenditures.
3. To fix the expenditures of the public administration
for each financial period, after submission of the draft
budget by the executive power.
4. To consider the development plans which the executive power submits for its consideration.
Article 96
The powers and duties of the President of the Republic
are:
7. To submit to the legislative power, within the first
thirty regular sessions, the national and departmental
budgets for the succeeding financial period.
8. To present to the legislative power development
plans not covered by ordinary budgets on the subject
or in time for action.

84

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,
including control over members perquisites.
Article 67
The following are the functions of each Chamber:
5. To fix the per diem to be received by the lawmakers; order payment of its budgets; appoint and
remove its administrative personnel; and attend to all
matters relating to its internal economy and procedure.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislators are immune, but legislative immunity may be lifted through a combined action of
the Supreme Court of Justice and the Attorney General.
Article 51
Deputies and Senators are inviolable at all times for the
opinions expressed by them in the discharge of their
duties.
Article 52
No Senator or Deputy shall be accused or prosecuted in
any criminal matter nor deprived of his freedom from
the day of election continuously until the end of his
term in office, without the prior authorization of the
Supreme Court of Justice through the vote of two-thirds
of its members, and at the request of the Attorney General of the Republic, except in the case of a flagrant
crime.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 60
IV. Deputies are elected by universal, direct, secret vote.
Article 63
The Senate is composed of three Senators for each
department, elected by universal and direct suffrage.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments require approval
in a popular referendum.
Article 231
I. In the first meetings of the legislative session of a
new constitutional term the matter shall be taken up in

Bolivian National Congress (Congreso Nacional)

the chamber that proposed the amendment and, if it is
approved by two-thirds of the votes it shall be sent to
the other chamber for review, where it must also receive
a two-thirds vote.
II. All other procedures shall be the same as is provided
in the Constitution for relations between the two chambers.
III. The Chambers shall deliberate and vote on the
Amendment, ensuring its consistency with the provisions established by its enabling Law.
IV. Within the fifteen days following the enactment of
the Amendment Law, the National Congress shall convene a Constitutional Referendum so that the citizenry
may approve or reject the Constitutional amendment;
such event shall take place within the ninety days following the convocation, and its organization shall be
supervised by the National Electoral Court.
Article 232
An amendment to the constitution is approved by a
simple majority of the favorable votes cast in a Constitutional Referendum and shall be forwarded to the
Executive for its promulgation, and the President of
the Republic shall not have the power to review or
veto it.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for the
declaration of war.
Article 59
The following are the functions of the legislative power:
15. To permit the transit of foreign troops through the
territory of the Republic, fixing the time they will be
allowed to remain therein.
16. To authorize national troops to leave the territory
of the Republic, fixing the time of their absence.
Article 68
The chambers shall meet in joint session of Congress
for the following purposes:
7. To decide on a declaration of war on petition of the
executive.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 59
The following are the functions of the legislative power:
12. To approve international treaties, concordats and
conventions.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature and president both have the
power to grant amnesty.
Article 59
The following are the functions of the legislative power:

Bolivian National Congress (Congreso Nacional)

19. To decree amnesties for political offenses and grant
pardons after receiving a report from the Supreme Court
of Justice.
Article 96
The powers and duties of the President of the Republic
are:
13. To grant amnesties for political offenses, without
prejudice to those that may be granted by the legislative
power.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

Yes. The legislature has the power of pardon.
Article 59
The following are the functions of the legislative power:
19. To decree amnesties for political offenses and grant
pardons after receiving a report from the Supreme Court
of Justice.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislature appoints the members of the
Supreme Court of Justice and the Constitutional
Tribunal.
Article 59
The following are the functions of the legislative power:
20. To appoint, in a session of the Congress, the Ministers of the Supreme Court of Justice [and] the Magistrates of the Constitutional Tribunal . . . by the twothirds vote of its members.
Article 68
The chambers shall meet in joint session of Congress
for the following purposes:
12. To appoint the Ministers of the Supreme Court of
Justice, the Magistrates of the Constitutional Tribunal.
Article 117
IV. The President and the Ministers [of the Supreme
Court of Justice] shall be elected by the National
Congress, by the votes of two-thirds of the totality of
its members, from recommendations proposed by the
Council of the Judicature.
Article 119
II. The President and Magistrates of the Constitutional
Tribunal are appointed by the National Congress by the
votes of two-thirds of the totality of its members.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the president of the
Central Bank of Bolivia.

85

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
No. The full legislature meets for a maximum of
only four months each year. A broad congressional committee meets when the legislature is
not in session.
Article 46
II. Congress shall meet in ordinary session every year in
the capital of the Republic on the sixth day of August,
even when it has not been convoked. The sessions shall
last ninety working days, which may be extended to
one hundred twenty days, either by the will of Congress
itself or upon request of the executive power.
Article 82
I. During the adjournment of the chambers a Congressional Committee shall function composed of nine Senators and eighteen Deputies, who, with their respective
alternates, shall be elected by each chamber in a way
that insofar as possible will reflect the territorial composition of Congress.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
Article 57
Senators and Deputies may be reelected.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
No. Since 1994, the turnover rate has been quite
high, resulting in a legislature that lacks a sizable
cohort of highly experienced members.

86

Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Parlamentarna skupstina)

PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (PARLAMENTARNA

SKUPSTINA)
Expert consultants: Zijad Hasic, Dragica Hinic, Adem Huskic, Adnan Huskic, Tamara Music
Score: .63
Influence over
executive (5/9)

Institutional
autonomy (6/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

Specified
powers (6/8)
X

Institutional
capacity (3/6)

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

23. pardon

24. judiciary

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

25. central bank

18. all elected

X
X

26. media
X

The Parliamentary Assembly (Parlamentarna

skupstina) of Bosnia and Herzegovina was established in the 1995 constitution. The document
was drawn up as part of the Dayton Peace Accords,
which ended the war that ravaged the country
following the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The
constitution calls for a bicameral legislature comprising a lower chamber, the House of Representatives (Predstavnicki dom), and an upper chamber,
the House of Peoples (Dom naroda). The constitution includes a three-person presidency, guaranteeing representation for Bosniacs, Croats, and
Serbs.
The legislature has substantial authority. It has
a moderate amount of power over the executive,
institutional autonomy, and institutional capacity.
Much of the Assemblys power derives from specified powers and prerogatives, which include the
powers to change the constitution, approve presidential declarations of war, approve international
treaties, grant amnesties and pardons, and appoint
members of the judiciary.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.

No. The legislature cannot impeach the members

of the presidency. It can remove the prime minister
(chair of the Council of Ministers) with a vote of
no confidence.
Article V
4. c. The Council of Ministers shall resign if at any time
there is a vote of no-confidence by the Parliamentary
Assembly.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Ministers are prohibited from serving simultaneously in the legislature.
3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article V
4. a. Together the Chair and the Ministers shall constitute the Council of Ministers, with responsibility for
carrying out the policies and decisions of Bosnia and
Herzegovina in the fields referred to in Article III(1),
(4), and (5) and reporting to the Parliamentary Assembly (including, at least annually, on expenditures by
Bosnia and Herzegovina).

Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Parlamentarna skupstina)

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. The legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The prime minister (chair of the Council of
Ministers) is appointed by the presidency.
Article V
4. The Presidency shall nominate the Chair of the
Council of Ministers, who shall take office upon the
approval of the House of Representatives. The Chair
shall nominate a Foreign Minister, a Minister for Foreign Trade, and other Ministers as may be appropriate,
who shall take office upon the approval of the House of
Representatives.

87

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The presidency can dissolve the House of Peoples.
Article IV
3g. The House of Peoples may be dissolved by the
Presidency or by the House itself, provided that the
Houses decision to dissolve is approved by a majority that includes the majority of Delegates from at least
two of the Bosniac, Croat, or Serb peoples. The House
of Peoples elected in the first elections after the entry
into force of this Constitution may not, however, be
dissolved.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The presidency lacks veto power.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The legislatures approval is required to confirm ministerial appointments.
Article V
4. The Chair [of the Council of Ministers] shall nominate a Foreign Minister, a Minister for Foreign Trade,
and other Ministers as may be appropriate, who shall
take office upon the approval of the House of Representatives.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. Each member of the three-person presidency
is directly elected.
Article V
The Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall consist
of three Members: one Bosniac and one Croat, each
directly elected from the territory of the Federation,
and one Serb directly elected from the territory of the
Republika Srpska.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article V
Section 4. c. The Council of Ministers shall resign if at
any time there is a vote of no-confidence by the Parliamentary Assembly.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article VI
3. The Constitutional Court shall uphold this Constitution.
a. The Constitutional Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide any dispute that arises under this
Constitution between the Entities or between Bosnia
and Herzegovina and an Entity or Entities, or between
institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including but
not limited to . . . whether any provision of an Entitys
constitution or law is consistent with this Constitution.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.

88

Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Parlamentarna skupstina)

Article IV
4. The Parliamentary Assembly shall have responsibility
for:
b. Deciding upon the sources and amounts of revenues for the operations of the institutions of Bosnia
and Herzegovina and international obligations of
Bosnia and Herzegovina.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislative immunity extends to official parliamentary business only. Legislators are subject to
arrest for common crimes.
Article IV
3j. Delegates and Members shall not be held criminally
or civilly liable for any acts carried out within the scope
of their duties in the Parliamentary Assembly.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article IV
1. House of Peoples. The House of Peoples shall comprise 15 Delegates, two-thirds from the Federation
(including five Croats and five Bosniacs) and one-third
from the Republika Srpska (five Serbs).
a. The designated Croat and Bosniac Delegates from
the Federation shall be selected, respectively, by the
Croat and Bosniac Delegates to the House of Peoples of the Federation. Delegates from the Republika
Srpska shall be selected by the National Assembly of
the Republika Srpska.
b. Nine members of the House of Peoples shall comprise a quorum, provided that at least three Bosniac,
three Croat, and three Serb Delegates are present.
2. House of Representatives. The House of Representatives shall comprise 42 Members, two-thirds elected
from the territory of the Federation, one-third from the
territory of the Republika Srpska.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The House of Representatives can change the
constitution with a two-thirds majority vote.
Article X
1. Amendment Procedure. This Constitution may be
amended by a decision of the Parliamentary Assembly,
including a two-thirds majority of those present and
voting in the House of Representatives.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. Formally, the constitution mentions the use of
armed force only to proscribe civil war. In practice,

the legislatures approval would be necessary for

the declaration of war.
Article V
5a. Each member of the Presidency shall, by virtue of
the office, have civilian command authority over armed
forces. Neither Entity shall threaten or use force against
the other Entity, and under no circumstances shall any
armed forces of either Entity enter into or stay within
the territory of the other Entity without the consent of
the government of the latter and of the Presidency of
Bosnia and Herzegovina.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article IV
4. The Parliamentary Assembly shall have responsibility
for:
d. Deciding whether to consent to the ratification of
treaties.
Article V
3. The Presidency shall have responsibility for:
d. Negotiating, denouncing, and, with the consent
of the Parliamentary Assembly, ratifying treaties of
Bosnia and Herzegovina.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature can grant amnesty through legislation.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
Yes. The legislature can grant pardons through legislation.
24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject
appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislature appoints six of the nine members of the Constitutional Court.
Article VI
1. The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina
shall have nine members.
a. Four members shall be selected by the House of
Representatives of the Federation, and two members
by the Assembly of the Republika Srpska. The remaining three members shall be selected by the President
of the European Court of Human Rights after consultation with the Presidency.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The presidency appoints the members of the
Governing Board of the Central Bank of Bosnia
and Herzegovina. The Board appoints the governor from among its members.

National Assembly of Botswana

89

Article VII
2. The first Governing Board of the Central Bank shall
consist of a Governor appointed by the International
Monetary Fund, after consultation with the Presidency.
3. Thereafter, the Governing Board of the Central Bank
of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall consist of five persons
appointed by the Presidency for a term of six years.
The Board shall appoint, from among its members, a
Governor for a term of six years.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.
28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.
No.

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
No. Electoral politics is relatively new and turbulence in parliamentary elections quite high, resulting in a paucity of highly experienced legislators.

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF BOTSWANA

Expert consultants: Matthias Basedau, John Holm, Zibani Maundeni, Jack D. Parson, Abdi Ismail
Samatar
Score: .44
Influence over
executive (5/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

Institutional
autonomy (3/9)
X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

Specified
powers (2/8)
X
X

19. amendments
20. war
21. treaties
22. amnesty
23. pardon
24. judiciary

The National Assembly of Botswana was established in 1966 following independence from
Great Britain. Botswanas constitution establishes
a unicameral legislature that elects the president. The institutional structure of the legislature has remained largely unchanged since its
inception. Ten constitutional amendments have
resulted in minor changes in the size of parlia-

Institutional
capacity (4/6)
X

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

25. central bank

26. media

ment, length of presidential terms, and electoral

rules.
The National Assembly exercises some influence over the executive branch. The legislature
elects the president. Legislative influence over the
executive is further advanced by the provision that
eighteen of the sixty-one members of the Assembly
also serve as ministers in government.

90

The legislatures institutional autonomy, however, is circumscribed by competing presidential powers. The president appoints some members of the National Assembly, can dissolve
the legislature at will, and enjoys gatekeeping
authority. The Assembly enjoys only two of the
eight enumerated powers included in this survey,
and it has a moderate measure of institutional
capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can remove the president with
a vote of no confidence.
Article 32
(8) An Elected Member of the National Assembly
may . . . move . . . that the President does not enjoy the
support of the majority of the Elected Members of the
Assembly . . . If it appears as a result of the voting on that
question that the President does not enjoy the support
of a majority of the Elected Members of the Assembly,
the office of President shall become vacant.
(9) Any Elected Member of the Assembly may give
notice to the President that he intends to move in the
Assembly a motion under the last foregoing subsection
and notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution the President shall not after receipt of any such
notice be empowered to dissolve Parliament before the
conclusion of the sitting of the Assembly mentioned in
the last foregoing subsection.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Ministers are selected from, and required to
serve simultaneously in, the legislature.
Article 42
(3) Appointments to the office of Minister or Assistant
Minister shall be made by the President from among
Members of the National Assembly.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly questions officials of
the executive.
4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The Ombudsman Act of 1995 gave the
legislature the power to call for an independent

National Assembly of Botswana

investigation of the executive, but it is the president or the ministers who appoint the investigatory body and at the conclusion of the investigation decide whether to make the report public.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The agencies of coercion report directly to the
president and, despite a constitutional provision
to the contrary, are not subject to legislative oversight.
Article 48
(1) The supreme command of the armed forces of the
Republic shall vest in the President and he shall hold
the office of Commander in Chief.
(4) Parliament may regulate the exercise of the powers
conferred by or under this section.

6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

No. The country lacks a prime minister.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 42
(3) Appointments to the office of Minister or Assistant
Minister shall be made by the President from among
Members of the National Assembly.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The legislature elects the president.
Article 32
(1) Whenever Parliament is dissolved an election shall
be held to the office of President in such manner as is
prescribed by this section and, subject thereto, by or
under an Act of Parliament.
(3) (a) a person nominated as a Parliamentary candidate may, at the time of his nomination and subject to
the provisions of paragraph (b), declare in such manner
as may be prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament
which of the candidates in the election of President he
supports.
(d) the returning officer shall declare to be elected as
President any candidate for whom support has been
declared in accordance with paragraph (a) above by not
less than such number of persons elected as Members
of the National Assembly in the Parliamentary election
as corresponds to more than half the total number of
seats for Elected Members in the Assembly, and if there

National Assembly of Botswana

is no such person the returning officer shall declare that
no candidate has been elected.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 92
If the National Assembly at any time passes a resolution supported by a majority of all the Members of the
Assembly who are entitled to vote declaring that it has
no confidence in the Government of Botswana, Parliament shall stand dissolved on the fourth day following
the day on which such resolution was passed, unless
the President earlier resigns his office or dissolves Parliament.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 91
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the
President may at any time dissolve Parliament.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote.
Article 87
(2) When a Bill is presented to the President for assent
he shall either assent or withhold his assent.
(3) Where the President withholds his assent to a Bill,
the Bill shall be returned to the National Assembly.
(4) If where the President withholds his assent to a Bill
the Assembly resolves within six months of the Bill
being returned to it that the Bill should again be presented for assent, the President shall assent to the Bill
within twenty-one days of its being again presented to
him, unless he sooner dissolves Parliament.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The High Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 105
(1) Where any question as to the interpretation of this
Constitution arises in any proceedings in any subordinate court and the court is of the opinion that the
question involves a substantial question of law, the

91
court may, and shall if any party to the proceedings
so requests, refer the question to the High Court.
(2) Where any question is referred to the High Court
in pursuance of this section, the High Court shall give
its decision upon the question and the court in which
the question arose shall, subject to any appeal, dispose
of the case in accordance with that decision.
Article 106
An appeal shall lie as of right to the Court of Appeal
from any decision of the High Court which involves
the interpretation of this Constitution, other than a
decision of the High Court under section 69 (1) of this
Constitution:
Provided that no appeal shall lie from a determination of the High Court under this section dismissing
an application on the ground that it is frivolous or vexatious.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. The legislature is prohibited from introducing
legislation related to taxation, public expenditures,
or government debt.
Article 88
(1) Except upon the recommendation of the President,
which recommendation may be signified by the VicePresident or a Minister, the National Assembly shall
not
(a) proceed upon any Bill (including any amendment
to a Bill) that, in the opinion of the person presiding,
makes provision for any of the following purposes
(i) for the imposition of taxation or the alteration
of taxation otherwise than by reduction;
(ii) for the imposition of any charge upon the revenues or other funds of Botswana or the alteration
of any such charge otherwise than by reduction;
(iii) for the payment, issue or withdrawal from
any public fund of Botswana of any moneys not
charged thereon or any increase in the amount of
such payment, issue or withdrawal; or
(iv) for the composition or remission of any debt
to the Government of Botswana;
(b) proceed upon any motion (including any amendment to a motion) the effect of which, in the opinion
of the person presiding, would be to make provision
for any of those purposes.
(2) The National Assembly shall not proceed upon any
Bill (including any amendment to a Bill) that, in the
opinion of the person presiding, would, if enacted, alter
any of the provisions of this Constitution or affect
(a) the designation, recognition, removal of powers
of Chiefs, Sub-Chiefs or Headmen;
(b) the organization, powers or administration of
African Courts;
(c) African customary law, or the ascertainment or
recording of African customary law; or
(d) tribal organization or tribal property, unless

92

National Assembly of Botswana

(i) a copy of the Bill has been referred to the
House of Chiefs after it has been introduced in the
National Assembly; and
(ii) a period of thirty days has elapsed from the date
when the copy of the Bill was referred to the House
of Chiefs.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The president can refuse to spend funds that
have been authorized by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislators are subject to arrest and prosecution
and if convicted of charges are required to give up
their seat in the legislature.
Article 68
(1) The seat of an Elected Member or a Specially
Elected Member of the National Assembly shall become
vacant
(2) (a) If circumstances such as are referred to in paragraph (c) of the preceding subsection arise in relation
to a Member of the Assembly by virtue of the fact that
he is . . . sentenced to . . . imprisonment, or convicted of
an election offence and it is open to the Member to
appeal against the decision (either with the leave of the
court or other authority or without such leave), he shall
forthwith cease to perform his functions as a Member
of the Assembly.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
No. The president appoints four special elected
members to the thirty-eight-member National
Assembly.
Article 58
(2) The National Assembly shall consist of
(a) thirty-four Elected Members who shall be elected
in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution and subject thereto in accordance with the provisions of any Act of Parliament;
(b) four Special Elected Members who shall be elected
in accordance with the provisions of the Schedule to
this Constitution and subject thereto in accordance
with the provisions of any Act of Parliament; and
(c) the Attorney-General.
Article 74
(2) The Attorney-General shall have no vote.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
through the normal legislative process. Amendments to selected articles of the constitution
require either a two-thirds majority vote in the
Assembly or approval in a popular referendum.
Article 89
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section Parliament
may alter this Constitution.
(3) In so far as it alters any of the provisions of
(a) Chapter II; sections 30 to 44 inclusive, 47 to 51
inclusive, and 56; sections 77 to 79 inclusive and section 85; Chapter VII; or sections 117 to 120 inclusive
and section 127 in its application to any of the provisions mentioned in this paragraph;
(b) sections 57, 63 to 67 inclusive, 86 to 89 inclusive,
90 (2) and (3), 91 (2), (3), (4) and (5), and 92; Chapter VI; and section 127 in its application to any of
the provisions mentioned in this paragraph, a Bill for
an Act of Parliament under this section shall not be
passed by the National Assembly unless
(i) the final voting on the Bill in the Assembly takes
place not less than three months after the previous
voting thereon in the Assembly; and
(ii) at such final voting the Bill is supported by the
votes of not less than two-thirds of all the Members
of the Assembly.
(4) In so far as it alters any of the provisions mentioned
in subsection (3) (b) of this section no Bill shall be
presented to the President for his assent unless after
its passage by the Assembly it has been submitted to
the electors qualified to vote in the election of the
Elected Members of the National Assembly, and, on a
vote taken in such manner as Parliament may prescribe,
the majority of the electors voting have approved the
Bill.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. The president can declare war without the legislatures approval.
Article 48
(2) The powers conferred on the President by subsection (1) of this section shall include
(a) the power to determine the operational use of the
armed forces.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
No. International treaties do not require the legislatures approval.
22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.
Yes. The legislature can grant amnesty through law.

National Assembly of Botswana

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 53
The President may
(a) grant to any person convicted of any offence a pardon, either free or subject to lawful conditions.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The judges of the High Court and the Court
of Appeal are appointed by the president, and
the appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 96
(1) The Chief Justice [of the High Court] shall be
appointed by the President.
(2) The puisne judges [of the High Court] shall be
appointed by the President, acting in accordance with
the advice of the Judicial Service Commission.
Article 100
(1) The President of the Court of Appeal shall, unless
that office is held ex-officio by the Chief Justice, be
appointed by the President.
(2) The Justices of Appeal, if any, shall be appointed by
the President, acting in accordance with the advice of
the Judicial Service Commission.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the governor of the
Bank of Botswana.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

93

No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the

operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.
Article 90
(1) Each session of Parliament shall be held at such
place within Botswana and shall commence at such
time as the President may appoint.
(2) There shall be a session of Parliament at least once
in every year so that a period of six months shall not
intervene between the last sitting of Parliament in one
session and the first sitting thereof in the next session.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

94

National Congress of Brazil (Congresso Nacional)

NATIONAL CONGRESS OF BRAZIL (CONGRESSO NACIONAL)

Expert consultants: Scott W. Desposato, Zachary Elkins, Bolvar Lamounier, Fernando Limongi, David
Samuels, Wendy M. Sinek, Kurt Weyland
Score: .56
Influence over
executive (3/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Institutional
autonomy (4/9)

Specified
powers (5/8)

Institutional
capacity (6/6)

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

X
X

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

23. pardon
24. judiciary
X

X
X

25. central bank

26. media

The National Congress (Congresso Nacional) of

Brazil originated in the 1891 constitution. The U.S.
system provided the model for Brazils constitution, which established a bicameral legislature consisting of a lower house, the Chamber of Deputies
(Camara dos Deputados), and an upper house, the
Federal Senate (Senado Federal). Constitutional revisions in 1934, 1937, and 1946 did not fundamentally alter the legislatures formal power. In 1964
a military government swept to power, bringing
with it a constitution, enacted in 1967, that sidelined the legislature. Following the end of military rule in 1985, a new constitution, adopted in
1988, restored the institutional order much as it
had existed prior to the authoritarian interregnum.
Congress wields significant authority. It has
some ability to influence the executive branch. It
summons and questions executive branch officials,
can set up investigatory commissions, and can
impeach the president. Congresss institutional
autonomy is sharply limited. Congress shares lawmaking power with the president, who can make
decrees, although the latter lapse after thirty days
if they are not subsequently approved by Congress.
The president also enjoys gatekeeping authority. Furthermore, a legal change in 2001 revoked
the immunity from prosecution that legislators
enjoyed prior to 2001. Since 2001 legislators may
be arrested and prosecuted for crimes not directly

related to their legislative duty. The legislature has

numerous specified powers. Congresss power is
most solid in the area of institutional capacity.
Legislators are provided with secretarial and policy staff, there are no restrictions on re-election,
and the legislature contains a body of highly experienced members.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature acting alone can impeach the
president for criminal malversion. It exercised
this power in 1992, when it impeached Fernando
Collor de Mello and swore in his vice president,
Itamar Franco, to serve out the remained of Collors term. The involvement of the Supreme Court
is required to impeach the president for common
criminal offenses.
Article 86
If charges against the President of the Republic are
admitted by two thirds of the House of Representatives,
he is submitted for trial before the Federal Supreme
Court for common criminal offenses or before the Federal Senate for criminal malversion.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.

National Congress of Brazil (Congresso Nacional)

No. Legislators who serve in government have a

sleeping mandate, meaning that they may join the
government but forfeit their voting rights in the
legislature during their government service. They
may return to the legislature when their government service ends.
Article 54
Representatives and Senators shall not be the holder of
more than one public elective position or office.
Article 56
(0) A Representative or Senator does not lose his or her
office if:
I. he or she is vested in an office of Minister of State.
(1) The alternate is called in cases of vacancy, of investiture in the functions set forth in this article, or of leave
of absence exceeding one hundred and twenty days.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly exercises its power to
summon and question executive branch officials.
Article 49
It is exclusively incumbent upon Congress:
X. to supervise and control, directly or through the Federal Senate and/or the House of Representatives, the acts
of the Executive.
Article 50
(0) The House of Representatives or the Federal Senate,
as well as any of their Committees, may call upon a Minister of State to personally render information on a predetermined matter, and his absence without adequate
justification shall constitute a criminal malversion.
(2) The Presiding Board of the House of Representatives
and of the Federal Senate may forward written requests
for information to the Ministers of State, and refusal
or noncompliance with such request within a period of
thirty days, as well as the rendering of false information,
shall constitute a criminal malversion.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive. Such investigations, or the threat of them,
have recently become highly salient factors in
Brazilian politics. For example, in 2004 opposition leaders called for a congressional investigation
after Waldomiro Diniz, the presidents liaison to
Congress, was caught on videotape soliciting campaign contributions from one of the kingpins of an
illegal lottery game in exchange for political favors.
Although a full investigation was never completed,
the threat of it contributed to the rapid dismissal
of Diniz. When a vote-buying scandal erupted in
2005, a congressional investigation commission
formed and successfully pushed for the indictment

95

of many top officials, including the presidents

chief of staff and the minister of finance.
Article 58
(3) Parliamentary investigation committees, which
shall have the investigation powers inherent to the
judicial authorities, in addition to other powers set
forth in their respective regulations, are created by the
House of Representatives and by the Federal Senate,
jointly or severally, at the request of one third of its
members, for investigation of a certain fact and for a certain period of time, and their conclusions shall, if necessary, be forwarded to the Attorney Generals Office to
determine the civil or criminal liability of the offenders.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The agencies of coercion report directly to the
president and are not subject to legislative oversight.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The country lacks a prime minister.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers, and the appointments do not require the legislatures approval.
Article 84
(0) It is incumbent exclusively upon the President of
the Republic:
I. to appoint and dismiss the Ministers of State.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 77
(0) Election of the President and of the Vice President
of the Republic takes place simultaneously, ninety days
before the end of the current presidential term of office.
(2) The candidate who, being registered by a political
party, obtains an absolute majority of votes, not counting blank or void votes, is considered to be elected as
President.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in
the government.
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the
executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.
Article 44
(1) Each legislature has a duration of four years.

96

National Congress of Brazil (Congresso Nacional)

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.

Article 97
The courts may declare the unconstitutionality of a law
or of a normative act of the Government only by an
absolute majority of their members or of the members
of the respective special body.

No. The president regularly issues decrees that have

the force of law. Decrees lapse after thirty days if
Congress does not approve them. Congress can
also delegate to the president temporary decree
power over limited issue areas.
Article 62
(0) In relevant and urgent cases, the President of the
Republic may adopt provisional measures with the force
of law and shall submit such measures to Congress
immediately. If Congress is in recess, an extraordinary
session shall be called within five days.
(1) Provisional measures lose their effectiveness as from
the date of their issuance if they are not converted into
law within a period of thirty days as from their publication, and Congress regulates the legal relations arising
therefrom.
Article 68
(0) Delegated laws are drawn up by the President of the
Republic who requests delegation from Congress.
(1) Acts subject to the exclusive authority of Congress,
those subject to the exclusive authority of the House
of Representatives or of the Federal Senate, matters
reserved for supplemental laws, and legislation on the
following shall not be delegated.
(2) Delegation to the President of the Republic is
granted by resolution of Congress, which specifies its
contents and the terms for performance thereof.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote of the total membership in both
houses.
Article 66
(0) The Chamber of Congress in which voting was concluded sends the bill of law to the President of the
Republic, who sanctions it if he consents thereto.
(1) If the President of the Republic deems all or part
of the bill to be unconstitutional or contrary to public
interests, he shall veto it fully or partially within fifteen
business days as from the date of receipt and advise the
President of the Federal Senate of the reasons for the
veto within forty-eight hours.
(4) A veto examines in a joint session within thirty days
of receipt thereof, and may only be rejected by an absolute majority of the Representatives and Senators by
secret ballot.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Supreme Court can review the constitutionality of laws.

Article 102
(0) The Federal Supreme Court is responsible, mainly,
for safeguarding the Constitution and it is incumbent
upon it:
I. to process and adjudicate, originally:
a) direct actions of unconstitutionality of a federal or
state law or normative act, and declaratory actions of
constitutionality of a federal law or normative act.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. The legislature is prohibited from introducing
legislation related to many issue areas, including
taxation.
Article 61
(1) The initiative of the following laws is incumbent
solely upon the President of the Republic:
I. laws which determine or modify the number of
troops in the Armed Forces;
II. laws which deal with:
a) creation of public offices, functions, or positions
in the direct administration and in autonomous
government entities, or increase in the compensation thereof;
b) administrative and judicial organization, tax,
and budgetary matters, public services, and administrative personnel of the Territories;
c) Government employees of the Republic and Territories, their legal treatment, appointment to offices, tenure and retirement of civil servants, retirement, and transfer of servicemen to inactivity;
d) organization of the Attorney Generals Office
and of the Public Defenders Office of the Republic, as well as general rules for the organization
of the Attorney Generals Office and of the Public
Defenders Office of the States, the Federal District
and the Territories;
e) creation, structuring, and duties of the Ministries and government administration agencies.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The president is not required to spend the
funds authorized in the budget.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
Article 49
It is exclusively incumbent upon Congress:

National Congress of Brazil (Congresso Nacional)

97

VII. to establish identical compensation for Federal Representatives and Senators.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Article 51
It is exclusively incumbent upon the House of Representatives:
III. to prepare its internal regulations;
IV. to provide for its organization, operation, police,
creation, transformation, or extinction of offices, positions, and functions of its services and establishment of
the respective compensation, observing the guidelines
established in the budget directives law.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for presidential war declarations.

Article 52
(0) It is incumbent exclusively upon the Federal Senate
XII. to draw up its internal regulations;
XIII. to provide for its organization, operation, police,
creation, transformation, or extinction of offices, positions, and functions of its services and to determine
the respective compensation, with due regard for the
guidelines established in the budget directives law.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

international treaties.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislative immunity extends to official parliamentary business only. Legislators are subject to
arrest for common crimes. Prior to 2001 legislators
enjoyed complete immunity.
18. All members of the legislature are elected; the
executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 45
(0) The House of Representatives is formed by representatives of the people, elected by the proportional system
in each State, in each Territory and in the Federal District.
Article 46
(0) The Federal Senate is composed of members representing the States and the Federal District, elected by
majority vote.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution in
multiple readings with a three-fifths majority vote.
Article 60
(0) The Constitution may be amended on the proposal
of:
I. at least one third of the members of the House of
Representatives or of the Federal Senate;
II. the President of the Republic;
III. more than one half of the Legislative Assemblies
of the units of the Federation, each of which expresses
itself by a simple majority of its members.
(2) The proposal is discussed and voted in each Chamber of Congress, in two rounds, and it is considered
approved if it obtains three-fifths of the votes of the
respective members in both rounds.

Article 49
It is exclusively incumbent upon Congress:
II. to authorize the President of the Republic to declare
war.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.

Article 49
It is exclusively incumbent upon Congress:
I. to resolve conclusively on international acts, agreements, or treaties which involve charges or commitments against the national patrimony.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant
amnesty.
Article 48
It is incumbent upon Congress . . . to provide for all
the matters within the jurisdiction of the Republic and
especially on:
VIII. granting of amnesty.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 84
XII. [The president has the power] to grant pardons and
reduce sentences.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The Senates confirmation is required for the
presidents appointments to the Supreme Court
and to the Superior Court of Justice.
Article 84
(0) It is incumbent exclusively upon the President of
the Republic:
XIV. to appoint, after approval by the Federal Senate,
the Justices of the Federal Supreme Court and of the
Superior Courts.
Article 101
(0) The Federal Supreme Court is formed by eleven
Justices, chosen among citizens over thirty-five years
and under sixty-five years of age, with notorious legal
knowledge and unblemished reputation.
(1) The Justices of the Federal Supreme Court shall be
appointed by the President of the Republic, after the
choice is approved by the absolute majority of the Federal Senate.
Article 104
(0) The Superior Court of Justice is formed by at least
thirty-three Justices.

98

National Congress of Brazil (Congresso Nacional)

(1) The Justices of the Superior Court of Justice are

appointed by the President of the Republic . . . after
approval of the choice by the Federal Senate.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the president of the
Central Bank of Brazil.
Article 84
(0) It is incumbent exclusively upon the President of
the Republic:
XIV. to appoint, after approval by the Federal Senate . . . the president and directors of the Central Bank.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature is in session for about eight
months each year.
Article 57
(0) Congress meets each year in the Federal Capital,
from February 15th to June 30th and from August 1st
to December 15th.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
Yes.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes. Legislators generally seek re-election, although
many former legislators opt to pursue positions in
the executive branch.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. The re-election rate since 1988 has been about
50 percent. There is a relatively stable group of
highly experienced legislative leaders.

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF BULGARIA (NARODNO SABRANIE)

Expert consultants: Robin S. Brooks, Georgi Ganev, Venelin I. Ganev, Yonko Grozev, Georgi
Karasimeonov, Albert P. Melone
Score: .78
Influence over
executive (7/9)

Institutional
autonomy (7/9)

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

26. media

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

Specified
powers (7/8)

18. all elected

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

The National Assembly (Narodno Sabranie) of Bulgaria traces its roots to Bulgarias Turnovo Constitution of 1878. The Turnovo system, which pro-

vided for a National Assembly, served as the fundamental law in Bulgaria for the subsequent seven
decades. Following Soviet occupation in World

National Assembly of Bulgaria (Narodno Sabranie)

99

War II, Bulgaria adopted a Soviet-type constitution

and created a 400-member unicameral National
Assembly. A constitutional change in 1971 explicitly recognized the Bulgarian Communist Party
as the countrys primary source of political
power.
In 1990 Bulgarias communist-era parliament
began drafting a new constitution. In 1991, as the
Soviet-style regime passed into history, a new constitution came into effect. It provides the National
Assembly with considerable clout. The Assembly
exercises considerable influence over the executive. It chooses the prime minister and the cabinet, interpellates and investigates ministers, and
can remove the government with a vote of no confidence. The Assemblys institutional autonomy is
well protected. It can override the presidents veto
with a majority vote and initiate bills in all policy jurisdictions. It enjoys a monopoly on lawmaking authority. The legislature is also endowed
with many individually specified powers and prerogatives. It has a moderate level of institutional
capacity.
A constitutional amendment in 2003 reformed
the judiciary in order to meet European Union
standards. The amendment did not affect legislative power.

(3) An impeachment against the President or Vice President shall be tried by the Constitutional Court within
a month following the lodging of the impeachment.
Should the Constitutional Court convict the President
or Vice President of high treason, or of a violation of the
Constitution, the Presidents or Vice Presidents prerogatives shall be suspended.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can replace the prime minister
with a vote of no confidence. Presidential impeachment requires action by the Constitutional Court.
Article 89
(1) A motion of no confidence in the in the Council of
Ministers shall require a seconding by one-fifth or more
of the Members of the National Assembly. To be passed,
the motion shall require a majority of more than half
of the votes of all National Assembly Members.
(2) Should the National Assembly vote no confidence
in the Prime Minister or the Council of Ministers, the
Prime Minister shall hand in his governments resignation.
Article 103
(1) The President and Vice President shall not be held
liable for actions committed in the performance of their
duties, except for high treason, or a violation of the
Constitution.
(2) An impeachment shall require a motion from no
fewer than one-fourth of all Members of the National
Assembly and shall stand if supported by more than
two-thirds of the Members.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators who serve in government have a
sleeping mandate, meaning that they may join the
government but forfeit their voting rights in the
legislature during their government service. They
may return to the legislature when their government service ends.
Article 68
(2) A Member of the National Assembly elected as a
minister shall cease to serve as a Member during his
term of office as a minister. During that period, he shall
be substituted in the National Assembly in a manner
established by law.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. Ministers field questions from the opposition
every week during question time. The legislature
also interpellates ministers.
Article 83
(2) The National Assembly and the parliamentary committees shall be free to order ministers to attend their
sessions and respond to questions.
Article 90
(1) Members of the National Assembly shall have the
right to address questions and interpellations to the
Council of Ministers and to individual ministers, who
shall be obligated to respond.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can establish committees to
investigate the executive.
Article 79
(1) The National Assembly shall elect permanent and
ad hoc committees from among its Members.
(2) The permanent committees shall aid the work of
the National Assembly and shall exercise parliamentary
control on its behalf.
(3) Ad hoc committees shall be elected to conduct
inquiries and investigations.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of

100

law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret

police).
Yes. Legislative committees have effective powers
of oversight over the agencies of the coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. The president nominates the prime minister,
but he or she is required to pick the candidate who
enjoys the support of parliament.
Article 84
The National Assembly shall:
6) elect and dismiss the Prime Minister.
Article 99
(1) Following consultations with the parliamentary
groups, the President shall appoint the Prime Minister
candidate nominated by the party holding the highest
number of seats in the National Assembly to form a
government.
(2) Should the Prime Minister candidate fail to form
a government within seven days, the President shall
entrust this task to a Prime Minister candidate nominated by the second largest parliamentary group.
(3) Should the new Prime Minister candidate also fail
to form a government within the period established by
the preceding paragraph, the President shall entrust the
task to a Prime Minister candidate nominated by one
of the minor parliamentary groups.
(4) Should the consultations prove successful, the President shall ask the National Assembly to elect the Prime
Minister candidate.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The legislature appoints ministers on the recommendation of the prime minister.
Article 84
The National Assembly shall:
6) elect and dismiss the Prime Minister and, on his
motion, the members of the Council of Ministers.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 93
(1) The President is elected directly by the voters for a
period of five years by a procedure established by law.

National Assembly of Bulgaria (Narodno Sabranie)

of the Members of the National Assembly. To be passed,
the motion shall require a majority of more than half
of the votes of all National Assembly Members.
(2) Should the National Assembly vote no confidence
in the Prime Minister or the Council of Ministers, the
Prime Minister shall hand in his governments resignation.
Article 112
(1) The Council of Ministers is free to ask for the
National Assemblys vote of confidence in its overall
policy, its program declaration, or on a specific issue. A
resolution shall require a majority of more than half of
the votes of the National Assembly Members present.
(2) Should the Council of Ministers fail to receive the
requested vote of confidence, the Prime Minister shall
hand in the governments resignation.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 99
(1) Following consultations with the parliamentary
groups, the President shall appoint the Prime Minister
candidate nominated by the party holding the highest
number of seats in the National Assembly to form a
government.
(2) Should the Prime Minister candidate fail to form
a government within seven days, the President shall
entrust this task to a Prime Minister candidate nominated by the second largest parliamentary group.
(3) Should the new Prime Minister candidate also fail
to form a government within the period established by
the preceding paragraph, the President shall entrust the
task to a Prime Minister candidate nominated by one
of the minor parliamentary groups.
(4) Should the consultations prove successful, the President shall ask the National Assembly to elect the Prime
Minister candidate.
(5) Absent an agreement on the formation of a government, the President shall appoint a caretaker government, dissolve the National Assembly and schedule
new elections.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the

government.

Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto

by a majority vote of its total membership.

Article 89
(1) A motion of no confidence in the in the Council of
Ministers shall require a seconding by one-fifth or more

Article 101
(1) Within the term established by Article 88 (3), the
President is free to return a bill together with his

National Assembly of Bulgaria (Narodno Sabranie)

101

motives to the National Assembly for further debate,

which shall not be denied.
(2) The new passage of such a bill shall require a majority of more than half of all Members of the National
Assembly.
(3) Following a new passage of the bill by the National
Assembly, the President shall promulgate it within
seven days following its receipt.

compel the investigative bodies to seek such a warrant. The measure was adopted in the context of
pressure from the European Union to combat corruption. It actually does little to compromise the
principle of parliamentary immunity, which is well
entrenched in Bulgaria.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 149
(1) The Constitutional Court shall:
1) provide binding interpretations of the Constitution;
2) rule on challenges to the constitutionality of the
laws and other acts passed by the National Assembly
and the acts of the President.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,
including control over members perquisites.
Article 71
The National Assembly shall establish the emoluments
of its Members.
Article 73
The National Assembly is organized and shall act in
accordance with the Constitution and its own internal
rules.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto, here
expressed as detained in the course of committing a grave crime. In 2006 a new provision was
adopted stipulating that a criminal investigation
against a member of parliament may proceed even
in the absence of a warrant from the National
Assembly or its chairman if the legislator in question agrees in writing to waive his or her right to

Article 70
A Member of the National Assembly is immune from
detention or criminal prosecution except for the perpetration of a grave crime, when a warrant from the
National Assembly or, in between its session, from the
Chairman of the National Assembly, is required. No
warrant shall be required when a Member is detained
in the course of committing a grave crime; the National
Assembly or, in between its session, the Chairman
of the National Assembly, shall be notified forthwith.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 64
(1) The National Assembly is elected for a term of four
years.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
with a three-fourths majority vote. If the proposed
amendment receives less than three-fourths, but
greater than two-thirds of the votes, it can be
passed by a two-thirds majority vote between two
and five months later.
Article 153
The National Assembly is free to amend all provisions of
the Constitution except those within the prerogatives
of the Grand National Assembly.
Article 154
(1) The initiative to introduce a constitutional amendment bill shall belong to one-fourth of the Members of
the National Assembly and to the President.
(2) An amendment bill shall be debated by the National
Assembly not earlier than one month and not later
than three months from the date on which it is introduced.
Article 155
(1) A constitutional amendment shall require a majority of three-fourths of the votes of all Members of the
National Assembly in three ballots on three different
days.
(2) A bill which has received less than three-fourths but
more than two-thirds of the votes of all Members shall
be eligible for reintroduction after not fewer than two
months and not more than five months. To be passed
at this new reading, the bill shall require a majority of
two-thirds of the votes of all Members.

102

National Assembly of Bulgaria (Narodno Sabranie)

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. The president has the power of pardon.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for presidential war declarations with the common exception for cases of foreign invasion. In cases of
armed attack against the country, the president
can declare war and then seek retroactive legislative approval.
Article 84
The National Assembly shall:
10) resolve on the declaration of war and conclusion of
peace.
Article 100
(5) The President shall proclaim a state of war in the
case of an armed attack against Bulgaria or whenever
urgent actions are required by virtue of an international
commitment, or shall proclaim martial law or any other
state of emergency whenever the National Assembly is
not in session and cannot be convened. The National
Assembly shall then be convened forthwith to endorse
the decision.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties on most major issues.
Article 85
(1) The National Assembly shall ratify or denounce by
law all international instruments which:
1) are of a political or military nature;
2) concern the Republic of Bulgarias participation in
international organizations;
3) envisage corrections to the borders of the Republic
of Bulgaria;
4) contain obligations for the treasury;
5) envisage the states participation in international
arbitration or legal proceedings;
6) concern fundamental human rights;
7) affect the action of the law or require new legislation
in order to be enforced;
8) expressly require ratification.
(2) Treaties ratified by the National Assembly may be
amended or denounced only by their built-in procedure or in accordance with the universally acknowledged norms of international law.
(3) The conclusion of an international treaty requiring
an amendment to the Constitution shall be preceded
by the passage of such an amendment.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant
amnesty.
Article 84
The National Assembly shall:
13) grant amnesty.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

Article 98
The President of the Republic shall:
11) exercise the right to pardon.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislature appoints one-third of the members of the Constitutional Court and eleven of
the twenty-five members of the Supreme Judicial
Council.
Article 130
(3) Eleven of the [25] members of the Supreme Judicial Council shall be elected by the National Assembly,
and eleven shall be elected by the bodies of the judicial
branch.
Article 147
(1) The Constitutional Court shall consist of 12 justices, one-third of whom shall be elected by the
National Assembly, one-third shall be appointed by the
President, and one-third shall be elected by a joint meeting of the justices of the Supreme Court of Cassation
and the Supreme Administrative Court.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
Yes. The legislature appoints the governor of the
Bulgarian National Bank.
Article 84
The National Assembly shall:
8) elect and dismiss the Governor of the Bulgarian
National Bank.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
Yes. The legislature appoints the members of the
body that oversees the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.
Article 74
The National Assembly is a permanently acting body.
It is free to determine its recesses.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No. Each parliamentary group has a small pool of
secretaries, but on average there is less than one
staff person for each legislator.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No. Some, but not all, legislators have staff members with policy expertise. See item 28.

National Assembly of Burkina Faso (Assemblee nationale)

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.

103

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Despite considerable electoral volatility, parliament has a core group of highly experienced
legislators.

Yes.

NATIONALE)
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF BURKINA FASO (ASSEMBLEE
Expert consultants: Sten Hagberg, Ernest Harsch, Augustin Loada, Moussa Michel Tapsoba, Harold
Tarver
Score: .53
Influence over
executive (3/9)

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)

Specified
powers (5/8)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

12. no veto
13. no review

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

23. pardon
24. judiciary

25. central bank

26. media

The National Assembly (Assmeblee nationale) of

Burkina Faso was established in the 1960 constitution. The legislature was in an almost constant state
of suspension from 1966 to 1990 due to political
instability and military coups. During this period
legislation was passed almost exclusively by executive decree.
In 1991 Burkina Faso enacted a new constitution that established the groundwork for a
functioning bicameral legislature. A constitutional
amendment in 1997 increased the duration of
the legislatures two annual sessions from sixty to
ninety days each. Another amendment in 2002 dissolved the upper house, the Chamber of Representatives, reshaping the legislature into a unicameral
National Assembly.
The legislatures influence over the executive is
highly circumscribed. It cannot remove the presi-

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

X
X
X

dent from office, its members cannot serve as ministers, and it does not make or approve the presidents appointments for prime minister or government. The legislature can, however, interpellate,
investigate, and censure the government. The legislatures autonomy is limited by the presidents
authority to issue decrees and dissolve the legislature. The strength of the legislature is bolstered by
a number of specified powers and prerogatives and
a moderate degree of institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires
involvement of the High Court of Justice.

the

104

National Assembly of Burkina Faso (Assemblee nationale)

Article 138
The High Court of Justice is competent to examine the
acts committed by the President of Faso in the exercise
of his functions and constituting high treason, of violating the Constitution or misappropriation of public
funds.
Article 139
The impeachment of the President of Faso is voted by
a majority of four-fifths of the voices of the Deputies
composing the Assembly. That of the members of the
Government is voted by a majority of two-thirds of the
voices of the Deputies composing the Assembly.
Article 140
The High Court of Justice is bound by the definition of
crimes and misdemeanors and by the determination of
punishments resulting from the penal laws in force at
the time when the acts had been committed.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Ministers are prohibited from serving simultaneously in the legislature.
Article 70
The functions of the members of the Government are
incompatible with the exercise of any parliamentary
mandate.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. Ministers address the legislatures questions in
a weekly question time.
Article 111
During the sessions, one sitting per week is reserved
to the questions of the Deputies and the responses
of the Government. The Assembly can address to the
Government written or oral question, with or without
debate.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can establish commissions of
inquiry to investigate the executive.
Article 113
The Government is held to furnish to the Assembly all
explications which are demanded of it concerning the
management and concerning its acts.
The Assembly may constitute commissions of
inquiry.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).

No. The agencies of coercion report directly to the

president and are not subject to legislative oversight.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister.
Article 46
The President of Faso appoints the Prime Minister and
terminates his functions, either on the presentation by
him of his resignation, or on his own authority in the
superior interest of the Nation.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers on the
proposal of the prime minister, and ministerial appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 46
On the proposal of the Prime Minister, [the president]
appoints the other members of the Government and
terminates their functions.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 37
The President of Faso is elected for seven years by universal, direct, equal and secret suffrage. He is re-eligible.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can remove the prime minister
with a motion of censure or a vote of no confidence.
Article 115
The National Assembly can present a motion of censure with respect to the Government. The motion of
censure is signed by at least one-third of the Deputies
of the Assembly. To be adopted, it must be voted by
an absolute majority of the members composing the
Assembly.
Article 116
The Prime Minister can, after deliberation of the Council of Ministers, engage before the National Assembly
the responsibility of the Government on a program or
on a declaration of general policy.
The confidence is refused to the Government if the text
presented does not receive the absolute majority of the
voices of the members composing the Assembly. The
vote on the question of confidence cannot intervene
less than forty-eight hours after the presentation of the
text.

National Assembly of Burkina Faso (Assemblee nationale)

105

The Prime Minister can, after deliberation of the Council of Ministers, engage the responsibility of the Government before the Assembly on the vote of a text. In
this case, this text is considered adopted except if a
motion of censure, presented within the twenty-four
hours which follow, is voted within the conditions
specified in the lines below.

of its conformity with the Constitution by the Supreme

Court.

Article 117
If the motion of censure is voted or the confidence
is refused, the President of Faso terminates, within a
time period of eight days, the functions of the Prime
Minster.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 50
The President of Faso can, after consultation with
the Prime Minister and the President of the Chamber
of Representatives, pronounce the dissolution of the
National Assembly.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The president issues decrees that have the force
of law.
Article 100
The simple decree is an act signed by the President of
Faso or by the Prime Minister and countersigned by the
competent member or members of the Government.
The decree in the Council of Ministers is an act signed
by the President of Faso and by the Prime Minister after
advice of the Council of Ministers: it is countersigned
by him or the competent members of the Government.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override presidential vetoes
by a majority vote.
Article 48
The President of Faso can, during the time period of
promulgation, demand a second reading of the law or
of certain of its articles.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Supreme Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 97
[The law] is voted by an absolute majority [of the
National Assembly] and promulgated after declaration

Article 152
The control of the constitutionality of the laws is
assured by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme
Court.

Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy

jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The president can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
Article 93
The Assembly enjoys financial autonomy. Its President
[of the Assembly] manages the credits which are allotted
to it for its functioning. The President [of the Assembly]
is responsible for this management before the Assembly; it can overrule him by an absolute majority for
incompetence in his management.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto.
Article 95
No Deputy can be pursued, investigated, arrested,
detained or judged because of the opinions or votes
made by him during the exercise or on the occasion of
the exercise of his functions.
Article 96
Except in the case of flagrante delicto, any Deputy can
only be pursued or arrested in a correctional or criminal
matter with the authorization of at least one-third of
the members of the Assembly during the sessions or of
the Bureau of the Assembly outside of the sessions.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 80
The Deputies are elected by direct, equal and secret universal suffrage. The Representatives are elected by indirect suffrage.

106

National Assembly of Burkina Faso (Assemblee nationale)

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
with a three-fourths majority vote.
Article 161
The initiative of the revision of the Constitution
belongs concurrently:
to the President of Faso;
to the majority of the members of the National Assembly;
to the people when a faction of at least thirty thousand
persons having the right to vote, introduces before the
National Assembly a petition constituting a proposal
drafted and signed.
Article 163
The draft of revision is, in all cases, submitted preliminarily to the evaluation of the National Assembly, after
the advice of the Chamber of Representatives.
Article 164
The draft of the text is then submitted to referendum.
It is considered to have been adopted when it has
obtained a majority of the votes cast . . . However, the
draft of revision is adopted without recourse to referendum if it is approved by the majority of three-quarters
of the members of the National Assembly.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for the
declaration of war.
Article 106
The declaration of war and the sending of troops abroad
are authorized by the Assembly.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties on most major issues.
Article 149
Peace treaties, treaties of commerce, treaties which
engage the finances of the State, those that modify the
provisions of legislative nature, and those that are relative to the state of persons, can only be ratified or
approved by virtue of a law. They can only take effect
after having been ratified or approved.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislature elects the deputies of the High
Court of Justice and three of the nine members
of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme
Court.
Article 137
There is instituted a High Court of Justice. The High
Court of Justice is composed of the Deputies that the
National Assembly elects after each general renewal.
Article 153
The Constitutional Chamber consists of, in addition to
the President of the Supreme Court, three magistrates
appointed by the President of Faso on the proposal of
the Minister of Justice, three persons appointed by the
President of Faso, three persons appointed by the President of the National Assembly.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. Burkina Faso is a member of the Central Bank
of West African States, whose governor is selected
by the member states.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
Yes. The legislature has a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature meets for two ninety-day sessions every year.
Article 87
The Assembly meets of right every year in two ordinary sessions. The duration of each will not exceed
ninety days. The first session opens the first Wednesday of March and the second the last Wednesday of September.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No.

No. The president has the power to grant amnesty.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.

Article 54
The President of Faso . . . proposes the laws of amnesty.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 54
The President of Faso exercises the right of pardon.

Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.

Parliament of Burundi (Parlement)

107

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.

Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

PARLIAMENT OF BURUNDI (PARLEMENT)

Expert consultants: Caty Clement, Alain Faupin, Jimmy MacClure, Edward McMahon, Louis-Marie
Nindorera, Peter R. Sampson, Christophe Sebudandi
Score: .41
Influence over
executive (3/9)

Institutional
autonomy (4/9)

Specified
powers (3/8)

Institutional
capacity (3/6)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

23. pardon

24. judiciary

X
X

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

25. central bank

X

26. media

The Parliament (Parlement) of Burundi was established in the 1992 constitution. Until the first multiparty elections in 1993, legislative power had
often rested in the hands of executives who ruled
by decree.
Throughout the 1990s implementation of the
constitution was hampered by ethnic violence,
high-level political assassinations, and political
instability. In 2005 a new constitution was
approved in a popular referendum and parliamentary elections were held.
The 2005 constitution calls for a bicameral parliament composed of a lower house, the National
Assembly (Inama NshingmateKa), and an upper
house, the Senate (Senat). It is too early to say
with any certainty how the legislature will function. By most appearances, the parliaments powers
are modest but not entirely insignificant. The legislature has minimal influence over the executive,
and presidential powers circumscribe the legislatures own autonomy.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires the
involvement of the General Office of Prosecutors
and the High Court of Justice.
Article 116
The President of the Republic may be removed from
office for grave negligence, grave abuse or corruption
by a resolution adopted by two-thirds of the members of the National Assembly and the Senate in joint
session.
Article 117
The President of the Republic may only be impeached
by the National Assembly and the Senate convened in
Congress and deciding, in a secret vote, with a twothirds majority of their members. The investigation
may only be conducted by a team of at least three magistrates from the General Office of Prosecutors led by
the General Prosecutor of the Republic.

108
Article 163
The two chambers of Parliament convene in Congress
in order to:
2) Impeach the President in case of high treason by a
resolution adopted by two-thirds of the members of the
National Assembly and the Senate.
Article 234
The High Court of Justice is competent to try the President of the Republic for high treason.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators who serve in government have a
sleeping mandate, meaning that they may join the
government but forfeit their voting rights in the
legislature during their government service. They
may return to the legislature when their government service ends.
Article 137
The functions of [a] member of the Government are
incompatible with the exercise of every [other] professional activity and the exercise of a parliamentary mandate.
Article 155
A deputy or senator who is appointed to the Government or any other public function incompatible
with the parliamentary mandate and who accepts the
appointment immediately ceases to hold a seat in
the National Assembly or the Senate and is replaced
by his proxy. The deputy or senator falling under
one of the incompatibilities mentioned in the preceding paragraph resumes his functions as soon as
the incompatibility has been removed and as long
as the mandate to which he has been elected is still
running.

Parliament of Burundi (Parlement)

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. Formally, the legislature can establish committees to investigate the executive, although in practice it lacks this power.
Article 204
The National Assembly and the Senate have the right
to constitute parliamentary committees charged with
the investigation of specific matters of governmental
action.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. Despite constitutional provisions to the contrary, the legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
Article 242
The maintenance of national security and national
defense are subject to the authority of the Government
and the control of Parliament.
Article 243
The defense and security forces must account for their
actions and work in absolute transparency.
Parliamentary committees charged with the task of
controlling the work of the defense and security
forces are established in accordance with the laws in
force and following the rules of procedure of Parliament.

6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

No. There is no prime minister.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.

No. According to the constitution, the legislature may question officials from the executive,
although in practice such hearings are rarely held.

Yes. The president appoints the ministers but is

obligated to do so on a basis proportional to party
representation in the National Assembly.

Article 202
The National Assembly and the Senate may keep themselves informed of the action of the Government by way
of oral or written questions addressed to the members
of the Government.
During the session periods, at least one session per week
is reserved by priority to the questions by the deputies
and senators and to the answers by the Government.
The Government is held to provide the National Assembly and the Senate with all explanations which are
requested from it concerning its administration or its
acts.

Article 108
The President of the Republic, in consultation with the
two Vice-Presidents, appoints the members of the Government and terminates their functions.
Article 129
The members [of government] come from different
political parties which have received more than five
percent of the vote and which so desire [to join the
Government]. These parties have the right to a percentage, rounded up, of the total number of Ministries,
which corresponds to the percentage of seats which
they hold in the National Assembly.

Parliament of Burundi (Parlement)

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. In 2005 the president was elected by the legislature. The constitution, however, provides for
direct presidential elections in the future, the next
to be held in 2010. The most recent presidential
election prior to 2005 was held in 1993, when the
president was elected directly.
Article 96
The President of the Republic is by direct universal suffrage for elected for a term of five years, and may be
re-elected once.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can pass a motion of censure
against the government.
Article 203
The National Assembly may present a motion of censure against the Government with a majority of twothirds of its members. It may be dissolved by the head
of state.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 203
The National Assembly may present a motion of censure against the Government with a majority of twothirds of its members. It may be dissolved by the head
of state.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. According to the constitution, the executive may rule by decree only when authorized
to do so by the legislature. In practice, the president often issues decrees that have the force of
law.
Article 195
The Government may, for the execution of its program, request from Parliament the authorization to
adopt by decree-law, for a limited time, the measures
which are normally of the domain of the statutory
law. Such decree-laws must be ratified by Parliament
in the course of the following session. The ratification
takes place by a single vote on the whole text of the
law.
In the absence of a law of ratification, such decrees
become lapsed; the lapse is stated by the Constitutional
Court, if necessary.

109

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A three-fourths majority vote in both houses
is required to override a presidential veto.
Article 197
The laws adopted by Parliament are promulgated by
the President of the Republic . . . unless he requests a
second reading . . . After a second reading, the same text
may not be promulgated unless it has been voted by a
majority of three-quarters of the deputies and threequarters (3/4) of the senators.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 228
The Constitutional Court is competent to . . . decide
on the constitutionality of laws and regulatory acts
adopted in matters other than those falling within the
domain of the statutory law.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
No. Legislators salaries are determined by law, but
the legislature is dependent on the executive for
the resources that finance its own operations.
Article 153
An organic law establishes the rules on allowances and
benefits of the deputies and senators as well as rules on
incompatibilities.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto.
Article 150
The deputies and senators may not be prosecuted,
searched, arrested, detained or judged for opinions or

110
votes delivered during the parliamentary sessions. During sessions, deputies and senators may be prosecuted
only with the authorization of the Executive Committee of the National Assembly or the Executive Committee of the Senate, except in case of flagrante delicto.
When not in session, the deputies and senators may be
arrested only with the authorization of the Executive
Committee of the National Assembly for the deputies
or the Executive Committee of the Senate for the senators, except in the cases of flagrante delicto, of previouslyauthorized prosecution or of final sentence.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected,
although former heads of state are guaranteed seats
in the Senate.
Article 180
The Senate is composed of:
1) Two delegates from each province, elected by an
electoral college composed of members of the local
councils of the relevant province, coming from different ethnic communities and elected in distinct electoral
procedures;
2) Three persons from the Twa ethnic group;
3) The former heads of State.
Article 164
The National Assembly is composed of at least hundred deputies . . . elected by direct universal suffrage for
a term of five years, and of three deputies of the Twa
ethnic group who are co-opted in accordance with the
electoral code.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments can be initiated
only by the president.
Article 297
The right to initiate a revision of the Constitution
belongs concurrently to the President of the Republic
after consultation with the Government, the National
Assembly or the Senate deciding respectively with an
absolute majority of the members which compose
them.
Article 298
The President of the Republic may submit a draft
amendment of the Constitution to a referendum.
Article 299
No amendment procedure shall be accepted if it undermines national unity, the cohesion of the Burundian
people, the secular character of the State, reconciliation,
democracy or the territorial integrity of the Republic.
Article 300
The bill or proposal of amendment is adopted by a fourfifths majority of the members composing the National
Assembly and two-thirds of the members of the Senate.

Parliament of Burundi (Parlement)

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. The president is required to consult with the
legislature before declaring war, but the legislatures approval is not necessary.
Article 110
The President of the Republic is the Commander-inChief of the defense and security forces. He declares
war and signs the armistice after consultation with
the Government, with the Executive Committees of
the National Assembly and the Senate and with the
National Council of Security.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties on most major issues.
Article 158
The National Assembly adopts the law.
Article 289
The President of the Republic exercises the superior
direction in international negotiations. He signs and
ratifies the treaties and international agreements.
Article 290
The peace and commerce treaties, treaties relating to
international organization, treaties which engage the
finances of the State, [and] those that modify provisions
of a legislative nature as well as those relating to the
status of persons may be ratified only by virtue of a law.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature may make laws granting
amnesty. It exercised this power in an important
case in 2006 and 2007. In 2006 it voted provisional immunity for political crimes committed
between 1962 and 2006. It followed this act by
releasing rebels from the Forces for National Liberation (FNL), a Hutu insurgent group. The legislature adopted the measure in an effort to bring
the FNL, the last holdout from Burundis long civil
war, to accept the terms of a ceasefire agreement.
Article 158
The National Assembly adopts the law.
Article 159
[The following] are of the domain of the statutory
law . . . amnesty.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 113
The President of the Republic has the right to grant
pardon which he exercises after consultation with the
two Vice-Presidents of the Republic and upon the advice
of the Superior Council of the Magistrature.

Parliament of Burundi (Parlement)

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The Senates approval is required for the presidents appointments to the Supreme Court, the
Constitutional Court, and other judicial positions.
Article 187
The Senate has the following powers:
9) To approve appointments only of the following positions:
e) the members of the Superior Council of the Magistrature;
f) the members of the Supreme Court;
g) the members of the Constitutional Court;
i) the President of the Court of Appeal and the President of the Administrative Court;
j) the General Prosecutor at the Court of Appeal;
k) the presidents of the upper courts, the Court of Commerce and the Labor Court.
Article 215
All appointments to judicial functions referred to in
Article 187(9), except those to the Constitutional Court,
are made by the President of the Republic on a proposal
by the Minister responsible for the justice sector, upon
advice by the Superior Council of the Magistrature and
confirmation by the Senate.

111

No. The president appoints the governor of the

Central Bank of Burundi.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature is in session for at least nine
months each year.
Article 174
The National Assembly convenes every year for three
ordinary session periods of three months each. The first
session period starts on the first Monday of February,
the second on the first Monday of June and the third
on the first Monday of October.
Article 185
The Senate convenes every year for three ordinary session periods of three months each and at the same time
as the National Assembly.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.

Article 218
The members of the Superior Council of Magistrature
are appointed by the President of the Republic after
approval by the Senate.

No.

Article 222
The judges of the Supreme Court are appointed by the
President of the Republic upon proposal by the Minister responsible for the justice sector, upon advice of
the Superior Council of the Magistrature and with the
approval of the Senate.

Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

Article 226
The Constitutional Court is composed of seven members. They are appointed by the President of the Republic after approval by the Senate. They have a nonrenewable term of office of six years.

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

No. The legislature is a young institution, and

members have not yet acquired substantial experience.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.

112

National Assembly of Cambodia (Radhsphea)

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF CAMBODIA (RADHSPHEA)

Expert consultants: Ron Abney, Dominic Cardy, Neam Koy, Mong Hay Lao, Nimmith Men,
Saumura Rainsy, Sophoan Rath, Sovandara Yin
Score: .59
Influence over
executive (5/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)

Specified
powers (5/8)

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

12. no veto
13. no review

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

X
X

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

23. pardon
24. judiciary

25. central bank

26. media

X
X

X
X

The National Assembly (Radhsphea) of Cambodia

was established in the 1947 constitution, which
granted Cambodia autonomy within the French
Union of Indochina. The country gained full independence in 1953. A 1970 constitution abolished
the monarchy and created the Khmer Republic.
In 1975 and 1976 Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge
seized power and, in a new constitution, created a
powerless body named the Peoples Representative
Assembly.
In 1981 Vietnam overthrew the Khmer Rouge
and established a single-party communist government while retaining the Peoples Representative Assembly. According to the 1981 constitution, the legislature was the highest organ of
state power. In practice, the pro-Vietnamese Kampuchean Peoples Revolutionary Party ruled by
decree.
Cambodias current political order was defined
in the countrys 1993 constitution. The document,
heavily influenced by the original 1947 constitution, rechristened the unicameral National Assembly. A coup in 1997 overthrew a democratically
elected government and brought to power a dominant prime minister, Hun Sen, who continues to
rule Cambodia with a strong hand. Constitutional

amendments in 1999 created a bicameral parliament by adding an upper house, the Senate.
The legislature enjoys some clout derived
largely from formally specified prerogatives and
some institutional capacity, but it is still largely
subordinate to Hun Sen and his Cambodian Peoples Party (CPP). The legislatures control over,
and autonomy from, Hun Sen are severely limited.
For example, legislators are shielded from arrest or
prosecution, but the legislature has voted to revoke
its members immunity for defaming the prime
minister. The legislature has little ability to oversee
the government, and its institutional autonomy
is circumscribed by executive decree, dissolution,
and impoundment powers.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can remove the prime minister
with a vote of no confidence. It merits note, however, that replacement of the current prime minister, Hun Sen, by the legislature, without action

National Assembly of Cambodia (Radhsphea)

113

by agencies of coercion, would be highly unlikely.

The legislature cannot remove the king.

week for questions and answers. There shall be no vote

during any session reserved for this purpose.

Article 98
The National Assembly shall dismiss a member or members of the Royal Government or the whole Cabinet by
the adoption of a motion of censure by 2/3 majority of
the entire National Assembly.

Article 97
The National Assembly commissions may invite any
minister to clarify certain issues under his/her field of
responsibility.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. The constitution forbids ministers from serving simultaneously in the legislature, although
some ministers appointed from the ranks of the
National Assembly have refused to give up their
seats while serving in government.
Article 79
The National Assembly mandate shall be incompatible
with the holding of any active public function and of
any membership in other institutions provided for in
the Constitution, except when the assembly members
is required to serve in the Royal Government.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
No. Formally, the legislature can question the government during weekly question time or in special
hearings, but in practice, such hearings are rare.
Even when they are held, opposition members are
often excluded from participation.
Article 89
Upon the request by at least 1/10 of its members the
National Assembly shall invite a high ranking official
to clarify important special issues.
Article 96
The deputies have the right to put a motion against
the Royal Government. The motion shall be submitted in writing through the Chairman of the National
Assembly. The replies shall be given by one or several ministers depending on the matters related to the
accountability of one or several ministers. If the case
concerns the overall policy of the Royal Government,
the Prime Minister shall reply in person. The explanations by the ministers or by the Prime Minister shall
be given verbally or in writing. The explanations shall
be provided within 7 days after the day when the question is received. In case of verbal reply, the Chairman of
the National Assembly shall decide whether to hold an
open debate or not. If there is no debate, the answer of
the minister or the Prime Minister shall be considered
final. If there is a debate, the questioner, other speakers, the ministers, or the Prime Minister may exchange
views within the time-frame not exceeding one session.
The National Assembly shall establish one day each

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislative committees exercise nominal
oversight, but in practice this oversight is far from
effective.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. The king is required to appoint as prime minister the leader of the party or coalition of parties
that enjoys the support of the legislature.
Article 19
The King shall appoint the Prime Minister and the
Council of Ministers according to the procedures stipulated in Article 119.
Article 119
At the recommendation of the Chairman and with the
agreement of both the Vice-Chairmen of the National
Assembly, the King shall designate a dignitary from
among the representatives of the winning party to form
the Royal Government. This designated representative
along with other members chosen from the political
parties or represented in the National Assembly, then
present themselves to the National Assembly to ask for
a vote of confidence.
After the National Assembly has given its vote of confidence, the King shall issue a Royal Decree appointing
the entire Council of Ministers.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The legislatures approval is required to confirm ministerial appointments.
Article 119
At the recommendation of the Chairman and with the
agreement of both the Vice-Chairmen of the National
Assembly, the King shall designate a dignitary from
among the representatives of the winning party to form
the Royal Government. This designated representative
along with other members chosen from the political
parties or represented in the National Assembly, then

114
present themselves to the National Assembly to ask for
a vote of confidence. After the National Assembly has
given its vote of confidence, the King shall issue a Royal
Decree appointing the entire Council of Ministers.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The country lacks a presidency.
9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.
Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 90
The National Assembly shall pass a vote of confidence
in the Royal Government by a two-third majority of all
members of the entire National Assembly membership.
Article 98
The National Assembly shall dismiss a member or members of the Royal Government or the whole Cabinet by
the adoption of a motion of censure by 2/3 majority of
the entire National Assembly.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The king can dissolve the legislature.
Article 78:
The legislative term of the National Assembly shall be 5
years and terminates on the day when the new National
Assembly convenes.
The National Assembly shall not be dissolved before
the end of its term except when the Royal government
is twice deposed within a period of twelve months. In
this case, following a proposal from the Prime Minister and the approval of the Chairman of the National
Assembly, the King shall dissolve the National Assembly.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. Despite constitutional provisions to the contrary, the prime minister issues decrees that have
the force of law.
Article 90
The National Assembly is the only organ which has
legislative power, and performs its duties as provided
for in the constitution and laws.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.

National Assembly of Cambodia (Radhsphea)

Yes. The executive lacks veto power. Theoretically

the king could refuse to assent to a bill, but this has
never happened.
13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 92
Laws adopted by the National Assembly which run
counter to the principles of preserving national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and affect
the political unity or the administration of the nation
shall be annulled. The Constitutional Council is the
only organ which shall decide upon this annulment.
Article 136
The Constitutional Council shall have the duty to safeguard respect of the constitution, interpret the Constitution and laws adopted by the National Assembly and
reviewed completely by the Senate.
Article 140
The King, The Prime Minister, The President of the
National Assembly, 1/10 of the members of National
Assembly, The President of the Senate, or 1/4 of the
members of Senate may send draft laws adopted by
National Assembly to the Constitutional Council for
review before promulgation. The constitutional council
shall decide within thirty days at the latest whether the
above laws and internal rules of the National Assembly
or the Senate are constitutional.
Article 141
After promulgation of any law, the King, the President
of the Senate, the President of the National Assembly, the Prime Minister, 1/4 of members of Senate,
1/10 of members of National Assembly or the Courts
may request the Constitutional Council to review the
constitutionality of that law.
Khmer Citizens shall have the right to appeal against
the constitutionality of any law through their representative or President of National Assembly or member
of the Senate or President of the Senate as mentioned
in the above articles.
Article 142
Provisions in any article ruled by the Constitutional
Council as unconstitutional shall not be promulgated
or implemented.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.

National Assembly of Cambodia (Radhsphea)

No. The government can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.

16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
Article 81
The National Assembly shall have an autonomous budget to conduct its function.
The deputies shall receive remuneration.
Article 105
The Senate shall have an autonomous budget to conduct its functions.
Senators shall receive remuneration.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto. In 2005,
however, legislators voted to strip immunity from
three members of the Assembly for defaming the
prime minister. In 2006 the legislature voted unanimously to restore these legislators immunity.
Article 80
The deputies shall enjoy parliamentary immunity. No
assembly member shall be prosecuted, detained or
arrested because of opinions expressed during the exercise of his duties.
The accusation, arrest, or detention of an assembly
member shall be made only with the permission of the
National Assembly or by the Standing Committee of
the National Assembly between sessions, except in case
of flagrante delicto. In that case, the competent authority shall immediately report to the National Assembly
or to the Standing Committee for decision.
The decision made by the Standing Committee of the
National Assembly shall be submitted to the National
Assembly at its next session for approval by a 2/3 majority vote of the assembly members. In any case, detention or prosecution of a deputy shall be suspended by a
3/4 majority vote of the National Assembly members.
Article 104
The Senator shall enjoy parliamentary immunity.
No Senator shall be prosecuted, detained or arrested
because of opinions expressed during the exercise of
his or her duties. The accusation, arrest, or detention
of a senator shall be made only with the permission of
the Senate or by the Standing Committee of the Senate
between sessions, except in the case of flagrante delicto.
In that case the competent authority shall immediately
report to the senate or to the Standing Committee for
decision.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.

115

Yes. All members of the 120-person legislature are

directly elected, with the exception of two senators
who are elected by the National Assembly on the
nomination of the king.
Article 76
The National Assembly consists of at least 120 members.
The deputies shall be elected by a free, universal,
equal, direct and secret ballot.
The deputies may be re-elected.
Article 100
The king shall nominate two Senators.
The Assembly shall elect two Senators by majority vote.
Others shall be universally elected.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
with a two-thirds majority vote.
Article 151
The initiative to review or to amend the Constitution
shall be the prerogative of the King, the Prime Minister,
[or] the Chairman of the National Assembly at the suggestion of 1/4 of all the assembly members. Revision
or amendments shall be enacted by a Constitutional
law passed by the National Assembly with a 2/3 majority vote.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for royal
war declarations.
Article 24
The King shall declare war after approval of the Assembly and the Senate.
Article 90
The National Assembly shall adopt the law on proclamation of war.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 26
The King shall sign and ratify international treaties
and conventions after a vote of approval by the
National Assembly and the Senate.
Article 90
The National Assembly shall adopt or repeal treaties
and International Convention.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. Since 1999 the National Assembly and the king
both have had the power to grant amnesty. Prior
to 1999 the king alone had this power.

116
Article 27
The King shall have the right to grant partial or complete amnesty.
Article 90
The National Assembly shall adopt the law on the general amnesty.

National Assembly of Cambodia (Radhsphea)

Article 107
The Senate shall hold its ordinary sessions twice a year.
Each session shall last at least three months. If there is a
proposal from the king or the prime Minister, or at least
one-third of the senate, the Senate standing Committee
shall call an extraordinary session of the Senate.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No. The king has the power of pardon.

Yes.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.

Yes. The National Assembly appoints three of the

nine members of the Constitutional Council.
Article 137
The Constitutional Council shall consist of nine members with a nine-year mandate. 1/3 of the members of
the Council shall be replaced every three years. 3 members shall be appointed by the King, 3 members by the
National Assembly and 3 others by the Supreme Council of the Magistracy.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. Formally, the legislature, on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers, appoints the
governor of the National Bank of Cambodia, but
in practice, the prime minister and the Council of
Ministers are wholly responsible for the appointment.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature is in session for at least six
months a year.
Article 83
The National Assembly shall hold its ordinary session
twice a year.
Each session shall last at least three months. If there
is a proposal from the King or the Prime Minister
or at least 1/3 of the National Assembly members,
the National Assembly Standing Committee shall call
an extraordinary session of the National Assembly.

No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
Article 76
The deputies may be re-elected.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
No. The first elections since 1970 were held in 1993
and resulted in a plurality of seats for a royalist
party, which goes by its French acronym, FUNCINPEC. In 1997 Hun Sen, then serving as second prime minister, carried out a bloody military
coup and deposed Prince Norodom Ranariddh, the
leader of FUNCINPEC, who at the time was serving as first prime minister. Hun Sen subsequently
took over as sole prime minister. In the 2003 parliamentary elections, Hun Sens Cambodian Peoples
Party (CPP), relying in part on the prime ministers
control over the agencies of coercion, obtained a
large plurality of votes and three-fifths of seats in
the National Assembly. Under these conditions,
turnover of legislators has been considerable, and
opportunities for members of the fledging parliament to acquire substantial experience as legislators have been sharply restricted.

National Assembly of Cameroon (Assemblee nationale)

117

NATIONALE)
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF CAMEROON (ASSEMBLEE
Expert consultants: Robert Akoko, Jean-Germain Gros, Benedict Jua, Andreas Mehler, Immanuel
Tatah Mentan, Francis B. Nyamnjoh
Score: .25
Influence over
executive (1/9)

Institutional
autonomy (3/9)

Specified
powers (1/8)

Institutional
capacity (3/6)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

12. no veto
13. no review

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

21. treaties
22. amnesty
23. pardon
24. judiciary

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

25. central bank

X

26. media

18. all elected

The National Assembly (Assemblee nationale) of

Cameroon was established along with a federal
state in the countrys 1961 constitution. The 1961
document set forth a unicameral legislature. A
new constitution in 1972 provided for a unitary
state structure but did not notably affect legislative power. In 1996 a constitutional amendment
sought to create a bicameral legislature by adding
an upper house of parliament, the Senate. At the
time of this writing, the Senate had not yet been
formed. The amendment gives the president the
power to appoint three out of every ten members
of the Senate. Prior to the 1996 amendments, all
members of the legislature were elected.
The National Assembly is a feeble body. It has
no significant ability to influence the executive
branch. The president appoints the prime minister and ministers, and the legislature cannot effectively interpellate or investigate the government.
Its own institutional autonomy is severely limited
by the presidents powers to appoint members of
the legislature, dissolve the legislature, and rule by
decree. Prerogatives specified in the constitution
are reserved almost exclusively for the president.
The legislature has modest institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires action by
the Court of Impeachment. The legislature can
vote no confidence in the government, forcing the
resignation of the prime minister, but the president
can simply reappoint the prime minister.
Article 34
(5) Where the National Assembly adopts a motion of
censure or passes a vote of no confidence, the Prime
Minister shall tender the resignation of the Government to the President of the Republic.
(6) The President of the Republic may re-appoint the
Prime Minister and ask him to form a new Government.
Article 53
(1) The Court of Impeachment shall have jurisdiction,
in respect of acts committed in the exercise of their
functions, to try the President of the Republic for high
treason and . . . for conspiracy against the security of the
State.

118

National Assembly of Cameroon (Assemblee nationale)

No. Ministers are prohibited from serving simultaneously in the legislature.

No. The president appoints ministers on the recommendation of the prime minister, and ministerial appointments do not require the legislatures
confirmation.

Article 13
The office of member of Government and any office
ranking as such shall be incompatible with that of
Member of Parliament.

Article 10
(1) The President of the Republic shall appoint the
Prime Minister and, on the proposal of the latter, the
other members of Government.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.

No. Although the legislature has the power of summons, this power is strictly limited to paper; it has
no practical significance.
Article 35
(1) The Parliament shall control Government action
through oral or written questions and by setting up
committees of inquiry with specific terms of reference.
(2) The Government shall, subject to the imperatives of
national defence, the security of the State or the secrecy
of criminal investigation, furnish any explanations and
information to Parliament.
(3) During each ordinary session, a special sitting shall
be set aside each week for question time.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature has some limited powers of
investigation, but in practice, it must halt its investigation if the president so desires.
Article 35
(1) The Parliament shall control Government action
through oral or written questions and by setting up
committees of inquiry with specific terms of reference.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The agencies of coercion report directly to the
president and are not subject to legislative oversight.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister.
Article 10
(1) The President of the Republic shall appoint the
Prime Minister and, on the proposal of the latter, the
other members of Government.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.

No. The president is directly elected.

Article 6
(1) The President of the Republic shall be elected by
a majority of the votes cast through direct, equal and
secret universal suffrage.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 34
(5) Where the National Assembly adopts a motion of
censure or passes a vote of no confidence, the Prime
Minister shall tender the resignation of the Government to the President of the Republic.
(6) The President of the Republic may re-appoint the
Prime Minister and ask him to form a new Government.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 8
(12) The President of the Republic may, if necessary and
after consultation with the Government, the Bureaux
of the National Assembly and the Senate, dissolve the
National Assembly.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. Formally, the president may rule by decree
only when delegated specific decree powers by the
legislature. In practice, the president frequently
issues decrees that have the force of law without
prior legislative authorization.
Article 28
(1) Parliament may empower the President of the
Republic to legislate by way of ordinance for a limited
period and for given purposes.
(2) Such ordinances shall enter into force on the date
of their publication. They shall be tabled before the
Bureaux of the National Assembly and the Senate for
purposes of ratification within the time-limit laid down

National Assembly of Cameroon (Assemblee nationale)

by the enabling law. They shall be of a statutory nature
as long as they have not been ratified.
(3) They shall remain in force as long as Parliament has
not refused to ratify them.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote of its total membership.
Article 19
(3) The President of the Republic may, before enacting
any law, ask for a second reading. In such case, bills
shall be passed by an absolute majority of the members
of the National Assembly.
Article 24
(3) The President of the Republic may, before enacting
a law, ask for a second reading.
In such case, bills shall be passed by an absolute majority of the Senators.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court has the formal power
to review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 46
The Constitutional Council shall have jurisdiction in
matters pertaining to the Constitution. It shall rule on
the constitutionality of laws. It shall be the organ regulating the functioning of the institutions.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The president can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
No. The legislature is dependent on the executive
for the resources that finance its own operations.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. The constitution stipulates only that legislative immunity will be determined by law. According to practice and subsequent legislation, legislators are immune from arrest unless immunity is
lifted by the legislature. In October 2006 Edouard

119

Etonde Ekoto and Andre Bootoo a Ngon, prominent parliamentarians from the Cameroon Peoples Democratic Movement, the countrys dominant party and the main political organization
headed by the president, Paul Biya, had their
immunity lifted by the legislature as a first step
toward criminal prosecution for corruption in their
management of state enterprises. The case apparently confirmed both the existence of immunity
from criminal prosecution and the necessity and
ability of the legislature to lift it.
Article 14
(6) The conditions for the election of members of
the National Assembly and of the Senate, as well
as the immunities, ineligibilities, incompatibilities,
allowances and privileges of the members of Parliament
shall be determined by law.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
No. The president appoints three out of every ten
senators. It bears note that, although the Senate
was established in a 1996 amendment, it has not
yet been created. Prior to 1996 all members of the
legislature were elected.
Article 15
(1) The National Assembly shall comprise 180 members
elected by direct and secret universal suffrage for a fiveyear term of office.
Article 20
(2) Each region shall be represented in the Senate by 10
Senators of whom 7 shall be elected by indirect universal suffrage on a regional basis and 3 appointed by the
President of the Republic.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. To date all constitutional amendments have
been made by presidential decree. Formally, the
legislature alone cannot change the constitution
without the approval of the president. If the president objects to a constitutional amendment that
has been passed by the legislature, he or she can
choose to put the amendment to a popular referendum.
Article 63
(1) Amendments to the Constitution may be proposed
either by the President of the Republic or by Parliament.
(2) Any proposed amendment made by a member of
Parliament shall be signed by at least one-third of the
members of either House.
(3) Parliament shall meet in congress when called
upon to examine a draft or proposed amendment. The
amendment shall be adopted by an absolute majority of

120
the members of Parliament. The President of the Republic may request a second reading; in which case the
amendment shall be adopted by a two-third Majority
of the members of Parliament.
(4) The President of the Republic may decide to submit
any bill to amend the Constitution to a referendum;
in which case the amendment shall be adopted by a
simple majority of the votes cast.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. The president can declare war without the legislatures approval.
21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 43
The President of the Republic shall negotiate and ratify treaties and international agreements. Treaties and
international agreements falling within the area of
competence of the Legislative Power . . . shall be submitted to Parliament for authorization to ratify.

National Assembly of Cameroon (Assemblee nationale)

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
No. The legislature meets for three thirty-day sessions.
Article 14
(3) Both Houses of Parliament shall meet on the same
dates:
(a) in ordinary session during the months of June,
November and March each year.
(b) in extraordinary session, at the request of the President of the Republic or of one-third of the members of
both Houses.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No.

No. Pardon and amnesty are not treated separately,

and the legislature lacks the power of pardon. See
item 23.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon
(clemency).
Article 8
(7) [The president] shall exercise the right of clemency
after consultation with the Higher Judicial Council.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The president appoints the members of the
Constitutional Council, and the appointments do
not require the legislatures approval.
Art. 51
(2) Members of the Constitutional Council shall be
appointed by the President of the Republic.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. Cameroon belongs to the Bank of Central
African States, whose governor is selected by the
member countries.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. The turnover rate is relatively low. The
Cameroon Peoples Democratic Movement, the
party of the president, Paul Biya, has dominated
the legislature since the mid-1990s, obtaining
overwhelming majorities in the 1997, 2002, and
2007 parliamentary elections. While the legislature contains a significant number of highly experienced members, it bears mention that the National
Assemblys subordination to the president means
that time spent in the legislature does not necessarily translate into significant member expertise
in legislative work.

Parliament of Canada

121

PARLIAMENT OF CANADA
Expert consultants: Charles Gonthier, Andrew Heard, Gregory S. Mahler, Christopher P. Manfredi,
Richard Schultz, Kenneth Vigeant
Score: .72
Influence over
executive (8/9)

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Specified
powers (4/8)

Institutional
capacity (6/6)

19. amendments
20. war

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

The antecedents to Canadian parliamentary government can be traced back to 1791, when Britain
split the North American possessions conquered
from the French into the provinces of Upper
Canada (later Ontario) and Lower Canada (later
Quebec). Perhaps partly motivated by its experience with colonial discontent during the American Revolution as well as Canadian calls for
Responsible Government (as local rule was then
described), direct appointment of governing councils was replaced by a bicameral assembly for each
province, with an elected Legislative Assembly and
an appointed Legislative Council although ultimate authority remained in Britain. The structure of colonial administration was reshuffled
several times, and the two provinces, as well
as their legislatures, were unified in 1840. In
1867 the British North America Act brought
greater political unity to Canada, bringing several of the Maritime Provinces into Confederation, and designated the United Kingdoms parliament as Canadas highest legislative power.
Legislation was subject to Britains approval until
the Statute of Westminster, enacted in 1931, which
granted Canada formal independence. Complete
legal separation from British legislative control was not achieved until the Canada Act of
1982.

27. sessions
28. secretary

X
X

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X
X

26. media

Canada does not have a single constitution, but

rather a number of conventions and constitutional
acts. The bicameral legislature consists of the Senate and the House of Commons. The Senate is a
fully appointed upper house. Although formally
endowed with legislative powers, the Senate routinely approves legislation passed in the House
of Commons. The Queen of England remains
Canadas official head of state, although in practice
this function is exercised by the Governor General.
Most executive power rests with the prime minister
and the cabinet.
Parliament is endowed with substantial powers.
It has extensive control over the executive. While
subject to dissolution, the legislature enjoys institutional autonomy. It does not share lawmaking
authority with the executive, and its laws, in practice, are veto-proof. Parliament holds a number of
specific powers and prerogatives and has a very
high level of institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can remove the prime minister with a vote of no confidence. The Governor

122

General can only be replaced by the queen on the

advice of the prime minister.
2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of
the legislature.
Yes. Ministers are selected from, and required to
serve simultaneously in, the legislature.
3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. Parliamentary committees can compel cabinet
members to testify with a majority vote. Committees often question ministry officials.
4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. Parliamentary committees have effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. The Governor General formally appoints the
prime minister but must select the candidate who
enjoys the support of the House of Commons.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The Governor General appoints ministers on
the recommendation of the prime minister, and
the appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Section 11
There shall be a Council to aid and advise in the Government of Canada, to be styled the Queens Privy
Council for Canada; and the Persons who are to be
Members of that Council shall be from Time to Time
chosen and summoned by the Governor General and
sworn in as Privy Councillors, and Members thereof
may be from Time to Time removed by the Governor
General.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The country lacks a presidency. The Governor
General is the head of state.

Parliament of Canada
Section 9
The Executive Government and Authority of and over
Canada is hereby declared to continue and be vested in
the Queen.
Section 10
The provisions of this act referring to the Governor
General extend and apply to the Governor General for
the Time being of Canada, or other the Chief Executive
Officer or Administrator for the Time being carrying on
the Government of Canada on behalf and in the Name
of the Queen, by whatever Title he is designated.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the
executive.
No. The Governor General, on the recommendation of the prime minister, can dissolve the House
of Commons.
11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. Formally, the Governor General could refuse
to give royal assent to legislation. This would
amount to a veto power. In practice, it is unthinkable that the Governor General would withhold
royal assent from legislation.
Section 55
Where a Bill passed by the Houses of Parliament is
presented to the Governor General for the Queens
Assent, he shall declare, according to his Discretion,
but subject to the provisions of this act and to Her
Majestys Instructions, either that he assents thereto in
the Queens name, or that he withholds the Queens
Assent, or that he reserves the Bill for the Signification
of the Queens Pleasure.
Section 57
A Bill reserved for the Signification of the Queens Pleasure shall not have any Force unless and until, within
Two Years from the Day on which it was presented to
the Governor General for the Queens Assent, the Governor General signifies, by Speech or Message to each of
the Houses of the Parliament or by Proclamation, that
it has received the Assent of the Queen in Council.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.

Parliament of Canada

No. The Supreme Court can review the constitutionality of laws.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all
policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive cannot withhold funds from a
dedicated program without legislative approval.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislative immunity extends to official parliamentary business only. Legislators are subject to
arrest for common crimes.
Section 18
The privileges, immunities, and powers to be held,
enjoyed, and exercised by the Senate and by the House
of Commons, and by the Members thereof respectively,
shall be such as are from time to time defined by
Act of the Parliament of Canada, but so that any Act
of the Parliament of Canada defining such privileges,
immunities, and powers shall not confer any privileges,
immunities, or powers exceeding those at the passing
of such Act held, enjoyed, and exercised by the Commons House of Parliament of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Ireland, and by the Members thereof.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
No. All of the members of the Senate are appointed
by the Governor General on the advice of the prime
minister and the government. All members of the
House of Commons are elected.
Section 24
The Governor General shall from Time to Time, in the
Queens Name, by Instrument under the Great Seal of
Canada, summon qualified Persons to the Senate; and,
subject to the provisions of this act, every Person so
summoned shall become and be a Member of the Senate
and a Senator.
Section 37
The House of Commons shall, subject to the provisions
of this act, consist of two hundred and eighty-two members of whom ninety-five shall be elected for Ontario,
seventy-five for Quebec, eleven for Nova Scotia, ten for

123
New Brunswick, fourteen for Manitoba, twenty-eight
for British Columbia, four for Prince Edward Island,
twenty-one for Alberta, fourteen for Saskatchewan,
seven for Newfoundland, one for the Yukon Territory
and two for the Northwest Territories.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments require approval
by the regional legislative assemblies in two-thirds
of the provinces.
Section 38
(1) An amendment to the Constitution of Canada may
be made by proclamation issued by the Governor General under the Great Seal of Canada where so authorized
by
(a) resolutions of the Senate and the House of Commons; and
(b) resolutions of the legislative assemblies of at least
two-thirds of the provinces.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. A constitutional convention in place since
1939 requires the legislatures approval for declarations of war.
21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The executive can negotiate and ratify international treaties. The legislature must, however,
approve treaties that would affect domestic legislation. Most treaties require separate legislative
implementation.
Section 132
The Parliament and Government of Canada shall have
all Powers necessary or Proper for performing the Obligations of Canada or of any Province thereof, as Part of
the British Empire, towards Foreign Countries, arising
under Treaties between the Empire and such Foreign
Countries.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature can grant amnesty through legislation.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
Yes. The legislature can grant a pardon through
special legislation.
24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject
appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The Governor General appoints members
of the judiciary on the recommendation of the
queens Privy Council for Canada, a distinctive
body that includes the prime minister, the cabinet,

124

former Governors General, and a variety of other

notables. The appointments do not require the legislatures approval.
Section 96
The Governor General shall appoint the Judges of the
Superior, District, and County Courts in each Province,
except those of the Courts of Probate in Nova Scotia
and New Brunswick.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

Parliament of Canada

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
Yes.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.

No. The prime minister appoints the governor of

the Bank of Canada.

Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election for

members of the House of Commons. Senators hold
their position until the age of seventy-five.

Section 91
It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate and House of Commons, to
make laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government
of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within
the Classes of Subjects by this act assigned exclusively
to the Legislatures of the Provinces . . . that is to say,
15) Banking, Incorporation of Banks, and the Issue of
Paper Money.

Section 29
(1) Subject to Subsection (2), a Senator shall, subject to
the provisions of this act, hold his place in the Senate for
life. (2) A Senator who is summoned to the Senate after
the coming into force of this subsection shall, subject
to this act, hold his place in the Senate until he attains
the age of seventy-five years.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.

No. The prime minister appoints the members of

the board of directors of the Canadian Broadcasting Company.

Yes.

Yes. The legislature is in session for between eight

and nine months a year.

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.

Section 5
There shall be a sitting of Parliament and of each legislature at least once every twelve months.

Yes. Re-election rates in the House of Commons are

sufficiently high to produce a significant number
of highly experienced members.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

National Assembly of the Central African Republic (Assemblee nationale)

125

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (ASSEMBLEE

NATIONALE)
Expert consultants: Stuart Crampton, Alain Faupin, Barrie Hofmann, Maxime-Faustin
Mbringa-Takama, Andreas Mehler
Score: .34
Influence over
executive (3/9)

Institutional
autonomy (3/9)

Specified
powers (3/8)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack president
9. no confidence

23. pardon
24. judiciary

Institutional
capacity (2/6)

X
X

25. central bank

X
X

The National Assembly (Assemblee nationale) of the

Central African Republic was established in the
1959 constitution. The political order was overthrown in a 1965 military coup that brought JeanBedel Bokassa to power. Bokassa declared himself
emperor and ruled until 1979, when he was overthrown with the help of French troops. The demise
of Bokassa led to some political opening, which
included a controversial presidential election in
1981 whose result was overturned in military coup
just six months later, and a referendum that ratified
a new constitution in 1986, which was followed by
parliamentary elections in 1987. Reasonably open
presidential elections were held in 1993. In 1994
the Central African Republic adopted a new constitution, but the experiment with open politics was
turbulent and punctuated by civil unrest and coup
attempts. In a 2003 military coup, Francois Bozize
seized power, declared himself president, and dissolved parliament. Under Bozize, a new constitution was approved in 2004. The constitution did
not differ markedly from its predecessor. The first
legislative elections under the new system were
held in the spring of 2005, and the legislature convened in the summer of 2005.
The National Assemblys role is not expansive.
It can question and investigate the executive officials and remove the government with a vote of
no confidence, but otherwise lacks influence over
the executive. The presidents powers of dissolu-

26. media

tion, decree, veto, gatekeeping, and impoundment

restrict the legislatures institutional autonomy.
The legislature is vested with some specified powers, including the right to amend the constitution.
It has scant institutional capacity; members of the
National Assembly lack staff, and the absence of
a tradition of legislative institutions has prevented
members from developing the expertise conducive
to a proficient legislature.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires the
involvement of the attorney general and the High
Court of Justice. The legislature can remove the
prime minister with a vote of no confidence.
Article 34
A vacancy of the Presidency of the Republic only occurs
in the case of death, resignation, removal from office,
conviction of the President or by his permanent incapacity to exercise his functions in conformity with the
requirements of his post. In the case of conviction, the
decision which pronounces [the conviction] is transmitted by the President of the jurisdiction concerned to
the President of the Constitutional Court, who informs
the President of the National Assembly by letter and the
Nation by message.

126

National Assembly of the Central African Republic (Assemblee nationale)

Article 40
The Prime Minister, Head of Government, is responsible
to the President of the Republic and to the National
Assembly.
The Prime Minister may be dismissed, at any time, by
the President of the Republic or following a censure
motion adopted by the absolute majority of the members composing the National Assembly.
Article 41
After the appointment of the members of the Government, the Prime Minister, Head of Government,
presents himself within a maximum period of sixty days
before the National Assembly and explains his general
policy program. In the case of non-observance of the
sixty day time limit, Article 40 above applies. This program defines the main features of the action which the
Government plans to carry out in the diverse sectors
of national activity and particularly in the areas of economic, scientific, technical, technological, social, environmental, cultural and foreign policy. On this occasion, the Prime Minister, Head of Government, must
ask the National Assembly for a vote of confidence. The
confidence is granted or refused [to the Prime Minister]
by the absolute majority of the members composing
the National Assembly. The Prime Minister, Head of
Government, may, after deliberation of the Council of
Ministers, make the vote of a [legislative] text a matter of the Governments responsibility instead of the
National Assemblys. In this case, the text is considered
as adopted, unless a censure motion submitted within
the following twenty-four hours is passed in the conditions established in Article 48 below.
Article 47
The National Assembly may involve the responsibility
of the Government by voting a censure motion. The
censure motion is remitted, signed, to the President
of the National Assembly, who without delay notifies
the Government of it. It obligatorily carries the title
MOTION OF CENSURE and must be signed by onethird of the members composing the National Assembly.
The vote on the censure motion takes place within the
forty-eight hours that follow its introduction. Voting
takes place by secret ballot and with the absolute majority of the members composing the National Assembly.
Article 48
When the National Assembly adopts a motion of censure or when it disapproves the program or a declaration of general policy of the Government, the Prime
Minister must submit without delay the resignation of
his Government to the President of the Republic.
Article 96
The President of the Republic is responsible for the acts
committed in the exercise of his functions only in the
case of high treason.
Crimes of high treason are, in particular:
the violation of the oath;
politically-motivated homicides;
business activities;

any action which is contrary to the higher interests of

the Nation.
The request for indictment is only admissible if it
receives the signature of fifty percent of the members
of the National Assembly.
The President of the Republic can only be indicted by
the National Assembly with a two-thirds majority of the
deputies voting in secret ballot.
The resolution of indictment, duly reasoned, is transmitted by the President of the National Assembly to the
Attorney-General before the High Court of Justice.
However, with regard to the ordinary offenses committed by the Head of State before his election or term
of office, he will be subject to prosecution before the
competent tribunals only after the end of his term.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Ministers are prohibited from serving simultaneously in the legislature.
Article 43
The functions of a member of Government are incompatible with those of a member of the National Assembly.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates executive branch officials. For example, in 2006 several
members of the Assembly, including the speaker,
used their right to interrogate the executive to
inveigh publicly against the government for massacres and insecurity in the northern part of the
country.
Article 45
In matters relating to their departments, the Ministers
are heard by the National Assembly on the occasion of
oral and written questions submitted by members of
Parliament.
Article 66
One session per week is reserved by priority for questions of the deputies and for the responses of the Government. The Ministers are required to respond to the
questions at the latest in the following week.
Article 68
In addition to the motion of censure, the other instruments of control of the National Assembly with regard
to the Government are:
oral questions with or without debate;
written questions;
committee hearings;
committees of inquiry and of control;
questioning.
The law determines the conditions for the organization
and functioning of the committees of inquiry as well as
the powers of the committees of inquiry and control.

National Assembly of the Central African Republic (Assemblee nationale)

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can establish committees of
inquiry to investigate the executive.
Article 68
In addition to the motion of censure, the other instruments of control of the National Assembly with regard
to the Government are:
oral questions with or without debate;
written questions;
committee hearings;
committees of inquiry and of control;
questioning.
The law determines the conditions for the organization
and functioning of the committees of inquiry as well as
the powers of the committees of inquiry and control.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister.
Article 22
The President . . . appoints the Prime Minister, the Head
of Government, and dismisses him. Upon the proposal
of the Prime Minister, he appoints and dismisses the
other members of the Government.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 22
The President . . . appoints the Prime Minister, the Head
of Government, and dismisses him. Upon the proposal
of the Prime Minister, he appoints and dismisses the
other members of the Government.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 21
The Executive consists of the President of the Republic
and the Government.
The Central African People elects the PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC by direct universal suffrage.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

127

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the

government.
Article 40
The Prime Minister may be dismissed, at any time, by
the President of the Republic or following a censure
motion adopted by the absolute majority of the members composing the National Assembly.
Article 41
After the appointment of the members of the Government, the Prime Minister, Head of Government,
presents himself within a maximum period of sixty days
before the National Assembly and explains his general
policy program. In the case of non-observance of the
sixty day time limit, Article 40 above applies. This program defines the main features of the action which the
Government plans to carry out in the diverse sectors
of national activity and particularly in the areas of economic, scientific, technical, technological, social, environmental, cultural and foreign policy. On this occasion, the Prime Minister, Head of Government, must
ask the National Assembly for a vote of confidence. The
confidence is granted or refused [to the Prime Minister]
by the absolute majority of the members composing
the National Assembly. The Prime Minister, Head of
Government, may, after deliberation of the Council of
Ministers, make the vote of a [legislative] text a matter of the Governments responsibility instead of the
National Assemblys. In this case, the text is considered
as adopted, unless a censure motion submitted within
the following twenty-four hours is passed in the conditions established in Article 48 below.
Article 47
The National Assembly may involve the responsibility
of the Government by voting a censure motion. The
censure motion is remitted, signed, to the President of
the National Assembly, who without delay notifies the
Government of it. It obligatorily carries the title MOTION OF CENSURE and must be signed by one-third
of the members composing the National Assembly.
The vote on the censure motion takes place within the
forty-eight hours that follow its introduction. Voting
takes place by secret ballot and with the absolute majority of the members composing the National Assembly.
Article 48
When the National Assembly adopts a motion of censure or when it disapproves the program or a declaration of general policy of the Government, the Prime
Minister must submit without delay the resignation of
his Government to the President of the Republic.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 33
The President of the Republic may, after consultation with the Council of Ministers, the Bureau of the
National Assembly and the President of the Constitutional Court, pronounce the dissolution of the National
Assembly.

128

National Assembly of the Central African Republic (Assemblee nationale)

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The president issues decrees that have the force
of law. According to the constitution, the president
must obtain prior authorization from the National
Assembly to issue decrees on specific issue areas,
although in practice the president regularly issues
decree-laws without prior legislative authorization.
Article 22
[The President] promulgates the laws, signs the ordinances and decrees.
Article 29
In exceptional circumstances, for a limited period and
for the execution of a specific program, the President
of the Republic may ask the National Assembly for
authorization to take, by ordinance, measures which
fall normally within the domain of statutory law. The
ordinances are adopted in the Council of Ministers
after the advice of the Constitutional Court. They enter
into force upon their publication but become void if
they have not been ratified on the expiration of the
period fixed in the enabling law. After the expiration
of this period, the ordinances, once they have been
ratified, may no longer be modified except by statute,
with regard to matters which fall within the legislative
domain.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority vote is required to override a presidential veto.
Article 27
The President of the Republic has the initiative of laws.
He promulgates them in the fifteen days which follow
the adoption of the final text by the National Assembly.
This period is reduced to five days in the case of urgency
declared by the National Assembly.
He may nevertheless, before the expiration of this
period, ask the National Assembly for a new deliberation of the law or certain of its provisions. This request
must be reasoned and the new deliberation may not be
refused. It takes place obligatorily during the course of
the same session. The adoption of the text submitted
to this new deliberation in its original form may then
only occur with a qualified two-thirds majority of the
members of the National Assembly.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 73
A Constitutional Court is established with the following
functions:

to monitor the regularity of electoral consultations,

to examine and proclaim their results;
to monitor the regularity of the referendum operations and to proclaim their results;
to resolve electoral disputes;
to resolve conflicts of competence between the executive power, the legislative power and the territorial
collectivities.
Apart from these competences and those which are conferred upon it by Articles 25, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34,
65, 68 and 72, the Constitutional Court interprets the
Constitution and rules on the constitutionality of ordinary and organic laws which have been promulgated or
are ready to be promulgated, as well as on the rules of
procedure of the National Assembly.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The president can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
No. The legislature is dependent on the executive
for the resources that finance its own operations.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto.
Article 52
The members of the National Assembly possess parliamentary immunity. As a consequence, no deputy
may be pursued, investigated or arrested, detained
or sentenced for reason of the views [expressed] or
votes issued by him in the exercise of his functions.
During the session, no deputy may be pursued or
arrested in criminal matters without the authorization
of the National Assembly, granted by secret vote with
the absolute majority of the members composing the
Assembly. Out of session, no deputy may be pursued
or arrested without the authorization of the Bureau of
the National Assembly. The authorization may be suspended if the National Assembly so decides by absolute majority. The deputy who has been caught flagrante delicto or is on the run after the perpetration
of an offense or crime may be pursued and arrested
without the authorization of the National Assembly or
its Bureau. Except in cases in which his parliamentary

National Assembly of the Central African Republic (Assemblee nationale)

immunity is suspended, the pursuit of a deputy is postponed until the end of his term, if the National Assembly so requires, by a vote of the absolute majority of its
members.
The deputy who has been the object of a final criminal
conviction is removed from the list of the deputies of
the National Assembly in the conditions established by
an organic law.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 49
The Central African people elects by direct universal
suffrage the citizens who compose PARLIAMENT and
who carry the title of DEPUTY.

129

Article 22
[The President] negotiates and ratifies international
treaties and agreements.
Article 69
The President of the Republic negotiates, signs, ratifies
and denounces international treaties and agreements.
The ratification or the denunciation may only intervene
after authorization of Parliament, in particular where
it concerns peace treaties, defense treaties, commercial
treaties, treaties relating to the environment and natural resources or agreements relating to an international
organization, [treaties] which have an impact upon the
finances of the State, modify dispositions of a legislative nature, affect the status of persons and the Rights
of Man or involve the cession, exchange or addition of
territory.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature alone can change the constitution with a three-fourths majority vote. The Constitutional Court comments on proposed amendments, but its opinion is not binding.
Article 76
The draft amendments to the Constitution are submitted to the Constitutional Court for advice by the President of the Republic or the President of the National
Assembly before they are submitted to the referendum
or the vote of the National Assembly.
Article 106
The initiative of amending the Constitution belongs
concurrently to the President of the Republic and the
National Assembly deciding by a two-thirds majority of
its members.
Article 107
The Constitution is amended when the draft amendment has been approved in the form submitted by a
three-fourths majority of the members composing the
National Assembly or has been adopted by referendum.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. Formally, the legislature declares war. In practice, the president can declare war without the legislatures approval.
Article 59
Only the National Assembly has the power to authorize
the declaration of war. It meets in special session for
this purpose. The President of the Republic informs the
Nation by message about it.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties on most major issues.

Yes. The legislature has exclusive power to pass legislation that is regulated by statute. This includes
the power to grant amnesty.
Article 61
[The following] are regulated by statute:
(1) The rules concerning the following matters:
amnesty.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 22
[The President] has the right of pardon.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The legislature as a body does not appoint or
approve appointments to the judiciary, although
the president of the National Assembly appoints
two of the nine members of the Constitutional
Court.
Article 74
The Constitutional Court consists of nine members, at
least three of whom are women; they carry the title of
Counselor.
The non-renewable term of office of the Counselors is
seven years.
The members of the Constitutional Court are designated as follows:
two Magistrates, including one woman, who are
elected by their peers;
one Lawyer elected by his peers;
two professors of law elected by their peers;
two members, including one woman, appointed by
the President of the Republic;
two members, including one woman, appointed by
the President of the National Assembly.

130

National Assembly of the Central African Republic (Assemblee nationale)

Article 94
A High Court of Justice is established as a nonpermanent court.
It is composed of six magistrates and six deputies
elected by secret ballot by their peers. The President
of the High Court of Justice is elected from among
the magistrates, and the Vice-President from among the
deputies, in the same manner as specified above.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The Central African Republic belongs to the
Bank of Central African States, whose governor is
selected by the member countries.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
No. The legislature meets in ordinary session for
less than six months each year.
Article 54
The National Assembly meets as of right in two ordinary
sessions every year, with a maximum duration of ninety
days each. The first session begins on the first of March,
the second session on the first of October.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes. The legislative elections in 2005, for example,
included over 900 candidates for 105 seats in the
legislature.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
No. Severe political turbulence has contributed to
high turnover in the legislature and has prevented
the emergence of a body of highly experienced
members.

NATIONALE)
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF CHAD (ASSEMBLEE
Expert consultants: Alain Faupin, Barrie Hoffman
Score: .22
Influence over
executive (1/9)

Institutional
autonomy (2/9)

Specified
powers (2/8)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack president
9. no confidence

23. pardon
24. judiciary

Institutional
capacity (2/6)
X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

25. central bank

26. media
X

The National Assembly (Assemblee nationale) of

Chad was established in the 1996 constitution. The
document calls for a bicameral National Assembly, although the upper house, the Senate, has

not yet been created. From independence in 1960

until the present, Chad has been plagued by internal violence, political instability, and foreign military intervention. Chad has had a succession of

National Assembly of Chad (Assemblee nationale)

constitutions; in practice, however, the military or

a hegemonic party has invariably ruled with little
regard for the law.
A lull in the violence during the 1990s led to
the adoption of the present constitution. Legislative elections were held in 1997 and 2002. War has
returned to Chad in the form of an armed insurrection in the north that began in 1998 and crossborder unrest originating in neighboring Darfur,
Sudan, that started in 2003. The wars and coups
that plague Chad prevent the National Assembly
from functioning as a working legislature.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of the High Court of Justice.
Article 180
Impeachment of the President of the Republic and
members of the Government is voted by secret ballot,
by a majority of two-thirds of the members composing
each of the two chambers of Parliament. The President
of the Republic and the members of the Government
are suspended in their functions in case of impeachment. In case of indictment, the President of the Republic is stripped of his powers and the ministers of their
functions by the High Court of Justice.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Ministers are prohibited from serving simultaneously in the legislature.
Article 105
The functions of a member of the Government are
incompatible with the exercise of any parliamentary
mandate.

131
The means of information and control of the Parliament on the action of Government are:
interpellation;
written question;
oral question;
the Commission of inquiry;
the motion of censure;
the hearing in Commissions.
These means are exercised according to conditions specified by the Internal Regulations of each chamber.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. Formally, the legislature can establish commissions of inquiry to investigate the actions of the
government. In practice, it would be unthinkable
for the legislature to launch an investigation of the
executive branch.
Article 145
The Government must provide the Parliament all the
explanations it demands concerning its management
and concerning its activities.
The means of information and control of the Parliament on the action of Government are:
interpellation;
written question;
oral question;
the Commission of inquiry;
the motion of censure;
the hearing in Commissions.
These means are exercised according to conditions specified by the Internal Regulations of each chamber.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.

No. The president appoints the prime minister.

Article 79
The President of the Republic appoints the Prime Minister.

No. Formally, the constitution grants the legislature the power to interpellate officials from the
executive, but in practice, this power is not exercised.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.

Article 141
One session every other week is reserved to the questions of the members of Parliament and to the answers
by the Government.

No. The president appoints ministers on the proposal of the prime minister, and ministerial appointments do not require the legislatures approval.

Article 145
The Government must provide the Parliament all the
explanations it demands concerning its management
and concerning its activities.

Article 95
The other members of the Government are appointed
by the President of the Republic on the proposal of the
Prime Minister.

132

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 61
The President of the Republic is elected for a five-year
mandate by direct universal suffrage.

National Assembly of Chad (Assemblee nationale)

No. Formally, the legislature can override a presidential veto by a majority vote of its present members. In practice, laws do not pass without presidential approval.
Article 81
The President of the Republic . . . may, before the expiration of this time limit, demand of Parliament a new
deliberation of the law or certain of its articles.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.

Yes. The legislature can adopt a motion of censure

against the government.

No. The Constitutional Council can review the

constitutionality of laws.

Article 143
When the National Assembly adopts a motion of censure or when it disapproves the program or a declaration
of general policy of the Government, the Prime Minister must present the resignation of the Government to
the President of the Republic.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 83
When the regular functioning of the public powers
is threatened by persistent crises between the executive power and the legislative power, or if the National
Assembly, in the space of a year, overthrows the Government in two instances, the President of the Republic
may, following consultation with the Prime Minister
and the Presidents of the two Assemblies, declare the
dissolution of the National Assembly.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The government can issue decrees that have
the force of law. Decrees, once passed into law, can
be modified only by subsequent legislation.
Article 129
For the execution of its program, the Government
may demand from the Parliament the authorization
to take by ordinances, for a limited time, measures
which are normally of the domain of the law. The ordinances are adopted in the Council of Ministers after
consultation with the administrative chamber of the
Supreme Court. They enter into force upon their publication and become lapsed if the bill of the law of ratification is not presented to the Parliament before the date
established by the enabling law. At the expiration of the
time limit mentioned in the first paragraph of this article, ordinances cannot be further modified except by
the law, in matters which are of the legislative domain.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.

Article 166
The Constitutional Council is the judge of the constitutionality of laws, treaties and international agreements.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The president controls the disbursement of
funds.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
No. According to the constitution, the legislature
provides for the perquisites of its members, but in
practice, this provision is a dead letter. The legislature is dependent on the executive for the resources
that finance its own operations.
Article 113
An organic law establishes the number of members of
each Assembly, their allowances, their regime of ineligibilities and of incompatibilities.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Formally, legislators are immune with the common exception for cases of flagrante delicto, here
expressed as in the case of a flagrant offense. In
practice, the president has the power to revoke legislators immunity.
Article 114
The members of the Parliament enjoy parliamentary
immunity. No member of Parliament may be prosecuted, sought, arrested, detained or judged for opinions
or votes expressed by him in the exercise of his functions. No member of Parliament may, during session, be
prosecuted or arrested in a criminal or correctional matter without the authorization of the Assembly to which

National Assembly of Chad (Assemblee nationale)

he belongs, except in the case of a flagrant offense.
No member of Parliament may, in between sessions,
be arrested without the authorization of the Bureau of
his Assembly, except in the case of a flagrant offense, of
authorized prosecution or of definitive condemnation.
In case of crime or established offense, the immunity
may be revoked by the Assembly to which the member of Parliament belongs during the sessions, or by the
Bureau of the same Assembly between sessions. In case
of flagrant offense, the Bureau of the Assembly to which
the member of Parliament belongs is notified immediately of the arrest.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 107
The Deputies are elected by universal suffrage.
Article 110
The Senators are elected by indirect universal suffrage, by an electoral college composed of the regional,
departmental, and municipal councilors.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments require approval
in a popular referendum. Technical revisions
of the constitution, however, can be passed by a
three-fifths majority vote in both houses of the legislature.
Article 223
The initiative of the revision belongs concurrently to
the President of the Republic upon decision taken in the
Council of Ministers and to the members of Parliament.
To be taken into consideration, any draft or proposition
of revision must be voted on, in identical terms, by
a two-thirds majority of the members of the National
Assembly and the Senate.
Article 224
The revision of the Constitution is approved by referendum. However, a technical revision may take place
with the approval of a three-fifths majority of the members of the National Assembly and the Senate meeting
in Congress.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for the
declaration of war.
Article 127
The declaration of war is authorized by the Parliament.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties on most major issues.

133
Article 219
The President of the Republic negotiates and ratifies
the treaties. He is informed of all negotiations aiming
to conclude any international agreement not submitted
to ratification.
Article 220
Peace treaties, defense treaties, commercial treaties,
treaties concerning the use of national territory or the
exploitation of natural resources, agreements concerning international organization, those that involve State
finances or those concerning the well-being of persons may be approved or ratified only upon the authorization of the Parliament. These treaties and agreements take effect only after being approved and ratified.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Formally, the legislature has the power to grant
amnesty. In practice, amnesty is granted by the
president.
Article 125
The law is passed by the Parliament.
The law determines the rules concerning . . . amnesty.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 89
The President of the Republic exercises the right of pardon.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The legislature as a body does not appoint or
approve appointments to the judiciary, although
the president of the National Assembly and the
president of the Senate have some formal appointment powers. The Senate, although established on
paper in the 1995 constitution, does not even exist
in practice.
Article 151
The President of the Republic presides over the Superior
Council of the Magistrature. The Minister of Justice is
by right its First Vice President. The President of the
Supreme Court is its second Vice President. The other
members of the Superior Council of the Magistrature are
elected by their peers, according to conditions specified
by the law.
Article 152
The Superior Council of the Magistrature proposes the
appointments and the promotions of the magistrates.
Article 153
The magistrates are appointed by a decree of the President of the Republic, upon affirmation of the Superior
Council of the Magistrature.

134
Article 158
The President of the Supreme Court . . . is appointed by
a decree of the President of the Republic upon consultation with the Presidents of the National Assembly and
of the Senate.
The Counsellors are designated in the following fashion:
eight chosen [from] among the high magistrates of
the judicial order respectively:
three by the President of the Republic;
three by the President of the National Assembly;
two by the President of the Senate.
seven chosen [from] among the specialists of
Administrative Law, Budgetary Law and [Law] of the
Public Accounts, respectively:
three by the President of the Republic;
two by the President of the National Assembly;
two by the President of the Senate.
Article 165
The Constitutional Council is composed of nine members including three magistrates and six jurists of the
high level designated in the following manner:
one magistrate and two jurists by the President of the
Republic;
one magistrate and two jurists by the President of the
National Assembly;
one magistrate and two jurists by the President of the
Senate.

National Assembly of Chad (Assemblee nationale)

regulates the relationship of communication
between the public powers, the organs of information and the public;
assures to the political parties equal access to the
public media;
guarantees to the associations equal access to the
public media;
gives technical advice, [and] recommendations on
the questions concerning the domaine of information.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

No. The legislature meets in two ordinary sessions,
and neither session can exceed ninety days. In
practice, civil turmoil prevents the legislature from
meeting even this frequently.
Article 121
The Parliament meets of right in two ordinary sessions
a year . . . The duration of each session cannot exceed
ninety days.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.

No. Chad belongs to the Bank of Central African

States, whose governor is selected by the member
countries.

Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The president appoints the members of the
High Council of Communication, the body that
oversees the state-owned media.
Article 184
The High Council of Communication is composed of
nine members appointed by decree of the President of
the Republic.
Article 186
The High Council of Communication:
sees to the respect of ethical rules in matters of
information and communication;
guarantees the freedom of the press and pluralistic
expression of opinions;

Article 109
The mandate of Deputy is four years [and is] renewable.
Article 112
The duration of the mandate of the Senators is six years,
renewable by thirds every other year.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
No. The legislature in Chad is relatively young and
ineffectual. Legislators lack substantial expertise.

Congress of Chile (Congreso)

135

CONGRESS OF CHILE (CONGRESO)

Expert consultants: John M. Carey, Ernst Hillebrand, Maiah Jaskoski, Patricio D. Navia,
Philip Oxhorn, Ricardo Israel Zipper
Score: .56
Influence over
executive (3/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Institutional
autonomy (4/9)
X

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

Specified
powers (5/8)
19. amendments
20. war

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

18. all elected

X
X

Institutional
capacity (6/6)

24. judiciary
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

X
X

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X
X

25. central bank

26. media

The Congress (Congreso) of Chile was established

in the 1812 constitution upon independence
from Spain. The bicameral Congress consists of a
lower house, the Chamber of Deputies (Camara
de Diputados), and an upper house, the Senate
(Senado). Chile adopted new constitutions in 1833
and 1925. In 1973 the military, led by General Augusto Pinochet, overthrew the government
and disbanded Congress. Pinochet had himself
appointed president and drew up a new constitution in 1980 that allowed the president arbitrarily to declare a state of emergency, appoint members of the Senate, and dissolve the Chamber of
Deputies.
Pinochets reign ended in 1990, following a
1988 plebiscite in which citizens voted for a return
to civilian rule. In 1989, during the transition to
civilian rule, the 1980 constitution fully came into
force, accompanied by reforms that curtailed the
presidents powers to declare a state of emergency
and eliminated the presidents right to dissolve the
Chamber of Deputies. Reforms in 2005 abolished
the institution of appointed Senators and the automatic granting of membership of the Senate to former presidents.
The Congress of Chile is limited in its ability
to influence the executive, although it can remove
the president from office and has some powers of

oversight. Its own institutional autonomy is circumscribed by presidential veto and gatekeeping
powers. It enjoys a number of specified powers
and prerogatives and a high level of institutional
capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The Chamber of Deputies can accuse the president of acts that gravely compromise the honor
and the security of the nation or that openly violate
the constitutions or laws. The Senate can declare
the president guilty and dismiss him or her from
office by a two-thirds majority vote of its present
members.
Article 52
The exclusive powers of the Chamber of Deputies are:
2. To declare whether or not accusations made by no
less than ten or more than twenty of its members
against the following persons have merit:
a. The President of the Republic, for acts of his/her
administration which have gravely compromised the
honor and the security of the Nation, or have openly
violated the Constitution or the laws. This accusation
may be filed while the President is in office and within

136

Congress of Chile (Congreso)

six months following the expiration of his/her term.
During the latter period he/she may not leave the
Republic without the approval of the Chamber.

Article 53
The exclusive powers of the Senate are:
1. To decide on the accusations submitted to it by the
Chamber of Deputies in accordance with the preceding
article. The Senate shall act as jury and shall be limited
to declare whether or not the accused is guilty of the
offense, infraction or abuse of power imputed to him.
The declaration of guilt must be pronounced by twothirds of the senators in office when the accusation is
brought against the President of the Republic, and by
the majority of the senators in office in other cases. By
the declaration of guilt, the accused shall be dismissed
from his/her position and may not perform any public
function, whether elective or not, until five years have
passed. The official declared guilty shall be judged in
accordance with the laws by a competent court in order
to apply the penalty attached to the crime, if any, as well
as in order to establish civil liability for the harm and
damage caused to the State or to private individuals.

affect the political responsibility of the Ministers of

State;
b. summon a Minister of State, upon the application
of at least one-third of the deputies in office, in order
to question him/her on matters related to the exercise
of his/her functions.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The Chamber of Deputies can establish special
committees to investigate the executive.

No. Ministers are prohibited from serving simultaneously in the legislature.

Article 52
The exclusive powers of the Chamber of Deputies are:
c. establish special investigation committees upon the
application of at least two-fifths of the deputies in office,
with the objective to collect information in relation to
specific Government actions. The investigation committees may, upon application of one-third of its members, issue summons and request documents. The Ministers of State, the other officials of the Administration
and the staff of the companies run by the Government or of those in which the State holds a majority
share, who are summoned by these committees shall be
obliged to appear before them and to deliver the documents and the information which have been requested
from them.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).

Yes. The legislature regularly summons executive

branch officials for questioning.

No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.

Article 37
Without prejudice to the foregoing, the Ministers have
to personally take part in the special sessions which are
convened by the Chamber of Deputies or Senators in
order to inform themselves on matters falling within
the sphere of competences of the respective Secretaries
of State which they agree to discuss.
Article 52
The exclusive powers of the Chamber of Deputies are:
1. To oversee the acts of the Government. In order to
exercise this power, the Chamber may:
a. with the vote of the majority of deputies present,
adopt resolutions or submit observations which shall
be transmitted in writing to the President of the
Republic who must give a reasoned reply, through
the competent Minister of State, within thirty days.
Without prejudice to the foregoing, any deputy may,
with the favorable vote of one-third of the Chamber members present, request specific documents
from the Government. The President of the Republic
shall give a reasoned reply, through the competent
Minister of State, within the delay specified in the
preceding paragraph. In no case shall the resolutions, observations or requests of documents

6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

No. There is no prime minister.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 32
Special powers of the President of the Republic are:
7. To appoint and remove at will Ministers of State,
Under-Secretaries, Superintendents and Governors.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 26
The President of the Republic shall be elected by direct
ballot and by an absolute majority of the votes validly
cast.

Congress of Chile (Congreso)

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in
the government.
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the
executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.
11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power. The legislature can delegate temporary decree powers to the
president in specific issue areas.
Article 32
Special powers of the President of the Republic are:
3. To dictate, subject to the prior authorization by
Congress, decrees with the force of law on the matters
determined by the Constitution.
Article 64
The President of the Republic may request authorization from the National Congress in order to issue provisions with the force of law during a period not exceeding more than one year on matters which fall within the
domain of the law.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority in both houses is needed
to override a presidential veto.
Article 73
If the President of the Republic disapproves of the bill,
it shall be returned to the Chamber of origin with the
appropriate observations within a period of thirty days.
In no case shall observations be admitted which do not
have a direct relation with the central or fundamental
ideas of the bill, unless they had been considered in the
respective message. If the two Chambers approve the
observations, the bill shall have the force of law and
shall be returned to the President for its promulgation.
If the two Chambers reject all or some of the observations, and persist with two-thirds of their members
present with the whole or part of the draft approved
by them, it shall be returned to the President for its
promulgation.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Tribunal can review the
constitutionality of laws.
Article 93
The powers of the Constitutional Tribunal are:
1. To control the constitutionality of laws interpreting a
provision of the Constitution, of constitutional organic

137
laws and of treaty rules relating to matters governed by
them [the Constitution and the constitutional organic
laws] before their promulgation.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. The legislature is prohibited from introducing
legislation related to the financial administration
of the state, taxation, government loans, wages and
pensions, or social security.
Article 65
The President of the Republic has the exclusive initiative for legal projects related to the alteration of the
political or administrative division of the country or to
the financial or budgetary administration of the State,
including the amendments to the Budget Law.
Likewise, the President of the Republic shall also have
the exclusive initiative for:
1. Imposing, suppressing, reducing or approving taxes
of any type or nature, establishing exemptions or
amending those in existence, and determining their
form, proportionality or progression;
2. Creating new public services or remunerated jobs,
whether they have a fiscal, semi-fiscal or autonomous
character or the character of a State enterprise; suppressing them and determining their functions or attributes;
3. Contracting loans or carrying out any other operations that may compromise the credit or the financial responsibility of the State, of the semi-fiscal entities, autonomous agencies, of the regional governments
or of the municipalities, and approving, reducing or
amending obligations, interest, and other financial burdens of any nature established on behalf of the National
Treasury or of the central organs or entities;
4. Fixing, modifying, granting or increasing wages,
retirement payments, pensions, widows pensions,
rents and any other type of payments, loans or benefits to persons in service or in retirement and to the
beneficiaries of the widows and orphans allowance of
the Public Administration and of the other organizations and entities previously mentioned, as well as the
fixing of minimum wages for workers of the private sector, the mandatory increase of their salaries and other
economic benefits or the alteration of the bases which
serve to determine them; all of this without prejudice
to the provisions in the following numerals;
5. Establishing the norms and procedures of collective
bargaining and determining the cases where bargaining
is not allowed; and
6. Establishing or amending the rules on or regarding
social security of both the public and the private sector.
The National Congress may only accept, reduce or reject
the services, employments, payments, loans, benefits,
expenditures and other initiatives on the matter that
the President of the Republic proposes.
Article 67
The draft of the Budget Law must be presented by the
President of the Republic to the National Congress at

138
least three months prior to the date on which it must
start to be effective; and if the Congress does not pass
it within sixty days from the date of its submission, the
draft submitted by the President of the Republic shall
become effective.
The National Congress may not increase nor diminish the estimation of revenues; it may only reduce the
expenditures contained in the draft of the Budget Law,
except those established by permanent law.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The president can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,
including control over members salaries.
Article 62
Deputies and senators shall receive as sole compensation a fee equal to the remuneration of a Minister of
State including all the corresponding allowances.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto, but immunity can be revoked by the Court of Appeals.
Article 61
Deputies and senators are only inviolable with regard
to the opinions they express and the votes they cast
in performance of their duties in congressional sessions
or committees. No deputy or senator, from the day of
his/her election or from the taking of the oath, as the
case may be, may be accused or deprived of his/her
freedom except if he/she is caught in flagrante delicto,
unless the Court of Appeals of the respective jurisdiction has previously authorized in plenary session the
accusation, declaring that the case has merit. This decision may be appealed before the Supreme Court. In the
case of a deputy or senator who is arrested on charges
of a crime committed in flagrante delicto, he/she shall
be brought immediately before the respective Court
of Appeals with the corresponding summary information. The Court shall then proceed in accordance with
the provisions of the aforementioned paragraphs. From
the time it is declared by a firm resolution that the
case has merit, the defendant deputy or senator shall
be suspended from his/her position and submitted to
the competent judge.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.

Congress of Chile (Congreso)

Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.

Prior to 2005 nine senators were appointed; the
president, the National Security Council, and the
Supreme Court each made several appointments.
Furthermore, former presidents who had completed a full term enjoyed status as senators-forlife. In 2005 the terms of the appointed members
expired and the institution of appointed senators and senators-for-life was abolished. The Senate
now consists of thirty-eight elected members.
Article 47
The Chamber of Deputies is composed of one hundred
and twenty members elected by direct ballot in the electoral district established by the respective organic constitutional law.
Article 49
The Senate shall be composed of members elected by
direct ballot in senatorial constituencies, with regard to
the regions of the countries.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. The legislature alone cannot change the constitution without the approval of the president. If
the president objects to a constitutional amendment that has been passed by a two-thirds majority
vote in Congress, he or she can choose to put the
amendment to a popular referendum.
Article 127
Bills to amend the Constitution may be initiated by a
message of the President of the Republic or by a motion
of any member of the National Congress . . . In order to
be approved, the reform bill shall require in each Chamber the consent of three-fifths of the deputies and senators in office. If the reform has an impact on Chapters
I, III, VIII, XI, XII, or XV it shall need, in each Chamber, the approval of the two-thirds of the deputies and
senators in office.
Article 128
The bill approved by both Chambers shall be submitted
to the President of the Republic.
If the President of the Republic entirely rejects a reform
bill approved by both Chambers and the latter insists
upon the proposal in all its parts by two-thirds of the
members in office of each Chamber, the President shall
have to promulgate the proposal unless he/she consults the citizens through a plebiscite. If the President
partially objects to the reform bill approved by both
Chambers, the objections shall be understood to have
been approved by a supporting vote of three-fifths or
two-thirds of the members in office of each Chamber
in conformity with the preceding article, and the bill
shall be returned to the President for its promulgation.
In case the Chambers do not approve all or some of
the objections made by the President, no constitutional
reform shall take place on the issues on which there
is disagreement, unless two-thirds of the members in

Congress of Chile (Congreso)

office of both Chambers insist upon the part of the bill
approved by them. In the latter case, the part of the bill
which has been the object of the insisting vote shall be
returned to the President for its promulgation, unless
the President consults the citizens through a plebiscite
with respect to the matters in dispute.
Article 129
The convening of the plebiscite must take place within
thirty days following the date on which both Chambers
have insisted upon the proposal approved by them, and
is decided by supreme decree fixing the date on which
the plebiscite is to be held, which may not take place
earlier than thirty days or later than sixty days after the
publication of this decree. If this period expires and the
President has not convoked a plebiscite, the proposal
approved by Congress shall be promulgated. The decree
of convocation shall contain, as the case may be, the
proposal approved by the Plenary Congress and vetoed
in total by the President of the Republic, or the parts
of the bill on which the Congress has insisted [remain
valid]. In the latter case, each of the issues on which
there is disagreement shall be voted upon separately in
the plebiscite. The Elections Tribunal shall communicate to the President of the Republic the result of the
plebiscite and specify the text of the bill approved by
the citizens which shall be promulgated as a constitutional reform within five days following this communication. Once the bill has been promulgated, and as of
the date it enters into force, its provisions shall become
a part of the Constitution and shall be regarded as incorporated therein.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for presidential war declarations.
Article 32
Special powers of the President of the Republic are:
19. To declare war, after authorization by law and after
having heard the National Security Council.
Article 63
Only the following are legislative matters:
15. Those that authorize the declaration of war upon
the proposal of the President of the Republic.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 32
Special powers of the President of the Republic are:
15. To . . . sign and ratify treaties deemed beneficial to
the interest of the country, which must be submitted
to the approval of Congress.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant
amnesty.

139
Article 63
Only the following are legislative matters:
16. Those that concede general pardons and amnesties.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The power of pardon, or the revocation of punishment for individuals, rests with the president.
Congress can legislate on general pardons, which
are normally understood in Chile as amnesties,
meaning the revocation of punishment for groups
of people.
Article 63
Only the following are legislative matters:
16. Those that concede general pardons and amnesties.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislature appoints four of the ten members of the Constitutional Council.
Article 92
There shall be a Constitutional Tribunal composed of
ten members appointed in the following manner:
a. Three members appointed by the President of the
Republic;
b. Four members elected by the National Congress. Two
members shall be appointed directly by the Senate, and
two shall be proposed by the Chamber of Deputies for
approval or rejection by the Senate. The appointments,
or the proposal for appointment, take place by single
ballot and require for their approval the favorable vote
of two-thirds of the senators and deputies in office, as
the case may be.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the governor of the
Central Bank of Chile.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
Yes. The legislature has a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature is in session for at least six
months every year.
28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.
Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
Yes.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.

140

Congress of Chile (Congreso)

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.

Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

Article 51
Parliamentarians may be re-elected to their offices.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.

Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

CHINESE NATIONAL PEOPLES CONGRESS (QUANGUO RENMIN DAIBIAO DAHUI)

Expert consultants: Jean-Pierre Cabestan, Michael Dowdle, Bruce Gilley, Kevin J. OBrien, Dali L. Yang
Score: .34
Influence over
executive (3/9)

Institutional
autonomy (3/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

12. no veto
13. no review

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

X
X

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Specified
powers (2/8)
19. amendments
20. war
21. treaties
22. amnesty
23. pardon
24. judiciary

Institutional
capacity (3/6)
X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

25. central bank

26. media

18. all elected

The Chinese National Peoples Congress

(NPC) (Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui) was established in 1954 in the first formal post-revolutionary
constitution of the Peoples Republic of China. The
NPC was formally vested with exclusive lawmaking
powers, although in practice it remained impotent
under Mao Zedongs centralized rule. Constitutional changes in 1975 and 1978 formalized NPC
weakness, explicitly subordinating the legislature
to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and
abolishing the NPCs exclusive lawmaking
authority.
In 1982 China drew up its most recent constitution, which formally reestablished the NPC as
the highest organ of national power. Still, China
lacks a clear delineation of lawmaking authority,
and the NPC shares legislative powers with the CCP
and the State Council, an executive organ composed of the premier and ministers. China has a
Soviet-type constitution and distribution of pow-

ers, meaning that the legislature has supreme lawmaking power on paper, but the party makes the
major decisions itself and the legislature ratifies
party decisions.
The legislature may, however, exert some influence. Although the CCP in practice remains
Chinas supreme ruling body, and although the
threat of the NPC voting down a bill or an
appointment is slight, the NPC can embarrass
the party by approving bills and appointments
by less-than-overwhelming majorities, which it
has done with increasing frequency in recent
years.
In previous decades NPC membership was
generally seen as a politically insignificant honorific bestowed on party cadres. In recent years,
however, a position in the NPC, especially in
the NPCs permanent organ, the Standing Committee, has been coveted by prominent politicians.

Chinese National Peoples Congress (Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui)

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. According to law, the legislature does have the
power of impeachment, but it has never been exercised, and such action is inconceivable without
prior CCP instruction.
Article 63
The National Peoples Congress has the power to recall
or remove from office the following persons:
1. the President and the Vice President of the Peoples
Republic of China;
2. the Premier, Vice Premiers, State Councillors, Ministers in charge of ministries or commissions, and the
Auditor General and the Secretary General of the State
Council.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Prior to the 1990s members of the NPC sometimes served simultaneously as ministers. Since the
early 1990s the norm has changed, and members
of the legislature do not now serve as ministers.
3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The practice of summoning officials is gradually being institutionalized, and the legislature
regularly questions officials from the executive. It
bears note, however, that some ministers resist testifying before the NPCs committees by sending
their deputy or refusing to show up. It remains
difficult for the NPC to compel ministers to
testify.
Article 73
Deputies to the National Peoples Congress during its
sessions, and all those on its Standing Committee during its meetings, have the right to address questions, in
accordance with procedures prescribed by law, to the
State Council or the ministries and commissions under
the State Council, which must answer the questions in
a responsible manner.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The Standing Committee conducts investigations every year, writes reports, and sends the
reports to the relevant agencies, although the end
result is difficult to assess. The plenary session may
also request investigations, although it cannot conduct them itself.

141

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The Standing Committee has some ability to
oversee the Ministry of Public Security, which handles regular police work. But neither the Standing
Committee nor the plenary session of the legislature, despite the statement contained in Article
94, has oversight authority over the military or the
intelligence services.
Article 94
The Chairman of the Central Military Commission is
responsible to the National Peoples Congress and its
Standing Committee.

6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

No. The president appoints the premier of the
State Council, and the NPC invariably approves
the choice.
Article 62
The National Peoples Congress exercises the following
functions and powers:
5. to decide on the choice of the Premier of the State
Council upon nomination by the President of the Peoples Republic of China and to decide on the choice of
the Vice Premiers.
Article 80
The President of the Peoples Republic of China, in pursuance of decisions of the National Peoples Congress
and its Standing Committee, promulgates statutes,
appoints and removes the Premier [and] Vice Premiers.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The NPC must confirm the appointment
of every individual minister. The constitution is
ambivalent as to who makes the nomination, however. Article 62 states that the premier nominates
ministers, but Article 80 suggests that the president
may do the job. In practice the CCP picks the sole
candidate for each position and submits the choice
to the NPC for approval. The NPC can embarrass
the party by approving appointments by less-thanoverwhelming majorities, which it has done with
increasing frequency in recent years. This potential for embarrassing the party encourages informal negotiation on appointment matters. There is
reason to believe that the CCP now informally consults with NPC leaders before submitting nominations, which suggests the possibility of informal
rejections prior to the official nomination stage.
Although the NPCs role is still difficult to assess, it

142

Chinese National Peoples Congress (Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui)

appears to be great enough to warrant an affirmative answer to this item.

Article 62
The National Peoples Congress exercises the following
functions and powers:
5. to decide on the choice of the Premier of the State
Council upon nomination by the President of the Peoples Republic of China, and to decide on the choice of
the Vice Premiers, State Councillors, Ministers in charge
of ministries or commissions, and the Auditor General
and the Secretary General of the State Council upon
nomination by the Premier.
Article 80
The President of the Peoples Republic of China, in pursuance of decisions of the National Peoples Congress
and its Standing Committee, promulgates statutes,
appoints and removes the Premier, Vice Premiers, State
Councillors, Ministers in charge of ministries or commissions, and the Auditor General and the Secretary
General of the State Council.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president of the Peoples Republic is formally elected by the NPC, but the election is strictly
pro forma. The single candidate is selected by the
CCP leadership.
Article 62
The National Peoples Congress exercises the following
functions and powers:
4. to elect the President and the Vice President of the
Peoples Republic of China.
Article 79
(1) The President and Vice President of the Peoples
Republic of China are elected by the National Peoples
Congress.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in
the government.
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the
executive.
Yes. The NPC is elected every five years and cannot
be dissolved before the end of the term.
11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. In practice, the party decrees laws. Some
major initiatives, such as the Three Gorges Dam
project, are submitted to the NPC for approval,
although such action appears to be aimed primarily at enhancing the legitimacy of momentous and
potentially controversial party decisions.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. There is no provision for veto. It merits note,
however, that bills are drawn up and approved by
the CCP before being submitted to the legislature.
13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. Formally, the Standing Committee of the NPC
has the exclusive power to interpret the constitution, but in practice, the legislatures laws are not
supreme because they are in no respect the handiwork of the National Assembly. Rather, they are the
products of the CCPs decisions. The Supreme Peoples Court has occasionally floated the idea that it
has the power to disregard NPC legislation that it
considers unconstitutional. This is a controversial
claim, however, and has never been acted upon. In
practice, party supremacy trumps other provisions.
Article 67
The Standing Committee of the National Peoples
Congress exercises the following functions and powers:
1. to interpret the Constitution and supervise its
enforcement.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The NPCs budgetary power was nonexistent
until 1999, when a Working Committee on Budgetary Affairs under the Standing Committee was
created in order to introduce some supervision, but
this supervision remains strictly limited.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
No. There is little transparency about how the NPC
is financed and the degree to which the NPC has
financial autonomy. Delegates to the plenary sessions are not even paid; only Standing Committee
members receive a salary. In practice, party organs
control NPC funds.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. By law legislators are immune, but the rule
has no actual force. For example, in the late 1990s

Chinese National Peoples Congress (Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui)

Chen Kejie, then NPC vice president, was accused

of corruption, expelled from the NPC, and executed.
Article 74
No deputy to the National Peoples Congress may be
arrested or placed on criminal trial without the consent of the Presidium of the current session of the
National Peoples Congress or, when the National Peoples Congress is not in session, without the consent of
its Standing Committee.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
No. Deputies are not directly elected by the people
but are selected by the provincial CCP leadership,
the central NPC leadership, and, most importantly,
the central CCP leadership.
Article 59
(1) The National Peoples Congress is composed of
deputies elected from the provinces, autonomous
regions, municipalities directly under the Central Government, and the special administrative regions, and of
deputies elected from the armed forces.
(2) Election of deputies to the National Peoples
Congress is conducted by the Standing Committee of
the National Peoples Congress.
(3) The number of deputies to the National Peoples
Congress and the manner of their election are prescribed by law.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. The NPC formally has the power to alter the
constitution, but proposals to change the constitution, in practice, always begin and end with the
CCP.
Article 62
The National Peoples Congress exercises the following
functions and powers:
1. to amend the Constitution.
Article 64
(1) Amendments to the Constitution are to be proposed by the Standing Committee of the National
Peoples Congress or by more than one-fifth of the
deputies to the National Peoples Congress and adopted
by a majority vote of more than two-thirds of all the
deputies to the Congress.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. Formally, the legislatures approval is necessary to declare war, and there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that this would not also be the
case in practice. China has not declared war since
the establishment of the present constitution in
1982.

143

Article 62
The National Peoples Congress exercises the following
functions and powers:
14. to decide on questions of war and peace.
Article 80
The President of the Peoples Republic of China, in pursuance of decisions of the National Peoples Congress
and its Standing Committee . . . proclaims a state of war;
and issues mobilization orders.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 67
The Standing Committee of the National Peoples
Congress exercises the following functions and powers:
14. to decide on the ratification and abrogation of
treaties and important agreements concluded with foreign states.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. The legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The legislature lacks the power of pardon.
24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject
appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The NPC formally appoints the members of the
Supreme Court and the Supreme Procuratorate, but
there is only one candidate for each position, someone who in all cases has been previously selected
by the top CCP organs (the Politburo and Central
Commission for Law and Politics). The NPC has
never failed to approve a judge for one of these
courts.
Article 62
The National Peoples Congress exercises the following
functions and powers:
7. to elect the President of the Supreme Peoples Court.
Article 67
The Standing Committee of the National Peoples
Congress exercises the following functions and powers:
11. to appoint and remove Vice Presidents and judges
of the Supreme Peoples Court, members of its Judicial
Committee, and the President of the Military Court at
the suggestion of the President of the Supreme Peoples
Court.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The CCP appoints the chairman of the Peoples
Bank of China with the approval of the NPC.

144

Chinese National Peoples Congress (Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui)

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.

No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the

operation of the public media.

Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.

No. The plenary session meets only three weeks

each year in one session in March. The Standing
Committee is more powerful and assertive, but it
meets only for 710 days every two months.
Article 61
(1) The National Peoples Congress meets in session
once a year and is convened by its Standing Committee.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No. Only the chairman, the fifteen vice chairmen,
some members of the Standing Committee, and
the secretary general have secretaries.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No. See item 28.

Yes. In previous decades NPC membership was generally seen as a politically insignificant honorific
bestowed upon party cadres. In recent years, however, a position in the NPC, especially in the NPCs
permanent organ, the Standing Committee, has
become coveted by talented politicians.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. There is a sizable cohort of highly experienced
members, especially in the Standing Committee.

CONGRESS OF COLOMBIA (CONGRESO)

Expert consultants: Ana Maria Bejarano, John Dugas, Erika Moreno, Eduardo Pizarro, Elizabeth Ungar,
Rodrigo Uprimny
Score: .56
Influence over
executive (3/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Institutional
autonomy (4/9)

Specified
powers (5/8)

Institutional
capacity (6/6)

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

X
X

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

23. pardon
24. judiciary
X

X
X

25. central bank

26. media

The Congress (Congreso) of Colombia traces its origins to the countrys first constitution, adopted in
1821 upon independence from Spain. The bicameral legislature comprises the Senate (Senado) and
the Chamber of Representatives (Camara de
Representantes). Colombian politics were plagued

by outbreaks of mass violence in the first half

of the twentieth century, the rise of a Marxist
guerilla insurgency in the 1960s, competing rightwing paramilitary organizations that proliferated
in the 1980s, and trafficking in illegal narcotics.
In an environment of insecurity, Congress was

Congress of Colombia (Congreso)

overshadowed by presidents who frequently used

emergency powers to bypass normal procedures
and rule by decree.
A new constitution in 1991 scaled back the presidents emergency powers. States of emergency,
renamed states of exception, still allow the president to rule by decree, although these periods cannot persist longer than ninety days without the
Senates approval. Congress also gained the power
to censure members of the presidents cabinet. The
1991 constitution prohibits members of Congress
from serving as ministers. Prior to 1991 legislators
could simultaneously serve in the government.
The legislature has some leverage over the executive. It can remove the president from office
by itself and has some investigatory powers. Yet
the presidents powers to declare states of exception and rule by decree means that the legislature shares lawmaking authority with the executive. The Colombian Congress does enjoy, however, a number of explicitly delegated powers and
has considerable institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The Chamber of Representatives can charge
the president with crimes, and the Senate can, by
a two-thirds majority vote of its present members,
remove the president from office. The president
could then go before the Supreme Court for a criminal trial.
Article 174
It is the responsibility of the Senate to take cognizance
of the charges brought by the Chamber of Representatives against the President of the Republic or whoever
replaces him/her . . . In this case, the Senate will determine the validity of the charges concerning actions or
omissions that have occurred in the discharge of their
duties.
Article 175
The following rules will be observed in the decisions
made by the Senate:
1. The accused is automatically suspended from his/her
office whenever he/she admits publicly to a charge.
2. If the charge refers to crimes committed in the exercise of his/her functions or that he/she becomes unworthy to serve because of a misdemeanor, the Senate may
only impose the sanction of discharge from office or
the temporary or absolute suspension of political rights.
However, the accused will be brought to trial before the
Supreme Court of Justice if the evidence demonstrates
that the individual to be responsible for an infraction
and deserves other penalties.

145
3. If the charge refers to common crimes, the Senate
will confine itself to declare whether or not there are
grounds for further measures, and if so, it will place the
accused at the disposal of the Supreme Court.
4. The Senate may commission a task force from among
its own ranks for investigation, reserving for itself the
decision and definitive sanction to be pronounced in a
public session by at least two-thirds of the votes of the
Senators present.
Article 178
The Chamber of Representatives will have the following
special powers:
3. To charge before the Senate, when constitutional reasons may exist, the President of the Republic.
Article 199
The President of the Republic, during the period for
which he/she is elected or whoever is entrusted with the
presidency, may not be prosecuted or tried for crimes
except following an indictment by the Chamber of Representatives and upon the declaration by the Senate
that there are sufficient grounds for indictment/bill of
particulars.
Article 235
The Supreme Court of Justice has the following powers:
2. To judge the President of the Republic or whoever
replaces him/her and the senior officials covered by
Article 174 for any punishable deed imputed to them,
in accordance with Article 175, paragraphs 2 and 3.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in a ministerial position. Prior to 1991
legislators could serve in the cabinet.
Article 128
No one may hold more than one public position simultaneously or receive more than one salary originating
from the Public Treasury, or from enterprises or institutions in which the State is a majority owner, except in
cases expressly determined by the law.
By Public Treasury, [it] is meant that of the nation, that
of the territorial entities, and that of the decentralized
entities.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. Congress regularly summons ministers for
questioning.
Article 135
Each chamber [of Congress] will have the following
powers:
3. Solicit from the government information that the
chamber may need.
4. Determine the holding of sessions reserved on a priority basis to [address] the oral questions formulated

146
by the congressmen to the ministries and the answers
thereof.
8. Summon and require the ministers to attend the sessions. The summons will have to be made not less than
five days prior to a session and to take the form of a
written questionnaire. In case that the ministers do not
attend, without an excuse accepted by the respective
chamber, the latter may propose a motion of censure.
The ministers will have to be heard at the session for
which they were summoned, without barring the discussion from continuing at subsequent sessions following a decision of the respective chamber.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
Article 137
Any permanent committee [of Congress] may summon
any individual or legal entity to a special session to
provide oral or written statements, which may be mandated under oath, on matters directly related to investigations pursued by the committee.
Article 178
The Chamber of Representatives will have the following
special powers:
5. To request the assistance of other authorities for the
conduct of investigations for which the Chamber is
competent, and to commission the collection of evidence when the Chamber considers it appropriate.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. There is no prime minister.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 189
It is the responsibility of the President of the Republic, as the chief of state, head of the government, and
supreme administrative authority to do the following:
1. Appoint and dismiss freely Cabinet ministers and
directors of administrative departments.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.

Congress of Colombia (Congreso)

No. The president is directly elected.

Article 190
The President of the Republic will be elected for a period
of four (4) years by one-half plus one of the ballots
which, in a secret and direct manner, the citizens will
cast on the date and following the procedures determined by the law.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature may censure individual ministers but cannot vote no confidence in the government as a whole.
Article 135
Each chamber [of Congress] will have the following
powers:
9. Propose a motion of censure with respect to ministers for matters related to functions for which they are
responsible . . . Approval of the motion will mandate an
absolute majority of the members of each house. Once
the motion is approved, the minister will be relieved
of his/her position. If it is rejected, no other motion
of censure may be proposed concerning the same issue
unless justified by new facts.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.
11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The president, with the approval of his or her
own government, can declare a state of emergency
that allows him or her to issue decrees that have the
force of law. Colombian presidents have often used
this provision. The state of emergency can continue for ninety days without legislative approval.
Congress can vote to repeal the laws that the president decrees.
Article 213
In the case of a serious disruption of the public order
imminently threatening the institutional stability and
security of the State, or the peaceful coexistence of the
citizenry and which cannot be met by the use of ordinary powers of the police authorities the President of
the Republic, with the approval of all the ministers, may
declare a state of internal disturbance throughout the
Republic or part of it for a period no longer than ninety
days, extendable for two similar periods, the second
of which requires the prior and favorable vote of the
Senate of the Republic . . . The legislative decrees issued
by the Government can suspend the laws incompatible
with the state of disturbance and will no longer be in
effect as soon as public order is declared to have been

Congress of Colombia (Congreso)

147

restored. The Government may extend application [of

those decrees for] up to ninety more days.

No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.

Article 214
The states of exception referred to in the previous articles will be subject to the following provisions:
1. The legislative decrees will be accompanied by the
signature of the President of the Republic and all his/her
ministers and may refer only to matters that have direct
and specific connection with the situation as determined by the declaration of the state of exception.

Article 241
The safeguarding of the integrity and supremacy of the
Constitution is entrusted to the Constitutional Court
in the strict and precise terms of this article. For such a
purpose, it will fulfill the following functions:
1. Decide on the petitions of unconstitutionality
brought by citizens against measures amending the
Constitution, no matter what their origin, exclusively
for errors of procedure in their formation.
2. Decide, prior to a popular expression of opinion, on
the constitutionality of the call for a referendum or a
constituent assembly to amend the Constitution, exclusively for errors of procedure in their formation.
3. Decide on the constitutionality of referendums about
laws and popular consultations and plebiscites of a
national scope, in case of these last ones exclusively
for errors of procedure in their convocation and implementation.
4. Decide on the petitions of unconstitutionality
brought by citizens against the laws, both for their substantive content as well as for errors of procedure in
their formation.
5. Decide on the petitions of unconstitutionality
brought by citizens against decrees with the force of
law issued by the government on the basis of Article
150, paragraph 10, and Article 341 of the Constitution
for their substantive content as well as for errors of procedure in their formation.
7. Decide definitively on the constitutionality of the legislative decrees issued by the government on the basis
of Articles 212, 213, and 215 of the Constitution.
10. Decide definitively on the feasibility of international treaties and the laws approving them. With such
a purpose, the government will submit them to the
Court within six days following the sanction of the law.
Any citizen may intervene to defend or challenge their
constitutionality. If the Court declares them constitutional, the Government may exchange said notes; in
the contrary case the laws will not be ratified. When
one or several provisions of a multilateral treaty are
declared invalid by the Constitutional Court, the President of the Republic alone may declare consent, prescribing the pertinent exception.

Article 215
When events different from those provided for in Articles 212 and 213 occur that disrupt or threaten to disrupt in serious or imminent manner the economic,
social, or ecological order of the country or which constitute a grave public calamity, the President, with the
signature of all the ministers, may declare a state of
emergency for periods up to thirty days in each case
which, in all, may not exceed ninety days in a calendar year. By means of such a declaration, which will
have to be validated, the President may, with the signature of all the ministers, issue decrees with the force of
law, slated exclusively to check the crisis and halt the
extension of its effects.
These decrees may refer to matters that have direct and
specific connection with the state of emergency and
may, in a provisional manner, establish new taxes or
amend existing ones. In these latter cases, the measures
will stop being in effect at the end of the subsequent fiscal year, except when Congress, during the subsequent
year, should grant them permanent character.
In the decree declaring the state of emergency, the
government will stipulate the deadline within which
it would use its extraordinary powers in situations
referred to in this article and will convene Congress
if the latter should not be met within the 10 days following the expiration of the said deadline . . . During
the year subsequent to the declaration of emergency,
Congress may repeal, amend, or add to the decrees
to which this article refers in areas that ordinarily fall
under the Governments jurisdiction.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote of its present members.
Article 165
Once a legislative bill is approved by both Chambers, it will be transmitted to the government for its
approval. Should the government see no objections, it
will approve the bills promulgation as law; if it objects
to it, the bill will be returned to the chamber in which
it originated.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. The legislature is prohibited from introducing legislation related to the national development
plan, government contracts and loans, the wages
and benefits of public servants, or the central bank.
Article 150
It is the responsibility of Congress to enact laws.
Through them, it exercises the following functions:
3. To approve the national development plan and public investments that must be undertaken or continued,

148
with the determination of the resources and appropriations which are authorized for their execution and
the measures necessary to promote their implementation.
7. To determine the structure of the national administration and create, eliminate, or merge ministries,
administrative departments, superintendencies, public
establishments, and other entities at a national level,
as well as to specify their objectives and organic structure; to regulate the creation and operation of regional
autonomous corporations within a system of autonomy; and, similarly, to create or authorize the creation
of industrial and commercial enterprises of the State
and mixed economic societies.
9. To grant authorizations to the Government to enter
into contracts, to negotiate loans, and to sell national assets. The Government will periodically inform
Congress on the exercise of these authorizations.
11. To establish national revenues and to determine the
expenditures of the administration.
19. To enact general rules that specify the objectives and
criteria to which the Government must be subjected for
the following purposes:
a) To organize public credit;
b) To regulate foreign trade and specify the international exchange system, in agreement with the functions which the Constitution assigns to the Board of
Directors of the Bank of the Republic;
e) To establish the system of wage and benefits concerning public servants, members of the National
Congress, and the Police Force; [and]
22. To issue laws concerning the Bank of the Republic
and the functions that must be performed by its Board
of Directors.
Article 154
The laws may originate in either of the chambers at
the proposal of their respective members, the national
government, the entities stipulated in Article 156, or
through popular initiative in the cases provided for by
the Constitution. However, the government may dictate or amend only those laws covered by paragraphs
3, 7, 9, 11, and 22 and by subparagraphs (a), (b), and
(e) of paragraph 19 of Article 150; those which decree
contributions to national revenues or transfers of same;
those which authorize contributions or grants by the
State to industrial or commercial enterprises; and those
which decree exemptions from taxes, contributions, or
national levies.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The executive can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.

Congress of Colombia (Congreso)

Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.

Members salaries are protected by law.
Article 187
The remuneration of the members of Congress will be
adjusted each year in proportion equal to the weighted
average of the adjustments made in the remuneration
of the public servants of the central administration on
the basis of a certification that the Controller General
of the Republic will issue for that purpose.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislators are immune, but immunity may be
lifted by the Supreme Court of Justice.
Article 185
Members of Congress enjoy immunity for their opinions and the votes that they cast in the exercise of
their office, without prejudice to the disciplinary rules
included in the respective by-laws.
Article 186
For the offenses that members of Congress may commit, the Supreme Court of Justice is the sole authority that may order their detention. In case of flagrante
delicto, members of Congress must be apprehended and
placed immediately at the disposal of said court.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 132
Senators and representatives will be elected for a period
of four years beginning on July 20 following the election.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
through a complicated procedure. The sitting legislature can propose a constitutional amendment,
and then, following an election, the subsequent
legislature can approve the amendment.
Article 374
The Political Constitution may be reformed by
Congress, a Constituent Assembly, or by the people
through a referendum.
Article 375
The Government, ten members of the Congress, twenty
percent of councilors or deputies, or citizens totaling
at least five percent of the electoral rolls in force may
introduce legislative bills. The bill will be discussed in
two ordinary and consecutive session periods. After
having been approved in the first period by a majority of those present, the bill will be published by the
Government. In the second period, the approval will
require the vote of the majority of the members of each

Congress of Colombia (Congreso)

Chamber. In this second period only initiatives presented in the first period may be discussed.
Article 376
By means of a law approved by the members of both
chambers, Congress may direct that the voters participating in the popular balloting decide if a Constituent
Assembly should be called with the jurisdiction, term,
and makeup as set forth by said law. It is understood
that the people will convoke the Assembly, if they
approve it by at least one-third of the electoral rolls.
Article 377
The constitutional reforms must be submitted to a referendum approved by Congress when referring to the
rights recognized in Chapter I of Title II and to their
guaranties, to the procedures of popular participation,
or to Congress, if so requested, within the six months
following the promulgation of the legislative act, by five
percent of the citizens who make up the electoral rolls.
Article 378
Upon the initiative of the government or the citizens
under the terms of Article 155, Congress, through the
law which mandates the approval of the majority of
the members of both Chambers, may submit to a referendum a bill of constitutional reform which the same
Congress would include in the law. The referendum
will be presented in such a manner that the voters
may freely select from the agenda of the various items
which they vote positively and which they vote negatively. The approval of constitutional reforms by means
of a referendum mandates the affirmative vote of over
one-half of the voters and that the number of these
should exceed one-fourth of the total number of citizens included in the electoral rolls.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The Senates approval is necessary for presidential war declarations with the common exception for cases of foreign invasion. The president can
declare war to repel foreign aggression without
prior congressional authorization.
Article 173
The following are the powers of the Senate:
5. To authorize the government to declare war on
another state.
Article 189
It is the responsibility of the President of the Republic, as the chief of state, head of the government, and
supreme administrative authority to do the following:
6. Declare war with the approval of the Senate or without such authorization to repel foreign aggression; and
agree to and ratify peace treaties, regarding all of which
matters the President will give an immediate account
to Congress.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.

149
Article 150
It is the responsibility of Congress to enact laws.
Through them, it exercises the following functions:
16. To approve or reject treaties that the Government
makes with other states or entities in international law.
Article 189
It is the responsibility of the President of the Republic, as the chief of state, head of the government, and
supreme administrative authority to do the following:
2. Make international treaties or agreements with other
states and international bodies to be submitted to the
approval of Congress.
Article 224
In order to be valid, treaties must be approved by
Congress.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant
amnesty.
Article 150
It is the responsibility of Congress to enact laws.
Through them, it exercises the following functions:
17. To grant, by a two-thirds majority of the members
of both Chambers or for grave reasons of public convenience, amnesties or general commutations for political crimes. In cases where the grantees are exempted
from civil liability with respect to private individuals,
the State must be obligated to make the proper compensations.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The government has the power of pardon.
Article 201
It is the duty of the Government to do the following in
relation with the Judiciary Branch:
2. Grant pardons.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The Senate appoints the judges of the Constitutional Court from a list presented to it by the
president, the Supreme Court, and the Council of
State.
Article 173
The following are the powers of the Senate:
6. To elect the judges of the Constitutional Court.
Article 239
The judges of the Constitutional Court will be elected
by the Senate of the Republic for single terms of eight
years from lists presented to it by the President of the
Republic, the Supreme Court of Justice, and the Council
of State.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the five members of the
directorate of the Bank of the Republic who in turn
select the governor.

150

Congress of Colombia (Congreso)

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. An independent body oversees the operation
of the public media, and the legislature does not
have a substantial voice in its operation.
Article 77
Television will be regulated by an autonomous entity
at the national level, subject to its own regime. The
direction and execution of that entitys functions will
be the responsibility of an Executive Board comprised
of five members, who will appoint its director. Members of the Executive Board will serve for a fixed period.
The national government will appoint two of them.
Another member will be chosen from among the legal
representatives of the regional television channels. The
law will specify how the other members of the board
are to be appointed and will regulate the organization
and operation of the entity.

session will begin on March 16 and conclude on June

20.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
Yes.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes. The legislature is in ordinary session for eight
months each year.
Article 138
Of its own right, Congress will meet in ordinary sessions
during two periods a year, which will constitute one
legislative term. The first period of sessions will begin
on July 20 and conclude on December 16; the second

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

ASSEMBLY OF COMOROS (ASSEMBLEE)

Expert consultant: Edward McMahon
Score: .38
Influence over
executive (1/9)

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack president
9. no confidence

12. no veto
13. no review

Specified
powers (4/8)
X
X

Institutional
capacity (2/6)

19. amendments
20. war

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

23. pardon
X

24. judiciary

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

25. central bank

X
X

The Assembly (Assemblee) of Comoros was established upon independence from France in 1975.
The unicameral assembly contains thirty-three
elected members. Since independence the country has been plagued by political instability

26. media

resulting from military coups and secessionist

demands made by breakaway islands. A new
constitution in 2001 granted the islands greater
autonomy but did not directly affect legislative
power. The 2001 constitution is not yet available

Assembly of Comoros (Assemblee)

in English; the following constitutional excerpts

are from the countrys 1996 constitution.
The legislature has modest power. Its ability to
influence the executive branch is slight, although
it can vote no confidence in the government. The
legislature has some institutional autonomy that is
limited by executive dissolution and gatekeeping
powers. The legislature can exercise some specified
powers. Its institutional capacity is negligible.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires the
involvement of the High Court of Justice. The
prime minister can be removed with a motion of
censure.
Article 24
The President of the Republic is penally responsible in
case of treason or crime committed in the exercise or
resulting from the exercise of his functions. However,
the decision to prosecute, [and] the proposal to charge
the President of the Republic, taken at the initiative of
half the deputies, are voted by a majority of two-thirds
of the members of the Federal Assembly, according to
the procedure provided by the internal regulations of
the said Assembly. Nonetheless, the charge may intervene only three days after the decision to prosecute has
been taken. The charge is notified, within no more than
eight days to the Procurator General of the High Council of the Republic sitting in the capacity of a High Court
of Justice. This function is assured, should the occasion
arise, by the Procurator General of the highest judicial
jurisdiction. The High Council of the Republic, sitting
as the High Court of Justice rules on the culpability of
the President of the Republic. If the accused is found
culpable, he is dismissed from his functions, without
prejudice to the punishments of law incurred.
Article 28
Members of the Government may be collectively
removed from office if the Federal Assembly questions
their responsibility by the adoption of a motion of censure deposited by at least one-fourth of the deputies
and voted by an absolute majority of the members who
comprise the Assembly.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Ministers are prohibited from serving simultaneously in the legislature.
Article 27
The functions of a member of the Government are
incompatible with the exercise of the mandate of
Deputy of the Federal Assembly.

151

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
No. According to the constitution, the legislature
can question officials from the executive, but in
practice, this power is not effectively exercised.
Article 44
The Federal Assembly and its commissions by the intermediary of their respective presidents, may at their
demand, obtain from the Government, its departments
and all the authorities of the State, the information they
require. The Federal Assembly and its commissions may
require the presence of a member of the Government.
The members of the Government have access to the sittings of the Federal Assembly and of its commissions
and will be heard when they demand it. They may be
accompanied by technicians to assist them. The members of the Government will equally be heard upon
demand of the deputies, either in commissions or in
plenary.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister.
Article 11
The President of the Republic appoints the Prime Minister. He terminates his functions.
On the proposal of the Prime Minister, he appoints the
other members of the Government.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers on the recommendation of the prime minister, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 11
The President of the Republic appoints the Prime Minister. He terminates his functions.
On the proposal of the Prime Minister, he appoints the
other members of the Government.

152

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 7
The President of the Republic is elected by direct universal suffrage for a six-year term.

Assembly of Comoros (Assemblee)

modified by law only. During that time, the Government may oppose the receivability of any proposal or
amendment whose provisions concern those matters
for which the habilitation has been given.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The executive lacks veto power.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the

government.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.

Article 28
Members of the Government may be collectively
removed from office if the Federal Assembly questions
their responsibility by the adoption of a motion of censure deposited by at least one-fourth of the deputies
and voted by an absolute majority of the members who
comprise the Assembly.

No. The High Council of the Republic can review

the constitutionality of laws.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 19
After written consultation with the Prime Minister and
the presidents of the Federal Assembly and the High
Council of the Republic, the President of the Republic
can pronounce the dissolution of the Federal Assembly.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power. The legislature can delegate temporary decree power to the
government on specified issue areas.
Article 14
The President of the Republic signs the ordinances,
decrees and acts deliberated in the Council of Ministers.
Article 42
The Government may, in order to execute its program,
demand of the Federal Assembly authorization to take,
by ordinances, for a limited period of time, measures
that are normally of the domain of the law, except for
matters concerning fundamental rights and public liberties.
This legislative delegation is conferred through a law of
habilitation. The ordinances are taken in the Council
of Ministers following the advice of the High Council
of the Republic. They come into effect upon their publication in the Official Journal, but become lapsed if the
bill of law of ratification is not presented to the Federal Assembly before the date determined by the law of
habilitation. At the expiration of the time period mentioned in the first paragraph, the ordinances may be

Article 53
The High Council of the Republic, seized by the President of the Republic, the President of the Federal Assembly, the Prime Minister, the governors of the islands,
the presidents of the councils of the islands, a third
of the deputies of the Federal Assembly or the absolute majority of the council of an island, decides in
case of disagreement, on the constitutionality of the
laws, the ordinances, treaties or international agreements and any normative provision having the force
of a law. The High Council of the Republic is seized,
in this case, either before the promulgation of the laws
or contested provisions, or within a time limit of one
month following this promulgation.
It decides within the time limit of a month. However,
upon the demand of the President of the Republic, if
there is urgency, this time limit may be reduced to eight
days.
In case of the seizing of the High Council of the Republic, the law or the contested provisions may neither be
promulgated nor published, as long as the High Council
has not decided.
A provision that has been declared unconstitutional,
may neither be promulgated and published, nor put
into effect. The decisions of the High Council of the
Republic are not susceptible to any recourse.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. The legislature is prohibited from initiating legislation that would cause a diminution of public
resources.
Article 37
The initiative of laws and the right of amendment
belong concurrently to the Government and the Federal Assembly.
Bills of law are deliberated in the Council of Ministers. Proposals of law and amendment by the Deputies
are not receivable when their adoption would cause a
diminution of public resources, either by way of creating or increasing a public expense. If a proposal or an
amendment does not appear to be within the domain

Assembly of Comoros (Assemblee)

of the law or cannot be received because of the preceding provision, the Government has the authority to
oppose the receivability.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
No. The legislature is dependent on the executive
for the resources that finance its own operations.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto, here
expressed as a flagrant offense.
Article 33
While a session is in progress, no deputy may be prosecuted, searched, arrested, detained or judged without
the authorization of the Federal Assembly, except in
the case of flagrant offence or crime. No deputy shall
be prosecuted, searched, arrested, detained or judged
because of his opinions or votes expressed in the exercise of his functions.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 32
The deputies of the Federal Assembly are elected for five
years by direct suffrage.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments require either the
presidents approval or approval in a popular referendum.
Article 68
The initiative to revise the Constitution belongs to the
President of the Republic. However, a third of the members of the Federal Assembly may bring a proposal to the
President of the Republic.
The bill or motion must be voted by the Federal Assembly with a majority of two-thirds of its members. Revision is definitive when it has been approved by referendum by a majority of votes throughout the Republic.
The new Constitution takes effect upon proclamation
of the results of the ballot by the High Council of the
Republic. However, the President of the Republic may
decide to promulgate, without submission to referendum, the bill or proposal that has been adopted by

153
the deputies and counselors of the islands convened in
congress with a majority of two-thirds of the members
which compose the congress. No procedure of revision
may be engaged which carries affects to the integrity of
the Republic or to the rights of the person.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislature declares war on the proposal of
the government.
Article 45
The state of siege or the state of war is proclaimed by
the Federal Assembly by the majority of two-thirds of
its members, upon demand of the Government.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 18
The President of the Republic negotiates and ratifies
treaties. Peace treaties, treaties of commerce, treaties
or agreements related to international organizations,
those that engage the State Finances, those concerning
the domain that the Constitution reserves to the law,
those which are relative to the state of persons, may
only be ratified or approved by virtue of a law.
The Federal Assembly is immediately informed of the
conclusion of the other treaties and international agreements. Upon their publication, treaties and agreements
that are regularly ratified or approved shall become
part of the internal juridical order and have an authority superior to that of the law under reserve that each
Agreement or Treaty is applied by the other party.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant
amnesty.
Article 39
The law is voted by the Federal Assembly.
The following matters are of the domain of the law:
amnesty.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 21
The President of the Republic has the right of pardon.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislature appoints three of the eight
members of the High Council of the Republic.
Article 16
The Magistrates . . . are appointed by decree taken in the
Council of Ministers.

154
Article 49
The High Council of the Republic sits in constitutional
matters, in matters of control of the accounts, in the
capacity as the High Court of Justice.
It is composed:
of four members appointed by the President of the
Republic;
of three members elected by the Federal Assembly upon presentation by the President of the Federal
Assembly
of one member elected by the council of each island,
upon presentation by the president of the council of
the island.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The Council of Ministers appoints the governor of the Central Bank of Comoros.
Article 16
The Governor of the Central Bank . . . [is] appointed by
decree taken in the Council of Ministers.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
No. The legislature is in session for only about five
months each year.
Article 35
The Federal Assembly convenes, by right, each year in
two ordinary sessions.

Assembly of Comoros (Assemblee)

The first session starts the first Thursday of October and
ends the last Thursday of December. The second session
opens the last Thursday of April. Its duration cannot
exceed three months.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
No. Violence and military interventions have hindered the formation of a body of highly experienced legislators in the Assembly. The country was
ruled by the military from 1999 to 2002, and since
then there has been only a single legislative election, in 2004.

Parliament of Congo-Brazzaville (Republic of Congo) (Parlement)

155

PARLIAMENT OF CONGO-BRAZZAVILLE (REPUBLIC OF CONGO) (PARLEMENT)

Expert consultants: Remy Bazenguissa-Ganga, John F. Clark, Max Fira, Ch. Didier Gondola, Cassie
Knight
Score: .38
Influence over
executive (1/9)

Institutional
autonomy (6/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

Specified
powers (2/8)

Institutional
capacity (3/6)

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

23. pardon
24. judiciary

25. central bank

26. media

The Parliament (Parlement) of Congo-Brazzaville

(Republic of Congo) was established upon independence in the 1960 constitution. A one-party
state was founded in the early years after independence, followed by military rule beginning in
1969. New constitutions were promulgated in 1969
and 1979. The first three decades of independence
included experimentation with Marxism-Leninism
as well as military rule. The legislature was, for the
most part, marginalized during this time.
The end of the Cold War led to the abandonment of communist ideology and the adoption of
a new constitution in 1992. During that same year,
the country had relatively open elections for parliament and president. In 1993, however, the president dissolved the legislature, and another round
of parliamentary elections was held. The 1993 elections were widely disputed and were followed by
a decade that was punctuated by three rounds
of civil war (in 199394, 1997, and 199899). A
ceasefire paved the way for the adoption of the
current constitution in 2002, which was followed
by presidential and parliamentary elections. The
constitution provides for a bicameral legislature
consisting of a lower house, the National Assembly (Assemblee nationale), and an upper house, the
Senate (Senat). In the 2002 elections, the sitting

X
X

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

president, Denis Sassou-Nguesso, was elected to

a new seven-year term, and his Congolese Labor
PartyUnited Democratic Forces coalition secured
about two-thirds of seats in the National Assembly, thereby cementing Sassou-Nguessos dominance of both the legislature and Congolese
politics.
The 2002 constitution made a number of
changes to the 1992 document that weakened the
legislature. Prior to 2002 the legislature had the
formal powers to interpellate ministers, conduct
investigations of the government, and adopt a
motion of censure against the government, but
these powers were stripped from the 2002 document. The legislature also had enjoyed the formal power to appoint members of the judiciary,
but the 2002 constitution gives the president this
right. Furthermore, prior to 2002 the legislatures
approval was necessary to approve presidential declarations of war. Since 2002 the president can, in
exceptional circumstances, declare war without
consulting the legislature. Only one change instituted by the 2002 constitution strengthened the
legislature: The 1992 constitution granted the president the power to dissolve the legislature, but
the 2002 constitution provides the legislature with
immunity from dissolution.

156

Parliament of Congo-Brazzaville (Republic of Congo) (Parlement)

The result of the civil war, the constitutional

changes, and the general situation in the politics
of the country is a legislature that has very little
control over the executive, some limited institutional autonomy, few specified powers, and some
institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires action by
the High Court of Justice.
Article 87
The personal responsibility of the President of the
Republic cannot be invoked except in case of high treason. High treason is involved, if, in violation of the
Constitution or the law, the President commits, deliberately, an act, contrary to the superior interests of
the nation, which compromised gravely the national
unity, social peace, social justice, the development of
the country or carries grave danger to the human rights,
the integrity of the territory, the independence and
national sovereignty. The President of the Republic cannot be impeached except by the National Assembly
based on a vote by secret ballot by a majority of twothirds of its members.
Article 114
The National Assembly cannot dismiss the President of
the Republic.
Article 153
The High Court of Justice is competent to judge the
President of the Republic in case of high treason. The
President of the Republic is arraigned under the conditions inferred to in paragraph 3 of Article 87.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in a ministerial position.
Article 75
The functions of a minister are incompatible with
the exercise of any parliamentary mandate, any public employment, civil or military and any professional
activity, with the exception of agricultural, cultural or
teaching. They are equally incompatible with the position of a member of an organ of a local collectivity, an
administrative council or of a directly committee of a
public enterprise.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.

Yes. The legislature was formally granted the power

of summons in the 1992 constitution, but the
power was deleted from the 2002 constitution.
Still, the legislature regularly interpellates executive branch officials in practice.
4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature had the power of investigation
according to the 1992 constitution but lost it in the
2002 constitution. In practice, it cannot investigate
the president and his or her cabinet.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. There is no prime minister.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 74
The President of the Republic appoints the ministers
who shall be responsible to him. He puts an end to their
functions. He determines by decree the attributions of
each minister. He can delegate a part of his powers to a
minister.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 57
The President of the Republic is elected for seven years
by universal and direct suffrage. He is re-eligible one
single time.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in
the government. Prior to the 2002 constitution,
the legislature, at least formally, had the power to
pass a motion of censure that would result in the
governments resignation.
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the
executive.

Parliament of Congo-Brazzaville (Republic of Congo) (Parlement)

157

Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.

Prior to the 2002 constitutional amendment, the
president had the formal power to dissolve the legislature.

Article 146
The Constitutional Court is charged with the control of
the constitutionality of laws, treaties and international
accords.

Article 114
The President of the Republic cannot dissolve the
National Assembly and the National Assembly cannot
dismiss the President of the Republic.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The president lacks decree power. The legislature can delegate temporary decree power to the
president on specified issue areas.
Article 132
The President of the Republic may, in order to expedite
the execution of his program, demand of the Parliament to vote (on) a law authorizing the enactment by
decree, during a limited time, the measures which are
normally in the domain of the law. This authorization
cannot be accorded except by simple majority of the
members of Parliament. The demand must indicate the
matter, in which the President of the Republic wishes
to issue orders. The orders are taken in the Council of
Ministers, after the advice of the Supreme Court. They
come into force from the (moment) of their publication, but become null if the project of ratification is not
filed in the Parliament before the date fixed by law of
habilitation. When for unfounded reasons, the demand
for habilitation is rejected, the President of the Republic
may legislate by decree, after the advice of the Supreme
Court. At the expiration of the time referred to in the
first paragraph of this Article, the orders cannot be further modified except by the law, whose provisions are
in the legislative domain.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority vote in both houses is
needed to override a presidential veto.
Article 83
The President of the Republic . . . can, before the expiration of his time limit, demand from Parliament a second
deliberation of the law or certain Articles of it . . . The
vote, for this second deliberation, requires a majority
of two-thirds of the members of the National Assembly
and the Senate reunited as Congress.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.

Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy

jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The president can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,
including control over members perquisites.
Article 91
The functions of deputy and senator give rise to the
reimbursement of travel expenses and the payment of
compensation for the sessions(s), whose rate and conditions of attribution are set by law.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto, here translated as flagrant act.
Article 101
No member of Parliament may be pursued, investigated, detained or judged for opinions or votes cast
by him in the exercise of his functions. No deputy, no
senator may, during the sessions, be arrested or pursued
without the authorization of the bureau of the National
Assembly, except in a case of a flagrant act of authorized
pursuit or a definitive sentence. No deputy, no senator
may be pursued or arrested outside the session, without the authorization of the bureau of the chamber to
which he belongs, except in the case of a flagrant act,
authorized pursuits or definitive sentence.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 90
The members of the National Assembly carry the title
of deputy. They are elected by universal direct suffrage . . . The members of the Senate carry the title of
Senator. They are elected by indirect suffrage by the
councils of local collectivities.

158

Parliament of Congo-Brazzaville (Republic of Congo) (Parlement)

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments require approval
in a popular referendum.
Article 187
When it emanates from the President of the Republic,
the project of amendment is submitted directly to referendum, after the advice of conformity by the Constitutional Courts. When it emanates from the Parliament
the project of amendment must be voted by two thirds
of the members of the two chambers of Parliament
united as Congress after the advice of conformity by the
Constitutional Court. In the two cases the amendment
is not definitive until after approval by referendum.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. The president can declare war without the legislatures approval in exceptional circumstances.
Prior to 2001 the legislatures approval was
required for the declaration of war.
Article 130
The declaration of war shall be authorized by the
National Assembly. When, in the course of exceptional circumstances, the National Assembly cannot
meet promptly, the decision on the declaration of war
is taken in the Council of Ministers by the President of
the Republic, following the advice of the High Council of the Nation. He (shall) immediately inform the
Nation of it.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties on most major issues.
Article 179
The President of the Republic negotiates, signs and ratifies the treaties and international accords. The ratification can only take place after the authorization by
the National Assembly, notably as it concerns peace
treaties, defense treaties, commercial treaties, treaties
relative to natural resources or accords relative to international organization, those which modify the provisions of a legislative nature, those which are relative
to the status of persons, those that involve cession,
exchange or addition of territory.
Article 180
The President of the Republic and the Parliament shall
be informed of all negotiations tending to the conclusion of an international accord not submitted to ratification.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty
through law.

Article 110
The Parliament has the legislative initiative and alone
passes the law.
Article 111
The (following) are in the domain of the law . . .
amnesty.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 80
The President of the Republic exercises the right of pardon.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The president appoints the members of the
Supreme Court and the Constitutional Council,
and the appointments do not require the legislatures approval. Prior to 2002 the legislature formally had the power to elect the members of the
Supreme Court and half of the members of the
High Court of Justice.
Article 141
The members of the Supreme Court and the magistrates of the other national jurisdictions are appointed
by the President of the Republic on the proposal of the
National Council of the Magistrature. The sitting magistrates are irremovable.
Article 144
The Constitutional Court is instituted. The Constitutional Court consists of nine members whose mandate
of nine years is renewable. It is renewed by thirds every
three years. Five members of the Constitutional Court
are appointed by the President of the Republic. The
other members are appointed by the President of the
Republic by reason of two members on the proposal of
the President of the National Assembly and two members on the proposal of the bureau of the Supreme Court
from the members of this jurisdiction. The president of
the Constitutional Court is appointed from among its
members. He has the decisive vote in a case of an even
division of votes.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. Congo-Brazzaville belongs to the Bank of Central African States, whose governor is selected by
the member countries.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.

National Assembly of Congo-Kinshasa (Democratic Republic of Congo)

Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session for

at least 135 days every year. In practice, when the
country is not at war, the legislature meets for at
least six months each year.
Article 103
The Parliament meets by right in three ordinary sessions
per year. The first session opens on March 2, the second
on July 2, the third on October 15. Each session shall
last forty five days or more. If March 2, July 2 or October
15 are holidays, the opening of the session shall take
place on the first day that follows.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

159

Article 92
The duration of the mandate of the deputy is five years.
They are re-eligible.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
No. Mass violence and chaos brought to wrack
the countrys politics in the 1990s, and only
since 2002 has Congo-Brazzaville had a legislature whose functioning was not interrupted by
civil war. The current parliament, most recently
renewed in 2007, does include some of CongoBrazzavilles longtime political figures, but sufficient time has not passed since 2002 to make possible a parliament that contains many highly experienced members.

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF CONGO-KINSHASA (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

NATIONALE)
OF CONGO) (ASSEMBLEE
Expert consultants: Osita George Afoaku, Greg Basue Babu-Kazadi, Pascal Musulay Mukonde, Dennis
Tull, Crawford Young
Score: .25
Influence over
executive (1/9)

Institutional
autonomy (3/9)

Specified
powers (1/8)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

23. pardon
24. judiciary

Institutional
capacity (3/6)
X

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

25. central bank

X

The National Assembly (Assemblee nationale) of the

Democratic Republic of Congo was established
in 1960 upon independence from Belgium. It

26. media

consisted of two chambers: the National Assembly (Assemblee nationale) and the Senate (Senat).
Shortly after independence, Joseph Mobutu seized

160

National Assembly of Congo-Kinshasa (Democratic Republic of Congo)

power in a military coup, renamed the country

Zaire, and declared himself president. During the
period of Mobutus rule, the parliament never exercised any of its lawful powers, and Mobutu ruled
by decree, despite the efforts of would-be reformers
in the early 1990s.
In 1997 anti-Mobutu rebels, with aid from
Rwanda, Uganda, and other African countries, captured the capital, Kinshasa, and installed Laurent
Kabila as president. After Kabila was assassinated in
2001, he was succeeded by his son, Joseph Kabila.
In 2003 President Joseph Kabila signed an interim
constitution, establishing a transitional government, and inaugurated an interim parliament.
The interim National Assembly adopted a new
constitution that came into force in February 2006.
Popular elections for the National Assembly and
president, the countrys first national elections
since independence, were held in July 2006. The
National Assembly was inaugurated in December
2006. It is too early to tell how the new National
Assembly will function. If the past is any guide, the
new body will remain essentially powerless.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires action by
the Constitutional Court.
Article 164
The Constitutional Court is the criminal court for the
President of the Republic . . . with regard to the offenses
of high treason, contempt of Parliament, failings in
matters of honor and integrity as well as insider crimes
and all the other common law offenses committed in
the exercise or on the occasion of the exercise of their
functions.
Article 165
Without prejudice to the other provisions of the Constitution, high treason is established if the President
of the Republic has deliberately violated the Constitution or if he or the Prime Ministers are identified
authors, co-authors or accomplices of grave and specific
human rights violations, or of the transfer of a part of
the national territory. Failings in matters of honor and
integrity are established particularly if the conduct of
the President of the Republic or the Prime Minister is
contrary to morality or if they are identified as authors,
co-authors or accomplices of embezzlement of funds,
corruption or unjustified enrichment. An insider crime
of the President of the Republic or the Prime Minister
is established if they conduct commercial operations
with regard to immovable assets or goods on which
they possess privileged information that they use for

their benefit before it is known by the public. The

insider crime covers the purchase and the selling of
shares based on information which would never be disclosed to the shareholders. Contempt of Parliament is
established if the Prime Minister does not provide any
response to questions asked by either of the Parliamentary Chambers concerning the activities of the Government within a time period of thirty days.
Article 166
The decision to prosecute and the bringing of charges
against the President of the Republic and the Prime
Minister are voted by a two-thirds majority of the members of Parliament assembled as Congress in accordance
with the procedure provided for by the internal regulations.
Article 167
In case of a conviction, the President of the Republic
and the Prime Minister are relieved of their functions.
The termination of their functions is pronounced by
the Constitutional Court.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in a ministerial position.
Article 108
The mandate of Deputy or Senator is incompatible with
the following functions and mandates:
a) Government member.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The new constitution grants the legislature the
power to interpellate ministers, who regularly testify before the legislature.
Article 131
The members of the Government have access to the
work of the National Assembly and the Senate as well
as to that of their committees. If they are requested to
do so, the members of the Government are obliged to
be present at the meetings of the National Assembly
and the Senate, to take the floor and to provide the
members of Parliament with all the explanations on
their activities on which they are asked.
Article 138
Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Constitution, the means of information and control of the
National Assembly and the Senate with regard to the
Government, the public companies, the public establishments and services are the following:
a) oral or written questions with or without discussion
followed by a vote;
b) questions on current events;
c) interpellation;
d) investigation committee;

National Assembly of Congo-Kinshasa (Democratic Republic of Congo)

e) hearings before the commissions.
These means of control are used under the conditions
prescribed by the internal regulations of each Chamber
and give rise, as the case may be, to a motion of defiance
or censure in accordance with Articles 146 and 147 of
this Constitution.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. In the past the legislature has lacked the power
to investigate the executive. The new constitution
would, at least formally, grant the legislature the
power to conduct such investigations. It is difficult to imagine, whatever the constitutions formal
provisions, the legislature conducting independent
investigations of the president.
Article 138
Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Constitution, the means of information and control of the
National Assembly and the Senate with regard to the
Government, the public companies, the public establishments and services are the following:
a) oral or written questions with or without discussion
followed by a vote;
b) questions on current events;
c) interpellation;
d) investigation committee;
e) hearings before the commissions.
These means of control are used under the conditions
prescribed by the internal regulations of each Chamber
and give rise, as the case may be, to a motion of defiance
or censure in accordance with Articles 146 and 147 of
this Constitution.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The agencies of coercion report to the president and are not subject to legislative oversight.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. Traditionally the president has appointed the
prime minister. According to the new constitution,
the president must choose the prime minister from
the ranks of the parliamentary majority. It remains
to be seen whether this rule will be observed in
practice.
Article 78
The President of the Republic appoints the Prime Minister from the ranks of the parliamentary majority after
consultation of the latter.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.

161

No. The president appoints ministers on the recommendation of the prime minister, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 78
The President of the Republic appoints the other members of the Government and terminates their functions
upon proposal by the Prime Minister.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 70
The President of the Republic is elected by direct universal suffrage for a term of five years which is renewable
only once.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. In the recent past it was unthinkable that the
legislature would vote no confidence in the government. The new constitution grants the legislature
the formal power to adopt a motion of censure
against the government that would result in the
governments resignation. It is too early to tell if
this provision will take effect.
Article 146
The Prime Minister may, after deliberation by the Council of Ministers, make the Government program, a general policy declaration or the vote of a text a matter
of the Governments responsibility before the National
Assembly. The National Assembly may challenge the
responsibility of the Government or of a member of
the Government by voting a motion of censure or defiance. The motion of censure against the Government is
admissible only if it is signed by a quarter of the members of the National Assembly.
Article 147
If the National Assembly adopts a motion of censure,
the Government is deemed to have resigned. In this
case, the Prime Minister tenders the resignation of the
Government to the President of the Republic within
twenty-four hours.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the National Assembly.
Article 148
In the case of a persisting crisis between the Government and the National Assembly, the President of the
Republic may, after consultation of the Prime Minister and the Presidents of the National Assembly and
the Senate, pronounce the dissolution of the National
Assembly.

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National Assembly of Congo-Kinshasa (Democratic Republic of Congo)

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The president issues decrees that have the
force of law. In the new constitution, presidential
decrees lapse if they are not subsequently approved
by the legislature. The president acting alone also
has the authority to declare a state of emergency,
during which he or she may also issue decrees that
have the force of law.
Article 129
The Government may, for the urgent execution of its
action program, ask the National Assembly or the Senate for authorization, for a limited period, to take measures by ordinance-laws on specific matters that fall
normally within the domain of statutory law. These
ordinance-laws are deliberated on by the Council of
Ministers. They come into force upon publication and
lapse if the draft law for their ratification is not presented to Parliament before the latest date set by
the enabling law. If Parliament does not ratify these
ordinance-laws at the end of the period referred to in
the first paragraph of this article, they automatically
cease to produce legal effects. The ordinance-laws deliberated on by the Council of Ministers and ratified may
not be amended in their provisions except by statutory
law. The ordinance-laws cease automatically to produce
any legal effects in case of the rejection of the law of
ratification.
Article 144
In application of the provisions of Article 85 of this
Constitution, the state of siege, like the state of emergency, is declared by the President of the Republic . . . The National Assembly and the Senate may by
way of statute end at any moment the state of emergency or siege.
Article 145
In the case of a state of emergency or state of siege, the
President of the Republic takes, by ordinances which
have been deliberated by the Council of Ministers, the
measures necessary to respond to the situation. Immediately after they have been signed, these ordinances
are submitted to the Constitutional Court which suspends all its other work and declares whether or not
they derogate from this Constitution.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. In the past it would have been unthinkable
for the legislature to override a presidential veto.
According to the new constitution, the legislature
can override a presidential veto by a majority vote
of its total membership. It is too early to tell if this
provision will take effect in practice.

Article 137
Within fifteen days from the date of transmission, the
President of the Republic may ask the National Assembly or the Senate for a new deliberation of the law or
of certain articles. This new deliberation may not be
refused. The text submitted for second deliberation is
adopted by the National Assembly and the Senate either
in the original form or after amendment by the absolute
majority of their members.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 124
The statutory laws to which the Constitution confers
the character of organic laws are adopted and amended
by the absolute majority of members of each Chamber
in the following conditions:
c) the organic laws may only be promulgated after the
declaration of their conformity with the Constitution
by the Constitutional Court within fifteen days after
they have obligatorily been referred to the latter by the
President of the Republic.
Article 139
Statutes may be referred to the Constitutional Court in
order to obtain a declaration of non-conformity with
the Constitution by the following authorities:
a) the President of the Republic, within fifteen days
following the transmission to him of the law finally
adopted;
b) the Government, within fifteen days following the
transmission to it of the law finally adopted;
c) a number of Deputies and Senators equal to at least
a tenth of the members of each Chamber, within a full
fifteen days following its final adoption.
The statute may only be promulgated if it has been
declared to be in accordance with the Constitution by
the Constitutional Court, which rules within fifteen
days after the matter has been referred to it. This deadline having lapsed, the statute is considered to be in
conformity with the Constitution.
Article 160
The Constitutional Court is charged with the control
of the constitutionality of laws and of measures having
the force of law.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The president can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.

National Assembly of Congo-Kinshasa (Democratic Republic of Congo)

16. The legislature controls the resources that finance

its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
No. The legislature is dependent on the executive
for the resources that finance its own operations,
although the new constitution formally grants the
legislature financial autonomy.
Article 100
Each Chamber [of Congress] enjoys administrative and
financial autonomy and has its own allocation.
Article 109
The National Deputies and Senators . . . are entitled to
an equitable indemnity which ensures their independence and their dignity. It is provided for in the Budget
Law.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto.
Article 107
No member of Parliament may be prosecuted, searched,
arrested, detained or judged for opinions or votes delivered in the exercise of his functions. Except in cases
of flagrante delicto, a member of Parliament may be
prosecuted or arrested during sessions only with the
authorization of the National Assembly or the Senate,
as the case may be. When not in session, a member of
Parliament may only be arrested with the authorization
of the Bureau of the National Assembly or the Bureau of
the Senate for the Senators, except in cases of flagrante
delicto, of previously authorized prosecution or of final
sentence.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. Since the legislative elections in 2006, all
members of the legislature are elected. Members of the previous transitional legislature were
appointed by various societal and political groups.
According to the new constitution, former presidents will be guaranteed seats in the Senate,
although no former presidents currently occupy a
legislative seat.
Article 101
The members of the National Assembly are called
National Deputies. They are elected by universal, direct
and secret suffrage.
Article 104
Senators . . . are elected at the second level by the
Provincial Assemblies. Each Senator is elected together
with two proxies. The former elected Presidents of the
Republic are by law Senators for life.

163

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. In practice, a constitutional amendment would
be unthinkable without presidential support. Formally, the legislature can change the constitution
with a three-fifths majority vote.
Article 218
The right to initiate a revision of the Constitution
belongs concurrently to:
a) the President of the Republic;
b) the Government after deliberation by the Council of
Ministers;
c) to either of the Chambers of Parliament upon initiative by half of its members;
d) to a fraction of the Congolese people, in the present
case to 100.000 persons expressing themselves by way
of petition addressed to either of the two Chambers.
Each of these initiatives is submitted to the National
Assembly and the Senate which decide by absolute
majority of each chamber on the substance of the
project, proposal or petition for revision. The revision is only final if the project, proposal or petition is
approved by referendum. However, the project, proposition or petition is not submitted to referendum if the
National Assembly and the Senate meeting jointly as
Congress approve it by a three-fifths majority of their
members.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The presidents war declarations require
approval by both houses of the legislature.
Article 86
The President of the Republic declares war by an ordinance which has been deliberated on by the Council of Ministers after having heard the High Council
for Defense and after approval of the measure by the
National Assembly and the Senate in conformity with
Article 144 of this Constitution.
Article 143
In accordance with the provisions of Article 86 of the
Constitution, the President of the Republic declares war
upon the decision of the Council of Ministers after hearing the High Council for Defense and after authorization by the two Chambers.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
No. The president negotiates and ratifies international treaties. Many types of international treaties
require approval by law, but given that the government can issue ordinance-laws (see item 11), the
ratification of even these treaties does not necessarily require the legislatures approval in practice.
Article 213
The President of the Republic negotiates and ratifies
international treaties and agreements.

164

National Assembly of Congo-Kinshasa (Democratic Republic of Congo)

The Government concludes international agreements

not subject to ratification after deliberation by the
Council of Ministers. It informs the National Assembly
and the Senate about it.
Article 214
Peace treaties, trade agreements, treaties and agreements relating to international organizations and to
the settlement of international conflicts, those which
involve public finance, those which amend legislative
provisions, those which relate to the status of individuals, or those which entail the exchange and addition
of territory may only be approved or ratified by virtue
of a law.
No transfer, exchange or addition of territory is valid
without the approval of the Congolese people consulted by way of referendum.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. In the past the president alone has had the
power to grant amnesty. The new constitution
endows the legislature with the power to grant
amnesty through legislation, although it remains
to be seen whether this power will be vested in the
legislature in practice.
Article 122
Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Constitution, statutory law establishes the rules concerning:
i) amnesty and extradition.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.

No. The president appoints the head of the Congolese Central Bank.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The National Assembly meets in ordinary session for six months each year.
Article 115
The National Assembly and the Senate hold by law each
year two ordinary sessions:
a) the first starts on March 15 and closes on June 15;
b) the second starts on September 15 and closes on
December 15.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
Article 103
The National Deputy is elected for a term of five years.
He may be re-elected.

Article 87
The President of the Republic exercises the right to pardon.
He may delay, commute or reduce sentences.

Article 105
The Senator is elected for a term of five years. He may
be re-elected.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.

No. The president appoints members of the judiciary, and the appointments do not require the legislatures approval.

Yes.

Article 158
The Constitutional Court consists of nine members
appointed by the President of the Republic.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
No. The National Assembly is a young institution,
and legislators have not had time to develop significant expertise.

Legislative Assembly of Costa Rica (Asamblea Legislativa)

165

LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF COSTA RICA (ASAMBLEA LEGISLATIVA)

Expert consultants: Leslie E. Anderson, John M. Carey, Natalia Ajenjo Fresno, Otton Sols, Bruce M.
Wilson
Score: .53
Influence over
executive (3/9)

Institutional
autonomy (6/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Specified
powers (5/8)
X
X

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

X
X

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

23. pardon
24. judiciary

25. central bank

26. media

The Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) of

Costa Rica traces its roots to the bodies that
gathered following independence in 1821. Costa
Ricas current constitution, which was adopted in
1949, provides the unicameral Legislative Assembly with some clout. It has oversight powers
that give it some control over the executive. The
legislature enjoys substantial institutional autonomy; the president lacks gatekeeping, decree,
and dissolution powers. The Legislative Assembly also enjoys a number of exclusive powers
and prerogatives, including the right to authorize war, approve international treaties, and grant
amnesty.
The institutional capacity of Costa Ricas legislature is bolstered by the presence of staff for members. It is limited, however, by a prohibition on reelection of legislators, who are limited to a single
consecutive term. Many aspiring politicians therefore view a seat in the legislature as a stepping stone
to executive branch positions.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.

Institutional
capacity (3/6)

No. Presidential impeachment requires action by

the Supreme Court of Justice.
Article 121
The Legislative Assembly has exclusive powers to:
9. Admit or refuse any impeachment made against
the person exercising the Presidency of the Republic . . . declaring by a vote of two thirds of the entire
Assembly whether or not there are grounds for legal
action against them, placing them, if there are, at the
disposition of the Supreme Court of Justice for prosecution thereof.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Ministers are prohibited from serving simultaneously in the legislature.
Article 109
The following may not be elected representatives or registered as candidates for that office:
2. Cabinet Ministers.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.

166

Legislative Assembly of Costa Rica (Asamblea Legislativa)

Article 121
In addition to other powers vested in it by this Constitution, the Legislative Assembly has exclusive powers
to:
23. Appoint commissions from within its membership
to investigate any matter entrusted to them by the
Assembly and submit the appropriate report.
Such Commissions shall have free access to all official
agencies to conduct their investigations and collect any
data they may deem necessary. They may receive any
kind of evidence and summon before them any person
for purposes of interrogation;
24. Formulate questions to Cabinet Ministers and, in
addition, by a vote of two thirds of the attending representatives, censure such officials if, in the opinion of
the Assembly, they are guilty of illegal or unconstitutional acts or serious errors that have caused or may
cause evident damages to the public interest.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
Article 121
In addition to other powers vested in it by this Constitution, the Legislative Assembly has exclusive powers
to:
23. Appoint commissions from within its membership
to investigate any matter entrusted to them by the
Assembly and submit the appropriate report.
Such Commissions shall have free access to all official
agencies to conduct their investigations and collect any
data they may deem necessary. They may receive any
kind of evidence and summon before them any person
for purposes of interrogation.
24. Formulate questions to Cabinet Ministers and, in
addition, by a vote of two thirds of the attending representatives, censure such officials if, in the opinion of
the Assembly, they are guilty of illegal or unconstitutional acts or serious errors that have caused or may
cause evident damages to the public interest.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. Legislative committees have effective powers
of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. There is no prime minister.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.

Article 139
The following are the exclusive powers and duties of
the occupant of the Presidency of the Republic:
1) To freely appoint and remove Cabinet Ministers.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 138
The President and Vice Presidents shall be elected simultaneously and by a majority vote that exceeds forty percent of the total number of validly cast votes.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature can censure individual ministers, but it cannot vote no confidence in the government as a whole.
Article 121
In addition to other powers conferred by this constitution, the Legislative Assembly has exclusive power to:
24. Formulate questions to Cabinet Ministers and, in
addition, by a vote of two thirds of the attending representatives, censure such officials if, in the opinion of
the Assembly, they are guilty of illegal or unconstitutional acts or serious errors that have caused or may
cause evident damages to the public interest.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.
11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority vote in the Assembly is
needed to override a presidential veto.
Article 127
When a bill of law is reconsidered by the Assembly with
the observations of the Executive Branch, if the Assembly rejects them and the bill of law is again passed by a
vote of two thirds of the total membership, it is thereby
sanctioned and must be enforced as a law of the Republic.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Supreme Court of Justice can review the
constitutionality of laws. In 1989 a Constitutional

Legislative Assembly of Costa Rica (Asamblea Legislativa)

Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice was created for this purpose.
Article 10
It shall be incumbent upon a specialized division of
the Supreme Court of Justice to declare, by absolute
majority of its members, the unconstitutionality of laws
of whatever nature and of acts subject to Public Law.
Not impugnable in this way are jurisdictional acts of
the Judicial Power, declaration of election made by the
Supreme Tribunal of Elections, and others determined
by law.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The executive can impound funds. The budget,
once passed by the legislature, authorizes but does
not oblige expenditures.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,
including control over members compensation.
Article 113
The law shall fix the compensation of representatives
as well as any technical and administrative assistance
to be given to them.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto.
Article 110
A representative is not liable for any opinions expressed
at the Assembly. During legislative sessions, he cannot
be arrested on civil grounds, except by authorization of
the Assembly or with the consent of the representative.
From the time he is declared elected as representative
or as an alternate representative, until expiration of his
legal term in office, he may not be deprived of his freedom on criminal grounds, unless he has been previously suspended by the Assembly. Such immunity does
not apply in case of flagrante delicto or when the representative waives it. Nevertheless, a representative who
has been arrested for flagrante delicto will be released if
the Assembly so orders.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.

167

Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.

Article 105
The power to legislate resides in the people, which delegate this power, by means of suffrage, to the Legislative
Assembly. Such a power may not be waived or subject to limitations by any agreement or contract, either
directly or indirectly, except in the case of treaties,
in accordance with the principles of International
Law.
Article 106
The deputies have this character for the nation and shall
be elected by provinces.
The Assembly consists of fifty-seven deputies. Each time
a general census of the population is taken, the Supreme
Electoral Tribunal shall designate for the provinces
their number of deputies in proportion to their population.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution in
multiple readings with a two-thirds majority vote.
A complete rewrite of the constitution requires
approval by a special Constituent Assembly.
Article 195
The Legislative Assembly may partially amend this Constitution complying strictly with the following provisions:
1. A proposal asking for the amendment of one or more
articles must be submitted to the Assembly at regular
sessions, signed by at least ten representatives;
2. The proposal shall be read three times at intervals
of six days, to determine whether or not it shall be
admitted for discussion;
3. If admitted, it shall be sent to a commission
appointed by absolute majority of the Assembly, which
has to render its opinion within a period of twenty business days;
4. Upon submission of this opinion, it shall be discussed
in accordance with the procedure established for enactment of laws; said amendment shall be approved by a
vote of no less than two thirds of the entire membership
of the Assembly;
5. Once the amendment has been favorably voted,
the Assembly shall prepare the appropriate bill of law
through a commission, being an absolute majority
enough for its approval;
6. Said bill of law shall be sent to the Executive Branch,
which in turn shall send it with the Presidential Message to the Assembly at the start of the next regular
legislative period, with his observations, or his recommendation;
7. The Legislative Assembly, at its first sessions, shall
discuss the bill of law in three debates. If it is approved
by a vote of no less than two thirds of the entire membership, it shall become a part of the Constitution and
communicated to the Executive Branch for publication
and observance thereof.

168

Legislative Assembly of Costa Rica (Asamblea Legislativa)

Article 196
A general amendment of this Constitution can only be
made by a Constituent Assembly called for the purpose.
A law calling such Assembly shall be passed by a vote of
no less than two thirds of the total membership of the
Legislative Assembly and does not require the approval
of the Executive Branch.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for the
declaration of war.
Article 121
In addition to other powers vested in it by this Constitution, the Legislative Assembly has exclusive powers
to:
6. Authorize the Executive Branch to declare a state of
national defense and to reach peace agreements.

Article 121
In addition to other powers vested in it by this Constitution, the Legislative Assembly has exclusive powers
to:
3. Appoint the regular and alternate justices of the
Supreme Court of Justice.
Article 157
The Supreme Court of Justice shall be composed of the
number of Justices that may be considered necessary
for a good service; they shall be elected by the Legislative Assembly, which shall make up the different Court
Chambers established by law.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the president of the
Central Bank of Costa Rica.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

international treaties.

No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the

operation of the public media.

Article 121
In addition to other powers vested in it by this Constitution, the Legislative Assembly has exclusive powers
to:
4. Approve or disapprove international conventions,
public treaties and concordats.
Public treaties and international conventions which
confer or transfer certain powers to a community legal
order for the purpose of achieving common regional
objectives shall require the approval of the Legislative
Assembly by a vote of not less than two-thirds of its
entire membership.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session for
six months each year.
Article 116
The Legislative Assembly shall meet each year on the
first day of May, even if it has not been convoked, and
its regular-session term shall last six months, divided
into two periods: from the first day of May to the thirtyfirst day of July and from the first day of September to
the thirtieth day of November.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant

amnesty.

Yes.

Article 121
In addition to other powers vested in it by this Constitution, the Legislative Assembly has exclusive powers
to:
21. By a vote of no less than two thirds of the entire
membership, grant general amnesties and pardons for
political crimes, except electoral offenses, for which
there shall be no mercy.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject
appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislature appoints the members of the
Supreme Court of Justice.

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.
Yes.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
No. Consecutive re-election is forbidden. Legislators can run for re-election only after sitting out at
least one term.
Article 107
Deputies shall hold office for four years and may not be
reelected to a succeeding term.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.

National Assembly of C
ote dIvoire (Assemblee nationale)

No. Surveys show that most legislators want political careers, but the prohibition on consecutive reelection prevents most from seeking re-election,
even after they become eligible for it.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature

169

contains a significant number of highly experienced

members.
No. The prohibition on consecutive re-election
results in a low number of experienced members.

NATIONALE)
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF COTE
DIVOIRE (ASSEMBLEE
Expert consultants: Aghi Bahi, Abdoulaye Essy, Christof Hartmann, Eleanor Marchant
Score: .38
Influence over
executive (1/9)

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Specified
powers (3/8)
X

12. no veto
13. no review
14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

19. amendments
20. war

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

23. pardon
24. judiciary

25. central bank

26. media

The National Assembly (Assemblee nationale) of

C
ote dIvoire was established in the 1960 constitution upon independence from France. For the
next three decades, C
ote dIvoire was ruled by its
first president, Felix Houphouet-Boigny. In 1999
General Robert Guei seized power in a military
coup and implemented a new constitution, which
was approved by referendum in 2000. Increasing
tensions between the government and the opposition erupted in an attempted coup and civil war
in September 2002. Government and opposition
forces subsequently agreed to a tenuous ceasefire held together by international peacekeeping
troops.
The unicameral National Assembly, whose powers are defined in the 2000 constitution, is quite
weak. It has little ability to influence the executive, and its own autonomy is circumscribed by,
among other restrictions, presidential decree and
veto powers. The legislature enjoys several pow-

Institutional
capacity (3/6)
27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

ers and prerogatives. Until the civil strife that

divides the country is resolved, the legislature will
be unable to exercise even the modest powers that
it formally enjoys.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of the High Court of Justice, which is
headed by the president of the Court of Cassation.
Article 108
The High Court of Justice is composed of Deputies that
the National Assembly elects from within, at the first
session of the legislature. It is presided over the by the
President of the Court of Cassation. An organic law
establishes the number of its members, its attributions

170

National Assembly of C
ote dIvoire (Assemblee nationale)

and the rules of its functioning as well as the procedure

to be followed before it.
Article 109
The President of the Republic is not responsible for acts
accomplished in the exercise of his functions and can
only be brought before the High Court of Justice in the
case of high treason.
Article 111
The impeachment of the President of the Republic
and of the members of the Government is voted in
secret ballot, by the National Assembly with a majority of 2/3 for the President of the Republic, and with
an absolute majority for the members of the Government.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Ministers are prohibited from serving simultaneously in the legislature.
Article 56
The functions of a member of the Government are
incompatible with the exercise of any office and of
any professional activity. A parliamentarian appointed
member of the Government cannot sit in the National
Assembly, for the duration of his ministerial functions.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 82
The means of information of the National Assembly
concerning the governmental action are the oral question, the written question, [and] the commission of
inquiry. During the term of the ordinary session, one
meeting per month is reserved by priority to the questions of the Deputies and to the responses of the President of the Republic. The President of the Republic
can delegate to the Head of Government and to the
ministers the power to respond to the questions of the
Deputies. In the circumstance, the National Assembly
can take a resolution to make recommendations to the
Government.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. According to the constitution, the legislature
can establish a commission of inquiry to investigate the executive, but in practice, it is unthinkable
that the legislature would initiate an investigation
of the president.

Article 82
The means of information of the National Assembly
concerning the governmental action are the oral question, the written question, [and] the commission of
inquiry. During the term of the ordinary session, one
meeting per month is reserved by priority to the questions of the Deputies and to the responses of the President of the Republic. The President of the Republic
can delegate to the Head of Government and to the
ministers the power to respond to the questions of the
Deputies. In the circumstance, the National Assembly
can take a resolution to make recommendations to the
Government.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The agencies of coercion report directly to the
president and are not subject to legislative oversight.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister.
Article 41
The President . . . appoints the Prime Minister, [the]
Head of Government, who is responsible to him. He
terminates his functions. The Prime Minister animates
and coordinates the governmental action. On the proposal of the Prime Minister, the President of the Republic appoints the other members of the Government and
determines their attributions. He terminates their functions under the same conditions.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers on the recommendation of the prime minister, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 41
On the proposal of the Prime Minister, the President of
the Republic appoints the other members of the Government and determines their attributions.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 35
The President of the Republic is elected for five years by
universal direct suffrage.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

National Assembly of C
ote dIvoire (Assemblee nationale)

No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in

the government.
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the
executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.
11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The president can issue decrees that have the
force of law. Presidential decrees remain in effect
until explicitly modified by subsequent legislation.
Furthermore, if the National Assembly does not
approve the national budget within seventy days of
its introduction, the president can pass the budget
by decree.
Article 75
The President of the Republic can, for the execution
of his program, demand of the National Assembly, the
authorization to take by ordinance, for a limited time,
the measures which are normally of the domain of the
law. The ordinances are taken in the Council of Ministers after the possible advice of the Constitutional
Council. They enter into force on their publication
but, become lapsed if the bill of law of ratification is
not deposited before the Parliament prior to the date
established by the enabling law. After the expiration of
the time limit mentioned in the first paragraph of this
article, the ordinances can only be further modified by
the law in their provisions which are of the legislative
domain.
Article 80
The National Assembly is seized with the bill of the
Law of Finance from the opening of the October session. The bill of the Law of Finance must provide the
receipts necessary for the integral covering of expenses.
The National Assembly votes the balanced budget. If the
National Assembly has not decided within a time period
of seventy days, the bill of law can be put into force by
ordinance. The President of the Republic seizes, for ratification, the National Assembly convoked in extraordinary session, within a time limit of fifteen days. If
the National Assembly has not voted the budget by the
end of this extraordinary session, the budget is definitively established by ordinance. If the bill of the Law of
Finance has not been deposited in a timely way to be
promulgated before the beginning of the exercise, the
President of the Republic demands [of] the National
Assembly by urgency, the authorization to repeat the
budget of the previous year by provisional twelfths.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority vote in the National
Assembly is needed to override a presidential veto.

171

Article 42
The President of the Republic can, before the expiration
of this time period, demand of the National Assembly a
second deliberation of the law or of certain of its articles.
This second deliberation cannot be refused . . . The vote
for this second deliberation is acquired by the majority
of two-thirds of the members present of the National
Assembly.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Council can review the
constitutionality of laws.
Article 88
The Constitutional Council is [the] judge of the constitutionality of the law.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The president can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,
including control over members perquisites.
Article 69
The Deputies receive an indemnity, the amount of
which is established by a law.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto.
Article 67
No Deputy can be prosecuted, investigated, arrested,
detained or judged on the occasion of his opinions or of
the votes made by him in the exercise of his functions.
Article 68
During the term of the sessions, no member of Parliament can be prosecuted or arrested in a criminal or
correctional matter without the authorization of the
National Assembly, except in a case of flagrante delicto.
No Deputy can, out of session, be arrested without the
authorization of the Bureau of the National Assembly
except in cases of flagrant delicto, authorized prosecutions or definitive condemnations. The detention or the
prosecution of a member of Parliament is suspended if
the National Assembly requires it.

172

National Assembly of C
ote dIvoire (Assemblee nationale)

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 58
The Parliament is composed of one sole chamber called
the National Assembly having members carrying the
title of Deputy. The Deputies are elected by universal
direct suffrage.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments require approval
in a popular referendum.
Article 124
The initiative of the revision of the Constitution
belongs concurrently to the President of the Republic
and to the members of the National Assembly.
Article 125
To be taken into consideration, the bill or the proposal
of revision must be voted by the National Assembly
with the majority of 2/3 of its members effectively in
[their] functions.
Article 126
The revision of the Constitution is only definitive after
having been approved by referendum with the absolute
majority of the suffrage expressed.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislature declares war.
Article 73
The declaration of war is authorized by the National
Assembly.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties on most major issues.
Article 84
The President of the Republic negotiates and ratifies the
treaties and international agreements.
Article 85
The peace Treaties, the Treaties and Agreements concerning international organization, [and] those that
modify the internal laws of the State can only be ratified
after passage of a law.

concerning . . . the determination of crimes and misdemeanors as well as the penalties which are applicable
to them, the penal procedure, [and] amnesty.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 49
The President of the Republic has the right of pardon.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. By law, the legislature has a role in appointments to the High Court, the Constitutional Council, and the Superior Council of the Magistrature,
but in practice, the legislature does not play a part
in judicial appointments.
Article 89
The Constitutional Council is composed:
of a President;
of the former Presidents of the Republic, except [on]
express renunciation on their part;
of six councillors[,] of which three are designated
by the President of the Republic and three by the
President of the National Assembly.
Article 105
The Superior Council of the Magistrature comprehends:
The President of the Court of Cassation, Vice President of right;
The President of the Council of State;
The President of the Court of Accounts;
The Procurator General before the Court of Cassation;
Six persons from outside of the Magistrature of
which three principals and three substitutes are
appointed in equal number by the President of the
Republic and the President of the National Assembly;
Three magistrates of the Bench of which two principals and one substitute and three magistrates of the
Office of the Public Prosecutor of which two principals and one substitute, are designated by their peers.
These magistrates cannot sit [if] they are affected by
the deliberations of the Council.
Article 108
The High Court is composed of Deputies that the
National Assembly elects from within, at the first session of the legislature. It is presided over the by the
President of the Court of Cassation. An organic law
establishes the number of its members, its attributions
and the rules of its functioning as well as the procedure
to be followed before it.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant
amnesty.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

Article 71
The National Assembly holds the legislative power.
It alone votes the law. The law establishes the rules

No. C
ote dIvoire is a member of the Central Bank
of West African States, whose governor is selected
by the member states.

Parliament of Croatia (Sabor)

173

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.

No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

No. The legislature is in session for less than five
months a year.
Article 62
Each year, the Parliament meets of right in two ordinary
sessions. The first session begins the last Wednesday of
April; its duration cannot exceed three months. The
second session begins the first Wednesday of October
and ends the third Friday of December.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

PARLIAMENT OF CROATIA (SABOR)

Expert consultants: Dorde

Gardasevic, Nikola Jelic, Andrej Krickovic, Ivona Mendes, Vanja Skoric

Score: .78
Influence over
executive (7/9)

Institutional
autonomy (7/9)

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

26. media

18. all elected

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

Specified
powers (7/8)
X

The Parliament (Sabor) of Croatia traces its roots

to representative bodies that convened in the late
thirteenth century. The legislature was established
in its current form in the countrys 1990 constitution, which called for a bicameral assembly consisting of a lower house, the Chamber of Deputies
(Zastupnicki dom), and an upper house, the Chamber of Counties (Zupanjski dom).

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

Constitutional amendments in 2000 shifted

considerable power from the presidency to the
parliament. The changes were characterized in
Croatia and by some political scientists as the
conversion of the Croatian political system from
semipresidentialism to parliamentarism. Prior to
2000 the president had free reign to appoint the
prime minister and the government. Since 2000

174

the president has been required to appoint a

prime minister and government that enjoy majority support in the legislature. The 1990 constitution granted the president the power to appoint
five members to the Chamber of Counties, but a
constitutional amendment in 2000 eliminated the
provision for appointed members. In March 2001
another constitutional amendment eliminated the
Chamber of Counties altogether, creating a unicameral parliament.
The legislature is endowed with formidable
authority. It influences the executive with powers
of interpellation, investigation, and a vote of no
confidence, among other powers. It does not share
lawmaking powers with the president, who lacks
decree, veto, and gatekeeping powers. The legislature is vested with a number of specified powers
and prerogatives and has a substantial amount of
institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can remove the prime minister
with a vote of no confidence. Presidential impeachment requires action by the Constitutional
Court.
Article 105
(1) The President of the Republic shall be impeachable
for any violation of the Constitution he has committed
in the performance of his duties.
(2) Proceedings for the impeachment of the President
of the Republic may be instituted by the Croatian Parliament by a two-thirds majority vote of all representatives.
(3) The impeachment of the President of the Republic
shall be decided upon by the Constitutional Court of
the Republic of Croatia by a two-thirds majority vote of
all the judges.
(4) The Constitutional Court shall decide upon the
impeachment of the President of the Republic during
the term of 30 days form the day of the submission of
the proposal to impeach the President of the Republic
for violation of the Constitution.
(5) If the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia sustains the impeachment, the duty of the President
of the Republic shall cease by force of the Constitution.
Article 115
(1) At the proposal of at least one fifth of the members
of the Croatian Parliament, a vote of confidence in the
Prime Minster, in individual members of the Government, or in the Government as a whole, shall be put in
motion.

Parliament of Croatia (Sabor)

(5) A no confidence decision shall be accepted if it has
been voted for by the majority of the total number of
members of the Croatian Parliament.
(7) If a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister or in
the Government as a whole is passed, the Prime Minister and the Government shall submit their resignation.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. According to the constitution, ministers may
not perform any other public duty without the
approval of the government. In practice, ministers
do not serve simultaneously in the legislature.
Article 108
The Government of the Republic of Croatia consists of
the Prime Minister, one or more Deputy Prime Ministers
and Ministers.
Without the approval of the Government, the Prime
Minister and members of the Government cannot perform any other public or professional duty.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 85
(1) Members of the Croatian Parliament shall have the
right to ask the Government of the Republic of Croatia
and individual ministers questions.
(2) At least one tenth of the representatives of the Croatian Parliament may submit an interpellation on the
operation of the Government of the Republic of Croatia or some of its individual members.
(3) Questioning and interpellation shall be more specifically regulated by the Standing Rules.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
Article 91
The Croatian Sabor may form commissions of inquiry
concerning any issue of public interest.
The commission of inquiry shall have a structure and
scope in accord with law.
The President of the commission of inquiry is elected
by a majority from its members.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. Legislative committees have effective powers
of oversight over the agencies of coercion.

Parliament of Croatia (Sabor)

6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

Yes. The president is required to appoint as prime
minister the candidate who enjoys majority support in parliament.
Article 97
The President of the Republic shall: confide the mandate to form the Government to the person who, upon
the distribution of the seats in the Croatian Parliament
and consultations held, enjoys confidence of the majority of its members.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The legislatures approval is required to confirm ministerial appointments.
Article 109
(1) The person to whom the President of the Republic
confides the mandate to form the Government shall
propose its members.
(2) Immediately upon the formation of the Government, but not later than 30 days from the acceptance
of the mandate, the mandatory shall present the Government and its program to the Croatian Parliament
and demand a vote of confidence to be passed.
(3) The Government shall assume its duty if the vote of
confidence is passed by a majority vote of all members
of the Croatian Parliament.
(4) The Prime Minister and the members of the Government shall take a solemn oath before the Croatian
Parliament. The text of the oath shall be determined by
law.
(5) Upon the decision of the Croatian Parliament to
express confidence to the Government of the Republic of Croatia, the ruling on the appointment of the
Prime Minister shall be brought by the President of
the Republic, with the counter signature of the President of the Croatian Parliament, and the ruling on
the appointment of the members of the Government
shall be brought by the Prime Minster with the counter
signature of the President of the Croatian Parliament.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 94
(1) The President of the Republic shall be elected in
direct elections by secret ballot, on the basis of universal
and equal suffrage, for a term of five years.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.

175
Article 115
(1) At the proposal of at least one fifth of the members
of the Croatian Parliament, a vote of confidence in the
Prime Minster, in individual members of the Government, or in the Government as a whole, shall be put in
motion.
(2) A vote of confidence in the Government may also
be requested by the Prime Minister.
(5) A no confidence decision shall be accepted if it has
been voted for by the majority of the total number of
members of the Croatian Parliament.
(7) If a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister
or in the Government as a whole is passed, the Prime
Minister and the Government shall submit their resignation. If the vote of confidence to a new mandatary
and the members he proposes for the Government is
not passed during the term of 30 days, the President of
the Croatian Parliament shall notify thereof the President of the Republic of Croatia. After the notification is received the President of the Republic instantly
issue a decision to dissolve the Croatian Parliament,
and simultaneously call elections for the Croatian
Parliament.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 77
(1) The Croatian Parliament may be dissolved in order
to call early elections if so decided by the majority of
all the members.
(2) The President of the Republic may, in conformity
with Article 103, dissolve the Croatian Parliament.
Article 103
(1) The President of the Republic, at the proposal of
the Government and with the counter-signature of the
Prime Minister, after consultations with the representatives of the clubs of parliamentary parties, dissolve
the Croatian Parliament if, at the proposal of the Government, the Parliament has passed a vote of no confidence to the Government, or if it has failed to approve
the state budget within 120 days from the date when it
was proposed.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The president and the government lack decree
power. The legislature can delegate temporary
decree power to the government on specified issue
areas.
Article 87
(1) The Croatian Parliament may authorize the Government of the Republic of Croatia, for a maximum
period of one year, to regulate by decrees certain issues
within its competence, except those relating to the elaboration of the constitutionally defined human rights

176

Parliament of Croatia (Sabor)

and fundamental freedoms, national rights, the electoral system, the organization, authority and operation
of government bodies and local self-government.
(2) Decrees based on statutory authority shall not have
a retroactive effect.
(3) Decrees passed on the basis of statutory authority
shall cease to be valid after the expiry of the period
of one year from the date when such authority was
granted, unless otherwise decided by the Croatian Parliament.

16. The legislature controls the resources that finance

its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.

Yes. The president lacks veto power, although he

may refer bills to the Constitutional Court to
review their constitutionality.
Article 89
(1) Laws shall be promulgated by the President of the
Republic within eight days from the date when they
were passed in the Croatian Parliament.
(2) If the President of the Republic considers the promulgated law not in accordance with the Constitution,
he may initiate proceedings to review the constitutionality of the law before the Constitutional Court of the
Republic of Croatia.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 128
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia
shall . . . decide on the conformity of laws with the Constitution.
Article 130
(1) The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia
shall repeal a law if it finds it to be unconstitutional.
(2) The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia
shall repeal or annul any other regulation if it finds it
to be unconstitutional or illegal.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.

Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,

including control over members remuneration.
Article 74
(2) Members of the Croatian Parliament shall receive
a regular monetary remuneration and shall have other
rights specified by law.

Yes. Legislators are immune with the exception of

flagrante delicto for major crimes, here expressed as
caught in the act of committing a criminal offense
which carries a penalty of imprisonment of more
than five years.
Article 75
(1) Members of the Croatian Parliament shall enjoy
immunity.
(2) No representative shall be prosecuted, detained or
punished for an opinion expressed or vote cast in the
Croatian Parliament.
(3) No representative shall be detained, nor shall criminal proceedings be instituted against him, without the
consent of the Croatian Parliament.
(4) A representative may be detained without the consent of the Croatian Parliament only if he has been
caught in the act of committing a criminal offence
which carries a penalty of imprisonment of more than
five years. In such a case, the President of the Croatian
Parliament shall be notified thereof.
(5) If the Croatian Parliament is not in session,
approval for the detention of a representative, or for
the continuation of criminal proceedings against him,
shall be given and his right to immunity decided by
the credentials-and-immunity committee, such a decision being subject to subsequent confirmation by the
Croatian Parliament.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 71
The Croatian Parliament shall have no less than 100
and no more than 160 members, elected on the basis of
direct universal and equal suffrage by secret ballot.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
with a two-thirds majority vote.
Article 80
The Croatian Parliament shall:

Parliament of Croatia (Sabor)

decide on the enactment and amendment of the Constitution.
Article 142
(1) Amendments to the Constitution of the Republic
of Croatia may be proposed by at least one- fifth of the
members of the Croatian Parliament, the President of
the Republic and the Government of the Republic of
Croatia.
Article 143
(1) The Croatian Parliament shall decide by a majority vote of all representatives whether or not to
start proceedings for the amendment of the Constitution.
(2) Draft amendments to the Constitution shall be
determined by a majority vote of all the members of
the Croatian Parliament.
Article 144
The decision to amend the Constitution shall be made
by a two-thirds majority vote of all the members of the
Croatian Parliament.
Article 145
Amendment of the Constitution shall be promulgated
by the Croatian Parliament.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for presidential war declarations with the common exception for cases of foreign invasion. The president
can order the use of the armed forces without
prior authorization in case of an immediate threat
to the independence, unity and existence of the
state.
Article 99
(3) On the basis of the decision of the Croatian Parliament, the President of the Republic may declare war
and conclude peace.
(4) In case of an immediate threat to the independence, unity and existence of the State, the President of the Republic may, with the counter signature
of the Prime Minister, order the employment of the
armed forces even if the state of war has not been declared.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislature must approve international
treaties on most major issues.
Article 139
(1) International agreements which entail the passage
of amendment of laws, international agreements of military and political nature, and international agreements
which financially commit the Republic of Croatia shall
be subject to ratification by the Croatian Parliament.

177
(2) International agreements which grant international
organization or alliances powers derived from the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, shall be subject to
ratification by the Croatian Parliament by two-thirds
majority vote of all representatives.
(3) The President of the Republic shall sign the documents of ratification, admittance, approval or acceptance of international agreements ratified by the
Croatian Parliament in conformity with sections 1 and
2 of this Article.
(4) International agreements which are not subject of
ratification by the Croatian Parliament are concluded
by the President of the Republic at the proposal of the
Government, or by the Government of the Republic of
Croatia.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant
amnesty.
Article 80
The Croatian Parliament shall . . . grant amnesty for
criminal offenses.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 97
The President of the Republic shall . . . grant pardons.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislature elects the thirteen judges of
the Constitutional Court and appoints, at the proposal of the president, the president of the Supreme
Court.
Article 118
(1) The Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia, as a
highest court, shall secure uniform application of laws
and equal justice to all.
(2) The President of the Supreme Court of the Republic
of Croatia shall be appointed and relieved from duty
by the Croatian Parliament at the proposal of the President of the Republic, with a prior opinion of the general
session of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia and of the authorized committee of the Croatian
Parliament.
Article 125
(1) The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia shall consist of thirteen judges elected by the Croatian Parliament for a term of eight years from among
notable jurists, especially judges, public prosecutors,
lawyers and university professors of law.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

178

Parliament of Croatia (Sabor)

Yes. The legislature appoints the governor the

Croatian National Bank.

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.
No.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
Yes. The legislature has a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session for
nine months each year.
Article 78
(1) The Croatian Parliament shall be in regular session
twice a year: the first period between January 15 and
July 15, and the second period between September 15
and December 15.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF PEOPLES POWER OF CUBA (ASEMBLEA NACIONAL DEL

PODER POPULAR)
Expert consultant: Juan del Aguila
Score: .28
Influence over
executive (2/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Institutional
autonomy (4/9)
X
X

Specified
powers (0/8)

Institutional
capacity (3/6)

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

12. no veto
13. no review

X
X

21. treaties
22. amnesty

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

24. judiciary

X
X
X

25. central bank

26. media

18. all elected

The National Assembly of Peoples Power (Asemblea

Nacional del Poder Popular) of Cuba was established
in the 1976 constitution that codified the institutions of the then twenty-seven-year-old communist regime of Fidel Castro. The constitution provides for a popularly elected unicameral legislature
that formally chooses the head of state and the
head of government (the president of the Council

of State), an executive organ that exercises legislative power when the legislature is not in session
(the Council of State), and the government (the
Council of Ministers). In practice, Fidel Castro, who
has held the position of president of the Council
of State since 1976, rules Cuba. When Castro fell ill
in 2006, Raul Castro, Fidels brother and the vice
president of the Council of State, became acting

National Assembly of Peoples Power of Cuba (Asemblea Nacional del Poder Popular)

president of the country. The Cuban Communist

Party (CCP) is the islands sole legal political party.
The legislature has little meaningful power. It
cannot choose or remove executive branch officials
and has little oversight authority. Its institutional
autonomy is limited by executive power to decree
laws and the CCPs power to appoint legislators. It
exercises none of the specified powers measured in
this survey and has a bit of institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. The legislature cannot remove the chief executive, the president, from office.
2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of
the legislature.
Yes. Members of the Council of State and the members of the Council of Ministers are selected from,
and serve simultaneously in, the legislature.
Article 74
The National Assembly of Peoples Power elects, from
among its deputies, the Council of State, which consists of one President, one First Vice President, five Vice
Presidents, one Secretary and 23 other members.
Article 96
The Council of Ministers is composed of the Head of
State and Government, as its President; the First Vice
President; the Vice Presidents; the Ministers; the Secretary; and the other members that the law determines.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly questions executive
branch officials.
Article 86
The deputies to the National Assembly of Peoples
Power have the right to make inquiries to the Council of State, the Council of Ministers or the members of
either and to have these inquiries answered during the
course of the same session or at the next session.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of

179

law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret

police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. There is no prime minister.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. Formally, the legislature elects the members of
the Council of State and elects ministers on the
recommendation of the president. In practice, the
president chooses the members of the Council of
State and ministers, and the appointments do not
require the legislatures approval.
Article 74
The National Assembly of Peoples Power elects, from
among its deputies, the Council of State, which consists of one President, one First Vice President, five Vice
Presidents, one Secretary and 23 other members.
Article 75
The National Assembly of Peoples Power is invested
with the following powers:
n) appointing, at the initiative of the President of the
Council of State, the First Vice President, the Vice President and the other members of the Council of Ministers.
Article 93
The President of the Council of State is Head of Government and is invested with the power to:
d) propose to the National Assembly of Peoples Power,
once elected by the latter, the members of the Council
of Ministers.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. Formally, the legislature elects the president,
but the election is strictly pro forma. Fidel Castro
has held the position since its creation in 1976.
Article 74
The National Assembly of Peoples Power elects, from
among its deputies, the Council of State, which consists of one President, one First Vice President, five Vice
Presidents, one Secretary and 23 other members. The
President of the Council of State is, at the same time,
the Head of State and Head of Government.
Article 75
The National Assembly of Peoples Power is invested
with the following powers:
n) appointing, at the initiative of the President of the
Council of State, the First Vice President, the Vice President and the other members of the Council of Ministers.

180

National Assembly of Peoples Power of Cuba (Asemblea Nacional del Poder Popular)

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in
the government.
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the
executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.
Article 72
The National Assembly of Peoples Power is elected for
a period of five years.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The Council of State can impound funds
appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.

No. The Council of State issues decrees with the

force of law when the legislature is not in session.

No. The legislature is dependent on the Council of

State for the resources that finance its own operations.

Article 90
The Council of State is invested with the power to:
c) issue decree-laws in the period between the sessions
of the National Assembly of Peoples Power.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislatures laws are not subject to veto. It
merits note, however, that laws are drawn up and
approved by the CCP before being submitted to the
legislature.
Article 76
All laws and resolutions of the National Assembly of
Peoples Power, barring those in relation to reforms in
the Constitution, are adopted by a simple majority vote.
Article 77
All laws approved by the National Assembly of Peoples
Power go into effect on the date determined by those
laws in each case.
Laws, decree-laws, decrees and resolutions, regulations
and other general provisions of the national organs of
the State are published in the Official Gazette of the
Republic.

No. Legislators can be arrested with the approval

of the Council of State when the legislature is not
in session.
Article 83
No deputy to the National Assembly of Peoples Power
may be arrested or placed on trial without the authorization of the Assembly or the Council of State if the
Assembly is not in session except in cases of flagrant
offenses.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
No. Formally, the legislature is elected, but in practice, there is but a single candidate for each seat,
and the candidates are preselected by the CCP
before the popular elections.
Article 71
The National Assembly of the Peoples Power is comprised of deputies elected through a free, direct, and
secret ballot by the voters, in the proportion and according to the procedure that the law establishes.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.

Yes. The legislatures laws are not subject to judicial

review. Formally, the legislature itself reviews the
constitutionality of laws.

No. Formally, the legislature can change the constitution with a two-thirds majority vote, but in practice, it would be unthinkable for the legislature to
change the constitution without the governments
direction.

Article 75
The National Assembly of Peoples Power is invested
with the following powers:
c) deciding on the constitutionality of laws, decreelaws, decrees and all other general provisions.

Article 75
The National Assembly of Peoples Power is invested
with the following powers:

National Assembly of Peoples Power of Cuba (Asemblea Nacional del Poder Popular)
a) deciding on reforms to the Constitution according
to that [which is] established in Article 11.
Article 137
This Constitution can only be modified by the National
Assembly of Peoples Power, by means of resolutions
adopted by roll-call vote by a majority of no less than
two-thirds of the total number of members; except
[where the modification] regards the political, social
and economic system, whose irrevocable character is
established in Article 3 of Chapter I, and the prohibition against negotiations under aggression, threats or
coercion by a foreign power as established in Article 11.
If the modification has to do with the integration and
authority of the National Assembly of the Peoples
Power or its Council of State or involves any rights
and duties contained in the Constitution, it shall also
require the approval of the majority of citizens with the
right to vote by means of a referendum called upon for
this purpose by the Assembly itself.

181

No. Formally, the legislature has the power to grant

amnesty. In practice, it would be unthinkable for
the legislature to grant amnesty without approval
from the Council of State.
Article 75
The National Assembly of Peoples Power is invested
with the following powers:
t) granting amnesty.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The Council of State has the power of pardon.
Article 90
The Council of State is invested with the power to:
n) grant pardons.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. Formally, the legislature elects the judges of the

Supreme Court, but in practice, justices are selected
by the Council of State.

No. Formally, the Council of State can declare war

without the legislatures approval in the event of
aggression when the legislature cannot be called
to session, but in practice, war declarations do not
require the legislatures approval.

Article 75
The National Assembly of Peoples Power is invested
with the following powers:
m) electing the President, Vice President and other
judges of the Peoples Supreme Court.

Article 75
The National Assembly of Peoples Power is invested
with the following powers:
i) declaring a state of war in the event of military aggression and approving peace treaties.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

Article 90
The Council of State is invested with the power to:
f) decree general mobilizations whenever the defense
of the country makes it necessary and assume the
authority to declare war in the event of aggression
or to approve peace treaties duties which the Constitution assigns to the National Assembly of Peoples
Power when the Assembly is in recess and cannot
be called to session with the necessary security and
urgency.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
No. The Council of Ministers approves and the
Council of State ratifies international treaties, and
treaties do not require the legislatures approval.
Article 90
The Council of State is invested with the power to:
m) ratify or denounce international treaties.
Article 98
The Council of Ministers is invested with the power to:
d) approve international treaties and submit them for
ratification by the Council of State.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. The Council of State appoints the president of

the Central Bank of Cuba.

No. The Council of State controls the state-owned

media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
No. The legislature is in session for less than half
the year.
Article 78
The National Assembly of Peoples Power holds two regular sessions a year and a special session when requested
by one-third of the membership or when called by the
Council of State.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

182

National Assembly of Peoples Power of Cuba (Asemblea Nacional del Poder Popular)

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.

Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members. It should be noted that the de facto control of the legislature by the president and the CCP
means that long experience of membership does
not necessarily spell substantial experience in legislative work.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF CYPRUS (VOULI ANTIPROSOPON)

Expert consultants: Sener Akt
urk, Angelos S. Gerontas, Theocharis Grigoriadis, Katerina Karakehagia,
Demis Mavrellis
Score: .41
Influence over
executive (1/9)

Institutional
autonomy (4/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Specified
powers (2/8)
19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

18. all elected

Institutional
capacity (6/6)

24. judiciary

25. central bank

X
X

26. media
X

The House of Representatives (Vouli Antiprosopon) of Cyprus was founded in the 1960 constitution upon independence from Great Britain.
The document called for a unicameral house
that split seats between the countrys two major
ethnic groups, the Greeks and the Turks. In 1963
the Turks stopped participating in government and
formed their own legislature, the Turkish Cypriot
Legislative Assembly. Twenty years later, Northern Cyprus declared independence, although the
move was never recognized by the international
community. Negotiations over political reunification of the island began in 2002, but a solution acceptable to both sides has not yet been
found.
The legislatures powers are circumscribed. The
House can question executive branch officials but
otherwise lacks influence over the executive. The
Houses institutional autonomy is limited by exec-

utive powers of decree, gatekeeping, and absolute veto over key issue areas. The legislature also
lacks common powers and prerogatives, such as the
power to make or approve judicial branch appointments. Yet the legislature does have considerable
institutional capacity. Members have administrative and policy staff, and the legislature includes
a significant number of highly experienced members.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires the
involvement of the attorney general of the Republic and the High Court.

House of Representatives of Cyprus (Vouli Antiprosopon)

Article 45
The President or the Vice-President of the Republic may
be prosecuted for high treason on a charge preferred by
the Attorney-General and the Deputy Attorney-General
of the Republic before the High Court upon a resolution
of the House of Representatives carried by a secret ballot
and a majority of three-fourths of the total number of
Representatives: Provided that no such resolution shall
be taken and no item shall be entered on the agenda
or debated in the House of Representatives in connection therewith unless the proposal for such resolution is
signed by at least one-fifth of the total number of Representatives. The President or the Vice-President of the
Republic may be prosecuted for an offence involving
dishonesty or moral turpitude upon a charge preferred
by the Attorney-General and the Deputy AttorneyGeneral of the Republic before the High Court with
the leave of the President of the High Court. (1) The
President or the Vice-President of the Republic upon
being prosecuted under paragraph 2 or 3 of this Article
shall be suspended from the performance of any of the
functions of his office and thereupon the provisions of
paragraph 2 of Article 36 shall apply. (2) The President
or the Vice-President of the Republic on any such prosecution shall be tried by the High Court; on his conviction his office shall become vacant and on his acquittal
he shall resume the performance of the functions of his
office.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 70
The office of a Representative shall be incompatible
with that of a Minister.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly questions executive
branch officials.
4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

183

No. There is no prime minister.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president and vice president appoint the
ministers, and confirmation by the legislature is
not necessary.
Article 46
Ministers shall be designated respectively by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic who shall
appoint them by an instrument signed by them both.
The Ministers may be chosen from outside the House
of Representatives.
Article 48
The executive power exercised by the President of the
Republic consists of the following matters, that is to
say:
(a) designation and termination of appointment of
Greek Ministers.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 39
The election of the President and the Vice-President of
the Republic shall be direct, by universal suffrage and
secret ballot.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in
the government.
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the
executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution by
the executive, although the House of Representatives can choose to dissolve itself.
Article 67
1. The House of Representatives may dissolve itself
only by its own decision carried by an absolute majority including at least one third of the Representatives
elected by the Turkish Community.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The president issues decrees that have the force
of law.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.

184

House of Representatives of Cyprus (Vouli Antiprosopon)

No. The president has absolute veto power over

a broad range of issues, including foreign affairs,
international treaties, and war. On other issues,
parliament can override a presidential by a majority vote of its present members.
Article 50
1. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic, separately or conjointly, shall have the right of final
veto on any law or decision of the House of Representatives or any part thereof concerning
(a) foreign affairs, except the participation of the
Republic in international organisations and pacts of
alliance in which the Kingdom of Greece and the
Republic of Turkey both participate. For the purposes
of this sub-paragraph foreign affairs includes
(i) the recognition of States, the establishment
of diplomatic and consular relations with other
countries and the interruption of such relations.
The grant of acceptance to diplomatic representatives and of exequatur to consular representatives.
The assignment of diplomatic representatives and
of consular representatives, already in the diplomatic service, to posts abroad and the entrusting of
functions abroad to special envoys already in
the diplomatic service. The appointment and the
assignment of persons, who are not already in the
diplomatic service, to any posts abroad as diplomatic or consular representatives and the entrusting of functions abroad to persons, who are not
already in the diplomatic service, as special envoys;
(ii) the conclusion of international treaties, conventions and agreements;
(iii) the declaration of war and the conclusion of
peace;
(iv) the protection abroad of the citizens of the
Republic and of their interests;
(v) the establishment, the status and the interests
of aliens in the Republic;
(vi) the acquisition of foreign nationality by citizens of the Republic and their acceptance of
employment by, or their entering the service of,
a foreign Government;
(b) the following questions of defence:
(i) composition and size of the armed forces and
credits for them;
(ii) nomination of cadres and their promotions;
(iii) importation of war materials and also explosives of all kinds;
(iv) cession of bases and other facilities to allied
countries;
(c) the following questions of security:
(i) nominations of cadres and their promotions;
(ii) distribution and stationing of forces;
(iii) emergency measures and martial law;
(iv) police laws.
It is specified that the right of veto under sub-paragraph
(c) above shall cover all emergency measures or decisions, but not those which concern the normal functioning of the police and the gendarmerie.

2. The above right of veto may be exercised either

against the whole of a law or decision or against any
part thereof, and in the latter case such law or decision
shall be returned to the House of Representatives for
a decision whether the remaining part thereof will be
submitted, under the relevant provisions of this Constitution, for promulgation.
3. The right of veto under this Article shall be exercised
within the period for the promulgation of laws or decisions of the House of Representatives as in Article 52
provided.
Article 51
1. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic
shall have the right, either separately or conjointly, to
return any law or decision or any part thereof of the
House of Representatives to the House for reconsideration.
2. On the adoption of the Budget by the House of Representatives the President and the Vice-President of the
Republic, either separately or conjointly, may exercise
his or their right to return it to the House of Representatives on the ground that in his or their judgement there
is a discrimination.
4. If the House of Representatives persists in its decision the President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall, subject to the provisions of this Constitution, promulgate the law or decision or the Budget,
as the case may be, within the time limit fixed for
the promulgation of laws and decisions of the House
of Representatives by publication of such law or decision or Budget in the official Gazette of the Republic.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Supreme Constitutional Court can review
the constitutionality of laws.
Article 140
3. In case the Supreme Constitutional Court is of the
opinion that such law or decision or any provision
thereof is repugnant to or inconsistent with any provision of this Constitution such law or decision or such
provision thereof shall not be promulgated by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. The legislature is prohibited from introducing
legislation that would increase government expenditures.
Article 80
1. The right to introduce Bills belongs to the Representatives and to the Ministers.
2. No Bill relating to an increase in budgetary expenditure can be introduced by any Representative.

House of Representatives of Cyprus (Vouli Antiprosopon)

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive cannot impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislators have immunity but it can be lifted
by a decision of the High Court.
Article 83
1. Representatives shall not be liable to civil or criminal
proceedings in respect of any statement made or vote
given by them in the House of Representatives.
2. A Representative cannot, without the leave of the
High Court, be prosecuted, arrested or imprisoned so
long as he continues to be a Representative. Such leave
is not required in the case of an offence punishable
with death or imprisonment for five years or more in
case the offender is taken in the act. In such a case the
High Court being notified forthwith by the competent
authority decides whether it should grant or refuse leave
for the continuation of the prosecution or detention so
long as he continues to be a Representative.
3. If the High Court refuses to grant leave for the prosecution of a Representative, the period during which the
Representative cannot thus be prosecuted shall not be
reckoned for the purposes of any period of prescription
for the offence in question.
4. If the High Court refuses to grant leave for the
enforcement of a sentence of imprisonment imposed
on a Representative by a competent court, the enforcement of such sentence shall be postponed until he
ceases to be a Representative.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 66
1. A general election for the House of Representatives
shall be held on the second Sunday of the month immediately preceding the month in which the term of office
of the outgoing House expires.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
with a majority vote.
Article 182
1. The Articles or parts of Articles of this Constitution set
out in Annex III hereto which have been incorporated

185
from the Zurich Agreement dated 11th February, 1959,
are the basic Articles of this Constitution and cannot,
in any way, be amended, whether by way of variation,
addition or repeal.
2. Subject to paragraph 1 of this Article any provision of
this Constitution may be amended, whether by way of
variation, addition or repeal, as provided in paragraph 3
of this Article.
3. Such amendment shall be made by a law passed by
a majority vote comprising at least two-thirds of the
total number of the Representatives belonging to the
Greek Community and at least two-thirds of the total
number of the Representatives belonging to the Turkish
Community.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. The president can declare war without the legislatures approval.
Article 50
1. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic, separately or conjointly, shall have the right of final
veto on any law or decision of the House of Representatives or any part thereof concerning
(iii) the declaration of war and the conclusion of
peace.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 169
Subject to the provisions of Article 50 and paragraph 3
of Article 57
(1) every international agreement with a foreign State
or any International Organisation relating to commercial matters, economic co-operation (including payments and credit) and modus vivendi shall be concluded under a decision of the Council of Ministers;
(2) any other treaty, convention or international agreement shall be negotiated and signed under a decision
of the Council of Ministers and shall only be operative and binding on the Republic when approved by a
law made by the House of Representatives whereupon
it shall be concluded;
(3) treaties, conventions and agreements concluded in
accordance with the foregoing provisions of this Article shall have, as from their publication in the official
Gazette of the Republic, superior force to any municipal law on condition that such treaties, conventions
and agreements are applied by the other party thereto.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Pardon and amnesty are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

186

House of Representatives of Cyprus (Vouli Antiprosopon)

No. The president has the power of pardon (mercy).

Article 47
The executive power exercised by the President and the
Vice-President of the Republic conjointly consists of the
following matters that is to say:

Article 118
1. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic
shall appoint jointly two fit and proper persons one
to be the Governor and the other to be the DeputyGovernor of the Issuing Bank of the Republic.

(i) exercise of the prerogative of mercy in capital cases

where the injured party and the convicted person are
members of different Communities as in Article 53 provided; remission, suspension and commutation of sentences as in Article 53 provided.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

Article 53
1. The President or the Vice-President of the Republic shall have the right to exercise the prerogative of
mercy with regard to persons belonging to their respective Community who are condemned to death.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The president appoints the judges of the
Supreme Constitutional Court and the High Court,
and the appointments do not require the legislatures approval.
Article 133
1. (1) There shall be a Supreme Constitutional Court of
the Republic composed of a Greek, a Turk and a neutral
judge. The neutral judge shall be the President of the
Court.
(2) The President and the other judges of the Supreme
Constitutional Court shall be appointed jointly by the
President and the Vice-President of the Republic.
Article 153
1. (1) There shall be a High Court of Justice composed
of two Greek judges, one Turkish judge and a neutral
judge. The neutral judge shall be the President of the
Court and shall have two votes.
(2) The President and the other judges of the High
Court shall be appointed jointly by the President and
the Vice-President of the Republic.

No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the

operation of the public media.

Yes. According to the constitution, the House of

Representatives meets in ordinary session for three
to six months each year. In practice, it is in session
at least six months each year.
Article 74
2. The ordinary session of the House of Representatives
shall last for a period of three to six months in each
year, as the House of Representatives may determine.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
Yes.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.

No. The president appoints the governor of the

Central Bank of Cyprus (here called the Issuing
Bank of the Republic).

Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

Parliament of the Czech Republic (Parlament)

187

PARLIAMENT OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC (PARLAMENT)

Expert consultants: Hilary Appel, Anna Grzymaa-Busse, Jan Fidrmuc, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Conor
ODwyer
Score: .81
Influence over
executive (8/9)

Institutional
autonomy (7/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

X
X

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

Specified
powers (5/8)

Institutional
capacity (6/6)

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

X
X

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

23. pardon

24. judiciary

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

25. central bank

26. media

X
X

The Parliament (Parlament) of the Czech Republic traces its origins to Czechoslovakias 1920 constitution, which provided for a bicameral assembly consisting of a lower house, the Chamber
of Deputies (Poslanecka snemovna), and an upper
house, the Senate (Senat). In 1948 a new constitution drawn up by the communist-party regime
replaced the interwar parliament with a unicameral, and largely powerless, Soviet-type legislature. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union
and the velvet divorce from Slovakia, the current constitution was established. The 1993 document is based broadly on the 1920 constitution of
Czechoslovakia.
The legislature has broad powers. It controls the
executive with powers to remove the prime minister, elect the president, and interpellate, investigate, and vote no confidence in the government.
Further, its members may serve in government.
It also enjoys extensive institutional autonomy. It
does not share any significant lawmaking authority with the executive. It can be dissolved by
the president, but only under specific conditions that are largely within the legislatures control. It also enjoys a number of specified powers
and prerogatives and a high level of institutional
capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can remove the prime minister with a vote of no confidence. Removing the
president requires action by the Constitutional
Court.
Article 65
(2) The President of the Republic can be prosecuted for
high treason before the Constitutional Court on the
basis of an indictment by the Senate. Punishment can
be the loss of Presidential office and of the qualification
to hold it again.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Legislators may simultaneously serve in ministerial positions.
3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.

188
Article 38
(2) A member of the Government is obliged to attend
personally a session of the Chamber of Deputies upon
the basis of its resolution. This also applies to a session
of a committee, commission, or investigatory commission, where, however, a member of the Government
may have himself be represented by his deputy or any
other member of the cabinet, if his or her personal presence is not expressly requested.
Article 53
(1) Every Deputy has the right to interpellate the Government or its members in matters falling under their
jurisdiction.
(2) Interpellated members of Government shall be
obliged to respond to the interpellation within a period
of thirty days from the day of its notification.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can establish a commission to
investigate the executive.
Article 30
(1) The Chamber of Deputies may set up an investigatory commission for the investigation of an affair of
public interest if this is suggested by at last one fifth of
deputies.
(2) Proceedings before the commission shall be determined by law.
Article 38
(2) A member of the Government is obliged to attend
personally a session of the Chamber of Deputies upon
the basis of its resolution. This also applies to a session
of a committee, commission, or investigatory commission, where, however, a member of the Government
may have himself be represented by his deputy or any
other member of the cabinet, if his or her personal presence is not expressly requested.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. Legislative committees have effective powers
of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister
(premier). It bears mention, however, that the leading coalition formed after elections names its own
candidate as prime minister, and the president normally appoints this candidate as prime minister.
Article 62
The President of the Republic:
a) appoints and dismisses the Premier and other members of the Government.

Parliament of the Czech Republic (Parlament)

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The legislatures approval is required to confirm ministerial appointments.
Article 62
The President of the Republic:
a) appoints and dismisses the Premier and other members of the Government.
Article 68
(2) The President of the Republic appoints the Premier and, on his suggestion, appoints other members
of the Government and entrusts them with managing
the ministries or other bodies.
(3) The Government shall appear before the Chamber
of Deputies within thirty days of its appointment and
request of it a vote of confidence.
(4) If the newly appointed Government fails to obtain
the confidence of the Chamber of Deputies, the procedure advances in accordance with Paragraphs (2) and
(3). If even the Government, appointed in this way, fails
to obtain the confidence of the Chamber of Deputies,
the President of the Republic shall appoint the Premier
upon the suggestion of the Chairman of the Chamber
of Deputies.
(5) In other cases, the President of the Republic
appoints and dismisses, upon the suggestion of the Premier, other members of the cabinet and entrusts them
with managing the ministries or other bodies.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The legislature elects the president.
Article 54
(2) The President of the Republic is elected by Parliament at a joint session of both Chambers.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 72
(1) The Chamber of Deputies may pass a vote of no
confidence in the Government.
(2) The Chamber of Deputies shall discuss a proposal
for a vote of no confidence in the Government only if
it is submitted in writing by no less than 50 deputies.
Passing the proposal requires the consent of an absolute
majority of all deputies.
Article 73
(1) The Premier offers his resignation to the President
of the Republic. Other members of the Government
offer their resignations to the President of the Republic
through the Premier.

Parliament of the Czech Republic (Parlament)

(2) The Government shall offer its resignation if the
Chamber of Deputies rejects its request for a vote of
confidence or if it passes a vote of no confidence in it.
The Government shall always offer its resignation after
the constituent session of a newly elected Chamber of
Deputies.
(3) If the Government offers its resignation according
to Paragraph (2), the President of the Republic shall
accept it.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 35
(1) The President of the Republic can dissolve the
Chamber of Deputies if:
a) the Chamber of Deputies passes a vote of nonconfidence in a newly appointed Government whose
Premier was appointed by the President of the Republic on the suggestion of the chairman of the Chamber
of Deputies,
b) the Chamber of Deputies fails to decide within
three months on a Government bill with the discussion of which the Government links the question of
confidence,
c) a session of the Chamber of Deputies is adjourned
for a longer period than admissible,
d) the Chamber of Deputies has not reached a quorum for a period longer than three months, although
its session was not adjourned and although it was
repeatedly called to session during this period.
(2) The Chamber of Deputies cannot be dissolved three
months before the expiration of its election term.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.

189

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 83
The Constitutional Court is a judicial body for the protection of constitutionality.
Article 87
(1) The Constitutional Court resolves:
a) the nullification of laws or their individual provisions if they are in contradiction with a constitutional
law or an international agreement under Article 10,
b) the nullification of other legal regulations or their
individual provisions if they are in contradiction
with a constitutional law, legislation, or international
agreement under Article 10.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The government cannot impound funds
appropriated by the legislature. A ministry can,
however, spend up to 5 percent above the allocated
amount according to the 1999 law on budgetary
rules.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.

Yes. The Chamber of Deputies can override a presidential veto by a majority vote of its total membership.

Yes. Legislators are immune. Even in cases of flagrante delicto, legislators must be set free unless the
respective chamber gives its consent to criminal
prosecution.

Article 50
(1) The President of the Republic has the right to
return an adopted law, except a constitutional law, giving explanation within fifteen days of the day of its
advancement.
(2) The Chamber of Deputies shall vote on the rejected
law once again. Draft amendments are inadmissible.
If the Chamber of Deputies re-approves the returned
law by an absolute majority of all deputies, the law is
promulgated. Otherwise it is assumed that the law was
not passed.

Article 27
(1) A Deputy or a Senator may not be prosecuted for
voting in the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate or
their bodies.
(2) A Deputy or a Senator may not be prosecuted for
statements made in the Chamber of Deputies or the
Senate or their bodies. A Deputy or a Senator is only
accountable to the disciplinary authority of the Chamber of which he or she is a member.
(3) A Deputy or a Senator shall be accountable for his
or her misdemeanor only to the disciplinary authority

190
of the Chamber of which he or she is a member, unless
determined otherwise by law.
(4) A Deputy or a Senator may not be criminally prosecuted without consent of the Chamber of which he or
she is a member. If the respective Chamber declines its
consent, criminal proceedings are rendered impossible
forever.
(5) A Deputy or a Senator may be taken into custody
only if caught while committing a criminal offence or
immediately thereafter. The responsible body is obliged
to immediately notify of the detention the Chairman
of the Chamber of which the detainee is a member; if
the Chambers Chairman fails to give his or her consent
to handing the detainee over to court within 24 hours
of the detention, the responsible body is obliged to set
him or her free. The Chamber shall decide with final
authority about the admissibility of the prosecution at
its first following session.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 18
(1) Elections to the Chamber of Deputies shall be held
on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage by
secret ballot, according to the principles of proportional
representation.
(2) Elections to the Senate shall take place on the basis
of universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot,
on the basis of the majority system.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
through the normal legislative process.
Article 9
(1) The Constitution may be amended or altered solely
by constitutional laws.
(2) Any change of fundamental attributes of the democratic law-observing state is inadmissible.
(3) Legal norms cannot be interpreted as warranting
the removal or threatening of the foundations of the
democratic state.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The approval of both chambers of parliament
is necessary to declare war.
Article 39
(3) The passage of a resolution on the declaration of the
state of war and a resolution approving the presence of
foreign troops on the territory of the Czech Republic
requires consent of an absolute majority of all deputies
and of all Senators.

Parliament of the Czech Republic (Parlament)

Article 43
(1) Parliament decides on a declaration of the state of
war in the event that the Czech Republic is attacked or
if it is necessary to meet international treaty obligations
concerning joint defense against aggression.
(2) Armed forces can be sent outside the territory of the
Czech Republic only with the consent of both Chambers.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties on most major issues.
Article 49
(1) International accords requiring consent from Parliament are passed by Parliament in the same way as
draft laws.
(2) Accords on human rights and fundamental freedoms, political agreements, and economic agreements
of a general nature, as well as agreements on the implementation of which a law must be passed, require consent from Parliament.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. The president has the power to grant amnesty.
Article 63
(1) The President of the Republic further:
j) has the right to grant amnesty.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 62
The President of the Republic:
g) pardons and mitigates penalties imposed by penal
courts, orders that criminal proceedings be not opened,
and if they have been, orders their discontinuation, and
expunges previous sentences.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The Senates consent is required to approve
the presidents appointments to the Constitutional
Court.
Article 84
(2) The judges of the Constitutional Court are
appointed by the President of the Republic with the
consent of the Senate.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the members of the
Czech National Bank.
Article 62
The President of the Republic:
k) appoints members of the Bank Council of the Czech
National Bank.

Parliament of Denmark (Folketinget)

191

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.

Yes. The legislature has a substantial voice in the

operation of the public media.

Yes. See item 28.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.
Article 34
(1) The Chambers are continually in session. A session
of the Chamber of Deputies is called by the President
of the Republic so that it be started no later than the
thirtieth day after the election day. If he fails to do so,
the Chamber of Deputies shall meet on the thirtieth
day after the election day.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.

Yes. Each legislator receives a monthly lump sum

for personal policy and administrative staff. He or
she also has access to parliamentary policy staff.

Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

PARLIAMENT OF DENMARK (FOLKETINGET)

Expert consultants: Thomas Adelskov, Jakob From Heg, Tim Knudsen, Asbjrn Skjveland, Richard
N. Swett
Score: .78
Influence over
executive (8/9)

Institutional
autonomy (7/9)

Specified
powers (4/8)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

26. media

18. all elected

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

19. amendments
20. war

Institutional
capacity (6/6)
X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

X
X

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

The Parliament (Folketinget) of Denmark was

established in Denmarks 1849 constitution.
This constitution called for a bicameral parliament (Rigsdag) that paired a lower house
(Folketinget) with an upper house (Landsting). Constitutional amendments in 1853 and 1863 adjusted
Denmarks territorial borders. In the late nineteenth century the Danish monarch wielded exec-

utive powers, but by 1901 the supremacy of

the parliament was established, and the king
began appointing ministers according to the
wishes of the majority in parliament. The 1953
constitution encoded the monarchs ceremonial
role and did away with the upper house of
the legislature, leaving a unicameral parliament
(Folketinget).

192

Today the legislature exercises substantial powers. It enjoys robust control over the executive.
Among other powers, it chooses the prime minister, interpellates and investigates the government,
and can remove the government with a vote of
no confidence. It also enjoys considerable institutional autonomy. Its legislation is not subject
to veto, and the executive lacks gatekeeping and
decree powers. The legislature enjoys numerous
specified powers and prerogatives and is equipped
with strong institutional capacity.

SURVEY

Parliament of Denmark (Folketinget)

law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret

police).
Yes. Legislative committees have effective powers
of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. The king appoints the candidate for prime
minister who enjoys the support of parliament. In
case of doubt, the king seeks the advice from the
parliamentary parties.
Section 14
The King shall appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister
and the other Ministers.

1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.

Yes. The legislature can replace the prime minister

with a vote of no confidence.

No. The king appoints ministers on the recommendation of the prime minister, and the appointments do not require the legislatures approval.

Section 15
(1) A Minister shall not remain in office after the Parliament has passed a vote of no confidence in him.
(2) Where the Parliament passes a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister, he shall ask for the dismissal of the Ministry unless writs are to be issued for
a general election. Where a vote of censure has been
passed on a Ministry, or it has asked for its dismissal, it
shall continue in office until a new Ministry has been
appointed.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.

Section 14
The King shall appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister
and the other Ministers.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The country lacks a presidency. The king is the
head of state.
Section 3
The executive power is vested in the King.

Yes. Ministers may serve simultaneously in the legislature.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the

government.

Yes. The legislature questions ministers during

weekly question time.
4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can establish committees to
investigate the executive.
Section 51
The Parliament may appoint committees from among
its Members to investigate matters of general importance. Such committees shall be entitled to demand
written or oral information both from private citizens
and from public authorities.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of

Section 15
(2) Where the Parliament passes a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister, he shall ask for the dismissal of the Ministry unless writs are to be issued for a
general election.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The king, on the request of the prime minister,
can dissolve the legislature.
Section 32
(2) The King may at any time issue writs for a new
election with the effect that the existing seats be vacated
upon a new election.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.

Parliament of Denmark (Folketinget)

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. Formally, the king can refuse to assent to a bill,
but in practice, it is unthinkable that he would do
so.
Section 22
A Bill passed by the Parliament shall become law if it
receives the Royal Assent not later than thirty days after
it was finally passed. The King shall order the promulgation of Statutes and shall see to it that they are carried
into effect.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. Laws are subject to judicial review. The
Supreme Court has overruled but a single law
passed by parliament in Denmarks history, however. In 1999, when a law regulating subsidies to
independent schools contained explicit mention
of a particular organization, the Supreme Court
found the measure to be a breach of the principle of equality before the law. Until this decision
in 1999, jurists disputed whether judicial review
even existed in Denmark; the decision appears to
have settled the question in the affirmative, meaning that the legislatures laws are not supreme and
are subject to judicial review.
14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all
policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive cannot impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
Members salaries are protected by law.
Section 58
The Members of the Parliament shall be paid such remuneration as may be provided for in the Elections Act.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto.

193
Section 57
No Member of the Parliament shall be prosecuted or
imprisoned in any manner whatsoever without the consent of the Parliament, unless he is caught in flagrante
delicto. Outside the Parliament no Member shall be
held liable for his utterance in the Parliament save by
the consent of the Parliament.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Section 31
(1) The Members of the Parliament shall be elected by
general and direct ballot.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments require approval
in a popular referendum.
Section 88
When the Parliament passes a Bill for the purposes of
a new constitutional provision, and the Government
wishes to proceed with the matter, writs shall be issued
for the election of Members of a new Parliament. If
the Bill is passed unamended by the Parliament assembling after the election, the Bill shall within six months
after its final passing be submitted to the Electors for
approval or rejection by direct voting. Rules for this
voting shall be laid down by Statute. If a majority of
the persons taking part in the voting, and at least 40
per cent of the Electorate has voted in favor of the Bill
as passed by the Parliament, and if the Bill receives the
Royal Assent it shall form an integral part of the Constitution Act.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is required to authorize the use of military force with the common
exception for cases of foreign invasion. When the
use of force is necessary to defend the country
against an armed attack, the legislatures approval
may be sought retroactively.
Section 19
(2) Except for purposes of defence against an armed
attack upon the Realm or Danish forces the King shall
not use military force against any foreign state without the consent of the Parliament. Any measure which
the King may take in pursuance of this provision shall
immediately be submitted to the Parliament. If the Parliament is not in session it shall be convoked immediately.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.

194

Parliament of Denmark (Folketinget)

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

international treaties.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

Section 19
(1) The King shall act on behalf of the Realm in international affairs. Provided that without the consent of
the Parliament the King shall not undertake any act
whereby the territory of the Realm will be increased or
decrease, nor shall he enter into any obligation which
for fulfillment requires the concurrence of the Parliament, or which otherwise is of major importance; nor
shall the King, except with the consent of the Parliament, terminate any international treaty entered into
with the consent of the Parliament.

Yes. The legislature has a substantial voice in the

operation of the public media.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. The king has the power to grant amnesty.
Section 24
The King shall have the prerogative of mercy and of
granting amnesty.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The king has the power of pardon (mercy).
Section 24
The King shall have the prerogative of mercy and of
granting amnesty.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The parliament elects half of the members of
the High Court of the Realm.
Section 59
(1) The High Court of the Realm shall consist of up to
fifteen of the eldest according to seniority of office
ordinary members of the highest court of justice of the
Realm, and an equal number of members elected for
six years by the Parliament according to proportional
representation.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.
Section 35
(1) A newly elected Parliament shall assemble at twelve
oclock noon on the twelfth week-day after the day
of election, unless the King has previously convoked
a meeting of its Members.
Section 36
(1) The sessional year of the Parliament shall commence on the first Tuesday of October, and shall continue until the first Tuesday of October of the following
year.
(2) On the first day of the sessional year at twelve
oclock noon the Members shall assemble for a new
session of the Parliament.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
Yes. Party groups provide staff members with policy expertise to legislators.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.

No. The king, on the recommendation of the government, appoints the governor of the National
Bank of Denmark.

Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

National Congress of the Dominican Republic (Congreso Nacional)

195

NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (CONGRESO NACIONAL)

Expert consultants: Flavio Dario Espinal, Guillermo Garcia, Pepijn Gerrits, Jonathan Hartlyn,
Ricardo Sosa Montas
Score: .41
Influence over
executive (2/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Institutional
autonomy (4/9)
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

12. no veto
13. no review

Specified
powers (3/8)
X

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

23. pardon
24. judiciary

X
X
X

25. central bank

X

The National Congress (Congreso Nacional) of the

Dominican Republic was established in the 1844
constitution upon independence from Haiti. The
bicameral legislature consists of the Chamber of
Deputies (Camara de Diputados) and the Senate
(Senado). Congress was essentially lifeless during
193061, under the military dictatorship of General Rafael Leonidas
Trujillo Molina. The subju
gation of the legislature was so complete that
legislators would sometimes read the morning
newspaper and find that they had resigned their
seat in Congress.
In 1966 the current constitution was established, bringing a revitalized legislative branch.
Constitutional amendments in 1994 and 2001 did
not directly affect legislative powers.
Congresss powers, while more substantial than
during periods of dictatorship, remain circumscribed. Congress is limited in its ability to influence the executive branch, although it can, acting
alone, vote to remove the president from office.
The legislature has some institutional autonomy. It
can initiate bills in all policy jurisdictions, it cannot be dissolved by the president, and its members are immune from arrest. Congress also enjoys
several specified powers and prerogatives and has
some institutional capacity.

26. media

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. Congress can impeach the president by a
three-fourths majority vote of its total membership
in each chamber.
Article 23
The following are powers of the Senate:
4. To try accusations presented by the Chamber of
Deputies against public officials elected for a predetermined period for bad conduct or serious faults in
the exercise of their functions. In response to accusations the Senate cannot impose penalties beyond
removal from office. The person removed, however,
shall remain subject, when appropriate, to indictment
and trial according to the law.
The Senate cannot remove an official from office unless
approved by a vote of at least three-fourths of its full
membership.
Article 26
It is an exclusive function of the Chamber of Deputies
to refer impeachments of public officials before the
Senate in the cases specified in Article 23(5). The
impeachment may not be ordered except by a vote of
three-fourths of the total membership of the Chamber.

196

National Congress of the Dominican Republic (Congreso Nacional)

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 18
The offices of Senator and of Deputy are incompatible
with any other office or position in the public administration.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 37
The following are powers of the Congress:
22. To interpellate the Secretaries of State and the Directors or Administrators of autonomous organs of the
State, on matters within their competence, when agreed
upon by two-thirds of the members present in the
Chamber requesting it, upon demand of one or more
of its members.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. There is no prime minister.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 55
The President of the Republic is the head of the Public
Administration and the supreme commander of all the
armed forces of the Republic and of the police corps.
It belongs to the powers and duties of the President of
the Republic:
1. To appoint the Secretaries and Undersecretaries of
State and other public officials and employees whose
appointment is not vested in any other power or

autonomous organ recognized by this Constitution or

by the laws, to accept their resignations, and to remove
them.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 49
The Executive Power is exercised by the President of the
Republic, who shall be elected every four years by direct
vote.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in
the government.
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the
executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.
11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The president issues decrees that have the force
of law.
Article 55
The President of the Republic is the head of the Public Administration and the supreme commander of all
the armed forces of the Republic and of the police
corps.
It belongs to the powers and duties of the President of
the Republic:
2. To issue regulations, decrees, and instructions whenever necessary.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority vote is needed to override a presidential veto.
Article 41
Every bill approved by both Chambers shall be forwarded to the Executive Power. If the President has
no objections, he shall promulgate it within eight days
after receipt and cause it to be published within fifteen
days after promulgation; if he has objections, he shall
return it to the Chamber from which it came within
eight days from the date on which it was sent to him,
unless the matter has been declared urgent, in which
case he shall return it within three days. The Chamber
that has received his objections shall place them on the
agenda of its next session and again discuss the bill. If,
after this discussion, two-thirds of the total membership

National Congress of the Dominican Republic (Congreso Nacional)

of this Chamber again approve it, it shall be forwarded
to the other Chamber, and if this Chamber approves
it by a like majority, it shall definitively be considered
a law. The President of the Republic shall be required
to promulgate and publish the law within the periods
indicated.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Supreme Court of Justice can review the
constitutionality of laws.
Article 67
The Supreme Court of Justice, without prejudice to
other powers conferred exclusively to it by law:
1. To take cognizance the constitutionality of the
laws.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The president can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
No. The legislature is dependent on the executive
for the resources that finance its operations.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators enjoy immunity. Even in cases of
flagrante delicto, here expressed as apprehended in
the moment of committing a crime, the legislature can demand the release of its members.
Article 31
The members of both Chambers shall enjoy the fullest
penal immunity for the opinions they express in sessions.
Article 32
No Senator or Deputy may be deprived of his freedom
during the legislative session without the authorization
of the Chamber to which he belongs, except in the
case of his being apprehended in the moment of committing a crime. In all cases the Senate or Chamber
of Deputies, or, if they are not in session or there is
no quorum, any member, may demand that a member
who has been detained, arrested, imprisoned, or in any
other way deprived of his liberty, be set free for the duration of the legislative session or any portion thereof. To

197

this end, the President of the Senate or of the Chamber

of Deputies, or the Senator or Deputy, as the case may
be, shall make such request to the Attorney General of
the Republic; and if necessary, shall give the order for
liberation directly, for which he may request the assistance of the public force, which must be given to him
by every depositary thereof.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 17
The election of Senators and Deputies is by direct vote.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
with a two-thirds majority vote.
Article 27
The Chambers shall meet together as a National Assembly in the cases indicated in the Constitution, and there
must be present for this purpose more than one-half of
the members of each Chamber.
Decisions shall be taken by absolute majority vote.
Article 116
This Constitution may be amended if the proposal
of amendment is presented in the National Congress
with the support of one-third of the members of
either Chamber, or if it is submitted by the Executive
Power.
Article 117
The need for amendment shall be declared through a
law. This law, which may not be opposed by the Executive Power, shall order a meeting of the National Assembly, shall specify the purpose of the amendment, and
shall indicate the articles of the Constitution that it will
affect.
Article 118
To act on the proposed amendments, the National
Assembly shall meet within fifteen days following publication of the law declaring the need for amendments,
with the presence of more than half of the members
of each of the Chambers. Once the National Assembly
has voted and proclaimed the amendments, the Constitution shall be published in its entirety, incorporating
the amended texts. As an exception to the provisions
of Article 27, decisions shall be taken in this case by
two-thirds of the votes.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. There is no provision for the declaration of
war. The president can declare a state of siege

198

National Congress of the Dominican Republic (Congreso Nacional)

without the legislatures approval in the event

of the disturbance of the public peace when
Congress is not in session.
Article 37
The following are powers of the Congress:
7. To declare a state of siege, in the event of disturbance
of the public peace or public disaster, and to suspend,
wherever the foregoing exist, and for their duration, the
human rights proclaimed in Article 8, paragraphs 2(b),
(c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) and 3, 4, 6, 7, and 9.
8. In the event that national sovereignty is exposed to
serious and imminent danger, Congress may declare a
state of national emergency, suspending the exercise of
individual rights, with the exception of the inviolability of life as affirmed in Article 8(1) of this Constitution. If Congress is not in session, the President of the
Republic may take the same measure, and shall convoke
Congress to inform it of the state of emergency and the
measures he has taken.
Article 55
The President of the Republic is the head of the Public Administration and the supreme commander of all
the armed forces of the Republic and of the police
corps.
It belongs to the powers and duties of the President of
the Republic:
7. In the event of a disturbance of the public peace if
the National Congress is not in session, to declare a
state of siege wherever the foregoing exists, and suspend the exercise of the rights which pursuant to Article 37(7) of this Constitution, Congress is permitted to
suspend. He may also, in the event that the national
sovereignty is in serious or imminent danger, declare a
state of national emergency, with the effects and requisites indicated in paragraph (8) of that Article. In
case of public disaster, he may also declare as disaster areas those in which damage has occurred, due to
storms, earthquakes, floods, or any other phenomenon
of nature, or as a consequence of epidemics.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 37
The following are powers of the Congress:
14. To approve or reject international treaties and conventions concluded by the Executive Power.
Article 55
The President of the Republic is the head of the Public
Administration and the supreme commander of all the
armed forces of the Republic and of the police corps.
It belongs to the powers and duties of the President of
the Republic:
6. To preside over all official acts of the Nation, to direct
diplomatic negotiations and to conclude treaties with
foreign nations or international organizations, which

must be submitted to the approval of the Congress,

without which they shall have no validity and shall
not bind the Republic.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant
amnesty.
Article 37
The following are powers of the Congress:
21. To grant amnesty on political grounds.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 55
It belongs to the powers and duties of the President of
the Republic:
27. To grant full or partial pardons, absolute or conditional, on February 27, August 16, and December 23
each year, in accordance with the law.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The legislature as a body lacks the power to
appoint or approve judicial branch appointments.
The members of the Supreme Court of Justice are
appointed by the National Council of the Magistrature, a body that is headed by the president and
consists of the vice president, the attorney general, the president of the Supreme Court of Justice,
a magistrate from the Supreme Court of Justice,
and two representatives each from the Chamber of
Deputies and the Senate.
Article 64
The Supreme Court of Justice shall consist of at least
eleven judges; but it may sit, deliberate, and render
judgments validly with a quorum determined by the
law that regulates its organization.
Paragraph I The judges of the Supreme Court of Justice shall be designated by the National Council of the
Magistrature, which shall be presided by the President
of the Republic, and in his absence, by the Vice President of the Republic, and in the absence of both, by the
Attorney General of the Republic. The other members
shall be:
1. The President of the Senate and one Senator selected
by the Senate that belongs to a party different than the
party of the President of the Senate.
2. The President of the Chamber of Deputies and one
Deputy selected by the Chamber of Deputies who
belongs to a party different than the party of the President of the Chamber of Deputies.
3. The President of the Supreme Court of Justice.
4. A Magistrate of the Supreme Court of Justice chosen
by this same body, who shall act as Secretary.

National Congress of Ecuador (Congreso Nacional)

199

Article 68
There shall be at least nine Courts of Appeal throughout
the Republic. The number of Judges to compose the
courts, as well as the Judicial Districts corresponding to
each Court, shall be determined by law.
Paragraph I. In electing the Judges of the Courts of
Appeal, the Supreme Court of Justice shall specify
which of them should occupy the presidency and shall
designate a first and second substitute to replace the
President in the event of default or impediment.

last ninety days, which may be extended for sixty days

more.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.

No. The president appoints the governor of the

Central Bank of the Dominican Republic.

Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.

Yes. The legislature is in regular session for at least

six months each year.

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.

Article 33
The Chambers shall meet regularly on February 27 and
August 16 of each year, and each legislative session shall

Yes. Despite a relatively low re-election rate,

Congress retains a substantial core of highly experienced members.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

NATIONAL CONGRESS OF ECUADOR (CONGRESO NACIONAL)

Expert consultants: Andres Meja Acosta, Marisa Kellam, Simon
Pachano, Roberta L. Rice,
Alison Vasconez
Score: .53
Influence over
executive (3/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no confidence

Institutional
autonomy (4/9)
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

Specified
powers (5/8)
19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

24. judiciary

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

18. all elected

Institutional
capacity (5/6)

25. central bank

26. media

X
X

X
X
X

The National Congress (Congreso Nacional) of

Ecuador was established in the 1830 constitution. Since that time civilian rule has frequently
been interrupted by military governments, the last

of which lost power in 1979. Ecuadors formal

institutional order has been turbulent and
included eight new constitutions between 1845
and 1998.

200

The current 1998 constitution, compared to

its 1978 predecessor, in some ways enhanced the
powers of the unicameral Congress. The new constitution allows legislators to seek immediate reelection. Prior to 1998 legislators were required
to sit out at least one term before returning to
office. The new constitution also encoded a practice that had been implemented in 1996. Prior to
1996 Congress was required to be in session for
only two months each year. The 1998 constitution
inverted the calendar, requiring Congress to meet
continually with only two months of annual vacation.
The legislature is endowed with substantial
but not formidable power. It has some, but not
a great deal of, influence over the executive. It
can interpellate and investigate the government
and impeach the president, but it lacks the powers to make or approve ministerial appointments.
Nor can it vote no confidence in the government. The legislatures own institutional autonomy, moreover, is circumscribed by presidential
veto, decree, and gatekeeping powers. The legislature is endowed with a substantial number of
specific prerogatives, including the right to change
the constitution alone and powers of amnesty and
pardon. Due in large part to the above-mentioned
changes of the mid- and late 1990s, which scrapped
term limits and lengthened the legislatures calendar, Congress has considerable institutional
capacity.
Ecuadors tradition of constitutional volatility
endures. In 2006 Rafael Correa, a leftist committed to changing Ecuadors constitution, was
elected president. In 2007 an overwhelming majority endorsed the idea of rewriting the constitution
in a popular referendum, and an assembly was
elected to pen the new document. The most contentious issues include a proposal to remove the
anti-abortion provision from the fundamental law.
Correa states that promoting political participation
and inclusion and reducing the power of the countrys traditional elites motivate his desire for constitutional change. How, if at all, a new constitution
will affect the powers of the National Congress is
not yet clear.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. Congress can impeach the president by a twothirds majority vote of its total membership.

National Congress of Ecuador (Congreso Nacional)

Article 130
The National Congress has the following duties and
powers:
9. Proceed to a political trial, on the petition of at least
one fourth of the members of the National Congress,
of the President and Vice-President of the Republic . . . during the exercise of their functions and until
a year after their [functions] have ended. The President
and Vice-President of the Republic may only be subject
to a political trial for the commission of crimes against
the security of the State or for crimes of extortion,
bribery, peculation and illicit enrichment and their censure and removal can only be decided through a vote
of two-thirds of the members of Congress. A criminal
indictment is not necessary to start this process.
10. Authorize, with a vote of two-thirds of its members,
the penal indictment of the President or Vice-President
if the competent judge solicits it with good reason.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 135
Deputies, while they act as such, cannot perform any
other public or private function, nor dedicate themselves to their professional activities if they are incompatible with their status as a deputy.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 130
The National Congress has the following duties and
powers:
8. Oversee the acts of the Executive Function and the
Supreme Electoral Tribunal and solicit the information
it considers necessary from public functionaries.
Article 179
The ministers of State have the following [powers or
duties]:
3. To inform the National Congress on matters for
which they are responsible each year and when it is
required.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can establish commissions to
investigate the executive.
Article 130
The National Congress has the following duties and
powers:
16. Constitute the special permanent commissions.

National Congress of Ecuador (Congreso Nacional)

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. There is no prime minister.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers, and ministerial appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 171
The following are the powers and duties of the President
of the Republic:
10. Freely name and remove the ministers of State . . . in
conformity with the Constitution and the law.
Article 176
The ministers of State shall be freely appointed and
removed by the President of the Republic.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 165
The President and the Vice-President, whose names
shall be recorded on the same ballot, shall be elected
by an absolute majority of votes cast in a universal,
equal, direct and secret manner.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in
the government.
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the
executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.
11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. If Congress does not act within thirty days on
a bill that the president classifies as economically
urgent, the president can promulgate the bill as an
executive decree. Congress can modify or revoke
the decree through subsequent legislation.
Article 155
The President of the Republic may send bills classified
as economically urgent to the National Congress. In
this case, Congress must approve, modify or deny them

201
within a maximum period of thirty days, counted from
when they were received.
Article 156
If Congress does not approve, modify or deny the bill
within the period indicated in the previous article, the
President of the Republic shall promulgate it as an
executive decree in the Official Register. The National
Congress can, at any time, modify or derogate it according to the ordinary process foreseen in the Constitution.
Article 179
The ministers of State have the following [powers or
duties]:
2. To sign, along with the President, the decrees issued
on matters that concern their ministry.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority vote in the legislature,
following a one-year waiting period, is required to
override a presidential veto. If the president only
vetoes part of the bill, Congress must reconsider it
within thirty days. A two-thirds majority vote in
the legislature is also needed to override a partial
veto.
Article 153
If the President of the Republic completely objects to
the bill, Congress can only consider it again after one
year from the date on which the objection was made.
After this period has expired, Congress may ratify it
in one sole debate with the vote of two-thirds of its
members and shall immediately send it to the Official Register for its promulgation. If the objection was
partial, Congress must consider it during a period of
no longer than thirty days counted from the date the
presidential objection was delivered and may, in one
sole debate, yield to [the objection] and amend the bill,
with the favorable vote of a majority of those attending the session. It may also ratify the initially approved
bill with a vote of two-thirds of its members. In both
cases, Congress shall send the bill to the Official Register for its promulgation. If Congress does not consider
the objection during the indicated period, it shall be
understood that it has yielded to it and the President of
the Republic may arrange for the promulgation of the
law in the Official Register.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Tribunal can review the
constitutionality of laws.
Article 154
If the objection of the President of the Republic is based
on the partial or total unconstitutionality of the bill, it
shall be sent to the Constitutional Tribunal so that it
can issue its judgment within a period of thirty days.

202
If the judgment confirms the total unconstitutionality
of the bill it will be set aside. If it confirms its partial unconstitutionality, the National Congress shall
make the necessary amendments so that the bill can
then be passed on for the approval of the President of
the Republic. If the Constitutional Tribunal judges that
there is no unconstitutionality, Congress shall order its
promulgation.
Article 276
The Constitutional Tribunal is responsible for [the
following]:
1. To take cognizance of and resolve complaints of substantive or procedural unconstitutionality that are presented regarding organic or ordinary laws, decree-laws,
decrees, ordinances, statutes, regulations and resolutions, emitted by organs of the institutions of the State,
and totally or partially suspend their effect.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. The legislature is prohibited from introducing
bills related to taxation, public expenditures, and
the political division of the country.
Article 147
Only the President of the Republic can present bills
through which taxes are created, modified or suppressed, [or that] raise the public expenditure or
modify the political-administrative division of the
country.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The president can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto.
Article 137
Deputies are not civilly or penally responsible for
the votes and opinions they emit in the exercise of
their functions. Criminal charges cannot be initiated
against them without the previous authorization of the
National Congress, nor will they be deprived of their
liberty, except in cases of flagrante delicto.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.

National Congress of Ecuador (Congreso Nacional)

Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.

Article 126
The Legislative Function is exercised by the National
Congress, located in Quito. Under exceptional circumstances it may meet in any other part of the
national territory. It is integrated by two legislators
elected for each province, and one more [legislator
elected] for each three hundred thousand inhabitants or fraction thereof over one hundred and fifty
thousand.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
through a complicated procedure. After waiting
one year after introducing and debating an amendment, Congress can make the change with a twothirds majority vote.
Article 280
The Political Constitution may be reformed by the
National Congress or through popular referendum.
Article 281
Proposals for the reform of the Constitution may be
presented before the National Congress by a number
of deputies equal to twenty percent of its members
or a legislative block; the President of the Republic,
the Supreme Court of Justice, the Constitutional Tribunal, or a number of persons in exercise of their political rights, whose names are recorded in the electoral
registry, and who equal one percent of the persons
recorded in it.
Article 282
The National Congress shall take cognizance of and discuss bills of constitutional reform, [and] follow the same
procedure foreseen for the ratification of laws. The second debate, which requires the favorable vote of twothirds of the total members of Congress, may not be
carried out until one year after the realization of the
first [debate].
Once the bill is approved, the National Congress shall
remit it to the President of the Republic for its sanction
or objection, in conformity with the dispositions of this
Constitution.
Article 283
The President of the Republic, in cases of urgency,
previously approved by the National Congress with a
vote of the majority of its members, may submit the
approval of constitutional reforms to popular referendum. In other cases, a referendum shall proceed when
the National Congress has not taken cognizance of,
approved or denied the reforms in a period of one hundred and twenty days counted from the expiration of
the period of one year referred to in the previous article.
In both events, concrete texts of constitutional reform
shall be submitted for the consideration of the electorate, which, if approved, shall be immediately incorporated into the Constitution.

National Congress of Ecuador (Congreso Nacional)

Article 284
In case of doubt over the scope of norms contained in
this Constitution, the National Congress may interpret
them in a generally obligatory manner. The same people or organisms that have the power to present bills
to reform [the Constitution] shall have the initiative
for the presentation of bills of constitutional interpretation, which shall be processed in the same way as the
issuance of laws. Their approval shall require the favorable vote of two-thirds of the members of the National
Congress.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. There is no provision for the declaration of war.
The president can, however, decree a state of emergency in the event of imminent external aggression, international war, or a grave internal disturbance without the authorization of Congress.
Congress can subsequently revoke the decree.
Article 180
The President of the Republic shall decree a state of
emergency in all or part of the national territory in case
of imminent external aggression, international war,
grave internal disturbance or natural catastrophes. The
state of emergency can affect all or some of the activities
of society.
Article 182
The President of the Republic shall notify the National
Congress of the state of emergency within forty-eight
hours after the publication of the corresponding decree.
The National Congress may revoke the decree at any
time if the circumstances justify it.
The decree of a state of emergency shall have effect for a
maximum period of sixty days. If the reasons that motivated it persist, it may be renewed, [and] the National
Congress shall be notified thereof.
When the reasons that motivated the state of emergency have disappeared, the President of the Republic
shall decree its termination and, with the respective
report, immediately notify the National Congress.

203
4. Those that attribute the exercise of powers derived
from the Constitution or the law to international or
supranational organisms.
5. Those which refer to the fundamental rights and
duties of the people and the collective rights.
6. Those that contain a commitment to issue, modify
or derogate any law.
Article 162
The ratification of treaties and agreements shall be
made in one sole debate and with a conforming vote of
the majority of Congress members.
The judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal shall be
previously solicited with respect to the conformity of
the treaty or agreement with the Constitution.
A treaty or agreement that requires a constitutional
reform may not be approved unless said reform is made
beforehand.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. Congress has the power to grant amnesty.
Article 130
The National Congress has the following duties and
powers:
15. Concede general amnesties for political crimes and
pardons for common crimes through the favorable vote
of two-thirds of its members. In both cases, the decision
shall be justified when humanitarian motives intercede. Pardons shall not be granted for crimes committed against the public administration and for the
crimes mentioned in the third paragraph of number 2 of
Art. 23.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

Yes. Both Congress and the president have the
power of pardon.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

international treaties.

Article 130
The National Congress has the following duties and
powers:
15. Concede general amnesties for political crimes and
pardons for common crimes through the favorable vote
of two-thirds of its members. In both cases, the decision
shall be justified when humanitarian motives intercede. Pardons shall not be granted for crimes committed against the public administration and for the
crimes mentioned in the third paragraph of number 2 of
Art. 23.

Article 129
The National Congress has the following duties and
powers:
7. Approve or reject international treaties, in the cases
in which [the responsibility] corresponds to them.

Article 171
The following are the powers and duties of the President
of the Republic:
20. Pardon, decrease or commute sentences, in conformity with the law.

Article 161
The National Congress shall approve or reject the following international treaties and agreements:
1. Those that refer to territorial or border matters.
2. Those that establish political or military alliances.
3. Those that bind the country to agreements of integration.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.

Yes. The legislature appoints the members of the

Constitutional Tribunal. Prior to 1997 the legislature also appointed members of the Supreme Court

204

of Justice. Since 1997 the Supreme Court of Justice

is independently appointed.
Article 130
The National Congress has the following duties and
powers:
11. Appoint . . . the members of the managing boards of
the Constitutional Tribunal.
Article 202
The magistrates of the Supreme Court of Justice shall
not be subject to a fixed term in the exercise of their
posts. They shall cease their functions for the reasons determined by the Constitution and the law. If
a vacancy is produced, the plenary [session] of the
Supreme Court of Justice shall designate the new magistrate with a favorable vote of two-thirds of its members,
observing the criteria of professionalism and the judicial career, in conformity with the law.
Article 275
The Constitutional Tribunal, with national jurisdiction,
shall maintain its seat in Quito. Nine board members,
who shall have respective substitutes, shall integrate
it . . . The National Congress shall designate them by the
majority of its members, in the following manner:
Two, from lists of candidates sent by the President of
the Republic.
Two, from lists of candidates presented by the Supreme
Court of Justice which do not include any of its members.
Two, selected by the National Congress, who do not
exhibit the characteristics of legislators.
One, from the list of candidates presented by the
municipal mayors and the provincial prefects.
One, from the list of candidates presented by the
legally recognized national workers headquarters and
the national indigenous and peasant organizations.
One, from the list of candidates sent by the legally recognized Production Chambers.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president of the Central Bank of Ecuador
is elected by the banks board of directors, who
themselves are nominated by the president and
confirmed by Congress.
Article 262
Five members proposed by the President of the Republic and confirmed by a majority of the members of the
National Congress shall integrate the board of directors
of the Central Bank. It shall exercise its functions for
a period of six years, with partial renewal every three
years. The National Congress shall make confirmations
within ten days counted from the date on which it
received the nomination of the candidates. If it does
not do so within this period, the persons proposed by
the President of the Republic will be understood to be

National Congress of Ecuador (Congreso Nacional)

confirmed. If Congress rejects any of the names or the
entire list of nominations, the President of the Republic must propose new candidates. The members of the
board of directors shall elect from amongst themselves
[the Central Banks] president, who shall carry out his
functions for three years.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. Since 1996 the legislature meets in ordinary
session for ten months each year. Prior to 1996 the
legislature only met for two months of ordinary
session each year.
Article 132
The National Congress meets in Quito, without the
need for convocation, from January 5 of the year in
which the President of the Republic takes possession of
his post, and is in session in ordinary and permanent
form, with two recesses of one month each every year.
The sessions of Congress are public. Under exceptional
circumstances, it can meet in a private session, subject
to the law.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No. Each legislator has at least two non-secretarial
staff members, but few of them have policy expertise.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. Since 1998 there have been no restrictions on
re-election. Prior to 1998 legislators were prohibited from seeking immediate re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. More than half of the legislators have previous
legislative experience, owing in part to the removal
of the ban on consecutive re-elections in the 1998
constitution.

Peoples Assembly of Egypt (Majilis al-Shab)

205

PEOPLES ASSEMBLY OF EGYPT (MAJILIS AL-SHAB)

Expert consultants: Nathan J. Brown, Jason Brownlee, Tamir Moustafa, Samer Shehata, Joshua Stacher
Score: .28
Influence over
executive (1/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Institutional
autonomy (3/9)

Specified
powers (1/8)

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

26. media

18. all elected

The Peoples Assembly (Majilis al-Shab) of Egypt

was established in the 1923 constitution. Egypt
gained nominal independence under a constitutional monarchy in 1922, although the British continued to maintain forces of military occupation in
Egypt for the next three decades. In 1952 Egypt
obtained full independence from Great Britain,
and the constitutional monarchy was overthrown
in a military coup led by Colonel Gamel Abdel
Nasser, who ruled without regard for the legislature until 1970.
The constitution that is currently in force was
adopted in 1971. The bulk of legislative responsibility is formally invested in the lower house, the
Peoples Assembly, while the upper house, the
Advisory Council (Majilis al-Shura), which was
established in 1980, plays a consultative role. In
2005 the constitution was amended to allow for the
direct election of the president in competitive elections. Prior to 2005 a single presidential candidate
was nominated by the legislature and approved in
a popular referendum.
The powers of the Peoples Assembly are highly
circumscribed. The legislature has scant ability to
influence the executive branch. The legislatures
own institutional autonomy is limited by presidential powers to decree legislation, appoint members
of the legislature, veto legislation, and dissolve the
legislature. Specified powers and prerogatives, such
as the power to declare war, are almost all reserved

for the president. The legislature has some institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires action by a
special tribunal.
Article 85
Any charge against the President of high treason or of
committing a criminal act shall be made upon a proposal by at least one-third of the members of the Peoples Assembly. No impeachment shall be issued except
upon the approval of a majority of two-thirds of the
Assembly members. The President shall be suspended
from the exercise of his duty as from the issuance of the
impeachment. The Vice-President shall take over the
Presidency temporarily until the decision concerning
the impeachment is taken. The President of the Republic shall be tried by a special tribunal set up by law. The
law shall also organise the trial procedures and define
the penalty.
If he is found guilty, he shall be relieved of his post,
without prejudice to other penalties.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Ministers may serve simultaneously in the legislature.

206
Article 134
The Prime Minister, his deputies, the Ministers and
their deputies may become members of the Peoples
Assembly.

Peoples Assembly of Egypt (Majilis al-Shab)

No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
No. The legislature formally has the right to summon executive branch officials for questioning, but
officials can and do often ignore such requests, and
hearings are not regularly held.
Article 124
Every member of the Peoples Assembly shall be entitled
to address questions to the Prime Minister or any of his
deputies or the Ministers or their deputies concerning
matters within their jurisdiction. The Prime Minister,
his deputies, the Ministers and the persons they delegate on their behalf shall answer the questions put
to them by members. The member may withdraw his
question at any time; this same question may not be
transformed into an interpellation in the same session.
Article 125
Every member of the Peoples Assembly shall be entitled
to address Interpellations to the Prime Minister or his
deputies or the Ministers or their deputies concerning
matters within their jurisdiction.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. Formally, ad hoc committees of the Peoples
Assembly have the right to investigate the executive. In practice, such investigations never occur,
and it is difficult to imagine that they could occur.
Article 131
The Peoples Assembly shall form an ad hoc committee
or entrust any of its committees with the inspection of
the activities of any of the administrative departments
or the general establishments or any administrative or
executive organ or any of the public projects, for the
purpose of finding facts and informing the Assembly
as to the actual financial or administrative or economic
positions or for conducting investigations into a subject
related to one of the said activities.
In the course of its work, such a committee shall be
entitled to collect whatever evidence it deems necessary
and to subpoena all those it needs. All executive and
administrative bodies shall answer the demands of the
committee and put under its disposal all the documents
and evidence it asks for this purpose.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).

Article 141
The President of the Republic shall appoint the Prime
Minister, his deputies, the Ministers and their deputies
and relieve them of the posts.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints the ministers, and
the appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 141
The President of the Republic shall appoint the Prime
Minister, his deputies, the Ministers and their deputies
and relieve them of the posts.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. Since 2005 the president is directly elected.
Prior to 2005 the president was nominated by the
legislature and elected in a popular referendum.
Article 76
The Peoples Assembly shall nominate the President of
the Republic. The nomination shall be referred to the
people for a plebiscite. The nomination to the post of
President of the Republic shall be made in the Peoples
Assembly upon the proposal of at least one third of its
members. The candidate who wins two-thirds of the
votes of the Assembly members shall be referred to
the people for a plebiscite. If none of the candidates
obtains the said majority the nomination process shall
be repeated two days after the first vote. The candidate winning the votes with an absolute majority of the
Assembly members shall be referred to the citizens for a
plebiscite. The candidate shall be considered President
of the Republic when he obtains an absolute majority
of the votes cast in the plebiscite. If the candidate does
not obtain this majority, the Assembly shall nominate
another candidate and the same procedure shall be followed.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. A legislative vote of no confidence requires
approval in a popular referendum before it leads
to the governments resignation.
Article 127
The Peoples Assembly shall determine the responsibility of the Prime Minister, on a proposal by one-tenth of
its members . . . In the event that such responsibility is
determined, the Assembly shall submit a report to the

Peoples Assembly of Egypt (Majilis al-Shab)

President of the Republic including the elements of the
subject, the conclusions reached on the matter and the
reasons behind it. The President of the Republic may
return such a report to the Assembly within ten days.
If the Assembly ratifies it once again, the President of
the Republic may put the subject of discord to a referendum. If the result of the referendum is in support
of the government, the Assembly shall be considered
dissolved, otherwise the President of the Republic shall
accept the resignation of the council of Ministries.
Article 128
The Prime Minister shall submit his resignation to the
President of the Republic if he is found responsible
before the Peoples Assembly.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature after
approval in a popular referendum.
Article 136
The President of the Republic shall not dissolve the Peoples Assembly unless it is necessary and after a referendum of the people. The President of the Republic shall
issue a decision terminating the sessions of the Assembly and conducting a referendum within thirty days.
If the total majority of the voters approve the dissolution of the Assembly, the President of the Republic shall
issue the decision of dissolution.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The president can issue decrees that have the
force of law when the legislature is not in session. The decrees lapse if they are not subsequently
approved by the legislature. The legislature can also
delegate temporary decree power to the president
on specified issue areas.
Article 108
The president of the Republic shall have the right,
in case of necessity or in exceptional cases and on
the authorisation of the Peoples Assembly upon the
approval of a majority of two thirds of its members, to
issue resolutions having the force of law. The authorisation must be for a limited period of time during which
the subjects of the resolutions and the grounds upon
which they are based, must be determined. The resolutions must be submitted to the Peoples Assembly in the
first meeting after the end of the authorisation period.
Article 147
In case it becomes necessary, during the recess between
the sessions of the Peoples Assembly, to take measures
which cannot suffer delay, the President of the Republic
shall issue decisions in their respect, which shall have
the force of law. Such decisions must be submitted to
the Peoples Assembly within fifteen days from their
date of issuance if the Assembly is standing. In case of

207
dissolution or recess of the Assembly, they shall be submitted at its first meeting. In case they are not submitted, their force of law disappears with retroactive effect,
without need for issuing a decision to this effect. If they
are submitted and are not ratified, their force of law
disappears with retroactive effect, unless the Assembly
ratifies their validity in the previous period or settling
their effects in another way.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority vote in the legislature is
needed to override a presidential veto.
Article 113
If the President of the Republic objects to a draft law
ratified by the Peoples Assembly he shall refer it back
to the Assembly within thirty days from the Assemblys
communication of it. If the draft law is not referred
back within this period, it is considered a law shall be
promulgated. If it is referred back to the Assembly on
the said date and approved once again by a majority of
two-thirds of the members, it shall be considered a law
and shall be promulgated.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Supreme Constitutional Court can review
the constitutionality of laws.
Article 175
The Supreme Constitutional Court alone shall undertake the judicial control in respect of the constitutionality of the laws and regulations, and shall undertake
the explanation of the legislative texts, all of which in
accordance with the manner prescribed by the law.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,
including control over members salaries.
Article 91
Members of the Peoples Assembly shall receive a remuneration determined by the law.

208

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Formally, legislators are immune, but in practice, legislative immunity can be revoked. Members of parliament have been tried on corruption
and embezzlement charges, and in recent years legislators have been arrested and beaten by security
forces.
Article 98
Members of the Peoples Assembly shall not be censured for any opinions or thoughts expressed by them
in the performance of their tasks in the Assembly or its
committees.
Article 99
No member of the Peoples Assembly shall be subject
to a criminal prosecution without the permission of
the Assembly except in cases of flagrante delicto. If the
Assembly is not in session, the permission of the President of the Assembly must be taken. The Assembly must
be notified of the measures taken in its first subsequent
session.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
No. The President can appoint up to ten members
of the Peoples Assembly, a body which contains at
least 350 members.
Article 87
The law shall determine the constituencies into which
the State shall be divided and the number of elected
members of the Peoples Assembly must be at least 350
persons, of which one half at least must be workers and
farmers elected by direct secret public balloting. The
definition of the worker and the farmer shall be made
by law. The President of the Republic may appoint a
number of members not exceeding ten.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments require approval
in a popular referendum.
Article 189
The President of the Republic, as well as the Peoples
Assembly, may request the amendment of one or more
of the Constitution articles. The articles to be revised
and the reasons justifying such amendment must be
mentioned in the request for amendment. In case the
request emanates from the Peoples Assembly, it should
be signed by at least one third of the Assembly members. In all cases, the Assembly shall discuss the amendment in principle, and the decision in this respect shall
be taken by the majority of its members. If the request
is rejected, the amendment of the same particular articles may not be requested again before the expiration
of one year from the date of such rejection. If the Peoples Assembly approves the principle of revision, the

Peoples Assembly of Egypt (Majilis al-Shab)

articles requested to be mended shall be discussed after
two months from the date of the said approval. If the
modification is approved by two-thirds of the members
of the Assembly, it must be referred to the people for a
plebiscite.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. Formally, the legislatures approval is necessary
for the declaration of war. In practice, the president
can declare war without the legislatures approval.
Article 150
The President of Republic shall be the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. He shall be the authority
who declares war, after the approval of the Peoples
Assembly.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 151
The President of Republic shall conclude treaties and
communicate them to the Peoples Assembly, accompanied with a suitable clarification. They shall have the
force of law after their conclusion, ratification and publication according to the established procedure. However, peace treaties, alliance pacts, commercial and maritime and all the treaties involving modifications in the
territory of the State, or having connection with the
rights of sovereignty, or which lay upon the Treasury of
the State certain charges not provided for in the budget,
must acquire the approval of the Peoples Assembly.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Formally, a general amnesty can be granted by
law. In practice, the president, and the president
alone, has the power to grant amnesty.
Article 149
The President of Republic shall have the right of granting amnesty or commute a sentence. As for general
amnesty, it can only be granted by virtue of a law.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon, here
expressed as the right of granting amnesty or commute a sentence.
Article 149
The President of Republic shall have the right of granting amnesty or commute a sentence. As for general
amnesty, it can only be granted by virtue of a law.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. According to the constitution, the conditions
for appointment of members of the judiciary will

Peoples Assembly of Egypt (Majilis al-Shab)

be determined by law, which suggests a role for the

legislature. In practice, the president makes judicial appointments, and the appointments do not
require the legislatures approval.
Article 167
The law shall determine the judiciary organisations and
their functions, organise the way of their formation,
prescribe the conditions and measures for the appointment and transfer of their members.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the chairman of the
Central Bank of Egypt.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The state-owned media is run by the Minister
of Information, who is subordinate to the president.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session for at
least seven months each year.
Article 101
The President of the Republic shall convoke the Peoples
Assembly for its ordinary annual session before the second Thursday of November. If it is not convoked, the
Assembly shall meet, by force of the Constitution, on
the said day. The session of the ordinary meeting shall
continue for at least seven months.

209

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. The re-election rate is relatively high, resulting in a significant number of highly experienced
members. Many of the longest serving members,
however, come from the presidents hegemonic
ruling party or are domesticated opposition figures. The presidents domination of the legislature means that long-serving members do not necessarily have experience in the business of legislating.

210

Legislative Assembly of El Salvador (Asamblea Legislativa)

LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF EL SALVADOR (ASAMBLEA LEGISLATIVA)

Expert consultants: David Holiday, Gerardo Le Chevallier, Hugo Lopez, Margaret Popkin, William
Stanley
Score: .59
Influence over
executive (3/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Institutional
autonomy (7/9)
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review
14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

Specified
powers (6/8)
X
X

Institutional
capacity (3/6)

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

23. pardon

24. judiciary

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

25. central bank

26. media

X
X
X

The Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) of

El Salvador was established in the 1841 constitution. Since then El Salvador has experienced much
turbulence, going through fifteen constitutions.
For most of the second half of the twentieth century, the legislature was sidelined by military rule
and gruesome civil war. The current constitution
was adopted in 1983 and calls for a unicameral
assembly.
The legislature has significant powers, although
its ability to influence the executive is not great.
The Assembly cannot make or approve ministerial
appointments or vote no confidence in the government. It does, however, have a fair degree of institutional autonomy. The executive lacks gatekeeping
and decree powers. The legislature does, moreover,
hold numerous specified powers and prerogatives,
including the authority to appoint members of the
judiciary and the power to change the constitution. Its institutional capacity is modest, due to
lack of staff and a legislative calendar that keeps
the Assembly in session for only about five-and-ahalf months each year.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.

Yes. The legislature can impeach the president.

Article 236
The President . . . shall answer to the Legislative Assembly for the official and common crimes [he] commit[s].
The Assembly, after hearing an accusing member and
the accused official or special defender, as the case may
be, shall declare whether or not there are grounds for
a trial. In the former event, the case shall be sent to
the Chamber of Second Instance specified by law, for
a trial in first instance; and in the latter event, the
case shall be dropped. The decisions rendered by the
aforementioned Chamber shall be passed upon in second instance by one of the Divisions of the Supreme
Court of Justice, and in cassation by the full court.
Any person has the right to denounce the offenses
with which this Article is concerned, and to appear
as a party if he has the qualifications required by
law.
Article 237
As soon as the Legislative Assembly or the Supreme
Court of Justice declares that there are grounds for trial,
the offender shall be suspended from the exercise of
his functions and may not continue in his position for
any reason whatsoever. If he does, he shall be guilty
of the crime of prolonging of functions. If the sentence is condemnatory, he shall be dismissed from his
position through the same act. If acquitted, he shall
resume the exercise of his functions, if the position is
one of those that is conferred for a determined time
and the period of his election or appointment has not
expired.

Legislative Assembly of El Salvador (Asamblea Legislativa)

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators who serve in government have a
sleeping mandate, meaning that they may join
the government but forfeit their voting rights in
the legislature during their service in government.
They may return to the legislature after their service in government ends.
Article 127
The following shall not be candidates for Deputies:
1. The Ministers and Vice Ministers of State.
Article 129
The Deputies in office shall not hold remunerated public positions during the time for which they have been
elected, except those of a teaching or cultural character, and those related to the professional services of
social assistance. Nevertheless, they may hold the positions of Ministers or Vice Ministers of State, Presidents
of Official Autonomous Institutions, Heads of Diplomatic Missions, Consular [Missions] or carry out Special Diplomatic Missions. In these cases, they shall be
reincorporated into the Assembly when their functions
cease, if the period of their election is still in force.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 131
It corresponds to the Legislative Assembly:
34th. To question Ministers.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can establish special commissions to investigate the executive.
Article 131
It corresponds to the Legislative Assembly:
32nd. To name special commissions for the investigation of matters of national interest and to adopt the
agreements or recommendations that are esteemed necessary based on the report of said commissions.
Article 132
All the public functionaries and employees, including those of Official Autonomous Institutions and the
Members of the Armed Force, are under the obligation
to collaborate with the special commissions of the Legislative Assembly; and the appearance and declaration
of these as well as any other person required by the
mentioned commissions shall be obligatory under the
same summons that are observed in the judicial procedure. The conclusions of the special commissions of
investigation of the Legislative Assembly shall not be

211

obliging the tribunals, nor shall they affect the judicial proceedings or resolutions, without prejudice that
the result be communicated to the General Office of
the Attorney General of the Republic for the exercise of
pertinent actions.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The agencies of coercion report to the president and are not subject to effective legislative
oversight.
Article 213
The Armed Force forms a part of the Executive Organ
and is subordinate to the authority of the President of
the Republic in his capacity as Commander-General. Its
structure, juridical regime, doctrine, composition, and
functioning are defined by the law, the regulations and
special provisions which the President of the Republic
adopts.

6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

No. There is no prime minister.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 162
It corresponds to the President of the Republic to
appoint, remove, accept the resignations of, and grant
leave to, Ministers and Vice Ministers of State, as well
as the Chief of Public Security and of the State Intelligence.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 151
To be elected President of the Republic it is required: to
be a Salvadoran by birth, child of a Salvadoran father or
mother; to be a layman, over thirty years of age, of wellknown morality and instruction; to be in the exercise
of the rights of citizenship, having been so for the six
years preceding the election, and to be affiliated with
one of the legally recognized political parties.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in
the government.

212

Legislative Assembly of El Salvador (Asamblea Legislativa)

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.

16. The legislature controls the resources that finance

its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority vote in the legislature is
required to override a presidential veto.
Article 137
When the President of the Republic vetoes a bill of law,
he shall return it to the Assembly within eight business
days of receiving it, indicating the reasons on which
his veto is founded; if within such term he has failed
to return it, it shall be considered ratified and he shall
order its publication as law. In the case of a veto, the
Assembly shall reconsider the bill and if it should ratify it with at least two-thirds of the votes of elected
Deputies, it shall send it again to the President of the
Republic, and he shall sanction it and send it to be published.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Supreme Court of Justice can review the
constitutionality of laws.
Article 138
When a bill of law is returned because the President of
the Republic considers it to be unconstitutional and the
Legislative Organ ratifies it in the manner established in
the preceding article, the President of the Republic shall
present it to the Supreme Court of Justice within three
business days, so that the latter may, after hearing the
arguments of both sides, decide whether it is or is not
constitutional, within fifteen business days at the latest.
If the Court decides that the bill is constitutional, the
President of the Republic shall be obligated to sanction
it and to order its publication as law.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.

Article 131
It corresponds to the Legislative Assembly:
1st. To determine its internal regulation;
10th. To approve its budget and salary system, as well
as its reforms, consulting previously with the President
of the Republic on them, for the sole effect of guaranteeing that the necessary funds exist for their compliance.
Once approved, said budget shall be incorporated into
the Budget of Revenues and Expenditures of the Public
Administration.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune. Even in cases of flagrante delicto, they can be released at the Assemblys
behest.
Article 125
The Deputies represent the whole nation and are not
bound by any imperative mandate. They are inviolable
and shall not have responsibility at any time for the
opinions or votes they emit.
Article 130
The Deputies shall cease in their position in the following cases:
1st. When they are convicted for serious crimes in a
definitive sentence;
2nd. When they commit the prohibitions contained
in Article 128 of this Constitution;
3rd. When they resign without just cause qualified as
such by the Assembly;
In these cases, they shall remain unqualified to carry
out any other public post during the period of their
election.
Article 238
The Deputies may not be tried for serious offenses they
commit from the day of their election until the end
of the period for which they were elected, without the
Legislative Assembly previously declaring that there are
grounds for trial, in conformity with the procedure
established in the preceding Article. For the less serious crimes and misdeeds they commit during the same
period they may not be detained or imprisoned, nor
called to testify until after the conclusion of the period
of their election. If . . . a Deputy were to be caught in
flagrante delicto, from the day of their election until the
end of the period for which they were elected, they may
be detained by any person or authority, who shall be
obliged to place the case immediately at the disposition
of the Assembly.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.

Legislative Assembly of El Salvador (Asamblea Legislativa)

Article 121
The Legislative Assembly is a professional associated
body composed of Deputies elected in the form prescribed by this Constitution, and to it fundamentally
belongs the authority to legislate.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
through a complicated procedure. The sitting legislature can propose an amendment, and then, following an election, the subsequent assembly can
approve the amendment with a two-thirds majority vote.
Article 248
Reformation of this Constitution may be decided by
the Legislative Assembly, with the vote of one-half plus
one of the elected Deputies. For this amendment to be
decreed, it must be ratified by the following Legislative Assembly by a vote of two-thirds of the elected
Deputies. Thus ratified, the corresponding decree shall
be issued and shall be published in the Official Gazette.
Amendments may only be proposed by elected
Deputies, by a number no less than ten.
Under no circumstances, may the articles of this Constitution, which refer to the form and system of government, to the territory of the Republic, and to the
principle that a President cannot succeed himself, be
amended.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislature declares war.
Article 131
It corresponds to the Legislative Assembly:
25th. To declare war and ratify peace, on the basis of
reports provided to it by the Executive Organ.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 131
It corresponds to the Legislative Assembly:
7th. To ratify the treaties or pacts made by the Executive with other States or international organisms, or to
refuse their ratification.
Article 147
For the ratification of any treaty or pact for which any
question related to the limits of the Republic are submitted to arbitration, a vote of at least three-quarters of
the elected Deputies shall be necessary. Any treaty or
agreement formalized by the Executive Organ referring
to the national territory, shall also require a vote of at
least three-quarters of the elected Deputies.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

213

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant

amnesty.
Article 131
It corresponds to the Legislative Assembly:
26th. To grant amnesty for political or common
crimes connected with these, or for common crimes
committed by not less than twenty persons; and to
grant pardons, upon favorable report of the Supreme
Court of Justice.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

Yes. The legislature has the power of pardon.
Article 131
It corresponds to the Legislative Assembly:
26th. To grant amnesty for political or common
crimes connected with these, or for common crimes
committed by not less than twenty persons; and to
grant pardons, upon favorable report of the Supreme
Court of Justice.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislature elects the president and the
members of the Supreme Court of Justice, the president and members of the Court of Accounts, and
the members of the National Council of the Judiciary.
Article 131
It corresponds to the Legislative Assembly:
19th. To elect in a public and registered vote the following functionaries: the President and Magistrates of
the Supreme Court of Justice, the President and Magistrates of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the President
and Magistrates of the Court of Accounts of the Republic . . . and Members of the National Council of the Judiciary.
Article 173
The Supreme Court of Justice shall be made up of the
number of Magistrates determined by the law, who will
be elected by the Legislative Assembly, and one of them
shall be the President.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the president of the
Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
No. The legislature meets in ordinary session from
February 15th to May 15th and from October 15th
to January 2nd each year. Its total time in session
is less than six months each year.

214

Legislative Assembly of El Salvador (Asamblea Legislativa)

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.

Yes.

No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
Article 124
The members of the Assembly shall be renewed every
three years and may be reelected.

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF ERITREA (HAGERAWI BAITO)

Expert consultants: Dan Connell, Edward McMahon
Score: .25
Influence over
executive (2/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

Institutional
autonomy (3/9)
X

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

Specified
powers (2/8)
X

12. no veto
13. no review

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

19. amendments
20. war
21. treaties
22. amnesty
23. pardon
24. judiciary

Institutional
capacity (1/6)
X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

25. central bank

26. media

18. all elected

The National Assembly (Hagerawi Baito) of Eritrea

was established in 1993, following a thirty-year war
for independence with Ethiopia. The Assembly was
designed to meet as a transitional body until a constitution could be drafted and presidential and parliamentary elections could be held. Elections were
scheduled for 2001 but were never carried out. The
transitional legislature is still in place. A new constitution (excerpted in the survey below) was ratified in 1997, but has not yet been implemented, in
part because of a revival of hostilities with Ethiopia.
The legislature has little power. Its sway over
executive power is slight. It does have some institutional autonomy, because the president cannot
issue decrees that have the force of law or veto the

Assemblys legislation. The bulk of specified powers and prerogatives are reserved for the president.
The legislatures institutional capacity is extremely
low.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Formally, the legislature can impeach the president by a two-thirds majority vote of its total membership. In practice, it would be unthinkable for the
legislature to impeach the president. For example,

National Assembly of Eritrea (Hagerawi Baito)

when legislators criticized the president in 2000,

the president simply refused to call the body back
into session until he had arrested his detractors and
defused the dissent.
Article 32
(9) Pursuant to the provisions of Sub-Article 6(a) and
(b) of Article 41 hereof, the National Assembly, by a
vote of two-thirds majority of all its members, shall
have the power to impeach and charge the President
before the end of his term of office.
Article 41
(6) The President may be removed from office by twothirds majority vote of all members of the National
Assembly for the following reasons:
a) violation of the Constitution or grave violation of
the law;
b) conducting himself in a manner which brings the
authority or honour of the office of President into
ridicule, contempt and disrepute;
c) being incapable of performing the functions of his
office by reason of physical or mental incapacity.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Ministers may serve simultaneously in the legislature.
Article 46
(2) The President may select ministers from among
members of the National Assembly or from among persons who are not members of the National Assembly.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
No. Formally, the legislature can interpellate ministers, but in practice, officials often refuse to attend
legislative meetings.
Article 47
(2) The National Assembly or its committees may,
through the Office of the President, summon any minister to appear before them to question him concerning
the policies or operation of his ministry.

215
power to call any person to appear before them to give
evidence or to submit documents.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The agencies of coercion report to the president and are not subject to legislative oversight.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. There is no prime minister.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. According to the as of yet unimplemented
1997 constitution, the legislature has responsibility
for confirming the presidents ministerial appointments. In practice, the president appoints ministers at will.
Article 32
(10) The National Assembly may approve the appointment of any person or persons pursuant to this Constitution.
Article 42
The President shall have the following powers and
duties:
7. appoint with the approval of the National Assembly,
ministers.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The legislature elects the president.
Article 32
(8) The National Assembly shall have the power to
elect, from among its members, by absolute majority
vote of all its members, the President who shall serve
for five years.
Article 41
(1) The President shall be elected from amongst the
members of the National Assembly by a vote of the
majority of its members. A candidate for the office of
the President must be nominated by at least 20 percent
vote of all the members of the National Assembly.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. Formally, the legislature can establish investigatory committees, although in practice it cannot.

No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in

the government.

Article 37
(1) The National Assembly shall have a secretariat
under the direction of its Chairman and committees
for various fields of interest, as circumstance may dictate.
(2) The various committees established pursuant to the
provisions of Sub-Article 1 of this Article shall have the

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. According to the 1997 constitution, the legislature is immune from dissolution. In practice, the
president has refused to call the legislature into session when not doing so has served his interests.

216

National Assembly of Eritrea (Hagerawi Baito)

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.

No. Formally, legislators are immune from arrest,

but in practice, they have been arrested and held
without charge for criticizing the president.

Yes. The president lacks decree power. While the

president dominates policymaking in practice, all
legislation formally passes through the legislature.

Article 38
(1) All members of the National Assembly shall maintain the high image of the National Assembly. They
shall regard themselves as humble servants of the people and maintain close contact with them.
(2) No member of the National Assembly or of its committees may be arrested or charged for any crimes he
commits during the session of the National Assembly,
unless he be apprehended in flagrante delicto. Nevertheless, where the National Assembly, by a majority
vote of those present and voting, revokes his immunity, the member may be charged.
(3) No member of the National Assembly may be
arrested or charged for words uttered or written statements submitted by him at any meeting of the National
Assembly or any meeting of its committees or any utterance or statement made outside the National Assembly
in connection with his duty as member thereof.
(4) The duties, responsibilities, immunities and compensation of the members of the National Assembly
shall be determined by law; and all members shall be
entitled to the protection of such immunities and shall
perform the duties enumerated therein.

Article 32
(1) Pursuant to the provisions of this Constitution:
a) The National Assembly shall have the power to
enact laws and pass resolutions for the peace, stability, development and good governance of Eritrea;
b) Unless, pursuant to the provisions of this Constitution or authorized by law enacted by the National
Assembly, no person or organization shall have the
power to make having the force of law.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The president lacks veto power.
Article 33
Any draft law approved by the National Assembly shall
be transmitted to the President who, within thirty days,
shall sign and have it published in the Gazette of
Eritrean Laws.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Supreme Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 49
(2) The Supreme Court shall have the power of:
a) sole jurisdiction of interpreting this Constitution
and the constitutionality of any law enacted or any
measure undertaken by government.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The president can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
No. More than half of the members of the current
transitional legislature were appointed by the ruling party. The others were elected at the regional
level in nonparty elections on slates chosen by the
ruling party and conducted under its supervision.
This is despite the fact that the 1997 constitution
states that all members of the legislature will be
elected.
Article 31
(1) There shall be a National Assembly which shall be
a supreme representative and legislative body.
(2) The National Assembly shall be composed of representatives elected by the people.
(3) Members of the National Assembly shall be elected
by direct and secret ballot by all citizens who are qualified to vote.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.

No. The legislature is dependent on the executive

for the resources that finance its operations.

No. In practice, it would be inconceivable for the

legislature to change the constitution without the
presidents approval. According to the 1997 constitution, the legislature alone can change the constitution.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.

Article 58
(1) A proposal for the amendment of any provision
of this Constitution may be initiated and tabled by

16. The legislature controls the resources that finance

its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.

National Assembly of Eritrea (Hagerawi Baito)

the President or 50 percent of all the members of the
National Assembly.
(2) Any provision of this Constitution may be amended
as follows:
a) where the National Assembly by a three-quarters
majority vote of all its members proposes an amendment with reference to a specific Article of the Constitution tabled to be amended; and
b) where, one year after it has proposed such an
amendment, the National Assembly, after deliberation, approves again the same amendment by fourfifths majority vote of all its members.

217
other person or persons who are required by any other
provisions of this Constitution or other laws to be
appointed by the President;
8. appoint justices of the Supreme Court upon proposal
of the Judicial Service Commission and approval of the
National Assembly.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the governor of the
National Bank of Eritrea.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for the

declaration of war.

Article 55
(2) The National Bank shall have a Governor appointed
by the President with the approval of the National
Assembly. There shall be a Board of Directors presided
by the Governor and whose members shall be
appointed by the President.

Article 32
(6) The National Assembly shall approve a state of
peace, war or national emergency.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 32
(4) The National Assembly shall ratify international
agreements by law.

No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the

operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
No. The legislature meets in ordinary session for
less than six months each year.
28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.
No.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. The president has the power to grant amnesty.
Article 42
The President shall have the following powers and
duties:
12. pardon, grant amnesty or reprieve offenders.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 42
The President shall have the following powers and
duties:
12. pardon, grant amnesty or reprieve offenders.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. Formally, the legislatures approval is required
to confirm the presidents appointments to
the Supreme Court. In practice, the legislature
does not challenge the presidents decisions and
plays no meaningful role in the appointments
process.
Article 42
The President shall have the following powers and
duties:
7. appoint with the approval of the National Assembly . . . the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and any

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
No. It is impossible to say with any certainty.
Eritreas transitional assembly has been in existence since the mid-1990s, and subsequent elections for a permanent body have not been held.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
No. Members have served for well over a decade in
the National Assembly, but the absence of elections
since the founding of the transitional legislature
means that there have been no opportunities for
re-election, and service in the marginalized body
has not translated into significant legislative experience.

218

Parliament of Estonia (Riigikogu)

PARLIAMENT OF ESTONIA (RIIGIKOGU)

Expert consultants: Jaak Allik, Piret Ehin, Mari-Ann Kelam, Tunne Kelam, Mikko Lagerspetz, Rein
Taagepera
Score: .75
Influence over
executive (8/9)

Institutional
autonomy (7/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

26. media

18. all elected

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

Specified
powers (5/8)
X

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

The Parliament (Riigikogu) of Estonia traces its

roots to the countrys 1920 constitution. Estonias
interwar independence was interrupted by occupation by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. In
1940 Estonia was formally absorbed into the Soviet
Union. Following the collapse of the USSR, Estonia
adopted a new constitution in 1992. The document
establishes a unicameral legislature that elects the
prime minister and the largely ceremonial president.
The legislature enjoys broad powers. It influences the executive with, among other powers,
the right to interpellate and investigate executive
branch officials and to remove the prime minister
with a vote of no confidence. It also has a good
deal of institutional autonomy. It is vested with a
number of specified powers and prerogatives and
enjoys some institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can remove the prime minister
with a vote of no confidence.
Article 92
(1) The Government of the Republic shall resign:

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

3) when the Parliament expresses no-confidence in

the Government or the Prime Minister.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators who serve in government have a
sleeping mandate, meaning that they may join
the government but forfeit their voting rights in
the legislature during their service in government.
They may return to the legislature when their service in government ends.
Article 63
(1) A member of the Parliament may not hold any
other public office.
Article 64
(1) The authority of a member of the Parliament shall
be suspended on his or her appointment as a member of
the Government of the Republic, and shall be restored
on his or her being released from the duties as a member
of government.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.

Parliament of Estonia (Riigikogu)

Article 74
(1) Members of the Parliament shall have the right
to request explanations from the Government of the
Republic and its members.
(2) Requests for explanations must be answered at a
session of the Parliament within twenty session days.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. Legislative committees have effective powers
of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. The president appoints a candidate for prime
minister who must obtain majority support in the
legislature. If the president presents two consecutive candidates who fail to obtain parliamentary
approval, the parliament directly appoints the candidate for prime minister.
Article 65
The Parliament shall:
5) authorize the candidate for Prime Minister to form
the Government of the Republic.
Article 78
The President of the Republic shall:
9) determine the candidate for Prime Minister in accordance with Article 89.
Article 89
(1) The President of the Republic, within fourteen days
after the Government of the Republic has resigned, shall
nominate a candidate for Prime Minister, who shall be
tasked with forming a new government.
(2) The candidate for Prime Minister shall report to the
Parliament, within fourteen days of being assigned the
task of forming a government, the bases for the formation of the new government, after which the Parliament
shall decide, without negotiation and by an open vote,
on giving the candidate for Prime Minister the authority to form a Government.
(3) The candidate for Prime Minister who has received
authority from the Parliament to form a government,
shall present, within seven days, the composition of the
Government to the President of the Republic, who shall
appoint the Government within three days.
(4) If the candidate for Prime Minister, nominated by
the President of the Republic, does not receive the
majority of yes-votes in the Parliament, or is unable
to form a Government, or abstains, the President of the
Republic shall have the right to present another candidate for Prime Minister within seven days.

219
(5) If the President of the Republic does not present
another candidate for Prime Minister within seven
days, or abstains, or if this candidate is unable to obtain
authority from the Parliament, in accordance with the
conditions and time restraints in Paragraphs (2) and
(3), or is unable to form a Government, or abstains, the
right to present a candidate for Prime Minister shall be
transferred to the Parliament.
(6) The Parliament shall present a candidate for Prime
Minister, who shall present the composition of the Government to the President of the Republic. If, within
fourteen days from the transfer of the right to present
a candidate for Prime Minister to the Parliament, the
composition of the Government has not been presented to the President of the Republic, the President
of the Republic shall declare early elections for the Parliament.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The legislatures approval is required to confirm ministerial appointments.
Article 78
The President of the Republic shall:
10) appoint and recall members of the Government, in
accordance with Articles 89, 90, and 92.
Article 89
(1) The President of the Republic, within fourteen days
after the Government of the Republic has resigned, shall
nominate a candidate for Prime Minister, who shall be
tasked with forming a new government.
(2) The candidate for Prime Minister shall report to the
Parliament, within fourteen days of being assigned the
task of forming a government, the bases for the formation of the new government, after which the Parliament
shall decide, without negotiation and by an open vote,
on giving the candidate for Prime Minister the authority to form a Government.
(3) The candidate for Prime Minister who has received
authority from the Parliament to form a government,
shall present, within seven days, the composition of the
Government to the President of the Republic, who shall
appoint the Government within three days.
(4) If the candidate for Prime Minister, nominated by
the President of the Republic, does not receive the
majority of yes-votes in the Parliament, or is unable
to form a Government, or abstains, the President of the
Republic shall have the right to present another candidate for Prime Minister within seven days.
(5) If the President of the Republic does not present
another candidate for Prime Minister within seven
days, or abstains, or if this candidate is unable to obtain
authority from the Parliament, in accordance with the
conditions and time restraints in Paragraphs (2) and
(3), or is unable to form a Government, or abstains, the
right to present a candidate for Prime Minister shall be
transferred to the Parliament.

220
(6) The Parliament shall present a candidate for Prime
Minister, who shall present the composition of the Government to the President of the Republic. If, within
fourteen days from the transfer of the right to present
a candidate for Prime Minister to the Parliament, the
composition of the Government has not been presented to the President of the Republic, the President
of the Republic shall declare early elections for the Parliament.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The legislature elects the president. If no candidate for president obtains the requisite majority
vote, a special electoral college containing members of the legislature and representatives of local
governments elects the president.
Article 65
The Parliament shall:
3) elect the President of the Republic.
Article 79
1) The President of the Republic shall be elected by the
Parliament, or, in the case described in Paragraph (4),
by the Electoral Body.
4) The President of the Republic shall be elected by
secret ballot. Each member of the Parliament shall have
one vote. A candidate who is supported by a two-thirds
majority of the complement of the Parliament shall be
considered to be elected. Should no candidate receive
the required majority, then a new vote shall be organized on the next day. Before the second round of voting, there shall be a new presentation of candidates.
Should no candidate receive the required majority in
the second round, then a third round of voting shall
be organized on the same day between the two candidates who received the most votes in the second round.
Should the President of the Republic still not be elected
in the third round of voting, the Speaker of the Parliament shall convene, within one month, an Electoral
Body to elect the President of the Republic.
5) The Electoral Body shall be comprised of the members of the Parliament and representatives of the local
government council. Each local government council
shall elect at least one representative, who must be an
Estonian citizen, to the Electoral Body.
6) The Parliament shall present to the Electoral Body
as candidates for President the two candidates who
received the greatest number of votes in the Parliament.
The right to present a presidential candidate shall also
rest with at least twenty-one members of the Electoral
Body.
7) The Electoral Body shall elect the President of the
Republic with a majority of those members of the Electoral Body who are present. Should no candidate be
elected in the first round, a second round of voting

Parliament of Estonia (Riigikogu)

shall be organized on the same day between the two
candidates who received the highest number of votes.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 65
The Parliament shall:
13) decide on votes of no-confidence in the Government of the Republic, the Prime Minister or individual
ministers.
Article 92
(1) The Government of the Republic shall resign:
3) when the Parliament expresses no-confidence in
the Government or the Prime Minister.
Article 97
(1) The Parliament may express no-confidence in either
the Government of the Republic, the Prime Minister or
a Minister
by a resolution adopted by the majority of the complement of the Parliament.
(2) The issue of no-confidence may be initiated by at
least one-fifth of the complement of the Parliament by
submitting a written motion at a session of the Parliament.
(3) The issue of expressing no-confidence may come up
for resolution no earlier than two days after its being
submitted, unless the Government demands speedier
resolution.
(4) In the case of no-confidence being expressed in the
Government or the Prime Minister, the President of
the Republic may, on proposal by the Government and
within three days, declare early elections.
(5) In the case of no-confidence being expressed in a
Minister, the Speaker of the Parliament shall notify the
President of the Republic, who shall recall the Minister
from office.
(6) The expression of no-confidence on the same
grounds may be re-initiated no earlier than three
months after the previous no-confidence vote.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 78
The President of the Republic shall:
3) declare regular Parliament elections, and early elections for the Parliament, in accordance with Articles 89,
97, 105, and 119.
Article 89
(1) The President of the Republic, within fourteen days
after the Government of the Republic has resigned, shall
nominate a candidate for Prime Minister, who shall be
tasked with forming a new government.

Parliament of Estonia (Riigikogu)

(2) The candidate for Prime Minister shall report to the
Parliament, within fourteen days of being assigned the
task of forming a government, the bases for the formation of the new government, after which the Parliament
shall decide, without negotiation and by an open vote,
on giving the candidate for Prime Minister the authority to form a Government.
(3) The candidate for Prime Minister who has received
authority from the Parliament to form a government,
shall present, within seven days, the composition
of the Government to the President of the Republic, who shall appoint the Government within three
days.
(4) If the candidate for Prime Minister, nominated by
the President of the Republic, does not receive the
majority of yes-votes in the Parliament, or is unable
to form a Government, or abstains, the President of the
Republic shall have the right to present another candidate for Prime Minister within seven days.
(5) If the President of the Republic does not present
another candidate for Prime Minister within seven
days, or abstains, or if this candidate is unable to obtain
authority from the Parliament, in accordance with the
conditions and time restraints in Paragraphs (2) and
(3), or is unable to form a Government, or abstains, the
right to present a candidate for Prime Minister shall be
transferred to the Parliament.
(6) The Parliament shall present a candidate for Prime
Minister, who shall present the composition of the Government to the President of the Republic. If, within
fourteen days from the transfer of the right to present
a candidate for Prime Minister to the Parliament, the
composition of the Government has not been presented to the President of the Republic, the President
of the Republic shall declare early elections for the Parliament.
Article 97
(4) In the case of no-confidence being expressed in the
Government or the Prime Minister, the President of
the Republic may, on proposal by the Government and
within three days, declare early elections.
Article 105
(1) The Parliament shall have the right to put draft legislation or other national issues to a referendum.
(2) The decision of the people shall be determined
by the majority of those participating in the referendum.
(3) A law which has been adopted by referendum shall
be immediately proclaimed by the President of the
Republic. The referendum decision shall be binding on
all state bodies.
(4) Should the draft law which has been put to referendum not receive a majority of yes-votes, the President
of the Republic shall declare early elections for the Parliament.
Article 119
If the Parliament has not adopted the budget within
two months of the beginning of the budget year, the

221
President of the Republic shall declare early elections
for the Parliament.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The president lacks decree power. The president can, however, issue decrees in an emergency when the legislature is incapable of meeting.
In such an event, the speaker of parliament and
the prime minister must cosign the decrees. The
decrees lapse if they are not subsequently approved
by the legislature.
Article 109
(1) If the Parliament is prevented from convening, the
President of the Republic shall have the right, in matters
of national interest which cannot be postponed, to issue
edicts which have the force of law, and which shall bear
the co-signatures of the Speaker of the Parliament and
the Prime Minister.
(2) When the Parliament convenes, the President of the
Republic shall present such edicts to the Parliament,
which shall immediately adopt a law either confirming
or repealing the edicts.
Article 110
Neither the Constitution, the laws listed in Article 104,
nor laws determining state taxes or the national budget
can be enacted, amended or repealed by edicts issued
by the President of the Republic.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote of its present members. It merits note, however, that the president also has the
ability to refer legislation to the National Court
before signing it. This provision gives the president
additional clout, as the legislature often prefers to
accommodate the presidents wishes before submitting the law for his or her signature rather than
risk seeing the bill languish in court for an indefinite period of time.
Article 107
(1) Laws shall be proclaimed by the President of the
Republic.
(2) The President of the Republic shall have the right
not to proclaim a law adopted by the Parliament, and to
return the law to the Parliament, within fourteen days
of receiving it, together with the reasons for its rejection. If the Parliament [again] adopts a law which has
been returned by the President of the Republic, without amendments, the President of the Republic shall
proclaim the law, or propose to the National Court that

222

Parliament of Estonia (Riigikogu)

it declare the law to be in conflict with the Constitution. If the National Court declares the law to be in
accordance with the Constitution, the President of the
Republic shall proclaim the law.

on proposal by the Legal Chancellor and with the consent of the majority of the complement of the Parliament.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.

No. The National Court can review the constitutionality of laws.

Article 107
(2) The President of the Republic shall have the right
not to proclaim a law adopted by the Parliament, and to
return the law to the Parliament, within fourteen days
of receiving it, together with the reasons for its rejection. If the Parliament [again] adopts a law which has
been returned by the President of the Republic, without amendments, the President of the Republic shall
proclaim the law, or propose to the National Court that
it declare the law to be in conflict with the Constitution. If the National Court declares the law to be in
accordance with the Constitution, the President of the
Republic shall proclaim the law.
Article 152
(2) If any law or other legal act is in conflict with the
provisions and spirit of the Constitution, it shall be
declared null and void by the National Court.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,
including control over members remuneration.
Article 75
The remuneration of members of the Parliament and
restrictions on other income shall be determined by
law, which may be amended for the next complement
of the Parliament.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune.
Article 76
A member of the Parliament enjoys immunity. Criminal charges can only be brought against him or her

Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.

Article 60
(1) Members of the Parliament shall be elected in free
elections on the principle of proportionality.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature alone can change the constitution through a complicated procedure. The sitting
legislature can propose the amendment, and then,
following an election, the subsequent legislature
can approve the amendment with a three-fifths
majority vote. The constitution can be amended
as a matter of urgency by the same procedure
with a four-fifths majority in one parliament and a
two-thirds majority in the next.
Article 161
(1) The right to initiate amendments to the Constitution shall rest with at least one-fifth of the complement
of the Parliament and with the President of the Republic.
Article 162
Chapter I General Provisions and Chapter XV Amendments to the Constitution may be amended only by
referendum.
Article 163
(1) The Constitution may be amended by a law which
is adopted by:
1) referendum;
2) two successive complements of the Parliament;
3) the Parliament, in matters of urgency.
(2) A draft law to amend the Constitution shall be
considered during three readings in the Parliament,
whereby the interval between the first and second readings shall be at least three months, and the interval
between the second and third readings shall be at least
one month. The manner in which the Constitution is
amended shall be decided at the third reading.
Article 165
(1) In order to amend the Constitution by two successive complements of the Parliament, the draft law to
amend the Constitution must receive the support of
the majority of the complement of the Parliament.
(2) If the next complement of the Parliament adopts
the draft which received the support of the majority
of the previous complement, without amendment, on
its first reading and with a three-fifths majority of its

Parliament of Estonia (Riigikogu)

complement, the law to amend the Constitution shall
be adopted.
Article 166
A proposal to consider a proposed amendment to the
Constitution as a matter of urgency shall be adopted by
the Parliament by a four-fifths majority. In such a case
the law to amend the Constitution shall be adopted by
a two-thirds majority of the complement of the Parliament.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislature alone can declare war on the
proposal of the president with the common exception for foreign invasion. In cases of armed attack
on the country, the president can declare war without prior legislative authorization.
Article 65
The Parliament shall:
15) on proposal by the President of the Republic declare
a state of war, order mobilization and demobilization.
Article 78
The President of the Republic shall:
17) present proposals to the Parliament on declarations
of a state of war, on orders for mobilization and demobilization and, in accordance with Article 129, on proclamations of a state of emergency.
Article 128
(1) The Parliament shall declare, on proposal by the
President of the Republic, a state of war, order mobilization and de-mobilization, and shall decide on the
utilization of the Defense Forces to fulfill the international obligations of the Estonian nation.
(2) In the case of aggression directed against the Republic of Estonia, the President of the Republic shall declare
a state of war and mobilization, and shall appoint the
Commander-in-Chief of the Defense Forces, without
waiting for a resolution to be adopted by the Parliament.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties on most major issues.
Article 65
The Parliament shall:
4) ratify and denounce foreign treaties in accordance
with Article 121.
Article 121
The Parliament shall ratify and denounce treaties of the
Republic of Estonia:
1) which amend state borders;
2) the implementation of which requires the adoption,
amendment or annulment of Estonian laws;
3) by which the Republic of Estonia joins international
organizations or leagues;

223
4) by which the Republic of Estonia assumes military
or assets obligations;
5) where ratification is prescribed.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The president has the power of pardon (mercy).
Article 78
The President of the Republic shall:
19) grant mercy, on the request of prisoners, by freeing
those sentenced or reducing the sentence.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislature appoints the chairman and the
judges of the National Court.
Article 65
The Parliament shall:
8) appoint, on proposal by the Chairman of the
National Court, judges for the National Court.
Article 78
The President of the Republic shall:
11) present proposals to the Parliament for appointments to the offices of the Chairman of the National
Court, the Chairman of the Council of the Bank of Estonia, the Legal Chancellor.
13) appoint judges on proposal by the National Court.
Article 150
(1) The Chairman of the National Court shall be
appointed by the Parliament, on proposal by the President of the Republic.
(2) Members of the National Court shall be appointed
by the Parliament, on proposal by the Chairman of the
National Court.
(3) Other judges shall be appointed by the President of
the Republic, on proposal by the National Court.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the president of the
Bank of Estonia.
Article 78
The President of the Republic shall:
12) appoint, on proposal by the Council of the Bank of
Estonia, the President of the Bank of Estonia.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
Yes. The media oversight council, which oversees
the public media, includes legislators among its
members.

224

Parliament of Estonia (Riigikogu)

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session for
about seven months each year.
Article 67
Regular sessions of the Parliament shall take place from
the second Monday of January to the third Thursday of
June, and from the second Monday of September to the
third Thursday of December.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.

Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

PARLIAMENT OF ETHIOPIA (MEKIR BET)

Expert consultants: Jon Abbink, Wondem Asres Degu, Sisay Gebre-Egziabher, Samuel Haile,
Hartmut Hess, Solomon Kebede, Kidane Mengisteab, David H. Shinn
Score: .50
Influence over
executive (5/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

X
X

X
X
X

Institutional
autonomy (6/9)

Specified
powers (2/8)

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

12. no veto
13. no review

X
X

21. treaties
22. amnesty

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

18. all elected

24. judiciary
X

25. central bank

26. media

Institutional
capacity (3/6)
X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

The Parliament (Mekir Bet) of Ethiopia was established in the 1994 constitution. The document
calls for a bicameral legislature consisting of a
lower house, the House of Peoples Representatives
(Yehizbtewekayoch Mekir Bet), and an upper house,
the House of Federation (Yefedereshn Mekir Bet).
Before 1994 Ethiopia was ruled for twenty years
by a military junta and prior to that by a traditional monarchy. Since its inception in 1994, the
legislature has been in the firm control of a single
party, the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Demo-

cratic Front (EPRDF), and a single prime minister,

Meles Zenawi. In Ethiopia the prime minister is the
chief executive and the commander-in-chief of the
armed forces; the president is the head of state but
holds executive powers far inferior to those of the
prime minister.
Parliament influences the executive through
the rights, among others, to elect the president
and the prime minister. It also enjoys some institutional autonomy. For example, legislation is not
subject to an executive veto, and the legislature

Parliament of Ethiopia (Mekir Bet)

itself, rather than any high court, has the final

word on the constitutionality of laws. On the other
hand, parliaments autonomy is circumscribed by
executive powers to dissolve the legislature and
issue decrees that have the force of law. The legislature enjoys some specified powers and prerogatives, including the authority to declare war and
ratify international treaties. It has some institutional capacity, although it lacks staff support and
a significant number of experienced legislators.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Formally, the legislature can remove the prime
minister from office with a vote of no confidence.
In practice, however, a vote of no confidence
would be unthinkable. The prime minister has a
tight grip on power, which he secures using personal control over the agencies of coercion and
the hegemonic Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary
Democratic Front (EPRDF).
Article 60
(1) With the consent of the House, the Prime Minister may cause the dissolution of the House before the
expiry of its term in order to hold new elections.
(2) The President may invite political parties to form a
coalition government within one week, if the Council
of Ministers of a previous coalition is dissolved because
of the loss of its majority in the House. The House
shall be dissolved and new elections shall be held if
the political parties cannot agree to the continuation of
the previous coalition or to form a new majority coalition.
(3) If the House is dissolved pursuant to sub-article 1 or
2 of this article, new elections shall be held within six
months of its dissolution.
(4) The new House shall convene within thirty days of
the conclusion of the elections.
(5) Following the dissolution of the House, the previous governing party of coalition of parties shall continue as a caretaker government. Beyond conducting
the day to day affairs of government and organizing
new elections, it may not enact new proclamations,
regulations or decrees, nor may it repeal or amend any
existing law.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.

225
(2) Power of Government shall be assumed by the political party or a coalition of political parties that constitutes a majority in the House of Peoples Representatives.
Article 74
(2) The Prime Minister shall submit for approval to the
House of Peoples Representatives nominees for ministerial posts from among members of the two Houses
or from among persons who are not members of either
House and possess the required qualifications.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The House of Peoples Representatives regularly interpellates officials from the executive.
Article 55
(17) The House of Peoples Representatives has the
power to call and to question the Prime Minister and
other Federal officials and to investigate the Executives
conduct and discharge of its responsibilities.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. Despite constitutional provisions to the contrary, the legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
Article 55
(7) The House of Peoples Representatives shall determine the organization of national defence, public security, and a national police force. If the conduct of these
forces infringes upon human rights and the nations
security, it shall carry out investigations and take necessary measures.

6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

Yes. The prime minister is elected by the party, or
coalition of parties, with the greatest number of
seats in the lower house of parliament.

Yes. Legislators may serve simultaneously in ministerial positions.

Article 56
A political party, or a coalition of political parties that
has the greatest number of seats in the House of Peoples
Representatives shall form the Executive and lead it.

Article 73
(1) The Prime Minister shall be elected from among
members of the House of Peoples Representatives.

Article 73
(1) The Prime Minister shall be elected from among
members of the House of Peoples Representatives.

226
(2) Power of Government shall be assumed by the political party or a coalition of political parties that constitutes a majority in the House of Peoples Representatives.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The approval of the House of Peoples Representatives is necessary to confirm the prime ministers ministerial appointments.
Article 56
A political party, or a coalition of political parties that
has the greatest number of seats in the House of Peoples
Representatives shall form the Executive and lead it.
Article 74
(2) The Prime Minister shall submit for approval to the
House of Peoples Representatives nominees for ministerial posts from among members of the two Houses
or from among persons who are not members of either
House and possess the required qualifications.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The House of Peoples Representatives elects
the president.
Article 70
(1) The House of Peoples Representatives shall nominate the candidate for President.
(2) The nominee shall be elected President if a joint
session of the House of Peoples Representatives and
the House of the Federation approves his candidacy by
a two-thirds majority vote.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. Formally, the legislature can vote no confidence in the government, but in practice, a
vote of no confidence would be unthinkable. See
item 1.
Article 60
(1) With the consent of the House, the Prime Minister may cause the dissolution of the House before the
expiry of its term in order to hold new elections.
(2) The President may invite political parties to form a
coalition government within one week, if the Council
of Ministers of a previous coalition is dissolved because
of the loss of its majority in the House. The House shall
be dissolved and new elections shall be held if the political parties cannot agree to the continuation of the previous coalition or to form a new majority coalition.
(3) If the House is dissolved pursuant to sub-article 1 or
2 of this article, new elections shall be held within six
months of its dissolution.
(4) The new House shall convene within thirty days of
the conclusion of the elections.

Parliament of Ethiopia (Mekir Bet)

(5) Following the dissolution of the House, the previous governing party or coalition of parties shall continue as a caretaker government. Beyond conducting
the day to day affairs of government and organizing
new elections, it may not enact new proclamations,
regulations or decrees, nor may it repeal or amend any
existing law.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The prime minister can dissolve the lower
house of parliament.
Article 60
(1) With the consent of the House, the Prime Minister may cause the dissolution of the House before the
expiry of its term in order to hold new elections.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The prime minister issues decrees that have the
force of law.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The president lacks veto power.
Article 57
Laws deliberated upon and passed by the House shall be
submitted to the Nations President for signature. The
President shall sign a law submitted to him within fifteen days. If the President does not sign the law within
fifteen days it shall take effect without his signature.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
Yes. The legislature has the final word on the constitutionality of laws.
Article 83
(1) All constitutional disputes shall be decided by the
House of the Federation.
(2) The House of the Federation shall, within thirty
days of receipt, decide a constitutional dispute submitted to it by the Council of Constitutional Inquiry.
Article 84
(1) The Council of Constitutional Inquiry shall have
powers to investigate constitutional disputes. Should
the Council, upon consideration of the matter, find it
necessary to interpret the Constitution, it shall submit
its recommendations thereon to the House of the Federation.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.

Parliament of Ethiopia (Mekir Bet)

Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy

jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.

227
(3) Members of the House of the Federation shall
be elected by the State Councils. The State Councils may themselves elect representatives to the House
of the Federation, or they may hold elections to
have the representatives elected by the people directly.

No. The executive can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.

16. The legislature controls the resources that finance

its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.

No. Constitutional amendments require approval in at least two-thirds of the state (provincial) assemblies.

Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto. At the governments request, however, parliament has sometimes voted to remove the immunity of opposition
members.
Article 54
(5) No member of the House may be prosecuted on
account of any vote he casts or opinion he expresses in
the House, nor shall any administrative action be taken
against any member on such grounds.
(6) No member of the House may be arrested or prosecuted without the permission of the House except in
the case of flagrante delicto.
Article 63
(1) No member of the House of the Federation may be
prosecuted on account of any vote he casts or opinion he expresses in the House, nor shall any administrative action be taken against any member on such
grounds.
(2) No member of the House of the Federation may be
arrested or prosecuted without the permission of the
House except in the case of flagrante delicto.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 54
(1) Members of the House of Peoples Representatives
shall be elected by the People for a term of five years
on the basis of universal suffrage and by direct, free and
fair elections held by secret ballot.
Article 61
(1) The House of the Federation is composed of representatives of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples.
(2) Each Nation, Nationality and People shall be represented in the House of the Federation by at least
one member. Each Nation or Nationality shall be represented by one additional representative for each one
million of its population.

Article 105
(1) All rights and freedoms specified in Chapter Three
of this Constitution, this very article, and Article 104
can be amended only in the following manner:
(a) When all State Councils, by a majority vote,
approve the proposed amendment;
(b) When the House of Peoples Representatives, by
a two-thirds majority vote, approves the proposed
amendment; and
(c) When the House of the Federation, by a twothirds majority vote, approves the proposed amendment.
(2) All provisions of this Constitution other than those
specified in sub-article 1 of this article can be amended
only in the following manner:
(a) When the House of Peoples Representatives and
the House of the Federation, in a joint session,
approve a proposed amendment by a two-thirds
majority vote; and
(b) When two-thirds of the Councils of the member
States of the Federation approve the proposed amendment by majority votes.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The approval of the House of Peoples Representatives is necessary for the declaration of war.
Article 55
(9) On the basis of a draft law submitted to it by
the Council of Ministers [the House of Peoples Representatives] shall proclaim a state of war.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 55
(12) [The House of Peoples Representatives] shall ratify international agreements concluded by the executive.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately,
and the president has the power to grant amnesty.

228
Article 71
(7) He shall, in accordance with conditions and procedures established by law, grant pardon.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 71
(7) He shall, in accordance with conditions and procedures established by law, grant pardon.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. Although the legislature by law has the power
to appoint the president and vice president of the
Federal Supreme Court and other federal judges
upon the nomination of the prime minister, the
prime ministers control of the process, backed by
his control of extraparliamentary levers of control that include the agencies of coercion and the
hegemonic ruling party, render the parliaments
authority a mere formality. In practice, the prime
ministers office controls the judiciary; the parliament does not have a substantial say in judicial
appointments.
Article 55
(13) It shall approve the appointment of Federal judges,
members of the Council of Ministers, commissioners, the Auditor General, and of other officials whose
appointment is required by law to be approved by it.
Article 81
(1) The President and Vice-President of the Federal
Supreme Court shall, upon recommendation by the
Prime Minister, be appointed by the House of Peoples
Representatives.
(2) Regarding other Federal judges, the Prime Minister
shall submit to the House of Peoples Representatives for
appointment candidates selected by the Federal Judicial
Administration Council.
Article 82
(2) The Council of Constitutional Inquiry shall have
eleven members comprising:
(a) The President of the Federal Supreme Court, who
shall serve as its President;
(b) The vice-president of the Federal Supreme Court,
who shall serve as its Vice-President;
(c) Six legal experts, appointed by the President of
the Republic on recommendation by the House of
Peoples Representatives, who shall have proven professional competence and high moral standing;
(d) Three persons designated by the House of the Federation from among its members.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

Parliament of Ethiopia (Mekir Bet)

No. The Council of Ministers appoints the governor of the National Bank of Ethiopia.
Article 77
(4) The Council of Ministers shall ensure the proper
execution of financial and monetary policies of the
country; it shall administer the National Bank, decide
on the printing of money and minting of coins, borrow money from domestic and external sources, and
regulate foreign exchange matters.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session for
about nine months each year, from the final week
of Meskerem (which correlates with early to midOctober) to the 30th day of Sene (which falls in
June).
Article 58
(1) The presence of more than half of the members of
the House constitutes a quorum.
(2) The annual session of the House shall begin on
Monday of the final week of the Ethiopian month of
Meskerem and end on the 30th day of the Ethiopian
month of Sene. The House may adjourn for one month
of recess during its annual session.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
No. The rate of re-election is relatively low, and the
legislature lacks a sizable cohort of highly experienced members.

Parliament of Fiji

229

PARLIAMENT OF FIJI
Expert consultants: Noel Cox, Jon Fraenkel, Kathryn Hawley, Brij V. Lal, Steven Ratuva
Score: .63
Influence over
executive (7/9)

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)

Specified
powers (4/8)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

26. media

X
X
X

18. all elected

The Parliament of Fiji originated in the colonial Legislative Council, established in 1904 to
advise the British governor. Fiji gained independence in 1970. A new constitution in 1990 and
a series of constitutional amendments in 1997
formally enshrined, and then backed away from
enshrining, the political dominance of the indigenous Fijians over the Indo-Fijians. Neither constitutional change substantially affected parliaments
powers. Tensions between the major ethnic groups
persist and have contributed to several attempts to
overturn the constitutional order, most notably in
military coups staged in 1987 and 2006.
The constitution calls for a bicameral parliament with an elected House of Representatives and
an upper house, the Senate, that is appointed by
the president. The legislature enjoys substantial
powers. It does not elect the figurehead president, a
power that is vested in the traditional Great Council of Chiefs, nor does it appoint or confirm individual ministers. In other respects, however, the
legislature controls the executive. The legislatures
own institutional autonomy is bolstered by provisions that deny the president and the government
decree, veto, or gatekeeping powers. The legislature
is granted a few specified powers and prerogatives
and a fair amount of institutional capacity.
At the time of this writing, parliament is not
playing its traditionally weighty role. Commodore

Frank Bainimarama shut down the legislature after

leading a military coup in late 2006. His junta
has balked at reopening parliament. Under pressure from influential neighbors, Bainimarama has
stated that he intends to hold new parliamentary elections in early 2009. The information presented below is based on conditions before the
coup.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can remove the prime minister
with a vote of no confidence. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of the Great Council of Chiefs (Bose Levu Vakaturaga) and the chief
justice.
Section 93
(1) The President or Vice-President may be removed
from office for inability to perform the functions of
office (whether arising from infirmity of body or mind
or any other cause) or for misbehaviour, and may not
otherwise be removed.
(2) Removal of the President or Vice-President from
office must be by the Bose Levu Vakaturaga pursuant
to this section.

230
(3) If the Prime Minister considers that the question
of removing the President or Vice-President from office
ought to be investigated, then:
(a) the Prime Minister requests the Chief Justice to
establish:
(i) in a case of alleged misbehaviour a tribunal
consisting of a chairperson and 2 other members
each of whom is, or is eligible to be, a judge; and
(b) the Chief Justice, who must act on the request,
establishes the tribunal.
(c) the tribunal . . . enquires into the matter and furnishes a written report to the Chief Justice;
(d) the Chief Justice refers the report to the Prime
Minister together with, in the case of a report on
alleged misbehaviour, written recommendations of
the Chief Justice;
(e) the Prime Minister considers the report and any
recommendations and:
(i) if he or she considers that the matter should
be considered by the Bose Levu Vakaturaga he
or she refers the report and any recommendations
to the Bose Levu Vakaturaga, with a request that it
consider the matter, and notifies the President or
Vice-President, as the case maybe, accordingly;
(f) upon receipt of a request from the Prime Minister
under
subparagraph (e)(i), the Bose Levu Vakaturaga convenes to consider whether the President or VicePresident, as the case may be, should be removed
from office.
(4) The President or Vice-President is taken to be unable
to perform the functions of his or her office during
the period starting on the day on which the President
or Vice President received notification under paragraph
(3)(a) and ending on:
(a) if the matter is not referred to the Bose Levu
Vakaturaga the day on which the President or VicePresident receives notification under subparagraph
(3)(e)(iii); or
(b) if the matter is referred to the Bose Levu Vakaturaga the day on which the matter is finally dealt
with by the Bose Levu Vakaturaga.
Section 107
If:
(a) the Government is defeated at a general election;
or
(b) the Government is defeated on the floor of the
House of Representatives in a vote:
(i) after due notice, on whether the Government
has the confidence of the House of Representatives;
(ii) that the Government treats as a vote of no confidence; or
(iii) the effect of which is to reject or fail to pass a
Bill appropriating revenue or moneys for the ordinary services of the Government; and the Prime
Minister considers that there is another person
capable of forming a Government that has the confidence of the House of Representatives, the Prime
Minister must immediately advise the President of
the person whom the Prime Minister believes can

Parliament of Fiji
form a Government that has the confidence of the
House and must thereupon resign.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Ministers are selected from, and required to
serve simultaneously in, the legislature.
Section 99
(1) The President appoints and dismisses other Ministers on the advice of the Prime Minister.
(2) To be eligible for appointment, a Minister must be a
member of the House of Representatives or the Senate.
Section 105
(1) Subject to subsection (2), the appointment of a Minister terminates if;
(a) the Prime Minister resigns in the circumstances
set out in section 107;
(b) the Prime Minister is dismissed;
(c) the Minister tenders his or her resignation to the
President; or
(d) the Minister ceases to be a member of the Parliament.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. Parliamentary standing committees summon
and hold hearings with executive branch officials.
Section 74
(3) The House of Representatives must, under its rules
and orders, establish not less than 5 sector standing committees with the functions of scrutinizing
Government administration and examining Bills and
subordinate legislation and such other functions as are
specified from time to time in the rules and orders of
the House.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can make provisions for investigation of the executive.
Section 156
(1) This section applies to the President, Vice-President,
Ministers, members of Parliament, holders of offices
established by or continued in existence under this
Constitution, members of commissions, Secretaries of
departments, the Secretary to the Cabinet and persons
who hold statutory appointments or governing or executive positions in statutory authorities.
(2) Persons to whom this section applies must so conduct themselves in relation to the performance of their
public duties as not:
(a) to place themselves in positions in which they
have, or could be seen as having, a conflict between
their private interests and their public duties;

Parliament of Fiji
(b) to compromise the fair exercise of their public
duties;
(c) to use their offices for private gain;
(d) to allow their integrity to be called into question;
or
(e) to cause respect for, or confidence in, the integrity
of the Government to be diminished.
(3) The Parliament must, as soon as practicable after
the commencement of this Constitution, make a
law:
(a) to implement more fully the conduct rules set out
in subsection (2);
(b) to provide for the monitoring of standards of conduct in relation to the performance of public duties;
and
(c) if the Parliament considers it appropriate, to make
provision in relation to the investigation of alleged
breaches of those standards and the enforcement of
those standards.
Section 158
(1) Subject to this Part, the Ombudsman:
(a) must investigate action, being action that relates
to a matter of administration.
(b) may, of his own motion or at the request of a
member of the Parliament or of a committee of the
Parliament, investigate any action, being action that
relates to a matter of administration, taken either
before or after the commencement of this Constitution by a department or by a prescribed authority.
(4) The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate
complaints in relation to action relating to a matter
of administration extends to action taken by a commission to the extent that:
(a) the action relates to a function conferred on it
otherwise than by this Constitution; and
(b) the authority to investigate is conferred by a law
made by the Parliament.
(5) The Ombudsman is not authorized to investigate:
(a) action taken by a Minister;
(b) action taken by a judge; or
(c) action taken by any body or person with respect
to the appointment of a person to, or the removal of a
person from, a public office, the taking of disciplinary
action against the holder of a public office or the
pension entitlement of a person who is or was the
holder of a public office.
(6) The proceedings of the Ombudsman may not be
called into question in any court of law.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. Legislative committees (in particular the
Standing Select Committee on Justice, Law and
Order) have effective powers of oversight over the
agencies of coercion.

231
Section 74
(3) The House of Representatives must, under its rules
and orders, establish not less than 5 sector standing
committees with the functions of scrutinizing Government administration and examining Bills and subordinate legislation and such other functions as are
specified from time to time in the rules and orders of
the House.

6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

Yes. The president appoints the candidate for
prime minister who enjoys the support of the
House of Representatives.
Section 98
The President, acting in his or her own judgment,
appoints as Prime Minister the member of the House
of Representatives who, in the Presidents opinion, can
form a government that has the confidence of the
House of Representatives.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers on the recommendation of the prime minister, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval. It bears note, however, that in Fijis multiethnic polity, which is divided between ethnic
Fijian and people of South Asian descent, the constitution recommends that the prime minister allocate ministerial portfolios in a manner that facilitates inclusion of the major parties represented in
parliament.
Section 99
(1) The President appoints and dismisses other Ministers on the advice of the Prime Minister.
(3) The Prime Minister must establish a multi-party
Cabinet in the way set out in this section comprising
such number of Ministers as he or she determines.
(4) Subject to this section, the composition of the Cabinet should, as far as possible, fairly represent the parties
represented in the House of Representatives.
(5) In establishing the Cabinet, the Prime Minister
must invite all parties whose membership in the
House of Representatives comprises at least 10% of
the total membership of the House to be represented
in the Cabinet in proportion to their numbers in the
House.
(6) If the Prime Minister selects for appointment to the
Cabinet a person from a party whose membership in the
House of Representatives is less than 10% of the total
membership of the House, that selection is deemed, for
the purposes of this section, to be a selection of a person
from the Prime Ministers own party.
(7) If a party declines an invitation from the Prime Minister to be represented in the Cabinet, the Prime Minister must allocate the Cabinet positions to which that

232
party would have been entitled amongst the other parties (including the Prime Ministers party) in proportion, as far as possible, to their respective entitlements
under subsection (5).
(8) If all parties (apart from the Prime Ministers
party and the party (if any) with which it is in
coalition) decline an invitation from the Prime Minister to be represented in the Cabinet, the Prime Minister
may look to his or her own party or coalition of parties
to fill the places in the Cabinet.
(9) In selecting persons from parties other than his or
her own party for appointment as Ministers, the Prime
Minister must consult with the leaders of those parties.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is appointed by the Great Council of Chiefs (Bose Levu Vakaturaga).
Section 90
The President and Vice-President are appointed by the
Bose Levu Vakaturaga after consultation by the Bose
Levu Vakaturaga with the Prime Minister.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Section 107
If:
(a) the Government is defeated at a general election; or
(b) the Government is defeated on the floor of the
House of Representatives in a vote:
(i) after due notice, on whether the Government has
the confidence of the House of Representatives;
(ii) that the Government treats as a vote of no confidence; or
(iii) the effect of which is to reject or fail to pass a
Bill appropriating revenue or moneys for the ordinary services of the Government; and the Prime Minister considers that there is another person capable
of forming a Government that has the confidence
of the House of Representatives, the Prime Minister
must immediately advise the President of the person
whom the Prime Minister believes can form a Government that has the confidence of the House and
must thereupon resign.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president, on the advice of the prime minister, can dissolve the legislature.
Section 108
(1) If a Prime Minister who has lost the confidence of the House of Representatives (defeated Prime
Minister) advises a dissolution of the House of Representatives, the President may, acting in his or her own
judgment, ascertain whether or not there is another

Parliament of Fiji
person who can get the confidence of the House of
Representatives (alternative Prime Minister) and:
(a) if the President ascertains that an alternative
Prime Minister exists-ask the defeated Prime Minister to resign, dismiss him or her if he or she does
not do so and appoint the alternative Prime Minister;
or
(b) if the President cannot ascertain that an alternative Prime minister exists-grant the dissolution
advised by the defeated Prime Minister.
(2) If the President appoints the alternative Prime Minister pursuant to paragraph (1)(a) but the alternative
Prime Minister fails to get the confidence of the House
of Representatives, the President must dismiss him or
her, re-appoint his or her predecessor and grant that
person the dissolution originally advised.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks veto power.
Section 46
(1) Subject to this Constitution, the power of the Parliament to make laws is exercised through the enactment
of Bills passed by both Houses of the Parliament and
assented to by the President.
(2) The President must not refuse to assent to a Bill duly
presented for his or her assent.
(3) A law made by the Parliament does not come into
operation before the date on which it is published in
the Gazette.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The High Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Section 120
(1) The High Court has unlimited original jurisdiction
to hear and determine any civil or criminal proceedings
under any law and such other original jurisdiction as is
conferred on it under this Constitution.
(2) The High Court also has original jurisdiction in any
matter arising under this Constitution or involving its
interpretation.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.

Parliament of Fiji

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislative immunity extends to official parliamentary business only. Legislators are subject to
arrest for common crimes.
18. All members of the legislature are elected; the
executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
No. All thirty-two members of the Senate are
appointed by the president on the advice of various other institutions. All of the members of the
House of Representatives are elected.
Section 50
The House of Representatives consists of 71 members
elected in accordance with this Constitution to represent single-member constituencies.
Section 64
(1) The Senate consists of 32 members, of whom:
(a) 14 are appointed by the President on the advice
of the Bose Levu Vakaturaga;
(b) 9 are appointed by the President on the advice of
the Prime Minister;
(c) 8 are appointed by the President on the advice of
the Leader of the Opposition; and
(d) 1 is appointed by the President on the advice of
the Council of Rotuma.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution in
multiple readings by a two-thirds majority vote.
If the bill to amend the constitution is declared
urgent by the prime minister, the House can adopt
a constitutional amendment with the support of at
least fifty-three of its seventy-one members.
Section 191
(1) A Bill for the alteration of this Constitution must be
expressed as a Bill for an Act to alter this Constitution.
(2) Subject to subsection (3) and section 192, the Bill,
with or without amendments passed by either House
of the Parliament, must be passed by both Houses in
accordance with the following procedure:

233
(a) the Bill is read 3 times in each House and motions
for the second and third readings are carried in each
House;
(b) at the second and third readings it is supported
by the votes of at least two-thirds of the members of
each House;
(c) in the House of Representatives an interval of at
least 60 days elapses between the second and third
readings and each of those readings is preceded by
full opportunity for debate;
(d) the third reading of the Bill in the House of Representatives does not take place until after the relevant
standing committee has reported on the Bill to that
House.
(3) Subject to section 192, if
(a) the Prime Minister certifies that a particular Bill
for the alteration of the Constitution is an urgent
measure that ought to be dealt with by the House of
Representatives under this subsection; and
(b) the giving of that certificate is supported by a
resolution passed by a majority of at least 53 members
of the House; paragraphs (2)(b), (c) and (d) do not
apply in relation to the consideration of the Bill by
that House and the Bill is deemed to have been duly
passed by that House if, on its third reading, it is
passed by a majority of at least 53 members of that
House.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. There is no specific constitutional provision for the declaration of war. The legislatures
approval is needed, however, for the president to
declare a state of emergency.
Section 187
(1) The Parliament may make a law conferring power
on the President, acting on the advice of the Cabinet,
to proclaim a state of emergency in Fiji, or in a part of
Fiji, in such circumstances as the law prescribes.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.
No. The president has the power to grant amnesty.
Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately. See
item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The president has the power of pardon.
Section 115
(1) The President may:
(a) grant to a person convicted of an offence under
the law of the State a pardon or a conditional pardon.

234

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The president appoints the members of the
judiciary, and these appointments do not require
the legislatures approval.
Section 132
(1) The Chief Justice is appointed by the President on
the advice of the Prime Minister following consultation
by him or her with the Leader of the Opposition.
(2) The judges of the Supreme Court, the Justices
of Appeal (including the President of the Court of
Appeal) and the puisne judges of the High Court are
appointed by the President on the recommendation of
the Judicial Service Commission following consultation
by it with the Minister and the sector standing committee of the House of Representatives responsible for
matters relating to the administration of justice.
(3) The President may, on the recommendation of the
Judicial Service Commission following consultation by
it with the Minister:
(a) appoint a judge or a person who is qualified for
appointment as a judge to act as Chief Justice during
any period, or during all periods, when the office of
Chief Justice is vacant or when the Chief Justice is
absent from duty or from Fiji or is, for any reason,
unable to perform the functions of office; and
(b) appoint a person to act as a puisne judge of the
High Court during any period, or during all periods,
when an office of puisne judge of the High Court is
vacant or when a puisne judge is absent from duty or
from Fiji or is, for any reason, unable to perform the
functions of office.
(4) A person is not eligible to be appointed under paragraph (3)(b) unless he or she is qualified for appointment as a judge.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The Constitutional Offices Commission, in
consultation with the board of the Reserve Bank,
appoints the governor of the Reserve Bank of Fiji.

Parliament of Fiji
Section 146
(1) The Constitutional Offices Commission has the
function of making appointments, in accordance with
this Constitution, to the following offices:
(g) Governor of the Reserve Bank of Fiji.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
Yes. The Fiji Broadcasting Act makes provisions for
the legislative scrutiny of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session for at
least six months each year.
28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.
No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members. It should be noted, however, that several senior legislators were defeated in the 2001
parliamentary elections.

Parliament of Finland (Eduskunta)

235

PARLIAMENT OF FINLAND (EDUSKUNTA)

Expert consultants: Ari Hyytinen, Mikko Mattila, Sari Pajula, Tapio Raunio, Eelis Roikonen
Score: .72
Influence over
executive (6/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Institutional
autonomy (6/9)

Specified
powers (6/8)

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

X
X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

X
X

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

X
X

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

24. judiciary

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

25. central bank

26. media

X
X

18. all elected

Institutional
capacity (5/6)

X
X

The Parliament (Eduskunta) of Finland was established in the Parliament Act of 1906 while Finland was still under Russian rule. Finland achieved
independence in 1919. Its fundamental law was
embodied in four important measures: the Form of
Government Act of 1919, the Ministerial Responsibility Act of 1922, the Court of the Realm Act of
1922, and the Parliament Act of 1928. Reforms in
the 1980s and 1990s did not markedly alter parliaments powers. In 2000 Finland adopted a unified constitution that integrated the four abovementioned documents.
Parliament enjoys broad authority. It controls
the executive with the powers to elect, interpellate, investigate, and vote no confidence in the
government, and its members can serve in government. It enjoys substantial institutional autonomy. Most notably, the legislatures laws are not
subject to judicial review. The legislature can pass
exceptive laws that are enacted even if the courts
judge them to be contrary to the constitution. Yet
the legislatures autonomy is limited by the presidents dissolution powers, the absence of immunity for legislators, and, most notably, the presence
of executive decree authority. The legislature has
numerous specified powers and enjoys a high level
of institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of the chancellor of justice, the ombudsman, or the government and prosecution by
the prosecutor-general before the High Court of
Impeachment. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.
Section 43
(1) A group of at least twenty Representatives may
address an interpellation to the Government or to an
individual Minister on a matter within the competence
of the Government or the Minister. The interpellation
shall be replied to in a plenary session of the Parliament
within fifteen days of the date when the interpellation
was brought to the attention of the Government.
(2) At the conclusion of the consideration of the interpellation, a vote of confidence shall be taken by the
Parliament, provided that a motion of no confidence
in the Government or the Minister has been put forward during the debate.
Section 44
(1) The Government may present a statement or report
to the Parliament on a matter relating to the governance
of the country or its international relations.

236
(2) At the conclusion of the consideration of a statement, a vote of confidence in the Government or a
Minister shall be taken, provided that a motion of no
confidence in the Government or the Minister has been
put forward during the debate. No decision on confidence in the Government or its Member shall be made
in the consideration of a report.
Section 113
If the Chancellor of Justice, the Ombudsman or the
Government deem that the President of the Republic
is guilty of treason or high treason, or a crime against
humanity, the matter shall be communicated to the
Parliament. In this event, if the Parliament, by three
fourths of the votes cast, decides that charges are to
be brought, the Prosecutor-General shall prosecute the
President in the High Court of Impeachment and the
President shall abstain from office for the duration of
the proceedings. In other cases, no charges shall be
brought for the official acts of the President.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Legislators may serve simultaneously in ministerial positions.
3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Section 4
(1) A group of at least twenty Representatives may
address an interpellation to the Government or to an
individual Minister on a matter within the competence
of the Government or the Minister. The interpellation
shall be replied to in a plenary session of the Parliament
within fifteen days of the date when the interpellation
was brought to the attention of the Government.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
Section 47
(1) The Parliament has the right to receive from
the Government the information it needs in the
consideration of matters. The appropriate Minister
shall ensure that Committees and other parliamentary
organs receive without delay the necessary documents
and other information in the possession of the authorities.
(2) A Committee has the right to receive information
from the Government or the appropriate Ministry on
a matter within its competence. The Committee may
issue a statement to the Government or the Ministry
on the basis of the information.

Parliament of Finland (Eduskunta)

(3) A Representative has the right to information which
is in the possession of authorities and which is necessary
for the performance of the duties of the Representative,
in so far as the information is not secret or it does not
pertain to a State budget proposal under preparation.
(4) In addition, the right of the Parliament to information on international affairs is governed by the provisions included elsewhere in this Constitution.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The agencies of coercion report to the president and are not subject to effective legislative
oversight.
Section 128
(1) The President of the Republic is the commanderin-chief of the defence forces. On the proposal of the
Government, the President may relinquish this task to
another Finnish citizen.
(2) The President appoints the officers of the defence
forces.

6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

Yes. The legislature elects the prime minister.
Section 61
(1) The Parliament elects the Prime Minister, who is
thereafter appointed to the office by the President of the
Republic. The President appoints the other Ministers in
accordance with a proposal made by the Prime Minister.
(2) Before the Prime Minister is elected, the groups represented in the Parliament negotiate on the political
programme and composition of the Government. On
the basis of the outcome of these negotiations, and after
having heard the Speaker of the Parliament and the
parliamentary groups, the President informs the Parliament of the nominee for Prime Minister. The nominee
is elected Prime Minister if his or her election has been
supported by more than half of the votes cast in an
open vote in the Parliament.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. Formally, the president appoints ministers,
but in practice, ministerial positions are allotted
according to the outcome of negotiations among
the parliamentary groups.
Section 61
(1) The Parliament elects the Prime Minister, who is
thereafter appointed to the office by the President of the
Republic. The President appoints the other Ministers in
accordance with a proposal made by the Prime Minister.
(2) Before the Prime Minister is elected, the groups represented in the Parliament negotiate on the political
programme and composition of the Government. On
the basis of the outcome of these negotiations, and after

Parliament of Finland (Eduskunta)

having heard the Speaker of the Parliament and the
parliamentary groups, the President informs the Parliament of the nominee for Prime Minister. The nominee
is elected Prime Minister if his or her election has been
supported by more than half of the votes cast in an
open vote in the Parliament.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Section 54
(1) The President of the Republic is elected by a direct
vote for a term of six years.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Section 43
(1) A group of at least twenty Representatives may
address an interpellation to the Government or to an
individual Minister on a matter within the competence
of the Government or the Minister. The interpellation
shall be replied to in a plenary session of the Parliament
within fifteen days of the date when the interpellation
was brought to the attention of the Government.
(2) At the conclusion of the consideration of the interpellation, a vote of confidence shall be taken by the
Parliament, provided that a motion of no confidence
in the Government or the Minister has been put forward during the debate.
Section 44
(1) The Government may present a statement or report
to the Parliament on a matter relating to the governance
of the country or its international relations.
(2) At the conclusion of the consideration of a statement, a vote of confidence in the Government or a
Minister shall be taken, provided that a motion of no
confidence in the Government or the Minister has been
put forward during the debate. No decision on confidence in the Government or its Member shall be made
in the consideration of a report.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president, on the recommendation of the
prime minister, can dissolve the legislature.
Section 26
(1) The President of the Republic, in response to a reasoned proposal by the Prime Minister, and after having
heard the parliamentary groups, and while the Parliament is in session, may order that extraordinary parliamentary elections shall be held. Thereafter, the Parliament shall decide the time when it concludes its work
before the elections.

237

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The president and the government can issue
decrees that have the force of law.
Section 80
(1) The President of the Republic, the Government and
a Ministry may issue Decrees on the basis of authorisation given to them in this Constitution or in another
Act. However, the principles governing the rights and
obligations of private individuals and the other matters
that under this Constitution are of a legislative nature
shall be governed by Acts. If there is no specific provision on who shall issue a Decree, it is issued by the
Government.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote of its present members.
Section 77
(1) An Act adopted by the Parliament shall be submitted to the President of the Republic for confirmation.
The President shall decide on the confirmation within
three months of the submission of the Act. The President may obtain a statement on the Act from the
Supreme Court or the Supreme Administrative Court.
(2) If the President does not confirm the Act, it is
returned for the consideration of the Parliament. If
the Parliament readopts the Act without material alterations, it enters into force without confirmation. If the
Parliament does not readopt the Act, it shall be deemed
to have lapsed.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
Yes. The Constitutional Law Committee can issue
statements on the constitutionality of laws but cannot void laws based on unconstitutionality. The
president can refuse to sign a bill for constitutional
concerns based on a report issued by the Constitutional Law Committee. The legislature can, nevertheless, pass what are sometimes called exceptive
laws that go into force despite contravening the
constitution.
Section 74
The Constitutional Law Committee shall issue statements on the constitutionality of legislative proposals and other matters brought for its consideration, as
well as on their relation to international human rights
treaties.
Section 77
(1) An Act adopted by the Parliament shall be submitted to the President of the Republic for confirmation.

238
The President shall decide on the confirmation within
three months of the submission of the Act. The President may obtain a statement on the Act from the
Supreme Court or the Supreme Administrative Court.
(2) If the President does not confirm the Act, it is
returned for the consideration of the Parliament. If
the Parliament readopts the Act without material alterations, it enters into force without confirmation. If the
Parliament does not readopt the Act, it shall be deemed
to have lapsed.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislators can be arrested and prosecuted for
any crime for which the minimum punishment is
at least six months.
Section 30
(1) A Representative shall not be prevented from carrying out his or her duties as a Representative.
(2) A Representative shall not be charged in a court
of law nor be deprived of liberty owing to opinions
expressed by the Representative in the Parliament or
owing to conduct in the consideration of a matter,
unless the Parliament has consented to the same by
a decision supported by at least five sixths of the votes
cast.
(3) If a Representative has been arrested or detained,
the Speaker of the Parliament shall be immediately notified of this. A Representative shall not be arrested or
detained before the commencement of a trial without
the consent of the Parliament, unless he or she is for
substantial reasons suspected of having committed a
crime for which the minimum punishment is imprisonment for at least six months.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Section 25
(1) The Representatives shall be elected by a direct, proportional and secret vote.

Parliament of Finland (Eduskunta)

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
through a complicated procedure. The sitting legislature can propose a constitutional amendment,
and then, following an election, the subsequent
legislature can pass the amendment with a twothirds majority vote. The legislature can also pass
an urgent constitutional amendment without
waiting for new elections with a five-sixths majority vote.
Section 73
(1) A proposal on the enactment, amendment or repeal
of the Constitution or on the enactment of a limited
derogation of the Constitution shall in the second reading be left in abeyance, by a majority of the votes cast,
until the first parliamentary session following parliamentary elections. The proposal shall then, once the
Committee has issued its report, be adopted without
material alterations in one reading in a plenary session
by a decision supported by at least two thirds of the
votes cast.
(2) However, the proposal may be declared urgent by a
decision that has been supported by at least five sixths
of the votes cast. In this event, the proposal is not left in
abeyance and it can be adopted by a decision supported
by at least two thirds of the votes cast.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for presidential war declarations.
Section 93
(1) The foreign policy of Finland is directed by the President of the Republic in co-operation with the Government. However, the Parliament accepts Finlands
international obligations and their denouncement and
decides on the bringing into force of Finlands international obligations in so far as provided in this Constitution. The President decides on matters of war and
peace, with the consent of the Parliament.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Section 93
(1) The foreign policy of Finland is directed by the President of the Republic in co-operation with the Government. However, the Parliament accepts Finlands
international obligations and their denouncement and
decides on the bringing into force of Finlands international obligations in so far as provided in this Constitution. The President decides on matters of war and
peace, with the consent of the Parliament.
Section 94
(1) The acceptance of the Parliament is required for
such treaties and other international obligations that

Parliament of Finland (Eduskunta)

contain provisions of a legislative nature, are otherwise
significant, or otherwise require approval by the Parliament under this Constitution. The acceptance of the
Parliament is required also for the denouncement of
such obligations.
(2) A decision concerning the acceptance of an international obligation or the denouncement of it is made
by a majority of the votes cast. However, if the proposal concerns the Constitution or an alteration of the
national borders, the decision shall be made by at least
two thirds of the votes cast.
(3) An international obligation shall not endanger the
democratic foundations of the Constitution.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty
through law.
Section 105
(2) A general amnesty may be provided only by an Act.

239

Parliamentary Supervisory Council, a ninemember body appointed by parliament, and approval by the government. The legislature controls the
appointments process.
Section 91
(1) The Bank of Finland operates under the guarantee
and supervision of the Parliament, as provided by an
Act. For the purpose of supervising the operations of
the Bank of Finland, the Parliament elects its governors.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
Yes. The Finnish Broadcasting Corporation is
under parliaments control, although politicians
do not generally interfere in its operational affairs.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

Yes. The legislature is in session year round, except

for breaks during the summer and the winter holidays.

No. The president has the power of pardon.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Section 105
(1) In individual cases, the President of the Republic
may, after obtaining a statement from the Supreme
Court, grant full or partial pardon from a penalty or
other criminal sanction imposed by a court of law.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The president makes judicial appointments,
and the appointments do not require the legislatures approval.
Section 102
Tenured judges are appointed by the President of the
Republic in accordance with the procedure laid down
by an Act.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
Yes.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.

Yes. The governor of the Bank of Finland is

formally appointed by the president, but the
president acts on the recommendation of the

Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

240

Parliament of France (Parlement)

PARLIAMENT OF FRANCE (PARLEMENT)

Expert consultants: Richard Balme, David S. Bell, Sylvain Brouard, Guy Carcassonne, Robert Elgie,
Nicholas Jabko, Vivien Ann Schmidt, Yves Surel
Score: .56
Influence over
executive (3/9)

Institutional
autonomy (6/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree
X
X

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Specified
powers (3/8)
X

19. amendments
20. war

X
X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

18. all elected

Institutional
capacity (6/6)

24. judiciary
X

25. central bank

26. media

27. sessions
28. secretary

X
X

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X
X

The Parliament (Parlement) of France was established following the 1789 revolution that overthrew the ancien regime. Over the next two centuries, France was governed by fifteen different
constitutions. The constitution of the Fifth Republic, adopted in 1958, stepped away from previous parliamentary systems by establishing a
directly elected president and a semipresidential
system. The bicameral parliament consists of a
lower house, the National Assembly (Assemblee
nationale), and an upper house, the Senate (Senat).
Parliament is an important but not dominant
actor in French politics and government. Its control over executive power is limited to the powers
to interpellate and investigate the executive and to
vote no confidence in the government. It lacks all
other means for influencing the executive captured
in this survey.
Parliament enjoys a fair degree of institutional
autonomy. For example, it can override a presidential veto with a majority vote. It is endowed
with a modest number of specified powers. Of
the eight specified powers enumerated in this survey, the parliament of France is vested with only
three: control over the declaration of war, control over ratification of treaties with foreign countries, and the power to grant amnesty. The legislatures muscle is most evident in the realm of

institutional capacity, for which parliament receives an affirmative answer for all six of the survey
items.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of the High Court of Justice. The legislature can remove the prime minister with a motion
of censure.
Article 49
(1) The Prime Minister, after deliberation by the Council of Ministers, may commit the Governments responsibility before the National Assembly with regard to its
program or, should the occasion arise, to a statement
of general policy.
(2) The National Assembly may challenge the responsibility of the Government by passing a motion of censure. Such a motion shall be admissible only if signed
by at least one tenth of the members of the National
Assembly. The vote may not take place until forty-eight
hours after the motion has been tabled; the only votes
counted shall be those in favor of the motion of censure, which may be adopted only by a majority of the
membership of the Assembly.

Parliament of France (Parlement)

(3) The Prime Minister may, after deliberation by
the Council of Ministers, commit the Governments
responsibility to the National Assembly on the passing
of a bill. In this case, the text shall be regarded as carried
unless a motion of censure, tabled within the succeeding twenty-four hours, is passed under the conditions
laid down in the previous paragraph.
(4) The Prime Minister may ask the Senate to approve
a general policy statement.
Article 50
If the National Assembly adopts a motion of censure,
or rejects the Governments program or a general policy
statement by the latter, the Prime Minister must tender
the Governments resignation to the President of the
Republic.
Article 68
(1) The President of the Republic shall not be held
accountable for actions performed in the exercise of
his office except in the case of high treason. He may be
indicted only by the two Assemblies ruling by identical
vote in open balloting and by an absolute majority of
their members. He shall be tried by the High Court of
Justice.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 23
(1) Membership of the Government shall be incompatible with the exercise of any Parliamentary mandate, with the holding of any representational office
at national level in a trade organization, and with any
public employment or professional activity.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. Legislators question the government during
question time, held for one hour each Tuesday and
Wednesday afternoon.
Article 48
(1) The discussion of bills tabled by the Government
and of private members bills agreed to by it shall have
priority on the agendas of the Assemblies in the order
decided by the Government.
(2) One meeting per week shall be reserved in priority
for members questions and the Governments replies.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of

241

law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret

police).
No. The agencies of coercion report to the president and are not subject to legislative oversight.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister,
although in some cases in which opponents of his
or her party control the legislature, the president
appoints a partisan opponent to the post, producing a situation known as cohabitation.
Article 8
(1) The President of the Republic shall appoint the
Prime Minister. He shall terminate that appointment
when the latter tenders the resignation of the Government.
(2) On the proposal of the Prime Minister, he shall
appoint the other members of the Government and
terminate their appointments.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 8
(1) The President of the Republic shall appoint the
Prime Minister. He shall terminate that appointment
when the latter tenders the resignation of the Government.
(2) On the proposal of the Prime Minister, he shall
appoint the other members of the Government and
terminate their appointments.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 6
The President of the Republic shall be elected for five
years by direct universal suffrage. The procedures implementing this Article shall be laid down in an organic
act.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can pass a motion of censure
in the government.
Article 49
(1) The Prime Minister, after deliberation by the Council of Ministers, may commit the Governments responsibility before the National Assembly with regard to its
program or, should the occasion arise, to a statement
of general policy.

242
(2) The National Assembly may challenge the responsibility of the Government by passing a motion of censure. Such a motion shall be admissible only if signed
by at least one tenth of the members of the National
Assembly. The vote may not take place until forty-eight
hours after the motion has been tabled; the only votes
counted shall be those in favor of the motion of censure, which may be adopted only by a majority of the
membership of the Assembly. Should the motion of
censure be rejected, its signatories may not introduce
another such motion in the course of the same session,
except in the case provided for in the following paragraph.
(3) The Prime Minister may, after deliberation by
the Council of Ministers, commit the Governments
responsibility to the National Assembly on the passing
of a bill. In this case, the text shall be regarded as carried
unless a motion of censure, tabled within the succeeding twenty-four hours, is passed under the conditions
laid down in the previous paragraph.
(4) The Prime Minister may ask the Senate to approve
a general policy statement.
Article 50
If the National Assembly adopts a motion of censure,
or rejects the Governments program or a general policy
statement by the latter, the Prime Minister must tender
the Governments resignation to the President of the
Republic.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 12
(1) The President of the Republic may, after consultation with the Prime Minister and the Presidents of the
Assemblies, pronounce the dissolution of the National
Assembly. A General election shall take place not less
than twenty days and not more than forty days after
the dissolution.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power. The government can, however, issue regulations to implement
parliaments laws, and parliament can grant the
government the power to issue temporary ordinance measures.
Article 37
(1) Matters other than those that fall within the sphere
of legislation shall be determined by regulation.
(2) Legislation concerning these matters may be
amended by orders issued after consultation with the
Conseil dEtat. Any such legislative texts introduced
after this Constitution has entered into force shall be
amended by order only if the Constitutional Council
has pronounced that the matters they deal with fall
within the field subject to regulation as defined in the
preceding paragraph.

Parliament of France (Parlement)

Article 38
(1) The Government may, in order to carry out its
program, ask Parliament to authorize it, for a limited
period, to take by ordinance measures normally within
the legislative sphere.
(2) Ordinances shall be enacted in meetings of the
Council of Ministers after consultation with the Conseil
dEtat. They shall come into force upon their publication, but shall become null and void if the bill for their
ratification is not submitted to Parliament before the
date set by the enabling act.
(3) Upon expiry of the period referred to in the
first paragraph of this article, the ordinances may be
amended only by act of Parliament in respect of those
matters which are within the legislative domain.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote of its present members.
Article 10
(1) The President of the Republic shall promulgate laws
within fifteen days following the transmission to the
Government of the said laws as finally adopted.
(2) He may, before expiry of this time limit, ask Parliament to reconsider a law or certain of its articles.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Council can review the
constitutionality of laws.
Article 46
(5) Organic acts may be promulgated only after the
Constitutional Council has declared them constitutional.
Article 61
(1) Organic acts, before their promulgation, and standing orders of the parliamentary Assemblies, before their
implementation, must be submitted to the Constitutional Council which shall rule on their constitutionality.
(2) To the same end, acts of Parliament may, before
their promulgation, be submitted to the Constitutional
Council by the President of the Republic, the Prime
Minister, the President of the National Assembly, the
President of the Senate, sixty deputies or sixty senators.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.

Parliament of France (Parlement)

No. The executive can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.

16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,
including control over members salaries.
Article 25
(1) An organic act shall determine the term for which
each Assembly is elected, the number of its members,
their emoluments, the conditions of eligibility and ineligibility and the offices incompatible with membership
of the Assemblies.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto.
Article 26
(1) No member of Parliament may be prosecuted or
subjected to inquiry, arrest, detention, or trial on
account of opinions expressed or votes cast in the
course of his or her duties.
(2) No member of Parliament may, during parliamentary sessions, be prosecuted or arrested for a felony or
misdemeanor without the authority of the Assembly of
which he or she is a member, except in cases of flagrante
delicto.
(3) When Parliament is not in session, no member of
Parliament may be arrested without the authority of the
bureau of the Assembly of which he or she is a member, except in the case of flagrante delicto, authorized
prosecution, or final sentence.
(4) The detention or prosecution of a member of Parliament shall be suspended if the Assembly of which he
or she is a member so demands.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 24
(1) Parliament shall consist of the National Assembly
and the Senate.
(2) Deputies of the National Assembly shall be elected
by direct suffrage.
(3) The Senate shall be elected by indirect suffrage. It
shall ensure the representation of the territorial entities
of the Republic. French nationals living outside France
shall be represented in the Senate.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. The constitution can be changed through two
procedures, both of which require the involvement of actors other than the legislature. In one
procedure, a legislative bill for constitutional

243

amendment must be approved in a popular referendum. In the other, the president must initiate
the amendment, which can then be approved by a
three-fifths majority vote in the legislature.
Article 89
(1) The initiative for amending the Constitution shall
belong both to the President of the Republic on the
proposal of the Prime Minister and to the members of
Parliament.
(2) A Government or private members bill for amendment must be passed by the two Assemblies in identical terms. The amendment shall become definitive after
approval by referendum.
(3) Nevertheless, the proposed amendment shall not be
submitted to a referendum when the President of the
Republic decides to submit it to Parliament convened in
Congress; in this case, the proposed amendment shall
be approved only if it is accepted by a three-fifths majority of the votes cast. The Bureau of the Congress shall
be that of the National Assembly.
(4) No amendment procedure may be undertaken or
followed when the integrity of the territory is in jeopardy.
(5) The republican form of government shall not be
subject to amendment.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for the
declaration of war.
Article 35
A declaration of war must be authorized by Parliament.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 53
(1) Peace treaties, commercial treaties and treaties, or
agreements relating to international organization, or
implying a financial commitment on the part of the
State, or modifying provisions of a legislative nature, or
relating to the status of persons, or entailing a cession,
exchange or ad junction of territory, may be ratified or
approved only by act of Parliament.
(2) They shall take effect only after having been ratified
or approved.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant
amnesty.
Article 34
(2) Legislation shall establish the rules concerning:
amnesty.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.

244
Article 17
The President of the Republic shall have the right of
pardon.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The president appoints the members of the
Council of Magistrates (Conseil Superieur de la
Magistrature). The president, the president of the
Senate, and the president of the National Assembly
each appoint three members to the Constitutional
Council. The appointments do not require the legislatures approval. The legislature elects the members of the High Court of Justice, but this body,
which is called together to judge the president for
high treason, has never been convened in the Fifth
Republic.
Article 56
(1) The Constitutional Council shall consist of nine
members, whose term of office shall last nine years and
shall not be renewable. Three of its members shall be
appointed by the President of the Republic, three by
the President of the National Assembly, three by the
President of the Senate.
Article 65
(1) The Conseil Superieur de la Magistrature shall be
presided over by the President of the Republic.
(2) The Conseil Superieur shall, in addition, comprise
nine members appointed by the President of the Republic under the terms laid down by an organic act.
Article 67
(1) A High Court of Justice shall be instituted.
(2) It shall be composed of members elected in equal
number by the National Assembly and the Senate from
within their ranks after each general or partial election to these Assemblies. It shall elect its President from
among its members.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the governor of the
Bank of France.

Parliament of France (Parlement)

ordinary session that meets for 120 days stretching from October through June, as well as extraordinary sessions, which can be convoked at any
time by the prime minister and a majority of the
Assembly. While the constitution continues to create the impression that parliament is in session for
less than half of the year, in practice it meets for
roughly nine months each year.
Article 28
(1) Parliament shall convene ipso jure in two ordinary
sessions per year.
(2) The first session shall begin on 2 April and last for
thirty days.
(3) The second session shall open on 2 October and last
for not more than ninety days.
(4) If 2 October or 2 April is a public holiday, the session
shall open on the first working day thereafter.
Article 29
Parliament convenes in extraordinary session, at the
request of the Prime Minister or of the majority of the
members of the National Assembly, to consider a specific agenda.
When an extraordinary session is held at the request of
members of the National Assembly, the decree closing
it shall take effect once Parliament has dealt with the
agenda for which it was convened, or twelve days after
its first sitting, whichever shall be the earlier.
Only the Prime Minister can request a new session
before the end of the month following the decree closing an extraordinary session.
Article 30
Apart from the case when Parliament convenes as of
right, extraordinary sessions are opened and closed by
decree of the President of the Republic.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
Yes.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the

operation of the public media.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes. According to the constitution adopted in 1958
and modified in 1963, the legislature met for two
ordinary sessions each year, totaling ninety days
in the spring and eighty in the fall. The brevity
of parliaments time in session, according to
critics, seriously limited the Assemblys capacity
and reduced its ability to influence the government. In 1995 the law was altered to allow for an

Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

Parliament of Gabon (Parlement)

245

PARLIAMENT OF GABON (PARLEMENT)

Expert consultants: Barrie Hofmann, Francois Ngolet, Guy Rossatanga-Rignault, Nicholas Shaxson,
Douglas A. Yates
Score: .44
Influence over
executive (2/9)

Institutional
autonomy (4/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree
X

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no confidence

Specified
powers (3/8)
X

12. no veto
13. no review
14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

23. pardon
24. judiciary

The Parliament (Parlement) of Gabon was established in 1960 upon independence from France.
For most of the next thirty years, the legislature was
sidelined by the one-party state of President Omar
Bongo. Economic instability threatened Bongos
control in the early 1990s, leading to the adoption
of a new constitution in 1991 that reintroduced
a multiparty system. A constitutional amendment
in 1994 created an upper house of parliament,
the Senate (Senat). Prior to 1994 parliament was
a unicameral body, consisting only of what is now
the lower house, the National Assembly (Assemblee
nationale). Amendments in 1997 and 2003 established the position of vice president and eliminated
presidential term limits, respectively.
The Gabonese legislature has little sway over
the executive branch. Its powers in this area are
limited to the rights to question executive branch
officials and to vote no confidence (in Gabon, to
pass a motion of censure) in the government. The
legislatures institutional autonomy is limited by
the presidents dissolution, veto, and impoundment powers. The legislature holds several specified powers and prerogatives, such as the power to
approve presidential treaties and war declarations.
It is endowed with some institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.

Institutional
capacity (5/6)
X
X

X
X
X

25. central
bank
26. media

No. Presidential impeachment requires the

involvement of the High Court of Justice. The
legislature can remove the prime minister with a
motion of censure.
Article 15
He [the President] ends his [the Prime Ministers] functions . . . upon the presentation by the Prime Minister
of the resignation of the Government, or following a
vote of defiance or the adoption of a motion of censure
by the National Assembly.
Article 63
The Prime Minister, after deliberation of the Council
of Ministers, engages the responsibility of Government
before the National Assembly, by posing the question of
confidence, either on a declaration of general policy, or
on the vote of a text of law. The debate on the question
of confidence may only intervene three full days after
it was raised. The confidence may only be refused by
an absolute majority of the members composing the
National Assembly.
Article 64
The National Assembly puts to issue the responsibility of the Government by the passing of a motion of
censure. Such a motion can only be receivable if it is
signed by at least one-quarter of the members of the
National Assembly . . . The motion to censure can only
be adopted by an absolute majority of the members of
the National Assembly.
Article 65
When the National Assembly adopts a motion of censure or denies its confidence to the Prime Minister, he
immediately submits his resignation to the President of
the Republic.

246
Article 78
The High Court of Justice . . . judges the President of the
Republic in the case of violation of the oath or high treason. The President of the Republic shall be impeached
by Parliament deciding by a two-thirds majority of its
members, by public ballot.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 31
The Government is composed of the Prime Minister,
and the other members of the Government.
The Prime Minister is the Head of the Government.
The members of the Government are chosen both from
within the National Assembly and outside of it.
Article 32
The functions of a member of the Government are
incompatible with the exercise of a parliamentary mandate.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature interpellates executive branch
officials and questions them during a weekly question time.
Article 57
The Prime Minister and the other members of the Government . . . are heard at their demand or that of the
parliamentary authorities.
Article 61
The means of control of the legislative upon the executive are the following: interpellations, written and
oral questions, commissions of inquiry and control, the
motion of censure exercised by the National Assembly
under the conditions provided for in Article 63 of the
present Constitution.
One meeting per week is reserved to the questions of
the Parliamentarians and to the responses by members
of the Government. The current questions may be the
object of interpellations of the Government, even during the extraordinary sessions of Parliament.
The executive is held to furnish to Parliament all the
elements of information which it has demanded on its
conduct and its activities.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. According to the constitution, the legislature
can establish commissions of inquiry to investigate
the executive. In practice, the legislature cannot
investigate the executive.

Parliament of Gabon (Parlement)

Article 61
The means of control of the legislative upon the executive are the following: interpellations, written and
oral questions, commissions of inquiry and control, the
motion of censure exercised by the National Assembly
under the conditions provided for in Article 63 of the
present Constitution.
One meeting per week is reserved to the questions of
the Parliamentarians and to the responses by members
of the Government. The current questions may be the
object of interpellations of the Government, even during the extraordinary sessions of Parliament. The executive is held to furnish to Parliament all the elements
of information which it has demanded on its conduct
and its activities.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister.
Article 15
The President of the Republic names the Prime Minister.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers on the proposal of the prime minister, and the appointments
do not require the legislatures approval.
Article 15
The President of the Republic names the Prime Minister . . . Upon the proposal of the Prime Minister, he
names the other members of the Government and ends
their functions.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 9
The President of the Republic is elected for seven years,
by direct universal suffrage.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can adopt a motion of censure
resulting in the resignation of the government.
Article 15
He [the President] ends his [the Prime Ministers] functions . . . upon the presentation by the Prime Minister
of the resignation of the Government, or following a

Parliament of Gabon (Parlement)

vote of defiance or the adoption of a motion of censure
by the National Assembly.
Article 64
The National Assembly puts to issue the responsibility
of the Government by the passing of a motion of censure. Such a motion can only be receivable if it is signed
by at least one-quarter of the members of the National
Assembly. The vote of the motion to censure can only
take place three days after its filing. The motion to censure can only be adopted by an absolute majority of the
members of the National Assembly.
Article 65
When the National Assembly adopts a motion of censure or denies its confidence to the Prime Minister, he
immediately submits his resignation to the President of
the Republic.
The resignation of the Prime Minister encompasses the
resignation of the entire Government.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 19
The President of the Republic may, after consultation
with the Prime Minister and the Presidents of the two
Chambers of the Parliament pronounce the dissolution
of the National Assembly.
However, the recourse to this prerogative, limited to
two times over the course of the same Presidential mandate, may not intervene consecutively in the twelve
months which follow the first dissolution.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires

ratification or approval by the legislature before
it takes effect; that is, the executive lacks decree
power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power. During
emergency circumstances, however, the president
can issue decree-laws. The legislature can also grant
the government the authority to issue decrees
under emergency circumstances. Both presidential
and governmental decrees lapse if they are not subsequently approved by the legislature.
Article 26
When the institutions of the Republic, independence or
the superior interests of the nation, territorial integrity
or the execution of its international engagements are
menaced in a grave and immediate manner and that
the regular operation of constitutional public powers is
interrupted, the President of the Republic takes by ordinance, during the intersessions, with the least delay,
measures necessitated by the circumstances, and after
consultation of the National Assembly as well as the
Constitutional Court. He informs the nation of this by
a message. During the sessions, these measures arise in
the domain of the law.

247
Article 51
Matters other than those which are of the domain of
the law have a regulatory character. They are made
the objects of decrees of the President of the Republic.
These matters may, for the application of these decrees,
be the object of administrative decisions taken by the
Prime Minister or, upon delegation of the Prime Minister, by the ministers responsible or by the other administrative authorities habituated to making them.
Article 52
The Government may, in case of emergency, for the
execution of its program, demand of Parliament the
authorization to be taken by ordinance during Parliamentary recess, measures which are normally of the
domain of the law. The ordinances are taken in the
Council of Ministers, after the advice of the Administrative Chamber and signed by the President of the Republic. They become effective upon their publication. They
must be ratified by Parliament in the course of its next
session. Parliament has the possibility to modify the
ordinances by way of amendments. In the absence of a
law of ratification, the ordinances are null and void.
Ordinances may be modified by another ordinance or
by a law.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority vote in the legislature is
needed to override a presidential veto.
Article 17
The President of the Republic may, during the period
of promulgation, demand of Parliament a new deliberation on the law or on certain articles. This new deliberation cannot be refused. The text thus submitted to a
second deliberation is adopted by a two-thirds majority
of its members, either in its original form, or after modification. The President of the Republic promulgates it
within the time limits fixed above.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 83
The Constitutional Court is the highest jurisdiction of
the State in constitutional matters. It is the judge of the
constitutionality of laws and it guarantees the fundamental rights of the human person and public liberties.
It is the regulatory organ of the operation of the institutions and of the activities of the pubic powers.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.

248

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The president can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
Article 46
Each Chamber of Parliament enjoys administrative and
financial autonomy.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. By law, legislators are immune, but in practice,
any legislator who dares to criticize the president
cannot depend on the law for protection and may
find himself or herself subject to persecution.
Article 38
No member of the Parliament may be prosecuted, investigated, arrested, detained or judged as a result of the
opinions or votes he expressed in the exercise of his
functions.
Any member of Parliament may, during sessions, only
be prosecuted, investigated, arrested for a criminal, correctional or simple police matter, with the authorization of the Bureau of the concerned Chamber, except
in the case of flagrant offense or definitive condemnation.
The detention or the prosecution of a member of Parliament will be suspended until the end of his mandate,
except in the case of a waiver of parliamentary immunity.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 35
The legislative power is represented by a Parliament
composed of two Chambers: the National Assembly and
the Senate.
The members of the National Assembly carry the title
of Deputy. They are elected for a duration of five years
by direct universal suffrage.
The members of the Senate carry the title of Senator.
They are elected for a duration of six years by indirect
universal suffrage. They must be forty years of age, at
least. The Senate assures the representation of the local
collectivities.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature alone can change the constitution with a two-thirds majority vote.

Parliament of Gabon (Parlement)

Article 116
The initiative of amendment belongs concurrently to
the President of the Republic, the Council of Ministers
thereupon focused, and the members of Parliament.
Any proposal of amendment is filed with the Bureau
of the National Assembly by at least one-third of the
Deputies or with the Bureau of the Senate by at least
one-third of the Senators. Any bill or proposal to revise
the Constitution as well as any amendment concerning
it, is submitted, for advice, to the Constitutional Court.
The amendment is adopted either by way of referendum, or by the parliamentary [vote]. When the parliamentary [vote] is chosen, the bill or proposal to revise
the Constitution must be voted upon respectively by
the National Assembly and by the Senate in identical
terms. The adoption of any bill or of any proposal of
revision of the Constitution by the parliamentary [vote]
requires the presence of at least two-thirds of the members of the Parliament convened in congress. The presidency of the congress is assured by the President of the
National Assembly.
The Bureau of the congress is that of the National
Assembly. A qualified majority of two-thirds of the
expressed votes is required to adopt the bill or proposal
to revise the Constitution.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for presidential war declarations.
Article 49
A Declaration of War by the President of the Republic
is authorized by the National Assembly by a two-thirds
majority of its members.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 113
The President of the Republic negotiates international
treaties and accords and ratifies them after the vote of
a law of authorization by the Parliament and the verification of their constitutionality by the Constitutional
Court. The President of the Republic and the Presidents
of the Chambers of the Parliament are informed of any
negotiation leading to the conclusion of an international accord not submitted to ratification.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. While the rules concerning . . . [the] amnesty
system are formally established by law, the power
to grant amnesty in practice rests with the president alone.
Article 47
Outside of the cases expressly provided for by the Constitution, the law establishes the rules concerning:

Parliament of Gabon (Parlement)

the determination of crimes and misdemeanors as
well as the penalties which are applicable to them, the
penal procedure, the penitentiary and amnesty system.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 23
The President of the Republic has the right of pardon.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. Formally, the legislature has the right to elect
a portion of the Superior Council of the Magistrature, but in practice, the legislature does not fulfill this role, and the president fully controls all
appointments to the judiciary.
Article 71
The Superior Council of the Magistrature is presided
over by the President of the Republic assisted by the
Minister charged with Justice, [as] Vice President.
The legislative power is represented within the Superior Council of the Magistrature by three Deputies and
two Senators chosen by the President of each Chamber
of Parliament from the different parliamentary groups,
and having consultative voice.
The Minister charged with Finance assists the Superior
Council of the Magistrature with a consultative voice.
Article 80
The High Court of Justice is composed of thirteen members of which seven professional magistrates are designated by the Superior Council of the Magistrature
and six members elected by Parliament from within, in
proportion to the members [effectifs] of parliamentary
groups.
The President and the Vice-President of the High Court
of Justice are elected from among the resultant magistrates of the preceding paragraph by the group of members of this institution.
Article 89
The Constitutional Court consists of nine appointed
members who carry the title of Counselors.
The duration of the mandate of the Counselors is seven
years renewable once.
The nine members of the Constitutional Court are chosen as follows:
three by the President of the Republic, one of which
will be the President;
three, by the President of the Senate;
three, by the President of the National Assembly.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

249

No. Gabon belongs to the Bank of Central African

States, whose governor is selected by the member
countries.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session for
roughly eight months each year.
Article 41
The Parliament meets by right in the course of two sessions per year.
The first session opens on the first business day of March
and end, at the latest on the last business day of June.
The second session opens on the first business day in
September and end at the latest on the last business day
of December.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members. The party of President Omar Bongo, the
Gabonese Democratic Party, has long held a lock
on the legislature. The partys near-monopoly of
seats was most recently confirmed in parliamentary elections held in 2001 and 2006. It should be
noted that the presidents de facto control of parliament means that long experience of membership
does not necessarily spell substantial experience in
legislative work.

250

National Assembly of the Gambia

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE GAMBIA

Expert consultants: Momodou N. Darboe, Ida-Denise Drameh, Eleanor Marchant, Hawa Sisay Sabally,
Abdoulaye Saine
Score: .31
Influence over
executive (2/9)

Institutional
autonomy (3/9)

1. replace

10. no
dissolution
11. no decree

2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee
police
6. appoint
PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no confidence

X
X

Specified
powers (2/8)

Institutional
capacity (3/6)

19. amendments

27. sessions

20. war

28. secretary

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

24. judiciary
X

X
X

25. central
bank
26. media

18. all elected

The National Assembly of The Gambia was established in the countrys 1970 constitution. For the
half-decade before that, The Gambia was ruled by
a legislative council under British colonial rule and
with the assistance of traditional chiefs. The constitution was suspended following a military coup
in 1994. It was replaced by a new constitution,
adopted in 1996. Yahya Jammeh, a military leader,
transformed himself and his military junta into
a civilian administration in the 1996 presidential
elections.
The unicameral National Assembly has little
influence over the executive branch. Its own institutional autonomy is circumscribed by presidential
gatekeeping powers and the presidents power to
appoint some members of the National Assembly.
The legislature is granted only a couple of specified
powers and has a fairly low level of institutional
capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires the establishment of a special tribunal appointed by the
chief justice of the Supreme Court.

Article 67
(1) The President may be removed from office in
accordance with this section on any of the following
grounds
(a) abuse of office, wilful violation of the oath of allegiance or the Presidents oath of office, or wilful violation of any provision of this Constitution, or
(b) misconduct in that
(i) he or she has conducted himself in a manner
which brings or is likely to bring the office of
President into contempt or disrepute; or
(ii) he or she has dishonestly done any act which
is prejudicial or inimical to the economy of The
Gambia or dishonestly omitted to act with similar
consequences.
(2) Where the Speaker receives a notice in writing
signed by not less than one half of all the members
of the National Assembly of a motion for the removal
of the President on any of the grounds set out in subsection (1), specifying particulars of the allegations (with
any necessary documentation), and requesting that a
tribunal be appointed to investigate the allegations, the
Speaker shall
(a) inform the President of the notice;
(b) request the Chief Justice to appoint a tribunal
consisting of a Justice of the Supreme Court, as Chairman, and not less than four other persons selected by
the Chief Justice, at least two of whom shall be persons who hold or have held high judicial office.
(3) The tribunal shall investigate the matter and shall
report to the National Assembly through the Speaker

National Assembly of the Gambia

whether or not it finds the allegations specified in the
motion to have been substantiated. The President shall
have the right to appear and be legally represented
before the tribunal.
(4) If the tribunal reports to the National Assembly that
it finds that the particulars of any allegation against the
President contained in the motion have not been substantiated, no further proceedings shall be taken under
this section in respect of that allegation.
(5) Where the tribunal reports to the National Assembly that it finds that the particulars of any such allegation have been substantiated, the National Assembly
may, on a motion supported by the votes of not less
than two thirds of all the members, resolve that the
President has been guilty of such abuse of office, violation of oath, violation of the Constitution, or misconduct or misbehaviour as to render him or her unfit
to continue to hold the office of President; and where
the National Assembly so resolves, the President shall
immediately cease to hold office.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 71
(2) A person shall not be qualified to be appointed, or
hold the office of a Secretary of State if, he or she is a
member of the National Assembly.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 77
(2) The National Assembly may request the President
to attend a sitting of the National Assembly for the
discussion of a matter of national importance.
(4) The Vice-President or a Secretary of State shall,
when requested by the National Assembly, report to the
National Assembly on any matter concerning a department or other business of Government committed to
his or her charge.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can establish committees to
investigate the executive.
Article 109
(2) Committees may be appointed
(a) to investigate or inquire into the activities or
administration of ministries or departments of the
Government, and such investigation or inquiry may
extend to making proposals for legislation;
(b) to investigate any matter of public importance.

251

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. Despite constitutional provisions to the contrary, the legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
Article 109
(1) The National Assembly shall appoint
(d) a Standing Committee on Defence and Security, and such other standing or other committees
as it considers necessary for the exercise of its functions.

6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

No. There is no prime minister.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. Ministers (secretaries of state) are appointed by
the president, and the appointments do not require
the legislatures approval.
Article 71
(3) Secretaries of State shall be appointed by the President and shall, before assuming the functions of their
office, take and subscribe the prescribed oaths.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 46
There shall be an election for the office of President in
the three months before the expiration of the term of
the incumbent President.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature can pass a vote of censure
against individual ministers (secretaries of state),
but not against the government as a whole.
Article 75
(1) The National Assembly may, by resolution supported by the votes of two-thirds of all the members,
pass a vote of censure against a Secretary of State or Vice
President on the grounds of
(a) his or her inability, arising from any cause, to
perform the functions of his or her office;
(b) abuse of office or violation of any provision of
this Constitution;
(c) his or her misconduct in office.
(2) A vote of censure shall be initiated by a petition,
signed by not less than one third of all the members
of the National Assembly to the President through the

252
Speaker stating the grounds on which they are dissatisfied with the conduct or performance of the Secretary
of State or Vice President.
(3) The President shall cause a copy of the petition to be
given to the Secretary of State or Vice President immediately he or she receives it.
(4) The motion for the resolution of censure shall not
be debated until after the expiry of fourteen days from
the day the petition was sent to the President.
(5) The Secretary of State or Vice President concerned
has the right to attend and be heard during the debate
on the motion.
(6) In this section, misconduct in office means that
the person concerned has
(a) conducted himself or herself in a manner which
brings or is likely to bring his or her office into contempt or disrepute;
(b) dishonestly done any act which is prejudicial or
inimical to the economy of The Gambia or dishonestly omitted to act with similar consequences.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.
Shortly before the 2006 presidential elections and
during a period of political tension, however, the
legislature voted to allow the president to dissolve
it.
11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires
ratification or approval by the legislature before
it takes effect; that is, the executive lacks decree
power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority vote in the National
Assembly is needed to override a presidential veto.
Article 100
(3) Where a Bill passed by the National Assembly is
presented to the President for his or her assent, the
President shall, within thirty days, assent to the Bill or
return it to the National Assembly with the request that
the National Assembly reconsider the Bill; and if he or
she requests the National Assembly to reconsider the
Bill, the President shall state the reasons for the request
and any recommendations for amendment of the Bill.
(4) Where the National Assembly has reconsidered a
Bill as so requested in accordance with subsection (3)
and has resolved by a vote supported by not less than
two thirds of all the members of the National Assembly that the Bill, with or without the amendments recommended by the President, be presented again to the

National Assembly of the Gambia

President for his or her assent, the President shall assent
to the Bill within seven days of it being so presented.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Supreme Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 127
(1) The Supreme Court shall have an exclusive original
jurisdiction
(a) for the interpretation or enforcement of any provision of this Constitution other than any provision
of sections 18 to 33 or section 36(5) (which relate to
fundamental rights and freedoms);
(b) on any question whether any law was made in
excess of the powers conferred by this Constitution
or any other law upon the National Assembly or any
other person or authority.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. The legislature is prohibited from initiating legislation related to taxation, public expenditures,
and government debt.
Article 101
(4) Without prejudice to the power of the National
Assembly to make any amendment (whether by the
increase or reduction of any tax or charges, or the
amount of any payment or withdrawal, or otherwise),
the National Assembly shall not give consideration to a
Bill that in the opinion of the person presiding makes
provision for any of the following purposes
(i) for the imposition of taxation or the alteration of
taxation;
(ii) for the imposition of any charges on the Consolidated Revenue Fund or any other public fund of The
Gambia or the alteration of any such charge;
(iii) for the payment, issue or withdrawal from the
Consolidated Revenue Fund or any other public fund
of The Gambia of moneys not charged thereon or
any increase in the amount of such payment, issue or
withdrawal; or
(iv) for the composition or remission of any debt due
to the Government, unless the Bill is introduced into
the National Assembly by the President.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The president can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.

National Assembly of the Gambia

Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,

including control over members perquisites.
Article 95
The Speaker, the Deputy Speaker and the other members of the National Assembly shall receive such remuneration and benefits, including retirement benefits, as
an Act of the National Assembly may prescribe.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislators can be arrested and prosecuted,
although not for anything they say, nor for anything at all while they are on their way to, attending, or returning from a legislative session.
Article 113
There shall be freedom of speech and debate in the
National Assembly and that freedom shall not be
impeached or questioned in any court or place outside
the National Assembly.
Article 114
Without prejudice to the generality of section 113, no
civil or criminal proceedings shall be instituted against
a member of the National Assembly in any court or
other place outside the National Assembly by reason of
anything said by him.
Article 115
No civil or criminal process issuing from any court
or other place outside the National Assembly shall be
served on or executed in relation to a member of the
National Assembly while he or she is on his or her way
to, attending or returning from any proceeding of the
National Assembly.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
No. The president appoints about 10 percent of the
members of the National Assembly.
Article 88
(1) Members of the National Assembly shall comprise
the following
(a) thirty-nine members elected from the Chieftaincy
Districts, each of which district shall constitute a constituency;
(b) three members elected from the constituencies
in Banjul, namely, Banjul North, Banjul South and
Banjul Central;
(c) three members elected from the constituencies in
the Kanifing Municipality, namely, Serrekunda West,
Serrekunda East and Bakau; and
(d) four members nominated by the President.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. The legislature alone cannot change the constitution without the approval of the president. If the

253

president objects to a constitutional amendment

that has been passed by a two-thirds majority vote
in the Assembly, he or she can choose to put the
amendment to a nationwide referendum.
Article 226
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, an Act of
the National Assembly may alter this Constitution.
(2) Subject to subsection (4), a bill for an Act of the
National Assembly under this section shall not be
passed by the National Assembly or presented to the
President for assent unless
(a) before the first reading of the Bill in the National
Assembly, the Bill is published in at least two issues of
the Gazette, the latest publication being not less than
three months after the first, and the Bill is introduced
into the National Assembly not earlier than ten days
after the latest publication;
(b) the Bill is supported on the second and third readings by the votes of not less than three quarters of all
the members of the National Assembly.
(3) If the President fails to assent within thirty days to
a Bill passed by the National Assembly in accordance
with subsection (2), the Bill shall be returned to the
Speaker who shall refer it to the Independent Electoral
Commission. The Independent Electoral Commission
shall cause a referendum to be held on the Bill in accordance with subsection (4) and, if the Bill is supported on
such a referendum by the majority provided for in that
subsection, it shall again be presented to the President
for his assent.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for presidential war declarations.
Article 79
(1) The President shall be responsible for
(d) subject to the prior approval of the National
Assembly, the declaration of war and the making of
peace.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 79
(1) The President shall be responsible for
(c) the negotiation and, subject to ratification by the
National Assembly, the conclusion of treaties and
other international agreements;
(2) The Gambia shall not
(a) enter into any engagement with any other country which causes it to lose its sovereignty without the
matter first being put to a referendum and passed by
such majority as may be prescribed by an Act of the
National Assembly;

254
(b) become a member of any international organization unless the National Assembly is satisfied that it is
in the interest of The Gambia and that membership
does not derogate from its sovereignty.
(3) The National Assembly may, by resolution, establish procedures for the ratification of treaties and other
international agreements.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. The president has the power to grant amnesty.
Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately. See
item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 82
(1) The President may, after consulting the Committee
established by subsection (2)
(a) grant to any person convicted of any offence a
pardon either free or subject to lawful conditions;
(b) grant to any person a respite, either indefinite or
for a specified period, of the execution of any punishment imposed on that person for any offence;
(c) substitute a less severe form of punishment for
any punishment imposed on any person for any
offence;
(d) remit the whole or any part of any punishment
imposed on any person for such an offence or any
penalty otherwise due to the Republic on account of
any offence.

National Assembly of the Gambia

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the chairman of the
Central Bank of Gambia.
Article 162
(1) The authority of the Central Bank shall vest in the
Board of Directors of the Bank which shall comprise
(a) a Chairman, who shall be the Governor and Chief
Executive of the Bank; and
(b) four other Directors.
(2) The members of the Board of Directors shall be
appointed from among persons of standing and experience in financial matters by the President, in consultation with the Public Service Commission.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature is required to meet in ordinary
session for only five months each year, but in practice, it normally meets for six months or longer.
Article 98
(b) The National Assembly shall sit for a period of not
less than one hundred and fifty days a year.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.

No. Formally, the legislature has a minimal role

in selecting judges, but in practice, the president
controls judicial appointments.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.

Article 134
(3) The members of the Special Criminal Court shall be
appointed by the Judicial Service Commission subject
to the approval of the National Assembly.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.

Article 138
(1) The Chief Justice shall be appointed by the President after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission.
(2) All other judges of the superior courts except the
judges of the Special Criminal Court shall be appointed
by the President on the recommendation of the Judicial
Service Commission.

No.

Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
No. The turnover rate is high, resulting in few
highly experienced legislators.

Supreme Council of Georgia (Parlamenti)

255

SUPREME COUNCIL OF GEORGIA (PARLAMENTI)

Expert consultants: Ivlian Haindrava, Nina Khatiskatsi, Mark Mullen, Ghia Nodia, Colette Selman
Score: .59
Influence over
executive (5/9)

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)

Specified
powers (5/8)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no confidence

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

18. all elected

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central
bank
26. media

X
X
X

The Supreme Council (Parlamenti) of Georgia first

met in 1918 and was formally established in the
countrys 1921 constitution. Shortly after the constitution was drawn up, it was rendered inoperative
by Georgias incorporation into the Soviet Union.
Georgia gained independence in 1991, and in 1995
parliament drafted and adopted the current constitution. The document calls for a unicameral legislature. Following the Rose Revolution of 2004, a
sweeping constitutional amendment altered parliaments powers. The 2004 amendments introduced a government under a prime minister as a
body of executive power separate from the presidency. Under the amendments, the legislature
gained the power to vote no confidence in the
government. Prior to 2004 parliament lacked the
ability to vote no confidence. The amendment
also gave the president the authority to dissolve
the parliament under certain circumstances. Previously the parliament had been immune from dissolution.
The legislature enjoys some ability to influence
the executive branch. In addition to holding the
power of confirmation of the presidents ministerial appointments, parliament can interpellate and
investigate executive branch officials. Parliament
has some institutional autonomy, although it is
limited by presidential decree, veto, and the aforementioned dissolution powers. It is granted a few

specified powers and prerogatives and has a fair

amount of institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment for treason requires
the involvement of the Supreme Court, and
impeachment for violation of the constitution
requires a decision by the Constitutional Court.
The legislature can remove the prime minister with
a vote of no confidence.
Article 63
1. Under the circumstances defined in the second paragraph of Article 75, not less than one third of the total
number of the members of the Parliament shall be
entitled to raise the question of the dismissal of the
President of Georgia in accordance with impeachment
procedure. The case shall be submitted to the Supreme
Court or Constitutional Court for a conclusion.
2. If, by its conclusion, the Supreme Court confirmed
corpus delicti in the act of the President or the Constitutional Court confirmed the violation of the Constitution, after having discussed the conclusion the Parliament shall adopt a decision by the majority of votes
of the total number of the members of the Parliament
on putting the issue of impeachment of the President
to the vote.

256

Supreme Council of Georgia (Parlamenti)

3. The President shall be deemed to be dismissed from

the office in accordance with impeachment procedure,
if not less than two thirds of the total number of the
members of the Parliament supported the decision.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.

Article 75
1. The President of Georgia shall enjoy personal immunity. While holding his/her position, his/her detention
or proceeding shall be impermissible.
2. In case of the violation of the Constitution, commission of high treason and other criminal offence,
the Parliament shall be authorized to dismiss the President in accordance with a procedures of Article 63 of
the Constitution and in accordance with a procedures
determined by the Organic Law if:
a. the violation of the Constitution is confirmed by a
judgment of the Constitutional Court;
b. corpus delicti of high treason and other criminal
offence is confirmed by a conclusion of the Supreme
Court.

Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials

from the executive.

Article 81
1. The Parliament shall be entitled to declare nonconfidence to the Government by the majority of the
total number. Not less than one third of the total number of the members of the Parliament shall be entitled to
raise a question of declaration of non-confidence. After
the declaration of non-confidence to the Government
the President of Georgia shall dismiss the Government
or not approve the decision of the Parliament. In case
the Parliament declares non-confidence to the Government again not earlier than 90 days and not later than
100 days, the President of Georgia shall dismiss the
Government or dissolve the Parliament and schedule
extraordinary elections. In case of circumstances provided for by subparagraphs ad of Article 51 revoting of non-confidence shall be held within 15 days
from the end of these circumstances.
2. The Parliament shall be entitled to raise the question of declaration of unconditional non-confidence
to the Government by a resolution. In case the Parliament declares non-confidence to the Government by
the majority of three-fifth of the total number of the
members of the Parliament not earlier than 15 days and
not later than 20 days from the adoption of the resolution, the President shall dismiss the Government. In
case the Parliament does not declare non-confidence to
the Government, it shall be impermissible to put the
question of non-confidence to the Government within
next 6 months.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 53
1. A member of the Parliament shall not be entitled
to hold any position in public office or engage in an
entrepreneurial activity. The conflict of interests shall
be determined by law.

Article 59
1. A member of the Parliament shall be entitled to apply
with a question to the bodies accountable to the Parliament, [including] a member of the Government . . . and
to receive answers from them.
2. A group of at least ten members of the Parliament or
a Parliamentary Faction shall be entitled to apply with
a question to any body accountable to the Parliament,
the Government, a particular member of the Government the latter being obliged to answer the raised questions at a sitting of the Parliament. The answer may
become a matter of discussion of the Parliament.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can establish committees to
investigate the executive.
Article 56
1. To prepare the legislative agenda, facilitate the implementation of decisions adopted by Parliament and to
control the activities of the bodies accountable to Parliament and the Government, committees shall be set
up for the duration of the term of Parliament.
2. In the cases defined in the Constitution and in the
rules of procedure of Parliament, as well as upon the
request of no fewer than one fourth of the members
of Parliament, investigative or other temporary committees are established by Parliament. The representation of the parliamentary majority in such a committee shall not exceed half of the total number of its
members.
3. At the request of the investigative committee, attendance at its meetings as well as the submission of documents required for the investigation of the matter under
consideration are obligatory.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. Legislative committees have effective oversight powers over the agencies of coercion. For
example, in a recent episode, the opposition in the
legislature came upon a secret Ministry of Security document that included proposals for spying on opposition parties. The Minister of Security
was speedily summoned to a hearing in which he
renounced the plan and sacked the employee who
drafted the document.

Supreme Council of Georgia (Parlamenti)

Article 59
1. A member of the Parliament shall be entitled to apply
with a question to the bodies accountable to the Parliament, [including] a member of the Government . . . and
to receive answers from them.
2. A group of at least ten members of the Parliament or
a Parliamentary Faction shall be entitled to apply with
a question to any body accountable to the Parliament,
the Government, a particular member of the Government the latter being obliged to answer the raised questions at a sitting of the Parliament. The answer may
become a matter of discussion of the Parliament.

6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

No. The president appoints the prime minister.
Prior to 2004 there was no prime minister.
Article 73
1. The President of Georgia:
b. appoints the Prime Minister and approves the
appointments of the other members of Government,
such as ministers, by the Prime Minister.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The president appoints ministers on the recommendation of the prime minister, and the
appointments require the legislatures approval.
The legislature can disapprove of individual ministers by raising a question of recusal. Prior to
2004 ministerial appointments did not require parliaments approval.
Article 73
1. The President of Georgia:
b. appoints the Prime Minister and approves the
appointments of the other members of Government,
such as ministers, by the Prime Minister.
Article 79
5. The Prime Minister shall appoint other members of
the Government by the consent of the President, be
authorized to dismiss the members of the Government.
Article 80
3. Within a week from the submission of the composition of the Government by the President of Georgia the
Parliament shall consider and vote the issue of declaration of confidence to the composition of the Government and the Governmental program. The confidence
of the Parliament shall be gained by the majority of
the total number of the members of the Parliament.
The members of the Government shall be appointed
within a term of three days from the declaration of
confidence. The Parliament shall be entitled to declare
non-confidence to the composition of the Government
and raise a question of recusal of a particular member of the Government in the same decision. In case
of approval of the decision of the Parliament on the
recusal by the President the recused person shall not be

257
appointed in the same composition of the Government
instead of a dismissed or resigned member.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 70
1. The President of Georgia shall be elected on the basis
of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot
for a term of five years.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 81
1. The Parliament shall be entitled to declare nonconfidence to the Government by the majority of the
total number. Not less than one third of the total number of the members of the Parliament shall be entitled
to raise a question of declaration of non-confidence.
After the declaration of non-confidence to the Government the President of Georgia shall dismiss the Government or not approve the decision of the Parliament.
In case the Parliament declares non-confidence to the
Government again not earlier than 90 days and not
later than 100 days, the President of Georgia shall dismiss the Government or dissolve the Parliament and
schedule extraordinary elections.
2. The Parliament shall be entitled to raise the question of declaration of unconditional non-confidence
to the Government by a resolution. In case the Parliament declares non-confidence to the Government by
the majority of three-fifth of the total number of the
members of the Parliament not earlier than 15 days and
not later than 20 days from the adoption of the resolution, the President shall dismiss the Government. In
case the Parliament does not declare non-confidence to
the Government, it shall be impermissible to put the
question of non-confidence to the Government within
next 6 months.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature. Prior
to 2004 the legislature was immune from dissolution.
Article 51
The Parliament shall be dissolved by the President only
in cases determined by the Constitution.
Article 73
1. The President of Georgia shall:
c. be entitled to dissolve the Government, dismiss
the Ministers of Internal Affairs, Defence and State
Security of Georgia on his/her own initiative or in
other cases envisaged by the Constitution;

258

Supreme Council of Georgia (Parlamenti)

o. dissolve the Parliament in accordance with a procedure and in cases established by the Constitution.

Article 80
5. In case a composition of the Government and the
program of the Governmental thereof do not gain the
confidence of the Parliament for three times, the President of Georgia shall nominate a new candidate of
the Prime Minister within a term of 5 days or appoint
the Prime Minister without consent of the Parliament,
whereas the Prime Minister shall appoint the Ministers by the consent of the President of Georgia within
a term of 5 days as well. In such a case the President
of Georgia shall dissolve the Parliament and schedule
extraordinary elections.
Article 81
1. The Parliament shall be entitled to declare nonconfidence to the Government by the majority of the
total number. Not less than one third of the total number of the members of the Parliament shall be entitled
to raise a question of declaration of non-confidence.
After the declaration of non-confidence to the Government the President of Georgia shall dismiss the Government or not approve the decision of the Parliament.
In case the Parliament declares non-confidence to the
Government again not earlier than 90 days and not
later than 100 days, the President of Georgia shall dismiss the Government or dissolve the Parliament and
schedule extraordinary elections.
Article 93
2. The Government shall submit the Draft Budget of
next year to the Parliament not later than three months
before the end of the budget year. Together with the
Draft Budget, the Government shall submit a report on
the progress of the fulfilment of the State Budget of the
current year. The Government shall submit a report on
the fulfilment of the State Budget to the Parliament for
approval not later than three months from the end of
the budget year. In case of non-fulfilment of the State
Budget the Parliament does not approve a report on the
fulfilment of the State Budget, the President of Georgia
shall consider the issue of liability of the Government
and inform the Parliament on his/her founded decision
within a month.
6. If the Parliament fails to adopt the Budget submitted in accordance with a procedure established by paragraph 2 of this Article within three months, the President of Georgia shall be authorised to dismiss the
Government or dissolve the Parliament and schedule
extraordinary elections.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The president can issue decrees that have the
force of law on tax and budgetary issues between
the dissolution of one parliament and the convocation of the next. The decrees lapse if they are not
subsequently approved by parliament.

Article 73
1. The President of Georgia shall:
j. issue decrees and orders on the basis of the Constitution and law;
q. from the dissolution of the Parliament to the first
convocation of the newly elected Parliament, in the
exclusive cases, be entitled to issue a decree having
the force of law on tax and budgetary issues, which
shall be invalid in case it is not approved by the newly
elected Parliament within a month from the first convocation.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A three-fifths majority vote in the legislature is
needed to override a presidential veto.
Article 68
1. A draft law adopted by the Parliament shall be submitted to the President of Georgia within a term of
seven days.
2. The President shall sign and promulgate the law
within a term of ten days or return it to the Parliament
with reasoned remarks.
3. If the President returns the draft law to the Parliament, the latter shall put to the vote the remarks of
the President. For the adoption of the remarks the same
number of votes shall suffice as determined for this kind
of draft law by Article 66 of the Constitution. If the
remarks are adopted, the final redaction of the draft
law shall be submitted to the President who shall sign
and promulgate it within a term of seven days.
4. If the Parliament rejects the remarks of the President, the initial redaction of the draft law shall be put
to the vote. A law or an Organic Law shall be deemed
to be adopted if it is supported by not less than three
fifths of the number of the members of the Parliament
on the current nominal list. The constitutional amendment shall be deemed to be passed if it is supported
by not less than two thirds of the total number of the
members of the Parliament.
5. If the President fails to promulgate the draft law
within the defined term, the President of the Parliament shall sign and promulgate it.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 89
1. The Constitutional Court of Georgia on the basis
of a constitutional claim or a submission of the President of Georgia, the Government, not less than one
fifth of the members of the Parliament, a court, the
higher representative bodies the Autonomous Republic
of Abkhazia and the Autonomous Republic of Ajara, the

Supreme Council of Georgia (Parlamenti)

Public Defender or a citizen in accordance with a procedure established by the Organic Law) shall:
a. adjudicate upon the constitutionality of a Constitutional Agreement, law, [and] normative acts of the
President and the Government.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,
including control over members remuneration.
Article 53
3. A member of the Parliament shall receive remuneration as determined by law.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune. Even in cases of
flagrante delicto, legislators must be immediately
released if the parliament does not consent to their
prosecution.
Article 52
2. Arrest or detention of a member of the Parliament,
the search of his/her apartment, car, workplace or
his/her person shall be permissible only by the consent of the Parliament, except in the cases when he/she
is caught flagrante delicto which shall immediately be
notified to the Parliament. Unless the Parliament gives
the consent, the arrested or detained member of the
Parliament shall immediately be released.
3. A member of the Parliament shall have the right
not to testify on the fact disclosed to him/her as to
a member of the Parliament. Seizure of written materials connected with this matter shall be impermissible.
The right shall also be reserved to a member of the Parliament after the termination of his/her office.
4. A member of the Parliament shall not be proceeded
on the account of the ideas and opinions expressed by
him/her in and outside the Parliament while performing his/her duties.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.

259
Article 49
1. The Parliament of Georgia shall consist of 150 members of the Parliament elected by a proportional system
and 85 members elected by a majority system for a term
of four years on the basis of universal, equal and direct
suffrage by secret ballot.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can pass a bill to amend the
constitution with a two-thirds majority vote. If
the bill is vetoed by the president, the legislature
can override the presidents veto with a two-thirds
majority vote.
Article 102
1. The following shall be entitled to submit a draft law
on general or partial revision of the Constitution: the
President; more than half of the total number of the
members of the Parliament; not less than 200,000 electors.
2. A draft law on the revision of the Constitution shall
be submitted to the Parliament, which shall promulgate
the former for the public discussion. The Parliament
shall begin the discussion of the draft law after a month
from its promulgation.
3. The draft law on the revision of the Constitution
shall be deemed to be adopted if it is supported by at
least two thirds of the total number of the members of
the Parliament of Georgia.
4. The law on the revision of the Constitution shall be
signed and promulgated by the President of Georgia in
accordance with a procedure provided for by Article 68
of the Constitution.
Article 68
1. A draft law adopted by the Parliament shall be submitted to the President of Georgia within a term of
seven days.
2. The President shall sign and promulgate the law
within a term of ten days or return it to the Parliament
with reasoned remarks.
3. If the President returns the draft law to the Parliament, the latter shall put to the vote the remarks
of the President. For the adoption of the remarks the
same number of votes shall suffice as determined for
this kind of draft law by Article 66 of the Constitution. If the remarks are adopted, the final redaction of
the draft law shall be submitted to the President who
shall sign and promulgate it within a term of seven
days.
4. If the Parliament rejects the remarks of the President, the initial redaction of the draft law shall be put
to the vote. A law or an Organic Law shall be deemed
to be adopted if it is supported by not less than three
fifths of the number of the members of the Parliament
on the current nominal list. The constitutional amendment shall be deemed to be passed if it is supported
by not less than two thirds of the total number of the
members of the Parliament.

260
5. If the President fails to promulgate the draft law
within the defined term, the President of the Parliament shall sign and promulgate it.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislature declares war. Since 2004 presidential decisions on the use of the armed forces
require the legislatures approval. Prior to 2004
the president was not required to obtain parliamentary approval before dispatching troops
abroad.
Article 62
Decision of the Parliament on the issues of war and
peace, state of emergency or martial law and issues
determined by Article 46 of the Constitution shall be
adopted by the majority of the total number of the
members of the Parliament.
Article 100
1. The President of Georgia shall adopt a decision on
the use of the armed forces and submit it to the Parliament within 48 hours for approval. In addition the
use of the armed forces for the honouring international
obligations shall be impermissible without the consent
of the Parliament of Georgia.
2. For the purpose of state defence in the exclusive
cases and in cases envisaged by law, the decision about
the entrance, use and movement of the armed forces
of another state on the territory of Georgia shall be
adopted by the President of Georgia. The decision
shall immediately be submitted to the Parliament for
approval and shall be enforced after the consent of the
Parliament.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties on most major issues.
Article 65
1. The Parliament of Georgia by the majority of the
total number of the members of the Parliament shall
ratify, denounce and annul the international treaties
and agreements.
2. Apart from the international treaties and agreements
providing for ratification, it shall also be obligatory to
ratify an international treaty and agreement which:
provides for accession of Georgia to an international
organisation or intergovernmental union; is of a military character; pertains to the territorial integrity of
the state or change of the state frontiers; is related
to borrowing or lending loans by the state; requires
a change of domestic legislation, adoption of necessary laws and acts with force of law with the view
of honouring the undertaken international obligations.
3. The Parliament shall be notified about the conclusion
of other international treaties and agreements.

Supreme Council of Georgia (Parlamenti)

4. In case of lodging a constitutional claim or a submission with the Constitutional Court, ratification of
the respective international treaty or agreement shall
be impermissible before adjudication by the Constitutional Court.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. The president has the power to grant amnesty.
Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately. See
item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 73
1. The President of Georgia:
n. grants pardon to convicted persons.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislature elects three of the nine judges
of the Constitutional Court and all of the judges
on the Supreme Court.
Article 88
2. The Constitutional Court of Georgia shall consist of
nine judges the members of the Constitutional Court.
Three members of the Constitutional Court shall be
appointed by the President of Georgia, three members
shall be elected by the Parliament by not less than three
fifths of the number of the members of the Parliament
on the current nominal list, three members shall be
appointed by the Supreme Court.
Article 90
2. The President and the judges of the Supreme Court
of Georgia shall be elected for a period of not less than
ten years by the Parliament by the majority of the
number of the members of Parliament on the current
nominal list upon the submission of the President of
Georgia.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the president of the
National Bank of Georgia.
Article 96
1. The Council of the National Bank shall be the higher
body of the National Bank of Georgia. The members of
the Council of the National Bank shall be elected for a
term of seven years by the Parliament by the majority
of the number of the members of the Parliament on
the current nominal list upon the submission of the
President of Georgia. The dismissal of the members of
the Council of the National Bank shall be permissible
only under a decision of the Parliament in accordance
with Article 64.
2. The President of the National Bank shall be appointed
and dismissed by the President of Georgia of the Bank

Parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany (Bundestag)

upon the submission of the Council of the National
Bank among the members of the Council.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
Yes. The Board of Trustees that oversees public
broadcasting is elected by the legislature. The initial nine-member board was elected from a slate
of eighteen candidates presented by the president.
In order to fill openings on the board, the parliament selects one of three candidates proposed by
the president.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session for
eight months each year.
Article 61
1. The Parliament of Georgia shall assemble ex officio
for a regular session twice a year. The autumn session
shall open on the first Tuesday of September and close
on the third Friday of December. The spring session
shall open on the first Tuesday of February and close
on the last Friday of June.

261

No. By law, legislators are entitled to personal staff,

but in practice, legislative staffs have been limited
by budgetary constraints.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No. See item 28.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

PARLIAMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (BUNDESTAG)

Expert consultants: Alison B. Alter, David Bach, Sebastian Karcher, Gerhard Loewenberg,
Carsten Schneider, Tobias Schulze-Cleven, Christian Soe, J. Nicholas Ziegler
Score: .84
Influence over
executive (8/9)

Institutional
autonomy (7/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Specified
powers (6/8)

Institutional
capacity (6/6)

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

X
X

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

X
X

23. pardon

24. judiciary

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

25. central bank

26. media

X
X

The Parliament (Bundestag) of the Federal Republic of Germany was founded in the Federal Republics 1949 constitution. The bicameral legislature

consists of the popularly elected House of Representatives (Bundestag) and the Senate (Bundesrat),
whose members are appointed by the governments

262

Parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany (Bundestag)

of the states. In 1990 East Germany acceded to the

Federal Republic of Germany under the 1949 constitutional framework.
The legislature is the center of German politics and government. It exerts formidable influence over the executive. It appoints and removes
the prime minister (chancellor), comprises half of
the membership of the electoral college that elects
the (largely ceremonial) president, and wields
effective oversight and investigatory authority. Its
members, moreover, serve in ministerial positions.
Parliament also has great autonomy in the legislative process. It can introduce bills in all policy jurisdictions, and bills are not subject to veto, although
most bills are introduced by the cabinet. In terms
of specified powers and prerogatives, the legislature is also strong. Of the eight powers listed in
this category, the German parliament has six. The
legislature is also equipped with substantial institutional capacity, holding every measure of institutional capacity measured in this survey. It attracts
and retains talented politicians, who are provided
with adequate staff and resources.
A distinctive feature of the German system is
the constructive vote of no confidence, according
to which the parliament must designate a successor
chancellor before passing a vote of no confidence
in the sitting government or risk its own dissolution.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The House of Representatives can replace the
chancellor with a constructive vote of no confidence, meaning that the parliament must designate a successor chancellor before passing a vote of
no confidence. Presidential impeachment requires
the involvement of the Federal Constitutional
Court.
Article 61
(1) The House of Representatives or the Senate may
impeach the President before the Federal Constitutional
Court for willful violation of this Constitution or any
other federal statute. The motion of impeachment is
filed by at least one quarter of the members of the
House of Representatives or one quarter of the votes of
the Senate. A decision to impeach requires a majority
of two thirds of the members of the House of Representatives or of two thirds of the votes of the Senate. The
impeachment is pleaded by a person commissioned by
the impeaching body.

(2) Where the Federal Constitutional Court finds the

President guilty of a willful violation of this Constitution or of another federal statute, it may declare him
to have forfeited his office. After impeachment, it may
issue an interim order preventing the President from
exercising his functions.
Article 67
(1) The House of Representatives can express its lack of
confidence in the Chancellor only by electing a successor with the majority of its members and by requesting
the President to dismiss the Chancellor.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Since 1949 the overwhelming majority of ministers have served simultaneously as members of
the House of Representatives.
3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The standing committees of the legislature
often question the ministers.
4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can establish committees to
investigate the executive.
Article 44
(1) The House of Representatives has the right, and
upon the motion of one quarter of its members the
duty, to set up a committee of investigation, which
takes the requisite evidence at public hearings.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. Legislative committees have effective powers
of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
Article 45a
(1) The House of Representatives appoints a Committee
on Foreign Affairs and Committee on Defence.
(2) The Committee on Defence also has the rights of
a committee of investigation. Upon the motion of one
quarter of its members it has the duty to make a specific
matter the subject of investigation.
Article 45b
A Defence Commissioner of the House of Representatives is appointed to safeguard the basic rights and to
assist the House of Representatives in exercising parliamentary control. Details are regulated by a federal
statute.

Parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany (Bundestag)

6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

Yes. The House of Representatives elects the chancellor.
Article 63
(1) The Chancellor is elected, without debate, by the
House of Representatives upon the proposal of the President.
(2) The person obtaining the votes of the majority of
the members of the House of Representatives is elected.
The person elected is appointed by the President.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers on the recommendation of the chancellor, and the appointments do not require the legislatures approval.
Article 64
(1) The Ministers are appointed and dismissed by the
President upon the proposal of the Chancellor.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The president is elected by a Federal Convention consisting of the members of the House of
Representatives and members elected by the state
parliaments.
Article 54
(1) The President is elected, without debate, by the Federal Convention. Every German who is entitled to vote
in House of Representatives elections and has attained
the age of forty years is eligible for election.
(2) The term of office of the President is five years.
Reelection for a consecutive term is permitted only
once.
(3) The Federal Convention consists of the members of
the House of Representatives [Bundestag] and an equal
number of members elected by the parliaments of the
States according to the principles of proportional representation.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The House of Representatives has a constructive vote of no confidence, meaning that the parliament must designate a successor chancellor before
passing a vote of no confidence.
Article 67
(1) The House of Representatives can express its lack
of confidence in the Chancellor only by electing a
successor with the majority of its members and by
requesting the President to dismiss the Chancellor. The

263

President complies with the request and appoints the

person elected.
Article 68
(1) Where a motion of the Chancellor for a vote of confidence is not carried by the majority of the members of
the House of Representatives, the President may, upon
the proposal of the Chancellor, dissolve the House of
Representatives within twenty-one days. The right of
dissolution lapses as soon as the House of Representatives elects another Chancellor with the majority of its
members.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president, on the proposal of the chancellor, can dissolve the House of Representatives.
Article 68
(1) Where a motion of the Chancellor for a vote of confidence is not carried by the majority of the members of
the House of Representatives, the President may, upon
the proposal of the Chancellor, dissolve the House of
Representatives within twenty-one days. The right of
dissolution lapses as soon as the House of Representatives elects another Chancellor with the majority of its
members.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The president lacks veto power.
13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Federal Constitutional Court can review
the constitutionality of laws.
Article 93
(1) The Federal Constitutional Court decides:
2. in case of differences of opinion or doubts on the
formal and material compatibility of federal law or
State law with this Constitution . . . at the request of
the Government, of a State government, or of one
third of the House of Representatives members.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions of federal (national) concern, meaning all areas except where power is reserved to the
states.

264

Parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany (Bundestag)

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
Members salaries are protected by law.
Article 48
(3) Deputies are entitled to adequate remuneration
ensuring their independence . . . Details are regulated by
a federal statute.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the exceptions
of defamatory insults and flagrante delicto, here
expressed as apprehended during commission of
the offence or in the course of the following day.
In practice, the exception for defamatory insults
is not used to threaten or intimidate opponents.

Article 79
(1) This Constitution can be amended only by statutes
which expressly amend or supplement the text thereof.
(2) Any such statute requires the consent of two thirds
of the members of the House of Representatives and
two thirds of the votes of the Senate.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is required to declare
a state of defense. Recently, the House of Representatives played a major role in debating and
approving the deployments of German troops outside the NATO area to the former Yugoslavia and
Afghanistan.
Article 80a
(1) Where this Constitution or a federal statute on
defence, including the protection of the civilian population, stipulates that legal provisions may only be
applied in accordance with this Article, their application is, except in a state of defence, admissible only
after the House of Representatives has determined that
a state of tension exists or where it has specifically
approved such application.

Article 51
(1) The Senate consists of members of the State governments which appoint and recall them.

Article 115a
(1) The determination that federal territory is being
attacked by armed force or that such an attack is directly
imminent are made by the House of Representatives
with the consent of the Senate. Such determination are
made at the request of the Government and require
a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, which include
at least the majority of the members of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Where the situation imperatively calls for immediate action and where insurmountable obstacles prevent
the timely assembly of the House of Representatives,
or where there is no quorum in the House of Representatives, the Joint Committee makes this determination with a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, which
includes at least the majority of its members.
(4) Where the federal territory is being attacked by
armed force and where the competent bodies of the Federation are not in a position at once to make the determination provided for in Paragraph (1) of this article,
such determination is deemed to have been made and
promulgated at the time the attack began. The President
announces such time as soon as circumstances permit.
(5) Where the determination of the existence of a state
of defence has been promulgated and where the federal
territory is being attacked by armed force, the President
may, with the consent of the House of Representatives,
issue declarations under international law regarding the
existence of such state of defence.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.

Yes. The legislature can change the constitution

with a two-thirds majority vote.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

international treaties.

Article 46
(1) A deputy may not at any time be subjected to court
proceedings or disciplinary action or otherwise called
to account outside the House of Representatives for a
vote cast or a statement made by him in the House of
Representatives or in any of its committees. This does
not apply to defamatory insults.
(2) A deputy may not be called to account or arrested
for a punishable offence except by permission of the
House of Representatives, unless he is apprehended during commission of the offence or in the course of the
following day.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to appoint
members of the legislature. The members of the
Senate are appointed at the state level.
Article 38
(1) The deputies to the German House of Representatives are elected in general, direct, free, equal, and secret
elections.

Parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany (Bundestag)

Article 59
(2) Treaties which regulate the political relations of the
Federation or relate to matters of federal legislation
require the consent or participation, in the form of a
federal statute, of the bodies competent in any specific
case for such federal legislation.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to pass an
amnesty law.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 60
(2) [The president] exercises the right of pardon in individual cases on behalf of the Federation.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislature elects the members of the Federal Constitutional Court.
Article 94
(1) The Federal Constitutional Court consists of federal
judges and other members. Half of the members of the
Federal Constitutional Court are elected by the House
of Representatives and half by the Senate.

265

Yes. The legislature appoints some members to the

board that oversees public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The House of Representatives has the authority
to determine its own sessions and chooses to meet
regularly.
Article 39
(3) The House of Representatives determines the termination and resumption of its meetings. The President
of the House of Representatives may convene it at an
earlier date. He does so where one third of its members
or the President or the Chancellor so demand.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
Yes.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president, on the recommendation of the
government, appoints the president of the German
Federal Bank.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

266

Parliament of Ghana

PARLIAMENT OF GHANA
Expert consultants: Sophia A. B. Akuffo, Emmanuel Akwetey, Vitus A. Azeem, Staffan I. Lindberg,
Minion K. C. Morrison
Score: .47
Influence over
executive (4/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

Institutional
autonomy (4/9)
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Specified
powers (4/8)
19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

18. all elected

X
X

Institutional
capacity (3/6)

24. judiciary

X
X

25. central bank

26. media
X

The Parliament of Ghana originated during the

years of British colonial rule, with the first legislative elections taking place under the Guggisberg Constitution of 1925. Under the new
1950 constitution, the legislature achieved some
autonomy from the colonial power, and members were elected to this body in 1951, 1954, and
1956. Ghana attained independence and adopted
a constitution in 1957. It thereafter operated a
Westminster-type system until 1960, when it created a presidency, which was occupied by Kwame
Nkrumah. In 1964 the constitution was amended
to turn Ghana into a one-party state, dominated by
Nkrumahs Convention Peoples Party (CPP), and
Nkrumah was declared president-for-life. A military coup in 1966 deposed Nkrumah and led to
the suspension of the constitution. Between then
and the early 1990s, Ghana was mostly controlled
by military governments, although there were brief
intervals of more open politics in 196972 and
197981. In the early 1990s, the country began
taking steps toward political opening. In 1992 it
adopted the constitution of the Fourth Republic
of Ghana and reconstituted a functioning parliament.
The legislatures powers are not insubstantial.
Parliament can control the executive by rejecting
the presidents ministerial appointments and by
interpellating and investigating executive branch

officials. Moreover, most ministers are drawn from

parliament. The legislatures own institutional
autonomy is not expansive. It is circumscribed by
presidential powers of veto and gatekeeping. Legislators also lack immunity from criminal prosecution. The legislature is granted a few specified powers, such as the authority to approve international
treaties and declarations of war. The legislature also
has some institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of the Supreme Court.
Article 69
(1) The President shall be removed from office if he
is found, in accordance with the provisions of this
article
(a) to have acted in willful violation of the oath of
allegiance and the presidential oath set out in the Second Schedule to, or in willful violation of any other
provision of, this Constitution; or
(b) to have conducted himself in a manner
(i) which brings or is likely to bring the high office
of President into disrepute, ridicule or contempt;
or

Parliament of Ghana
(ii) prejudicial or inimical to the economy or the
security of the State; or
(c) to be incapable of performing the functions of his
office by reason of infirmity of body or mind.
(2) For the purposes of the removal from office of the
President, a notice
in writing
(a) signed by not less than one-third of all the members of Parliament, and
(b) stating that the conduct or the physical or mental
capacity of the President be investigated on any of the
grounds specified in clause (1) of this article, shall be
given to the Speaker who shall immediately inform
the Chief Justice and deliver the notice to him copied
to the President.
(3) The notice referred to in clause (2) of this article
shall be accompanied by a statement in writing setting out in detail the facts, supported by the necessary documents, on which it is claimed that the conduct or the physical or mental capacity of the President
be investigated for the purposes of his removal from
office.
(4) Subject to clause (5) of this article, the Chief Justice
shall, by constitutional instrument, immediately convene a tribunal consisting of the Chief Justice as Chairman and the four most senior Justices of the Supreme
Court and the tribunal shall inquire, in camera, whether
there is a prima facie case for the removal of the President.
(5) Where a notice under clause (2) of this article is
delivered to the Chief Justice in respect of the removal
from office of the President on the grounds of physical
or mental incapacity, the Chief Justice shall, in consultation with the professional head of the Ghana Health
Services, causes a medical board to be convened which
shall consist of not less than four eminent medical specialists and the President shall be informed accordingly.
(6) The President shall be invited to submit himself for
examination by the medical board within fourteen days
after the appointment of the board.
(7) The President shall be entitled during the proceedings of the tribunal or of the medical board to be heard
in his defence by himself or by a lawyer or other expert
or person as the case may be, of his own choice.
(8) The Rules of Court Committee shall, by constitutional instrument, make rules for the practice and procedure of the tribunal or of the medical board for the
removal of the President.
(9) Where the tribunal or medical board specified in
clauses (4) and (5) of this article determines that there
is a prima facie case for the removal of the President
or that the President is by reason of physical or mental incapacity unable to perform the functions of his
office, the findings shall immediately be submitted to
the Speaker of Parliament through the Chief Justice and
copied to the President.
(10) Parliament shall, within fourteen days after the
date of the findings of the tribunal or medical board,
move a resolution whether or not the President shall be
removed from office.

267
(11) The resolution for the removal from office of the
President shall be by a secret ballot and shall be taken to
be approved by Parliament if supported by the votes of
not less that two-thirds of all the members of Parliament
after prior debate.
(12) The proceedings of Parliament for the removal of
the President shall not be held in camera except where
Parliament otherwise orders in the interest of national
security.
(13) The President shall cease to hold office as President
on the date Parliament decides that he be removed from
office.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. A majority of the ministers are required to
serve simultaneously in the legislature.
Article 78
(1) Ministers of State shall be appointed by the President with the prior approval of Parliament from
among members of Parliament or persons qualified to
be elected as members of Parliament, except that the
majority of Ministers of State shall be appointed from
among members of Parliament.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly summons and holds
hearings with executive branch officials.
Article 103
(1) Parliament shall appoint standing committees and
other committees as may be necessary for the effective
discharge of its functions.
(3) Committees of Parliament shall be charged with
such functions, including the investigation and inquiry
into the activities and administration of ministries and
departments as Parliament may determine; and such
investigation and inquiries may extend to proposals for
legislation.
6) A committee appointed under this article shall have
the powers, rights and privileges of the High Court or a
Justice of the High Court at a trial for
(a) enforcing the attendance of witnesses and examining them on oath, affirmation or otherwise;
(b) compelling the production of documents; and
(c) issuing a commission or request to examine witnesses abroad.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can establish committees to
investigate the executive.

268
Article 103
(1) Parliament shall appoint standing committees and
other committees as may be necessary for the effective
discharge of its functions.
(3) Committees of Parliament shall be charged with
such functions, including the investigation and inquiry
into the activities and administration of ministries and
departments as Parliament may determine; and such
investigation and inquiries may extend to proposals for
legislation.
6) A committee appointed under this article shall have
the powers, rights and privileges of the High Court or a
Justice of the High Court at a trial for
(a) enforcing the attendance of witnesses and examining them on oath, affirmation or otherwise;
(b) compelling the production of documents; and
(c) issuing a commission or request to examine witnesses abroad.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. There is no prime minister.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to confirm the presidents ministerial appointments.
Article 78
(1) Ministers of State shall be appointed by the President with the prior approval of Parliament from
among members of Parliament or persons qualified to
be elected as members of Parliament, except that the
majority of Ministers of State shall be appointed from
among members of Parliament.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 63
(2) The election of the President shall be on the terms of
universal adult suffrage and shall, subject to the provisions of this Constitution, be conducted in accordance
with such regulations as may be prescribed by constitutional instrument by the Electoral Commission.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature can pass a motion of censure in
individual ministers, but not in the government as
a whole.

Parliament of Ghana
Article 82
(1) Parliament may, by a resolution supported by the
votes of not less than two-thirds of all the members of
Parliament, pass a vote of censure on a Minister of State.
(3) The motion shall be debated in Parliament within
fourteen days after the receipt by the Speaker of the
notice for the motion.
(4) A Minister of State in respect of whom a vote of censure is debated under clause (3) of this article is entitled,
during the debate, to be heard in his defence.
(5) Where a vote of censure is passed against a Minister under this article the President may, unless the
Minister resigns his office, revoke his appointment as a
Minister.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.
11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority vote in the legislature is
required to override a presidential veto.
Article 106
(8) Where the President refuses to assent to a bill, he
shall, within fourteen days after the refusal
(a) state in a memorandum to the Speaker any specific provisions of the bill which in his opinion
should be reconsidered by Parliament, including his
recommendations for amendments if any; or
(b) inform the Speaker that he has referred the bill to
the Council of State for consideration and comment
under article 90 of this Constitution.
(9) Parliament shall reconsider a bill taking into
account the comments made by the President or the
Council of State, as the case may be, under clause (8) of
this article.
(10) Where a bill reconsidered under clause (9) of this
article is passed by Parliament by a resolution supported
by the votes of not less than two-thirds of all the members of Parliament, the President shall assent to it within
thirty days after passing of the resolution.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Supreme Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 130
(1) Subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court in the
enforcement of the Fundamental Human Rights and
Freedoms as provided in article 33 of this Constitution,

Parliament of Ghana
the Supreme Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in
(a) all matters relating to the enforcement or interpretation of this Constitution; and
(b) all matters arising as to whether an enactment
was made in excess of the powers conferred on Parliament or any other authority or person by law or
under this Constitution.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. The legislature is prohibited from introducing
legislation related to taxation, public expenditures,
and government debt.
Article 108
Parliament shall not, unless the bill is introduced or
the motion is introduced by, or on behalf of, the President
(a) proceed upon a bill including an amendment to a
bill, that, in the opinion of the person presiding, makes
provision for any of the following
(i) the imposition of taxation or the alteration of taxation otherwise than by reduction; or
(ii) the imposition of a charge on the Consolidated
Fund or other public funds of Ghana or the alteration
of any such charge otherwise than by reduction; or
(iii) the payment, issue or withdrawal from the Consolidated Fund or other public funds of Ghana of any
moneys not charged on the Consolidated Fund or
any increase in the amount of that payment, issue or
withdrawal; or
(iv) the composition or remission of any debt due to
the Government of Ghana; or
(b) proceed upon a motion, including an amendment
to a motion, the effect of which, in the opinion of the
person presiding, would be to make provision for any
of the purpose specified in paragraph (a) of this article.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.

269
appointed by the President, acting in accordance with
the advice of the Council of State.
Article 98
(1) A member of Parliament shall be paid such salary
and allowances and provided with such facilities as may
be determined in accordance with article 71 of this Constitution.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislators are subject to arrest and prosecution. Legislators cannot be arrested or prosecuted,
however, for something that they say, or while
they are on their way to, attending, or returning
from a legislative session.
Article 115
There shall be freedom of speech, debate and proceedings in Parliament and that freedom shall not be
impeached or questioned in any court or place out of
Parliament.
Article 116
(1) Subject to the provisions of this article, but without
prejudice to the general effect of article 115 of this Constitution, civil or criminal proceedings shall not be instituted against a member of Parliament in any court or
place out of Parliament for any matter or thing brought
by him in or before Parliament by petition, bill, motion
or otherwise.
Article 117
Civil or criminal process coming from any court or place
out of Parliament shall not be served on, or executed
in relation to, the Speaker or a member or the clerk to
Parliament while he is on his way to, attending at or
returning from, any proceedings of Parliament.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.

Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound

funds appropriated by the legislature.

Article 93
(1) There shall be a Parliament of Ghana which shall
consist of not less than one hundred and forty elected
members.

16. The legislature controls the resources that finance

its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.

No. The legislature is dependent on the executive

for the resources that finance its operations.
Article 71
(1) The salaries and allowances payable, and the facilities and privileges available, to
(a) members of Parliament;
being expenditure charged on the Consolidated Fund,
shall be determined by the President on the recommendations of a committee of not more than five persons

Yes. The legislature can amend non-entrenched

provisions of the constitution in multiple readings of the bill with a two-thirds majority vote.
Changes to entrenched provisions of the constitution require approval in a popular referendum.
Article 289
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution. Parliament may, by an Act of Parliament, amend any provision of this Constitution.

270
(2) This Constitution shall not be amended by an Act
of Parliament or altered whether directly or indirectly
unless
(a) the sole purpose of the Act is to amend this Constitution; and
(b) the Act has been passed in accordance with this
Chapter.
Article 290
(1) This article applies to the amendment of the following provisions of this Constitution, which are, in
this Constitution referred to as entrenched provisions
(a) The Constitution: articles 1, 2 and 3;
(b) The Territories of Ghana: articles 4 and 5;
(c) The Laws of Ghana: article 11;
(d) Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms:
Chapter 5;
(e) Representation of the People: articles 42, 43, 46,
49, 55 and 56;
(f) The Executive: Chapter 8;
(g) The Legislature: articles 93 and 106;
(h) The Judiciary: articles 125, 127, 129, 145 and
146;
(i) Freedom and Independence of the Media: article
162, clauses (1) to (5);
(j) Finance: articles 174 and 187;
(k) Police Service: article 200;
(l) The Armed Forces of Ghana: article 210;
(m) Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice: articles 216 and 225;
(n) National Commission for Civic Education: article
231;
(o) Decentralization and Local Government: articles
240 and 252;
(p) Chieftaincy: article 270;
(q) Code of Conduct for Public Officers: article 286;
(r) Amendment of the Constitution: Chapter 25; and
(s) Miscellaneous: articles 293 and 299.
(2) A bill for the amendment of an entrenched provision shall, before Parliament proceeds to consider it, be
referred by the Speaker to the Council of State for its
advice and the Council of State shall render advice on
the bill within thirty days after receiving it.
(3) The bill shall be published in the Gazette but shall
not be introduced into Parliament until the expiry of
six months after the publication in the Gazette under
this clause.
(4) After the bill has been read the first time in Parliament it shall not be proceeded with further unless it
has been submitted to a referendum held throughout
Ghana and at least forty percent of the persons entitled
to vote, voted at the referendum and at least seventyfive percent of the persons who voted cast their votes
in favour of the passing of the bill.
(5) Where the bill is approved at the referendum, Parliament shall pass it.
(6) Where a bill for the amendment of an entrenched
provision has been passed by Parliament in accordance
with this article, the President shall assent to it.

Parliament of Ghana
Article 291
(1) A bill to amend a provision of this Constitution
which is not an entrenched provision shall not be introduced into Parliament unless
(a) it has been published twice in the Gazette with the
second publication being made at least three months
after the first; and
(b) at least ten days have passed after the second publication.
(2) The Speaker shall, after the first reading of the bill
in Parliament, refer it to the Council of State for consideration and advice and the Council of State shall render
advice on the bill within thirty days after receiving it.
(3) Where Parliament approves the bill, it may only
be presented to the President for his assent if it was
approved at the second and third readings of it in Parliament by the votes of at least two thirds of all the
members of Parliament.
(4) Where the bill has been passed in accordance with
this article, the President shall assent to it.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. There is no constitutional provision specifically addressing the declaration of war. In practice,
the legislatures approval is necessary for presidential war declarations.
21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 75
(1) The President may execute or cause to be executed
treaties, agreements or conventions in the name of
Ghana.
(2) A treaty, agreement or convention executed by or
under the authority of the President shall be subject to
ratification by
(a) Act of Parliament; or
(b) a resolution of Parliament supported by the votes
of more than one-half of all the members of Parliament.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. The president has the power to grant amnesty.
Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately. See
item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 72
(1) The President may, acting in consultation with the
Council of State
(a) grant to a person convicted of an offence a pardon
either free or subject to lawful conditions; or

Parliament of Ghana
(b) grant to a person a respite, either indefinite or for
a specified period, from the execution of punishment
imposed on him for an offence; or
(c) substitute a less severe form of punishment for a
punishment imposed on a person for an offence; or
(d) remit the whole or part of a punishment imposed
on a person or of a penalty or forfeiture otherwise due
to Government on account on any offence.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislatures consent is required to approve
the presidents Supreme Court nominations.
Article 144
(1) The Chief Justice shall be appointed by the President acting in consultation with the Council of State
and with the approval of Parliament.
(2) The other Supreme Court Justices shall be
appointed by the President acting on the advice of the
Judicial Council, in consultation with the Council of
State and with the approval of Parliament.
(3) Justices of the Court of Appeal and of the High
Court and Chairmen of Regional Tribunals shall be
appointed by the President acting on the advice of the
judicial Council.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the governor of the
Bank of Ghana.
Article 183
(4) The following shall apply to the Governor of the
Bank of Ghana
(a) he shall be appointed by the President acting in
consultation with the Council of State for periods of
four years.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.

271

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes. The legislature meets in three sessions, each
lasting between eight and twelve weeks, every year.
Article 112
(1) A session of Parliament shall be held at such place
within Ghana and shall commence at such time as the
Speaker may, by constitutional instrument, appoint.
(2) A session of Parliament shall be held at least once a
year, so that the period between the last sitting of Parliament in one session and the first sitting of Parliament
in the next session does not amount to twelve months.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
No. Stability in membership has not been high
through the four rounds of parliamentary elections
held since the early 1990s. While the legislature is
not entirely bereft of experienced members, the
re-election rate has averaged well under 50 percent, and only a relative handful of legislators have
retained their seats throughout the period of the
Fourth Republic.

272

Parliament of Greece (Vouli ton Ellinon)

PARLIAMENT OF GREECE (VOULI TON ELLINON)

Expert consultants: P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, James Georgas, Georgia Gionna, Dimitris Keridis,
Dimitris G. Papadimitriou
Score: .81
Influence over
executive (8/9)

Institutional
autonomy (7/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Specified
powers (5/8)

Institutional
capacity (6/6)

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

X
X

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

X
X

23. pardon

24. judiciary

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

25. central bank

26. media

X
X

The Parliament of Greece (Vouli ton Ellinon) can

trace its origins to the various national assemblies
that gathered following independence from the
Ottoman Empire in the 1830s. During 18641911
a national parliament operated as part of a democratic monarchy. For much of the twentieth century, the legislature was sidelined as power alternated between authoritarian presidents and military juntas. In 1967 a group of military officers
seized power in a coup detat and ruled by decree
until civilian rule was restored in 1975. A new constitution in that year called for a unicameral parliament paired with a powerful president who was
vested with the authority to rule by decree and
to appoint the government. In practice, the president rarely exercised the broad powers vested in
the presidency, and in 1986 the presidents more
modest de facto powers were codified in a constitutional amendment. The amendment formally
shifted executive powers to the prime minister,
spelled out the governments responsibility to the
legislature, and scaled back the presidents decree
power. A constitutional amendment in 2001 dealt
with individual rights but did not directly affect
legislative power.
The legislature is the main stage of national politics. Its control over executive power is formidable,
and parliament enjoys substantial institutional autonomy. Parliament also holds numerous

specified prerogatives, which include the power to

change the constitution alone without the involvement of any other agencies. It has a high level of
institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can remove the prime minister
with a vote of no confidence. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of a special court.
Article 38
(1) The President of the Republic shall divest the Prime
Minster of his duties when the latter has resigned and
when the Government has been defeated in Parliament,
in accordance with the provisions of Article 84.
(2) If the Prime Minister resigns or dies, the President
of the Republic shall appoint at this post the person
proposed by the deputies of its party, in a period no
longer than three days.
Article 49
(1) The President of the Republic shall not be held in
any way responsible for the acts carried out in the
discharge of his duties, save in the case of high treason or wilful violation of the Constitution. Prosecution for acts unrelated to the discharge of his duties
shall be postponed until the end of the presidential
term.

Parliament of Greece (Vouli ton Ellinon)

(2) Impeachment motions against the President of the
Republic shall be submitted to Parliament in writing
signed by at least one third of the members thereof,
and must be accepted by a decision taken by a two
thirds majority of the total number of the members
thereof.
(3) If such motion be accepted, the President of the
Republic shall appear before the special court provided
for by Article 86, and the provisions relating thereto
shall apply also in this case.
(4) Following his impeachment, the President shall
refrain from exercising his duties and shall be replaced
in accordance with the provisions of Article 34. He shall
resume again his duties, if his term of office has not
expired after he has been acquitted by the court provided for by Article 86.
(5) A law to be passed by the plenum of Parliament
shall regulate questions relating to the implementation
of the provisions of this Article.
Article 84
(1) The Government must enjoy the confidence of Parliament. The Government must ask for a vote of confidence from Parliament within fifteen days from the
swearing in of the Prime Minister and may do so at any
other time. If Parliament should be in adjournment
when the Government is formed, Parliament shall be
convened within fifteen days in order to decide on the
motion of confidence.
(2) Parliament may, by its decision, withdraw its confidence from the Government or from a member of
the Government. A motion of no confidence in the
Government may not be submitted before the lapse of
six months from the rejection by Parliament of such a
motion. The motion of no confidence must be signed
by at least one sixth of the deputies and must contain
in detail the topic to be discussed.
(3) By exception, a motion of no confidence may be
submitted before the lapse of the said six month period
if it be signed by the total number of deputies.
(4) The debate on the motion of confidence or no confidence shall commence two days after the submission of the said motion, unless the Government in
the case of a motion of no confidence should ask for
the debate to be held immediately, and may not be
extended beyond three days from the commencement
thereof.
(5) The vote on the motion of confidence or no confidence shall be taken immediately after the end of the
debate; it may, however, be postponed for forty-eight
hours if the Government should ask for such postponement.
(6) No motion of confidence shall be upheld unless it
be approved by the absolute majority of the deputies
present, which may not be less than two fifths of the
total number thereof. A motion of no confidence shall
only be upheld if approved by the absolute majority of
the total number of deputies.
(7) The Ministers and Deputy Ministers who are also
deputies shall be permitted to vote on such motions.

273

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Legislators may serve simultaneously in ministerial positions, although in recent years there have
been debates about instituting an incompatibility
law, the possibility of which is envisioned in the
constitution.
Article 81
(4) A law may establish the incompatibility of the office
of Minister or Deputy Minister with other functions as
well.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 69
No one shall, without being summoned, appear before
Parliament to report on any matter either orally or in
writing. Petitions may be presented through a deputy or
delivered to the Speaker. Parliament shall have the right
to forward petitions addressed to it to the ministers and
Deputy-Ministers who shall be obliged, whenever it be
demanded, to provide explanations.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can establish committees of
inquiry to investigate the executive.
Article 68
(1) At the beginning of each regular session, Parliament
shall constitute Parliamentary committees the members
whereof shall be deputies, with a view to processing and
examining the bills and private members bills which
have been submitted and shall come before the Plenum
and the Departments of Parliament.
(2) Parliament shall constitute committees of enquiry,
the members whereof shall be deputies, by a majority of two fifths of the total number of deputies and
following a proposal made by one fifth of the same
number.
(3) The constitution of committees of enquiry on matters relating to foreign policy or national defence shall
require a decision by Parliament taken by the absolute majority of the total number of deputies. Matters
relating to the composition and functioning of the said
committees shall be determined by the Regulations of
Parliament.
(4) The Parliamentary committees, the committees of
enquiry, and Departments of Parliament operating
under Articles 70 and 71 shall be composed in proportion to the parliamentary strength of each party, group,
or independent deputies, as laid down by the Regulations.

274

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. Legislative committees have effective powers
of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. The president is required to appoint as prime
minister the candidate who enjoys the support of
parliament.
Article 37
(1) The President of the Republic shall appoint the
Prime Minister and, at the recommendation of the latter, he shall also appoint the rest of the members of the
Government and the Deputy Ministers.
(2) The leader of the party which shall have the absolute majority in Parliament shall be appointed Prime
Minister. If there is not such party, the President of
the Republic shall give the leader of the party which
commands the relative majority an exploratory mandate with a view to ascertain the possibility of forming
a government which shall enjoy the confidence of Parliament.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers on the recommendation of the prime minister, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 37
(1) The President of the Republic shall appoint the
Prime Minister and, at the recommendation of the latter, he shall also appoint the rest of the members of the
Government and the Deputy Ministers.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The legislature elects the president.
Article 30
(1) The President of the Republic shall regulate the
functions of the powers of the State. He shall be elected
by Parliament for a term of five years, according to the
procedure specified in Articles 32 and 33.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 84
(1) The Government must enjoy the confidence of Parliament. The Government must ask for a vote of confidence from Parliament within fifteen days from the
swearing in of the Prime Minister and may do so at any
other time. If Parliament should be in adjournment

Parliament of Greece (Vouli ton Ellinon)

when the Government is formed, Parliament shall be
convened within fifteen days in order to decide on the
motion of confidence.
(2) Parliament may, by its decision, withdraw its confidence from the Government or from a member of
the Government. A motion of no confidence in the
Government may not be submitted before the lapse of
six months from the rejection by Parliament of such a
motion. The motion of no confidence must be signed
by at least one sixth of the deputies and must contain
in detail the topic to be discussed.
(3) By exception, a motion of no confidence may be
submitted before the lapse of the said six month period
if it be signed by the total number of deputies.
(4) The debate on the motion of confidence or no confidence shall commence two days after the submission of the said motion, unless the Government in
the case of a motion of no confidence should ask for
the debate to be held immediately, and may not be
extended beyond three days from the commencement
thereof.
(5) The vote on the motion of confidence or no confidence shall be taken immediately after the end of the
debate; it may, however, be postponed for forty-eight
hours if the Government should ask for such postponement.
(6) No motion of confidence shall be upheld unless it
be approved by the absolute majority of the deputies
present, which may not be less than two fifths of the
total number thereof. A motion of no confidence shall
only be upheld if approved by the absolute majority of
the total number of deputies.
(7) The Ministers and Deputy Ministers who are also
deputies shall be permitted to vote on such motions.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 32
(4) If the said increased majority be not attained in the
final vote, Parliament shall be dissolved within ten days
from the said vote and elections for a new Parliament
shall be proclaimed. The relevant decree shall be signed
by the incumbent President of the Republic, and if this
be not possible by the Speaker who shall replace him.
Article 41
(1) The President of the Republic may dissolve Parliament, if two Governments have resigned or defeated in
the Parliament and its composition cannot achieve stability of government. The elections shall be organized
by the Government enjoying the confidence of the dissolved Parliament. In every other case, the provisions
of the last phrase of Article 37 (3) shall apply.
(2) The President of the Republic shall dissolve the Parliament at the suggestion of a Government which has
been given a vote of confidence, with a view to renewing its mandate in order to deal with a problem of
extraordinary importance for the nation. The dissolution of the new Parliament for the same reason is prohibited.

Parliament of Greece (Vouli ton Ellinon)

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power. Under
extreme circumstances of the most urgent and
unforeseen need, the president can, however,
with the approval of the cabinet, issue decrees that
have the force of law. The decrees lapse if they are
not subsequently approved by the legislature.
Article 43
(1) The President of the Republic shall issue the decrees
necessary for the execution of the laws, but he shall
under no circumstances suspend the operation of the
laws nor exempt anyone from the execution thereof.
Article 44
(1) In extraordinary circumstances of most urgent and
unforeseen need, the President of the Republic may, at
the suggestion of the Cabinet, issue acts of legislative
content. These acts shall be brought before Parliament
for approval, in accordance with the provisions of Article 72 (1), within forty days from the day of issuance
or within forty days from the commencement of a Parliamentary session. If the said acts be not submitted
to Parliament within the said time limits, or if they
be not approved by Parliament within three months
from each submission, they shall become invalid for the
future.
Article 48
(1) In case of a state of war or mobilization due to external dangers or of manifest threat to the national security, or in case of armed revolt against the Democratic
regime, the Parliament may, after proposition of the
Cabinet, suspend throughout the country or in part
thereof the operation of Articles 5 (4), 6, 8, 9, 11, 12
(1)(4), 14, 19, 22, 23, 96 (4), and 97 or some of these
Articles and put into effect the law on state of siege
as this law may apply on each occasion, and establish
extraordinary tribunals. The President of the Republic
issues the resolution of the Parliament. This resolution
defines also the duration of the imposed measures, that
can not be longer than fifteen days.
(2) If the Parliament is in absence or it is not possible to
convoke it in time, the measures of the aforegoing Paragraph shall be taken by presidential decree, after proposition of the Cabinet. This decree shall be brought to
the Parliament when its convocations becomes possible, even if its term has ended or if it has been dissolved
and, in any case, not later than fifteen days after its
issuance.
(3) The duration of the measures of the aforegoing
paragraphs can be extended beyond fifteen days only
by decision of the Parliament, each time for a period of
fifteen days. The Parliament is convoked therefore even
if its term has ended or if it has been dissolve.
(4) The measures taken in accordance to the aforegoing
paragraphs shall ipso jure be lifted after the termination
of the war and, in any other case, after the expiration
of the delays of the Paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) of the
present Article.

275
(5) The President of the Republic may, after proposition
of the Cabinet, issue Legislative Acts, with a view to
coping with the situation and the speedy resumption of
the operation of the constitutional institutions. These
acts shall be brought before Parliament for approval
within fifteen days from the day of issuance or from
the day of the convocation of the Parliament. If the
said acts be not submitted to Parliament within the said
time limits, or if they be not approved by Parliament
within fifteen days from their submission, they shall
become invalid for the future. The law on the state of
siege may not be amended while it is in force.
(6) The decisions of the Parliament in accordance to
Paragraphs (2) and (3) are taken by the absolute majority of the total number of deputies, whereas the decision
in accordance to the Paragraph (1) is taken by a majority of the three fifths of the total number thereof, in
one only Session.
(7) During the application of measures of the state of
siege the provisions of the Articles 61 and 62 shall
remain ipso jure in force, even if the term of Parliament
has ended or if it has been dissolved.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote of its present members.
Article 42
(1) The President of the Republic shall issue and publish
the laws passed by Parliament within one month from
the passing thereof. The President of the Republic may,
within the time limit specified in the aforegoing paragraph, send back to Parliament a bill passed thereby,
stating the reasons for his veto.
(2) A bill or private members bill vetoed by the President of the Republic shall be brought before the Plenary
Session of Parliament, and should it be passed again by
the absolute majority of the total number of deputies,
according to the procedure laid down by Article 76
(2), the President of the Republic shall issue and publish such bill within ten days from the second passing
thereof.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Supreme Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all
policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions, with one minor exception. According to the constitution, legislation related to the
granting of pensions can only be introduced by
the minister of finance following a recommendation by the Council of Comptrollers.

276
Article 73
(1) The right of proposing laws shall belong to Parliament and the Government.
(2) Bills relating in any way to the granting of pensions
and the prerequisites thereof shall be submitted only
by the Minister of Finance following a recommendation by the Council of Comptrollers. In the case of pensions involving an increase in the budgetary expenditure of local authority bodies or other bodies corporate
of public law, the bills in question shall be submitted
by the competent Minister and the Minister of Finance.
Such bills on pensions must be specific, the insertion of
provisions regarding pensions in laws designed to settle other matters being prohibited and resulting in the
annulment of the said bills.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,
including control over members salaries.
Article 63
(1) Deputies shall receive compensation and an
expense allowance from the Public Treasury for the discharge of their duties. The amounts to cover both the
aforegoing shall be fixed by a decision taken by the
plenum of Parliament.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto.
Article 61
(1) Deputies shall not be persecuted or in any way questioned on account of an opinion or vote given by them
in the discharge of their duties as deputies.
(2) Deputies may be prosecuted, with the leave of
Parliament, for malicious slander, according to law.
The competent court shall be the Appeal Court. Leave
shall be deemed not granted if Parliament does not
decide within forty five days from the day when the
indictment was received by the Speaker. In the event
that leave be not granted or the fixed period expire,
the act shall be deemed unindicted. This paragraph
shall be applicable as from the next parliamentary
term.
(3) Deputies shall not be questioned in relation to
information received or given by them in the discharge
of their duties or in relation to persons who entrusted
them with such information or to whom they provided
the same.

Parliament of Greece (Vouli ton Ellinon)

Article 62
During the parliamentary term no deputy shall be prosecuted, arrested, imprisoned, or in any way restricted
without the leave of Parliament. Likewise, no deputy
of Parliament which has been dissolved shall be prosecuted for political crimes from the dissolution of
the said Parliament and until the declaration of the
deputies of the new Parliament. Leave shall be deemed
not given if Parliament should not decide within three
months from the day on which the application of the
Public Prosecutor to press charges be submitted to the
Speaker. The fixed period of three months shall be suspended during the recess of Parliament. Leave shall not
be required for crimes committed in flagrante delicto.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 51
(3) The deputies shall be elected by direct, universal,
and secret ballot and by citizens having the right to
vote as the law provides.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
through a complicated procedure. The sitting legislature can propose an amendment in multiple
readings by a three-fifths majority vote, and then,
following an election, the subsequent legislature
can approve the amendment with a majority vote.
Article 110
(1) The provisions of the Constitution, save those
which determine the basis and the form of government
as a Parliamentary Republic with a President as Head of
State and those of Articles 2 (1), 4 (1), (4) and (7), 5 (1)
and (3), 13 (1) and 26 shall be subject to revision.
(2) The need to revise the Constitution shall be ascertained by a decision of Parliament taken following a
motion by at least fifty deputies, approved by a majority of three fifths of the total number of deputies in two
votes separated from each other by at least one month.
The same decision shall determine in detail the provisions to be revised.
(3) Once the revision has been decided upon by Parliament, the following Parliament in its first session shall,
with an absolute majority of all the members thereof,
decide on the provisions to be revised.
(4) If the proposal for the revision of the Constitution
be approved by the majority of the total number of
deputies but not by the majority of three fifths specified
in Paragraph (2), the following Parliament in its first
session may decide on the provisions to be revised by a
majority of three fifths of the total number thereof.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Parliament of Greece (Vouli ton Ellinon)

277

Yes. Formally, the president declares war. In practice, it would be unthinkable for the president to
declare war without the legislatures approval.

(2) The President of the Republic shall have the right

to grant a pardon to a minister sentenced according to
Article 86 only with the consent of Parliament.

Article 36
(1) The President of the Republic without any prejudice to the provisions of Article 35 (1) shall represent the State in its relations to other States, declare
war, conclude treaties of peace, alliance, economic cooperation and participation in international organizations or unions, and announce the same to Parliament
with the necessary clarifications, if the interests and
security of the State so permit.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 36
(1) The President of the Republic without any prejudice to the provisions of Article 35 (1) shall represent the State in its relations to other States, declare
war, conclude treaties of peace, alliance, economic cooperation and participation in international organizations or unions, and announce the same to Parliament
with the necessary clarifications, if the interests and
security of the State so permit.
(2) Commercial treaties and those relating to taxation,
economic co-operation, and participation in international organizations or unions, and such other treaties
as contain concessions in regard to which, under the
provisions of this Constitution, nothing can be determined without a law, or which entail a burden on
Greeks as individuals, shall be invalid without the formal law which ratifies them.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature can grant amnesty for political
crimes by a three-fifths majority vote.
Article 47
(3) Amnesty may only be granted in cases of political
crimes, by a law voted in Plenary Session of the Parliament by a majority of three fifths of the total number
of deputies.
(4) Amnesty in the cases of common crimes may not
be granted even by law.

No. The president appoints the judiciary, and

the appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 88
(1) All judicial functionaries shall be appointed by presidential decree, on the basis of a law determining their
qualifications and the procedure of selection; judicial
functionaries shall be appointed for life.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
Yes. The legislature appoints the governor of the
Bank of Greece.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature is required by law to meet in
ordinary session for at least five months each year.
In practice, the legislature is in session for well over
six months each year.
Article 64
(1) Parliament shall meet ipso jure on the first Monday
of October in regular session for the annual parliamentary work, unless the President of the Republic should
convoke the same earlier under Article 40.
(2) The duration of the regular session shall be not less
than five months which shall not include the period of
suspension under Article 40.
(3) The regular session shall be obligatorily extended
until the passing of the budget under Article 79 or the
passing of the special law under the same article.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon. To
grant pardon to a minister, however, the president
must receive the consent of parliament.
Article 47
(1) The President of the Republic shall have the right,
following a proposal by the Minister of Justice and having consulted the opinion of a council which contains a
majority of judges, to pardon, commute, alter, or reduce
sentences pronounced by the courts of law and to lift
legal consequences of any kind emanating from sentences which have been pronounced and served.

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.
Yes.
Article 65
(5) The Regulations may provide for the setting up of
a Parliamentary experts committee which would assist
in the legislative work of Parliament.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

278

Parliament of Greece (Vouli ton Ellinon)

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature

contains a significant number of highly experienced

members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

CONGRESS OF GUATEMALA (CONGRESO)

Expert consultants: Marco Fonseca, Natalia Ajenjo Fresno, Eduardo Daz Reyna, Rachel Sieder,
William Stanley, Anja Stuckert
Score: .50
Influence over
executive (2/9)

Institutional
autonomy (6/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

X
X

Specified
powers (5/8)
X
X

19. amendments
20. war

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

12. no veto
13. no review
14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

Institutional
capacity (3/6)
27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

26. media
X

The Congress (Congreso) of Guatemala traces its

origins to the first independence constitution of
1839. For much of Guatemalas history, however,
the legislatures power failed to materialize, as generals and presidents staged coups and clashed with
insurgents. From 1960 to 1996 the country was
engulfed in a gruesome civil war. A political opening in the mid-1980s led to the adoption of the
1985 constitution and the establishment of a unicameral Congress. A constitutional amendment in
1994 gave the Supreme Court of Justice the power
to lift legislators parliamentary immunity. Prior to
1994 legislators enjoyed immunity.
The legislature has only slight leverage over the
president. It does, however, enjoy significant institutional autonomy and holds numerous specific
powers, including the sole authority to declare war
and the powers of amnesty and pardon. The development of institutional capacity has been impeded
by a dearth of experienced legislators and a lack of
personal staff.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. The legislature cannot impeach the president.
2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of
the legislature.
No. Legislators who serve in government have a
sleeping mandate, meaning that they may join the
government but forfeit their voting rights in the
legislature during their government service. They
may return to the legislature when their government service ends.
Article 160
A deputy can hold the position of minister or official
of the State or any other decentralized or autonomous
entity. In these cases permission must be granted
to him for the period that his executive responsibilities last. During his temporary absence, one shall

Congress of Guatemala (Congreso)

proceed in conformity with the last paragraph of Article 157.
Article 157
In case of the definitive fault of a deputy the post shall
be declared vacant. Vacancies shall be filled, according to the case, by calling the postulate that appears in
the respective district list of candidates or national list
immediately after the last post awarded.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 165
The Congress will have the power to do the following:
j. To interpellate ministers of State.
Article 166
The ministers of State have the obligation to appear
in Congress in order to answer the interpellations formulated by one or more deputies. Those which refer to
diplomatic or pending military operations are excepted.
The basic questions must be addressed to the minister
or ministers interpellated with forty-eight hours notice.
Neither the full Congress, nor any authority, will be able
to limit the deputies to the Congress in their right to
interpellate, qualify the questions, or restrict them. Any
deputy can address additional questions that he deems
pertinent and related to the matter or matters underlying the interpellation and it is from the latter that a
vote of no confidence may originate, which must be
petitioned by four deputies, at least, and carried out
without delay, in the same session or in one of the two
immediately subsequent ones.
Article 167
When an interpellation is made to a minister, the latter
cannot absent himself from the country nor decline to
answer in any form.
Article 168
Ministers of State are required to attend the sessions
of Congress, Commissions and Legislative Blocks when
they are invited for this purpose. Notwithstanding, they
can attend in any case and participate with voice in all
discussions concerning matters of their competence.
They can have themselves represented by their Vice
Ministers.
All the officials and public employees are obliged to
appear and report to the Congress, when the latter, its
commissions or legislative blocks consider it necessary.
Article 199
The Ministers have the obligation to appear before the
Congress, with the purpose of answering the interpellations addressed to them.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.

279

Yes. The legislature can establish committees to

investigate the executive.
Article 171
Other Powers of the Congress.
It is also among the powers of the Congress to do the
following:
m. To appoint investigation committees in specific matters of the public administration, that may involve
problems of national interest.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature can interpellate national security officials, but the legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. There is no prime minister.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 183
The following are functions of the President of the
Republic:
s. To appoint and remove the Ministers of State, Vice
Ministers, Secretaries and Undersecretaries of the Presidency, ambassadors and other officials which correspond to him in accordance with the law.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 184
The President and Vice President of the Republic will
be elected by the people through universal and secret
suffrage and for a single term of four years.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in
the government.
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the
executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.
11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.

280

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority vote in Congress is
needed to override a presidential veto.
Article 179
Once the decree is sent back to Congress, the Directive
Board should bring it to the attention of the plenary
in the next session, and Congress may reconsider it or
reject it during a period not to exceed thirty days. If the
observations made by the Executive are not accepted
and the Congress rejects the veto by a vote of two-thirds
of its members, the Executive will obligatorily have to
approve and promulgate the decree within the eight
subsequent days after receiving it. Should the Executive not do so, the Directive Board of the Congress
shall order its publication in a period not to exceed
three days so it may enter into effect as a law of the
Republic.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Court of Constitutionality can review the
constitutionality of laws.
Article 266
In concrete cases, in every process of whatever competence or jurisdiction, in any instance, and in cassation and even before sentence is decreed, the parties
will be able to press as an action, exception, or incident the total or partial unconstitutionality of a law.
The court will have to make a determination in that
respect.
Article 267
Actions against the laws, regulations or provisions of
a general character which contain a partial or total
absence of constitutionality will be heard directly by
the Tribunal or Court of Constitutionality.
Article 268
The Court of Constitutionality is a permanent tribunal
of exclusive jurisdiction, whose essential function is the
defense of the constitutional order.
Article 272
The Court of Constitutionality has the following functions:
e. To issue an opinion on the constitutionality of
treaties, agreements, and bills of law at the request of
any of the organisms of the State.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.

Congress of Guatemala (Congreso)

Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound

funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,
including control over members compensation.
Article 170
The specific powers of the Congress are as follows:
b. To appoint and remove its administrative personnel. The relations of the Legislative Organism with its
administrative, technical, and service personnel, will
be regulated by a specific law, which will establish the
regime of classification, pay, discipline, and dismissals.
The labor benefits of the personnel of the Legislative
Organism that may be obtained by law, internal accord,
resolution, or custom, cannot be diminished or distorted.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislative immunity can be revoked by a decision of the Supreme Court of Justice. Prior to 1994
legislators were immune.
Article 161
Deputies are representatives of the people and dignitaries of the Nation; as a guarantee for the exercise of
their functions they will enjoy, from the day they are
declared elected, the following prerogatives:
a. Personal immunity from arrest or trial if the Supreme
Court of Justice does not previously declare that there is
probable cause, after examining the report of the investigating judge that will be named for this end. The case
of flagrante delicto is excepted, for which that deputy
shall be immediately placed at the disposition of the
Directive Board or the Permanent Commission of the
Congress for the purpose of the corresponding initial
judgment.
b. They cannot be held responsible for their opinions, initiative, and the manner of handling public business in the performance of their work. All
the dependencies of the State have the obligation to
show deputies the consideration attaching to their
high position. These prerogatives do not authorize
arbitrariness, excess of personal initiative, or any type
of action tending to undermine the principle of no
reelection for the exercise of the Presidency of the
Republic. Only the Congress will be competent to
judge and determine if there has been arbitrariness
or excess and to impose the appropriate disciplinary
sanctions. Considering the declaration to which paragraph (a) in this article refers, those accused are subject to the jurisdiction of the competent judge. If
he should decree provisional imprisonment for them,
they shall be suspended from their functions as long
as the incarceration decree is not revoked. In the
case of firm condemnatory sentence, it shall remain
vacant.

Congress of Guatemala (Congreso)

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 157
Legislative power belongs to the Congress of the Republic made up of deputies elected directly by the people in
universal and secret suffrage through the national list
and electoral district system for a period of four years,
allowing for reelection.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Amendments to Chapter I, Title II, of
the constitution require the convocation of a
National Constituent Assembly. Other constitutional amendments require approval in a popular
referendum.
Article 277
The following have the initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution:
a. The President of the Republic in the Council of Ministers;
b. Ten or more deputies to the Congress of the Republic;
c. The Court of Constitutionality; and
d. The people through a petition addressed to the
Congress of the Republic by no fewer than 5,000 citizens duly listed in the Register of Citizens.
In any of the cases above, the Congress of the Republic
must address without delay whatsoever the issue raised.
Article 278
In order to amend this or any article contained in Chapter I of Title II of this Constitution, it is indispensable
that the Congress of the Republic, with the affirmative
vote of two-thirds of the members composing it, should
call a National Constituent Assembly. In the decree of
convocation, the article or articles to be amended shall
be specified and shall be communicated to the Supreme
Electoral Tribunal so that it may determine the date
when the elections would be held within the maximum
deadline of 120 days, proceeding in other respects in
accordance with the Constitutional Electoral Law.
Article 279
The National Constituent Assembly and the Congress
of the Republic will be able to function simultaneously. The characteristics required to be deputy to the
National Constituent Assembly are the same as those
that are required to be deputy to the Congress, and the
constituent deputies shall enjoy equal immunities and
privileges.
It will not be possible to be simultaneously deputy to
the National Constituent Assembly and to the Congress
of the Republic.
The elections of deputies to the National Constituent
Assembly, the number of deputies to be elected, and
the other questions relating to the electoral process will
be regulated in an equal form as the elections to the
Congress of the Republic.

281
Article 280
For any other constitutional amendment, it will be necessary that the Congress of the Republic approve it with
an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the total number of
deputies. Amendments will not enter into effect unless
they are ratified through a referendum referred to in
Article 173 of this Constitution.
If the result of the referendum were to ratify the amendment, the latter will enter into effect 60 days after the
Supreme Electoral Court announced the result of the
referendum.
Article 281
In no case can Articles 140, 141, 165 (paragraph g), 186,
and 187 be amended, nor can any question relating to
the republican form of government, to the principle
of the non-reelectibility for the exercise of the Presidency of the Republic be raised in any form, neither
may the effectiveness or application of the articles that
provide for alternating the tenure of the Presidency of
the Republic be suspended or their content changed or
modified in any other way.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislature declares war.
Article 171
It is also among the powers of the Congress to do the
following:
f. To declare war and approve or disapprove peace
treaties.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties on most major issues.
Article 171
It is also among the powers of the Congress to do the
following:
f. To declare war and approve or disapprove peace
treaties.
l. To approve, before their ratification, the treaties,
agreements, or any international settlement when:
1. They affect the existing laws where this Constitution may require the same majority of votes;
2. They affect the power of the Nation, establish
the economic or political union of Central America, whether partial or total, or attribute or transfer
competences to organs, institutions, or mechanisms
created for an ordained juridical community to realize regional and common objectives in the Central
American area;
3. They obligate the State financially in proportion
that it exceeds one percent of the Budget of Ordinary
Revenues or when the amount of the obligation is
indeterminate;
4. They constitute a pledge [compromiso] to submit
any matter to international judicial or arbitral decision;
5. They contain a general arbitration clause or one for
submission to international jurisdiction; and

282

Congress of Guatemala (Congreso)

m. To appoint investigation committees in specific matters of the public administration, that may
involve problems of national interest.

Article 172
To approve before their ratification, with a vote of twothirds of the total number of deputies who make up
the Congress, treaties, agreements, or any international
settlement when:
a. They refer to the passage of foreign armed forces
through the national territory or the temporary establishment of foreign military bases; and
b. They affect or can affect the security of the State or
put an end to a state of war.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty
for political crimes.
Article 171
Other Powers of the Congress.
It is also among the powers of the Congress to do the
following:
g. To decree amnesty for political and related common
crimes when public convenience demands it.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

Yes. The legislature has the power of pardon, indicated here as amnesty for . . . common crimes.
Article 171
Other Powers of the Congress.
It is also among the powers of the Congress to do the
following:
g. To decree amnesty for political and related common
crimes when public convenience demands it.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislature elects all of the magistrates
on the Supreme Court of Justice and the Court
of Appeals and one of the five magistrates on the
Court of Constitutionality.
Article 205
The following are established as guarantees of the Judicial Organism:
a. Functional independence;
b. Financial independence;
c. Irremovability of the magistrates and judges of the
first instance, except in cases established by the law;
and
d. The selection of personnel.

The Magistrates of the Supreme Court of Justice shall be

elected by the Congress of the Republic for a period of
five years from a list of twenty-six candidates proposed
by a postulation commission composed of a representative of the Rectors of the Universities of the country,
who shall preside, the Deans of the Faculties of Law
or Juridical and Social Sciences of each University of
the country, an equivalent number of representatives
elected by the General Assembly of the Association of
Lawyers and Notaries of Guatemala and by an equal
number of representatives elected by the titled judges
of the Court of Appeals and other tribunals referred to
in Article 217 of this Constitution.
Article 217
The titled magistrates [of the Court of Appeals] shall be
elected by the Congress of the Republic from a panel of
candidates with double the number to be elected, proposed by a postulation commission composed of one
representative of the Rectors of the Universities of the
country, who shall preside, the Deans of the Law or
Juridical and Social Sciences Departments of each University of the country, an equivalent number of members elected by the General Assembly of the Association
of Lawyers and Notaries of Guatemala and by an equal
number of representatives elected by the judges of the
Supreme Court of Justice.
Article 269
The Court of Constitutionality consists of five titled
magistrates each of whom will have his respective alternate. When it is seized with matters of unconstitutionality against the Supreme Court of Justice, the Congress
of the Republic, or the President or Vice President of the
Republic, the number of its members will be raised to
seven, the other two magistrates being selected by lot
from among the alternates.
The magistrates serve in their functions five years and
shall be appointed in the following manner:
a. One magistrate by the plenary of the Supreme Court
of Justice;
b. One magistrate by the plenary of the Congress of the
Republic;
c. One magistrate by the President of the Republic in
the Council of Ministers;
d. One magistrate by the Higher University Council of
the University of San Carlos de Guatemala; and
e. One magistrate by the Assembly of the Bar Association.
Simultaneously with the appointment of the magistrate, that of the respective alternate will occur before
the Congress of the Republic.
The installation of the Court of Constitutionality will
become effective 90 days after that of the Congress of
the Republic.

Article 209
Judges, secretaries, and auxiliary personnel will be
appointed by the Supreme Court of Justice. The judicial career is established.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

Article 215
Election of the Supreme Court of Justice.

No. The president appoints the president of the

Bank of Guatemala.

National Assembly of Guinea (Assemblee nationale)

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.

283

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session for at
least seven months each year.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.

Article 158
The annual period of sessions of the Congress is initiated the fourteenth of January of each year without
necessity of convocation. The Congress meets in ordinary sessions of the fourteenth of January to the fifteenth of May and of the first of August to the thirteenth of November of each year.

Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

Article 163
Each year the Congress will elect its Directorate [Junta
Directiva]. Before closing its period of ordinary sessions the Congress will elect its Permanent Committee,
presided over by the President of the Congress, that will
function while the Congress is not in session.

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.

No. The party system has been highly unstable,

resulting in a great deal of turnover and a dearth
of highly experienced legislators.

NATIONALE)
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF GUINEA (ASSEMBLEE
Expert consultants: Kake Makanera Al-Hassan, Mohamed Saliou Camara, Malick Diakite, Nanfadima
Magassouba, Denis Marantz
Score: .31
Influence over
executive (1/9)

Institutional
autonomy (3/9)

Specified
powers (3/8)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

23. pardon
24. judiciary

Institutional
capacity (3/6)
27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

25. central bank

26. media

The National Assembly (Assemblee nationale) of

Guinea has origins in the Peoples National Assembly (Assemblee nationale populaire) established in
1962 under the Marxist-Leninist government of
President Sekou Toure. In practice, Toure sidelined
the legislature and ruled by decree. Upon Toures

death in 1984, Lasana Conte seized power in a military coup and dissolved the legislature. A new constitution in 1990 called for the establishment of the
unicameral National Assembly, and Guinea held its
first multiparty elections in 1995. A constitutional
amendment in 2001 gave the president the power

284

National Assembly of Guinea (Assemblee nationale)

to appoint Supreme Court justices. Prior to 2001

the National Assembly appointed them.
The legislature has almost no influence over the
executive branch. It cannot remove the president,
question executive branch officials, or reject the
presidents ministerial appointments. The legislatures own institutional autonomy is circumscribed
by presidential veto and decree powers. The legislature has some specified powers, including the right
to approve presidential declarations of war and to
ratify international treaties. Its institutional capacity is modest.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of the High Court of Justice.
Article 86
The President of the Republic shall be responsible for
the acts accomplished in the exercise of his functions
only in the case of high treason.
He shall only be accused by the National Assembly deciding by a three-fifths majority in a secret vote. He shall
be judged by the High Court of Justice. It may decide
when the President of the Republic is accused, that the
President of the National Assembly shall exercise his
interim powers until the outcome is determined.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
No. Formally, the legislature has the power to interpellate executive branch officials, but this right is
not regularly exercised.
Article 73
The Deputies can ask the Ministers, who are obligated
to respond, written and oral questions with or without debate. The responses given shall not be followed
by a vote. They shall be published in the Official Journal. One meeting per week shall be reserved during the
course of each extraordinary session, for oral questions
without debate. The National Assembly can designate
at its center commissions of inquiry. The regulations
of the Assembly shall determine the powers of these
commissions. They shall be created by law, which shall
define their composition, functioning and objective,
and which shall specify their powers.

Yes. The legislature can establish commissions of

inquiry to investigate the executive.
Article 73
The Deputies can ask the Ministers, who are obligated
to respond, written and oral questions with or without debate. The responses given shall not be followed
by a vote. They shall be published in the Official Journal. One meeting per week shall be reserved during the
course of each extraordinary session, for oral questions
without debate. The National Assembly can designate
at its center commissions of inquiry. The regulations
of the Assembly shall determine the powers of these
commissions. They shall be created by law, which shall
define their composition, functioning and objective,
and which shall specify their powers.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. There is no prime minister.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints the ministers, and
the appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 39
The President of the Republic shall appoint Ministers
who shall assist him and shall be responsible only to
him.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 24
The President of the Republic shall be elected by direct
universal suffrage.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in
the government.
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the
executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.

National Assembly of Guinea (Assemblee nationale)

Article 76
In the case of persistent disagreement between the President of the Republic and the National Assembly on fundamental questions, the President of the Republic can,
after having consulted the President of the National
Assembly, pronounce the dissolution of the Assembly.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. According to the constitution, the president
may issue regulatory decrees and can issue decrees
that have the force of law only when he or she is
authorized to do so by the legislature. In practice,
the president issues decrees that have the force of
law without prior legislative authorization.
Article 38
The President of the Republic shall assure the execution of laws and prescribe regulatory power which he
exercises by decree.
Article 66
The National Assembly can enable the President by a
law to take measures normally relegated to the domain
of the law, for a specified period of time and objectives
that it specifies.
Within the time limits and domain fixed by the enabling act, the President of the Republic can make ordinances which shall be effective upon their publication,
but become void if a bill of ratification is not presented
before the National Assembly before the date fixed by
the enabling act. After this last date, they may only be
modified by law. They retain at all times their regulatory
value until their ratification. They may be amended at
the time of the vote of the law of ratification.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority vote in the legislature is
needed to override a presidential veto.
Article 63
In the ten days fixed for promulgation, the President of
the Republic can, by message, demand a new deliberation of the National Assembly which cannot be refused.
The delay period of promulgation is thereby suspended.
The law shall only be voted upon a second time if two
thirds of the members of the National Assembly are
in favor. It shall take priority on the days agenda if
the majority of the members of the National Assembly
demand it.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Supreme Court can review the constitutionality of laws.

285
Article 64
In the full eight days which follow the adoption of a
law, the President of the Republic or a tenth of the
Deputies can convene the Supreme Court for close
scrutiny to ensure the conformity of the law with the
Fundamental Law. The delay period of promulgation is
thus suspended. The Supreme Court shall decide within
the thirty days that follow its convocation or, if the President of the republic makes the demand, in eight days.
The decision of the Supreme Court shall be published
in the Official Journal. A disposition of a law declared
nonconforming to the Fundamental Law shall not be
promulgated nor applied. The decision of the Supreme
Court shall be binding on all.
The delay period of promulgation begins to run from
the date of publication of the decision of the Supreme
Court which declares the law in conformity with the
Fundamental Law.
Article 83
The Supreme Court shall have the authority to declare
the constitutionality of laws and international engagements, under the conditions established in Articles 64,
67 and 78.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The executive can impound funds appropriated by the legislature. Legislative appropriations
authorize, but do not require, the expenditure of
funds.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. By law, legislators are immune, but in practice,
opponents of the president are subject to arrest and
prosecution. For example, in 1998 four members of
the Assembly, including Alpha Conde, an opposition leader and a candidate for president that
year, were arrested and imprisoned for causing a
breach of the peace. Although the law provides
that members of the Assembly may be arrested
only if their immunity is lifted by the Assembly,
in these cases and others the executive and the
agencies of coercion ignored the legal requirement
for the authorization of the National Assembly.

286
Article 52
No member of the National Assembly shall be prosecuted, investigated, arrested, detained or tried because
of opinions or votes expressed by him while exercising
his functions as Deputy.
No deputy shall be prosecuted or arrested on penal
grounds while the National Assembly is in session
except with the Assemblys authorization, except in the
case of flagrante delicto.
No deputy can be arrested or detained while the Assembly is not in session without the authorization of the
office of the National Assembly except in the case of
flagrante delicto, prosecutions authorized by the Assembly or final condemnations. The preventive detention
or prosecution of a Deputy shall be suspended if the
Assembly requires it.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 47
The Deputies to the National Assembly shall be elected
by direct universal suffrage.
The duration of their term shall be five years, except in
the case of dissolution. They may be reelected.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments initiated by the
legislature require approval in a popular referendum.
Article 91
The initiative of the revision of the Fundamental Law
belongs to both the President of the Republic and to the
Deputies. The bill or proposition of revision adopted
by the National Assembly shall only become definitive after having been approved by referendum. At any
time, the bill of revision shall not be presented to referendum when the President of the Republic decides to
submit it only to the National Assembly. In this case
the bill of revision shall be approved by a two thirds
majority of the members of the National Assembly. It
shall consist of the same proposition of revision which
had received the approval of the President of the Republic.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for presidential war declarations.
Article 75
The state of war shall be declared by the President of the
Republic after being authorized by the National Assembly by a two thirds majority of its members.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.

National Assembly of Guinea (Assemblee nationale)

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

international treaties on most major issues.
Article 77
The President of the Republic negotiates international engagements. Peace treaties, commercial treaties,
treaties or accords relative to international organization, those which engage the finances of the State,
those which modify provisions of a legislative nature,
those which are relative to the state of persons, those
which encompass cession, exchange or adjunction
of territory, shall only be ratified or approved by a
law.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The National Assembly has the power to grant
amnesty.
Article 59
Subject to the provisions of Article 45, the National
Assembly alone shall pass laws.
The law shall only be prospective.
The law shall fix rules concerning:
amnesty.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 43
The President of the Republic exercises the power to
grant pardons.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. Formally, the legislature makes appointments
to the High Court of Justice, while the president
appoints the magistrates of the Supreme Court, but
in practice, the president fully controls all judicial
appointments, and the legislature lacks a meaningful role.
Article 81
Magistrates shall be named by the President of the
Republic, those of the bench after consultation of the
Superior Council of the Magistrate.
Article 85
The High Court of Justice shall be composed of members elected by the National Assembly, at its center, at
the beginning of each legislature.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the governor of the
Central Bank of Guinea.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.

National Peoples Assembly of Guinea-Bissau

287

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

No. The legislature meets in ordinary session for
no more than three months each year.
Article 55
The National Assembly shall meet, as of right, in ordinary sessions twice a year.
The first session shall open on April 5 and shall last no
longer than thirty days.
The second session shall open on October 5 and shall
last no longer than sixty days.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
Article 47
The Deputies to the National Assembly shall be elected
by direct universal suffrage.

The duration of their term shall be five years, except in

the case of dissolution. They may be reelected.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Since the first multiparty elections in 1995, the
re-election rate has been relatively high, producing a stable body of experienced members. President Lasana Contes Party of Unity and Progress
has long dominated parliament. Its hegemony was
reconfirmed in the 2002 elections, in which it captured three-quarters of the seats in the legislature.
The presidents dominance of politics, including
his de facto control of the National Assembly,
means that even experienced members do not necessarily possess significant acumen as legislators.

NATIONAL PEOPLES ASSEMBLY OF GUINEA-BISSAU

(ASSEMBLEIA NACIONAL POPULAR)
Expert consultants: Elisabete Azevedo, Joshua B. Forrest, Fode Mane, Eleanor Marchant, P. M. Karibe
Mendy, Lars Rudebeck
Score: .25
Influence over
executive (0/9)

Institutional
autonomy (3/9)

Specified
powers (3/8)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

18. all elected

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

12. no veto
13. no review

24. judiciary

Institutional
capacity (2/6)

X
X

25. central bank

26. media

The National Peoples Assembly (Assembleia

Nacional Popular) of Guinea-Bissau was established
upon independence from Portugal in 1974. A new
constitution was adopted in 1984 that called for a

unicameral assembly. Constitutional amendments

in 1991 and 1993 did not directly concern the legislatures power. In practice, the African Party for the
Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde

288

(PAIGC) dominated Guinea-Bissau after independence, and competitive multiparty elections were
not held until 1994. A dispute over the 1999 presidential elections led to civil conflict and eventually the dissolution of the Assembly in November 2002. The Assembly drafted a new constitution
in 2001, but the president never either promulgated or vetoed it, resulting in ambiguity about
which constitution contains the countrys legitimate fundamental law. The constitutional excerpts
cited below are from the 1984 constitution. The
Assembly reconvened following legislative elections in March 2004, which were again won by the
PAIGC.
The Assembly has little clout. It cannot influence the executive. It also has little institutional
autonomy; presidential powers that include veto
and decree circumscribe the legislatures autonomy. The legislature holds three of the enumerated
powers assessed here: It can change the constitution, declare war, and ratify treaties. The absence
of staff, a paucity of legislators with substantial
experience, and the absence of regular meeting sessions severely restrict the Assemblys institutional
capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. The legislature cannot impeach the president.
The legislature can remove the prime minister with
a vote of no confidence.
Article 75
The Government shall be politically responsible to the
National Popular Assembly and to the Council of State.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 55
1. The National Popular Assembly shall elect its President and other members of his Cabinet at the first session of each legislature.
2. The Cabinet shall be composed of the President, one
First Vice-President, one Second Vice-President, a First
Secretary, and a Second Secretary, elected by the total
legislature. The powers and jurisdiction of the Cabinet
shall be regulated by the Rules and Procedures of the
Assembly.
3. The office of the President of the National Popular
Assembly shall be incompatible with that of Member
of the Government.

National Peoples Assembly of Guinea-Bissau

Article 59
Members of the Political Bureau of the PAIGC and members of the Government who are not Deputies may sit
and speak in plenary sessions of the Assembly.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
No. According to the constitution, the legislature
can interpellate executive branch officials, but in
practice, hearings are rare.
Article 52
A Deputy shall have the right to question members of
the Council of State and of the Government, either
orally or in written form; the respective answer must
be provided to him during the same session or within
two weeks, at the most, in written form, if an investigation is required.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. Although the legislature formally has the right
to create special commissions to investigate the
executive, in practice, the legislature lacks the ability to investigate the executive.
Article 52
A Deputy shall have the right to question members of
the Council of State and of the Government, either
orally or in written form; the respective answer must
be provided to him during the same session or within
two weeks, at the most, in written form, if an investigation is required.
Article 57
The National Popular Assembly shall create permanent
specialized Commissions according to various matters
and create temporary committees to take up predetermined subjects.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister.
Article 67
The attributions of the President of the Council of
State shall be those which are conferred upon him by
the National Popular Assembly or by this Constitution,
namely:
4. to appoint and to recall the Prime Minister, Ministers,
Secretaries of State, and the Governor of the Central
Bank.

National Peoples Assembly of Guinea-Bissau

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 67
The attributions of the President of the Council of
State shall be those which are conferred upon him by
the National Popular Assembly or by this Constitution,
namely:
4. to appoint and to recall the Prime Minister, Ministers,
Secretaries of State, and the Governor of the Central
Bank.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. According to the 1984 constitution cited here,
the president is elected by the legislature, but the
constitution does not provide a good guide to
the means of election. In 1994, 1999, and 2005,
the citizens of Guinea-Bissau elected the president
directly.
Article 63
1. The Council of State shall comprise 15 members
elected from among the Deputies by the National Popular Assembly in the first session of each legislature.
2. The National Popular Assembly shall elect the President of the Council of State from among members
elected to the Council of State.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. Although the government is formally politically responsible to the legislature, the legislature
cannot vote no confidence in the government.
Article 75
The Government shall be politically responsible to the
National Popular Assembly and to the Council of State.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. Formally, the legislature is immune from dissolution. In practice, the president can dissolve the
legislature, as he did in 2002.
11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. Formally, the president can issue decrees that
have the force of law only with the prior authorization of the legislature. In practice, the president
regularly issues decree-laws without such authorization.

289
Article 67
The attributions of the President of the Council of
State shall be those which are conferred upon him by
the National Popular Assembly or by this Constitution,
namely:
11. to promulgate laws-by-decree, to sign and to order
the publication of decisions of the Council of State and
of decrees of the Cabinet Council in the Official Bulletin.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. The legislature cannot override the presidents veto. The constitution does not grant the
president a veto of any type, but in practice, the
president simply refuses to promulgate any legislation to which he objects.
13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
Yes. According to the 1984 constitution, the legislature itself has the authority to review the constitutionality of laws. The new constitution, if
adopted, will provide for a Supreme Court with
the power to review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 56
The following shall be incumbent upon the National
Popular Assembly:
5. to decide on the constitutionality of laws, laws-bydecree, and other legislation;
6. to approve, modify, or annul legislation and other
measures adopted by organs of the State that are contrary to this Constitution and laws.
Article 98
1. Cases placed before the courts may not apply rules
that infringe upon the provisions of the Constitution
or principles herein consecrated.
2. The question of unconstitutionality may be raised
officially by a court, by the Public Ministry, or by any
of the parties.
3. Whenever a question of unconstitutionality is raised,
the incident shall be separately submitted to the
National Popular Assembly, which shall decide the matter.
4. All decisions made by the National Popular Assembly
regarding unconstitutionality shall be generally mandatory and shall be published in the Official Bulletin.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.

290

National Peoples Assembly of Guinea-Bissau

No. The president can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.

2. A proposed law for revision must be submitted by at

least one-third of the Deputies actively in office, by the
Council of State, or by the Government.

16. The legislature controls the resources that finance

its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.

Article 101
Proposals for revision must be approved by the majority
of two-thirds of the Deputies comprising the Assembly.

No. The legislature is dependent on the executive

for the resources that finance its operations.

Article 102
No proposal for revision may impose upon:
a) the unitary structure or republican form of the State;
b) the Laic Statute of the State;
c) the integrity of national territory.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Formally, legislators are immune, but in practice, this constitutional provision is overlooked,
and legislators have been arrested and detained.
Article 53
1. No deputy may be disturbed, prosecuted, arrested,
imprisoned, judged, or condemned for his voting
record or the opinions he expresses while performing
his duties as Deputy.
2. Except if apprehended in the act of committing an
offense flagrante delicto that bears a penalty equal to
or greater than two years of forced labor, or with the
previous consent of the National Popular Assembly or
the Council of State, Deputies may not be prosecuted
or imprisoned for a criminal or disciplinary question,
whether judged or not.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 47
1. Members of the Regional Councils shall be elected by
free, universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. Voters
shall be all citizens of the nation over 18 years old,
except for those disqualified by law.
2. Members of the National Popular Assembly shall be
elected by the Regional Councils from among their
members, provided same are native citizens of the
nation according to conditions and forms fixed by
law.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. There is no constitutional provision that
specifically addresses the declaration of war. The
legislature alone can declare a state of martial law
or a state of emergency.
Article 56
The following shall be incumbent upon the National
Popular Assembly:
10. to declare a state of martial law or a state of emergency, according to terms of law.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties on most major issues.
Article 56
The following shall be incumbent upon the National
Popular Assembly:
8. to approve treaties that concern the participation of
Guinea-Bissau in international organizations, treaties
for friendship, peace, defense, the changing of borders,
and any others that the Government decides to submit
for approval.
Article 72
The following shall be incumbent upon the Government in exercising its functions:
h) to negotiate and to sign international pacts and conventions.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
with a two-thirds majority vote.
Article 99
1. This Constitution may be amended at any time by
the National Popular Assembly.
2. The initiative to revise the Constitution shall belong
to Deputies, to the Council of State, and to the Government.
Article 100
1. The proposal for revision shall indicate the articles
that must be revised and the sense of the changes to be
introduced.

No. The legislature formally has the power to grant

amnesty, but in practice, this power is reserved for
the president.
Article 56
The following shall be incumbent upon the National
Popular Assembly:
12. to grant amnesty.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The cabinet (the Council of State) has the
power of pardon.
Article 64
1. The responsibilities of the Council of State are:
k) to pardon and to commute penalties.

National Peoples Assembly of Guinea-Bissau

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The president appoints judges, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 67
The attributions of the President of the Council of
State shall be those which are conferred upon him by
the National Popular Assembly or by this Constitution,
namely:
5. to appoint and recall Judges of the Supreme Court of
Justice and the Procurator-General of the Republic.
Article 92
The Supreme Court of Justice shall be the Republics
supreme judicial instance. Its judges shall be appointed
by the President of the Council of State.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. Guinea-Bissau is a member of the Central Bank
of West African States, whose governor is selected
by the member states.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

291
Article 58
The National Popular Assembly shall meet in regular
session once a year. It may also gather in special session
when called by the Council of State at its own initiative, by the Council or Ministers, or when required by a
majority of Deputies. All details of said operation shall
be regulated by law.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.

No. The legislature usually meets in only one

annual ordinary session, which lasts two or three
months.

No. Political instability and irregular sittings of the

legislature have prevented legislators from developing significant expertise.

No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the

operation of the public media.

292

National Assembly of Guyana

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF GUYANA

Expert consultants: Deryck M. Bernard, Desiree Bernard, Percy C. Hintzen, Michael Murphy,
Haslyn Parris
Score: .38
Influence over
executive (2/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

Institutional
autonomy (4/9)
X

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no confidence

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

Specified
powers (2/8)

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

23. pardon

24. judiciary

X
X
X

25. central bank

26. media
X

The National Assembly of Guyana was established

in 1966 in the countrys first post-independence
constitution. The constitution called for a
Westminster-style system with a prime minister
and government appointed by, and responsible to,
the legislature. A new constitution in 1980 instituted a semipresidential system. The president is
the leader of the plurality party in the legislature, but the prime minister and other ministers
are appointed by the president, and ministerial
appointments do not require legislative approval.
The legislature can no longer vote no confidence
in the government or remove the chief executive
from office.
The legislature has little control over the executive. The legislatures own institutional autonomy
is circumscribed by presidential veto and dissolution powers. Many of the specified powers and
prerogatives assessed in this survey are granted to
the president. The legislature can, however, change
the constitution without the involvement of any
other actors. The legislature also has some institutional capacity, although legislators lack personal
staff.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.

No. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of the judiciary.

Article 180
(1) If notice in writing is given to the Speaker of the
National Assembly, signed by not less than one-half of
all the elected members of the Assembly, of a motion
alleging that the President has committed any violation of the Constitution or any gross misconduct and
specifying the particulars of the allegations and proposing that a tribunal be established under this article to
investigate those allegations, the Speaker shall
(a) if Parliament is then sitting or has been summoned to meet within five days, cause the motion
to be considered by the Assembly within seven days
of the notice; or
(b) if Parliament is not then sitting (and notwithstanding that it may be prorogued) summon the
Assembly to meet within twenty-one days of the
notice and cause the motion to be considered at that
meeting.
(2) Where a motion under this article is proposed for
consideration by the National Assembly, the Assembly
shall not debate the motion but the person presiding in
the Assembly shall forthwith cause a vote to be taken on
the motion and, if the motion is supported by the votes
of not less than two-thirds of all the elected members
of the Assembly, shall declare the motion to be passed.
(3) If the motion is declared to be passed under paragraph (2)
(a) the Chancellor shall appoint a tribunal which
shall consist of a chairman and not less than two
other members selected by the Chancellor from

National Assembly of Guyana

among persons who hold or have held office as a
Judge of a court having unlimited jurisdiction in civil
and criminal matters in some part of the Commonwealth or a court having jurisdiction on appeal from
any such court;
(b) the tribunal shall investigate the matter and shall
report to the National Assembly whether it finds the
particulars of the allegations specified in the motion
to have been substantiated;
(c) the President shall have the right to appear and
be represented before the tribunal during its investigation of the allegations against him.
(4) If the tribunal reports to the National Assembly that
the tribunal finds that the particulars of any allegation against the President specified in the motion have
not been substantiated no further proceedings shall
be taken under this article in respect of that allegation.
(5) If the tribunal reports to the National Assembly that
the tribunal finds that the particulars of any allegation
specified in the motion have been substantiated, the
Assembly may, on a motion supported by the votes of
not less than three-quarters of all elected members of
the Assembly, resolve that the President has been guilty
of such violation of the Constitution or, as the case
may be, such gross misconduct as is if the Assembly so
resolves, the President shall cease to hold office upon
the third day following the passage of the resolution
unless he sooner dissolves Parliament.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. The prime minister and vice presidents must
be selected from the members of the legislature.
Other ministers may be appointed from inside or
outside the legislature. Ministers who were not
members of the legislature at the time of their
appointment become nonvoting members of the
legislature.
Article 103
(2) Subject to the provisions of article 101 (1), Vice Presidents and other Ministers shall be appointed by the
President from among persons who are elected members of the National Assembly or are qualified to be
elected as such members.
Article 105
A Minister who was not an elected member of the
Assembly at the time of his appointment shall (unless
he becomes such a member) be a member of the Assembly by virtue of holding the office of Minister but shall
not vote in the Assembly.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
No. The legislature does not regularly question officials from the executive.

293

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister.
Article 101
(1) The President shall appoint an elected member
of the National Assembly to be Prime Minister of
Guyana.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 103
(2) Subject to the provisions of article 101 (1), Vice Presidents and other Ministers shall be appointed by the
President from among persons who are elected members of the National Assembly or are qualified to be
elected as such members.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. Although the constitution states that the president is elected by the people, in practice, the
president is the leader of the party that wins a plurality of seats in parliamentary elections.
Article 91
The President shall be elected by the people.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in
the government.
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the
executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 70
(2) The President may at any time by proclamation dissolve Parliament.

294
Article 85
(1) The President may at any time by proclamation
summon, prorogue or dissolved on the occurrence of
a dissolution of Parliament.
(2) The Supreme Congress of the People, unless sooner
dissolved, shall stand dissolved on the occurrence of a
dissolution of Parliament.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires

ratification or approval by the legislature before
it takes effect; that is, the executive lacks decree
power.

National Assembly of Guyana

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.

Yes. The executive lacks decree power.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority vote in the National
Assembly is needed to override a presidential veto.
Article 170
(1) Subject to the provisions of article 164, the power
of Parliament to make laws shall be exercised by Bills
passed by the National Assembly and assented to by the
President.
(2) When a Bill is presented to the President for assent,
he shall signify that he assents or that he withholds
assent.
(3) Where the President withholds his assent to a Bill,
he shall return it to the Speaker within twenty-one days
of the date when it was presented to him for assent with
a message stating the reasons why he has withheld his
assent.
(4) Where a Bill is so returned to the Speaker it shall
not again be presented to the President for assent unless
within six months of the Bill being so returned upon
a motion supported by the votes of not less that twothirds of all the elected members of the National Assembly the Assembly resolves that the Bill be again presented for assent.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Supreme Court of Judicature can review
the constitutionality of laws.
Article 123
(1) There shall be for Guyana a Supreme Court of Judicature consisting of a Court of Appeal and a High Court,
with such jurisdiction and powers as are conferred on
those Courts respectively by this Constitution or any
other law.
(2) Each of those Courts shall be a superior court of
record and, save as otherwise provided by Parliament,
shall have all the powers of such a court.
(3) Parliament may confer on any court any part of the
jurisdiction of and any powers conferred on the High
Court by this Constitution or any other law.

16. The legislature controls the resources that finance

its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
No. The legislature is dependent on the executive
for the resources that finance its operations.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislative immunity extends to official parliamentary business and civil debt only. Legislators
are subject to arrest for common crimes.
Article 172
(1) Subject to the provisions of paragraphs (2), (3) and
(4), Parliament may by law determine the privileges,
immunities and powers of the National Assembly and
the members thereof.
(2) No civil or criminal proceedings may be instituted
against any member of the Assembly for words spoken
before, or written in a report to, the Assembly or to a
committee thereof or by reason of any matter or thing
brought by him therein by petition, bill, resolution,
motion or otherwise.
(3) For the duration of any session, members of the
Assembly shall enjoy freedom from arrest for any civil
debt.
(4) No process issued by any court in the exercise of its
civil jurisdiction shall be served or executed within the
precincts of the Assembly while the Assembly is sitting
or through the Speaker, the Clerk or any officer of the
Assembly.
Article 176
(1) Parliament may by law determine the privileges,
immunities, and powers of the Supreme Congress of
the People and the members thereof.
(2) No civil or criminal proceedings may be instituted
against any member of the Congress for words spoken
before or written in a report to, the Congress or to a
committee thereof or by reason of any matter or thing
brought by him therein by petition, resolution, motion
or otherwise.
(3) For the duration of any session members of the
Congress shall enjoy freedom from arrest for any civil
debt.

National Assembly of Guyana

(4) No process issued by any court in the exercise of its
civil jurisdiction shall be served or executed within the
precincts of the Congress while the Congress is sitting
or through the Chairman, the Clerk or any officer of
the Congress.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected. The
president can appoint ministers from outside the
legislature, who become, by virtue of their ministerial position, nonvoting members of the legislature.
Article 52
(1) Subject to paragraph (2) and to articles 105, 185
and 186, the National Assembly shall consist of sixtyfive members who shall be elected in accordance with
the provisions of this Constitution and, subject thereto,
in accordance with any law made by Parliament in that
behalf.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
with a majority vote.
Article 164
(1) Subject to the provisions of paragraphs (2) and (3),
a Bill for an Act or Parliament to alter this Constitution
shall not be passed by the National Assembly unless it
is supported at the final voting in the Assembly by the
votes of a majority of all the elected members of the
Assembly.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. The constitution does not specifically address
the declaration of war. The president can issue
a proclamation of emergency without the legislatures approval. If the legislature does not subsequently approve the proclamation, the state of
emergency lapses after fourteen days.
Article 150
(1) This article applies to any period when
(a) Guyana is at war; or
(b) there is in force a proclamation (in this article
referred to as a proclamation of emergency) made
by the President declaring that a state of public emergency exists for the purposes of this article; or
(c) there is in force a resolution of the National
Assembly, in favour of which there were cast the
votes of not fewer that two-thirds of all the elected
members, declaring that democratic institutions in
Guyana are threatened by subversion.
(2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any laws shall be held to be inconsistent with
or in contravention of article 139, 140 (2) or 143,

295
any provision of article 144 other than paragraph (4)
thereof, or any provision of articles 145 to 149 (inclusive) to the extent that the law in question makes in
relation to any period to which this article applies provision, or authorises the doing during any such period
of anything, which is reasonably justifiable in the circumstances of any situation arising or existing during
that period for the purpose of dealing with that situation.
(3a) Where any proclamation of emergency has been
made, copies thereof shall as soon as practicable be
laid before the National Assembly, and if, by reason
of its adjournment or the prorogation of Parliament,
the Assembly is not due to meet within five days the
President shall, by proclamation, summon the Assembly to meet within five days, and the Assembly shall
accordingly meet and sit upon the day appointed by
the proclamation and shall continue to sit and act as
if it had stood adjourned or Parliament had stood prorogued to that day.
(b) A proclamation of emergency shall, unless it is
sooner revoked by the President, cease to be in force at
the expiration of a period of fourteen days beginning
on the date on which it was made or such longer
period as may be provided under the next following
subparagraph, but without prejudice to the making
of another proclamation of emergency at or before
the end of the period.
(c) If at any time while a proclamation of emergency
is in force (including any time while it is in force
by virtue of the provisions of this subparagraph) a
resolution is passed by the Assembly approving its
continuance in force for a further period, not exceeding six months, beginning on the date on which it
would otherwise expire, the proclamation shall, if
not sooner revoked, continue in force for that further period.
(4) A resolution such as is referred to in paragraph (1)
(c) shall, unless it is sooner revoked by a resolution
of the Assembly, ceased to be in force at the expiration of two years beginning on the date on which it
was passed or such shorter period as may be specified therein, but without prejudice to the passing of
another resolution by the Assembly in the manner prescribed by that paragraph at or before the end of that
period.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.
No. Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The president has the power of pardon.

296

National Assembly of Guyana

Article 121
The Prerogative of Mercy shall vest in the President and
shall be exercised by him in accordance with the provisions of articles 191 to 196 (inclusive).

No. The president appoints the members of the

board that controls the public media.

Article 188
(1) The President may
(a) grant to any person concerned in or convicted
of any offence under the law of Guyana, a pardon,
either free or subject to lawful conditions;
(b) grant to any person a respite, either indefinite, or
for a specified period, of the execution of any punishment imposed on that person for such an offence;
or
(c) substitute a less severe form of punishment for
any punishment imposed on any person for such an
offence; or
(d) remit the whole or any part of any punishment
imposed on any person for such an offence or of any
penalty or forfeiture otherwise due to the State on
account of such an offence.

Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session for

about ten months each year from October 10 until
August 10.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. Members of the judiciary are appointed by the
president, and the appointments do not require the
legislatures approval.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Article 69
(1) Each session of Parliament shall be held at such
place within Guyana and shall begin at such time (not
being later than six months from the end of the preceding session if Parliament has been prorogued or sixteen
months from the end of that session if Parliament has
been dissolved) as the President shall appoint by proclamation.
(2) Subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the sittings of the National Assembly shall be
held at such time and place as the Assembly may, by its
rules of procedure or otherwise, determine.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.

Article 127
The Chancellor and the Chief Justice shall be appointed
by the President acting after consultation with the
Minority Leader.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.

Article 128
The Judges, other than the Chancellor and the Chief
Justice, shall be appointed by the President, acting in
accordance with the advice of the Judicial Service Commission.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the governor of the
Bank of Guyana.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

National Assembly of Haiti (Assemblee nationale)

297

NATIONALE)
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF HAITI (ASSEMBLEE
Expert consultants: Joy Cadogan-Logie, Maria Del Pilar Gonzalez Morales, Jean-Germain Gros,
Tim Pershing
Score: .44
Influence over
executive (4/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

Institutional
autonomy (4/9)
X

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Specified
powers (3/8)

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

19. amendments
20. war

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

Institutional
capacity (3/6)
X
X

23. pardon
24. judiciary

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

25. central bank

26. media
X

The National Assembly (Assemblee nationale) of

Haiti traces its roots to Haitis 1805 constitution,
adopted following independence from France in
1804. For the next two centuries, political instability, foreign military occupation, and dictatorship
prevented the development of a well-functioning
legislature. In 1987 the countrys current constitution was adopted. It calls for a bicameral legislature
consisting of a lower house, the House of Deputies
(Chambre des deputes), and an upper house, the Senate (Senat). In 1990 Jean-Bertrand Aristide became
Haitis first elected president, only to be ousted in a
military coup the following year. The next decade
and a half witnessed U.S. military intervention to
restore civilian rule, the election of a civilian president who declared the expiration of parliaments
term and proceeded to rule by decree, an attempted
coup, civil strife leading to a presidents exile, massive floods, and the deployment to of UN peacekeeping forces.
Despite grave political instability, the legislature, refreshed by legislative elections held in 2006,
potentially has some authority. For example, the
constitution grants the legislature the power to
indict the president for treason with a two-thirds
majority vote and to remove the government with
a motion of censure. The formal absence of executive dissolution, decree, and veto powers provides

the legislature with some institutional autonomy.

The legislature holds several enumerated powers
and has some institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The House of Deputies can indict the president for treason by a two-thirds majority vote of
its total membership. It can remove the prime minister with a vote of censure.
Article 129-4
When the interpellation request ends in a vote of censure on a question concerning a Government program
or declaration of general policy, the Prime Minister
must submit his Governments resignation to the President of the Republic.
Article 186
The House of Deputies, by a majority of two-thirds of
its members, shall indict:
a) The President of the Republic for the crime of high
treason or any other crime or offense committed in the
discharge of his duties.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.

298

No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.

Article 129-1
Service as a member of the Legislature is incompatible
with any other duty remunerated by the State, except
that of teacher.
Article 132
Members of the Executive Branch and the Director Generals of Government departments may not be elected
members of the Legislature unless they resign at least
one (1) year before the date of the elections.
Article 164
The duties of the Prime Minister and of a member of
the Government are incompatible with membership in
the Parliament. If such a case occurs, the member of
Parliament must choose one duty or the other.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 129-2
Every member of the two Houses has the right to question and interpellate a member of the Government
or the entire Government on events and acts of the
Administration.
Article 129-3
An interpellation request must be seconded by five
members of the body concerned. It becomes a vote of
confidence or of censure when passed by a majority of
that body.
Article 129-4
When the interpellation request ends in a vote of censure on a question concerning a Government program
or declaration of general policy, the Prime Minister
must submit his Governments resignation to the President of the Republic.
Article 161
The Prime Minister and the Ministers may appear before
the two Houses to support bills and the objections of the
President of the Republic and to reply to interpellations.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.

National Assembly of Haiti (Assemblee nationale)

6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

No. The president appoints the prime minister in
consultation with the legislature.
Article 137
The President of the Republic shall choose a Prime Minister from among the members of the majority party of
the Parliament. In the absence of such a majority, the
President of the Republic shall choose his Prime Minister in consultation with the President of the Senate
and the President of the House of Deputies. In either
case, the Presidents choice must be ratified by the Parliament.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The legislatures approval is required to confirm ministerial appointments.
Article 158
With the approval of the President, the Prime Minister
shall choose the members of his Cabinet of Ministers
and shall go before Parliament to obtain a vote of confidence on his declaration of general policy. The vote
shall be taken in open ballot, and an absolute majority
of both Houses is required.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 134
The President of the Republic is elected in direct universal suffrage by an absolute majority of votes. If that
majority is not obtained in the first election, a second
election is held.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can pass a vote of censure
against the government.
Article 129-2
Every member of the two Houses has the right to question and interpellate a member of the Government
or the entire Government on events and acts of the
Administration.
Article 129-3
An interpellation request must be seconded by five
members of the body concerned. It becomes a vote of
confidence or of censure when passed by a majority of
that body.
Article 129-4
When the interpellation request ends in a vote of censure on a question concerning a Government program
or declaration of general policy, the Prime Minister
must submit his Governments resignation to the President of the Republic.

National Assembly of Haiti (Assemblee nationale)

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.
Article 111-8
In no case may the House of Deputies or the Senate
be dissolved or adjourned, nor shall the terms of their
members be extended.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires

ratification or approval by the legislature before
it takes effect; that is, the executive lacks decree
power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote of its present members.
Article 121
Any bill passed by the Legislature shall be immediately
forwarded to the President of the Republic, who, before
promulgating it, has the right to make objections to it
in all or in part.
Article 121-1
In such cases, the President of the Republic sends back
the bill with his objections to the House where it
was originally passed. If the bill is amended by that
House, it is sent to the other House with the objections.
Article 121-2
If the bill thus amended is voted on by the second
House, it will be sent back to the President of the Republic for promulgation.
Article 121-3
If the objections are rejected by the House that originally passed the bill, it shall be returned to the other
House with the objections.
Article 121-4
If the second House also votes to reject it, the bill is sent
back to the President of the Republic, who must then
promulgate it.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Supreme Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 128
Only the Legislative Branch has the authority to interpret laws, which it does by passing a law.
Article 183
When litigation is referred to it, the Supreme Court, sitting as a full Court, shall rule on the unconstitutionality
of the laws.

299

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. The legislature is prohibited from initiating
bills related to taxation, government revenues, and
government expenditures.
Article 111-2
However, only the Executive Branch may initiate budget laws, laws concerning the assessment, percentage
and manner of collecting taxes and contributions, and
laws designed to generate revenues or to increase revenues and expenditures of the Government. Bills introduced on these matters must be voted on first by the
House of Deputies.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The president can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
No. The legislature is dependent on the executive
for the resources that finance its operations.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. By law, legislators are immune, but in practice,
many legislators have been subject to arrest and
state-backed repression in the violence and waves
of reprisals that frequently mar Haitis electoral
politics. The government has sometimes abused
the flagrante delicto provision to deprive opposition
members of parliament of their immunity.
Article 114
Members of the Legislature are inviolable from the day
they take oath up to the expiration of their term, subject
to the provisions of Article 115 below.
Article 114-1
They may at no time be prosecuted or attacked for the
opinions and votes cast by them in the discharge of
their duties.
Article 114-2
No member of the Legislature shall be subject to civil
imprisonment during his term of office.
Article 115
No member of the Legislature may during his term
be arrested under ordinary law for a crime, a minor
offense or a petty violation, except by authorization of
the House of which he is a member, unless he is apprehended in the act of committing an offense punishable
by death, personal restraint or penal servitude or the
loss of civil rights. In that case, the matter is referred
to the House of Deputies or the Senate without delay if

300
the Legislature is in session, and if not, it shall be taken
up at the next regular or special session.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 89
The House of Deputies is a body composed of members
elected by direct suffrage by the citizens and is responsible for exercising, on their behalf and in concert with
the Senate, the functions of the Legislative Branch.
Article 94
The Senate is a body composed of members elected by
direct suffrage of the citizens and charged with exercising on their behalf, in concert with the House of
Deputies, the duties of the Legislative Branch.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Formally, the legislature can change the constitution with a two-thirds majority vote in both
houses, but in practice, such action would be
unthinkable without presidential backing.
Article 98-3
The Assemblys powers are:
4) To amend the Constitution according to the procedure indicated herein.
Article 282
On the recommendation, with reasons given to support it, of one of the two Houses or of the Executive
Branch, the Legislature may declare that the Constitution should be amended.
Article 282-1
This declaration must be supported by two-thirds of
each of the two Houses. It may be made only in the
course of the last Regular Session of the Legislative
period and shall be published immediately throughout
the territory.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for presidential war declarations.
Article 98-3
The Assemblys powers are:
2) To ratify any decision to declare war when all efforts
at conciliation have failed.
Article 140
[The president] declares war, and negotiates and signs
peace treaties with the approval of the National Assembly.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.

National Assembly of Haiti (Assemblee nationale)

Article 98-3
The Assemblys powers are:
3) To approve or reject international treaties and conventions.
Article 139
[The president] shall negotiate and sign all international treaties, conventions and agreements and submit
them to the National Assembly for ratification.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. The president has the power to grant amnesty.
Article 147
[The president] may grant amnesty only for political
matters as stipulated by law.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 146
The President of the Republic has the right to pardon
and commute sentences in all res judicata cases, except
for sentences handed down by the High Court of Justice
as stipulated in this Constitution.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The president appoints members of the
Supreme Court from a list of candidates proposed
by the Senate.
Article 97
In addition to the responsibilities incumbent upon it as
a branch of the Legislature, the Senate shall have the
following powers:
1) To propose to the Executive the list of Supreme
Court justices according to the provisions of the Constitution;
2) Constitute itself as a High Court of Justice.
Article 175
Supreme Court justices are appointed by the President
of the Republic from a list submitted by the Senate of
three persons per court seat. Judges of the Courts of
Appeal and Courts of First Instance are appointed from
a list submitted by the Departmental Assembly concerned; Justices of the Peace are appointed from a list
drawn up by the Communal Assemblies.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the governor of the
Central Bank of Haiti.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.

National Congress of Honduras (Congreso Nacional)

Yes. The House of Deputies meets in ordinary session for seven months each year. The Senate is permanently in session.
Article 92-2
The first session [of the House of Deputies] runs from
the second Monday of January to the second Monday
of May; the second session, from the second Monday
of June to the second Monday of September.
Article 95-1
The Senate is permanently in session.
Article 95-2
The Senate may however adjourn, but not during the
Legislative Session. When it adjourns, it leaves a permanent committee charged with handling current business. The committee may not make any decisions,
except to convene the Senate.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.

301

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
Article 92
Deputies are elected for four years and may be reelected
an indefinite number of times.
Article 95
Senators are elected for six years and may be reelected
an indefinite number of times.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
No. Political instability has prevented politicians
from developing significant experience and legislative expertise.

NATIONAL CONGRESS OF HONDURAS (CONGRESO NACIONAL)

Expert consultants: Natalia Ajenjo Fresno, Peter Peetz, Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson, Ian Walker,
Maureen Zamora
Score: .53
Influence over
executive (3/9)

Institutional
autonomy (6/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

Specified
powers (4/8)
X
X

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

X
X
X

26. media
X

The National Congress (Congreso Nacional) of Honduras traces its roots to the countrys independence
in 1840. For most of its history, the legislature was
not a key player because Honduras was ruled by a
succession of high-handed presidents and military

dictators. Civilian rule returned with a new constitution in 1982 the sixteenth in Hondurass history bringing with it a more assertive National
Congress. A constitutional amendment in 2004
removed immunity for members of the National

302

Congress. Prior to 2004 legislators were immune

from arrest and prosecution while in office.
The legislature enjoys some authority. It can
influence the executive with its powers of interpellation, investigation, and oversight, although it
does not elect the president and has no say in the
formation of the government. It enjoys significant
institutional autonomy, including a monopoly on
lawmaking power and immunity from dissolution.
It has a number of specified powers and a fair
amount of institutional capacity.
SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of the Supreme Court of Justice.
Article 205
The National Congress shall have the following powers:
15. To declare whether or not there are grounds for
impeachment of the President.
Article 319
The Supreme Court of Justice shall have the following
power:
2. To try official and common crimes of high functionaries of the Republic, when the National Congress
has declared that there are grounds for impeachment.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators who serve in government have a
sleeping mandate, meaning that they may join the
government but forfeit their voting rights in the
legislature during their government service. They
may return to the legislature when their government service ends.

National Congress of Honduras (Congreso Nacional)

branch officials testifying before the legislature or its

committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 205
The National Congress shall have the following powers:
22. To interpellate Secretaries of State and other functionaries of the central government, decentralized
organisms, state enterprises and any other entity in
which the State has an interest, concerning matters
related to the public administration.
Article 251
The National Congress may summon the Secretaries of
State and these must answer any questions put to them
concerning matters relating to public administration.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can establish special commissions to investigate the executive.
Article 205
The National Congress shall have the following powers:
21. To appoint special commissions for the investigation of matters of national interest. The summons of
such commissions shall be compulsory under penalty
of contempt similar to that observed in the judicial procedure.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. Legislative committees have effective powers
of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. There is no prime minister.

Article 199
The following may not be elected deputies:
3. Secretaries and Sub-secretaries of State.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.

Article 203
Deputies in office may not obtain remunerated public positions during the term for which they have been
elected, except teaching and cultural positions and professional services related to social welfare. They may,
however, be Secretaries or Sub-Secretaries of State, President or Manager of decentralized entities, Chief of
Diplomatic or Consular missions, or serve in Ad Hoc
Diplomatic Missions. In such cases they will be reinstated in the National Congress upon the termination
of these functions. Alternates may hold public positions
or employment without losing their status as alternates.

No. The president appoints the ministers (secretaries), and the appointments do not require the
legislatures approval.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive

Article 245
The President of the Republic shall be responsible for
the general administration of the State; his powers:
5. To freely appoint and dismiss the Secretaries and
Sub-secretaries of State and other functionaries and
employees whose appointment is not attributed to
other authorities.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.

National Congress of Honduras (Congreso Nacional)

No. The president is directly elected.

Article 236
The President of the Republic and three Designates of
the Presidency shall be elected jointly and directly by
the people, by a simple majority of votes.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in
the government.
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the
executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.
11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power. The president can issue regulatory decrees.
Article 245
The President of the Republic shall be responsible for
the general administration of the State; his powers:
11. To issue directives and decrees and to issue regulations and resolutions according to the Law.
Article 248
The decrees, regulations, directives, orders and executive acts of the President of the Republic must be authorized by the Secretaries of State in their respective areas
or by the Sub-Secretaries, as the case may be. Without
this requirement they shall not have legal force.
The Secretaries of State and the Sub-Secretaries shall be
jointly responsible with the President of the Republic
for the acts they authorize.
For decisions taken in the Council of Ministers, the
Ministers present shall be responsible unless they have
given grounds for their dissenting votes.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority vote is needed to override a presidential veto.
Article 216
Should the Executive Power find impediments to the
sanction of the Bill of Law, it shall return it to the
National Congress within ten days with the formulation: Return to Congress, and shall explain the
grounds on which disapproval is based. If it does not
object it within the period indicated, it shall be considered sanctioned and shall be promulgated as Law.
Whenever the Executive returns a Bill of Law, it shall
again be debated in the National Congress, and if it is
ratified by a two-thirds vote, it shall again be sent to the

303
Executive Power, with this formulation: Constitutionally ratified and the Executive Power shall publish it
forthwith.
If the grounds for the veto are that the Bill of Law is
unconstitutional, it may not be submitted to a new
debate until the opinion of the Supreme Court of Justice has been obtained; it shall issue its opinion within
such period as the National Congress shall specify.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Supreme Court of Justice can review the
constitutionality of laws.
Article 184
The Laws may be declared unconstitutional by reason
of form or content.
The Supreme Court of Justice has original and exclusive
competence over hearing and deciding such matters,
and must render its decisions with the requirements of
definitive sentences.
Article 319
The Supreme Court of Justice shall have the following
powers:
12. To declare laws to be unconstitutional in the manner and cases provided in this Constitution.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds that the legislature appropriates.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
The executive is required to include the funds
requested by the legislature for its operations in
the state budget.
Article 211
The Executive Power shall include in the General Budget of Expenditures and Revenue of the Republic the
funds budgeted by the Legislative Power for its functioning.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislators are subject to arrest and prosecution. A constitutional amendment in 2004
removed immunity. Prior to 2004 legislators were
immune.

304

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 189
The Legislative Power is exercised by a Congress of
Deputies, who shall be elected by direct suffrage. It shall
convene in the capital of the Republic in ordinary sessions on the twenty-fifth of January of each year without the necessity of convocation and shall adjourn on
the thirty-first of October of the same year.

National Congress of Honduras (Congreso Nacional)

Article 245
The President of the Republic shall be responsible for
the general administration of the State; his powers:
13. To conclude treaties and agreements and to ratify,
following approval by the National Congress, International Treaties of a political and military character, those relating to the national territory, sovereignty
and concessions, those entailing financial obligations
for the Public Treasury, or those requiring amendment
or repeal of any constitutional or legal provision, and
those needing legislative measures for their execution.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
with a two-thirds majority vote.
Article 373
The amendment of this Constitution may be decreed by
the National Congress, in ordinary sessions, with twothirds of the votes of all its members. The Decree shall
specify for that purpose the article or articles that are to
be amended, which must be ratified by the subsequent
ordinary legislature, by the same number of votes, in
order to take effect.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. The president can declare war while the legislature is in recess.
Article 205
The National Congress shall have the following powers:
26. To authorize or deny the transit of foreign troops
through the territory of the country;
27. To authorize the Executive Power to order troops of
the Armed Forces to serve in foreign territory, in accordance with international treaties and conventions;
28. To declare war and to make peace.
Article 245
The President of the Republic shall be responsible for
the general administration of the State; his powers:
17. To declare war and make peace during a recess of the
National Congress, which must be convened forthwith.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties on most major issues.
Article 16
All international treaties must be approved by the
National Congress before their ratification by the Executive Power.
Article 205
The National Congress shall have the following powers:
30. To approve or disapprove international treaties
signed by the Executive Power.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant

amnesty.
Article 205
The National Congress shall have the following powers:
16. To grant amnesty for political offenses or related
common offenses, except in such cases the National
Congress may not make decisions on pardons.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 245
The President of the Republic shall be responsible for
the general administration of the State; his powers:
24. To pardon and commute sentences according to the
Law.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislature appoints the nine magistrates,
the seven alternates, and the president of the
Supreme Court of Justice. Normally, the president
submits a list of recommended candidates for the
bench to the legislature, and the legislature chooses
from names on the presidents list, although it is
not obligated to do so.
Article 205
The National Congress shall have the following powers:
9. To elect for the constitutional term, nine principal
magistrates and seven alternates of the Supreme Court
of Justice and to elect its President.
Article 303
The power to dispense justice emanates from the people
and is administered free of charge on behalf of the State
by independent magistrates and judges. The Judicial
Power consists of a Supreme Court of Justice, the Courts
of Appeals, and the Courts established by the Law.
The Supreme Court of Justice shall have its seat in the
Capital of the Republic, shall be composed of nine principal magistrates and seven alternates, elected by the
National Congress, and shall be divided into chambers,
in accordance with the provisions of the Internal Regulations of that Court.

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National Assembly of Hungary (Orszaggyu

305

Article 304
The President of the Supreme Court of Justice shall be
elected by the National Congress for a term of four
years.

without the necessity of convocation and shall

adjourn on the thirty-first of October of the same year.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

No. Political parties and legislative committees provide staff, but on average there is less than one staff
person for each legislator.

No. The president appoints the president of the

Central Bank of Honduras.

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session from
late January until the end of October. The legislatures internal rules provide for a one-month recess
during the summer, leaving Congress in session for
a total of eight months.
Article 189
The Legislative Power is exercised by a Congress of
Deputies, who shall be elected by direct suffrage. It
shall convene in the capital of the Republic in ordinary sessions on the twenty-fifth of January of each year

No. See item 28.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

LES)

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF HUNGARY (ORSZAGGYU

Expert consultants: Kenneth Benoit, Matyas E
orsi, Anna Grzymaa-Busse, Renata Uitz, Jason
Wittenberg
Score: .75
Influence over
executive (8/9)

Institutional
autonomy (7/9)

Specified
powers (5/8)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

X
X

26. media

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack president
9. no confidence

X
X

The National Assembly (Orszaggyules) of Hungary traces its origins to the countrys first
post-independence legislative body, the National

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

Council, established at the end of World War I.

Hungary came under Soviet domination shortly
after the end of World War II. The 1949

306

constitution institutionalized a National Assembly that formally enjoyed supreme authority, but
in practice, the Communist Party dictated legislation. During the collapse of communist-party
rule in 1989, the National Assembly passed a constitutional amendment that overhauled the fundamental law, providing for the open political
system found in Hungary today. The renovated
constitution granted the legislature oversight
authority over the government, guaranteed a competitive multiparty system, established a Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality of laws,
mandated that the legislature meet regularly, and
established procedures for the election of the legislature. Subsequent amendments did not directly
affect legislative power.
The National Assembly has considerable clout.
Its approval is not needed for the appointment of
ministers, but it holds every other means of controlling executive power assessed in this survey.
It also enjoys considerable autonomy, including a
monopoly on lawmaking powers, and is endowed
with a number of specified powers. It has some
institutional capacity, although legislators lack personal staff.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can remove the prime minister
with a vote of no confidence. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of the Constitutional Court.
Article 33A
The Governments mandate shall end
f) if the Parliament passes a motion of no-confidence
in the Prime Minister and elects a new Prime Minister
in accordance with the provisions of Par. (1), Article
39A.
Article 31A
(1) The person of the President of the Republic is inviolable; protection from criminal prosecution shall be
granted by a separate law.
(2) Should the President of the Republic violate the
Constitution or any other law while in office, a motion
supported by one-fifth of the Members of Parliament
may propose that impeachment proceedings be initiated against the President of the Republic.
(3) A majority of two-thirds of the votes of the Members of Parliament is required to initiate impeachment
proceedings. Voting shall be held by secret ballot.
(4) From passage of this resolution by the Parliament
until the conclusion of the impeachment proceedings,
the President of the Republic may not attend to any of
the duties of his office.

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National Assembly of Hungary (Orszaggyu

(5) The Constitutional Court shall have jurisdiction in
such cases.
(6) Should the Constitutional Court determine that the
law was violated, it shall have the authority to remove
the President of the Republic from office.
Article 39A
(1) A motion of no-confidence in the Prime Minister
may be initiated by a written petition, which includes
the nomination for a candidate for the office of Prime
Minister, by no less than one-fifth of the Members of
Parliament. A motion of no-confidence in the Prime
Minister is considered a motion of no-confidence in
the Government as well. Should, on the basis of this
motion, the majority of the Members of Parliament
withdraw their confidence, then the candidate nominated for Prime Minister in the motion shall be considered to have been elected.
(2) The debate and vote on the motion of noconfidence shall be held no earlier than three days from
the date of proposal and no later than eight days from
the date of proposal.
(3) The Government, via the Prime Minister, may propose a vote of confidence in accordance with the period
of time specified in Paragraph (2).
(4) The Government, via the Prime Minister, may propose that the vote on the motion it has made simultaneously be considered as a vote of confidence.
(5) Should the Parliament fail to give the Government
a vote of confidence in accordance with the provisions
of Paragraphs (3)(4), the Government shall resign.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Legislators may serve simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 20
(5) A Member of Parliament may not be the President
of the Republic, a member of the Constitutional Court,
the Ombudsman for Civil Rights, the President, Deputy
President or auditor of the State Audit Office, a judge
or prosecutor, an employee of a public administration
body with the exception of the Members of the Government and Parliamentary State Secretaries nor a
professional member of the armed forces, the police or
other security organs. Other cases of conflict of interest
may be established by law.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly questions executive
branch officials.
Article 27
Any Member of Parliament may direct a question . . . to
the Government or any of the Members of the Government . . . on matters which fall within their respective
sphere of authority.

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National Assembly of Hungary (Orszaggyu

Article 39
(1) The Government is responsible to the Parliament
for its operation and is required to furnish the Parliament with regular reports on its work.
(2) Members of the Government are responsible to
the Government and to the Parliament and shall provide the Government and the Parliament with reports
on their activities. The legal status, compensation and
method of accountability of Members of the Government and State Secretaries shall be regulated by law.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can establish committees to
investigate the executive.
Article 21
(2) The Parliament shall establish standing committees
from among its members and may delegate a committee
for the investigation of any issue whatsoever.
(3) Everyone is obliged to provide Parliamentary Committees with the information requested and is obliged
to testify before such committees.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. Legislative committees have effective powers
of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature elects the prime minister.
Article 19
(3) Within this sphere of authority, the Parliament
shall
k) elect . . . the Prime Minister.
Article 33
(3) The Prime Minister shall be elected by a majority of
the votes of the Members of Parliament, based on the
recommendation made by the President of the Republic. The Parliament shall hold the vote on the election
of the Prime Minister and on the passage of the Governments program at the same time.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints the ministers on
the recommendation of the prime minister, and
the appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 33
(4) The Ministers shall be appointed and dismissed by
the President of the Republic, based on the recommendation made by the Prime Minister.

307

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The legislature elects the president.
Article 19
(3) Within this sphere of authority, the Parliament
shall
k) elect the President of the Republic.
Article 29A
(1) The Parliament shall elect the President of the
Republic for a term of five years.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 33A
The Governments mandate shall end
f) if the Parliament passes a motion of no-confidence
in the Prime Minister and elects a new Prime Minister
in accordance with the provisions of Par. (1), Article
39A.
Article 39A
(1) A motion of no-confidence in the Prime Minister
may be initiated by a written petition, which includes
the nomination for a candidate for the office of Prime
Minister, by no less than one-fifth of the Members of
Parliament. A motion of no-confidence in the Prime
Minister is considered a motion of no-confidence in
the Government as well. Should, on the basis of this
motion, the majority of the Members of Parliament
withdraw their confidence, then the candidate nominated for Prime Minister in the motion shall be considered to have been elected.
(2) The debate and vote on the motion of noconfidence shall be held no earlier than three days from
the date of proposal and no later than eight days from
the date of proposal.
(3) The Government, via the Prime Minister, may propose a vote of confidence in accordance with the period
of time specified in Paragraph (2).
(4) The Government, via the Prime Minister, may propose that the vote on the motion it has made simultaneously be considered as a vote of confidence.
(5) Should the Parliament fail to give the Government a vote of confidence in accordance with the provisions of Paragraphs (3)(4), the Government shall
resign.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 28
(1) The term of Parliament commences from its inaugural sitting.
(2) The Parliament has the right to declare its dissolution prior to the completion of its term.

308
(3) The President of the Republic has the right
to dissolve the Parliament, simultaneously with the
announcement of new elections, if
a) the Parliament passes a motion of no-confidence
in the Government on no less than four occasions in
a period of twelve months during the course of one
term, or;
b) in the event that the mandate of the Government
ends, a candidate for Prime Minister proposed by
the President of the Republic is not elected by the
Parliament within a period of forty days from the
day upon which the first candidate is nominated.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power. During a
state of martial law, however, the National Defense
Council may pass decrees that have the force of
law. If not subsequently passed by parliament, the
decrees lapse at the end of the crisis.
Article 19B
(4) The National Defense Council may pass decrees,
which may suspend the application of certain laws or
which may deviate from the provisions of certain laws.
Furthermore, it may take other extraordinary measures,
but may not, however, suspend the application of the
Constitution.
(5) Decrees passed by the National Defense Council
shall lose validity upon cessation of the state of national
crisis, unless the Parliament extends the validity of such
decrees.
Article 19C
(4) Emergency measures introduced by decree shall
remain in force for a period of thirty days, unless the
Parliament or, should the Parliament be obstructed, the
Parliamentary Defense Committee extends their validity.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote of its present members.
Article 26
(1) The President of the Republic shall ensure promulgation of the law within a period of fifteen days following its receipt, or within a period of five days if
the Speaker of Parliament requests that the issue be
accorded urgency. The President of the Republic shall
ratify the law sent for promulgation. The law shall be
promulgated in the Official Gazette.
(2) Should the President of the Republic disagree with a
law or with any provision of a law, prior to ratification,
he shall refer such law, along with his comments, to
the Parliament for reconsideration within the period of
time specified in Par. (1).

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National Assembly of Hungary (Orszaggyu

(3) The Parliament shall debate the law again and hold
another vote on its passage. The President of the Republic is required to ratify and promulgate the law sent to
him by the Speaker of Parliament following this procedure, within a period of five days.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 26
(4) Should the President of the Republic have reservations about the constitutionality of any provision of a
law, he may refer such law to the Constitutional Court
for review within the period of time specified in Par. (1)
prior to ratification.
(5) Should the Constitutional Court in special proceedings determine the law to be unconstitutional,
the President of the Republic shall refer such law to the
Parliament; otherwise he shall ratify and promulgate
the law within a period of five days.
Article 32A
(1) The Constitutional Court shall review the constitutionality of laws and attend to the duties assigned to its
jurisdiction by law.
(2) The Constitutional Court shall annul any laws and
other statutes that it finds to be unconstitutional.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,
including control over members perquisites.
Article 20
Members of Parliament are entitled to compensation
adequate to ensure their independence, to specified
allowances and to reimbursement of their expenses. A
majority of two-thirds of the votes of the Members of
Parliament present is required to pass the law on the
amount of compensation, reimbursement of expenses
and allowances.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.

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National Assembly of Hungary (Orszaggyu

309

Yes. Legislators are immune with the common

exception for cases of flagrante delicto.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.

Article 20
Members of Parliament are granted parliamentary
immunity, in accordance with the regulations of the
law defining the legal status of Members of Parliament.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

international treaties.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
with a two-thirds majority vote.
Article 24
(3) A majority of two-thirds of the votes of the Members
of Parliament is required to amend the Constitution
and for certain decisions specified therein.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. If the legislature is out of session and meeting is impossible, the president may declare war
without the legislatures approval. The decision
must be submitted to the legislature for subsequent
approval.
Article 19
(3) Within this sphere of authority, the Parliament
shall
g) decide on the declaration of a state of war and on
the conclusion of peace.
Article 19A
(1) Should the Parliament be obstructed in reaching
such decisions, the President of the Republic shall have
the right to declare a state of war, a state of national
crisis and establish the National Defense Council, or to
declare a state of emergency.
(2) The Parliament shall be considered to be obstructed
in reaching such decisions, if it is not in session and
convening it is impossible due to lack of time or due to
the events responsible for the declaration of the state of
war, state of national crisis or state of emergency.
(3) The Speaker of Parliament, the President of the Constitutional Court and the Prime Minister shall jointly
determine whether the Parliament is obstructed, and
whether a declaration of a state of war, a state of
national crisis or a state of emergency is justified.
(4) At its first meeting following the end of the obstruction, the Parliament shall review the justification of the
declaration of a state of war, state of national crisis
or state of emergency, and shall rule on the legality
of the measures taken. A majority of two-thirds of the
votes of the Members of Parliament is required for this
decision.

Article 19
(3) Within this sphere of authority, the Parliament
shall
f) conclude international treaties of outstanding
importance to the foreign relations of the Republic
of Hungary.
Article 30A
(1) The President of the Republic shall
b) conclude international treaties in the name of the
Republic of Hungary; if the subject of the treaty falls
within its legislative competence, prior ratification
by the Parliament is necessary for conclusion of the
treaty.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant
amnesty.
Article 19
(3) Within this sphere of authority, the Parliament
shall
m) exercise general amnesty.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 30A
(1) The President of the Republic shall
k) exercise the right to grant individual pardons.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislature appoints the members of the
Constitutional Court and the president of the
Supreme Court.
Article 19
(3) Within this sphere of authority, the Parliament
shall
k) elect . . . the members of the Constitutional
Court, . . . [and] the President of the Supreme Court.
Article 32A
(4) The Constitutional Court shall consist of eleven
members who are elected by the Parliament. Members of the Constitutional Court shall be nominated
by the Nominating Committee which shall consist of
one member of each political party represented in the
Parliament. A majority of two-thirds of the votes of the
Members of Parliament is required to elect a member of
the Constitutional Court.
Article 48
(1) Based on the recommendation made by the President of the Republic, the Parliament shall elect the

les)

National Assembly of Hungary (Orszaggyu

310
President of the Supreme Court; based on the recommendation made by the President of the Supreme
Court, the President of the Republic shall appoint the
Deputy Presidents of the Supreme Court. A majority of
two-thirds of the votes of the Members of Parliament is
required to elect the President of the Supreme Court.
(2) The President of the Republic shall appoint professional judges in the manner specified by law.
(3) Judges may only be removed from office on the
grounds and in accordance with the procedures specified by law.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the president of the
National Bank of Hungary.
Article 30A
(1) The President of the Republic shall
i) appoint and dismiss the President and VicePresidents of the National Bank of Hungary.
Article 32D
(2) The President of the National Bank of Hungary is
appointed by the President of the Republic for a term
of six years.

Yes. The legislature is in session for roughly seven

months each year.
Article 22
(1) The Parliament shall hold two regular sessions
annually: every year from the 1st of February through
the 15th of June and from the 1st of September through
the 15th of December.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No. Political parties provide legislators with secretarial assistance, but on average there is less than
one staff person for each legislator.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No. See item 28.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
Yes. The legislature has a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media. The parties represented in parliament elect the board of the stateowned broadcasting companies.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

Parliament of India (Sansad)

311

PARLIAMENT OF INDIA (SANSAD)

Expert consultants: Niraja Gopal Jayal, Kuldeep Mathur, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Amit Prakash,
Pai Ramachandra
Score: .63
Influence over
executive (8/9)

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)

Specified
powers (2/8)
19. amendments
20. war

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack president
9. no confidence

X
X

Institutional
capacity (5/6)
X

21. treaties
22. amnesty

26. media

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

X
X
X

The Parliament (Sansad) of India traces its roots to

the assemblies that met during British rule, which
ended in 1947. Parliament was formally established
in the 1950 constitution. The constitution called
for a bicameral legislature with a lower chamber,
the House of the People (Lok Sabha), and an upper
chamber, the Council of States (Rajya Sabha). The
constitution has been altered at a rate of about
two amendments each year since independence,
but none of these changes has appreciably affected
parliaments power.
Parliament is a formidable center of authority. It
has broad sway over executive power. Parliaments
composition determines the identity of the prime
minister, and parliament elects the president. Furthermore, parliaments members serve in government, and parliament can interpellate and investigate the executive branch, vote no confidence
in the government, and remove the president
from office. Parliaments institutional autonomy
is circumscribed, however, by presidential decree
and dissolution powers. Parliament has remarkably few specified powers and prerogatives, but it is
endowed with a high level of institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.

Yes. The legislature can remove the prime minister with a vote of no confidence. The legislature
can remove the president from office by a twothirds majority vote of its total membership in
both houses.
Article 61
(1) When a President is to be impeached for violation
of the Constitution, the charge shall be preferred by
either House of Parliament.
(2) No such charge shall be preferred unless
(a) the proposal to prefer such charge is contained
in a resolution which has been moved after at least
fourteen days notice in writing signed by not less
than one-fourth of the total number of members of
the House has been given of their intention to move
the resolution, and
(b) such resolution has been passed by a majority of
not less than two-thirds of the total membership of
the House.
(3) When a charge has been so preferred by either
House of Parliament, the other House shall investigate
the charge or cause the charge to be investigated and
the President shall have the right to appear and to be
represented at such investigation.
(4) If as a result of the investigation a resolution is
passed by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the
total membership of the House by which the charge
was investigated or caused to be investigated, declaring that the charge preferred against the President has
been sustained, such resolution shall have the effect of
removing the President from his office as from the date
on which the resolution is so passed.

312

Parliament of India (Sansad)

Article 75
(3) The Council of Ministers shall be collectively
responsible to the House of the People.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.

No. The president appoints ministers on the advice

of the prime minister, and the appointments do
not require the legislatures approval.

Yes. Ministers are generally selected from, and

required to serve simultaneously in, the legislature.
Nonmembers can also be appointed for a period
of six months, within which time they must be
elected to the legislature or lose their position in
government.
3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The constitution grants parliament the authority to define its own powers but does not specifically address interpellation. In practice, the legislature regularly interpellates executive branch officials.
Article 105
(3) In other respects, the powers . . . of each House of
Parliament . . . shall be such as may from time to time
be defined by Parliament by law.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The constitution grants parliament the authority to define its own powers but does not specifically address investigations. In practice, the legislature can investigate the executive.
Article 105
(3) In other respects, the powers . . . of each House of
Parliament . . . shall be such as may from time to time
be defined by Parliament by law.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. Legislative committees have effective powers
of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. Formally, the president appoints the prime
minister, but in practice, the president appoints
as prime minister the candidate who enjoys the
support of the legislature.
Article 75
(1) The Prime Minister shall be appointed by the President and the other Ministers shall be appointed by the
President on the advice of the Prime Minister.

Article 75
(1) The Prime Minister shall be appointed by the President and the other Ministers shall be appointed by the
President on the advice of the Prime Minister.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The legislature elects the president.
Article 54
The President shall be elected by the members of an
electoral college consisting of
(a) the elected members of both Houses of Parliament;
and
(b) the elected members of the Legislative Assemblies
of the States. Explanation: In this article and in article
55, State includes the National Capital Territory of
Delhi and the Union territory of Pondicherry.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The House of the People can vote no confidence in the government (the Council of Ministers).
Article 75
(3) The Council of Ministers shall be collectively
responsible to the House of the People.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 83
(2) The House of the People, unless sooner dissolved,
shall continue for five years from the date appointed for
its first meeting and no longer and the expiration of the
said period of five years shall operate as a dissolution of
the House:
Provided that the said period may, while a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, be extended by Parliament by law for a period not exceeding one year at a
time and not extending in any case beyond a period of
six months after the Proclamation has ceased to operate.
Article 85
(2) The President may from time to time
(a) prorogue the Houses or either House;
(b) dissolve the House of the People.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.

Parliament of India (Sansad)

No. The president (or the government) can issue

decrees (ordinances) that have the force of law
when the legislature is not in session. The decrees
lapse if they are not subsequently approved by the
legislature.
Article 123
(1) If at any time, except when both Houses of Parliament are in session, the President is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to
take immediate action, he may promulgate such Ordinances as the circumstances appear to him to require.
(2) An Ordinance promulgated under this article shall
have the same force and effect as an Act of Parliament,
but every such Ordinance
(a) shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament and
shall cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks
from the reassembly of Parliament, or, if before the
expiration of that period resolutions disapproving it
are passed by both Houses, upon the passing of the
second of those resolutions; and
(b) may be withdrawn at any time by the President.
Explanation: Where the Houses of Parliament are summoned to reassemble on different dates, the period of
six weeks shall be reckoned from the later of those dates
for the purposes of this clause.
(3) If and so far as an Ordinance under this article makes any provision which Parliament would not
under this Constitution be competent to enact, it shall
be void.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote of its present members.
Article 111
When a Bill has been passed by the Houses of Parliament, it shall be presented to the President, and the
President shall declare either that he assents to the Bill,
or that he withholds assent therefrom. Provided that
the President may, as soon as possible after the presentation to him of a Bill for assent, return the Bill if it is
not a Money Bill to the Houses with a message requesting that they will reconsider the Bill or any specified
provisions thereof and, in particular, will consider the
desirability of introducing any such amendments as he
may recommend in his message, and when a Bill is so
returned, the Houses shall reconsider the Bill accordingly, and if the Bill is passed again by the Houses with
or without amendment and presented to the President
for assent, the President shall not withhold assent therefrom.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Supreme Court can review the constitutionality of laws.

313
Article 132
(1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any
judgement, decree of final order of a High Court in
the territory of India, whether in a civil, criminal or
other proceeding, if the High Court certifies under article 134A that the case involves a substantial question
of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,
including control over members perquisites.
Article 106
Members of either House of Parliament shall be entitled to receive such salaries and allowances as may from
time to time be determined by Parliament by law and,
until provision in that respect is so made, allowances
at such rates and upon such conditions as were immediately before the commencement of this Constitution
applicable in the case of members of the Constituent
Assembly of the Dominion of India.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislative immunity extends to official parliamentary business only. Legislators are subject to
arrest for common crimes.
Article 105
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
to the rules and standing orders regulating the procedure of Parliament, there shall be freedom of speech in
Parliament.
(2) No member of Parliament shall be liable to any proceedings in any court in respect of anything said or
any vote given by him in Parliament or any committee
thereof, and no person shall be so liable in respect of the
publication by or under the authority of either House
of Parliament of any report, paper, votes or proceedings.
(3) In other respects, the powers, privileges and immunities of each House of Parliament, and of the members
and the committees of each House, shall be such as
may from time to time be defined by Parliament by
law, and, until so defined, shall be those of that House
and of its members and committees immediately before

314
the coming into force of section 15 of the Constitution
(Forty-fourth Amendment) Act. 1978.
(4) The provisions of clauses (1), (2) and (3) shall apply
in relation to persons who by virtue of this Constitution
have the right to speak in, and otherwise to take part
in the proceedings of, a House of Parliament or any
committee thereof as they apply in relation to members
of Parliament.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected, with
two minor exceptions. The president appoints two
of the 538 members of the House of the People to
represent the Anglo-Indian community and twelve
of the 238 members of the Council of States from
the world of the arts, literature, science, and social
service.
Article 80
(1) The Council of States shall consists of
(a) twelve members to be nominated by the President
in accordance with the provisions of clause (3); and
(b) not more than two hundred and thirty-eight representatives of the States and of the Union territories.
(2) The allocation of seats in the Council of States
to be filled by representatives of the States and of
the Union territories shall be in accordance with the
provisions in that behalf contained in the Fourth
Schedule.
(3) The members to be nominated by the President
under sub-clause (a) and clause (1) shall consists of persons having special knowledge or practical experience
in respect of such matters as the following, namely:
Literature, science, art and social service.
(4) The representatives of each State in the Council
of States shall be elected members of the Legislative
Assembly of the State in accordance with the system
of proportional representation by means of the single
transferable vote.
(5) The representatives of the Union territories in the
Council of States shall be chosen in such manner as
Parliament may by law prescribe.
Article 81
(1) Subject to the provisions of article 331, the House
of the People shall consists of
(a) not more than five hundred and thirty members
chosen by direct election from territorial constituencies in the States, and
(b) not more than twenty members to represent the
Union territories, chosen in such manner as Parliament may by law provide.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can changes the constitution with a two-thirds majority vote in both

Parliament of India (Sansad)

houses. Amendments to select constitutional articles require approval by the state legislatures.
Article 368
(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,
Parliament may in exercise of its constituent power
amend by way of addition, variation or repeal any provision of this Constitution in accordance with the procedure laid down in this article.
(2) An amendment of this Constitution may be initiated only by the introduction of a Bill for the purpose in
either House of Parliament, and when the Bill is passed
in each House by a majority of the total membership
of that House and by a majority of not less than twothirds of the members of that House present and voting,
it shall be presented to the President who shall give his
assent to the Bill and thereupon the Constitution shall
stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill:
Provided that if such amendment seeks to make any
change in
(a) article 54, article 55, article 73, article 162 or article 241, or
(b) Chapter IV of Part V, Chapter V of Part VI, or
Chapter I of Part XI, or
(c) any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, or
(d) the representation of States in Parliament, or
(e) the provisions of this article,
the amendment shall also require to be ratified by the
Legislatures of not less than one-half of the States by
resolutions to that effect passed by those Legislatures
before the Bill making provision for such amendment
is presented to the President for assent.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. The president, with the cabinets approval, can
issue a proclamation of emergency without the legislatures prior approval. The proclamation lapses
after one month if it is not subsequently approved
by the legislature.
Article 352
(1) If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency
exists whereby the security of India or of any part of the
territory thereof is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or armed rebellion, he may, by proclamation, make a declaration to that effect in respect of the
whole of India or of such part of the territory thereof as
may be specified in the proclamation.
Explanation: A proclamation of Emergency declaring
that the security of India or any part of the territory
thereof is threatened by war or by external aggression
or by armed rebellion may be made before the actual
occurrence of war or of any such aggression or rebellion,
if the President is satisfied that there is imminent danger
thereof.
(3) The President shall not issue a Proclamation under
clause (1) or a Proclamation varying such Proclamation
unless the decision of the Union cabinet (that is to say,
the Council consisting of the Prime Minister and other

Parliament of India (Sansad)

Ministers of Cabinet rank appointed under article 75)
that such a Proclamation may be issued has been communicated to him in writing.
(4) Every Proclamation issued under this article shall be
laid before each House of Parliament and shall, except
where it is a Proclamation revoking a previous Proclamation, cease to operate at the expiration of one month
unless before the expiration of that period it has been
approved by resolutions of both Houses of Parliament:
Provided that if any such Proclamation (not being
a Proclamation revoking a previous Proclamation) is
issued at a time when the House of the People has been
dissolved, or the dissolution of the House of the People
takes place during the period of one month referred to
in this clause, and if a resolution approving the Proclamation has been passed by the Council of States, but no
resolution with respect to such Proclamation has been
passed by the House of the People before the expiration
of that period, the Proclamation shall cease to operate
at the expiration of thirty days from the date on which
the House of the People first sits after its reconstitution,
unless before the expiration of the said period of thirty
days a resolution approving the Proclamation has been
also passed by the House of the People.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
No. The president can conclude international
treaties without the legislatures approval.
22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.
No. Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 72
(1) The President shall have the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of punishment
or to suspend, remit or commute the sentence of any
persons convicted of any offence.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The president appoints the members of the
Supreme Court, and the appointments do not
require the legislatures approval.
Article 124
(1) There shall be a Supreme Court of India consisting of a Chief Justice of India and, until Parliament by
law prescribes a larger number, of not more than seven
other Judges.

315
(2) Every Judge of the Supreme Court shall be
appointed by the President by warrant under his hand
and seal after consultation with such of the Judges of
the Supreme Court and of the High Courts in the States
as the President may deem necessary for the purpose
and shall hold office until he attains the age of sixtyfive years.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The government appoints the governor of the
Reserve Bank of India.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
Yes. The legal framework and budgetary allocations of the public media are subjected to legislative
scrutiny.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session for
about eight months each year. The budget session runs from February to May, the monsoon
session occurs in July and August, and the winter session is held in November and December.
28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.
Yes. Legislators are paid a fixed sum toward secretarial assistance and office expenses.
Article 98
(1) Each House of Parliament shall have a separate secretarial staff.

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.
No. Legislators are provided funds for staff, but not
every legislator has a policy expert on staff.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

316

House of Representatives of Indonesia (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF INDONESIA (DEWAN PERWAKILAN RAKYAT)

Expert consultants: Harry Bhaskara, Jonathan Chang, Harold Crouch, Hans J. Esderts,
Muhamad Nadratuzzaman Hosen, Peter Lewis
Score: .56
Influence over
executive (3/9)

Institutional
autonomy (6/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

24. judiciary

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

25. central bank

X
X

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

18. all elected

Specified
powers (4/8)

Institutional
capacity (5/6)

X
X

X
X
X

26. media
X

The House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan

Rakyat, or DPR) of Indonesia was established in the
1945 constitution. The legislature of Indonesia as
constituted today consists of three separate bodies. The House of Representatives is the primary
lawmaking body. The House of Regional Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, or DPD), created
in a 2004 constitutional amendment, serves as an
upper house of the legislature and is charged with
providing the DPR with input on regional issues.
The Peoples Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, or MPR) is a special body that
consists of the members of the DPR and the DPD. It
meets to amend the constitution and to inaugurate
and impeach the president.
The legislature was largely sidelined under the
rule of President Suharto, who held power from
1965 to 1997. Following Suhartos fall, the legislature was revitalized, and in 1999 Indonesia held
its first free parliamentary election since 1955. A
constitutional amendment in 1999 placed some
constraints on the presidents previously unlimited decree powers. In 2000 another constitutional
amendment revoked the veto powers that the president had previously held. A 2001 amendment provided for direct presidential elections; prior to 2001
the MPR elected the president. The amendment
also established a Constitutional Court with the
power of judicial review; prior to 2001 the laws

of the legislature were supreme and not subject

to judicial review. Another amendment in 2001
took away from the president the right to appoint
members of the MPR; prior to 2001 the president
appointed some of the MPR membership.
The legislature is a fairly weighty institution.
It has some influence over the executive, including the ability to interpellate and investigate executive branch officials. It has a fair amount of
institutional autonomy, although legislators lack
immunity from arrest and criminal prosecution. It
exercises a number of specified powers, and it has
considerable institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires
involvement of the Constitutional Court.

the

Article 3
(3) The MPR may only dismiss the President and/or
Vice-President during his/her term of office in accordance with the Constitution.
Article 7A
The President and/or the Vice-President may be dismissed from his/her position during his/her term of
office by the MPR on the proposal of the House of

House of Representatives of Indonesia (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat)

Representatives, both if it is proven that he/she has
violated the law through an act of treason, corruption, bribery, or other act of a grave criminal nature,
or through moral turpitude, and/or that the President
and/or Vice-President no longer meets the qualifications to serve as President and/or Vice-President.
Article 7B
(1) Any proposal for the dismissal of the President
and/or the Vice-President may be submitted by the DPR
to the MPR only by first submitting a request to the
Constitutional Court to investigate, bring to trial, and
issue a decision on the opinion of the DPR either that
the President and/or Vice-President has violated the law
through an act of treason, corruption, bribery, or other
act of a grave criminal nature, or through moral turpitude, and/or that the President and/or Vice-President
no longer meets the qualifications to serve as President
and/or Vice-President.
(2) The opinion of the DPR that the President and/or
Vice-President has violated the law or no longer meets
the qualifications to serve as President and/or VicePresident is undertaken in the course of implementation of the supervision function of the DPR.
(3) The submission of the request of the DPR to the
Constitutional Court shall only be made with the support of at least 2/3 of the total members of the DPR who
are present in a plenary session that is attended by at
least 2/3 of the total membership of the DPR.
(4) The Constitutional Court has the obligation to
investigate, bring to trial, and reach the most just decision on the opinion of the DPR at the latest ninety
days after the request of the DPR was received by the
Constitutional Court.
(5) If the Constitutional Court decides that the President and/or Vice-President is proved to have violated
the law through an act of treason, corruption, bribery,
or other act of a grave criminal nature, or through moral
turpitude; and/or the President and/or Vice-President is
proved no longer to meet the qualifications to serve as
President and/or Vice-President, the DPR shall hold a
plenary session to submit the proposal to impeach the
President and/or Vice-President to the MPR.
(6) The MPR shall hold a session to decide on the proposal of the DPR at the latest thirty days after its receipt
of the proposal.
(7) The decision of the MPR over the proposal to
impeach the President and/or Vice-President shall be
taken during a plenary session of the MPR which is
attended by at least 3/4 of the total membership and
shall require the approval of at least 2/3 of the total of
members who are present, after the President and/or
Vice-President have been given the opportunity to
present his/her explanation to the plenary session of
the MPR.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Ministers may not serve simultaneously in the
legislature.

317

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 20A
(1) The DPR shall hold legislative, budgeting and oversight functions.
(2) In carrying out its functions, in addition to the
rights regulated in other articles of this Constitution,
the DPR shall hold the right of interpellation, the right
of investigation, and the right to declare an opinion.
(3) Other than the rights regulated in other articles of
this Constitution, every DPR member shall hold the
right to submit questions, the right to propose suggestions and opinions, and the right of immunity.
(4) Further provisions on the rights of the DPR and the
rights of DPR members shall be regulated by law.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
Article 20A
(1) The DPR shall hold legislative, budgeting and oversight functions.
(2) In carrying out its functions, in addition to the
rights regulated in other articles of this Constitution,
the DPR shall hold the right of interpellation, the right
of investigation, and the right to declare an opinion.
(3) Other than the rights regulated in other articles of
this Constitution, every DPR member shall hold the
right to submit questions, the right to propose suggestions and opinions, and the right of immunity.
(4) Further provisions on the rights of the DPR and the
rights of DPR members shall be regulated by law.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. There is no prime minister.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 17
(1) The President shall be assisted by Ministers of State.
(2) Ministers of State shall be appointed and dismissed
by the President.

318

House of Representatives of Indonesia (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat)

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected. Prior to 2001
the MPR elected the president.
Article 6A
(1) The President and Vice-President shall be elected as
a single ticket directly by the people.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote to censure the government. The vote is merely symbolic, however. It
does not result in the governments resignation.
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the
executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.
Article 7C
The President may not freeze and/or dissolve the DPR.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The president can issue decrees (here expressed
as regulations) that have the force of law should
exigencies compel. The decrees lapse if they are
not subsequently approved by the legislature.
Article 22
(1) Should exigencies compel, the President shall have
the right to establish government regulations in lieu of
laws.
(2) Such government regulations must obtain the
approval of the DPR during its next session.
(3) Should there be no such approval, these government regulations shall be revoked.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks veto power. If the president refuses to sign a bill, it automatically becomes
law within thirty days. Prior to a 2000 constitutional amendment, the president had veto powers.
Article 20
(1) The DPR shall hold the authority to establish laws.
(2) Each bill shall be discussed by the DPR and the President to reach joint approval.
(3) If a bill fails to reach joint approval, that bill shall
not be reintroduced within the same DPR term of sessions.
(4) The President signs a jointly approved bill to
become a law.
(5) If the President fails to sign a jointly approved bill
within 30 days following such approval, that bill shall
legally become a law and must be promulgated.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 24C
(1) The Constitutional Court . . . shall have the final
power of decision in reviewing laws against the Constitution.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. The constitution specifies only that legislators
have the right of immunity. In practice, legislators can be arrested with the presidents approval.
Article 20A
(3) Other than the rights regulated in other articles of
this Constitution, every DPR member shall hold the
right to submit questions, the right to propose suggestions and opinions, and the right of immunity.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the three legislative bodies are
elected. Prior to 2001 some of the members of the
MPR were appointed.
Article 2
(1) The MPR shall consist of the members of the DPR
and the members of the DPD who have been elected
through general elections, and shall be regulated further by law.
Article 19
(1) Members of the DPR shall be elected through a general election.
Article 22C
(1) The members of the DPD shall be elected from every
province through a general election.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.

House of Representatives of Indonesia (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat)

Yes. The MPR can change the constitution with a

two-thirds majority vote.
Article 3
(1) The MPR has the authority to amend and enact the
Constitution.
Article 37
(1) A proposal to amend the Articles of this Constitution may be included in the agenda of an MPR session
if it is submitted by at least 1/3 of the total MPR membership.
(2) Any proposal to amend the Articles of this Constitution shall be introduced in writing and must clearly
state the articles to be amended and the reasons for the
amendment.
(3) To amend the Articles of this Constitution, the session of the MPR requires at least 2/3 of the total membership of the MPR to be present.
(4) Any decision to amend the Articles of this Constitution shall be made with the agreement of at least fifty
percent plus one member of the total membership of
the MPR.
(5) Provisions relating to the form of the unitary state
of the Republic of Indonesia may not be amended.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The House of Representatives approval is necessary for presidential war declarations.
Article 11
(1) The President with the approval of the DPR may
declare war, make peace and conclude treaties with
other countries.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 11
(1) The President with the approval of the DPR may
declare war, make peace and conclude treaties with
other countries.
(2) The President in making other international agreements that will produce an extensive and fundamental
impact on the lives of the people which is linked to
the state financial burden, and/or that will requires an
amendment to or the enactment of a law, shall obtain
the approval of the DPR.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. The president has the power to grant amnesty.
Article 14
(1) The President may grant clemency and restoration
of rights and shall in so doing have regard to the opinion of the Supreme Court.
(2) The President may grant amnesty and the dropping
of charges and shall in so doing have regard to the
opinion of the DPR.

319

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 14
(1) The President may grant clemency and restoration
of rights and shall in so doing have regard to the opinion of the Supreme Court.
(2) The President may grant amnesty and the dropping
of charges and shall in so doing have regard to the
opinion of the DPR.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislatures consent is required to approve
the presidents appointments to the Supreme Court
and the Judicial Commission.
Article 24A
(3) Candidate justices of the Supreme Court shall be
proposed by the Judicial Commission to the DPR for
approval and shall subsequently be formally appointed
to office by the President.
Article 24B
(3) The members of the Judicial Commission shall be
appointed and dismissed by the President with the
approval of the DPR.
Article 24C
(3) The Constitutional Court shall be composed of nine
persons who shall be constitutional justices and who
shall be confirmed in office by the President, of whom
three shall be nominated by the Supreme Court, three
nominated by the DPR, and three nominated by the
President.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the governor of the
Bank of Indonesia.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. According to the constitution, the MPR must
meet once every five years, and the DPR and the
DPD must meet at least once a year. In practice,
the MPR meets for about ten days each year, and
the DPR meets regularly in ordinary session.
Article 2
(1) The MPR shall consist of the members of the DPR
and the members of the DPD who have been elected
through general elections, and shall be regulated further by law.

320

House of Representatives of Indonesia (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat)

(2) The MPR shall convene in a session at least once in

every five years in the capital of the State.
Article 19
(3) The DPR shall convene in a session at least once a
year.
Article 22C
(3) The DPD shall hold a session at least once every
year.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.

Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Since the opening of the political system in
the late 1990s, Indonesia has held two rounds of
parliamentary elections, in 1999 and 2004. Reelection rates are sufficiently high to produce a
significant number of highly experienced members.

ISLAMIC CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

(MAJLES-E-SHURA-YE-ESLAMI)
Expert consultants: Navabeh Espahbodi, Elahe Koolaee, Homeira Moshirzadeh, Babak Rahimi,
Masoud Shafigh, Nargess Tavassolian, G
unes Murat Tezc
ur, Reza Yousefian
Score: .44
Influence over
executive (4/9)

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree
X
X

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

12. no veto
13. no review
14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

Specified
powers (1/8)

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty
X

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

X
X

26. media
X

The Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majles-e-Shuraye-Eslami) of Iran traces its roots to the legislature established in Irans 1906 constitution. The
legislature was subordinated to the shahs, however, except for a few years in the early twentieth century and between 1941 and 1953. The
1979 constitution, still in place today, created a
system of dual authority with an elected legislature, prime minister, and president overseen by
a religious Supreme Leader and Guardian Coun-

cil. A 1989 amendment eliminated the position of

the prime minister. The 1989 amendment further
cluttered the already crowded institutional landscape by creating the Council of Expediency of the
State, which formally enjoys supreme legislative
authority and is intended to mediate between the
Guardian Council and the legislature.
The legislature nevertheless has some power.
It can influence the executive with, among other
powers, its ability to interpellate officials from

Islamic Consultative Assembly of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Majles-e-Shura-ye-Eslami)

the executive. The legislature also enjoys some

institutional autonomy. Its lawmaking authority is
severely circumscribed, however, by the Guardian
Council, which reviews laws for compatibility
with Islam and the constitution and thereby
wields absolute veto power. The legislature wields
only one of the specified powers assessed in this
survey. Furthermore, its institutional capacity is
limited by a lack of a significant number of highly
experienced legislators. A low level of legislative
expertise among members is partly the result of the
Guardian Councils powers to disqualify electoral
candidates and invalidate electoral results. In the
2004 parliamentary elections alone, the Guardian
Council rejected over two thousand candidates,
including scores of incumbent legislators.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Removing the president from office requires
the involvement of the Supreme Leader.
Article 89
(2) In the event at least one-third of the members of
the Islamic Consultative Assembly interpellate the President concerning his executive responsibilities in relation with the Executive Power and the executive affairs
of the country the President must be present in the
Assembly within one month after the tabling of the
interpellation in order to give adequate explanations in
regard to the matters raised. In the event, after hearing the statements of the opposing and favoring members and the reply of the President, two-thirds of the
members of the Assembly declare a vote of no confidence, the same will be communicated to the Leadership for information and implementation of Article 110
(10).
Article 110
(1) Following are the duties and powers of the Leadership:
10. Dismissal of the President of the Republic, with
due regard for the interests of the country, after
the Supreme Court holds him guilty of the violation of his constitutional duties, or after a vote of
the Islamic Consultative Assembly testifying to his
incompetence on the basis of Article 89.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 141
(1) The President, the deputies to the President, Ministers, and Government employees cannot hold more

321

than one Government position, and it is forbidden for

them . . . to be a member of the Islamic Consultative
Assembly.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 89
(1) Members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly can
interpellate the Council of Ministers or an individual
Minister in instances they deem necessary. Interpellations can be tabled if they bear the signatures of at least
ten members. The Council of Ministers or interpellated
Minister must be present in the Assembly within ten
days after the tabling of the interpellation in order to
answer it and seek a vote of confidence. If the Council
of Ministers or the Minister concerned fails to attend
the Assembly, the members who tabled the interpellation will explain their reasons, and the Assembly will
declare a vote of no confidence if it deems it necessary.
If the Assembly does not pronounce a vote of confidence, the Council of Ministers or the Minister subject
to interpellation is dismissed. In both cases, the Ministers subject to interpellation cannot become members
of the next Council of Ministers formed immediately
afterwards.
(2) In the event at least one-third of the members of
the Islamic Consultative Assembly interpellate the President concerning his executive responsibilities in relation with the Executive Power and the executive affairs
of the country the President must be present in the
Assembly within one month after the tabling of the
interpellation in order to give adequate explanations in
regard to the matters raised. In the event, after hearing the statements of the opposing and favoring members and the reply of the President, two-thirds of the
members of the Assembly declare a vote of no confidence, the same will be communicated to the Leadership for information and implementation of Article 110 (10).

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
Article 76
The Islamic Consultative Assembly has the right to
investigate and examine all the affairs of the country.
Article 90
Whoever has a complaint concerning the work of the
Assembly or the executive power or the judicial power
can forward his complaint in writing to the Assembly.
The Assembly must investigate his complaint and give a
satisfactory reply. In cases where the complaint relates
to the executive or the judiciary, the Assembly must

322

Islamic Consultative Assembly of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Majles-e-Shura-ye-Eslami)

demand proper investigation in the matter and an adequate explanation from them, and announce the results
within a reasonable time. In cases where the subject of
the complaint is of public interest, the reply must be
made public.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).

the Assembly, the government must seek a fresh vote

of confidence from the Assembly.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.
11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.

No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.

No. The president can issue decrees that have the

force of law.

6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

No. There has been no prime minister in Iran since
1989.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.

No. The president lacks veto power, but all laws

are subject to an absolute veto by the Guardian
Council.

Yes. The legislatures approval is required to confirm ministerial appointments.

Article 123
The President is obliged to sign legislation approved by
the Assembly or the result of a referendum, after the
legal procedures have been completed and it has been
communicated to him. After signing, he must forward
it to the responsible authorities for implementation.

Article 133
Ministers will be appointed by the President and will
be presented to the Assembly for a vote of confidence.
With the change of Assembly, a new vote of confidence
will not be necessary.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 114
The President is elected for a four-year term by the direct
vote of the people.
Article 117
The President is elected by an absolute majority of votes
polled by the voters.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 87
The President must obtain, for the Council of Ministers,
after being formed and before all other business, a vote
of confidence from the Assembly. During his incumbency, he can also seek a vote of confidence for the
Council of Ministers from the Assembly on important
and controversial issues.
Article 136
The President can dismiss the Ministers and in such a
case he must obtain a vote of confidence for the new
Minister(s) from the Assembly. In case half of the members of the Council of Ministers are changed after the
government has received its vote of confidence from

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Guardian Council reviews laws to ensure
their compatibility with the criteria of Islam and
the Constitution.
Article 94
All legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative
Assembly must be sent to the Guardian Council. The
Guardian Council must review it within a maximum
of ten days from its receipt with a view to ensuring its
compatibility with the criteria of Islam and the Constitution. If it finds the legislation incompatible, it will
return it to the Assembly for review. Otherwise the legislation will be deemed enforceable.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.

Islamic Consultative Assembly of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Majles-e-Shura-ye-Eslami)

Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislative immunity extends to official parliamentary business only. Legislators are subject to
arrest for common crimes.
Article 86
Members of the Assembly are completely free in
expressing their views and casting their votes in the
course of performing their duties as representatives,
and they cannot be prosecuted or arrested for opinions
expressed in the Assembly or votes cast in the course of
performing their duties as representatives.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected. It
bears note, however, that the Guardian Council,
while unable directly to appoint members of the
legislature, influences the composition of the body
through its right to disqualify candidates.
Article 62
(1) The Islamic Consultative Assembly is constituted by
the representatives of the people elected directly and by
secret ballot.

323

(2) The method of working, manner of selection and

the terms and conditions of the Council shall be determined by law.
(3) The decisions of the Council, after the confirmation
and signatures of the Leader, shall be valid if approved
by an absolute majority vote in a national referendum.
(4) The provisions of Article 59 shall not apply to the
referendum for the Revision of the Constitution.
(5) The contents of the articles of the Constitution
related to the Islamic character of the political system;
the basis of all the rules and regulations according to
Islamic criteria; the religious footing; the objectives of
the Islamic Republic of Iran; the democratic character
of the government; the holy principle; the Imamate of
Ummah; and the administration of the affairs of the
country based on national referenda, official religion of
Iran and the religious school are unalterable.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. The Supreme Leader can declare war without
the legislatures approval.
Article 110
(1) Following are the duties and powers of the Leadership:
5. Declaration of war and peace and the mobilization
of the Armed Forces.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

international treaties.

No. The constitution can be amended only by

a special Council for Revision of the Constitution, which includes representatives from all three
branches of government, the Guardian Council,
and other institutions.

Article 77
International treaties, protocols, contracts, and agreements must be approved by the Islamic Consultative
Assembly.

Article 177
(1) The revision of the Constitution of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, whenever needed by the circumstances, will be done in the following manner:
The Leader issues an edict to the President after consultation with the Nations Exigency Council stipulating
the amendments or additions to be made by the Council for Revision of the Constitution which consists of:
1. Members of the Guardian Council;
2. heads of the three branches of the government;
3. permanent members of the Nations Exigency
Council;
4. five members from among the Assembly of Experts;
5. ten representatives selected by the Leader;
6. three representatives from the Council of Ministers;
7. three representatives from the judiciary branch;
8. ten representatives from among the members of
the Islamic Consultative Assembly; and
9. three representatives from among the university
professors.

Article 125
The President or his legal representative has the authority to sign treaties, protocols, contracts, and agreements
concluded by the Iranian government with other governments, as well as agreements pertaining to international organizations, after obtaining the approval of the
Islamic Consultative Assembly.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The Supreme Leader has the power of pardon.
Article 110
(1) Following are the duties and powers of the Leadership:
11. Pardoning or reducing the sentences of convicts,
within the framework of Islamic criteria, on a recommendation from the Head of judicial power.

324

Islamic Consultative Assembly of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Majles-e-Shura-ye-Eslami)

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.

the public media, the legislature lacks a substantial

voice. The state-owned media is under the control
of the Supreme Leader and the president.

No. The head of the judiciary is appointed by the

Supreme Leader, and the Chief of the Supreme
Court is nominated by the head of the judiciary.
The appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.

Article 175
(1) The freedom of expression and dissemination of
thoughts in the Radio and Television of the Islamic
Republic of Iran must be guaranteed in keeping with
the Islamic criteria and the best interests of the country.
(2) The appointment and dismissal of the head of the
Radio and Television of the Islamic Republic of Iran
rests with the Leader. A council consisting of two representatives each of the President, the head of the judiciary branch, and the Islamic Consultative Assembly
shall supervise the functioning of this organization.
(3) The policies and the manner of managing the organization and its supervision will be determined by
law.

Article 91
With a view to safeguard the Islamic ordinances and
the Constitution, in order to examine the compatibility of the legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly with Islam, a council to be known as the
Guardian Council is to be constituted with the following composition:
1. six religious men, conscious of the present needs and
the issues of the day, to be selected by the Leader, and
2. six jurists, specializing in different areas of law, to
be elected by the Islamic Consultative Assembly from
among the Muslim jurists nominated by the Head of
the Judicial Power.
Article 157
In order to fulfil the responsibilities of the judiciary
power in all the matters concerning judiciary, administrative and executive areas, the Leader shall appoint a
just honorable man well versed in judiciary affairs and
possessing prudence and administrative abilities as the
head of the judiciary power for a period of five years
who shall be the highest judicial authority.
Article 162
The Chief of the Supreme Court and the ProsecutorGeneral must both be just honorable men well versed
in judicial matters. They will be nominated by the head
of the judiciary branch for a period of five years, in
consultation with the judges of the Supreme Court.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The governor of the Central Bank of the Islamic
Republic of Iran is nominated by the president,
confirmed by the general assembly of the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and then
appointed by the president.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. Despite the legislatures right to appoint two
of the six members to the council that oversees

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.
28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.
Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
No. The legislature lacks a significant number
of highly experienced members. The Council of
Guardians disqualified over two thousand candidates, including scores of incumbents, before the
parliamentary elections of 2004.

Council of Representatives of Iraq (Mejlis Watani)

325

COUNCIL OF REPRESENTATIVES OF IRAQ (MEJLIS WATANI)

Expert consultants: Adeed Dawisha, David Patel
Score: .63
Influence over
executive (7/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no confidence

Institutional
autonomy (8/9)
X

Specified
powers (3/8)

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

19. amendments
20. war

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

26. media

18. all elected

X
X

X
X

Institutional
capacity (2/6)
X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

The Council of Representatives (Mejlis Watani)

of Iraq was established in the 2005 constitution
adopted following the American-led invasion and
occupation that overthrew the regime of Saddam
Hussein. The document calls for a unicameral body
that appoints the prime minister and elects a
largely ceremonial head of state, the president.
The constitution grants the legislature significant authority. The Council enjoys broad influence
over the executive branch, including powers to
choose the prime minister, the ministers, and the
president. The Councils laws are subject to judicial review, but otherwise the Council possesses
every measure of institutional autonomy measured
in this survey. It exercises a few specified powers
and has some institutional capacity.
The legislature has continued to function even
in the face of an active insurgency, but it is too
early to say whether the body will be able effectively to exercise the substantial powers vested in
it by the constitution. As of this writing, Iraq is
under occupation and embroiled in civil war, and
the future of the country, including its legislature,
is entirely uncertain.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.

Yes. The legislature can remove the prime minister

with a vote of no confidence. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of the Supreme Federal Court.
Article 58
The Council of Representatives shall have the following
powers:
(6) A. To question the President of the Republic on the
basis of a reasoned petition by an absolute majority of
the members of the Council of Representatives.
B. To remove the President of the Republic from office
by an absolute majority of the members of the Council of Representatives after he has been convicted by
the Supreme Federal Court for one of the following
offenses:
1. Perjury of the constitutional oath.
2. Violation the Constitution.
3. High treason.
(8) A. The Council of Representatives may withdraw
confidence from one of the Ministers by an absolute
majority; in this case the Minister concerned is deemed
to have resigned on the day on which the decision
to withdraw the confidence has been taken. The issue
of no-confidence in the Minister may be tabled only
upon request by the Minister concerned or on a petition signed by fifty (50) members of the Council after
an inquiry hearing directed at him. The Council of Representatives shall not issue its decision regarding the
request or petition before seven (7) days have passed
after its submission.
B. 1. The President of the Republic may submit a request
to the Council of Representatives to withdraw confidence from the Prime Minister.

326
2. The Council of Representatives may withdraw confidence from the Prime Minister based on the request
of one-fifth (1/5) of its members. This request may be
submitted only after a question has been put to the
Prime Minister and after at least seven (7) days from
submitting the request.
3. The Council of Representatives shall decide to
withdraw confidence from the Prime Minister by an
absolute majority of its members.
C. In case of a withdrawal of confidence from the Prime
Minister, the Government is deemed to have resigned.
D. In case of a vote of withdrawal of confidence in the
Cabinet as a whole, the Prime Minister and the Ministers continue in their functions in order to administer
the current affairs for a period not exceeding thirty (30)
days until a new cabinet is formed in accordance with
the provisions of Article 73 of this Constitution.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in the legislature.
Article 47
(6) No member of the Council of Representatives shall
be allowed to hold any other official position or work.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly questions executive
branch officials.
Article 58
The Council of Representatives shall have the following
powers:
(6) A. To question the President of the Republic on the
basis of a reasoned petition by an absolute majority of
the members of the Council of Representatives.
(7) A. Member(s) of the Council of Representatives may
direct questions to the Prime Minister and the Ministers
on any subject within their competence and they may
answer the members questions. The Member who has
asked the question solely has the right to comment on
the answer.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. Legislative committees can investigate the
executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. While the new legal order intends the parliament to oversee the official agencies of coercion,

Council of Representatives of Iraq (Mejlis Watani)

parliament has yet to demonstrate its powers of

oversight over the army and the police.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. The president is required to appoint as prime
minister the candidate from the ranks of the
group with the highest numbers of members in
the legislature.
Article 73
(1) The President of the Republic shall charge a candidate designated from the ranks of the group with the
highest numbers of members in the Council of Representatives with the formation of the Cabinet within
fifteen (15) days from the date of the election of the
President of the Republic.
(2) The Prime Minister-designate shall name the members of his Cabinet within a period not exceeding thirty
(30) days from the date of his designation.
(3) In case the Prime Minister-designate fails to form
the cabinet during the period specified in clause (2),
the President of the Republic shall name a new candidate for the post of Prime Minister within fifteen (15)
days.
(4) The Prime Minister-designate shall present the
names of his Cabinet members and the program of
his government to the Council of Representatives. He
is deemed to have gained its confidence upon the
approval, by an absolute majority of the Council of
Representatives, of the individual Ministers and of the
program of government.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The legislatures approval is required to confirm ministerial appointments.
Article 73
(1) The President of the Republic shall charge a candidate designated from the ranks of the group with the
highest numbers of members in the Council of Representatives with the formation of the Cabinet within
fifteen days from the date of the election of the President of the Republic.
(2) The Prime Minister-designate shall name the members of his Cabinet within a period not exceeding thirty
days from the date of his designation.
(3) In case the Prime Minister-designate fails to form
the cabinet during the period specified in clause (2),
the President of the Republic shall name a new candidate for the post of Prime Minister within fifteen
days.
(4) The Prime Minister-designate shall present the
names of his Cabinet members and the program of
his government to the Council of Representatives. He
is deemed to have gained its confidence upon the
approval, by an absolute majority of the Council of
Representatives, of the individual Ministers and of the
program of government.

Council of Representatives of Iraq (Mejlis Watani)

327

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.

Yes. The legislature elects the president.

Yes. The executive lacks decree power. The president can issue administrative decrees to implement law.

Article 58
The Council of Representatives shall have the following
powers:
(3) To elect the President of the Republic.
Article 67
(1) The Council of Representatives shall elect, from
amongst the nominees, the President of the Republic
by a two-thirds majority of its members.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 58
The Council of Representatives shall have the following
powers:
(8) A. The Council of Representatives may withdraw
confidence from one of the Ministers by an absolute
majority; in this case the Minister concerned is deemed
to have resigned on the day on which the decision
to withdraw the confidence has been taken. The issue
of no-confidence in the Minister may be tabled only
upon request by the Minister concerned or on a petition signed by fifty members of the Council after an
inquiry hearing directed at him. The Council of Representatives shall not issue its decision regarding the
request or petition before seven days have passed after
its submission.
B. 1. The President of the Republic may submit a request
to the Council of Representatives to withdraw confidence from the Prime Minister.
2. The Council of Representatives may withdraw confidence from the Prime Minister based on the request
of one-fifth of its members. This request may be submitted only after a question has been put to the Prime
Minister and after at least seven days from submitting
the request.
3. The Council of Representatives shall decide to
withdraw confidence from the Prime Minister by an
absolute majority of its members.
C. In case of a withdrawal of confidence from the Prime
Minister, the Government is deemed to have resigned.
D. In case of a vote of withdrawal of confidence in the
Cabinet as a whole, the Prime Minister and the Ministers continue in their functions in order to administer the current affairs for a period not exceeding
thirty days until a new cabinet is formed in accordance with the provisions of Article 73 of this Constitution.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.

Article 70
The President of the Republic shall have the following
powers:
G. To issue presidential decrees.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks veto power.
Article 70
The President of the Republic shall have the following
powers:
C. To ratify and issue the laws enacted by the Council of
Representatives. Such laws are considered ratified after
fifteen days from the date of receipt.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Federal Supreme Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 90
The Federal Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction over
the following matters:
(1) Oversight of the constitutionality of laws and regulations in force.
(2) Interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in
all policy jurisdictions.
Article 57
(2) A. Bills shall be presented by the President of the
Republic and the Prime Minister.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.

328

Yes. Legislators are immune with the common

exception for cases of flagrante delicto.
Article 60
(2) A. Each member of the Council of Representatives
shall enjoy immunity for statements made while the
Council is in session, and the member may not be prosecuted before the courts for such.
B. A member of the Council of Representatives may
not be placed under arrest during the legislative term
of the Council of Representatives, unless the member is accused of a felony and the [other] members of
the Council of Representatives consent by an absolute
majority to lift his immunity or if caught in flagrante
delicto in the commission of a felony.
C. A member of the Council of Representatives may
not be arrested after the legislative term of the Council
of Representatives, unless the member is accused of a
felony and the President of the Council of Representatives agrees to lift his immunity or unless he is caught
in flagrante delicto in the commission of a felony.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 47
(1) The Council of Representatives shall consist of a
number of members at a ratio of one representative per
one hundred thousand Iraqis, representing the entire
Iraqi people. The members shall be elected by direct,
secret and general ballot.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments require approval
by the public in a popular referendum and by the
president.
Article 122
(1) The President of the Republic and the Council of
the Ministers, jointly, or one-fifth of the members of
the Council of Representatives may propose to amend
the Constitution.
(2) The fundamental principles mentioned in Section
One and the rights and liberties mentioned in Section
Two of the Constitution may not be amended except
after two successive electoral terms, with the approval
of two-thirds of the Council members, the approval of
the people in a general referendum and the ratification
of the President of the Republic within seven days.
(3) Other Articles not stipulated in clause Second of this
Article may not be amended, except with the approval
of two-thirds of the members of the Council of Representatives, the approval of the people in a general
referendum and the ratification of the President of the
Republic within seven (7) days.
(4) Articles of the Constitution may not be amended if
such amendment diminishes the powers of the regions

Council of Representatives of Iraq (Mejlis Watani)

that are not part of the exclusive powers of the federal authorities, except with the consent of the legislative authority of the region concerned, and the
approval of the majority of its citizens in a general referendum.
(5) A. The amendment is considered ratified by the
President of the Republic after the expiration of the
period stipulated in clauses Second and Third and of
this Article in case he does not ratify it.
B. An amendment shall enter into force on the date of
its publication in the Official Gazette.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is required to
approve war declarations, which are made on a
joint request from the president and the prime
minister.
Article 58
The Council of Representatives shall have the following
powers:
(9) A. To consent to the declaration of war and the
state of emergency by a two-thirds majority based on
a joint request from the President of the Republic and
the Prime Minister.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 58
The Council of Representatives shall have the following
powers:
(4) A law shall regulate the ratification of international
treaties and agreements by a two-thirds majority of the
members of the Council of Representatives.
Article 70
The President of the Republic shall have the following
powers:
B. To ratify international treaties and agreements after
approval by the Council of Representatives. Such international treaties and agreements are considered ratified
after fifteen days from the date of receipt.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 70
The President of the Republic shall have the following
powers:
A. To issue a special pardon on the recommendation
of the Prime Minister, except for anything concerning
private claims and those who have been convicted of

Council of Representatives of Iraq (Mejlis Watani)

committing international crimes, terrorism, or financial
and administrative corruption.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislature appoints the president and
members of the Federal Court of Cassation, the
president of the Judicial Oversight Commission,
and the members of the Federal Supreme Court.
Article 58
The Council of Representatives shall have the following
powers:
(5) To approve the appointment of the following:
A. The President and members of the Federal Court of
Cassation, the Chief Public Prosecutor and the President of Judicial Oversight Commission upon a proposal from the Higher Juridical Council, by an absolute majority.
Article 89
(2) The Federal Supreme Court shall be made up of a
number of judges who are experts in Islamic jurisprudence and the law; their number, selection procedure
and the work of the court shall be determined by a law
enacted by a two-thirds majority of the members of the
Council of Representatives.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The current governor of the Central Bank of
Iraq was appointed by the Iraqi Governing Council, the transitional government.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.

329

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session for
eight months each year.
Article 55
The Council of Representatives shall have one annual
term with two legislative sessions lasting eight months.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
No. There has been only one election, so it is too
early to tell how legislators will behave with regard
to re-election. It bears note, however, that a large
proportion of the legislators who served in the
transitional legislature sought election to the permanent body.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
No. The permanent legislature has gone through
only one election, and members do not have substantial experience as legislators.

330

Parliament of Ireland (Oireachtas)

PARLIAMENT OF IRELAND (OIREACHTAS)

Expert consultants: Robert Elgie, Brian Girvin, Michael Marsh, Gary Murphy, Eoin OMalley,
Nicola Jo-Anne Smith
Score: .66
Influence over
executive (8/9)

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)

Specified
powers (3/8)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

X
X

18. all elected

19. amendments
20. war

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

23. pardon
24. judiciary

Institutional
capacity (5/6)
27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

X
X
X

25. central bank

26. media

The Parliament (Oireachtas) of Ireland originated

in the representative bodies that began meeting in
the thirteenth century. In 1800 the Act of Union
abolished the Irish parliament and transferred legislative authority in Ireland to London. In 1920 the
British parliament passed the Government of Ireland Act, reestablishing the Irish parliament. Ireland achieved independence the following year.
The bicameral legislature consists of a lower house,

the House of Representatives (Dail Eireann),

and an

upper house, the Senate (Seanad Eireann).

The Senate, much like the British House of Lords, serves
as an advisory body. Its sole legislative power is to
delay, not veto, the decisions of the lower house.
The executive branch consists of a prime minister and government chosen by parliament, which
operate alongside a directly elected president.
The legislature holds strong sway over the executive branch, including the power to remove both
the prime minister and the president without the
involvement of any other agencies. The legislatures autonomy is considerable but not unlimited. The executive branch, rather than the legislature, exercises many of the specified powers and
prerogatives assessed here, including the power to
appoint judges and the chairman of the central
bank. The legislature has considerable institutional
capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The House of Representatives can remove the
prime minister with a vote of no confidence. The
legislature, acting alone, can also impeach the president. Impeachment can be proposed by a twothirds majority vote of the total membership in
one house of parliament and, following a parliamentary investigation, approved by a two-thirds
majority vote of the total membership in the other
house of parliament.
Article 12
(10.1) The President may be impeached for stated misbehavior.
(10.2) The charge shall be preferred by either of the
Houses of Parliament, subject to and in accordance with
the provisions of this section.
(10.3) A proposal to either House of Parliament to prefer a charge against the President under this section
shall not be entertained unless upon a notice of motion
in writing signed by not less than thirty members of
that House.
(10.4) No such proposal shall be adopted by either of
the Houses of Parliament save upon a resolution of that
House supported by not less than two-thirds of the total
membership thereof.

Parliament of Ireland (Oireachtas)

(10.5) When a charge has been preferred by either
House of Parliament, the other House shall investigate
the charge, or cause the charge to be investigated.
(10.6) The President shall have the right to appear
and to be represented at the investigation of the
charge.
(10.7) If, as a result of the investigation, a resolution be
passed supported by not less than two-thirds of the total
membership of the House of Parliament by which the
charge was investigated, or caused to be investigated,
declaring that the charge preferred against the President has been sustained and that the misbehavior, the
subject of the charge, was such as to render him unfit
to continue in office, such resolution shall operate to
remove the President from his office.
Article 28
(10) The Prime Minister shall resign from office upon
his ceasing to retain the support of a majority in the
House of Representatives unless on his advice the President dissolves the House of Representatives and on the
reassembly of the House of Representatives after the
dissolution the Prime Minister secures the support of a
majority in the House of Representatives.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Ministers are selected from, and required to
serve simultaneously in, the House of Representatives.
Article 28
(7.1) The Prime Minister, the Vice Prime Minister and
the member of the Government who is in charge of the
Department of Finance must be members of the House
of Representatives.
(7.2) The other members of the Government must be
members of the House of Representatives or the Senate, but not more than two may be members of the
Senate.

331

Yes. The legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. The president is required to appoint as prime
minister the candidate selected by the House of
Representatives.
Article 13
(1.1) The President shall, on the nomination of the
House of Representatives, appoint the Prime Minister.
(1.2) The President shall, on the nomination of the
Prime Minister with the previous approval of the House
of Representatives, appoint the other members of the
Government.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The president appoints ministers on the recommendation of the prime minister, and the legislatures approval is necessary to confirm the
appointments.
Article 13
(1.1) The President shall, on the nomination of the
House of Representatives, appoint the Prime Minister.
(1.2) The President shall, on the nomination of the
Prime Minister with the previous approval of the House
of Representatives, appoint the other members of the
Government.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 12
(2.1) The President shall be elected by direct vote of the
people.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials

from the executive.

Article 28
(10) The Prime Minister shall resign from office upon
his ceasing to retain the support of a majority in the
House of Representatives unless on his advice the President dissolves the House of Representatives and on the
reassembly of the House of Representatives after the
dissolution the Prime Minister secures the support of a
majority in the House of Representatives.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).

Yes. The House of Representatives can vote no confidence in the government.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president, on the advice of the prime minister, can dissolve the House of Representatives.

332
Article 13
(2.1) The House of Representatives shall be summoned
and dissolved by the President on the advice of the
Prime Minister.
Article 28
(10) The Prime Minister shall resign from office upon
his ceasing to retain the support of a majority in the
House of Representatives unless on his advice the President dissolves the House of Representatives and on the
reassembly of the House of Representatives after the
dissolution the Prime Minister secures the support of a
majority in the House of Representatives.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks veto power.
Article 25
(1) As soon as any Bill, other than a Bill expressed to be
a Bill containing a proposal for the amendment of this
Constitution, shall have been passed or deemed to have
been passed by both Houses of Parliament, the Prime
Minister shall present it to the President for his signature and for promulgation by him as a law in accordance
with the provisions of this article.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Supreme Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 26
(1.1) The President may, after consultation with the
Council of State, refer any Bill to which this article
applies to the Supreme Court for a decision on the question as to whether such Bill or any specified provision
or provisions of such Bill is or are repugnant to this
Constitution or to any provision thereof.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The executive can impound funds appropriated by the legislature. The House of Representatives appropriations authorize, but do not require,
the expenditure of funds.

Parliament of Ireland (Oireachtas)

16. The legislature controls the resources that finance

its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,
including control over members perquisites.
Article 15
(15) Parliament may make provision by law for the
payment of allowances to the members of each House
thereof in respect of their duties as public representatives and for the grant to them of free traveling and
such other facilities (if any) in connection with those
duties as Parliament may determine.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislative immunity extends to official parliamentary business only. Legislators are subject to
arrest for common crimes.
Article 15
(13) The members of each House of Parliament shall,
except in case of treason as defined in this Constitution,
felony or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest
in going to and returning from, and while within the
precincts of, either House, and shall not, in respect of
any utterance in either House, be amenable to any court
or any authority other than the House itself.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the House of Representatives
are elected. Eleven of the sixty-two members of
the largely ceremonial Senate are appointed by the
prime minister.
Article 16
(2.5) The members shall be elected on the system of
proportional representation by means of the single
transferable vote.
Article 18
(1) The Senate shall be composed of sixty members, of
whom eleven shall be nominated members and fortynine shall be elected members.
(2) A person to be eligible for membership of the Senate
must be eligible to become a member of the House of
Representatives.
(3) The nominated members of the Senate shall be
nominated, with their prior consent, by the Prime Minister who is appointed next after the reassembly of
the House of Representatives following the dissolution
thereof which occasions the nomination of the said
members.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments require approval
in a popular referendum.

Parliament of Ireland (Oireachtas)

Article 46
(1) Any provision of this Constitution may be
amended, whether by way of variation, addition, or
repeal, in the manner provided by this article.
(2) Every proposal for an amendment of this Constitution shall be initiated in the House of Representatives
as a Bill, and shall upon having been passed or deemed
to have been passed by both Houses of Parliament, be
submitted by Referendum to the decision of the people
in accordance with the law for the time being in force
relating to the Referendum.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for governmental war declarations, with the common
exception for cases of foreign invasion. In cases
of invasion, the government can declare war and
seek retroactive authorization.
Article 28
(3.1) War shall not be declared and the State shall not
participate in any war save with the assent of the House
of Representatives.
(3.2) In the case of actual invasion, however, the Government may take whatever steps they may consider
necessary for the protection of the State, and the House
of Representatives if not sitting shall be summoned to
meet at the earliest practicable date.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The House of Representatives approval is necessary to ratify international treaties.
Article 29
(5.1) Every international agreement to which the State
becomes a party shall be laid before the House of Representatives.
(5.2) The State shall not be bound by any international
agreement involving a charge upon public funds unless
the terms of the agreement shall have been approved
by the House of Representatives.

333

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The president appoints the judges of the
Supreme Court, the High Court, and all other
courts, and the appointments do not require the
legislatures approval.
Article 35
(1) The judges of the Supreme Court, the High Court
and all other Courts established in pursuance of Article
34 hereof shall be appointed by the President.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president, on the recommendation of the
government, appoints the governor of the Central
Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session for
about eight months each year, from January to
July, and again from October to December.
Article 15
(7) Parliament shall hold at least one session every year.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

Yes. The legislature can grant amnesty through law.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

Yes.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. The president has the power of pardon.

Article 13
(6) The right of pardon and the power to commute
or remit punishment imposed by any court exercising criminal jurisdiction are hereby vested in the President, but such power of commutation or remission
may, except in capital cases, also be conferred by law
on other authorities.

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

334

Parliament of Israel (Knesset)

PARLIAMENT OF ISRAEL (KNESSET)

Expert consultants: Gregory S. Mahler, Bettina Malka-Igelbusch, Emanuele Ottolenghi, Nadav Shelef,
Alan S. Zuckerman
Score: .75
Influence over
executive (9/9)

Institutional
autonomy (7/9)

Specified
powers (3/8)
19. amendments

27. sessions

20. war

28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

1. replace

2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no
dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

26. media

18. all elected

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

X
X

Institutional
capacity (5/6)

X
X
X

The Parliament (Knesset) of Israel was established

at the creation of the state of Israel in the late
1940s. At the time of the foundation of the new
state in 1948, a Provisional State Council functioned as the countrys legislature. In 1949 elections were held for the Constituent Assembly; legislators voted to change the name of the body to
the Knesset soon after they convened. Israel lacks a
formal constitution. Rather, a number of separate
basic laws establish the fundamental law. The
legislature adopted the Basic Law of the Knesset
in 1950, which was subsequently amended nine
times between 1958 and 2003. A 2003 change to
the Basic Law provided for a constructive vote
of no confidence. Between 1996 and 2003, Israel
experimented with the direct election of the prime
minister, but the provision for direct election was
revoked in 2003.
The Knesset is the main stage of Israel politics.
It holds every power over the executive included
in this survey. It chooses the president and the
prime minister and can remove them from office.
It also has a monopoly on lawmaking authority;
the executive lacks decree, veto, and gatekeeping powers. It holds several specified powers and
prerogatives and has a high level of institutional
capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can remove the prime minister
from office by a majority vote of its total membership. It can remove the president from office by
a three-fourths majority vote of its total membership.
Section 20
(a) The Knesset may, by resolution, remove the President of the State from office if it finds that he is unworthy of his office owing to conduct unbecoming his status as President of the State.
(b) The Knesset shall not remove the President of the
State from office, save following a complaint brought
before the House Committee by at least twenty members of the Knesset and upon the proposal of the House
Committee passed by a three-quarters majority of the
members of the Committee. A resolution by the Knesset to remove the President from office shall require a
three-quarters majority of the Members of the Knesset.
(c) The House Committee shall not propose the
removal of the President of the State from office before
he has been given an opportunity to refute the complaint in accordance with procedure prescribed by the
Committee with the approval of the Knesset, and the

Parliament of Israel (Knesset)

Knesset shall not resolve to remove the President of the
State from office before he has been given an opportunity to be heard in accordance with procedure prescribed by the House Committee with the approval of
the Knesset.
(d) The President of the State may be represented before
the House Committee and before the Knesset by an
authorized representative. A Member of the Knesset
shall not act as the representative of the President. The
House Committee and the Knesset may summon the
President of the State to be present at proceedings under
this section.
(e) Proceedings of the Knesset under this section shall
be taken at a meeting, or successive meetings, assigned
solely for that purpose. The proceedings shall begin not
later than twenty days after the resolution of the House
Committee. The time of their beginning shall be notified by the Speaker of the Knesset to all the Members
of the Knesset, in writing, at least ten days in advance.
If the beginning of the proceedings does not fall in one
of the session terms of the Knesset, the Speaker of the
Knesset shall convene the Knesset for the proceedings.

335
held on the last Tuesday before the end of 90 days of
the Presidents announcement, or of the rejection of the
request for confidence in the Government, as relevant.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Legislators may serve simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Section 23
A cabinet member who is not a member of the Knesset
shall, as to everything relating to the Knesset, have the
same status as a cabinet member who is a member of
the Knesset, except that he shall not have the right to
vote.
(b) The Prime Minister shall be a member of the Knesset. A Minister need not be a member of the Knesset.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.

Section 18
(a) Should the Prime Minister be convicted of an
offense which the court defined as involving moral
turpitude, the Knesset may remove him from office,
pursuant to a decision of a majority of the Knesset
members. Should the Knesset so decide, the Government shall be deemed to have resigned.

Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials

from the executive.

Section 28
(a) The Knesset may adopt an expression of no confidence in the Government.
(b) An expression of no confidence in the Government
will be by a decision adopted by the majority of the
Members of Knesset to request that the President assign
the task of forming a Government to a certain Knesset
member who gave his written consent thereto.
(c) If the Knesset has expressed no confidence in the
Government, the Government shall be deemed to have
resigned on the day of the expression of no confidence.
The President will, within two days, charge the Knesset
Member so named with the task of forming a Government.
(d) A Knesset Member to whom the task of forming a
Government has been assigned under this section shall
have a period of 28 days for its fulfillment. The President
of the State may extend the period by additional periods
not in the aggregate exceeding 14 days.
(e) Where the periods referred to in subsection (d) have
passed and the Knesset Member has not notified the
President of the State that he has formed a Government,
or where he has notified him before then that he is
unable to form a Government, the President will so
notify the Speaker of the Knesset.
(f) If the President so informed the Speaker of the Knesset as per subsection (e) or where he presented a Government and the Knesset rejected his request for confidence under section 13(d), it will be deemed to be a
Knesset decision to disperse prior to the completion of
its period of service, and elections to the Knesset will be

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.

Section 42
(a) The Government will provide the Knesset and its
committees with information upon request and will
assist them in the discharging of their roles.

Yes. The legislature can establish commissions of

inquiry to investigate the executive.
Section 22
The Knesset may appoint commissions of inquiry
either by empowering one of the permanent committees in that behalf or by electing a commission from
among its members to investigate matters designated
by the Knesset; the powers and functions of a commission of inquiry shall be prescribed by the Knesset; every
commission of inquiry shall include also representatives of party groups which do not participate in the
Government, in accordance with the relative strength
of the party groups in the Knesset.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. The legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. The president appoints as prime minister the
candidate who enjoys the support of the Knesset. From 1996 until 2003 the prime minister was
directly elected.

336
Section 7
(a) When a new Government has to be constituted,
the President of the State shall, after consultation with
representatives of party groups in the Knesset, assign
the task of forming a Government to a Knesset Member
who has notified him that he is prepared to accept the
task; the President shall do so within seven days of the
publication of the election results, or should the need
arise to form a new government; and in the case of
the death of the Prime Minister, within 14 days of his
death.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The prime minister and the leading parliamentary groups allocate ministerial portfolios.
Section 7
(a) When a new Government has to be constituted,
the President of the State shall, after consultation with
representatives of party groups in the Knesset, assign
the task of forming a Government to a Knesset Member
who has notified him that he is prepared to accept the
task; the President shall do so within seven days of the
publication of the election results, or should the need
arise to form a new government; and in the case of
the death of the Prime Minister, within 14 days of his
death.
(d) When a Government has been formed, it shall
present itself to the Knesset, shall announce the basic
lines of its policy, its composition and the distribution
of functions among the Ministers, and shall ask for an
expression of confidence. The Government is constituted when the Knesset has expressed confidence in it,
and the Ministers shall thereupon assume office.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The legislature elects the president.
Section 3
(a) The President of the State shall be elected by the
Knesset for seven years.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. Since 2003 the parliament has had the power
to pass a constructive vote of no confidence, meaning that parliament must designate a successor
prime minister before passing a vote of no confidence. Prior to 2003 the legislature could vote no
confidence in the government without designating
a successor prime minister.
Section 28
(a) The Knesset may adopt an expression of no confidence in the Government.

Parliament of Israel (Knesset)

(b) An expression of no confidence in the Government
will be by a decision adopted by the majority of the
Members of Knesset to request that the President assign
the task of forming a Government to a certain Knesset
member who gave his written consent thereto.
(c) If the Knesset has expressed no confidence in the
Government, the Government shall be deemed to have
resigned on the day of the expression of no confidence.
The President will, within two days, charge the Knesset
Member so named with the task of forming a Government.
(d) A Knesset Member to whom the task of forming a
Government has been assigned under this section shall
have a period of 28 days for its fulfillment. The President
of the State may extend the period by additional periods
not in the aggregate exceeding 14 days.
(e) Where the periods referred to in subsection (d) have
passed and the Knesset Member has not notified the
President of the State that he has formed a Government,
or where he has notified him before then that he is
unable to form a Government, the President will so
notify the Speaker of the Knesset.
(f) If the President so informed the Speaker of the Knesset as per subsection (e) or where he presented a Government and the Knesset rejected his request for confidence under section 13(d), it will be deemed to be a
Knesset decision to disperse prior to the completion of
its period of service, and elections to the Knesset will be
held on the last Tuesday before the end of 90 days of
the Presidents announcement, or of the rejection of the
request for confidence in the Government, as relevant.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The prime minister, with the approval of the
president, can dissolve the legislature.
Section 29
(a) Should the Prime Minister ascertain that a majority
of the Knesset opposes the Government, and that the
effective functioning of the Government is prevented
as a result, he may, with the approval of the President of
the State, disperse the Knesset by way of an order to be
published in Reshumot. The order will enter into effect
21 days after its publication, unless a request is submitted under subsection (c), and the Government will
be deemed to have resigned on the day of the orders
publication.
Section 36
Once the Knesset decides to dissolve itself, the term
of office of the next Knesset shall run until the next
month of Cheshvan following the termination of four
years from the day of its election.
(b) Should the President so inform the Knesset Speaker,
or should a Knesset Member charged with forming
a Government under section 10(a) present a Government and fail to win the confidence of the Knesset
under section 13(d), then the Knesset shall be deemed
to have decided to disperse prior to the completion of
its period of service, and elections for the Knesset will

Parliament of Israel (Knesset)

be held on the last Tuesday before the end of 90 days of
the Presidents announcement, or of the rejection of the
request for confidence in the Government, as relevant.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks veto power.
13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Supreme Court has the power to review
the constitutionality of laws, although, in practice,
it has rarely struck down Knesset legislation.
14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all
policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature. In cases in
which the legislature passes a law allocating funds
that the government opposes, the government has
organized a subsequent law to cancel the expenditure.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,
including control over members salaries.
Section 36
The salaries of the Ministers and the Deputy Ministers
and other payments paid to them during their period
of service or thereafter, or to their next of kin after their
deaths, will be specified by law, or by virtue of a decision
of the Knesset, or a public committee appointed by the
Knesset for that purpose.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Members of the legislature are immune.
Section 17
The members of the Knesset shall have immunity; particulars shall be prescribed by Law.

337

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Section 4
The Knesset shall be elected by general, national, direct,
equal, secret, and proportional elections, in accordance
with the Knesset Elections Law; this section shall not
be altered save by a majority of the members of the
Knesset.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the fundamental
law through the normal legislative process.
20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.
Yes. Formally, the government has the power to
declare war. In practice, it would be unthinkable
for the government to declare war without the legislatures approval.
Section 40
(a) The state may only begin a war pursuant to a Government decision.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Section 11
(a) The President of the State
(5) shall sign such conventions with foreign states as
have been ratified by the Knesset.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The president has the power of pardon.
Section 11
(b) The President of the State shall have power to pardon offenders and to lighten penalties by the reduction
or commutation thereof.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The president appoints the members of the
judiciary on the basis of recommendations made
by a committee that consists of the minister of justice, several other members of the Knesset, and presiding judges. The appointments do not require the
legislatures approval.

338

Parliament of Israel (Knesset)

Section 4
(a) A judge shall be appointed by the President of the
State upon election by a Judges Election Committee.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president, on the recommendation of the
prime minister, appoints the governor of the Bank
of Israel.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the

operation of the public media.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes.

Yes. The legislature meets for at least eight months

each year.
Section 31
(a) The Knesset shall hold two sessions a year; one of
them shall open within four weeks after the Feast of
Tabernacles, the other within four weeks after Independence Day; the aggregate duration of the two sessions
shall not be less than eight months.

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

PARLIAMENT OF ITALY (PARLAMENTO)

Expert consultants: Francesco Battegazzorre, Giliberto Capano, Giuseppe Di Palma, Marco Giuliani,
Giuseppe Ieraci, Amie Kreppel, Roberta Maffio, Leonardo Morlino, Alan S. Zuckerman
Score: .84
Influence over
executive (8/9)

Institutional
autonomy (6/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Specified
powers (7/8)

Institutional
capacity (6/6)

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

X
X

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

X
X

23. pardon

24. judiciary

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

25. central bank

26. media

X
X

The Parliament (Parlamento) of Italy was established in the 1861 constitution following the
Risorgimento that unified Italy. The bicameral legislature consists of a lower house, the Chamber

of Deputies (Camera dei deputati), and an upper

house, the Senate (Senato). A new constitution was
adopted in 1948, after the 1946 referendum that
abolished the monarchy. The new constitution

Parliament of Italy (Parlamento)

created a Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality of laws. Prior to 1948 parliaments laws
were supreme and not subject to judicial review.
A proposed constitutional amendment that would
have given the prime minister the powers to dissolve parliament and to appoint ministers was
defeated in a June 2006 referendum.
The legislature is the main stage of national politics. It holds all but one of the measures of influence over the executive assessed here. It has substantial institutional autonomy. It is vested with
all but one of the specified powers measured in
this survey, and it has formidable institutional
capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can remove the prime minister
with a vote of no confidence. A joint session of parliament can impeach the president by a majority
vote of its total membership.
Article 90
(1) The president may not be held responsible for exercising his duties, except for high treason and attempts
to overthrow the constitution.
(2) In these cases, he must be impeached by parliament
in joint session by a majority of its members.
Article 94
(1) Government has to enjoy the confidence of both
chambers.
(2) Confidence is granted or withdrawn by each chamber on a reasoned motion by vote using a roll-call.
(3) The government has to appear before each chamber
no later than ten days after its appointment to get a vote
of confidence.
(4) The rejection of a government proposal by a chamber does not force government resignation.
(5) The request for a vote of no-confidence requires the
signatures of at least one-tenth of the members of either
chamber and is not debated until three days after it has
been filed.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Ministers may serve simultaneously in the legislature.
3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.

339

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can establish committees of
inquiry to investigate the executive.
Article 82
(1) A chamber may start inquiries into matters of public
interest.
(2) It therefore appoints a committee composed of its
members in proportion to the size of the groups in
parliament. The committee of enquiry investigates and
examines the matters carrying the same powers and
limitations as the judiciary.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. The legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. Formally, the president appoints the prime
minister. In practice, the president appoints as
prime minister the candidate who enjoys the support of parliament.
Article 92
(2) The president appoints the prime minister and, on
his advice, the ministers.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers on the recommendation of the prime minister, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 92
(2) The president appoints the prime minister and, on
his advice, the ministers.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. Parliament elects the president.
Article 83
(1) The president is elected in joint session of parliament.
(2) Three delegates from every region, elected by the
regional councils in a way guaranteeing minority representation, participate in the election. The Aosta Valley
is represented by one delegate.
(3) Presidential elections, conducted by secret ballot,
require a two-thirds majority of the assembly. After the
third ballot a majority of the members is sufficient.

340

Parliament of Italy (Parlamento)

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the

government.

Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto

by a majority vote of its present members.

Article 94
(1) Government has to enjoy the confidence of both
chambers.
(2) Confidence is granted or withdrawn by each chamber on a reasoned motion by vote using a roll-call.
(3) The government has to appear before each chamber
no later than ten days after its appointment to get a vote
of confidence.
(4) The rejection of a government proposal by a chamber does not force government resignation.
(5) The request for a vote of no-confidence requires the
signatures of at least one-tenth of the members of either
chamber and is not debated until three days after it has
been filed.

Article 74
(1) Before promulgation, the president may ask for further deliberation by message to the chambers giving the
reasons for such request.
(2) The law has to be promulgated if the chambers
adopt the bill once more.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 88
(1) The president may dissolve one or both chambers
after having consulted their speakers.
(2) He may not exercise this power during the last six
months of his term, provided this period does not coincide partly or entirely with the last six months of the
term of chambers.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The president and government lack decree
power. Formally, the government can issue decrees
that carry the force of law with prior authorization
from the legislature or as an exception by necessity and urgency. In practice, it would be unthinkable for the government to issue decrees without
legislative approval.
Article 77
(1) The government may not issue decrees with the
force of law unless empowered by a proper delegation
of the chambers.
(2) As an exception by necessity and urgency, government may issue provisional measures with the force of
law and submits them on the same day to the chambers for confirmation; if the chambers are not in session,
they have to be summoned for that purpose within five
days.
(3) Legal decrees lose effect at the date of issue if they
are not confirmed within sixty days of their publication. However, chambers may sanction rights and obligations arising out of decrees are not confirmed.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 134
The constitutional court decides:
disputes concerning the constitutionality of laws and
acts with the force of law adopted by state or regions.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,
including control over members perquisites.
Article 69
Members of parliament receive an allowance defined by
law.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Prior to 1993 legislators were immune, but
following the mani pulite (clean hands) corruption scandals and anticorruption campaign of the
early 1990s, the constitution was altered to allow
members to be prosecuted without parliaments
permission. In 2003 parliament passed a law to
grant immunity from prosecution to five top state
officials, including the prime minister and the
speaker of each house of parliament. The measure was designed by Forza Italy, the party of the
thenprime minister, Silvio Berlusconi, to shield
Berlusconi from charges he faced for allegedly bribing judges. In early 2004, just months after this

Parliament of Italy (Parlamento)

peculiar law was enacted, the Constitutional Court

voided it.
Article 68
(1) Members of parliament may not be called to answer
for opinions expressed or votes cast in the exercise of
their office.
(2) Members of parliament may not be subjected to
searches of their person or home without prior authorization by their chamber, nor arrested or otherwise
deprived of personal freedom, nor kept in a state
of detention, except on an irrevocable conviction or
caught in the act of a crime for which arrest is mandatory.
(3) The same authorization is required to subject members of parliament to any form of interception of their
conversations or communications, and in order to seize
their mail or correspondence.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected, with
two minor exceptions. The president may appoint
five senators for life from the social, scientific,
artistic, and literary fields. Former presidents are
also guaranteed a position as senator for life. As
of May 2006, following the April 2006 elections,
seven of the 315 members of the Senate were
appointed senators for life (of which three were
former presidents).
Article 56
(1) The Chamber of Deputies is elected by universal
and direct suffrage.
Article 57
(1) The Senate is elected on a regional basis except for
the seats assigned to the constituency of Italians abroad.
Article 59
(1) Anyone who was president of the republic is a senator for life unless waiving this privilege.
(2) The president may appoint as senators for life five
citizens who have brought honor to the nation through
their exceptional accomplishments in the social, scientific, artistic, and literary fields.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can amend the constitution in
multiple readings with a two-thirds majority vote.
Article 138
(1) Law amending the constitution and other constitutional acts are adopted by each of the two chambers
twice within no less than three months and need the
approval of a majority of the members of each chamber
in the second voting.

341
(2) Such laws are afterwards submitted to popular referendum when, within three months of their publication, a request is made by one fifth of the members of
either chamber, by 500,000 electors, or by five regional
councils. The law submitted to referendum is not promulgated if it does not receive the majority of valid
votes.
(3) No referendum may be held if the law has been
approved by each chamber in the second vote with a
majority of two thirds of its members.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislature declares war.
Article 78
Chambers are competent to declare war and assign the
necessary powers to government.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties on most major issues.
Article 80
Chambers ratify by law international treaties which are
of political nature, provide for arbitration or judicial
regulation, imply modifications of the territory, impose
financial burdens, or result in modifications of the laws.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature can grant amnesty by a twothirds majority vote in both chambers.
Article 79
(1) Amnesties and pardons may be granted by a law
which must be adopted both article by article and in its
entirety by two thirds of the members of each chamber.
(2) A law granting amnesty or pardon has to establish
time limits for its enforcement.
(3) In no instance may amnesty or pardon be extended
to offences committed after the bill has been introduced.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

Yes. The legislature can grant pardons by a twothirds majority vote in both chambers.
Article 79
(1) Amnesties and pardons may be granted by a law
which must be adopted both article by article and in its
entirety by two thirds of the members of each chamber.
(2) A law granting amnesty or pardon has to establish
time limits for its enforcement.
(3) In no instance may amnesty or pardon be extended
to offences committed after the bill has been introduced.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.

342

Yes. The legislature elects one-third of the members

of the Superior Council of the Judiciary and onethird of the members of the Constitutional Court.
Article 104
(2) The superior council of the judiciary is chaired by
the president.
(3) The first president and the general public prosecutor
of the court of cassation are members by law.
(4) Other members are elected with two-thirds majority by all ordinary judges belonging to the different categories, and one-third by parliament in joint session,
from among full professors of law and lawyers with at
least fifteen years of practice.
(5) The council elects a vice-chairman from among the
members designated by parliament.
(6) The elected members have a term of for four years
and may not be immediately re-elected.
(7) They are not allowed, while in office, to be registered as members of the legal profession, nor become
members of parliament or of a regional council.
Article 106
(1) Appointment to the judiciary is based on competitive examinations.
(2) The law on the organization of the judiciary may
provide for honorary magistrates, possibly by election,
to perform the duties of single judges.
(3) By proposal of the superior council of the judiciary,
full professors of law as well as lawyers with at least fifteen years practice and registered for practice in higher
courts, may be appointed to the court of cassation for
exceptional merits.
Article 135
(1) The constitutional court consists of fifteen justices;
one third being appointed by the president, one third
by parliament in joint session, and one third by ordinary and administrative supreme courts.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The government appoints the governor of the
Bank of Italy with the approval of the president.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
Yes. The legislature appoints the president of the
state-owned radio and television networks and

Parliament of Italy (Parlamento)

oversees their activity through a special committee. The presidents of the two chambers of the
legislature also appoint the board that directs the
state-owned media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session for
about eight months each year.
Article 62
(1) Sessions commence on the first days of February
and October that are not holidays.
(2) Each chamber may be summoned in extraordinary
session on the initiative of its speaker, the president of
the republic, or of one third of its members.
(3) If a chamber is summoned for an extraordinary session, the other chamber also convenes.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
Yes. Legislators receive a budget for staff expenditure, although not all legislators decide to hire a
policy advisor.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. The clean hands (mani pulite) affair of the
early 1990s shook the party system and the parliaments membership profile. Nevertheless, many
former politicians have returned, and post-scandal
re-election rates have been sufficiently high to
ensure the presence of a significant number of
highly experienced members.

Parliament of Jamaica

343

PARLIAMENT OF JAMAICA
Expert consultants: Robert Buddan, Perry Mars, Derwin Munroe, Karen Turner
Score: .63
Influence over
executive (8/9)

Institutional
autonomy (4/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Specified
powers (3/8)
X
X

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

23. pardon
X

24. judiciary

25. central bank

The Parliament of Jamaica finds heritage in the

early nineteenth century, in the assembly that represented the Jamaican colony in the British Empire.
The legislature in its current form was established
in the 1962 constitution upon independence from
Great Britain. The bicameral parliament comprises
an elected lower house, the House of Representatives, and an appointed upper house, the Senate.
The Governor General is the symbolic head of state
and formally is the representative of the Queen of
England. A constitutional amendment in 1986 did
not directly affect legislative power.
The legislature enjoys significant power. It has
substantial control over the executive. It chooses
the prime minister and can question and investigate the executive. Parliament has never voted no
confidence in the government, however, perhaps
because such a vote would likely result in its own
dissolution. The legislatures institutional autonomy is circumscribed by the governments gatekeeping power and the Governor Generals right
to appoint the members of the Senate. The legislature is granted a few specified powers and possesses
considerable institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.

Institutional
capacity (5/6)
X
X

X
X
X

26. media

Yes. The legislature can remove the prime minister

with a vote of no confidence.
Article 64
(5) In the exercise of his powers under this section
the Governor-General shall act in accordance with the
advice to the Prime Minister: Provided that if House
of Representatives by a resolution which has received
the affirmative vote of a majority of all the members
thereof has resolved that it has no confidence in the
Government, the Governor-General shall by Proclamation published in the Gazette dissolve Parliament.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Ministers are selected from, and required to
serve simultaneously in, the legislature. Between
two and four of the ministers must be senators. The
rest are drawn from the House of Representatives.
Article 70
(1) Whenever the Governor-General has occasion to
appoint a Prime Minister he, acting in his discretion,
shall appoint the member of the House of Representatives who, in his judgment, is best able to command the
confidence of a majority of the members of that House
and shall, acting in accordance with the advice of the
Prime Minister, appoint from among the members of
the two Houses such number of other Ministers as the
Prime Minister may advise.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive

344

branch officials testifying before the legislature or its

committees are regularly held.
Yes. Legislators can question executive branch officials during weekly question time.
4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.

Parliament of Jamaica
Article 27
There shall be a Governor-General of Jamaica who shall
be appointed by Her Majesty and shall hold office
during Her Majestys pleasure and who shall be Her
Majestys representative in Jamaica.
Article 68
(1) The executive authority of Jamaica is vested in Her
Majesty.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the
executive authority of Jamaica may be exercised on
behalf of Her Majesty by the Governor-General either
directly or through officers subordinate to him.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the

government.

6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

Yes. The Governor General appoints as prime minister the candidate who enjoys the support of the
legislature.
Article 70
(1) Whenever the Governor-General has occasion to
appoint a Prime Minister he, acting in his discretion,
shall appoint the member of the House of Representatives who, in his judgment, is best able to command the
confidence of a majority of the members of that House
and shall, acting in accordance with the advice of the
Prime Minister, appoint from among the members of
the two Houses such number of other Ministers as the
Prime Minister may advise.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The Governor General appoints ministers
on the recommendation of the prime minister,
and the appointments do not require legislative
approval.
Article 70
(1) Whenever the Governor-General has occasion to
appoint a Prime Minister he, acting in his discretion,
shall appoint the member of the House of Representatives who, in his judgment, is best able to command the
confidence of a majority of the members of that House
and shall, acting in accordance with the advice of the
Prime Minister, appoint from among the members of
the two Houses such number of other Ministers as the
Prime Minister may advise.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The country lacks a presidency. The Governor
General is the head of state.

Article 64
(5) In the exercise of his powers under this section
the Governor-General shall act in accordance with the
advice to the Prime Minister: Provided that if House
of Representatives by a resolution which has received
the affirmative vote of a majority of all the members
thereof has resolved that it has no confidence in the
Government, the Governor-General shall by Proclamation published in the Gazette dissolve Parliament.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The Governor General, on the recommendation of the prime minister, can dissolve the legislature.
Article 64
(1) The Governor-General may at any time by Proclamation published in the Gazette prorogue or dissolve
Parliament.
(5) In the exercise of his powers under this section
the Governor-General shall act in accordance with the
advice to the Prime Minister: Provided that if House
of Representatives by a resolution which has received
the affirmative vote of a majority of all the members
thereof has resolved that it has no confidence in the
Government, the Governor-General shall by Proclamation published in the Gazette dissolve Parliament.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislatures laws are veto-proof. Formally,
the Governor General can refuse to assent to a
law. This would amount to veto power. In practice,

Parliament of Jamaica

however, it would be unthinkable for the Governor

General to withhold assent from a law.
Article 60
(1) A Bill shall not become law until the GovernorGeneral has assented thereto in Her Majestys name and
on Her Majestys behalf and has signed it in token of
such assent.
(2) Subject to the provisions of sections 37, 49, 50, 56
and 57 of this Constitution, a Bill shall be presented
to the Governor-General for assent if, and shall not
be so presented unless, it has been approved by both
Houses of Parliament either without amendment or
with such amendments only as are agreed to by both
Houses.
(3) When a Bill is presented to the Governor-General
for assent he shall signify that he assents or that he
withholds assent.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The legislatures laws are subject to judicial
review.
14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all
policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. The legislature is prohibited from introducing legislation related to increases in taxation,
increases in government expenditures, or increases
in government debt.
Article 55
(3) Except on the recommendation of the GovernorGeneral signified by a Minister, the House of Representatives shall not proceed upon any Bill (including
any amendment to a Bill) which Bill or amendment, as
the case may be, in the opinion of the person presiding, makes provision for any of the following purposes,
that is to say, for imposing or increasing any tax, for
imposing or increasing any charge on the revenues or
other funds of Jamaica or for altering any such charge
otherwise than by reducing it, or for compounding or
remitting any debt due to Jamaica; proceed upon any
motion (including any amendment to a motion) the
effect of which motion or amendment, as the case may
be, in the opinion of the person presiding, is that provision should be made for any of the purposes aforesaid;
or receive any petition which, in the opinion of the person presiding, requests that provision be made for any
of the purposes aforesaid.
(4) The Senate shall not proceed upon any Bill, other
than a Bill sent from the House of Representatives, or
upon any amendment to a Bill, which Bill or amendment, as the case may be, in the opinion of person
presiding, makes provision for any of the following
purposes, that is to say, for imposing or altering any
existing or proposed tax, for imposing or altering any
existing or proposed charge on the revenues or other
funds of Jamaica, or for compounding or remitting any

345
debt due to Jamaica; proceed upon any motion (including any amendment to a motion) the effect of which
motion or amendment, as the case may be, in the opinion of the person presiding, is that provision should be
made for any of the purposes aforesaid; or receive any
petition which, in the opinion of the person presiding,
requests that provision be made for any of the purposes
aforesaid.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislators are immune for civil debt while
the legislature is in session only. Legislators are subject to arrest for common crimes.
Article 48
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection
(1) and subject to the provisions of subsections (3), (4)
and (5) of this section Parliament may by law determine the privileges, immunities and powers of the two
Houses and the members thereof.
(3) No civil or criminal proceedings may be instituted
against any member of either House for words spoken
before, or written in a report to, the House of which
he is a member or to a committee thereof or to any
joint committee of both Houses or by reason of any
matter or thing brought by him therein by petition,
bill, resolution, motion or otherwise.
(4) For the duration of any session of both Houses shall
enjoy freedom from arrest for any civil debt except a
debt the contraction of which constitutes a criminal
offence.
(5) No process issued by any court in the exercise of its
civil jurisdiction shall be served or executed within the
precincts of either House while such House is sitting or
through the President or the Speaker, the Clerk or any
officer of either House.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
No. All twenty-one senators are appointed by the
Governor General. Thirteen senators are appointed
on the recommendation of the prime minister,
and the remaining eight are appointed on the
recommendation of the leader of the opposition.
All members of the House of Representatives are
elected.

346
Article 35
(1) The Senate shall consist of twenty-one persons who
being qualified for appointment as Senators in accordance with this Constitution have been so appointed
in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(2) Thirteen Senators shall be appointed by the
Governor-General, acting in accordance with the advice
of the Prime Minister, by instrument under the Broad
Seal.
(3) The remaining eight Senators shall be appointed by
the Governor-General, acting in accordance with the
advice of the Leader of the Opposition, by instrument
under the Broad Seal.
Article 36
The House of Representatives shall consist of persons
who, being qualified for election as members in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution, have
been so elected in the manner provided by or under
any law for the time being in force in Jamaica and who
shall be known as Members of Parliament.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
with a majority vote. A constitutional amendment
to change the fundamental structure of government, however, requires approval in a national referendum.
Article 49
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section Parliament
may by Act of Parliament passed by both Houses alter
any of the provisions of this Constitution.
(2) In so far as it alters
a. sections 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,
25, 26, subsection (3) of section 48, sections 66, 67,
82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 94, subsections
(2), (3), (4), (5), (6) or (7) of section 96, sections 97,
98, 99, subsections (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) or (9) of
section 100, sections 101, 103, 104, 105, subsections
(3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) or (9) of section 106, subsections (1), (2), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9) or (10) of section
111, sections 112, 113, 114, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120,
subsections (2), (3), (4), (5), (6) or (7) of section 121,
sections 122, 124, 125, subsection (1) of section 126,
sections 127, 129, 130, 131, 135 or 136 or the Second
or Third Schedule to this Constitution; or a. section
1 of this Constitution in its application to any of the
provisions specified in paragraph (a) of this subsection; a Bill for an Act of Parliament under this section
shall not be submitted to the Governor-General for
his assent unless a period of three months has elapsed
between the introduction of the Bill into the House of
Representatives and the commencement of the first
debate on the whole text of that Bill in that House and
a further period of three months has elapsed between
the conclusion of that debate and the passing of that
Bill by that House.
(3) In so far as it alters
a. this section;

Parliament of Jamaica
b. sections 2, 34, 35, 36, 39, subsection (2) of section
63, subsections (2), (3) or (5) of section 64, section
65, or subsection (1) of section 68 of this Constitution;
c. section 1 of this Constitution in its application to
any of the provisions specified in paragraph (a) or (b)
of this subsection; or
d. any of the provisions of the Jamaica Independence Act, 1962, a Bill for an Act of Parliament under
this section shall not be submitted to the GovernorGeneral for his assent unless
i. a period of three months has elapsed between the
introduction of the Bill into the House of Representatives and the commencement of the first debate
on the whole text of that Bill in that House and a
further period of three months has elapsed between
the conclusion of that debate and the passing of
that Bill by that House, and
ii. subject to the provisions of subsection (6) of
this section, the Bill, not less than two nor more
than six months after its passage through both
Houses, has been submitted to the electors qualified to vote for the election of members of the
House of Representatives and, on a vote taken
in such manner as Parliament may prescribe, the
majority of the electors voting have approved the
Bill.
(4) A Bill for an Act of Parliament under this section
shall not be deemed to be passed in either House unless
at the final vote thereon it is supported
e. in the case of a Bill which alters any of the provisions specified in subsection (2) or subsection (3) of
this section by the votes of not less than two-thirds
of all the members of that House, or
f. in any other case by the votes of a majority of all
the members of that House.
(5) If a Bill for an Act of Parliament which alters any of
the provisions specified in subsection (2) of this section
is passed by the House of Representatives
g. twice in the same session in the manner prescribed
by subsection (2) and paragraph (a) of subsection (4)
of this section and having been sent to the Senate
on the first occasion at least seven months before the
end of the session and on the second occasion at least
one month before the end of the session, is rejected
the Senate on each occasion, or
h. in two successive sessions (whether of the same
Parliament or not) in the manner prescribed by subsection (2) and paragraph (a) of subsection (4) of this
section and, having been sent to the Senate in each
of those sessions at least one month before the end
of the session, the second occasion being at least six
months after the first occasion is rejected by the Senate in each of those sessions, that Bill may, not less
than two nor more than six months after its rejection
by the Senate for the second time, be submitted to
the electors qualified to vote for the election of members of the House of Representatives and, if on a vote
taken in such manner as Parliament may prescribe,
three-fifths of the electors voting approve the Bill,

Parliament of Jamaica
the Bill may be presented to the Governor-General for
assent.
(6) If a Bill for an Act of Parliament which alters any of
the provisions specified in subsection (3) of this section
is passed by the House of Representatives
i. twice in the same session in the manner prescribed
by subsection (3) and paragraph (a) of subsection (4)
of this section and having been sent to the Senate
on the first occasion at least seven months before the
end of the session and on the second occasion at least
one month before the end of the session, is rejected
by the Senate on each occasion, or
j. in two successive sessions (whether of the same
Parliament or not) in the manner prescribed by subsection (3) and paragraph (a) of subsection (4) of this
section and, having been sent to the Senate in each
of those sessions at least one month before the end
of the session, the second occasion being at least six
months after the first occasion, is rejected by the Senate in each of those sessions, that Bill may, not less
than two nor more than six months after its rejection
by the Senate for the second time, be submitted to
the electors qualified to vote for the election of members of the House of Representatives and, if on a vote
taken in such manner as Parliament may prescribe,
two-thirds of the electors voting approve the Bill, the
Bill may be presented to the Governor-General for
assent.
(7) For the purposes of subsection (5) and subsection
(6) of this section a Bill shall be deemed to be rejected
by the Senate if
k. it is not passed by the Senate in the manner prescribed by paragraph (a) of subsection (4) of this section within one month after it is sent to that House;
or
l. it is passed by the Senate in the manner so prescribed with any amendment which is not agreed to
by the House of Representatives.
(8) For the purposes of subsection (5) and subsection
(6) of this section a Bill that is sent to the Senate from
the House of Representatives in any session shall be
deemed to be the same Bill as the former Bill sent to the
Senate in the same or in the preceding session if, when
it is sent to the Senate, it is identical with the former
Bill or contains only such alterations as are specified by
the Speaker to be necessary owing to the time that has
elapsed since the date of the former Bill or to represent
any amendments which have been made by the Senate
in the former Bill.
(9) In this section
m. reference to any of the provisions of this Constitution or the Jamaica Independence Act, 1962,
includes references to any law that alters that provision; and
n. alter includes amend, modify, re-enact with or
without amendment or modification, make different
provision in lieu of, suspend, repeal or add to.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

347

Yes. Formally, the Governor General declares war,

but in practice, the legislatures approval is necessary for the Governor General to declare war.
21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.
No. Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The Governor General has the power of pardon.
Article 90
(1) The Governor-General may, in Her Majestys name
and on Her Majestys behalf
grant to any person convicted of any offence against
the law of Jamaica a pardon, either free or subject to
lawful conditions; grant to any person a respite, either
indefinite or for a specified period, from the execution
of any punishment imposed on that person for such an
offence; substitute a less severe form of punishment for
that imposed on any person for such an offence; or
remit the whole or part of any punishment imposed
on any person for such an offense or any penalty or
forfeiture otherwise due to the Crown on account of
such an offence.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The Governor General and the Judicial Service
Commission are responsible for judicial appointments, and the appointments do not require the
legislatures approval. The approval of the prime
minister and the leader of the opposition in the
legislature is needed for the Governor Generals
appointment of the chief justice of the Supreme
Court.
Article 98
(1) The Chief Justice shall be appointed by the
Governor-General by instrument under the Broad Seal
on the recommendation of the Prime Minister after
consultation with the Leader of the Opposition.
(2) The Puisne Judges shall be appointed by the
Governor-General by instrument under the Broad Seal
acting on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission.
(3) The qualifications for appointment as a Judge of the
Supreme Court shall be such as may be prescribed by
any law for the time being in force:
Provided that a person who has been appointed as a
Judge of the Supreme Court may continue in office

348

Parliament of Jamaica

notwithstanding any subsequent variations in the qualifications so prescribed.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The minister of finance appoints the governor
of the Bank of Jamaica.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The executive dominates the state-owned
media and uses it to provide public service information on its own behalf.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature meets regularly in ordinary session.
Article 63
(2) Sessions shall be held at such times so that a period
of six months shall not intervene between the last sitting of Parliament in one session and the first sitting
thereof in the next session.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

NATIONAL DIET OF JAPAN (KOKKAI)

Expert consultants: Ellis S. Krauss, Mikitaka Masuyama, T. J. Pempel, Frances M. Rosenbluth,
Richard J. Samuels, Steven K. Vogel
Score: .66
Influence over
executive (8/9)

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)

Specified
powers (2/8)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

23. pardon

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

19. amendments
20. war

24. judiciary
X

Institutional
capacity (6/6)
X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

X
X

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X
X

25. central bank

26. media

The National Diet (Kokkai) of Japan was established in the 1889 Meiji Constitution. The document, the first written constitution in Asia, called
for a bicameral legislature consisting of a lower
house, the House of Representatives (Sh
ugi-in),
and an upper house, the House of Counselors

(Sangi-in). In practice, the Meiji-era legislature exercised little influence; the emperor held supreme
executive, legislative, and judicial power. In 1947
Japan adopted a new constitution that retained
and invigorated the bicameral parliament. In the
new political order, the emperor became head of

National Diet of Japan (Kokkai)

state, and the position of prime minister was created to serve as head of government. The constitution granted the legislature the authority to
appoint the prime minister and to vote no confidence in the government. The legislature also
gained the power to question executive branch
officials. The constitution further established the
Supreme Court and judicial review, although in
practice, judicial review in Japan has not become a
robust, vigorous institution.
Today the National Diet enjoys broad authority,
which includes numerous levers for influencing
the executive, fairly extensive institutional autonomy, and robust institutional capacity, although
the legislature enjoys few specified powers and prerogatives.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can remove the prime minister
with a vote of no confidence.
Article 69
If the House of Representatives passes a resolution of no
confidence, or rejects a confidence resolution, the Cabinet shall resign altogether, unless the House of Representatives is dissolved within ten days.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. A majority of ministers must be selected from,
and serve simultaneously in, the legislature.
Article 68
(1) The Prime Minister shall appoint the Ministers of
State.
(2) However, a majority of their number must be chosen from among the members of the Diet.
(3) The Prime Minister may remove the Ministers of
State as he chooses.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 63
(1) The Prime Minister and other Ministers of State
may, at any time, appear in either House for the purpose of speaking on bills, regardless of whether they are
members of the House or not.
(2) They must appear when their presence is required
in order to give answers or explanations.

349

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
Article 62
Each House may conduct investigations in relation to
government, and may demand the presence and testimony of witnesses and the production of records.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. The legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. The emperor appoints the Diets choice for
prime minister. It is noteworthy, however, that
although the choice of prime minister ultimately
rests with parliament, the influence of the bosses
of the ruling party (the Liberal Democratic Party)
on the selection of the prime minister is especially
(and famously) weighty in Japanese politics.
Article 6
(1) The Emperor shall appoint the Prime Minister as
designated by the Diet.
Article 67
(1) The Prime Minister shall be designated from among
the members of the Diet by a resolution of the Diet.
(2) This designation shall precede all other business.
(3) If the House of Representatives and the House of
Councilors disagree and if no agreement can be reached
even through a joint committee of both Houses, provided for by law, or the House of Councilors fails to
make designation within ten days, exclusive of the
period of recess, after the House of Representatives has
made designation, the decision of the House of Representatives shall be the decision of the Diet.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The prime minister appoints ministers, and
the appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 68
(1) The Prime Minister shall appoint the Ministers of
State.
(2) However, a majority of their number must be chosen from among the members of the Diet.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The country lacks a presidency. The emperor
is the head of state.

350

National Diet of Japan (Kokkai)

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The Supreme Court can review the constitutionality of laws.

Yes. The House of Representatives can vote no confidence in the government.

Article 81
The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with power
to determine the constitutionality of any law, order,
regulation, or official act.

Article 69
If the House of Representatives passes a resolution of no
confidence, or rejects a confidence resolution, the Cabinet shall resign altogether, unless the House of Representatives is dissolved within ten days.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The emperor, on the advice of the government,
can dissolve the House of Representatives.
Article 7
The Emperor, with the advice and approval of the Cabinet, shall perform the following acts in matters of state
on behalf of the people:
3. Dissolution of the House of Representatives.
Article 69
If the House of Representatives passes a resolution of no
confidence, or rejects a confidence resolution, the Cabinet shall resign altogether, unless the House of Representatives is dissolved within ten days.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks veto power.
Article 59
(1) A bill becomes a law on passage by both Houses,
except as otherwise provided by the Constitution.
(2) A bill which is passed by the House of Representatives, and upon which the House of Councilors makes a
decision different from that of the House of Representatives, becomes a law when passed a second time by the
House of Representatives by the majority of two-thirds
or more of the members present.
(3) The provision of the preceding paragraph does not
preclude the House of Representatives from calling for
the meeting of a joint committee of both Houses, provided for by law.
(4) Failure by the House of Councilors to take final
action within sixty days after receipt of a bill passed by
the House of Representatives, time in recess excepted,
may be determined by the House of Representatives to
constitute a rejection of the said bill by the House of
Councilors.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The government can increase or decrease Dietapproved funds from the Fiscal Investment and
Loan Program (FILP), Japans distinctive second
budget funded by postal savings, by up to 50 percent.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,
including control over members salaries.
Article 49
Members of both Houses shall receive appropriate
annual payment from the national treasury in accordance with law.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislators are immune while the legislature is
in session only.
Article 50
Except in cases provided by law, members of both
Houses shall be exempt from apprehension while the
Diet is in session, and any members apprehended
before the opening of the session shall be freed during the term of the session upon demand of the
House.
Article 51
Members of both Houses shall not be held liable outside
the House for speeches, debates, or votes cast inside the
House.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 43
(1) Both Houses shall consist of elected members, representative of all the people.

National Diet of Japan (Kokkai)

(2) The number of the members of each House shall be
fixed by law.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments require approval
in a popular referendum.
Article 96
(1) Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a concurring vote of twothirds or more of all the members of each House
and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for
ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote
of a majority of all votes cast thereon, at a special referendum or at such election as the Diet shall
specify.
(2) Amendments when so ratified shall immediately be
promulgated by the Emperor in the name of the people,
as an integral part of this Constitution.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. In the constitution Japan renounces war. In
practice, the legislatures approval is necessary for
the international deployment of Japanese troops
and would be necessary for a war declaration.
Article 9
(1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based
on justice and order, the Japanese people forever
renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the
threat or use of force as means of settling international
disputes.
(2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding
paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other
war potential, will never be maintained. The right of
aggression of the state will not be recognized.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 60
(1) The budget must first be submitted to the House of
Representatives.
(2) Upon consideration of the budget, when the House
of Councilors makes a decision different from that of
the House of Representatives, and when no agreement
can be reached even through a joint committee of both
Houses, provided for by law, or in the case of failure
by the House of Councilors to take final action within
thirty days, the period of recess excluded, after the
receipt of the budget passed by the House of Representatives, the decision of the House of Representatives
shall be the decision of the Diet.
Article 61
Article 60 (2) applies also to the Diet approval required
for the conclusion of treaties.

351
Article 73
The Cabinet, in addition to other general administrative functions, shall perform the following functions:
3. Conclude treaties. However, it shall obtain prior or,
depending on circumstances, subsequent approval of
the Diet.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. The emperor and the cabinet have the power
to grant amnesty.
Article 7
The Emperor, with the advice and approval of the Cabinet, shall perform the following acts in matters of state
on behalf of the people:
6. Attestation of general and special amnesty, commutation of punishment, reprieve, and restoration of
rights.
Article 73
The Cabinet, in addition to other general administrative functions, shall perform the following functions:
7. Decide on general amnesty, special amnesty, commutation of punishment, reprieve, and restoration of
rights.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The emperor and the cabinet have the power of
pardon, here expressed as commutation of punishment, reprieve, and restoration of rights.
Article 7
The Emperor, with the advice and approval of the Cabinet, shall perform the following acts in matters of state
on behalf of the people:
6. Attestation of general and special amnesty, commutation of punishment, reprieve, and restoration of
rights.
Article 73
The Cabinet, in addition to other general administrative functions, shall perform the following functions:
7. Decide on general amnesty, special amnesty, commutation of punishment, reprieve, and restoration of
rights.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. Supreme Court justices are appointed by the
cabinet, and the appointments are reviewed by the
people in a popular referendum every ten years.
The appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 6
(2) The Emperor shall appoint the Chief Judge of the
Supreme Court as designated by the Cabinet.
Article 76
(1) The whole judicial power is vested in a Supreme
Court and in such inferior courts as are established by
law.

352
(2) No extraordinary tribunal shall be established, nor
shall any organ or agency of the Executive be given final
judicial power.
(3) All judges are independent in the exercise of their
conscience and bound only by this Constitution and
the laws.
Article 79
(1) The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Judge
and such number of judges as may be determined by
law; all such judges excepting the Chief Judge shall be
appointed by the Cabinet.
(2) The appointment of the judges of the Supreme
Court shall be reviewed by the people at the first general
election of members of the House of Representatives following their appointment, and shall be reviewed again
at the first general election of members of the House
of Representatives after a lapse of ten years, and in the
same manner thereafter.
(3) In cases mentioned in the preceding paragraph,
when the majority of the voters favors the dismissal
of a judge, he shall be dismissed.
(4) Matters pertaining to review shall be prescribed by
law.
(5) The judges of the Supreme Court shall be retired
upon the attainment of the ages as fixed by law.
(6) All such judges shall receive, at regular stated
intervals, adequate compensation which shall not be
decreased during their terms of office.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The cabinet appoints the governor of the Bank
of Japan with the approval of the legislature.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

National Diet of Japan (Kokkai)

No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the

operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session for
roughly six months each year, and extra sessions
are common.
Article 52
An ordinary session of the Diet shall be convoked once
per year.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
Yes.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

National Assembly of Jordan (Majlis al-Umma)

353

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF JORDAN (MAJLIS AL-UMMA)

Expert consultants: Nizam Assaf, Canan Atilgan, Russell E. Lucas, Ellen Lust-Okar, Pete W. Moore,
Jillian Schwedler, Jeff VanDenBerg
Score: .22
Influence over
executive (4/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

Institutional
autonomy (0/9)

Specified
powers (1/8)

Institutional
capacity (2/6)

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty
23. pardon

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

X
X

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no confidence

The National Assembly (Majlis al-Umma) of Jordan was established in the 1952 constitution. It
comprises a lower house, the Chamber of Deputies
(Majlis al-Nuwaab), and an upper house, the Senate
(Majlis al-Ayan). Since its inception the legislature
has had little influence on national politics. It has
been dissolved for long periods of time, and legislative elections were completely suspended from
1967 to 1989. During 20013 the legislature was
dissolved, and King Abdullah ruled by decree.
Today the royal palace remains the hub of political power and the legislature a feeble body. The
Assemblys leverage over the executive is modest.
It is completely lacking in institutional autonomy.
It has only one of the specified powers assessed
here, the right to ratify international treaties, and
very little institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. The legislature cannot impeach the king. The
Chamber of Deputies can replace the prime minister with a vote of no confidence.
Article 30
The King is the Head of the State and is immune from
any liability and responsibility.

24. judiciary

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

25. central bank

26. media

Article 53
(i) A motion of no confidence in the Council of Ministers or in any Minister may be raised by the Chamber
of Deputies.
(ii) If the Chamber of Deputies casts a vote of no confidence in the Council of Ministers by an absolute majority of all its members, the Council of Ministers shall
resign.
(iii) If the vote of no confidence concerns an individual
Minister, he shall resign his office.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Legislators may serve simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 52
The Prime Minister, or the Minister who is a member of
either the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate, shall be
entitled to vote in the House to which he belongs and
to speak in both Houses. However, Ministers who are
not members of either House may speak in both Houses
without the right to vote.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.

354
Article 96
Any Senator or Deputy may address questions or interpellations to the Ministers concerning any public matters, in accordance with the provisions of the Internal
Regulations of the Senate or the House (as the case may
be). No interpellation may be debated before the lapse
of eight days from the date of its receipt by the Minister,
unless the case is of an urgent nature and the Minister
agrees to shorten this period.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature can investigate the government, but not the royal palace.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The king appoints the prime minister.
Article 35
The King appoints the Prime Minister and may dismiss
him or accept his resignation. He appoints the Ministers; he also dismisses them or accepts their resignation,
upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The king appoints ministers, and the appointments do not require the legislatures approval.
Article 35
The King appoints the Prime Minister and may dismiss
him or accept his resignation. He appoints the Ministers; he also dismisses them or accepts their resignation,
upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The country lacks a presidency. The king is the
head of state.
Article 26
The Executive Power shall be vested in the King, who
shall exercise his powers through his Ministers in accordance with the provisions of the present Constitution.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The Chamber of Deputies can vote no confidence in the government. It is noteworthy, however, that the legislature has never passed a vote of

National Assembly of Jordan (Majlis al-Umma)

no confidence in a government because the king

has dissolved, or threatened to dissolve, the legislature in advance.
Article 53
(i) A motion of no confidence in the Council of Ministers or in any Minister may be raised by the Chamber
of Deputies.
(ii) If the Chamber of Deputies casts a vote of no confidence in the Council of Ministers by an absolute majority of all its members, the Council of Ministers shall
resign.
(iii) If the vote of no confidence concerns an individual
Minister, he shall resign his office.
Article 54
(i) A session to consider a vote of no confidence in the
Council of Ministers or in any individual Minister shall
be held either at the request of the Prime Minister or at
a request signed by not less than ten Deputies.
(ii) A vote of no confidence in the Council of Ministers or in any individual Minister may be postponed
only for one period, which shall not exceed ten days,
either upon the request of the Minister concerned or
of the Council of Ministers. The Chamber shall not be
dissolved during this period.
(iii) Every newly formed Council of Ministers shall
within one month of its formation, in cases where
the Chamber of Deputies is in session, place before
the Chamber of Deputies a statement of its policy and
request a vote confidence on the basis of the said statement. If the Chamber of Deputies is not in session at the
time, or stands dissolved, the Speech from the Throne
shall be considered to be a statement of its policy for
the purposes of this Article.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The king can dissolve both houses of the legislature.
Article 34
(iii) The King may dissolve the Chamber of Deputies.
(iv) The King may dissolve the Senate or relieve any
Senator of his membership.
Article 74
If the Chamber of Deputies is dissolved for any reason,
the new Chamber shall not be dissolved for the same
reason. A Minister who intends to nominate himself
for election shall resign fifteen days at least before the
beginning of nomination.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The king can issue decrees that have the force
of law. The cabinet (Council of Ministers) can also
issue decrees that have the force of law when the
legislature is not in session or dissolved. The laws
remain in force unless they are explicitly rejected
by the National Assembly in its next sitting.

National Assembly of Jordan (Majlis al-Umma)

Article 40
The King shall exercise the powers vested in him by
Royal Decree. Every such Decree shall be countersigned
by the Prime Minister and the Minister or Ministers concerned. The King expresses his concurrence by placing
his signature above the said signatures.
Article 94
(i) In cases where the National Assembly is not sitting
or is dissolved, the Council of Ministers has, with the
approval of the King, the power to issue provisional
laws covering matters which require necessary measures
which admit of no delay or which necessitate expenditures incapable of postponement. Such provisional
laws, which shall not be contrary to the provisions of
the Constitution, shall have the force of law, provided
that they are placed before the Assembly at the beginning of its next session, and the Assembly may approve
or amend such laws. In the event of the rejection of
such provisional laws, the Council of Ministers shall,
with the approval of the King, immediately declare their
nullity, and from the date of such declaration these
provisional laws shall cease to have force provided that
such nullity shall not affect any contracts or acquired
rights.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority is needed to override the
kings veto.
Article 93
(i) Every draft law passed by the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies shall be submitted to the King for ratification.
(ii) A law shall come into force after its promulgation
by the King and the lapse of thirty days from the date of
its publication in the Official Gazette unless it is specifically provided in that law that it shall come into force
on any other date.
(iii) If the King does not see fit to ratify a law, He may,
within six months from the date on which the law was
submitted to him, refer it back to the House coupled
with a statement showing the reasons for withholding
his ratification.
(iv) If any draft law (other than the Constitution) is
referred back within the period specified in the preceding paragraph and is passed for the second time
by two-thirds of the members of each of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, it shall be promulgated. If the law is not returned with the Royal ratification within the period prescribed in paragraph (iii)
above, it shall be considered as promulgated and effective. If any draft law fails to obtain the two-thirds
majority of votes, it cannot be reconsidered during
the same session, provided that the National Assembly may reconsider the draft during its next ordinary
session.

355

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The legislatures laws are subject to judicial
review.
14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all
policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. Formally, the legislature has the right to initiate bills in all policy jurisdictions. In practice,
the king has complete gatekeeping authority. He
can prevent the introduction of any bill as he sees
fit.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The king can impound funds appropriated by
the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
No. The legislature is dependent on the king and
the government for the resources that finance its
operations.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislators are immune while the legislature is
in session only.
Article 86
(i) No Senator or Deputy may be detained or tried during the currency of the sessions of the National Assembly unless the House to which he belongs decides by
an absolute majority that there is sufficient reason for
his detention or trial or unless he was arrested flagrant
delicto. In the event of his arrest in this manner, the
House to which he belongs shall be notified immediately.
(ii) If a member is detained for any reason while the
National Assembly is not sitting, the Prime Minister
shall notify the Senate or the Chamber of Deputies
when it reassembles of the proceedings which were
taken against him, coupled with the necessary explanation.
Article 87
Every Senator or Deputy shall have complete freedom
of speech and expression of opinion within the limits
of the Internal Regulations of the Senate or Chamber of
Deputies, as the case may be, and shall not be answerable in respect of any vote which he had cast or opinion
expressed or speech made by him during the meetings
of the House.

356

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
No. Senators are appointed by the king. All members of the Chamber of Deputies are elected.
Article 36
The King appoints members of the Senate and appoints
the Speaker from amongst them and accepts their resignation.
Article 67
The Chamber of Deputies shall consist of members,
elected by secret ballot, in a general direct election.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments require the kings
approval.
Article 126
(i) The procedure prescribed in the present Constitution with regard to draft laws shall apply to any draft
law for the amendment of this Constitution, provided
that any such amendment is passed by a two-thirds
majority of the members of each of the Senate and the
Chamber of Deputies. In the event of a joint meeting of
the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies in accordance
with Article (92) of this Constitution, the amendment
shall be passed by a two-thirds majority of the members
of both Houses, provided that in both cases the amendment shall not come into force unless ratified by the
King.
(ii) No amendment of the Constitution affecting the
rights of the King and the succession to the Throne
may be passed during the period of Regency.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. The king can declare war without the legislatures approval.
Article 33
(i) The King declares war, concludes peace and ratifies
treaties and agreements.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties that involve financial commitments to the treasury or affect citizens rights.
Article 33
(i) The King declares war, concludes peace and ratifies
treaties and agreements.
(ii) Treaties and agreements which involve financial
commitments to the Treasury or affect the public or
private rights of Jordanians shall not be valid unless
approved by the National Assembly. In no circumstances shall any secret terms contained in any treaty
or agreement be contrary to their overt terms.

National Assembly of Jordan (Majlis al-Umma)

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. According to the constitution, amnesty, here
referred to as general pardon, can be granted by
legislation. In practice, the legislature could not
grant amnesty without the kings approval.
Article 38
The King has the right to grant a special pardon or
remit any sentence, but any general pardon shall be
determined by special law.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The king has the power of pardon, here referred
to as special pardon.
Article 38
The King has the right to grant a special pardon or
remit any sentence, but any general pardon shall be
determined by special law.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The king appoints the members of the judiciary, and the appointments do not require the
legislatures approval.
Article 98
Judges of the Civil and Sharia Courts shall be appointed
and dismissed by a Royal Decree in accordance with the
provisions of the law.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The king appoints the governor of the Central
Bank of Jordan.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
No. The legislature meets in ordinary session for
only four months each year.
Article 78
(iii) The ordinary session of the National Assembly
shall begin on the date upon which it was summoned
to meet in accordance with the two preceding paragraphs, and shall last for four months unless the House
of Deputies is dissolved by the King before the expiration of that period. The session may be prolonged by the
King for a further period not exceeding three months to
allow for the despatch of pending matters. At the expiration of the four months or any such prolongation
thereof, the King shall prorogue the Assembly.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.

Parliament of Kazakhstan (Kenges)

357

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.

contains a significant number of highly experienced

members.

No.

No. Long spells of suspension and inactivity have

precluded the development of a sizable cohort of
legislators with substantial experience. In the elections of 2003 for the Chamber of Deputies, members of the party called Allies of King Abdullah II
obtained roughly three-fifths of all seats. Some of
these loyalists served in parliament prior to its suspension during 20013, but given the lack of continuity in parliaments existence in recent decades,
one cannot reasonably speak of re-election
rates.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature

PARLIAMENT OF KAZAKHSTAN (KENGES)

Expert consultants: Irina Chernykh, Sally N. Cummings, Pauline Jones Luong, Alen Sabyrov,
Dina Sharipova
Score: .38
Influence over
executive (1/9)

Institutional
autonomy (3/9)

Specified
powers (3/8)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

23. pardon
24. judiciary

25. central bank

26. media

Institutional
capacity (5/6)
27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

X
X
X

18. all elected

The Parliament (Kenges) of Kazakhstan was

founded in the 1993 constitution following the
collapse of the Soviet Union. The constitution
called for a unicameral parliament. A new constitution in 1995 established a second chamber,
creating a bicameral legislature with an upper
house, the Senate (Senat), and a lower house, the
Assembly (Majilis). A constitutional amendment in
1998 extended the presidents term from five to
seven years but did not directly affect legislative
power.
The legislature has little authority. It has little meaningful ability to influence the executive branch. Its institutional autonomy is circumscribed by presidential powers to veto and decree

legislation, appoint legislators, and dissolve the

legislature. It has three of the eight specified powers
assessed here, namely, the powers to declare war,
ratify treaties, and grant amnesty. The legislature
does posses some institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Council.

358
Article 47
2. The President of the Republic shall bear responsibility for the actions performed while exercising his
duties and only in the case of high treason may be
discharged from office by Parliament. The decision
to bring an accusation and conduct its investigation
may be adopted by the majority of the deputies of
the Majilis at the initiative of no less than one-third
of the total number of its deputies. Investigation of
the accusation shall be organized by the Senate and
by the majority of votes of the total number of the
deputies of the Senate its results are transferred for
consideration at a joint session of the Parliaments
Chambers. The final decision of this issue shall be
adopted at a joint session of the Parliaments Chambers by the majority of no less than three-fourths of
the total number of the deputies of each Chamber, provided the Supreme Court concludes the validity of the
accusation and conclusion by the Constitutional Council that the established constitutional procedures were
observed. The failure to arrive at a final decision within
two months from the moment of the accusation shall
result in the recognition that the accusation against
the President of the Republic is rejected. Rejection of
the accusation of the President of the Republic in perpetration of high treason at any stage shall result in
premature termination of the powers of the deputies
of the Majilis who initiated the consideration of this
issue.
3. The issue of discharge of the President of the Republic
from office may not be initiated in the period when the
President is considering premature termination of the
powers of the Parliament of the Republic.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Ministers are prohibited from serving simultaneously in the legislature.
Article 68
2. Members of the Government shall not have right to
be deputies of a representative body.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
No. According to the constitution, the legislature
has the right to hear reports on the activities of
the members of government, but in practice, the
power is rarely exercised.
Article 57
Each Chamber of the Parliament independently, without participation of the other Chamber shall:
6) have the right to hear reports of the members
of the Government of the Republic on the issues of
their activities, at the initiative of no less than onethird from the total number of the deputies of the
Chambers.

Parliament of Kazakhstan (Kenges)

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister.
Article 44
1. The President of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall:
3) appoint a Prime Minister of the Republic with the
Parliaments consent; release him from office; determine the structure of the Government of the Republic
at the proposal of the Prime Minister, appoint to and
release from office its members.
Article 53
Parliament at a joint session of the Chambers shall:
5) give consent to the appointment of the Prime Minister of the Republic.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers on the proposal of the prime minister, and the appointments
do not require the legislatures approval.
Article 44
1. The President of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall:
3) appoint a Prime Minister of the Republic with the
Parliaments consent; release him from office; determine the structure of the Government of the Republic
at the proposal of the Prime Minister, appoint to and
release from office its members.
Article 65
1. The Government shall be formed by the President of
the Republic of Kazakhstan according to the procedure
stipulated by this Constitution.
2. Suggestions about the structure and composition of
the Government shall be submitted to the President of
the Republic of Kazakhstan by the Prime Minister of the
Republic within ten days after his appointment.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 41
1. The President of the Republic shall be elected by universal, equal and direct suffrage under a secret ballot for

Parliament of Kazakhstan (Kenges)

a seven-year term in accordance with the constitutional
law by the citizens of the Republic who have come of
age.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 53
Parliament at a joint session of the Chambers shall:
6) hear the report of the Prime Minister on the Governments program and approve or reject the program.
A second rejection of the program brought about by
the majority of two-thirds of votes from the total number of deputies of each Chamber denotes a vote of no
confidence in the Government. The absence of such
a majority implies the approval of the Governments
program;
7) express a vote of no confidence in the Government
by the majority of two-thirds of votes from the total
number of deputies of each Chamber at the initiative
of no less than one-fifth of the total number of the
Parliaments deputies and in cases established by this
Constitution.
Article 61
7. In the case when of a draft of law submitted by the
Government is not adopted, the Prime-Minister shall
have the right to raise an issue of nonconfidence in the
Government at a joint session of the Chambers. Voting on this issue shall be held not earlier than within
forty-eight hours from the moment of calling for a
vote of confidence. If the call for a vote of no confidence does not receive the necessary number of votes
established by this Constitution, a draft of law shall be
deemed adopted without voting. However, the Government may not use this right more than twice a year.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 63
1. The President of the Republic of Kazakhstan may dissolve Parliament in cases: expressing by Parliament of a
vote of no confidence in the Government, twice refusal
of Parliament to give consent to the appointment of the
Prime Minister, political crisis resulting from of insurmountable differences between the Chambers of Parliament or Parliament and other branches of state power.
2. The Parliament may not be dissolved in the period of
a state of emergency or martial law, during the last six
months of the Presidents term, as well as within a year
after a previous dissolution.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The president issues decrees that have the force
of law.

359
Article 45
1. The President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, on the
basis of and with the exercise of the Constitution and
the laws, shall issue decrees and resolutions which are
binding on the entire territory of the Republic.
2. In the case envisioned by subparagraph 4 of Article 53
of the Constitution the President of the Republic shall
issue laws, and in the case envisioned by subparagraph
2 of Article 61 of the Constitution, the President of the
Republic shall issue decrees having the force of laws in
the Republic.
Article 53
Parliament at a joint session of the Chambers shall:
4) have the right to delegate legislative Powers for a
term not exceeding one year to the President by twothirds of the votes from the total number of deputies of
each Chamber at the initiative of the President.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority vote in a plenary session
of the legislature is needed to override a presidential veto.
Article 53
Parliament at a joint session of the Chambers shall:
3) conduct a second round of discussion and voting on
the laws or articles of the law that caused objections
of the President of the Republic within a months term
from the moment the objections were presented. Nonobservance of this term denotes the acceptance of the
Presidents objections. If Parliament by the majority of
two-thirds of votes from the total number of deputies
from each Chamber confirms the decision adopted earlier, the President shall sign the law within seven days.
If the Presidents objections are not overruled, the law
shall be deemed not adopted or adopted in the version
proposed by the President.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Council can review the
constitutionality of laws.
Article 72
1. The Constitutional Council by appeal of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the chairperson of
the Senate, the Chairperson of Majilis, not less than
one-fifth of the total number of deputies of Parliament,
the Prime Minister shall:
2) consider the laws adopted by Parliament with
respect to their compliance with the Constitution of
the Republic before they are signed by the President.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.

360

Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy

jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The president can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto, here
expressed as being apprehended on the scene of a
crime or committing grave crimes.
Article 52
4. A deputy of Parliament during the term of his office
may not be arrested, subject to detention, measures of
administrative punishment imposed by a court of law,
arraigned on a criminal charge without the consent of a
respective Chamber except for the cases of being apprehended on the scene of a crime or committing grave
crimes.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
No. The president appoints seven of the forty-seven
senators. All members of the Majilis are elected.
Article 50
1. Parliament shall consist of two Chambers acting on
a permanent basis: the Senate and the Majilis.
2. The Senate shall be composed of deputies elected in
twos from each oblast, major city and the capital of
the Republic of Kazakhstan, at a joint session of the
deputies of all representative bodies of the respective
oblast, major city and the capital of the Republic. Seven
deputies of the Senate shall be appointed by the President of the Republic for the term of the Senate.
3. The Majilis shall consist of seventy-seven deputies.
Sixty-seven deputies shall be elected in constituencies having one mandate and formed according to the
administrative-territorial division of the Republic with
an approximately equal number of constituents. Ten
deputies shall be elected on the basis of the Party Lists
according to the system of proportional representation
and in the territory of a unified national constituency.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments must be approved
either by the president or in a popular referendum.

Parliament of Kazakhstan (Kenges)

Article 53
Parliament at a joint session of the Chambers shall:
1) introduce amendments and make additions to
the Constitution; adopt constitutional laws, introduce
amendments and make additions to the Constitution
at the proposal of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan.
Article 62
3. Amendments and additions to the Constitution shall
be introduced by the majority of no less than threefourths of votes from the total number of the deputies
of each chamber.
4. Constitutional laws shall be adopted on the issues
stipulated by the Constitution by the majority of no
less than two-thirds of votes from the total number of
the deputies of each Chamber.
Article 91
1. Amendments and additions to the Constitution of
the Republic of Kazakhstan may be introduced only by
an all-nation referendum held by the decision of the
President of the Republic made on his own initiative, at
the recommendation of Parliament or the Government.
The draft of amendments and additions to the Constitution shall not be submitted to an all-nation referendum
if the President decides to pass it to the consideration
of Parliament. In this case, Parliaments decision shall
be adopted according to the procedure established by
this Constitution. In case the President of the Republic
refuses the proposal of the Parliament on submission of
amendments and additions to the Constitution for the
consideration of the Republican referendum, the Parliament has the right by majority of not less than fourfifths of votes of the total number of deputies of each
Chamber of the Parliament to adopt the law on making
of these amendments and additions to the Constitution. In such case the President of the Republic shall
sign this law or submit it for the consideration of the
Republican referendum which shall be deemed valid if
more than half of the Republican citizens, possessing
the right to participate in the Republican referendum,
take part in it. Amendments and additions to the Constitution, which are submitted for the consideration of
the Republican referendum, shall be deemed adopted,
if more than half of citizens, taking part in it, vote
for it.
2. The unitary status and territorial integrity of the
Republic, the forms of government may not be
changed.
Article 92
1. The constitutional laws must be adopted within a
year from the day of enactment of the Constitution.
If the laws called constitutional in the Constitution or
the acts having the force thereof have been adopted
by the moment of enactment of the Constitution, they
are brought into accordance with the Constitution and
deemed to be the constitutional laws of the Republic of
Kazakhstan.
2. Other laws named in the Constitution must be
adopted according to the procedure and within the

Parliament of Kazakhstan (Kenges)

terms determined by the Parliament but no later than
two years after the enactment of the Constitution.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislature declares war.
Article 53
Parliament at a joint session of the Chambers shall:
8) decide issues of war and peace.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 44
1. The President of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall:
11) conduct negotiations and sign international
treaties of the Republic; sign ratification instruments;
receive letters of credentials and recall from diplomatic and other representatives of foreign states
accredited to him.
Article 54
Parliament at separate sessions of the Chambers
through consecutive consideration of issues first in the
Majilis and then in the Senate shall:
7) ratify and denounce international treaties of the
Republic.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant
amnesty.
Article 54
Parliament at separate sessions of the Chambers
through consecutive consideration of issues first in the
Majilis and then in the Senate shall:
6) issue acts of amnesty to citizens.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 44
1. The President of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall:
15) exercise pardon of citizens.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The president appoints most judges. The Senate formally has some appointment authority, but
its choices are made on the proposal of the president, and in practice, the Senate automatically
accepts the presidents nominations.
Article 82
1. The Chairperson of the Supreme Court, the Chairpersons of the Collegiums and judges of the Supreme
Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall be elected by

361
the Senate at the proposal of the President of the Republic based on a recommendation of the Highest Judicial
Council of the Republic.
2. The Chairpersons of oblast and equivalent courts,
the Chairpersons of the Collegiums and judges of the
oblast and equivalent courts shall be appointed by the
President of the Republic at the recommendation of the
Highest Judicial Court of the Republic.
3. The Chairperson and judges of other courts of the
Republic shall be appointed by the President of the
Republic at the proposal of the Minister of Justice based
on a recommendation of the Qualification Collegium
of Justice.
4. The Highest Judicial Council shall be headed by the
Chairperson who is appointed by the President of the
Republic and consist of the Chairperson of the Constitutional Council, the Chairperson of the Supreme
Court, the Procurator General, the Minister of Justice, deputies of the Senate, judges and other persons
appointed by the President of the Republic.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the chairman of the
National Bank of Kazakhstan with the legislatures
approval.
Article 44
1. The President of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall:
4) appoint the Chairperson of the National Bank of
the Republic of Kazakhstan with the Parliaments
consent.
Article 53
Parliament at a joint session of the Chambers shall:
5) give consent to the appointment of the . . . Chairperson of the National Bank of the Republic by the
President of the Republic.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session for
about ten months each year.
Article 59
3. Regular sessions of the Parliament shall be held once
a year from the first working day of September to the
last working day of June.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.

362

Parliament of Kazakhstan (Kenges)

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.

contains a significant number of highly experienced

members.

Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members. Maintaining a place, however, depends
largely on loyalty to President Nursultan Nazarbaev
and his Fatherland Party, which holds a monopoly
on seats.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF KENYA (BUNGE)

Expert consultants: June Gachui, Nairobi Legis, David K. Leonard, Gideon Ochanda, Bjarte Tra
Score: .31
Influence over
executive (3/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Institutional
autonomy (1/9)

Specified
powers (1/8)

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon
24. judiciary
X

Institutional
capacity (5/6)
X

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

X
X
X

25. central bank

26. media

18. all elected

The National Assembly (Bunge) of Kenya was established in the 1963 constitution upon independence from Great Britain. The document called for
a bicameral legislature with an elected lower house,
the National Assembly, and an upper house, the
Senate. In 1966 the Senate was eliminated, leaving a unicameral National Assembly. From 1968
until 1992 presidential elections were not held, and
the leader of the Kenyan African National Union
(KANU) served as president. During this period
KANU was the sole legal party and held all seats
in the legislature. In the 1992 elections for both
president and the National Assembly, the ban on
alternative parties was lifted. A national referendum held in 2005 rejected a proposed constitutional amendment that would have created the
post of prime minister.

The National Assembly is an ineffectual body.

It has modest power over the executive. Presidential dissolution, decree, veto, and gatekeeping powers undermine the legislatures institutional autonomy. The Assembly is granted only one specified
power, the power to amend the constitution, and
has considerable institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. The legislature cannot impeach the president.
Article 14
1. No criminal proceedings whatsoever shall be instituted or continued against the President while he holds

National Assembly of Kenya (Bunge)

office or against any person while he is exercising the
functions of the office of President.
2. No civil proceedings in which relief is claimed in
respect of anything done or omitted to be done shall be
instituted or continued against the President while he
holds office or against any person, while he is exercising
the functions of the office of President.
3. Where provision is made by law limiting the time
within which proceedings of any description may be
brought against any person, a period of time during
which a person holds or exercises the functions of the
office of President shall not be taken into account in
any period of time prescribed by that law which determines whether any such proceedings as are mentioned
in subsection (1.) or (2.) may be brought against that
person.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Ministers are selected from, and required to
serve simultaneously in, the legislature.
Article 16
(1) There shall be such offices of Minister of the Government of Kenya as may be established by Parliament
or, subject to any provisions made by Parliament, by
the President.
(2) The President shall, subject to the provisions of any
written law, appoint the Ministers from among the
members of the National Assembly. Provided that, if
occasion arises for making an appointment to the office
of any Minister while Parliament stands dissolved, a
person who was a member of the National Assembly
immediately before the dissolution may be appointed
to that office.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. Parliamentary select committees have some
limited power to scrutinize the executive, but cannot conduct independent investigations.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. There is no prime minister.

363

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 16
1. There shall be such offices of Minister of the Government of Kenya as may be established by Parliament or,
subject to any provisions made by Parliament, by the
President.
2. The President shall, subject to the provisions of any
written law, appoint the Ministers from among the
members of the National Assembly:
Provided that, if occasion arises for making an appointment to the office of any Minister while Parliament
stands dissolved, a person who was a member of the
National Assembly immediately before the dissolution
may be appointed to that office.
Article 19
1. The President may appoint Assistant Ministers from
among the members of the National Assembly to assist
Ministers, The President, Vice-President and Ministers
in the performance of their duties:
Provided that, if occasion arises for making an appointment while Parliament stands dissolved, a person who
was a member of the National Assembly immediately
before the dissolution may be appointed as an Assistant
Minister.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 5
(1) The President shall be elected in accordance with
this Chapter and, subject thereto, with any Act of Parliament regulating the election of a President.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 59
(3) If the National Assembly passes a resolution which
is supported by the votes of a majority of all the members of the Assembly (excluding the ex officio members), and of which not less than seven days notice
has been given in accordance with the standing orders
of the Assembly, declaring that it has no confidence in
the Government of Kenya, and the President does not
within three days of the passing of that resolution either
resign from his office or dissolve Parliament, Parliament
shall stand dissolved on the fourth day following the
day on which that resolution was passed.

364

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 59
(2) The President may at any time dissolve Parliament.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A 65 percent majority is required to override a
presidential veto.
Article 46
(1) Subject to this Constitution, the legislative power
of Parliament shall be exercisable by Bills passed by the
National Assembly.
(2) When a Bill has been passed by the National Assembly, it shall be presented to the President for his assent.
(3) The President shall, within twenty-one days after
the Bill has been presented to him for assent under
subsection (2), signify to the Speaker that he assents to
the Bill or refuses to assent to the Bill.
(4) Where the President refuses to assent to a Bill he
shall, within fourteen days of the refusal, submit a
memorandum to the Speaker indicating the specific
provisions of the Bill which in his opinion should be
reconsidered by the National Assembly including his
recommendations for amendments.
(5) The National Assembly shall reconsider a Bill
referred to it by the President taking into account the
comments of the President and shall either
(a) approve the recommendations proposed by the
President with or without amendment and resubmit
the Bill to the President for assent; or
(b) refuse to accept the recommendations and approve
the Bill in its original form by a resolution in that behalf
supported by votes of not less than sixty-five per cent
of all the Members of the National Assembly (excluding
ex officio members) in which case the President shall
assent to the Bill within fourteen days of the passing of
the resolution.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The High Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 67
(1) Where a question as to the interpretation of this
Constitution arises in proceedings in a subordinate
court and the court is of the opinion that the question involves a substantial question of law, the court
may, and shall if a party to the proceedings so requests,
refer the question to the High Court.

National Assembly of Kenya (Bunge)

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. The legislature is prohibited from introducing
legislation related to taxation, public expenditures,
and government debt.
Article 48
Except upon the recommendation of the President signified by a Minister, the National Assembly shall not

(a) proceed upon a Bill (including an amendment to a

Bill) that, in the opinion of the person presiding, makes
provision for any of the following purposes
(i) the imposition of taxation or the alteration of taxation otherwise than by reduction; or
(ii) the imposition of a charge on the Consolidated
Fund or any other fund of the Government of Kenya
or the alteration of any such charge otherwise than
by reduction; or
(iii) the payment, issue or withdrawal from the Consolidated Fund or any other fund of the Government
of Kenya of moneys not charged upon the fund or
an increase in the amount of the payment, issue or
withdrawal; or
(iv) the composition or remission of a debt due to
the Government of Kenya; or
(b) proceed upon a motion (including an amendment to a motion) the effect of which, in the opinion
of the person presiding, would be to make provision
for any of those purposes.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The executive can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. According to the constitution, the legislature
has the power to establish immunity. In practice,
legislators are subject to arrest beyond the grounds
of parliament for common crimes.
Article 57
Without prejudice to the powers conferred by section
56, Parliament may, for the purpose of the orderly
and effective discharge of the business of the National
Assembly, provide for the powers, privileges and immunities of the Assembly and its committees and members.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.

National Assembly of Kenya (Bunge)

No. The president appoints twelve of the 224 members of the National Assembly to represent special
interests.
Article 31
Subject to this Constitution, the National Assembly
shall consist of elected members elected in accordance
with section 32, nominated members appointed in
accordance with section 33 and the ex officio members.
Article 33
(1) Subject to this section, there shall be twelve nominated members of the National Assembly appointed by
the President following a general election, to represent
special interests.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution in
multiple readings by a 65 percent majority vote.

365

No. The president can declare war without the legislatures approval.
21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
treaties with foreign countries.
No. The legislatures approval is not necessary to
ratify international treaties.
22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.
No. Pardon and amnesty are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 27
The President may:
(a) grant to a person convicted of an offence a pardon,
either free or subject to lawful conditions;
(b) grant to a person a respite, either indefinite or for
a specified period, of the execution of a punishment
imposed on that person for an offence;
(c) substitute a less severe form of punishment for a
punishment imposed on a person for an offence;
(d) remit the whole or part of a punishment imposed
on a person for an offence or of a penalty or forfeiture
otherwise due to the Republic on account of an offence;
and
(e) remove in whole or in part the non-qualification
or the disqualification of a person, arising out of or in
consequence of the report of an election court under
the provisions of the National Assembly and Presidential Elections Act, from registration as an elector on a
register of electors or from nomination for election as
an elected member of the National Assembly.

Article 47
(1) Subject to this section, Parliament may alter this
Constitution.
(2) A Bill for an Act of Parliament to alter this Constitution shall not be passed by the National Assembly
unless it has been supported on the second and third
readings by the votes of not less than sixty-five per cent
of all the members of the Assembly (excluding the ex
officio members).
(3) If, on the taking of a vote for the purposes of subsection (2), the Bill is supported by a majority of the
members of the Assembly voting but not by the number of votes required by that subsection, and the Bill
is not opposed by thirty-five per cent of all the members of the Assembly or more, then, subject to such
limitations and conditions as may be prescribed by the
standing orders of the Assembly, a further vote may be
taken.
(4) When a Bill for an Act of Parliament to alter this
Constitution has been introduced into the National
Assembly, no alterations shall be made in it before it
is presented to the President for his assent, except alterations which are certified by the Speaker to be necessary
because of the time that has elapsed since the Bill was
first introduced into the Assembly.
(5) A certificate of the Speaker under subsection (4)
shall be conclusive as regards proceedings in the Assembly, and shall not be questioned in any court.
(6) In this section
(a) references to this Constitution are references to
this Constitution as from time to time amended; and
(b) references to the alteration of this Constitution
are references to the amendment, modification or
reenactment, with or without amendment or modification, of any provision of this Constitution, the
suspension or repeal of that provision and the making of a different provision in the place of that provision.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the

operation of the public media.

No. The president appoints the chief justice and

other judges of the High Court, and the appointments do not require the legislatures approval.
Article 61
(1) The Chief Justice [of the High Court] shall be
appointed by the President.
(2) The puisne judges [of the High Court] shall be
appointed by the President acting in accordance with
the advice of the Judicial Service Commission.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the governor of the
Central Bank of Kenya.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

366

National Assembly of Kenya (Bunge)

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes. The legislature meets regularly in ordinary session.
Article 58
(1) Subject to this section, each session of Parliament
shall be held at such place within Kenya and shall commence at such time as the President may appoint.
(2) There shall be a session of Parliament at least once
in every year, so that a period of twelve months shall
not intervene between the last sitting of the National
Assembly in one session and the first sitting thereof in
the next session.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Although there was considerable electoral
volatility across the 1992, 1997, and 2002 National
Assembly elections, re-election rates have been sufficiently high to produce a significant number of
highly experienced members.

No.

SUPREME PEOPLES ASSEMBLY OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF

KOREA (NORTH KOREA) (CHOEGO INMIN HOEUI)
Expert consultants: Peter Beck, Hong Yung Lee
Score: .13
Influence over
executive (0/9)

Institutional
autonomy (1/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Specified
powers (0/8)

Institutional
capacity (3/6)

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

24. judiciary

X
X
X

25. central bank

26. media

18. all elected

The Supreme Peoples Assembly (Choego Inmin

Hoeui) of the Democratic Peoples Republic of
Korea was established in the 1948 constitution following the division of the Korean peninsula at the
end of World War II. The document called for a
unicameral legislature paired with a cabinet led by
a premier. A subset of the Supreme Peoples Assembly (SPA), the SPA Presidium, meets when the larger
SPA is not in session, which is all but a few days

a year. Despite the formal state institutions, Kim

Il Sung, the countrys first premier and head of
the dominant political party, the Korean Workers
Party (KWP), ruled as an absolute dictator. Following a constitutional amendment in 1972, Kim Il
Sung assumed the newly created position of president. Upon his death in 1994, he was replaced
as the head of state by his son, Kim Jong Il. The
elder Kim was named eternal president, and the

Supreme Peoples Assembly of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (North Korea)

younger Kim assumed the title of Chairman of the

National Defense Commission.
North Korea is a single-man dictatorship, and
the legislature is essentially defunct. It lacks any
ability to influence the executive. Its formal powers to appoint members of the executive branch are
illusory. The legislature has negligible institutional
autonomy. Its membership is completely selected
by Kim Jong Il and the ruling KWP, and it merely
rubber-stamps legislation decreed by the dictator.
The legislature exercises none of the specified powers measured in this survey. It has a bit of institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. The legislature cannot remove the Chairman
of the National Defense Commission, the highest executive position in the country; nor can it
remove the premier (i.e., head) of the cabinet.
2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of
the legislature.
No. Members of the Supreme Peoples Assembly
cannot serve simultaneously in the cabinet and the
National Defense Commission.
3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
No. The legislature cannot question officials from
the executive.

367

No. Formally, the legislature has the power to elect

the prime minister (the premier of the cabinet),
but in practice, the sole candidate for the post is
selected by Kim Jong Il.
Article 91
The SPA has the authority to:
9. elect or transfer the Premier of the Cabinet.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. Formally, the legislature appoints the members of the cabinet on the recommendation of the
premier. In practice, the legislature merely rubberstamps the candidates selected by Kim Jong Il.
Article 91
The SPA has the authority to:
10. appoint the vice premiers of the Cabinet, chairmen
of commissions, ministers and other members of the
Cabinet according to the recommendation of the Premier of the Cabinet.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. Formally, the legislature elects the chairman
of the National Defense Commission, the highest
executive post, but in practice, Kim Jong Il, the current chairman of the National Defense Commission, inherited the position of head of state from
his father, Kim Il Sung.
Article 91
The SPA has the authority to:
5. elect or transfer the Chairman of the DPRK National
Defense Commission.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.

No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in

the government.

No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. Formally, the NDC is accountable to the SPA,
but in practice, the legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
Article 15
The NDC is accountable to the SPA.

6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

Yes. There is no institutionalized mechanism for

dissolving the legislature.
11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. Formally, the executive lacks decree power, but
in practice, Kim Jong Il issues decrees that have the
force of law.
Article 114
The SPA Presidium issues decrees, decisions and directions.

368

Supreme Peoples Assembly of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (North Korea)

Article 97
The SPA adopts laws and decisions.
Laws and decisions of the SPA are adopted when more
than half of the deputies attending signify approval by
a show of hands.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. Formally, there is no provision for veto, but in
practice, Kim Jong Il could veto legislation passed
by the SPA and the SPA would have no recourse to
override.
13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. Formally, there is no judicial review and the
legislatures laws are supreme, but in practice, the
laws are in no respect the products of the Supreme
Peoples Assembly. Rather, they are the products
of the decisions of the National Defense Commission.
Article 110
The SPA Presidium has the duties and authority to
4. interpret the Constitution, departmental laws and
regulations in force.
6. abolish State organs decisions which violate the Constitution, SPAs laws and decisions, NDCs decisions and
orders and the SPA Presidiums decrees, decisions and
directions, and suspend the implementation of unwarranted decisions by a local peoples assembly.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. Formally, the legislature has the right to initiate bills in all policy jurisdictions, but in practice,
Kim Jong Il possesses absolute gatekeeping authority.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The executive can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
No. The legislature depends on the executive for
the resources that finance its own operation.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Formally, legislators are immune from arrest
with the common exception for cases of flagrante

delicto, here expressed as flagrant offence. In

practice, legislators can be arrested and worse if
they fall out of favor with Kim Jong Il.
Article 99
Deputies to the SPA are guaranteed inviolability as such.
No deputy to the SPA can be arrested or punished without the consent of the SPA or, when it is not in session,
without the consent of the SPA Presidium, except for a
flagrant offence.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
No. Formally, all members of the legislature are
elected, but in practice, the ruling party chooses a
list of candidates who are elected without opposition.
Article 6
The organs of State power at all levels, from the county
Peoples Assembly to the SPA, are elected on the principle of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret
ballot.
Article 89
The SPA is composed of deputies elected on the principle of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret
ballot.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement

of any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Formally, the legislature can amend the constitution, but in practice, constitutional changes are
decided upon by Kim Jong Il and the KWP.
Article 91
The SPA has the authority to:
1. amend and supplement the Constitution.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. The NDC can declare war without need for the
legislatures approval.
Article 13
The NDC has the duties and authority to:
5. proclaim a state of war and orders for mobilization.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
No. Formally, the legislature must ratify international treaties, but in practice, Kim Jong Il can conclude treaties and the legislatures approval is not
needed.
Article 91
The SPA has the authority to:
17. decide on the ratification or abrogation of treaties
submitted to the SPA.

Supreme Peoples Assembly of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (North Korea)
Article 110
The SPA Presidium has the duties and authority to
14. ratify or abrogate treaties concluded with other
countries.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Formally, the legislature has the power to grant
amnesty, but in practice, Kim Jong Il alone has the
power to grant amnesty.
Article 110
The SPA Presidium has the duties and authority to
17. exercise the right to grant general amnesties or special pardon.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. Formally, the legislature has the power of pardon, but in practice, Kim Jong Il alone has the
power of pardon.
Article 110
The SPA Presidium has the duties and authority to
17. exercise the right to grant general amnesties or special pardon.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. Formally, the legislature elects the chief justice
and judges of the Central Court, but in practice,
judges are selected by Kim Jong Il and the hegemonic party.
Article 91
The SPA has the authority to
12. elect or transfer the Chief Justice.
Article 110
The SPA Presidium has the duties and authority to
13. elect or transfer judges of the Central Court and
people s assessors.
Article 155
The Central Court appoints and removes the director
and judges of the Special Court.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

369

No. Kim Jong Il appoints the chairman of the Central Bank of the DPRK.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
No. Every year the legislature meets in two ordinary
sessions, each lasting a few days.
Article 92
The SPA holds regular and extraordinary sessions.
Regular sessions are convened once or twice a year by
the SPA Presidium. Extraordinary sessions are convened
when the SPA Presidium deems them necessary or at the
request of a minimum of one-third of the total number
of deputies.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. Legislators who remain in the good graces
of Kim Jung Il face no formal restrictions on reelection.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Loyal party cadres are regularly re-elected,
thereby forming a body of highly experienced
members.

370

National Assembly of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) (Kukhoe)

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (SOUTH KOREA) (KUKHOE)

Expert consultants: Charles K. Armstrong, Peter Gey, David C. Kang, Samuel S. Kim, Kenji Kushida,
Seong-ho Lim, Chan Wook Park
Score: .59
Influence over
executive (4/9)

Institutional
autonomy (6/9)

1. replace

10. no
dissolution
11. no decree

2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate

4. investigate

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

12. no
veto
13. no
review
14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

Specified
powers (3/8)

Institutional
capacity (6/6)

19. amendments

27. sessions

20. war

28. secretary

21. treaties

29. staff

X
X

30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

22. amnesty
X

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

X
X

26. media
X

The National Assembly (Kukhoe) of the Republic

of Korea was established in the 1948 constitution,
which called for a unicameral body with a president elected by the assembly. For the next forty
years, the legislature sat on the sidelines and the
military ruled.
In 1987 a major set of changes in the constitution ushered in the current, more open political system, the Sixth Republic of South Korea.
The amendments greatly expanded the power of
the legislature. The legislature gained the right to
remove the prime minister, or any other minister,
from office with a majority vote, and the president lost the power to dissolve the legislature. The
length of the ordinary sessions of the National
Assembly was lengthened. The legislature gained
powers of investigation into the operations of the
executive branch and the power to review and
reject the presidents appointments to the Supreme
Court.
The legislature is a major force in national politics. It has substantial influence over the executive
branch and a fair amount of institutional autonomy. It enjoys some specified powers and prerogatives and scores perfectly in terms of institutional
capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of the Constitutional Court. The legislature can remove the prime minister from office
by a majority vote of its total membership.
Article 63
(1) The National Assembly may pass a recommendation for the removal of the Prime Minister or a State
Council member from office.
(2) A recommendation for removal as referred to in
Paragraph (1) may be introduced by one third or more
of the total members of the National Assembly, and
passed with the concurrent vote of a majority of the
total members of the National Assembly.
Article 65
(1) In case the President [has] violated the Constitution or other laws in the performance of official duties, the National Assembly may pass motions
for . . . impeachment.
(2) A motion for impeachment prescribed in Paragraph
(1) may be proposed by one-third or more of the total
members of the National Assembly, and requires a concurrent vote of a majority of the total members of the

National Assembly of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) (Kukhoe)

National Assembly for passage: Provided, that a motion
for the impeachment of the President shall be proposed
by a majority of the total members of the National
Assembly and approved by two-thirds or more of the
total members of the National Assembly.
(3) Any person against whom a motion for impeachment has been passed is suspended from exercising his
power until the impeachment has been adjudicated.
(4) A decision on impeachment does not extend further
than removal from public office. However, it does not
exempt the person impeached from civil or criminal
liability.
Article 111
(1) The Constitutional Court is competent to adjudicate the following matters:
2) Impeachment.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Legislators may serve simultaneously in ministerial positions.
3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.

371

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. The legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister
with the consent of the National Assembly.
Article 86
(1) The Prime Minister is appointed by the President
with the consent of the National Assembly.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers on the recommendation of the prime minister, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 87
(1) The members of the State Council are appointed
by the President on the recommendation of the Prime
Minister.

Article 62
(1) The Prime Minister, members of the State Council, or government delegates may attend meetings of
the National Assembly or its committees and report on
the state administration or deliver opinions and answer
questions.
(2) When requested by the National Assembly or its
committees, the Prime Minister, members of the State
Council, or government delegates have to attend any
meeting of the National Assembly and answer questions. If the Prime Minister or State Council members
are requested to attend, the Prime Minister or State
Council members may have State Council members
or government delegates attend any meeting of the
National Assembly and answer questions.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.

Article 63
(1) The National Assembly may pass a recommendation for the removal of the Prime Minister or a State
Council member from office.
(2) A recommendation for removal as referred to in
Paragraph (1) may be introduced by one third or more
of the total members of the National Assembly, and
passed with the concurrent vote of a majority of the
total members of the National Assembly.

Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.

Article 61
(1) The National Assembly may inspect affairs of state
or investigate specific matters of state affairs, and may
demand the production of documents directly related
thereto, the appearance of a witness in person, and the
furnishing of testimony or statements of opinion.
(2) The procedures and other necessary matters concerning the inspection and investigation of state
administration are determined by law.

No. The president is directly elected.

Article 67
(1) The President is elected by universal, equal, direct,
and secret ballot by the people.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature can vote to remove the prime
minister and other individual ministers from
office, but cannot vote no confidence in the government as a whole.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.

372

National Assembly of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) (Kukhoe)

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.

Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy

jurisdictions.

Yes. The executive lacks decree power. The president can issue decrees only when explicitly authorized to do so by the legislature.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.

Article 75
The President may issue presidential decrees concerning
matters delegated to him by law with the scope specifically defined and also matters necessary to enforce laws.

Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound

funds appropriated by the legislature.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority vote is required to override a presidential veto.
Article 53
(1) Each bill passed by the National Assembly shall be
sent to the Executive, and the President shall promulgate it within fifteen days.
(2) In case of objection to the bill, the President may,
within the period referred to in Paragraph (1), return
it to the National Assembly with written explanation
of his objection, and request it be reconsidered. The
President may do the same during adjournment of the
National Assembly.
(3) The President may not request the National Assembly to reconsider the bill in part, or with proposed
amendments.
(4) In case there is a request for reconsideration of a
bill, the National Assembly reconsiders it, and if the
National Assembly repasses the bill in the original form
with the attendance of more than one half of the total
members, and with a concurrent vote of two-thirds or
more of the members present, it becomes law.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The courts can review the constitutionality of
laws.
Article 107
(1) When the constitutionality of a law is at issue in
trial, the court requests a decision of the Constitutional
Court, and judges according to the decision thereof.
(2) The Supreme Court has the power to make a final
review of the constitutionality or legality of administrative decrees, regulations or actions, when their constitutionality or legality is at issue in a trial.
(3) Administrative appeals may be conducted as a procedure prior to a judicial trial. The procedure of administrative appeals are determined by law and are in conformity with the principles of judicial procedures.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.

16. The legislature controls the resources that finance

its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislators are immune only while the legislature is in session.
Article 44
(1) During the sessions of the National Assembly, no
member of the National Assembly may be arrested or
detained without the consent of the National Assembly
except in case of flagrante delicto.
(2) In case of apprehension or detention of a member of
the National Assembly prior to the opening of a session,
such member must be released during the session upon
the request of the National Assembly, except in case of
flagrante delicto.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 41
(1) The National Assembly is composed of members
elected by universal, equal, direct, and secret ballot by
the citizens.
(2) The number of members of the National Assembly
is determined by law, but the number may not be less
than 200.
(3) The constituencies of members of the National
Assembly, proportional representation, and other matters pertaining to National Assembly elections are determined by law.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments require approval
in a popular referendum.
Article 128
(1) A proposal to amend the Constitution can be introduced either by a majority of the total members of the
National Assembly or by the President.
(2) Amendments to the Constitution for the extension
of the term of office of the President or for a change
allowing for the re-election of the President are not

National Assembly of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) (Kukhoe)

effective for the President in office at the time of the
proposal for such amendments to the Constitution.
Article 130
(1) The National Assembly decides upon the proposed
amendments within sixty days of the public announcement, and passage by the National Assembly requires
the concurrent vote of two-thirds or more of the total
members of the National Assembly.
(2) The proposed amendments to the Constitution are
submitted to a national referendum not later than
thirty days after passage by the National Assembly, and
are confirmed by more than one half of all votes cast by
more than one half of voters eligible to vote in elections
for members of the National Assembly.
(3) When the proposed amendments to the Constitution receive the concurrence prescribed in Paragraph
(2), the amendments to the Constitution is finalized,
and the President promulgates it without delay.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for presidential war declarations.
Article 60
(2) The National Assembly also has the right to consent
to the declaration of war, the dispatch of armed forces
to foreign states, and the stationing of alien forces in
the territory of the Republic of Korea.
Article 73
The President concludes and ratifies treaties; accredits,
receives, or dispatches diplomatic envoys; and declares
war and concludes peace.
Article 89
The following matters are referred to the State Council
for deliberation:
(1) Basic plans for state affairs, and general policies of
the Executive;
(2) Declaration of war, conclusion of peace, and other
important matters pertaining to foreign policy.

373

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. The president grants amnesty with the consent
of the National Assembly.
Article 79
(1) The President may grant amnesty, commutation
and restoration of rights under the conditions as prescribed by law.
(2) The President needs the consent of the National
Assembly in granting a general amnesty.
(3) Matters pertaining to amnesty, commutation and
restoration of rights are determined by law.
Article 89
The following matters are referred to the State Council
for deliberation:
9) Granting of amnesty, commutation, and restoration
of rights.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon, here
expressed as commutation and restoration of
rights.
Article 79
(1) The President may grant amnesty, commutation
and restoration of rights under the conditions as prescribed by law.
(2) The President needs the consent of the National
Assembly in granting a general amnesty.
(3) Matters pertaining to amnesty, commutation and
restoration of rights are determined by law.
Article 89
The following matters are referred to the State Council
for deliberation:
9) Granting of amnesty, commutation, and restoration
of rights.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.

Yes. The legislatures consent is needed for the presidents appointments to the Supreme Court.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

international treaties on most major issues.

Article 104
(1) The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is appointed
by the President with the consent of the National
Assembly.
(2) The Supreme Court Justices are appointed by the
President on the recommendation of the Chief Justice
and with the consent of the National Assembly.
(3) Judges other than the Chief Justice and the Supreme
Court Justices are appointed by the Chief Justice with
the consent of the Conference of Supreme Court Justices.

Article 60
(1) The National Assembly has the right to consent to
the conclusion and ratification of
treaties pertaining to mutual assistance or mutual security; treaties concerning important international organizations; treaties of friendship, trade and navigation;
treaties pertaining to any restriction in sovereignty;
peace treaties; treaties which will burden the State or
people with an important financial obligation; and
treaties related to legislative matters.
Article 73
The President concludes and ratifies treaties; accredits,
receives, or dispatches diplomatic envoys; and declares
war and concludes peace.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the governor of the
Bank of Korea.

374

National Assembly of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) (Kukhoe)

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes.

Yes. Although the constitution stipulates that the

legislature must meet for no more than 100 days
each year in ordinary session, the legislature is
normally in session for over six months each
year.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.

Article 47
(1) A regular session of the National Assembly is convened once every year under the conditions prescribed
by law, and extraordinary sessions of the National
Assembly can be convened upon the request of the President or at least one-fourth of the members.
(2) The period of regular sessions cannot exceed a hundred days, and that of extraordinary sessions, thirty
days.
(3) If the President requests the convening of an
extraordinary session, the period of the session and the
reasons for the request must be clearly specified.

Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF KUWAIT (MAJILIS AL-UMMA)

Expert consultants: Essa Al-Ghazali, F. Gregory Gause, Michael Herb, Jacqueline S. Ismael,
Pete W. Moore
Score: .38
Influence over
executive (3/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Institutional
autonomy (2/9)

Specified
powers (2/8)

Institutional
capacity (5/6)

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon
24. judiciary

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

X
X
X

25. central bank

26. media

18. all elected

The National Assembly (Majilis al-Umma) of

Kuwait partakes of the heritage of the Majilis
movement of 1938, when the people of Kuwait
elected a legislative assembly that met for over
six months before the emir dispersed it. The post-

independence constitution of 1962 inaugurated

the National Assembly in its current form. The
unicameral body consists of both elected and
appointed members. The emir has the right to
dissolve the legislature at will, and emirs have

National Assembly of Kuwait (Majilis al-Umma)

frequently invoked this power; the legislature was

suspended during 197681 and 198692.
The legislature can influence the executive
branch through powers of interpellation, and ministers are drawn in part from members of parliament. Its own institutional autonomy is limited, however, by the emirs powers to decree
and veto legislation, to appoint legislators, and
to dissolve the legislature. The emir, rather than
the legislature, also exercises most of the specified powers and prerogatives although, notably,
the legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties, and the legislature has a
voice in the operation of the state-controlled
media. The legislature has appreciable institutional
capacity, receiving affirmative answers for five
of the six measures of capacity scored in this
survey.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. The legislature cannot impeach the emir. Only
the emir can remove the prime minister.
Article 102
(1) The Prime Minister does not hold any portfolio; nor
shall the question of confidence in him be raised before
the National Assembly.
(2) Nevertheless, if the National Assembly decides, in
the manner specified in the preceding Article, that it
cannot co-operate with the Prime Minister, the matter
is submitted to the Head of State. In such a case, the
Emir may either relieve the Prime Minister of office and
appoint a new Cabinet or dissolve the National Assembly.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Ministers are required to serve simultaneously
in the legislature. Ministers appointed from outside the legislatures ranks automatically become
ex-officio members of the National Assembly.
Article 56
(2) Ministers are appointed from amongst the members
of the National Assembly and from others.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.

375
Article 99
Every member of the National Assembly may put to the
Prime Minister and to Ministers questions with a view
to clarifying matters falling within their competence.
The questioner alone has the right to comment once
upon the answer.
Article 100
(1) Every member of the National Assembly may
address to the Prime Minister and to Ministers interpellations with regard to matters falling within their
competence.
(2) The debate on such an interpellation shall not take
place until at least eight days have elapsed after its presentation, except in case of urgency and with the consent of the Minister concerned.
(3) Subject to the provisions of Articles 101 and 102,
an interpellation may lead to the question of noconfidence being put to the Assembly.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature is vested with the right to investigate ministers, but it cannot investigate the emir.
Article 114
The National Assembly at all times has the right to
set up committees of inquiry or to delegate one or
more of its members to investigate any matter within
its competence. Ministers and all Government officials
must produce testimonials, documents, and statements
requested from them.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The emir appoints the prime minister.
Article 56
(1) The Emir, after the traditional consultations,
appoints the Prime Minister and relieves him of office.
The Emir also appoints Ministers and relieves them of
office upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The emir appoints ministers on the recommendation of the prime minister, and the appointments do not require the legislatures approval.
Article 56
(1) The Emir, after the traditional consultations,
appoints the Prime Minister and relieves him of office.

376
The Emir also appoints Ministers and relieves them of
office upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister.
(2) Ministers are appointed from amongst the members
of the National Assembly and from others.
(3) The number of Ministers in all shall not exceed onethird of the number of the members of the National
Assembly.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The country lacks a presidency. The emir is the
head of state.
9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.
No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in
the government. It can notify the emir that it is
unable to cooperate with the prime minister, and
the emir can decide to remove the prime minister
or dissolve the legislature. In May 2006 the legislature started the process to declare its inability to
work with the prime minister. The emir called elections, which the opposition won. The emir reappointed the former prime minister to form a new
government, but the new government conceded
on the underlying policy dispute that had led to
the elections.
Article 102
(1) The Prime Minister does not hold any portfolio; nor
shall the question of confidence in him be raised before
the National Assembly.
(2) Nevertheless, if the National Assembly decides, in
the manner specified in the preceding Article, that it
cannot co-operate with the Prime Minister, the matter
is submitted to the Head of State. In such a case, the
Emir may either relieve the Prime Minister of office and
appoint a new Cabinet or dissolve the National Assembly.
(3) In the event of dissolution, if the new Assembly
decides by the abovementioned majority vote that it
cannot co-operate with the said Prime Minister, he shall
be considered to have resigned as from the date of the
decision of the Assembly in this respect, and a new
Cabinet shall be formed.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The emir can dissolve the legislature.
Article 102
(1) The Prime Minister does not hold any portfolio; nor
shall the question of confidence in him be raised before
the National Assembly.
(2) Nevertheless, if the National Assembly decides, in
the manner specified in the preceding Article, that it
cannot co-operate with the Prime Minister, the matter
is submitted to the Head of State. In such a case, the

National Assembly of Kuwait (Majilis al-Umma)

Emir may either relieve the Prime Minister of office and
appoint a new Cabinet or dissolve the National Assembly.
(3) In the event of dissolution, if the new Assembly
decides by the abovementioned majority vote that it
cannot co-operate with the said Prime Minister, he shall
be considered to have resigned as from the date of the
decision of the Assembly in this respect, and a new
Cabinet shall be formed.
Article 107
(1) The Emir may dissolve the National Assembly by
a decree in which the reasons for dissolution is indicated. However, dissolution of the Assembly may not
be repeated for the same reasons.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The emir can issue decrees that have the force
of law while the legislature is out of session or
dissolved. The decrees lapse if they are not subsequently approved by the legislature.
Article 71
(1) Should necessity arise for urgent measures to be
taken while the National Assembly is not in session or is
dissolved, the Emir may issue decrees in respect thereof
which have the force of law, provided that they are not
contrary to the Constitution or to the appropriations
included in the budget law.
(2) Such decrees are referred to the National Assembly within the fifteen days following their issue if the
Assembly is in session. If it is dissolved or its legislative term has expired, such decrees are referred to the
next Assembly at its first sitting. If they are not thus
referred, they retrospectively cease to have the force of
law, without the necessity of any decision to that effect.
If they are referred and the Assembly does not confirm
them, they retrospectively cease to have the force of
law, unless the Assembly approves their validity for the
preceding period or settles in some other way the effects
arising therefrom.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority is needed to override the
emirs veto.
Article 66
Reference of a bill for reconsideration is by a decree
stating the grounds therefore. If the National Assembly
confirms the bill by a two-thirds majority vote of its
members, the Emir sanctions and promulgates the bill
within thirty days from its submission to him. If the
bill does not receive the said majority, it may not be
reconsidered during the same session. If the National
Assembly, in another session, considers the same bill
by a majority vote of its members, the Emir sanctions

National Assembly of Kuwait (Majilis al-Umma)

and promulgates the bill as law within thirty days from
its submission to him.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The judiciary can review the constitutionality
of laws.
Article 173
(1) The law specifies the judicial body competent to
deciding disputes relating to the constitutionality of
laws and regulations and determines its jurisdiction and
procedure.
(2) The law ensures the right of both the Government
and the interested parties to challenge the constitutionality of laws and regulations before the said body.
(3) If the said body decides that a law or a regulation is
unconstitutional, it is considered null and void.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The emir can impound funds appropriated by
the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,
including control over members salaries.
Article 119
The remuneration of the President of the National
Assembly, the Deputy President, and the Members are
fixed by law. In the event of a modification of the said
remuneration, such modification may not take effect
until the next legislative term.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.

377
a decision regarding a request for authorization within
one month from the date of its receipt, permission is
deemed to have been given.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
No. The emir appoints many members of the legislature. There are fifty elected members and up to
fifteen additional members appointed by the emir.
Article 80
(1) The National Assembly is composed of fifty members elected directly by universal suffrage and secret ballot in accordance with the provisions prescribed by the
electoral law.
(2) Ministers who are not elected members of the
National Assembly are considered ex-officio members
thereof.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments require the emirs
approval.
Article 174
(1) The Emir or one-third of the members of the
National Assembly have the right to propose a revision of the Constitution by amending or deleting one
or more of its provisions or by adding new provisions.
(2) If the Emir and the majority of the members constituting the National Assembly approve the principle of revision and its subject matter, the Assembly
debates the bill article by article. Approval by a twothirds majority vote of the members constituting the
Assembly is required for the bill to be passed. The revision comes into force only after being sanctioned and
promulgated by the Emir regardless of the provisions of
Articles 65 and 66.
(3) If the principle of revision or its subject matter is
rejected, it may not be presented again before the lapse
of one year from the rejection.
(4) No amendment to this Constitution may be proposed before the lapse of five years from its coming
into force.

No. Legislators are immune only while the legislature is in session.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Article 111
Except in cases of flagrante delicto, no measures of
inquiry, search, arrest, detention, or any other penal
measure may be taken against a member while the
Assembly is in session, except with the authorization
of the Assembly. The Assembly must be notified of any
penal measure that may be taken during its session in
accordance with the foregoing provision. The Assembly, at its first meeting, is always notified of any such
measure taken against any of its members while it was
not sitting. In all cases, if the Assembly does not give

No. The emir declares war, and the legislatures

approval is not required.
Article 68
The Emir declares defensive war by decree. Offensive
war is prohibited.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties on most major issues.

378
Article 70
(1) The Emir concludes treaties by decree and transmits them immediately to the National Assembly with
the appropriate statement. A treaty has the force of law
after it is signed, ratified, and published in the Official
Gazette.
(2) However, treaties of peace and alliance; treaties concerning the territory of the State, its natural resources or
sovereign rights, or public or private rights of citizens;
treaties of commerce, navigation, and residence; and
treaties entailing additional expenditure not provided
for in the budget, or involving amendment of the laws
of Kuwait; shall come into force only when made by a
law.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Amnesty is granted by law, but in practice, it
would be unthinkable for the legislature to pass an
amnesty law without the emirs approval.
Article 75
(1) The Emir may, by decree, grant a pardon or commute a sentence.
(2) However, general amnesty shall not be granted
except by a law and then only in respect of offences
committed prior to the proposal of the amnesty.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The emir has the power of pardon.
Article 75
(1) The Emir may, by decree, grant a pardon or commute a sentence.
(2) However, general amnesty shall not be granted
except by a law and then only in respect of offences
committed prior to the proposal of the amnesty.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The emir appoints the members of the judiciary, and the appointments do not require the
legislatures approval.
25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by
the legislature.

National Assembly of Kuwait (Majilis al-Umma)

No. The emir appoints the governor of the Central

Bank of Kuwait.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
Yes. The legislature has budgetary control over the
media, and, along with the executive, the legislature also establishes the legal framework for the
functioning of public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature is in session for at least eight
months each year.
Article 85
The National Assembly has an annual session of not
less than eight months.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
Article 83
(2) Members whose term of office expires may be reelected.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

Legislative Assembly of Kyrgyzstan (Jogorku Kenesh)

379

LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF KYRGYZSTAN (JOGORKU KENESH)

Expert consultants: Saltanat Berdikeeva, Eugene Huskey, Pauline Jones Luong, Bhaswar
Mukhopadhyay, Natalia Pisareva, Aigul Turgunbaeva
Score: .47
Influence over
executive (3/9)

Institutional
autonomy (1/9)

Specified
powers (5/8)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

X
X

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

18. all elected

24. judiciary

Institutional
capacity (6/6)

X
X

25. central bank

26. media
X

The Legislative Assembly (Jogorku Kenesh) of Kyrgyzstan was established in the 1993 constitution.
The document called for an elected, unicameral
legislature. A 1994 amendment brought a brief
experiment with a bicameral body, but the unicameral legislature was restored in a 2003 constitutional amendment. Constitutional amendments
in 1996 and 1998 did not directly affect the legislatures power. In November 2006 the country
adopted a new constitution that strengthened the
legislatures power, most notably, granting the legislature the right to appoint the prime minister.
A constitutional amendment in December 2006,
however, revoked the legislatures new powers and
restored the power to appoint the prime minister
to the president. The 2006 constitution is not yet
available in English. The constitutional excerpts
below are from the 1993 constitution.
Apart from the powers to investigate the government, approve ministerial appointments, and
vote no confidence in the government, the legislature lacks control over the executive branch.
The legislature has precious little autonomy; in this
area, presidential decree, veto, gatekeeping, and
dissolution powers weight heavily. The authority
that the legislature does possess comes in the form
of specified powers and prerogatives and a high
level of institutional capacity.

As of this writing, Kyrgyzstans constitutional

order is in a state of upheaval. In October 2007,
according to the official results of a disputed referendum, voters approved the adoption of a new
constitution. The referendum was pushed by the
president, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, who sought to
enhance his offices powers at the expense of parliament. Shortly after the referendum, Bakiyev dissolved parliament and called new elections. Precisely how the changes will affect the legislatures
power, and whether they will take hold and prove
lasting, are uncertain at this time.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of the Constitutional Court.
Article 51
1. The President of the Kyrgyz Republic can be removed
from office only on the basis of a charge of state treason or committing another severe crime brought by the
Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic, confirmed by
a conclusion of the Constitutional Court of the Kyrgyz
Republic.

380

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 56
5. A Deputy of the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic cannot simultaneously hold the office of a member
of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic and be a
Deputy of a local Kenesh.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
No. Legislators do not regularly question executive
branch officials.
4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive. For example, a parliamentary investigation recently uncovered a government scheme to
embezzle the countrys gold reserves.
Article 57
A Deputy of the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic
has the right of inquiry with organs of executive power,
local self-government, and their officials who are obligated to respond to the inquiry within one months
period.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister
with the assent of the legislature.
Article 46
1. The President of the Kyrgyz Republic:
2) Appoints the Prime Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic with the consent of the Jogorku Kenesh of the
Kyrgyz Republic.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The president appoints ministers on the recommendation of the prime minister, and the legislatures approval is necessary to confirm the
appointments.
Article 46
1. The President of the Kyrgyz Republic:

Legislative Assembly of Kyrgyzstan (Jogorku Kenesh)

3) Appoints members of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic according to the proposal of the Prime
Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic and with the consent
of the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 43
1. The President of the Kyrgyz Republic shall be elected
for a term of five years.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 58
1. The following [powers] belong within the authority
the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic:
10) Expression of no confidence in the Government
of the Kyrgyz Republic by the majority of no less than
two thirds of votes of the total number of Deputies
in cases provided by the Constitution.
Article 72
3. The Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic may, as
a result of considerations of the annual report of the
Prime Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic, by the initiative
of a majority of the total number of Deputies of the
Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic, consider the
matter of expressing no confidence in the Government
of the Kyrgyz Republic.
4. A resolution on expressing no confidence in the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic is adopted by a majority
of no less than two thirds of votes of the total number of Deputies of the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz
Republic.
6. After the expression of no confidence in the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic the President of the
Kyrgyz Republic has the right to decide to dissolve
the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic or to disagree
with the decision of the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz
Republic.
7. In the event that the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic within three months adopts a vote of no
confidence in the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic once more, the President of the Kyrgyz Republic
declares the dismissal of the Government of the Kyrgyz
Republic or dissolves the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz
Republic.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 46
6. The President of the Kyrgyz Republic:
3) in cases provided by this Constitution dissolves
the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic.

Legislative Assembly of Kyrgyzstan (Jogorku Kenesh)

Article 72
3. The Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic may, as
a result of considerations of the annual report of the
Prime Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic, by the initiative of a majority of the total number of Deputies of
the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic, consider
the matter of expressing no confidence in the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic.
4. A resolution on expressing no confidence in the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic is adopted by a majority
of no less than two thirds of votes of the total number of
Deputies of the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic.
6. After the expression of no confidence in the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic the President of the Kyrgyz
Republic has the right to decide to dissolve the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic or to disagree with the
decision of the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic.
7. In the event that the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic within three months adopts a vote of no
confidence in the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic once more, the President of the Kyrgyz Republic
declares the dismissal of the Government of the Kyrgyz
Republic or dissolves the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz
Republic.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The president issues decrees that have the force
of law.
Article 47
1. The President of the Kyrgyz Republic issues decrees
and orders.
2. Decrees and orders of the President of the Kyrgyz
Republic must be executed on the entire territory of the
Kyrgyz Republic.
3. Decrees issued by the President of the Kyrgyz Republic while exercising [his] legislative powers in correspondence with sub-point 6 of point 5 of Article 46 of the
Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic have the power of
law.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority vote is required to override a presidential veto. A four-fifths majority is
needed to override a presidential veto on a constitutional amendment.
Article 66
1. A law adopted by the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz
Republic is submitted to the President of the Kyrgyz
Republic for signature within one month.
2. The President of the Kyrgyz Republic signs the law or
returns it with his objections to the Jogorku Kenesh of
the Kyrgyz Republic for a another consideration within

381
one month of receiving the law. A law may be reconsidered by the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic no earlier than six months after it was received with
objections of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic. This
rule does not apply if the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz
Republic agrees with the objections of the President of
the Kyrgyz Republic. In case of agreement of the Jogorku
Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic with the wording proposed by the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, the law
is to be signed by the President of the Kyrgyz Republic within the time period provided by point 2 of this
Article.
3. If during the re-consideration the law is approved in
the formerly adopted wording by a majority of no less
than two thirds of votes of the total number of Deputies,
it is to be signed by the President of the Kyrgyz Republic
within one month of the receipt.
4. A law returned by the President of the Kyrgyz Republic for a re-consideration indicated in point 6 of Article
65 [related to constitutional amendments] of this Constitution may be re-considered by the Jogorku Kenesh
no earlier than after one year. This rule does not apply
if the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic decides to
agree with the objections of the President of the Kyrgyz
Republic. In case of agreement of the Jogorku Kenesh
of the Kyrgyz Republic with the wording proposed by
the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, the law is to be
signed by the President of the Kyrgyz Republic within
the time period provided by point 2 of this article.
5. If during the re-consideration taking place no earlier
than after one year, the law indicated in point 6 of
Article 65 of this Constitution is adopted in the previous
wording by a majority of no less than four fifths of the
votes of the total number of the Deputies of the Jogorku
Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic, it is to be signed by the
President of the Kyrgyz Republic within one month.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 81
3. The Constitutional Court of the Kyrgyz Republic:
1) Deems laws and other normative legal acts unconstitutional in the event they contradict the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. The legislature is prohibited from initiating
legislation related to taxation, government expenditures, government revenues, and government
financial obligations.
Article 65
5. Changes to the law on the stated budget, draft
laws on the introduction or cancellation of taxes, the
exemption from their payment, on changes of the state

382
financial obligations, other draft laws providing for the
increase in expenses covered from the state budget, as
well as the decrease in income can be introduced to the
Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic and adopted
only with the consent of the Government of the
Kyrgyz Republic.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The president can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
No. The legislature is dependent on the executive
for the resources that finance its own operations.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Formally, legislators are immune, but in practice, this right is not consistently observed. For
example, an opposition member of parliament,
Emil Aliyev, was arrested in July 2003 on embezzlement charges.
Article 56
4. A Deputy of the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic enjoys the right to immunity. He cannot be subjected to persecution for opinions expressed in connection with the activity of a Deputy or for the results of
voting in the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic.
A Deputy may not be detained or arrested, subjected to
search or body search, except for cases when caught at
a crime scene. Bringing a Deputy to a criminal as well
as administrative responsibility imposed according to a
court procedure is only permitted with the consent of
the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 54
2. The Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic consists
of 75 Deputies who are elected for five years from singlemandate territorial electoral districts.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can amend the constitution
with a two-thirds majority vote.
Article 96
1. Changes and amendments to this Constitution are
adopted by a referendum called by the President of the
Kyrgyz Republic.

Legislative Assembly of Kyrgyzstan (Jogorku Kenesh)

2. Changes and amendments may be adopted by the
Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic upon proposal
of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, [by] a majority of the total number of Deputies of the Jogorku
Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic, or on the initiative of no
less than 300 thousand voters.
3. Proposals concerning introduction of changes and
amendments to the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic are considered by the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic taking into account the conclusion of the
Constitutional Court of the Kyrgyz Republic no earlier
than three months and no later than six months from
the day of presentation of the proposal to the Jogorku
Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic.
4. The text of the draft law on the introduction of
changes and amendments to the Constitution of the
Kyrgyz Republic may not be changed in the course of its
discussion by the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic.
Article 97
1. Changes and amendments to this Constitution are
considered adopted by the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic if no less than two thirds of votes of the
total number of Deputies of the Jogorku Kenesh of the
Kyrgyz Republic voted for them.
2. A proposal which has not been adopted may be submitted to the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic for
another consideration no earlier than after one year.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is required for presidential war declarations with the common exception for cases of foreign invasion. In the event of
aggression the president can declare war and then
seek retroactive legislative approval.
Article 46
6. The President of the Kyrgyz Republic:
8) The President of the Kyrgyz Republic declares
universal or partial mobilization (of troops); shall
announce the status of troops in the event of aggression or direct threat of aggression to the Kyrgyz
Republic, and shall promptly submit this matter for
the consideration of the Legislative Assembly; and
declares the state of war, in the interests of the defense
of the country and the safety of its citizens, and shall
promptly submit this matter for the consideration of
the Legislative Assembly.
Article 58
1. The following [powers] belong within the authority
the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic:
23) Decision on matters of war and peace; imposition
of martial law, declaration of a state of war, confirmation or repeal of the decrees of the President of the
Kyrgyz Republic concerning that matter.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.

Legislative Assembly of Kyrgyzstan (Jogorku Kenesh)

383

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

international treaties.
Article 46
3. The President of the Kyrgyz Republic:
1) directs the foreign policy of the Kyrgyz Republic;
2) conducts negotiations and signs the international
treaties of the Kyrgyz Republic;
3) signs instruments of ratification.
Article 58
1. Powers of the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic
shall be as follows:
21) to ratify and denounce international treaties
except in the cases provided by Article 48 of this Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.
Article 58
1. The following [powers] belong within the authority
the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic:
27) Issuance of acts on amnesty.

12) election, upon nomination by the President of

the Kyrgyz Republic, of the Chairman of the Supreme
Court of the Kyrgyz Republic, their deputies, and the
judges of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Economic Court of the Kyrgyz Republic.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the chairman of the
National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic.
Article 46
2. The President of the Kyrgyz Republic:
4) Appoints with the consent of the Jogorku Kenesh
of the Kyrgyz Republic the Chairman of the National
Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic; according to the proposal of the Chairman of the National Bank of the
Kyrgyz Republic appoints the deputies of the Chairman and members of the Board of the National Bank
of the Kyrgyz Republic; releases them from office.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the

operation of the public media.

No. The president has the power of pardon.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Article 46
4. The President of the Kyrgyz Republic:
4) Grants pardon.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislature, on the proposal of the president, elects the chairman and judges of the Constitutional Court, the chairman and judges of the
Supreme Court, and the judges of the Supreme Economic Court.
Article 46
2. The President of the Kyrgyz Republic:
1) Presents to the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz
Republic the candidates for the election to the post
of the Chairman of the Constitutional Court of the
Kyrgyz Republic, his deputy and judges of the Constitutional Court of the Kyrgyz Republic;
2) Presents to the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz
Republic the candidates for the election to the post
of the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Kyrgyz Republic, his deputies and judges of the Supreme
Court of the Kyrgyz Republic.
Article 58
1. The following [powers] belong within the authority
the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic:
11) election, upon nomination by the President of
the Kyrgyz Republic, of the Chairman of the Constitutional Court of the Kyrgyz Republic, his deputy,
and the judges of the Constitutional Court of the
Kyrgyz Republic;

Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session ten

months each year.
Article 62
1. Sessions of the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic are carried out in the form of a sitting and are conducted once a year, beginning the first working day of
September and ending the last working day of June of
the following year.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
Yes.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

384

National Assembly of Laos (Sapha Heng Xat)

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF LAOS (SAPHA HENG XAT )

Expert consultant: Martin Stuart-Fox
Score: .28
Influence over
executive (1/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)
X

Specified
powers (0/8)

Institutional
capacity (3/6)

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

18. all elected

23. pardon
24. judiciary

X
X
X

25. central bank

X

The National Assembly (Sapha Heng Xat) of Laos, as

currently constituted, was provided for in the 1991
constitution. The document calls for a unicameral legislature that elects the president. In practice, Laos is ruled by the sole legal political party,
the communist Lao Peoples Revolutionary Party
(LPRP). As in most other Soviet-type systems, the
party vets candidates for election to the legislature,
it is the fount of all legislation, and its leader is the
president of the country.
The legislatures role is negligible. Effective lawmaking authority rests with the LPRP. The National
Assembly has virtually no influence over the executive. It has some institutional autonomy. In practice, it does not enjoy any of the specified powers
examined in this survey. It has a bit of institutional
capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. The legislature cannot remove the president.
Formally, it can remove the prime minister with
a vote of no confidence. In practice, it would
be unthinkable for the legislature to vote no
confidence in the government without explicit
direction from the LPRP.

26. media

Article 61
The National Assembly may pass a vote of no confidence in the government or any member of the government if the National Assembly Standing Committee or one-fourth of the total number of the National
Assembly members raise the question.
Within twenty-four hours after the vote of no confidence in the government by the National Assembly,
the President of state has the right to bring the no confidence question to the National Assembly for reconsideration. The second consideration must be held within
the forty-eight hours interval from the first consideration. If the new vote of no confidence in the government is passed the government must resign.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Ministers may serve simultaneously in the legislature.
3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
No. Formally, the legislature has the right to interpellate officials from the executive, but hearings
are not regularly held.
Article 50
Members of the National Assembly have the right
to interpellate the members of the government, the
President of the Peoples Supreme Court and the Public
Prosecutor-General.

National Assembly of Laos (Sapha Heng Xat)

Organisations or persons interpellated must give verbal
or written answers at the National Assembly session.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister
with the approval of the legislature.
Article 53
The President of state has the following rights and
duties:
3. To appoint or remove the Prime Minister and the
members of the government with the approval or resolution of no confidence of the National Assembly.
Article 59
The Prime Minister is appointed by the President of
state with the approval of the National Assembly.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. Formally, the president makes ministerial
appointments and the National Assembly must
confirm them, but in practice, the legislature
merely rubber-stamps the candidates selected by
the LPRP.
Article 40
The National Assembly has the following rights and
duties:
6. To consider and approve the appointment or removal
of the members of the government on the recommendation of the President of State.
Article 53
The President of state has the following rights and
duties:
3. To appoint or remove the Prime Minister and the
members of the government with the approval or resolution of no confidence of the National Assembly.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. Formally, the National Assembly elects the
president, but in practice, its decision is entirely

385

predetermined by the LPRP leadership, and the

National Assembly plays no meaningful role.
Article 40
The National Assembly has the following rights and
duties:
5. To elect or remove the President of state and the
Vice- President of state on the recommendation of the
National Assembly Standing Committee.
Article 54
The President of state is elected by the National Assembly with two-thirds of the votes of all members of the
National Assembly attending the session.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. Formally, the legislature can vote no confidence in the government. In practice, it would be
unthinkable for the legislature to vote no confidence in the government.
Article 61
The National Assembly may pass a vote of no confidence in the government or any member of the government if the National Assembly Standing Committee or one-fourth of the total number of the National
Assembly members raise the question.
Within twenty-four hours after the vote of no confidence in the government by the National Assembly,
the President of state has the right to bring the no confidence question to the National Assembly for reconsideration. The second consideration must be held within
the forty-eight hours interval from the first consideration. If the new vote of no confidence in the government is passed the government must resign.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.
11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The president and the government issue
decrees that have the force of law.
Article 53
The President of state has the following rights and
duties:
2. To issue state decrees and state acts on the recommendation of the National Assembly Standing Committee.
Article 57
The government has the following rights and duties:
4. To issue decrees and decisions on the management of
socio-economic, scientific and technical fields; national
defence and security; and foreign affairs.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto

386

power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
with a majority vote. It merits note, however, that
bills are drawn up and approved by the LPRP before
being submitted to the legislature.
Article 46
Laws already adopted by the National Assembly must
be promulgated by the President of state not later
than thirty days after their endorsement. During this
period, the President of state has the right to request
the National Assembly to reconsider such laws. If the
National Assembly affirms to adhere to its previous decision in reconsidering such laws, the President of state
must promulgate them within fifteen days.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. Formally, there is no judicial review and the
legislatures laws are supreme, but in practice, the
laws are in no respect the work of the National
Assembly. Rather, they are the products of the
LPRPs decisions.

National Assembly of Laos (Sapha Heng Xat)

Article 51
Members of the National Assembly shall not be prosecuted in court or detained without the approval of
the National Assembly or the National Assembly Standing Committee during the two sessions of the National
Assembly. In cases involving gross and urgent offenses,
the organisations detaining members of the National
Assembly must immediately report to the National
Assembly or to the National Assembly Standing Committee during the two sessions of the National Assembly for consideration and decisions concerning them.
Inquiries and interrogations shall not cause the absence
of prosecuted members from the National Assembly
session.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected. It
merits mention, however, that in legislative elections voters choose from among a narrow range of
LPRP-approved candidates.
Article 41
Members of the National Assembly are elected by the
Lao citizens in accordance with the provisions stipulated in the law.

Article 40
The National Assembly has the following rights and
duties:
12. To supervise the observance of the Constitution and
laws.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.

Article 48
The National Assembly Standing Committee has the
following rights and duties:
2. To interpret and explain the provisions of the constitution and laws.

No. Formally, the legislature can change the constitution with a two-thirds majority vote, but in
practice, it would be unthinkable for the legislature to change the constitution without the LPRPs
instructions.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.

Article 40
The National Assembly has the following rights and
duties:
1. To establish, endorse or amend the Constitution.

Yes. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in

all policy jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The executive can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
No. The legislature depends on the government
and the LPRP for the resources that finance its own
operation.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune.

Article 80
Only the National Assembly of the Lao Peoples Democratic Republic has the right to amend the Constitution.
The amendment to the Constitution requires the votes
of approval cast by at least two-thirds of the total number of the National Assembly members.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. Formally, the legislature has responsibility for
declaring war, but in practice, the power to declare
war rests exclusively with the LPRP.
Article 40
The National Assembly has the following rights and
duties:
11. To decide on matters of war or peace.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.

National Assembly of Laos (Sapha Heng Xat)

No. Formally, and in a peculiar constitutional formulation, both the legislature and the president are
granted virtually identical responsibility for ratifying treaties; in practice, the power rests with the
president and the LPRP.
Article 40
The National Assembly has the following rights and
duties:
10. To decide on the ratification or abolition of treaties
and agreements signed with foreign countries in accordance with international law and regulations.
Article 53
The President of state has the following rights and
duties:
11. To declare on the ratification or abolition of all
treaties and agreements signed with foreign countries.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Formally, the legislature has the power to grant
amnesty, but in practice, the president and the
LPRP, not the National Assembly, have the power
to grant amnesty.
Article 40
The National Assembly has the following rights and
duties:
9. To decide on granting general amnesties.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 53
The President of state has the following rights and
duties:
9. To decide on granting pardons.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. Formally, the National Assembly Standing
Committee appoints the president and vice president of the Supreme Court and the judges of the
peoples courts, but in practice, all personnel decisions are made by the LPRP.
Article 40
The National Assembly has the following rights and
duties:
7. To elect or remove the President of the Peoples
Supreme Court and the Public Prosecutor-General on
the recommendation of the National Assembly Standing committee.
Article 67
The Vice-President of the Peoples Supreme Court and
the judges of the peoples courts at all levels are
appointed or removed by the National Assembly Standing Committee.

387

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The governor of the Bank of Laos is appointed
by the president, on the recommendation of the
prime minister, and with the approval of the
National Assembly.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The LPRP tightly controls all media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
No. The National Assembly meets in two brief ordinary sessions each year. The National Assembly
Standing Committee, however, is permanently in
session.
Article 43
The National Assembly convenes its ordinary session twice a year at the summoning of the National
Assembly Standing Committee. The National Assembly Standing Committee may convene an extraordinary session of the National Assembly if it deems
necessary.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Through the elections of 1992, 1997, 2002,
and 2006, the legislature retained a small but
significant core of highly experienced members.
It merits note, however, that membership does
not amount to genuine experience in legislative
affairs. Most members primary jobs are as district and provincial-level administrators, and their
membership in the National Assembly is more of
an honorary affiliation than a substantial occupation.

388

Parliament of Latvia (Saeima)

PARLIAMENT OF LATVIA (SAEIMA)

Expert consultants: Daunis Auers, Stephen Bloom, Janis Ikstens, Ivars Indans, Katia Papagianni
Score: .78
Influence over
executive (7/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Institutional
autonomy (6/9)

Specified
powers (7/8)

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

26. media

18. all elected

Institutional
capacity (5/6)
X
X

X
X
X

The Parliament (Saeima) of Latvia was established

in the constitution of 1922. From 1940 to 1991
Latvia was incorporated into the Soviet Union and
its parliament submerged. In 1990, near the end of
the Soviet period, elections for the Supreme Soviet
of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic brought
many new, independence-minded politicians of
various political stripes into the legislature and
marked the end of communist-party control of the
body. Shortly after the dissolution of the USSR,
Latvia formally restored the 1922 constitution.
In 1996 the Constitutional Court was created to
review the constitutionality of laws. Prior to 1996
the legislatures laws were supreme and not subject
to judicial review.
The legislature is powerful. It scores high in
terms of influence over the executive well on the
other indicators of power. The major exception to
the legislatures preeminence is the governments
power to issue decrees that have the force of law
between legislative sessions.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can remove the prime minister
with a vote of no confidence. It can remove the

president from office by a two-thirds majority vote

of its total membership.
Article 51
Upon the proposal of not less than half of all of the
members of the Parliament, the Parliament may decide,
in closed session and with a majority vote of not less
than two-thirds of all of its members, to remove the
President from office.
Article 59
In order to fulfill their duties, the Prime Minister and
other Ministers must have the confidence of the Parliament and they shall be accountable to the Parliament
for their actions. If the Parliament expresses no confidence in the Prime Minister, the entire Government
shall resign. If there is an expression of no confidence
in an individual Minister, then the Minister shall resign
and another person shall be invited to replace them by
the Prime Minister.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Legislators may serve simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 63
Ministers, even if they are not members of the Parliament, and responsible government officials authorised
by a Minister, have the right to attend sittings of the
Parliament and its committees and to submit additions
and amendments to draft laws.

Parliament of Latvia (Saeima)

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 27
The Parliament shall have the right to submit to the
Prime Minister or to an individual Minister requests
and questions which either they, or a responsible government official duly authorized by them, must answer.
The Prime Minister or any Minister shall furnish the
relevant documents and enactments requested by the
Parliament or by any of its committees.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.

389
Article 35
The President shall be elected by the Parliament for a
term of four years.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 59
In order to fulfill their duties, the Prime Minister and
other Ministers must have the confidence of the Parliament and they shall be accountable to the Parliament
for their actions. If the Parliament expresses no confidence in the Prime Minister, the entire Government
shall resign. If there is an expression of no confidence
in an individual Minister, then the Minister shall resign
and another person shall be invited to replace them by
the Prime Minister.

Yes. The legislature can appoint parliamentary

committees to investigate the executive.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.

Article 26
The Parliament shall appoint parliamentary investigatory committees for specified matters if not less than
one-third of its members request it.

No. The president can dissolve the legislature after

securing approval for the move in a popular referendum.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. The president appoints as prime minister the
candidate who enjoys the support of the legislature.
Article 56
The Government shall be formed by the person who
has been invited by the President to do so.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers on the recommendation of the prime minister, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 55
The Government shall be composed of the Prime Minister and the Ministers chosen by the Prime Minister.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The legislature elects the president.

Article 48
The President shall be entitled to propose the dissolution of the Parliament. Following this proposal a
national referendum shall be held. If in the referendum
more than half of the votes are cast in favor of dissolution, the Parliament shall be considered dissolved,
new elections called, and such elections held no later
than two months after the date of the dissolution of the
Parliament.
Article 50
If in the referendum more than half of the votes are cast
against the dissolution of the Parliament, then the President shall be deemed to be removed from office, and the
Parliament shall elect a new President to serve for the
remaining term of office of the President so removed.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The government can issue decrees that have
the force of law between sessions of parliament.
The decrees lapse if they are not subsequently
approved by the legislature. The executive also
issues regulations specifying the implementation
of laws.
Article 81
During the time between sessions of the Parliament the
Government has the right, if necessary and if not able
to be postponed, to issue regulations which have the
force of law. Such regulations may not amend the law
regarding elections of the Parliament, laws governing
the court system and court proceedings, the Budget and
rights pertaining to the Budget, as well as laws adopted

390
during the term of the current Parliament, and they
may not pertain to amnesty, state taxes, customs duties,
and loans and they shall cease to be in force unless submitted to the Parliament not later than three days after
the next session of the Parliament has been convened.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote of its present members.
Article 71
Within seven days of the adoption of a law by the Parliament, the President, by means of a written and reasoned request to the Chairperson of the Parliament,
may require that a law be reconsidered. If the Parliament does not amend the law, the President then may
not raise objections a second time.
Article 72
The President has the right to suspend the proclamation of a law for a period of two months. The President
shall suspend the proclamation of a law if so requested
by not less than one-third of the members of the Parliament. This right may be exercised by the President, or
by one-third of the members of the Parliament, within
seven days of the adoption of the law by the Parliament.
The law thus suspended shall be put to a national referendum if so requested by not less than one-tenth of
the electorate. If no such request is received during the
aforementioned two month period, the law shall then
be proclaimed after the expiration of such period. A
national referendum shall not take place, however, if
the Parliament again votes on the law and not less than
three-quarters of all members of the Parliament vote for
the adoption of the law.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 85
In Latvia, there shall be a Constitutional Court, which,
within its jurisdiction as provided for by law, shall
review cases concerning the compliance of laws with
the Constitution, as well as other matters regarding
which jurisdiction is conferred upon it by law. The Constitutional Court shall have the right to declare laws or
other enactments or parts thereof invalid. The appointment of judges to the Constitutional Court shall be
confirmed by the Parliament for the term provided for
by law, by secret ballot with a majority of the votes of
not less than fifty-one members of the Parliament.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.

Parliament of Latvia (Saeima)

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power
to impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto, here
expressed as apprehended in the act of committing a crime. There is another exception to immunity, this one utterly eccentric: Legislators can also
be arrested for disseminating defamatory statements which they know to be false, or defamatory
statements about private or family life. This rule
has no effect in practice.
Article 28
Members of the Parliament may not be called to
account by any judicial, administrative or disciplinary
process in connection with their voting or their views
as expressed during the execution of their duties. Court
proceedings may be brought against members of the
Parliament if they, albeit in the course of performing
parliamentary duties, disseminate:
1) defamatory statements which they know to be false,
or
2) defamatory statements about private or family life.
Article 29
Members of the Parliament shall not be arrested, nor
shall their premises be searched, nor shall their personal liberty be restricted in any way without the consent of the Parliament. Members of the Parliament may
be arrested if apprehended in the act of committing a
crime. The Presidium shall be notified within twentyfour hours of the arrest of any member of the Parliament; the Presidium shall raise the matter at the next
sitting of the Parliament for decision as to whether the
member shall continue to be held in detention or be
released. When the Parliament is not in session, pending the opening of a session, the Presidium shall decide
whether the member of the Parliament shall remain in
detention.
Article 30
Without the consent of the Parliament, criminal prosecution may not be commenced and administrative fines
may not be levied against its members.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.

Parliament of Latvia (Saeima)

Article 6
The Parliament shall be elected in general, equal, direct
and secret elections, based on proportional representation.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can amend the constitution in
multiple readings with a two-thirds majority vote.
Article 76
The Parliament may amend the Constitution in sittings
at which at least two-thirds of the members of the Parliament participate. The amendments shall be passed in
three readings by a majority of not less than two-thirds
of the members present.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for presidential war declarations with the common exception for cases of foreign invasion. In the case that
Latvia is invaded, the president may declare war
and seek retroactive legislative approval.
Article 43
The President shall declare war on the basis of a decision
of the Parliament.
Article 44
The President has the right to take whatever steps
are necessary for the military defence of the State
should another state declare war on Latvia or an enemy
invade its borders. Concurrently and without delay, the
President shall convene the Parliament, which shall
decide as to the declaration and commencement of
war.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 68
(1) All international agreements, which settle matters
that may be decided by the legislative process, shall
require ratification by the Parliament.
(3) Membership of Latvia in the European Union shall
be decided by a national referendum, which is proposed
by the Parliament.
(4) Substantial changes in the terms regarding the
membership of Latvia in the European Union shall be
decided by a national referendum if such referendum
is requested by at least one-half of the members of the
Parliament.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.
Article 45
The President has the right to grant clemency to criminals against whom judgment of the court has come

391
into legal effect. The extent of, and procedures for, the
utilisation of this right shall be set out in a specific law.
Amnesty is granted by the Parliament.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon, here
expressed as clemency.
Article 45
The President has the right to grant clemency to criminals against whom judgment of the court has come
into legal effect. The extent of, and procedures for, the
utilisation of this right shall be set out in a specific law.
Amnesty is granted by the Parliament.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislatures consent is required to approve
judicial appointments.
Article 84
Judicial appointments shall be confirmed by the Parliament and they shall be irrevocable.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
Yes. The parliament appoints the governor of the
Bank of Latvia.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
Yes. The legislature has a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature is regularly in session with the
exception of brief recesses during winter holidays
and the summer.
Article 19
The Presidium shall convene sessions of the Parliament
and schedule regular and extraordinary sittings.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes. Each legislator is provided funds to hire personnel.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No. Some, but not all, legislators hire a staff member with policy expertise.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.

392

Parliament of Latvia (Saeima)

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.

Yes. Despite considerable instability in the party

system and a fairly high rate of turnover in membership, the legislature retains a cohort of highly
experienced members.

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF LEBANON (MAJLIS AL-NUWAAB)

Expert consultants: Mona Khalaf, Amer K. Mohsen, Marwan Sakr, Nadim Shehadi, Abdulkader Sinno
Score: .50
Influence over
executive (3/8)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

Specified
powers (4/8)

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no confidence

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

26. media
X

The National Assembly (Majlis al-Nuwaab) of

Lebanon was established in the 1926 constitution,
which called for a bicameral legislature consisting
of an upper house, the Senate, and a lower house,
the Chamber of Deputies. A constitutional amendment in 1927 merged the two houses to form
a unicameral assembly. In 1943 Lebanon gained
independence from France. From 1975 to 1989
the legislature was sidelined as Lebanon endured
a civil war that was sparked by sectarian violence
and that triggered intervention by foreign powers. Israel held the southern part of the country,
while Syria established a presence in some other
areas. Legislative elections were suspended during
the conflict; the legislature elected in 1972 simply
renewed its own term every two years. By 1990 stability had returned, imposed by a Syrian-backed
government. Legislative elections, the first since
1972, resumed in 1992. In 2000 Israel withdrew
from southern Lebanon. A controversial constitutional amendment in 2004 extended the presidents term by three years but did not directly affect
legislative power. In 2005 Syrian troops withdrew
from Lebanon under mounting international pressure. In 2006 violence returned, as Israel once again
invaded southern Lebanon.

The National Assembly, which is sometimes

referred to as the Assembly of Deputies or the
Chamber of Deputies (the last is used in the translation of the constitution excerpted below), has significant authority. Its influence over the executive
is not expansive, although its members can serve in
government, it elects the president, and it can vote
no confidence in the government. The legislature
must contend with executive decree and dissolution powers but nevertheless enjoys notable institutional autonomy. It can, for example, override
a presidential veto with a majority vote. The legislature also possesses some specified powers and
prerogatives and some institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. The impeachment of the president or the
prime minister requires the involvement of the
Supreme Council, a special body established to try
impeachment cases. The legislature can remove the
prime minister with a vote of no confidence.

National Assembly of Lebanon (Majlis al-Nuwaab)

393

Article 60
(1) While performing his functions, the President of
the Republic may not be held responsible except when
he violates the constitution or in the case of high treason.
(2) However, his responsibility in respect of ordinary
crimes is subject to the ordinary laws. For such crimes,
as well as for violation of the constitution and for high
treason, he may not be impeached except by a majority
of two thirds of the total membership of the Chamber
of Deputies. He is to be tried by the Supreme Council
provided for in Article 80. The functions of Public Prosecutor of the Supreme Council are performed by a judge
appointed by the Supreme Council in plenary session.

members of the Chamber or from persons outside the

Chamber.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
No. Hearings with executive branch officials testifying before the legislature are rarely held.
4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.

Article 37
Every Deputy has the absolute right to raise the question of no-confidence in the government during ordinary or extraordinary sessions. Discussion of and voting
on such a proposal may not take place until at least five
days after submission to the secretariat of the Chamber
and its communication to the ministers concerned.

No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive.

Article 69
(1) The Government is considered resigned in the following circumstances:
f. when it loses the confidence of the Chamber of
Deputies based on the Chambers initiative or based
on the Councils initiative to gain the Chambers confidence.
(2) Ministers are to be dismissed by a Decree signed
by the President and the Prime Minister in accordance
with Article 65 of the constitution.

No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.

Article 70
(1) The Chamber of Deputies has the right to impeach
the Prime Minister and Ministers for high treason or for
serious neglect of their duties. The Decision to impeach
may not be taken except by a majority of two thirds of
the total membership of the Chamber.
(2) A special law is to be issued to determine the conditions of the civil responsibility of the Prime Minister
and individual Ministers.
Article 71
The impeached Prime Minister or Minister are tried by
the Supreme Council.
Article 72
A Prime Minister or Minister leaves office as soon as
the Decision of impeachment concerning him is issued.
If he resigns, his resignation does not prevent judicial
proceedings from being instituted or continued against
him.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).

6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

No. The president appoints the prime minister. It
bears note, however, that the presidents decision
must take into account the wishes of the leading
parties in parliament.
Article 53
2. The President designates the Prime Minister in consultation with the President of the Chamber of Deputies
based on parliamentary consultations which are binding and the content of which the President formally
discloses to the Prime Minister.
3. The President alone issues the Decree which designates the Prime Minister.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers on the recommendation of the prime minister, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 53
(4) The President issues, in agreement with the Prime
Minister, the decree appointing the Cabinet and the
decrees accepting the resignation of Ministers.

Yes. Legislators may serve simultaneously in ministerial positions.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.

Article 28
A Deputy may also occupy a ministerial position. Ministers, all or in part, may be selected from among the

Yes. The legislature elects the president. In the

recent past, the Syrian government has also had
a say in the presidential election.

394

National Assembly of Lebanon (Majlis al-Nuwaab)

Article 49
(2) The President of the Republic shall be elected by
secret ballot and by a two thirds majority of the Chamber of Deputies. After a first ballot, an absolute majority
shall be sufficient.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Article 56
(2) The President issues decrees and requests their promulgation; he has the right to ask the Council of Ministers to review any Decision that the Chamber has taken
within fifteen days of the decisions transmission to the
Presidency. If the Council of Ministers insists on the
Decision or if the time limit passes without the Decree
being issued or returned, the Decision or Decree is considered legally operative and must be promulgated.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the

government.
Article 37
Every Deputy has the absolute right to raise the question of no-confidence in the government during ordinary or extraordinary sessions.
Article 69
(1) The Government is considered resigned in the following circumstances:
f. when it loses the confidence of the Chamber of
Deputies based on the Chambers initiative or based
on the Councils initiative to gain the Chambers confidence.
(2) Ministers are to be dismissed by a Decree signed
by the President and the Prime Minister in accordance
with Article 65 of the constitution.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The Council of Ministers, at the presidents
request, can dissolve the legislature.
Article 55
(1) The President of the Republic may, in accordance
with the conditions stipulated in Articles 65 and 77
of this constitution, ask the Council of Ministers to
dissolve the Chamber of Deputies before the expiration of its mandate. If the Council, based on this
request, decides to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies,
the President issues the Decree dissolving it, and in this
case, the electoral bodies meet as provided for in Article 25, and the new Chamber is to be called to convene within fifteen days after the proclamation of the
election.
Article 65
Executive authority is vested in the Council of Ministers. It is the authority to which the armed forces are
subject. Among the powers that it exercises are the following:
(4) It dissolves the Chamber of Deputies upon the
request of the President of the Republic if the Chamber of Deputies, for no compelling reasons, fails to
meet during one of its regular periods and fails to meet
throughout two successive extraordinary periods, each
longer than one month, or if the Chamber returns an
annual budget plan with the aim or paralyzing the Government. This right cannot be exercised a second time
if it is for the same reasons which led to the dissolution
of the Chamber the first time.

No. The president issues decrees that have the force

of law.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote of its total membership.
Article 57
The President of the Republic, after consultation with
the Council of Ministers, has the right to request the
reconsideration of a law once during the period prescribed for its promulgation. This request may not be
refused. When the President exercises this right, he is
not required to promulgate this law until it has been
reconsidered and approved by an absolute majority of
all the members legally composing the Chamber. If
the time limits pass without the law being issued or
returned, the law is considered legally operative and
must be promulgated.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Council can review the
constitutionality of laws.
Article 19
A Constitutional Council is established to supervise the
constitutionality of laws and to arbitrate conflicts that
arise from parliamentary and presidential elections. The
President, the President of the Parliament, the Prime
Minister, along with any ten Members of Parliament,
have the right to consult this Council on matters that
relate to the constitutionality of laws. The officially recognized heads of religious communities have the right
to consult this Council only on laws relating to personal
status, the freedom of belief and religious practice, and
the freedom of religious education.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.

National Assembly of Lebanon (Majlis al-Nuwaab)

395

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power
to impound funds appropriated by the legislature.

Article 77
The constitution may also be revised upon the request
of the Chamber of Deputies. In this case the following procedures are to be observed: During an ordinary
session and at the request of at least ten of its members, the Chamber of Deputies may recommend, by a
majority of two thirds of the total members lawfully
composing the Chamber, the revision of the constitution. However, the articles and the questions referred
to in the recommendation must be clearly defined and
specified. The President of the Chamber then transmits
the recommendation to the Government requesting it
to prepare a draft law relating thereto. If the Government approves the recommendation of the Chamber
by a majority of two thirds, it must prepare the draft
amendment and submit it to the Chamber within four
months; if it does not agree, it shall return the Decision to the Chamber for reconsideration. If the Chamber insists upon the necessity of the amendment by a
majority of three fourths of the total members lawfully
composing the Chamber, the President of the Republic
has then either to accede to the Chambers recommendation or to ask the Council of Ministers to dissolve
the Chamber and to hold new elections within three
months. If the new Chamber insists on the necessity
of amending the constitution, the Government must
yield and submit the draft amendment within four
months.

Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound

funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,
including control over members perquisites.
Article 48
The remuneration of members of the Chamber is determined by law.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislators are immune only while the legislature is in session.
Article 39
No member of the Chamber may be prosecuted because
of ideas and opinions expressed during the period of his
mandate.
Article 40
No member of the Chamber may, during the sessions,
be prosecuted or arrested for a criminal offense without the permission of the Chamber, except when he is
caught in the act.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 22
With the election of the first Parliament on a national,
non-confessional basis, a Senate is established in which
all the religious communities are represented.
Article 24
(1) The Chamber of Deputies is composed of elected
members; their number and the method of their election is determined by the electoral laws in effect.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature alone can change the constitution. The legislature can propose a constitutional
amendment with a two-thirds majority vote. If the
government returns the bill proposing the amendment for reconsideration, the legislature can override the government by a three-fourths majority
vote. If the government still objects, it can dissolve
the legislature. The amendment passes if the new
legislature approves it.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. The Council of Ministers war declarations do
not require legislative approval.
Article 65
Executive authority is vested in the Council of Ministers. It is the authority to which the armed forces are
subject. Among the powers that it exercises are the following:
5. Basic national issues are considered the following: . . . war and peace.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 52
The President of the Republic negotiates international
treaties in coordination with the Prime Minister. These
treaties are not considered ratified except after agreement of the Council of Ministers. They are to be made
known to the Chamber whenever the national interest and security of the state permit. However, treaties
involving the finances of the state, commercial treaties,
and in general treaties that cannot be renounced every
year are not considered ratified until they have been
approved by the Chamber.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

396

National Assembly of Lebanon (Majlis al-Nuwaab)

Yes. The legislature grants general amnesty

through law.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

Article 53
(9) [The president] grants particular pardons by Decree,
but a general amnesty cannot be granted except by a
law.

No. The Council of Ministers, on the recommendation of the minister of finance, appoints the governor of the Central Bank of Lebanon.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 53
(9) [The president] grants particular pardons by Decree,
but a general amnesty cannot be granted except by a
law.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislature appoints five of ten members of
the Constitutional Council and seven of the fifteen
members of the Supreme Council.
Article 19
A Constitutional Council is established to supervise the
constitutionality of laws and to arbitrate conflicts that
arise from parliamentary and presidential elections. The
President, the President of the Parliament, the Prime
Minister, along with any ten Members of Parliament,
have the right to consult this Council on matters that
relate to the constitutionality of laws. The officially recognized heads of religious communities have the right
to consult this Council only on laws relating to personal status, the freedom of belief and religious practice,
and the freedom of religious education. The rules governing the organization, operation, composition, and
modes of appeal of the Council are decided by a special
law.
Article 80
The Supreme Council, whose function is to try Presidents and Ministers, consists of seven deputies elected
by the Chamber of Deputies and of eight of the highest
Lebanese judges, according to their rank in the judicial
hierarchy, or, in case of equal ranks, in the order of
seniority. They meet under the presidency of the judge
of the highest rank. The Decisions of condemnation by
the Supreme Council is rendered by a majority of ten
votes. A special law is to be issued to determine the
procedure to be followed by this Council.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
No. The legislature is in session for only five
months each year.
Article 32
The Chamber meets each year in two ordinary sessions.
The first session opens on the first Tuesday following 15
March and continues until the end of May. The second
session begins on the first Tuesday following 15 Oct;
its meetings is reserved for the discussion of and voting
on the budget before any other work. This session lasts
until the end of the year.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

Parliament of Lesotho

397

PARLIAMENT OF LESOTHO
Expert consultants: Jrgen Elklit, Leonard Letsepe, Chelete Monyane, Roger Southall,
Richard F. Weisfelder
Score: .53
Influence over
executive (8/9)

Institutional
autonomy (4/9)

Specified
powers (1/8)
19. amendments
20. war

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

21. treaties
22. amnesty
23. pardon
24. judiciary

Institutional
capacity (4/6)
X

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

25. central bank

26. media

The Parliament of Lesotho was formally established

in 1966 upon independence from Great Britain. It
consists of an elected lower house, the National
Assembly, and an appointed upper house, the Senate. When the opposition won the first legislative elections in 1970, the ruling Basotho National
Party (BNP) refused to cede power, setting the stage
for a protracted violent struggle. The legislature was
impotent, and the BNP ruled by decree until 1986,
when the military executed a coup and transferred
executive and legislative powers to the monarch. In
1993 the current constitution was adopted, and the
first legislative elections since 1970 were held. The
1990s also witnessed political instability, however,
including military coups, suspension of the constitution, disputes over succession to the throne,
and military intervention from neighboring South
Africa and Botswana. Peaceful legislative elections, in which opposition parties won and were
allowed to hold some seats, were held in 2002 and
2007.
Despite political instability, the legislature manages to exercise some authority. It has broad control over the executive, with powers to elect the
prime minister and remove the government with
a vote of no confidence. The legislatures weakness
is demonstrated in the other measured categories.
Its institutional autonomy is circumscribed by the
prime ministers powers to decree legislation and

dissolve the legislature. With the exception of its

ability to change the constitution, the legislature is
granted none of the specified powers and prerogatives assessed in this survey. It has some institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can remove the prime minister
with a vote of no confidence.
Article 87
(5) The King may, acting in accordance with the advice
of the Council of State, remove the Prime Minister from
office
(a) if a resolution of no confidence in the Government of Lesotho is passed by the National Assembly
and the Prime minister does not within three days
thereafter, either resign from his office or advise a
dissolution of Parliament; or
(b) if at any time between the holding of a general
election to the National Assembly and the date on
which the Assembly first meets thereafter, the King
considers that, in consequence of changes in the
membership of the Assembly resulting from that election, the Prime Minister will no longer be the leader
of the political party or coalition of political parties

398

Parliament of Lesotho
that will command the support of a majority of the
members of the Assembly.

National Assembly immediately before the dissolution

may be appointed to the office of Prime Minister.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.

Yes. Ministers are selected from, and required to

serve simultaneously in, the legislature.
Article 76
(1) A Minister or an Assistant Minister who is a member
of the National Assembly shall be entitled to attend all
meetings of the Senate and to take part in all proceedings thereof but he shall not be regarded as a member
of, or be entitled to vote on any question before, the
Senate; and a Minister or an Assistant Minister who is
a Senator shall be entitled to attend all meetings of the
National Assembly and to take part in all proceedings
thereof but he shall not be regarded as a member of, or
be entitled to vote on any question before, the National
Assembly.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. Legislators question executive branch officials
during weekly question time.
4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can form a commission of
inquiry to investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. The legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. The king is required to appoint as prime minister the candidate who enjoys majority support in
the legislature.
Article 87
(1) There shall be a Prime Minister who shall be
appointed by the King acting in accordance with the
advice of the Council of State.
(2) The King shall appoint as Prime Minister the member of the National Assembly who appears to the Council of State to be the leader of the political party or coalition of political parties that will command the support
of a majority of the members of the National Assembly:
Provided that if occasion arises for making an appointment to the office of Prime Minister while Parliament
stands dissolved, a person who was a member of the

No. The king appoints ministers on the advice of

the prime minister, and the appointments do not
require the legislatures approval.
Article 87
(3) There shall be, in addition to the office of Prime
Minister, such other offices of Minister of the Government of Lesotho (not being less than seven in number
and one of which shall be the office of Deputy Prime
Minister) as may be established by Parliament or, subject to any provision made by Parliament, by the King,
acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister.
(4) The King shall, acting in accordance with the advice
of the Prime Minister, appoint the other Ministers from
among the members of the National Assembly or from
among the Senators who are nominated as Senators by
the King under section 55 of this Constitution:
Provided that if occasion arises for making an appointment to the office of Minister other than Prime Minister while Parliament stands dissolved a person who
immediately before the dissolution was a member of the
National Assembly or such a Senator may be appointed
to the office of Minister.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The country lacks a presidency. The king is the
head of state.
Article 44
(1) There shall be a King of Lesotho who shall be a
constitutional monarch and Head of State.
(2) The King shall do all things that belong to his
office in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution and of all other laws for the time being in
force and shall faithfully comply with the terms of the
oath of the office of King set out in Schedule 1 to this
Constitution.
Article 45
(1) The College of Chiefs may at any time designate,
in accordance with the customary law of Lesotho, the
person (or the persons, in order of prior right) who are
entitled to succeed to the office of King upon the death
of the holder of, or the occurrence of any vacancy in,
that office and if on such death or vacancy, there is
a person who has previously been designated in pursuance of this section and who is capable under the
customary law of Lesotho of succeeding to that office,
that person (or, if there is more than one such person,
that one of them who has been designated as having
the first right to succeed to the office) shall become
King.

Parliament of Lesotho

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can pass a constructive vote
no confidence, meaning that it must designate a
successor prime minister before passing a vote of
no confidence.
Article 83
(4) In the exercise of his powers to dissolve or prorogue
Parliament, the King shall act in accordance with the
advice of the Prime Minister:
Provided that
(b) if the National Assembly passes a resolution of no
confidence in the Government of Lesotho and the
Prime Minister does not within three days thereafter
either resign or advise a dissolution the King may,
acting in accordance with the advice of the Council
of State, dissolve Parliament; and
(5) A resolution of no confidence in the Government
of Lesotho shall not be effective for the purposes of subsection (4)(b) unless it proposes the name of a member
of the National Assembly for the King to appoint in the
place of the Prime Minister.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The king, at the request of the prime minister,
can dissolve the legislature.
Article 83
(1) The King may at any time prorogue or dissolve Parliament.
(2) Subject to the provisions of subsection (3), Parliament, unless sooner dissolved, shall continue for five
years from the date when the two Houses of Parliament
first meet after any dissolution and shall then stand
dissolved.
(3) At any time when Lesotho is at war Parliament may
from time to time extend the period of five years specified in subsection (2) for not more than twelve months
at a time:
Provided that the life of Parliament shall not be
extended under this subsection for more than five years.
(4) In the exercise of his powers to dissolve or prorogue
Parliament, the King shall act in accordance with the
advice of the Prime Minister:
Provided that
(a) if the Prime Minister recommends a dissolution and the King considers that the Government
of Lesotho can be carried on without a dissolution
and that a dissolution would not be in the interests
of Lesotho, he may, acting in accordance with the
advice of the Council of State, refuse to dissolve Parliament;
(b) if the National Assembly passes a resolution of no
confidence in the Government of Lesotho and the
Prime Minister does not within three days thereafter
either resign or advise a dissolution the King may,
acting in accordance with the advice of the Council
of State, dissolve Parliament; and

399
(c) if the office of Prime Minister is vacant and the
King considers that there is no prospect of his being
able within a reasonable time to find a person who is
the leader of a political party or a coalition of political
parties that will command the support of a majority
of the members of the National Assembly, he may,
acting in accordance with the advice of the Council
of State, dissolve Parliament.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The prime minister issues decrees that have the
force of law.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. Formally, the king can refuse to assent to a bill;
in practice, it would be unthinkable for the king to
withhold assent.
Article 78
(1) The power of Parliament to make laws shall be exercisable by bills passed by both Houses of Parliament (or,
in the cases mentioned in section 80 of this Constitution, by the National Assembly) and assented to by the
King.
(2) A bill may originate only in the National Assembly.
(3) When a bill has been passed by the National Assembly it shall be sent to the Senate and
(a) when it has been passed by the Senate and agreement has been reached between the two Houses on
any amendments made to it by the Senate; or
(b) when it is required to be presented under section
80 of this Constitution,
it shall be presented to the King for assent.
(4) When a bill has been presented to the King for
assent in pursuance of subsection (3), he shall signify
that he assents or that he withholds assent.
(5) When a bill that has been duly passed is assented to
in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution
it shall become law and the King shall thereupon cause
it to be published in the Gazette as a law.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The High Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 119
(1) There shall be a High Court which shall have unlimited original jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil
or criminal proceedings and the power to review the
decisions or proceedings of any subordinate or inferior court, court-martial, tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or public administrative

400
functions under any law and such jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred on it by this Constitution or by
or under any other law.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. Once funds are approved through the budgetary process, the executive is not required to
spend them. In fact, the government usually fails to
spend appropriated funds. The problem, however,
is often a matter of capacity rather than deliberate
executive challenge to the legislatures authority.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislators are immune only while they are in
the parliament buildings during a legislative session. They are subject to arrest at other times.
18. All members of the legislature are elected; the
executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the National Assembly are
elected. The largely ceremonial Senate is composed
of appointed members.
Article 55
The Senate shall consist of the twenty-two Principal
Chiefs and eleven other Senators nominated in that
behalf by the King acting in accordance with the advice
of the Council of State.
Article 56
The National Assembly shall consist of eighty members
elected in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
with a majority vote. Amendments to certain specified articles require approval in a popular referendum.
Article 85
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, Parliament
may alter this Constitution.

Parliament of Lesotho
(2) A bill for an Act of Parliament under this section
shall not be passed by Parliament unless it is supported
at the final voting in the National Assembly by the votes
of the majority of all the members of the Assembly and,
having been sent to the Senate, has become a bill that,
apart from this section, may be presented to the King
for his assent under subsection 80(1) or (3) as the case
may be, of this Constitution.
(3) A bill to alter any of the following provisions of this
Constitution, that is to say
(a) this section, sections 1(1) and 2, Chapter II except
sections 18(4) and 24(3), sections 44 to 48 inclusive,
50(1) to (3), 52, 86, 91 (1) to (4), 92, 95, 103, 104, 107,
108, 118(1) and (2), 119(1) to (3), 120(1), (2), (4), and
(5), 121, 123(1), (3), (4), 125, 128, 129, 132, 133 and
sections 154 and 155 in their application to any of
the provisions mentioned in this paragraph; and
(b) sections 37, 38, 54 to 60 inclusive; sections 66,
67, 68, 69(1) and (6), 70, 74, 75(1), 78(1), (2), (3)
and (4), 80(1), (2), and (3), 82(1), 83 and 84; sections
134 to 142 inclusive, 150 and 151 and sections 154
and 155 in their application to any of the provisions
mentioned in this paragraph, shall not be submitted
to the King for his assent unless the bill, not less than
two nor more than six months after its passage by
Parliament, has, in such manner as may be prescribed
by or under an Act of Parliament, been submitted
to the vote of the electors qualified to vote in the
election of the members of the National Assembly,
and the majority of the electors voting have approved
the bill:
Provided that if the bill does not alter any of the provisions mentioned in paragraph (a) and is supported
at the final voting in each House of Parliament by the
votes of no less than two-thirds of all the members of
that House it shall not be necessary to submit the bill
to the vote of the electors.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. There is no provision for the declaration of
war. In times of war, the prime minister can
declare a state of emergency without the legislatures approval. The state of emergency lapses after
fourteen days if it is not subsequently approved by
the legislature.
Article 23
(1) In time of war or other public emergency which
threatens the life of the nation, the Prime Minister may,
acting in accordance with the advice of the Council of
State, by proclamation which shall be published in the
Gazette, declare that a state of emergency exists for the
purposes of this Chapter.
(2) Every declaration of emergency shall lapse at the
expiration of fourteen days, commencing with the day
on which it was made, unless it has in the meantime
been approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.

Parliament of Lesotho
(3) A declaration of emergency may at any time be
revoked by the Prime Minister acting in accordance
with the advice of the Council of State, by proclamation
which shall be published in the Gazette.
(4) A declaration of emergency that has been approved
by a resolution of each House of Parliament in pursuance of subsection (2) shall, subject to the provisions
of subsection (3), remain in force so long as those resolutions remain in force and no longer.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
No. The legislatures approval is not necessary to
ratify international treaties.
22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.
No. Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The king has the power of pardon.
Article 101
(1) The King may
(a) grant to any person convicted of any offence
under the law of Lesotho a pardon, either free or subject to lawful conditions.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.

401

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a voice in the operation
of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The constitution does not specify the number
and duration of the legislatures ordinary sessions.
In practice, the legislature meets in ordinary session for between six and seven months each year.
Article 82
(1) Each session of Parliament shall be held at such
place within Lesotho and shall begin at such time as
the King shall appoint:
Provided that
(a) the time appointed for the meeting of Parliament
after Parliament has been prorogued shall be not later
than twelve months from the end of the preceding
session; and
(b) after Parliament has been dissolved, the time
appointed for the meeting of the National Assembly
shall not be later than fourteen days after the holding of a general election of members of the National
Assembly and the time appointed for the meeting
of the Senate shall be such time as may be convenient after the nomination of one or more Senators
in accordance with section 55 of this Constitution.
(2) Subject to the provisions of subsection (1), the sittings of each House of Parliament shall be held at such
time and place as that House may, by its rules of procedure or otherwise, determine.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No. The king, the prime minister, and the Judicial Service Commission are responsible for judicial appointments, and the appointments do not
require the legislatures approval.

No.

Article 120
(1) The Chief Justice shall be appointed by the King
acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister.
(2) The puisne judges shall be appointed by the King,
acting in accordance with the advice of the Judicial Service Commission.

No.

Article 124
(1) The President shall be appointed by the King on the
advice of the Prime Minister.
(2) The Justices of Appeal shall be appointed by the
King, acting in accordance with the advice of the Judicial Service Commission after consultation with the
President.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The king, on the advice of the prime minister, appoints the governor of the Central Bank of
Lesotho.

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. The dominant political parties and their leaders have managed to hold on to their seats in the
legislature despite the countrys political turmoil.
The result is the presence of numerous seasoned
legislators in the parliament.

402

National Assembly of Liberia

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF LIBERIA

Expert consultants: Alfred Fofie, Barrie Hofmann, Jacques Paul Klein, Eleanor Marchant
Score: .44
Influence over
executive (3/9)
1. replace

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)
X

2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

Institutional
capacity (3/6)

19. amendments

27. sessions

20. war

28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

10. no
dissolution
11. no decree

Specified
powers (3/8)

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

23. pardon
24. judiciary

X
X

25. central bank

26. media

The National Assembly of Liberia was established in the 1847 constitution. The document
called for a bicameral legislature with a lower
house, the House of Representatives, and an upper
house, the Senate. The country enjoyed relative
stability for over a century. A coup detat in
1980 sparked two decades of civil violence. In
the midst of the conflict, a new constitution
was adopted in 1986. Charles Taylor, a warlordbecome-president, assumed office in 1997 and
ruled without regard for the legislature. In 2003
Taylor stepped down under international pressure,
paving the way for a transitional government.
Liberia held legislative and presidential elections in
2005.
Given the recentness of Taylors departure, it
is too early to tell how exactly the legislature will
function in practice, although on paper its powers are not insignificant. Its influence over the
executive includes the powers to approve ministerial appointments and impeach the president.
The legislature also has a degree of institutional
autonomy. It is immune from dissolution and
is not subject to presidential decree or gatekeeping powers. The legislature is also granted several specified powers and has some institutional
capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can impeach the president. The
impeachment is proposed by the House of Representatives and decided by a two-thirds majority
vote of the total membership in the Senate.
Article 43
The power to prepare a bill of impeachment is vested
solely in the House of Representatives, and the power
to try all impeachments is vested solely in the Senate. When the President, Vice President or an Associate Justice is to be tried, the Chief Justice shall preside; when the Chief Justice or a judge of a subordinate
court of record is to be tried, the President of the Senate shall preside. No person shall be impeached but
by the concurrence of two-thirds of the total membership of the Senate. Judgments in such cases shall not
extend beyond removal from office and disqualification
to hold public office in the Republic; but the party may
be tried at law for the same offense. The Legislature shall
prescribe the procedure for impeachment proceedings
which shall be in conformity with the requirements of
due process of law.
Article 62
The President and the Vice-President may be removed

National Assembly of Liberia

from office by impeachment for treason, bribery and
other felonies, violation of the Constitution or gross
misconduct.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 3
Liberia is a unitary sovereign state divided into counties
for administrative purposes. The form of government
is Republican with three separate coordinate branches:
the Legislative, the Executive and Judiciary. Consistent
with the principles of separation of powers and checks
and balances, no person holding office in one of these
branches shall hold office in or exercise any of the powers assigned to either of the other two branches except
as otherwise provided in this Constitution.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
No. The legislature lacks the power to interpellate
executive branch officials.
4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. There is no prime minister.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The Senates approval is required to confirm
the presidents ministerial appointments.
Article 54
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of
the Senate, appoint and commission
a. cabinet ministers, deputy and assistant cabinet ministers.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.

403

No. The president is directly elected.

Article 50
The president shall be elected by universal adult suffrage of registered voters in the Republic and shall hold
office for a term of six years commencing at noon on
the third working Monday in January of the year immediately following the elections.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government. It is too early, however, to know
whether the legislature will ever use this power.
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the
executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.
11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires
ratification or approval by the legislature before
it takes effect; that is, the executive lacks decree
power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority is needed to override a
presidential veto.
Article 35
Each bill or resolution which shall have passed both
Houses of the Legislature shall, before it becomes law,
be laid before the President for his approval. If he grants
approval, it shall become law. If the President does not
approve such bill or resolution, he shall return it, with
his objections, to the House in which it originated. In so
doing, the President may disapprove of the entire bill
or resolution or any item or items thereof. This veto
may be overridden by the re-passage of such bill, resolution or item thereof by a veto of two-thirds of the
members in each House, in which case it shall become
law. If the President does not return the bill or resolution within twenty days after the same shall have been
laid before him it shall become law in like manner as if
he had signed it, unless the Legislature by adjournment
prevents its return.
No bill or resolution shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in its title.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Supreme Court can review the constitutionality of laws.

404
Article 2
This Constitution is the supreme and fundamental law
of Liberia and its provisions shall have binding force
and effect on all authorities and persons throughout
the Republic.
Any laws, treaties, statutes, decrees, customs and regulations found to be inconsistent with it shall, to the extent
of the inconsistency, be void and of no legal effect. The
Supreme Court, pursuant to its power of judicial review,
is empowered to declare any inconsistent laws unconstitutional.
Article 66
The Supreme Court shall be final arbiter of constitutional issues.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The president can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,
including control over members perquisites.
Article 36
The Senators and Representatives shall receive from the
Republic remuneration for their services to be fixed by
law, provided that any increase shall become effective
at the beginning of the next fiscal year.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislators are subject to arrest and criminal
prosecution. They are immune from arrest only
while traveling to, attending, or returning from
legislative sessions, and for votes cast and opinions
expressed in the exercise of their duties.
Article 42
No member of the Senate or House of Representatives
shall be arrested, detained, prosecuted or tried as a result
of opinions expressed or votes cast in the exercise of
the functions of his office. Members shall be privileged
from arrest while attending, going to or returning from
sessions of the Legislature, except for treason, felony or
breach of the peace. All official acts done or performed
and all statement made in the Chambers of the Legislature shall be privileged, and no Legislator shall be held
accountable or punished therefor.

National Assembly of Liberia

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 48
The House of Representatives shall be composed of
members elected for a term of six years by the registered voters in each of the legislative constituencies of
the counties, but a member of the House of Representatives elected in a by-election to fill a vacancy created
by death, resignation or otherwise, shall be elected to
serve only the remainder of the unexpired term of the
office. Members of the House of Representatives shall
be eligible for re-election.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments require approval
in a popular referendum.
Article 91
This Constitution may be amended whenever a proposal by either (1) two-thirds of the membership of
both Houses of the Legislature or (2) a petition submitted to the Legislature, by not fewer than 10,000 citizens which receives the concurrence of two-thirds of
the membership of both Houses of the Legislature, is
ratified by two-thirds of the registered voters, voting in
a referendum conducted by the Elections Commission
not sooner than one year after the action of the Legislature.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislature declares war.
Article 34
The Legislature shall have the power:
b. to provide for the security of the Republic;
c. to provide for the common defense, to declare war
and authorize the Executive to conclude peace.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 34
The Legislature shall have the power:
f. to approve treaties, conventions and such other international agreements negotiated or signed on behalf of
the Republic.
Article 57
The President shall have the power to conduct the foreign affairs of the Republic and in that connection he is
empowered to conclude treaties, conventions and similar international agreements with the concurrence of a
majority of each House of the Legislature.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

National Assembly of Liberia

405

No. Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.

No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the

operation of the public media.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

Yes. Since the 2005 elections, the legislature has

regularly met in ordinary sessions.

No. The president has the power of pardon.

Article 59
The President may remit any public forfeitures and
penalties, suspend fines and sentences, grant reprieves
and pardons, and restore civil rights after conviction for
all public offenses, except impeachment.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The Senates consent is necessary to approve
the presidents appointments to the Supreme
Court.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Article 32
The Legislature shall assemble in regular session once
a year on the second working Monday in January. The
President shall, on his own initiative or upon receipt
of a certificate signed by at least one-fourth of the
total membership of each House, and by proclamation, extend a regular session of the Legislature beyond
the date for adjournment or call a special extraordinary
session of that body to discuss or act upon matters of
national emergency and concern. When the extension
or call is at the request of the Legislature, the proclamation shall be issued not later than forty-eight hours
after receipt of the certificate by the President.

Article 67
The Supreme Court shall comprise of one Chief Justice
and four Associate Justices, a majority of whom shall
be deemed competent to transact the business of the
Court. If a quorum is not obtained to enable the Court
to hear any case, a circuit judge in the order of seniority
shall sit as an ad hoc justice of the Supreme Court.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Article 68
The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court shall, with the consent of the Senate, be
appointed and commissioned by the President.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.

Article 69
The judges of subordinate courts of record shall, with
the consent of the Senate, be appointed and commissioned by the President.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the governor of the
Central Bank of Liberia.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.

Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
No. Decades of civil violence and the absence of
a meaningful legislature have prevented legislators
from developing expertise.

406

General Peoples Congress of Libya (Mutamar Al Shaab Al Aam)

GENERAL PEOPLES CONGRESS OF LIBYA (MUTAMAR AL SHAAB AL AAM)

Expert consultants: Alessandro Bruno, Mujeeb R. Khan, Amer K. Mohsen, Ronald Bruce St. John,
Diederik Vandewalle
Score: .13
Influence over
executive (2/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

Institutional
autonomy (1/9)
X

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Specified
powers (0/8)

Institutional
capacity (1/6)

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

24. judiciary

25. central bank

26. media

18. all elected

The General Peoples Congress (Mutamar Al Shaab

Al Aam) of Libya was established by decree by
Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi in 1977. The General Peoples Congress sits at the apex of a nationwide system of local Peoples Congresses that
include every adult citizen in the country. The
General Peoples Congress contains over 1,000
members and meets for about two weeks every
year. When Congress is not in session, its powers
are delegated to the cabinet (the General Peoples
Committee), headed by the Secretary General. The
members of the General Peoples Committee are,
at least formally, selected by the General Peoples
Congress. In practice, Libya remains under the control of Colonel Qadhafi, who does not hold an official government position. Since Qadhafi assumed
power in a 1969 military coup, the country has
lacked a formal constitution. The excerpts cited
below are from the 1969 Constitutional Proclamation and the 1979 Declaration on the Establishment of
the Authority of the People (cited in italics). The Constitutional Proclamation refers to the cabinet as the
Revolutionary Command Council, whose name
was changed to the General Peoples Committee
in 1979. Therefore, excerpts from the Constitution
Proclamation refer to the cabinet as the Revolutionary Command Council, whereas excerpts from
the 1979 Declaration refer to the General Peoples
Committee.

The legislature is a symbolic organization with

no meaningful authority. It has little control over
the executive and scant institutional autonomy.
It passes legislation in the form of annual resolutions but otherwise is denied most normal legislative functions. The legislature exercises none
of the specified powers measured in this survey.
Finally, annual sessions that last a mere two weeks
are among the handicaps that hamper the legislatures institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. The legislature can impeach neither the de
facto head of state, Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi,
nor the formal head of state, the Secretary General.
2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of
the legislature.
Yes. Ministers (secretaries) may serve simultaneously in the General Peoples Congress.
3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.

General Peoples Congress of Libya (Mutamar Al Shaab Al Aam)

No. The legislature does not regularly question

executive branch officials.
4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. Formally, the General Peoples Congress
chooses the prime minister (Secretary General). In
practice, Qadhafi appoints the prime minister.
Article VI
The General Peoples Congress chooses the Secretary General and the Secretaries, dismisses them and accepts their
resignations from their posts.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.

407

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The General Peoples Committee issues decrees
that have the force of law.
Article 18
The Revolutionary Command Council constitutes the
supreme authority in the Libyan Arab Republic. It will
exercise the powers attached to national sovereignty,
promulgate laws and decrees.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. There is no provision for veto, but in practice, Qadhafi could simply ignore resolutions of the
General Peoples Congress with which he does not
agree, and the legislature would have no recourse
to override.
13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. There is no judicial review process, but laws
and their interpretation are decided by the General
Peoples Committee.

No. Formally, the General Peoples Congress

chooses the ministers (secretaries). In practice,
Qadhafi appoints ministers at will.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.

Article VI
The General Peoples Congress chooses the Secretary General and the Secretaries, dismisses them and accepts their
resignations from their posts.

No. Qadhafi has complete gatekeeping authority.

The agenda for the annual meeting of the General
Peoples Congress is determined by the executive.
The legislature cannot initiate any bills without
formal executive approval.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The country lacks a presidency. Qadhafi is the
de facto head of state. The official head of state, the
Secretary General of the General Peoples Committee, is formally selected by the General Peoples
Congress. In practice, Qadhafi chooses the Secretary General.
9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The General Peoples Committee can impound
funds.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.

No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in

the government.

No. The legislature relies on the General Peoples

Committee for the resources that finance its own
operation.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.

Yes. There is no institutionalized mechanism for

dissolving the legislature.

No. Legislators are subject to arrest and criminal

prosecution.

408

General Peoples Congress of Libya (Mutamar Al Shaab Al Aam)

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.

No. The members of the General Peoples Congress

are selected by local Peoples Congresses and other
local organizations that are under control of the
executive.

No. Formally, the legislature has a role in the

appointment of judicial branch officials. In practice, the General Peoples Committee appoints
judges.

Article III
The General Peoples Congress is the national conference
of the Peoples Congresses, Peoples Committees and Professional Unions.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The General Peoples Committee appoints the
governor of the Central Bank of Libya.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

No. Changes to the basic law without Qadhafis

approval would be unthinkable.

No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the

operation of the public media.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

No. The General Peoples Committee can declare

war without the legislatures approval.
Article 23
The Revolutionary Command Council shall declare
war, conclude and ratify treaties and agreements, unless
it authorizes the Council of Ministers to do so.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
No. The General Peoples Committee can conclude international treaties without the legislatures approval.
Article 23
The Revolutionary Command Council shall declare
war, conclude and ratify treaties and agreements, unless
it authorizes the Council of Ministers to do so.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Formally, amnesty is granted by law. In
practice, the General Peoples Committee grants
amnesty.
Article 32
Annulment or reduction of sentences shall be proclaimed by decree of the Revolutionary Command
Council, and general amnesty by law.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The General Peoples Committee has the power
of pardon.
Article 32
Annulment or reduction of sentences shall be proclaimed by decree of the Revolutionary Command
Council, and general amnesty by law.

No. The General Peoples Congress meets in ordinary session for about two weeks each year.
28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.
No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
No. There are no direct parliamentary elections.
Legislators can, however, seek subsequent terms in
the legislature without any formal restriction.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
No. Membership carries some perks, but the legislature has so little power and so many members,
and meets so infrequently, that membership is not
highly sought after.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Many of the same politicians return to the
General Peoples Congress year after year, producing a significant number of highly experienced
members. Given the General Peoples Congresss
lack of real lawmaking authority, however, the
bodys longstanding members cannot necessarily
be regarded as holders of substantial legislative
expertise.

Parliament of Lithuania (Seimas)

409

PARLIAMENT OF LITHUANIA (SEIMAS)

Expert consultants: Terry D. Clark, Algis Krupavicius, Alvidas Lukosaitis, Andrius Pauga,
Virgis Valentinavicius, Darius Zeruolis
Score: .78
Influence over
executive (6/9)

Institutional
autonomy (7/9)

Specified
powers (7/8)

Institutional
capacity (5/6)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

X
X

26. media

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack president
9. no
confidence

The Parliament (Seimas) of Lithuania was established in the 1922 constitution. Lithuania lost its
independence during World War II and was subsequently incorporated into the USSR. In 1992, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Lithuania
adopted its current constitution, which provided
for a directly elected president, a prime minister,
and a unicameral legislature.
The legislature has formidable power. It has
substantial influence over the executive. Parliamentarians can serve in the government, and
parliament can interpellate and investigate the
government and remove the prime minister and
president from office. The legislatures institutional
autonomy is exceptionally robust. The president
can dissolve the legislature, but an unusual provision tempers dissolution power. When the president dissolves the legislature, the newly elected
parliament can, in turn, call new presidential elections. The legislature possesses all but one of the
specified powers and has substantial institutional
capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

X
X
X

Yes. The legislature can remove the prime minister with a vote of no confidence. It can impeach
the president with a three-fifths majority vote
of its total membership. In 2004 the legislature
impeached the president on corruption charges,
making Lithuania the first European country ever
to impeach a president.
Article 61
(1) Parliament members shall have the right to submit
inquiries to the Prime Minister, the individual Ministers, and the heads of other State institutions formed or
elected by the Parliament. Said persons or bodies must
respond orally or in writing at the Parliaments session
in the manner established by the Parliament.
(2) At sessions of the Parliament, a group of no less than
one-fifth of the Parliament members may interpellate
the Prime Minister or a Minister.
(3) Upon considering the response of the Prime Minister or Minister to the interpellation, the Parliament
may decide that the response is not satisfactory, and,
by a majority vote of half of all the Parliament members, express non-confidence in the Prime Minister or a
Minister.
(4) The voting procedure shall be established by law.
Article 74
For gross violation of the Constitution, breach of oath,
or upon the disclosure of the commitment of felony,
the Parliament may, by three-fifths majority vote of
all the Parliament members, remove from office the

410
President of the Republic. Such actions shall be carried out in accordance with impeachment proceedings
which shall be established by the Statute of the Parliament.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Legislators may serve simultaneously in ministerial positions.

Parliament of Lithuania (Seimas)

Article 67
The Parliament shall:
6) approve or reject the candidature of the Prime Minister proposed by the President of the Republic.
Article 84
The President of the Republic shall:
4) appoint, upon approval of the Parliament, the Prime
Minister, charge him or her to form the Government,
and approve its composition.

Article 60
(2) A Parliament member may be appointed only as
Prime Minister or Minister.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.

No. The president appoints ministers on the recommendation of the prime minister, and ministerial appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.

Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials

from the executive.

Article 92
(1) The Prime Minister shall, with the approval of the
Parliament, be appointed or dismissed by the President
of the Republic. The Ministers shall be appointed by
the President of the Republic on the nomination of the
Prime Minister.

Article 61
(1) Parliament members shall have the right to submit
inquiries to the Prime Minister, the individual Ministers, and the heads of other State institutions formed or
elected by the Parliament. Said persons or bodies must
respond orally or in writing at the Parliaments session
in the manner established by the Parliament.
(2) At sessions of the Parliament, a group of no less than
one-fifth of the Parliament members may interpellate
the Prime Minister or a Minister.
Article 101
(1) Upon the request of the Parliament, the Government or individual Ministers must give an account of
their activities to the Parliament.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. The legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister,
who must be confirmed by parliament.
Article 92
(1) The Prime Minister shall, with the approval of the
Parliament, be appointed or dismissed by the President
of the Republic. The Ministers shall be appointed by
the President of the Republic on the nomination of the
Prime Minister.

Article 84
The President of the Republic shall:
9) appoint or dismiss individual Ministers upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 78
(2) The President of the Republic shall be elected by
the citizens of the Republic of Lithuania on the basis of
universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot for
a term of five years.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 58
(2) The President of the Republic of Lithuania may also
announce pre-term elections to the Parliament:
1) if the Parliament fails to adopt a decision on the
new program of the Government within 30 days of
its presentation, or if the Parliament twice in succession disapproves of the Government program within
60 days of its initial presentation; or
2) on the proposal of the Government, if the Parliament expresses direct non-confidence in the Government.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.

Parliament of Lithuania (Seimas)

No. The president can dissolve the legislature. It is

worthy of note, however, that the president jeopardizes his or her own term by choosing to dissolve
the legislature.
Article 58
(1) Pre-term elections to the Parliament may be held on
the decision of the Parliament adopted by three-fifths
majority vote of all the Parliament members.
(2) The President of the Republic of Lithuania may also
announce pre-term elections to the Parliament:
1) if the Parliament fails to adopt a decision on the
new program of the Government within 30 days of its
presentation, or if the Parliament twice in succession
disapproves of the Government program within 60
days of its initial presentation; or
2) on the proposal of the Government, if the Parliament expresses direct non-confidence in the Government.
Article 87
(1) When, in cases specified in Article 58 (2), the President of the Republic announces pre-term elections to
the Parliament, the newly-elected Parliament may, by
three-fifths majority vote of all the Parliament members and within 30 days of the first sitting, announce a
pre-term election of the President of the Republic.
(2) If the President of the Republic wishes to compete in
the election, he or she shall immediately be registered
as a candidate.
(3) If the President of the Republic is re-elected in such
an election, he or she shall be deemed elected for a
second term, provided that more than three years of
the first term had expired prior to the election. If the
expired period of the first term is less than three years,
the President of the Republic shall only be elected for
the remainder of the first term, which shall not be considered a second term.
(4) If a pre-term election for the President of the Republic is announced during the Presidents second term, the
current President of the Republic may only be elected
for the remainder of the second term.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote of its total membership. A threefifths majority vote is needed to override a presidential veto of a constitutional amendment.
Article 72
(1) The Parliament may reconsider and enact laws
which have been referred back by the President of the
Republic.

411
(2) After reconsideration by the Parliament, a law shall
be deemed enacted if the amendments and supplements submitted by the President of the Republic were
adopted, or if more than half of all the Parliament members vote in the affirmative, and if it is a constitutional
law if at least three-fifths of all the Parliament members vote in the affirmative.
(3) The President of the Republic must, within three
days, sign and forthwith officially promulgate laws reenacted by the Parliament.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 102
(1) The Constitutional Court shall decide whether the
laws and other legal acts adopted by the Parliament
are in conformity with the Constitution and legal acts
adopted by the President and the Government, do not
violate the Constitution or laws.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,
including control over members salaries.
Article 60
(3) The service of a Parliament member shall be remunerated, and all expenses incurred from parliamentary
activities shall be reimbursed with funds from the State
Budget. A Parliament member may not receive any
other salary, with the exception of payment for creative
activities.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with exceptions for
cases of personal insult or slander. In practice,
this exception is inoperative and does not affect
politics.
Article 62
(1) The person of a Parliament member shall be inviolable.

412
(2) Parliament members may not be found criminally
responsible, may not be arrested, and may not be subjected to any other restriction of personal freedom without the consent of the Parliament.
(3) Parliament members may not be persecuted for
voting or speeches in the Parliament. However, legal
actions may be instituted against Parliament members
according to the general procedure if they are guilty of
personal insult or slander.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 55
(1) The Parliament shall consist of 141 Parliament
members
representatives of the People, who shall be elected
for a four-year term on the basis of universal, equal,
and direct suffrage by secret ballot.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can amend the constitution
with a three-fifths majority vote. Amendments
to certain specified constitutional articles require
approval in a popular referendum.
Article 69
(3) Constitutional laws of the Republic of Lithuania
shall be deemed adopted if more than half of all the
members of the Parliament vote in the affirmative. Constitutional laws shall be amended by at least a threefifths majority vote of all the Parliament members. The
Parliament shall establish a list of constitutional laws by
a three-fifths majority vote of the Parliament members.
(4) Provisions of the laws of the Republic of Lithuania
may also be adopted by referendum.
Article 72
(1) The Parliament may reconsider and enact laws
which have been referred back by the President of the
Republic.
(2) After reconsideration by the Parliament, a law shall
be deemed enacted if the amendments and supplements submitted by the President of the Republic were
adopted, or if more than half of all the Parliament members vote in the affirmative, and if it is a constitutional
law if at least three-fifths of all the Parliament members vote in the affirmative.
(3) The President of the Republic must, within three
days, sign and forthwith officially promulgate laws reenacted by the Parliament.
Article 147
(1) In order to amend or append the Constitution of
the Republic of Lithuania, a proposal must be submitted
to the Parliament by either no less than one-fourth of
the members of the Parliament, or by at least 300,000
voters.

Parliament of Lithuania (Seimas)

Article 148
(1) The provision of Article 1 that the State of Lithuania is an independent democratic republic may only
be amended by a referendum in which at least threefourths of the electorate of Lithuania vote in favor
thereof.
(2) The provisions of Chapter 1 and Chapter 14 may be
amended only by referendum.
(3) Amendments of other chapters of the Constitution must be considered and voted upon in the Parliament twice. There must be a lapse of at least three
months between each vote. Bills for constitutional
amendments shall be deemed adopted by the Parliament if, in each of the votes, at least two-thirds of all
the members of the Parliament vote in favor of the
enactment.
(4) An amendment to the Constitution which is
rejected by the Parliament may not be submitted to
the Parliament for reconsideration for the period of one
year.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislature alone can declare war with the
common exception for cases of foreign invasion.
In the case of armed invasion, the president can
declare war and submit the decision to parliament
for retroactive approval.
Article 67
The Parliament shall:
20) impose direct administration and martial law,
declare states of emergency, announce mobilization,
and adopt decisions to use the Armed Forces.
Article 84
The President of the Republic shall:
16) adopt, in the event of an armed attack which
threatens State sovereignty or territorial integrity, decisions concerning defence against such armed aggression, the imposition of martial law, and mobilization,
and submit these decisions to the next sitting of the
Parliament for approval.
17) declare states of emergency according to the procedures and situations established by law, and submit
these decisions to the next sitting of the Parliament for
approval.
Article 142
(1) The Parliament shall impose martial law, shall
announce mobilization or demobilization, and shall
adopt decisions to use the Armed Forces in defence of
the homeland or for the fulfillment of the international
obligations of Lithuania.
(2) In the event of an armed attack which threatens
the sovereignty of the State or territorial integrity, the
President of the Republic of Lithuania shall immediately pass a decision concerning defence against such
armed aggression, shall impose martial law throughout
the country or in separate parts thereof, shall declare
mobilization, and shall submit these decisions to the

Parliament of Lithuania (Seimas)

413
among them, a candidate for Constitutional Court
Chairperson to the Parliament.

next sitting of the Parliament; in the period between

sessions, the President shall immediately convene an
unscheduled session of the Parliament. The Parliament
shall approve or abolish the decision of the President of
the Republic of Lithuania.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.

Yes. The legislature, on the recommendation of the

president, appoints the chairman of the Bank of
Lithuania.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

international treaties.
Article 67
The Parliament shall:
16) ratify or denounce international treaties whereto
the Republic of Lithuania is a party, and consider other
issues of foreign policy.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant
amnesty.
Article 67
The Parliament shall:
19) issue acts of amnesty.

Article 67
The Parliament shall:
11) appoint to, and dismiss from, office the State Controller as well as the Chairperson of the Board of the
Bank of Lithuania.
Article 126
(2) The Board Chairperson of the Bank of Lithuania
shall be appointed for a five-year term by the Parliament
on the nomination of the President of the Republic of
Lithuania.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
Yes. The legislature appoints four of the twelve
members of the council that oversees Lithuanian
Radio and Television (LRT).

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 84
The President of the Republic shall:
23) grant pardons to sentenced persons.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislature, on the presidents recommendation, appoints the judges and chairpersons of the
Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court. The
legislatures approval is needed for the presidents
appointments to the Court of Appeals.
Article 67
The Parliament shall:
10) appoint judges to, and Chairpersons of, the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court.
Article 84
The President of the Republic shall:
11) propose Supreme Court judge candidates to the Parliament, and, upon the appointment of all the Supreme
Court judges, recommend from among them a Supreme
Court Chairperson to the Parliament; appoint, with the
approval of the Parliament, Court of Appeal judges,
and from among them the Court of Appeal Chairperson; appoint judges and chairpersons of district
and local district courts, and change their places of
office.
12) propose to the Parliament the candidatures of three
Constitutional Court judges, and, upon appointing all
the judges of the Constitutional Court, propose, from

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session for
over six months each year.
Article 64
(1) Every year, the Parliament shall convene for two
regular sessions one in spring and one in fall. The
spring session shall commence on March 10th and shall
end on June 30th. The fall session shall commence on
September 10th and shall end on December 23rd. The
Parliament may resolve to prolong a session.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No. Some, but not all, legislators have staff with
policy expertise.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.

414

Parliament of Lithuania (Seimas)

Yes. Despite a re-election rate that averaged only

about 40 percent in the 1996, 2000, and 2004

elections, the legislature retains a core of highly

experienced members.

ASSEMBLY OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA (SOBRANIE)

Expert consultants: Robert Hislope, Lidija Hristova, Andreas Klein, Ana Petruseva, Goce Todoroski
Score: .81
Influence over
executive (7/9)

Institutional
autonomy (8/9)

Specified
powers (7/8)

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

24. judiciary

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

25. central bank

26. media

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

X
X

18. all elected

X
X
X

The Assembly (Sobranie) of the Republic of Macedonia was established in the 1991 constitution upon
independence from Yugoslavia. The constitution
calls for a unicameral legislature that elects the
prime minister and cabinet, as well as a popularly
elected president. Constitutional amendments in
2001 and 2005 recognized Albanian as an official language, along with Macedonian, and made
changes to the judiciary, but did not directly affect
the powers of parliament.
The legislature is the main stage of national politics. It influences the executive in numerous ways,
including with powers to appoint the government
and remove it with a vote of no confidence. The
legislature also has formidable institutional autonomy. In fact, with the exception of the Constitutional Courts power to review the constitutionality of laws, the legislature enjoys every measure of
autonomy included in this survey. The legislature
is also vested with all but one of the specified powers and prerogatives, and it has some institutional
capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.

Yes. The legislature can remove the prime minister

with a vote of no confidence. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of the Constitutional Court.
Article 87
(1) The President is held accountable for any violations of the Constitution in exercising his/her rights
and duties.
(2) The procedure for determining the President of the
Republics answerability is initiated by the Assembly
with a two-thirds majority vote of all Representatives.
(3) It is the Constitutional Court that decides on the
answerability of the President by a two-thirds majority
vote of all judges.
(4) If the Constitutional Court considers the President
answerable for a violation, his/her mandate is terminated by the force of the Constitution.
Article 89
(1) The Government is composed of a Prime Minister
and Ministers.
Article 92
(1) The Government and each of its members are
accountable to the Assembly.
(2) The Assembly may take a vote of no-confidence in
the Government.
(3) A vote of no-confidence in the Government may be
initiated by a minimum of 20 Representatives.
(4) The vote of no-confidence in the Government is
taken after three days have elapsed since the last

Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia (Sobranie)

415

vote, unless proposed by a majority of all Representatives.

(5) A vote of no-confidence in the Government is
adopted by a majority vote of all the Representatives. If
a vote of no-confidence in the Government is passed,
the Government is obliged to submit its resignation.

Yes. Legislative committees have effective powers

of oversight over the agencies of coercion.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 89
(1) The Government is composed of a Prime Minister
and Ministers.
(2) The Prime Minister and the Ministers cannot be
Representatives in the Assembly.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 72
(1) An interpellation may be made concerning the
work of any public office-holder, the Government and
any of its members individually, as well as on issues
concerning the performance of state bodies.
(2) Interpellations may be made by a minimum of five
Representatives.
(3) All Representatives have the right to ask a Representatives question.
(4) The mode and procedure for submitting and debating on an interpellation and Representatives question
are regulated by the Rules of Procedure.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can set up commissions to
investigate the executive.
Article 76
(1) The Assembly sets up permanent and temporary
working bodies.
(2) The Assembly may set up survey commissions for
any domain or any matter of public interest.
(3) A proposal for setting up a survey of commission
may be submitted by a minimum of 20 Representatives.
(4) The Assembly sets up a permanent survey commission for the protection of the freedoms and rights of
citizens.
(5) The findings of the survey commissions form the
basis for the initiation of proceedings to ascertain the
answerability of public office-holders.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).

6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

Yes. The president is required to appoint as prime
minister the candidate who enjoys majority support in the legislature.
Article 90
(1) The President of the Republic of Macedonia is
obliged, within 10 days of the constitution of the
Assembly, to entrust the mandate for constituting the
Government to a candidate from the party or parties
which has/have a majority in the Assembly.
(2) Within 20 days from the day of being entrusted
with the mandate, the mandator submits a program
to the Assembly and proposes the composition of the
Government.
(3) The Government is elected by the Assembly on the
proposal of the mandator and on the basis of the program by a majority vote of the total number of Representatives.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The legislature elects the government on the
proposal of the prime minister.
Article 90
(1) The President of the Republic of Macedonia is
obliged, within 10 days of the constitution of the
Assembly, to entrust the mandate for constituting the
Government to a candidate from the party or parties
which has/have a majority in the Assembly.
(2) Within 20 days from the day of being entrusted
with the mandate, the mandator submits a program
to the Assembly and proposes the composition of the
Government.
(3) The Government is elected by the Assembly on the
proposal of the mandator and on the basis of the program by a majority vote of the total number of Representatives.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 80
(1) The President of the Republic of Macedonia is
elected in general and direct elections, by secret ballot,
for a term of five years.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 92
(1) The Government and each of its members are
accountable to the Assembly.

416
(2) The Assembly may take a vote of no-confidence in
the Government.
(3) A vote of no-confidence in the Government may be
initiated by a minimum of 20 Representatives.
(4) The vote of no-confidence in the Government is
taken after three days have elapsed since the last
vote, unless proposed by a majority of all Representatives.
(5) A vote of no-confidence in the Government is
adopted by a majority vote of all the Representatives. If a vote of no-confidence in the Government is
passed, the Government is obliged to submit its resignation.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.

Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia (Sobranie)

decides on the conformity of laws with the Constitution.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.

Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution by

the executive. The legislature can, however, vote
to dissolve itself.

16. The legislature controls the resources that finance

its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.

Article 63
(5) The Assembly is dissolved when more than half of
the total number of Representatives vote for dissolution.

Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,

including control over members salaries.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.

Article 64
(6) A Representative is entitled to remuneration determined by law.

Yes. The executive lacks decree power.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.

Yes. Legislators are immune with the common

exception for cases of flagrante delicto for major
crimes, here expressed as found committing a
criminal offence for which a prison sentence of at
least five years is prescribed.

Yes. The legislature can override a presidential

veto by a majority vote of its total membership,
although the constitution is ambiguous, if not outright contradictory, on this question.
Article 75
(2) The promulgation declaring a law is signed by the
President of the Republic and the President of the
Assembly.
(3) The President of the Republic may decide not to
sign the promulgation declaring a law. The Assembly
considers the President of the Republic is then obligated
to sign the promulgation in so far as it is adopted by a
majority vote of the total number of Representatives.
(4) The President is obligated to sign a promulgation if
the law has been adopted by a two-thirds majority vote
of the total number of Representatives in accordance
with the Constitution.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 110
The Constitutional Court of Macedonia.

Article 64
(1) Representatives enjoy immunity.
(2) A Representative cannot be held to have committed
a criminal offence or be detained owing to views he/she
has expressed or to the way he/she has voted in the
Assembly.
(3) A Representative cannot be detained without the
approval of the Assembly unless found committing a
criminal offence for which a prison sentence of at least
five years is prescribed.
(4) The Assembly can decide to invoke immunity for
a Representative without his/her request, should it be
necessary for the performance of the Representatives
office.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 62
(1) The Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia is composed of 120 to 140 Representatives.
(2) The Representatives are elected at general, direct
and free elections and by secret ballot.

Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia (Sobranie)

417

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.

Article 119
(1) International agreements are concluded in the
name of the Republic of Macedonia by the President
of the Republic of Macedonia.
(2) International agreements may also be concluded by
the Government of the Republic of Macedonia, when
it is so determined by law.

Yes. The legislature can change the constitution

with a two-thirds majority vote.
Article 68
(1) The Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia:
adopts and changes the Constitution.
Article 131
(1) The decisions to initiate a change in the Constitution is made by the Assembly by a two-thirds majority
vote of the total number of Representatives.
(2) The draft amendment of the Constitution is confirmed by the Assembly by a majority vote of the total
number of Representatives and then submitted to public debate.
(3) The decision to change the Constitution is made by
the Assembly by a two-thirds majority vote of the total
number of Representatives.
(4) The change in the Constitution is declared by the
Assembly.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislature declares war on the proposal
of the president with the common exception for
cases of foreign invasion. In the event of an attack
or an impending attack during a time when the
legislature is out of session and cannot meet,
the president can declare war and then submit
the decision to the legislature for retroactive authorization.
Article 68
(1) The Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia:
decides on war and peace.
Article 124
(1) A state of war exists when direct danger of military attack on the Republic is impending, or when the
Republic is attacked, or war is declared on it.
(2) A state of war is declared by the Assembly by a twothirds majority vote of the total number of Representatives of the Assembly, on the proposal of the President
of the Republic, the Government or at least 30 Representatives.
(3) If the Assembly cannot meet, the decision on the
declaration of a state of war is made by the President of
the Republic who submits it to the Assembly for confirmation as soon as it can meet.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.
Article 68
(1) The Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia:
proclaims amnesties.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 84
The President of the Republic of Macedonia
grants pardons in accordance with the law.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislature appoints the members of the
Republican Judicial Council and the members of
the Constitutional Court.
Article 104
(1) The Republican Judicial Council is composed of
seven members.
(2) The Assembly elects the members of the Council.
Article 109
(1) The Constitutional Court of Macedonia is composed of nine judges.
(2) The Assembly elects the judges to the Constitutional Court by a majority vote of the total number
of Representatives. The term of office of the judges is
nine years without the right to reelection.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
Yes. The legislature, on the recommendation of the
president, appoints the governor of the National
Bank of the Republic of Macedonia.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.

Yes. The legislature has a substantial voice in the

operation of the public media.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

international treaties.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Article 68
(1) The Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia:
ratifies international agreements.

Yes. The legislature is permanently in session.

Article 66
(1) The Assembly is in permanent session.

418

Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia (Sobranie)

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

No. There is legislative staff, but on average there

is less than one staff person for each legislator. For
example, each parliamentary group has a single
secretary, and policy expertise is provided by the
Staff Service of the Assembly.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.

No. See item 28.

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.

Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF MADAGASCAR (ANTENIMIERAM-PIRENENA/

NATIONALE)
ASSEMBLEE
Expert consultants: Richard R. Marcus, Dominique Rakotomalala, Solofo Randrianja,
Adrien M. Ratsimbaharison, Marc Spindler
Score: .41
Influence over
executive (1/9)

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)

Specified
powers (4/8)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

12. no veto
13. no review

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

26. media

Institutional
capacity (3/6)

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

18. all elected

The National Assembly (Antenimieram-Pirenena/

Assemblee nationale) of Madagascar was established in 1960 upon independence from France.
Between 1976 and 1991, President Didier Ratsiraka, who gained power in a military coup, instituted a socialist government with a hegemonic
party that dominated the legislature. Political pressure led to reforms and the adoption of the current constitution in 1992. The constitution calls
for a bicameral legislature consisting of a lower
house, the National Assembly (AntenimieramPirenena/Assemblee nationale), and an upper house,
the Senate (Antenimieran-Doholona/Senat). The Senate was not established until 2001.

Constitutional amendments in 1995 and 1998

weakened the legislature, shifting power to appoint
the prime minister from the Assembly to the
president and granting the president the right to
appoint members of the Senate. Once the Senate
finally convened in 2001, one-third of its members were presidential appointees. The constitutional changes also expanded the presidents power
to dissolve the legislature and stripped the legislature of its prior right to change the constitution on its own. Since the changes of the 1990s,
the legislature can alter the constitution only with
the assent of the president or of the people as a
whole in a popular referendum. In 2007 voters

National Assembly of Madagascar (Antenimieram-Pirenena/Assemblee nationale)

approved in a referendum constitutional changes

that allowed the president the right to issue decrees
in emergencies without first obtaining the legislatures approval. In fact, even prior to that time, the
president issued decrees that had the force of law,
even in nonemergency situations. The referendum
merely formalized a power that was already being
wielded in practice.
Despite these measures, the legislature retains
some power. It possesses little meaningful control
over the executive, but it has some institutional
autonomy. The president lacks gatekeeping and
veto powers, and legislators enjoy immunity from
arrest. The legislature is granted several specified
powers and has modest institutional capacity.

SURVEY

419

No. Ministers are prohibited from serving simultaneously in the legislature.

Article 62
The functions of member of the Government are
incompatible with the exercise of any elected public
mandate, of any function of professional representation, any public employment or any other remunerated
professional activity.
Article 67
The mandate of Deputy is incompatible with the exercise of all other elected, public mandate and all public
office except teaching.
A Deputy appointed as a member of the Government is
relieved of the office of his mandate.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.

1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.

No. Formally, the legislature can interpellate executive branch officials, but in practice, it rarely does
so.

No. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of the High Court of Justice. The legislature can remove the prime minister with a vote
of no confidence.

Article 93
(1) The National Assembly shall be informed of governmental action by means of oral questions, written
questions, summonses, and commissions of inquiry.
(2) During ordinary sessions, one meeting a month
shall be reserved for questions put to the Government
by members of Parliament and for the Governments
responses.

Article 91
The Prime Minister, after deliberation in the Council of
Ministers, may commit the responsibility of his Government by raising the question of confidence.
The vote may only take place forty-eight hours after
the filing of the question. If it is placed in minority by
an absolute majority of the members composing the
National Assembly, the Government remits its resignation to the President of the Republic.
The President of the Republic appoints a Prime Minister,
according to Article 53.
Article 113
The President of the Republic is accountable for acts
accomplished in the exercise or on the occasion of the
exercise of his functions deciding only in case of high
treason or severe and repeated violation of the Constitution.
He may be impeached only by the two parliamentary
Assemblies deciding by a separate vote, by public ballot
and a majority of two-thirds of the members composing
each assembly.
He is justiciable by the High Court of Justice and may
incur forfeiture.
If forfeiture is pronounced, the High Constitutional
Court establishes the vacancy of the Presidency of the
Republic; the election of a new President will be initiated within the conditions of Article 47 above. The
President struck with forfeiture is no longer eligible to
any elective public function.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister.
Article 53
The President of the Republic appoints the Prime
Minister.
He terminates his functions for any determinant
reason.
Upon proposal of the Prime Minister, he appoints the
other members of the Government and terminates their
functions.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.

420

National Assembly of Madagascar (Antenimieram-Pirenena/Assemblee nationale)

No. The president appoints the ministers, and

the appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 53
The President of the Republic appoints the Prime
Minister.
He terminates his functions for any determinant
reason.
Upon proposal of the Prime Minister, he appoints the
other members of the Government and terminates their
functions.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 45
The President of the Republic shall be elected by universal direct suffrage for a five-year term. He may be
re-elected for one additional term.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 91
The Prime Minister, after deliberation in the Council of
Ministers, may commit the responsibility of his Government by raising the question of confidence.
The vote may only take place forty-eight hours after
the filing of the question. If it is placed in minority by
an absolute majority of the members composing the
National Assembly, the Government remits its resignation to the President of the Republic.
The President of the Republic appoints a Prime Minister,
according to Article 53.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 95
The President of the Republic may dissolve the National
Assembly for determinant causes.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. Prior to 2007 the president could rule by decree
only when he or she has received prior authorization from the legislature to do so. In practice, the
president issued decrees that had the force of law
without prior legislative authorization. In a referendum held in 2007, voters endorsed giving the
president the right to legislate by decree in emergencies. In practice, the presidents use of decree
powers, like before the new measure was passed in
the referendum, is not limited to emergencies.

Article 96
The Parliament, by a vote of an absolute majority of
the members composing each Assembly, may delegate
its power to legislate to the President of the Republic,
for a limited time and for a specific purpose.
The delegation of power authorizes the President of the
Republic to take, by ordinance in the Council of Ministers, general measures falling within the domain of
the law. They enter into force on their publication but
become lapsed if the bill of the law of ratification is
not presented before the National Assembly prior to
the date established by the enabling law.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote of its present members.
Article 57
The President of the Republic promulgates the laws
within three weeks of the transmission by the National
Assembly of the law definitely adopted.
Before the expiration of this time limit, the President
of the Republic may demand the Parliament for a new
deliberation of the law or of certain of its articles. This
new deliberation may not be refused.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The High Constitutional Court can review the
constitutionality of laws.
Article 118
In addition to the questions that are referred to it by
other articles of the Constitution, the High Constitutional Court, within conditions determined by an
organic law:
decides on the conformity to the Constitution of the
treaties, the laws, the ordinances, the Interprovincial
Conventions, and the autonomous regulations decreed
the Central Power.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.

National Assembly of Madagascar (Antenimieram-Pirenena/Assemblee nationale)

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto.
Article 69
(1) No deputy may be prosecuted, investigated, arrested, detained, or judged for opinions and votes cast
by him in the exercise of his duties.
(2) For the duration of legislative sessions, no deputy
may be prosecuted or arrested in a criminal or correctional matter, without the authorization of the bureau
of the Assembly, except in case of flagrante delicto.
(3) Outside of legislative sessions, no deputy may be
arrested without the authorization of the bureau of the
Assembly, except in case of flagrante delicto, authorized
prosecution, or final conviction.
(4) Anyone may bring to the attention of the National
Assembly the acts or omissions of a deputy. The permanent bureau must furnish a prompt response.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
No. The president appoints one-third of the Senates membership. All members of the National
Assembly are elected.
Article 66
(1) The members of the National Assembly shall have
the title of Deputies of Madagascar.
(2) They shall be elected by direct universal suffrage for
four-year terms.
Article 77
(1) Two-thirds of the Senate shall consist of an equal
number of members elected in each electoral district
by elected representatives of the territorial entities, and
one-third shall consist of members representing economic, social, cultural, and religious groups appointed
by the President of the Republic upon nomination by
legally constituted organizations and groups.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. The legislature alone cannot change the constitution without the approval of the president. If the
president objects to a constitutional amendment
that has been passed by the legislature, he or she
can choose to put the amendment to a nationwide
referendum.
Article 140
The initiative of the revision of the Constitution
belongs either to the President of the Republic who
decides in the Council of Ministers, or to the parliamentary Assemblies deciding by a separate vote of
the absolute majority of the members composing each
assembly.
No project or proposal of revision may have the object
of affecting the integrity of the national territory.

421

Article 141
The project or proposal of revision is adopted only
by a majority of three-quarters of the members of the
National Assembly and the Senate.
Article 142
The President of the Republic, in the Council of Ministers, may decide to submit the revision of the Constitution to a referendum.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislature declares war.
Article 58
(2) In addition to matters referred to the Parliament by
other articles of the Constitution:
V) War may only be declared by Parliament.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties on most major issues.
Article 82
(2) In addition to matters referred to the Parliament by
other articles of the Constitution:
VIII) The ratification or approval of treaties of alliance,
treaties of commerce, treaties or agreements relating
to international organization, of those which bind the
finances of the State, of those which modify the provisions of legislative nature, of those which concern the
state of persons, of treaties of peace, of those which
entail modification of territory, must be authorized by
the law. Prior to any ratification, the treaties are submitted by the President of the Republic to the control of
constitutionality of the High Constitutional Court. In
case of non-conformity to the Constitution, ratification
may take place only after revision of it. The treaties or
agreements regularly ratified or approved have, upon
their publication, an authority superior to those of the
laws, with reservation, for each agreement or treaty, of
its application by the other party.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.
Article 82
(2) In addition to matters referred to the Parliament by
other articles of the Constitution:
I) The law shall establish rules concerning . . . amnesty.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 56
(6) [The president] shall have the right of pardon.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.

422

National Assembly of Madagascar (Antenimieram-Pirenena/Assemblee nationale)

Yes. The legislature appoints three of the nine

members of the High Constitutional Court and
four of the nine members of the High Court of
Justice.
Article 98
The President of the Republic is the guarantor of the
independence of Justice.
For this purpose, he is assisted by a Superior Council of the Magistrature of which he is the president.
The Minister charged with Justice is the vice-president
of it.
Article 98.1
The magistrate is appointed to the office corresponding
to his rank or dismissed from his function by a decree
of the President of the Republic taken according to the
conditions determined by an organic law.
Article 106
The First President and the Procurator General of the
Supreme Court are the heads of this high jurisdiction.
They are respectively appointed in the Council of Ministers upon proposal of the Minister charged with Justice after consultation with the Superior Council of the
Magistrature.
Article 106.1
The First President of the Supreme Court is seconded
by three Vice-Presidents, entrusted respectively with
the presidency of the Court of Cassation, of the Council of State and of the Court of Accounts. Each VicePresident is chosen among the magistrates in office in
the Supreme Court, the most senior at the highest level
of the judicial, administrative or financial order concerned.
Article 116
The High Court of Justice is composed of nine members:
The First President of the Supreme Court, President,
substituted by right, in case of incapacity, by the President of the Court of Cassation;
two presidents of the Chamber of the Court of Cassation, and two substitutes, designated by the general
assembly of the said Court;
two first presidents of the Courts of Appeal, and
two substitutes, designated by the First President of the
Supreme Court;
two titular Deputies and two substitute Deputies,
elected by the National Assembly;
two titular Senators and two substitute Senators,
elected by the Senate.
The public Ministry is represented by the Procurator
General of the Supreme Court assisted by one or several members of his general public prosecutors department. In case of incapacity of the Procurator General,
he is substituted by the chief clerk of the Court of
Cassation.
Article 119
The High Constitutional Court is composed of nine
members whose mandate lasts seven years.

Three of the members are appointed by the President

of the Republic, two are designated by the National
Assembly, two by the Senate, two are elected by the
Superior Council of the Magistrature. The President of
the High Constitutional Court is appointed by decree
of the President of the Republic. The designation of the
other members is established by decree of the President
of the Republic.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the governor of the
Central Bank of Madagascar.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
No. Formally, the legislature meets in ordinary session for four to six months each year, and in practice, it is generally in session for less than half the
year.
Article 71
The National Assembly shall meet officially in two ordinary sessions per year. The length of each session may
not be less than sixty days nor more than ninety days.
The first session shall begin on the first Tuesday in May,
and the second, devoted principally to the adoption of
the budget, on the last Tuesday in September.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

National Assembly of Malawi

423

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF MALAWI

Expert consultants: Blessings Chinsinga, Brionne Dawson, Lameck Gondwe, Rob Jamieson,
Heiko Meinhardt, Eric Pelser, Kimberly Smiddy, Arne Tostensen
Score: .38
Influence over
executive (3/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack president
9. no confidence

Institutional
autonomy (4/9)

Specified
powers (2/8)

Institutional
capacity (3/6)

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

23. pardon
24. judiciary

X
X
X

25. central bank

26. media
X

The National Assembly of Malawi traces its beginnings to the Nyasaland African Congress that was
established under British colonial rule. Malawi
gained independence in 1964. The 1966 constitution, while calling for a legislative assembly, also
created a single-party state. Shortly thereafter President Hastings Banda became president, and he
dominated national politics for the next quartercentury. Banda exited power in 1993, paving the
way for political change. The current constitution,
established in 1994, calls for a bicameral legislature
consisting of a lower house, the National Assembly,
and an upper house, the Senate. To date the Senate has not yet convened, making the legislature
de facto a unicameral body.
The legislature plays a part in national political life, although that role is not expansive. It
has some ability to keep tabs on the government:
Its members can serve in government, and it has
the power to investigate and interpellate executive
branch officials. The legislatures greatest strength
is in the realm of institutional autonomy. It does
not contend with presidential decree powers, it can
overrule the presidents veto with a majority vote,
it cannot be dissolved by the president, and the
president does not appoint any members of the
legislature. The legislature possesses only two of
the eight specified powers assessed in this survey,
and its institutional capacity is slight.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. The legislature cannot impeach the president.
This issue of impeachment is currently being discussed in parliament, however. The constitution
states that the parliament should follow the procedures for impeachment in the standing orders,
but the standing orders do not yet include these
procedures.
Article 86
(1) The President and Vice-President shall be removed
from office where the National Assembly has indicted
and convicted the President or Vice-President by
impeachment.
(2) The procedure for impeachment shall be as laid
down by the Standing Orders of Parliament, provided
that they are in full accord with the principles of natural
justice and that
(a) indictment and conviction by impeachment shall
only be on the grounds of serious violation of the
Constitution or serious breach of the written laws of
the Republic that either occurred or came to light
during the term of office of the President or the VicePresident;
(b) indictment on impeachment shall require the
affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of

424

National Assembly of Malawi

the National Assembly in a committee of the whole
house;
(c) the Speaker shall preside over proceedings of
indictment by impeachment and the Chief Justice
shall preside over trial on impeachment;
(d) conviction on impeachment shall require the
affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of both
Chambers;
(e) conviction in cases of impeachment shall cause
the removal, and disqualification from future office,
of the office holder; and
(f) conviction by way of impeachment shall not act
as a bar to legal proceedings.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. At present, virtually all ministers are also legislators. The Supreme Courts interpretation of the
constitution is that ministers may serve simultaneously in the legislature, although the matter is a
subject of public debate.
Article 88
(3) The President and members of the Cabinet shall
not hold any other public office and shall not perform
remunerative work outside the duties of their office and
shall fully disclose all of their assets, liabilities and business interests, those of their spouses, or held on their
behalf upon election.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive, although the responsible committees are dependent on external donor funding
for their operations.
Article 60
(3) The National Assembly and the Senate shall each
have the power to conduct investigations and exercise
the power to subpoena the attendance of any person or
office holder whosoever as required in connexion with
the prudent exercise of the respective functions of each
Chamber.
(4) The President shall be called to Parliament to
answer questions at such times as may be prescribed
by the Standing Orders of Parliament or on a motion of
the National Assembly or Senate.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
Article 60
(3) The National Assembly and the Senate shall each
have the power to conduct investigations and exercise
the power to subpoena the attendance of any person or
office holder whosoever as required in connection with

the prudent exercise of the respective functions of each

Chamber.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. There is no prime minister.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 92
(1) There shall be a Cabinet consisting of the President,
the Vice-President and such Ministers and Deputy Ministers as may, from time to time, be appointed by the
President.
Article 93
(1) There shall be Ministers and Deputy Ministers who
shall be appointed by the President and who shall exercise such powers and functions, including the running
of Government departments, as may be prescribed by
the President subject to this Constitution.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 80
(2) The President shall be elected by a majority of
the electorate through direct, universal and equal
suffrage.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in
the government.
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the
executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.
Article 67
(1) The National Assembly shall last for five years from
the date of its swearing in and then shall stand dissolved.
Article 72
The Senate shall continue from the date of its first sitting, being no later than thirty days after a Local Government election after any dissolution, until it dissolves
sixty days before the next Local Government elections:

National Assembly of Malawi

Provided that the life of the Senate shall not, in any
case, be longer than three years.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The president lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote of its present members.
Article 73
(1) Where a Bill is presented to the President for assent,
the President shall either assent or withhold assent.
(2) Where the President withholds assent to a Bill, the
Bill shall be returned to the Speaker of the National
Assembly by the President with a notification that the
Presidents assent has been withheld, including reasons
therefor, and the Bill shall not be again debated by the
National Assembly until after the expiry of twenty-one
days from the date of the notification of that withholding.
(3) If the Bill is debated again and passed by a majority
of the National Assembly at any time between the date
of the expiry of the twenty-one days referred to in subsection (2) and six months from that date, the Bill shall
again be presented for assent by the President.
(4) Where a Bill is again presented to the President for
assent in accordance with subsection (3), the President
shall assent to the Bill within twenty-one days of its
presentation.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The High Court of the Republic can review the
constitutionality of laws.
Article 108
(2) The High Court shall have original jurisdiction to
review any law, and any action or decision of the Government, for conformity with this Constitution, save as
otherwise provided by this Constitution and shall have
such other jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred
on it by this Constitution or any other law.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. The legislature is prohibited from introducing
legislation related to taxation, public expenditures,
and government debt.
Article 57
(1) Except upon the recommendation of the Minister responsible for Finance, signified in writing, the
National Assembly shall not

425
(a) proceed upon any Bill or any amendment to a Bill
that, in the opinion of the person presiding, makes
provision for any of the following purposes
(i) for the imposition of tax or the alteration of
tax;
(ii) for the imposition of any charge upon the
Consolidated Fund, or the alteration of any such
charge;
(iii) for the payment, issue or withdrawal from the
Consolidated Fund of any moneys not charged
thereon, or any increase in the amount of such
payment, issue or withdrawal; or
(iv) for the composition or remission of any debt
due to the Government;
(b) proceed upon any motion or any amendment to
a motion the effect of which, in the opinion of the
person presiding, would be to make provision for any
of the purposes specified in subsection (a); or
(c) receive any petition that, in the opinion of the
person presiding, requests that provision be made for
any of the purposes.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The president can impound funds appropriated by the legislature. Malawi operates on a
cash budget, which gives the president pretexts
for impounding funds. Even so-called protected
expenditure can be impounded.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
No. The legislature lacks financial autonomy. The
budgetary allocations for parliamentary business
are inadequate. The committees are largely dependent on external donor funding, and some cannot
even meet because of a lack of funds. Entire parliamentary sessions have been canceled because the
minister of finance refused to allocate the necessary
funds.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislators are immune only for statements
made in the legislature and while they are going to,
returning from, or located on the grounds of the
legislature. Otherwise they are subject to arrest.
Article 60
(1) The Speaker, every Deputy Speaker, every member
of the National Assembly and every member of the Senate shall, except in cases of treason, be privileged from
arrest while going to, returning from, or while in the
precincts of the National Assembly or the Senate, and
shall not, in respect of any utterance that forms part of
the proceedings in the National Assembly or the Senate,

426
be amenable to any other action or proceedings in any
court, tribunal or body other than Parliament.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to appoint any
members of the legislature. All members of the
National Assembly are directly elected. Election to
the Senate is indirect but does not involve appointment by the executive. The Senate, although established in the 1994 constitution, has never convened.
Article 66
(1) The National Assembly shall be a directly elected
Chamber.
Article 68
(1) The Senate shall consist of eighty members as follows
(a) one Senator from each District, registered as a
voter in that District and elected by the District Council of that District in secret ballot within thirty days
of each local government election;
(b) one Senator from each District, being a Chief registered as a voter in that District and elected by a caucus of all the Chiefs of that District in secret ballot
within thirty days of each local government election;
(c) thirty-two other Senators who shall be elected by
a two-thirds majority of sitting members of the Senate on the basis of nominations by the Nominations
Committee provided for in subsection
(2) from all of the following sectors
(i) interest groups, who shall include representatives
from womens organizations, the disabled and from
health, education, farming and business sectors, and
from trade unions;
(ii) society, who shall be such persons as are generally
recognized for their outstanding service to the public
or contribution to the social, cultural, or technological development of the nation; and
(iii) religion, who shall include representatives of the
major religious faiths in Malawi.
Functions and powers of the Senate.
Article 70
The Senate shall be an indirectly elected chamber.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
with a two-thirds majority vote. Amendments to
the constitutional amendment process itself and
to the chapters listed in the schedule, which
includes provisions on fundamental principles,
human rights, and citizenship, require approval in
a popular referendum.
Article 195
Parliament may amend this Constitution in accordance
with this Chapter.

National Assembly of Malawi

Article 196
(1) Subject to this section, Parliament may amend this
Chapter and the sections of this Constitution listed in
the Schedule only if
(a) the provision to be amended and the proposed
amended to it have been put to a referendum of the
people of Malawi and the majority of those voting
have voted for the amendment; and
(b) the Electoral Commission has so certified to the
Speaker.
(2) The Parliament may pass a Bill proposing an amendment to which the conditions set out in subsection (1)
have been satisfied by a simple majority.
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (1), Parliament may
pass a Bill containing an amendment to the provisions
referred to in that subsection without a referendum
where
(a) the amendment would not affect the substance
of the effect of the Constitution;
(b) the Speaker has so certified; and
(c) the Bill is supported by a majority of at least twothirds of the total number of members of the National
Assembly entitled to vote.
Article 197
Subject to section 196, Parliament may amend those
Chapters and sections of this Constitution not listed in
the Schedule only if the Bill proposing the amendment
is supported by at least two-thirds of the total number
of members of the National Assembly entitled to vote.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. In times of war or threat of war, the president
can declare a state of emergency without obtaining the legislatures approval. The state of emergency can be extended beyond twenty-one days
only with the legislatures approval.
Article 45
(1) No derogation from rights contained in this Chapter shall be permissible save to the extent provided for
by this section and no such derogation shall be made
unless there has been a declaration of a state of emergency within the meaning of this section.
(2) The President may declare a state of emergency
(a) only to the extent that it is provided for in this
section;
(b) only with the approval of the Defence and Security Committee of the National Assembly;
(c) only in times of war, threat of war, civil war or
widespread natural disaster;
(d) only with regard to the specific location where
that emergency exists, and that any declaration of a
state of emergency shall be publicly announced; and
(e) only after the state of emergency has been publicly announced.
(3) Derogation shall only be permissible during a state
of emergency
(a) with respect to freedom of expression, freedom
of information, freedom of movement, freedom of

National Assembly of Malawi

assembly and rights under section 19 (6) (a) and section 42 (2) (b);
(b) to the extent that such derogation is not inconsistent with the obligations of Malawi under International Law; and
(c) to the extent that
(i) in the case of war or threat of war, it is strictly
required to prevent the lives of defensive combatants and legitimate military objectives from being
placed in direct jeopardy; or
(ii) in the case of a widespread natural disaster, it
is strictly required for the protection and relief of
those people in the disaster area.
(4) The declaration of a state of emergency and any
action taken in consequence thereof shall be in force
for a period of not more than twenty-one days, unless
it is extended for a period of not longer than three
months, or consecutive periods of not longer than three
months at a time, by resolution of the National Assembly adopted by a majority of at least two-thirds of all its
members.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. Although the power to negotiate treaties is
formally granted to the president, in practice, the
legislatures approval is necessary to ratify international treaties.
Article 89
(1) The President shall have the following powers and
duties
(f) to negotiate, sign, enter into and accede to international agreements.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 89
(2) The President may pardon convicted offenders,
grant stays of execution of sentence, reduce sentences,
or remit sentences.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The legislatures role is limited to confirming
the presidents appointment for chief justice of
the High Court. The president appoints the other
judges of the High Court, and these appointments
do not require the legislatures approval.
Article 111
(1) The Chief Justice shall be appointed by the President and confirmed by the National Assembly by a

427
majority of two-thirds of the members present and voting.
(2) All other judges shall be appointed by the President
on the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission.
(3) Magistrates and persons appointed to other judicial
offices shall be appointed by the Chief Justice on the
recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission
and shall hold office until the age of seventy unless
removed in accordance with section 119.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the governor of the
Reserve Bank of Malawi.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. Formally, the media committee in parliament
has oversight powers, but, in practice, the committee has never been funded by donors or by parliament.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
No. The legislature typically meets between two
and four times a year in two-to-six-week sessions.
Article 59
(1) Every session of the National Assembly and of the
Senate shall be held at such place within Malawi and
shall commence at such time as each Speaker, in consultation with the President, may appoint with respect
to the Chamber in which that Speaker presides and the
sittings of each Chamber after the commencement of
that session shall be held at such times and on such
days as that Chamber shall appoint:
Provided that
(a) the President, in consultation with the Speaker of
the relevant Chamber, may summon, on extraordinary occasions, a meeting of the National Assembly
or the Senate; and
(b) the President may, in consultation with the
Speaker of the relevant Chamber, prorogue the
National Assembly or the Senate.
(2) There shall be at least two sittings of the National
Assembly and of the Senate every year.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

428

National Assembly of Malawi

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature

contains a significant number of highly experienced

members.
Yes. Since 1994, re-election rates have been sufficiently high to produce a significant number of
highly experienced members.

PARLIAMENT OF MALAYSIA (PARLIMEN)

Expert consultants: Muthiah Alagappa, William Case, Harold Crouch, Chris Fadzel, Francis Loh
Score: .34
Influence over
executive (3/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Institutional
autonomy (4/9)
X

Specified
powers (1/8)

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

12. no veto
13. no review

X
X

21. treaties
22. amnesty

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon
24. judiciary

Institutional
capacity (3/6)
X

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

25. central bank

26. media

18. all elected

The Parliament (Parlimen) of Malaysia traces its

origins to the legislative bodies that met under
British colonial rule. It was formally encoded in
Malaysias 1957 constitution adopted upon independence from Great Britain. The constitution
called for a bicameral legislature consisting of a
lower house, the House of Representatives (Dewan
Rakyat), and an upper house, the Senate (Dewan
Negara). The monarch (Yang di-Pertuan Agong) is
the head of state, and the prime minister is the
head of government. A constitutional amendment
in 1994 granted the judiciary the right to advise on
the constitutionality of proposed legislation, but
stopped short of granting the judiciary the power
to declare laws unconstitutional.
The legislature appoints the prime minister and
its members serve in government, but it has few
other means to influence the executive. The legislature has some institutional autonomy. Most
notably, the legislatures laws are not subject to
judicial review. The ability to change the constitution is the legislatures only specified power. Its
institutional capacity is slight.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Formally, the legislature can remove the prime
minister with a vote of no confidence. In practice,
a vote of no confidence would be unthinkable.
Article 43
(4) If the Prime Minister ceases to command the confidence of the majority of the members of the House of
Representatives, then, unless at his request the Yang diPertuan Agong dissolves Parliament, the Prime Minister
shall tender the resignation of the Cabinet.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Ministers are selected from, and required to
serve simultaneously in, the legislature.
Article 43
(1) The Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall appoint a Jemaah
Menteri (Cabinet of Ministers) to advise him in the exercise of his functions.

Parliament of Malaysia (Parlimen)

429
Cabinet a member of the House of Representative
who in his judgment is likely to command the confidence of the majority of the members of that House;
and
(b) he shall on the advice of the Prime Minister
appoint other Menteri (Ministers) from among the
members of either House of Parliament.

(2) The Cabinet shall be appointed as follows, that is to

say
(a) the Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall first appoint as
Perdana Menteri (Prime Minister) to preside over the
Cabinet a member of the House of Representative
who in his judgment is likely to command the confidence of the majority of the members of that House;
and
(b) he shall on the advice of the Prime Minister
appoint other Menteri (Ministers) from among the
members of either House of Parliament.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.

No. The monarch appoints ministers on the recommendation of the prime minister, and ministerial appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.

No. The legislature does not regularly question executive branch officials, although a Westminster-style question time is occasionally held.

Article 43
(1) The Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall appoint a Jemaah
Menteri (Cabinet of Ministers) to advise him in the exercise of his functions.
(2) The Cabinet shall be appointed as follows, that is to
say
(a) the Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall first appoint as
Perdana Menteri (Prime Minister) to preside over the
Cabinet a member of the House of Representative
who in his judgment is likely to command the confidence of the majority of the members of that House;
and
(b) he shall on the advice of the Prime Minister
appoint other Menteri (Ministers) from among the
members of either House of Parliament.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. Formally, the monarch appoints the prime
minister, but in practice, the monarch appoints as
prime minister the candidate who enjoys majority
support in parliament.
Article 40a
(1) In the exercise of his functions under this Constitution or federal law the Yang di-Pertuan Agong
(Monarch) shall act in accordance with the advice of
the Cabinet or of a Minister acting under the general
authority of the Cabinet, except as otherwise provided
by this Constitution; but shall be entitled, at his request,
to any information concerning the government of the
Federation which is available to the Cabinet.
(2) The Yang di-Pertuan Agong may act in his discretion in the performance of the following functions, that
is to say
(a) the appointment of a Prime Minister.
Article 43
(1) The Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall appoint a Jemaah
Menteri (Cabinet of Ministers) to advise him in the exercise of his functions.
(2) The Cabinet shall be appointed as follows, that is to
say
(a) the Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall first appoint as
Perdana Menteri (Prime Minister) to preside over the

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The country lacks a presidency. The head of
state is the monarch.
Article 32
(1) There shall be a Supreme Head of the Federation, to
be called the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (Monarch), who
shall take precedence over all persons in the Federation
and shall not be liable to any proceedings whatsoever
in any court.
(2) The Consort of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (to be
called the Raja Permaisuri Agong) shall take precedence
next after the Yang di-Pertuan Agong over all other persons in the Federation.
(3) The Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall be elected by the
Conference of Rulers for a term of five years, but may
at any time resign his office by writing under his hand
addressed to the Conference of Rulers or be removed
from office by the Conference of Rulers, and shall cease
to hold office on ceasing to be a Ruler.
Article 39
The executive authority of the Federation shall be
vested in the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and exercisable,
subject to the provisions of any federal law and of the
Second Schedule, by him or by the Cabinet or any Minister authorised by the Cabinet, but Parliament may by
law confer executive function on other persons.

430

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. Formally, the legislature can vote no confidence in the government, but in practice, a vote of
no confidence would be unthinkable. See item 1.
Article 43
(4) If the Prime Minister ceases to command the confidence of the majority of the members of the House of
Representatives, then, unless at his request the Yang diPertuan Agong dissolves Parliament, the Prime Minister
shall tender the resignation of the Cabinet.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The monarch, at the request of the prime minister, can dissolve the legislature.
Article 43
(4) If the Prime Minister ceases to command the confidence of the majority of the members of the House of
Representatives, then, unless at his request the Yang diPertuan Agong dissolves Parliament, the Prime Minister
shall tender the resignation of the Cabinet.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.

Parliament of Malaysia (Parlimen)

(4A) If the Yang di-Pertuan Agong returns a Bill to the
House in which it originated in accordance with Clause
(4) (b), the House shall as soon as possible proceed to
reconsider the Bill. If after such reconsideration the Bill
is passed by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the
total number of members of that House in the case of
a Bill for making any amendment to the Constitution
other than any amendment excepted pursuant to Article 159, and by a simple majority in the case of any
other Bill, with or without amendment, it shall be sent
together with the objections to the other House, by
which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if similarly
approved by members of that House, the Bill shall again
be presented to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong for assent
and the Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall give his assent
thereto within thirty days after the Bill is presented to
him.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
Yes. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all
policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.

Yes. The executive lacks decree power.

Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy

jurisdictions.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.

Yes. The legislature can override the monarchs

veto by a majority vote of its present members.
A two-thirds majority is required to override a veto
of a constitutional amendment.
Article 66
(1) The power of Parliament to make laws shall be
exercised by Bills passed by both Houses (or, in the
cases mentioned in Article 68, the House of Representatives) and, except as otherwise provided in this Article,
assented to by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong.
(2) Subject to Article 67, a Bill may originate in either
House.
(3) When a Bill has been passed by the House in which
it originated it shall be sent to the other House; and it
shall be presented to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong for his
assent when it has been passed by the other House and
agreement has been reached between the two Houses
and any amendments made in it or when it is required
to be so presented under Article 68.
(4) The Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall within thirty days
after a Bill is presented to him
(a) assent to the Bill by causing the Public Seal to be
affixed thereto; or
(b) if it is not a money Bill, return the Bill to the
House in which it originated with a statement of the
reasons for his objection to the Bill, or to any provision thereof.

No. The prime minister and government can

impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
No. Formally, the legislature has the power to
provide for its own financial operations. In practice, the legislature is dependent on the government for the resources that finance its own operations.
Article 43
(9) Parliament shall by law make provision for the
remuneration of members of the Cabinet.
Article 62
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
of federal law, each House of Parliament shall regulate
its own procedure.
Article 64
Parliament shall by law provide for the remuneration
of members of each House.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislators are subject to arrest and criminal
prosecution.

Parliament of Malaysia (Parlimen)

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
No. The monarch appoints forty of the seventy
members of the Senate. All members of the House
of Representatives are elected.
Article 45
(1) Subject to Clause (4), the Senate shall consist of
elected and appointed members as follows:
(a) two members for each State shall be elected in
accordance with the Seventh Schedule; and
(aa) two members for the Federal Territory of Kuala
Lumpur and one member for the Federal Territory of Labuan shall be appointed by the Yang diPertuan Agong; and
(b) forty members shall be appointed by the Yang
di-Pertuan Agong.
(2) The members to be appointed by the Yang diPertuan Agong shall be persons who in his opinion have
rendered distinguished public service or have achieved
distinction in the professions, commerce, industry,
agriculture, cultural activities or social service or are
representative of racial minorities or are capable of representing the interests of aborigines.
Article 46
(1) The House of Representatives shall consist of one
hundred and ninety two elected members.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can amend the constitution
with a two-thirds majority vote.
Article 159
(1) Subject to the following provisions of this Article
and to Article 161E the provisions of this Constitution
may be amended by federal law.
(3) A Bill for making any amendment to the Constitution (other than an amendment except from the provisions of this Clause) and a Bill for making any amendment to a law passed under Clause (4) of Article 10 shall
not be passed in either House of Parliament unless it has
been supported on Second and Third Readings by the
votes of not less than two-thirds of the total number of
members of that House.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. There is no constitutional provision for the
declaration of war. The monarch, on the advice
of the prime minister, can issue a proclamation of
emergency in times of war and then seek retroactive legislative approval.
Article 150
(1) If the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is satisfied that a grave
emergency exists whereby the security or economic life
of the Federation or of any part thereof is threatened,
whether by war or external aggression or internal disturbance, he may issue a Proclamation of Emergency.

431
(2) If a Proclamation of Emergency is issued when Parliament is not sitting, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall
summon Parliament as soon as may be practicable, and
may, until both Houses of Parliament are sitting, promulgate ordinances having the force of law, if satisfied
that immediate action is required.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
No. The government can conclude international
treaties without the legislatures approval.
22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.
No. Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The monarch has the power of pardon.
Article 42
(1) The Yang di-Pertuan Agong has power to grant pardons, reprieves and respites in respect of all offences
which have been tried by court-martial and all offences
committed in the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur
and Labuan; and the Ruler or Yang di-Pertua Negeri of a
State has power to grant pardons, reprieves and respites
in respect of all other offences committed in his State.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The monarch appoints judges on the advice of
the prime minister, and the appointments do not
require the legislatures approval.
Article 122
(1) The Supreme Court shall consist of a president of
the Court (to be styled the Lord President of the
Supreme Court), of the Chief Justices of the High
Courts and, until the Yang di- Pertuan Agong by order
otherwise provides, of four other judges and such additional judges as may be appointed pursuant to Clause
(1A).
(1A) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution
contained, the Yang di- Pertuan Agong acting on the
advice of the Lord President of the Supreme Court
may appoint for such purposes or for such period
as he may specified any person who has held high
judicial office in Malaysia to be an additional judge
of the Supreme Court.
Article 122b
(1) The Lord President of the Supreme Court, and chief
justices of the High Courts and (subject to Article 122C)
the other judges of the Supreme Court and of the
High Court shall be appointed by the Yang di- Pertuan
Agong, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, after
consulting the Conference of Rulers.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

432

Parliament of Malaysia (Parlimen)

No. The monarch, on the recommendation of the

prime minister, appoints the governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.
Article 55
(1) The Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall from time to time
summon Parliament and shall not allow six months to
elapse between the last sitting in one session and the
date appointed for its first meeting in the next session.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.
No. Members of the House of Representatives are
eligible for re-election without restriction. Senators, however, are limited to two terms.
Article 45
(3A) A member of the Senate shall not hold office for
more than two terms either continuously or otherwise:
Provided that where a person who has already completed two or more terms of office as a member of
the Senate is immediately before the coming into force
of this Clause a member of the Senate, he may continue to serve as such member for the remainder of his
term.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.

No. Some, but not all, legislators have personal secretaries provided by the legislature.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.

No. Some leading legislators have personal advisers, but these arrangements are informal and are
not funded by the legislature.

Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

NATIONALE)
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF MALI (ASSEMBLEE
Expert consultants: Rokia Ba, Earl Conteh-Morgan, Olly Owen, Susanna Wing, Mossa Yattara
Score: .34
Influence over
executive (1/9)

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)

Specified
powers (2/8)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

5. oversee
police
6. appoint
PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
X

18. all elected

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

26. media

Institutional
capacity (3/6)
X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

The National Assembly (Assemblee nationale) of

Mali was established in the 1960 constitution
upon independence from France. For the next

three decades a military dictatorship ruled Mali,

and the legislature functioned only sporadically.
A movement toward greater political openness in

National Assembly of Mali (Assemblee nationale)

433

1992 brought a new constitution and the reestablishment of a functioning unicameral legislature.
Although the legislature is more powerful than
in the past, it still takes a back seat to the president in national politics. With the exception of
the power to vote no confidence in the government, the National Assembly has no meaningful
ability to influence the executive. The presidents
decree, veto, and dissolution powers circumscribe
the legislatures institutional autonomy. The legislature possesses two of the eight specified powers
and prerogatives assessed here. It has little institutional capacity.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).

SURVEY

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.

1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. The legislature cannot impeach the president.
The legislature can remove the prime minister with
a vote of no confidence.
Article 79
When the National Assembly adopts a motion of censure or when it disapproves the program or the declaration of general policy of the Government, the Prime
Minister must submit to the President of the Republic
the resignation of the Government.

No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister.
Article 38
The President of the Republic appoints the Prime Minister. He ends his functions upon his presentation of the
resignation of the Government. Upon the proposition
of the Prime Minister, he appoints the other members
of the Government and sets limits upon their functions.

No. The president appoints ministers on the recommendation of the prime minister, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 38
The President of the Republic appoints the Prime Minister. He ends his functions upon his presentation of the
resignation of the Government. Upon the proposition
of the Prime Minister, he appoints the other members
of the Government and sets limits upon their functions.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.

No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.

No. The president is directly elected.

Article 58
The functions of a member of the Government are
incompatible with the exercise of any parliamentary mandate, any function of professional representation at the national or local level, of any public
employment or of any professional and lucrative activity . . . The replacement of members of Parliament who
are appointed to the Government takes place in accordance with the provisions of Article 63.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
No. The legislature cannot interpellate executive
branch officials.
4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive.

Article 30
The President of the Republic is elected for five years by
direct universal suffrage and by an absolute majority in
two stages.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can pass a motion of censure
in the government.
Article 78
The Prime Minister, after the deliberation of the Council of Ministers, assumes before the Assembly the
responsibility of the Government with regard to its
program or eventually with respect to a declaration
of general policy. The National Assembly questions
the responsibility of the Government by the vote of
a motion of censure. Such a motion is only receivable
if it is signed by at least one-tenth of the members of
the National Assembly. The vote may only take place
forty-eight hours after its introduction. The only votes
counted are those favorable to the motion of censure
which may only be adopted by a two-thirds majority of
the members composing the Assembly. If the motion

434
of censure is rejected, the signatories may not propose
a new one during the course of the same session. The
Prime Minister can, after deliberation of the Council of
Ministers, assume the responsibility of the Government
before the National Assembly on the vote of a text.
In this case, the text is considered adopted, unless a
motion of censure, introduced in the following twentyfour hours, is passed.

National Assembly of Mali (Assemblee nationale)

specify the legislative procedure for overriding

a presidential veto. This constitutional oversight
reflects the fact that, in practice, the presidents
veto power is absolute.

Article 79
When the National Assembly adopts a motion of censure or when it disapproves the program or the declaration of general policy of the Government, the Prime
Minister must submit to the President of the Republic
the resignation of the Government.

Article 40
The President of the Republic promulgates the laws
within the 15 days that follow the transmission to
the Government of the text definitively adopted. He
can before the expiration of this time demand of the
National Assembly a new deliberation of the law or of
certain of its articles. This new deliberation cannot be
refused and suspends the time period of the promulgation. In the case of urgency, the time of promulgation
can be shortened to eight days.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.

No. The president can dissolve the legislature.

No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.

Article 42
The President of the Republic can, after consultation
with the Prime Minister and the President of the
National Assembly, pronounce the dissolution of
the National Assembly. General elections take place
twenty-one days at the least and forty days at the most,
after the dissolution. The National Assembly cannot be
dissolved in the year following these elections.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. Formally, the government can issue decrees
that have the force of law only with the prior
authorization of the legislature. In practice, the
president issues decrees that have the force of law
without prior authorization.
Article 74
The Government can, for the execution of its program
or in areas determined by law, demand the authorization of Parliament to take by Ordinances, during a
specified period of time or between the two sessions,
measures that are normally within the domain of the
law. The Ordinances are taken in the Council of Ministers after consultation with the Supreme Court. They
enter into force from the time of their adoption, but
become lapsed if the bill for their ratification is not
deposited at the National Assembly before the date set
by the enabling law. Upon the expiration of the date
mentioned in the first paragraph of the present Article,
Ordinances cannot be further modified except by the
law in matters which are in the legislative domain.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. The president has the power to return a bill
to the legislature, but the constitution does not

Article 85
The Constitutional Court is the judge of the constitutionality of the laws and guarantees the fundamental
rights of the human person and the public liberties.
Article 86
The Constitutional Court rules obligatorily on:
the constitutionality of organic laws and the laws
before their promulgation.
Article 88
Organic laws are submitted by the Prime Minister to
the Constitutional Court before their promulgation.
The other categories of law, before their promulgation,
can be deferred to the Constitutional Court be it by
the President of the Republic, by the Prime Minister,
the President of the National Assembly or one-tenth
of the Deputies, the President of the High Council of
the Collectivities or one-tenth of the National Councilors or the President of the Supreme Court.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.

National Assembly of Mali (Assemblee nationale)

Yes. Legislators are immune with the common

exception for cases of flagrante delicto, here
expressed as flagrant offense.
Article 62
The Deputies benefit from parliamentary immunity.
No member of the National Assembly may be prosecuted, sought, arrested, detained, or judged because of
his opinions or votes expressed by him in the exercise
of his functions. No member of the National Assembly can, during its sessions, be prosecuted or arrested
for criminal or correctional offenses without the authorization of the National Assembly, except in the case of
a flagrant offense. No member of the National Assembly
may, out of session, be arrested without the authorization of the Bureau of the National Assembly, except in
the case of flagrant offense, of authorized prosecutions
or of definitive condemnation. The detention or the
prosecution of a member of the National Assembly is
suspended if the National Assembly so requests.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 61
The Deputies are elected for five years by universal
direct suffrage. A law determines the modalities of this
election.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments require approval
in a popular referendum.
Article 118
The initiative for the revision of the Constitution
belongs concurrently to the President of the Republic
and the Deputies. The project or proposition of revision must be adopted by the National Assembly by
a two-thirds majority of its members. The revision is
only definitive after having been approved by referendum. No procedure of revision can be engaged in or
pursued if it infringes on the integrity of the State. The
republican form and the secularity of the State as well
as multipartyism cannot be the object of revision.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for presidential war declarations.
Article 49
The President of the Republic decrees after deliberation
in the Council of Ministers, the state of siege and the
state of urgency.
Article 71
The declaration of war is authorized by the National
Assembly specially convened for this purpose. The
President of the Republic informs the Nation by a
message.

435

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 114
The President of the Republic negotiates and ratifies
treaties. He shall be informed of any negotiations likely
to lead to an international agreement not submitted to
ratification.
Article 115
Peace treaties, [treaties] of commerce, treaties or accords
relating to international organizations, those involving State finances, those concerning the status of persons, those relating to cession, exchange or annexation of territory, cannot be approved except by virtue
of the law. They only take effect after approval or
ratification. No cession, no exchange, no annexation of territory is valid without the consent of the
people.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. The legislature can pass an amnesty law only
on the presidents recommendation.
Article 45
The President of the Republic is the President of the
High Council of the Judiciary. He exercises the power
of pardon. He proposes laws of amnesty.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 45
The President of the Republic is the President of the
High Council of the Judiciary. He exercises the power
of pardon. He proposes laws of amnesty.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The legislature itself does not appoint members
of the judiciary; nor is the legislatures approval
required to appoint members of the judiciary.
Article 47
The Members of the Supreme Court are appointed by
decree taken in the Council of Ministers.
Article 91
The Constitutional Court consists of nine members
who carry the title of Councilor with a mandate of seven
years renewable one time.
The nine members of the Constitutional Court are designated as follows:
three are designated by the President of the Republic
of which at least two [are] jurists;
three are designated by the President of the National
Assembly of which at least two [are] jurists;
three Magistrates are designated by the High Council of the Judiciary.

436

National Assembly of Mali (Assemblee nationale)

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. Mali is a member of the Central Bank of West
African States, whose governor is selected by the
member states.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
No. The legislature meets in ordinary session for a
maximum of five and a half months each year.
Article 65
The National Assembly convenes by right in two ordinary sessions per year.
The first session begins the first Monday in October. It
may not exceed 75 days. The second session begins the
first Monday in April and may not exceed a duration of
ninety days.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Since the 1992 parliamentary elections, reelection rates have been sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

PARLIAMENT OF MAURITANIA (BARLAMANE)

Expert consultants: Mohamed Abdellahi, Mohamed Elhacen, Cedric Jourde, Moktar Lam,
Amer K. Mohsen, Boubacar NDiaye, Regina Wegemund
Score: .31
Influence over
executive (1/9)

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree
12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee
police
6. appoint
PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

Specified
powers (2/8)
X

19. amendments
20. war
21. treaties
22. amnesty
23. pardon
24. judiciary

Institutional
capacity (2/6)
X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

25. central bank

X

The Parliament (Barlamane) of Mauritania was

established in the 1961 constitution when Mauritania achieved independence from France. The
document called for a bicameral legislature consisting of a lower house, the National Assembly

26. media

(Majlis al-Watani), and an upper house, the Senate (Majlis al-Shuyukh). A new constitution enacted
in 1991 granted the president the power to dissolve parliament. Prior to 1991 the legislature
was immune from dissolution. A constitutional

Parliament of Mauritania (Barlamane)

amendment in 2006 limited the presidents term

in office but did not directly affect the legislatures
power.
From the time of independence until 1978,
Mauritania was ruled by an autocratic president,
Moktar Ould Daddah, who presided over a singleparty regime. After Daddahs ouster in a military
coup, Mauritania was ruled by a military council until 1992. In 1984 Maaouya Ould SidAhmed
Taya took control of the military government and
became president. In 1992 Mauritania returned to
civilian rule, and presidential and legislative elections were held. Taya held onto the presidency,
and his party, the Democratic and Social Republican Party, won the vast majority of seats in the
National Assembly. The party retained its hegemonic control in subsequent parliamentary elections in 1996 and 2001, and Taya was re-elected
by overwhelming majorities in 1997 and 2003. In
2005 Tayas two decades of rule were ended by a
military coup led by Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed
Vall. In the aftermath of the coup, parliament
was suspended for over a year. New elections
for the National Assembly, which was expanded
from eighty-one to ninety-five seats, were held in
November and December of 2006.
It is too early to say whether the new, postcoup situation will bring substantial changes in the
power of the legislature, but to date the legislatures
role in politics and government has been negligible. The legislature has hardly any influence on the
executive branch, although it does have some institutional autonomy. It has few specified powers and
little institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of the High Court of Justice. The legislature can remove the prime minister with a vote
of no confidence.

437
confidence or a motion of censure shall result in bringing into question his political responsibility.
(2) The Prime Minister, after deliberation with the
Council of Ministers, shall take the responsibility of the
Government before the National Assembly for his program and ultimately for a declaration of general policy.
(3) The National Assembly may challenge the responsibility of the Government by voting a motion of censure.
(4) A motion of censure brought by a deputy must
expressly bear this title and the signature of its author.
Such a motion is acceptable only if it is signed by at least
one third of the members of the National Assembly. The
vote may take place only forty-eight hours after raising
the question of the lack of confidence or the motion of
censure.
Article 75
(1) The vote of no confidence or the adoption of a
motion of censure causes the immediate resignation of
the Government. Such a vote or motion can only be
reached by a majority of the deputies making up the
National Assembly; only the votes of no confidence or
the votes favorable in the motion of censure shall be
counted.
(2) The resigned government continues to manage current business the nomination by the President of the
Republic of a new Prime Minister and a new Government.
(3) If a motion of censure is rejected, its signatories may
not propose a new one during the course of the same
session except in the case set forth in the following
paragraph.
(4) The Prime Minister, after deliberation with the
Council of Ministers takes the responsibility of the Government before the National Assembly for the voting of
a bill. In this case, this bill shall be considered adopted
unless a motion of censure brought during the following twenty-four hours shall be voted under the conditions set forth in the first paragraph.
(5) The Prime Minister may ask the Senate for the
approval of a declaration of general policy.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.

Article 93
(1) The President of the Republic is held liable for the
acts committed in the exercise of his duties only in the
case of high treason.
(2) He may be impeached only by the two assemblies
voting together in a public vote by an absolute majority
of the members; he is tried before the High Court of
Justice.

Article 44
The functions of a member of the government are
incompatible with the exercise of any parliamentary
mandate, with any function of professional representation of a national character, with any professional
activity, and in general with any public or private
employment. An organic law shall determine the conditions under which the holders of such mandates, functions, or employment are replaced. The replacement of
members of Parliament shall take place according to the
dispositions of Article 48.

Article 74
(1) The Prime Minister, together with his ministers,
is responsible to the National Assembly. A lack of

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive

438

Parliament of Mauritania (Barlamane)

branch officials testifying before the legislature or its

committees are regularly held.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. Formally, the legislature can question executive branch officials, but in practice, such hearings
are rarely held.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the

government.

Article 69
(3) One session per week shall be reserved by priority
for questions by members of Parliament and for the
answers from the Government.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. Formally, the government is required to
provide the legislature with all explanations
requested concerning its management and acts.
In practice, the legislature cannot investigate the
executive.
Article 72
The Government is required to provide to the Parliament, in the form established by law, all explanations
requested concerning its management and its acts.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister.
Article 30
(2) [The President of the Republic] shall appoint the
Prime Minister and discharge him from his functions.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers on the recommendation of the prime minister, and ministerial appointments do not require legislative
approval.
Article 30
(3) Upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister,
the President shall appoint the Ministers to whom he
may delegate by decree certain of his powers.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 26
(1) The President of the Republic is elected for six years
by direct, universal suffrage.

Article 74
(1) The Prime Minister, together with his ministers, is
responsible to the National Assembly. A lack of confidence or a motion of censure shall result in bringing
into question his political responsibility.
(2) The Prime Minister, after deliberation with the
Council of Ministers, shall take the responsibility of the
Government before the National Assembly for his program and ultimately for a declaration of general policy.
(3) The National Assembly may challenge the responsibility of the Government by voting a motion of censure.
(4) A motion of censure brought by a deputy must
expressly bear this title and the signature of its author.
Such a motion is acceptable only if it is signed by at least
one third of the members of the National Assembly. The
vote may take place only forty-eight hours after raising
the question of the lack of confidence or the motion of
censure.
Article 75
(1) The vote of no confidence or the adoption of a
motion of censure causes the immediate resignation of
the Government. Such a vote or motion can only be
reached by a majority of the deputies making up the
National Assembly; only the votes of no confidence or
the votes favorable in the motion of censure shall be
counted.
(2) The resigned government continues to manage current business until the nomination by the President of
the Republic of a new Prime Minister and a new Government.
(3) If a motion of censure is rejected, its signatories may
not propose a new one during the course of the same
session except in the case set forth in the following
paragraph.
(4) The Prime Minister, after deliberation with the
Council of Ministers takes the responsibility of the Government before the National Assembly for the voting of
a bill. In this case, this bill shall be considered adopted
unless a motion of censure brought during the following twenty-four hours shall be voted under the conditions set forth in the first paragraph.
(5) The Prime Minister may ask the Senate for the
approval of a declaration of general policy.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 31
(1) The President of the Republic, after consultation
with the Prime Minister and the Presidents of the
Assemblies, may pronounce the dissolution of the
National Assembly. General elections shall take place
at least thirty days and at most sixty days after the dissolution.

Parliament of Mauritania (Barlamane)

(2) The National Assembly shall meet in regular session fifteen days after the elections. If this session takes
place during a period outside of the periods set aside for
ordinary sessions, a session shall be legally opened for
a period of fifteen days.
(3) There cannot be a new dissolution of the Assembly
during the twelve months which follow these elections.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The president and the government lack decree
power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote of its total membership.
Article 70
(1) The President of the Republic shall promulgate the
laws within a time period of eight days at the earliest
and thirty days at the latest, following the transmission
to him of the laws by the Parliament.
(2) During this period, the President may send back
the draft law or bill for a second reading. If the National
Assembly decides on the adoption of the law by a majority of its members, the law shall be promulgated and
published during the time period indicated in the preceding paragraph.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Council can review the
constitutionality of laws.
Article 67
(5) Organic laws may he promulgated only after certification by the Constitutional Council of their conformity with the Constitution.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions. The legislature can initiate bills that
reduce government revenues or increase government expenditures only, however, if it also provides a bill that offsets the change in revenue.
Article 62
(2) The bills or amendments proposed by the members
of Parliament shall not be accepted when their adoption
would entail either a reduction in public revenues or
the creation or enlargement of public expenses unless
they are accompanied by a bill for increasing revenues
or equivalent savings.

439
(3) They may be declared unacceptable when they bear
upon a matter which comes under the regulatory power
by virtue of Article 59 or are contrary to a delegation
granted by virtue of Article 60.
(4) If the Parliament disregards the objections raised by
the Government by virtue of one of the two preceding
paragraphs, the President of the Republic has recourse
to the Constitutional Council which rules within a
period of one week.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The president can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
No. The legislature is dependent on the executive
for the resources that finance its own operations.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto.
Article 50
(1) No member of Parliament may be prosecuted, pursued, arrested, detained, or tried because of the opinions or votes voiced by him during the exercise of his
functions.
(2) No member of Parliament, while Parliament is in
session, may be prosecuted or arrested for a criminal
or penal matter, except with the authorization of the
assembly to which he belongs unless it is a case of
flagrante delicto or authorized prosecution or a judicial
sentence.
(3) No member of Parliament, while Parliament is out
of session, may be arrested, except with the authorization of the office of the assembly to which he belongs
unless it is a case of flagrante delicto or authorized prosecution or a judicial sentence.
(4) The detention or prosecution of a member of Parliament is suspended if the assembly to which he belongs
demands it.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 47
(1) The Deputies to the National Assembly are elected
for five years by direct suffrage.
(2) The Senators are elected for six years by indirect
suffrage.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.

440

No. Constitutional amendments require approval

in a popular referendum.
Article 99
(1) The initiative for a revision of the Constitution
belongs jointly to the President of the Republic and to
the members of Parliament. No proposed revision presented by the members of Parliament may be debated
if it has not been signed by at least one third of the
members of one of the assemblies.
(2) Any proposed revision must be passed by a twothirds majority of the deputies in the National Assembly
and a two-thirds majority of the senators in the Senate
in order for it to be submitted for a referendum.
(3) No procedure for revision may be initiated if it challenges the existence of the State or undermines the
integrity of the territory, the republican form of government, or the pluralist character of Mauritanian democracy.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for the
declaration of war.
Article 58
The declaration of war shall be authorized by the Parliament.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 36
The President of the Republic signs and ratifies treaties.
Article 78
(1) Peace treaties, union treaties, commerce treaties,
treaties or accords concerning an international organization, treaties which require the finances of the State,
treaties which modify provisions of a legislative nature,
treaties concerning the status of persons, and treaties
concerning the borders of the State may only he ratified by a law.
(2) They may take effect only after being ratified or
approved. No cession, no exchange, and no annexation
of territory is valid without the consent of the people
who shall decide through referendum.
(3) In the case set forth in the last paragraph of Article
2, the required majority is four-fifths of the votes cast.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. According to the constitution, amnesty can be
passed only by law. In practice, the president holds
the power to grant amnesty.
Article 57
(1) The following subjects are the domain of the law:
amnesty.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

Parliament of Mauritania (Barlamane)

No. The president has the power of pardon.

Article 37
The President of the Republic has the right to grant
clemency and the right to remit or commute sentences.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. Formally, the legislature has the power to elect
the members of the High Court of Justice. In practice, the legislature has no role in judicial branch
appointments.
Article 92
(1) There is instituted a High Court of Justice.
(2) It is composed of members elected from its midst
and in equal number by the National Assembly and
the Senate after each complete or partial renewal of
these assemblies. It elects its president from among its
members.
Article 81
(1) The Constitutional Council is composed of six
members whose mandate lasts nine years and is not
renewable. One third of the Constitutional Council
shall be chosen every three years. Three of the members
shall be appointed by the President of the Republic, two
by the President of the National Assembly, and one by
the President of the Senate.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the chairman of the
central bank.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
No. The legislature meets in ordinary session for
less than four months each year.
Article 52
The Parliament meets in regular session for two ordinary sessions each year. The first ordinary session will
convene during the first fortnight in November. The
second will convene during the first fortnight in May.
The length of each ordinary session may not exceed
two months.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.

National Assembly of Mauritius

441

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
No. From the mid-1980s until 2005, during the
dictatorship of Maaouya Ould SidAhmed Taya, the
National Assembly was either effectively inope-

rative or wholly dominated by Tayas Democratic

and Social Republican Party. Re-election rates were
high owing to an absence of genuine competition,
although members did not acquire a great deal of
genuine experience in legislative matters. The parliament was suspended for over a year following
the military coup of August 2005. Elections for
the National Assembly held at the end of 2006
produced a legislature that contains myriad new
parties and is highly fragmented in terms of party
affiliation. Some legislators survive from the Taya
era, but the discontinuity induced by the coup and
the extended suspension of parliament, along with
the dissolution of the previously hegemonic party
system, have created a body that lacks a significant
body of highly experienced legislators.

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF MAURITIUS

Expert consultants: John Bridge, V. Coopoomootoo, Staffan I. Lindberg, Edward McMahon,
Brendan McSherry
Score: .66
Influence over
executive (8/9)

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no confidence

Specified
powers (4/8)
X
X

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

23. pardon
X

24. judiciary

25. central bank

26. media

X
X
X

The National Assembly of Mauritius has origins in

the legislative bodies that represented the country in the British Empire in the late nineteenth
century. The constitution adopted upon independence in 1968 instituted a unicameral legislature
with a prime minister as head of government and
a Governor General as head of state. A constitutional amendment in 1992 replaced the Governor
General with a president elected by the legislature.
The 1992 amendment also granted the judiciary
the power to review the constitutionality of laws.
Prior to 1992 the National Assemblys legislation

was supreme and not subject to judicial review. Further constitutional amendments in 2003 granted
the president the powers to dissolve the legislature
and to issue pardons. Before 2003 the legislature
had the power of pardon and was immune from
dissolution.
Even after the adoption of these amendments that reduced parliaments powers, parliament remains a muscular institution. It influences
the executive with, among other powers, the right
to appoint the president, appoint and remove
the prime minister, and oversee the agencies of

442

coercion. Its own institutional autonomy is limited by executive dissolution and gatekeeping powers and a lack of immunity for legislators. The
legislature possesses some specified powers and
prerogatives and a fair amount of institutional
autonomy.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can remove the prime minister
with a vote of no confidence. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of the prime minister and an independent tribunal appointed by the
judicial branch.
Article 30
(1) The President or the Vice-President may be removed
from office in accordance with this section for
(a) violation of the Constitution or any other serious
act of misconduct;
(b) inability to perform his functions whether arising
from infirmity of mind or body or from any other
cause.
(2) Where the President fails to comply with section
46(2), he may be removed from office on a motion made
by the Prime Minister in the Assembly and supported
by the votes of a majority of all the members of the
Assembly.
(3) The President or the Vice-President shall not be
removed from office for any other cause unless
(a) a motion that the circumstances requiring the
removal of the President or the Vice-President be
investigated by a tribunal is made in the Assembly
by the Prime Minister;
(b) the motion states with full particulars the ground
on which the removal of the President or the VicePresident is sought;
(c) the motion is supported by the votes of not less
than two-thirds of all the members of the Assembly;
(d) the tribunal, after its investigation, forwards a
written report on the investigation addressed to the
Assembly and delivered to the Speaker and recommends the removal of the President or the VicePresident; and
(e) subject to paragraph (f), a motion made by the
Prime Minister and supported by the votes of a majority of all the members of the Assembly requires the
removal of the President or the Vice-President on a
recommendation to that effect by the tribunal;
(f) a motion under paragraph (e) is made
(i) where the Assembly is sitting, within 20 days
of the receipt of the report of the tribunal by the
Speaker;
(ii) where the Assembly is not sitting, within 20
days of the day on which the Assembly resumes its
sitting.

National Assembly of Mauritius

(4) The President or the Vice-President shall have the
right to appear and to be represented before the tribunal
during its investigation.
(5) Where the Assembly supports a motion under subsection (3)(c), it may suspend the President or the VicePresident from performing the functions of his office.
(6) A suspension under subsection (5) shall cease to
have effect where
(a) a report under subsection (3)(d) does not recommend that the President or the Vice-President ought
to be removed from office; or
(b) the Assembly does not support a motion under
subsection (3)(e) requiring the removal of the President or the Vice-President.
(7) Where the Assembly supports a motion under subsection (3)(e) requiring the removal of the President
or the Vice-President, the office of the President or the
Vice-President, as the case may be, shall become vacant.
(8) In this section, tribunal means a tribunal consisting of a chairman and 2 or 4 other members appointed
by the Chief Justice from amongst persons who hold or
have held office as a Judge of a court having unlimited
jurisdiction in civil or criminal matters in some part of
the Commonwealth or a court having jurisdiction in
appeals from such a court.
Article 57
(1) The President, acting in accordance with the advice
of the Prime Minister, may at any time prorogue or
dissolve Parliament:
Provided that
(a) where the Assembly passes a resolution that it
has no confidence in the Government and the Prime
Minister does not within 3 days either resign from his
office or advise the President to dissolve Parliament
within 7 days or at such later time as the President,
acting in his own deliberate judgment, may consider
reasonable, the President, acting in his own deliberate
judgment, may dissolve Parliament.
(4) The office of a Minister (other than the Prime Minister) shall become vacant
(a) where the President, acting in accordance with
the advice of the Prime Minister, so directs;
(b) where the Prime Minister resigns from office
within 3 days after the passage by the Assembly of
a resolution of no confidence in the Government or
is removed from office under subsection (1) or (2); or
(c) upon the appointment of any person to the office
of Prime Minister.
Article 60
(1) Where a resolution of no confidence in the Government is passed by the Assembly and the Prime Minister
does not within 3 days resign from his office, the President shall remove the Prime Minister from office unless,
in pursuance of section 57(1), Parliament has been or is
to be dissolved in consequence of such resolution.
(2) Where at any time between the holding of a general election and the first sitting of the Assembly thereafter the President, acting in his own deliberate judgment, considers that, in consequence of changes in the

National Assembly of Mauritius

membership of the Assembly resulting from that general election, the Prime Minister will not be able to command the support of a majority of the members of the
Assembly, the President may remove the Prime Minister
from office:
Provided that the President shall not remove the Prime
Minister from office within the period of 10 days immediately following the date prescribed for polling at that
general election unless he is satisfied that a party or
party alliance in opposition to the Government and registered for the purposes of that general election under
paragraph 2 of the First Schedule has at that general
election gained a majority of all seats in the Assembly.
(4) The office of a Minister (other than the Prime Minister) shall become vacant
(b) where the Prime Minister resigns from office
within 3 days after the passage by the Assembly of
a resolution of no confidence in the Government or
is removed from office under subsection (1) or (2).

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Legislators may serve simultaneously in ministerial positions.
3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. The legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. The president appoints as prime minister the
candidate who enjoys the support of the legislature.
Article 59
(1) There shall be a Prime Minister and a Deputy Prime
Minister who shall be appointed by the President.
(2) There shall be, in addition to the offices of Prime
Minister, Deputy Prime Minister and Attorney-General,
such other offices of Minister of the Government as
may be prescribed by Parliament or, subject to any law,
established by the President, acting in accordance with
the advice of the Prime Minister:

443
Provided that the number of offices of Minister, other
than the Prime Minister, shall not be more than 24.
(3) The President, acting in his own deliberate judgment, shall appoint as Prime Minister the member of
the Assembly who appears to him best able to command the support of the majority of the members of
the Assembly, and shall, acting in accordance with the
advice of the Prime Minister, appoint the Deputy Prime
Minister, the Attorney-General and the other Ministers
from among the members of the Assembly:
Provided that
(a) where occasion arises for making an appointment
while Parliament is dissolved, a person who was a
member of the Assembly immediately before the dissolution may be appointed; and
(b) a person may be appointed Attorney-General,
notwithstanding that he is not (or, as the case may
be, was not) a member of the Assembly.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers on the recommendation of the prime minister, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 59
(1) There shall be a Prime Minister and a Deputy Prime
Minister who shall be appointed by the President.
(2) There shall be, in addition to the offices of Prime
Minister, Deputy Prime Minister and Attorney-General,
such other offices of Minister of the Government as
may be prescribed by Parliament or, subject to any law,
established by the President, acting in accordance with
the advice of the Prime Minister:
Provided that the number of offices of Minister, other
than the Prime Minister, shall not be more than 24.
(3) The President, acting in his own deliberate judgment, shall appoint as Prime Minister the member of
the Assembly who appears to him best able to command the support of the majority of the members of
the Assembly, and shall, acting in accordance with the
advice of the Prime Minister, appoint the Deputy Prime
Minister, the Attorney-General and the other Ministers
from among the members of the Assembly:
Provided that
(a) where occasion arises for making an appointment
while Parliament is dissolved, a person who was a
member of the Assembly immediately before the dissolution may be appointed; and
(b) a person may be appointed Attorney-General,
notwithstanding that he is not (or, as the case may
be, was not) a member of the Assembly.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. Parliament elects the president.

444
Article 28
(2) (a) The President shall
(i) be elected by the Assembly on a motion made by
the Prime Minister and supported by the votes of a
majority of all the members of the Assembly.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 57
(1) The President, acting in accordance with the advice
of the Prime Minister, may at any time prorogue or
dissolve Parliament:
Provided that
(a) where the Assembly passes a resolution that it
has no confidence in the Government and the Prime
Minister does not within 3 days either resign from his
office or advise the President to dissolve Parliament
within 7 days or at such later time as the President,
acting in his own deliberate judgment, may consider
reasonable, the President, acting in his own deliberate
judgment, may dissolve Parliament.
Article 60
(1) Where a resolution of no confidence in the Government is passed by the Assembly and the Prime Minister
does not within 3 days resign from his office, the President shall remove the Prime Minister from office unless,
in pursuance of section 57(1), Parliament has been or is
to be dissolved in consequence of such resolution.
(2) Where at any time between the holding of a general
election and the first sitting of the Assembly thereafter
the President, acting in his own deliberate judgment,
considers that, in consequence of changes in the membership of the Assembly resulting from that general
election, the Prime Minister will not be able to command the support of a majority of the members of the
Assembly, the President may remove the Prime Minister
from office:
Provided that the President shall not remove the Prime
Minister from office within the period of 10 days immediately following the date prescribed for polling at that
general election unless he is satisfied that a party or
party alliance in opposition to the Government and
registered for the purposes of that general election
under paragraph 2 of the First Schedule has at that
general election gained a majority of all seats in the
Assembly.
(4) The office of a Minister (other than the Prime Minister) shall become vacant
(b) where the Prime Minister resigns from office
within 3 days after the passage by the Assembly of
a resolution of no confidence in the Government or
is removed from office under subsection (1) or (2).

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.

National Assembly of Mauritius

Article 57
(1) The President, acting in accordance with the advice
of the Prime Minister, may at any time prorogue or
dissolve Parliament:
Provided that
(a) where the Assembly passes a resolution that it
has no confidence in the Government and the Prime
Minister does not within 3 days either resign from his
office or advise the President to dissolve Parliament
within 7 days or at such later time as the President,
acting in his own deliberate judgment, may consider
reasonable, the President, acting in his own deliberate
judgment, may dissolve Parliament;
(b) where the office of Prime Minister is vacant and
the President considers that there is no prospect of
his being able within a reasonable time to appoint
to that office a person who can command the support of a majority of the members of the Assembly,
the President, acting in his own deliberate judgment,
may dissolve Parliament.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote of its present members.
Article 46
(1) The power of Parliament to make laws shall be exercisable by Bills passed by the Assembly and assented to
by the President.
(2) (a) Subject to paragraphs (b) and (c), where a Bill
is submitted to the President for assent in accordance
with this Constitution, he shall signify that he assents
or that he withholds assent.
(b) The President shall not withhold assent under
paragraph (a)
(i) in the case of a Bill which makes provision for
any of the purposes specified in section 54;
(ii) in the case of a Bill which amends any provision of the Constitution and which is certified by
the Speaker as having complied with the requirements of section 47;
(iii) in the case of any other Bill, unless he is of
opinion, acting in his own deliberate judgment,
that the Bill including any proposed amendment
thereto, should be reconsidered by the Assembly.
(c) Where the President withholds assent under paragraph (b)(iii), he shall, within 21 days of the submission of the Bill for assent, return the Bill to the Assembly with a request that it should reconsider the Bill,
including any proposed amendment thereto.
(d) Where a Bill is returned to the Assembly under
paragraph (c), the Assembly shall reconsider the Bill

National Assembly of Mauritius

accordingly, and where it is passed again by the
Assembly with or without amendment and submitted anew to the President for assent, the President
shall signify his assent.
(3) Where the President assents to a Bill that has been
submitted to him in accordance with this Constitution,
the Bill shall become law and the President shall thereupon cause it to be published in the Gazette as a law.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Supreme Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 83
(1) Subject to sections 41(5), 64(5) and 101(1), where
any person alleges that any provision of this Constitution (other than Chapter II) has been contravened
and that his interests are being or are likely to be
affected by such contravention, then, without prejudice to any other action with respect to the same matter which is lawfully available, that person may apply
to the Supreme Court for a declaration and for relief
under this section.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction, in any
application made by any person in pursuance of subsection (1) or in any other proceedings lawfully brought
before the court, to determine whether any provision
of this Constitution (other than Chapter II) has been
contravened and to make a declaration accordingly.
Article 84
(1) Where any question as to the interpretation of this
Constitution arises in any court of law established for
Mauritius (other than the Court of Appeal, the Supreme
Court or a court martial) and the court is of opinion that
the question involves a substantial question of law, the
court shall refer the question to the Supreme Court.
(2) Where any question is referred to the Supreme
Court in pursuance of this section, the Supreme Court
shall give its decision upon the question and the court
in which the question arose shall dispose of the case
in accordance with that decision or, where the decision
is the subject of an appeal to the Court of Appeal or
the Judicial Committee, in accordance with the decision of the Court of Appeal or, as the case may be, of
the Judicial Committee.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. The legislature is prohibited from introducing
legislation related to taxation, public expenditures,
or government debt.
Article 54
Except upon the recommendation of a Minister, the
Assembly shall not
(a) proceed upon any Bill (including any amendment
to a Bill) that, in the opinion of the person presiding,
makes provision for any of the following purposes

445
(i) for the imposition of taxation or the alteration of
taxation otherwise than by reduction;
(ii) for the imposition of any charge upon the Consolidated Fund or other public funds of Mauritius or
the alteration of any such charge otherwise than by
reduction;
(iii) for the payment, issue or withdrawal from the
Consolidated Fund or other public funds of Mauritius
of any money not charged on it or any increase in the
amount of such payment, issue or withdrawal; or
(iv) for the composition or remission of any debt to
the Government;
(b) proceed upon any motion (including any amendment to a motion) the effect of which, in the opinion
of the person presiding, would be to make provision for
any of those purposes; or
(c) receive any petition that, in the opinion of the person presiding, requests that provision be made for any
of those purposes.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislators are subject to arrest and criminal
prosecution.
Article 38
(1) Subject to this section, where a member of the
Assembly is sentenced by a court in any part of the
Commonwealth to death or to imprisonment (by whatever name called) for a term exceeding 12 months, he
shall forthwith cease to perform his functions as a member of the Assembly and his seat in the Assembly shall
become vacant at the expiration of a period of 30 days
thereafter.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 31
(1) There shall be a Parliament for Mauritius, which
shall consist of the President and a National Assembly.
(2) The Assembly shall consist of persons elected in
accordance with the First Schedule, which makes provision for the election of 70 members.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.

446

Yes. The legislature can change the constitution

with a two-thirds majority vote.
Article 47
(1) Subject to this section, Parliament may alter this
Constitution.
(2) A Bill for an Act of Parliament to alter any of the
following provisions of this Constitution
(3) A Bill for an Act of Parliament to alter the provisions
of section 1 or 57(2) shall not be passed by the Assembly
unless
(a) the proposed Bill has before its introduction in
the Assembly been submitted, by referendum, to the
electorate of Mauritius and has been approved by the
votes of not less than three quarters of the electorate;
(b) it is supported at the final voting in the Assembly
by the votes of all the members of the Assembly.
(4) A Bill for an Act of Parliament to alter any provision
of this Constitution (but which does not alter any of
the provisions of this Constitution as specified in subsection (2)) shall not be passed by the Assembly unless
it is supported at the final voting in the Assembly by
the votes of not less than two-thirds of all the members
of the Assembly.
(5) In this section, references to altering this Constitution or any part of this Constitution include references
(a) to revoking it, with or without re-enactment or
the making of different provision;
(b) to modifying it, whether by omitting or amending any of its provisions or inserting additional provisions in it or otherwise; and
(c) to suspending its operation for any period, or terminating any such suspension.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for the
declaration of war.
21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. Although not stated explicitly in the constitution, the legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.

National Assembly of Mauritius

No. The president and the Judicial and Legal

Service Commission are responsible for judicial
appointments, and these appointments do not
require the legislatures approval.
Article 77
(1) The Chief Justice shall be appointed by the President acting after consultation with the Prime Minister.
(2) The Senior Puisne Judge shall be appointed by the
President, acting in accordance with the advice of the
Chief Justice.
(3) The Puisne Judges shall be appointed by the President, acting in accordance with the advice of the Judicial and Legal Service Commission.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the governor of the
Bank of Mauritius.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
Yes. The legislature has a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.
Article 56
(1) The sessions of the Assembly shall be held in such
place and begin at such time as the President by Proclamation may appoint:
Provided that the place at which any session of the
Assembly is to be held may be altered from time to time
during the course of the session by further Proclamation
made by the President.
(2) A session of the Assembly shall be held from time to
time so that a period of 12 months shall not intervene
between the last sitting of the Assembly in one session
and its first sitting in the next session.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. The legislature lacks the power to grant amnesty.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 75
(1) The President may
(a) grant to any person convicted of any offence a
pardon, either free or subject to lawful conditions.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.

Mexican Congress (Congreso)

447

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.

Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

MEXICAN CONGRESS (CONGRESO)

Expert consultants: Kathleen Bruhn, Roderic A. Camp, Ernesto Castaneda, Victor Hermosillo,
Jose Manuel Minjares Jimenez, Benito Nacif, Jeffrey A. Weldon
Score: .44
Influence over
executive (3/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no confidence

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)
X

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

Specified
powers (4/8)
X
X

12. no veto
13. no review
14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

19. amendments
20. war

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

23. pardon
24. judiciary

Institutional
capacity (2/6)

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

25. central bank

26. media

The Mexican Congress (Congreso) was established

in Mexicos 1824 constitution. This and other
nineteenth-century constitutions were largely
ignored by presidents, who tended to rule without close regard for the law. At the conclusion
of the Mexican Revolution (191017), the constitution currently in force was drawn up. Framers
sought to curtail the powers of the presidency,
although the president remained a central actor
in the post-revolutionary Mexican political system.
As the leaders of the hegemonic Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), successive Mexican presidents exerted sway over the other branches of government. In 2000, for the first time, a candidate
who did not come from the PRI, Vicente Fox, was
elected president.
Congress has some meaningful authority,
although its powers are not expansive. Its leverage over the executive is quite circumscribed, but
it does enjoy some institutional autonomy. The
legislature cannot be dissolved, and the president
cannot issue decrees without prior authorization
by Congress. The legislature holds four of the eight
specified powers assessed here: It has the authority

to grant amnesty, and its approval is needed to

declare war, ratify treaties, and confirm some highlevel judicial appointments. It has some institutional capacity, in part by virtue of the presence of
staff. Yet overall institutional capacity is relatively
low, for two reasons. First, legislators may not
run for re-election in successive terms. This provision prevents legislators from developing experience and expertise in the legislature. Furthermore,
the legislature is in session for only about five
months each year, which further limits its institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can impeach the president.
The Chamber of Deputies can declare grounds for
impeachment by a majority vote of its total membership. The Senate investigates the accusations
and can remove the president from office by a twothirds majority vote of its total membership.

448
Article 108
The President of the Republic, during his term of office,
may be impeached only for treason to the country and
serious common crimes.
Article 109
If the offense is of a common order, the Chamber of
Deputies acting as a grand jury shall determine, by
an absolute majority of votes of its total membership,
whether or not there are grounds for proceeding against
the accused.
Article 111
The Senate, constituted as a grand jury, shall take cognizance of all official offenses; but it may not open
the pertinent investigation without a previous bill of
impeachment by the Chamber of Deputies. If after conducting such proceedings as it deems advisable and
hearing the accused, the Chamber of Senators shall
decide by a two-thirds majority of all its members that
he is guilty, the latter shall be removed from office by
virtue of such decision and disqualified from holding
any other office for a period determined by law.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 62
Proprietary deputies and senators, during their terms of
office, may not hold any other commission or employment of the Federation or of the States for which they
receive a salary, without prior permission from the
respective chamber; but their representative functions
shall thereupon cease, while they are holding the new
position.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive. Additionally, the legislature
questions the executive following the presidents
annual Informe de Govierno, which is similar to the
State of the Union Address in the United States of
America.
4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.

Mexican Congress (Congreso)

6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

No. There is no prime minister.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The Senate must confirm only the attorney
general. All other ministers are appointed by the
president, and the appointments do not require
the legislatures approval.
Article 89
The powers and duties of the President are the following:
1. To appoint and remove freely the secretaries of the
Government . . . and to appoint and remove freely all
other employees of the Union whose appointment or
removal is not otherwise provided for in the Constitution or by law.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 81
The election of the President shall be direct and under
the terms prescribed by the Electoral Law.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in
the government.
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the
executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.
11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power. The legislature can authorize the executive temporary decree
power in specified issue areas.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds vote of the total membership of
both chambers of the legislature is required to override an executive veto.
Article 72
c. A bill or proposed decree rejected in whole or in part
by the Executive shall be returned, with his objections,
to the chamber of origin. It must be discussed anew by
the latter, and if it is confirmed by a vote of two thirds
of the total membership it shall again be sent to the

Mexican Congress (Congreso)

449

revisory chamber. If it is sanctioned by the latter by the

same majority, the bill shall become a law or decree
and shall be returned to the Executive for promulgation.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.

Article 51
The Chamber of Deputies is composed of representatives of the Nation, all elected every three years by the
Mexican citizens.

No. The Supreme Court of Justice has judicial

review power. This power, however, is limited. The
Court may hear only challenges brought by at least
one-third of Congress itself, or the attorney general, within thirty days of the publication of the
law.
14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all
policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all other
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The executive can introduce cuts to projected
expenditures if actual revenues are lower than
expected.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
Article 77
Each of the chambers, without the intervention of the
other, may:
1. Dictate economic resolutions relating to its internal
organization.
Article 127
The deputies and senators . . . shall receive a compensation for their services that shall be specified by law.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Members of the legislature enjoy immunity
only for statements made in their work as legislators. They are subject to arrest for common crimes.
Article 61
Deputies and senators are inviolable for opinions
expressed by them in the discharge of their offices and
shall never be called to account for them.
Article 108
Senators and deputies of the Congress of the
Union . . . are liable for common crimes that they may
commit during their term of office, and also for crimes,
offenses, or omissions that they incur in the exercise of
their office.

Yes. All members of Congress are elected.

Article 56
The Chamber of Senators shall be composed of two
members for each State and two for the Federal District,
all directly elected every six years.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments require the
approval of the majority of the provincial (state)
legislatures.
Article 135
The present Constitution may be added to or amended.
In order that the additions or amendments shall
become a part thereof, it shall be required that the
Congress of the Union, by a vote of two thirds of the
individuals present, agree to the amendments or additions and that they be approved by a majority of the
legislatures of the States.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for presidential war declarations.
Article 73
The Congress has the power:
XII. To declare war, in the light of information submitted by the Executive.
Article 89
The powers and duties of the President are the following:
XX. To declare war in the name of the United Mexican
States, pursuant to a previous law of the Congress of the
Union.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 76
The exclusive powers of the Senate are:
I. To approve the treaties and diplomatic conventions
made by the President of the Republic with foreign powers.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

450
Article 73
The Congress has the power:
XXII. To grant amnesties for crimes within the jurisdiction of the federal courts.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 89
The powers and duties of the President are the following:
XIV. To grant, according to law, pardons to criminals
convicted of crimes within the jurisdiction of the federal courts, and to those convicted of common crimes
in the Federal District and Territories.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. Congressional approval is necessary for some
high-level judicial appointments.
Article 73
VI. 4. Appointments of the magistrates of the superior
court of justice of the Federal District and of the Territories shall be made by the President of the Republic and submitted for the approval of the Chamber
of Deputies, which shall grant or refuse such approval
within a period of ten days, without extension.
Article 74
The exclusive powers of the Chamber of Deputies are:
vi. To grant or refuse its approval of appointments of
magistrates of the superior court of justice of the Federal
District and of the Territories, submitted to it by the
President of the Republic.
Article 76
The exclusive powers of the Senate are:
vi. To grant or deny its approval of the appointments
of ministers of the Supreme Court of Justice of the
Nation . . . which the President of the Republic may submit to it.
Article 96
Appointments of the ministers of the Supreme Court
shall be made by the President of the Republic and
submitted to the approval of the Chamber of Senators,
which shall grant or deny approval within the unalterable period of ten days.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the governor of the
Bank of Mexico.

Mexican Congress (Congreso)

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The public media are largely controlled by
executive branch bureaucracies with little input
from the legislature.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
No. The legislature is in session for only five
months each year. Ordinary sessions are scheduled
to last from September 1 to December 15 (except
in a presidential election year when it may extend
to December 31) and from March 15 to April 30.
During interim periods, a smaller legislative commission meets and has legislative power. Congress
may also vote to extend its own session.
28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.
Yes. The parliamentary groups provide personnel.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
Yes. See item 28.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
No. Consecutive re-election is forbidden. Legislators can run for re-election only after sitting out at
least one term.
Article 59
Senators and deputies to the Congress of the Union
cannot be reelected for the immediately following term.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
No. The ban on immediate re-election creates conditions under which most legislators treat their
offices as stepping stones to other positions. Legislators generally are not interested in seeking reelection after sitting out for one or more terms,
although some do seek to return to the legislature
at some later point in their careers.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
No. Since legislators are prohibited from serving
consecutive terms, the legislature contains relatively few highly experienced members.

Parliament of Moldova (Parlamentul)

451

PARLIAMENT OF MOLDOVA (PARLAMENTUL)

Expert consultants: Igor Botan, Radu Gorincioi, Natalia Postica, Vladimir Solonari, Lucan A. Way
Score: .75
Influence over
executive (8/9)

Institutional
autonomy (6/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

X
X

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

Specified
powers (6/8)
X
X

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

19. amendments
20. war

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

23. pardon
X

24. judiciary

25. central bank

26. media

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

The Parliament (Parlamentul) of Moldova was born

along with the new state following the dissolution
of the USSR in 1992. A new constitution in 1994
established the institutional framework of the current legislature. The 1994 constitution called for
a unicameral parliament with a popularly elected
president. In 2000 a constitutional amendment
granted parliament the power to elect the president.
The legislature influences the executive branch
with robust oversight powers and with powers to elect the prime minister and the president and shape the government. It also has
substantial institutional autonomy. It exercises
many specified powers and prerogatives, including
the powers to declare war, approve international
treaties, and grant amnesty. It has some institutional capacity, although legislators lack personal
staff.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can dismiss the prime minister
with a vote of no confidence. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of the Supreme
Court of Justice.

Article 81
(2) The President of the Republic of Moldova enjoys
immunity. He may not be brought to juridical responsibility for opinions expressed in the exercise of his mandate.
(3) The Parliament may decide to impeach the President of the Republic of Moldova by the vote of twothirds of the elected deputies if he commits a crime. The
competence of judgment belongs to the Supreme Court
of Justice in accordance with the law. The President is
removed from office by right on the day on which the
conviction is final (definitive).
Article 89
(1) In case of actions committed that violate the provisions of the Constitution, the President of the Republic
of Moldova may be removed from office by the Parliament by the vote of two-thirds of the elected deputies.
(2) The proposal for the removal from office may be
initiated by at least one-third of the deputies and must
be brought to the attention of the President of the
Republic Moldova without delay. The President may
provide the Parliament and the Constitutional Court
with explanations of the accusation brought against
him.
Article 106
(1) The Parliament may, on the proposal of at least one
quarter of the deputies, express no confidence in the
Government by the majority vote of the deputies.
(2) The initiative to express no confidence is examined
three days after the date when it was presented to the
Parliament.

452
Article 106.1
(2) The Government resigns if the motion of censure
brought within a three-month period from the moment
of introducing a program, declaration of a general political character or a bill is adopted in accordance with
Article 106.
(3) If the Government does not resign in accordance
with paragraph (2), the presented bill is considered
adopted, and the program or declaration of a general
political character [becomes] obligatory for the Government.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 70
(1) The position of a deputy is incompatible with the
performance of any other remunerated function with
the exception of teaching and scientific activity.
(2) Other incompatibilities are established by an
organic law.
Article 99
(1) The function of a member of the Government is
incompatible with the performance of any other remunerated function.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 105
(1) The Government and each of its members are obligated to respond to questions and interpellations formulated by deputies.
(2) Parliament may adopt a motion that expresses its
position on the subject of the interpellation.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. The legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. The president appoints as prime minister the
candidate who enjoys the support of the legislature.

Parliament of Moldova (Parlamentul)

Article 98
(1) After consultations with Parliamentary factions, the
President of the Republic of Moldova nominates a candidate for the office of the Prime Minister.
(2) The candidate for the office of the Prime Minister
shall request, within 15 days of his nomination, a vote
of confidence from the Parliament regarding his action
program and the entire composition of the Government.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The legislatures approval is required to confirm ministerial appointments.
Article 98
(1) After consultations with Parliamentary factions, the
President of the Republic of Moldova nominates a candidate for the office of the Prime Minister.
(2) The candidate for the office of the Prime Minister
shall request, within 15 days of his nomination, a vote
of confidence from the Parliament regarding his action
program and the entire composition of the Government.
(3) The action program and the composition of the
Government are debated in a session of the Parliament.
[The Parliament] expresses confidence in the Government by the majority vote of the elected deputies.
(4) Based on the vote of confidence expressed by the
Parliament, the President of the Republic of Moldova
appoints the Government.
(5) The Government exercises its powers from the day
its members take the oath before the President Republic
of Moldova.
(6) In case of governmental changes or vacancies in the
Government functions, the President of the Republic
of Moldova, upon the proposal of the Prime Minister,
dismisses from office and appoints individual members
of the Government.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The legislature elects the president. Prior to a
constitutional amendment in 2000, the president
was directly elected.
Article 78
(1) The President of the Republic of Moldova is elected
by secret ballot.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 106
(1) The Parliament may, on the proposal of at least one
quarter of the deputies, express no confidence in the
Government by the majority vote of the deputies.

Parliament of Moldova (Parlamentul)

(2) The initiative to express no confidence is examined
three days after the date when it was presented to the
Parliament.
Article 106.1
(2) The Government resigns if the motion of censure
brought within a three-month period from the moment
of introducing a program, declaration of a general political character or a bill is adopted in accordance with
Article 106.
(3) If the Government does not resign in accordance
with paragraph (2), the presented bill is considered
adopted, and the program or declaration of a general
political character [becomes] obligatory for the Government.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.

453
Article 106.2
(1) For implementing Government program of activities, at its proposal Parliament may adopt a special
law entitling Government to issue ordinances in the
domains other than subjects of organic laws.
(2) Entitling law has to stipulated the domain and the
term for issuing ordinances.
(3) Ordinances shall enter into force upon their publication, without being promulgated.
(4) Provided entitling law specifically stipulates so,
ordinances shall be approved by Parliament. The draft
law on approving the ordinances shall be submitted
within the term set in the entitling law. Failure to
observe the term results in annulment of the ordinance.
Unless Parliament rejects the draft law on approving the
ordinance, the later shall remain in force.
(5) After expiration of the term set for issuing ordinances, the latter may be abrogated, suspended or modified only by law.

Article 85
(1) In cases [when it is] impossible to form the Government or [when] the procedure for adoption of new legislation has been blocked for a period of three months,
the President of the Republic of Moldova, after consultation with parliamentary factions, may dissolve the
Parliament.
(2) The Parliament may be dissolved if it did not express
confidence in the formed Government within 45 days
of the first request and also after rejecting, at least twice,
the vote of confidence.
(3) In the course of a year, the Parliament may be dissolved only once.
(4) The Parliament may not be dissolved during the last
six months of the term of the President of the Republic
Moldova, with the exception of the case provided by
Article 78, paragraph (5) as well as during the time of
the state of urgency, siege or war.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires

ratification or approval by the legislature before
it takes effect; that is, the executive lacks decree
power.

No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.

Yes. The president and the government both lack

the power to issue decrees that have the force of
law. The president can issue regulatory decrees but
not decrees that have the force of law. The legislature can also delegate temporary decree powers to
the government.
Article 94
(1) In the exercise of his powers, the President of the
Republic of Moldova issues decrees obligatory for execution on the entire territory of the State. The decrees
are published in the Monitorul Oficial of the Republic
of Moldova.
(2) Decrees issued by the President in the exercise of his
powers provided in Article 86, paragraph (2) and Article
87, paragraphs (2), (3) and (4) are countersigned by the
Prime Minister.

Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto

by a majority vote of its present members.
Article 93
(1) The President of the Republic of Moldova promulgates laws.
(2) The President of the Republic of Moldova has the
right, in case he objects to a law, to send it within the
period of two weeks to the Parliament for reexamination. In the event that the Parliament maintains the
previously adopted decision, the President promulgates
the law.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.

Article 135
(1) The Constitutional Court:
a) Exercises, upon notification, control over the constitutionality of laws, decisions of the Parliament,
decrees of the President of the Republic of Moldova,
decisions and ordinances of the Government as well
as international treaties to which the Republic of
Moldova is a party;
b) Interprets the Constitution.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. The legislature is prohibited from passing legislation that affects budgetary incomes or expenses.
Article 131
(4) Any legislation or amendment increasing or reducing budget incomes or loans, as well as increasing or

454
reducing budgetary expenses, may be adopted only
after Government approval.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto, here
expressed as cases of flagrant offense.
Article 70
(3) A deputy may not be detained, arrested, searched
or prosecuted, with the exception of cases of flagrant
offense, without the Parliaments consent [and] after a
hearing.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 61
(1) The Parliament is elected on the basis of universal,
equal, direct, secret and freely expressed suffrage.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments can be presented
to parliament only on the advice of the Constitutional Court.
Article 141
(1) Revision of the Constitution may be initiated by:
a) At least 200,000 citizens of the Republic of
Moldova who have the right to vote. The citizens who
initiate the revision of the Constitution must represent at least a half of the administrative-territorial
units of second level, and at least 20,000 signers in
support of the initiative must be registered in each of
them;
b) At least one-third of the deputies of the Parliament;
c) The Government.
(2) Draft constitutional laws are presented to the Parliament only with the approval of the Constitutional
Court adopted by at least four judges.
Article 142
(1) The provisions regarding the sovereignty, independence and unity of the State, as well as those related to
the permanent neutrality of the State, may be revised

Parliament of Moldova (Parlamentul)

only with the approval of a referendum by the majority
vote of citizens registered to vote.
(2) No revision may be done if it results in the suppression of the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens
or of the guarantees thereof.
(3) The Constitution may not be revised during the
state of urgency, siege or war.
Article 143
(1) The Parliament has the right to adopt a law on
the amendment to the Constitution after at least six
months from the date when the corresponding initiative was presented. The law is adopted by the vote of
two-thirds of the deputies.
(2) If, within one year after the presentation of the initiative to amend the Constitution, the Parliament has
not adopted the corresponding constitutional law, the
proposal is considered null and void.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislature alone declares war with the
common exception for cases of foreign invasion.
In the event of foreign invasion, the president
can declare war and seek retroactive legislative
approval.
Article 66
The Parliament has the following basic powers:
m) To declare the states of urgency, siege and war.
Article 87
(1) The President of the Republic of Moldova is the
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.
(2) The President of the Republic of Moldova may
declare, upon prior approval of the Parliament, partial
or general mobilization.
(3) In the event of armed aggression against the country, the President of the Republic of Moldova takes measures to repel aggression, declares a state of war and
informs the Parliament without delay. If the Parliament
is not in session, it is convened by right within 24 hours
of the start of the aggression.
(4) The President of the Republic of Moldova may take
other measures in order to ensure national security and
public order within the limits and in accordance with
the law.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 66
The Parliament has the following basic powers:
g) To ratify, denounce, suspend and annul international treaties concluded by the Republic of Moldova.
Article 86
(1) The President of the Republic of Moldova conducts talks and participates in negotiations, concludes
international treaties in the name of the Republic of

Parliament of Moldova (Parlamentul)

Moldova and presents them, in the manner and time
period established by the law, to the Parliament for ratification.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.
Article 66
The Parliament has the following basic powers:
p) To adopt acts of amnesty.
Article 72
(1) The Parliament adopts constitutional, organic and
ordinary laws.
(2) Constitutional laws are those for the revision of the
Constitution.
(3) Organic laws regulate [the following]:
o) granting of amnesty and pardon.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. Formally, the parliament and the president
both have the power of pardon, but in practice,
the power of pardon is reserved for the president
alone.

455
who have passed through the selection process (concursul) are initially appointed for a term of five years.
After the expiration of the five-year term, judges are
appointed [for a term lasting] until they reach the age
limit established in accordance with the law.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
Yes. The legislature appoints the governor of the
National Bank of Moldova.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
Yes. The legislature has a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session for
approximately eight months each year.
Article 67
(1) The Parliament meets in two ordinary sessions per
year. The first session begins in February and may not
last beyond the end of July. The second session begins
in September and may not last beyond the end of
December.
(2) The Parliament also meets in extraordinary or special sessions at the request of the President of the Republic of Moldova, the President of Parliament or one-third
of the deputies.

Article 72
(1) The Parliament adopts constitutional, organic and
ordinary laws.
(2) Constitutional laws are those for the revision of the
Constitution.
(3) Organic laws regulate [the following]:
o) granting of amnesty and pardon.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Article 88
The President of the Republic of Moldova also exercises
the following powers:
e) Grants individual pardons.

No. There is legislative staff, but on average there

is less than one staff person for each legislator.
Legislative committees have between three and five
staff members for every eight to ten members.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.

Yes. The legislature appoints two of the six judges

on the Constitutional Court.
Article 136
(1) The Constitutional Court is composed of six judges
appointed for a six-year term.
(2) Two judges are appointed by the Parliament, two
by the Government and two by the Superior Council of
the Magistrature.
(3) The judges of the Constitutional Court elect its president by secret ballot.
Article 116
(1) Judges of judicial instances are independent, impartial and irremovable according to the law.
(2) Judges of judicial instances are appointed by the
President of the Republic of Moldova upon the proposal
of the Superior Council of the Magistrature (Consiliului
Superior al Magistraturii) according to the law. Judges

No. See item 28.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

456

Great State Assembly of Mongolia (Ulsiyn ikh-Hural)

GREAT STATE ASSEMBLY OF MONGOLIA (ULSIYN IKH-HURAL)

Expert consultants: L. Burma, D. Byambajav, N. Enhbold, B. Enkhbat, L. Sumati
Score: .84
Influence over
executive (8/9)

Institutional
autonomy (7/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack president
9. no confidence

X
X

Specified
powers (7/8)
X
X

Institutional
capacity (5/6)

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

X
X

26. media

The Great State Assembly (also translated as

National Parliament; Ulsiyn ikh-Hural) of Mongolia was established in the 1924 constitution,
which codified communist-party dominance that
endured for nearly seven decades. As in all Soviettype systems, the legislature hypothetically held
supreme power but was fully subordinate to the
hegemonic party in practice. The collapse of the
Soviet Union paved the way for a more open political system and a new constitution in 1992. Postcommunist Mongolia has a unicameral legislature,
a prime minister as the head of government, and
a directly elected president as the head of state. A
constitutional amendment in 1999 granted legislators the right to serve simultaneously in government. Prior to 1999 legislators lacked the formal
right to serve in government.
The legislature is a formidable force. It possesses
every means of influencing the executive scored in
this survey with the exception of the power to elect
the president. Apart from presidential veto powers and the Constitutional Courts power to review
the constitutionality of laws, moreover, the legislature has full institutional autonomy. Parliament
also scores nearly perfectly in terms of specified
powers and institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.

X
X

X
X
X

Yes. The legislature can impeach the president. It

can also remove the prime minister with a vote of
no confidence.
Article 25
The National Parliament may consider, at its initiative, any issue pertaining to domestic and foreign policies of the country, and retains within its exclusive
competence the following questions and decisions thereon:
5) to pass a law . . . to relieve or remove the President.
Article 43
(1) The Prime Minister may tender his resignation to
the National Parliament before the expiry of his terms
of office if he considers that the Government is unable
to exercise its powers.
(2) The Government steps down in its entirety upon
the resignation of the Prime Minister or if half of the
members of the Government resign at the same time.
(3) The National Parliament considers the matter and
makes a final decision within 15 days after taking initiative to dissolve the Government or receiving the Presidents proposal or the Prime Ministers statement on
resignation.
(4) The National Parliament considers and takes decision on the dissolution of the Government if not less
than one fourth of the members of the National Parliament formally propose the dissolution of the Government.
Article 44
If the Government submits a draft resolution requesting a vote of confidence, the National Parliament proceeds with the matter in accordance with Article 43
(3).

Great State Assembly of Mongolia (Ulsiyn ikh-Hural)

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Legislators may serve simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 29
(1) Members of the National Parliament receive remuneration from the State budget during their tenure and
may not hold concurrently any posts and employment
other than those assigned by law.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. The legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Article 25
The National Parliament may consider, at its initiative, any issue pertaining to domestic and foreign policies of the country, and retains within its exclusive
competence the following questions and decisions thereon:
6) Appointing, replacing or removing the Prime Minister, members of the Government and other bodies
responsible and accountable to the National Parliament
as provided for by law.
Article 33
The President enjoys the following prerogative rights:
2) to propose to the National Parliament the candidature for the appointment to the post of Prime Minister
in consultation with the majority party or parties in
the National Parliament if none of them has majority
of seats.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The legislature appoints ministers.
Article 25
The National Parliament may consider, at its initiative,
any issue pertaining to domestic and foreign policies

457
of the country, and retains within its exclusive competence the following questions and decisions thereon:
6) Appointing, replacing or removing the Prime Minister, members of the Government and other bodies
responsible and accountable to the National Parliament
as provided for by law.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 31
(1) Presidential elections are conducted in two stages.
(2) Political parties which have obtained seats in the
National Parliament nominate individually or collectively presidential candidates, one candidate for each
party or coalition of parties.
(3) At the primary stage of the elections, citizens eligible to vote participate in electing the President on
the basis of universal, free, and direct suffrage by secret
ballot.
(4) The National Parliament considers the candidate
who has obtained a majority of all votes cast in the first
voting as elected President and passes a law recognizing
his or her mandate.
(5) If none of the candidates obtains a majority vote
in the first round, second voting takes place involving the two candidates who have obtained the largest
number of votes in the first round. The candidate who
wins a majority of all votes cast in the second ballot
is considered elected President and a law recognizing
his or her mandate is passed by the National Parliament.
(6) If neither of the candidates wins in the second ballot, Presidential elections are held anew.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 43
(1) The Prime Minister may tender his resignation to
the National Parliament before the expiry of his terms
of office if he considers that the Government is unable
to exercise its powers.
(2) The Government steps down in its entirety upon
the resignation of the Prime Minister or if half of the
members of the Government resign at the same time.
(3) The National Parliament considers the matter and
makes a final decision within 15 days after taking initiative to dissolve the Government or receiving the Presidents proposal or the Prime Ministers statement on
resignation.
(4) The National Parliament considers and takes decision on the dissolution of the Government if not less
than one fourth of the members of the National Parliament formally propose the dissolution of the Government.

458
Article 44
If the Government submits a draft resolution requesting
a vote of confidence, the National Parliament proceeds
with the matter in accordance with Article 43 (3).

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution
by the executive, although it can vote to dissolve
itself.
Article 22
(1) If regular elections of the National Parliament cannot be held due to extraordinary circumstances such as
sudden calamities occurred in the whole or in part of
the country, the National Parliament retains its power
till the extraordinary circumstances cease to exist and
the newly elected members of the National Parliament
are sworn in.
(2) The National Parliament may decide on its dissolution if not less than two thirds of its members consider that the National Parliament is unable to carry out
its mandate, or if the President, in consultation with
the Chairman of the National Parliament, proposes to
do so for the same reason. In case of such a decision,
the National Parliament exercises its powers until the
newly elected members of the National Parliament are
sworn in.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive cannot issue decrees that have
the force of law. The president and government
can issue regulatory decrees to implement law.
Article 33
The President enjoys the following prerogative rights:
3) to instruct the Government on issues within his
competence. If the President issues a relevant decree
it becomes effective upon signature by the Prime
Minister.
Article 34
(1) The President, within his powers, issues decrees in
conformity with the law.
(2) If a Presidential decree is incompatible with law,
the President himself or the National Parliament invalidates it.
Article 45
(1) The Government shall, in conformity with legislation, issue decrees and ordinances which shall be signed
by the Prime Minister and the Minister responsible for
their application.
(2) If these decrees and ordinances are incompatible
with laws and regulations, the Government itself or the
National Parliament shall invalidate them.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.

Great State Assembly of Mongolia (Ulsiyn ikh-Hural)

No. A two-thirds majority vote is required to override a presidential veto.

Article 33
(1) The President enjoys the following prerogative
rights:
1) to veto, partially or wholly, laws and other decisions adopted by the National Parliament. The laws
or decisions remain in force if two-thirds of the members of the National Parliament present do not accept
the Presidents veto.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 64
(1) The Constitutional Court is an organ exercising
supreme supervision over the implementation of the
constitution, making judgment on the violation of its
provisions, and resolving constitutional disputes. It is
the guarantee for the strict observance of the Constitution.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune.
Article 29
(2) Immunity of members of the National Parliament
is protected by law.
(3) If a question arises that a member of the National
Parliament is involved in a crime, it is considered by
the session of the National Parliament to decide on the
suspension of his or her mandate. If the court proves the
member in question to be guilty of crime, the National
Parliament shall terminate his or her membership in
the legislature.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.

Great State Assembly of Mongolia (Ulsiyn ikh-Hural)

Article 21
(2) The members of the National Parliament are elected
by citizens qualified to vote, on the basis of universal,
free, and direct suffrage by secret ballot for a term of
four years.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can pass constitutional amendments with a three-fourths majority vote.
Article 68
(1) Amendments to the Constitution may be initiated
by organizations and officials enjoying the right to legislative initiative and may be proposed by the Constitutional Court to the National Parliament.
(2) A national referendum on constitutional amendment may be held on the concurrence of not less than
two-thirds of the members of the National Parliament.
The referendum is held in accordance with the provisions of Article 25 (1) No. 16.
Article 69
(1) An amendment to the Constitution is adopted by
not less that three-fourths of votes of all members of
the National Parliament.
(2) A draft amendment to the Constitution which has
twice failed to win three-fourths of votes of all members of the National Parliament is not subject to consideration until the National Parliament sits in a new
composition following general elections.
(3) The National Parliament may not undertake
amendment of the Constitution within six months
pending the next general elections.
(4) Amendments which have been adopted are of the
same force as the Constitution.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislature declares war with the common
exception for cases of foreign invasion. In the event
that the country is threatened by external invasion
and the legislature is in recess, the president can
declare war without first obtaining the legislatures
approval. The war declaration must be retroactively
approved by the legislature within seven days or
the declaration becomes null and void.
Article 25
The National Parliament may consider, at its initiative,
any issue pertaining to domestic and foreign policies
of the country, and retains within its exclusive competence the following questions and decisions thereon:
17) to declare a state of war in case the sovereignty
and independence of the state are threatened by armed
actions on the part of a foreign power, and to abate
it.
Article 33
The President enjoys the following prerogative rights:
12) to declare a state of emergency or a state of war on
the whole or a part of the national territory and to order

459
the deployment of armed forces when extraordinary circumstances described in Article 25 (2) and (3) arise and
the National Parliament concurrently in recess, cannot be summoned at short notice. The National Parliament considers within 7 days the Presidential decree
declaring a state of emergency or a state of war and
approves or disapproves it. If the National Parliament
does not take decision on the matter, the Presidential
decree becomes null and void.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 25
The National Parliament may consider, at its initiative,
any issue pertaining to domestic and foreign policies
of the country, and retains within its exclusive competence the following questions and decisions thereon:
15) to ratify and denounce international agreements
to which Mongolia is a Party and to establish and sever
diplomatic relations with foreign States at the suggestion of the Government.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.
Article 25
The National Parliament may consider, at its initiative,
any issue pertaining to domestic and foreign policies
of the country, and retains within its exclusive competence the following questions and decisions thereon:
14) to issue acts of amnesty.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 33
The President enjoys the following prerogative rights:
8) to grant pardon.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislature appoints the members of the
Constitutional Court.
Article 51
(1) The Supreme Court comprises the Chief Justice and
judges.
(2) The President appoints the judges of the Supreme
Court upon their presentation to the National Parliament by the General Council of Courts and appoints
judges of other courts on the proposal of the General
Council of Courts.
Article 65
(1) The Constitutional Court consists of 9 members.
Members of the Constitutional Court are appointed by
the National Parliament for a term of six years upon

460

Great State Assembly of Mongolia (Ulsiyn ikh-Hural)

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

the nomination of three of them by the National Parliament, three by the President, and the remaining three
by the Supreme Court.
(3) The Chairman of the Constitutional Court is elected
from among 9 members for a term of three years by a
majority vote of the members of Constitutional Court.
He may be re-elected once.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

Yes. The legislature appoints the governor of the

Bank of Mongolia.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

Yes.

Yes. The legislature has a substantial voice in the

operation of the public media.

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes. The constitution requires that the legislature
meets for at least two fifty-day sessions each year.
In practice, the legislature is in regular session for
well over half of the year.

Yes. Postcommunist Mongolia has experienced

several major alternations in power between rival
parties following parliamentary elections, and the
turnover rate of legislators has been substantial,
but parliament nevertheless includes a cohort of
experienced members.

Article 27
(2) The National Parliament holds a regular session,
which lasts not less then 50 workdays per six-month.

PARLIAMENT OF MOROCCO (BARLAMAN)

Expert consultants: Sanket Dhruva, Silam El Yaghmouri, Abdou Filali-Ansary,
Abdeslam M. Maghraoui, Saloua Zerhouni
Score: .31
Influence over
executive (3/9)

Institutional
autonomy (2/9)

Specified
powers (1/8)

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

1.
2.
3.
4.

10.
11.
12.
13.

19.
20.
21.
22.

27.
28.
29.
30.

replace
serve as ministers
interpellate
investigate

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

no dissolution
no decree
no veto
no review

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

The Parliament (Barlaman) of Morocco was established in the 1962 constitution. Since that time
the king has dominated national politics, leaving

amendments
war
treaties
amnesty

23. pardon
24. judiciary
X

sessions
secretary
staff
no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

25. central bank

26. media

the legislature with only modest power. In 1965

the king temporarily suspended parliament in the
face of social unrest. A constitutional amendment

Parliament of Morocco (Barlaman)

in 1996 added a second house to create a bicameral legislature consisting of a lower house, the
House of Representatives (Majlis an-Nuwab), and
an upper house, the House of Counselors (Majlis
al-Mustasharin).
The legislatures influence over the executive is
severely limited, and its institutional autonomy
is circumscribed by the kings veto, dissolution,
decree, and gatekeeping powers. Of the specified
powers covered in this survey, parliament possesses only one, the right to be involved in judicial appointments. The legislature does enjoy some
institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. The legislature cannot impeach the king. The
legislature can remove the prime minister from
office with a vote of no confidence.
Article 75
The Prime Minister may engage the responsibility of
the Government before the House of Representatives
through a vote of confidence regarding a statement on
a general policy or a proposal requesting the approval
thereof. Confidence shall be withdrawn and a bill
rejected only by an absolute majority vote of the Members of the House of Representatives. The vote shall be
held three clear days after the matter of the vote of confidence has been raised. Withdrawal of confidence shall
entail the resignation of the Government in a body.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.

461
committees may be established on the Kings initiative
or upon the request of the majority of the members of
one of the two Houses and within each House, with
the mission of inquiring about specific facts and submitting findings thereon to that House. There shall be
no fact-finding committees in cases involving prosecutions, and as long as these are being conducted. The
mission of any fact-finding committee which may be
established shall end with the opening of the judicial investigation pertaining to the instances bringing
about the establishment thereof. Fact-finding committees shall by nature be temporary. Their mission shall
end with the submission of their reports. The functioning of these committees shall be governed by an organic
law.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The king appoints the prime minister.
Article 24
The King shall appoint the Prime Minister. Upon
the Prime Ministers recommendation, the King shall
appoint the other Cabinet members as he may terminate their services. The King shall terminate the services of the Government either on his own initiative or
because of their resignation.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The king appoints ministers on the prime ministers recommendation, and the appointments do
not require the legislatures approval.

Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials

from the executive.

Article 24
The King shall appoint the Prime Minister. Upon
the Prime Ministers recommendation, the King shall
appoint the other Cabinet members as he may terminate their services. The King shall terminate the services of the Government either on his own initiative or
because of their resignation.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.

No. Formally, the legislature can establish parliamentary fact-finding committees to investigate
the executive. In practice, the legislature lacks the
power to investigate the royal palace.

Yes. The country lacks a presidency. The monarch

is the head of state.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.

Article 42
Apart from the standing committees referred to in
the preceding paragraph, parliamentary fact-finding

Article 20
The Moroccan Crown and the constitutional rights
thereof shall be hereditary and handed down, from
father to son, to descendants in direct male line and
by order of primogeniture among the offspring of His

462

Parliament of Morocco (Barlaman)

Majesty King Hassan II, unless the King should, during

his lifetime, designate a successor among his sons apart
from the eldest one. In case of failing descendants in
direct male line, the right of succession to the Throne
shall, under the same conditions, be invested in the
closest male in the collateral consanguinity.

Article 67
The King may request a second reading by the two
Houses of any draft bill or proposed law.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Article 69
After a second reading, the King may, by Royal Decree,
submit any draft bill or proposed law to referendum,
except in the case of those submitted for a new reading
which shall have been adopted or rejected by a twothird majority of the members of each one of the two
Houses.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the

government.
Article 75
The Prime Minister may engage the responsibility of
the Government before the House of Representatives
through a vote of confidence regarding a statement on
a general policy or a proposal requesting the approval
thereof. Confidence shall be withdrawn and a bill
rejected only by an absolute majority vote of the Members of the House of Representatives. The vote shall be
held three clear days after the matter of the vote of
confidence has been raised. Withdrawal of confidence
shall entail the resignation of the Government in a
body.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The king can dissolve the legislature.
Article 27
The King may dissolve the two Houses of Parliament
or one thereof by Royal Decree, in accordance with the
conditions prescribed in Articles 71 and 73.
Article 71
After consulting with the Presidents of the two Houses
and the Chairman of the Constitutional Council and
addressing the Nation, the King may decree the dissolution of the two Houses or of one of them only.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The king issues decrees that have the force of
law.
Article 29
The King shall, by Royal Decrees, exercise the statutory
powers explicitly conferred upon him by the Constitution. Royal Decrees shall be countersigned by the Prime
Minister, with the exception of those provided for in
Articles 21 (Paragraph 2), 24 (paragraphs 1, 3 and 4),
35, 69, 71, 79, 84, 91, 99 and 105.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority vote in both houses is
required to override the monarchs veto.

Article 68
A second reading shall be requested in a message. Such
a new reading shall not be refused.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Council can review the
constitutionality of laws.
Article 81
The Constitutional Council shall perform the functions
assigned by the articles of the Constitution or the provisions of the organic laws . . . Organic laws before
promulgation and the Rules of Procedure of each
House before implementation shall be submitted to
the Constitutional Council to look into their consistence with the Constitution. Before promulgation, laws
may, for the same reason, be referred to the Constitutional Council by the King, the Prime Minister, the President of the House of Representatives, the President of
the House of Counselors or one-fourth of the members
making up one House or the other. The Constitutional
Council shall have one month to decide upon the special instances stated in the preceding two paragraphs.
However, in case of emergency, the deadline may be reduced to eight days if so requested by the Government.
Regarding the above mentioned instances, referring
law to the Constitutional Council shall entail the suspension of the deadline of the promulgation thereof.
No unconstitutional provision shall be promulgated or
implemented. Decisions of the Constitutional Council shall, in no way, be put into question. They shall,
furthermore, be binding upon all public authorities,
administrative and judicial sectors.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. The legislature is prohibited from initiating
bills beyond a restricted domain of issues and generally may not initiate bills in areas that the government deems outside the purview of the legislative
power.
Article 46
Within the domain of the law are, in addition to the
matters which are expressly assigned to it by other articles of the Constitution:
individual and collective rights enumerated in Title
One of the present Constitution;

Parliament of Morocco (Barlaman)

the determination of misdemeanors and the penalties
which are applicable, penal procedure, civil procedure
and the establishment and the creation of new categories of jurisdiction;
the Statute of Magistrates;
the General Statute of the Civil Service;
the fundamental guarantees accorded to civil and military functionaries;
the electoral regime of the assemblies and the Councils of local collectivities;
the regime of civil and commercial liabilities;
the creation of public establishments;
the nationalization of enterprises and the transfer of
enterprises from the public sector to the private sector.
The Parliament is entitled to vote framework laws concerning fundamental objectives of the economic, social
and cultural action of the State.
Article 47
All other matters which are not within the legislative
domain belong to the regulatory domain.
Article 53
The Government may declare the unsuitability of any
proposal or amendment considered outside the purview
of the legislative power. In case of disagreement, the
Constitutional Council shall take action within a period
of eight days upon request of one of the two Houses or
the Government.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power
to impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The king can impound funds appropriated by
the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislators can be prosecuted for the expression of any opinion that may be injurious to the
monarchical system and the religion of Islam or
derogatory to the respect owed the king.
Article 39
No member of Parliament shall be prosecuted, arrested,
put into custody or brought to trial as a result of expressing opinions or casting a vote while exercising office
functions, except when the opinions expressed may be
injurious to the monarchical system and the religion of
Islam or derogatory to the respect owed the king. During parliamentary sessions, no member of Parliament
shall be subject to prosecution or arrest for criminal
charges or felonies, besides those mentioned in the preceding paragraph, without permission from the House
except flagrante delicto.

463
Outside parliamentary sessions, no member of Parliament shall be subject to arrest without permission from
the Board of the House, except flagrante delicto, or in
the case of authorized prosecution or final judgment.
The imprisonment or prosecution of a member of Parliament shall be suspended if so required by the House,
except flagrante delicto or in the case of authorized
prosecution or final judgment.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 37
Members of the House of Representatives shall be
elected for a six- year term by direct universal suffrage.
The legal legislative period shall end at the opening of
the October session in the fifth year following the election of the House.
Article 38
For 3/5 of its membership, the House of Counsellors
shall consist of members elected in each region by electoral colleges made up of elected members of trade
chambers as well as members elected at the national
level by an electoral college consisting of wage-earners
representatives.
Members of the House of Counsellors shall be elected
for a nine-year term. One third of the House shall
be renewed every three years. In the first and second
renewal operations, seats shall be drawn by lot. The
number of counsellors as well as the voting system,
the number of members to be elected by each electoral
college, the distribution of seats according to regions,
eligibility requirements, incompatibility cases, balloting procedures mentioned above and legal contentions
concerning elections shall be set out in an organic
law.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. All constitutional amendments have been initiated by the king, and any violation of this norm
would be unimaginable. Formally, the legislature
can amend the constitution with a two-thirds
majority vote in both houses.
Article 103
The King, the House of Representatives and the House
of Counsellors shall have the right to initiate a revision
of the Constitution. The King shall have the right to
submit, directly for referendum, the revision project he
may initiate.
Article 104
A proposal for revision submitted by one or more members of one of the two Houses shall be adopted only if
voted on by a two-thirds majority of the members of
the House concerned. The proposal shall be submitted
to the other House which may adopt it by a two-thirds
majority of its members.

464

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. The king can declare war without obtaining
the legislatures approval.
Article 66
The Cabinet shall be notified of the following, before
any relevant decision is taken:
(c) declaration of war.
Article 74
The declaration of war shall be announced after notifying the House of Representatives and the House of
Counsellors.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
No. The king can conclude international treaties
without the legislatures approval. Treaties requiring approval under law can be concluded with a
royal decree (see item 11).
Article 31
The King shall sign and ratify treaties. However, treaties
committing State finances shall not be ratified without
having been approved under the law.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. The king has the power to grant amnesty.

Parliament of Morocco (Barlaman)

Article 91
The High Court of Justice shall consist of equal numbers
of members elected from the House of Representatives
and the House of Counsellors. Its President shall be
appointed by Royal Decree.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The king appoints the governor of the Bank of
Morocco.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature meets in two three-month sessions each year.
Article 40
The Parliament shall hold its meetings during two sessions a year. The King shall preside over the opening of
the first session which shall begin on the second Friday
in October. The second session shall begin on the second Friday in April. When the Parliament convenes for
at least three months during one session, the session
may be adjourned by decree.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The king has the power of pardon.
Article 34
The King shall exercise the right of granting pardon.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislature elects some of the members of
the High Court of Justice.
Article 79
The Constitutional Council shall be made up of six
members appointed by the King for a nine-year period.
Upon consultation with parliamentary groups, six
other members shall be appointed for the same period,
half of them by the President of the House of Representatives and the other half by the President of the
House of Counsellors. A third of each category of members shall be renewed every three years. The chairman
of the Constitutional Council shall be selected by the
king among the members appointed by him.
Article 84
Upon recommendations made by the Supreme Council
of Magistracy, Magistrates shall be appointed by Royal
Decrees.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

Assembly of Mozambique (Assembleia)

465

ASSEMBLY OF MOZAMBIQUE (ASSEMBLEIA)

Expert consultants: Joao Carlos Colaco, Carrie L. Manning, Eduardo Sitoe, Zaida Maria Sultanegy,
Jan Nico van Overbeeke, Elysa Vieira
Score: .44
Influence over
executive (3/9)

Institutional
autonomy (3/9)

Specified
powers (5/8)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

23. pardon

24. judiciary

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

Institutional
capacity (3/6)

X
X
X

25. central bank

X

The Assembly (Assembleia) of Mozambique was

established in 1975 upon independence from Portugal. For the next fifteen years, Mozambique was
ruled as a single-party Marxist-Leninist regime and
was engulfed in civil war. A new constitution in
1990 paved the way for multiparty elections in
1994 and an enhanced role for the legislature.
The legislatures ability to influence the executive branch is limited to powers to interpellate,
investigate, and vote no confidence in the government. The executive lacks gatekeeping authority
and the power to appoint members of the legislature, and legislators are immune from arrest, but
otherwise the legislature lacks institutional autonomy. The one area where the legislatures authority is expansive is that of specified powers; it enjoys
five of the eight such powers assessed in this survey.
The legislature has weak institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. The legislature cannot impeach the president.
Article 132
1. The President of the Republic shall enjoy immunity from civil and criminal proceedings with

26. media

respect to actions taken in the discharge of his

duties.
2. During the term of his office the President of the
Republic may not be sued in court for actions taken
outside the discharge of his duties.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. As established by law, ministers are prohibited from serving simultaneously in the legislature.
Article 192
1. No person may hold at the same time more than one
of the following positions:
President of the Republic, President of the Assembly of
the Republic, Prime Minister, President of the Supreme
Court, Deputy President of the Supreme Court, President of the Constitutional Council, President of the
Administrative Court, Attorney-General of the Republic, Deputy Attorney-General of the Republic, Provincial
Governor, Secretary of State.
2. The position of member of Government (Cabinet)
shall also be incompatible with the posts named above,
except those of President of the Republic and Prime
Minister, since these are themselves members of Government.
3. Other cases of incompatibility may be established by
law.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive

466

branch officials testifying before the legislature or its

committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister.
Article 121
In the function of directing government activity, the
President of the Republic shall have power to:
b) appoint, exonerate, and dismiss the Prime Minister.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints the ministers, and
the appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 121
In the function of directing government activity, the
President of the Republic shall have power to:
d) appoint, exonerate and dismiss:
Ministers and Deputy Ministers.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 118
1. The President of the Republic shall be elected by
direct universal suffrage and by personal and secret
ballot.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government (reject the governments program).
Article 136
1. At the beginning of each legislative session, the
Assembly of the Republic shall evaluate the programme
of the Government.
2. The Government may present a revised programme
that takes the conclusions of the debate into account.

Assembly of Mozambique (Assembleia)

3. Should the Assembly of the Republic, after debate,
reject the Governments programme, the President of
the Republic may dissolve the Assembly and call new
general elections.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 120
In his role as head of State, the President of the Republic
shall have power to:
e) dissolve on a onetime basis the Assembly of the
Republic if the Assembly does not approve the program
of the government.
Article 136
1. At the beginning of each legislative session, the
Assembly of the Republic shall evaluate the programme
of the Government.
2. The Government may present a revised programme that takes the conclusions of the debate into
account.
3. Should the Assembly of the Republic, after debate,
reject the Governments programme, the President of
the Republic may dissolve the Assembly and call new
general elections.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires

ratification or approval by the legislature before
it takes effect; that is, the executive lacks decree
power.
No. Formally, the president and the government
can issue regulatory decrees and presidential orders
only. In practice, the president and the government issue decrees that have the force of law.
Article 131
Regulatory acts of the President of the Republic shall
take the form of presidential decrees. Other decisions
arising from the Presidents constitutional powers shall
take the form of presidential orders. Both are to be published in the Boletim da Republica.

Article 157
1. Regulatory acts of the Council of Ministers shall take
the form of decrees. Other decisions of the Council of
Ministers shall take the form of resolutions.
2. Decrees and resolutions shall be signed by the Prime
Minister and published in the Boletim da Republica.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority vote is required to override a presidential veto.
Article 124
3. The President of the Republic may return a bill to
the Assembly of the Republic for reexamination, giving
reasons in a message to the Assembly.

Assembly of Mozambique (Assembleia)

467

4. Should the bill, under reexamination, be approved

by a two-thirds majority, the President of the Republic
shall promulgate it as law and order its publication.

Article 134
1. The Assembly of the Republic shall be elected by
direct universal suffrage and personal secret ballot.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.

No. The Constitutional Council can review the

constitutionality of laws.

Yes. The legislature can amend the constitution

with a two-thirds majority vote.

Article 181
1. The Constitutional Council shall have power to:
a) adjudicate the constitutionality and legality of legislative and regulatory acts of State organs.

Article 120
In his role as head of State, the President of the Republic
shall have power to:
c) decide on the holding of referenda on amendments
to the Constitution or on matters of fundamental interest for the nation.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The president can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
No. The legislature is dependent on the executive
for the resources that finance its own operations.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.

Article 198
1. Amendments to the Constitution may be proposed
by the President of the Republic or by at least one-third
of the deputies to the Assembly of the Republic.
2. Draft amendments must be submitted to the Assembly of the Republic 90 days before the opening of
debate.
Article 199
1. If a proposed amendment implies fundamental
changes in the rights of citizens or in the organization
of public powers, the proposal, after adoption by the
Assembly of the Republic, shall be submitted to public
debate and to a referendum.
2. The results of the referendum and the approved constitutional text shall be adopted by the Assembly of the
Republic in the form of a constitutional law, and shall
be published by order of the President of the Republic.
3. In other cases, amendments to the Constitution shall
be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the deputies of
the Assembly of the Republic.

Yes. Legislators are immune with the common

exception for cases of flagrante delicto, here
expressed as in the very act of committing a criminal offense.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Article 144
1. No deputy to the Peoples Assembly may be arrested,
unless apprehended in the very act of committing a
criminal offense. No deputy may be brought to trial
without the consent of the Assembly or its Standing
Commission.
2. Deputies to the Peoples Assembly shall be tried by
the Supreme Court.

Article 122
In matters of national defense and public order, the
President of the Republic shall have power to:
a) declare a state of war and its termination, a state of
siege or a state of emergency.

Article 145
1. Deputies to the Peoples Assembly may not be sued,
detained, or put on trial for opinions voiced or votes
cast in exercising their functions as deputies.
2. The above does not apply to civil or criminal responsibility for defamation or slander.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.

No. The president can declare war without the legislatures approval.

Article 159
In particular, the National Defense and Security Council shall have power to:
a) pronounce upon a state of war before such is
declared.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 122
In matters of national defense and public order, the
President of the Republic shall have power to:
b) make treaties.

468
Article 135
1. The Assembly of the Republic shall have power to
legislate on basic questions of the countrys domestic
and foreign policy.
2. In particular, the Assembly of the Republic shall have
power to:
k) ratify and terminate international treaties.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.
Article 135
1. The Assembly of the Republic shall have power to
legislate on basic questions of the countrys domestic
and foreign policy.
2. In particular, the Assembly of the Republic shall have
power to:
l) grant amnesties and pardons.

Assembly of Mozambique (Assembleia)

4. The Assembly of the Republic shall elect the other
judges to the Supreme Court.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the governor of the
Bank of Mozambique.
Article 121
In the function of directing government activity, the
President of the Republic shall have power to:
d) appoint, exonerate and dismiss:
the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Bank of
Mozambique.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes. The legislature and the president both have

the power of pardon.

No. The legislature does not regularly meet in ordinary session.

Article 120
In his role as head of State, the President of the Republic
shall have power to:
i) grant pardons and commute sentences.

Article 139
The Assembly of the Republic shall meet in ordinary
session twice a year, and in extraordinary session whenever requested by the President of the Republic, by the
Standing Commission of the Assembly of the Republic,
or by at least one-third of the deputies of the Assembly
of the Republic.

Article 135
1. The Assembly of the Republic shall have power to
legislate on basic questions of the countrys domestic
and foreign policy.
2. In particular, the Assembly of the Republic shall have
power to:
l) grant amnesties and pardons.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislature appoints some members of the
Supreme Court.
Article 120
In his role as head of State, the President of the Republic
shall have power to:
g) appoint the President and Deputy President of
the Supreme Court, the President of the Constitutional Council, and the President of the Administrative Court.
Article 170
1. The Supreme Court shall be composed of professional
judges and of elected judges, the number to be established by law.
2. The professional judges shall be appointed by the
President of the Republic, after consultation with the
Supreme Council of the Judiciary.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Across the 1994, 1999, and 2004 Assembly
elections, re-election rates were sufficiently high
to produce a significant number of highly experienced members.

Peoples Assembly of Myanmar (Burma) (Pyithu Hluttaw)

469

PEOPLES ASSEMBLY OF MYANMAR (BURMA) (PYITHU HLUTTAW )

Score: .00
Influence over
executive (0/9)

Institutional
autonomy (0/9)

Specified
powers (0/8)

Institutional
capacity (0/6)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no confidence

24. judiciary
25. central bank
26. media

18. all elected

The Peoples Assembly (Pyithu Hluttaw) of Myanmar (Burma) has been suspended since 1988. The
Assembly traces its origins to the 1948 Constitution of the Union of Burma, which called for
the creation of a bicameral Union Parliament. In
1962 a military coup brought to power a socialist
government. In 1974 the government established a
new constitution and a unicameral Peoples Assembly. In 1988 a military junta named the State
Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) suspended the constitution. Legislative elections were

held in 1990, but the juntas displeasure with the

results, which produced a landslide for the opposition National League for Democracy, prompted it
to deny the legislatures right to assemble.
In 2008 a new draft constitution passed in
a national referendum whose result was widely
regarded as rigged. Although the new constitution may pave the way for parliamentary elections in 2010, the juntas track record in power
leaves ample grounds for skepticism regarding the
promise of future elections.

470

National Assembly of Namibia

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF NAMIBIA

Expert consultants: Achieng Akumu, Joshua B. Forrest, Jakes Jacobs, G. J. C. Strydom,
Diana Swain
Score: .50
Influence over
executive (5/9)

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack president
9. no confidence

Specified
powers (2/8)
X

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

X
X
X

26. media
X

The National Assembly of Namibia was established

in the 1990 constitution upon independence from
South Africa. The document called for a bicameral legislature consisting of a lower house, the
National Assembly (from which the entire legislature takes its name), and an upper house, the
National Council, whose members are elected by
regional councils.
The legislature enjoys substantial influence over
the executive. It can remove the president and
appoint its members to the government, and it
has effective powers of oversight over the executive branch. The legislature has some institutional
autonomy but must live with presidential veto and
dissolution powers and de facto lack of immunity
for legislators. The legislature is granted few specified powers. It has a moderate amount of institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can remove the president from
office by a two-thirds majority vote of the total
membership in both houses.
Article 29
(1)(a) The Presidents term of office shall be five years
unless he or she dies or resigns before the expiry of the
said term or is removed from office.

(b) In the event of the dissolution of the National

Assembly in the circumstances provided for under
Article 57 (1), the Presidents term of office shall also
expire.
(2) A President shall be removed from office if a twothirds majority of all the members of the National
Assembly, confirmed by a two-thirds majority of all the
members of the National Council, adopts a resolution
impeaching the President on the ground that he or she
has been guilty of a violation of the Constitution or
guilty of a serious violation of the laws of the land or
otherwise guilty of such gross misconduct or ineptitude
as to render him or her unfit to hold with dignity and
honour the office of President.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Legislators may serve simultaneously in ministerial positions.
3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 59
(3) For the purpose of exercising its powers and performing its functions any committee of the National
Assembly established in terms of Paragraph (1) shall
have the power to subpoena persons to appear before it
to give evidence on oath and to produce any documents
required by it.

National Assembly of Namibia

Article 63
(2) The National Assembly shall further have the power
and function, subject to this Constitution:
(f) to receive reports on the activities of the Executive, including para-statal enterprises, and from time
to time to require any senior official to appear before
any of the committees of the National Assembly to
account for and explain his or her acts and programmes.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. The legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister.
Article 32
(3) The President . . . shall have the power, subject to
this Constitution to; i) appoint the following persons:
(aa) the Prime Minister.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 32
(3) The President . . . shall have the power, subject to
this Constitution to (i) appoint the following persons:
(bb) Ministers and Deputy-Ministers.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 28
(1) The President shall be elected in accordance with
the provisions of this Constitution and subject thereto.
(2) Election of the President shall be:
(a) by direct, universal and equal suffrage.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature can remove the president with
a two-thirds majority vote and can vote no confidence in individual ministers with a majority vote,

471

but it cannot vote no confidence in the government as a whole.

Article 29
(1)(a) The Presidents term of office shall be five years
unless he or she dies or resigns before the expiry of the
said term or is removed from office.
(b) In the event of the dissolution of the National
Assembly in the circumstances provided for under
Article 57 (1), the Presidents term of office shall also
expire.
(2) A President shall be removed from office if a twothirds majority of all the members of the National
Assembly, confirmed by a two-thirds majority of all the
members of the National Council, adopts a resolution
impeaching the President on the ground that he or she
has been guilty of a violation of the Constitution or
guilty of a serious violation of the laws of the land or
otherwise guilty of such gross misconduct or ineptitude
as to render him or her unfit to hold with dignity and
honour the office of President.
Article 39
The President shall be obliged to terminate the appointment of any member of the Cabinet, if the National
Assembly by a majority of all its members resolves that
it has no confidence in that member.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 57
(1) The National Assembly may be dissolved by the
President on the advice of the Cabinet if the Government is unable to govern effectively.
(2) Should the National Assembly be dissolved a
national election for a new National Assembly and a
new President shall take place within a period of ninety
(90) days from the date of such dissolution.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority is required to override a
presidential veto.
Article 56
(1) Every bill passed by Parliament in terms of this Constitution in order to acquire the status of an Act of Parliament shall require the assent of the President to be
signified by the signing of the bill and the publication
of the Act in the Gazette.
(2) Where a bill is passed by a majority of twothirds of all the members of the National Assembly

472
and has been confirmed by the National Council the
President shall be obliged to give his or her assent
thereto.
(3) Where a bill is passed by a majority of the members
of the National Assembly but such majority consists of
less than two-thirds of all the members of the National
Assembly and has been confirmed by the National
Council, but the President declines to assent to such
bill, the President shall communicate such dissent to
the Speaker.
(4) If the President has declined to assent to a bill under
Paragraph (3), the National Assembly may reconsider
the bill and, if it so decides, pass the bill in the form
in which it was referred back to it, or in an amended
form or it may decline to pass the bill. Should the bill
then be passed by a majority of the National Assembly
it will not require further confirmation by the National
Council but, if the majority consists of less than twothirds of all the members of the National Assembly,
the President shall retain his or her power to withhold
assent to the bill. If the President elects not to assent to
the bill, it shall then lapse.
Article 64
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the
President shall be entitled to withhold his or her assent
to a bill approved by the National Assembly if in the
Presidents opinion such bill would upon adoption conflict with the provisions of this Constitution.
(2) Should the President withhold assent on the
grounds of such opinion, he or she shall so inform
the Speaker who shall inform the National Assembly
thereof, and the Attorney-General, who may then take
appropriate steps to have the matter decided by a competent Court.
(3) Should such Court thereafter conclude that such
bill is not in conflict with the provisions of this Constitution, the President shall assent to the said bill if it
was passed by the National Assembly by a two-thirds
majority of all its members. If the bill was not passed
with such majority, the President may withhold his or
her assent to the bill, in which event the provisions of
Article 56 (3) and (4) shall apply.
(4) Should such Court conclude that the disputed
bill would be in conflict with any provisions of this
Constitution, the said bill shall be deemed to have
lapsed and the President shall not be entitled to assent
thereto.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.

National Assembly of Namibia

the Speaker who shall inform the National Assembly
thereof, and the Attorney-General, who may then take
appropriate steps to have the matter decided by a competent Court.
(3) Should such Court thereafter conclude that such
bill is not in conflict with the provisions of this Constitution, the President shall assent to the said bill if it
was passed by the National Assembly by a two-thirds
majority of all its members. If the bill was not passed
with such majority, the President may withhold his or
her assent to the bill, in which event the provisions of
Article 56 (3) and (4) shall apply.
(4) Should such Court conclude that the disputed bill
would be in conflict with any provisions of this Constitution, the said bill shall be deemed to have lapsed and
the President shall not be entitled to assent thereto.
Article 80
(1) The High Court shall consist of a Judge-President
and such additional Judges as the President, acting on
the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission, may determine.
(2) The High Court shall have original jurisdiction to
hear and adjudicate upon all civil disputes and criminal prosecutions, including cases which involve the
interpretation, implementation and upholding of this
Constitution and the fundamental rights and freedoms
guaranteed thereunder. The High Court shall also have
jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate upon appeals from
Lower Courts.
(3) The jurisdiction of the High Court with regard to
appeals shall be determined by Act of Parliament.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.

No. The High Court can review the constitutionality of laws.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.

Article 64
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the
President shall be entitled to withhold his or her assent
to a bill approved by the National Assembly if in the
Presidents opinion such bill would upon adoption conflict with the provisions of this Constitution.
(2) Should the President withhold assent on the
grounds of such opinion, he or she shall so inform

No. According to the constitution, the legislature

has the power to pass legislation on its members
immunity. In practice, legislators are subject to
arrest and criminal prosecution.
Article 60
(3) Rules providing for the privileges and immunities
of members of the National Assembly shall be made by

National Assembly of Namibia

Act of Parliament and all members shall be entitled to
the protection of such privileges and immunities.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All of the seventy-two members of the
National Assembly are elected. The president can
appoint up to six additional members, but these
appointees do not have voting rights.
Article 46
(1) The composition of the National Assembly shall be
as follows: a) seventy-two members to be elected by
the registered voters by general, direct and secret ballot. Every Namibian citizen who has the qualifications
described in Article 17 shall be entitled to vote in the
elections for members of the National Assembly and,
subject to Article 47, shall be eligible for candidature as
a member of the National Assembly; b) not more than
six persons appointed by the President under Article 32
(5)(c), by virtue of their special expertise, status, skill or
experience: provided that such members shall have no
vote in the National Assembly, and shall not be taken
into account for the purpose of determining any specific majorities that are required under this Constitution
or any other law.
Article 69
(1) The National Council shall consist of two members
from each region referred to in Article 102, to be elected
from amongst their members by the Regional Council
for such region.
(2) The elections of members of the National Council
shall be conducted according to procedures to be prescribed by Act of Parliament.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
with a two-thirds majority vote in both houses.
Article 132
(1) Any bill seeking to repeal or amend any provision of this Constitution shall indicate the proposed
repeals and/or amendments with reference to the specific articles sought to be repealed and/or amended and
shall not deal with any matter other than the proposed
repeals or amendments.
(2) The majorities required in Parliament for the repeal
and/or amendment of any of the provisions of this Constitution shall be:
(a) two-thirds of all the members of the National
Assembly; and
(b) two-thirds of all the members of the National
Council.
(3)(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph (2),
if a bill proposing a repeal and/or amendment of any of
the provisions of this Constitution secures a majority of
two-thirds of all the members of the National Assembly,
but fails to secure a majority of two-thirds of all the

473
members of the National Council, the President may
by Proclamation make the bill containing the proposed
repeals and/or amendments the subject of a national
referendum.
(b) The national referendum referred to in Paragraph
(a) shall be conducted in accordance with procedures
prescribed for the holding of referenda by Act of Parliament.
(c) If upon the holding of such a referendum the bill
containing the proposed repeals and/or amendments
is approved by a two-thirds majority of all the votes
cast in the referendum, the bill shall be deemed to
have been passed in accordance with the provisions
of this Constitution, and the President shall deal it in
terms of Article 56.
(4) No repeal or amendment of this paragraph or Paragraphs (2) or (3) in so far as it seeks to diminish or
detract from the majorities required in Parliament or in
a referendum shall be permissible under this Constitution, and no such purported repeal or amendment shall
be valid or have any force or effect.
(5) Nothing contained in this article: (a) shall detract in
any way from the entrenchment provided for in Article
131 of the fundamental rights and freedoms contained
and defined in Chapter 3;
(b) shall prevent Parliament from changing its own
composition or structures by amending or repealing
any of the provisions of this Constitution: provided
always that such repeals or amendments are effected
in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. The constitution contains no explicit provision
on the declaration of war, although in times of war
the president may declare a state of martial law
without obtaining the legislatures approval.
Article 26
(7) The President shall have the power to proclaim or
terminate martial law. Martial law may be proclaimed
only when a state of national defence involving another
country exists or when civil war prevails in Namibia:
provided that any proclamation of martial law shall
cease to be valid if it is not approved within a reasonable
time by a resolution passed by a two-third majority of
all the members of the National Assembly.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 32
(3) Without derogating from the generality of the functions and powers contemplated by Paragraph (1), the
President shall . . . have the power, subject to this Constitution to:
e) negotiate and sign international agreements, and
to delegate such power.

474
Article 40
The members of the Cabinet shall have the following
functions:
(i) to assist the President in determining what international agreements are to be concluded, acceded to
or succeeded to and to report to the National Assembly thereon.
Article 63
(2) The National Assembly shall further have the power
and function, subject to this Constitution:
(d) to consider and decide whether or not to succeed to such international agreements as may have
been entered into prior to Independence by administrations within Namibia in which the majority of
the Namibian people have historically not enjoyed
democratic representation and participation; (e) to
agree to the ratification of or accession to international agreements which have been negotiated and
signed in terms of Article 32 (3)(e).

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 32
(3) Without derogating from the generality of the functions and powers contemplated by Paragraph (1), the
President shall have the power, subject to this Constitution to:
(d) pardon or reprieve offenders, either unconditionally or subject to such conditions as the President may
deem fit.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The president appoints the judiciary, and
the appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 82
(1) All appointments of Judges to the Supreme Court
and the High Court shall be made by the President on
the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission and upon appointment Judges shall make an oath
or affirmation of office in the terms set out in Schedule 1.
(2) At the request of the Chief Justice the President
may appoint Acting Judges of the Supreme Court to
fill casual vacancies in the Court from time to time, or
as ad hoc appointments to sit in cases involving constitutional issues or the guarantee of fundamental rights
and freedoms, if in the opinion of the Chief Justice it
is desirable that such persons should be appointed to
hear such cases by reason of their special knowledge of
or expertise in such matters.

National Assembly of Namibia

(3) At the request of the Judge-President, the President
may appoint Acting Judges of the High Court from time
to time to fill casual vacancies in the Court, or to enable
the Court to deal expeditiously with its work.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the governor of the
Central Bank of Namibia.
Article 128
(2) The Governing Board of the Central Bank shall consist of a Governor, a Deputy-Governor and such other
members of the Board as shall be prescribed by Act
of Parliament, and all members of the Board shall be
appointed by the President in accordance with procedures prescribed by such Act of Parliament.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.
Article 62
(1) The National Assembly shall sit:
(a) at its usual place of sitting determined by the
National Assembly, unless the Speaker directs otherwise on the grounds of public interest, security or
convenience;
(b) for at least two (2) sessions during each year,
to commence and terminate on such dates as the
National Assembly from time to time determines;
(c) for such special sessions as directed by Proclamation by the President from time to time.
(2) During such sessions the National Assembly shall
sit on such days and during such times of the day or
night as the National Assembly by its rules and standing
orders may provide.
(3) The day of commencement of any session of the
National Assembly may be altered by Proclamation by
the President, if the President is requested to do so
by the Speaker on grounds of public interest or convenience.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

Parliament of Nepal (Sansad)

475

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to pro-

duce a significant number of highly experienced

members. The dominance of a single party, the
South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO),
has contributed to high rates of re-election and
membership stability. SWAPO has won between
fifty-three and fifty-five of the seventy-two seats in
the National Assembly in each of the three postindependence elections, held in 1994, 1999, and
2004.

PARLIAMENT OF NEPAL (SANSAD)

Expert consultants: Lok Raj Baral, Ram Guragain, Deepak Gyawali, Nick Langton,
Prakash Raj Sapkota, Anil Kumar Sinha, Deepak Thapa
Score: .44
Influence over
executive (6/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Institutional
autonomy (3/9)

Specified
powers (2/8)

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

23. pardon
24. judiciary

The Parliament of Nepal (Sansad) traces its origins

to the Assembly of Lords (Bharadari Sabha) that
acted as a consultative court to Nepalese monarchs from 1851 to 1947. A 1948 constitution introduced a bicameral parliament, although the legislature did not exercise significant powers. Royal
authority was buttressed by a new constitution
adopted in 1959. The monarch ruled until 1990,
when Nepal adopted a new constitution that limited the kings powers and established a bicameral
legislature with a directly elected lower house, the
House of Representatives (Pratinidhi Sabha), and a
partly appointed upper house, the National Assembly (Rashtriya Sabha). In 2002 the king suspended
parliament, and in 2005 he also dismissed the government and assumed absolute power, claiming
that his action was needed to combat antigovernment rebels who controlled much of the coun-

Institutional
capacity (3/6)
27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

25. central bank

26. media

tryside. In April 2006, under the pressure of massive public demonstrations, the king recalled parliament. In May of that year parliament voted to
curtail the monarchs political power. New elections were held in January 2007. At the time of
this writing, discussions are underway on replacing the parliament with a Constituent Assembly,
elections for which have been repeatedly postponed and which are now scheduled to be held
sometime in 2008. The character and role of the
legislature remain contested and unsettled and are
at the center of public debate in Nepal. The constitutional excerpts cited below are from the 1990
constitution.
The legislature has some ability to influence
the executive. Notably, it can appoint and remove
the prime minister. The legislatures institutional
autonomy is limited by the monarchs powers

476

to dissolve the legislature, decree legislation, and

appoint members of the legislature. Apart from
rights to change the constitution and approve
treaties, the legislature lacks the specified powers
assessed here. It has some institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can remove the prime minister
with a vote of no confidence. The king cannot be
impeached.
Article 31
No question shall be raised in any court about any act
performed by His Majesty:
Provided that nothing in this Article shall be deemed
to restrict any right under law to initiate proceedings
against His Majestys Government or any employee of
His Majesty.
Article 59
(1) The Prime Minister, while he holds office, may,
whenever he is of the opinion that it is necessary or
appropriate to obtain a vote of confidence from the
members of the House of Representatives, present a resolution to that effect in the House of Representatives.
(2) One-fourth of the total number of members of the
House of Representatives may present in writing a noconfidence motion against the Prime Minister: Provided
that a no-confidence motion shall not be presented
more than once in the same session.
(3) A decision on a resolution presented pursuant to
clauses (1) and (2) shall be made by a majority of the
total number of members of the House of Representatives.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Ministers are required to serve simultaneously
in the legislature.
Article 38
Notwithstanding anything contained in Articles 36 and
37, any person who is not a member of either House of
Parliament may be appointed Deputy-Prime Minister,
Minister, State Minister or Assistant-Minister:
Provided that such Deputy-Prime Minister, Minister,
State Minister or Assistant-Minister shall be required
to become a member of Parliament within six months
from the date of his appointment.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.

Parliament of Nepal (Sansad)

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature cannot investigate the royal
palace.
Article 31
No question shall be raised in any court about any act
performed by His Majesty:
Provided that nothing in this Article shall be deemed
to restrict any right under law to initiate proceedings
against His Majestys Government or any employee of
His Majesty.
Article 56
(1) No discussion shall be held in either House of Parliament on the conduct of His Majesty, Her Majesty the
Queen and the heir apparent to His Majesty: Provided
that nothing in this Article shall be deemed to bar criticism of His Majestys Government.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective oversight powers
over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. The monarch appoints as prime minister the
candidate who enjoys majority support in the
House of Representatives.
Article 36
(1) His Majesty shall appoint the leader of the party
which commands a majority in the House of Representatives as the Prime Minister, and shall constitute the
Council of Ministers under his chairmanship.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The monarch appoints ministers on the recommendation of the prime minister, and the appointments do not require the legislatures approval.
Article 37
(1) His Majesty shall, on the recommendation of the
Prime Minister, appoint State Ministers from amongst
the members of Parliament.
(2) His Majesty shall, upon the recommendation of
the Prime Minister, appoint Assistant Ministers from
amongst the members of Parliament to assist any Minister in carrying out his responsibilities.
(3) The provisions of clause (6) of Article 36 relating to
Ministers shall also be applicable to State Ministers and
Assistant Ministers.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.

Parliament of Nepal (Sansad)

Yes. The country lacks a presidency. The monarch

is the head of state.
Article 35
(1) The executive power of the Kingdom of Nepal shall,
pursuant to this Constitution and other laws, be vested
in His Majesty and the Council of Ministers.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 59
(1) The Prime Minister, while he holds office, may,
whenever he is of the opinion that it is necessary or
appropriate to obtain a vote of confidence from the
members of the House of Representatives, present a resolution to that effect in the House of Representatives.
(2) One-fourth of the total number of members of the
House of Representatives may present in writing a noconfidence motion against the Prime Minister: Provided
that a no-confidence motion shall not be presented
more than once in the same session.
(3) A decision on a resolution presented pursuant to
clauses (1) and (2) shall be made by a majority of the
total number of members of the House of Representatives.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The monarch, on the recommendation of the
prime minister, can dissolve the House of Representatives.
Article 53
(4) His Majesty may dissolve the House of Representatives on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. His
Majesty shall, when so dissolving the House of Representatives, specify a date, to be within six months, for
new elections to the House of Representatives.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires

ratification or approval by the legislature before
it takes effect; that is, the executive lacks decree
power.
No. The monarch can issue decrees (ordinances)
that have the force of law when parliament is not
in session. The decrees lapse if they are not subsequently approved by the legislature.
Article 72
(1) If at any time, except when both Houses of Parliament are in session, His Majesty is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to
take immediate action, He may, without prejudicing
the provisions set forth in this Constitution, promulgate any Ordinance as He may deem necessary.
(2) An Ordinance promulgated under clause (1) shall
have the same force and effect as an Act: Provided that
every such Ordinance:

477
(a) shall be presented at the next session of both
Houses of Parliament, and if not passed by both
Houses, it shall ipso facto cease to be effective;
(b) may be repealed at any time by His Majesty; and
(c) shall, unless rendered ineffective or repealed
under sub-clause (a) or (b), ipso-facto cease to have
effect at the expiration of six months from its promulgation or sixty days from the commencement of
a session of both the Houses. Explanation: If the two
Houses of Parliament meet on different dates, the latter date on which a House commences its session
shall be deemed to be the date of commencement of
session for the purpose of computation of time under
this clause.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote of its present members.
Article 71
(1) A Bill which is to be presented to His Majesty for
assent pursuant to Article 69 shall be so presented by
the Speaker or the Chairman of the House in which the
Bill originated after it has been duly certified by him
under his hand:
Provided that in the case of a Finance Bill, the Speaker
shall so certify.
(2) Upon His Majestys assent to any Bill that has been
presented to Him pursuant to this Article, both Houses
shall be informed as soon as possible.
(3) Except for a Finance Bill, if His Majesty is of the
opinion that any Bill needs further deliberations, he
may send back the Bill with His message to the House
of origin of the Bill within one month from the date of
presentation of the Bill to Him.
(4) If any Bill is sent back with a message from His
Majesty, it shall be reconsidered by a joint sitting of
the two Houses and if the Bill so reconsidered is again
passed as it was or with amendments, and it is again
presented to him, His Majesty shall give assent to that
Bill within thirty days of such presentation.
(5) A Bill shall become an Act after His Majesty grants
his assent to it in accordance with this Article, and such
assent shall be deemed to have been granted after the
Royal Seal has been affixed thereon.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Supreme Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 88
(1) Any Nepali citizen may file a petition in the
Supreme Court to have any law or any part thereof
declared void on the ground of inconsistency with
this Constitution because it imposes an unreasonable
restriction on the enjoyment of the fundamental rights

478
conferred by this Constitution or on any other ground,
and extraordinary power shall rest with the Supreme
Court to declare that law as void either ab initio or
from the date of its decision if it appears that the law in
question is inconsistent with the Constitution.
(5) If His Majesty wishes to have an opinion of the
Supreme Court on any complicated legal question of
interpretation of this Constitution or of any other law,
the Court shall, upon consideration on the question,
report to His Majesty its opinion thereon.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The monarch can impound funds appropriated
by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,
including control over members perquisites.
Article 67
The remuneration and privileges of the . . . members of
Parliament shall be determined by law.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislators are immune while the legislature is
in session and for anything done as part of official parliamentary business, but they are subject to
arrest for common crimes when the legislature is
not in session.
Article 62
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, there
shall be full freedom of speech in both Houses of Parliament and no member shall be arrested, detained or
prosecuted in any court for anything said or any vote
cast in the House.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, each
House of Parliament shall have full power to regulate
its internal business, and it shall be the exclusive right
of the House concerned to decide whether or not any
proceeding of the House is regular. No question shall
be raised in any court in this regard.
(3) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, no
comment shall be made about the good faith concerning any proceeding of either House of Parliament and
no publication of any kind shall be made about anything said by any member which intentionally distorts
or misinterprets the meaning of the speech.

Parliament of Nepal (Sansad)

(4) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the
provisions of clauses (1) and (3) shall also apply to any
person, other than a member, who is entitled to take
part in a meeting of the House.
(5) No proceedings shall be initiated in any court
against any person for publication of any document,
report, vote or proceeding which is made under authority given, subject to the provisions of this Constitution,
by a House of Parliament. Explanation: For the purposes
of this clause and clauses (1), (2), (3) and (4), the word
House shall mean and include the committees of a
House and shall also mean a joint sitting of Parliament
or a meeting of the Joint Committee.
(6) No member of Parliament shall be arrested between
the date of issuance of the summons for a session and
the date on which that session closes: Provided that
nothing in this clause shall be deemed to prevent the
arrest under any law of any member on a criminal
charge. If any member is so arrested, the official making
such arrest shall forthwith inform the person chairing
the concerned House.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
No. The monarch appoints ten of the sixty members of the National Assembly. All members of the
House of Representatives are elected.
Article 45
(1) The House of Representatives shall consist of two
hundred and five members.
(2) For the purpose of election of members to the
House of Representatives, administrative districts shall
be treated as election districts, and the ratio of the number of seats allocated to any district shall be, so far as
practicable, equal to the ratio of the population of that
district to the national population as determined by
the last census preceding the concerned election; and
the number of election constituencies shall be equal to
the number of seats so allocated; and one member shall
be elected from each election constituency. Provided
that the number of members to be elected from the districts shall be so determined and election constituency
so delimitated that there be elected at least one member
from each district irrespective of its population.
Article 46
(1) The National Assembly shall consist of sixty members as follows:
(a) ten members to be nominated by His Majesty
from amongst persons of high reputation who have
rendered prominent service in various fields of
national life,
(b) thirty-five members, including at least three
women members, to be elected by the House of Representatives in accordance with the provisions of law,
on the basis of the system of proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote, and
(c) fifteen members, three from each of the Development Regions, to be elected in accordance with

Parliament of Nepal (Sansad)

law on the basis of the system of single transferable
vote by an electoral college consisting of the Chief
and the Deputy-Chief of the Village and Town level
Local Authorities and the Chief, Deputy-Chief, and
the members of the District level Local Authorities:
Provided that until elections are held for the Local
Authorities, such electoral college shall, for the first
time, consist of the members of the House of Representatives elected from the concerned Development
Region.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
with a two-thirds majority vote in both houses.
Article 116
(1) A bill to amend or repeal any Article of this Constitution, without prejudicing the spirit of the Preamble of
this Constitution, may be introduced in either House of
Parliament: Provided that this Article shall not be subject to amendment.
(2) If each House, with a two-thirds majority of its total
membership attending, passes a Bill introduced pursuant to clause (1) by a majority of at least two-thirds
of the members present, the Bill shall be submitted to
His Majesty for assent; and His Majesty may, within
thirty days from the date of submission, either grant
assent to such Bill or send the Bill back for reconsideration with His message to the House where the Bill originated.
(3) A Bill sent back by His Majesty pursuant to clause
(2) above shall be reconsidered by both Houses of Parliament; and if both the Houses, upon following the
procedures referred to in clause (2), resubmit the Bill in
its original an amended form to His Majesty for assent,
His Majesty shall grant assent to such Bill within thirty
days of such submission.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. In times of war, the king can declare a state of
emergency without the legislatures approval. The
state of emergency ceases if it is not approved by
the legislature within three months.
Article 115
(1) If a grave crisis arises in regard to the sovereignty
or integrity of the Kingdom of Nepal or the security
of any part thereof, whether by war, external aggression, armed rebellion or extreme economic disarray, His
Majesty may, by Proclamation, declare or order a State
of Emergency in respect of the whole of the Kingdom
of Nepal or of any specified part thereof.
(2) Every Proclamation or Order issued under clause
(1) above shall be laid before a meeting of the House of
Representatives for approval within three months from
the date of issuance.
(3) If a Proclamation or Order laid for approval pursuant to clause (2) is approved by a two-thirds majority

479
of the House of Representatives present at that meeting,
such Proclamation or Order shall continue in force for
a period of six months from the date of issuance.
(4) If a Proclamation or Order laid for approval pursuant to clause (2) is not approved pursuant to clause
(3), such Proclamation or Order shall be deemed ipso
facto to cease to operate.
(5) Before the expiration of the period referred to in
clause (3), if a meeting of the House of Representatives,
by a majority of two-thirds of the members present,
passes a resolution to the effect that circumstances
referred to in clause (1) above continue to exist, it may
extend the period of the Proclamation or Order of the
State of Emergency for one other period, not exceeding six months as specified in such resolution, and the
Speaker shall inform His Majesty of such extension.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties on most major issues.
Article 126
(1) The ratification of, accession to, acceptance of or
approval of treaties or agreements to which the Kingdom of Nepal or His Majestys Government is to become
a party shall be as determined by law.
(2) The laws to be made pursuant to clause (1) shall,
inter alia, require that the ratification of, accession to,
acceptance of or approval of treaties or agreements on
the following subjects be done by a majority of twothirds of the members present at a joint sitting of both
Houses of Parliament:
(a) peace and friendship;
(b) defence and strategic alliance;
(c) boundaries of the Kingdom of Nepal; and
(d) natural resources, and the distribution of their
uses.
Provided that out of the treaties and agreements
referred to in sub-clauses (a) and (d), if any treaty or
agreement is of an ordinary nature, which does not
affect the nation extensively, seriously, or in the long
term, the ratification of, accession to, acceptance of or
approval of such treaty or agreement may be done at
a meeting of the House of Representatives by a simple
majority of the members present.
(3) After the commencement of this Constitution,
unless a treaty or agreement is ratified, acceded to,
accepted or approved in accordance with this Article,
it shall not be binding on His Majestys Government or
the Kingdom of Nepal.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in clauses (1)
and (2), no treaty or agreement shall be concluded that
is detrimental to the territorial integrity of the Kingdom
of Nepal.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.

480

Parliament of Nepal (Sansad)

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

No. The king has the power of pardon.

No. The legislature has been subject to frequent

suspensions by the monarch, including between
2002 and 2006.

Article 122 Pardons

His Majesty shall have the power to grant pardons and
to suspend, commute or remit any sentence passed by
any court, special court, military court or by any other
judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative authority or
institution.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The monarch controls judicial appointments.
Article 87
(1) His Majesty shall appoint the Chief Justice of Nepal
on the recommendation of the Constitutional Council,
and other Judges of the Supreme Court on the recommendation of the Judicial Council. The tenure of office
of the Chief Justice shall be seven years from the date
of appointment.
Article 91
(1) His Majesty shall, on the recommendation of the
Judicial Council, appoint any Chief Judge and Judges
of the Appellate Courts and any Judges of the District
Courts: Provided that His Majesty may delegate His
authority to the Chief Justice for the appointment of
the District Judges to be made on the recommendation
of the Judicial Council.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The government appoints the governor of the
Central Bank of Nepal.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.

Article 53
(1) His Majesty shall summon a session of parliament
within one month after the elections to the House of
Representatives are held. Thereafter, His Majesty shall
summon other sessions from time to time in accordance with this Constitution. Provided that the interval between two consecutive sessions shall not be more
than six months.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
No. The lengthy suspension of parliament by the
monarch between 2002 and 2006 severely interrupted the rhythm of normal parliamentary elections and activity and the potential for the emergence of a cohort of highly experienced legislators.

States-General of the Netherlands (Staten Generaal)

481

STATES-GENERAL OF THE NETHERLANDS (STATEN GENERAAL)

Expert consultants: Kees Aarts, Rudy B. Andeweg, Richard Gerding, Jane Rebecca Gingrich,
Michael Thurman
Score: .78
Influence over
executive (7/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee
police
6. appoint
PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Institutional
autonomy (7/9)

Specified
powers (6/8)

10. no
dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments

27. sessions

20. war

28. secretary

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

X
X

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

18. all elected

Institutional
capacity (5/6)

X
X
X

26. media

The States-General (Staten Generaal) of the Netherlands traces its origins to the mid-fifteenth century, when it gathered as a body of representatives
from the various Dutch provinces. In 1581 it proclaimed independence from the Spanish monarchy. The States-General was included in the first
constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
passed in 1814, and became a bicameral body in
1815. The legislature consists of the First Chamber
(Eerste Kamer) and the Second Chamber (Tweede
Kamer). Between 1815 and 1848 members of the
Second Chamber were indirectly elected through
the Provincial Estates, and members of the First
Chamber were appointed by the crown. Since 1848
members of the Second Chamber have been elected
by all enfranchised citizens, while members of the
First Chamber have been indirectly elected by the
Provincial Estates.
The parliament is a formidable force. It has
substantial influence over the executive. It is subject to dissolution and its members lack immunity, but otherwise the legislature enjoys complete
institutional autonomy. It holds all but two of
the specified prerogatives measured in this survey. Its rating on institutional capacity is blemished only by the lack of at least one personal
staff member with policy expertise for every legislator.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can remove the prime minister
with a vote of no confidence.
2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of
the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 57
(2) A member of the Parliament may not be a Minister.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 68
Ministers and State Secretaries shall provide orally or
in writing the Chambers either separately or in joint
session, with any information requested by one or
more members, provided that the provision of such
information does not conflict with the interests of the
State.

482

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can establish bodies to investigate the executive.
Article 108
(1) The establishment, powers and procedures of any
general independent bodies for investigating complaints relating to actions of the authorities shall be
regulated by Act of Parliament.
(2) Appointment to such bodies shall be made by the
Second Chamber of the Parliament if their jurisdiction
covers the actions of the central authorities. Members
may be dismissed in cases prescribed by Act of Parliament.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. The legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. While the king formally appoints the prime
minister, he selects the candidate who enjoys the
support of the legislature.
Article 43
The Prime Minister and the other Ministers shall be
appointed and dismissed by Royal Decree.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. Formally, ministers are appointed by the
crown. In practice, the king appoints ministers on
the recommendation of the prime minister, and
the appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 43
The Prime Minister and the other Ministers shall be
appointed and dismissed by Royal Decree.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The country lacks a presidency. The monarch
is the head of state.
Article 24
The title to the Throne shall be hereditary and shall vest
in the legitimate descendants of King William I, Prince
of Orange-Nassau.
Article 30
(1) A successor to the Throne may be appointed by
Act of Parliament if it appears that there will otherwise
be no successor. The Bill shall be presented by or on

States-General of the Netherlands (Staten Generaal)

behalf of the King, upon which the Chambers shall be
dissolved. The newly convened Chambers shall discuss
and decide upon the matter in joint session. Such a Bill
shall be passed only if at least two-thirds of the votes
cast are in favor.
(2) The Chambers shall be dissolved if there is no successor on the death or abdication of the King. The newly
convened Chambers shall meet in joint session within
four months of the decease or abdication in order to
decide on the appointment of a King. They may appoint
a successor only if at least two-thirds of the votes cast
are in favor.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the
executive.
No. The crown, on the advice of the prime minister, can dissolve the legislature.
Article 64
(1) Each of the Chambers may be dissolved by Royal
Decree.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. Formally, the monarch has decree power. In
practice, the crown and the government lack the
power to issue decrees that have the force of law.
Article 47
All Acts of Parliament and Royal Decrees shall be signed
by the King and by one or more Ministers or State Secretaries.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks veto power.
13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
Yes. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
Article 120
The constitutionality of Acts of Parliament and treaties
shall not be reviewed by the courts.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.

States-General of the Netherlands (Staten Generaal)

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power
to impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislative immunity extends to official parliamentary business only. Legislators are subject to
arrest for common crimes.
Article 71
Members of the Parliament, Ministers, State Secretaries,
and other persons taking part in deliberations may not
be prosecuted or otherwise held liable in law for anything they say during the sittings of the Parliament or
of its committees or for anything they submit to them
in writing.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 53
(1) The members of both Chambers shall be elected by
proportional representation within the limits to be laid
down by Act of Parliament.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
through a complicated procedure. The sitting legislature can propose a constitutional amendment,
and then, following an election, the subsequent
legislature can approve the amendment with a twothirds majority vote.
Article 137
(1) An Act of Parliament shall be passed stating that an
amendment to the Constitution in the form proposed
shall be considered.
(2) The Second Chamber may divide a Bill presented
for this purpose into a number of separate Bills, either
upon a proposal presented by or on behalf of the King
or otherwise.
(3) The two Chambers of the Parliament shall be dissolved after the Act referred to in the first paragraph has
been published.
(4) The newly elected Chambers shall consider the Bill
and it shall be passed only if at least two thirds of the
votes cast are in favor.

483
(5) The Second Chamber may divide a Bill for the
amendment of the Constitution into a number of separate Bills, either upon a proposal presented by or on
behalf of the King or otherwise, if at least two-thirds of
the votes cast are in favor.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for the
declaration of war.
Article 96
(1) A declaration that the Kingdom is in a state of war
shall not be made without the prior approval of the
Parliament.
(2) Such approval shall not be required in cases where
consultation with Parliament proves to be impossible
as a consequence of the actual existence of a state of
war.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 91
(1) The Kingdom shall not be bound by treaties, nor
shall such treaties be denounced without the prior
approval of the Parliament. The cases in which approval
is not required shall be specified by Act of Parliament.
(3) Any provisions of a treaty that conflict with the
Constitution or which lead to conflicts with it may be
approved by the Chambers of the Parliament only if at
least two-thirds of the votes cast are in favor.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature can grant amnesty through law.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
Yes. The legislature has the power of pardon.
Article 122
(2) Pardons shall be granted by or pursuant to Act of
Parliament.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The members of the Supreme Court are
appointed by the crown on the nomination of the
legislature.
Article 117
(1) Members of the judiciary responsible for the administration of justice and the Procurator General at the
Supreme Court shall be appointed for life by Royal
Decree.
Article 118
(1) The members of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands shall be appointed from a list of three persons
drawn up by the Second Chamber of the Parliament.

484

States-General of the Netherlands (Staten Generaal)

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The monarch appoints the governor of the
Netherlands Bank.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.

No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.
28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.
Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

PARLIAMENT OF NEW ZEALAND

Expert consultants: Jonathan Boston, Malcolm Mackerras, Elizabeth McLeay, Alan McRobie,
Susan M. Smith
Score: .69
Influence over
executive (8/9)

Institutional
autonomy (7/9)

Specified
powers (1/8)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

X
X

21. treaties
22. amnesty

5. oversee
police
6. appoint
PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

Institutional
capacity (6/6)
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

X
X

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X
X

26. media
X

The Parliament of New Zealand was established in

1852 to represent the country in the British Empire.
The directly elected legislature is paired with an
executive branch that consists of a prime minister
as the head of government and a Governor General
(formerly the British monarchs representative) as
the head of state. New Zealand achieved full independence from Britain in 1947. It lacks a formal
constitution. Rather, its fundamental law consists
of a series of legal documents and acts including

the Constitution Act of 1986 (from which excerpts

cited below are taken).
The legislature is the main stage of national
politics. It possesses nearly every means of influencing the executive recorded in this survey. It is
subject to dissolution and legislators lack criminal
immunity, but otherwise the legislature has complete institutional autonomy. In sharp contrast to
its powers in other areas, the legislature exercises
but a single specified power (the right to change

Parliament of New Zealand

the constitution). The legislature has robust institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.

485

Yes. The country lacks a presidency. The Governor

General is the head of state.
Article 2
(1) The Sovereign in right of New Zealand is the head
of State of New Zealand, and shall be known by the
royal style and titles proclaimed from time to time.
(2) The Governor-General appointed by the Sovereign
is the Sovereigns representative in New Zealand.

Yes. The legislature can remove the prime minister

with a vote of no confidence.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the

government.

Yes. Ministers are selected from, and required to

serve simultaneously in, the legislature.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.

Section 6
A person may be appointed and may hold office as a
member of the Executive Council or as a Minister of the
Crown only if that person is a member of Parliament.

No. The Governor General can, upon the advice of

the prime minister, dissolve the legislature.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.

Section 18
(2) The Governor-General may by Proclamation prorogue or dissolve Parliament.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.

Yes. Legislative committees regularly interpellate

officials from the executive.

Yes. The executive lacks decree power.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.

Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. The legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. The Governor General appoints as prime minister the candidate who enjoys the support of the
legislature.

Yes. The executive lacks veto power. Formally, the

Governor General could withhold assent from a
bill. In practice, it would be unthinkable for the
Governor General to withhold assent from a bill.
Article 16
A Bill passed by the House of Representatives shall
become law when the Sovereign or the GovernorGeneral assents to it and signs it in token of such assent.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
Yes. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.

No. The Governor General appoints ministers on

the recommendation of the prime minister, and
the appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.

Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy

jurisdictions.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.

486

Parliament of New Zealand

16. The legislature controls the resources that finance

its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.

No. The attorney general makes judicial appointments, and the appointments do not require the
legislatures approval.

Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.

The running costs of the legislature and the
salaries of legislators are a permanent charge on
the governments budget and are not subject to
annual appropriation. The payment of salary and
allowances to the legislature is mandatory under
an Act of Parliament and cannot be withheld.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislative immunity extends only to civil
charges; it begins forty days before the start of a parliamentary session begins and extends to forty days
after the session concludes. Legislators are subject
to arrest at other times.
18. All members of the legislature are elected; the
executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 10
(4) The House of Representatives shall have as its members those persons who are elected from time to time
in accordance with the provisions of the Electoral Act
1956, and who shall be known as members of Parliament.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the fundamental
law through the normal legislative process.
20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. The government, on the recommendation of

the State Services Commission, appoints the governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. Public television and public radio are governed by independent boards whose members are
appointed by the government.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session for
about ten months each year.
Section 17
(1) The term of Parliament shall, unless Parliament is
sooner dissolved, be 3 years from the day fixed for the
return of the writs issued for the last preceding general
election of members of the House of Representatives,
and no longer.
(2) Section 189 of the Electoral Act 1956 shall apply in
respect of subsection (1) of this section.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes. As part of the running cost of parliament,
each legislator is provided with a secretary in his
or her parliamentary office and another secretary
and office in his or her electoral district.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.

No. The government can declare war without the

legislatures approval.

Yes. Each party has its own research unit within

the parliament buildings paid for by the state. On
average, there is at least one staff member with
policy expertise for each legislator.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.

No. The government can conclude international

treaties without the legislatures approval.

Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. The government has the power to grant
amnesty.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The Governor General has the power of pardon.
24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject
appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

National Assembly of Nicaragua (Asamblea Nacional)

487

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF NICARAGUA (ASAMBLEA NACIONAL)

Expert consultants: Leslie E. Anderson, Nestor Davilo, Lus Humberto Guzman,
Nehemas Lopez
Carrion,

Jose Luis Rivas Calero, Reinaldo Saily

Score: .69
Influence over
executive (3/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee
police
6. appoint
PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Institutional
autonomy (8/9)

Specified
powers (6/8)

Institutional
capacity (5/6)

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

24. judiciary

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

25. central bank

26. media

18. all elected

The National Assembly (Asamblea Nacional) of

Nicaragua traces its origins to the 1809 colonial constitution established by Spain. Nicaragua
became fully independent in 1838 but was ruled
by the powerful Somoza family for the next century and a half. In 1979 the Somoza regime was
overthrown amid a civil war. A new constitution
in 1987 called for a unicameral National Assembly.
The legislature has significant power. Its ability to influence the executive is relatively modest. In other areas, however, the legislatures powers are considerable. The Assembly has significant
institutional autonomy: Apart from the Supreme
Courts power to review the constitutionality of
laws, the National Assembly possesses every measure of institutional autonomy measured in this
survey. It also enjoys the bulk of the specified powers and prerogatives scored here, and it has a high
level of institutional capacity.

SURVEY

X
X

X
X
X

Republic of this immunity with a two-thirds

majority vote of its total membership.
Article 130
The National Assembly, by resolution approved by twothirds of the votes of its members, may deprive the President of the Republic of this immunity. Public officers
enjoying immunity in accordance with the Constitution may not be detained or prosecuted if the aforementioned procedure has not been followed, except for
matters relating to family and labor. Immunity may be
waived. This matter will be regulated by law.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Ministers are prohibited from serving simultaneously in the legislature.
Article 134
2. The following persons may not run for Deputies, Proprietors or Substitutes:
a. Government ministers or vice ministers . . . unless
they resign the office at least 12 months in advance
of the election date.

1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.

Yes. The legislature can impeach the president,

here expressed as deprive the President of the

Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials

from the executive.

488
Article 138
The National Assembly has the following powers:
4. To request reports from Ministers and Vice Ministers
of the State, presidents or directors of autonomous and
governmental entities. The National Assembly may also
request their personal appearance and interpellation.
Their appearance will be obligatory under the same constraints that are observed in judicial proceedings. If, as a
consequence of the interpellation, the National Assembly, by an absolute majority of its members should
consider that there are grounds for it, the interpellated
functionary shall lose his immunity from that moment.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
Article 138
The National Assembly has the following powers:
18. Create permanent, special, and investigative committees.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The country lacks a prime minister.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 150
The functions of the President of the Republic are the
following:
6. To appoint and remove Ministers and Vice Ministers
of State.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 146
The election of the President and Vice President of the
Republic is made by universal, equal, direct, free and
secret vote.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in
the government.

National Assembly of Nicaragua (Asamblea Nacional)

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.
11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires
ratification or approval by the legislature before
it takes effect; that is, the executive lacks decree
power.
Yes. The president lacks decree powers. The president can issue decrees to implement laws, but
aside from emergency powers, the president cannot issue decrees that have the force of law.
Article 138
The National Assembly has the following powers:
28. Approve, reject, or amend the Executive Decree
which declares the suspension of constitutional rights
and guarantees or the State of Emergency, as well as
their extensions.
Article 150
The functions of the President of the Republic are the
following:
4. To issue executive decrees in administrative matters.
9. To decree and put into effect the suspension of rights
and guarantees in the cases provided by this Political Constitution and to send the appropriate decree
to the National Assembly within a period no longer
than seventy-two hours for its approval, modification,
or rejection.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote of its total membership.
Article 142
The President of the Republic may veto totally or in part
a bill of law within the fifteen days following its receipt.
If the President of the Republic does not exercise this
power nor sanction, promulgate, or publish the bill,
the President of the National Assembly shall order the
law to be published in any national written diffusion
media.
Article 143
A bill of law partially or totally vetoed by the President of the Republic must be returned to the National
Assembly with expression of the reasons for the veto; it
can reject it with a vote of half the total plus one of its
Deputies, in which case the President of the National
Assembly shall order the law to be published.
Article 150
The functions of the President of the Republic are the
following:
3. To exercise the power of initiative of law and the
right of veto, in conformity with that established by
this Constitution.

National Assembly of Nicaragua (Asamblea Nacional)

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Supreme Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 164
The functions of the Supreme Court of Justice are:
4. To take cognizance of and resolve the recourses of
the unconstitutionality of laws.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune.
Article 139
Deputies shall be exempt from responsibility for their
opinions and votes cast in the National Assembly and
enjoy immunity in conformity with the law.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 132
The National Assembly is composed of ninety Deputies
with their respective substitutes elected by universal,
equal, direct, free, and secret suffrage through the system of proportional representation.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature alone can change the constitution through a complicated procedure. For a partial reform amendment, the sitting legislature can
propose the amendment, and then, following an
election, the subsequent legislature can approve
the amendment. A total constitutional revision
requires a two-thirds majority vote from a specially
elected Constituent National Assembly.

489
Article 191
The National Assembly has the authority to partially
reform this Political Constitution and to take cognizance of and resolve concerning the initiative of its
total revision. The initiative for partial reform corresponds to the President of the Republic or to one-third
of the Deputies of the National Assembly. The initiative for total reform corresponds to half plus one of the
Deputies of the National Assembly.
Article 192
The initiative of partial reform must specify the article
or articles to be reformed with a statement of reasons.
It must be sent to a special commission which shall
dictate an opinion within a period of no more than
sixty days. The bill of reform shall then follow the same
process as for the creation of a law. The initiative of
partial reform must be discussed in two legislatures.
Article 193
A total revision initiative shall follow the same process
established in the previous article, in terms of its presentation and finding. Upon the approval of a total revision initiative, the National Assembly shall establish
a time period for holding elections for a Constituent
National Assembly. The National Assembly shall retain
its mandate until the installation of the new Constituent National Assembly. While the new Constitution is not yet approved by the Constituent National
Assembly, this Constitution shall remain in effect.
Article 194
Approval of a partial reform shall require a favorable
vote by sixty percent of the Deputies. Two-thirds of the
total number of Deputies are required in the case of
approval of the total revision initiative. The President
of the Republic shall promulgate the partial reform and
in this case may not exercise the right to veto.
Article 195
The reform of constitutional laws shall be made in
accordance with the procedure established for partial
reform of the Constitution, with the exception of the
requirement of the two legislatures.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The National Assemblys approval is necessary
to authorize any external deployment of the armed
forces.
Article 138
The National Assembly has the following powers:
26. Authorize or forbid armed forces from leaving the
national territory.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties on most major issues.
Article 138
The National Assembly has the following powers:

490
12. Approving or rejecting international treaties,
covenants, pacts, agreements, and contracts of an
economic character, international commerce, regional
integration, defense and security; those which increase
external debt or risk the Nations credit; and those
which involve the juridical organization of the State.
Said instruments will have to be presented to the
National Assembly within a deadline of fifteen days
beginning with their introduction; they may only be
discussed and debated at that time in a general sense
and will have to be approved or rejected at most within
no more than sixty days counting from their presentation in the National Assembly. Once that deadline
is past, for all legal purposes the instruments will be
considered as having been approved.
Article 150
The functions of the President of the Republic are the
following:
8. To direct the international relations of the Republic. To negotiate, hold and sign treaties, covenants, or
agreements and other instruments provided for in paragraph 12 of Article 138 of the Political Constitution, for
their approval by the National Assembly.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant
amnesty.
Article 138
The National Assembly has the following powers:
3. To grant amnesty and pardon on their own initiative
or on the initiative of the President of the Republic.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

Yes. The legislature has the power of pardon.
Article 138
The National Assembly has the following powers:
3. To grant amnesty and pardon on their own initiative
or on the initiative of the President of the Republic.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislature elects the judges of the Supreme
Court and of the Supreme Electoral Council.
Article 138
The National Assembly has the following powers:
7. To elect the Judges of the Supreme Court of Justice
from separate lists proposed for every position by the
President of the Republic and by the Deputies of the
National Assembly, in consultation with the appropriate civilian associations. The deadline for presenting
the lists will be fifteen days counting from the summoning of the National Assembly for their election.
In the absence of lists presented by the President of
the Republic, the proposals by Deputies of the National
Assembly will be enough. Each Judge will be elected
with the favorable vote of at least sixty percent of the
Deputies of the National Assembly.

National Assembly of Nicaragua (Asamblea Nacional)

8. To elect Judges, proprietary and substitute, of the
Supreme Electoral Council from separate lists proposed
for each position by the President of the Republic and
the Deputies of the National Assembly, in consultation
with the appropriate civilian associations. The deadline for presenting the lists will be fifteen days counting from the summoning of the National Assembly for
their election. In the absence of lists presented by the
President of the Republic, the proposals by the Deputies
of the National Assembly shall be enough. Each Judge
shall be elected with the favorable vote of at least sixty
percent of the Deputies of the National Assembly.
Article 163
The Supreme Court of Justice will consist of sixteen
magistrates elected by the National Assembly for a
period of five years . . . The National Assembly shall
appoint a Co-judge for each magistrate. In the event of
an absence, excuse, impediment or recusation of any of
the magistrates, the Co-judges shall be called to serve in
Full Court or in any of the Courts. The magistrates of the
Supreme Court take office before the National Assembly, having previously taken the promise of law. They
elect their President and Vice President, among themselves, by majority of votes and for a one-year term.
They may be reelected.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the president of the
Central Bank of Nicaragua.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary
session.
Article 138
The National Assembly has the following powers:
31. Hold ordinary and extraordinary sessions.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.

National Assembly of Niger (Assemblee nationale)

491

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.

Yes. Nicaragua held five rounds of parliamentary

elections between 1984 and 2006, and re-election
rates have been sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced members.

NATIONALE)
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF NIGER (ASSEMBLEE
Expert consultants: Monique Alexis, H. Badje, Sheryl Cowan, Foukori Fati, Barrie Hofmann,
Ahmed Mohamed
Score: .50
Influence over
executive (3/9)

Institutional
autonomy (7/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

12. no veto
13. no review

X
X

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

18. all elected

5. oversee
police
6. appoint
PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

X
X

Specified
powers (3/8)

24. judiciary
X

25. central bank

26. media

The National Assembly (Assemblee nationale) of

Niger was created in 1960 upon independence
from France. Formally Niger had a Westminsterstyle system, but in practice, single-party, militarybacked regimes ruled for the next thirty years.
Civilian rule was reintroduced in 1989, but singleparty dominance persisted. Reforms in 1992 paved
the way for multiparty elections. The current
constitution, adopted in 1999, is inspired by
the French model and calls for a unicameral
parliament, a directly elected president, and a
prime minister and cabinet selected by the president.
The legislature has some meaningful power.
It has little sway over the executive but enjoys
considerable institutional autonomy. For example, the Assembly is unencumbered by presidential
decree and veto powers, and its laws are de facto
supreme and not subject to judicial review. The
legislature exercises only two of the eight specified powers assessed here. Its institutional capacity
is modest, curbed by the brevity of legislative sessions and the absence of staff support for legislators.

Institutional
capacity (3/6)
27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of the High Court of Justice. The legislature can remove the prime minister with a vote
of no confidence.
Article 42
In case of an impeachment of the President of the
Republic before the High Court of Justice, his interim
shall be performed by the President of the Constitutional Court who exercises all the duties of the President of the Republic, with the exception of the duties
mentioned in paragraph 8 of this article. He may not
stand as candidate in the presidential elections.
Article 88
The Prime Minister, after deliberation by the Council of Ministers, may make the Governments program
or possibly a statement of its general policy an issue
of its responsibility before the National Assembly. The
National Assembly may raise an issue of the Governments responsibility by passing a motion censure. Such
a motion is not admissible unless it is signed by at

492
least one-tenth of the members of the National Assembly. Voting may not take place within forty-eight hours
after the motion has been introduced. Only the votes
in favor of the motion censure are counted; the motion
of censure is not adopted unless it is voted for by the
majority of the members of the Assembly. The Prime
Minister may, after deliberation by the Council of Ministers, make the passing of a bill an issue of the Governments responsibility before the National Assembly. In
that event, the bill shall be considered adopted unless
a motion of censure, introduced within the subsequent
twenty-four hours, is carried as provided for in the preceding paragraph.
Article 89
When the National Assembly adopts a motion of censure or when it fails to endorse the program or a statement of general policy of the Government, the Prime
Minister must tender the resignation of the Government to the President of the Republic.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Ministers are prohibited from serving simultaneously in the legislature.
Article 64
The functions of a member of the Government shall
be incompatible with the exercise of any parliamentary
mandate, of any function of professional representation
at the national or local level, of any public work and of
any professional activity.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 80
The members of the National Assembly, either individually, or collectively may question the Prime Minister
or any member of the Government by means of a petition.
The members of the National Assembly may as well
obtain, by means of written or oral questions, all information on the activities or the administrative acts of
the Government.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.

National Assembly of Niger (Assemblee nationale)

6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

No. The president appoints the prime minister
from a list proposed by the legislature.
Article 45
The President of the Republic shall appoint the Prime
Minister from a list of three (3) people proposed by the
majority. The majority shall be composed of a party
or of a coalition of parties detaining the majority in
the National Assembly. On the proposal of the Prime
Minister, the President shall appoint other members of
the Government and terminate their appointments.
The President of the Republic shall put an end to the
functions of the Prime Minister upon presentation by
the Prime Minister of the Governments resignation.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers on the proposal of the prime minister, and the appointments
do not require the legislatures approval.
Article 45
The President of the Republic shall appoint the Prime
Minister from a list of three (3) people proposed by the
majority. The majority shall be composed of a party
or of a coalition of parties detaining the majority in
the National Assembly. On the proposal of the Prime
Minister, the President shall appoint other members of
the Government and terminate their appointments.
The President of the Republic shall put an end to the
functions of the Prime Minister upon presentation by
the Prime Minister of the Governments resignation.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 36
The President of the Republic is elected for five years
by universal, free, direct, equal and secret suffrage. The
President shall be re-eligible only once.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 88
The Prime Minister, after deliberation by the Council
of Ministers, may make the Governments program or
possibly a statement of its general policy an issue of its
responsibility before the National Assembly.
The National Assembly may raise an issue of the Governments responsibility by passing a motion censure.
Such a motion is not admissible unless it is signed by at
least one-tenth of the members of the National Assembly. Voting may not take place within forty-eight hours
after the motion has been introduced. Only the votes

National Assembly of Niger (Assemblee nationale)

in favor of the motion censure are counted; the motion
of censure is not adopted unless it is voted for by the
majority of the members of the Assembly.
The Prime Minister may, after deliberation by the Council of Ministers, make the passing of a bill an issue of
the Governments responsibility before the National
Assembly. In that event, the bill shall be considered
adopted unless a motion of censure, introduced within
the subsequent twenty-four hours, is carried as provided
for in the preceding paragraph.
Article 89
When the National Assembly adopts a motion of censure or when it fails to endorse the program or a statement of general policy of the Government, the Prime
Minister must tender the resignation of the Government to the President of the Republic.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 48
The President of the Republic may, after consultation of
the Prime Minister and of the President of the National
Assembly, pronounce the dissolution of the National
Assembly.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The president lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote of its total membership.
Article 47
The President of the Republic shall promulgate the
laws within fifteen days, following the transmission
that is done to him by the President of the National
Assembly.
This time limit shall be reduced to five days in case of
urgency declared by the National Assembly. The President of the Republic may, before the expiry of these
time limits, address a request to the National Assembly for a second deliberation of the law of some of its
articles. This deliberation may not be rejected. If after a
second reading, the National Assembly votes the text at
the absolute majority of its members, the law shall be
promulgated of full right and published in accordance
to the procedure of urgency.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
Yes. In practice, the legislatures laws are supreme
because the Constitutional Court is unable to

493

exercise its formal authority to review the constitutionality of laws.

Article 84
Matters other than those that fall within the domain of
the law are of a regulatory character.
Texts of legislative form passed concerning these matters prior to the entry into force of this Constitution
may be amended by decree issued after consultation
with the Constitutional Court.
Article 92
Bills, projects and amendments which are not matters
for law or which violate morality shall not be admissible. The inadmissibility shall be pronounced by the
President of the National Assembly.
In case of disagreement, the Constitutional Court, at
the request of the Prime Minister or of the President of
the National Assembly, shall rule within eight days.
Article 103
The Constitutional Court is the competent jurisdiction in constitutional and electoral matters. It is in
charge of ascertaining the constitutionality of the laws,
of ordinances as well as the conformity of international treaties and agreements to the Constitution. It
interprets the provisions of the Constitution. It controls the conformity, the transparency and the sincerity of the referendum, the presidential, legislative
and local elections. It has competence over electoral
litigation and proclaims the definitive results of elections.
Article 115
The decisions of the Constitutional Court are not susceptible to any appeal. They are binding on public
authorities and on all other administrative, civil, military and judicial authorities.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The president can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto, here
expressed as a flagrant offence.

494
Article 70
The members of the National Assembly enjoy parliamentary immunity. No deputy may be prosecuted,
searched, arrested, detained or judged on the basis of
the opinions or the votes expressed by him in the exercise of his functions. Except in case of flagrant offence,
no deputy can be prosecuted or arrested, during the
period of the sessions, in matters of misdemeanors or
serious crimes except with the authorization of the
National Assembly. A deputy may be arrested out of session only with the authorization of the Bureau of the
National Assembly, except in case of flagrant offence,
of authorized prosecutions or of final condemnations.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.

National Assembly of Niger (Assemblee nationale)

Article 129
The President of the Republic negotiates and ratifies
treaties and international agreements.
Article 130
Defense and peace treaties and agreements relating to
international organizations, those which modify the
internal laws of the State and those which commit the
finances of the State may only be ratified by virtue of a
law.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.
Article 81
The law establishes the regulations concerning . . .
amnesty.

Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.

Article 67
The Deputies shall be elected by universal, free, direct,
equal and secret suffrage.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments require approval
in a popular referendum.
Article 134
The initiative for the revision of the Constitution
belongs concurrently to the President of the Republic
and the members of the National Assembly.
Article 135
In order to be taken into consideration, the project
or bill to amend the Constitution must be voted by
a majority of three-fourths of the members composing the National Assembly. If the project to amend
the Constitution has been approved by a majority of
four-fifths of the members composing the National
Assembly, the amendment is approved. In default, the
project or bill to amend the Constitution is submitted to
Referendum.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for the
declaration of war.
Article 54
The President of the Republic, after deliberation of
the Council of Ministers, shall announce the State of
urgency in the conditions determined by the law.
Article 85
A declaration of war and the sending of military troupes
abroad shall be authorized by the National Assembly.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 55
The President of the Republic shall have the right of
pardon.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The president makes judicial appointments,
and the appointments do not require the approval
of the legislature. The legislature does, however,
propose one of the seven members of the Constitutional Court.
Article 101
Judges shall be appointed by the President of the Republic on proposition of the Minister of Justice, Keeper of
the Seals, after consultation with the High Council of
the Judiciary.
Article 104
The Constitutional Court consists of seven members of
at least of forty years of age.
The Court consists of: two persons having extended
professional experiences with one being proposed by
the Bureau of the National Assembly and one proposed
by the President of the Republic; two magistrates elected
by their peers; one lawyer elected by his peers; one professor from the Faculty of Law holding at least a doctorate in public law elected by his peers; a representative of the Associations of Defense of Human Rights
recognized for his expertise in public law. The members of the Constitutional Court are appointed for six
years by decree of the President of the Republic. Their
mandate is not renewable. One-third of the membership of the Constitutional Court is renewed every two
years.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

National Assembly of Nigeria

495

No. Niger is a member of the Central Bank of West

African States, whose governor is selected by the
member states.

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.

No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the

operation of the public media.

Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.

No. The legislature meets in ordinary session for

less than five months each year.
Article 73
Each year, the National Assembly meets as of right in
two ordinary sessions on convocation of its President.
The first session opens the first week of the month of
March and must not exceed ninety days. The second
session, called the budgetary session, shall open the first
week of the month of October and must not exceed
sixty days.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.

Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Niger held five rounds of National Assembly
elections between 1993 and 2004. Re-election rates
are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced members.

No.

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF NIGERIA

Expert consultants: Etannibi Alemika, Peter Lewis, Oyeleye Oyediran, Rebecca Sako-John,
Richard L. Sklar
Score: .47
Influence over
executive (3/9)

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

5. oversee
police
6. appoint
PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

X
X

Specified
powers (2/8)
X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

19. amendments
20. war
21. treaties
22. amnesty

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

23. pardon
24. judiciary

Institutional
capacity (5/6)
X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

X
X
X

25. central bank

26. media

The National Assembly of Nigeria was formally

established in the 1963 constitution, following the
achievement of independence from Great Britain
in 1960. The document called for a Westminsterstyle parliamentary system. In 1979 Nigeria
adopted a new constitution that established a presi-

dential system with a bicameral National Assembly

consisting of a lower house, the House of Representatives, and an upper house, the Senate. The
legislature was sidelined for much of the postindependence period as the country was ruled
intermittently by military dictators. Military rule

496

ended in 1999, leading to presidential and legislative elections.

The legislature has middling powers. Its influence over the executive is not expansive. It has
some institutional autonomy; most notably, the
president lacks the powers to rule by decree or to
dissolve the legislature. The legislature holds two
of the eight specified prerogatives assessed here. It
also enjoys a good deal of institutional capacity.
SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of a special panel appointed by the chief
justice of Nigeria.
Article 143
(1) The President or Vice-President may be removed
from office in accordance with the provisions of this
section.
(2) Whenever a notice of any allegation in writing
signed by not less than one-third of the members of
the National Assembly
(a) is presented to the President of the Senate;
(b) stating that the holder of the office of President
or Vice-President is guilty of gross misconduct in the
performance of the functions of his office, detailed
particulars of which shall be specified, the President
of the Senate shall within seven days of the receipt
of the notice cause a copy thereof to be served on
the holder of the office and on each member of the
National Assembly, and shall also cause any statement made in reply to the allegation by the holder
of the office to be served on each member of the
National Assembly.
(3) Within fourteen days of the presentation of the
notice to the President of the Senate (whether or not
any statement was made by the holder of the office
in reply to the allegation contained in the notice) each
House of the National Assembly shall resolve by motion
without any debate whether or not the allegation shall
be investigated.
(4) A motion of the National Assembly that the allegation be investigated shall not be declared as having
been passed, unless it is supported by the votes of not
less than two-thirds majority of all the members of each
House of the National Assembly.
(5) Within seven days of the passing of a motion under
the foregoing provisions, the Chief Justice of Nigeria
shall at the request of the President of the Senate
appoint a Panel of seven persons who in his opinion
are of unquestionable integrity, not being members of
any public service, legislative house or political party,
to investigate the allegation as provided in this section.
(6) The holder of an office whose conduct is being
investigated under this section shall have the right to

National Assembly of Nigeria

defend himself in person and be represented before the
Panel by legal practitioners of his own choice.
(7) A Panel appointed under this section shall
(a) have such powers and exercise its functions in
accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed
by the National Assembly; and
(b) within three months of its appointment report its
findings to each House of the National Assembly.
(8) Where the Panel reports to each House of the
National Assembly that the allegation has not been
proved, no further proceedings shall be taken in respect
of the matter.
(9) Where the report of the Panel is that the allegation against the holder of the office has been proved,
then within fourteen days of the receipt of the report,
each House of the National Assembly shall consider
the report, and if by a resolution of each House of
the National Assembly supported by not less than twothirds majority of all its members, the report of the
Panel is adopted, then the holder of the office shall
stand removed from office as from the date of the adoption of the report.
(10) No proceedings or determination of the Panel
or of the National Assembly or any matter relating
thereto shall be entertained or questioned in any
court.
(11) In this section
gross misconduct means a grave violation or breach
of the provisions of this Constitution or a misconduct of such nature as amounts in the opinion of the
National Assembly to gross misconduct.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Ministers are prohibited from serving simultaneously in the legislature.
Article 147
(4) Where a member of the National Assembly or of a
House of Assembly is appointed as Minister of the Government of the Federation, he shall be deemed to have
resigned his membership of the National Assembly or of
the House of Assembly on his taking the oath of office
as Minister.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 88
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, each
House of the National Assembly shall have power by
resolution published in its journal or in the Official
Gazette of the Government of the Federation to direct
or cause to be directed an investigation into
(a) any matter or thing with respect to which it has
power to make laws; and

National Assembly of Nigeria

(b) the conduct of affairs of any person, authority, Ministry or government department charged, or
intended to be charged, with the duty of or responsibility for
(i) executing or administering laws enacted by the
National Assembly, and
(ii) disbursing or administering moneys appropriated or to be appropriated by the National Assembly.
(2) The powers conferred on the National Assembly
under the provisions of this section are exercisable only
for the purpose of enabling it to
(a) make laws with respect to any matter within its
legislative competence and correct any defects in
existing laws; and
(b) expose corruption, inefficiency or waste in the
execution or administration of laws within its legislative competence and in the disbursement or administration of funds appropriated by it.
Article 89
(1) For the purposes of any investigation under section
88 of this Constitution and subject to the provisions
thereof, the Senate or the House of Representatives or a
committee appointed in accordance with section 62 of
this Constitution shall have power to
(a) procure all such evidence, written or oral, direct
or circumstantial, as it may think necessary or desirable, and examine all persons as witnesses whose
evidence may be material or relevant to the subject
matter;
(b) require such evidence to be given on oath;
(c) summon any person in Nigeria to give evidence
at any place or produce any document or other thing
in his possession or under his control, and examine
him as a witness and require him to produce any
document or other thing in his possession or under
his control, subject to all just exceptions; and
(d) issue a warrant to compel the attendance of any
person who, after having been summoned to attend,
fails, refuses or neglects to do so and does not excuse
such failure, refusal or neglect to the satisfaction of
the House or the committee in question, and order
him to pay all costs which may have been occasioned
in compelling his attendance or by reason of his failure, refusal or neglect to obey the summons, and also
to impose such fine as may be prescribed for any such
failure, refusal or neglect; and any fine so imposed
shall be recoverable in the same manner as a fine
imposed by a court of law.
(2) A summons or warrant issued under this section
may be served or executed by any member of the Nigeria Police Force or by any person authorised in that
behalf by the President of the Senate or the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, as the case may require.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.

497
Article 88
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, each
House of the National Assembly shall have power by
resolution published in its journal or in the Official
Gazette of the Government of the Federation to direct
or cause to be directed an investigation into
(a) any matter or thing with respect to which it has
power to make laws; and
(b) the conduct of affairs of any person, authority, Ministry or government department charged, or
intended to be charged, with the duty of or responsibility for
(i) executing or administering laws enacted by the
National Assembly, and
(ii) disbursing or administering moneys appropriated or to be appropriated by the National Assembly.
(2) The powers conferred on the National Assembly
under the provisions of this section are exercisable only
for the purpose of enabling it to
(a) make laws with respect to any matter within its
legislative competence and correct any defects in
existing laws; and
(b) expose corruption, inefficiency or waste in the
execution or administration of laws within its legislative competence and in the disbursement or administration of funds appropriated by it.
Article 89
(1) For the purposes of any investigation under section
88 of this Constitution and subject to the provisions
thereof, the Senate or the House of Representatives or a
committee appointed in accordance with section 62 of
this Constitution shall have power to
(a) procure all such evidence, written or oral, direct or
circumstantial, as it may think necessary or desirable,
and examine all persons as witnesses whose evidence
may be material or relevant to the subject matter;
(b) require such evidence to be given on oath;
(c) summon any person in Nigeria to give evidence
at any place or produce any document or other thing
in his possession or under his control, and examine
him as a witness and require him to produce any
document or other thing in his possession or under
his control, subject to all just exceptions; and
(d) issue a warrant to compel the attendance of any
person who, after having been summoned to attend,
fails, refuses or neglects to do so and does not excuse
such failure, refusal or neglect to the satisfaction of
the House or the committee in question, and order
him to pay all costs which may have been occasioned
in compelling his attendance or by reason of his failure, refusal or neglect to obey the summons, and also
to impose such fine as may be prescribed for any such
failure, refusal or neglect; and any fine so imposed
shall be recoverable in the same manner as a fine
imposed by a court of law.
(2) A summons or warrant issued under this section
may be served or executed by any member of the
Nigeria Police Force or by any person authorised in
that behalf by the President of the Senate or the

498
Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may
require.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. There is no prime minister.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The Senates approval is necessary to confirm
the presidents ministerial appointments.
Article 147
(1) There shall be such offices of Ministers of the Government of the Federation as may be established by the
President.
(2) Any appointment to the office of Minister of the
Government of the Federation shall, if the nomination
of any person to such office is confirmed by the Senate,
be made by the President.
(3) Any appointment under subsection (2) of this section by the President shall be in conformity with the
provisions of section 14(3) of this Constitution:
Provided that in giving effect to the provisions aforesaid
the President shall appoint at least one Minister from
each State, who shall be an indigene of such State.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.

National Assembly of Nigeria

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires

ratification or approval by the legislature before
it takes effect; that is, the executive lacks decree
power.
Yes. The president lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority vote is required to override a presidential veto.
Article 58
(1) The power of the National Assembly to make laws
shall be exercised by bills passed by both the Senate and
the House of Representatives and, except as otherwise
provided by subsection (5) of this section, assented to
by the President.
(2) A bill may originate in either the Senate or the
House of Representatives and shall not become law
unless it has been passed and, except as otherwise provided by this section and section 59 of this Constitution, assented to in accordance with the provisions of
this section.
(3) Where a bill has been passed by the House in which
it originated, it shall be sent to the other House, and
it shall be presented to the President for assent when it
has been passed by that other House and agreement has
been reached between the two Houses on any amendment made on it.
(4) Where a bill is presented to the President for assent,
he shall within thirty days thereof signify that he
assents or that he withholds assent.
(5) Where the President withholds his assent and the
bill is again passed by each House by two-thirds majority, the bill shall become law and the assent of the President shall not be required.

No. The president is directly elected.

Article 132
(1) An election to the office of President shall be held
on a date to be appointed by the Independent National
Electoral Commission.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in
the government.
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the
executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.
Article 64
(1) The Senate and the House of Representatives shall
each stand dissolved at the expiration of a period of
four years commencing from the date of the first sitting
of the House.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The courts can review the constitutionality of
laws.
Article 295
(1) Where any question as to the interpretation or
application of this Constitution arises in any proceedings in any court of law in any part of Nigeria (other
than in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, the
Federal High Court or a High Court) and the court is
of the opinion that the question involves a substantial
question of law, the court may, and shall if any of the
parties to the proceedings so requests, refer the question to the Federal High Court or a High Court having
jurisdiction in that part of Nigeria and the Federal High
Court or the High Court shall
(a) if it is of opinion that the question involves a
substantial question of law, refer the question to the
Court of Appeal; or

National Assembly of Nigeria

(b) if it is of opinion that the question does not
involve a substantial question of law, remit the question to the court that made the reference to be disposed of in accordance with such directions as the
Federal High Court or the High Court may think fit
to give.
(2) Where any question as to the interpretation or
application of this Constitution arises in any proceedings in the Federal High Court or a High Court, and
the court is of opinion that the question involves a
substantial question of law, the court may, and shall if
any party to the proceedings so requests, refer the question to the Court of Appeal; and where any question is
referred in pursuance of this subsection, the court shall
give its decision upon the question and the court in
which the question arose shall dispose of the case in
accordance with that decision.
(3) Where any question as to the interpretation or
application of this Constitution arises in any proceedings in the Court of Appeal and the court is of opinion
that the question involves a substantial question of law,
the court may, and shall if any party to the proceedings
so requests, refer the question to the Supreme Court
which shall give its decision upon the question and
give such directions to the Court of Appeal as it deems
appropriate.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The president can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
Members remuneration is protected by law.
Article 70
A member of the Senate or of the House of Representatives shall receive such salary and other allowances as
the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission may determine.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislators are subject to arrest and criminal
prosecution.
18. All members of the legislature are elected; the
executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.

499

Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.

Article 65
(1) Subject to the provisions of section 66 of this Constitution, a person shall be qualified for election as a
member of
(a) the Senate, if he is a citizen of Nigeria and has
attained the age of thirty-five years; and
(b) the House of Representatives, if he is a citizen of
Nigeria and has attained the age of thirty years.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. A constitutional amendment requires approval
by a two-thirds majority of the provincial (state)
legislatures.
Article 9
(1) The National Assembly may, subject to the provisions of this section, alter any of the provisions of this
Constitution.
(2) An Act of the National Assembly for the alteration
of this Constitution, not being an Act to which section 8
of this Constitution applies, shall not be passed in either
House of the National Assembly unless the proposal
is supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds
majority of all the members of that House and approved
by resolution of the Houses of Assembly of not less than
two-thirds of all the States.
(3) An Act of the National Assembly for the purpose
of altering the provisions of this section, section 8 or
Chapter IV of this Constitution shall not be passed by
either House of the National Assembly unless the proposal is approved by the votes of not less than fourfifths majority of all the members of each House, and
also approved by resolution of the Houses of Assembly
of not less than two-thirds of all the States.
(4) For the purposes of section 8 of this Constitution
and of subsections (2) and (3) of this section, the number of members of each House of the National Assembly
shall, notwithstanding any vacancy, be deemed to be
the number of members specified in sections 48 and 49
of this Constitution.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is required for the
president to declare war.
Article 5
(a) the President shall not declare a state of war between
the Federation and another country except with the
sanction of a resolution of both Houses of the National
Assembly sitting in a joint session.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.

500
Article 12
(1) No treaty between the Federation and any other
country shall have the force of law except to the extent
to which any such treaty has been enacted into law by
the National Assembly.

National Assembly of Nigeria

No. The president appoints the governor of the

Central Bank of Nigeria.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the

operation of the public media.

No. Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 175
(1) The President may
(a) grant any person concerned with or convicted of
any offence created by an Act of the National Assembly a pardon, either free or subject to lawful conditions;
(b) grant to any person a respite, either for an indefinite or for a specified period, of the execution of
any punishment imposed on that person for such an
offence;
(c) substitute a less severe form of punishment for
any punishment imposed on that person for such an
offence; or
(d) remit the whole or any part of any punishment
imposed on that person for such an offence or of any
penalty or forfeiture otherwise due to the State on
account of such an offence.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The president makes judicial appointments,
and the appointments do not require the legislatures approval.
Article 231
(1) The appointment of a person to the office of Chief
Justice of Nigeria shall be made by the President on
the recommendation of the National Judicial Council
subject to confirmation of such appointment by the
Senate.
(2) The appointment of a person to the office of a Justice of the Supreme Court shall be made by the President on the recommendation of the National Judicial
Council subject to confirmation of such appointment
by the Senate.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session for at

least six months each year.
Article 63
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
sit for a period of not less than one hundred and eightyone days in a year.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
Article 51
There shall be a Clerk to the National Assembly and
such other staff as may be prescribed by an Act of the
National Assembly, and the method of appointment of
the Clerk and other staff of the National Assembly shall
be as prescribed by that Act.

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Military interventions caused considerable turbulence and interruption in parliamentary life during the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, but
the National Assembly elections of 1999, 2003, and
2007 restored some stability and continuity, and
re-election rates have been sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

Parliament of Norway (Storting)

501

PARLIAMENT OF NORWAY (STORTING)

Expert consultants: Christine Ingebritsen, Tor Arne Morskogen, Bjrn Erik Rasch,
Hilmar Rommetvedt, Eva Stabell, Lars Svasand
Score: .72
Influence over
executive (7/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Institutional
autonomy (7/9)
X

Specified
powers (4/8)

Institutional
capacity (5/6)

10. no
dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments

27. sessions

20. war

28. secretary

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

18. all elected

26. media

X
X
X

The Parliament (Storting) of Norway was established in the 1814 Eisvold Convention, the oldest
constitution in Europe that is currently in force.
After a period of Swedish rule, Norway regained
independence in 1905. The Eisvold Convention
provided for a constitutional monarchy and a
unicameral parliament consisting of two separate
departments, the Permanent Chamber (Lagting)
and the General Chamber (Odelsting). A constitutional amendment passed in 2007 called for a unicameral legislature to be established following the
2009 general election. Since 1880 the monarchs
executive powers have been exercised by the government. Judicial review was instituted in 1890
and then eliminated in 1930. From 1930 to 1975
the legislatures laws were supreme and not subject
to judicial review. Judicial review was reinstated
in 1976. In the 1990s a number of reforms were
instituted to update procedures by which the parliament oversees the executive, including the creation of a new Standing Committee on Scrutiny
and Constitutional Affairs.
The parliament is a weighty political actor. It
has considerable influence over the executive and
a great deal of institutional autonomy. It exercises
some specified powers and has a high level of institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. Formally, the king has the power to remove
the prime minister from office. In practice, the legislature can remove the prime minister with a vote
of no confidence. The legislature cannot depose the
king.
Article 5
The Kings person is sacred; he cannot be censured or
accused. The responsibility rests with his Council.
Article 22
(1) The Prime Minister and the other Members of the
Council of State, together with the State Secretaries,
may be dismissed by the King without any prior court
judgment, after he has heard the opinion of the Council
of State on the subject.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 62
(1) Officials who are employed in government departments, except however the State Secretaries, or officials

502
and pensioners of the Court, may not be elected as representatives to the Parliament. The same applies to officials employed in the diplomatic or consular services.
(2) Members of the Council of State may not attend
meetings of the Parliament as representatives while
holding a seat in the Council of State. Nor may the State
Secretaries attend as representatives while holding their
appointments.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 75
It devolves upon the Parliament:
h) to have the right to require anyone, the King and the
Royal Family excepted, to appear before it on matters
of State; the exception does not, however, apply to the
Royal Princes if they hold any public office.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.

Parliament of Norway (Storting)

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The country lacks a presidency. The king is the
head of state.
Article 3
The Executive Power is vested in the King, or in the
Queen if she has succeeded to the Crown pursuant to
the provisions of Article 6 or Article 7 or Article 48 of
this Constitution. When the Executive Power is thus
vested in the Queen, she has all the rights and obligations which pursuant to this Constitution and the Law
of the Land are possessed by the King.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 22
(1) The Prime Minister and the other Members of the
Council of State, together with the State Secretaries,
may be dismissed by the King without any prior court
judgment, after he has heard the opinion of the Council
of State on the subject.

Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. The legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. The king appoints as prime minister the candidate who enjoys the support of the legislature.
Article 12
(1) The King himself chooses a Council from among
Norwegian citizens who are entitled to vote. This Council shall consist of a Prime Minister and at least seven
other Members.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. Formally, ministers are appointed by the
crown. In practice, the king appoints ministers on
the recommendation of the prime minister, and
the appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 12
(1) The King himself chooses a Council from among
Norwegian citizens who are entitled to vote. This Council shall consist of a Prime Minister and at least seven
other Members.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.
11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires
ratification or approval by the legislature before
it takes effect; that is, the executive lacks decree
power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. Formally, the king can refuse to assent to a
bill, which would amount to a veto power. In practice, it would be unthinkable for the monarch to
veto legislation. There is one noteworthy exception, however. In 1940 the king vetoed a bill that
would have conceded Norways military defeat by
Nazi Germany.
Article 78
(1) If the King assents to the Bill, he appends his signature, whereby it becomes law.
(2) If he does not assent to it, he returns it to the General Chamber with a statement that he does not for the
time being find it expedient to sanction it. In that case
the Bill must not again be submitted to the King by the
Parliament then assembled.

Parliament of Norway (Storting)

Article 79
If a Bill has been passed unaltered by two sessions of
the Parliament, constituted after two separate successive elections and separated from each other by at least
two intervening sessions of the Parliament, without a
divergent Bill having been passed by any Parliament in
the period between the first and last adoption, and it
is then submitted to the King with a petition that His
Majesty shall not refuse his assent to a Bill which, after
the most mature deliberation, the Parliament considers
to be beneficial, it shall become law even if the Royal
Assent is not accorded before the Parliament goes into
recess.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The courts can review the constitutionality of
laws.
14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all
policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,
including control over members perquisites.
Article 65
(1) Every representative and proxy called to the Parliament shall be entitled to receive from the Treasury
such reimbursement as is prescribed by law for travelling expenses to and from the Parliament, and from the
Parliament to his home and back again during vacations lasting at least fourteen days.
(2) He shall further be entitled to remuneration, likewise prescribed by law, for attending the Parliament.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislators are immune only for opinions
expressed in the legislature or while they are in
parliament or traveling to and from parliament.
Article 66
Representatives on their way to and from the Parliament, as well as during their attendance there, shall
be exempt from personal arrest, unless they are apprehended in public crimes, nor may they be called to
account outside the meetings of the Parliament for
opinions expressed there.

503

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 49
The people exercises the Legislative Power through the
Parliament, which consists of two departments, the Permanent Chamber and the General Chamber.
Article 58
(1) Each county constitutes a constituency.
(2) One hundred and fifty-seven of the Representatives of the Parliament are elected as representatives
of constituencies and the remaining 8 representatives
are elected so as to achieve a greater degree of proportionality.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
with a two-thirds majority vote.
Article 112
(1) If experience shows that any part of this Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway ought to be amended,
the proposal to this effect shall be submitted to the
first, second or third Parliament after a new General
Election and be publicly announced in print. But it
shall be left to the first, second or third Parliament after
the following General Election to decide whether or
not the proposed amendment shall be adopted. Such
amendment must never, however, contradict the principles embodied in this Constitution, but solely relate
to modifications of particular provisions which do not
alter the spirit of the Constitution, and such amendment requires that two thirds of the Parliament agree
thereto.
(2) An amendment to the Constitution adopted in the
manner aforesaid shall be signed by the President and
the Secretary of the Parliament, and shall be sent to the
King for public announcement in print, as an applicable provision of the Constitution of the Kingdom of
Norway.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is required to deploy
the armed forces abroad.
Article 25
(1) The King is Commander-in-Chief of the land and
naval forces of the Realm. These forces may not be
increased or reduced without the consent of the Parliament. They may not be transferred to the service of foreign powers, nor may the military forces of any foreign
power, except auxiliary forces assisting against hostile
attack, be brought into the Realm without the consent
of the Parliament.
(2) The territorial army and the other troops which cannot be classed as troops of the line must never, without

504

Parliament of Norway (Storting)

the consent of the Parliament, be employed outside the

borders of the Realm.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.

Yes. The legislature appoints the members of the

board that oversees the operation of the public
media.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

international treaties.
Article 26
(2) Treaties on matters of special importance, and, in
all cases, treaties whose implementation, according to
the Constitution, necessitates a new law or a decision
by the Parliament, are not binding until the Parliament
has given its consent thereto.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.
Article 80
(1) The Parliament shall remain in session as long as it
deems it necessary and shall terminate its proceedings
when it has concluded its business.
(2) In accordance with the rules of procedure adopted
by the Parliament, the proceedings may be resumed,
but they shall terminate not later than the last Sunday
in the month of September.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No. The king has the power of pardon.

Yes.

Article 20
(1) The King shall have the right in the Council of State
to pardon criminals after sentence has been passed. The
criminal shall have the choice of accepting the Kings
pardon or submitting to the penalty imposed.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The constitution does not specify how justices
are to be appointed. In practice, the government
appoints the judiciary, and the appointments do
not require the legislatures approval.
Article 88
(2) The Supreme Court shall consist of a President and
at least four other Members.

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.

No. The king, on the recommendation of the government, appoints the governor of the Central
Bank of Norway.

Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

Council of Oman (Majlis)

505

COUNCIL OF OMAN (MAJLIS )

Expert consultant: Michael Herb
Score: .16
Influence over
executive (2/9)

Institutional
autonomy (1/9)

Specified
powers (0/8)

Institutional
capacity (2/6)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

24. judiciary

25. central bank

X

26. media

18. all elected

The Council (Majlis) of Oman was established by

royal decree of the sultan in 1981. It was formalized
and expanded in the countrys first written constitution, which was decreed by the sultan in 1996.
The constitution devotes but a single article to the
Council and its powers; its other responsibilities
were defined in subsequent legislation. The bicameral Council consists of an elected lower house,
the Consultative Council (Majlis ash Shura), and an
appointed upper house, the Council of State (Majlis
al-Dawla). Oman held its first legislative elections
in 2003.
The Council is not a legislature in the traditional sense. It does not introduce or pass legislation, but serves in an advisory role to the sultan. The Council questions government officials
but otherwise lacks influence over the executive.
It is virtually bereft of institutional autonomy and
entirely lacking in the specified powers assessed in
this survey. Notably, however, the Council does
have some institutional capacity.

SURVEY

Article 41
The Sultan is the Head of State and the Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces. His person is inviolable and must be respected and his orders must be
obeyed.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive.

1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).

No. The legislature cannot remove the sultan from

office.

No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.

506

6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

No. The sultan, if he so chooses, can appoint a
prime minister.
Article 48
If the Sultan appoints a Prime Minister, his competencies and powers shall be specified in the Decree appointing him.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The sultan appoints ministers, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 42
The Sultan discharges the following functions:
appointing and dismissing Deputy Prime Ministers,
Ministers and those of their rank.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The country lacks a presidency. The sultan is
the head of state.
Article 41
The Sultan is the Head of State and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. His person is inviolable
and must be respected and his orders must be obeyed.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in
the government.
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the
executive.
No. The sultan can dissolve the legislature.
11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The sultan issues decrees that have the force of
law.
Article 42
The Sultan discharges the following functions:
issuing and ratifying laws.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. The sultan has absolute control over legislation. The legislature does not pass legislation; it
merely provides advice to the sultan.

Council of Oman (Majlis)

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Council does not make laws. Furthermore,
a judicial department can settle disputes related to
the constitutionality of laws.
Article 70
The Law shall stipulate the judicial department concerned with settling disputes arising from the incompatibility of laws and regulations with the Basic Law
of the State and ensuring that the latters provisions
are not contravened, and shall define that departments
powers and procedures.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. The sultan has absolute gatekeeping authority.
The legislature is prohibited from initiating legislation.
Article 42
The Sultan discharges the following functions:
issuing and ratifying laws.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The Council does not appropriate funds.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the perquisites of its own members.
No. The Council is dependent on the Sultan for the
resources that finance its own operations.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Members of the Council are immune.
18. All members of the legislature are elected; the
executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
No. The sultan appoints all of the members of the
Council of State. All members of the Consultative
Council are elected.
19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional changes are made in the same
manner in which [the constitution] was promulgated, meaning by the sultans decree.
Article 81
This Basic Law can only be amended in the same manner in which it was promulgated.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Council of Oman (Majlis)

No. The sultan can declare war without the Councils approval.
Article 42
The Sultan discharges the following functions:
declaring . . . war, and making peace in accordance
with the provisions of the Law.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
No. The sultan can conclude international treaties
without the Councils approval.
Article 42
The Sultan discharges the following functions:
signing international treaties and agreements in accordance with the provisions of the Law (or authorising a
signatory to sign them) and issuing decrees ratifying
them.

507

No. The sultan appoints the chairman of the Central Bank of Oman.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The Council regularly meets in ordinary session.
28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.
No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No.

No. The sultan has the power to grant amnesty.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.

Article 42
The Sultan discharges the following functions:
waiving or commuting punishments.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The sultan has the power of pardon.
Article 42
The Sultan discharges the following functions:
waiving or commuting punishments.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The sultan appoints judges, and the appointments do not require the legislatures approval.
Article 42
The Sultan discharges the following functions:
appointing and dismissing senior judges.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
No. There has been only one legislative election in
Oman, so legislators have not yet had the opportunity to seek re-election.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
No. The first legislative elections were held in 2003.
Since its creation in 1981, royal reappointment
rates have been high, so the Council has seen some
consistency in membership over the past several
decades. Still, it is too early to speak of re-election
rates and continuity of elected membership.

508

Parliament of Pakistan (Majlis-e-Shoora)

PARLIAMENT OF PAKISTAN (MAJLIS-E-SHOORA)

Expert consultants: Sanaullah Baloch, Mary Cummins, Charles H. Kennedy, Aqil Shah, Nusrat Sheikh
Score: .44
Influence over
executive (5/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)

Specified
powers (1/8)

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

12. no veto
13. no review

14. no gatekeeping
15. no impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

5. oversee police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack president
9. no confidence

21. treaties
22. amnesty

Institutional
capacity (3/6)
X

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

26. media
X

The Parliament (Majlis-e-Shoora) of Pakistan formally came into being upon independence from
Great Britain and the partition of British India in
1947. Pakistans constitution of 1956 called for
a bicameral legislature with a lower house, the
National Assembly, and an upper house, the Senate. The year 1971 brought separation of what had
been East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) from West
Pakistan (now Pakistan) in the Bangladesh Liberation War. The constitution currently in effect
was promulgated in 1973. The military has frequently intervened in politics. The 1973 constitution was suspended by military rulers in 1977 and
then restored with amendments in 1985. Prior to
1997 the legislature was subject to dissolution, but
in that year Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif repealed
the presidents power to dismiss the legislature. In
1999 General Pervez Musharraf took over the country in a bloodless coup, declared himself president,
and suspended parliament and the constitution. In
2002 the legislature again convened, but Musharraf reinstated the presidents power to dissolve the
legislature. The constitution was restored in stages.
In late 2007 Musharraf declared a state of emergency and suspended the parliament. In early 2008
the country returned to civilian rule when Musharraf, under international pressure, resigned as army
chief of staff. Musharraf retained his position as
civilian president and held fresh elections that
reinstated the parliament and brought to power
a new, coalition government.

The legislature, while often hamstrung by military governments, is not devoid of power. It has
some influence over the executive. Its powers in
this area include the right to impeach the president and remove the prime minister with a vote
of no confidence and to interpellate officials from
the executive. Its institutional autonomy is not
inconsiderable but is circumscribed by presidential
decree and dissolution powers. The legislature exercises only one specified power, the right to change
the constitution, and has modest institutional
capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
[A]Yes. The legislature can impeach the president
by a two-thirds majority vote of its total membership. It can remove the prime minister with a vote
of no confidence.
Article 47
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution, the President may, in accordance with the provisions of this Article, be removed from office on the
ground of physical or mental incapacity or impeached
on a charge of violating the Constitution or gross misconduct.
(2) Not less than one-half of the total membership of
either House may give to the Speaker of the National

Parliament of Pakistan (Majlis-e-Shoora)

Assembly or, as the case may be, the Chairman written notice of its intention to move a resolution for the
removal of, or, as the case may be, to impeach, the President; and such notice shall set out the particulars of his
incapacity or of the charge against him.
(3) If a notice under clause (2) is received by the Chairman, he shall transmit it forthwith to the Speaker.
(4) The Speaker shall, within three days of the receipt
of a notice under clause (2) or clause (3), cause a copy
of the notice to be transmitted to the President.
(5) The Speaker shall summon the two Houses to meet
in a joint sitting not earlier than seven days and not
later than fourteen days after the receipt of the notice
by him.
(6) The joint sitting may investigate or cause to be
investigated the ground or the charge upon which the
notice is founded.
(7) The President shall have the right to appear and be
represented during the investigation, if any, and before
the joint sitting.
(8) If, after consideration of the result of the investigation, if any, a resolution is passed at the joint sitting by
the votes of not less than two-thirds of the total membership of declaring that the President is unfit to hold
the office due to incapacity or is guilty of violating the
Constitution or of gross misconduct, the President shall
cease to hold office immediately on the passing of the
resolution.
Article 95
(1) A resolution for a vote of no-confidence moved by
not less than twenty per centum of the total membership of the National Assembly may be passed against
the Prime Minister by the National Assembly.
(2) A resolution referred to in clause (1) shall not be
voted upon before the expiration of three days, or later
than seven days, from the day on which such resolution
is moved in the National Assembly.
(3) A resolution referred to in clause (1) shall not be
moved in the National Assembly while the National
Assembly is considering demands for grants submitted
to it in the Annual Budget Statement.
(4) If the resolution referred to in clause (1) is passed
by a majority of the total membership of the National
Assembly, the Prime Minister shall cease to hold
office.

509

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. The president appoints as prime minister the
candidate who enjoys the support of the legislature.
Article 91
(1) There shall be a Cabinet of Ministers, with the Prime
Minister at its head, to aid and advise the President in
the exercise of his functions.
(2) The President shall in his discretion appoint from
amongst the members of the National Assembly a Prime
Minister who, in his opinion, is most likely to command the confidence of the majority of the members
of the National Assembly.
[(2A) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause
(2), after the twentieth day of March, one thousand nine hundred and ninety, the President shall
invite the member of the National Assembly to be the
Prime Minister who commands the confidence of the
majority of the members of the National Assembly, as
ascertained in a session of the Assembly summoned
for the purpose in accordance with the provisions of
the Constitution.]

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.

[A]Yes. Ministers are chosen from, and required to

serve simultaneously in, the legislature.

No. The legislatures approval is not required to

confirm the appointment of individual ministers.

Article 91
(7) A Minister who for any period of six consecutive
months is not a member of the National Assembly shall,
at the expiration of that period, cease to be a Minister
and shall not before the dissolution of that Assembly be
again appointed a Minister unless he is elected a member of that Assembly; provided that nothing contained
in this clause shall apply to a Minister who is a member
of the Senate.

Article 91
(1) There shall be a Cabinet of Ministers, with the Prime
Minister at its head, to aid and advise the President in
the exercise of his functions.
(2) The President shall in his discretion appoint from
amongst the members of the National Assembly a Prime
Minister who, in his opinion, is most likely to command the confidence of the majority of the members
of the National Assembly.

510

Parliament of Pakistan (Majlis-e-Shoora)

[(2A) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause
(2), after the twentieth day of March, one thousand nine hundred and ninety, the President shall
invite the member of the National Assembly to be the
Prime Minister who commands the confidence of the
majority of the members of the National Assembly, as
ascertained in a session of the Assembly summoned
for the purpose in accordance with the provisions of
the Constitution.]
(3) The person appointed under clause (2), [or, as the
case may be, invited under clause (2A)] shall, before
entering upon the office, make before the president
oath in the form set out in the Third Schedule and
shall within a period of sixty days thereof obtain a
vote of confidence from the National Assembly.
(4) The Cabinet, together with the Ministers of State,
shall be collectively responsible to the National
Assembly.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. According to the constitution, the legislature
and provincial assemblies together form an electoral college that selects the president. In practice, since the 1999 coup General Musharraf has
appointed himself president.
Article 41
(1) There shall be a President of Pakistan who shall be
the Head of State and shall represent the unity of the
Republic.
(3) The President to be elected after the expiration of
the term specified in clause (7) shall be elected in accordance with the provisions of the Second Schedule by
the members of an electoral college consisting of
(a) the members of both Houses; and
(b) the members of the Provincial Assemblies.
(4) Election to the office of President shall be held not
earlier than sixty days and not later than thirty days
before the expiration of the term of the President in
office:
Provided that, if the election cannot be held within
the period aforesaid because the National Assembly
is dissolved, it shall be held within thirty days of the
general election to the Assembly.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 95
(1) A resolution for a vote of no-confidence moved by
not less than twenty per centum of the total membership of the National Assembly may be passed against
the Prime Minister by the National Assembly.
(2) A resolution referred to in clause (1) shall not be
voted upon before the expiration of three days, or later

than seven days, from the day on which such resolution

is moved in the National Assembly.
(3) A resolution referred to in clause (1) shall not be
moved in the National Assembly while the National
Assembly is considering demands for grants submitted
to it in the Annual Budget Statement.
(4) If the resolution referred to in clause (1) is passed
by a majority of the total membership of the National
Assembly, the Prime Minister shall cease to hold
office.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president, on the advice of the prime minister, can dissolve the legislature.
Article 58
(1) The President shall dissolve the National Assembly
if so advised by the Prime Minister; and the National
Assembly shall, unless sooner dissolved, stand dissolved
at the expiration of forty-eight hours after the Prime
Minister has so advised.
Explanation. Reference in this Article to Prime Minister shall not be construed to include reference to
a Prime Minister against whom a [notice of a resolution for a vote of no-confidence has been given] in
the National Assembly but has not been voted upon
or against whom such a resolution has been passed or
who is continuing in office after his resignation or after
the dissolution of the National Assembly
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (2)
of Article 48, the President may also dissolve the
National Assembly in his discretion where, in his opinion,
(a) a vote of no-confidence having been passed
against the Prime Minister, no other member of
the National Assembly is likely to command the
confidence of the majority of the members of the
National Assembly in accordance with the provisions
of the Constitution, as ascertained in a session of the
National Assembly summoned for the purpose; or
(b) A situation has been arisen in which the government of the Federation cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the constitution and an
appeal to the electorate is necessary.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The president can issue decrees that have the
force of law, here called ordinances, while the
legislature is out of session. The decrees lapse if
they are subsequently rejected by the legislature.
Article 89
(1) The President may, except when the National
Assembly is in session, if satisfied that circumstances
exist which render it necessary to take immediate
action, make and promulgate an Ordinance as the circumstances may require.

Parliament of Pakistan (Majlis-e-Shoora)

(2) An Ordinance promulgated under this Article shall
have the same force and effect as an Act of Parliament
and shall be subject to like restrictions as the power of
Parliament to make law, but every such ordinance
(a) shall be laid
(i) before the National Assembly if it [contains provisions dealing with all or any of the matters specified
in clause (2) of Article 73], and shall stand repealed at
the expiration of four months from its promulgation
or, if before the expiration of that period a resolution
disapproving it is passed by the Assembly, upon the
passing of that resolution;
(ii) before both Houses if it [does not contain provisions dealing with any of the matters referred to
in sub-paragraph (i)], and shall stand repealed at the
expiration of four months from its promulgation or,
if before the expiration of that period a resolution
disapproving it is passed by either House, upon the
passing of that resolution; and
(b) may be withdrawn at any time by the President.
(3) Without prejudice to the provisions of clause
(2), and Ordinance laid before the National Assembly shall be deemed to be a Bill introduced in the
National Assembly.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote of its present members.
Article 75
(1) When a Bill is presented to the President for assent,
the President shall, within [thirty] days,
(a) assent to the Bill; or
(b) in the case of a Bill other than a Money Bill, return
the Bill to the Majlis-e-Shoora with a message requesting that the Bill, or any specified provision thereof,
be reconsidered and that any amendment specified
in the message be considered.
(2) When the President has returned a Bill to the Majlise-Shoora, it shall be reconsidered by the Majlis-e-Shoora
and, if it is again passed, with or without amendment,
by the Majlis-e-Shoora, [in accordance with Article 70,]
it shall be deemed for the purposes of the Constitution to have been passed by both Houses and shall be
presented to the President and the President shall not
withhold assent therefrom.
(3) When the President has assented to a Bill, it shall
become law and be called an Act of Majlis-e-Shoora.
(4) No Act of Majlis-e-Shoora, and no provision in any
such Act, shall be invalid by reason only that some recommendation, previous sanction or consent required
by the Constitution was not given if that Act was
assented to in accordance with the Constitution.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.

511

No. The Supreme Court can review the constitutionality of laws.

Article 185
(2) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any
judgment, decree, final order or sentence of a High
Court
(f) if the High Court certifies that the case involves a
substantial question of law as to the interpretation of
the Constitution.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,
including control over members perquisites.
Article 250
(1) Within two years from the commencing day, provision shall be made by law for determining the
salaries, allowances and privileges of . . . a member of
the National Assembly . . . and a member of the Senate.
(2) Until other provision is made by law,
(a) the salaries, allowances and privileges of . . . a
member of the National Assembly shall be the same
as the salaries, allowances and privileges to which the
President, the Speaker or Deputy Speaker or a member
of the National Assembly of Pakistan or a Provincial
Assembly, a Federal Minister, a Minister of State, a
Chief Minister, a Provincial Minister or, as the case
may be, the Chief Election Commissioner was entitled immediately before the commencing day; and
(b) the salaries, allowances and privileges of the
Chairman, the Deputy Chairman, the Prime Minister and a member of the Senate shall be such as the
President may by Order determine.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislative immunity extends to official parliamentary business only. Legislators are subject to
arrest for common crimes.
Article 66
(1) Subject to the Constitution and to the rules of procedure of Majlis-e-Shoora, there shall be freedom of
speech in Majlis-e-Shoora and no member shall be liable
to any proceedings in any court in respect of anything

512
said or any vote given by him in [Majlis-e-Shoora], and
no person shall be so liable in respect of the publication by or under the authority of Majlis-e-Shoora of
any report, paper, votes or proceedings.
(2) In other respects, the powers, immunities and privileges of Majlis-e-Shoora, and the immunities and privileges of the members of Majlis-e-Shoora, shall be such
as may from time to time be defined by law and, until so
defined, shall be such as were, immediately before the
commencing day, enjoyed by the National Assembly of
Pakistan and the committees thereof and its members.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 51
(1) There shall be three hundred and forty-two seats of
the members in the National Assembly, including seats
reserved for women and non-Muslims.
(4) For the purpose of election to the National Assembly,
(a) The constituencies for the general seats shall
be single member territorial constituencies and the
members to fill such seats shall be elected by direct
and free vote in accordance with Law;
(b) Each Province shall be a single constituency for
all seats reserved for women which are allocated to
the respective Provinces under clause (1A);
(c) The constituency for all seats reserved for nonMuslims shall be the whole country;
(d) members to the seats reserved for women which
are allocated to a Province under clause (1A) shall be
elected in accordance with law through proportional
representation system of political parties lists of candidates on the basis of total number of general seats
secured by each political party from the Province concerned in the National Assembly[:]
[Provided that for the purpose of this sub-clause the
total number of general seats won by a political party
shall include the independent returned candidate or
candidates who may duly join such political party
within three days of the publication in the official
Gazette of the names of the returned candidates;]
(e) members to the seats reserved for non-Muslims
shall be elected in accordance with law through proportional representation system of political parties
lists of candidates on the basis of total number of general seats won by each political party in the National
Assembly:
Provided that for the purpose of this sub-clause the
total number of general seats won by a political party
shall include the independent returned candidate or
candidates who may duly join such political party
within three days of the publication in the official
Gazette of the names of the returned candidates.
Article 59
(1) The Senate shall consist of one hundred members,
of whom

Parliament of Pakistan (Majlis-e-Shoora)

(a) fourteen shall be elected by the members of each
Provincial Assembly;
(b) eight shall be elected from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in such manner as the President
may, by order prescribe;
(c) two on general seats, and one technocrat including Aalim shall be elected from the Federal Capital
in such manner as the President may, by Order, prescribe;
(d) four women shall be elected by the members of
each Provincial Assembly;
(e) four technocrats including Ulema shall be elected
by the members of each provincial Assembly;
(2) Election to fill seats in the Senate allocated to each
Province shall be held in accordance with the system
of proportional representation by means of the single
transferable vote.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
with a two-thirds majority vote in both houses.
Article 238
Subject to this Part, the Constitution may be amended
by Act of [Majlis-e-Shoora].
Article 239
(1) A Bill to amend the Constitution may originate in
either House and, when the Bill has been passed by the
votes of not less than two-thirds of the total membership of the House, it shall be transmitted to the other
House.
(2) If the Bill is passed without amendment by the votes
of not less than two-thirds of the total membership
of the House to which it is transmitted under clause
(1), it shall, subject to the provisions of clause (4), be
presented to the President for assent.
(3) If the Bill is passed with amendment by the votes
of not less than two-thirds of the total membership of
the House to which it is transmitted under clause (1),
it shall be reconsidered by the House in which it had
originated, and if the Bill as amended by the former
House is passed by the latter by the votes of not less than
two-thirds of its total membership it shall, subject to the
provisions of clause (4), be presented to the president
for assent.
(4) A Bill to amend the Constitution which would have
the effect of altering the limits of a Province shall not be
presented to the President for assent unless it has been
passed by the Provincial Assembly of that Province by
the votes of not less than two-thirds of its total membership.
(5) No amendment of the Constitution shall be called
in question in any court on any ground whatsoever.
(6) For the removal of doubt, it is hereby declared that
there is no limitation whatever on the power of the
Majlis-e-Shoora to amend any of the provisions of the
Constitution.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Parliament of Pakistan (Majlis-e-Shoora)

513

No. In times of war the president can issue a

proclamation of emergency without the legislatures approval. The proclamation lapses after two
months if it is not subsequently approved by both
houses of the legislature.

Article 45
The president shall have power to grant pardon,
reprieve and respite, and to remit, suspend or commute
any sentence passed by any court, tribunal or other
authority.

Article 232
(1) If the president is satisfied that a grave emergency
exists in which the security of Pakistan, or any part
thereof, is threatened by war or external aggression, or
by internal disturbance beyond the power of a Provincial Government to control, he may issue a Proclamation of Emergency.
(7) A Proclamation of Emergency shall be laid before a
joint sitting which shall be summoned by the President
to meet within thirty days of the Proclamation being
issued and
(a) shall cease to be in force at the expiration of two
months unless before the expiration of that period it
has been approved by a resolution of the joint sitting;
and
(b) shall, subject to the provisions of paragraph (a),
cease to be in force upon a resolution disapproving
the Proclamation being passed by the votes of the
majority of the total membership of the two Houses
in joint sitting.
(8) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (7),
if the National Assembly stands dissolved at the time
when a Proclamation of Emergency is issued, the Proclamation shall continue in force for a period of four
months but, if a general election to the Assembly is
not held before the expiration of that period, it shall
cease to be in force at the expiration of that period
unless it has earlier been approved by a resolution of the
Senate.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
No. The legislatures approval is not necessary to
ratify international treaties, although the power to
implement treaties is listed as a legislative power in
the constitution.
Article 70(4) (Taken from the Fourth Schedule, which
lists the legislatures powers):
3. External affairs; the implementing of treaties and
agreements, including educational and cultural pacts
and agreements, with other countries; extradition,
including the surrender of criminals and accused persons to Governments outside Pakistan.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The president has the power of pardon.

No. The president appoints members of the judiciary, and the appointments do not require parliaments approval.
Article 176
The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Justice to
be known as the Chief Justice of Pakistan and so many
other Judges as may be determined by Act of [Majlis-eShoora] or, until so determined, as may be fixed by the
President.
Article 177
(1) The Chief Justice of Pakistan shall be appointed
by President, and each of the other Judges shall be
appointed by the President after consultation with the
Chief Justice.
Article 193
(1) A Judge of a High Court shall be appointed by the
President after consultation
(a) with the Chief Justice of Pakistan;
(b) with the Governor concerned; and
(c) except where the appointment is that of Chief
Justice, with the Chief Justice of the High Court.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the governor of the
State Bank of Pakistan.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
No. The legislature does not regularly meet in ordinary session.
Article 54
(1) The President may, from time to time, summon
either House or both Houses or [Majlis-e-Shoora] in
joint sitting to meet at such time and place as he thinks
fit and may also prorogue the same.
(2) There shall be at least [three] sessions of the
National Assembly every year, and not more than one
hundred and twenty days shall intervene between the
last sitting of the Assembly in one session and the date
appointed for its first sitting in the next session:
Provided that the National Assembly shall meet for not
less than one hundred and [thirty] working days in each
year.

514

Parliament of Pakistan (Majlis-e-Shoora)

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No. See item 28.

No. The constitution provides for secretarial staff,

although in practice there is less than one staff
person for each legislator.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.

Article 87
(1) Each House shall have a separate Secretariat:
Provided that nothing in this clause shall be construed
as preventing the creation of posts common to both
Houses.
(2) Majlis-e-Shoora may by law regulate the recruitment and the conditions of service of persons
appointed to the secretarial staff of either House.
(3) Until provision is made by Majlis-e-Shoora under
clause (2), the Speaker or, as the case may be, the Chairman may, with the approval of the President, make
rules regulating the recruitment, and the conditions of
service, of persons appointed to the secretarial staff of
the National Assembly or the Senate.

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.

Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Despite frequent military interventions in politics, five rounds of parliamentary elections were
held between 1988 and 2002, and re-election rates
are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced members.

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF PANAMA (ASAMBLEA NACIONAL)

Expert consultants: Natalia Ajenjo Fresno, Maria Del Pilar Gonzales Morales, Robert Harding,
Carlos Guevara Mann, Orlando J. Perez
Score: .50
Influence over
executive (3/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack president
9. no confidence

Institutional
autonomy (4/9)
X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

Specified
powers (5/8)
X

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

23. pardon

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

24. judiciary

25. central bank

X
X

X
X

26. media
X

The National Assembly (Asamblea Nacional) of

Panama was established in the 1904 constitution,
following Panamas declaration of independence
from Colombia. The legislature has been denied
authority for much of its history. From 1968 to
1981 a military leader, General Omar Torrijos Herrera, ruled Panama. Shortly thereafter, Manuel Noriega, another military ruler, came to power. His
ouster by U.S. forces in 1989 paved the way for
civilian rule. Panamas current constitution was

adopted in 1972. In 1983 constitutional amendments set the formal parameters of a unicameral
legislature as it exists today. Constitutional amendments in 1994 and 2004 did not noticeably affect
the legislatures power.
The legislature has moderate authority. It can
influence the executive with powers to remove the
president and interpellate executive branch officials. Furthermore, its members can serve in government. The legislatures institutional autonomy

National Assembly of Panama (Asamblea Nacional)

is bolstered by the presidents lack of dissolution

powers. The legislature exercises many specified
powers and has some institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can remove the president from
office.

515
the Legislative Assembly requires, to better discharge its
duties, or to have knowledge of administration actions,
except for that which is stated in Number 7 of Article
157. When the reports are to be oral, the call should be
delivered at least forty-eight hours ahead of time, and
in the form of specific written questions. The officials
who are asked to give such reports must attend and be
heard during the session for which they were called,
regardless of the debate to continue in later sessions for
a decision by the Legislative Assembly. Such a debate
shall not extend to subjects unrelated to the specific
question.

Article 154
Judicial functions of the Legislative Assembly are:
1. To take cognizance of the accusations or charges
lodged against the President of the Republic and the Justices of the Supreme Court, and to judge them, should
the occasion arise, for acts performed in the exercise of
the free functioning of the public power, or in violation
of the Constitution or laws.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.

Article 186
The President and the Vice-Presidents of the Republic
are responsible only in the following cases:
1. For exceeding their constitutional powers;
2. For acts of violence or coercion during the electoral
process; for impeding the meeting of the Legislative
Assembly, for blocking its exercise of functions, and the
exercise of functions of the rest of the public organizations or authorities that are established by this Constitution;
3. For offenses against the international personality of
the State, or against public authority. In the first and
second cases, the penalty shall be removal from office,
and disqualification to hold public office for a period of
time fixed by law. In the third case ordinary law shall
apply.

Article 155
Administrative functions of the Legislative Assembly
are the following:
6. To appoint the permanent Committees of the Legislative Assembly, and Committees of Investigation over
any matters of public interest, in accordance with this
Constitution and the rules for its internal proceedings,
for the information of a full session of the Assembly so that measures considered appropriate will be
issued.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Legislators may serve simultaneously in ministerial positions.
3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 155
9. To call, or request, from officials that the Legislative
Branch of Government appoints or confirms, from the
Ministers of State, the General Directors or Managers of
all Autonomous and Semi-autonomous Entities, decentralized organizations, industrial or commercial state
enterprises, as well as mixed enterprises referred to in
Number 11 of Article 153, the submission of written
or oral reports on subjects under their authority, that

No. Formally, the legislature can establish committees to investigate the executive, but in practice,
the legislature lacks the ability to investigate the
president.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. There is no prime minister.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 178
Functions which may be exercised by the President of
the Republic by himself are:
1. To appoint and remove freely the Ministers of State.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.

516

National Assembly of Panama (Asamblea Nacional)

Article 172
The President of the Republic shall be elected by a
majority of votes in popular, direct suffrage for a period
of five years.

Legislative Branch shall have the power at all times, and

on its own initiative, to repeal, amend, or add to without limitation as to matters, the Decree-Laws that have
been issued.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.

No. Legislators can censure individual ministers

but cannot vote no confidence in the government
as a whole.
Article 155
Administrative functions of the Legislative Assembly
are the following:
7. To give votes of censure against the Ministers of State
when they, in the opinion of the Legislative Assembly, are responsible for threatening or illegal acts, or
for grave errors that are considered detrimental to the
interests of the State. In order that the vote of censure
may be in order, it must be proposed in writing six days
before its debate, by no less than half of the Legislators,
and approved by the vote of two thirds of the Assembly.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.
11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. Formally, the president can issue decrees only
when granted explicit authority to do so by the
legislature, but in practice, this provision is abused,
and the president regularly issues decrees that have
the force of law.
Article 153
Legislative functions of the Nation are vested in the Legislative Assembly and consist in issuing laws necessary
for the fulfillment of the purposes of the performance
functions, of the State declared in this Constitution,
and especially for the following:
16. To grant the Executive Branch of Government,
when it so requests, and when the need exists, precise
extraordinary powers that shall be exercised during the
Legislative Assembly recess by means of Decree Laws.
The law which confers such powers shall express specifically the matters and purposes that shall be the object
of the Decree Laws and shall not include the matters
mentioned in Numbers 3, 4, and 10 of this Article, nor
the development of fundamental guarantees, suffrage,
political party regulations and specification of crimes
and punishments. The extraordinary powers law shall
expire when the next ordinary session of the Legislative Assembly begins. Every Decree Law that the Executive Authority issues in the exercise of powers that are
conferred upon it, must be submitted to the Legislative
Branch of Government, so that the latter may legislate
upon the matter, in ordinary session, immediately following promulgation of the respective Decree-Law. The

No. A two-thirds majority is required to override a

presidential veto.
Article 163
The Executive Authority shall be allowed a period of
no more than thirty working days to return a bill with
objections. If the Executive Authority does not return
the bill with his objections within the terms prescribed
therefor, he must approve it and order it to be promulgated.
Article 164
A bill vetoed as a whole by the Executive Authority,
will be returned to the Legislative Assembly for a third
reading. If it has been objected to only in part, it will
be returned for a second reading for the sole purpose of
the objections being considered. If the objections having been considered by the Legislative Assembly the bill
is approved by the two-thirds of the Legislators composing the Assembly, the Executive Authority will approve
it and have it promulgated without power to present
new objections. If it does not obtain the approval of
that number of Legislators, the bill shall be rejected.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Supreme Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 203
In the course of exercising from its Constitutional and
legal powers, the Supreme Court of Justice shall:
1. Guard the integrity of the Constitution. For this purpose, and after hearing the opinion of the Attorney
General of the Nation or the Solicitor General of the
Administration, the Court in plenary session shall try
and rule on cases concerning the unconstitutionality of
laws, decrees, decisions, resolutions and other acts that
for reasons of substance or form are challenged before
it, by any person.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. The legislature is prohibited from initiating legislation related to public sector salaries and other
major financial issues.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.

National Assembly of Panama (Asamblea Nacional)

Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound

funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,
including control over members salaries.
Article 151
Legislators shall receive emoluments as provided by law
which shall be paid by the National Treasury, but an
increase in such emoluments shall not become effective
until after the Legislative Assembly term in which it was
approved has expired.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislators immunity is limited to the time
period surrounding the legislative session only.
Legislators are subject to arrest at other times.
Article 149
Five days before the period of each Legislature, during
it, and up to five days after, members of the Legislative
Assembly shall be granted immunity. In such a period
they may not be prosecuted or arrested for penal or
police reasons without prior authorization by the Legislative Assembly. This immunity shall have no effect
when the Legislator renounces his immunity, or if hes
caught in the act of committing a crime. The Legislator
shall be subject to civil jurisdiction, but not subject to
garnishment, attachment or other prejudgment remedies, against his property, from the day of his election
to the end of his term.

517
Article 308
The initiative to propose Constitutional amendments
belongs to the Legislative Assembly, the Cabinet Council, or the Supreme Court of Justice. Such amendments
must be approved by one of the following procedures:
1. Through a Legislative Act, approved in three readings
by an absolute majority of Legislative Assembly members, which must be published in the Official Gazette
and sent from the Executive Branch of Government to
the same Assembly within the first five days of ordinary sessions following elections for the new Legislative Branch of Government, for the purpose of, in this
final Legislature, begin newly read and approved, without modification, in a single reading and by an absolute
majority of all members of the Assembly.
2. Through a Legislative Act approved in three readings
by an absolute majority of Legislative Assembly members, in one Legislature period, and approved equally,
in three readings by an absolute majority of the members of the already mentioned Assembly, in the Legislature period immediately following. At this time the text
approved during the previous Legislature period may be
modified. The Legislative Act approved in this manner
must be published in the Official Gazette and submitted
to the people for direct, popular consideration through
a referendum that shall be held on the date designated
by the Legislative Assembly, within a time period no
less than three months, nor more than six months from
the date of the Acts approval by the second Legislature.
The Legislative Act approved according to either of the
two procedures mentioned will enter into force upon
its publication in the Official Gazette, which shall be
accomplished by the Executive Branch of Government
within ten (10) working days following its ratification
by the Legislative Assembly, or within thirty (30) working days following its approval through referendum,
whichever the case may be, without a later publication
being the cause of the Acts being unconstitutional.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.

Yes. The legislature declares war.

Article 140
The Legislative Branch of Government shall be composed of a body named the Legislative Assembly, whose
members shall be elected by means of party nominations, and direct popular vote, in accordance with that
which is established in this Constitution.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement

of any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
through a complicated procedure. The sitting legislature can propose the amendment in three separate readings, and then, following an election,
the subsequent legislature can approve the amendment.

Article 153
Legislative functions of the Nation are vested in the Legislative Assembly and consist in issuing laws necessary
for the fulfillment of the purposes of the performance
functions, of the State declared in this Constitution,
and especially for the following:
5. To declare war and to empower the Executive Branch
of Government to negotiate peace.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 179
The following functions shall be exercised by the President of the Republic with the participation of the
respective Minister:

518
9. To direct foreign relations, to negotiate Treaties and
international Agreements, which shall be submitted to
the consideration of the Legislative Branch and authorize and to assign and receive diplomatic and consular
agents.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.
Article 153
Legislative functions of the Nation are vested in the Legislative Assembly and consist in issuing laws necessary
for the fulfillment of the purposes of the performance
functions, of the State declared in this Constitution,
and especially for the following:
6. To declare amnesty for political offenses.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 179
The following functions shall be exercised by the President of the Republic with the participation of the
respective Minister:
12. To decree pardons for political offenses, reduce
penalties and grant conditional freedom to common
crimes convicts.

National Assembly of Panama (Asamblea Nacional)

No. The president appoints the president of the

National Bank of Panama.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session for
eight months each year.
Article 143
The Legislative Assembly shall convene, in its own
right, without need for previous convocation, in the
capital city for sessions that last eight months in a
one year period, divided into two ordinary legislative
sessions of four months duration. Such sessions shall
extend from September 1 through December 31, and
March 1 through June 30. The Legislative Assembly
shall meet in extraordinary session when convoked by
the Executive Branch of Government and during the
time it designates, to hear exclusively, matters that the
Branch submits for the Legislators consideration.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislatures consent is required to approve
the presidents appointments to the Supreme
Court.
Article 155
Administrative functions of the Legislative Assembly
are the following:
4. To approve or disapprove appointments of Justices to
the Supreme Court . . . that are made by the Executive
Power and under this Constitution, or by law, requiring
ratification by the Legislative Assembly.
Article 200
The Supreme Court of Justice shall be composed of the
number of Justices determined by law, appointed with
the agreement of the Cabinet Council, subject to the
approval of the Legislative Branch of Government, for
a ten year term.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
No. Turnover rates are high, preventing the maintenance of a substantial cohort of highly experienced legislators.

National Parliament of Papua New Guinea

519

NATIONAL PARLIAMENT OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Expert consultants: Donald Denoon, Graham Hassall, Joseph Ketan, Peter Larmour, Michael Morgan
Score: .66
Influence over
executive (8/9)

Institutional
autonomy (6/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee
police
6. appoint
PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack president
9. no confidence

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

X
X

Specified
powers (3/8)

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

23. pardon

24. judiciary

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

25. central bank

X
X
X
X

26. media
X

The National Parliament of Papua New Guinea was

established in the 1975 constitution upon independence from Australia. The constitution, which
is not a paradigm of concision and lucidity, calls
for a unicameral parliament. The executive comprises a prime minister as the head of government
and a Governor General (formally representing the
Queen of England) as the head of state.
The legislature has broad powers. With the
exception of the power to appoint ministers, it
possesses every means of influencing the executive captured in this survey. It also enjoys significant institutional autonomy, evidenced by a lack
of executive decree, veto, and gatekeeping powers. The legislature exercises few specified powers, however. It enjoys some institutional capacity, but its capacity is limited by infrequent legislative sessions and a dearth of highly experienced
legislators.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can remove the prime minister
from office with a vote of no confidence.
Article 142
(5) The Prime Minister
(a) shall be dismissed from office by the Head of State
if the Parliament passes, in accordance with Section

145 (motions of no confidence), a motion of no confidence in him or the Ministry.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Ministers are chosen from, and required to
serve simultaneously in, the legislature.
Article 141
The Ministry is a Parliamentary Executive, and therefore
(a) no person who is not a member of the Parliament
is eligible to be appointed to be a Minister, and, except
as is expressly provided in this Constitution to the contrary, a Minister who ceases to be a member of the Parliament ceases to hold office as a Minister.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can order a special investigative
body, the Ombudsman Commission, to investigate
the executive.
Article 219
(1) Subject to this section and to any Organic Law made
for the purposes of Subsection (7), the functions of the
Ombudsman Commission are

520
(a) to investigate, on its own initiative or on complaint by a person affected, any conduct on the part
of
(i) any State Service or provincial service, or a member of any such service; or
(ii) any other governmental body, or an officer or
employee of a governmental body; or
(iii) any local government body or an officer or
employee of any such body; or
(iv) any other body set up by statute
(A) that is wholly or mainly supported out of
public moneys of Papua New Guinea; or
(B) all of, or the majority of, the members of the
controlling authority of which are appointed by
the National Executive, or an officer of employee
of any such body; and
(v) any member of the personal staff of the
Governor-General, a Minister or the Leader or
Deputy Leader of the Opposition; or
(vi) any other body or person prescribed for the
purpose by an Act of the Parliament, specified by
or under an Organic Law in the exercise of a power
or function vested in it or him by law in cases
where the conduct is or may be wrong, taking into
account, amongst other things, the National Goals
and Directive Principles, the Basic Rights and the
Basic Social Obligations; and
(b) to investigate any defects in any law or administrative practice appearing from any such investigation; and
(c) to investigate, either on its own initiative or
on complaint by a person affected, any case of an
alleged or suspected discriminatory practice within
the meaning of a law prohibiting such practices; and
(d) any functions conferred on it under Division III.2
(leadership code); and
(e) any other functions conferred upon it by or under
an Organic Law.
(Subsection (1) amended by Constitutional Amendment No. 3).
(See: Organic Law on the Ombudsman Commission).
(2) Subject to Subsections (3), (4) and (5), and without
otherwise limiting the generality of the expression, for
the purposes of Subsection (1)(a) conduct is wrong if it
is
(a) contrary to law; or
(b) unreasonable, unjust, oppressive or improperly
discriminatory, whether or not it is in accordance
with law or practice; or
(c) based wholly or partly on improper motives, irrelevant grounds or irrelevant considerations; or
(d) based wholly or partly on a mistake of law or of
fact; or
(e) conduct for which reasons should be given but
were not, whether or not the act was supposed to be
done in the exercise of deliberate judgement within
the meaning of Section 62.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of

National Parliament of Papua New Guinea

law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret

police).
Yes. The legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. The Governor General appoints as prime minister the candidate who enjoys the support of the
legislature.
Article 142
(1) An office of Prime Minister is hereby established.
(2) The Prime Minister shall be appointed, at the first
meeting of the Parliament after a general election and
otherwise from time to time as the occasion for the
appointment of a Prime Minister arises, by the Head
of State, acting in accordance with a decision of the
Parliament.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The Governor General appoints ministers on
the advice of the prime minister, and the appointments do not require the legislatures approval.
Article 144
(1) There shall be such number of Ministers (other than
the Prime Minister), not being less than six or more
than one quarter of the number of members of the Parliament from time to time, as is determined by or under
an Organic Law.
(2) The Ministers, other than the Prime Minister, shall
be appointed by the Head of State, acting with, and in
accordance with, the advice of the Prime Minister.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The country lacks a presidency. The Governor
General is the head of state.
Article 82
(1) Her Majesty the Queen
(a) having been requested by the people of Papua
New Guinea, through their Constituent Assembly, to
become the Queen and Head of State of Papua New
Guinea; and
(b) having graciously consented so to become, is the
Queen and Head of State of Papua New Guinea.
(2) Subject to and in accordance with this Constitution,
the privileges, powers, functions, duties and responsibilities of the Head of State may be had, exercised
and performed through a Governor-General appointed
in accordance with Division 3 (appointment, etc.,
of Governor-General) and, except where the contrary
intention appears, reference in any law to the Head of
State shall be read accordingly.

National Parliament of Papua New Guinea

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 145
(1) For the purposes of Sections 142 (the Prime Minister) and 144 (other Ministers), a motion of no confidence is a motion
(a) that is expressed to be a motion of no confidence
in the Prime Minister, the Ministry or a Minister, as
the case may be; and
(b) of which not less than one weeks notice, signed
by a number of members of the Parliament being not
less than one-tenth of the total number of seats in
the Parliament, has been given in accordance with
the Standing Orders of the Parliament.
(2) A motion of no confidence in the Prime Minister or
the Ministry
(a) moved during the first four years of the life of
Parliament shall not be allowed unless it nominates
the next Prime Minister; and
(b) moved within 12 months before the fifth anniversary of the date fixed for the return of the writs at the
previous general election shall not be allowed if it
nominates the next Prime Minister.
(3) A motion of no confidence in the Prime Minister
or the Ministry moved in accordance with Subsection
(2)(a) may not be amended in respect of the name of the
person nominated as the next Prime Minister except by
substituting the name of some other person.
(4) A motion of no confidence in the Prime Minister or
in the Ministry may not be moved during the period
of eighteen months commencing on the date of the
appointment of the Prime Minister.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The Governor General, on the advice of the
prime minister, can dissolve the legislature.
Article 105
(1) A general election to the Parliament shall be held
(a) within the period of three months before the fifth
anniversary of the day fixed for the return of the writs
for the previous general election; or
(b) if, during the last 12 months before the fifth
anniversary of the day fixed for the return of the writs
for the previous general election
(i) a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister or
the Ministry is passed in accordance with Section
145 (motions of no confidence); or
(ii) the Government is defeated on the vote on a
question that the Prime Minister has declared to
the Parliament to be a question of confidence; or
(c) if the Parliament, by an absolute majority vote, so
decides.
(2) The Head of State, acting with, and in accordance
with, the advice of the Electoral Commission, shall fix
the first and last days of the period during which polling

521
shall take place and the date by which the writs for a
general election shall be returned.
(3) In advising the Head of State under Subsection (2),
and in conducting the election, the Electoral Commission shall do its best to ensure that
(a) in a case to which Subsection (1)(a) applies the
date for the return of the writs is fixed as nearly as may
reasonably be to the fifth anniversary of the date fixed
for the return of the writs for the previous general
election; and
(b) in a case to which Subsection (1)(b) or (c) applies
the date for the return of the writs is fixed as soon
as may reasonably be after the date of the relevant
decision of the Parliament.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks veto power. Formally, the
Governor General could refuse to assent to legislation, but in practice, it would be unthinkable for
the Governor General to withhold assent to a bill.
13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Supreme Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all
policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Immunity extends only to official parliamentary business and to criminal proceedings while the
legislature is in session only. Legislators are subject

522

to arrest for common crimes when the legislature

is not in session.
Article 115
(1) The powers (other than legislative powers), privileges and immunities of the Parliament and of its members and committees are as prescribed by or under this
section and by any other provision of this Constitution.
(2) There shall be freedom of speech, debate and proceeding in the Parliament, and the exercise of those
freedoms shall not be questioned in any court or in any
proceedings whatever (otherwise than in proceedings
in the Parliament or before a committee of the Parliament).
(3) No member of the Parliament is subject to the jurisdiction of any court in respect of the exercise of his
powers or the performance of his functions, duties or
responsibilities as such, but this subsection does not
affect the operation of Division III.2 (leadership code).
(4) No member of the Parliament is liable to civil or
criminal proceedings, arrest, imprisonment, fine, damages or compensation by reason of any matter or thing
that he has brought by petition, question, bill, resolution, motion or otherwise, or has said before or submitted to the Parliament or a committee of the Parliament.
(5) No member of the Parliament or other person is
liable to civil or criminal proceedings, arrest, imprisonment, fine, damages or compensation by reason of
(a) an act done under the authority of the Parliament
or under an order of the Parliament or a committee
of the Parliament; or
(b) words spoken or used, or a document or writing
made or produced, under an order or summons made
or issued under the authority of the Parliament or a
committee of the Parliament.
(6) Members of the Parliament are free from arrest for
civil debt during meetings of the Parliament and during
the period commencing three days before, and ending three days after, a meeting when they are traveling from their respective electorates to attend the
meeting or are returning to their electorates from the
meeting.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected, with
one exception. The legislature itself may, by a twothirds majority vote, appoint a single member of
parliament.
Article 101
(1) Subject to this section, the Parliament is a singlechamber legislature, consisting of
(a) a number of members elected from singlemember open electorates; and
(b) a number of members elected from singlemember provincial electorates; and
(c) not more than three nominated members,
appointed and holding office in accordance with Section 102.

National Parliament of Papua New Guinea

Article 102
The Parliament may, from time to time, by a twothirds absolute majority vote, appoint a person (other
than a member) to be a nominated member of the
Parliament.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution in
multiple readings with a two-thirds majority vote.
Article 13
This Constitution may be altered only by law made by
the Parliament that
(a) is expressed to be a law to alter this Constitution;
and
(b) is made and certified in accordance with Section 14
(making of alterations to the Constitution and Organic
Laws).
Article 14
(1) Subject to Sections 12(3) (Organic Laws) and 15
(urgent alterations), a proposed law to alter this Constitution, or a proposed Organic Law, must be supported
on a division in accordance with the Standing Orders
of the Parliament by the prescribed majority of votes
determined in accordance with Section 17 (prescribed
majority of votes) expressed on at least two occasions
after opportunity for debate on the merits.
Article 17
(1) Subject to this section, in relation to a proposed
law to alter any provision of this Constitution the prescribed majority of votes for the purposes of Section 14
(making of alterations to the Constitution and Organic
Laws) is the majority of votes prescribed by this Constitution in relation to that provision, or if no majority is
prescribed a two-thirds absolute majority vote.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. Formally, the Governor General, on the advice
of the government (National Executive Council),
can declare war. In practice, a declaration of war
would be unthinkable without the legislatures
approval.
Article 227
The Head of State, acting with, and in accordance with,
the advice of the National Executive Council, may publicly declare that Papua New Guinea is at war with
another country.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 117
(3) Subject to Subsection (5), the consent of Papua New
Guinea to be bound as a party to a treaty shall not be
given

National Parliament of Papua New Guinea

(a) unless a treaty document relating to the treaty
has been presented to the Parliament for at least ten
sitting days; or
(b) if within ten sitting days of the Parliament after
the day on which the treaty document was presented
to the Parliament the Parliament, by an absolute
majority vote, disapproves the giving of the consent.
(4) The fact that the Parliament has disapproved the
giving of the consent of Papua New Guinea to be
bound as a party to a treaty does not prevent the representation to the Parliament of a treaty document
relating to the treaty, and in that event Subsection (3)
once again applies.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The Governor General has the power of pardon.
Article 151
(1) Subject to this Subdivision, the Head of State, acting
with, and in accordance with, the advice of the National
Executive Council, may grant to a person convicted of
an offence or held in penal detention under a law of
Papua New Guinea
(a) a pardon, either free or conditional; or
(b) a remission or commutation of sentence; or
(c) a respite of the execution of sentence; or
(d) a less severe form of punishment for that imposed
by any sentence, and may remit or refund, in whole
or in part, any fine, penalty or forfeiture paid or
payable to a governmental body.
(2) Where an offence has been committed, the Head of
State, acting with, and in accordance with, the advice
of the National Executive Council, may grant a pardon, either free or conditional, to an accomplice who
gives evidence that leads to the conviction of a principal
offender.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The Governor General, on the advice of the
government, appoints the Chief Justice. Other justices are selected by a judicial services commission.
The appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 169
(1) An office of Chief Justice of Papua New Guinea is
hereby established.
The Chief Justice shall be appointed by the Head of
State, acting with, and in accordance with, the advice of
the National Executive Council given after consultation
with the Minister responsible for the National Justice
Administration.

523
Article 170
(1) An office of Deputy Chief Justice of Papua New
Guinea is hereby established.
(2) The Deputy Chief Justice and the other Judges of
the National Court (other than the Chief Justice) and
acting Judges shall be appointed by the Judicial and
Legal Services Commission.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The government appoints the governor of the
Bank of Papua New Guinea with the legislatures
approval.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
No. Formally, the legislature is required to meet at
least three times each year, in sessions that are to
last for at least nine weeks. In practice, the legislature does not regularly meet because governments
fearing a vote of no confidence often limit legislative sessions.
Article 124
(1) The Parliament shall be called to meet not more
than seven days after the day fixed for the return of the
writs for a general election, and shall meet not less frequently than three times in each period of 12 months,
and, in principle, for not less than nine weeks in each
such period.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
Yes.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
No. The legislature lacks a significant number of
highly experienced members. In 2002, for example, eighty-three of 109 legislators were voted out
of office.

524

Congress of Paraguay (Congreso)

CONGRESS OF PARAGUAY (CONGRESO)

Expert consultants: Esteban Areco, Rafael Filizzola, Phil Kelly, Desir`ee Masi, Sebastian M. Saiegh,
Brian Turner
Score: .56
Influence over
executive (3/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee
police
6. appoint
PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack president
9. no
confidence

Institutional
autonomy (7/9)
X

X
X

Specified
powers (4/8)

Institutional
capacity (4/6)
27. sessions

X
X

10. no
dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments

20. war

28. secretary

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

23. pardon
24. judiciary

25. central bank

X
X

26. media

The Congress (Congreso) of Paraguay was established in 1813 upon independence from Spain.
Within a decade the 1,000-member assembly was
disbanded, and President Jose Gaspar Rodrguez de
Francia ruled until his death in 1840. In 1844 a
new constitution recreated a substantial role for
Congress, a part it retained for the next century.
In 1954 General Alfredo Stroessner seized power
and subsequently ruled for over three decades. He
was deposed in 1989, leading to parliamentary and
presidential elections and the adoption of a new
constitution in 1992. The constitution called for a
bicameral parliament consisting of a lower house,
the House of Deputies (Camara de Diputados), and
an upper house, the Senate (Camara de Senadores).
Congress has substantial powers overall, but
its authority is unevenly distributed. Its opportunity to influence the executive is relatively modest. It cannot appoint the president or ministers,
its members cannot serve in government, and it
cannot vote no confidence in the government. It
also lacks meaningful powers of oversight over the
agencies of coercion. Its institutional autonomy,
on the other hand, is formidable. With the exception of freedom from judicial review, the legislature
possesses every measure of institutional autonomy
captured in this survey. The legislature exercises
some specified powers and has a fair amount of
institutional capacity.

X
X

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can impeach the president. The
Chamber of Deputies presses charges by a twothirds majority vote, and the Senate conducts a
public trial and removes the president from office
by a majority vote.
Article 225
(1) The president of the Republic . . . may be forced to
undergo impeachment proceedings for malfeasance in
office, for crimes committed in office, or for common
crimes.
(2) The Chamber of Deputies, by a two-thirds majority, will press the respective charges. The Senate, by a
two-thirds absolute majority, will conduct a public trial
of those charged by the Chamber of Deputies and, if
appropriate, will declare them guilty for the sole purpose of removing them from office. In cases in which
it appears that common crimes have been committed,
the files on the respective impeachment proceedings
will be referred to a competent court.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.

Congress of Paraguay (Congreso)

Article 196
(1) Advisors of public offices or officials and employees who are on the payroll of the State or of municipalities, irrespective of their position and the nature
of their remuneration, may be elected to a legislative
office but cannot exercise legislative functions as long
as their appointment to such positions is in force.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 193
(1) Each chamber, by an absolute majority, may individually summon and interpellate ministers and other
senior administration officials and directors and directors and administrators of autonomous, self-supported,
or decentralized companies, as well as directors and
administrators of organizations charged with administering state funds and those in which the State is a
majority shareholder, when the chamber is discussing
a law or is studying a matter pertaining to their respective activities. The respective questions must be conveyed to the summoned official at least five days in
advance. Except for those cases in which the summoned individual may claim a legal cause for being
excused, it will be mandatory for him to appear before
the respective chamber, to answer the questions, and
to provide all the information he has been asked to
give.
(2) The law will determine the participation of majority
and minority blocs in the formulation of the questions.
(3) Neither the president of the Republic, the vice president, nor the members of the judicial branch may be
summoned or interpellated on matters pertaining to
their jurisdictional activity.

525
(2) Directors and administrators of autonomous, selfsupported, or decentralized companies, those of companies in which the State is a majority shareholder, and
those charged with administering state funds, as well as
public officials and private citizens, must appear before
the two chambers to supply the information and documents they are asked to give. The law will establish
sanctions for those failing to comply with this obligation.
(5) The judges will order, in accordance with the
law, those actions and discovery proceedings that are
required for the purpose of the investigation.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. There is no prime minister.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 238
The president of the Republic has the following duties
and powers:
6. To appoint or remove cabinet ministers.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
Article 192
(1) Each chamber may ask other branches of government, as well as autonomous, self-supported, decentralized companies, or public officials, to submit reports
on matters of public interest that it deems necessary,
with the exception of matters pertaining to jurisdictional activities.
(2) The affected parties will have to submit the respective report within an established deadline, which will
not be under 15 days.
Article 195
(1) Both chambers of Congress may create joint investigating committees on any matter of public interest, as
well as on the conduct of their members.

Article 230
The president and vice president of the Republic will be
elected jointly and directly by the people, by a simple
majority of voters, in general elections held between
90 and 120 days prior to the expiration of the ongoing
constitutional term.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature can censure individual ministers but cannot vote no confidence in the government as a whole.
Article 194
(1) If a summoned official fails to appear before the
respective chamber, or if this chamber considers his
briefing to be unsatisfactory, the two chambers, by a
two-thirds absolute majority, will issue a vote of censure against him and will recommend that the president

526

Congress of Paraguay (Congreso)

of the Republic or the officials immediate supervisor

remove him from office.
(2) If a motion of censure is not approved, no other
motion may be proposed during that same period of
sessions on the same subject with regard to the same
minister or official.

this chamber approves it too, by the same majority, the

executive branch will have to promulgate it within five
working days and will order its publication. If the two
chambers fail to agree to override the total rejection,
that draft law cannot be considered again during that
period of sessions.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.

Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.

No. The Supreme Court can review the constitutionality of laws.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.

Article 132
The Supreme Court of Justice has the power to declare
any legal provision or decision by the courts unconstitutional, in the manner and within the scope established in this Constitution and the law.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.

Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto

by a majority vote of its total membership.

Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy

jurisdictions.

Article 238
The president of the Republic has the following duties
and powers:
4. To veto, either totally or partially, laws approved by
Congress through observations or objections he may
deem appropriate.
Article 208
(1) A draft law that has been partially vetoed by the
executive branch will be returned to the originating
chamber, which will study and pass judgment on the
objections. If this chamber, by an absolute majority,
overrides the executive veto, the draft law will be passed
on to the reviewing chamber, which will also pass judgment on the objections. If the reviewing chamber, by
the same majority vote, also overrides the executive
veto, the original version of the law will have been
approved, and the executive branch will have to promulgate it by ordering its publication within five days.
If both chambers fail to agree to override the objections,
the respective draft law cannot be reconsidered during
that period of sessions.
(2) The executive branch objections may be totally or
partially accepted or rejected by the two chambers. If
they were totally or partially accepted, the two chambers may decide, by an absolute majority, to approve
the unquestioned portion of the draft law, which will
then have to be promulgated by the executive branch.
(3) The originating chamber will have to consider these
objections within 60 days. The reviewing chamber will
also have 60 days.
Article 209
If a draft law is totally rejected by the executive branch,
it will be returned to the originating chamber, which
will discuss it again. If the originating chamber, by
an absolute majority, reaffirms its earlier approval, the
draft law will be passed on to the reviewing chamber. If

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The executive often fails to spend funds allocated by the legislature, particularly in the areas of
public works and social service provision.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto.
Article 191
(1) No charge may be pressed in court against a member
of Congress for the opinions he may have expressed
in discharging his duties. No senator or deputy may be
arrested from the day of his election until the end of his
term, unless he is caught in flagrante delicto in relation
to a crime meriting a prison sentence. In this case, the
official intervening will place the legislator under house
arrest and report the arrest to the respective chamber
and to a competent judge immediately, to whom he
will submit the case files as soon as possible.
(2) If a court of law orders a pretrial inquest against
a senator or a deputy, the presiding judge will send a
copy of the case files to the respective chamber, which
will examine the merits of the inquest and, by a twothirds majority vote, will decide whether the senator
or deputy involved should be stripped of his immunity
in order to stand trial. If the chamber votes against the

Congress of Paraguay (Congreso)

legislator, it will suspend his immunity so that he may
be brought to trial.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 182
(1) The legislative branch will be exercised by Congress,
which consists of the Senate and of the Chamber of
Deputies.
(2) Members and alternate members of both chambers
will be directly elected by the people in accordance with
the law.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments require approval
in a popular referendum. A total revision of the
constitution requires a constituent assembly convened for the purpose.
Article 289
(1) This Constitution may be removed only 10 years
after its promulgation.
(2) Its reform may be requested by 25 percent of the
members of any of the two chambers of Congress,
by the president of the Republic, or by 30,000 voters
through a signed petition.
(3) By a two-thirds absolute majority vote of its members, the two chambers of Congress may declare the
need for constitutional reform.
(4) Once the need for the reform has been declared, the
Supreme Electoral Court will call general elections that
must not coincide with any other scheduled election
within a period of 180 days.
(5) The number of members of the National Constituent Assembly will not exceed the total number of
the members of Congress. The causes for their ineligibility or incompatibility will be established by law.
(6) Members of a constituent assembly will enjoy
the same immunities established for the members of
Congress.
(7) As soon as the new Constitution is approved by the
National Constituent Assembly, it will be considered to
have been automatically promulgated.
Article 290
(1) This Constitution may be amended three years after
it has been promulgated, at the initiative of one-fourth
of the members of any of the two chambers of Congress,
of the president of the Republic, or of 30,000 voters
through a signed petition;
(2) The full text of the amendment will, have to be
approved by an absolute majority by the originating
chamber. A similar procedure will be followed at the
reviewing chamber. If the majority required for its
approval is not met in either of the two chambers, it
will be considered that the proposed amendment has

527
been rejected, and it may not be proposed again within
a period of one year.
(3) If the amendment has been approved by the two
chambers of Congress, the full text of it will be submitted to the Superior Electoral Court, which, within
a period of 180 days will call a referendum. If the outcome of the referendum is in favor of the amendment,
it will be considered that it has been approved and promulgated and considered part of the Constitution.
(4) If the amendment repeals any provision of the Constitution, no amendment may again be proposed on the
same subject for three years.
(5) The procedures established for the reform of the
Constitution, rather than those established for its
amendment, will be followed with regard to those provisions affecting the election, composition, term in
office, or powers of any of the three branches of government or the provisions of Chapters I, II, III and IV
of Title II of Part I.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is required for the
president to declare a state of national defense
in the event of foreign aggression.
Article 238
The president of the Republic has the following duties
and powers:
7. In case of foreign aggression he will declare having
first been authorized by Congress a State of National
Defense or make efforts to seek peace.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 141
International treaties that were properly concluded and
approved by a law of Congress and the instruments of
ratification which have been exchanged or deposited
are part of the domestic legal system in keeping with
the order of preeminence established under Article 136.
Article 202
Congress has the following duties and powers:
9. To approve or to reject treaties or other international
agreements signed by the executive branch.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.
Article 202
Congress has the following duties and powers:
18. To grant amnesties.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.

528

Congress of Paraguay (Congreso)

Article 238
The president of the Republic has the following duties
and powers:
10. Based on reports by the Supreme Court of Justice,
he may pardon or commute sentences imposed by the
judges or courts of the Republic.

No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the

operation of the public media.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.

Article 184
(1) Both chambers of Congress will convene yearly in
ordinance sessions that will last from 1 July to 30 June
of the following year, with a period of recession from
31 December to 1 March, date on which the President
of the Republic will give his report. Both chambers will
call special sessions or will extend their ordinary sessions through a decision approved by one-fourth of the
members of either house, by two-thirds of the Standing
Congressional Committee, or by an executive branch
decree. The president of Congress, or of the Standing
Committee, must call the session within the peremptory term of 48 hours.

Yes. The Senate appoints the members of the

Supreme Court of Justice and the Superior Electoral
Court on the proposal of the Council for Magistrates and with the approval of the executive.
Article 251
Members of appellate or lower courts of the Republic
will be appointed by the Supreme Court of Justice from
a list of three candidates proposed by the Council for
Magistrates.
Article 264
The Council for Magistrates has the following duties
and powers:
1. To propose a list of three candidates selected on
the basis of their abilities, qualifications, and merits
for each seat of the Supreme Court of Justice, and to
submit such lists to the Senate, which will appoint said
justices with the concurrence of the executive branch;
2. To propose a list of three candidates, following the
above selection criteria and guidelines, for each member of appellate and lower courts, as well as for members
of the Attorney Generals Office.
Article 275
(1) The Superior Electoral Court will consist of three
members who may be elected or removed following
procedures established for the justices of the Supreme
Court of Justice.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the president of
the Central Bank of Paraguay with the Senates
approval.
Article 224
The Senate has the following exclusive Powers:
6. To agree to the appointment of the president and the
members of the board of directors of the Paraguayan
Central Bank.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session for
about ten months each year.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
Article 187
(2) The term in office of legislators, which will be five
years, will begin on 1 July. They may be reelected.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
No. The re-election rate is relatively low, resulting
in a relatively small number of highly experienced
legislators. For example, in 1998 only 60 percent of
deputies ran for re-election, and only about 18 percent of the total membership won in the primaries
and general elections to serve a second term in the
lower house.

Congress of Peru (Congreso)

529

CONGRESS OF PERU (CONGRESO)

Expert consultants: Julio Javier Aguayo, Guillermo Garcia, R
udiger Graichen, Cynthia McClintock,
Percy Medina
Score: .66
Influence over
executive (5/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

Institutional
autonomy (6/9)

Specified
powers (4/8)

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

X
X

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

X
X

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

X
X

26. media

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

5. oversee police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack president
9. no confidence

The Congress (Congreso) of Peru was established

in 1824 upon independence from Spain. The legislature enjoyed moderate influence in the civilian governments that alternated with military dictatorships throughout the twentieth century. In
the 1980s and 1990s, a Maoist guerilla insurgency
beleaguered Peru. In 1992 President Alberto Fujimori, with the armys backing, suspended the constitution and dissolved Congress. Fujimoris move
paved the way for a new constitution in 1993,
which currently remains in force. The document
calls for a unicameral legislature and a directly
elected president. The president appoints a president of the Council of Ministers. The latter in
practice serves as an aide to the president. Yet, like
a prime minister, the president of the Council of
Ministers is subject to votes of confidence by the
legislature.
The legislature has substantial authority. It
influences the executive with, among other powers, the right to impeach the president, interpellate
and investigate officials from the executive branch,
and vote no confidence in the government. It also
enjoys significant institutional autonomy. It exercises many of the specified powers measured in
this survey, and it has a high level of institutional
capacity.

Institutional
capacity (6/6)

X
X

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can impeach the president. It
can remove the president of the Council of Ministers with a vote of no confidence.
Article 99
It is the responsibility of the Standing Committee to
impeach . . . the President of the Republic . . . for violations of the Constitution and for any offense that (he
or she) may commit in the exercise of (his or her) functions and up to five years after (he or she has) relinquished them.
Article 113
The [the office of the] President of the Republic may
become vacant for the following reasons:
2. His permanent intellectual or physical incapacity is
declared by Congress.
4. He leaves Perus territory without permission from
Congress or does not return within the set deadline.
And,
5. He is removed from office after being sentenced for
any of the violations mentioned in Article 117 of the
Constitution.
Article 117
The President of the Republic may be impeached only
during his term of office for treason to the country;

530
for blocking presidential, parliamentary, regional, or
municipal elections; for dissolving Congress except in
those cases provided for in Article 134 of the Constitution; and for impeding its meeting or the functioning
of the National Board of Elections and other organs of
the electoral system.
Article 130
Within 30 days of assuming his functions, the President
of the Council of Ministers attends Congress accompanied by the other ministers to expound and discuss the
governments general policy and the principal measures
necessary for their implementation. For that purpose, a
vote of confidence is taken.
Article 132
Congress implements the political responsibility of the
Council of Ministers, or of the ministers individually,
by means of a vote of censure or by defeating a vote
of confidence. The latter may only be proposed upon
a ministerial initiative. Any motion of censure of the
Council of Ministers or of any of the ministers must
be introduced by no fewer than 25 percent of the legal
number of members of Congress. It is debated between
the fourth and tenth calendar day following its introduction. Its approval requires the vote of over half the
legal number of the members of Congress. The Council
of Ministers or the censured minister must then resign.
The President of the Republic accepts his resignation
within the subsequent 72 hours.
The defeat of a ministerial initiative does not obligate
the minister to resign, unless its approval was made a
question of confidence.
Article 133
The President of the Council of Ministers may introduce
before Congress a question of confidence on behalf of
the Council of Ministers. If confidence is denied, or if
the President is censured, or if he resigns or is removed
by the President of the Republic, a total crisis of the
Cabinet is produced.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Ministers may not run for Congress, but legislators may be appointed to, and serve simultaneously in, ministerial positions.

Congress of Peru (Congreso)

branch officials testifying before the legislature or its

committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 96
Any representative in Congress may request from the
Ministers of State, the National Board of Elections, the
Comptroller General, the Central Reserve Bank, the
Superintendency of Banking, Insurance and Privately
Administered Funds, the Regional and Local Governments and the institutions determined by law the information which he deems necessary.
The request must be done in writing and in accordance with Congressional rules of procedure. Failure
to respond may be sanctioned as provided by law.
Article 131
When summoned by Congress for an interpellation,
attendance by the Council of Ministers or any of the
ministers is mandatory. Interpellation is done in writing. It must be submitted by no fewer than 15 percent of the legal number of members of Congress. For
their acceptance, the vote of one-third of the number of competent representatives is necessary. A vote
must be taken without fail at the subsequent session.
Congress determines the day and hour for the ministers to respond to the interpellation. The latter may not
occur or be voted upon before the third day of its receipt
or after the 10th day.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
Article 97
Congress may initiate an inquiry into any matter
of public interest. It is mandatory to appear, upon
their request, before the committees charged with such
inquiries, subject to the same sanctions as in judicial
proceedings. For the implementation of their purposes,
said committees may have access to any information,
which may involve the lifting of banking secrecy and
tax confidentiality, with the exception of information
that may bear on intimate personal matters. Their conclusions are not binding upon the judicial organs.

Article 91
The following persons may not be elected members
of Congress if they have not resigned from office six
months before the election:
1. Ministers and deputy ministers of State, the
Comptroller General, and regional authorities.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).

Article 92
The function of a member of Congress is full-time. The
member is forbidden to hold any other post or exercise any profession or office during the hours when
Congress is in session.

6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive

No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.

No. There is no prime minister. The president of

the Council of Ministers, who fulfills some of the
same roles as a prime minister, is appointed by the
president without the need for legislative approval.

Congress of Peru (Congreso)

Article 122
The President of the Republic appoints and removes the
President of the Council of Ministers. He also appoints
and removes the other ministers on the recommendation and agreement, respectively, of the President of the
Council of Ministers.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers on the recommendation of the president of the Council of
Ministers, and the appointments do not require
the legislatures approval.
Article 122
The President of the Republic appoints and removes the
President of the Council of Ministers. He also appoints
and removes the other ministers on the recommendation and agreement, respectively, of the President of the
Council of Ministers.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 110
The President of the Republic is the Head of State and
personifies the Nation.
In order to be elected President of the Republic one must
be Peruvian by birth, be over 35 years of age at the time
of his candidacy, and enjoy the right of suffrage.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 130
Within 30 days of assuming his functions, the President
of the Council of Ministers attends Congress accompanied by the other ministers to expound and discuss the
governments general policy and the principal measures
necessary for their implementation. For that purpose, a
vote of confidence is taken.
Article 132
Congress implements the political responsibility of the
Council of Ministers, or of the ministers individually,
by means of a vote of censure or by defeating a vote
of confidence. The latter may only be proposed upon
a ministerial initiative. Any motion of censure of the
Council of Ministers or of any of the ministers must
be introduced by no fewer than 25 percent of the legal
number of members of Congress. It is debated between
the fourth and tenth calendar day following its introduction. Its approval requires the vote of over half the
legal number of the members of Congress. The Council
of Ministers or the censured minister must then resign.

531
The President of the Republic accepts his resignation
within the subsequent 72 hours.
The defeat of a ministerial initiative does not obligate
the minister to resign, unless its approval was made a
question of confidence.
Article 133
The President of the Council of Ministers may introduce
before Congress a question of confidence on behalf of
the Council of Ministers. If confidence is denied, or if
the President is censured, or if he resigns or is removed
by the President of the Republic, a total crisis of the
Cabinet is produced.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 134
The President of the Republic has the power to dissolve Congress if the latter has censured or denied its
confidence to two Councils of Ministers. The dissolution decree contains a call for the election of a new
Congress. Said election must take place within four
months of the dissolution of Congress without any
alteration to the existing electoral system. Congress
may not be dissolved in the final year of its mandate.
Once Congress is dissolved, its Standing Committee,
which cannot be dissolved, maintains its functions.
The parliamentary mandate may not be revoked in any
other form. Under a state of siege, Congress may not be
dissolved.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The president can issue decrees that have
the force of law in economic and financial matters when required by the national interest. The
decrees lapse if they are subsequently nullified by
the legislature. The president can also issue decrees
that have the force of law when authorized to do
so by the legislature.
Article 104
Congress may delegate to the Executive Branch the
responsibility of legislating by means of legislative
decrees relating to a specific subject and for a stated
period established by the authorizing law. Matters may
not be delegated by Congress which cannot be delegated to its Standing Committee. Legislative decrees
are treated under the same rules that apply to laws
as regards their promulgation, publication, scope, and
effects. The President of the Republic is accountable to
Congress or its Standing Committee for each legislative
decree.
Article 118
It is the responsibility of the President of the Republic:
19. To decree extraordinary measures by means of
urgency decrees with the force of law in economic and

532
financial matters when required by the national interest, while being accountable to Congress. Congress can
modify or nullify the said emergency decrees.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote of its present members.
Article 108
A law approved according to a provision in the Constitution is sent to the President of the Republic for his
promulgation within a period of 15 days. In case the
President of the Republic does not promulgate a law,
the President of Congress or its Standing Committee
does so, as appropriate. If the President of the Republic
has comments to make on the entire law or part of the
law approved by Congress, he transmits these to the
latter within the stated deadline of 15 days.
Once Congress reconsiders the law, its President promulgates it as long as more than half of the legal number of members approve it.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 201
The Constitutional Court is the organ that oversees
adherence to the Constitution.
Article 202
The Constitutional Court has the following responsibilities:
1. To adjudicate, as the unique instance, actions of
unconstitutionality.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.

Congress of Peru (Congreso)

Yes. Legislators are immune with the common

exception for cases of flagrante delicto.
Article 93
Members of Congress represent the Nation. They are
not subject to an imperative mandate or to interpellation. They are not responsible before any authority or
court for opinions held and votes cast in the exercise of
their functions. They may not be prosecuted or arrested
without prior authorization of Congress or its Standing
Committee. Members of Congress have tenure from the
time of their election to a month after the termination
of their functions, except for an offense in flagrante
delicto, in which case they are placed at the disposal of
Congress or its Standing Committee within 24 hours to
determine whether their imprisonment and trial may
be authorized or not.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 90
The Legislative Power is vested in Congress, which is
unicameral. The number of members of Congress is
120. Congress is elected for a period of five years by
means of elections organized according to law.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature alone can change the constitution through a complicated procedure. The sitting legislature can propose the amendment with
a two-thirds majority vote, and then, following an
election, the subsequent legislature can approve
the amendment with a two-thirds majority
vote.
Article 206
Every constitutional amendment must be approved by
Congress with an absolute majority of the legal number
of its members and ratified by referendum. The referendum may be omitted when the amendment is approved
by Congress in two successive ordinary sessions by a
favorable vote which exceeds, in each case, two-thirds
of the legal number of members of Congress.
The constitutional amendment law is not subject to
comments by the President of the Republic.
The right to initiate constitutional reform belongs to
the President of the Republic, with the approval of the
Council of Ministers; to the members of Congress, and
to a number of citizens equivalent to three-tenths of
one percent (0.3%) of the voters, with signatures verified by the elections authority.

Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.

Yes. The legislatures approval is required for presidential war declarations.

Congress of Peru (Congreso)

Article 118
It is the responsibility of the President of the Republic:
16. To declare war and make peace, with the approval
of Congress.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties on most major issues.
Article 56
Treaties must be approved by Congress before their ratification by the President of the Republic if they involve
the following matters:
1. Human rights.
2. Sovereignty, dominion, or integrity of the State.
3. National defense.
4. Financial obligations of the State.
Congress must also approve the treaties that create,
amend, or eliminate taxes; those that require the modification or repeal of any law; and those that require
legislative measures for their execution.
Article 57
The President of the Republic may accept or ratify
treaties without need for the prior approval of Congress
in matters not covered in the previous article. In
all these cases, he must account to Congress. When
the treaty affects constitutional provisions, it must be
approved by the same procedure that applies to amending the Constitution before being ratified by the President of the Republic. The denunciation of treaties falls
under the authority of the President of the Republic
who is obliged to account to Congress. In the case
of treaties subject to the approval of Congress, their
denunciation requires its prior approval.
Article 102
The duties of Congress are as follows:
3. To approve treaties, in accordance with the Constitution.
Article 118
It is the responsibility of the President of the Republic:
11. To direct foreign policy and international relations
and to sign and ratify treaties.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.
Article 102
The duties of Congress are as follows:
6. To exercise the right of amnesty.

533
period of investigation has exceeded twice its maximum
deadline.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. Formally, the legislature elects the members
of the Constitutional Court, while other members
of the judiciary are self-selected, but in practice,
the president and the judiciary control judicial
appointments without the legislatures participation.
Article 150
The National Council of the Magistracy is charged with
the selection and appointment of judges and prosecutors, except when these are popularly elected.
Article 152
Justices of the Peace are popularly elected.
Article 154
The following are the duties of the National Council of
the Magistracy:
1. To appoint, following a prior public competitive
examination and personal evaluation, judges and prosecutors at all levels. Said appointments require a vote
of two-thirds of the legal number of its members.
Article 155
The members of the National Council of the Magistracy, in accordance with the law on the subject, are as
follows:
1. One elected by the Supreme Court by secret ballot in
plenary session.
2. One elected by secret ballot by the Board of Senior
Prosecutors.
3. One elected by secret ballot by members of the Bar
Association.
4. Two elected by secret ballot by the members of the
other national professional colleges, in accordance with
the law.
5. One elected by secret ballot by the rectors of national
universities.
6. One elected by secret ballot by the rectors of private
universities.
Article 201
The members of the Constitutional Court are elected
by the National Congress with the affirmative votes of
two-thirds of the legal number of its members. Judges
of the Constitutional Court, judges or prosecutors who
have not relinquished their position for a year prior,
cannot be voted into membership.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 118
It is the responsibility of the President of the Republic:
21. To grant pardons and commute sentences. To
exercise the power of pardon in processes where the

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The executive branch appoints the directorate
of the Central Reserve Bank of Peru with the
approval of Congress.

534

Congress of Peru (Congreso)

Article 86
The Bank is managed by a seven-member Directorate.
The Executive Branch appoints four, among them the
President [of the Directorate]. Congress ratifies the latter
and elects the other three members, with approval by an
absolute majority of the legal number of its members.
All the directors of the Bank are appointed for the constitutional period concurrent with the term of the President of the Republic. The board members do not represent any particular interests. Congress may remove
them for grave error. In case of removal, the new directors complete the applicable constitutional term.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.
28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
Yes.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (KONGRESO)

Expert consultants: Yvonne T. Chua, Maria Socorro I. Diokno, David C. Kang, Carl H. Lande,
James Putzel, Geronimo Velasco
Score: .56
Influence over
executive (5/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

Institutional
autonomy (6/9)
X

10. no
dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack president
9. no confidence

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

Specified
powers (2/8)

Institutional
capacity (5/6)

19. amendments

27. sessions

20. war

28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

X
X

26. media
X

The Congress (Kongreso) of the Philippines was

established in 1946 upon independence from the
United States. In 1972 President Ferdinand Marcos
suspended parliament and declared martial law. A
new constitution in the following year formalized
Marcoss absolute authority. Marcos relinquished
power in 1986 amid demonstrations sparked by
massive fraud in a presidential election. He subse-

quently fled the country, and in 1987 the Philippines adopted its current constitution. The document calls for a bicameral legislature with an
upper house, the Senate (Senado), and a lower
house, the House of Representatives (Kapulungan
Ng Mga Kinatawan). In 2006 President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, who is obligated by the constitution to vacate the presidency after the end of her

Congress of the Philippines (Kongreso)

term in 2010, proposed to rewrite the constitution to disband the Senate and establish a powerful unicameral legislature, thereby enabling her
to remain in power, as prime minister rather than
president, after 2010. Arroyos attempt to transform the country from a presidential to a parliamentary political system in order to enable herself
to retain the helm indefinitely met with vigorous
and widespread opposition, and Arroyo and her
supporters backed down following a brief political
crisis.
Congress has significant, albeit not vast, authority. Its ability to influence the executive branch
includes powers to impeach the president, interpellate and investigate the government, and review
the presidents ministerial appointments. It has
some degree of institutional autonomy, as evidenced by the presidents lack of decree, dissolution, and gatekeeping authority. With the exception of the powers to declare war and approve international treaties, however, the legislature exercises
none of the specified powers measured in this survey. It has substantial institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can impeach the president.
One-third of the Houses total membership can
propose the impeachment. The Senate then conducts the trial and can impeach the president by a
two-thirds majority vote of its total membership.
Article 11
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes,
or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by
law, but not by impeachment.
Section 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have
the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified compliant for impeachment may be
filed by any Member of the House of Representatives
or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement
by any Member thereof, which shall be included in
the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing,
and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days
from such referral, together with the corresponding

535
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days
from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of
the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of
the Committee, or override its contrary resolution.
The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified compliant or resolution of
impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute the
Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a
period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and
decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for
that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on
trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall
preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all
the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not
extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the
Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and
punishment according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of
this section.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 6
Section 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment
in the Government.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Section 22. The heads of departments may upon their
own initiative, with the consent of the President, or
upon the request of either House, as the rules of each
House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such
House on any matter pertaining to their departments.
Written questions shall be submitted to the President
of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled
appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto.

536
When the security of the State or the public interest
so requires and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall be conducted in executive session.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.

Congress of the Philippines (Kongreso)

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 7
Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be
elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six
years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of
June next following the day of the election and shall
end at noon of the same date six years thereafter. The
President shall not be eligible for any reelection. No
person who has succeeded as President and has served
as such for more than four years shall be qualified for
election to the same office at any time.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The House Committee on Oversight oversees

all executive branch agencies, both civilian and
military.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.

6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

No. There is no prime minister.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The presidents ministerial appointments
require the approval of the Commission on
Appointments, a body composed of the leaders of
the legislative branch.
Article 16
Section 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex
officio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each
House on the basis of proportional representation from
the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein.
The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except
in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the
Congress from their submission. The Commission shall
rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
Article 7
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint
the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in
him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he
may be authorized by law to appoint.

No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in

the government.

Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority vote is required to override a presidential veto.
Article 6
Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall,
before it becomes a law, be presented to the President.
If he approves the same he shall sign it; otherwise, he
shall veto it and return the same with his objections
to the House where it originated, which shall enter the
objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all
the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it
shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other
House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and
if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that
House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes
of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and
the names of the Members voting for or against shall
be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated
within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any
particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue,
or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or
items to which he does not object.

Congress of the Philippines (Kongreso)

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Supreme Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 8
Section 4. (2) All cases involving the constitutionality of
a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law,
which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc,
and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are
required to be heard en banc, including those involving
the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions,
ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with
the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the
case and voted thereon.
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,
including control over members salaries.
Article 6
Section 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives shall be determined by law.
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until
after the expiration of the full term of all the Members
of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislators are immune only while the legislature is in session. They are subject to arrest at other
times.

537
Article 6
Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more
than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest
while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any
speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee
thereof.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 6
Section 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four
Senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified
voters of the Philippines, as may be provided by law.
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall
be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments require approval
in a popular referendum.
Article 17
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all
its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of
the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three
per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five
years following the ratification of this Constitution nor
oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of
the exercise of this right.
Section 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds
of all its Members, call a constitutional convention, or
by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the
electorate the question of calling such a convention.
Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later
than ninety days after the approval of such amendment
or revision.

538

Congress of the Philippines (Kongreso)

dent from a list of at least three nominees prepared by
the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such
appointments need no confirmation.

Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid

when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty
days nor later than ninety days after the certification
by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of
the petition.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. The president appoints the governor of the

Central Bank of the Philippines.

Yes. The legislature declares war.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

Article 6
Section 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds
of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence
of a state of war.

No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the

operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.

Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.

Yes. The Senates approval is necessary to ratify

international treaties.

Article 6
Section 15. The Congress shall convene once every year
on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session,
unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may
determine until thirty days before the opening of its
next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays,
and legal holidays.

Article 7
Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall
be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least
two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. The president grants amnesty with the legislatures approval.
Article 7
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 7
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as
otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President
may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The president appoints magistrates on the
proposal of the Judicial and Bar Council, and
the appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 8
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and
judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the Presi-

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
Yes.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
No. Senators are limited to two consecutive terms.
Deputies are limited to three consecutive terms.
Article 6
Section 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six
years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided
by law, at noon on the thirteenth day of June next
following their election.
No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive
terms.
Section 7. The Members of the House of Representatives
shall be elected for a term of three years which shall
begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on
the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve
for more than three consecutive terms.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.

Parliament of Poland (Parlament)

539

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.

Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

PARLIAMENT OF POLAND (PARLAMENT )

Expert consultants: Michael Bernhard, Anna Grzymaa-Busse, Krzysztof Jasiewicz, Conor ODwyer,
Wei-fang Wang, Jakub Zielinski
Score: .75
Influence over
executive (7/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

Institutional
autonomy (6/9)
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee police

6. appoint PM

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack president
9. no confidence

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

Specified
powers (5/8)
X

Institutional
capacity (6/6)

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

X
X

21. treaties
22. amnesty

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

X
X

26. media

The Parliament (Parlament) of Poland was founded,

along with an independent Polish state, at the end
of World War I. In 1926 the legislatures role was
diminished by a military coup and the establishment of an authoritarian government. Following
World War II, Poland was incorporated into the
communist bloc and, in 1952, enacted a Sovietstyle constitution. In 1989 Poland adopted sweeping constitutional amendments that removed the
provisions that enshrined communist-party dominance. In 1992 these changes and others were
formalized in the little constitution so called
because it set out a structure of government but
did not contain sections on individual rights
and liberties that called for a bicameral legislature consisting of a lower house, the Diet (Sejm),
and an upper house, the Senate (Senat). In 1997
the country adopted a new permanent constitution.
The legislature has a good deal of power. It
holds considerable influence over the executive
and enjoys a high degree of institutional autonomy, although it is subject to presidential veto and
dissolution powers. It exercises numerous specified
powers and prerogatives, including the power to

X
X

declare war. It also enjoys every aspect of institutional capacity scored in this survey.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of a judicial body, the Tribunal of State.
The legislature can remove the prime minister with
a vote of no confidence.
Article 145
(1) The President of the Republic may be held accountable before the Tribunal of State for an infringement
of the Constitution or statute, or for commission of an
offence.
(2) Bringing an indictment against the President of the
Republic shall be done by resolution of the National
Assembly passed by a majority of at least two-thirds
of the statutory number of members of the National
Assembly, on the motion of at least 140 members of
the Assembly.
(3) On the day on which an indictment, to be heard
before the Tribunal of State, is brought against the
President of the Republic, he shall be suspended from

540
discharging all functions of his office. The provisions of
Article 131 shall apply as appropriate.
Article 158
(1) The Diet shall pass a vote of no confidence by a
majority of votes of the statutory number of Deputies,
on a motion moved by at least 46 Deputies and which
shall specify the name of a candidate for Prime Minister. If such a resolution has been passed by the Diet, the
President of the Republic shall accept the resignation of
the Council of Ministers and appoint a new Prime Minister as chosen by the Diet, and, on his application, the
other members of the Council of Ministers and accept
their oath of office.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Legislators may serve simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 103
(1) The mandate of a Deputy shall not be held jointly
with the office of the President of the National Bank
of Poland, the President of the Supreme Chamber of
Control, the Commissioner for Citizens Rights, the
Commissioner for Childrens Rights or their deputies,
a member of the Council for Monetary Policy, a member of the National Council of Radio Broadcasting and
Television, ambassador, or with employment in the
Chancellory of the Diet, Chancellery of the Senate,
Chancellery of the President of the Republic, or with
employment in government administration. This prohibition shall not apply to members of the Council of
Ministers and secretaries of state in government administration.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 115
(1) The Prime Minister and other members of the
Council of Ministers shall furnish answers to interpellations and Deputies questions within 21 days. (2) The
Prime Minister and other members of the Council of
Ministers shall furnish answers to matters raised in the
course of each sitting of the Diet.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can establish a committee to
investigate the executive.
Article 111
(1) The Diet may appoint an investigative committee
to examine a particular matter.
(2) The procedures for work by an investigative committee shall be specified by statute.

Parliament of Poland (Parlament)

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. The legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. The president appoints as prime minister the
candidate who enjoys the support of the legislature.
Article 144
(1) The President of the Republic, exercising his constitutional and statutory authority, shall issue Official
Acts.
(2) Official Acts of the President shall require, for their
validity, the signature of the Prime Minister who, by
such signature, accepts responsibility therefor to the
House of Representatives.
(3) The provisions of (2) above shall not relate to:
11) nominating and appointing the Prime Minister.
Article 154
(1) The President of the Republic shall nominate a
Prime Minister who shall propose the composition of
a Council of Ministers. The President of the Republic
shall, within 14 days of the first sitting of the Diet or
acceptance of the resignation of the previous Council of
Ministers, appoint a Prime Minister together with other
members of a Council of Ministers and accept the oaths
of office of members of such newly appointed Council
of Ministers.
(2) The Prime Minister shall, within 14 days following the day of his appointment by the President of
the Republic, submit a programme of activity of the
Council of Ministers to the Diet, together with a motion
requiring a vote of confidence. The Diet shall pass such
vote of confidence by an absolute majority of votes in
the presence of at least half of the statutory number of
Deputies.
(3) In the event that a Council of Ministers has not
been appointed pursuant to Paragraph (1) above or has
failed to obtain a vote of confidence in accordance with
Paragraph (2) above, the Diet, within 14 days of the end
of the time periods specified in Paragraphs (1) and (2),
shall choose a Prime Minister as well as members of
the Council of Ministers as proposed by him, by an
absolute majority of votes in the presence of at least
half of the statutory number of Deputies. The President
of the Republic shall appoint the Council of Ministers
so chosen and accept the oaths of office of its members.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The legislatures approval is required to confirm ministerial appointments.

Parliament of Poland (Parlament)

Article 154
(1) The President of the Republic shall nominate a
Prime Minister who shall propose the composition of
a Council of Ministers. The President of the Republic
shall, within 14 days of the first sitting of the Diet or
acceptance of the resignation of the previous Council of
Ministers, appoint a Prime Minister together with other
members of a Council of Ministers and accept the oaths
of office of members of such newly appointed Council
of Ministers.
(2) The Prime Minister shall, within 14 days following the day of his appointment by the President of
the Republic, submit a programme of activity of the
Council of Ministers to the Diet, together with a motion
requiring a vote of confidence. The Diet shall pass such
vote of confidence by an absolute majority of votes in
the presence of at least half of the statutory number of
Deputies.
(3) In the event that a Council of Ministers has not
been appointed pursuant to Paragraph (1) above or has
failed to obtain a vote of confidence in accordance with
Paragraph (2) above, the Diet, within 14 days of the end
of the time periods specified in Paragraphs (1) and (2),
shall choose a Prime Minister as well as members of
the Council of Ministers as proposed by him, by an
absolute majority of votes in the presence of at least
half of the statutory number of Deputies. The President of the Republic shall appoint the Council of Ministers so chosen and accept the oaths of office of its
members.

541
(2) In the event that a vote of confidence has not been
granted to the Council of Ministers pursuant to Paragraph (1), the President of the Republic shall shorten
the term of office of the Diet and order elections to be
held.
Article 158
(1) The Diet shall pass a vote of no confidence by a
majority of votes of the statutory number of Deputies,
on a motion moved by at least 46 Deputies and which
shall specify the name of a candidate for Prime Minister. If such a resolution has been passed by the Diet, the
President of the Republic shall accept the resignation of
the Council of Ministers and appoint a new Prime Minister as chosen by the Diet, and, on his application, the
other members of the Council of Ministers and accept
their oath of office.
(2) A motion to pass a resolution referred to in Paragraph (1) above, may be put to a vote no sooner than 7
days after it has been submitted. A subsequent motion
of a like kind may be submitted no sooner than after
the end of 3 months from the day the previous motion
was submitted. A subsequent motion may be submitted
before the end of 3 months if such motion is submitted
by at least 115 Deputies.
Article 160
The Prime Minister may submit to the Diet (Sejm) a
motion requiring a vote of confidence in the Council of Ministers. A vote of confidence in the Council
of Ministers shall be granted by a majority of votes in
the presence of at least half of the statutory number of
Deputies.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.

No. The president is directly elected.

No. The president can dissolve the legislature.

Article 127
(1) The President of the Republic shall be elected by the
Nation, in universal, equal and direct elections, conducted by secret ballot.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature has a constructive vote of no
confidence, meaning that the parliament must designate a successor prime minister before passing a
vote of no confidence.
Article 155
(1) In the event that a Council of Ministers has not
been appointed pursuant to the provisions of Article
154 (3), the President of the Republic shall, within a
period of 14 days, appoint a Prime Minister and, on
his application, other members of the Council of Ministers. The Diet, within 14 days following the appointment of the Council of Ministers by the President of the
Republic, shall hold, in the presence of at least half of
the statutory number of Deputies, a vote of confidence
thereto.

Article 155
(1) In the event that a Council of Ministers has not
been appointed pursuant to the provisions of Article
154 (3), the President of the Republic shall, within a
period of 14 days, appoint a Prime Minister and, on
his application, other members of the Council of Ministers. The Diet, within 14 days following the appointment of the Council of Ministers by the President of the
Republic, shall hold, in the presence of at least half of
the statutory number of Deputies, a vote of confidence
thereto.
(2) In the event that a vote of confidence has not been
granted to the Council of Ministers pursuant to Paragraph (1), the President of the Republic shall shorten
the term of office of the Diet and order elections to be
held.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto

542

Parliament of Poland (Parlament)

power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.

1) the conformity of statutes and international agreements to the Constitution.

No. A three-fifths majority vote in the Diet is

required to override a presidential veto.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.

Article 122
(1) After the completion of the procedure specified in
Article 121, the Marshal of the Diet shall submit an
adopted bill to the President of the Republic for signature.
(2) The President of the Republic shall sign a bill within
21 days of its submission and shall order its promulgation in the Journal of Laws of the Republic of
Poland.
(3) The President of the Republic may, before signing a
bill, refer it to the Constitutional Tribunal for an adjudication upon its conformity to the Constitution. The
President of the Republic shall not refuse to sign a bill
which has been judged by the Constitutional Tribunal
as conforming to the Constitution.
(4) The President of the Republic shall refuse to sign a
bill which the Constitutional Tribunal has judged not
to be in conformity to the Constitution. If, however, the
non-conformity to the Constitution relates to particular
provisions of the bill, and the Tribunal has not judged
that they are inseparably connected with the whole bill,
then, the President of the Republic, after seeking the
opinion of the Marshal of the Diet, shall sign the bill
with the omission of those provisions considered as
being in non-conformity to the Constitution or shall
return the bill to the Diet for the purpose of removing
the non-conformity.
(5) If the President of the Republic has not made reference to the Constitutional Tribunal in accordance with
Paragraph (3), he may refer the bill, with reasons given,
to the Diet for its reconsideration. If the said bill is
repassed by the Diet by a three-fifths majority vote in
the presence of at least half of the statutory number
of Deputies, then, the President of the Republic shall
sign it within 7 days and shall order its promulgation
in the Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland. If the
said bill has been repassed by the Diet, the President of
the Republic shall have no right to refer it to the Constitutional Tribunal in accordance with the procedure
prescribed in Paragraph (3).
(6) Any such reference by the President of the Republic
to the Constitutional Tribunal for an adjudication upon
the conformity of a statute to the Constitution, or any
application for reconsideration of a bill, shall suspend
the period of time allowed for its signature, specified in
Paragraph (2) above.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Tribunal can review the
constitutionality of laws.
Article 188
The Constitutional Tribunal shall adjudicate regarding
the following matters:

Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy

jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto.
Article 105
(1) A Deputy shall not be held accountable for his activity performed within the scope of a Deputys mandate during the term thereof nor after its completion.
Regarding such activities, a Deputy can only be held
accountable before the Diet and, in a case where he has
infringed the rights of third parties, he may only be
proceeded against before a court with the consent of
the Diet.
(2) From the day of announcement of the results of the
elections until the day of the expiry of his mandate, a
Deputy shall not be subjected to criminal accountability without the consent of the Diet.
(3) Criminal proceedings instituted against a person
before the day of his election as Deputy, shall be suspended at the request of the Diet until the time of expiry
of the mandate. In such instance, the statute of limitation with respect to criminal proceedings shall be
extended for the equivalent time.
(4) A Deputy may consent to be brought to criminal
accountability. In such instance, the provisions of Paragraphs (2) and (3) shall not apply.
(5) A Deputy shall be neither detained nor arrested
without the consent of the Diet, except for cases in
flagrante delicto and in which his detention is necessary for securing the proper course of proceedings. Any
such detention shall be immediately communicated to
the Marshal of the Diet, who may order an immediate
release of the Deputy.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.

Parliament of Poland (Parlament)

Article 96
(1) The Diet shall be composed of 460 Deputies.
(2) Elections to the Diet shall be universal, equal, direct
and proportional and shall be conducted by secret ballot.
Article 97
(1) The Senate shall be composed of 100 Senators.
(2) Elections to the Senate shall be universal, direct and
shall be conducted by secret ballot.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement

of any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
with a two-thirds majority vote in the Diet and
with a majority vote in the Senate. Amendments
to select chapters require approval in a popular referendum.
Article 235
(1) A bill to amend the Constitution may be submitted by the following: at least one-fifth of the statutory
number of Deputies; the Senate; or the President of the
Republic.
(2) Amendments to the Constitution shall be made by
means of a statute adopted by the Diet and, thereafter,
adopted in the same wording by the Senate within a
period of 60 days.
(3) The first reading of a bill to amend the Constitution may take place no sooner than 30 days after the
submission of the bill to the Diet.
(4) A bill to amend the Constitution shall be adopted
by the Diet by a majority of at least two-thirds of votes
in the presence of at least half of the statutory number
of Deputies, and by the Senate by an absolute majority
of votes in the presence of at least half of the statutory
number of Senators.
(5) The adoption by the Diet of a bill amending the
provisions of Chapters I, II or XII of the Constitution
shall take place no sooner than 60 days after the first
reading of the bill.
(6) If a bill to amend the Constitution relates to the
provisions Chapters I, II or XII, the subjects specified
in Paragraph (1) above may require, within 45 days of
the adoption of the bill by the Senate, the holding of
a confirmatory referendum. Such subjects shall make
application in the matter to the Marshal of the Diet,
who shall order the holding of a referendum within 60
days of the day of receipt of the application. The amendment to the Constitution shall be deemed accepted if
the majority of those voting express support for such
amendment.
(7) After conclusion of the procedures specified in Paragraphs (4) and (6) above, the Marshal of the Diet shall
submit the adopted statute to the President of the
Republic for signature. The President of the Republic
shall sign the statute within 21 days of its submission
and order its promulgation in the Journal of Laws of
the Republic of Poland.

543

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislature declares war.
Article 116
(1) The Diet shall declare, in the name of the Republic
of Poland, a state of war and the conclusion of peace.
(2) The Diet may adopt a resolution on a state of war
only in the event of armed aggression against the territory of the Republic of Poland or when an obligation of
common defence against aggression arises by virtue of
international agreements. If the Diet cannot assemble
for a sitting, the President of the Republic may declare
a state of war.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties on most major issues.
Article 89
(1) Ratification of an international agreement by the
Republic of Poland, as well as denunciation thereof,
shall require prior consent granted by statute if such
agreement concerns:
1) peace, alliances, political or military treaties;
2) freedoms, rights or obligations of citizens, as specified in the Constitution;
3) the Republic of Polands membership in an international organization;
4) considerable financial responsibilities imposed on
the State;
5) matters regulated by statute or those in respect of
which the Constitution requires the form of a statute.
(2) The President of the Council of Ministers (the Prime
Minister) shall inform the Diet of any intention to submit, for ratification by the President of the Republic,
any international agreements whose ratification does
not require consent granted by statute.
(3) The principles of and procedures for the conclusion
and renunciation of international agreements shall be
specified by statute.
Article 133
(1) The President of the Republic, as representative of
the State in foreign affairs, shall: 1) ratify and renounce
international agreements, and shall notify the Diet and
the Senate thereof;
(2) The President of the Republic, before ratifying an
international agreement may refer it to the Constitutional Tribunal with a request to adjudicate upon its
conformity to the Constitution.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The president has the power of pardon.

544
Article 139
The President of the Republic shall have the power of
pardon. The power of pardon may not be extended to
individuals convicted by the Tribunal of State.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The president makes judicial appointments,
and the appointments do not require the legislatures approval.
Article 179
Judges shall be appointed for an indefinite period by the
President of the Republic on the motion of the National
Council of the Judiciary.
Article 183
(3) The First President of the Supreme Court shall be
appointed by the President of the Republic for a 6-year
term of office from amongst candidates proposed by
the General Assembly of the Judges of the Supreme
Court.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
Yes. The Diet, on the recommendation of the president, appoints the president of the National Bank
of Poland.
Article 227
(3) The Diet, on request of the President of the Republic, shall appoint the President of the National Bank of
Poland for a period of 6 years.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

Parliament of Poland (Parlament)

Yes. The legislature appoints members to the

National Council of Radio Broadcasting and Television, the body that oversees the public media.
Article 214
(1) The members of the National Council of Radio
Broadcasting and Television shall be appointed by the
Diet, the Senate and the President of the Republic.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.
28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.
Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
Yes.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

Assembly of Portugal (Assembleia)

545

ASSEMBLY OF PORTUGAL (ASSEMBLEIA)

Expert consultants: Ana Freitas, Lawrence S. Graham, Pedro Magalhaes, Jose M. Magone,
Paul Christopher Manuel
Score: .63
Influence over
executive (6/9)

Institutional
autonomy (3/9)

Specified
powers (7/8)
19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

23. pardon

24. judiciary

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee police

6. appoint PM

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack president
9. no confidence

Institutional
capacity (4/6)
X

X
X
X

25. central bank

26. media

The Assembly (Assembleia) of Portugal traces it origins to the early nineteenth century. For most of
its history, the legislature wielded little power. Portugal was ruled by a constitutional monarch until
the early twentieth century and by the dictatorship of Antonio
de Oliveira Salazar from the early

1930s until the late 1960s. Reforms carried out

from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s established
a semipresidential system with a strong prime minister and government and provided a basis for open
political competition. A new constitution in 1976
created a unicameral parliament. A 1982 amendment established a civilian government and created a Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality of laws.
The Assembly has significant powers. It has considerable influence over the executive but a relatively modest measure of institutional autonomy.
Its autonomy is circumscribed by executive decree,
dissolution, impoundment, and gatekeeping powers. The Assembly exercises many specified powers.
Its institutional capacity is limited by a lack of personal legislative staff.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can remove the prime minister with a vote of no confidence. Removing the

president from office requires the involvement of

the Supreme Court of Justice.
Article 133
(1) The President of the Republic is answerable before
the Supreme Court of Justice for offences committed in
the performance of his duties.
(2) It shall be the duty of the Assembly of the Republic
to initiate proceedings at the proposal of one fifth and
by a decision of two thirds of its members entitled to
vote.
(3) Conviction results in dismissal from office and
excludes re-election.
(4) The President of the Republic is answerable to the
common courts after the end of his term of office
for offences not committed in the performance of his
duties.
Article 186
Taking and leaving office
1. The Prime Minister shall take office upon his installation and shall leave office when he is discharged by
the President of the Republic.
4. In the event that the Government resigns or is
removed, the Prime Minister of the outgoing Government shall be discharged on the date of the appointment and installation of the new Prime Minister.
Article 195
1. The Government shall resign upon:
a) The beginning of a new legislature;
b) Acceptance by the President of the Republic of the
Prime Ministers resignation;
c) The Prime Ministers death or lasting physical
incapacitation;

546
d) Rejection of the Governments Programme;
e) The failure of any confidence motion;
f) Passage of a no confidence motion by an absolute
majority of all the Members in full exercise of their
office.
2. The President of the Republic may only remove the
Government when it becomes necessary to do so in
order to ensure the normal functioning of the democratic institutions and after first consulting the Council
of State.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 154
1. Members who are appointed to the Government shall
not exercise the office of Member until they leave the
Government, and shall be temporarily substituted in
accordance with the previous Article.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 156
Members shall have the following powers:
d) To question the Government about any of its acts
or those of the Public Administration, and to obtain
answers within a reasonable period of time, save the
provisions of the law concerning state secrets;
e) To request and obtain from the Government or the
governing bodies of any public entity, such information
and documents and official publications as the Member
or Members in question may deem useful to the exercise
of their mandate.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can establish committees of
inquiry to investigate the executive.
Article 156
Members shall have the following powers:
f) To request the formation of parliamentary committees of inquiry.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. The legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.

Assembly of Portugal (Assembleia)

6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

Yes. The president appoints as prime minister the
candidate who enjoys the support of the legislature.
Article 133
In relation to other bodies the President of the Republic
shall be responsible for:
f) Appointing the Prime Minister pursuant to Article
187(1);
h) Upon a proposal from the Prime Minister, appointing members of the Government and discharging them
from office.
Article 187
1. The President of the Republic shall appoint the
Prime Minister after consulting the parties with seats
in Assembly of the Republic and in the light of the electoral results.
2. The President of the Republic shall appoint the
remaining members of the Government upon a proposal from the Prime Minister.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers on the recommendation of the prime minister, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 133
In relation to other bodies the President of the Republic
shall be responsible for:
f) Appointing the Prime Minister pursuant to Article
187(1);
h) Upon a proposal from the Prime Minister, appointing members of the Government and discharging them
from office.
Article 187
1. The President of the Republic shall appoint the
Prime Minister after consulting the parties with seats
in Assembly of the Republic and in the light of the electoral results.
2. The President of the Republic shall appoint the
remaining members of the Government upon a proposal from the Prime Minister.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 121
1. The President of the Republic shall be elected by the
universal, direct, secret suffrage of all Portuguese citizens who are registered to vote in Portuguese territory
and, in accordance with the following paragraph, of all
Portuguese citizens who reside abroad.

Assembly of Portugal (Assembleia)

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 166
With respect to other organs, the Assembly of the
Republic has the following powers:
e) To pass motions of confidence in and censure of the
Government.
Article 195
1. The Government shall resign upon:
e) The failure of any confidence motion;
f) Passage of a no confidence motion by an absolute
majority of all the Members in full exercise of their
office.
2. The President of the Republic may only remove the
Government when it becomes necessary to do so in
order to ensure the normal functioning of the democratic institutions and after first consulting the Council
of State.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 133
In relation to other bodies the President of the Republic
shall be responsible for:
b) In accordance with electoral law, setting the date for
elections for President of the Republic, Members of the
Assembly of the Republic, Members of the European
Parliament and members of the Legislative Assemblies
of the autonomous regions;
e) Subject to the provisions of Article 172 and after first
consulting both the parties with seats in the Assembly
and the Council of State, dissolving the Assembly of the
Republic.
Article 195
1. The Government shall resign upon:
e) The failure of any confidence motion;
f) Passage of a no confidence motion by an absolute
majority of all the Members in full exercise of their
office.
2. The President of the Republic may only remove the
Government when it becomes necessary to do so in
order to ensure the normal functioning of the democratic institutions and after first consulting the Council
of State.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The government issues decrees that have the
force of law.
Article 201
1. The Government has the following powers:
a) To issue decree-laws on matters not reserved to the
Assembly of the Republic;

547
b) To issue decree-laws on matters relatively reserved
to the Assembly of the Republic subject to its authorization;
c) To issue decree-laws in application of laws laying
down legal principles or bases.
2. The Government has exclusive competence in matters concerning its own organization and working.
3. The decree-laws provided for in Paragraph (1)(b)
and (c) expressly mention the law granting legislative
authorization or the law laying down bases under cover
of which they are approved.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote of its total membership. A twothirds majority is required to override a presidential
veto on laws in a handful of extraordinary areas,
including those relating to national defense and
states of emergency.
Article 136
1. Within twenty days of the receipt of any decree of
the Assembly of the Republic for enactment as a law, or
of the publication of a Constitutional Court ruling that
does not declare any of the decrees provisions unconstitutional, the President of the Republic shall either
enact the decree or exercise the right of veto. In the latter case he shall send a message setting out the grounds
therefore and requesting that the statute be reconsidered.
2. If the Assembly of the Republic confirms its original
vote by an absolute majority of all the Members in full
exercise of their office, the President of the Republic
shall enact the decree within eight days of receiving it.
3. However, a majority that is at least equal to two thirds
of all Members present and greater than an absolute
majority of all the Members in full exercise of their
office shall be required to confirm decrees that take the
form of organic laws, as well as to confirm those concerning the following matters:
a) External relations;
b) Boundaries between the public, private and cooperative sectors in relation to the ownership of the
means of production;
c) Such regulations governing the electoral acts provided for by this Constitution as do not take the form
of an organic law.
4. Within forty days of the receipt of any Government decree for enactment, or of the publication of
a Constitutional Court ruling that does not declare any
of the decrees provisions unconstitutional, the President of the Republic shall either enact the decree or
exercise his right of veto. In the latter case he shall
inform the Government in writing of the reasons for
doing so.
5. The President of the Republic shall also exercise the
right of veto pursuant to Articles 278 and 279.

548

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 223
1. The Constitutional Court shall assess cases of unconstitutionality and illegality in accordance with Articles
277 et sequitur.
Article 277
(1) Provisions of law that infringe a provision of the
Constitution or the principles laid down therein are
unconstitutional.
(2) The organic or formal unconstitutionality of international treaties that have been regularly ratified do
not prevent the application of their provisions in Portuguese law as long as the provisions are applied in the
law of the other party, except if the said unconstitutionality results from the violation of a fundamental
principle.
Article 278
(1) The President of the Republic may request the Constitutional Court to judge preventively the constitutionality of any provision of any international treaty
that has been submitted to him for ratification, an act
sent to him for promulgation as a law or decree-law or
an international agreement the act of approval of which
has been sent to him for signature.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. The legislature is prohibited from introducing bills that increase government expenditures or
reduce government revenue in the financial year.
Article 170
(2) The Members, the parliamentary groups, and the
regional legislative assemblies may not table bills or
move amendments involving in the financial year running any increase in State expenditure, or any reduction
in State revenue, allowed in the Budget.
(3) The Members and the parliamentary groups may
not propose referenda involving in the financial year
running any increase in State expenditure, or any reduction in State revenue, allowed in the Budget.

Assembly of Portugal (Assembleia)

No. Legislators are subject to arrest in the event

of strong evidence of the commission of a serious
crime punishable by imprisonment for a maximum
term of more than three years. In these cases the
legislature shall obligatorily authorize a Members
appearance as defendant.
Article 117
1. Political officeholders shall be politically, civilly and
criminally liable for their actions and omissions in the
exercise of their functions.
2. The law shall lay down both the duties, responsibilities, liabilities and incompatibilities of political office
and the consequences of any breach thereof, and the
rights, privileges and immunities that apply thereto.
3. The law shall specify the special crimes for which
political officeholders may be held liable, together with
the applicable penalties and the effects thereof, which
may include removal from office or loss of seat.
Article 157
1. Members shall not be civilly or criminally liable for or
subject to disciplinary proceedings in relation to their
votes or the opinions they express in the performance
of their functions.
2. Members shall not appear as makers of declarations
or defendants without the Assemblys authorisation. In
the event of strong evidence of the commission of a
serious crime punishable by imprisonment for a maximum term of more than three years, the Assembly shall
obligatorily authorise a Members appearance as defendant.
3. No Member may be detained, arrested or imprisoned
without the Assemblys authorisation, save for a serious
crime punishable by the type of prison term referred to
in the previous paragraph and in flagrante delicto.
4. In the event that criminal proceedings are brought
against any Member and he is definitively charged, the
Assembly shall decide whether or not he is to be suspended so that the proceedings can take their course. In
the event of a crime of the type referred to in the previous paragraphs, the Assembly shall obligatorily suspend
the Member.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The government can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.

Article 149
1. Members shall be elected for constituencies that shall
be geographically defined by law. The law may create
plurinominal and uninominal constituencies and lay
down the nature and complementarity thereof, all in
such a way as to ensure that votes are converted into
seats in accordance with the proportional representation system and using dHondts highest-average rule.

Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.

Yes. The legislature can change the constitution

with a two-thirds majority vote.

Assembly of Portugal (Assembleia)

Article 156
Members shall have the following powers:
a) To submit draft amendments to the Constitution.
Article 286
(1) Amendments to the Constitution are approved by
a two-thirds majority of the members of the Assembly
entitled to vote.
(2) Changes in the Constitution which are approved
are incorporated in a single revision law.
(3) The President of the Republic may not refuse to
promulgate the revision law.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is required for presidential war declarations.
Article 138
Declaration of a state of siege or a state of emergency
shall require prior consultation of the Government and
authorisation by the Assembly of the Republic, or, if the
Assembly is not sitting and it is not possible to arrange
for it to sit immediately, by its Standing Committee.
2. In the event that a declaration of a state of siege or
a state of emergency is authorised by the Assembly of
the Republics Standing Committee, such declaration
shall require confirmation by the Plenary as soon as it
is possible to arrange for it to sit.
Article 161
The Assembly of the Republic shall be responsible for:
m) Authorising the President of the Republic to declare
war or to make peace.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties on most major issues.
Article 138
The President of the Republic is competent in international relations to:
a) Appoint ambassadors and envoys extraordinary at
the proposal of the Government, and accept the credentials of foreign diplomatic representatives;
b) Ratify international treaties once they have been
duly approved.
Article 161
The Assembly of the Republic shall be responsible for:
i) Passing treaties, particularly those that entail Portugals participation in international organisations,
friendship, peace, defence, the rectification of borders
or military affairs, as well as international agreements
that address matters which are the exclusive responsibility of the Assembly, or which the Government
deems fit to submit to the Assembly for consideration.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

549
Article 161
Political and legislative responsibilities
f) Granting generic amnesties and pardons.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

Yes. The legislature has the power of pardon.
Article 161
Political and legislative responsibilities
f) Granting generic amnesties and pardons.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislature appoints seven of the sixteen
members of the Higher Council of the Bench and
ten of the thirteen members of the Constitutional
Court.
Article 133
In relation to other bodies the President of the Republic
shall be responsible for:
m) Upon a proposal from the Government, appointing
the President of the Audit Court.
n) Appointing . . . two members of the Supreme Judicial
Council.
Article 217
1. The appointment, assignment, transfer and promotion of judges of the courts of law and the exercise of
discipline over them shall be the responsibility of the
Supreme Judicial Council, as laid down by law.
2. The appointment, assignment, transfer and promotion of judges of the administrative and tax courts and
the exercise of discipline over them shall be the responsibility of the respective Supreme Council, as laid down
by law.
3. Subject to the guarantees provided for by this Constitution, the law shall define the rules governing the
assignment, transfer and promotion of judges of the
remaining courts and the exercise of discipline over
them, and shall determine the responsibility to do so.
Article 219
(1) The Higher Council of the Bench has the powers
to appoint, assign, transfer, and promote the judges of
the courts of law; it also has the powers to exercise
disciplinary action against the latter. Such powers must
be used in conformity with the law.
Article 220
(1) The Higher Council of the Bench are presided over
by the President of the Supreme Court of Justice; its
membership is as follows:
a) Two members appointed by the President of the
Republic, one of which is to be a judge;
b) Seven members elected by the Assembly of the
Republic;
c) Seven judges elected by their peers in accordance
with the principle of proportional representation.
Article 224
(1) The Constitutional Court is made up of thirteen
judges, of which ten are appointed by the Assembly of
the Republic and the remaining three are co-opted.

550

Assembly of Portugal (Assembleia)

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The prime minister appoints the governor of
the Bank of Portugal.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
Yes. The legislature has a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session for
nine months each year.
Article 174
1. Legislative sessions shall last for one year commencing on 15 September.
2. Without prejudice to suspensions decided by a twothirds majority of all Members present, the Assembly of
the Republics normal parliamentary term shall be from
15 September to 15 June.
3. Following a Plenary decision to extend the normal
parliamentary term, or on the initiative of the Standing
Committee, or, in the event that the said Committee
is unable to function and there is a dire emergency, on
the initiative of more than half of all the Members, the
Assembly may conduct proceedings outside the term
set out in the previous paragraph.
4. The President of the Republic may also call the
Assembly on an extraordinary basis in order to address
specific matters.

5. When the Assembly so decides under the same terms

as those set out in (2) above, committees may conduct
proceedings regardless of whether the Assemblys Plenary is in full session.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No. There is legislative staff, but on average there
is less than one staff person for each legislator.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No. See item 28.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL OF QATAR (MAJLIS AL-SHURA)

Expert consultant: Michael Herb
Score: .22
Influence over
executive (3/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee police

X
X

6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack president
9. no confidence

Institutional
autonomy (2/9)

Specified
powers (1/8)

Institutional
capacity (1/6)

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

12. no veto
13. no review
14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

21. treaties
22. amnesty
23. pardon

24. judiciary

29. staff
30. no term limits X
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

25. central bank

X

The Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shura) of Qatar

was established in the 1972 provisional constitution following national independence in 1971.
The original body was partly elected and partly

26. media

appointed, although legislative elections have not

been repeated since the early 1970s, and the original legislators have simply been reappointed by the
emir every four years. For the past three decades,

Consultative Council of Qatar (Majlis al-Shura)

the legislature has functioned as an advisory body

to the emir.
Qatari voters endorsed a new constitution in
2003 that, at least formally, gives the Council some
powers. Under the new system, which came into
effect in 2005, the Council may initiate legislation.
Formerly it merely commented on government legislation. The new constitution also affords powers
to question executive branch officials and approve
international treaties. Legislative elections, the
first in over three decades, are scheduled for
2008.

551

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The Council cannot investigate the emir.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The Council lacks effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. The legislature cannot remove the chief executive, the emir. Only the emir can replace the prime
minister.
Article 72
The Emir shall appoint the Prime Minister, accept his
resignation and remove him from office by an Emiri
Order; and the resignation of the Prime Minister or his
removal from office shall entail all Ministers. In the
event of acceptance or resignation or removal from
the office, the same Council shall continue to run
urgent matters until such time the new Council is appointed.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Ministers may serve simultaneously in the
Council.

No. The emir appoints the prime minister.

Article 72
The Emir shall appoint the Prime Minister, accept his
resignation and remove him from office by an Emiri
Order; and the resignation of the Prime Minister or his
removal from office shall entail all Ministers. In the
event of acceptance or resignation or removal from the
office, the same Council shall continue to run urgent
matters until such time the new Council is appointed.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The emir appoints ministers, and the appointments do not require the legislatures approval.
Article 73
The Emir shall appoint Ministers by an Emiri Order
upon nomination by the Prime Minister; and he shall
accept resignations of Ministers and relieve them from
office in a like manner. Where a resignation of a minister has been accepted, the Minister may be entrusted
with running urgent matters until his successor is
appointed.

Article 77
Al-Shoura Council shall consist of forty-five Members
thirty of whom shall be elected by direct, general secret
ballot; and the Emir shall appoint the remaining fifteen Members from amongst the Ministers or any other
persons. The term of service of the appointed Members
in Al-Shoura Council shall expire when these Members
resign their seats or are relieved from their posts.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The Council regularly interpellates officials of

the executive.
Article 110
Every Member of Al-Shoura Council may address an
interpellation to Ministers on matters within their jurisdiction. An interpellation may not be made unless it is
agreed on by one third of the Members of the Council.

Yes. The country lacks a presidency. The emir is the

head of state.
Article 64
The Emir is the head of State.

No. The Council cannot vote no confidence in the

government.
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the
executive.
No. The emir can dissolve the Council.
Article 104
The Emir may dissolve the Council by a decree in which
the reasons for the dissolution shall be stated; however,

552
the Council shall not be dissolved twice for the same
reasons. Where the Council is dissolved, the elections
of the new Council shall take place within a period not
exceeding six months as of the date of dissolution. Until
a new Council is elected, the Emir with the assistance
of the Council of Ministers shall assume the power of
legislation.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The emir may rule by decree in exceptional
cases when the Council is not in session. Decrees
remain in force unless they are explicitly rejected
by the Council.
Article 69
The Emir may, by a decree, declare Martial Laws in
the country in the event of exceptional cases specified by the law; and in such cases, he may take all
urgent necessary measures to counter any threat that
undermine the safety of the State, the integrity of its
territories or the security of its people and interests or
obstruct the organs of the State from performing their
duties. However, the decree must specify the nature of
such exceptional cases for which the martial laws have
been declared and clarify the measures taken to address
this situation. Al-Shoura Council shall be notified of
this decree within the fifteen days following its issue;
and in the event that the Council is not in session for
any reason whatsoever, the Council shall be notified of
the decree at its first convening. Martial laws shall be
declared for a limited period and the same shall not be
extended unless approved by Al-Shoura Council.
Article 70
The Emir may, in the event of exceptional cases that
require measures of utmost urgency which necessitate
the issue of special laws and in case that Al-Shoura
Council is not in session, issue pertinent decrees that
have the power of law. Such decree-laws shall be submitted to Al-Shoura Council at its first meeting; and
the Council may within a maximum period of forty
days from the date of submission and with a two-thirds
majority of its Members reject any of these decree-laws
or request amendment thereof to be effected within a
specified period of time; such decree-laws shall cease to
have the power of law from the date of their rejection
by the Council or where the period for effecting the
amendments have expired.
Article 104
The Emir may dissolve the Council by a decree in which
the reasons for the dissolution shall be stated; however,
the Council shall not be dissolved twice for the same
reasons. Where the Council is dissolved, the elections
of the new Council shall take place within a period not
exceeding six months as of the date of dissolution. Until
a new Council is elected, the Emir with the assistance
of the Council of Ministers shall assume the power of
legislation.

Consultative Council of Qatar (Majlis al-Shura)

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority is needed to override the
emirs veto.
Article 106
1. Any draft law passed by the Council shall be referred
to the Emir for ratification.
2. If the Emir declines to approve the draft law, he shall
return it a long with the reasons for such declination to
the Council within a period of three months from the
date of referral.
3. In the event that a draft law is returned to the Council
within the period specified in the preceding paragraph
and the Council passes the same once more with a twothirds majority of all its Members, the Emir shall ratify
and promulgate it. The Emir may in compelling circumstances order the suspension of this law for the period
that he deems necessary to serve the higher interests of
the country.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The constitution calls for the establishment of
a judicial body to review the constitutionality of
laws.
Article 140
The law shall specify the competent judicial body for
settling of disputes pertaining to the constitutionality
of laws and regulations, define its powers and method
of challenging and procedures to be followed before
the said body. It shall also specify the consequences of
judgment regarding unconstitutionality.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The new constitution does not explicitly grant
the executive gatekeeping authority.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The emir can impound funds appropriated by
the Council.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
No. The Council is dependent on the emir for the
resources that finance its own operations.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.

Consultative Council of Qatar (Majlis al-Shura)

Yes. According to the 2003 constitution, legislators

are immune with the common exception for cases
of flagrante delicto.
Article 112
The Minister of the Council shall in no circumstances
be accountable for opinions or statements he makes in
respect of matters within the jurisdiction of the Council.
Article 113
1. Save when a Member of Al-Shoura Council is found
flagrante delicto, he shall not be arrested, detained,
searched or subject to investigation without prior permission from the Council. Where the Council has not
issued a resolution on the request for permission within
a period of one month from the date of receipt of the
said request, this shall be virtually considered a permission. The permission shall be issued by the Speaker of
the Council when the latter is not in session.
2. In case of flagrante delicto, the Council must be
notified of the measures taken against the offending
Member; and where the Council is not in session, such
notification should be made at the first subsequent
session.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
No. According to the 2003 constitution, the emir
appoints fifteen of the forty-five members of the
Al-Shoura Council. Legislative elections have not
been held since the early 1970s but are scheduled
for 2008.
Article 77
Al-Shoura Council shall consist of forty-five Members
thirty of whom shall be elected by direct, general secret
ballot; and the Emir shall appoint the remaining fifteen Members from amongst the Ministers or any other
persons. The term of service of the appointed Members
in Al-Shoura Council shall expire when these Members
resign their seats or are relieved from their posts.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments require the emirs
approval.
Article 144
The Emir or one third of the Members of Al-Shoura
Council each shall have the prerogative to apply for
the amendment of one or more of the articles of this
Constitution. If the majority of Members of the Council
accept the amendment in principle, the Council may
discuss it article by article. The amendment shall be
passed by a two-thirds majority of the Members of the
Council. The said amendment shall not be into force
before the approval of the Emir and its publication in
the official Gazette. If, on the other hand, the proposal
for amendment is rejected in principle or in subject, it

553
may not be re-introduced before the lapse of one year
from the date of its rejection.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. The emir can declare war without the legislatures approval.
Article 71
Defensive war shall be declared by an Emiri decree and
aggressive war is prohibited.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The Councils approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 68
The Emir shall conclude treaties and agreements by a
decree and refer them to Al-Shoura Council accompanied with appropriate explanatory notes. The treaty or
agreement shall have the power of law after ratification
and publication in the official Gazette; however, reconciliation treaties and treaties pertaining to the territory
of the State or those relating to the right of sovereignty
or public or private rights of the citizens, or those that
involve an amendment of the laws of the State shall
come into force when the same are issued as a law.
Under no case may a treaty include secret conditions
contradicting its publicized conditions.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately,
and the Council lacks the power to grant amnesty.
See item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The emir has the power of pardon.
Article 67
The Emir shall discharge the following functions:
6. Granting pardon or commuting penalty in accordance with the law.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The Council has no role in judicial branch
appointments.
Article 137
The judiciary shall have a Supreme Council to supervise
the proper functioning of courts of law and their auxiliary organs. The law shall determine the composition,
powers and functions of the said Council.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The monarch appoints the governor of the
Qatar Central Bank.

554

Consultative Council of Qatar (Majlis al-Shura)

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The Council lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
No. According to the 2003 constitution, the Council meets in ordinary session for at least eight
months each year. In practice, it does not regularly
meet in ordinary session.
Article 84
The annual term of session of the Council shall at least
be eight months and the Council may not be allowed
to adjourn the session until the budget of the State is
approved.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. According to the 2003 constitution, there are
no restrictions on re-election.

Article 81
The term of Al-Shoura Council shall be four calendar
years commencing from the date of the first meeting;
and the elections of the new Council shall be conducted
during the last ninety days of the aforementioned term.
The Member whose term of service expires may be reelected; and where the elections are not held at the
expiry of the term of the Council or delayed for any
reason whatsoever, the term of the Council shall remain
intact until a new Council is elected.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
No. There have been no elections since the early
1970s, so Council members have not had the
opportunity to seek re-election. It bears note, however, that Council members generally welcome reappointment.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
No. The re-election of incumbent legislators is
not possible because elections have never been
held.

PARLIAMENT OF ROMANIA (PARLAMENTUL)

Expert consultants: Florin Fesnic, Venelin I. Ganev, Claudiu Lucaci, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi,
Grigore Pop-Eleches, Marina Popescu, Michael Shafir
Score: .72
Influence over
executive (6/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack president
9. no confidence

Institutional
autonomy (7/9)

Specified
powers (6/8)

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

X
X

26. media

The Parliament (Parlamentul) of Romania traces

its origins to the countrys various representative
assemblies that met as part of the constitutional
monarchy in the nineteenth century. The monar-

19. amendments
20. war

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

chical system gave way to a Soviet-backed communist regime at the end of World War II. Romania adopted a new constitution in 1991, following
the dissolution of the Soviet bloc. The document

Parliament of Romania (Parlamentul)

calls for a bicameral parliament consisting of a

lower house, the Chamber of Deputies (Camera Deputatilor), and an upper house, the Senate
(Senat). The legislature is paired with a directly
elected president. Prior to 2003 the legislatures
laws were supreme, but a constitutional amendment in that year revoked parliaments power to
overrule Supreme Court decisions.
The legislature is a formidable body. It enjoys
extensive control over the executive, although it
does not elect the president and cannot, acting
along, remove the president from office. The executives lack of decree, veto, and gatekeeping powers
enhance the institutional autonomy of parliament.
The legislature exercises many specified powers,
including the powers to declare war and appoint
the governor of the central bank. The legislature
enjoys some institutional capacity, although its
rating on this dimension is limited by the paucity
of parliamentary staffers.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of the Constitutional Court and
approval in a national referendum. The legislature
can remove the prime minister with a vote of no
confidence.
Article 95
(1) In case of having committed grave acts infringing
upon Constitutional provisions, the President of Romania may be suspended from office by the Chamber of
Deputies and the Senate, in joint session, by a majority vote of Deputies and Senators, and after consultation with the Constitutional Court. The President may
explain before Parliament with regard to imputations
brought against him.
(2) The proposal of suspension from office may be initiated by at least one third of the number of Deputies
and Senators, and the President shall be immediately
notified thereof.
(3) If the proposal of suspension from office has been
approved, a referendum shall be held within 30 days,
in order to remove the President from office.
Article 112
(1) The Chamber of Deputies and the Senate may, in
joint session, withdraw confidence granted to the Government, by carrying a motion of censure by a majority
vote of the Deputies and Senators.
(2) The motion of censure may be initiated by at least
one fourth of the total number of Deputies and Senators, and shall be notified to the Government upon the
date of its tabling.

555
(3) The motion of censure shall be debated upon three
days after its presentation in the joint session of the
Chambers.
(4) If the motion of censure fails to be passed, the
Deputies and the Senators who signed it may not submit another one during the same session, except for
the case that the Government assumes responsibility in
conformity with Article 113.
Article 113
(1) The Government may assume responsibility before
the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, in joint session, upon a program, a general policy statement, or a
bill.
(2) The Government shall be dismissed if a motion of
censure, tabled within three days from the date of presenting the program, the general policy statement, or
the bill, has been passed in accordance with provisions
under Article 112.
(3) If the Government has not been dismissed in
accordance with Paragraph (2), the bill presented
shall be considered as passed, and the program or
the general policy statement become binding on the
Government.
(4) In case the President of Romania demands reconsideration of the law passed according to Paragraph (3),
the debate thereon shall be carried in the joint session
of both Chambers.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Legislators may serve simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 68
(1) No one may be a Deputy and a Senator at one and
the same time.
(2) The capacity as a Deputy or Senator is incompatible
with the exercise of any public office in authority, with
the exception of Government membership.
(3) Other incompatibilities shall be established by an
organic law.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 110
(1) The Government and other agencies of Public
Administration shall, within the Parliamentary control over their activity, be bound to present any information and documents requested by the Chamber of
Deputies, the Senate, or Parliamentary Committees,
through their respective Presidents. In case a legislative initiative involves amendment of provisions of the
State Budget or the State social security budget, the
request for information shall be compulsory.

556
(2) Members of the Government are entitled to attend
the proceedings of Parliament. If they are requested to
be present, participation shall be compulsory.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
Article 108
(1) The Government is politically responsible for its
entire activity only before Parliament. Each member
of the Government is politically and jointly answerable
with the others for the activity and acts of the Government.
(2) It is only the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate, and
the President of Romania that shall have the right to
demand criminal prosecutions be taken against members of the Government for acts committed in the exercise of their office. If such criminal prosecution has
been requested, the President of Romania may decree
that they be suspended from office. Institution of proceedings against a member of the Government entails
suspension from office. The case shall be within the
competence of the Supreme Court of Justice.
(3) Cases of liability, and penalties applicable to members of the Government shall be regulated by a law on
Ministerial responsibility.
Article 110
(1) The Government and other agencies of Public
Administration shall, within the Parliamentary control over their activity, be bound to present any information and documents requested by the Chamber of
Deputies, the Senate, or Parliamentary Committees,
through their respective Presidents. In case a legislative initiative involves amendment of provisions of the
State Budget or the State social security budget, the
request for information shall be compulsory.
(2) Members of the Government are entitled to attend
the proceedings of Parliament. If they are requested to
be present, participation shall be compulsory.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. The legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. The president appoints the candidate as prime
minister who enjoys the support of the legislature.
Article 85
(1) The President of Romania shall designate a candidate to the office of Prime Minister and appoint the
Government on the vote of confidence of Parliament.
Article 102
(1) The President of Romania shall designate a candidate to the office of Prime Minister, as a result of his

Parliament of Romania (Parlamentul)

consultation with the party which has obtained absolute majority in Parliament, or if no such majority
exists with the parties represented in Parliament.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers on the recommendation of the prime minister. The legislatures approval is necessary to confirm the government as a whole, but it cannot vote to approve or
reject individual ministers.
Article 85
(1) The President of Romania shall designate a candidate to the office of Prime Minister and appoint the
Government on the vote of confidence of Parliament.
Article 102
(1) The President of Romania shall designate a candidate to the office of Prime Minister, as a result of his
consultation with the party which has obtained absolute majority in Parliament, or unless such majority
exists with the parties represented in Parliament.
(2) The candidate to the office of Prime Minister shall,
within ten days after his designation, seek the vote of
confidence of Parliament upon the program and complete list of the Government.
(3) The program and list of the Government shall be
debated upon by the Chamber of Deputies and Senate
in joint session. Parliament shall grant confidence to
the Government by a majority vote of Deputies and
Senators.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 81
(1) The President of Romania shall be elected by universal, equal, direct, secret, and free suffrage.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 112
(1) The Chamber of Deputies and the Senate may, in
joint session, withdraw confidence granted to the Government, by carrying a motion of censure by a majority
vote of the Deputies and Senators.
(2) The motion of censure may be initiated by at least
one fourth of the total number of Deputies and Senators, and shall be notified to the Government upon the
date of its tabling.
(3) The motion of censure shall be debated upon three
days after its presentation in the joint session of the
Chambers.

Parliament of Romania (Parlamentul)

(4) If the motion of censure fails to be passed, the
Deputies and the Senators who signed it may not submit another one during the same session, except for
the case that the Government assumes responsibility in
conformity with Article 113.
Article 113
(1) The Government may assume responsibility before
the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, in joint session, upon a program, a general policy statement, or a
bill.
(2) The Government shall be dismissed if a motion of
censure, tabled within three days from the date of presenting the program, the general policy statement, or
the bill, has been passed in accordance with provisions
under Article 112.
(3) If the Government has not been dismissed in accordance with Paragraph (2), the bill presented shall be
considered as passed, and the program or the general
policy statement become binding on the Government.
(4) In case the President of Romania demands reconsideration of the law passed according to Paragraph (3),
the debate thereon shall be carried in the joint session
of both Chambers.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 89
(1) After consultation with the Presidents of both
Chambers and the leaders of the Parliamentary groups,
the President of Romania may dissolve the Parliament,
if no vote of confidence has been obtained to form a
government within 60 days after the first request was
made, and only after rejection of at least two requests
for investiture.
(2) During the same year, Parliament can be dissolved
only once.
(3) Parliament cannot be dissolved during the last six
months of the term of office of the President of Romania, nor can it be dissolved during a state of siege or
emergency.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power. The constitution apparently provides for decree powers, but
these are actually usable only in emergency, or take
the form of enabling laws under which the legislature grants the government temporary powers to
issue decrees in specified issue areas.
Article 99
(1) In the exercise of his powers, the President of Romania shall issue decrees which shall be published in
the Official Gazette of Romania. Absence of publicity
entails the non-existence of a decree.
(2) The decrees issued by the President of Romania in
the exercise of his powers, as provided for under Article

557
91 (1) and (2), 92 (2) and (3), 93 (1), and 94 (a), (b) and
(d) shall be countersigned by the Prime Minister.
Article 114
(1) Parliament may pass a special law enabling the Government to issue orders in fields outside the scope of
organic laws.
(2) The enabling law shall compulsorily establish the
field and the date up to which orders can be issued.
(3) If the enabling law so requests, orders shall be submitted to Parliament for approval, according to the
legislative procedure, until expiration of the enabling
term. Non-compliance with the term entails discontinuation of effectiveness of the order.
(4) In exceptional cases, the Government may adopt
emergency orders, which shall come into force only
after their submission to Parliament for approval. If Parliament does not sit in a session, it shall obligatorily be
convened.
(5) Orders shall be approved or rejected by a law which
must also contain the orders that ceased to be effective
in accordance with Paragraph (3).

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote of its present members.
Article 77
(1) A law shall be submitted for promulgation to the
President of Romania. Promulgation shall be given
within twenty days after receipt of the law.
(2) Before promulgation, the President of Romania may
return the law to Parliament for reconsideration, and he
may do so only once.
(3) In case the President has requested that the law be
reconsidered or a review has been asked about its conformity with the Constitution, promulgation shall be
made within ten days from receiving the law passed
after its reconsideration, or the decision of the Constitutional Court confirming its Constitutionality.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 144
The Constitutional Court shall have the following powers: a) to adjudicate on the constitutionality of laws,
before promulgation, upon notification by the President of Romania, by the President of either Chamber of
Parliament, by the Government, the Supreme Court of
Justice, by a number of at least 50 Deputies or at least 25
Senators, as well as, ex officio, on initiatives to revise the
Constitution; b) to adjudicate on the constitutionality
of the Standing Orders of Parliament, upon notification
by the President of either Chamber, by a parliamentary
group or a number of at least 50 Deputies or at least

558
25 Senators; c) to decide on exceptions brought to the
Courts of law as to the unconstitutionality of laws and
orders.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
Article 61
(1) The organization and functioning of each Chamber
shall be regulated by its own Standing Orders. Financial
resources of the Chambers shall be provided for in the
budgets approved by them.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto.
Article 69
(1) No Deputy or Senator shall be detained, arrested,
searched, or prosecuted for a criminal or minor offence
without authorization of the Chamber he is a member
of, after being given a hearing. The case shall be in the
competence of the Supreme Court of Justice.
(2) In the case of flagrante delicto, he may be detained
and searched. The Minister of Justice shall promptly
inform the President of the respective Chamber about
the detention and search. In case the Chamber thus
notified finds no grounds for his detention, it shall
immediately order that this detainment be repealed.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 59
(1) The Chamber of Deputies and the Senate are elected
by universal, equal, direct, secret, and free suffrage, in
accordance with the electoral law.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments require approval
in a popular referendum.

Parliament of Romania (Parlamentul)

Article 146
(1) Revision of the Constitution may be initiated by the
President of Romania on proposal of the Government,
by at least one quarter of the number of Deputies or
Senators, as well as by at least 500,000 citizens with the
right to vote.
(2) The citizens who initiate the revision of the Constitution must belong to at least half the number of
the counties in the country, and in each of the respective counties or in the City of Bucharest, at least 20,000
signatures must be recorded in support of this initiative.
Article 147
(1) The draft or proposed revision must be adopted by
the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate by a majority
of at least two thirds of the members of each Chamber.
(2) If no agreement can be reached by a mediation procedure, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate shall
decide thereupon, in joint session, by the vote of at least
three quarters of the number of Deputies and Senators.
(3) The revision shall be final after approval by a referendum held within 30 days from the date of passing
the draft or proposed revision.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislature declares war.
Article 62
(2) The Chambers shall meet in joint sessions in order:
d) to declare a state of war.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 11
(1) The Romanian State pledges to fulfill as such and in
good faith its obligations as deriving from the treaties
it is a party to.
(2) Treaties ratified by Parliament, according to the law,
are part of national law.
Article 91
(1) The President shall, in the name of Romania, conclude international treaties negotiated by the Government, and then submit them to Parliament for ratification within 60 days.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.
Article 72
(1) Parliament passes constitutional, organic, and ordinary laws.
(2) Constitutional laws shall be pertaining to the revision of the Constitution.
(3) Organic laws shall regulate:
g) granting of amnesty or collective pardon.

Parliament of Romania (Parlamentul)

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 94
The President of Romania shall also have the following
powers:
d) to grant individual pardon.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislature elects the members of the Superior Council of the Magistracy and six of the nine
judges of the Constitutional Court.
Article 124
(1) Judges appointed by the President of Romania shall
be irremovable, according to the law. The President
and other judges of the Supreme Court of Justice shall
be appointed for a term of six years, and may be reinvested in office. Promotion, transfer, and sanctions
against Judges may be decided upon only by the Superior Council of the Magistracy, in accordance with the
law.
(2) The office of a Judge shall be incompatible with any
other public or private office, except that of an academic
professorial activity.

559
Article 31
(5) Public radio and television services shall be
autonomous. They must guarantee for any important
social and political group the exercise of the right to
be on the air. The organization of these services and
the Parliamentary control over their activity shall be
regulated by an organic law.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session for
about eight months each year.
Article 63
(1) The Chamber of Deputies and the Senate shall meet
in two ordinary sessions every year. The first session
begins in February and is due to last by the end of June
at the latest. The second session begins in September
and is due to last by the end of December at the latest.
(2) The Chamber of Deputies and the Senate may also
meet in extraordinary sessions, upon request of the
President of Romania, the Standing Bureau of each
Chamber, or of at least one third of the number of
Deputies or Senators.
(3) Each Chamber shall be convened by its President.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.

Article 132
The Superior Council of the Magistracy shall consist
of magistrates elected for a term of four years by the
Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, in a joint session.

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.

Article 140
(1) The Constitutional Court consists of nine Judges,
appointed for a term of office of nine years, that cannot
be prolonged or renewed.
(2) Three Judges shall be appointed by the Chamber of
Deputies, three by the Senate, and three by the President of Romania.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
Yes. The legislature elects the governor of the
National Bank of Romania.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
Yes. The legislature has a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.

No.

Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

560

Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (Federalnoe Sobranie)

FEDERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (FEDERALNOE SOBRANIE)

Expert consultants: Gerald M. Easter, Grigorii Golosov, Andrei Kunov, Joel M. Ostrow,
Thomas F. Remington, Andrei Riabov, Robert Sharlet
Score: .44
Influence over
executive (1/9)

Institutional
autonomy (3/9)

Specified
powers (4/8)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

5. oversee police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack president
9. no confidence

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control resources

17. immunity
18. all elected

X
X

The Federal Assembly (Federalnoe Sobranie) of Russia traces its origins to the State Duma that was
established following the 1905 revolution. During
the half-decade following the demise of the Russian Empire and the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in 1918, the Soviet Union came into existence and its legislature, the Supreme Soviet, was
subordinated to the Communist Party. In 1989 and
1990, during the twilight of the Soviet era, both the
Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the republicanlevel Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) were reorganized,
and popular elections were held for each. In 1991
a constitutional referendum created a presidency
to function alongside the Russian Supreme Soviet.
The demise of the USSR at the end of 1991 left the
newly created Russian Federation operating under
a Soviet-era constitution that had been heavily
amended to reflect the reforms of the late Soviet
period. A new constitution adopted by referendum
in 1993 replaced the Supreme Soviet with the Federal Assembly, a bicameral legislature consisting of
a lower house, the State Duma (Gosudarstvennaia
duma), and an upper house, the Federation Council (Sovet federatsii).
The legislatures powers are markedly unbalanced and, on the whole, tightly circumscribed.
The legislature has almost no ability to influence
the executive branch, and its own institutional
autonomy is severely hampered by the presidents
expansive powers. Such potency as the legislature

Institutional
capacity (6/6)

23. pardon
24. judiciary

27. sessions
28. secretary

X
X

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X
X

25. central bank

26. media

does possess comes in part in the form of scattered

specified prerogatives, which include rights over
the declaration of war, ratification of treaties, and
granting of amnesty. The other area in which the
legislature has some muscle is in its institutional
capacity: The legislature is regularly in session, has
staff, and contains a significant corpus of experienced members.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court.
Article 93
(1) The President of the Russian Federation may be
impeached by the Federation Council only on the basis
of charges put forward against him of high treason or
some other grave crime, confirmed by a ruling of the
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on the presence of indicia of crime in the Presidents actions and
by a ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Russian
Federation confirming that the procedure of bringing
charges has been observed.
(2) The ruling of the State Duma on putting forward
charges and the decision of the Federation Council on
impeachment of the President is passed by the votes of
two-thirds of the total number in each of the chambers

Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (Federalnoe Sobranie)

at the initiative of at least one-third of the deputies of
the State Duma and in the presence of the opinion of a
special commission formed by the State Duma.
(3) The decision of the Federation Council on impeaching the President of the Russian Federation is passed
within three months of the charges being brought
against the President by the State Duma. The charges
against the President are considered to be rejected if
the decision of the Federation Council is not passed.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
No. The legislature can request executive branch
officials to testify, but hearings are not a part of
normal practice.
4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. Formally, the legislature can establish commissions to investigate the government. In practice, however, investigations are rare and subject
to executive influence.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister
(here called chairman of the government) with the
consent of the State Duma.
Article 83
The President of the Russian Federation shall:
a) appoint Chairman of the Government of the Russian
Federation subject to consent of the State Duma.
Article 111
(1) The Chairman of the Government of the Russian
Federation is appointed by the President of the Russian
Federation with consent of the State Duma.
(2) The proposal on the candidacy of the Chairman
of the Government of the Russian Federation is made
no later than two weeks after the inauguration of the
newly-elected President of the Russian Federation or
after the resignation of the Government of the Russian
Federation or within one week after the rejection of the
candidate by the State Duma.

561

(3) The State Duma considers the candidacy of the

Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation submitted by the President of the Russian Federation within one week after the nomination.
(4) After the State Duma thrice rejects candidates for
Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation
nominated by the President of the Russian Federation,
the President of the Russian Federation appoints the
Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, dissolves the State Duma and calls a new election.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers on the recommendation of the prime minister, and the
appointments do not require legislative approval.
Article 112
(1) The Chairman of the Government of the Russian
Federation shall, not later than one week after appointment, submit to the President of the Russian Federation
proposals on the structures of the federal bodies of executive power.
(2) The Chairman of the Government of the Russian
Federation proposes to the President of the Russian Federation candidates for the office of Deputy Chairmen of
the Government of the Russian Federation and federal
ministers.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 81
(1) The President of the Russian Federation is elected
for a term of four years by the citizens of the Russian
Federation on the basis of general, equal and direct vote
by secret ballot.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 117
(3) The State Duma may express non-confidence in
the Government of the Russian Federation. The nonconfidence resolution is approved by a simple majority
of deputies in the State Duma. In the event the State
Duma again expresses non-confidence in the Government of the Russian Federation within three months,
the President of the Russian Federation announces the
resignation of the Government or dissolves the State
Duma.
(4) The Chairman of the Government of the Russian
Federation may put the question of confidence in the
Government of the Russian Federation before the State
Duma. In the case of a non-confidence vote by the State
Duma, the President decides within seven days about

562

Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (Federalnoe Sobranie)

the resignation of the Government of the Russian Federation or about the dissolution of the State Duma and
calls a new election.
(5) If the Government of the Russian Federation resigns
or lays down its powers, it shall, following instructions
by the President of the Russian Federation, continue
working until the formation of a new government of
the Russian Federation.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the State Duma.
Article 84
The President of the Russian Federation shall:
b) dissolve the State Duma in cases and under procedures envisaged by the Constitution.
Article 109
(1) The State Duma may be dissolved by the President
of the Russian Federation in cases stipulated in Articles
111 and 117 of the Constitution.
(2) In the event of the dissolution of the State Duma,
the President of the Russian Federation determines the
date of elections so that the newly-elected State Duma
convenes not later than four months since the time of
dissolution.
(3) The State Duma may not be dissolved on grounds
provided for by Article 117 of the Constitution within
one year after its election.
(4) The State Duma may not be dissolved since the time
it has brought accusations against the President of the
Russian Federation and until a corresponding decision
has been taken by the Federation Council.
(5) The State Duma may not be dissolved during the
period of the state of emergency or martial law throughout the territory of the Russian Federation, as well as
within six months of the expiry of the term of office of
the President of the Russian Federation.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The president issues decrees that have the force
of law.
Article 90
(1) The President of the Russian Federation issues
decrees and executive orders.
(2) The decrees and orders of the President of the Russian Federation are binding throughout the territory of
the Russian Federation.
(3) The decrees and orders of the President of the Russian Federation may not contravene the Constitution
or federal laws.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.

No. A two-thirds majority is required to override a

presidential veto.
Article 107
(1) An adopted federal law is sent to the President of the
Russian Federation for signing and publication within
five days.
(2) The President of the Russian Federation shall,
within fourteen days, sign a federal law and publish
it.
(3) If the President rejects a federal law within fourteen days since it was sent to him, the State Duma and
the Federation Council again consider the law in accordance with the procedure established by the Constitution. If, during the second hearings, the federal law is
approved in its earlier draft by a majority of not less
than two thirds of the total number of deputies of the
Federation Council and the State Duma, it is signed by
the President of the Russian Federation within seven
days and published.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 125
(2) The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation
on request by the President of the Russian Federation,
the State Duma, one-fifth of the members of the Federation Council or deputies of the State Duma, the
Government of the Russian Federation, the Supreme
Court of the Russian Federation and Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation, bodies of legislative and executive power of subjects of the Russian
Federation resolves cases about compliance with the
Constitution of:
a) federal laws, normative acts of the President of
the Russian Federation, the Federation Council, State
Duma and the Government of the Russian Federation;
b) republican constitutions, charters, as well as laws
and other normative acts of subjects of the Russian
Federation published on issues pertaining to the jurisdiction of bodies of state power of the Russian Federation and joint jurisdiction of bodies of state power
of the Russian Federation and bodies of state power
of subjects of the Russian Federation;
c) agreements between bodies of state power of the
Russian Federation and bodies of state power of subjects of the Russian Federation, agreements between
bodies of state power of subjects of the Russian Federation;
d) international agreements of the Russian Federation that have not entered into force.
(4) The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation,
proceeding from complaints about violation of constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens and requests
from courts reviews the constitutionality of the law
applied or due to be applied in a specific case in accordance with procedures established by federal law.

Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (Federalnoe Sobranie)

(5) The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation
on request by the President of the Russian Federation,
the Federation Council, State Duma, the Government
of the Russian Federation, legislative bodies of subjects
of the Russian Federation interprets the Constitution.
(6) Acts and their provisions deemed unconstitutional
loose force thereof; international agreements of the Russian Federation may not be enforced and applied if they
violate the Constitution.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The president can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
No. The legislature is dependent on the president
for the resources that finance its own operations.
An office in the presidential apparatus controls legislators perks and is regularly deployed by the president to sway legislators behavior.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto, here
expressed as in the act of perpetrating a crime.
Article 98
(1) Deputies to the Federation Council and deputies
to the State Duma possess immunity throughout their
term in office. A deputy may not be detained, arrested,
searched except when detained in the act of perpetrating a crime, and may not be subject to personal search
except when such search is authorized by law to ensure
the safety of other people.
(2) The question of stripping a deputy of immunity
is decided on the recommendation of the ProsecutorGeneral of the Russian Federation by the corresponding
chamber of the Federal Assembly.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 96
(1) The State Duma is elected for a term of four years.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.

563

No. Much of the constitution can be amended

only with the involvement of actors besides the
legislature. Amendments to chapters 3 (federation)
and 8 (local self-government) require approval by
two-thirds of the provincial governments. Amendments to chapters 1 (fundamental principles), 2
(rights and liberties), and 9 (constitutional amendments) require the convocation of a constitutional
assembly.
Article 108
(1) Federal constitutional laws are passed on issues
specified in the Constitution.
(2) A federal constitutional law is considered adopted,
if it has been approved by a majority of at least three
quarters of the total number of deputies of the Federation Council and at least two thirds of the total number of deputies of the House of Representatives [State
Duma]. The adopted federal constitutional law is signed
by the President of the Russian Federation within fourteen days and published.
Article 134
Proposals on amendments and revision of constitutional provisions may be made by the President of
the Russian Federation, the Federation Council, the
State Duma, the Government of the Russian Federation, legislative (representative) bodies of the subjects
of the Russian Federation as well as groups of deputies
numbering not less than one-fifth of the total number of deputies of the Federation Council or the State
Duma.
Article 135
(1) The provisions of Chapters 1, 2 and 9 of the Constitution may not be revised by the Federal Assembly.
(2) In the event a proposal to revise any provisions in
Chapters 1, and 9 of the Constitution is supported by
three-fifths of the total number of deputies of the Federation Council and the State Duma, a Constitutional
Assembly is convened in accordance with the federal
constitutional law.
(3) The Constitutional Assembly may either confirm
the inviolability of the Constitution or develop a new
draft of the Constitution which is adopted by twothirds of the total number of deputies to the Constitutional Assembly or submitted to popular voting. The
Constitution is considered adopted during such poll if
more than half of its participants have voted for it, provided more than half of the electorate have taken part
in the poll.
Article 136
Amendments to Chapters 3 to 8 of the Constitution
are adopted in accordance with the procedures envisaged for the adoption of a federal constitutional law
and come into force following the approval thereof by
no less than two-thirds of the subjects of the Russian
Federation.
Article 137
(1) Changes to Article 65 of the Constitution which
determines the composition of the Russian Federation,

564

Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (Federalnoe Sobranie)

are made on the basis of the federal constitutional law

on admission to the Russian Federation and the formation within the Russian Federation of a new subject
and on a change of the constitutional-legal status of the
subject of the Russian Federation.
(2) In the event of a change in the name of the republic, territory, region, federal cities, autonomous region
and autonomous area, the new name of the subject of
the Russian Federation is included in Article 65 of the
Constitution.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislature declares war.
Article 106
The federal laws adopted by the State Duma are considered by the Federation Council on a mandatory basis if
such laws deal with the issues of:
f) war and peace.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 86
The President of the Russian Federation shall:
b) conduct negotiations and sign international treaties
of the Russian Federation;
c) sign instruments of ratification.
Article 106
The federal laws adopted by the State Duma are considered by the Federation Council on a mandatory basis if
such laws deal with the issues of:
d) ratification and denunciation of international
treaties of the Russian Federation.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.
Article 103
(1) The jurisdiction of the State Duma includes:
f) granting amnesty.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 89
The President of the Russian Federation shall:
c) grant pardon.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The Federation Council appoints the judges to
the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, and
the Supreme Arbitration Court on the recommendation of the president.

Article 102
The jurisdiction of the Federation Council includes:
g) the appointment of judges of the Constitutional
Court of the Russian Federation, the Supreme Court
of the Russian Federation, and the Supreme Court of
Arbitration of the Russian Federation.
Article 83
The President of the Russian Federation shall:
f) submit to the Federation Council candidates for
appointment to the office of judges of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, the Supreme
Court of the Russian Federation and the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation as well as the
candidate for Prosecutor-General of the Russian Federation; submit to the Federation Council the proposal on
relieving the Prosecutor-General of the Russian Federation of his duties; appoint the judges of other federal
courts.
Article 128
(1) Judges of the Constitutional Court of the Russian
Federation, of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian
Federation are appointed by the Federation Council following nomination by the President of the Russian Federation.
(2) Judges of other federal courts are appointed by the
President of the Russian Federation in accordance with
procedures established by federal law.
(3) The powers, and procedure of the formation and
activities of the Constitutional Court of the Russian
Federation, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation and the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian
Federation and other federal courts are established by
federal constitutional law.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. Formally, the legislature, on the recommendation of the president, appoints the chairman of
the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, but in
practice, appointment authority rests exclusively
with the president.
Article 83
The President of the Russian Federation shall:
d) introduce to the State Duma a candidature for
appointment to the office of the Chairman of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.
Article 103
(1) The jurisdiction of the House of Representatives
[State Duma] includes:
a) granting consent to the President of the Russian
Federation for the appointment of the Chairman of
the Government of the Russian Federation;
b) decisions on confidence in the government of the
Russian Federation;
c) the appointment and dismissal of the Chairman
of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.

Parliament of Rwanda (Inteko Ishinga Amategeko)

565

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.
Article 99
(2) The State Duma holds its first session on the 30th
day after its election. The President of the Russian Federation may convene a session of the State Duma before
this term.
(3) The first session of the State Duma is opened by the
oldest deputy.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.

Yes.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Electoral volatility has been quite high across
the parliamentary elections held since 1993, and
turnover rates have been high, but a body of members has maintained membership from session to
session, creating a substantial cohort of highly
experienced members.

PARLIAMENT OF RWANDA (INTEKO ISHINGA AMATEGEKO)

Expert consultants: Timothy Longman, Aloys Muberanziza, Charles Ntampaka, Tito Rutaremara,
Colin Waugh
Score: .47
Influence over
executive (3/9)

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)

Specified
powers (3/8)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

23. pardon

24. judiciary

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

25. central bank

26. media

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack president
9. no confidence

The Parliament of Rwanda (Inteko Ishinga

Amategeko) was established upon independence
from Belgium in 1962. The bicameral legislature
consists of a lower house, the Chamber of Deputies
(Umutwe wAbadepite), and an upper house, the
Senate (Umutwe wa Sena). In 1991 a new constitution was adopted that allowed for greater multiparty competition. Ethnic violence and genocide
shredded the country and undermined the leg-

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

X
X

X
X

islatures influence in the mid-1990s. In 2003 a

new constitution banned the incitement of ethnic
hatred, and parliamentary elections, the first since
1994, were held.
The legislature has only modest sway over
the executive, although it does enjoy substantial institutional autonomy. Most notably, the
legislatures laws are supreme and not subject
to judicial review. The legislature exercises few

566

specified powers, but it does enjoy some institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. The legislature cannot impeach the president.
It can remove the prime minister with a motion of
censure or a vote of no confidence.
Article 130
The Chamber of Deputies may put the performance of
Government or of one or several members into question through a vote of censure. A motion of censure is
not receivable except after interpellation and only on
condition that the motion is signed by at least a fifth
of the members of the Chamber of Deputies in the case
against one member of the Government, or by at least
a third of the members of the Chamber of Deputies if it
concerns the entire Government. A motion of censure
cannot be voted upon prior to the expiry of at least
forty-eight hours after its introduction and it shall be
adopted through a secret ballot by a majority of at least
two-thirds of the members of the Chamber of Deputies.
The conclusion of ordinary or extraordinary sessions is
by right postponed to ensure the application of the provisions of this article.
Article 131
A member of the Government against whom a vote
of censure is passed must tender his resignation to the
President of the Republic through the Prime Minister.
When the vote of censure is passed against the Government, the Prime Minister tenders the resignation of the
Government to the President of the Republic.
If a motion of censure is rejected, signatories to the
motion cannot introduce another motion for a vote of
censure during the same session.
Article 132
The Prime Minister may, upon the proposal of the Government, request the Chamber of Deputies to pass a
motion on a vote of confidence either in respect of the
Government program or the adoption of the text of a
bill. The debate on the request for a vote of confidence
may not take place prior to the expiry of at least three
full days from the time the request was submitted. A
vote on the motion of confidence may only be rejected
through a secret ballot by a majority of two-thirds of the
members to the Chamber of Deputies. If the confidence
is refused, the Prime Minister submits the resignation
of the Government to the President of the Republic,
within twenty-four hours.

Parliament of Rwanda (Inteko Ishinga Amategeko)

Article 68
No one shall at the same time be a member of the
Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.
The office of a Parliamentarian shall not be compatible
with being a member of the Government.
An organic law determines other offices which are
incompatible with the office of a Parliamentarian.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly questions executive
branch officials.
Article 129
In the context of obtaining information and exercising
oversight of government action, members of the Senate may address oral or written questions to the Prime
Minister to which he shall either respond in person if
the questions relate to the government as a whole or to
several Ministries collectively or through the Ministers
who are responsible for the matters in question.
The Senate may, in addition, set up commissions of
inquiry for oversight of government action.
However, it may not conduct interpellation or initiate
a motion of censure.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The Senate can set up commissions of inquiry
to investigate the executive.
Article 129
In the context of obtaining information and exercising
oversight of government action, members of the Senate may address oral or written questions to the Prime
Minister to which he shall either respond in person if
the questions relate to the government as a whole or to
several Ministries collectively or through the Ministers
who are responsible for the matters in question.
The Senate may, in addition, set up commissions of
inquiry for oversight of government action.
However, it may not conduct interpellation or initiate
a motion of censure.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.

No. The president appoints the prime minister.

Article 116
The Government is composed of the Prime Minister,
Ministers, Ministers of State and other members who

Parliament of Rwanda (Inteko Ishinga Amategeko)

may be determined, if necessary, by the President of
the Republic.
The Prime Minister is chosen, appointed and removed
from office by the President of the Republic. Other
members of Government are appointed and removed
from office by the President of the Republic upon proposal of the Prime Minister.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 116
The Government is composed of the Prime Minister,
Ministers, Ministers of State and other members who
may be determined, if necessary, by the President of
the Republic.
The Prime Minister is chosen, appointed and removed
from office by the President of the Republic. Other
members of Government are appointed and removed
from office by the President of the Republic upon proposal of the Prime Minister.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 100
The election of the President of the Republic shall be
by universal suffrage through a direct and secret ballot
with a simple majority of the votes cast.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 130
The Chamber of Deputies may put the performance of
Government or of one or several members into question through a vote of censure. A motion of censure is
not receivable except after interpellation and only on
condition that the motion is signed by at least a fifth
of the members of the Chamber of Deputies in the case
against one member of the Government, or by at least
a third of the members of the Chamber of Deputies if it
concerns the entire Government. A motion of censure
cannot be voted upon prior to the expiry of at least
forty-eight hours after its introduction and it shall be
adopted through a secret ballot by a majority of at least
two-thirds of the members of the Chamber of Deputies.
The conclusion of ordinary or extraordinary sessions is
by right postponed to ensure the application of the provisions of this article.

567
Article 131
A member of the Government against whom a vote
of censure is passed must tender his resignation to the
President of the Republic through the Prime Minister.
When the vote of censure is passed against the Government, the Prime Minister tenders the resignation of the
Government to the President of the Republic.
If a motion of censure is rejected, signatories to the
motion cannot introduce another motion for a vote of
censure during the same session.
Article 132
The Prime Minister may, upon the proposal of the Government, request the Chamber of Deputies to pass a
motion on a vote of confidence either in respect of the
Government program or the adoption of the text of a
bill. The debate on the request for a vote of confidence
may not take place prior to the expiry of at least three
full days from the time the request was submitted. A
vote on the motion of confidence may only be rejected
through a secret ballot by a majority of two-thirds of the
members to the Chamber of Deputies. If the confidence
is refused, the Prime Minister submits the resignation
of the Government to the President of the Republic,
within twenty-four hours.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the Chamber of
Deputies, although the Senate is immune from dissolution.
Article 133
The President of the Republic, after consultation with
the Prime Minister, the Presidents of the two Chambers of Parliament and the President of the Supreme
Court, may dissolve the Chamber of Deputies. Elections
of Deputies take place within ninety days after the dissolution.
The President of the Republic cannot dissolve the
Chamber of Deputies more than once in the same presidential term of office. The Senate cannot be dissolved.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The president can issue decrees that have the
force of law when the legislature is not in session. The decrees lapse if they are not subsequently
approved by the legislature.
Article 63
In the event of an absolute impossibility of Parliament
holding a session, the President of the Republic during
such a period promulgates decree-laws adopted by the
Government and those decree-laws have the same effect
as ordinary laws. These decree-laws lose their obligatory
force, if they are not adopted by Parliament at its next
session.

568

Parliament of Rwanda (Inteko Ishinga Amategeko)

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.

Article 74
Each Chamber of Parliament disposes over its own budget and shall enjoy financial and administrative autonomy.

No. A two-thirds majority vote is required to override a presidential veto of ordinary laws, and a
three-fourths majority vote is required to override
a presidential veto of organic laws.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.

Article 108
The President of the Republic promulgates laws within
fifteen days from the day on which the adopted definitive text is delivered to the Government.
However, the President of the Republic may before promulgation of laws request Parliament to proceed to a
second reading (lecture).
In such a case, if Parliament adopts the same laws, a
majority of two-thirds in the case of ordinary laws, and
in the case of the organic laws, a majority of threequarters, the President of the Republic must promulgate
the laws within the period referred to in paragraph 1 of
this article.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
Yes. The legislatures laws are not subject to judicial review. The legislature is responsible for the
authentic interpretation of laws.
Article 96
The authentic interpretation of laws belongs to both
Chambers of Parliament acting jointly after the
Supreme Court has given an opinion on the matter;
each Chamber shall decide on the basis of the majority referred to in Article 93 of this Constitution. The
authentic interpretation of the laws may be requested
by the Government, a member of one of the Chambers of Parliament or by the Bar Association (lOrdre
des Avocats). Any interested person may request the
authentic interpretation of laws through the members
of Parliament or the Bar Association.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.

Yes. Legislators are immune with the common

exception for cases of flagrante delicto.
Article 69
The members of Parliament enjoy parliamentary immunity in the following manner:
1. no Member of Parliament may be prosecuted, pursued, arrested, detained or judged for any opinions
expressed or votes made by him in the exercise of his
functions;
2. during the session period, no Member of Parliament
may be arrested for a crime or felony without the authorization of the Chamber to which he belongs;
3. when Parliament is not in session, no Member of
Parliament may be arrested without the authorization
of the Bureau of the Chamber to which he belongs,
unless he or she is caught flagrante delicto committing
a felony or the Bureau of the Chamber to which he
belongs has previously authorized his prosecution or
a court of law has passed a final verdict and sentence
against him. Any Member of Parliament convicted of a
felony by a court of law of last instance is automatically
stripped of his parliamentary seat by the Chamber to
which he belongs, after confirmation by the Supreme
Court. Likewise, each Chamber of Parliament may, in
its internal regulations, make provisions for serious misconduct as a consequence of which a member of that
Chamber may be removed from office. In such a case,
the decision to remove the member from office shall be
taken by a majority of three-fifths of the members of
the Chamber concerned.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
No. The president appoints eight of the twentysix members of the Senate to ensure the representation of historically marginalized communities. All members of the Chamber of Deputies are
elected.
Article 76
The Chamber of Deputies is composed of eighty members as follows:
1. fifty-three are elected in accordance with the provisions of Article 77 of this Constitution;
2. twenty-four women; that is: two from each Province
and the City of Kigali. These shall be elected by a
joint assembly composed of members of the respective District, Municipality, Town or Kigali City Councils and members of the Executive Committees of
womens organizations at the Province, Kigali City, District, Municipalities, Towns and Sector levels;

Parliament of Rwanda (Inteko Ishinga Amategeko)

3. two members elected by the National Youth Council;
4. one member elected by the Federation of the Associations of the Disabled.
Article 82
The Senate is composed of twenty-six members serving
for a term of eight (8) years and at least thirty per cent
of whom are women. In addition, the former Heads of
State become members of the Senate upon their request
as provided for in paragraph 4 of this article.
These twenty-six members are elected or appointed as
follows:
1. twelve members representing each Province and
the City of Kigali are elected through secret ballot by
members of the Executive Committees of Sectors and
District, Municipality, Town or City Councils of each
Province and the City of Kigali;
2. eight members appointed by the President of the
Republic who shall ensure the representation of historically marginalized communities;
3. four members designated by the Forum of Political
Organizations;
4. one university lecturer of at least the academic rank
of Associate Professor elected by the academic and
research staff of public universities and institutions of
higher learning;
5. one university lecturer of at least the rank of Associate
Professor elected by the academic and research staff of
private universities and institutions of higher learning.
The organs responsible for the nomination of Senators
shall take into account national unity and equal representation of both sexes. Former Heads of State who honorably completed their terms or voluntarily resigned
from office become members of the Senate by submitting a request to the Supreme Court. Dispute relating to
the application of Article 82 and 83 of this Constitution
which may arise, shall be adjudicated by the Supreme
Court.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
with a three-fourths majority vote. Amendments to
select articles, including those concerning the presidents term in office, require approval in a popular
referendum.
Article 193
The power to initiate amendment of the Constitution
is vested concurrently in the President of the Republic, upon the proposal of the Government, and each
Chamber of Parliament, upon a resolution passed by a
two-thirds majority vote of its members. The passage of
a constitutional amendment requires a three-quarters
majority vote of the members of each chamber of Parliament.
However, if the constitutional amendment concerns
the term of the President of the Republic or the system of democratic government based on political pluralism, or the constitutional regime established by this
Constitution, especially the republican form of the

569
government or national sovereignty, the amendment
must be passed by referendum after adoption by each
Chamber of Parliament. No amendment to this article
is permitted.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. The president can declare war and then seek
retroactive legislative approval.
Article 110
The President of the Republic is the Commander-inChief of the Rwanda Defense Forces.
He declares war in accordance with the provisions of
Article 136 of this Constitution.
He signs armistice and peace agreements. He declares
a state of siege and a state of emergency in accordance
with the provisions of the Constitution and the law.
Article 136
The President of the Republic has the right to declare
war and inform the Parliament within seven days. Parliament votes on the declaration of war by a simple
majority of the members of each Chamber.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
treaties on most major issues.
Article 189
The President of the Republic negotiates international
treaties and agreements and ratifies them. The Parliament is notified of such treaties and agreements following their conclusion.
However, peace treaties and treaties or agreements relating to commerce and international organizations and
those which commit state finances, modify provisions
of laws already adopted by Parliament or relate to the
status of persons can only be ratified after authorization
by Parliament.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 111
The President of the Republic has authority to exercise the prerogative of mercy in accordance with the
procedure determined by law and after consulting the
Supreme Court.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The Senate appoints Supreme Court judges on
the recommendation of the president.

570

Parliament of Rwanda (Inteko Ishinga Amategeko)

Article 148
The President of the Republic, after consultation with
the Council of Ministers and the Supreme Council of
the Magistrature, shall submit to the Senate a list of
candidates for appointment as judges of the Supreme
Court. The list must have two candidates per post in
respect of which there is an election. The candidates
shall be elected by an absolute majority vote of the
members of the Senate.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the governor of the
National Bank of Rwanda.
Article 113
The President of the Republic signs Presidential orders
deliberated in the Council of Ministers concerning:
5. the promotion and appointment of:
e) the Governor of the Central Bank.

1. the first session shall commence on February 5th;

2. the second session shall commence on June 5th;
3. the third session shall commence on October 5th.
Where the commencement date of a session falls on a
non-working day, the opening of the session shall be
postponed to the following day; or, if the following day
is a holiday, to the next working day.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.

No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the

operation of the public media.

Yes.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes. The legislature meets in three two-month ordinary sessions each year.
Article 71
The Chambers of Parliament shall hold three ordinary
sessions of two months each.

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
No. It is too early to tell. In 2003 the first parliamentary elections were held since 1994.

CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL OF SAUDI ARABIA (MAJLIS ASH-SHURA)

Expert consultants: Sener Akt
urk, Awadh Al-Badi, Hind Al-Sheikh, Michael Herb
Score: .09
Influence over
executive (2/9)

Institutional
autonomy (0/9)

Specified
powers (0/8)

Institutional
capacity (1/6)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee police

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

12. no veto
13. no review
14. no gatekeeping

21. treaties
22. amnesty
23. pardon

15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

24. judiciary

29. staff
30. no term limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack president
9. no confidence

The Consultative Council (Majlis Ash-Shura) of

Saudi Arabia was established in 1993. The Consultative Council is not a legislature in the

25. central bank

26. media

traditional sense. It has very little legislative

or oversight power. Its membership is entirely
appointed, and it serves as an advisory body

Consultative Council of Saudi Arabia (Majlis Ash-Shura)

to the monarch, who retains ultimate political

authority.
The fundamental law of Saudi Arabia is contained in a number of royal decrees. Those most
relevant to the Consultative Council include The
Basic Form of Government, The Consultative
Council Establishment Act, and The Consultative
Council Sanctions Statute, each promulgated in
1993. Unless otherwise noted, constitutional citations excerpted below are drawn from The Basic
Form of Government.
The Council lacks the powers of a normal legislature. It has minimal influence over the executive and no institutional autonomy. In fact, the
monarch can choose, at any time, completely to
disband the Council by decree. The legislature does
not exercise any specified powers and enjoys scant
institutional capacity.

571

No. The Council can request documents from the

cabinet but cannot investigate the king or the government.
Article 24 (Consultative Council Establishment Act)
The chairman of the Shura Council should submit a
request to the prime minister to provide the Council
with statements and documents in the possession of
the government apparatus which the council believes
are necessary for facilitating its work.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The Council lacks effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The king appoints the prime minister.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. The legislature cannot remove the chief executive, the king, from office. The prime minister can
be replaced only by the king.
2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of
the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 9 (Consultative Council Establishment Act)
It is not permitted to combine membership of the Shura
Council and any other government post or to manage
any other company unless the King sees fit that there is
a need for this.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature summons government officials
to testify, and hearings are regularly held.
Article 22 (Consultative Council Establishment Act)
The chairman of the Shura Council has to submit to
the Chairman of the Council of Ministers requests to
summon any government official to the meetings of
the Shura Council when it discusses matters relating
to that officials jurisdiction. The official will have the
right to debate but not the right to vote.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The king appoints ministers, and the appointments do not require the legislatures approval.
Article 57
(a) The King appoints and relieves deputies of the prime
minister and ministers and members of the Council of
Ministers by Royal decree.
Article 58
The King appoints those who enjoy the rank of ministers, deputy ministers and those of higher rank, and
relieves them of their posts by Royal decree in accordance with the explanations included in the law. Ministers and heads of independent departments are responsible before the prime minister for the ministries and
departments which they supervise.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The country lacks a presidency. The king is the
head of state.
9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.
No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in
the government.
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the
executive.
No. The king can dissolve the legislature.
11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.

572

Consultative Council of Saudi Arabia (Majlis Ash-Shura)

No. All legislation is issued by royal decree. The

Council makes suggestions to the king but does
not legislate.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. The king has absolute veto power. The king
can take the legislatures suggestions but has the
right to decide what he deems fit.
Article 17
The decisions of the Shura Council will be submitted to
the chairman of the Council of Ministers for deliberation. If the views of both Councils are concordant, they
will be issued following the Kings consent; if the views
are different, the King has the right to decide what he
deems fit.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Council is an advisory body and does not
make laws.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislators are subject to arrest and criminal
prosecution.
18. All members of the legislature are elected; the
executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
No. The king appoints all of the members of the
Shura Council.
Article 3 (Consultative Council Establishment Act)
The Shura Council is composed of a chairman and sixty
members chosen by the King from amongst scholars
and men of knowledge and expertise, and the rights
and duties of members and all their affairs are defined
by a Royal decree.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments are made in the
same way as [the constitution] was promulgated,
meaning by royal decree.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.

Article 83
This law may only be amended in the same way as it
was promulgated.

No. The Shura Council is prohibited from pursuing

lawmaking at all. It is not, however, restricted in its
ability to propose bills to the king.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Article 23 (Consultative Council Establishment Act)

Every ten members of the Shura Council have the right
to propose a new draft law or amendment of an executive law and submit them to the chairman of the Shura
Council; the chairman should submit the proposal to
the King.

Article 61
The King declares a state of emergency, general mobilization and war, and the law defines the rules for this.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The legislature does not appropriate funds.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
No. The legislature is dependent on the king for
the resources that finance its own operations.
Article 27 (Consultative Council Establishment Act)
The Shura Council is to be allocated a special budget by
the King; it will be spent in accordance with rules to be
issued by a Royal decree.
Article 28 (Consultative Council Establishment Act)
The Shura Councils financial matters, financial control
and final statement of accounts are to be organized in
accordance with special rules to be issued by a Royal
decree.

No. The king can declare war without the Councils

approval.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
No. The king can conclude international treaties
without the Councils approval. The Council does,
however, have the right to examine treaties and
offer advice on them to the king.
Article 70
International treaties, agreements, regulations and concessions are approved and amended by Royal decree.
Article 18 (Consultative Council Establishment Act)
International treaties, agreements, orders and concessions are issued and amended by Royal decrees after
being studied by the Shura Council.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. The king has the power to grant amnesty.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The king has the power of pardon.

Consultative Council of Saudi Arabia (Majlis Ash-Shura)

573

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.

No. The law requires that more than half of the

sitting legislators must be turned out every four
years at the end of each term.

No. The king appoints the members of the judiciary, and the appointments do not require the
Councils approval.

Article 13 (Consultative Council Establishment Act)

The period of the Shura Council will be four Hijrah
years starting from the date specified in the Royal decree
issued regarding its establishment. A new Council will
be formed at least two months before the end of its predecessors term. In the event of the term ending before
the formation of a new Council, the outgoing Council will continue to function until a new Council is
formed. When a new Council is formed, it has to be
observed that new members must be selected, whose
number must not be less than half of the total number
of council members.

Article 52
The appointment of judges and the termination of their
duties is carried out by Royal decree by a proposal from
the Higher Council of Justice in accordance with the
provisions of the law.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The king appoints the governor of the Saudi
Arabian Monetary Agency.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
No. There are no elections, so Council members cannot seek re-election. It bears note, however, that Council members generally welcome reappointment.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.
Article 12 (Consultative Council Sanctions Statute)
The Consultative Council shall hold an ordinary session
at least once every two weeks. The date and time of the
session shall be decided by the chairman of the Council
who has the right to bring it forward or to postpone it
should the need arise.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No. There is legislative staff, but on average there is
less than one staff person for each legislator. One
secretary is provided for every three members of
the Council.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No. See item 28.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
No. There have not been elections for the Council,
nor does the Council legislate, so one cannot speak
of re-election rates or members experience as legislators. Furthermore, the law requires that more
than half of the sitting Council members must be
turned out every four years.
Article 13 (Consultative Council Establishment Act)
The period of the Shura Council will be four Hijrah
years starting from the date specified in the Royal decree
issued regarding its establishment. A new Council will
be formed at least two months before the end of its predecessors term. In the event of the term ending before
the formation of a new Council, the outgoing Council will continue to function until a new Council is
formed. When a new Council is formed, it has to be
observed that new members must be selected, whose
number must not be less than half of the total number
of council members.

574

National Assembly of Senegal (Assemblee nationale)

NATIONALE )
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF SENEGAL (ASSEMBLEE
Expert consultants: Mamadou Diouf, Martha Gning, Gerti Hesseling, Mayke Kaag, Boubacar Niane,
Nicholas van de Walle
Score: .44
Influence over
executive (3/9)

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)

Specified
powers (2/8)

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

1. replace

10. no
dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments

27. sessions

2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack president
9. no confidence

20. war

28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

X
X
X

26. media
X

The National Assembly (Assemblee nationale) of

Senegal was established upon independence from
France in 1960. Like many other former French
colonies, Senegal borrowed key aspects of its political system from the French model. The National
Assembly is rare among African legislatures in that
it has enjoyed decades of influence under uninterrupted civilian rule. In 2001 the Senegal adopted a
new constitution that called for a unicameral legislature, thereby abolishing the Senate that had
existed in what had been a bicameral legislature.
The new document also granted the president the
power to dissolve the legislature. Prior to 2001 the
legislature was immune from dissolution.
The legislature is a significant, although not
commanding, political actor. Its ability to influence the executive is limited to the powers to
interpellate and investigate executive branch officials and to vote no confidence in the government. It has considerable institutional autonomy.
Its specified powers are limited to responsibilities
for confirming declarations of war and for ratifying international treaties. It has some institutional
capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.

No. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of the High Court of Justice. The legislature can remove the prime minister with a vote
of no confidence.
Article 86
The Prime Minister may, after deliberation of the Council of Ministers, decide to pose a question of confidence
in a program or a declaration of general policy. The vote
on the question of confidence may not take place until
two full days after it has been presented. Confidence is
refused by a public vote by the absolute majority of the
members of the National Assembly. The refusal entails a
collective resignation of the Government. The National
Assembly may provoke the resignation of the Government by the vote of a motion of censure. The motion
of censure must, on pain of irreceivability, be accompanied by the signatures of one-tenth of the members
composing the National Assembly. The vote of censure
can only take place two full days after its filing with the
bureau of the National Assembly. The motion of censure is voted by public ballot, by an absolute majority of
the members composing the National Assembly; only
the votes in favor of the motion of censure are counted.
If the motion of censure is adopted, the Prime Minister
immediately presents the Government to the President
of the Republic. A new motion of censure cannot be
presented in the course of the same session.
Article 101
The President of the Republic is only responsible for
acts accomplished in the exercise of his functions in
the case of high treason. He can be impeached only by
the National Assembly, declared by secret ballot, by a

National Assembly of Senegal (Assemblee nationale)

majority of three-fifths of the members composing it;
he is judged by the High Court of Justice.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Ministers are prohibited from serving simultaneously in the legislature.
Article 54
The office of a member of the Government is incompatible with a parliamentary mandate or any paid public
or private professional activity.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly questions executive
branch officials.
Article 85
The Deputies may pose to the Prime Minister and to
the other members of the Government who are held
to respond to it, written questions and oral questions
with or without debate. The questions or the responses
which are made to them are not put to a vote.
The National Assembly can designate, from its midst,
commissions of inquiry.
The law determines the conditions of the organization
and of the functioning as well as the powers of the
commissions of inquiry.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can establish commissions of
inquiry to investigate the executive.
Article 85
The Deputies may pose to the Prime Minister and to
the other members of the Government who are held
to respond to it, written questions and oral questions
with or without debate. The questions or the responses
which are made to them are not put to a vote.
The National Assembly can designate, from its midst,
commissions of inquiry.
The law determines the conditions of the organization
and of the functioning as well as the powers of the
commissions of inquiry.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister.

575
Article 49
The President of the Republic appoints the Prime Minister and ends his functions. On the proposal of the
Prime Minister, the President of the Republic appoints
the Ministers, establishes their attributions and ends
their functions.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers on the proposal of the prime minister, and the appointments
do not require the legislatures approval.
Article 49
The President of the Republic appoints the Prime Minister and ends his functions. On the proposal of the
Prime Minister, the President of the Republic appoints
the Ministers, establishes their attributions and ends
their functions.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 26
The President of the Republic is elected by direct universal suffrage and by majority vote in two rounds.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 86
The Prime Minister may, after deliberation of the Council of Ministers, decide to pose a question of confidence
in a program or a declaration of general policy. The vote
on the question of confidence may not take place until
two full days after it has been presented. Confidence is
refused by a public vote by the absolute majority of the
members of the National Assembly. The refusal entails a
collective resignation of the Government. The National
Assembly may provoke the resignation of the Government by the vote of a motion of censure. The motion
of censure must, on pain of irreceivability, be accompanied by the signatures of one-tenth of the members
composing the National Assembly. The vote of censure
can only take place two full days after its filing with the
bureau of the National Assembly. The motion of censure is voted by public ballot, by an absolute majority of
the members composing the National Assembly; only
the votes in favor of the motion of censure are counted.
If the motion of censure is adopted, the Prime Minister
immediately presents the Government to the President
of the Republic. A new motion of censure cannot be
presented in the course of the same session.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.

576

No. The president can dissolve the legislature.

Article 87
The President of the Republic may pronounce, by
decree, the dissolution of the National Assembly, after
consulting its President, when it has adopted a motion
of censure in opposition to the Government under the
conditions established by Article 75.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power. The legislature can, however, delegate temporary decree powers to the president on limited issue areas.

National Assembly of Senegal (Assemblee nationale)

a) by the President of the Republic, within six full days
of the transmission to him of the definitely adopted
law;
b) by a number of deputies equal to at least one-tenth
of the members of the National Assembly, within six
full days which follow its definitive adoption.
Article 92
The Constitutional Council takes cognizance of the
constitutionality of the laws and of the international
obligations, of conflicts of competence between the
executive and the legislative, of conflicts of competence between the Council of State and the Court of
Cassation, as well as of exceptions of unconstitutionality raised before the Council of State or the Court of
Cassation.

Article 77
The National Assembly can by a law empower the President of the Republic to take the measures which are normally of the domain the law. Within the limits of time
and competences established by the enabling law, the
President of the Republic takes the ordinances which
enter in force on their publication but become lapsed
if the bill of law of ratification is not presented to the
Bureau of the National Assembly before the date established by the enabling law. The Parliament can amend
them at the time of the vote (on) the law of ratification.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.

16. The legislature controls the resources that finance

its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.

No. A three-fifths majority vote is required to override a presidential veto.

Article 72
The President of the Republic promulgates the definitely adopted law within eight days which follow the
expiration of the time period of recourse specified in
Article 74.
The time period of promulgation is reduced by half in
case of urgency declared by the National Assembly.
Article 73
Within the time period specified for promulgation, the
President of the Republic may, by a motivated message,
demand of the National Assembly a new deliberation
which cannot be refused. The law cannot be voted in
second reading unless three-fifths of the members composing the National Assembly pronounce themselves in
favor.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 74
The Constitutional Court may be seated for the purpose
of having a law declared unconstitutional:

Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy

jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.

Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislators are immune only while the legislature is in session. They are subject to arrest at other
times.
Article 61
No deputy may be prosecuted, sought, arrested,
detained or judged as the result of opinions expressed
by him in the exercise of his functions. No deputy may,
during the sessions, be prosecuted or arrested in a criminal or correctional mater without the authorization
of the National Assembly. The deputy apprehended in
flagrant offense or in flight after the perpetration of a
punishable act can be arrested, prosecuted and imprisoned without the authorization of the bureau of the
National Assembly.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 60
The deputies to the National Assembly are elected by
universal direct suffrage.

National Assembly of Senegal (Assemblee nationale)

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. The legislature alone cannot change the constitution. Constitutional amendments must be
approved in a popular referendum or be introduced
by the president and approved by the legislature.
Article 103
The initiative for the revision of the Constitution
belongs concurrently to the President of the Republic
and to the deputies. The Prime Minister can propose
to the President of the Republic a revision of the Constitution. The bill or the proposal of revision must be
adopted by the National Assembly. The revision is definite after it has been approved by referendum.
However, the bill or the proposal is not presented to
referendum when the President of the Republic presents
them to the National Assembly only. In this case the
bill or the proposal is approved if it receives a majority
of three-fifths of the members composing the National
Assembly.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for the
declaration of war.
Article 70
The declaration of war is authorized by the National
Assembly.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 95
The President of the Republic negotiates international
obligations. He ratifies them or approves them.
Article 96
The peace treaties, the commercial treaties, the treaties
or agreements relating to international organizations,
those which engage the finances of the State, those
which modify the provisions of a legislative nature,
those which concern the status of persons, (and) those
which entail a cession, exchange or acquisition of territory can only be ratified or approved by virtue of a
law.
They take effect only after they have been ratified or
approved. No cession, no annexation of territory is
valid without the consent of the population concerned.
The Republic of Senegal can conclude with any African
State treaties of association or of community including
the partial or complete relinquishment of sovereignty
with the purpose of realizing the African unity.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Formally, the legislature has the power to grant
amnesty. In practice, the president has this power.

577
Article 67
The National Assembly holds the legislative power. It
alone votes the law. The law establishes the rules concerning . . . amnesty.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 47
The President of the Republic has the right of pardon.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The president makes judicial appointments,
and the appointments do not require the legislatures approval.
Article 89
The members of the Constitutional Council are
appointed by the President of the Republic.
Article 90
The magistrates other than the members of the Constitutional Council and the Court of Accounts are
appointed by the President of the Republic after the
advice of the Superior Council of the Magistrature. The
magistrates of the Court of Accounts are appointed by
the President of the Republic after the advice of the
Superior Council of the Court of Accounts.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. Senegal is a member of the Central Bank of
West African States, whose governor is selected by
the member states.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. Each year the legislature meets in two ordinary sessions, each of which may not exceed four
months.
Article 63
With the exception of the date of the opening of
the first session of the newly elected Assembly, which
is determined by the President of the Republic, the
National Assembly establishes the date of the opening
and the duration of the ordinary session. These are,
however, governed by the following rules:
a) the first is opened during the second trimester of the
year;
b) the second is opened obligatorily during the first
fifteen days of the month of October.
The duration of each ordinary session may not exceed
four months.

578

National Assembly of Senegal (Assemblee nationale)

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.

No.

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.
No.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF SERBIA (NARODNA SKUPSHTINA)

Expert consultants: Ruzica Dabic, Jadranka Jelincic, Nemanja Nenadic, Danijel Pantic,
Vladimir Petrovic, Jelena Simjanovic
Score: .69
Influence over
executive (5/9)

Institutional
autonomy (7/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree
X
X

5. oversee police
6. appoint PM

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack president
9. no confidence

Specified
powers (6/8)
X

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

12. no veto
13. no review

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

X
X

26. media

The National Assembly (Narodna skupshtina) of Serbia, as currently structured, was established in the
countrys 2006 constitution as the Union of Serbia
and Montenegro disintegrated. The constitution
established a unicameral legislature. From 1992
until 2006 Serbia had been joined with Montenegro to form first the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(19922003) and then the short-lived Union of
Serbia and Montenegro (20036). In May 2006
Montenegro voted for independence in a popular referendum. Serbia responded by declaring
itself independent and drafting a new constitution.
The National Assembly has considerable powers. It influences the executive with, among other
powers, the right to appoint, oversee, and remove
the government. The legislature can be dissolved,
and its laws are subject to judicial review, but oth-

X
X
X

erwise it enjoys complete institutional autonomy.

It holds numerous specific powers and has some
institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. The dismissal of the president requires the
involvement of the Constitutional Court. The legislature can remove the prime minister with a vote
of no confidence.
Article 118
The President of the Republic shall be dismissed for
the violation of the Constitution, upon the decision
of the National Assembly, by the votes of at least two
thirds of deputies. Procedure for the dismissal may be

National Assembly of Serbia (Narodna skupshtina)

579

initiated by the National Assembly, upon the proposal

of at least two thirds of deputies. The Constitutional
Court shall have the obligation to decide on the violation of the Constitution, upon the initiated procedure
for dismissal, not later than within 45 days.

No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.

Article 130
A vote of no confidence in the Government or the particular member of the Government may be requested by
at least 60 deputies. The proposal for the vote of no confidence in the Government or the particular member
of the Government shall be discussed by the National
Assembly at the next first session, not later than five
days after the submission of the proposal. After the
discussion is concluded, they shall vote on the proposal. The proposal for the vote of no confidence in the
Government or the member of the Government shall
be accepted by the National Assembly, if more than a
half of the total number of deputies votes for it. If the
National Assembly passes a vote of no confidence in
the Government, the President of the Republic shall be
obliged to initiate proceedings for election of the new
Government. If the National Assembly fails to elect the
new Government within 30 days from the passing of
a vote of no confidence, the President of the Republic
shall be obliged to dissolve the National Assembly and
schedule elections. If the National Assembly passes a
vote of no confidence in the member of the Government, the President of the Republic shall be obliged to
initiate proceedings for election of a new member of
the Government, in accordance with the Law. If the
National Assembly fails to pass a vote of no confidence
in the Government or the member of the Government,
signatories of the proposal may not submit a new proposal for a vote of no confidence before the expiry of
the 180-day deadline.
Article 131
The Government may require a vote of its confidence.
Upon the request of the Government, proposal for a
vote of confidence in the Government may be discussed
at the current session of the National Assembly, and if
the Government has failed to submit such a proposal,
the proposal shall be discussed on the next first session, not later than five days from its submission. After
the discussion is concluded, they shall vote on the proposal. The proposal for the vote of confidence in the
Government or the member of the Government shall
be accepted by the National Assembly, if more than a
half of the total number of deputies votes for it. If the
National Assembly fails to pass a vote of confidence in
the Government, the term of office of the Government
ends and the President of the Republic shall be obliged
to initiate proceedings for election of the new Government. If the National Assembly fails to elect the new
Government within 30 days from the day of passing
of vote of no confidence, the President of the Republic
shall be obliged to dissolve the National Assembly and
schedule elections.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.

Article 102
Deputy may not be a deputy in the Assembly of the
autonomous province, nor an official in bodies of executive government and judiciary, nor may he or she perform other functions, affairs and duties, which represent a conflict of interest, according to the Law.
Article 126
Member of the Government may not be a deputy in the
National Assembly.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 105
The National Assembly shall adopt decisions by majority vote of deputies at the session at which majority of
deputies are present.
By means of majority vote of all deputies the National
Assembly shall:
10. decide on response to interpellation.
Article 129
At least 50 deputies may propose interpellation in relation to the work of the Government or particular member of the Government.
The Government shall have the obligation to respond
to interpellation within 30 days.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature elects the prime minister on
the recommendation of the president.
Article 112
The President of the Republic shall:
3. propose to the National Assembly a candidate for the
Prime Minister, after considering views of representatives of elected lists of candidates.
Article 127
A candidate for the Prime Minister shall be proposed
to the National Assembly by the President of the

580
Republic, after he or she considers the opinions of representatives of elected election lists. The candidate for the
Prime Minister shall present to the National Assembly
the Governments Programme and propose its constitution. The National Assembly shall simultaneously vote
on the Governments Programme and election of the
Prime Minister and members of the Government. The
Government shall be elected if the majority of the total
number of deputies votes for its election.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The legislature elects ministers.
Article 99
Within its election rights, the National Assembly shall:
1. elect the Government, supervise its work and decide
on expiry of the term of office of the Government and
ministers.
Article 105
The National Assembly shall adopt decisions by majority vote of deputies at the session at which majority of
deputies are present.
By means of majority vote of all deputies the National
Assembly shall:
9. elect members of the Government and decide on
the end of the term of office of the Government and
ministers.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 114
The President of the Republic shall be elected on direct
elections, by secret ballot, in accordance with the Law.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 130
A vote of no confidence in the Government or the particular member of the Government may be requested by
at least 60 deputies. The proposal for the vote of no confidence in the Government or the particular member
of the Government shall be discussed by the National
Assembly at the next first session, not later than five
days after the submission of the proposal. After the
discussion is concluded, they shall vote on the proposal. The proposal for the vote of no confidence in the
Government or the member of the Government shall
be accepted by the National Assembly, if more than a
half of the total number of deputies votes for it. If the
National Assembly passes a vote of no confidence in
the Government, the President of the Republic shall be
obliged to initiate proceedings for election of the new
Government. If the National Assembly fails to elect the

National Assembly of Serbia (Narodna skupshtina)

new Government within 30 days from the passing of
a vote of no confidence, the President of the Republic
shall be obliged to dissolve the National Assembly and
schedule elections. If the National Assembly passes a
vote of no confidence in the member of the Government, the President of the Republic shall be obliged to
initiate proceedings for election of a new member of
the Government, in accordance with the Law. If the
National Assembly fails to pass a vote of no confidence
in the Government or the member of the Government,
signatories of the proposal may not submit a new proposal for a vote of no confidence before the expiry of
the 180-day deadline.
Article 131
The Government may require a vote of its confidence.
Upon the request of the Government, proposal for a
vote of confidence in the Government may be discussed
at the current session of the National Assembly, and if
the Government has failed to submit such a proposal,
the proposal shall be discussed on the next first session, not later than five days from its submission. After
the discussion is concluded, they shall vote on the proposal. The proposal for the vote of confidence in the
Government or the member of the Government shall
be accepted by the National Assembly, if more than a
half of the total number of deputies votes for it. If the
National Assembly fails to pass a vote of confidence in
the Government, the term of office of the Government
ends and the President of the Republic shall be obliged
to initiate proceedings for election of the new Government. If the National Assembly fails to elect the new
Government within 30 days from the day of passing
of vote of no confidence, the President of the Republic
shall be obliged to dissolve the National Assembly and
schedule elections.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 109
The President of the Republic may dissolve the National
Assembly, upon the elaborated proposal of the Government. The Government may not propose dissolution of
the National Assembly, if a proposal has been submitted for the vote of no confidence in the Government
or if the issue of its confidence has been raised. The
National Assembly shall be dissolved if it fails to elect
the government within 90 days from the day of its constitution. The National Assembly may not be dissolved
during the state of war and emergency. The President of
the Republic shall be obliged to dissolve the National
Assembly upon his/her decree, in cases stipulated by
the Constitution.
Simultaneously with the dissolution of the National
Assembly, the President of the Republic shall schedule elections for deputies, so that elections finish not
later than 60 days from the day of their announcement.
The National Assembly, which has been dissolved, shall
only perform current or urgent tasks, stipulated by the

National Assembly of Serbia (Narodna skupshtina)

581

Law. In case of declaration of the state of war or emergency, its full competence shall be reestablished and
last until the end of the state of war, that is, emergency.

16. The legislature controls the resources that finance

its own internal operation and provide for the perquisites of its own members.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote of its total membership.
Article 113
The President of the Republic shall be obliged to issue
a decree on promulgation of laws or to return the law
for reconsideration with a written explanation to the
National Assembly, within maximum 15 days from the
day of adoption of the law, that is, not later than within
seven days, if the law has been adopted by emergency
procedure. If the National Assembly decides to vote
again on the law, which has been returned for reconsideration by the President of the Republic, the law shall be
adopted by the majority vote from the total number of
deputies. The President of the Republic shall be obliged
to promulgate the newly adopted Law. If the President
of the Republic fails to issue a decree on promulgation
of the law within the deadline stipulated by the constitution, the decree shall be issued by the Chairman of
the National Assembly.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court reviews the constitutionality of laws.
Article 167
The Constitutional Court shall decide on:
1. compliance of laws and other general acts with the
Constitution, generally accepted rules of the international law and ratified international treaties,
2. compliance of ratified international treaties with the
Constitution.

Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto, here
expressed as found in the act of committing any
criminal offence.
Article 103
Deputies shall enjoy immunity. Deputies may not
accept criminal or other liability for the expressed
opinion or cast vote in performing the deputys function. Deputy who uses his/her immunity may not be
detained, nor may he or she be involved in criminal or
other proceedings in which prison sentence may be pronounced, without previous approval by the National
Assembly.
Deputy found in the act of committing any criminal offence for which the prison sentence longer than
five years is not envisaged, may be detained without
previous approval by the National Assembly. There
shall be no deadlines stipulated for the criminal or
other proceedings in which the immunity is established. Failure to use the immunity shall not exclude
the right of the National Assembly to establish the
immunity.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 100
The National Assembly shall consist of 250 deputies,
who are elected in direct elections by secret ballot, in
accordance with the Law.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution by
a two-thirds majority vote of its total membership.
Amendments to select articles of the constitution
also require approval in a popular referendum.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.

Article 99
The National Assembly shall:
1. adopt and amend the Constitution.

Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy

jurisdictions.

Article 203
A proposal to amend the Constitution may be submitted by at least one third of the total number of deputies,
the President of the Republic, the Government and
at least 150,000 voters. The National Assembly shall
decide on amending the Constitution. A proposal to
amend the Constitution shall be adopted by a twothird majority of the total number of deputies . . . The
National Assembly shall adopt an act on amending the

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.

582
Constitution by a two-third majority of the total number of deputies and may decide to have it endorsed in
the republic referendum by the citizens. The National
Assembly shall be obliged to put forward the act on
amending the Constitution in the republic referendum
to have it endorsed, in cases when the amendment of
the Constitution pertains to the preamble of the Constitution, principles of the Constitution, human and
minority rights and freedoms, the system of authority,
proclamation the state of war and emergency, derogation from human and minority rights in the state of
emergency or war or the proceedings of amending the
Constitution.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. If the legislature is unable to meet, the president, together with the president of the National
Assembly and the prime minister, can declare
war.
Article 99
The National Assembly shall:
5. decide on war and peace and declare state of war and
emergency.
Article 140
The Army of Serbia may be used outside the borders of
the Republic of Serbia only upon the decision of the
National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia.
Article 201
The National Assembly shall proclaim the state of war.
When the National Assembly is not in a position to
convene, the decision on proclamation of the state of
war shall be passed by the President of the Republic
together with the President of the National Assembly
and the Prime Minister.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 99
The National Assembly shall:
4. ratify international contracts when the obligation of
their ratification is stipulated by the Law.
Article 105
By means of majority vote of all deputies, the National
Assembly shall:
6. conclude and ratify international contracts.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. Both the legislature and the president have the
power to grant amnesty.
Article 99
The National Assembly shall:
12. grant amnesty for criminal offences.

National Assembly of Serbia (Narodna skupshtina)

Article 105
The National Assembly shall adopt decisions by majority vote of deputies at the session at which majority of
deputies are present.
By means of majority vote of all deputies the National
Assembly shall:
1. grant amnesty for criminal offences.
Article 112
The President of the Republic shall:
7. grant amnesties and award honours.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject
appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislature elects some of the judges of the
Constitutional Court, the president of the Supreme
Court of Cessation, and other judges.
Article 99
The National Assembly shall:
2. appoint and dismiss judges of the Constitutional
Court.
3. appoint the President of the Supreme Court of Cassation, presidents of courts, Republic Public Prosecutor,
public prosecutors, judges and deputy public prosecutors, in accordance with the Constitution.
Article 105
The National Assembly shall adopt decisions by majority vote of deputies at the session at which majority of
deputies are present.
By means of majority vote of all deputies the National
Assembly shall:
11. elect judges of the Constitutional Court and
decide on their dismissal and end of their term of
office.
12. elect the President of the Supreme Court of Cessation, presidents of courts, Republic Public Prosecutor
and public prosecutors and decide on the end of their
term of office.
13. elect judges and deputy public prosecutors, in accordance with the Constitution.
Article 144
President of the Supreme Court of Cassation shall be
elected by the National Assembly, upon the proposal
of the High Judicial Council and received opinion of
the meeting of the Supreme Court of Cassation and
competent committee of the National Assembly.
Article 147
On proposal of the High Judicial Council, the National
Assembly shall elect as a judge the person who is elected
to the post of judge for the first time.
Article 172
The Constitutional Court shall have 15 justices who
shall be elected and appointed for the period of nine
years. Five justices of the Constitutional Court shall

National Assembly of Serbia (Narodna skupshtina)

be appointed by the National Assembly, another five
by the President of the Republic, and another five at
the general session of the Supreme Court of Cassation.
The National Assembly shall appoint five justices of the
Constitutional Court form among ten candidates proposed by the President of the Republic, the President of
the Republic shall appoint five justices of the Constitutional Court from among ten candidates proposed by
the National Assembly, and the general session of the
Supreme Court of Cassation shall appoint five justices
from among ten candidates proposed at a general session by the High Judicial Court and the State Prosecutor
Council.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
Yes. The legislature elects the governor of the
National Bank of Serbia.
Article 95
The National Bank of Serbia shall be managed by the
Governor elected by the National Assembly.
Article 99
The National Assembly shall:
4. appoint and dismiss the Governor of the National
Bank of Serbia and supervise his/her work.
Article 105
The National Assembly shall adopt decisions by majority vote of deputies at the session at which majority of
deputies are present.
By means of majority vote of all deputies the National
Assembly shall:
14. elect and dismiss the Governor of the National Bank
of Serbia, Governors Council and Civic Defender.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
Yes. The legislature has a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.

583

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session for
a maximum of 180 days each year. In practice,
including special sessions, the legislature meets for
more than six months each year.
Article 106
The National Assembly shall be convoked for two regular sessions per year. The first regular session shall start
on the first weekday of March, while the second regular session shall start on the first weekday of October.
Regular sessions may not last longer than 90 days. The
National Assembly shall be convoked for extraordinary
session upon the request of at least one third of deputies
or upon the request of the Government, with previously
determined agenda.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

584

Parliament of Sierra Leone

PARLIAMENT OF SIERRA LEONE

Expert consultants: Daniel Gbondo, Lawrence Harding, Sheku Mesali, George Ola-Davies, R. H. O.
Robbin-Coker
Score: .41
Influence over
executive (1/9)

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Specified
powers (4/8)
X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

18. all elected

Institutional
capacity (3/6)

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

23. pardon

24. judiciary

X
X
X

25. central bank

26. media
X

The Parliament of Sierra Leone was established

in 1961 upon independence from Great Britain.
For most of its history, the legislature was suspended or sidelined due to single-party regimes,
military coups, and civil wars. The countrys current constitution, adopted in 1991, calls for a unicameral legislature. In 2002, with the help of UN
peacekeeping forces, the most recent round of civil
violence ceased, and parliamentary elections were
held.
Despite a shaky history, the legislature has
regained some power. Its ability to influence the
executive is negligible, although its confirmation
is needed for ministerial appointments. A degree
of institutional autonomy is conferred by the presidents inability to dissolve the legislature, decree
legislation, or appoint legislators. The legislature
exercises several specified powers and has modest
institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of a special tribunal established by the
chief justice of the Supreme Court.

Article 51
(1) If notice in writing is given to the Speaker signed
by not less than one-half of all the Members of Parliament of a motion alleging that the President has
committed any violation of the Constitution or any
gross misconduct in the performance of the functions
of his office and specifying the particulars of the allegations and proposing that a tribunal be appointed under
this section to investigate those allegations, the Speaker
shall: if Parliament is then sitting or has been summoned to meet within five days, cause the motion to
be considered by Parliament within seven days of the
receipt of the notice; or if Parliament is not then sitting (and notwithstanding that it may be prorogued),
summon Parliament to meet within twenty-one days
of the receipt of the notice, and cause the motion to be
considered by Parliament.
(2) Where a motion under this section is proposed for
consideration by Parliament, it shall meet in secret session and shall not debate the motion, but the Speaker or
the person presiding in Parliament shall forthwith cause
a vote to be taken on the motion and, if the motion is
supported by the votes of not less than two thirds of all
Members of Parliament, shall declare the motion to be
passed.
(3). If a motion is declared to be passed under subsection (2), the Speaker shall immediately notify the Chief
Justice who shall appoint a tribunal which shall consist
of a Chairman who shall be a Justice of the Supreme
Court and not less than four others selected by the Chief
Justice, at least two of whom shall hold or shall have

Parliament of Sierra Leone

held high judicial office; the Tribunal shall investigate
the matter and shall within the period of three months
from the date on which the motion was passed report to
Parliament through the Speaker whether or not it finds
the particulars of the allegation specified in the motion
to have been sustained; the President shall have the
right to appear and be represented before the Tribunal
during its investigation of the allegations against him.
(4) If the Tribunal reports to Parliament that if finds
that the particulars of any allegations against the President specified in the motion have not been substantiated, no further proceedings shall be taken under this
Section in respect of that allegation.
(5) Where the Tribunal reports to Parliament that it
finds that the particulars of any allegation specified in
the motion have been substantiated, Parliament may,
in secret session, on a motion supported by not less than
two-thirds of all the Members of Parliament, resolve
that the President has been guilty of such violation of
the Constitution or, as the case may, such gross misconduct as is incompatible with his continuance in office as
President; and where Parliament so resolves, the President shall thereupon cease to hold office and a vacancy
shall then be deemed to have occurred in the office of
President and subsection (4) of Section 49 of this Constitution shall apply accordingly.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 56
(1) There shall be, in addition to the office of VicePresident, such other offices of Ministers and Deputy
Ministers as may be established by the President: Provided that no Member of Parliament shall be appointed
a Minister or Deputy Minister.
(3) A Minister or a Deputy Minister shall not, while
he continues in office, hold any other office of profit
or emolument whether by way of allowances or otherwise, whether private or public, and either directly or
indirectly.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
No. Formally, legislative committees can enforc[e]
the attendance of witnesses, but in practice, the
legislature lacks such power and testimony is rare.
Article 93
(1) At the beginning of each session of Parliament, but
in any case not later than twenty-one days thereafter,
there shall be appointed from among its members the
following Standing Committees, that is to say
(a) the Legislative Committee;
(b) the Finance Committee;

585
(c) the Committee on Appointments and Public Service;
(d) the Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Committee;
(e) the Public Accounts Committee;
(f) the Committee of Privileges;
(g) the Standing Orders Committee;
(h) such other Committees of Parliament as the rules
of procedure of Parliament shall provide.
(2) In addition to the Committees referred to in subsection (1), Parliament shall appoint other Committees
which shall perform the functions specified in subsection (3).
(3) It shall be the duty of any such Committee as is
referred to in subsection (2) to investigate or inquire
into the activities or administration of such Ministries
or Departments as may be assigned to it, and such investigation or inquiry may extend to proposals for legislation.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsections (1) and (2), Parliament may at any time appoint
any other Committee to investigate any matter of public importance.
(5) The composition of each of the Committees
appointed under subsections (1), (2) and (4) shall, as
much as possible, reflect the strength of the political
parties and Independent Members in Parliament.
(6) For the purposes of effectively performing its functions, each of the Committees shall have all such powers, rights and privileges as are vested in the High Court
at a trial in respect of
(a) enforcing the attendance of witnesses and examining them on oath, affirmation or otherwise;
(b) compelling the production of documents; and
(c) the issue of a commission or request to examine
witnesses abroad.
Article 107
(1) A Minister may introduce a Bill in Parliament and
take part, but without a vote, in the deliberations of
Parliament on that Bill.
(2) A Minister may be summoned before Parliament or
a Committee thereof
(a) to give an account of any matter falling within his
portfolio; or (b) to explain any aspect of Government
policy.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. Although the constitution provides legislative
committees with the right to investigate the executive, they lack the ability to do so in practice.
Article 93
(1) At the beginning of each session of Parliament, but
in any case not later than twenty-one days thereafter,
there shall be appointed from among its members the
following Standing Committees, that is to say
(a) the Legislative Committee;

586
(b) the Finance Committee;
(c) the Committee on Appointments and Public Service;
(d) the Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Committee;
(e) the Public Accounts Committee;
(f) the Committee of Privileges;
(g) the Standing Orders Committee;
(h) such other Committees of Parliament as the rules
of procedure of Parliament shall provide.
(2) In addition to the Committees referred to in subsection (1), Parliament shall appoint other Committees
which shall perform the functions specified in subsection (3).
(3) It shall be the duty of any such Committee as is
referred to in subsection (2) to investigate or inquire
into the activities or administration of such Ministries
or Departments as may be assigned to it, and such investigation or inquiry may extend to proposals for legislation.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsections (1) and (2), Parliament may at any time appoint
any other Committee to investigate any matter of public importance.
(5) The composition of each of the Committees
appointed under subsections (1), (2) and (4) shall, as
much as possible, reflect the strength of the political
parties and Independent Members in Parliament.
(6) For the purposes of effectively performing its functions, each of the Committees shall have all such powers, rights and privileges as are vested in the High Court
at a trial in respect of
(a) enforcing the attendance of witnesses and examining them on oath, affirmation or otherwise;
(b) compelling the production of documents; and
(c) the issue of a commission or request to examine
witnesses abroad.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. There is no prime minister.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The legislatures approval is required to confirm the presidents ministerial appointments.
Article 56
(1) There shall be, in addition to the office of VicePresident, such other offices of Ministers and Deputy
Ministers as may be established by the President:
Provided that no Member of Parliament shall be
appointed a Minister or Deputy Minister.

Parliament of Sierra Leone

(2) A person shall not be appointed a Minister or
Deputy Minister unless he is qualified to be elected
as a Member of Parliament; and he has not contested
and lost as a candidate in the general election immediately preceding his nomination for appointment; and
his nomination is approved by Parliament.
(3) A Minister or a Deputy Minister shall not, while
he continues in office, hold any other office of profit
or emolument whether by way of allowances or otherwise, whether private or public, and either directly or
indirectly.
Article 59
(1) There shall be a Cabinet whose functions shall be
to advise the President in the government of Sierra
Leone and which shall consist of the President, the VicePresident and such Ministers as the President may from
time to time appoint.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 40
There shall be a President of the Republic of Sierra
Leone who shall be Head of State, the supreme executive authority of the Republic and the Commanderin-Chief of the Armed Forces.
Article 42
(2) The following provisions shall apply to an election
to the office of President
(a) all persons registered in Sierra Leone as voters for
the purposes of election to Parliament shall be entitled to vote in the election;
(b) the poll shall be taken by a secret ballot on such
day or days, at such time, and in such manner as may
be prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament;
(c) a candidate for an election to the office of President shall be deemed to have been duly elected to
such office where he is the only candidate nominated
for the election after the close of nomination;
(d) where in an election to the office of President a
candidate nominated for the election dies, is incapacitated or disqualified, the party which nominated
him shall within seven days of such death, incapacitation or disqualification, nominate another candidate;
(e) no person shall be elected as President of Sierra
Leone unless at the Presidential election he has polled
not less than fifty-five per cent of the valid votes in
his favour; and
(f) in default of a candidate being duly elected under
paragraph (e), the two candidates with the highest
number or numbers of votes shall go forward to a
second election which shall be held within fourteen
days of the announcement of the result of the previous election, and the candidate polling the higher
number of votes cast in his favour shall be declared
President.
(3) A person elected to the office of President under this
section shall assume that office on the day upon which

Parliament of Sierra Leone

he is declared elected by the Returning Officer, or upon
the date that his predecessors term of office expires,
whichever is the latter.

587
dispose of the case in accordance with the decision of
the Supreme Court.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.

No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in

the government.

Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy

jurisdictions.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.

Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.

Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound

funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the perquisites of its own members.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.

No. The legislature is dependent on the executive

for the resources that finance its own operations.

No. A two-thirds majority is required to override a

presidential veto.

No. Legislative immunity extends only to anything

said in parliament and while legislators are in, or
traveling to and from, the parliament buildings
only. They can be arrested for common crimes at
other times.

Article 106
(7) Where a Bill has been passed by Parliament but the
President refuses to sign it, the President shall within
fourteen days of the presentation of the Bill for his signature cause the unsigned Bill to be returned to Parliament giving reasons for his refusal.
(8) Where a Bill is returned to Parliament pursuant to
subsection (7) and that Bill is thereafter passed by the
votes of not less than two-thirds of the Members of
Parliament, it shall immediately become law and the
Speaker shall thereupon cause it to be published in the
Gazette.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Supreme Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 124
(1) The Supreme Court shall, save as otherwise provided in section 122 of this Constitution, have original jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other Courts
in all matters relating to the enforcement or interpretation of any provision of this Constitution; and where
any question arises whether an enactment was made in
excess of the power conferred upon Parliament or any
other authority or person by law or under this Constitution.
(2) Where any question relating to any matter or question as is referred to in subsection (1) arises in any proceedings in any Court, other than the Supreme Court,
that Court shall stay the proceedings and refer the question of law involved to the Supreme Court for determination; and the Court in which the question arose shall

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.

Article 98
There shall be freedom of speech, debate and proceedings in Parliament and that freedom shall not be
impeached or questioned in any court or place out of
Parliament.
Article 99
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, but without prejudice to the generality of section 97, no civil or
criminal proceedings shall be instituted against a Member of Parliament in any court or place out of Parliament
by reason of anything said by him in Parliament.
Article 100
No civil or criminal process issuing from any court or
place out of Parliament shall be served on or executed
in relation to the Speaker or a Member or the Clerk
of Parliament while he is on his way to attending or
returning from any proceedings of Parliament.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 74
(1) Members of Parliament shall comprise the following
(a) one Member of Parliament for each District who
shall, subject to the provisions of this Constitution,
be elected in such manner as may be prescribed by or
under any law from among the persons who, under

588
any law, are for the time being Paramount Chiefs;
and (b) such number of Members as Parliament may
prescribe who, subject to the provisions of this Constitution, shall be elected in such manner as may be
prescribed by or under any law.
(2) The number of Members of Parliament to be elected
pursuant to paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1) shall
not together be less than sixty.
(3) In any election of Members of Parliament the votes
of the electors shall be given by ballot in such manner
as not to disclose how any particular elector votes.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution on
multiple readings with a two-thirds majority vote.
Amendments to selected sections of the constitution require approval in a popular referendum.
Article 108
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, Parliament
may alter this Constitution.
(2) A Bill for an Act of Parliament under this section
shall not be passed by Parliament unless
(a) before the first reading of the Bill in Parliament
the text of the Bill is published in at least two issues
of the Gazette: Provided that not less than nine days
shall elapse between the first publication of the Bill
in the Gazette and the second publication; and
(b) the Bill is supported on the second and third readings by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the
Members of Parliament.
(3) A Bill for an Act of Parliament enacting a new Constitution or altering any of the following provisions of
this Constitution, that is to say
(a) this section,
(b) Chapter III,
(c) sections 46, 56, 72, 73, 74(2), 74(3), 84(2), 85, 87,
105, 110119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 128, 129, 131,
132, 133, 135, 136, 137, 140, 151, 156, 167, shall
not be submitted to the President for his assent and
shall not become law unless the Bill, after it has been
passed by Parliament and in the form in which it was
so passed, has, in accordance with the provisions of
any law in that behalf, been submitted to and been
approved at a referendum.
(4) Every person who is entitled to vote in the elections
of Members of Parliament shall be entitled to vote at a
referendum held for the purposes of subsection (3) and
no other person may so vote; and the Bill shall not be
regarded as having been approved at the referendum
unless it was so approved by the votes of not less than
one-half of all such persons and by not less than twothirds of all the votes validly cast at the referendum:
Provided that in calculating the total number of persons entitled to vote at such referendum, the names
of deceased persons, of persons disqualified as electors,
and of persons duplicated in the register of electors and
so certified by the Electoral Commission, shall not be
taken into account.

Parliament of Sierra Leone

(5) The conduct of any referendum for the purposes of
subsection (3) of this section shall be under the general
supervision of the Electoral Commission and the provisions of subsections (4), (5) and (6) of section 38 of this
Constitution shall apply in relation to the exercise by
the Electoral Commission of its functions with respect
to a referendum as they apply in relation to the exercise
of its functions with respect to elections of Members of
Parliament.
(6) A Bill for an Act of Parliament under this section
shall not be submitted to the President for his signature
unless it is accompanied by a certificate under the hand
of the Speaker of Parliament (or, if the Speaker is for any
reason unable to exercise the functions of his office, the
Deputy Speaker) that the provisions of subsections (3)
and (4) of this section have been complied with, and
every such certificate shall be conclusive for all purposes
and shall not be inquired in any court.
(7) No Act of Parliament shall be deemed to amend, add
to or repeal or in any way alter any of the provisions of
this Constitution unless it does so in express terms.
(8) Any suspension, alteration, or repeal of this Constitution other than on the authority of Parliament shall
be deemed to be an act of Treason.
(9) In this section
(a) references to this Constitution include references
to any law that amends or replaces any of the provisions of this Constitution; and
(b) references to the alteration of this Constitution or
of any Chapter or section of this Constitution include
references to the amendment, modification or reenactment, with or without amendment or modification, of any provision for the time being contained
in this Constitution or Chapter or section thereof, the
suspension or repeal of any such provision, the making of different provision in lieu of such provision
and the addition of new provisions to this Constitution or Chapter or section thereof, and references
to the alteration of any particular provision of this
Constitution shall be construed likewise.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for the
declaration of war.
Article 40
(4) Notwithstanding any provisions of this Constitution or any other law to the contrary, the President
shall, without prejudice to any such law as may for the
time being be adopted by Parliament, be responsible,
in addition to the functions conferred upon him in the
Constitution, for
(g) the declaration of war.
Provided that any Treaty, Agreement or Convention
executed by or under the authority of the President
which relates to any matter within the legislative competence of Parliament, or which in any way alters the
law of Sierra Leone or imposes any charge on, or authorises any expenditure out of, the Consolidated Fund or

Parliament of Sierra Leone

any other fund of Sierra Leone, and any declaration of
war made by the President shall be subject to ratification by Parliament.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 40
(4) Notwithstanding any provisions of this Constitution or any other law to the contrary, the President
shall, without prejudice to any such law as may for the
time being be adopted by Parliament, be responsible,
in addition to the functions conferred upon him in the
Constitution, for
(d) the execution of treaties, agreements or conventions in the name of Sierra Leone;
Provided that any Treaty, Agreement or Convention
executed by or under the authority of the President
which relates to any matter within the legislative
competence of Parliament, or which in any way alters
the law of Sierra Leone or imposes any charge on, or
authorises any expenditure out of, the Consolidated
Fund or any other fund of Sierra Leone, and any declaration of war made by the President shall be subject
to ratification by Parliament.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The president has the power of pardon (mercy).
Article 40
(4) Notwithstanding any provisions of this Constitution or any other law to the contrary, the President
shall, without prejudice to any such law as may for the
time being be adopted by Parliament, be responsible,
in addition to the functions conferred upon him in the
Constitution, for
(e) the exercise of the Prerogative of Mercy.

589
Service Commission and subject to the approval of Parliament.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the governor of the
Bank of Sierra Leone.
Article 71
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 152 of this
Constitution and save as otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the President shall, in accordance with
the provisions of this Constitution or any other law,
appoint
(c) the Governor and the other members of the governing body of any State Bank, Banking or Financial
Institutions.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
No. In practice, the legislature does not regularly
meet in ordinary session.
Article 84
(1) Each session in Parliament shall be held at such
place within Sierra Leone and shall commence at such
time as the President may be Proclamation appoint.
(2) There shall be a session of Parliament at least once
in every year, so that a period of twelve months shall
not intervene between the last sitting of Parliament in
one session and the first sitting thereof in the next session: Provided that there shall be a session of Parliament
not later than twenty-eight days from the holding of a
general election of Members of Parliament.
(3) The President shall at the beginning of each session
of Parliament present to Parliament an address on the
state of the nation.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to confirm the presidents appointments to the Supreme
Court.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.

Article 135
(1) The President shall, acting on the advice of the Judicial and Legal Service Commission and subject to the
approval of Parliament, appoint the Chief Justice by
warrant under his hand from among persons qualified
to hold office as Justice of the Supreme Court.
(2) The other Judges of the Superior Court of Judicature
shall be appointed by the President by warrant under
his hand acting on the advice of the Judicial and Legal

No.

Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature

590

Parliament of Sierra Leone

contains a significant number of highly experienced

members.
Yes. Despite instability, military interventions, and
electoral volatility, the elections of 1996, 2002, and

2007 created parliaments in which there was some

continuity in membership, and the legislature contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.

PARLIAMENT OF SINGAPORE
Expert consultants: Jens Kayser, Diane K. Mauzy, Ern Ser Tan, Kevin Tan, Li-ann Thio
Score: .38
Influence over
executive (2/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree
12. no veto
13. no review

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

Specified
powers (1/8)
X
X

19. amendments
20. war
21. treaties
22. amnesty
23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

Institutional
capacity (4/6)
X

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

26. media
X

The Parliament of Singapore was established in the

countrys 1959 constitution that declared Singapore an autonomous state. The document called
for a unicameral legislature led by a powerful prime
minister. Singapore separated from Malaysia in
1965, achieving full independence. Constitutional
amendments in 1984 and 1990 introduced nonconstituency members of parliament and nominated members of parliament, respectively. The
stated purpose of these nonelected legislators
was to increase the opportunities of participation for opposition parties and underrepresented
minorities. Prior to 1993 the president was elected
by the legislature, but in that year Singapore introduced direct election of the president.
The legislatures powers are few and scattered.
Apart from its members serving in government and
its choosing the prime minister, parliament has
no meaningful ability to influence the executive
branch. Its institutional autonomy is limited by
substantial executive powers. Most notably, executive gatekeeping authority prevents parliament
from introducing legislation related to taxation,
government debt, and other financial issues. The
legislature lacks all but one of the specified powers

and prerogatives included in this survey. It does,

however, have some institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. The legislature cannot remove the prime
minister from office. Presidential impeachment
requires the involvement of a special tribunal
established by the chief justice of the Supreme
Court.
Article 22l
(3) The Prime Minister or not less than one-quarter
of the total number of the elected Members of Parliament referred to in Article 39 (1)(a) may give notice
of a motion alleging that the President is permanently
incapable of discharging the functions of his office by
reason of mental or physical infirmity or that the President has been guilty of
(a) intentional violation of the Constitution;
(b) treason;
(c) misconduct or corruption involving the abuse of
the powers of his office; or

Parliament of Singapore
(d) any offence involving fraud, dishonesty or moral
turpitude, and setting out full particulars of the allegations made and seeking an inquiry and report
thereon.
(4) Where the motion referred to in clause (3) has
been adopted by not less than half of the total number of the elected Members of Parliament referred to in
Article 39 (1)(a), the Chief Justice shall appoint a tribunal to inquire into the allegations made against the
President.
(5) A tribunal appointed by the Chief Justice shall consist of not less than 5 Judges of the Supreme Court of
whom the Chief Justice shall be one, unless he otherwise decides and such tribunal may regulate its own
procedure and make rules for that purpose.
(6) A tribunal shall, after due inquiry at which the President shall have the right to appear and to be heard in
person or by counsel, make a report of its determination
to the Speaker together with the reasons therefor.
(7) Where the tribunal reports to the Speaker that in its
opinion the President is permanently incapable of discharging the functions of his office by reason of mental or physical infirmity or that the President has been
guilty of any of the other allegations contained in such
resolution, Parliament may by a resolution passed by
not less than three-quarters of the total number of the
elected Members of Parliament referred to in Article 39
(1)(a) remove the President from office.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Ministers are chosen from, and required to
serve simultaneously in, the legislature.
Article 25
(1) The President shall appoint as Prime Minister a
Member of Parliament who in his judgment is likely to
command the confidence of the majority of the Members of Parliament, and shall, acting in accordance with
the advice of the Prime Minister, appoint other Ministers from among the Members of Parliament: Provided
that, if an appointment is made while Parliament is
dissolved, a person who was a Member of the last Parliament may be appointed but shall not continue to
hold office after the first sitting of the next Parliament
unless he is a Member thereof.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
No. The legislature cannot interpellate executive
branch officials.
4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive.

591

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. The president appoints as prime minister the
candidate who enjoys the support of the legislature.
Article 25
(1) The President shall appoint as Prime Minister a
Member of Parliament who in his judgment is likely to
command the confidence of the majority of the Members of Parliament, and shall, acting in accordance with
the advice of the Prime Minister, appoint other Ministers from among the Members of Parliament: Provided
that, if an appointment is made while Parliament is
dissolved, a person who was a Member of the last Parliament may be appointed but shall not continue to
hold office after the first sitting of the next Parliament
unless he is a Member thereof.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers on the advice
of the prime minister, and ministerial appointments do not require the legislatures approval.
Article 25
(1) The President shall appoint as Prime Minister a
Member of Parliament who in his judgment is likely to
command the confidence of the majority of the Members of Parliament, and shall, acting in accordance with
the advice of the Prime Minister, appoint other Ministers from among the Members of Parliament: Provided
that, if an appointment is made while Parliament is
dissolved, a person who was a Member of the last Parliament may be appointed but shall not continue to
hold office after the first sitting of the next Parliament
unless he is a Member thereof.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. Since 1993 the president has been directly
elected. Prior to 1993 the legislature elected the
president.
Article 17
(1) There shall be a President of Singapore who shall be
the Head of State and shall exercise and perform such
powers and functions as are conferred on the President
by this Constitution and any other written law.
(2) The President shall be elected by the citizens of Singapore in accordance with any law made by the Legislature.

592

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence
in the government. The president can, however,
choose to remove the prime minister from office
if he or she believes that the prime minister has
ceased to command the confidence of a majority
of the legislature.
Article 26
(1) The President shall, by writing under the public seal,
declare the office of Prime Minister vacant
(b) if the President, acting in his discretion, is satisfied that the Prime Minister has ceased to command
the confidence of a majority of the Members of Parliament: Provided that, before declaring the office
of Prime Minister vacant under this paragraph, the
President shall inform the Prime Minister that he
is satisfied as aforesaid, and, if the Prime Minister
so requests, the President may dissolve Parliament
instead of making such a declaration.

Parliament of Singapore

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks veto power.
Article 58
(1) Subject to the provisions of Part VII, the power of
the Legislature to make laws shall be exercised by Bills
passed by Parliament and assented to by the President.
(2) A Bill shall become law on being assented to by
the President and such law shall come into operation
on the date of its publication in the Gazette or, if it is
enacted either in such law or in any other law for the
time being in force in Singapore that it shall come into
operation on some other date, on that date.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.

No. The president can dissolve the legislature.

No. The judiciary can review the constitutionality

of laws.

Article 65
(1) The President may, at any time, by Proclamation in
the Gazette, prorogue Parliament.
(2) If, at any time, the office of Prime Minister is vacant,
the President shall, by Proclamation in the Gazette, dissolve Parliament as soon as he is satisfied, acting in his
discretion, that a reasonable period has elapsed since
that office was last vacated and that there is no Member of Parliament likely to command the confidence of
a majority of the Members thereof.
(3) The President may, at any time, by Proclamation
in the Gazette, dissolve Parliament if he is advised by
the Prime Minister to do so, but he shall not be obliged
to act in this respect in accordance with the advice of
the Prime Minister unless he is satisfied that, in tendering that advice the Prime Minister commands the
confidence of a majority of the Members of Parliament.
(3a) The President shall not dissolve Parliament after a
notice of motion proposing an inquiry into the conduct
of the President has been given under Article 22l (3)
unless
(a) a resolution is not passed pursuant to the notice
of such motion under Article 22l (4);
(b) where a resolution has been passed pursuant to
the notice of such motion under Article 22l (4), the
tribunal appointed under Article 22l (5) determines
and reports that the President has not become permanently incapable of discharging the functions of his
office or that the President has not been guilty of any
of the other allegations contained in such motion;
(c) the consequent resolution for the removal of the
President is not passed under Article 22l (7); or
(d) Parliament by resolution requests the President
to dissolve Parliament.

Article 4
This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic
of Singapore and any law enacted by the Legislature
after the commencement of this Constitution which is
inconsistent with this Constitution shall to the extent
of the inconsistency, be void.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. The legislature is prohibited from introducing legislation related to taxation, government
expenditures, government debt, and other financial issues.
Article 59
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and of
Standing Orders of Parliament, any Member may introduce any Bill or propose any motion for debate in, or
may present any petition to, Parliament, and the same
shall be debated and disposed of according to the Standing Orders of Parliament.
(2) A Bill or amendment making provision (whether
directly or indirectly) for
(a) imposing or increasing any tax or abolishing,
reducing or remitting any existing tax;
(b) the borrowing of money, or the giving of any
guarantee, by the Government, or the amendment
of the law relating to the financial obligations of the
Government;
(c) the custody of the Consolidated Fund, the charging of any money on the Consolidated Fund or the
abolition or alteration of any such charge;

Parliament of Singapore

593

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.

(a) such number of elected Members as is required to

be returned at a general election by the constituencies
prescribed by or under any law made by the Legislature;
(b) such other Members, not exceeding 6 in number,
who shall be known as non-constituency Members,
as the Legislature may provide in any law relating
to Parliamentary elections to ensure the representation in Parliament of a minimum number of Members from a political party or parties not forming the
Government; and
(c) such other Members not exceeding 6 in number,
who shall be known as nominated Members, as may
be appointed by the President in accordance with the
provisions of the Fourth Schedule.
(2) A non-constituency Member or a nominated Member shall not vote in Parliament on any motion pertaining to
(a) a Bill to amend the Constitution;
(b) a Supply Bill, Supplementary Supply Bill, or Final
Supply Bill;
(c) a Money Bill as defined in Article 68;
(d) a vote of no confidence in the Government;
and
(e) removing the President from office under Article
22l.
(3) In this article and in Articles 39a and 47, a constituency shall be construed as an electoral division for
the purposes of Parliamentary elections.
(4) If any person who is not a Member of Parliament is
elected as Speaker or Deputy Speaker, he shall, by virtue
of holding the office of Speaker or Deputy Speaker, be
a Member of Parliament in addition to the Members
aforesaid, except for the purposes of Chapter 2 of Part
V and of Article 46.

No. Formally, the legislature has the power to pass

laws on immunity, but in practice, legislators are
subject to arrest and criminal prosecution.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.

Article 63
It shall be lawful for the Legislature by law to determine
and regulate the privileges, immunities or powers of
Parliament.

Yes. The legislature can change the constitution

with a two-thirds majority vote. Amendments to
select articles of the constitution require approval
in a popular referendum.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.

Article 5
(1) Subject to this article and Article 8, the provisions
of this Constitution may be amended by a law enacted
by the Legislature.
(2) A Bill seeking to amend any provision in this Constitution shall not be passed by Parliament unless it has
been supported on Second and Third Readings by the
votes of not less than two-thirds of the total number of
the elected Members of Parliament referred to in Article
39 (1)(a).
(2a) Unless the President, acting in his discretion,
otherwise directs the Speaker in writing, a Bill seeking
to amend this clause, Articles 17 to 22, 22a to 22o, 35,
65, 66, 69, 70, 93a, 94, 95, 105, 107, 110a, 110b, 151
or any provision in Part IV or XI shall not be passed by
Parliament unless it has been supported at a national
referendum by not less than two-thirds of the total

(d) the payment of moneys into the Consolidated

Fund or the payment, issue or withdrawal from
the Consolidated Fund of any moneys not charged
thereon, or any increase in the amount of such a
payment, issue or withdrawal; or
(e) the receipt of any moneys on account of the Consolidated Fund or the custody or issue of such moneys, being provision as respects which the Minister
charged with responsibility for finance signifies that
it goes beyond what is incidental only and not of a
substantial nature having regard to the purposes of
the Bill or amendment, shall not be introduced or
moved except on the recommendation of the President signified by a Minister.
(3) A Bill or amendment shall not be deemed to make
provision for any of the said matters by reason only
that it provides for the imposition or alteration of any
fine or other pecuniary penalty or for the payment or
demand of a license fee or a fee or charge for any service
rendered.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.

Yes. The executive lacks the power to appoint any

members of the legislature. Not all members of
the legislature are elected in the strict sense, however. Non-constituency members of parliament
are the top three members of the opposition who
failed to get elected but received at least 35 percent of the vote. Nominated members of parliament are chosen by a parliamentary select committee. These nonelected members have limited voting privileges in parliament.
Article 39
(1) Parliament shall consist of

594
number of votes cast by the electors registered under
the Parliamentary Elections Act.
(3) In this article, amendment includes addition and
repeal.
Article 8
(1) A Bill for making an amendment to this Part shall
not be passed by Parliament unless it has been supported, at a national referendum, by not less than twothirds of the total number of votes cast by the electors
registered under the Parliamentary Elections Act.
(2) In this article, amendment includes addition and
repeal.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. There is no constitutional provision for the
declaration of war. The president can, however,
declare a state of emergency in response to security threats without the legislatures approval. The
state of emergency expires if it is not subsequently
approved by the legislature.
Article 150
(1) If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency
exists whereby the security or economic life of Singapore is threatened, he may issue a Proclamation of
Emergency.
(2) If a Proclamation of Emergency is issued when Parliament is not sitting, the President shall summon Parliament as soon as practicable, and may, until Parliament is sitting, promulgate ordinances having the force
of law, if satisfied that immediate action is required.
(3) A Proclamation of Emergency and any ordinance
promulgated under clause (2) shall be presented to Parliament and, if not sooner revoked, shall cease to have
effect if a resolution is passed by Parliament annulling
such Proclamation or ordinance, but without prejudice
to anything previously done by virtue thereof or to the
power of the President to issue a new Proclamation
under clause (1) or promulgate any ordinance under
clause (2).
(4) Subject to clause (5) (b), while a Proclamation of
Emergency is in force, Parliament may, notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, make laws with
respect to any matter, if it appears to Parliament that
the law is required by reason of the emergency; and
any provision of this Constitution (except Articles 22e,
22h, 144 (2) and 148a) or of any written law which
requires any consent or concurrence to the passing of a
law or any consultation with respect thereto, or which
restricts the coming into force of a law after it is passed
or the presentation of a Bill to the President for his
assent, shall not apply to a Bill for such a law or an
amendment to such a Bill.
(5)(a) Subject to Paragraph (b), no provision of any
ordinance promulgated under this article, and no
provision of any Act which is passed while a Proclamation of Emergency is in force and which declares
that the law appears to Parliament to be required

Parliament of Singapore
by reason of the emergency, shall be invalid on the
ground of inconsistency with any provision of this
Constitution.
(b) Paragraph (a) shall not validate any provision
inconsistent with
(i) Article 5 (2a);
(ii) the provisions of this Constitution specified in
Article 5 (2a) conferring discretionary powers on
the President; and
(iii) the provisions of this Constitution relating to
religion, citizenship or language.
(6) At the expiration of a period of 6 months beginning
with the date on which a Proclamation of Emergency
ceases to be in force, any ordinance promulgated in
pursuance of the Proclamation and, to the extent that
it could not have been validly made but for this article,
any law made while the Proclamation was in force, shall
cease to have effect, except as to things done or omitted
to be done before the expiration of that period.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
No. The legislatures approval is not necessary to
ratify international treaties.
22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.
No. The government has the power to grant
amnesty.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The president, on the advice of the government, has the power of pardon.
24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject
appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. Judges are appointed by the president on the
advice of the prime minister, and the appointments do not require the legislatures approval.
Article 95
(1) The Chief Justice, the Judges of Appeal, and the
Judges of the High Court shall be appointed by the
President if he, acting in his discretion, concurs with
the advice of the Prime Minister.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The government appoints the chairman of the
Monetary Authority of Singapore.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.


Rada)
National Council of the Slovak Republic (Narodn
a
Article 64
(1) There shall be a session of Parliament once at least
in every year and a period of 6 months shall not intervene between the last sitting of Parliament in any one
session and the first sitting thereof in the next session.
(2) The sessions of Parliament shall be held in such
places and shall commence at such times as the President may, from time to time, by Proclamation in the
Gazette, appoint.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.

595

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC (NARODN

A RADA)
Expert consultants: Jan Fidrmuc, Darina Malov`a, Peter Matijek, Grigorij Meseznikov, Conor ODwyer,
Geoffrey Pridham
Score: .72
Influence over
executive (6/9)

Institutional
autonomy (7/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

26. media

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

Specified
powers (5/8)

18. all elected

Institutional
capacity (5/6)

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

X
X
X

The National Council (Narodna Rada) of the Slovak

Republic was established in the 1993 constitution
upon the breakup of Czechoslovakia. The Council
is a unicameral body. Prior to 1999 the legislature
elected the president, but in that year a constitutional crisis led to a constitutional amendment
that established the direct election of the president.
The legislature has considerable muscle. It
can influence the executive with the powers to
interpellate and investigate the government, and
remove the government with a vote of no con-

fidence. Furthermore, although the president formally has the right to appoint the prime minister, the outcome of parliamentary elections predetermines the presidents choice, meaning that the
legislature effectively chooses the prime minister.
The legislatures institutional autonomy is ensured
by an absence of executive decree, veto, and gatekeeping authorities. The legislature is, however,
subject to dissolution. It exercises a number of specified powers and prerogatives and has much institutional capacity.

596

Rada)
National Council of the Slovak Republic (Narodn
a

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can remove the prime minister
with a vote of no confidence. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of the Constitutional Court.
Article 107
The President can be prosecuted only for the intentional violation of the Constitution or for treason. The
issuance of an accusation against the President of the
Republic is decided by the National Council of the Slovak Republic by a three-fifths majority of the votes of all
Deputies. The accusation is presented by the National
Council of the Slovak Republic to the Constitutional
Court of the Slovak Republic, which decides on it in its
plenary session. The sentencing decision of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic results in the loss
of the function of the President and the capacity to seek
this function again.
Article 115
(1) The president of the Slovak Republic will recall
the Government if the National Council of the Slovak
Republic passes a vote of no confidence in it or if it
turns down the Governments request to pass a vote of
confidence in it.
(2) If the president of the Slovak Republic accepts the
Governments resignation, he will entrust it with the
execution of its duties until a new Government is
appointed.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators who serve in government have a
sleeping mandate, meaning that they may join the
government but forfeit their voting rights in the
legislature during their government service. They
may return to the legislature when their government service ends.
Article 77
(2) If a deputy is appointed member of the Government
of the Slovak Republic, his mandate as a deputy does
not cease while he executes the government post, but
is just not being exercised.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 80
(1) A deputy may address an interpellation to the Government of the Slovak Republic, a member of the Government of the Slovak Republic, or the head of another

central body of state administration concerning matters within their jurisdiction. The deputy must receive
a reply within 30 days.
(2) The reply to an interpellation shall become the subject of a debate in the National Council of the Slovak Republic that may be linked with a vote of confidence.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. The legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. Formally, the president appoints the prime
minister, but in practice, the president appoints
the candidate who enjoys the support of the legislature.
Article 102
The president
f) appoints and recalls the prime minister and other
members of the Government of the Slovak Republic.
Article 110
(1) The prime minister is appointed and recalled by the
president of the Slovak Republic.
(2) Any citizen of the Slovak Republic who can be
elected to the National Council of the Slovak Republic can be appointed prime minister.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers on the recommendation of the prime minister, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 102
The president
f) appoints and recalls the prime minister and other
members of the Government of the Slovak Republic.
Article 111
At the recommendation of the prime minister, the
president of the Slovak Republic appoints and recalls
other members of the Government and entrusts them
with the management of ministries. The president can
appoint as deputy prime minister and minister any citizen who can be elected to the National Council of the
Slovak Republic.


Rada)
National Council of the Slovak Republic (Narodn
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8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. Since 1999 the president has been directly
elected. Prior to 1999 the president was elected by
the legislature.
Article 101
(1) The Head of the Slovak Republic is the President.
The President represents the Slovak Republic externally and internally and by his decisions safeguards the
orderly conduct of the Constitutional organs. The President conducts his office according to his conscience
and convictions and is not bound by any orders.
(2) The President is elected by the citizens of the Slovak Republic in direct elections by secret voting for five
years. (All) citizens who have the right to vote for the
National Council have the right to vote for the President.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government without jeopardizing its own term.
Article 88
(1) The motion to pass a vote of no-confidence in the
Government of the Slovak Republic or a member of it
will be discussed by the National Council of the Slovak
Republic if requested by at least one-fifth of its deputies.
(2) The consent of more than 50 percent of all deputies
is required to pass a vote of no-confidence in the Government of the Slovak Republic or a member of it.
Article 115
(1) The president of the Slovak Republic will recall
the Government if the National Council of the Slovak
Republic passes a vote of no confidence in it or if it
turns down the Governments request to pass a vote of
confidence in it.
(2) If the president of the Slovak Republic accepts the
Governments resignation, he will entrust it with the
execution of its duties until a new Government is
appointed.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 102
(1) The President:
e) may dissolve the National Council of the Slovak
Republic within six months of the appointment of
the Government of the Slovak Republic, if it did
not approve its announced program, if the National
Council of the Slovak Republic did not agree within
three months on a proposed Government law which
the Government connected with a vote of confidence, if the National Council of the Slovak Republic
was not able within no more than three months to

597
agree either that its session was interrupted or that
it was, during this period, repeatedly called into session, or that the session of the National Council of the
Slovak Republic was interrupted for a longer period
than the Constitution permits. (The President) cannot make use of this right during the last six months
of his electoral term, in times of war, martial law
or a state of exception. (The President) dissolves the
National Council of the Slovak Republic in case of
a popular voting on the recall of the President, the
President was not recalled.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote of its total membership.
Article 87
(1) Bills may be introduced by the Committees of the
National Council of the Slovak Republic, members of
the National Council and the Government of the Slovak
Republic.
(2) If the President of the Slovak Republic returns a bill
with comments, the National Council shall reconsider
it and in case of its approval such a law must be promulgated.
(3) The law is signed by the President of the Slovak Republic, the Chairman of the National Council
and the Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic. If the
National Council of the Slovak Republic after reconsideration in spite of the comments of the President of
the Slovak Republic, and the President of the Slovak
Republic does not sign the law, the law is published
without the signature of the President of the Slovak
Republic.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 125
(1) The Constitutional Court rules on the consonance
a) of laws with the Constitution, constitutional laws
with international treaties, with which the National
Council of the Slovak Republic has expressed its
treaty and which were ratified and promulgated in
the manner established by law.
Article 128
The Constitutional Court provides an interpretation of
the Constitution or the constitutional law if the matter
is in dispute.

598

Rada)
National Council of the Slovak Republic (Narodn
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14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power
to impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune.
Article 78
(1) No deputy shall be prosecuted for his vote in the
national council or its committees, and this even after
the expiration of his mandate.
(2) For statements made in the National Council of
the Slovak Republic in the exercise of the function of
deputy, no deputy can be criminally prosecuted and
this even after the expiration of his mandate. The
deputy is subject to the disciplinary powers of the
National Council of the Slovak Republic. The responsibility of the deputy under civil law is not affected
thereby.
(3) A deputy cannot be criminally or disciplinarily prosecuted, not taken into custody without the approval
of the National Council of the Slovak Republic. If the
National Council rejects a criminal prosecution or an
arrest is excluded for the duration of the mandate of
the deputy, in such a case the suspension of his mandate does not count.
(4) If a deputy was apprehended and detained while
committing a criminal offence, the competent organ is
obligated to inform immediately the Chairman of the
National Council of the Slovak Republic. If the mandate
and community committee does not give the required
approval for the arrest, the deputy must be immediately
released.
(5) If the deputy is in custody his mandate does not
end, but it is not taken into account.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 74
(1) Deputies are elected by secret ballot in general,
equal, and direct elections.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
with a three-fifths majority vote.
Article 84
(4) For . . . amending the Constitution . . . the consent
of at least a three-fifths majority of all deputies is
required.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is required for presidential war declarations.
Article 86
The powers of the National Council of the Slovak
Republic shall be mainly to:
j) to resolve to declare war, if the Slovak Republic is
attacked or if a declaration ensues from obligations of
international treaties of common defense against attack
and after the end of war and conclusion of peace.
Article 102
(1) The President:
l) declares war on the basis of a resolution by the
National Council of the Slovak Republic when the Slovak Republic is attacked or when this ensues from
obligations of international treaties concerning joint
defense against assault, and concludes peace.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties on most major issues.
Article 86
The powers of the National Council of the Slovak
Republic shall be mainly to:
d) prior to their ratification, give consent to international treaties concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms, international political treaties, international treaties of a military nature, from which arise
for the Slovak Republic membership in international
organizations, international economic treaties of a
general nature, international treaties for whose implementation a law is required, as well as from international treaties, which directly establish rights and obligations of physical persons or juridical persons, and
also to decide whether it concerns international treaties
according to Art. 7 paragraph (5).
Article 102
(1) The President:
a) represents the Slovak Republic externally, negotiates and ratifies international treaties. He can delegate
negotiation of international treaties to the Government of the Slovak Republic or, with the consent of
the Government, to individual members thereof.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. The president has the power to grant amnesty.


Rada)
National Council of the Slovak Republic (Narodn
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Article 102
(1) The President:
j) pardons and commutes sentences imposed by
courts in criminal proceedings and mitigates sentences in the form of individual grace or amnesty.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 102
The president
i) grants amnesty and pardon, lowers punishments
meted out by criminal courts, issues orders not to initiate or not to continue criminal proceedings, and nullifies punishments.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The president appoints the twelve judges of
the Constitutional Court from a group of twentyfour candidates nominated by the legislature.
Article 134
(1) The Constitutional Court is composed of thirteen
judges.
(2) The judges of the Constitutional Court are
appointed for twelve years by the President of the
Slovak Republic. The National Council of the Slovak
Republic nominates a twofold number of candidates
for judgeships, which the President shall appoint.
Article 145
(1) The judges are appointed and recalled by the President of the Slovak Republic on the proposal of the Judicial Council of the Slovak Republic; he appoints them
without time limits.
(3) The President of the Supreme Court of the Slovak
Republic and the Vice President of the Supreme Court
of the Slovak Republic are appointed from the judges
of the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic by the
President of the Republic for five years.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the governor of the
National Bank of Slovakia.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
Yes. The legislature has a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.

599

Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.

Article 82
(1) The National Council of the Slovak Republic holds
permanent sessions.
(2) The constituent meeting of the National Council
of the Slovak Republic is called by the president of the
Slovak Republic within 30 days after the announcement
of election results. If he fails to do so, the National
Council of the Slovak Republic convenes on the 30th
day after the announcement of the election results.
(3) The National Council of the Slovak Republic may
interrupt its session by means of a resolution. The
length of interruption must not exceed four months
in a year. The chairman, deputy chairmen, and bodies
of the National Council of the Slovak Republic perform
their duties while the National Council of the Slovak
Republic is in recess.
(4) While the session is interrupted, the chairman of
the National Council of the Slovak Republic may call a
meeting of the National Council of the Slovak Republic even prior to the set date. He will call a meeting
whenever requested to do so by the Government of the
Slovak Republic or at least one-fifth of the deputies.
(5) The session of the National Council of the Slovak
Republic ends with the expiration of the electoral term
or with its dissolution.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

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Parliament of Slovenia (Parlament)

PARLIAMENT OF SLOVENIA (PARLAMENT )

Expert consultants: Milica Antic-Gaber, Erika Harris, Damjan Lajh, Nicole Lindstrom,
Jurij Toplak
Score: .75
Influence over
executive (7/9)

Institutional
autonomy (7/9)

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

26. media

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no confidence

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

Specified
powers (6/8)

18. all elected

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

The Parliament (Parlament) of Slovenia traces its

origins to the Slovene parliament in the Yugoslav
federation. In 1989 the Slovene parliament seceded
from the Yugoslav federation. Slovenia subsequently declared independence. Its 1991 constitution called for a bicameral parliament consisting
of a lower house, the National Assembly (Drzavni
zbor), and an upper house, the National Council
(Drzavni svet).
Parliament occupies a commanding position in
national politics. It controls the executive with
powers to remove the prime minister (referred to as
the president of the government) and to appoint,
effectively oversee, and remove the government.
The legislature can be dissolved by the president
and its laws are subject to judicial review, but otherwise the legislature enjoys complete institutional
autonomy. It exercises six of the eight specified
powers measured in this survey and has moderate
institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can remove the prime minister
(president of the government) with a vote of no
confidence. Presidential impeachment requires the
involvement of the Constitutional Court.

Article 109
If in the performance of his office the President of the
Republic violates the Constitution or seriously violates
the law, he may be impeached by the National Assembly before the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional
Court shall decide either that the impeachment charges
are justified or it shall dismiss the charges, and it may
further decide on relieving the President of office by a
two-thirds majority vote of all judges. Upon receiving a
resolution on impeachment from the National Assembly, the Constitutional Court may decide that pending
a decision on impeachment the President of the Republic may not perform his office.
Article 116
(1) The National Assembly may pass a vote of no confidence in the Government only by electing a new President of the Government on the proposal of at least
ten deputies and by a majority vote of all deputies. The
incumbent President of the Government is thereby dismissed, but together with his ministers he must continue to perform his regular duties until the swearing
in of a new Government.
(2) No less than forty-eight hours must elapse between
the lodging of a proposal to elect a new President of the
Government and the vote itself, unless the National
Assembly decides otherwise by a two-thirds majority
vote of all deputies, or if the country is at war or in a
state of emergency.
(3) Where a President of the Government has been
elected on the basis of the fourth paragraph of Article 111 a vote on no confidence is expressed in him if
on the proposal of at least ten deputies, the National

Parliament of Slovenia (Parlament)

Assembly elects a new President of the Government by
a majority of votes cast.
Article 119
The National Assembly may impeach the President of
the Government or ministers before the Constitutional
Court on charges of violating the Constitution and laws
during the performance of their office. The Constitutional Court considers the charges in such a manner as
determined in Article 109.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 118
(1) An interpellation with respect to the work of the
Government or an individual minister may be initiated
in the National Assembly by at least ten deputies.
(2) If, after the debate following such interpellation, a
majority of all deputies carries a vote of no confidence
in the Government or in an individual minister, the
National Assembly dismisses the Government or said
minister.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.

601
the National Assembly a candidate for President of the
Government.
(2) The President of the Government is elected by the
National Assembly by a majority vote of all deputies
unless otherwise provided by this Constitution. Voting
is by secret ballot.
(3) If such candidate does not receive the necessary
majority of votes, the President of the Republic may
after renewed consultation propose within fourteen
days a new candidate, or the same candidate again,
and candidates may also be proposed by parliamentary groups or a minimum of ten deputies. If within
this period several candidates have been proposed, each
one is voted on separately beginning with the candidate
proposed by the President of the Republic, and if this
candidate is not elected, a vote is taken on the other
candidates in the order in which they were proposed.
(4) If no candidate is elected, the President of the
Republic dissolves the National Assembly and calls new
elections, unless within eighty-four hours the National
Assembly decides by a majority of votes cast by those
deputies present to hold new elections for President of
the Government, whereby a majority of votes cast by
those deputies present is sufficient for the election of
the candidate. In such new elections a vote is taken on
candidates individually in order of the number of votes
received in the earlier voting and then on the new candidates proposed prior to the new vote, wherein any
candidate proposed by the President of the Republic
takes precedence.
(5) If in such elections no candidate receives the necessary number of votes, the President of the Republic dissolves the National Assembly and calls new elections.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.

Article 93
The National Assembly may order inquiries on matters
of public importance, and it must do so when required
by a third of the deputies of the National Assembly or
when required by the National Council. For this purpose it shall appoint a commission which in matters of
investigation and examination has powers comparable
to those of judicial authorities.

Yes. The legislature appoints ministers on the recommendation of the prime minister (president of
the government).

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.

Yes. The legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.

Article 103
(1) The President of the Republic is elected in direct,
general elections by secret ballot.

6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

Article 112
(1) Ministers are appointed and dismissed by the
National Assembly on the proposal of the President of
the Government.

No. The president is directly elected.

Yes. The legislature appoints the prime minister

(president of the government).

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Article 111
(1) After consultation with the leaders of parliamentary groups the President of the Republic proposes to

Yes. The legislature can pass a constructive vote of

no confidence in the government, meaning that
the legislature must designate a successor prime

602

minister (president of the government) before passing a vote of no confidence.

Article 116
(1) The National Assembly may pass a vote of no confidence in the Government only by electing a new President of the Government on the proposal of at least
ten deputies and by a majority vote of all deputies. The
incumbent President of the Government is thereby dismissed, but together with his ministers he must continue to perform his regular duties until the swearing
in of a new Government.
(2) No less than forty-eight hours must elapse between
the lodging of a proposal to elect a new President of the
Government and the vote itself, unless the National
Assembly decides otherwise by a two-thirds majority
vote of all deputies, or if the country is at war or in a
state of emergency.
(3) Where a President of the Government has been
elected on the basis of the fourth paragraph of Article 111 a vote on no confidence is expressed in him if
on the proposal of at least ten deputies, the National
Assembly elects a new President of the Government by
a majority of votes cast.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 117
(1) The President of the Government may require a
vote of confidence in the Government. If the Government does not receive the support of a majority vote of
all deputies, the National Assembly must elect within
thirty days a new President of the Government or in a
new vote express its confidence in the incumbent President of the Government, or failing this, the President of
the Republic dissolves the National Assembly and calls
new elections. The President of the Government may
tie the issue of confidence to the adoption of a law or to
some other decision in the National Assembly. If such
decision is not adopted, it is deemed that a vote of no
confidence in the Government has been passed.
(2) No less than forty-eight hours must elapse between
the requirement of a vote of confidence and the vote
itself.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. In normal political circumstances, the executive lacks decree power. The president can issue
decrees that have the force of law only when the
legislature is unable to meet because of war or a
state of emergency.
Article 108
(1) In the event that the National Assembly is unable
to convene due to a state of emergency or war, the
President of the Republic may, on the proposal of the
Government, issue decrees with the force of law.

Parliament of Slovenia (Parlament)

(2) Such decrees may, in exception, restrict individual
rights and fundamental freedoms as provided by Article
16 of this Constitution.
(3) The President of the Republic must submit decrees
with the force of law to the National Assembly for confirmation immediately upon it next convening.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks veto power.
Article 91
(1) Laws are promulgated by the President of the
Republic no later than eight days after they have been
passed.
(2) The National Council may within seven days of the
passing of a law and prior to its promulgation require
the National Assembly to decide again on such law. In
deciding again, a majority of all deputies must vote for
such law to be passed unless the Constitution envisages
a higher majority for the passing of the law under consideration. Such new decision by the National Assembly
is final.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 153
(1) Laws, regulations and other general legal acts must
be in conformity with the Constitution.
(2) Laws must be in conformity with generally accepted
principles of international law and with valid treaties
ratified by the National Assembly, whereas regulations
and other general legal acts must also be in conformity
with other ratified treaties.
(3) Regulations and other general legal acts must be in
conformity with the Constitution and laws.
(4) Individual acts and actions of state authorities, local
community authorities and bearers of public authority
must be based on a law or regulation adopted pursuant
to law.
Article 160
(1) The Constitutional Court decides:
on the conformity of laws with the Constitution.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.

Parliament of Slovenia (Parlament)

16. The legislature controls the resources that finance

its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto, here
expressed as apprehended committing a criminal
offence for which a prison sentence of over five
years is prescribed.
Article 83
(1) No deputy of the National Assembly shall be criminally liable for any opinion expressed or vote cast at
sessions of the National Assembly or its working bodies.
(2) No deputy may be detained nor, where such deputy
claims immunity, may criminal proceedings be initiated against him without the permission of the
National Assembly, except where such deputy has been
apprehended committing a criminal offence for which
a prison sentence of over five years is prescribed.
(3) The National Assembly may also grant immunity
to a deputy who has not claimed such immunity or
who has been apprehended committing such criminal offence as referred to in the preceding paragraph.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 80
(1) The National Assembly is composed of deputies of
the citizens of Slovenia and comprises ninety deputies.
(2) Deputies are elected by universal, equal, direct and
secret voting.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
with a two-thirds majority vote.
Article 168
(1) A proposal to initiate the procedure for amending the Constitution may be made by twenty deputies
of the National Assembly, the Government or at least
thirty thousand voters.
(2) Such proposal is decided upon by the National
Assembly by a two-thirds majority vote of deputies
present.
Article 169
The National Assembly adopts acts amending the Constitution by a two-thirds majority vote of all deputies.
Article 170
(1) The National Assembly must submit a proposed
constitutional amendment to voters for adoption in

603
a referendum, if so required by at least thirty deputies.
(2) A constitutional amendment is adopted in a referendum if a majority of those voting voted in favour of
the same, provided that a majority of all voters participated in the referendum.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislature declares war with the common
exception for foreign invasion. If a great and general danger threatens the existence of the state
at a time when the legislature is unable to meet,
the president can declare war and seek retroactive
approval.
Article 92
(1) A state of emergency shall be declared whenever
a great and general danger threatens the existence of
the state. The declaration of war or state of emergency,
urgent measures and their repeal shall be decided upon
by the National Assembly on the proposal of the Government.
(2) The National Assembly decides on the use of the
defence forces.
(3) In the event that the National Assembly is unable
to convene, the President of the Republic shall decide
on matters from the first and second paragraphs of this
article. Such decisions must be submitted for confirmation to the National Assembly immediately upon it next
convening.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 86
The National Assembly adopts laws and other decisions
and ratifies treaties by a majority of votes cast by those
deputies present, save where a different type of majority
is provided by the Constitution or by law.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 107
(1) The President of the Republic:
decides on the granting of clemency.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislature elects judges on the proposal
of the Judicial Council.

604

Parliament of Slovenia (Parlament)

Article 130
Judges are elected by the National Assembly on the proposal of the Judicial Council.

of the deputies of the National Assembly or by the President of the Republic.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

No.

Yes. The legislature appoints the governor of the

Bank of Slovenia.

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.

Article 152
(2) The governor of the central bank is appointed by
the National Assembly.

No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

Yes. The legislature appoints members to the board

that oversees the operations of the public media.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes.

Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.

Article 85
(1) The National Assembly meets in regular and
extraordinary sessions.
(2) Regular and extraordinary sessions are called by the
President of the National Assembly; an extraordinary
session must be called if so required by at least a quarter

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL ASSEMBLY OF SOMALIA

Score: .00
Influence over
executive (0/9)

Institutional
autonomy (0/9)

Specified
powers (0/8)

Institutional
capacity (0/8)

1. replace

10. no
dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments

27. sessions

20. war

28. secretary

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

24. judiciary
25. central bank
26. media

18. all elected

The Transitional Federal Assembly (TFA) of Somalia

traces its origins to the legislature that was established upon independence in 1960. Somalia was

ruled by Siad Barre from 1969 until his ouster in

1991, after which the country descended into the
anarchy that prevails to this day.

Parliament of South Africa

605

The TFA was established in August 2004 as

part of a new transitional government. The conference establishing the legislature was held in
neighboring Kenya. The members of the new legislature elected a transitional president, who then
appointed a prime minister and a transitional
federal government. In June 2005 some members of the legislature moved back to Somalia.
An insurgency, the Union of Islamic Courts, subsequently forced the government from the capital, Mogadishu. Ethiopian troops then intervened

and pushed the Union of Islamic Courts out of

Mogadishu.
The legislature exerts no meaningful power in
an anarchic Somalia. In early 2007 a legislative session convened and voted to declare martial law,
giving the government the power to rule by decree.
The session was not held in the capital, but in the
town of Baidoa. Only about one-third of the members of the legislature attended; the rest were in
Mogadishu, Kenya, or scattered throughout other
locations. The legislature does not have a parliament building in the capital.

PARLIAMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA

Expert consultants: Thomas A. Koelble, Nancy Msibi, Robert M. Price, Robert I. Rotberg, Ros Sagnelli,
Robert Schrire
Score: .63
Influence over
executive (7/9)

Institutional
autonomy (6/9)

Specified
powers (3/8)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no confidence

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

26. media

X
X
X

The Parliament of South Africa traces its origins

to the 1910 constitution that established a selfgoverning Union of South Africa within the British
Empire. In 1961 a new constitution declared an
independent state. Under the subsequent postindependence apartheid rule, only white South
Africans were able to occupy legislative seats; separate representative bodies were established for
other racial groups. The apartheid system came
to an end in 1994, and South Africa adopted a
new constitution in 1996. The document called
for a bicameral parliament consisting of a lower
house, the National Assembly, and an upper house,
the National Council of Provinces, which comprises representatives drawn from each of the nine
provincial legislatures.

The legislature has considerable powers, including extensive control over the executive. Among
other powers, the legislature elects the president,
can interpellate and investigate officials from the
executive, and can remove the president from
office. It merits note that the South African president, despite the name of the office, plays the role
typically associated with that of a prime minister.
The South African president is elected by and presides over the legislature and heads the government in the manner of a prime minister. The legislature also enjoys broad institutional autonomy
that is limited only by the threat of dissolution,
judicial review, and a lack of immunity for legislators. The legislature exercises relatively few of the
specified powers and prerogatives measured in this

606

survey. Its institutional capacity is limited by lack

of staff.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can remove the president with
a vote of no confidence, or by a two-thirds majority vote of its total membership, it can remove the
president from office for violations of the constitution, misconduct, or inability to perform the functions of office.
Section 89
(1) The National Assembly, by a resolution adopted
with a supporting vote of at least two thirds of its members, may remove the President from office only on the
grounds of
(a) a serious violation of the Constitution or the law;
(b) serious misconduct; or
(c) inability to perform the functions of office.
(2) Anyone who has been removed from the office of
President in terms of subsection (1) (a) or (b) may not
receive any benefits of that office, and may not serve in
any public office.
Section 102
(1) If the National Assembly, by a vote supported by a
majority of its members, passes a motion of no confidence in the Cabinet excluding the President, the President must reconstitute the Cabinet.
(2) If the National Assembly, by a vote supported by
a majority of its members, passes a motion of no confidence in the President, the President and the other
members of the Cabinet and any Deputy Ministers must
resign.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Ministers are generally selected from, and may
serve simultaneously in, the legislature.
Section 91
(2) The President appoints the Deputy President and
Ministers, assigns their powers and functions, and may
dismiss them.
(3) The President
(a) must select the Deputy President from among the
members of the National Assembly;
(b) may select any number of Ministers from among
the members of the Assembly; and
(c) may select no more than two Ministers from outside the Assembly.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.

Parliament of South Africa

Yes. The legislature regularly summons executive

branch officials.
Section 56
The National Assembly or any of its committees may
(a) summon any person to appear before it to give
evidence on oath or affirmation, or to produce documents;
(b) require any person or institution to report to it;
(c) compel, in terms of national legislation or the
rules and orders, any person or institution to comply
with a summons or requirement in terms of paragraph (a) or (b); and
(d) receive petitions, representations or submissions
from any interested persons or institutions.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. The legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. There is no prime minister.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Section 91
(2) The President appoints the Deputy President and
Ministers, assigns their powers and functions, and may
dismiss them.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The National Assembly elects the president,
who is chosen from among members of the Assembly.
Section 86
(1) At its first sitting after its election, and whenever
necessary to fill a vacancy, the National Assembly must
elect a woman or a man from among its members to be
the President.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.

Parliament of South Africa

Section 102
(1) If the National Assembly, by a vote supported by a
majority of its members, passes a motion of no confidence in the Cabinet excluding the President, the President must reconstitute the Cabinet.
(2) If the National Assembly, by a vote supported by
a majority of its members, passes a motion of no confidence in the President, the President and the other
members of the Cabinet and any Deputy Ministers must
resign.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Section 50
(1) The President must dissolve the National Assembly
if
(a) the Assembly has adopted a resolution to dissolve
with a supporting vote of a majority of its members;
and
(b) three years have passed since the Assembly was
elected.
(2) The Acting President must dissolve the National
Assembly if
(a) there is a vacancy in the office of President; and
(b) the Assembly fails to elect a new President within
30 days after the vacancy occurred.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote of its present members.
Section 79
(1) The President must either assent to and sign a Bill
passed in terms of this Chapter or, if the President has
reservations about the constitutionality of the Bill, refer
it back to the National Assembly for reconsideration.
(2) The joint rules and orders must provide for the procedure for the reconsideration of a Bill by the National
Assembly and the participation of the National Council
of Provinces in the process.
(3) The National Council of Provinces must participate
in the reconsideration of a Bill that the President has
referred back to the National Assembly if
(a) the Presidents reservations about the constitutionality of the Bill relate to a procedural matter that
involves the Council; or
(b) section 74(1), (2) or (3)(b) or 76 was applicable in
the passing of the Bill.
(4) If, after reconsideration, a Bill fully accommodates the Presidents reservations, the President must

607
assent to and sign the Bill; if not, the President must
either
(a) assent to and sign the Bill; or
(b) refer it to the Constitutional Court for a decision
on its constitutionality.
(5) If the Constitutional Court decides that the Bill is
constitutional, the President must assent to and sign
it.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Section 80
(1) Members of the National Assembly may apply to
the Constitutional Court for an order declaring that all
or part of an Act of Parliament is unconstitutional.
(2) An application
(a) must be supported by at least one third of the
members of the Assembly; and
(b) must be made within 30 days of the date on
which the President assented to and signed the Act.
(3) The Constitutional Court may order that all or part
of an Act that is the subject of an application in terms of
subsection (1) has no force until the Court has decided
the application if
(a) the interests of justice require this; and
(b) the application has a reasonable prospect of success.
(4) If an application is unsuccessful, and did not have
a reasonable prospect of success, the Constitutional
Court may order the applicants to pay costs.
Section 84
(1) The President has the powers entrusted by the Constitution and legislation, including those necessary to
perform the functions of Head of State and head of the
national executive.
(2) The President is responsible for
(b) referring a Bill back to the National Assembly for
reconsideration of the Bills constitutionality;
(c) referring a Bill to the Constitutional Court for a
decision on the Bills constitutionality.
Section 172
(1) When deciding a constitutional matter within its
power, a court
(a) must declare that any law or conduct that is
inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the
extent of its inconsistency; and
(b) may make any order that is just and equitable,
including
(i) an order limiting the retrospective effect of the
declaration of invalidity; and
(ii) an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on any conditions, to allow
the competent authority to correct the defect.
(2) (a) The Supreme Court of Appeal, a High Court or
a court of similar status may make an order concerning
the constitutional validity of an Act of Parliament, a
provincial Act or any conduct of the President, but an

608
order of constitutional invalidity has no force unless it
is confirmed by the Constitutional Court.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,
including control over members perquisites.
Section 58
(3) Salaries, allowances and benefits payable to members of the National Assembly are a direct charge against
the National Revenue Fund.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislative immunity extends to official parliamentary business only. Legislators are subject to
arrest for common crimes.
Section 58
(1) Cabinet members and members of the National
Assembly
(a) have freedom of speech in the Assembly and in
its committees, subject to its rules and orders; and
(b) are not liable to civil or criminal proceedings,
arrest, imprisonment or damages for
(i) anything that they have said in, produced
before or submitted to the Assembly or any of its
committees; or
(ii) anything revealed as a result of anything that
they have said in, produced before or submitted to
the Assembly or any of its committees.
(2) Other privileges and immunities of the National
Assembly, Cabinet members and members of the
Assembly may be prescribed by national legislation.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the National Assembly are
elected. Sixty percent of the National Council of
Provinces is elected, with the remainder appointed
by provincial legislatures. The National Council
of Provinces is, for the most part, a ceremonial
body.

Parliament of South Africa

Section 46
(1) The National Assembly consists of no fewer than
350 and no more than 400 women and men elected as
members in terms of an electoral system that
(a) is prescribed by national legislation;
(b) is based on the national common voters roll;
(c) provides for a minimum voting age of 18 years;
and
(d) results, in general, in proportional representation.
(2) An Act of Parliament must provide a formula for
determining the number of members of the National
Assembly.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution with a three-fourths majority vote in the
National Assembly and with the approval of at least
six of the provinces represented in the National
Council.
Section 74
(1) Section 1 and this subsection may be amended by
a Bill passed
by
(a) the National Assembly, with a supporting vote of
at least 75 per cent of its members; and
(b) the National Council of Provinces, with a supporting vote of at least six provinces.
(2) Chapter 2 may be amended by a Bill passed by
(a) the National Assembly, with a supporting vote of
at least two thirds of its members; and
(b) the National Council of Provinces, with a supporting vote of at least six provinces.
(3) Any other provision of the Constitution may be
amended by a Bill passed
(a) by the National Assembly, with a supporting vote
of at least two thirds of its members; and
(b) also by the National Council of Provinces, with a
supporting vote of at least six provinces, if the amendment
(i) relates to a matter that affects the Council;
(ii) alters provincial boundaries, powers, functions
or institutions; or
(iii) amends a provision that deals specifically with
a provincial matter.
(9) A Bill amending the Constitution that has been
passed by the National Assembly and, where applicable,
by the National Council of Provinces, must be referred
to the President for assent.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. The president can declare war without the legislatures approval. The declaration of war lapses if
it is not subsequently approved by the legislature
within seven days.

Parliament of South Africa

Section 203
(1) The President as head of the national executive may
declare a state of national defence, and must inform
Parliament promptly and in appropriate detail of
(a) the reasons for the declaration;
(b) any place where the defence force is being
employed; and
(c) the number of people involved.
(2) If Parliament is not sitting when a state of national
defence is declared, the President must summon Parliament to an extraordinary sitting within seven days of
the declaration.
(3) A declaration of a state of national defence lapses
unless it is approved by Parliament within seven days
of the declaration.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties on most major issues.
Section 231
(1) The negotiating and signing of all international
agreements is the responsibility of the national executive.
(2) An international agreement binds the Republic
only after it has been approved by resolution in both
the National Assembly and the National Council of
Provinces, unless it is an agreement referred to in subsection (3).
(3) An international agreement of a technical, administrative or executive nature, or an agreement which
does not require either ratification or accession, entered
into by the national executive, binds the Republic
without approval by the National Assembly and the
National Council of Provinces, but must be tabled in
the Assembly and the Council within a reasonable
time.
(4) Any international agreement becomes law in the
Republic when it is enacted into law by national legislation; but a self-executing provision of an agreement
that has been approved by Parliament is law in the
Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution
or an Act of Parliament.
(5) The Republic is bound by international agreements
which were binding on the Republic when this Constitution took effect.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

609

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The presidents judicial nominations do not
require the legislatures approval, although for
some appointments to high positions on the bench
the president is obliged to consult with the leaders
of parties represented in the National Assembly.
Section 174
(3) The President as head of the national executive,
after consulting the Judicial Service Commission and
the leaders of parties represented in the National Assembly, appoints the President and Deputy President of
the Constitutional Court and, after consulting the Judicial Service Commission, appoints the Chief Justice and
Deputy Chief Justice.
(4) The other judges of the Constitutional Court are
appointed by the President as head of the national executive, after consulting the President of the Constitutional Court and the leaders of parties represented in
the National Assembly, in accordance with the following procedure:
(a) The Judicial Service Commission must prepare a
list of nominees with three names more than the
number of appointments to be made, and submit the
list to the President.
(b) The President may make appointments from the
list, and must advise the Judicial Service Commission,
with reasons, if any of the nominees are unacceptable
and any appointment remains to be made.
(c) The Judicial Service Commission must supplement the list with further nominees and the President must make the remaining appointments from
the supplemented list.
(5) At all times, at least four members of the Constitutional Court must be persons who were judges at the
time they were appointed to the Constitutional Court.
(6) The President must appoint the judges of all other
courts on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission.
(7) Other judicial officers must be appointed in terms
of an Act of Parliament which must ensure that the
appointment, promotion, transfer or dismissal of, or
disciplinary steps against, these judicial officers take
place without favour or prejudice.
(8) Before judicial officers begin to perform their functions, they must take an oath or affirm, in accordance
with Schedule 2, that they will uphold and protect the
Constitution.

No. Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president appoints the governor of the

South African Reserve Bank.

No. The president has the power of pardon.

Section 84
(2) The President is responsible for
(j) pardoning or reprieving offenders and remitting
any fines, penalties or forfeitures.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
Yes. The legislature has influence over the board
that regulates public broadcasting.

610

Parliament of South Africa

Section 192
National legislation must establish an independent
authority to regulate broadcasting in the public interest,
and to ensure fairness and a diversity of views broadly
representing South African society.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.
Section 51
(1) After an election, the first sitting of the National
Assembly must take place at a time and on a date determined by the President of the Constitutional Court,
but not more than 14 days after the election result has
been declared. The National Assembly may determine
the time and duration of its other sittings and its recess
periods.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members. The dominance of a single party, the
African National Congress (ANC), has contributed
to high rates of re-election and stability of membership. In the 1994 election for the National Assembly, the ANC captured 252 of 400 seats. The ANC
subsequently won 266 seats in 1999 and 279 seats
in 2004.

THE GENERAL COURTS OF SPAIN (LAS CORTES GENERALES )

Expert consultants: Carles Campuzano, Blanca Martin Delgado, Oscar Luengo,
Jaime Rodrguez-Arana, Sebastian Royo
Score: .72
Influence over
executive (8/9)

Institutional
autonomy (6/9)

Specified
powers (5/8)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

23. pardon
24. judiciary

25. central bank

26. media

X
X
X

The General Courts (Las Cortes Generales) of Spain

came into being during first decade of the nineteenth century. For much of its history, however,
the General Courts, or parliament, was sidelined
by dominant executives: a constitutional monarch

in the nineteenth century and Francisco Francos

military-backed dictatorship in the twentieth century. After Francos death in 1975, Spain drew up a
new constitution, which came into effect in 1978.
The document established a bicameral legislature

The General Courts of Spain (Las Cortes Generales)

611

consisting of a directly elected lower house, the

Congress of Deputies (Congreso de los Diputados), and an upper house, the Senate (Senado).
The constitutional excerpts cited below translate
Congreso de los Diputados as House of Representatives.
The king retains considerable moral authority
in Spains constitutional monarchy, but the legislature is the center of national politics and government. It enjoys many controls over the executive. Its institutional autonomy is protected by the
absence of executive decree, veto, and gatekeeping
powers. The legislature has a number of specified
powers, including the authority to change the constitution. It has some institutional capacity.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.

SURVEY

Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials

from the executive.

1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can remove the prime minister
(referred to as the president of the government)
with a vote of no confidence.
Article 101
(1) The Government shall resign after the holding of
general elections in the cases of the loss of confidence
by parliament as stipulated in the Constitution, or
because of the resignation or death of its President.
(2) But the outgoing Government shall continue in its
functions until the new Government takes office.
Article 113
(1) The House of Representatives may require political
responsibility from the Government by means of the
adoption by an absolute majority of a motion of censure.
(2) The motion of censure must be proposed by at least
one-tenth of the Deputies and must include a candidate
to the office of the Presidency of the Government.
(3) The motion of censure cannot be voted on until five
days after its presentation. During the first two days of
this period, alternative motions may be presented.
(4) If the motion of censure is not approved by the
House of Representatives, its signers cannot present
another during the same period of sessions.
Article 114
(1) If the House of Representatives denies its confidence
to the Government, it must present its resignation to
the King, the President of the Government then to be
designated pursuant to the provisions of Article 99.
(2) If the House of Representatives adopts a motion
of censure, the Government shall present its resignation to the King and the candidate included in it shall
be understood to have the confidence of the Chamber
for the purposes specified in Article 92. The King shall
appoint him President of the Government.

Yes. Ministers may serve simultaneously in the legislature.

Article 98
(3) The members of the Government may not exercise
representative functions other than those of the parliamentary mandate itself, nor any other public function
which does not derive from their office, nor any professional or mercantile activity whatsoever.
(4) A law shall regulate the Statute and the incompatibilities of the members of the Government.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.

Article 111
(1) The Government and each of its members are subject to interpellations or questions put to them in the
Chambers. The rules shall establish a weekly minimum
time for this type of debate.
(2) Any interpellation may lead to a motion in which
the Chamber can express its position.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can establish commissions to
investigate the executive.
Article 76
(1) The House of Representatives and the Senate, and if
necessary both Chambers jointly, may appoint investigating Commissions on any subject of public interest.
Their conclusions shall not be binding on the courts
nor will they affect judicial decisions, but they may be
transmitted to the Public Prosecutor for the exercise of
the necessary actions when required.
(2) Appearance before the Chambers on request shall
be obligatory. The law shall regulate the sanctions
which may be imposed for noncompliance with this
obligation.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. The legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. The king appoints as prime minister (president of the government) the candidate who enjoys
majority support in the legislature.

612
Article 99
(1) After each renewal of the House of Representatives
and in the other cases provided for by the Constitution,
the King shall, after consultation with the representatives designated by the political groups represented in
parliament, and through the President of the House of
Representatives, propose a candidate for the Presidency
of the Government.
(2) The proposed candidate, in conformity with the
provisions of the foregoing paragraph, shall submit to
the House of Representatives the political program of
the Government he intends to form and shall seek the
confidence of the Chamber.
(3) If the House of Representatives, by an absolute
majority of its members, grants its confidence to said
candidate, the King will appoint him President. If said
majority is not obtained, the same proposal shall be
submitted to a new vote 98 hours after the former, and
confidence shall be understood to have been granted if
a simple majority is obtained.
(4) If after the aforementioned votes are cast, confidence is not granted for investiture, successive proposals will be made in the manner foreseen in the foregoing
paragraphs.
(5) If within two months from the first voting for
investiture no candidate has obtained the confidence
of the House of Representatives, the King shall dissolve
both Chambers and call for new elections with the concurrence of the President of the House of Representatives.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The king appoints ministers on the recommendation of the prime minister (president of the government), and the appointments do not require
the legislatures approval.
Article 100
The other members of the Government shall be
appointed and dismissed by the King at the proposal
of its President.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The country lacks a presidency. The king is the
head of state.
Article 56
(1) The King is the Head of State, the symbol of its
unity and permanence. He arbitrates and moderates
the regular functioning of the institutions, assumes the
highest representation of the Spanish State in international relations, especially with the nations of its historical community, and exercises the functions expressly
attributed to him by the Constitution and the laws.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

The General Courts of Spain (Las Cortes Generales)

Yes. The legislature can pass a constructive vote of

no confidence in the government, meaning that
the legislature must designate a successor prime
minister (president of the government) before passing a vote of no confidence.
Article 101
(1) The Government shall resign after the holding of
general elections in the cases of the loss of confidence
by parliament as stipulated in the Constitution, or
because of the resignation or death of its President.
(2) But the outgoing Government shall continue in its
functions until the new Government takes office.
Article 113
(1) The House of Representatives may require political
responsibility from the Government by means of the
adoption by an absolute majority of a motion of censure.
(2) The motion of censure must be proposed by at least
one-tenth of the Deputies and must include a candidate
to the office of the Presidency of the Government.
(3) The motion of censure cannot be voted on until five
days after its presentation. During the first two days of
this period, alternative motions may be presented.
(4) If the motion of censure is not approved by the
House of Representatives, its signers cannot present
another during the same period of sessions.
Article 114
(1) If the House of Representatives denies its confidence
to the Government, it must present its resignation to
the King, the President of the Government then to be
designated pursuant to the provisions of Article 99.
(2) If the House of Representatives adopts a motion
of censure, the Government shall present its resignation to the King and the candidate included in it shall
be understood to have the confidence of the Chamber
for the purposes specified in Article 92. The King shall
appoint him President of the Government.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The king can dissolve the legislature on the
proposal of the prime minister (president of the
government).
Article 99
(5) If within two months from the first voting for
investiture no candidate has obtained the confidence
of the House of Representatives, the King shall dissolve
both Chambers and call for new elections with the concurrence of the President of the House of Representatives.
Article 115
(1) The President of the Government, after deliberation
of the Council of Ministers, and on his exclusive responsibility, may propose the dissolution of the House of
Representatives, the Senate, and the Parliament, which
shall be decreed by the King. The dissolution decree
shall establish the date of the elections.

The General Courts of Spain (Las Cortes Generales)

613

(2) The proposal for dissolution may not be presented

when a motion of censure is in process.
(3) No new dissolution may take place before a year has
passed since the previous one, except as provided for in
Article 99 (5).

Article 163
If a judicial organ considers, in some action, that a
regulation with the status of law which is applicable
thereto and upon the validity of which the judgment
depends, may be contrary to the Constitution, it may
bring the matter before the Constitutional Court in the
cases, manner, and with the consequences which the
law establishes, which in no case shall be suspensive.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power in normal
political circumstances. In cases of extraordinary
and urgent necessity, however, the government
can issue decrees that have the force of law. The
laws subsequently lapse if they are not explicitly
approved by the legislature.
Article 86
(1) In the case of extraordinary and urgent necessity,
the Government may issue provisional legislative decisions which shall take the form of decree-laws and
which may not affect the regulation of the basic institution of the State, the rights, duties, and liberties of
the citizens which are regulated in Title I, the systems
of Autonomous Communities, or the general electoral
Law.
(2) The Decree-laws must be immediately submitted
for debate and voting by the entire House of Representatives of Deputies convoked for that purpose, if
it is not already in session, within a period of thirty
days after their promulgation. The House of Representatives must expressly declare within that period
its approval or repeal, for which purpose the Regulation shall establish a special and summary procedure.
(3) During the period established in the foregoing paragraph, the Parliament may treat them as draft laws by
emergency procedure.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks veto power.
13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 161
(1) The Constitutional Court has jurisdiction over the
whole of Spanish territory and is competent to hear:
a) appeals on the grounds of unconstitutionality
against laws and regulations having the force of law;
a declaration of unconstitutionality of a legal rule
with the status of law, interpreted by jurisprudence,
shall also affect the latter, although an overturned
sentence or sentences shall not lose the validity of a
judgment.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The executive can impound funds. The legislatures budgetary allocations authorize, but do not
require, the expenditure of funds.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
Article 71
(4) The Deputies and Senators shall receive a remuneration which shall be fixed by the respective Chamber.
Article 72
(1) The Chambers establish their own regulations,
autonomously approve their own budgets, and by common accord regulate the Personnel Statute of the Parliament. The Regulations and their reform shall be submitted to a final voting in their entirety which shall
require an absolute majority.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators enjoy immunity with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto.
Article 71
(1) The Deputies and Senators enjoy indemnity for the
opinions expressed during the exercise of their functions.
(2) During the period of their mandate, the Deputies
and Senators enjoy immunity and may only be arrested
in case of flagrante delicto. They may not be indicted
or tried without prior authorization of the respective
Chamber.
(3) In actions against Deputies and Senators, the Criminal Section of the Supreme Court shall be competent.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.

614
Article 68
(1) The House of Representatives is composed of a minimum of 300 and a maximum of 400 Deputies elected by
universal, free, equal, direct, and secret suffrage under
the terms established by law.
Article 69
(1) The Senate is the chamber of territorial representation.
(2) In each province, four senators will be elected by
universal, free, equal, direct, and secret suffrage by the
voters of each of them under the terms established by
an organic law.
(3) In the island provinces, each island or grouping of
them with a representation or insular council shall be
a voting district for the purposes of the election of
senators, three of them going to each of the major
islands Grand Canary, Mallorca, and Tenerife and
one each to the following islands or groupings: IbizaFormentera, Menorca, Fuerteventura, Gomera, Hierro,
Lanzarote, and La Palma.
(4) The cities of Ceuta and Melilla shall elect two senators each.
(5) The Autonomous Communities shall also designate
one senator and one additional senator for each million inhabitants in their respective territories. The designation shall be made by the legislative assembly, or
in its absence, by the higher collective body of the
Autonomous Community pursuant to the provisions of
the Statutes, which in any case, shall insure adequate
proportional representation.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
with a three-fifths majority vote in each chamber or by an absolute majority vote in the Senate
and a two-thirds majority vote in the Congress of
Deputies.
Article 167
(1) Bills on Constitutional amendment must be
approved by a majority of three-fifths of the members
of each Chamber. If there is no agreement between the
Chambers, an effort to reach it shall be made by setting up a Joint Commission of Deputies and Senators
which shall submit a text to be voted on by the House
of Representatives and the Senate.
(2) If adoption is not obtained by means of the procedure outlined in the foregoing paragraph, and provided that the text has obtained a favorable vote by an
absolute majority of the Senate, the House of Representatives may approve the amendment by a two-thirds
vote.
(3) Once the amendment has been passed by the Parliament, it shall be submitted to a referendum for its
ratification, if so requested by one tenth of the members
of either Chamber within fifteen days after its passage.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

The General Courts of Spain (Las Cortes Generales)

Yes. The legislatures approval is required for the

king to declare war.
Article 63
(3) It is incumbent on the King, after authorization by
the Parliament, to declare war and make peace.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties on most major issues.
Article 63
(2) It is incumbent on the King to express the consent
of the State to obligate itself internationally through
treaties in conformity with the Constitution and the
laws.
Article 93
By means of an organic law, authorization may be established for the conclusion of treaties which attribute to
an international organization or institution the exercise of competences derived from the Constitution. It is
the responsibility of the Parliament or the Government,
depending on the cases, to guarantee compliance with
these treaties and the resolutions emanating from the
international or supranational organizations who have
been entitled by this cession.
Article 94
(1) The giving of the consent of the State to obligate
itself to something by means of treaties or agreements
shall require prior authorization of the Parliament in
the following cases:
a) Treaties of a political nature;
b) Treaties or agreements of a military nature;
c) Treaties or agreements which affect the territorial
integrity of the State or the fundamental rights and
duties established in Title I;
d) Treaties or agreements which imply important
obligations for the public treasury;
e) Treaties or agreements which involve modification
or repeal of some law or require legislative measures
for their execution.
(2) The House of Representatives and the Senate shall
be immediately informed of the conclusion of the
treaties or agreements.
Article 95
(1) The conclusion of an international treaty which
contains stipulations contrary to the Constitution shall
require a prior constitutional revision.
(2) The Government or either of the Chambers may
request the Constitutional Court to declare whether or
not such a contradiction exists.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The king has the power of pardon.

The General Courts of Spain (Las Cortes Generales)

615

Article 62
It is incumbent upon the King:
i) to exercise the right of clemency pursuant to a law,
which cannot authorize general pardons.

Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session for

about seven months each year.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislature nominates eight of the twelve
members of the Constitutional Court. The kings
subsequent appointment of these nominations is a
mere formality.
Article 123
(2) The President of the Supreme Court shall be
appointed by the King at the proposal of the General
Council of the judicial branch in the manner determined by law.
Article 159
(1) The Constitutional Court is composed of twelve
members appointed by the King. Of these, four shall
be nominated by the House of Representatives by a
majority of three-fifths of its members, four shall be
nominated by the Senate with the same majority; two
shall be nominated by the Government, and two by the
General Council of the Judiciary.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The king, on the recommendation of the prime
minister, appoints the governor of the Bank of
Spain.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
Yes. The legislature appoints the members of the
board that oversees public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Article 73
(1) The Chambers shall meet annually in two ordinary
periods of sessions, the first from September to December and the second from February to June.
(2) The Chambers may meet in extraordinary periods
of sessions at the request of the Government, the Permanent Deputation, or by the absolute majority of the
members of either of the two Chambers. The extraordinary periods of sessions must be convoked with a specific agenda and shall be closed once it has been dealt
with.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

616

Parliament of Sri Lanka

PARLIAMENT OF SRI LANKA

Expert consultants: Sunanda Deshapriya, Basil Ilangakoon, Jehan Perera, Jayadeva Uyangoda,
Hasitha Wickremasinghe
Score: .50
Influence over
executive (4/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)

Specified
powers (2/8)

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
X

18. all elected

X
X

23. pardon
X

24. judiciary

25. central bank

Institutional
capacity (5/6)
X
X

X
X
X

26. media
X

The Parliament of Sri Lanka was established in

the 1948 constitution upon independence from
Great Britain. The constitution called for a bicameral legislature and a Westminster-style government headed by the prime minister. A new constitution in 1972 changed the countrys name from
Ceylon to Sri Lanka, established a unicameral legislature, and replaced the Governor General, the
British monarchs local representative, with a ceremonial president as head of state. In political practice the president gathered substantial power, and
this tendency was formalized in 1978 in a new
constitution, which established a directly elected
president.
The legislature has a moderate amount of
power. It has some sway over the executive, but
its institutional autonomy is limited by executive
prerogatives. For example, executive gatekeeping
authority prohibits the legislature from initiating
legislation related to taxation or public expenditures. Yet the legislatures laws provide the final
word; although the Supreme Court can review legislation that is under consideration in parliament,
once a bill is enacted it is not subject to judicial
review. The legislatures specified powers do not
extend beyond the authority to change the constitution and to ratify international treaties. The legislature does enjoy a considerable amount of institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of the Supreme Court. The legislature can
remove the prime minister with a vote of no confidence.
Article 38
(2) (a) Any Member of Parliament may, by a writing
addressed to the Speaker, give notice of a resolution
alleging that the President is permanently incapable of
discharging the functions of his office by reason of mental or physical infirmity or that the President has been
guilty of
(i) intentional violation of the Constitution,
(ii) treason,
(iii) bribery,
(iv) misconduct or corruption involving the abuse of
the powers of his office, or
(v) any offense under any law, involving moral turpitude, and setting out full particulars of the allegation
or allegations made and seeking an inquiry and report
thereon by the Supreme Court.
(b) No notice of such resolution shall be entertained by
the Speaker or placed on the Order Paper of Parliament
unless it complies with the provisions of sub-paragraph
(a) and

Parliament of Sri Lanka

(i) such notice of resolution is signed by not less than
two-thirds of the whole number of Members of Parliament, or
(ii) such notice of resolution is signed by not less
than one-half of the whole number of Members of
Parliament, and the Speaker is satisfied that such allegation or allegations merit inquiry and report by the
Supreme Court.
(c) Where such resolution is passed by not less than
two-thirds of the whole number of Members (including those not present) voting in its favor, the allegation or allegations contained in such resolution shall
be referred by the Speaker to the Supreme Court for
inquiry and report.
(d) The Supreme Court shall, after due inquiry at which
the President shall have the right to appear and to be
heard, in person or by an attorney-at-law, make a report
of its determination to Parliament together with the
reasons therefor.
(e) Where the Supreme Court reports to Parliament that
in its opinion the President is permanently incapable
of discharging the functions of his office by reason of
mental or physical infirmity or that the President has
been guilty of any of the other allegations contained
in such resolution, as the case may be, Parliament may
by a resolution passed by not less than two-thirds of
the whole number of Members (including those not
present) voting in its favor remove the President from
office.
Article 49
(2) If Parliament rejects the Statement of Government
Policy or the Appropriation Bill or passes a vote of noconfidence in the Government, the Cabinet of Ministers shall stand dissolved, and the President shall, unless
he has in the exercise of his powers under Article 70,
dissolved Parliament, appoint a Prime Minister, Ministers of the Cabinet of Ministers, other Ministers and
Deputy Ministers in terms of Articles 43, 44, 45 and
46.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Ministers are selected from, and required to
serve simultaneously in, the legislature.
Article 44
(1) The President shall, from time to time, in consultation with the Prime Minister, where he considers such
consultation to be necessary
(a) determine the number of Ministers of the Cabinet
of Ministers and the Ministries and the assignment of
subjects and functions to such Ministers; and
(b) appoint from among the Members of Parliament,
Ministers to be in charge of the Ministries so determined.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.

617

Yes. Parliamentary select committees regularly

summon executive branch officials.
4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. Parliamentary select committees can investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. Formally, the president appoints as prime minister the candidate who enjoys majority support in
the legislature. In practice, the president has wide
leeway in choosing the prime minister.
Article 43
(3) The President shall appoint as Prime Minister the
Member of Parliament who in his opinion is most likely
to command the confidence of Parliament.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers in consultation with the prime minister, and the appointments do not require the legislatures approval.
Article 44
(1) The President shall, from time to time, in consultation with the Prime Minister, where he considers such
consultation to be necessary
(a) determine the number of Ministers of the Cabinet
of Ministers and the Ministries and the assignment of
subjects and functions to such Ministers; and
(b) appoint from among the Members of Parliament,
Ministers to be in charge of the Ministries so determined.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 30
(2) The President of the Republic shall be elected by the
People, and shall hold office for a term of six years.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.

618
Article 49
(2) If Parliament rejects the Statement of Government
Policy or the Appropriation Bill or passes a vote of noconfidence in the Government, the Cabinet of Ministers shall stand dissolved, and the President shall, unless
he has in the exercise of his powers under Article 70,
dissolved Parliament, appoint a Prime Minister, Ministers of the Cabinet of Ministers, other Ministers and
Deputy Ministers in terms of Articles 43, 44, 45 and 46.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 70
(1) The President may, from time to time, by Proclamation summon, prorogue and dissolve Parliament:
Provided that
(a) subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph (d),
when a General Election has been held consequent
upon a dissolution of Parliament by the President,
the President shall not thereafter dissolve Parliament
until the expiration of a period of one year from the
date of such General Election, unless Parliament by
resolution requests the President to dissolve Parliament;
(b) the President shall not dissolve Parliament on the
rejection of the Statement of Government Policy at
the commencement of the first session of Parliament
after a General Election;
(c) subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph (d),
the President shall not dissolve Parliament after the
Speaker has entertained a resolution complying with
the requirements of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of
paragraph (2) of Article 38, unless
(i) such resolution is not passed as required by subparagraph (c) of paragraph (2) of Article 38;
(ii) the Supreme Court determines and reports that
the President has not become permanently incapable of discharging the functions of his office or
that the President has not been guilty of any of the
other allegations contained in such resolution;
(iii) the consequent resolution for the removal of
the President is not passed as required by subparagraph (e) of paragraph (2) of Article 38; or
(iv) Parliament by resolution requests the President to dissolve Parliament;
(d) where the President has not dissolved Parliament
consequent upon the rejection by Parliament of the
Appropriation Bill, the President shall dissolve Parliament if Parliament rejects the next Appropriation
Bill.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. Formally, the president can issue decrees that
have the force of law only in emergency situations.
In practice, the issuance of decrees by the president
is part of ordinary political practice.

Parliament of Sri Lanka

Article 155
(2) The power to make emergency regulations under
the Public Security Ordinance or the law for the time
being in force relating to public security shall include
the power to make regulations having the legal effect
of over-riding, amending or suspending the operation
of the provisions of any law, except the provisions of
the Constitution.
(3) The provisions of any law relating to public security,
empowering the President to make emergency regulations which have the legal effect of over-riding, amending or suspending the operation of the provisions of
any law, shall not come into operation, except upon
the making of a Proclamation under such law, bringing
such provisions into operation.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks veto power.
Article 80
(1) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (2) of this
Article, a Bill passed by Parliament shall become law
when the certificate of the Speaker is endorsed thereon.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
Yes. The Supreme Court can review and reject bills
under consideration by the legislature, but laws,
once enacted, are not subject to judicial review.
Article 80
(3) Where a Bill becomes law upon the certificate of
the President or the Speaker, as the case may be, being
endorsed thereon, no court or tribunal shall inquire
into, pronounce upon or in any manner call in question, the validity of such Act on any ground whatsoever.
Article 120
The Supreme Court shall have sole and exclusive jurisdiction to determine any question as to whether any
Bill or any provision thereof is inconsistent with the
Constitution.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. The legislature is prohibited from introducing
legislation related to taxation or public expenditures.
Article 152
No Bill or motion, authorizing the disposal of, or the
imposition of charges upon, the Consolidated Fund or
other funds of the Republic, or the imposition of any
tax or the repeal, augmentation or reduction of any
tax for the time being in force shall be introduced in
Parliament except by a Minister, and unless such Bill
or motion has been approved either by the Cabinet of

Parliament of Sri Lanka

Ministers or in such manner as the Cabinet of Ministers
may authorize.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power
to impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. According to the constitution, the legislature
can regulate issues of legislators immunity. In
practice, legislators are subject to arrest and prosecution.
Article 67
The privileges, immunities, and powers of Parliament
and of its Members may be determined and regulated
by Parliament by law, and until so determined and regulated, the provisions of the Parliament (Powers and
Privileges) Act, shall, mutatis mutandis, apply.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 62
(1) There shall be a Parliament which shall consist of
two hundred and twenty-five Members elected in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
with a two-thirds majority vote. Amendments to
select articles of the constitution require approval
in a popular referendum.
Article 82
(1) No Bill for the amendment of any provision of the
Constitution shall be placed on the Order Paper of Parliament, unless the provision to be repealed, altered
or added, and consequential amendments, if any, are
expressly specified in the Bill and is described in the
long title thereof as being an Act for the amendment of
the Constitution.
(2) No Bill for the repeal of the Constitution shall be
placed on the Order Paper of Parliament unless the Bill
contains provisions replacing the Constitution and is
described in the long title thereof as being an Act for
the repeal and replacement of the Constitution.

619
(3) If in the opinion of the Speaker, a Bill does not comply with the requirements of paragraph (1) or paragraph
(2) of this Article, he shall direct that such Bill be not
proceeded with unless it is amended so as to comply
with those requirements.
(4) Notwithstanding anything in the preceding provisions of this Article, it shall be lawful for a Bill which
complies with the requirements of paragraph (1) or
paragraph (2) of this Article to be amended by Parliament provided that the Bill as so amended shall comply
with those requirements.
(5) A Bill for the amendment of any provision of the
Constitution or for the repeal and replacement of the
Constitution, shall become law if the number of votes
cast in favor thereof amounts to not less than two-thirds
of the whole number of Members (including those not
present) and upon a certificate by the President or the
Speaker, as the case may be, being endorsed thereon
in accordance with the provisions of Article 80 or
79.
(6) No provision in any law shall, or shall be
deemed to, amend, repeal or replace the Constitution or any provision thereof, or be so interpreted
or construed, unless enacted in accordance with the
requirements of the preceding provisions of this Article.
(7) In this Chapter, amendment includes repeal,
alteration and addition.
Article 83
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the provisions of Article 82
(a) a Bill for the amendment or for the repeal and
replacement of or which is inconsistent with any of
the provisions of Articles 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11,
or of this Article, and
(b) a Bill for the amendment or for the repeal and
replacement of or which is inconsistent with the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 30 or of paragraph
(2) of Article 62 which would extend the term of office
of the President or the duration of Parliament, as the
case may be, to over six years, shall become law if the
number of votes cast in favor thereof amounts to not
less than two-thirds of the whole number of Members (including those not present), is approved by the
People at a Referendum and a certificate is endorsed
thereon by the President in accordance with Article
80.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. The president can declare war without the legislatures approval.
Article 33
In addition to the powers and functions expressly conferred on or assigned to him by the Constitution or
by any written law whether enacted before or after the
commencement of the Constitution, the President shall
have the power
(e) to declare war and peace.

620

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 157
Where Parliament by resolution passed by not less than
two-thirds of the whole number of Members of Parliament (including those not present) voting in its favor,
approves as being essential for the development of the
national economy, any Treaty or Agreement between
the Government of Sri Lanka and the Government of
any foreign State for the promotion and protection
of the investments in Sri Lanka of such foreign State,
its nationals, or of corporations, companies and other
associations incorporated or constituted under its laws,
such Treaty or Agreement shall have the force of law
in Sri Lanka, and otherwise than in the interests of
national security no written law shall be enacted or
made, and no executive or administrative action shall
be taken, in contravention of the provisions of such
Treaty or Agreement.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Parliament of Sri Lanka

No. The president makes judicial appointments,

and the appointments do not require the legislatures approval.
Article 107
(1) The Chief Justice, the President of the Court of
Appeal and every other Judge of the Supreme Court and
Court of Appeal shall . . . be appointed by the President
by warrant under his hand.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the governor of the
Central Bank of Sri Lanka.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.
Article 70
(2) Parliament shall be summoned to meet once at least
in every year.

No. Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

Yes.

No. The president has the power of pardon.

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.

Article 34
(1) The President may in the case of any offender convicted of any offense in any court within the Republic
of Sri Lanka
(a) grant a pardon, either free or subject to lawful
conditions;
Provided that where any offender shall have been
condemned to suffer death by the sentence of any
court, the President shall cause a report to be made to
him by the Judge who tried the case and shall forward
such report to the Attorney-General with instructions
that after the Attorney-General has advised thereon,
the report shall be sent together with the AttorneyGenerals advice to the Minister in charge of the subject of Justice, who shall forward the report with his
recommendation to the President.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.

No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

National Legislature of Sudan

621

NATIONAL LEGISLATURE OF SUDAN

Expert consultants: Richard Lobban, Jok Madut, Philip G. Roessler
Score: .22
Influence over
executive (1/9)

Institutional
autonomy (1/9)

Specified
powers (2/8)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon
24. judiciary

Institutional
capacity (3/6)
X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

25. central bank

26. media

18. all elected

The National Legislature of Sudan traces its origins

to the waning years of the countrys domination by
outside powers. In 1953 Britain and Egypt agreed to
give Sudan independence within three years and to
establish a Senate and a House of Representatives.
In late 1953 elections were held for the new parliament, and in 1956 Sudan achieved full independence. General Ibrahim Abboud staged a military
coup in 1958, and for the next half-century the legislature was often marginalized, as the armed forces
frequently controlled the government and waged
civil wars in the south and the northwest, although
there were intervals of parliamentary activity. In
1964 Abboud was overthrown, and during the subsequent few years parliamentary activity revived.
The legislature was marginalized again after 1969,
when Gaafar Mohamed el-Nimeiri seized power in
a military coup. Nimeiris ouster in 1985 was followed by a revival of parliament in the second half
of the 1980s.
Since 1989 politics have been marked by military coups and mass violence. In 1998 the ruling National Islamic Front promulgated a new
constitution that called for a unicameral National
Assembly. In the following year, however, President Umar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir partially suspended the constitution, dissolved the National
Assembly, and declared a state of emergency. In
2000 there were new parliamentary elections in
which Bashirs National Congress/National Islamic

Front Party obtained a virtual monopoly on seats.

In 2002 the government and southern rebel groups
reached a cease fire. Although fighting continued
during the negotiations, talks helped produce a
peace agreement and the 2005 Interim National
Constitution, which is the document from which
excerpts are drawn here. In 2004, just as the war
in the south appeared to be ebbing, conflict in the
northwestern Darfur region flared, and continues
to rage as of this writing.
In addition to granting southern Sudan considerable autonomy, the new constitution calls for
a bicameral National Legislature consisting of the
directly elected National Assembly (Majlis Watani)
and the Council of States (Majlis Welayat), which
is comprised of members elected by state legislatures. Members of the National Assembly as it is
currently constituted were appointed by the president in 2005 on the recommendation of political
parties to represent the countrys diverse and often
warring groups. The first parliamentary elections
are scheduled for 2009.
At least in its current form, the legislatures
power is negligible. It interpellates ministers
but otherwise lacks meaningful influence over
the executive branch. Any potential institutional
autonomy is squeezed out by presidential decree,
dissolution, and veto powers. The legislature exercises few specified powers. It has a bit of institutional capacity.

622

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of the Constitutional Court.
Article 59
The Office of the President of the Republic shall fall
vacant in any of the following cases:
(d) impeachment in accordance with the provisions of
this Constitution.
Article 60
(1) The President of the Republic and the First Vice President shall be immune from any legal proceedings and
shall not be charged or sued in any court of law during
their tenure of office.
(2) Notwithstanding sub-Article (1) above, and in case
of high treason, gross violation of this Constitution or
gross misconduct in relation to State affairs, the President or the First Vice President may be charged before
the Constitutional Court upon a resolution passed by
three quarters of all members of the National Legislature.
(3) In the event of conviction of the President of the
Republic or the First Vice President, in accordance with
sub-Article (2) above, he shall be deemed to have forfeited his office.
Article 91
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of sub-Article
(1) above, the National Legislature shall convene for
the following purposes to:
(h) impeach the President of the Republic.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Ministers are prohibited from serving simultaneously in the legislature.
3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly questions executive branch officials. For example, in December 2006 the minister of defense was summoned
to the National Assembly to testify on violence
in Malakal, southern Sudan, between the Sudan
Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA).
Article 91
(3) The National Assembly shall be competent to:
(g) summon national ministers to present reports on
the executive performance of the government in general or of specified ministries or particular activities,
(h) interrogate, at will, national ministers about their
performance or the performance of their ministries

National Legislature of Sudan

and may recommend to the President of the Republic,
in a subsequent sitting, the removal of a national
minister, if he is deemed to have lost the confidence
of the National Assembly.
Article 105
(1) The National Assembly or any of its committees
may summon any public official or any person, other
than the President of the Republic and the two Vice
Presidents to testify before it, give opinion to the Assembly or any of its committees.
(2) Inquiry on any matter that falls within the direct
responsibility of the National Executive may only be
made after notifying the President of the Republic.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion. The military
and intelligence organs serve the executive and
operate beyond the reach of the legislature. They
secretly execute many security activities throughout the country, including the provision of military
support to irregular armed groups.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. There is no prime minister.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 70
(1) The President of the Republic shall, after consultation within the Presidency, appoint the National Council of Ministers.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 52
There shall be a President for the Republic of the Sudan
to be directly elected by the people in national elections according to the law and the regulations set by
the National Elections Commission.

National Legislature of Sudan

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature can vote no confidence in individual ministers, but not in the government as a
whole.
Article 91
(1) The National Legislature represents the will of the
people and shall foster national unity, exercise national
legislative functions, oversee the National Executive,
and promote the decentralized system of government.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of sub-Article
(1) above, the National Legislature shall convene for
the following purposes to:
(h) interrogate, at will, national ministers about their
performance or the performance of their ministries
and may recommend to the President of the Republic,
in a subsequent sitting, the removal of a national
minister, if he is deemed to have lost the confidence
of the National Assembly.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.

623
Article 113
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 109(2)
above, the President of the Republic may wherever he
deems it appropriate for public interests, make a presidential order having the force of law, providing that
the imposition of any tax, or fee or the amendment
thereof shall come into force, pending submission of a
bill requiring the same to the National Assembly. When
that financial bill is adopted or rejected, the force of the
presidential order shall cease without the rejection or
amendment of the bill having retrospective effect.
Article 115
The National Legislature or any of its Chambers may,
by law, delegate to the President of the Republic, the
National Council of Ministers or any public body, the
power to make any subsidiary regulations, rules, orders
or any other subsidiary instrument having the force of
law; provided that such subsidiary legislation shall be
tabled before the concerned Chamber and be subject to
adoption or amendment by a resolution of that Chamber in accordance with the provisions of its regulations.

No. The president can dissolve the legislature.

Article 58
(1) The President of the Republic is the Head of the
State and Government and represents the will of the
people and the authority of the State; he shall exercise the powers vested in him by this Constitution and
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and shall, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, perform
the following functions:
(e) summon, adjourn or prorogue the National Legislature.
Article 211
The President of the Republic, with the consent of the
First Vice President, may during the state of emergency
take, by virtue of law or exceptional order, any measures that shall not derogate from the provisions of this
Constitution and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
except as may be provided herein:
(b) to dissolve or suspend any of the state organs or
suspend such powers, as may be conferred upon the
states under this Constitution. The President of the
Republic with the consent of the First Vice President
shall assume the functions of such organs and exercise the powers or prescribe the manner in which the
affairs of the state concerned may be managed.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The president can issue decrees that have the
force of law whenever he deems it appropriate
for public interests. The decrees lapse if they are
subsequently rejected by the legislature. The legislature can also choose to delegate subsidiary
decree power to the president.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority vote is required to override a presidential veto.
Article 91
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of sub-Article
(1) above, the National Legislature shall convene for
the following purposes to:
(d) reconsider a bill which has been rejected by the
President of the Republic under Article 108.
Article 108
(1) Any bill approved by the National Legislature shall
not become law unless the President of the Republic
assents to it and signs it into law. If the President withholds assent for thirty days without giving reasons, the
bill shall be deemed to have been so signed.
(2) Should the President of the Republic withhold
assent to the bill and give reasons within the aforementioned thirty days, the bill shall be re-introduced
to the National Legislature to consider the observations
of the President of the Republic.
(3) The bill shall become law if the National Legislature again passes it by a two-thirds majority of all the
members and representatives of the two Chambers; the
assent of the President of the Republic shall not be
required for that bill to come into force.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.

624
Article 122
(1) The Constitutional Court shall be the custodian of
this Constitution, the constitutions of southern Sudan
and the states; its decisions shall be final and binding,
it shall:
(e) adjudicate on the constitutionality of laws or provisions in accordance with this Constitution, the
Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan or the relevant state constitutions.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power
to impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The president can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
No. The legislature is dependent on the executive
for the resources that finance its own operations.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. By law, legislators are immune, but in practice, opponents of the executive may be subject
to persecution. For example, in 2004 Ali Dosa, a
member of parliament, was arrested and imprisoned on charges of collaborating with rebels from
the Darfur region. By law, members may be arrested
only if the legislature lifts their immunity. Dosa
was arrested and imprisoned even in the absence
of any action by the legislature to lift his immunity.
Article 92
(1) Except where he is caught in the act of crime, no
criminal proceedings shall be initiated against a member of the National Legislature; neither shall any measure be taken against his person or belongings without
permission from the Speaker of the appropriate Chamber.
(2) In case the member or representative is charged
with a serious crime the appropriate Chamber may
waive the immunity of the accused member or representative.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.

National Legislature of Sudan

No. Following the 2005 peace agreement between

the government and the SPLM, all 450 members of
the National Assembly were appointed by the president following the recommendations of political
parties. The first parliamentary election under the
new constitution is scheduled for 2009.
Article 84
(1) The National Assembly shall be composed of members elected in free and fair elections.
(2) The National Elections Law shall determine the
number of members and composition of the National
Assembly.
Article 85
(1) The Council of States shall be composed of two representatives from each state, elected by the state legislature in accordance with the National Elections Law and
regulations set forth by the National Elections Commission.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments can be initiated
only by the president.
Article 58
(1) The President of the Republic is the Head of the
State and Government and represents the will of the
people and the authority of the State; he shall exercise the powers vested in him by this Constitution and
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and shall, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, perform
the following functions:
(h) initiate constitutional amendments and legislations and assent to laws.
Article 91
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of sub-Article
(1) above, the National Legislature shall convene for
the following purposes to:
(a) amend this Constitution and approve amendments affecting the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
that are presented by its signatories in accordance
with Article 224 of this Constitution.
Article 224
(1) This Constitution shall not be amended unless the
amendments are approved by three-quarters of all the
members of each Chamber of the National Legislature
sitting separately and only after introduction of the
draft amendment at least two months prior to deliberations.
(2) Any amendment affecting the provisions of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement shall be introduced
only with the approval of both Parties signatory to the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is required for presidential war declarations.

National Legislature of Sudan

Article 58
(1) The President of the Republic is the Head of the
State and Government and represents the will of the
people and the authority of the State; he shall exercise the powers vested in him by this Constitution and
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and shall, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, perform
the following functions:
(f) declare war in accordance with this Constitution
and the law.
Article 91
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of sub-Article
(1) above, the National Legislature shall convene for
the following purposes to:
(f) approve declaration of war.
Article 213
The President of the Republic, with the consent of
the First Vice President, shall declare war whenever
they decide that the country is under external aggression. Such declaration shall be legally enforceable upon
approval by the National Legislature.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 58
(1) The President of the Republic is the Head of the
State and Government and represents the will of the
people and the authority of the State; he shall exercise the powers vested in him by this Constitution and
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and shall, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, perform
the following functions:
(k) direct and supervise the foreign policy of the State
and ratify treaties and international agreements with
the approval of the National Legislature.
Article 91
(3) The National Assembly shall be competent to:
(d) ratify international treaties, conventions and
agreements.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 58
(1) The President of the Republic is the Head of the
State and Government and represents the will of the
people and the authority of the State; he shall exercise the powers vested in him by this Constitution and
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and shall, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, perform
the following functions:

625
(i) approve death sentences, grant pardon, lift convictions and remit penalties according to this Constitution
and the national law.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. According to the constitution, the Council of
States must approve the presidents appointments
to the Constitutional Court, while other judges
are named by the president without need for the
legislatures consent, but in practice, the executive has full control over all judicial appointments.
The legislature has no genuine review authority on
appointments to the Constitutional Court or any
other judicial organ.
Article 121
(1) All Justices of the Constitutional Court shall be
appointed by the President of the Republic in accordance with Article 58 (2) (c) herein and upon the recommendation of the National Judicial Service Commission and subject to approval by a two-thirds majority
of all the representatives at the Council of States.
Article 130
(1) Having regard to competence, integrity and credibility, the Chief Justice of the Republic of the Sudan,
his deputies, Justices and Judges shall be appointed by
the President of the Republic in accordance with Article
58(2)(c) herein, where applicable, and upon the recommendation of the National Judicial Service Commission.
Article 132
The President of Government of Southern Sudan shall,
within one week after the adoption of the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan, appoint, without prejudice to Article 130(1) herein, the President and Justices
of Southern Sudan Supreme Court, Judges of Courts of
Appeal and other courts having regard to competence,
integrity, credibility and impartiality as shall be determined by that Constitution and the law.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the governor of the
Central Bank of Sudan.
Article 202
(6) The Governor of the Central Bank of Sudan and his
two Deputies shall be appointed by the President of the
Republic in accordance with Article 58(2)(c) herein.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.

626

National Legislature of Sudan

Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.

Article 93
(1) Each Chamber of the National Legislature shall
hold its first sitting upon convocation by the President of the Republic within thirty days following the
official declaration of the results of the elections. The
first sitting shall be chaired by the eldest of the members/representatives present.
(2) Without prejudice to Article 58(2)(d), each Chamber shall determine the commencement and closure
dates of its sessions.
(3) Either Chamber may convene an emergency or
extraordinary session on the request of half of its members or representatives or upon call from the President
of the Republic.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No. Some prominent members of the legislature
have personal secretaries, but most legislators do
not.

No. See item 28.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
No. The legislature is made up of members
appointed by the president in 2005. This group
includes some experienced politicians, but the
absence of elections and the infancy of the current body leave the legislature without a cohort of
experienced legislators.

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.

PARLIAMENT OF SWAZILAND (LIBANDLA)

Expert consultants: Matthias Basedau, Khabele Matlosa, H. M. Mushala, Mark Y. Rosenberg,
one anonymous expert
Score: .25
Influence over
executive (2/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

Institutional
autonomy (1/9)
X

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

Specified
powers (1/8)

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon
24. judiciary

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

25. central bank

26. media

18. all elected

The Parliament (Libandla) of Swaziland was formally established in the countrys 1968 constitution upon independence from Great Britain. The
constitution provided for a bicameral parliament
with a lower house, the House of Assembly, and

an upper house, the Senate. In 1973 the king

suspended parliament and banned political parties. The legislature was reestablished in 1978 along
with the tinkhundla electoral system, in which legislative candidates are vetted by local tribal leaders.

Parliament of Swaziland (Libandla)

A new constitution in 2005 maintained the ban

on political parties but removed the kings decree
powers.
Even after the elimination of the kings decree
authority, the legislature remains feckless. It cannot appoint, oversee, or remove executive branch
officials and generally has little sway over the king.
Expansive royal powers that include the right to
appoint a large proportion of the members of both
the House of Assembly and the Senate ensure that
the legislature is virtually bereft of institutional
autonomy. The legislature exercises only one of the
specified powers measured in this survey, although
it does enjoy some institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. The legislature cannot remove the king from
office. Formally, it can remove the prime minister with a vote no confidence, but in practice, this
would be unthinkable without the kings assent.
Article 11
The King and iNgwenyama shall be immune from
(a) suit or legal process in any cause in respect of all
things done or omitted to be done by him.
Article 68
(1) The office of the Prime Minister shall become vacant
where
(d) after a resolution of no confidence in the Prime
Minister is passed by at least two thirds majority of all
members of the House, the King removes the Prime
Minister.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Ministers are selected from, and required to
serve simultaneously in, the legislature.
Article 67
(1) The King shall appoint the Prime Minister from
among members of the House acting on recommendation of the Kings Advisory Council.
(2) The King shall appoint Ministers from both chambers of Parliament on the recommendation of the Prime
Minister.

627

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. Formally, the legislature can establish committees of investigation. In practice, the legislature
cannot investigate the king and his inner circle.
Article 129
(1) Each chamber of Parliament shall appoint sessional
committees and other committees as may be necessary
for the effective discharge of the functions of that chamber.
(2) The standing committees shall be charged with
such functions, including the investigation and inquiry
into the activities and administration of ministries and
departments as Parliament may determine and the
investigations and enquiries may extend to proposals
for legislation.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The king appoints the prime minister.
Article 67
(1) The King shall appoint the Prime Minister from
among members of the House acting on recommendation of the Kings Advisory Council.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The king appoints ministers, and the appointments do not require the legislatures approval.
Article 67
(1) The King shall appoint the Prime Minister from
among members of the House acting on recommendation of the Kings Advisory Council.
(2) The King shall appoint Ministers from both chambers of Parliament on the recommendation of the Prime
Minister.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The country lacks a presidency. The king is the
head of state.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.

Article 64
(1) The executive authority of Swaziland vests in the
King as Head of State and shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.

No. The legislature does not have the power to

summon and question officials from the executive.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

628

No. Formally, the legislature can vote no confidence in the government, but in practice, this
would be unthinkable without the kings assent.
Article 68
(1) The office of the Prime Minister shall become vacant
where
(d) after a resolution of no confidence in the Prime
Minister is passed by at least two thirds majority of all
members of the House, the King removes the Prime
Minister.
(5) Where a resolution of no confidence is passed on
the Cabinet by a three-fifths majority of all members of
the House the King shall dissolve the Cabinet.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The king can dissolve the legislature.
Article 64
(4) The King in his capacity as Head of State has authority, in accordance with this Constitution or any other
law, among other things to
(b) summon and dissolve Parliament.
Article 134
(1) The King may at any time
(b) dissolve Parliament.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.

Parliament of Swaziland (Libandla)

Article 111
Except with the consent of the Cabinet signified by the
Prime Minister or the Minister responsible for finance,
neither chamber of Parliament shall
(a) proceed upon any bill including an amendment
to a bill that in the opinion of the person presiding
makes provision for any of the following
(i) the imposition of taxation or the alteration of
taxation otherwise than by reduction;
(ii) the imposition of any charge upon the Consolidated Fund or other public funds of Swaziland or
the alteration of any such charge otherwise than
by reduction;
(iii) the payment, issue or withdrawal, from the
Consolidated Fund or other public funds of Swaziland of any moneys not charged on the Consolidated Fund or any increase in the amount of that
payment, issue or withdrawal, or the composition
or remission of any debt due to the Government;
or
(b) proceed upon any motion including an amendment to a motion the effect of which, in the opinion
of the person presiding, would be to make provision
for any of the purposes specified in paragraph (a) of
this section.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power
to impound funds appropriated by the legislature.

Yes. The king lacks decree power. Prior to 2005

the king issued decrees with the force of law, but
the 2005 constitution removed the kings power of
decree.

No. The king can impound funds.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.

No. The legislature is dependent on the king for

the resources that finance its own operations.

No. The king has absolute veto power. All bills

require the kings assent in order to become law.
Article 108
(1) A bill shall not become law unless the King has
assented to it and signed it in token of that assent.

16. The legislature controls the resources that finance

its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Formally, the legislature can prescribe laws for
the immunity of its members, but in practice, legislators are subject to arrest and prosecution.

No. Although there is no judicial review, the legislatures laws are not supreme, as the king wields
ultimate executive and legislative authority.

Article 130
(1) The President, Speaker, members of Parliament and
any other person participating or assisting in or acting
in connection with or reporting the proceedings of Parliament or any of its committees shall be entitled to
such immunities and privileges as Parliament may by
law prescribe.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.

No. The legislature is prohibited from introducing

legislation related to taxation, public expenditures,
or government debt.

No. The king appoints ten of the seventy-six members of the House of Assembly and twenty of the
thirty-one members of the Senate.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.

Parliament of Swaziland (Libandla)

Article 94
(1) The Senate shall consist of not more than thirty-one
members (in this Constitution referred to as Senators)
who shall be elected or appointed in accordance with
this section.
(2) Ten Senators, at least half of whom shall be female,
shall be elected by the members of the House in such
manner as may be prescribed by or under any law at
their first meeting so as to represent a cross-section of
the Swazi society.
(3) Twenty Senators, at least eight of whom shall be
female, shall be appointed by the King acting in his
discretion after consultation with such bodies as the
King may deem appropriate.
Article 95
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the
House of Assembly shall consist of not more than
seventy-six members composed as follows
(a) not more than sixty members elected from tinkhundla areas serving as constituencies;
(b) not more than ten members nominated by the
King acting in his discretion after consultation with
such bodies as the King may deem appropriate;
(c) four female members specially elected from the
four Regions subject to subsection (3);
(d) the Attorney-General who shall be an ex officio
member.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments require the kings
assent.
Article 245
(1) Subject to the provisions of this chapter, Parliament may amend any provision of this Constitution
by the introduction of a bill expressly providing that
the Constitution shall be amended as proposed in that
bill.
(2) A bill to amend this Constitution shall only be
introduced at a joint sitting of the Senate and the House
summoned for the purpose in accordance with the provisions of the First Schedule.
(5) If, after the prescribed period the bill is passed at the
joint sitting and or at a referendum with the requisite
majority, the bill shall be submitted to the King for
assent.
Article 246
(1) Where a bill in terms of this Chapter contains provision for amending any of the specially entrenched
provisions of this Constitution as set out in sub-section
(2), the bill shall not be passed at the joint sitting unless
it is supported on its final reading by the votes of not
less than three-quarters of all the members of the two
chambers.
(2) The specially entrenched provisions are as follows
(a) The Kingdom and its Constitution: section 2;
(b) Monarchy: section 4, 5, 7(2), 7(3), 8(2), 9, 10, 11;
(c) Protection and Promotion of Fundamental Rights
and Freedoms Chapter III

629
(d) The Executive: section 64, 65, 66(1), 69(1), 69(2);
(e) The Legislature: section 79, 84, 93, 106, 108, 115,
119(1), 134;
(f) The Judicature: section 138, 139, 140, 141, 146,
151, 153(1) 155, 158, 159 except 159(5);
(g) Director of Public Prosecutions and the Commission on Human Rights: section 162(1), 162(4), 162(6);
(h) Public Finance: section 207(1);
(i) Land, Minerals, etc: section 210(1), 211(1), 213;
(j) Traditional Institutions: section 227, 228, 229;
230; 231;
(k) Amendment of the Constitution: Chapter XVII;
(l) Miscellaneous: Chapter XVIII in its application to
any of the provisions referred to in this section except
section 251;
(m) The First Schedule in its application to any of the
provisions referred to in this section.
(3) Where a bill in terms of this section has been duly
passed at a joint sitting that bill shall not be presented
to the King for assent unless it is approved by a simple
majority of all votes validly cast at a referendum in such
manner as may be prescribed, at which every person
who at the time of the referendum is registered as a
voter for purposes of the elected members of the House
shall be entitled to vote.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. The king can declare a state of emergency
in times of war without first obtaining legislative
approval. The state of emergency lapses if it is not
subsequently approved by the legislature.
Article 36
(1) The king may, on the advice of the Prime Minister, by proclamation which shall be published in the
Gazette, declare that a state of emergency exists in Swaziland or any part of Swaziland for the purposes of this
Chapter.
(2) The provisions of subsection (1) shall not apply and
a proclamation shall not be issued under that subsection and where issued that proclamation shall not be
effective in law unless
(a) Swaziland is at war or circumstances have arisen
making imminent a state of war between Swaziland
and a foreign State;
(b) there is in Swaziland a natural disaster or imminent threat of a natural disaster; or
(c) there is action taken or immediately threatened
by a person or body of persons of such a nature or
on so extensive a scale as to be likely to endanger the
public safety or to deprive the community or a significant part of that community of supplies or services
essential to the life of the community.
(4) A declaration under subsection (1) if not sooner
revoked, shall cease to have effect
(a) in the case of a declaration made when Parliament
is sitting or has been summoned to meet within three
days, at the expiration of a period of seven days beginning with the date of publication of the declaration;

630

Parliament of Swaziland (Libandla)

(b) in any other case, at the expiration of a period of
twenty-one days beginning with the date of publication of the declaration, unless, before the expiration
of that period, the declaration is approved by a resolution passed by a two-thirds majority at a joint sitting
of all the members of the Senate and the House.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 238
(1) The Government may execute or cause to be executed an international agreement in the name of the
Crown.
(2) An international agreement executed by or under
the authority of the Government shall be subject to
ratification and become binding on the government
by
(a) an Act of Parliament; or
(b) a resolution of at least two-thirds of the members
at a joint sitting of the two Chambers of Parliament.
(3) The provisions of sub-section (2) do not apply
where the agreement is of a technical, administrative
or executive nature or is an agreement which does not
require ratification or accession.
(4) Unless it is self-executing, an international agreement becomes law in Swaziland only when enacted into
law by Parliament.
(5) Accession to an international agreement shall be
done in the same manner as ratification under subsection (2).

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The king has the power of pardon.
Article 64
(4) The King in his capacity as Head of State has authority, in accordance with this Constitution or any other
law, among other things to
(a) issue pardons, reprieves or commute sentences.
Article 78
(1) The King may, in respect of a person sentenced to
death or life imprisonment
(a) grant a pardon, either free or subject to lawful
conditions;
(b) grant to any person a respite, either indefinite or
for a specified period;
(c) substitute a less severe form of punishment for
any punishment imposed on any person for such an
offence; or
(d) remit the whole or part of that sentence, penalty
or forfeiture otherwise due to the Government on
account of that offence.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The king makes judicial appointments on the
recommendation of a special commission, and
the appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 153
(1) The Chief Justice and the other Justices of the superior courts shall be appointed by the King on the advice
of the Judicial Service Commission.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The king appoints the minister of finance, who
heads the Central Bank of Swaziland.
Article 206
(1) There shall be the Central Bank of Swaziland consisting of the Governor and such other staff and having
such powers and functions as Parliament shall determine.
(4) The Governor shall be appointed by the King on
the advice of the Prime Minister based on the recommendation of the Board.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The monarch controls the state-owned media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.
Article 133
(1) There shall be a session of Parliament at least once
in every year so that a period of six months shall not
intervene between the last sitting of Parliament in one
session and the first sitting of Parliament in the next
session.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.

Parliament of Sweden (Riksdag)

631

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.

Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

PARLIAMENT OF SWEDEN (RIKSDAG)

Expert consultants: Nicholas Aylott, Magnus Hagevi, Jonas Hinnfors, Johannes Lindvall, Jon Pierre
Score: .72
Influence over
executive (7/9)

Institutional
autonomy (7/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Specified
powers (5/8)

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

X
X

21. treaties
22. amnesty

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

26. media

18. all elected

X
X
X

The Parliament (Riksdag) of Sweden first met in

1435. Its existence was formalized in 1719, when
Sweden adopted its first constitution. The constitution granted executive power to the king and
divided legislative power between the king and parliament. Over the centuries the legislatures powers
gradually expanded. In 1975 a sweeping constitutional amendment formalized the monarchs ceremonial role.
The legislature dominates national politics and
government. The executive is dependent on and
responsible to the legislature. For example, the legislature chooses the prime minister and can remove
the government from office with a vote of no confidence. The legislature also has broad institutional
autonomy. Most notably, its laws are supreme and
not subject to judicial review. It holds numerous specified powers and has some institutional
capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.

Yes. The legislature can remove the prime minister

with a vote of no confidence.
Chapter 6, Article 5
If the Parliament declares that the Prime Minister or
any other Minister no longer enjoys its confidence, the
Speaker shall discharge the Minister concerned. When
the Government is in a position to order an extra election, however, no decision shall be made to discharge
the Minister if the Government issues an order for an
extra election within one week from the declaration of
no confidence.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators who serve in government have a
sleeping mandate, meaning that they may join the
government but forfeit their voting rights in the
legislature during their government service. They
may return to the legislature when their government service ends.
Chapter 4, Article 9
(1) While a member of the Parliament is acting as
Speaker of the Parliament or is a member of the Government, his mandate as a member of the Parliament shall
be exercised by an alternate member. The Parliament
may prescribe in the Parliament Act that an alternate

632

Parliament of Sweden (Riksdag)

member shall replace a member of the Parliament while

the latter is on leave of absence.

(3) Further provisions concerning the auditors are set

out in the Parliament Act.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).

Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials

from the executive.

Yes. The legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.

Chapter 12, Article 5

Under provisions laid down in the Parliament Act, any
member of the Parliament may submit an interpellation
or put down a question for a Minister in any matter
concerning the Ministers performance of his duties.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
Chapter 12, Article 1
The Committee on the Constitution shall examine
Ministers performance of their duties and the handling
of Government business. The Committee is entitled for
this purpose to have access to the records of the decisions made in Cabinet matters and to all documents
pertaining to such matters. Any other Parliament Committee and any member of the Parliament shall be entitled to raise in writing with the Committee on the Constitution any issue concerning a Ministers performance
of his duties or concerning the handling of Cabinet
business.
Chapter 12, Article 6
(1) The Parliament shall elect one or more Ombudsmen to supervise under instructions laid down by the
Parliament the application in public service of laws and
other statutes. An Ombudsman may initiate legal proceedings in the cases indicated in these instructions.
(2) An Ombudsman may be present at the deliberations of a court or an administrative authority and shall
have access to the minutes and other documents of any
such court or authority. Any court or administrative
authority and any State or local government official
shall provide an Ombudsman with such information
and reports as he may request. A similar obligation shall
also be incumbent on any other person coming under
the supervision of the Ombudsman. A public prosecutor shall assist an Ombudsman on request.
(3) Further provisions concerning the Ombudsmen are
set forth in the Parliament Act.
Chapter 12, Article 7
(1) The Parliament shall elect auditors from among its
members to examine the activities of the State. The Parliament may decide that the auditors scrutiny shall
extend also to other activities. The Parliament draws
up standing orders for the auditors.
(2) Under provisions set forth in law, the auditors may
demand such documents, data, and reports as are necessary for their scrutiny.

6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

Yes. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Chapter 6, Article 1
The Government comprises the Prime Minister and
other members of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister is
appointed in the manner prescribed in Articles 2 to 4.
The Prime Minister appoints the other members of the
Cabinet.
Chapter 6, Article 2
(1) When a Prime Minister is to be appointed, the
Speaker shall summon for consultation one or more
representatives from each party group in the Parliament. The Speaker shall confer with the Deputy Speakers and shall then submit a proposal to the Parliament.
(2) The Parliament shall proceed to vote on the proposal, no later than the fourth day thereafter, without
preparation in committee. If more than half the members of the Parliament vote against the proposal, it is
rejected. In all other circumstances it is approved.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The prime minister appoints ministers, and
the appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Chapter 6, Article 1
The Government comprises the Prime Minister and
other members of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister is
appointed in the manner prescribed in Articles 2 to 4.
The Prime Minister appoints the other members of the
Cabinet.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The country lacks a presidency. The monarch
is the head of state.
Chapter 1, Article 5
(1) The King or Queen who occupies the throne of Sweden in accordance with the Act of Succession shall be
the Head of State.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.

Parliament of Sweden (Riksdag)

Chapter 6, Article 2
(1) When a Prime Minister is to be appointed, the
Speaker shall summon for consultation one or more
representatives from each party group in the Parliament. The Speaker shall confer with the Deputy Speakers and shall then submit a proposal to the Parliament.
(2) The Parliament shall proceed to vote on the proposal, no later than the fourth day thereafter, without
preparation in committee. If more than half the members of the Parliament vote against the proposal, it is
rejected. In all other circumstances it is approved.
Chapter 6, Article 3
If the Parliament rejects the Speakers proposal the procedure laid down in Article 2 shall be resumed. If the
Parliament rejects the Speakers proposal four times in
succession, the procedure for appointing a Prime Minister is discontinued and resumed only after an election for the Parliament has been held. Unless ordinary elections must in any case be held within three
months, an extra election shall be held within that same
period.
Chapter 6, Article 5
If the Parliament declares that the Prime Minister or
any other Minister no longer enjoys its confidence, the
Speaker shall discharge the Minister concerned. When
the Government is in a position to order an extra election, however, no decision shall be made to discharge
the Minister if the Government issues an order for an
extra election within one week from the declaration of
no confidence.
Chapter 12, Article 4
(1) The Parliament may declare that a particular Minister does not enjoy the confidence of Parliament. Such a
declaration of no confidence requires the concurrence
therein of more than half the members of the Parliament.
(2) A motion for a declaration of no confidence shall
be taken up for consideration only if it is introduced
by no fewer than one tenth of the members of the Parliament. It shall not be taken up for consideration during the period between the date on which an ordinary
election has been held or an extra election has been
declared and the Parliament elected in such an election has convened. A motion which concerns a Minister holding office under the terms of Chapter 6, Article
8 after having been discharged may not be taken up for
consideration in any circumstances.
(3) A motion calling for a declaration of no confidence
shall not be prepared in committee.

633
be held within three months of the issue of such an
order.
(2) After an election for the Parliament has been held,
the Government is debarred from issuing an order for
an extra election until three months have elapsed from
the first meeting of the newly-elected Parliament. Nor
may the Government issue an order for an extra election while ministers retain their posts, after having all
been formally discharged, pending the assumption of
office by a new Government.
(3) Provisions concerning an extra election in a particular case are set forth in Chapter 6, Article 3.
Chapter 6, Article 2
(1) When a Prime Minister is to be appointed, the
Speaker shall summon for consultation one or more
representatives from each party group in the Parliament. The Speaker shall confer with the Deputy Speakers and shall then submit a proposal to the Parliament.
(2) The Parliament shall proceed to vote on the proposal, no later than the fourth day thereafter, without
preparation in committee. If more than half the members of the Parliament vote against the proposal, it is
rejected. In all other circumstances it is approved.
Chapter 6, Article 3
If the Parliament rejects the Speakers proposal the procedure laid down in Article 2 shall be resumed. If the
Parliament rejects the Speakers proposal four times in
succession, the procedure for appointing a Prime Minister is discontinued and resumed only after an election
for the Parliament has been held. Unless ordinary elections must in any case be held within three months, an
extra election shall be held within that same period.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks veto power.
13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.

No. The government can dissolve the legislature.

Dissolution is here expressed as order an extra
election.

Yes. In practice, the legislatures laws are supreme

and not subject to judicial review. Formally, courts
can refuse a law only if its contravention of the
constitution is totally indisputable or manifest,
and there has been but a single case of such a decision, involving a minor matter. The case arose in
the 1990s, when a court voided an archaic law from
the 1930s concerning political uniforms.

Chapter 3, Article 4
(1) The Government may order an extra election to be
held between ordinary elections. Extra elections shall

Chapter 11, Article 14

If a court or any other public body considers that a
provision conflicts with a provision of a fundamental

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.

634
law or with a provision of any other superior statute,
or that the procedure prescribed was set aside in any
important respect when the provision was introduced,
the provision may not be applied. However, if the provision has been approved by the Parliament or by the
Government, it may be set aside only if the fault is
manifest.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
Chapter 9, Article 2
(1) State funds may not be used in any way other than
that determined by the Parliament.
(2) The Parliament approves the use of such funds
for different purposes by adopting a budget in accordance with Articles 3 to 5. The Parliament may, however, decide that funds are to be employed in another
manner.

16. The legislature controls the resources that finance

its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislators are subject to arrest for crimes that
carry a minimum penalty of not less than two
years imprisonment.
Chapter 4, Article 8
(1) No one may bring an action against any person who
holds a mandate, or has held a mandate, as a member
of the Parliament, deprive him of his liberty, or prevent
him from traveling within the country, on account of
his actions or statements in the fulfillment of his mandate, unless the Parliament has given its consent by
means of a decision in which no fewer than five sixths
of those present and voting have concurred.
(2) If, in any other case, a member of the Parliament
is suspected of having committed a criminal act, the
relevant provisions of law relating to arrest, detention
or remand are applicable only if he admits guilt or was
caught in the act, or if the minimum penalty for the
crime is not less than two years imprisonment.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.

Parliament of Sweden (Riksdag)

Chapter 3, Article 1
(1) The Parliament is appointed by free, secret and
direct elections.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
with a three-fourths majority vote. It can also
change the constitution through a more complicated procedure. The sitting legislature can propose
the constitutional amendment in multiple readings with a majority vote, and, following an election, the subsequent legislature can approve the
amendment.
Chapter 8, Article 15
(1) A fundamental law shall be adopted by means of
two decisions of identical wording. The second decision may not be taken until elections for the Parliament have been held throughout the country following
the first decision, and the newly-elected Parliament has
been convened. Not less than nine months shall furthermore elapse between the time when the matter was
first submitted to the Chamber of the Parliament and
the time of the election, unless the Constitutional Committee of the Parliament grants an exemption from this
provision by means of a decision taken not later than
the Committee stage, and in which no fewer than five
sixths of the members concur.
Chapter 8, Article 16
The Parliament Act shall be adopted as prescribed in
Article 15 (1), first and second sentences, and (2). It may
also be adopted by means of a single decision, provided
that it is approved by no fewer than three fourths of
those present and voting and by more than half the
members of the Parliament. Supplementary provisions
of the Parliament Act shall however be adopted in the
same way as ordinary laws.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for the
declaration of war, with the common exception
for cases of foreign invasion. In order to repel
an armed attack, the government can unilaterally
deploy the countrys armed forces.
Chapter 10, Article 9
(1) The Government may commit the countrys
defence forces, or any part of them, to battle in order to
repel an armed attack upon the Realm. Swedish armed
forces may otherwise be committed to battle or sent to
another country only if
1) the Parliament has assented thereto;
2) it is permitted under a law which sets out the prerequisites for such action;
3) an obligation to take such action follows from
an international agreement or obligation which has
been approved by the Parliament.

Parliament of Sweden (Riksdag)

(2) No declaration of war may be made without the
consent of the Parliament, except in the event of an
armed attack against Sweden.
(3) The Government may authorize the defence forces
to use force in accordance with international law and
custom to prevent a violation of Swedish soil in time of
peace or during a war between foreign states.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Chapter 10, Article 1
Agreements with other states or with international
organizations shall be concluded by the Government.
Chapter 10, Article 2
(1) The Government may not conclude any international agreement binding upon the Realm without Parliament approval, if the agreement presupposes the
amendment or abrogation of a law or the enactment
of a new law, or if it otherwise concerns a matter which
is for the Parliament to decide.
(2) If in a case under Paragraph (1) a special procedure
has been prescribed for the decision of the Parliament,
the same procedure shall be followed in connection
with the approval of the agreement.
(3) Nor may the Government in cases other than cases
under Paragraph (1) without the approval of the Parliament conclude any international agreement which is
binding upon the Realm, if the agreement is of major
importance. The Government may, however, act without obtaining the Parliaments approval of the agreement if the interest of the Realm so requires. In such
a case the Government shall confer instead with the
Foreign Affairs Advisory Council before concluding the
agreement.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The government has the power of pardon.
Chapter 1, Article 13
(1) The Government may by exercising mercy remit or
reduce a penal sanction or other legal effect of a criminal act, and may remit or reduce any other similar
intervention affecting the person or property of a private subject made by a public authority.
(2) Where exceptional reasons so warrant, the Government may order that no further action be taken to
investigate or prosecute a criminal act.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The government makes judicial appointments,

635

and the appointments do not require the legislatures approval.

Chapter 11, Article 9
(1) Appointments to a post in a court or in an administrative authority under the Government shall be made
by the Government or by an authority designated by
the Government.
(2) When making appointments to posts within the
State administration attention shall be directed only to
objective factors such as merit and competence.
(3) Only a Swedish citizen may hold or exercise the
functions of a judicial office, an office directly subordinate to the Government, a post or commission as
head of an authority directly subordinate to the Parliament or to the Government, or as a member of such
an authority or its board, a post in the Government
Chancery immediately subordinate to a Minister or a
post as a Swedish envoy. Also in other cases no one who
is not a Swedish citizen may hold an office or carry out
a commission, if the holder of such an office or commission is elected by the Parliament. Swedish nationality may otherwise be made a prerequisite of the right
to hold or exercise an office or commission under the
State or a local authority only if laid down in law or
under conditions prescribed by law.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
Yes. Parliament appoints the governor of the Bank
of Sweden, although it does so indirectly, by electing the body that names the governor.
Chapter 9, Article 12
(2) The Bank of Sweden is an authority under the Parliament.
(3) The Bank of Sweden is administered by eight
Trustees. Seven of the Trustees are elected by the Parliament. These Trustees elect a Trustee to act also as Governor of the Bank for a five-year period. The Trustees
elected by the Parliament elect a chairman from among
their number. This chairman may not exercise any
other commission or hold any office within the executive direction of the Bank. Rules concerning the Parliaments election of Trustees, concerning the direction of
the Bank of Sweden in other respects, and concerning
its operations are laid down in the Parliament Act and
elsewhere in law.
(4) A Trustee for whom the Parliament does not grant
discharge of responsibility is thereby severed from his
appointment. The Trustees elected by the Parliament
may remove the chairman from office and the person
who is a Trustee and the Governor of the Bank from his
appointment.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
Yes. The legislature has authority over the funding
and organization of the public media, although it
is forbidden from interfering with programs content.

636

Parliament of Sweden (Riksdag)

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.

No. Party groups provide secretarial assistance, but

on average there is less than one staff person for
each legislator.

Chapter 4, Article 1
The Parliament shall convene in session every year.
Sessions shall be held in Stockholm, unless otherwise
decided by the Parliament, or by the Speaker, having
regard to the safety or liberty of Parliament.
Chapter 1, Article 4
(1) An ordinary session which has begun during
August, September or October shall be prorogued no
later than 31 May the following year. If special grounds
exist the Parliament can prolong the session up to and
including 15 June, but no longer. Other sessions continue for as long as the Parliament finds necessary. If a
motion has been raised calling for the holding of a referendum on a matter concerning a fundamental law, the
session shall continue until the motion has been considered, notwithstanding what has been stated above in
this article. A session shall be prorogued not later than
the day on which the next ordinary session shall begin.
(2) If the Government has ordered an extra election, it
may decide to suspend a session for the remainder of
the electoral period. The Parliament shall be dissolved
immediately after the decision has been announced at
a meeting of the Chamber.

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.
No. See item 28.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

FEDERAL ASSEMBLY OF SWITZERLAND (BUNDESVERSAMMLUNG/ASSEMBLEE

ERALE/ASSEMBLEA

FED
FEDERALE )
Expert consultants: Clive H. Church, Paolo Dardanelli, Hans Hirter, Wolf Linder, Gerald Schneider,
Susanne Alice Wengle
Score: .72
Influence over
executive (6/9)

Institutional
autonomy (9/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

X
X

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

26. media

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no confidence

X
X
X

18. all elected

Specified
powers (5/8)

Institutional
capacity (3/6)
27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

The Federal Assembly (Bundesversammlung/

Assemblee federale/Assemblea federale) of Switzerland traces its origins to the meetings of repre-

sentative diets in the late thirteenth century. The

diets were formalized in the countrys 1815 constitution. The 1848 constitution established the

Federal Assembly of Switzerland

present bicameral legislature, consisting of a lower

house, the National Council (Nationalrat/Conseil
national/Consiglio nazionale), and an upper house,
the Council of States (Standerat/Conseil des e tats/
Consiglio degli stati). The constitution also established the Federal Council, a seven-person
executive elected by the legislature. The ceremonial presidency rotates every year among the
members of the Federal Council.
The legislature is the center of national politics.
It selects and effectively oversees the members of
government. The legislature enjoys complete institutional autonomy. It is noteworthy, however, that
although the executive lacks decree power, the legislatures laws can be rejected in a popular referendum. The legislature exercises many specified powers and has some institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in,
or impeach, the president.
2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of
the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 144
(1) Members of the National Council, of the Council
of States, of the Federal Government, and Judges of the
Federal Court may not at the same time be members of
another of these bodies.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 169
(1) The Federal Parliament shall exercise the high
supervision over the Federal Government, the Federal Administration, the Federal Courts and the other
organs entrusted with tasks of the Federation.
(2) Official secrecy shall not be opposable to those special delegations of supervisory commissions that are
appointed as provided by Statute.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.

637
Article 169
(1) The Federal Parliament shall exercise the high
supervision over the Federal Government, the Federal Administration, the Federal Courts and the other
organs entrusted with tasks of the Federation.
(2) Official secrecy shall not be opposable to those special delegations of supervisory commissions that are
appointed as provided by Statute.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. The legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature appoints the members of the
Federal Council, among whom the federal president rotates annually.
Article 168
(1) The Federal Parliament shall elect the members of
the Federal Government, the Federal Chancellor, the
judges of the Federal Court and the General.
Article 175
(1) The Federal Government shall consist of seven
members.
(2) The members of the Federal Government shall be
elected by the Federal Parliament after each full renewal
of the National Council.
Article 176
(1) The President of the Federation shall chair the Federal Government.
(2) The Federal Parliament shall elect, for a term of
one year, one of the members of the Federal Government as President of the Federation, and another as
Vice-President of the Federal Government.
(3) These mandates may not be renewed for the following year. The President of the Federation shall not be
eligible to be Vice-President for the following year.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The legislature elects the members of the federal government.
Article 168
(1) The Federal Parliament shall elect the members of
the Federal Government, the Federal Chancellor, the
judges of the Federal Court and the General.
Article 175
(1) The Federal Government shall consist of seven
members.
(2) The members of the Federal Government shall be
elected by the Federal Parliament after each full renewal
of the National Council.

638

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The country lacks a presidency in the usual
sense of the term. The legislature does, however,
elect the president of the federation from among
the members of the federal government.
Article 176
(1) The President of the Federation shall chair the Federal Government.
(2) The Federal Parliament shall elect, for a term of
one year, one of the members of the Federal Government as President of the Federation, and another as
Vice-President of the Federal Government.
(3) These mandates may not be renewed for the following year. The President of the Federation shall not be
eligible to be Vice-President for the following year.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in
the government.
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the
executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.
11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power. The government can issue ordinances to ensure the implementation of laws.
Article 182
(1) The Federal Government shall legislate in the form
of ordinances, insofar as the Constitution or the statute
empower it to do so.
(2) It shall ensure the implementation of statutes, of
decrees of the Federal Parliament, and of judgments of
the federal judiciary.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks veto power. Laws can be
vetoed, however, in a popular referendum.
13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
Yes. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all
policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.

Federal Assembly of Switzerland

Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy

jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune.
Article 162
(1) The members of the Federal Parliament and the Federal Government, and the Federal Chancellor may not
be held responsible for their statements in the Chambers and before parliamentary organs.
(2) The statute may provide for further forms of immunity, and extend them to other persons.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 149
(1) The National Council shall be composed of 200 representatives of the People.
(2) The representatives shall be elected directly by the
People according to the system of proportional representation. The National Council shall be renewed in
full every four years.
Article 150
(1) The Council of States shall consist of 46 delegates
of the Cantons.
(2) The Cantons of Obwald, Nidwald, Basle-City, BasleLand, Appenzell Outer-Rhodes and Appenzell InnerRhodes shall elect one Senator each, the other Cantons
shall elect two Senators.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments require approval
in a popular referendum.
Article 138
(1) 100,000 citizens entitled to vote may propose a total
revision of the Federal Constitution.
(2) This proposal has to be submitted to the people by
referendum.
Article 140
(1) The following shall be submitted to the vote of the
People and the Cantons:

Federal Assembly of Switzerland

a. Revisions of the Federal Constitution.
Article 193
(1) A total revision of the Federal Constitution may be
proposed by the People or by one of the Chambers, or
may be decreed by the Federal Parliament.
(2) If the initiative emanates from the People or if the
Chambers disagree, the People shall decide whether a
total revision shall be undertaken.
(3) Should the People accept a total revision, both
Chambers shall be newly elected.
(4) The mandatory provisions of international law may
not be violated.
Article 194
(1) A partial revision of the Federal Constitution may
be requested by the People, or be decreed by the Federal
Parliament.
(2) A partial revision must respect the principle of the
unity of subject matter; it may not violate the mandatory provisions of international law.
(3) A popular initiative for partial revision must, moreover, respect the principle of the unity of form.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. Switzerland maintains permanent neutrality,
and the constitution does not provide for a declaration of war. The legislatures approval is required
for a sustained mobilization of a substantial number of troops.
Article 185
(1) The Federal Government shall take measures to
secure the external security, the independence, and the
neutrality of Switzerland.
(2) It shall take measures to safeguard the inner security.
(3) It may base itself directly on the present article to
issue ordinances and orders to obviate existing or imminent great disturbances of the public order, the external
or the inner security. Such ordinances shall be limited
in time.
(4) In urgent cases, it may mobilize troops. If it mobilizes more than 4000 members of the armed forces for
active duty, or if the mobilization for active duty is
expected to last more than three weeks, the Federal Parliament must be convened without delay.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify international treaties with the exception for
treaties that are within the powers of the federal
government.
Article 141a
(1) If the approval of an international treaty is subject to a mandatory public referendum, the Federal
Parliament may include into the approval act those
amendments to the Constitution necessary for the
implementation of the treaty.

639
(2) If the approval of an international treaty is subject
to a facultative public referendum, the Federal Parliament may include into the approval act those changes
of the law necessary for the implementation of the
treaty.
Article 166
(1) The Federal Parliament shall participate in shaping
foreign policy, and shall supervise foreign relations.
(2) It shall approve international treaties, with the
exception of those which by statute or international
treaty are within the powers of the Federal Government.
Article 184
(1) The Federal Government shall conduct foreign relations safeguarding the Federal Parliaments participation rights; it shall represent Switzerland abroad.
(2) It shall sign treaties and ratify them. It shall submit
them to the Federal Parliament for approval.
(3) When the safeguard of the interests of the country so require, the Federal Government may issue ordinances and orders. Ordinances must be limited in time.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant
amnesty.
Article 173
(1) The Federal Parliament shall further have the following tasks and powers:
k. It shall decide on petitions for pardon and declare
amnesties.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

Yes. The legislature has the power of pardon.
Article 157
(1) The National Council and the Council of States
shall deliberate in common as the Federal Parliament
in Joint Session under the chairmanship of the President of the National Council in order to:
c. to rule on petitions for pardon.
Article 173
(1) The Federal Parliament shall further have the following tasks and powers:
k. It shall decide on petitions for pardon and declare
amnesties.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislature elects the members of the judiciary.
Article 168
(1) The Federal Parliament shall elect the judges of the
Federal Court.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The Federal Council appoints the chairman of
the Swiss National Bank.

640

Federal Assembly of Switzerland

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.

No. See item 28.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

No. Parliament is in session for only four threeweek meetings each year.
Article 151
(1) The Chambers shall meet regularly for sessions. The
Statute shall regulate the calling of sessions.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No. Legislators receive a modest fixed sum for personal staff, although not all legislators have a secretary.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

PEOPLES ASSEMBLY OF SYRIA (MAJLIS AL-SHAAB)

Expert consultants: Taima Aljayoush, Souhal Belhadj, Ellen Lust-Okar, Daniel Neep, Eyal Zisser
Score: .31
Influence over
executive (2/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Institutional
autonomy (2/9)

Specified
powers (2/8)

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

23. pardon
24. judiciary

Institutional
capacity (4/6)
X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

25. central bank

26. media

The Peoples Assembly (Majlis al-Shaab) of Syria

traces its origins to the Syrian National Congress
established by the French in 1919. Over the course
of its history, the Syrian legislature has had few
opportunities to assert itself. After achieving independence from France in 1946, Syria briefly (1958
61) united with Egypt to create the United Arab
Republic. Following its separation from Egypt,
Syria was ruled by emergency law in the Arab
Socialist Baath Partys one-party state. A new con-

stitution in 1973 established the unicameral Peoples Assembly. Under this constitution the president is nominated by the Baath Party and approved
in a popular referendum.
The Assembly has little meaningful power. It
has meager influence over the executive. The
Assemblys own autonomy is circumscribed by the
presidents dissolution, decree, and veto powers. It
exercises strikingly few specified powers but does
enjoy some institutional capacity.

Peoples Assembly of Syria (Majlis al-Shaab)

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. The legislature alone cannot impeach the
president. According to law, the president can
be removed from office in a procedure involving
both the legislature and the Supreme Constitutional Court. In practice, the president cannot be
removed from office at all by constitutional means.
The legislature can remove the prime minister with
a vote of no confidence.
Article 72
Confidence may not be withheld without the interrogation of the cabinet or a minister. A request for withholding confidence has to be made in accordance with a
proposal submitted by at least one-fifth of the members
of the Assembly. Confidence in the cabinet or a minister
may be withheld by a majority of the members of the
Assembly. In the event of no confidence in the cabinet,
the Prime Minister must submit the cabinets resignation to the President of the Republic. A minister from
whom confidence has been withheld must also resign.
Article 91
The President cannot be held responsible for actions
pertaining directly to his duties, except in the case of
high treason. A request for his indictment requires a
proposal of at least one-third of the members of the Peoples Assembly and an Assembly decision adopted by a
two-thirds majority in an open vote at a special secret
session. His trial takes place only before the Supreme
Constitutional Court.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Legislators may serve simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 125
Cabinet and Peoples Assembly membership may be
combined.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
No. Formally, the legislature can question executive branch officials, but in practice, it lacks this
power.
Article 70
The members of the Assembly have the right to . . .
address questions and inquiries to the cabinet or any
minister in accordance with the Assemblys internal
organization.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.

641

No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister.
Article 95
The President of the Republic appoints one or more Vice
Presidents and delegates some of his duties to them.
The President also appoints the Prime Minister and his
deputies and the ministers and their deputies, accepts
their resignations, and dismisses them from their
posts.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 95
The President of the Republic appoints one or more Vice
Presidents and delegates some of his duties to them.
The President also appoints the Prime Minister and his
deputies and the ministers and their deputies, accepts
their resignations, and dismisses them from their posts.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is elected in a popular referendum on the proposal of the Arab Socialist Baath
Party.
Article 84
Upon the proposal of the Arab Socialist Baath Party
regional command, the Assembly issues the order for
election of the President:
1) the candidacy is proposed to the citizens for referendum;
2) the referendum takes place upon the request of the
President of the Assembly;
3) the new president is elected before termination of
the term of the present President, within a period of
not less than 30 days and not more than 60 days;
4) the candidate becomes President of the Republic if
he obtains an absolute majority of the total votes. If
he fails to obtain this majority, the Assembly names
another candidate. The same procedures are followed
concerning the election, provided this takes place
within 1 month from the time the results of the first
plebiscite were announced.

642

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 72
Confidence may not be withheld without the interrogation of the cabinet or a minister. A request for withholding confidence has to be made in accordance with a
proposal submitted by at least one-fifth of the members
of the Assembly. Confidence in the cabinet or a minister may be withheld by a majority of the members
of the Assembly. In the event of no confidence in the
cabinet, the Prime Minister must submit the cabinets
resignation to the President of the Republic. A minister
from whom confidence has been withheld must also
resign.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 107
(1) The President of the Republic can dissolve the Peoples Assembly through a decision giving the reasons.
Elections are held within 90 days from the date of the
dissolution.
(2) He may not dissolve the Peoples Assembly more
than once for the same reason.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The president issues decrees that have the force
of law.
Article 99
The President of the Republic issues decrees, decisions,
and orders in accordance with the legislation in effect.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority vote is required to override the presidents veto.
Article 98
The President of the Republic promulgates the laws
approved by the Peoples Assembly, he may veto these
laws through a decision, giving the reasons for this
objection, within a month after their receipt by the
President. If the Assembly again approves them by a
two-thirds majority, the President of the Republic has
to issue them.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Supreme Constitutional Court can review
the constitutionality of laws made by the legislature. In an unusual twist on the practice of

Peoples Assembly of Syria (Majlis al-Shaab)

judicial review, the Supreme Constitutional Court

may review laws enacted by the legislature, but not
those made by the president and approved by public referendum.
Article 145
The Supreme Constitutional Court looks into and
decides on the constitutionality of laws in accordance
with the following:
1) Should the President of the Republic or a quarter of
the Peoples Assembly members challenge the constitutionality of a law before its promulgation, the promulgation of such law is suspended until the court makes a
decision on it within 15 days from the date the appeal
was filed with it. Should the law be of an urgent nature,
the Supreme Constitutional Court must make a decision within 7 days.
2) Should a quarter of the Peoples Assembly members
object to the constitutionality of a legislative decree
within 15 days of the date of the Peoples Assembly
session, the Supreme Constitutional Court must decide
on it within 15 days from the date the objection was
filed with it.
3) Should the Supreme Constitutional Court decide
that a law or a decree is contrary to the Constitution,
whatever is contrary to the text of the Constitution is
considered null and void with retroactive effect and has
no consequence.
Article 146
The Supreme Constitutional Court has no right to look
into laws which the President of the Republic submits
to public referendum and are approved by the people.
Article 147
The Supreme Constitutional Court, at the request of
the President of the Republic, gives its opinion on the
constitutionality of bills and legislative decrees and the
legality of draft decrees.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The president can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
No. The legislature is dependent on the executive
for the resources that finance its own operations.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.

Peoples Assembly of Syria (Majlis al-Shaab)

No. Formally, legislators are immune for official

parliamentary business, but in practice, legislators
lack immunity. For example, in 2002 two legislators urging political reform were stripped of
their parliamentary immunity and charged with
attempting to illegally change the constitution.
Article 66
Members of the Assembly are not accountable before
criminal or civil courts for any occurrences or views
they express, in voting in public or secret sessions, or
in the activities of the various committees.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 50
(2) The members of the Peoples Assembly are elected
by general, secret, direct, and equal ballot in accordance
with the provisions of the election law.

643
sovereignty or agreements which grant concessions to
foreign companies or establishments, as well as treaties
and agreements which entail expenditures of the state
treasury not included in the treasurys budget, and
treaties and agreements which run counter to the provisions of the laws in force or treaties and agreements
which require promulgation of new legislation to be
implemented.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. The legislatures approval is necessary to confirm the presidents decisions to grant amnesty, but
the legislature cannot grant amnesty itself.
Article 71
The Peoples Assembly assumes the following powers:
6) Approval of general amnesty.
Article 105
The President of the Republic can issue amnesty and
reinstatement decisions.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.

No. The president has the power of pardon.

No. Constitutional amendments require the presidents approval.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.

Article 149
(1) The President of the Republic as well as a two-thirds
majority of the Peoples Assembly members have a right
to propose amending the Constitution.
(2) The amendment proposal includes the provisions
to be amended and the reasons for it.
(3) Upon receipt of the proposal, the Peoples Assembly
sets up a special committee to investigate it.
(4) The Assembly discusses the amendment proposal,
and if approved by a two-thirds majority of its members, the amendment is considered final, provided it is
approved by the President of the Republic. It will then
be included in the body of the Constitution.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is required for presidential war declarations.
Article 100
The President of the Republic can declare war and general mobilization and conclude peace following the
approval by the Peoples Assembly.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties on most major issues.
Article 71
The Peoples Assembly assumes the following powers:
5) Approval of international treaties and agreements
connected with state security; namely, peace and
alliance treaties, all treaties connected with the rights of

No. The president appoints the members of the

Supreme Constitutional Court and other courts,
and the appointments do not require the legislatures approval.
Article 139
The Supreme Constitutional Court is composed of five
members, of whom one will be the President, and all of
whom are appointed by the President of the Republic
by decree.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the governor of the
Central Bank of Syria.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a voice in the operation
of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.
Article 61
The Peoples Assembly is convened in three ordinary
sessions yearly. It may also be convened in extraordinary sessions. The Assemblys table of organization sets
the dates and periods of the sessions. The Assembly is
invited to meet at extraordinary sessions by a decision
of the President of the Assembly, at the written request

644

Peoples Assembly of Syria (Majlis al-Shaab)

of the President of the Republic, or at the request of

one-third of the members of the Assembly.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.

Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members. It merits note, however, that remaining
in the good graces of the president and his hegemonic Baath Party, rather than maintaining popular support in elections, is the key to members
retention of seats and to the presence of continuity of membership in the legislature.

YUAN
`
LEGISLATIVE YUAN OF TAIWAN, REPUBLIC OF CHINA (LI`FA
)
Expert consultants: Jean-Pierre Cabestan, Tun-jen Cheng, Yun Fan, Thomas B. Gold, Pei-Shan Lee,
I-Chou Liu, Alexander C. Tan, Yu-Shan Wu
Score: .59
Influence over
executive (3/9)

Institutional
autonomy (6/9)

Specified
powers (4/8)

Institutional
capacity (6/6)

1. replace

10. no
dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments

27. sessions

2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

20. war

28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

26. media

X
X

The Legislative Yuan (L`fa Yuan)

of Taiwan traces
`
its origins to the Republic of Chinas 1931 provisional constitution. The constitution set up a system of government with five branches: the Legislative Yuan, the Executive Yuan, the Judicial Yuan, as
well as the Control Yuan (responsible for ensuring
that public officials obey the law) and the Examination Yuan (responsible for recruitment, training, and promotion of civil servants). The constitution also called for an elected National Assembly
responsible for electing a new president and changing the constitution.

Following the Kuomintangs evacuation from

mainland China to Taiwan in 1948, the island
came under martial law and single-party rule,
which lasted until 1991. During this period, legislative elections were irregularly held and constitutional limits on presidential re-election were
ignored. Public officials chosen in the last elections
before leaving the mainland remained in office,
partly to maintain the legitimacy of the claim
that the government of Taiwan represented all of
China. In the late 1980s, Taiwan began a period
of liberalization, which led to the formal abolition

`
Legislative Yuan of Taiwan, Republic of China (L`f
a Yuan)

of emergency measures in 1991 and to legislative

elections in 1992.
A constitutional amendment in 1992 provided
for the direct election of the president, and a presidential election was held in 1996. Prior to 1996
the president was elected by the National Assembly. According to a constitutional amendment of
2000, which went into effect in 2003, the president, vice president, and grand justices of the Judicial Yuan are appointed by the president with the
consent of the Legislative Yuan. Prior to 2003 the
president appointed the members of the judiciary,
and the appointments were confirmed by the Control Yuan. In 2005 the National Assembly passed
a constitutional amendment to abolish itself. In
the future, constitutional amendments will be proposed by the Legislative Yuan and approved in a
national referendum. In 2004 the Legislative Yuan
voted to cut the number of seats from 225 to 113.
The change took effect at the time of the legislative
elections in January 2008.
There are currently discussions underway to further amend the constitution to clarify the separation of powers in Taiwans semipresidential system.
Those who favor change disagree about whether
the reforms should move the system closer to parliamentarism or presidentialism.
The Legislative Yuan enjoys substantial powers.
It can control the executive branch through powers of interpellation and investigation, as well as
oversight over the agencies of coercion. The legislature has considerable institutional autonomy. The
members of the legislature are immune from arrest,
and the executive lacks gatekeeping and decree
powers. The legislature also enjoys a number of
specified prerogatives and has a high level of institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment can be initiated
only by the Control Yuan, an institution whose
purpose is to exercise the powers of censure and
impeachment. According to a 2005 amendment,
the impeachment proceedings are then carried out
by the Judicial Yuan. Prior to 2005 presidential
impeachment was initiated by the Control Yuan,
and the proceedings were held in the National
Assembly.
Article 100
Impeachment proceedings initiated by the Control
Yuan against the President or the Vice President shall be
instituted upon the proposal of one fourth or more than

645

one fourth of all Members of the Control Yuan and the

resolution, after careful consideration, by a majority of
all Members of the Control Yuan.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 75
No Member of the Legislative Yuan shall concurrently
hold a government post.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 57
The Executive Yuan shall be responsible to the Legislative Yuan in accordance with the following provisions:
1. When the Legislative Yuan is in session, its Members
have the right to interpellate the President of the Executive Yuan and Ministers and Chairmen of Commissions
of the said Yuan.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can set up committees to investigate the executive.
Article 67
(1) The Legislative Yuan may set up various committees.
(2) The various committees of the Legislative Yuan may
invite government officials and concerned individuals
in society at large to be present at the committee meetings to present their views.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. Legislative committees have effective powers
of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister,
called the president of the Executive Yuan.
Article 55
(1) The President of the Executive Yuan shall be nominated and . . . appointed by the President of the Republic.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.

646

`
Legislative Yuan of Taiwan, Republic of China (L`f
a Yuan)

No. The president appoints ministers on the recommendation of the president of the Executive
Yuan, and the appointments do not require the
legislatures approval.
Article 56
The Vice President of the Executive Yuan, Ministers and
Chairmen of Commissions, and Ministers without Portfolio shall be appointed by the President of the Republic
upon the recommendation of the President of the Executive Yuan.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. A 1992 amendment calls for the direct election
of the president, and the first nationwide presidential elections were held in 1996. Prior to 1996 the
president was elected by the National Assembly.
9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.
No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in
the government.
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the
executive.
No. The president can dissolve the Legislative
Yuan.
11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. The president does not have a direct veto but
can request his own government, the Executive
Yuan, to ask the Legislative Yuan to reconsider
legislation. A two-thirds majority from the Legislative Yuan is needed to override an executive
veto.
Article 57
The Executive Yuan shall be responsible to the Legislative Yuan in accordance with the following provisions:
3. In case the Executive Yuan deems an enactment,
a budget, or a treaty passed by the Legislative Yuan
difficult to enforce, it may, with the approval of the
President of the Republic and within ten days after the
transmission of the Legislative Yuans message, request
the latter for reconsideration. If, during reconsideration, two thirds of the members of the Legislative Yuan
present at the meeting uphold the original resolution,
the President of the Executive Yuan shall either abide

by the Legislative Yuans resolution or tender his resignation.

Article 72
Law bills passed by the Legislative Yuan shall be transmitted to the President of the Republic and the Executive Yuan. The President shall, within ten days after
receipt of the bills, promulgate them, but he may also
deal with them in accordance with the provisions of
Article 57 of this Constitution.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Judicial Yuan can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 78
The Judicial Yuan shall interpret the Constitution and
shall have the power to unify the interpretation of laws
and ordinances.
Article 171
(1) Laws that contravene the Constitution shall be null
and void.
(2) In case of doubt as to whether a given law contravenes the Constitution, the matter shall be settled by
interpretation by the Judicial Yuan.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive cannot impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature has financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto.
Article 73
No Member of the Legislative Yuan shall be held responsible outside the Yuan for opinions expressed or votes
cast in the Yuan.
Article 74
No Member of the Legislative Yuan shall, except in case
of flagrante delicto, be arrested or detained without the
permission of the Legislative Yuan.

`
Legislative Yuan of Taiwan, Republic of China (L`f
a Yuan)

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. Since 1992, all members of the legislature are
elected. From 1948 to 1992, in an attempt to claim
that the Republic of China was the official government of mainland China, the legislature retained
the legislators who had been elected in the final
elections held on the mainland before fleeing to
Taiwan. During this time periodic elections were
held to replace deceased members and to expand
the size of the legislature.
Article 62
The Legislative Yuan . . . shall be composed of Members elected by the people and shall exercise legislative
power on their behalf.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments require approval
in a popular referendum.
20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.
Yes. The legislatures approval is required for the
declaration of war.

647

No. The president has the power of pardon.

Article 40
The President shall, in accordance with law, exercise
the powers of amnesty, pardon, remission of sentence,
and restitution of civil rights.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. According to a constitution amendment of
2000, which entered into effect in 2003, the president, vice president, and grand justices of the Judicial Yuan are appointed by the president with the
consent of the Legislative Yuan. Prior to 2003 the
president appointed the members of the judiciary,
and the appointments, which were confirmed by
the Control Yuan, did not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 79
(1) The Judicial Yuan shall have a President and a Vice
President. The President and the Vice President of the
Judicial Yuan shall be nominated and, upon confirmation by the Control Yuan, appointed by the President
of the Republic.
(2) The Judicial Yuan shall have a number of Grand
Justices to be responsible for the matters specified in
Article 78 of this Constitution. The Grand Justices shall
be nominated and, upon confirmation by the Control
Yuan, appointed by the President of the Republic.

Article 63
The Legislative Yuan shall have the power to pass bills
on laws, budgets, martial law, and amnesty, declaration
of war, conclusion of peace, treaties, and other important matters of State.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.

No. The president appoints the chairman of the

Bank of Taiwan.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

international treaties on most major issues.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

Article 38
The President shall, in accordance with the provisions
of this Constitution, exercise the powers of concluding
treaties, declaring war, and making peace.

No. The legislature lacks a voice in the operation

of the public media.

Article 63
The Legislative Yuan shall have the power to pass bills
on laws, budgets, martial law, amnesty, declaration of
war, conclusion of peace, treaties, and other important
matters of State.

Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session for at

least eight months each year.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant
amnesty.
Article 63
The Legislative Yuan shall have the power to pass bills
on laws, budgets, martial law, amnesty, declaration of
war, conclusion of peace, treaties, and other important
matters of State.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Article 68
The Legislative Yuan shall hold two sessions each year
and shall convene of its own accord. The first session
shall be from February to the end of May, and the second from September to the end of December. Any session may be prolonged, if necessary.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
Yes.

`
Legislative Yuan of Taiwan, Republic of China (L`f
a Yuan)

648

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
Article 65
Members of the Legislative Yuan shall serve a term of
three years and shall be re-eligible.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.

Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

SUPREME ASSEMBLY OF TAJIKISTAN (MAJLISI OLI)

Expert consultants: Mehrdad Haghayeghi, Zuhra Halimova, Lidia Isamova, Sarmad Khawaja,
Faizullokhodzha Nasrulloev
Score: .31
Influence over
executive (1/9)

Institutional
autonomy (2/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no confidence

Specified
powers (2/8)
X

19. amendments
20. war

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon
24. judiciary

Institutional
capacity (5/6)
X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

X
X
X

25. central bank

X

26. media

18. all elected

The Supreme Assembly (Majlisi Oli) of Tajikistan

traces its origins to the Regional Congress of the
Soviets held in Tashkent in 1917. Beginning in
1921, the country that is now Tajikistan fell under
seven decades of Soviet rule. Tajikistan achieved
independence in 1991, paving the way for the
adoption of the 1994 constitution. The document
called for a bicameral legislature consisting of
the lower house, the Assembly of Representatives
(Majlisi Namoyandagon), and an upper house, the
National Assembly (Majlisi Milli). A constitutional
amendment in 2003 extended the length of the
presidents term but did not directly affect the legislatures powers.
During much of the 1990s, Tajikistan was torn
by civil war, and the legislature did not function
normally. During the first decade of the 2000s,
the Assembly took on more of its formal functions, but its role in national politics is still diminu-

tive. Tajikistan is dominated by its president, Emomali Rakhmon, and the legislature has almost
no influence on the executive branch. For example, it cannot choose the president or the prime
minister, effectively oversee the government, or
remove members of the executive from office. The
legislatures own institutional autonomy is limited by a president whose powers include decree
authority and the right to appoint one-quarter of
the upper house of the legislature. The legislature
exercises few specified powers. It does possess some
institutional capacity, which is bolstered by the
presence of personal legislative staff.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.

Supreme Assembly of Tajikistan (Majlisi Oli)

No. Presidential impeachment requires the approval of the Constitutional Court. The president
must initiate removal of the prime minister.
Article 55
Powers of the Majlisi Milli and the Majlisi Namoyandagon while conducting joint sessions:
Approval of presidential decrees on appointment and
dismissal of the Prime Minster and other members of
the Government.
Article 72
The President has the right to immunity.
The President is deprived of immunity in the event of
committing a State treason based on the conclusion
of the Constitutional Court by two thirds of votes of
all the members of the Majlisi Milli and the deputies
of the Majlisi Namoyandagon voting in each Majlisi
separately.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Ministers are prohibited from serving simultaneously in the legislature.
Article 50
Members of the Government . . . may not become members of the Majlisi Milli.
Article 73
The members of the Government do not have the
right to hold another office, be deputies of representative organs, or engage in entrepreneurial activity with
the exception of scientific, creative, and educational
activity.

649
Appoints and dismisses the Prime Minister and other
members of the Government; presents decrees appointing and dismissing the Prime Minister and other
members of the Government to the joint session of
the Majlisi Milli and the Majlisi Namoyandagon for
approval.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to confirm the presidents ministerial appointments.
Article 69
Powers of the President:
Appoints and dismisses the Prime Minister and other
members of the Government; presents decrees appointing and dismissing the Prime Minister and other
members of the Government to the joint session of
the Majlisi Milli and the Majlisi Namoyandagon for
approval.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 65
The President is elected by the citizens of Tajikistan on
the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by a
secret ballot for a term of seven years.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.

No. The legislature cannot, acting alone, vote no

confidence in the government. The legislatures
approval, however, is necessary for the president
to dismiss the prime minister.

No. The legislature does not regularly question

executive branch officials.
4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.

Article 55
Powers of the Majlisi Milli and the Majlisi Namoyandagon while conducting joint sessions:
Approval of presidential decrees on appointment and
dismissal of the Prime Minster and other members of
the Government.

No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).

Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution by

the executive, although the legislature can vote to
dissolve itself.

No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister.
Article 69
Powers of the President:

Article 63
The Majlisi Milli and the Majlisi Namoyandagon in a
joint session may dissolve themselves prematurely with
the support of no less than two thirds of the members of the Majlisi Milli and deputies of the Majlisi
Namoyandagon.
The Majlisi Milli and the Majlisi Namoyandagon may
not be dissolved during the state of emergency and martial law.

650

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The president issues decrees that have the force
of law.
Article 70
The President within the limits of his powers issues
decrees and orders, informs the joint session of the
Majlisi Milli and the Majlisi Namoyandagon about the
countrys situation, [and] submits important and necessary issues for discussion to the joint session of the
Majlisi Milli and the Majlisi Namoyandagon.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority vote is required to override a presidential veto.
Article 62
Laws are presented to the President of the Republic of
Tajikistan for signature and promulgation. If the President does not agree with a law or its part, he returns
it within fifteen days to the Majlisi Namoyandagon
with his objections. The Majlisi Milli and the Majlisi
Namoyandagon reconsider the given law according to
the procedure established by the Constitution. If during the reconsideration the law is approved in the earlier adopted wording by a majority of no less than
two thirds of all the members of the Majlisi Milli
and the deputies of the Majlisi Namoyandagon, the
President shall sign the law and promulgate it within
10 days.
During reconsideration of a law returned by the President previously adopted by the Majlisi Namoyandagon
by two thirds of the votes, the Majlisi Milli and
the Majlisi Namoyandagon approve the law again
by a majority of no less than two thirds of the
votes.
If the President returns a constitutional law, the Majlisi
Namoyandagon and the Majlisi Milli reconsider the
given law according to the procedure established by the
Constitution. If during the reconsideration the constitutional law is approved in the earlier adopted wording by a majority of no less than two thirds of all the
members of the Majlisi Milli and deputies of the Majlisi
Namoyandagon, the President shall sign the law and
promulgate it within 10 days.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 89
Powers of the Constitutional Court:
Determining of the conformity to the Constitution of
laws.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

Supreme Assembly of Tajikistan (Majlisi Oli)

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping

authority.
No. The legislature is prohibited from initiating legislation related to taxation and amnesty.
Article 59
Amnesty bills are introduced to the Majlisi Namoyandagon by the President of the Republic of Tajikistan. Budget bills and bills establishing and abolishing
taxes are introduced to the Majlisi Namoyandagon by
the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The president can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
No. The legislature is dependent on the president
for the resources that finance its own operations.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto, here
expressed as detainment at a scene of a crime.
Article 51
A member of the Majlisi Milli and a deputy of the
Majlisi Namoyandagon have the right to immunity; he
may not be arrested, detained, taken into custody, [and]
searched, except in cases of detainment at a scene of a
crime. A member of the Majlisi Milli and a deputy of
the Majlisi Namoyandagon may not be subjected to a
personal search except in cases provided for by law in
order to ensure safety of other people. Issues regarding
the deprivation of a member of the Majlisi Milli and
a deputy of the Majlisi Namoyandagon of their immunity are resolved by the corresponding Majlisi upon a
presentation of the General Procurator.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
No. The president appoints eight of the thirty-four
members of the National Assembly. All members
of the Assembly of Representatives are elected.
Article 48
The Majlisi Oli the Parliament of the Republic of Tajikistan is the highest representative and legislative organ
of the Republic of Tajikistan.
The Majlisi Oli consists of two Majlisis (assemblies)
the Majlisi Milli and the Majlisi Namoyandagon.
The term of the Majlisi Milli and the Majlisi
Namoyandagon is five years. The powers of the Majlisi
Milli and the Majlisi Namoyandagon are terminated on

Supreme Assembly of Tajikistan (Majlisi Oli)

the day on which the activity of the Majlisi Milli and the
Majlisi Namoyandagon of the new convocation begins.
The organization and activity of the Majlisi Oli are
determined by a constitutional law.
Article 49
The Majlisi Namoyandagon is elected on the basis
of universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot . . . Three quarters of the members of the Majlisi
Milli are elected indirectly by way of secret ballot at
joint assemblies of peoples deputies of the GornoBadakhshan Autonomous Oblast and its cities and
rayons, oblasts and their cities and rayons, the city of
Dushanbe and its rayons, cities and rayons of republican subordination (jointly). In the Majlisi Milli, the
Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast, oblasts, the
city of Dushanbe, [and] cities and rayons of republican subordination have an equal number of representatives. One quarter of the members of the Majlisi Milli is
appointed by the President of the Republic of Tajikistan.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments require approval
in a popular referendum.
Article 98
Amendments and supplements to the Constitution take
place by means of a national referendum.
A referendum is called by the President or the Majlisi
Namoyandagon with the support of no less than two
thirds of the total number of deputies.
Article 99
Proposed amendments and supplements to the Constitution are introduced by the President or by no less
than one third of all members of the Majlisi Milli
and deputies of the Majlisi Namoyandagon. Proposed
amendments and supplements to the Constitution are
published in the press three months before the referendum.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. There is no formal provision for the declaration of war. The legislatures approval is necessary,
however, for presidential declarations of martial
law and a state of emergency.
Article 55
Powers of the Majlisi Milli and the Majlisi
Namoyandagon while conducting joint sessions:
Approval of the presidential decree on declaration of
martial law and state of emergency
Article 69
Powers of the President:
Declares a state of emergency on the entire territory
of the Republic or in individual locations with an
immediate presentation of a corresponding decree for
approval to the joint session of the Majlisi Milli and the
Majlisi Namoyandagon and notification of the United
Nations.

651

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The approval of the Assembly of Representatives is necessary to ratify international treaties.
Article 57
Powers of the Majlisi Namoyandagon:
Ratification and denouncement international treaties
Article 69
Powers of the President:
Leads the conduct of foreign policy, signs international
treaties and presents them for the approval of the
Majlisi Namoyandagon.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Amnesty bills are introduced by the president
and approved by the Assembly of Representatives.
Article 59
Amnesty bills are introduced to the Majlisi Namoyandagon by the President of the Republic of Tajikistan.
Article 60
The laws on the State budget and amnesty are adopted
only by the Majlisi Namoyandagon.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 69
Powers of the President:
Grants pardons.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The National Assembly elects the judges of the
Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, and the
Highest Economic Court upon the presentation
of the president, but in practice, the presidents
presentation is the final word, and the legislature has no substantial voice in the appointments.
Other judges are appointed by the president on the
recommendation of the Council of Justice.
Article 56
Powers of the Majlisi Milli:
Election and recall of the Chairman, Deputy Chairmen,
and judges of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme
Court, and the Highest Economic Court upon the presentation of the President.
Article 86
Judges of the Military Court, judges of the court of the
Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast, oblasts, the
city of Dushanbe, city and rayon courts, judges of the
economic court of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous
Oblast, oblasts, and the city of Dushanbe are appointed
and dismissed by the President upon the presentation
of the Council of Justice.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

652

Supreme Assembly of Tajikistan (Majlisi Oli)

No. The president appoints the chairman of the

National Bank of Tajikistan with the approval of
the legislature.
Article 69
Powers of the President:
Appoints and dismisses the Chairman of the National
Bank, his deputies, and presents relevant decrees for the
approval of the Majlisi Namoyandagon.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a voice in the operation
of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session for
about eight months each year.
Article 52
The activity of the Majlisi Namoyandagon is conducted
in the form of sessions. Regular session of the Majlisi
Namoyandagon is held once a year from the first working day of October until the last working day of June.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Legislative elections were held in 1995, 2000,
and 2005, and the legislature is staffed with a significant number of experienced politicians. It bears
note, however, that legislators loyalty to the president, who dominates politics by controlling the
agencies of coercion, the media, and the hegemonic Peoples Democratic Party, is the key to
maintaining a seat in the Assembly.

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF TANZANIA (BUNGE)

Expert consultants: Paul J. Kaiser, Apollonia Kerenge, David K. Leonard, Rwekaza Mukandala,
Vibeke Wang
Score: .31
Influence over
executive (4/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

Institutional
autonomy (1/9)

Specified
powers (1/8)

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

24. judiciary
X

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

25. central bank

26. media

18. all elected

The National Assembly (Bunge) of Tanzania traces

its origins to the Executive Council established in
1920 to provide representation in Britains colonial

government. Tanzania achieved independence in

1962, but for the next few decades the legislature
was marginalized under the single-party system

National Assembly of Tanzania (Bunge)

erected by President Julius Nyerere. The countrys

current constitution was adopted in 1977 and calls
for a unicameral legislature. Nyereres retirement in
1985 paved the way for multiparty politics and the
adoption of a constitutional amendment in 1992,
which provides the legislature with a vote of no
confidence.
The Assemblys modest powers are distributed
unevenly. The Assembly enjoys some influence
over the executive branch. It members serve in
government. Furthermore, it can interpellate and
investigate the government and remove the government with a vote of no confidence. The legislatures own institutional autonomy, however,
is negligible. Furthermore, the legislature exercises only one of the specified powers assessed in
this survey, but it does have some institutional
capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires the
involvement of a Special Committee of Inquiry,
whose membership includes extraparliamentary
judicial authorities. The legislature can remove the
prime minister with a vote of no confidence.
Article 46
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 46 of this
Constitution the National Assembly may pass a resolution to remove the President from office if a motion to
impeach the President is moved and passed in accordance with the provisions of this Article.
(2) Subject to the other provisions of this Article, no
motion to impeach the President shall be moved save
only if it is alleged that the President
(a) has committed acts which generally violate the
Constitution or the law concerning the ethics of public leaders;
(b) has committed acts which contravene the conditions concerning the registration of political parties
specified in Article 20(2) of this Constitution; or
(c) has conducted himself in a manner which lowers
the esteem of the office of President of the United
Republic, and no such motion shall be moved within
twenty months from the time when a similar motion
was previously moved and rejected by the National
Assembly.
(3) The National Assembly shall not pass a motion to
impeach the President save only if
(a) a written notice signed and supported by not
less the twenty per cent of all the member of Parliament is submitted to the Speaker thirty days prior
to the sitting at which such motion is intended to
be moved in the National Assembly, specifying the

653
wrong committed by the President and proposing
that a Special Committee of Inquiry be constituted
to inquire into the charges brought against the President.
(b) at any time after the Speaker receives the notice
duly signed by the Member of Parliament and satisfies himself that the provisions of the Constitution
for the moving of the motion have been complied
with, to vote on the motion to constitute a Special
Committee of Inquiry, and if it is supported by not
less than two thirds of all the Member of Parliament,
the Speaker shall announce the names of the member
of the Special Committee of Inquiry.
(4) The Special Committee of Inquiry for the purpose
of this Article shall consist of the following members,
that is to say
(a) the Chief Justice of the United Republic who shall
be the Chairman of the Committee;
(b) the Chief Justice of Tanzania Zanzibar; and
(c) seven members appointed by the Speaker in
accordance with the Standing Orders of the National
Assembly and taking into account the proportional
representation amongst the political parties represented in the National Assembly.
(5) In the event that the National Assembly passes the
motion to constitute a Special Committee of Inquiry,
the President shall be deemed to be out of office,
and the duties and functions of the office of President shall be discharged in accordance with the provisions of Article 37(3) of this Constitution until the
Speaker shall inform the President about the resolution of the National Assembly in connection with the
charges brought against him.
(6) Within seven days after the Special Committee of
Inquiry is constituted, it shall sit, inquire into and analyse the charges preferred against the President, including affording the President the opportunity to be heard
in his defence in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Standing Orders of the National Assembly.
(7) As soon as possible and in any event within a period
of not more than ninety days, the Special Committee
of Inquiry shall submit its report to the Speaker.
(8) After the Speaker receives the report of the Special
Committee of Inquiry, the report shall be tabled before
the National Assembly in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Standing Orders of the National
Assembly.
(9) After the report of the Special Committee of Inquiry
is submitted pursuant to subarticle (8) the National
Assembly shall discuss the report and shall afford the
President the opportunity to be heard, and then by the
votes of not less than two thirds majority of all the
Members of Parliament, the National Assembly shall
pass a resolution either that the charges against the
President have been proved and that he is unworthy
of continuing to hold the office of President, or that
the charges have not been proved.
(10) In the event the National Assembly passes a resolution that the charges against the President have been

654
proved and that he is unworthy of continuing to hold
the office of President, the Speaker shall inform the President and the Chairman of the Electoral Commission
about such resolution of the National Assembly, whereupon the President shall be obliged to resign before the
expiry of three days from the day the National Assembly passed the resolution.
(11) In the event the President ceases to hold the office
of President by reason of the charges against him being
proved he shall not be entitled to receive any payment
by way of pension or to receive any benefits or other
privileges which he has under the Constitution or any
other law enacted by Parliament.
Article 51
(1) There shall be a Prime Minister of the United Republic who shall be appointed by the President in accordance with the provisions of this Article and who,
before assuming his office, shall take and subscribe
before the President such oath of office of Prime Minister as may be prescribed by Parliament.
(2) As soon as possible, and in any event within fourteen days after assuming his office, the President shall
appoint a Member of Parliament elected from a constituency from a political party having a majority of
Members of Parliament in the National Assembly or, if
no political party has a majority, who appears to have
the support of the majority of the Members of Parliament, to be Prime Minister of the United Republic, and
he shall not assume office until his appointment is first
confirmed by a resolution of the National Assembly
supported by a majority vote of Members of Parliament.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Ministers are required to serve simultaneously
in the legislature.
Article 55
(4) All Ministers and Deputy Ministers shall be
appointed from among Members of Parliament.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 63
(3) For the purposes of discharging its functions the
National Assembly may
(a) put any question to any Minister concerning public affairs in the United Republic which are within his
responsibility.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can establish special committees to investigate the executive.

National Assembly of Tanzania (Bunge)

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister
with the consent of the National Assembly.
Article 51
(1) There shall be a Prime Minister of the United Republic who shall be appointed by the President in accordance with the provisions of this Article and who,
before assuming his office, shall take and subscribe
before the President such oath of office of Prime Minister as may be prescribed by Parliament.
(2) As soon as possible, and in any event within fourteen days after assuming his office, the President shall
appoint a Member of Parliament elected from a constituency from a political party having a majority of
Members of Parliament in the National Assembly or,
if no political party has a majority, who appears to
have the support of the majority of the Members of Parliament, to be Prime Minister of the United Republic,
and he shall not assume office until his appointment is
first confirmed by a resolution of the National Assembly supported by a majority vote of Members of Parliament.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers on the advice
of the prime minister, and the appointments do
not require the legislatures approval.
Article 55
(1) All Ministers who are members of the Cabinet by
virtue of Article 54 shall be appointed by the President
after consultation with the Prime Minister, and they
shall be responsible for such offices as the President
may, from time to time, by writing under his hand and
the Public Seal, establish.
(2) In addition to the Ministers referred to in subarticle (1) the President may, after consultation with the
Prime Minister, appoint Deputy Ministers. All Deputy
Ministers shall not be members of the Cabinet.
(3) The President may appoint any number of Deputy
Ministers who shall assist Ministers in the discharge of
their duties and functions.
(4) All Ministers and Deputy Ministers shall be
appointed from among Members of Parliament.
(5) Notwithstanding the provisions of subarticle (4),
in the event that the President is obliged to appoint
a Minister or a Deputy Minister after dissolution of
Parliament then he may appoint any person who was
a Member of Parliament before Parliament was dissolved.

National Assembly of Tanzania (Bunge)

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 33
(1) There shall be a President of the United Republic.
Article 38
(1) The President shall be elected by the people in
accordance with the provisions of this Constitution
and in accordance with the law enacted by Parliament
pursuant to the provisions of this Constitution, making provisions concerning the election of the President.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 53A
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 51 of this
Constitution, the National Assembly may pass a vote of
no confidence in the Prime Minister if a motion proposing in that behalf is moved and passed in accordance
with the provisions of this Article.
(2) Subject to the other provisions of this Article, any
motion for a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister shall not be moved in the National Assembly
if
(a) either it has no relation with the discharge of the
responsibilities of the Prime Minister in accordance
with Article 52 of the Constitution) or there are no
allegations that the Prime Minister has contravened
the law concerning the ethics of public leaders;
(b) six months have not lapsed since he was
appointed;
(c) nine months have not lapsed since a similar
motion was moved in and rejected by the National
Assembly.
(3) A motion for a vote of no confidence in the Prime
Minister shall not be passed by the National Assembly
save only if:
(a) a written notice, signed and supported by not less
than twenty percentum of all the Members of Parliament is submitted to the Speaker, at least fourteen
days prior to the day on which the motion is intended
to be moved before the National Assembly;
(b) The Speaker satisfies himself that the provisions
of the Constitution governing the moving of the
motion have been complied with.
(4) A motion which satisfies the provisions of this Article shall be moved before the National Assembly as soon
as possible in accordance with the Standing Orders of
the National Assembly.
(5) A motion for a vote of no confidence in the Prime
Minister shall be passed only if it is supported by a
majority of the Members of Parliament.
(6) In the event the motion for a vote of no confidence
in the Prime Minister is supported by a majority of the

655
Members of Parliament, the Speaker shall submit the
resolution to the President, and as soon as possible and
in any event within two days from the day the National
Assembly passed the vote of no confidence in the Prime
Minister, the Prime Minister shall be required to resign,
and the President shall appoint another Member of Parliament to be Prime Minister.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 90
(2) The President shall not have power to dissolve Parliament at any time save only
(a) if the life of Parliament has expired in terms of
Article 65 of the Constitution or at any time within
the last twelve months of the life of Parliament, save
only if the Speaker receives a formal notice under
Article 46A of this Constitution proposing the formation of a Special Committee of Inquiry with a view to
impeaching the President;
(b) if the National Assembly refuses to approve a budget proposed by the Government;
(c) if Parliament fails to pass a Bill in terms of the
provisions of Article 97(4);
(d) if the National Assembly declines to pass a
motion which is of fundamental importance to Government policies and the President considers that the
way out is not to appoint another Prime Minister but
to call for a general election; or
(e) if, having regard to the proportional representation of political parties in the National Assembly
the President considers that it is no longer legitimate for the Government in power to continue in
office, and it is not feasible to form a new Government.
(3) Upon the expiration of the life of Parliament, Parliament shall stand dissolved: Save that if the life of
Parliament expires at any time when the United Republic is at war, the National Assembly may, from time to
time, extend the period mentioned in Article 65 of this
Constitution for a period not exceeding twelve months
each time; provided that the life of Parliament shall not
be extended under the provisions of this subarticle for
a period of more than five years.
(4) If an emergency arises or exists which, in the opinion of the President, necessitates the summoning of
a Parliament at a time when Parliament stands dissolved, and the majority of results in the general election following the dissolution have not been declared,
the President may, by Proclamation, summon Parliament and direct that the Speaker and all the persons who were the Members of Parliament immediately before the dissolution of Parliament attend such
meeting of Parliament and such persons together with
the Speaker shall be deemed to be the Members of the
National Assembly for the purposes of that meeting
and shall be so deemed until midnight of the day the
majority of the results of the general election are declared.

656

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. Formally, the executive lacks decree power. In
practice, the president issues decrees that have the
force of law.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority vote is required to override a presidential veto. Moreover, an override does
not necessarily result in the passage of a bill. Even
after the legislature votes to override the presidents veto, the president can still choose to dissolve the legislature rather than assent to the bill.
Article 97
(1) Subject to the provisions contained in this Constitution, the National Assembly shall exercise its legislative power through the process of debating and passing
Bills which eventually shall have to be assented to by
the President, and a Bill shall not become law unless it
is so passed by the National Assembly and assented to
by the President in accordance with the provisions of
this Article.
(2) After a Bill is presented to the President for his
assent, the President may either assent to the Bill or
withhold his assent, and in the event the President
withholds his assent to a Bill, he shall return it to the
National Assembly together with a statement of his reasons for withholding his assent to the Bill.
(3) After a Bill is returned to the National Assembly
pursuant to the provisions of this Article, it shall not be
presented again to the President for his assent before the
expiration of six months since it was so returned, except
if at the last stage in the National Assembly before it is
again presented to the President it is supported by the
votes of not less than two-thirds of all the Members of
Parliament.
(4) If a Bill is returned to the National Assembly by
the President, and it is then supported in the National
Assembly by not less than two-thirds of all Members of
Parliament as provided in subarticle (3) and it is presented a second time to the President for assent within
six months of its being so returned, then the President
shall be obliged to assent to the Bill within twenty-one
days of its being presented to him, otherwise he shall
have to dissolve Parliament.
(5) The provisions contained in this Article or in Article
64 of this Constitution shall not prevent Parliament
from enacting laws making provisions conferring on
any person or department of Government the power to
make regulations having the force of law or conferring
the force of law on any regulations made by any person,
or any department of Government.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.

National Assembly of Tanzania (Bunge)

No. The High Court can review the constitutionality of laws.

Article 30
(5) Where in any proceedings it is alleged that any law
enacted or any action taken by the Government or any
other authority abrogates or abridges any of the basic
rights, freedoms and duties set out in Articles 12 to 29
of this Constitution, and the High Court is satisfied
that the law or action concerned, to the extent that it
conflicts with this Constitution, is void, or is inconsistent with this Constitution, then the High Court, if it
deems fit, or if the circumstances or public interest so
requires, instead of declaring that such law or action is
void, shall have power to decide to afford the Government or other authority concerned an opportunity to
rectify the defect found in the law or action concerned
within such a period and in such manner as the High
Court shall determine, and such law or action shall be
deemed to be valid until such time the defect is rectified or the period determined by the High Court lapses,
whichever is the earlier.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. The legislature is prohibited from introducing
legislation related to taxation, public expenditures,
or government debt.
Article 99
(1) The National Assembly shall not deal with any
of the matters to which this Article relates except if
the President has proposed that the matter be dealt
with by the National Assembly and the proposal has
been submitted to the National Assembly by a Minister.
(2) The matters to which this Article relate are the following:
(a) a Bill to enact a law providing for any of the following
(i) to levy a tax or to alter taxation otherwise than
by reduction;
(ii) the imposition of any charge upon the Consolidated Fund or any other public fund or the alteration of any such charge otherwise than by reduction;
(iii) the payment, issue or withdrawal from the
Consolidated Fund or any other public fund of
any moneys not charged thereon, or any increase
in the amount of such payment, issue or withdrawal;
(iv) the composition or remission of any debt due
or payable to the United Republic;
(b) a motion or any amendment of a motion for the
purposes of any of the matters referred to in paragraph (a) of this subarticle.
(3) The provisions of this Article shall not apply to a Bill
or any amendment to a Bill introduced by or a motion
or an amendment to a motion moved by a Minister or
a Deputy Minister.

National Assembly of Tanzania (Bunge)

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The president can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislative immunity extends to official parliamentary business only. Legislators are subject to
arrest for common crimes.
Article 100
(1) There shall be freedom of opinion, debate and in
the National Assembly, and that freedom shall not be
breached or questioned by any organ in the United
Republic or in any court or elsewhere outside the
National Assembly.
(2) Subject to this Constitution or to the provisions of
any other relevant law, a Member of Parliament shall
not be prosecuted and no civil proceedings may be instituted against him in a court in relation to any thing
which he has said or done in the National Assembly
or has submitted to the National Assembly by way of a
petition, bill, motion or otherwise.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
No. The executive can appoint members of the
legislature. The executive branch, relying on constitutional provisions that allow the Electoral
Commission a say in ensuring adequate female
membership, enjoys some effective appointment
powers. The attorney general, who is appointed by
the president, also serves as a legislator.
Article 66
(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Article, there
shall be the following categories of Members of Parliament, that is to say:
(a) members elected to represent, constituencies;
(b) women members being not less than fifteen percent of the members mentioned in paragraphs (a),
(c) and (d) elected by the political parties represented
in the National Assembly in terms of Article 78 and
on the basis of proportional representation amongst
those parties;
(c) five members elected by the House of Representatives from among its members;
(d) the Attorney General.
(2) The President and the Vice-President shall each not
be a Member of Parliament.

657
(3) Where a Regional Commissioner is elected a Member of Parliament representing a constituency or where
a Member of Parliament representing a constituency
is appointed a Regional Commissioner, the National
Assembly shall be deemed to consist of the requisite number of members and its proceedings shall be
valid notwithstanding that the ordinary total number
of members in terms of this Article shall have been
reduced by reason of such election of the Regional Commissioner or such appointment of a constituency member.
Article 78
(1) For the purposes of the election of women Members of Parliament mentioned in Article 66(1) (b), political parties which took part in the election shall in
accordance with the procedure laid down propose to
the Electoral Commission the names of women on the
basis of the proportional representation among the parties which won elections in constituencies and secured
seats in the National Assembly. If the Commission is
satisfied that any person so proposed has the qualifications to be Member of Parliament it shall declare that
that person has been elected Member of Parliament and
the provisions of Article 83 of this Constitution shall
apply in connection with the election of that person to
be Member of Parliament.
(2) No person may be proposed by any political party
for the purposes of election in accordance with this
Article save only if that person has the requisite qualifications for election in terms of Article 67 of this Constitution.
(3) The names of the persons proposed to the Electoral
Commission in accordance with subarticle (1) shall be
declared to be the results of the election after the Commission is satisfied that the relevant provisions of the
Constitution and of other legislation have been complied with.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments require the presidents approval.
Article 97
(1) Subject to the provisions contained in this Constitution, the National Assembly shall exercise its legislative power through the process of debating and passing
Bills which eventually shall have to be assented to by
the President, and a Bill shall not become law unless it
is so passed by the National Assembly and assented to
by the President in accordance with the provisions of
this Article.
Article 98
(1) Parliament may enact legislation for altering any
provision of this Constitution in accordance with the
following principles:
(a) A Bill for an Act to alter any provisions of this
Constitution (other than those relating to paragraph
(b) of this subarticle) or any provisions of any law

658
specified in List One of the Second Schedule to this
Constitution shall be supported by the votes of not
less than two-thirds of all the Members of Parliament;
(b) A Bill for an Act to alter any provisions of this
Constitution or any provisions of any law relating to
any of the matters specified in List Two of the Second
Schedule to this Constitution shall be passed only
if it is supported by the votes of not less than twothirds of all Members of Parliament from Mainland
Tanzania and not less than two-thirds of all Members
of Parliament from Tanzania Zanzibar.
(2) For the purposes of construing the provisions of
subarticle (1), alteration of provisions of this Constitution or the provisions of a law shall be understood to
include modification, or correction of those provisions
or repeal and replacement of those provisions or the
re-enactment or modification of the application of the
provisions.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. The president can declare war without the legislatures approval. The president is required to seek
the legislatures support for the war declaration
within fourteen days.
Article 44
(1) Subject to this Constitution or to any Act of Parliament providing in that behalf, the President may
declare the existence of a state of war between the
United Republic and any other country.
(2) After making the declaration, the President shall
transmit a copy of such declaration to the Speaker of
the National Assembly who, after consultation with
the Leader of Government Business in the National
Assembly, shall within fourteen days from the date
of the declaration, convene a meeting of the National
Assembly to deliberate on the prevailing situation and
to consider whether or not to pass a resolution in
support of the declaration of war made by the President.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 63
(3) For the purposes of discharging its functions the
National Assembly may
(e) deliberate upon and ratify all treaties and agreements to which the United Republic is party and the
provisions of which require ratification.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

National Assembly of Tanzania (Bunge)

No. The president has the power of pardon.

Article 45
(1) Subject to the other provisions contained in this
Article, the President may do any of the following:
(a) grant a pardon to any person convicted by a court
of law of any offence, and he may grant such pardon
unconditionally or on conditions, subject to law;
(b) grant any person a respite, either indefinitely or
for a specified period, of the execution of any punishment imposed on that person for any offence;
(c) substitute a less severe form of punishment for
any punishment imposed on any person for any
offence; and
(d) remit the whole or part of any punishment
imposed on any person for any offence, or remit
the whole or part of any penalty of fine or forfeiture
of property belonging to a convicted person which
would otherwise be due to the Government of the
United Republic on account of any offence.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The president makes judicial appointments,
and the appointments do not require the legislatures approval.
Article 109
(1) There shall be a Principal Judge of the High Court
(who in the following provisions of this Constitution
shall be referred to as the Principal Judge) and other
Judges of the High Court who shall be not less than
fifteen.
(2) The Principal Judge and other Judges of the High
Court shall be appointed by the President after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission.
Article 113
(1) Subject to the provisions of any law enacted by
Parliament concerning the appointment of magistrates
and other Judicial officers, the division of power for that
purpose shall be as follows:
(a) the power to appoint persons to hold offices prescribed in subarticle (2) of this Article (including the
power to confirm such persons in office and to promote them) is hereby vested in the President;
(2) The offices to which this Article applies are the
offices of the Registrar of the Court of Appeal of Tanzania and his Deputy of any grade, the offices of the Registrar of the High Court and his Deputy of any grade,
the office of Resident Magistrate and of a magistrate
of any other category, and any other office connected
with any court (other than a court-martial) as may be
specified by a law enacted by Parliament in accordance
with the provisions of this Constitution.
Article 118
(1) There shall be a Chief Justice of the Court of Appeal
(who in the subsequent Articles of this Constitution
shall be referred to in short as the Chief Justice) and
not less than two other Justices of Appeal; save that a

National Assembly of Thailand (Rathasapha)

659

full bench of the Court of Appeal shall consist of not

less than five Justices of Appeal.
(2) The Chief Justice shall be appointed by the President, and shall be the Head of the Court of Appeal and
of the Judiciary as defined in Article 116 of this Constitution.
(3) The other Justices of Appeal shall be appointed by
the President after consultation with the Chief Justice, from among persons who qualify to be appointed
Judges of the High Court of the United Republic as provided for in Article 109 of this Constitution, or from
among persons who qualify to be appointed Judges of
the High Court of Zanzibar in accordance with the laws
applicable in Zanzibar.

Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.
No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.

No. The president appoints the governor of the

Bank of Tanzania.

Yes.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.

No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the

operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THAILAND (RATHASAPHA)

Expert consultants: Chris Baker, Paul Chambers, Allen Hicken, James R. Klein, Michael Nelson,
Pasuk Phongpaichit, Aaron M. Stern
Score: .59
Influence over
executive (7/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no confidence

Institutional
autonomy (3/9)

Specified
powers (4/8)

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

X
X

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

23. pardon

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

18. all elected

24. judiciary

25. central bank

26. media

The National Assembly (Rathasapha) of Thailand

was established in the 1932 constitution, which set
forth a constitutional monarchy with a prime min-

Institutional
capacity (5/6)

X
X

ister as the head of government and the king as the

head of state. A new constitution in 1947 instituted
the current bicameral legislative structure with a

660

lower house, the House of Representatives (Sapha

Phuthaen Ratsadon), and an upper house, the Senate (Wuthisapha). A 1994 amendment mandated
that the prime minister must be an elected member of the parliamentary majority. Prior to 1994
the monarch had wide discretion in choosing the
prime minister.
For much of its history, the legislature was a
sideshow in successive military dictatorships. The
early 1990s brought military withdrawal to the barracks and the onset of more regular parliamentary politics. In 2006, however, the military again
staged a coup, this one allegedly to rid the country of the overweening and corrupting influence
of the then-prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra.
The new military regime appointed an interim
National Assembly and drafted a new constitution,
the countrys current fundamental law, which was
passed in a popular referendum in 2007. The new
constitution allows ministers to serve simultaneously in the House of Representatives. Prior to
2007 the prime minister and other ministers were
required by law to vacate their seats in the legislature in order to assume a government position. The new constitution also grants the king
the power to appoint the members of the Senate
on the recommendation of a special commission.
Prior to 2007 all members of the legislature were
elected.
The legislature has substantial, albeit not overwhelming, power. It can influence the government
by choosing the prime minister, interpellating
and investigating executive branch officials, and
removing the prime minister with a vote of no confidence. The legislatures institutional autonomy
is limited by the executive branchs gatekeeping,
veto, dissolution, and decree powers. For example,
the legislature is prohibited from initiating money
bills, bills relating to taxes, public expenditure,
loans, and currency without the endorsement of
the prime minister. It has several specified powers
and significant institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can replace the prime minister
with a vote of no confidence. It cannot remove the
king from the throne.
Section 8
The King shall be enthroned in a position of revered
worship and shall not be violated. No person shall
expose the King to any sort of accusation or action.

National Assembly of Thailand (Rathasapha)

Section 158
Members of the House of Representatives of not less
than one-fifth of the total number of the existing members of the House have the right to submit a motion
for a general debate for the purpose of passing a vote
of no-confidence in the Prime Minister. Such motion
must nominate the suitable next Prime Minister who
is also a person under section 171 paragraph two and,
when the motion has been submitted, the dissolution
of the House of Representatives shall not be permitted,
except that the motion is withdrawn or the resolution
is passed without being supported by the vote in accordance with paragraph three. If the general debate is concluded with a resolution not to pass over the agenda of
the general debate, the House of Representatives shall
pass a vote of confidence or no-confidence. Voting in
such case shall not take place on the date of the conclusion of the debate. The vote of no-confidence must
be passed by more than one-half of the total number of
the existing members of the House of Representatives.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. The prime minister is chosen from, and
required to serve simultaneously in, the House of
Representatives.
Section 116
A senator shall not be a Minister or a person holding
any political position or a person holding position in
the independent constitutional organ.
Section 171
The Prime Minister must be a member of the House of
Representatives appointed under section 172.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Section 156
Every member of the House of Representatives or senator has the right to interpellate a Minister on any matter
within the scope of his authority, but the Minister has
the right to refuse to answer it if the Council of Ministers is of the opinion that the matter should not yet be
disclosed on the ground of safety or vital interest of the
State.
Section 157
In the administration of State affairs on any matter
which involves an important problem of public concern, affects national or public interest, or requires
urgency, a member of the House of Representatives may
notify the President of the House of Representatives in
writing prior to the commencement of the sitting of
the day, that he will interpellate the Prime Minister or
the Minister responsible for the administration of State
affairs on that matter without specifying the question,

National Assembly of Thailand (Rathasapha)

and the President of the House of Representatives shall
place such matter on the agenda of the meeting of that
day.
The interpellation and the answer to the interpellation
under paragraph one may be made once a week, and
a verbal interpellation by a member of the House of
Representatives on a matter involving the administration of State affairs may be made not exceeding three
times on each matter in accordance with the rules of
procedure of the House of Representatives.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can establish committees to
investigate the executive.
Section 135
The House of Representatives and the Senate have the
power to select and appoint members of each house to
constitute a standing committee and have the power to
select and appoint persons, being or not being its members, to constitute an non-standing committee in order
to perform any act, inquire into or study any matter
within the powers and duties of the House and report
its findings to the House. The resolution appointing
such non-standing committee must specify its activities or the responsible matters clearly and without repetition or duplication. The committee under paragraph
one has the power to demand documents from any person or summon any person to give statements of fact or
opinions on the act or the matter under its inquiry or
study and such demand or summoning is enforceable
as provided by law but it is not applicable to a judge
performing his powers and duties in trial of the case
or to the personnel management of each Court and
to the Ombudsman or members of the independent
Constitutional organ in the performance of their powers and duties under the Constitution or the organic
laws, as the case may be. In the case where the person
under paragraph two is a government official, official
or employee of government agency, State agency, State
enterprise or local government organ, the Chairperson
of the committee shall notify the Minister who supervises and controls the agency to which such person is
attached in order to instruct him to act as prescribed
in paragraph two, except that, in the case of the safety
of or important benefit to the State, it shall be deemed
as a ground for the exemption to the compliance with
paragraph two.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

661

Yes. The king is required to appoint as prime minister the candidate nominated by a majority vote
in the House of Representatives.
Section 171
The King appoints the Prime Minister and not more
than thirty-five other Ministers to constitute the Council of Ministers having the duty to carry out the administration of State affairs with collective accountability.
Section 172
The House of Representatives shall complete its consideration and approval of the person suitable to be
appointed as Prime Minister within thirty days as from
the day the National Assembly is convoked for the first
sitting under section 127. The nomination of a person
who is suitable to be appointed as Prime Minister under
paragraph one shall be endorsed by members of the
House of Representatives of not less than one-fifth of
the total number of the existing members of the House.
The resolution of the House of Representatives approving the appointment of a person as Prime Minister shall
be passed by the votes of more than one-half of the total
number of the existing members of the House of Representatives. The passing of the resolution in such case
shall be by open votes.
Section 173
In the case where the period of thirty days as from
the date the National Assembly is convoked for the
first sitting of members of the House of Representatives has elapsed and no one has been approved for
appointment as Prime Minister under section 172 paragraph three, the President of the House of Representatives shall, within fifteen days as from the lapse of such
period, present to the King for the issuance of a Royal
Command appointing the person who has received the
highest votes as Prime Minister.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The king appoints ministers on the recommendation of the prime minister, and ministerial
appointments do not require legislative approval.
Section 171
The King appoints the Prime Minister and not more
than thirty-five other Ministers to constitute the Council of Ministers having the duty to carry out the administration of State affairs with collective accountability.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The country lacks a presidency. The king is the
head of state.
Section 2
Thailand adopts a democratic regime of government
with the King as Head of State.

662

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can pass a constructive vote of
no confidence in the government, which means
that parliament must designate a successor prime
minister before passing a vote of no confidence.
Section 158
Members of the House of Representatives of not less
than one-fifth of the total number of the existing members of the House have the right to submit a motion
for a general debate for the purpose of passing a vote
of no-confidence in the Prime Minister. Such motion
must nominate the suitable next Prime Minister who
is also a person under section 171 paragraph two and,
when the motion has been submitted, the dissolution
of the House of Representatives shall not be permitted,
except that the motion is withdrawn or the resolution
is passed without being supported by the vote in accordance with paragraph three. If the general debate is concluded with a resolution not to pass over the agenda of
the general debate, the House of Representatives shall
pass a vote of confidence or no-confidence. Voting in
such case shall not take place on the date of the conclusion of the debate. The vote of no-confidence must
be passed by more than one-half of the total number of
the existing members of the House of Representatives.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The king, on the advice of the prime minister,
can dissolve the legislature.
Section 108
The King has the prerogative to dissolve the House of
Representatives for a new election of members of the
House. The dissolution of the House of Representatives
shall be made in the form of a Royal Decree in which
the day for a new general election must be fixed for
not less than forty-five days but not more than sixty
days as from the day the House of Representatives has
been dissolved and such election day must be the same
throughout the Kingdom. The dissolution of the House
of Representatives may be made only once under the
same circumstance.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The king issues royal decrees that have the
force of law. The king, on the advice of the government, can also decree laws in emergency situations. If the emergency decree is not subsequently
approved by the legislature, it lapses. The government has made liberal use of its emergency decree
powers; it held such powers continually for over a
year prior to the military coup of 2006 in order to
grapple with a separatist movement in the southern part of the country.

National Assembly of Thailand (Rathasapha)

Section 184
For the purpose of maintaining national or public
safety or national economic security, or averting public calamity, the King may issue an Emergency Decree
which shall have the force as an Act.
The issuance of an Emergency Decree under paragraph
one shall be made only when the Council of Ministers is
of the opinion that it is the case of emergency and necessary urgency which is unavoidable. In the next succeeding sitting of the National Assembly, the Council
of Ministers shall submit the Emergency Decree to the
National Assembly for its consideration without delay.
If it is out of session and it would be a delay to wait for
the opening of an ordinary session, the Council of Ministers must proceed to convoke an extraordinary session
of the National Assembly in order to consider whether
to approve or disapprove the Emergency Decree without delay. If the House of Representatives disapproves
it or approves it but the Senate disapproves it and the
House of Representatives reaffirms its approval by the
votes of not more than one-half of the total number
of the existing members of the House, the Emergency
Decree shall lapse; provided that it shall not affect any
act done during the enforcement of such Emergency
Decree.
Section 187
The King has the prerogative to issue a Royal Decree
which is not contrary to the law.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a simple majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority vote is required to override the kings veto.
Section 151
If the King refuses His assent to a bill and either returns
it to the National Assembly or does not return it within
ninety days, the National Assembly must reconsider
such bill. If the National Assembly resolves to reaffirm the bill with the votes of not less than two-thirds
of the total number of existing members of both
Houses, the Prime Minister shall present such bill to the
King for signature once again. If the King does not sign
and return the bill within thirty days, the Prime Minister shall cause the bill to be promulgated as an Act in
the Government Gazette as if the King had signed it.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court reviews the constitutionality of laws.
Section 141
Before presenting the organic law bill as approved by
the National Assembly to the King for His signature,
it shall be submitted to the Constitutional Court for
considering of its constitutionality and, it such case,
the Constitutional Court shall have a decision thereon

National Assembly of Thailand (Rathasapha)

within thirty days as from the date of receiving thereof.
If the Constitutional Court decides that the provisions
of an organic law bill are contrary to or inconsistent
with the Constitution, such provisions shall lapse and
if the Constitutional Court decides that such provisions
are the essential element thereof or the organic law bill
is enacted inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution, such organic law bill shall lapse.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. The legislature is prohibited from introducing
legislation related to taxation, public expenditure,
government loans, or currency.
Section 142
Subject to section 139, a bill may be introduced only by
the followings:
(1) the Council of Ministers;
(2) members of the House of Representatives of not less
than twenty in number;
(3) the Court or the independent Constitutional organs
only for the bills relating to their organization over the
execution of which the President of such Court or organ
has control;
(4) the persons having the right to vote of not less than
ten thousand in number whom jointly introduce a bill
under section 163.
If the bill under (2), (3) or (4) is a money bill, it shall
be introduced only with the endorsement of the Prime
Minister.
Section 143
A money bill means a bill with provisions dealing with
any of the following matters:
(1) the imposition, repeal, reduction, alteration, modification, remission, or regulation of taxes or duties;
(2) the allocation, receipt, custody, payment of the
State funds, or transfer of expenditure estimates of the
State;
(3) the raising of loans, or guarantee or redemption of
loans, or any binding of States properties;
(4) currency.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto.

663
Section 131
No member of the House of Representatives or senator
shall, during a session, be arrested, detained or summoned by a warrant for inquiry as the suspect in a
criminal case unless permission of the House of which
he is a member is obtained or he is arrested in flagrante
delicto. In the case where a member of the House of Representatives or a senator has been arrested in flagrante
delicto, it shall be forthwith reported to the President
of the House of which he is a member and such President may order the release of the person so arrested.
In the case where a criminal charge is brought against
a member of the House of Representatives or a senator,
whether the House is in session or not, the Court shall
not try the case during a session, unless permission of
the House of which he is a member is obtained or it is
a case concerning the organic law on election of members of the House of Representatives and acquisition of
senators, the organic law on Election Commission or
the organic law on political parties; provided that the
trial of the Court shall not hinder such member from
attending the sitting of the House. The trial and adjudication of the Court conducted before it is invoked that
the accused is a member of either House are valid.
If a member of the House of Representatives or a senator
is detained during the inquiry or trial before the beginning of a session, when the session begins, the inquiry
official or the Court, as the case may be, must order his
release as soon as the President of the House of which
he is a member has so requested. The order of release
under paragraph one shall be effective as from the date
of such order until the last day of the session.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
No. Some members of the Senate are appointed
by a special commission, and others are elected.
All members of the House of Representatives are
elected.
Section 93
The House of Representatives consists of four hundred
and eighty members, four hundred of whom are from
the election on a constituency basis and eighty of whom
are from the election on a proportional basis. The election of member of the House of Representatives shall
be by direct suffrage and secret ballot, and the ballot to
be used in an election shall be varied upon the election
basis.
Section 111
The Senate consists of one hundred and fifty members
acquired upon the basis of election in each Changwat,
one elected senator for each Changwat, and upon the
selection basis in an amount equal to the total number
of senators deducted by the number of senators from
the election basis.
Section 112
In an election of senators, the area of Changwat shall be
regarded as one constituency and the number of senator

664
for each Changwat is one. The person having the right
to vote at an election of senators may cast ballot, at the
election, for one candidate and the election shall be by
direct suffrage and secret ballot. For the purpose of the
election of senators, the campaign to be launched by
the candidates in the election is limited to the matters
related to the performance of duties of the Senate.
Section 113
There shall be the Senators Selection Committee consisting of the President of the Constitutional Court, the
Chairperson of the Election Commission, the President
of the Ombudsmen, the Chairperson of the National
Counter Corruption Commission, the Chairperson of
the State Audit Commission, a judge of the Supreme
Court of Justice holding the position of not lower than
judge of the Supreme Court of Justice as entrusted
by the general meeting of the Supreme Court of Justice and a judge of the Supreme Administrative Court
as entrusted by the general meeting of the Supreme
Administrative Court, having a duty to select persons
under section 114 within thirty days as from the date of
receiving the list of candidates from the Election Commission and to notify the selection result to the Election
Commission for publication of the persons selected as
senators.
Section 114
The Senators Selection Committee shall carry out the
selection process for persons who may be beneficial
to the performance of powers and duties of the Senate from persons nominated by academic institutions,
public sector, private sector, professional organizations
and other organizations to be senators in an amount
as prescribed in section 111 paragraph one. In selection
of person under paragraph one, regard shall be had to
knowledge, skills or experience of the nominated persons which will be beneficial to the performance of the
Senate, and the composition of the selected persons
shall be regarded to interdisciplinary knowledge and
experience, genders opportunity and equality, closely
apportion of the persons nominated by the organizations under paragraph one and opportunity of social
vulnerable groups.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution in
multiple readings with a majority vote.
Section 291
An amendment of the Constitution may be made only
under the rules and procedure as follows:
(1) a motion for amendment must be proposed either
by the Council of Ministers or members of the House
of Representatives of not less than one-fifth of the total
number of the existing members of the House of Representatives or members of both Houses of not less than
one-fifth of the total number of the existing members
thereof or persons having the right to votes of not less
than fifty thousand in number under the law on the
public submission of a bill;

National Assembly of Thailand (Rathasapha)

A motion for amendment which has the effect of changing the democratic regime of government with the King
as Head of State or changing the form of State shall be
prohibited;
(2) a motion for amendment must be proposed in
the form of a draft Constitution Amendment and the
National Assembly shall consider it in three readings;
(3) the voting in the first reading for acceptance in
principle shall be by roll call and open voting, and the
amendment must be approved by votes of not less than
one-half of the total number of the existing members
of both Houses;
(4) in the consideration section by section in the second reading, consultation with the people who submit
a draft Constitution Amendment shall be held;
The voting in the second reading for consideration section by section shall be decided by a simple majority of
votes;
(5) at the conclusion of the second reading, there shall
be an interval of fifteen days after which the National
Assembly shall proceed with its third reading;
(6) the voting in the third and final reading shall be by
roll call and open voting, and its promulgation as the
Constitution must be approved by votes of more than
one-half of the total number of the existing members
of both Houses;
(7) after the resolution has been passed in accordance
with the above rules and procedure, the draft Constitution Amendment shall be presented to the King, and the
provisions of section 150 and section 151 shall apply
mutatis mutandis.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is required for the
kings war declarations.
Section 189
The King has the prerogative to declare war with the
approval of the National Assembly. The approval resolution of the National Assembly must be passed by the
votes of not less than two-thirds of the total number of
the existing members of both Houses. During the expiration of the term or the dissolution of the House of
Representatives, the Senate shall perform the function
of the National Assembly in giving the approval under
paragraph one, and the resolution shall be passed by the
votes of not less than two-thirds of the total number of
the existing senators.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Section 190
The King has the prerogative to conclude a peace treaty,
armistice and other treaties with other countries or
international organizations. A treaty which provides for
a change in the Thai territories or the Thai external territories that Thailand has sovereign right or jurisdiction

National Assembly of Thailand (Rathasapha)

over such territories under any treaty or an international law or requires the enactment of an Act for its
implementation or affects immensely to economic or
social security of the country or results in the binding
of trade, investment budget of the country significantly
must be approved by the National Assembly.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The king has the power of pardon.
Section 191
The King has the prerogative to grant a pardon.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The king appoints the members of the Constitutional Court on the recommendation of the
Senate. The king appoints other judges on the recommendation of the appropriate judicial commission.
Section 200
The King appoints and removes judges except in the
case of removal from office upon death.
The appointment and removal from office of a judge
of any Court other than the Constitutional Court, the
Court of Justice, the Administrative Court and the Military Court as well as the adjudicative jurisdiction and
procedure of such Courts shall be in accordance with
the law on the establishment of such Courts.
Section 204
The Constitutional Court consists of the President
and eight judges of the Constitutional Court to be
appointed by the King upon advice of the Senate from
the following persons:
(1) three judges of the Supreme Court of Justice holding a position of not lower than judge of the Supreme
Court of Justice and elected at a general meeting of the
Supreme Court of Justice by secret ballot;
(2) two judges of the Supreme Administrative Court
elected at a general meeting of the Supreme Administrative Court by secret ballot;
(3) two qualified persons in law who having orientated
knowledge and experience in this field and having been
selected under section 206;
(4) two qualified persons in political science, public
administration or other social sciences who having orientated knowledge and experience in the administration of State affairs and having been selected under section 206.
Section 220
The appointment and removal from office of a judge
of a Court of Justice must be approved by the Judicial

665
Commission of the Courts of Justice before they are
tendered to the King.
Section 224
The appointment and removal from office of an administrative judge must be approved by the Judicial Commission of the Administrative Courts as provided by
law before they are tendered to the King.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The government appoints the governor of the
Bank of Thailand.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
Section 47
Transmission frequencies for radio or television broadcasting and telecommunication are national communication resources for public interest. There shall be an
independent regulatory body having the duty to distribute the frequencies under paragraph one and supervise radio or television broadcasting and telecommunication businesses as provided by the law.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes. The constitution requires only 120 days of
meeting each year. In practice, the legislature normally is in session for at least half of the year.
Section 127
The National Assembly shall, within thirty days as from
the date of the election of members of the House of
Representatives, be summoned for the first sitting. Each
year, there shall be a general ordinary session and a
legislative ordinary session. An ordinary session of the
National Assembly shall last one hundred and twenty
days but the King may prolong it. An ordinary session
may be prorogued before the end of one hundred and
twenty days only with the approval of the National
Assembly.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
Yes.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
No. Senators may serve only one term and may not
seek reappointment.
Section 117
The term of membership of the senates is six years as
from the election day or the day the Election Commission publishes the result of the selection, as the case

666

National Assembly of Thailand (Rathasapha)

may be, and no senator shall hold office more than one
term.

contains a significant number of highly experienced

members.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.

Yes. Prior to the 2006 coup, legislators regularly

sought and achieved re-election, and the legislature contained a body of experienced members. It
is unclear whether this pattern will hold in the
post-coup environment.

Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature

NATIONAL PARLIAMENT OF TIMOR-LESTE

Expert consultants: Naazneen Barma, Nicole Seibel
Score: .47
Influence over
executive (2/9)

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no confidence

12. no veto
13. no review

18. all elected

Specified
powers (5/8)
X
X

Institutional
capacity (3/6)

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

23. pardon
X

24. judiciary

25. central bank

X
X

26. media
X

The National Parliament of Timor-Leste (also called

East Timor) was established in the countrys 2002
constitution upon independence from Indonesia.
The document calls for a unicameral legislature,
a prime minister as head of the government, and
a directly elected president as the head of state.
Timor-Leste held parliamentary elections in August
2001, before the country formally gained independence. The first legislative elections since independence were held in June 2007.
It is too early to say with any certainty how the
legislature will function in the new polity. From
the constitution and early indications, it appears
that the legislature has a moderate amount of
power, although it has very little ability to influence the executive. It chooses the prime minister but cannot effectively oversee the executive
or remove executive branch officials. The legislature does have some institutional autonomy, and
it holds five of the eight specified powers and pre-

rogatives assessed in this survey. The legislature has

some institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of the Supreme Court of Justice. The presidents approval is needed to remove the prime minister following a vote of no confidence.
Article 79
1. The President of the Republic enjoys immunity in
the exercise of his or her functions.
2. The President of the Republic is responsible before
the Supreme Court of Justice for crimes committed in the exercise of his or her functions and for
clear and serious violation of constitutional obligations.

National Parliament of Timor-Leste

667

3. It is the incumbent upon the National Parliament to

initiate the criminal proceedings, following a proposal
made by one-fifth, and deliberation approved by a twothird majority, of its Members.
4. The Plenary of the Supreme Court of Justice shall
issue a judgment within a maximum of 30 days.
5. Conviction shall result in forfeiture of office and disqualification from re-election.
6. For crimes not committed in the exercise of his or
her functions, the President of the Republic shall also
be answerable before the Supreme Court of Justice, and
forfeiture of office shall only occur in case of sentence
to prison.

Article 101
1. The Members of the Government have the right to
attend plenary sessions of the National Parliament and
may take the floor as provided for in the rules of procedures.
2. Sittings shall be scheduled at which members of the
Government shall be present to answer questions from
Members of Parliament in accordance with the Rules of
Procedure.
3. The National Parliament or its Committees may
request members of the Governments to take part in
their proceedings.

Article 111
1. The National Parliament may, following proposal by
one-quarter of the Members in full exercise of their
functions, pass a vote of no confidence on the Government with respect to the implementation of its program
or any relevant matter of national interest.
2. When a vote of no confidence is not approved, its signatories shall not move another vote of no confidence
during the same legislative session.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.

Article 112
1. The dismissal of the Government shall occur when:
a. at the beginning of a new legislative;
b. by the acceptance by the President of the Republic
of the resignation of the Prime Minister;
c. by the death of the Prime Minister or by suffering
a permanent physical incapacity;
d. by the rejection of its program for the second consecutive time;
e. by the non-approval of a vote of confidence;
f. by the approval of a vote of no confidence by a
absolute majority of the Members in full exercise of
their functions;
2. The President of the Republic can only dismiss the
Prime Minister in accordance with the cases provided
for in the previous number and when it is deemed necessary to ensure the regular functioning of the democratic institutions, after consultation with the Council
of State.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. The constitution states that incompatibilities
will be determined by law. In practice, legislators
are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 68
2. The law shall define other incompatibilities.

No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. The president is required to appoint as prime
minister the candidate who enjoys majority support in the legislature.
Article 85
It is exclusively incumbent upon the President of the
Republic:
d. to appoint and swear in the Prime Minister designated by the party or alliance parties with parliamentary majority after consultation with the political
parties sitting in the National Parliament.
Article 106
1. The Prime Minister shall be designated by the political party or alliance of political parties with parliamentary majority and shall be appointed by the President
of the Republic, after consultation with the political
parties sitting in the National Parliament.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.

No. The president appoints ministers on the

proposal of the prime minister, and ministerial appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.

No. Formally, legislators can question government

officials, but in practice, ministers do not regularly
respond to the legislatures requests.

Article 86
It is incumbent upon the President of the Republic, with
regard to other organs:

668

National Parliament of Timor-Leste

h. to appoint, swear in and remove Government
Members from office, following a proposal by the
Prime Minister, in accordance with number 2, Article
106.

Article 106
2. The remaining members of the Government shall
be appointed by the President of the Republic on the
proposal by the Prime Minister.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 76
1. The President of the Republic is elected by universal,
free, direct, secret and personal suffrage.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 111
1. The National Parliament may, following proposal
by one-quarter of the Members in full exercise of
their functions, pass a vote of no confidence on the
Government with respect to the implementation of
its program or any relevant matter of national interest.
2. When a vote of no confidence is not approved, its signatories shall not move another vote of no confidence
during the same legislative session.
Article 112
1. The dismissal of the Government shall occur when:
f. by the approval of a vote of no confidence by a absolute majority of the Members in full exercise of their
functions;
2. The President of the Republic can only dismiss the
Prime Minister in accordance with the cases provided
for in the previous number and when it is deemed necessary to ensure the regular functioning of the democratic institutions, after consultation with the Council
of State.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 86
It is incumbent upon the President of the Republic, with
regard to other organs:
f. to dissolve the National Parliament in case of a serious
institutional crisis preventing the formation of a government or the approval of the State Budget and lasting
more than sixty days, after consultation with political
parties sitting in the Parliament and with the Council of State, on pain of rendering the act of dissolution
null and void, taking into consideration provisions of
Article 100.

Article 100
1. The National Parliament shall not be dissolved during the six months immediately following its election,
during the last half-year of the term of office of the
President of the Republic or during a state of siege or
a state of emergency, on pain of rendering the act of
dissolution null and void.
2. The dissolution of the National Parliament does not
affect the continuance of the mandates of its Members
until the first meeting of the National Parliament after
the ensuing election.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power. The legislature can, however, grant the government temporary decree powers on certain issue areas.
Article 96
1. The National Parliament may authorize the government to make laws concerning the following matters:
a. definition of crimes, sentences, security measures
and respective prerequisites;
b. definition of civil and criminal procedure;
c. organization of the Judiciary and status of magistrates;
d. general rules and regulations for the public service,
the status of the civil servants and the responsibility
of the State;
e. general bases for the organization of public administration;
f. monetary system;
g. banking and financial system;
h. definition of the bases for a policy of protection of
the environment and sustainable development;
i. general rules and regulations for radio and television broadcasting and other mass media communication;
j. military or civic service;
k. general rules and regulations for the requisition
and expropriation for public utility;
l. means and ways of intervention, expropriation,
nationalization and privatization of means of production and soils on grounds of public interest, as well
as criteria for the establishment of compensation in
such cases.
2. Laws on legislative authorization shall define the subject, sense, scope and duration of the authorization,
which may be renewed.
3. Laws on legislative authorization cannot be used
more than once and shall lapse with the dismissal of
the Government, with the end of the legislative term
or with the dissolution of the National Parliament.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote of its total membership.

National Parliament of Timor-Leste

Article 88
1. Within thirty days after receiving any draft law from
the National Parliament for the purpose of its promulgation as law, the President of the Republic shall either
promulgate the law or exercise the right of veto, based
on substantive grounds, send a message to the National
Parliament requesting a new appraisal of the statute.
2. If, within ninety days, the National Parliament confirms its vote by an absolute majority of its Members
in full exercise of their functions, the President of the
Republic shall promulgate the law within eight days
after receiving it.
3. However, a majority of two-thirds of the Members
present shall be required to ratify laws on matters provided for in Article 95 when that majority exceeds an
absolute majority of the Members in full exercise of
their functions.
4. Within forty days after receiving any draft law from
the Government for the purpose of its promulgation as
law, the President of the Republic shall either promulgate it or exercise the right of veto by way of a written
communication to the Government containing the reasons for the veto.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Supreme Court of Justice can review the
constitutionality of laws.
Article 120
The courts shall not apply rules that contravene the
Constitution or the principles contained therein.
Article 126
1. It is incumbent upon the Supreme Court of Justice,
in the domain of juridico-constitutional questions:
a. to review and declare the unconstitutionality and
illegality of normative and legislative bills by the
organs of the State;
b. to provide an anticipatory verification of the legality and constitutionality of the bills and referenda;
c. to verify cases of unconstitutionality by commission;
d. to verify cases of unconstitutionality by omission;
e. to verify the legality of the establishment of political parties and their coalitions and order their registration or dissolution, in accordance with the Constitution and the law;
f. to exercise all other competences provided for by
the Constitution or the law.
Article 152
1. The Supreme Court of Justice has jurisdiction to hear
appeals against any of the following court decisions:
a. decisions refusing to apply a legal rule on the
grounds of unconstitutionality;
b. decisions applying a legal rule the constitutionality
of which was challenged during the proceedings.
2. An appeal under paragraph (1) (b) above may be
brought only by the party who raised the question of
unconstitutionality.

669

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. The legislature is prohibited from introducing
legislation that would increase state expenditures
or reduce state revenues.
Article 97
2. There cannot be any presentation of bills, draft legislation or amendments involving, in any given fiscal
year, any increase in State expenditure or any reduction
in State revenues provided for in the Budget or Rectifying Budgets.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislators are subject to arrest for felonies that
carry a maximum sentence of more than two years.
Article 114
No member of the Government may be detained or
imprisoned without the permission of the National Parliament, except for a felonious crime punishable with
a maximum sentence of imprisonment for more than
two years and in flagrante delicto.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 93
1. The National Parliament is elected by universal, free,
direct, equal, secret and personal suffrage.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can assume the power to revise
the constitution with a four-fifths majority vote
and can change the constitution with a two-thirds
majority vote.
Article 154
1. The initiative for constitutional revision is incumbent upon the Members of Parliament and the Parliamentary Groups.
2. The National Parliament may revise the Constitution after six years have elapsed since the last date of

670
publication of the last law revising the Constitution was
published.
3. The period of six years for the first constitutional
review is counted from the day the present Constitution
enters into force.
4. The National Parliament, regardless of any time
frame, can take on powers to revise the Constitution
by a majority of four-fifths of the Members of Parliament in full exercise of their functions.
5. Proposals for revision must be deposited with the
National Parliament one hundred and twenty days
prior to the date of the commencement of the debate.
6. After submission of a proposal for constitutional revision under the terms of number 5 above, any other
proposal shall be submitted within thirty days.
Article 155
1. Amendments to the Constitution shall be approved
by a majority of two-thirds of the Members of Parliament in full exercise of their functions.
2. The new text of the Constitution shall be published
together with the revision law.
3. The President of the Republic shall not refuse to promulgate a revision law.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is required for the
presidents war declarations.
Article 85
It is exclusively incumbent upon the President of the
Republic:
h. to declare war and make peace following a Government proposal, after consultation with the Council of
State and the Supreme Council of Defense and Security, under authorization of the National Parliament.
Article 87
It is incumbent upon the President of the Republic, in
the field of international relations:
a. to declare war in case of actual or imminent aggression and to make peace, following proposal by the
Government, after consultation with the Supreme
Council for Defense and Security and following
authorization of the National Parliament or of its
Standing Committee.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 85
It is exclusively incumbent upon the President of the
Republic:
a. to promulgate statutes and order the publication
of resolutions by the National Parliament approving
agreements and ratifying international treaties and
conventions.
Article 95
3. It is also incumbent upon (the National Parliament):

National Parliament of Timor-Leste

f. to approve and renounce agreements and to ratify
treaties and international conventions.
Article 115
1. It is incumbent upon the Government:
f. to prepare and negotiate treaties and enter into,
approve, accede and renounce international agreements which do not fall within the competence of
the National parliament or of the President of the
Republic.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.
Article 95
3. It is also incumbent upon (the National Parliament):
g. to grant amnesty.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 85
It is exclusively incumbent upon the President of the
Republic:
i. to grant pardons and commute sentences after consultation with the Government.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislature elects one of the members of
the Supreme Court of Justice, and its approval
is required to ratify the presidents appointments
to head the Supreme Court of Justice, the High
Administrative Court, the Tax Court, and the Audit
Court.
Article 86
It is incumbent upon the President of the Republic, with
regard to other organs:
j. to appoint the President of the Supreme Court
of Justice and swear in the President of the High
Administrative Court, the Tax Court and the Court
of Accounts.
Article 95
3. It is also incumbent upon (the National Parliament):
a. to ratify the appointment of the President of the
Supreme Court of Justice and of the High Administrative, Tax and Audit Court.
Article 125
2. The Supreme Court of Justice is composed of career
judges, magistrates of the Public Prosecution or jurists
of recognized merit in number to be established by law,
as follows:
a. one elected by the National Parliament;
b. and all the others designated by the Superior Council for the Judiciary.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

National Assembly of Togo (Assemblee nationale)

671

No. According to the constitution, the governance

of the central bank will be determined by law. In
practice, the central bank has not yet been established.
Article 143
1. The State shall establish a national central bank
jointly responsible for the definition and implementation of the monetary and financial policy.
2. The law defines the functions and the relationship of
the Central Bank with the National Parliament and the
Government, safeguarding the management autonomy
of the financial institution.
3. The Central Bank has exclusive competence for issuing the national currency.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.
Article 99
1. The legislative term comprises five legislative sessions, and each legislative session shall have the duration of one year.
2. The regular period of functioning of the National
Parliament is defined by the Rules of Procedure.

3. The National Parliament convenes on a regular basis

following notice by its President.
4. The National Parliament convenes on an extraordinary basis whenever so decided by the Standing Committee, at the request of one-third of Members or following notice of the President of the Republic with a
view to addressing specific issues.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
No. The legislature is relatively new, preventing
legislators from yet having much experience.

NATIONALE)
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF TOGO (ASSEMBLEE
Expert consultants: Markoua Dadjo, Alain Faupin, El Hadj Kassim Mensah, Mathurin Houngnikpo,
Comi M. Toulabor
Score: .38
Influence over
executive (2/9)

Institutional
autonomy (3/9)

Specified
powers (3/8)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack president
9. no confidence

12. no veto
13. no review

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
18. all elected

23. pardon
24. judiciary

Institutional
capacity (4/6)
X

X
X
X

25. central bank

26. media
X

The National Assembly (Assemblee nationale) of

Togo was established in the 1961 constitution,
following independence from France in 1960.

The assembly was dissolved in 1967 by President

Gnassingbe Eyadema, who also suspended the constitution and proceeded to monopolize executive

672

National Assembly of Togo (Assemblee nationale)

and legislative power for the next several decades.

A new constitution in 1992 called for a popularly
elected unicameral legislature. A second house, the
Senate, was called for in a 2002 constitutional
amendment, although the Senate has not yet been
established. Eyademas death in 2005 led to a brief
spate of political violence and the establishment
of a transitional government. Eyademas son, Faure
Gnassingbe, subsequently assumed the presidency,
thereby completing a dynastic succession.
The legislature is a diminutive political actor. It
has scant influence over the executive. The legislatures autonomy is circumscribed by, among other
things, presidential decree powers and a failure to
observe the formal institutions of immunity for
legislators. The legislature exercises several specified powers and has some institutional capacity.

fessional activity. An organic law shall determine the

status of former members of the Government concerning, in particular, their compensation and security.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. The legislature cannot impeach the president.
The legislature can remove the prime minister with
a vote of no confidence.
Article 97
The Prime Minister, after deliberation by the Council of Ministers, may commit the responsibility of the
Government before the National Assembly with regard
to its program or to a declaration of general policy.
The National Assembly, after debate, shall cast a vote.
The Government may only be denied a vote of confidence by a majority of two-thirds of the deputies of the
National Assembly. In the event that the vote of confidence is refused, the Prime Minister must submit the
resignation of the Government to the President of the
Republic.
Article 127
The High Court of Justice is the only jurisdiction with
competence to judge infringements committed by the
President of the Republic. The President of the Republic
shall not be held politically liable except in case of high
treason.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Ministers are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 76
The functions of a member of the Government are
incompatible with the exercise of any parliamentary
mandate, of any function of professional representation with national character and of any private or public, civil or military employment or of any other pro-

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 96
Members of the Government have access to the
National Assembly, the Senate and their committees.
They shall also be heard on interpellation, by the
National Assembly, on written or oral questions which
are addressed to them.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister.
Article 66
The President of the Republic shall appoint the Prime
Minister. He shall terminate the functions of the Prime
Minister. Upon the proposal of the Prime Minister, he
shall appoint the other members of the Government
and shall terminate their functions.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 66
The President of the Republic shall appoint the Prime
Minister. He shall terminate the functions of the Prime
Minister. Upon the proposal of the Prime Minister, he
shall appoint the other members of the Government
and shall terminate their functions.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.

National Assembly of Togo (Assemblee nationale)

Article 59
The President of the Republic is elected by universal,
direct and secret suffrage for a mandate of five years.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 97
The Prime Minister, after deliberation by the Council of Ministers, may commit the responsibility of the
Government before the National Assembly with regard
to its program or to a declaration of general policy.
The National Assembly, after debate, shall cast a vote.
The Government may only be denied a vote of confidence by a majority of two-thirds of the deputies of the
National Assembly. In the event that the vote of confidence is refused, the Prime Minister must submit the
resignation of the Government to the President of the
Republic.
Article 98
The National Assembly may challenge the responsibility of the Government by passing a motion of censure.
Such a motion, in order to be admissible, must be signed
by at least one-third of the deputies of the National
Assembly. The vote may only be called five days after
the motion has been introduced. The National Assembly may only pass a vote to censure the Government by
a majority of two-thirds of its members. If the motion of
censure is adopted, the Prime Minister shall hand in his
resignation of Government. The President of the Republic shall appoint a new Prime Minister. If the motion of
censure is rejected, its signatories may not propose a
new motion during the same session.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 68
The President of the Republic, after consultation with
the Prime Minister and the President of the National
Assembly, may pronounce the dissolution of the
National Assembly. This dissolution may not take place
during the first year of the legislature. A new Assembly shall have to be elected within sixty days following
the dissolution. The National Assembly shall meet as
of right on the second Tuesday following its election;
if this meeting takes place out of determined periods
for the ordinary sessions, a session shall take place as
of right for a duration of fifteen days. A new dissolution may not take place during the year following these
elections.

673
Article 69
The President of the Republic shall sign the ordinances
and decrees deliberated upon in the Council of Ministers.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote of its present members.
Article 67
The President of the Republic shall promulgate the laws
within fifteen days following the transmission to the
Government of the law definitively adopted by the
National Assembly; during this time period, he may
request a new deliberation of the law or of certain articles, the request must be justified. The new deliberation
may not be refused.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 92
The projects or bills of organic laws shall be submitted
to the deliberation and vote of the National Assembly
at the end of a time period of fifteen days after their registration. Organic laws may not be promulgated before
a declaration by the Constitutional Court of their conformity with the Constitution.
Article 99
The Constitutional Court is the highest jurisdiction of
the State in constitutional matters. It shall judge the
constitutionality of the law and it shall guarantee the
fundamental rights of the human person and of public
freedoms. It shall be the regulatory organ for the functioning of the institutions and of the activity of the
public powers.
Article 104
The Constitutional Court is the jurisdiction charged
with ensuring respect for the disciplines of the Constitution . . . It is the judge of the constitutionality of
laws.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.

No. The president issues decrees that have the force

of law.

No. The executive can impound funds allocated by

the legislature.

674

National Assembly of Togo (Assemblee nationale)

16. The legislature controls the resources that finance

its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.

Such a motion, in order to be admissible, must be signed

by at least one-third of the deputies of the National
Assembly. The vote may only be called five days after
the motion has been introduced. The National Assembly may only pass a vote to censure the Government by
a majority of two-thirds of its members. If the motion of
censure is adopted, the Prime Minister shall hand in his
resignation of Government. The President of the Republic shall appoint a new Prime Minister. If the motion of
censure is rejected, its signatories may not propose a
new motion during the same session.

No. The legislature is dependent on the president

for the resources that finance its own operations.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Formally, legislators enjoy immunity, but in
practice, opposition legislators have been arrested
and even killed.
Article 53
Deputies and senators shall enjoy parliamentary immunity. No deputy or senator may be prosecuted, searched,
arrested, detained or judged on the basis of the opinions or the votes expressed by him in the exercise of
his functions, even after the expiration of his mandate.
Except in case of flagrant offense, deputies and senators
can only be arrested or prosecuted for crimes or offenses
after their parliamentary immunity has been removed
by their respective Assembly. Any proceeding relating
to a flagrant offense against a deputy or against a senator shall be brought without delay to the knowledge of
the board of their Assembly. A deputy or a senator may
not be arrested out of session without the authorization of the board of the Assembly to which he belongs.
The detention or prosecution of a deputy or a senator
shall be suspended if the Assembly to which he belongs
requests it.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the National Assembly are
elected. According to the constitution, the president will appoint one-third of the members of
the Senate. The Senate has not yet been established, however. Moreover, the Senate will not be
a weighty legislative body. It cannot initiate legislation or take part in votes of confidence.
Article 52
The deputies are elected for five years by universal,
direct and secret suffrage by uninominal majority vote
with one ballot. They may be reelected. Each deputy
shall be the representative of the entire Nation. Any
imperative mandate is void . . . The Senate is composed
of two-thirds by personalities elected by the representatives of the Territorial Collectivities and of one-third
by personalities designated by the President of the
Republic.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
with a four-fifths majority vote.
Article 144
The initiative for revision of the Constitution belongs
concurrently to the President of the Republic and to at
least one-fifth of the deputies composing the National
Assembly. The project or bill for revision shall be considered adopted if it is voted upon by a majority of fourfifths of the deputies composing the National Assembly. When this majority is not reached, the project or
bill for revision adopted by a majority of two-thirds of
the deputies composing the National Assembly shall be
submitted to referendum. The President of the Republic
may submit any constitutional law bill to referendum.
No procedure for revision can be engaged in or pursued during an interim period or a vacancy or when the
integrity of the territory is being violated. The Republican form of the State and the States secularity shall not
be subject to revision.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for the
presidents war declarations.
Article 93
The declaration of war is authorized by the National
Assembly.
Article 72
The President of the Republic shall be the head of the
Army. He shall preside over the Defense Councils. He
shall declare war upon authorization of the National
Assembly.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties on most major issues.

Article 83
The introduction of laws shall lie concurrently in the
hands of the deputies and of the Government.

Article 137
The President of the Republic negotiates and ratifies
international treaties and agreements.

Article 98
The National Assembly may challenge the responsibility of the Government by passing a motion of censure.

Article 138
Peace treaties, commercial treaties, treaties relating to
international organizations, those that involve use of

National Assembly of Togo (Assemblee nationale)

the States finances, those that modify the provisions
of a legislative nature, those relating to the state of people and to Human Rights, those that involve cession,
exchange or addition of territory, shall only be ratified
pursuant to a law. Such treaties shall only take effect
after having been ratified and published. No cession, no
exchange or addition of territory shall be valid without
the consent of the population concerned.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Pardon and amnesty are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The president has the power of pardon (grace).
Article 73
The President of the Republic exercises the right of grace
after consultation of the High Council of the Judiciary.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. Formally, the legislature has broad judicial
appointment powers, but in practice, the president
controls judicial appointments.
Article 100
The Constitutional Court is composed of nine members
designated for seven renewable years. Three are designated by the President of the Republic including one
because of his juridical competence(s). Three are elected
by the National Assembly by a majority of two-thirds
of its members. They must be chosen from the outside
of the deputies. One among them must be designated
because of his juridical competence(s). Three shall be
elected by the Senate by a majority of two-thirds of its
members. They shall be chosen from outside the pool of
senators. One among them must be designated because
of his juridical competence(s).
Article 108
The Court of Audit is composed of: the President, the
Chamber Presidents, the Master-Counselors, the Audit
Counselors, and the Auditors. The public ministry of
the Court of Audit shall be directed by the Prosecutor General and General Attorneys. The President, the
Prosecutor General, the General Attorneys, the Chamber Presidents and the Master-Counselors are appointed
by decree of the President of the Republic taken in the
Council of Ministers. The Audit Counselors and the
Auditors are appointed by the President of the Republic on proposal of the Prime Minister after consultation
with the Minister of Finance and favorable opinion by
the National Assembly.
Article 121
The President of the Supreme Court is of necessity a
professional magistrate. He is appointed by a decree of
the President of the Republic taken in the Council of

675
Ministers on the proposal of the High Council of the
Judiciary.
Article 126
The High Court of Justice is composed of the President
and the Chamber Presidents of the Supreme Court and
of four deputies elected by the National Assembly.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. Togo is a member of the Central Bank of West
African States, whose governor is selected by the
member states.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session for
six months each year.
Article 55
The National Assembly shall meet as of right in two
ordinary sessions per year.
The first session shall open on the first Tuesday of April.
The second session shall open on the first Tuesday of
October.
The Senate shall meet as of right in two ordinary sessions per year.
The first session shall open on the first Thursday of
April.
The second session shall open on the first Thursday of
October.
Each session shall last three months.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
Article 52
The deputies are elected for five years by universal,
direct and secret suffrage by uninominal majority vote
with one ballot. They may be reelected.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature

676

National Assembly of Togo (Assemblee nationale)

contains a significant number of highly experienced

members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced

members. Re-election, however, depends largely

on maintaining fealty to the president and the
hegemonic party, the Rally of the Togolese People.

PARLIAMENT OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Expert consultants: Kirk Meighoo, Dennis Pantin, Rita Pemberton, Ralph R. Premdas, Selwyn D. Ryan
Score: .53
Influence over
executive (6/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no confidence

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)

Specified
powers (2/8)

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

12. no veto
13. no review

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

The Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago traces its

roots to the body that represented the country in
the British Empire. Upon independence from Great
Britain in 1962, Trinidad and Tobago retained a
Westminster-style system with a prime minister as
the head of government and a Governor General,
acting as the British monarchs representative, as
the head of state. A new constitution, adopted in
1976, abolished the Governor General and established a presidency. The bicameral legislature consists of a lower house, the House of Representatives,
and an upper house, the Senate. Subsequent constitutional amendments have not directly affected
legislative power.
The legislature possesses moderate powers. Its
influence over the executive includes powers to
select the president and the prime minister. The
legislatures institutional autonomy is bolstered by
the executives lack of veto, decree, and gatekeeping powers. Yet parliament exercises relatively few
specified powers and prerogatives. Its institutional
capacity is limited by the absence of staff.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

21. treaties
22. amnesty

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

26. media

any other agencies, can impeach the president or

replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can remove the prime minister
with a vote of no confidence. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of a special judicial
tribunal.
Article 36
1. The President shall be removed from office where
(a) a motion that his removal from office should be
investigated by a tribunal is proposed in the House of
Representatives;
(b) the motion states with full particulars the
grounds on which his removal from office is proposed, and is signed by not less than one-third of the
total membership of the House of Representatives;
(c) the motion is adopted by the vote of not less than
two-thirds of the total membership of the Senate and
the House of Representatives assembled together;
(d) a tribunal consisting of the Chief Justice and four
other Judges appointed by him, being as far as practicable the most senior Judges, investigate the complaint and report on the facts to the House of Representatives;
(e) the Senate and the House of Representatives
assembled together on the summons of the Speaker
consider the report and by resolution supported by
the votes of not less than two-thirds of the total

Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago

membership of the Senate and the House of Representatives assembles together declare that he shall be
removed from office.
2. Where a motion is adopted as is provided for in subsection (1)(a), (b) and (c) the President shall cease to
perform any of his functions as President and the President of the Senate shall act temporarily as President.
3. The procedure of the tribunal shall be such as is prescribed, but, subject to such procedure, the tribunal may
regulate its own procedure.
4. Upon the adoption of the resolution in accordance
with subsection (1)(c) the office shall become vacant.
Article 77
1. Where the House of Representatives passes a resolution, supported by the votes of a majority of all the
members of the House, declaring that it has no confidence in the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister
does not within seven days of the passing of such a resolution either resign or advise the President to dissolve
Parliament, the President shall revoke the appointment
of the Prime Minister.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Ministers are chosen from, and serve simultaneously in, the legislature.
Article 76
3. The Ministers other than the Prime Minister shall be
such persons as the President, acting in accordance with
the advice of the Prime Minister, shall appoint from
among the members of the House of Representatives
and the Senators.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly questions officials of
the executive.
4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive. Investigations are conducted by the Ombudsman.
Article 93
1. Subject to this section and to sections 94 and 95 the
principal function of the Ombudsman shall be to investigate any decision or recommendation made, including any advice given or recommendation made to a
Minister, or any act done or omitted by any department of Government or any other authority to which
this section applies, or by officers or members of such a
department or authority, being action taken in exercise
of the administrative functions of that department or
authority.

677
2. The Ombudsman may investigate any such matter in
any of the following circumstances
(a) where a complaint is duly made to the Ombudsman by any person alleging that the complainant has
sustained an injustice as a result of a fault in administration;
(b) where a member of the House of Representatives
requests the Ombudsman to investigate the matter
on the ground that a person or body of persons specified in the request has or may have sustained such
injustice;
(c) in any other circumstances in which the Ombudsman considers that he ought to investigate the matter
on the ground that some person or body of persons
has or may have sustained such injustice.
3. The authorities other than departments of Government to which this section applies are
(a) local authorities or other bodies established for
purposes of the public service or of local Government;
(b) authorities or bodies the majority of whose members are appointed by the President or by a Minister or
whose revenues consist wholly or mainly of moneys
provided out of public funds;
(c) any authority empowered to determine the person with whom any contract shall be entered into by
or on behalf of Government;
(d) such other authorities as may be prescribed.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. The president appoints as prime minister the
candidate who enjoys the support of the legislature.
Article 76
1. Where there is occasion for the appointment of a
Prime Minister, the President shall appoint as Prime
Minister
(a) a member of the House of Representatives who
is the Leader in that House of the party which commands the support of the majority of members of that
House; or
(b) where it appears to him that party does not have
an undisputed leader in that House or that no party
commands the supports of such a majority, the member of the House of Representatives who, in his judgment, is most likely to command the support of the
majority of members of that House; and who is willing to accept the office of Prime Minister.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.

678

Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago

No. The president appoints ministers on the recommendation of the prime minister, and ministerial appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.

Article 76
3. The Ministers other than the Prime Minister shall be
such persons as the President, acting in accordance with
the advice of the Prime Minister, shall appoint from
among the members of the House of Representatives
and the Senators.

Article 68
1. The President, acting in accordance with the advice
of the Prime Minister, may at any time prorogue or
dissolve Parliament.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The legislature elects the president.
Article 22
There shall be a President of Trinidad and Tobago
elected in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter who shall be the Head of State and Commander-inChief of the armed forces.
Article 28
1. There shall be an Electoral College for the purposes
of this Chapter which shall be a unicameral body consisting of all the members of the Senate and all the
members of the House of Representatives assembled
together.
2. The Electoral College shall be convened by the
Speaker.
3. The Speaker shall preside as Chairman over the proceedings of the Electoral College and shall have an original vote.
4. Subject to this Chapter, the Electoral College may
regulate its own procedure and may make provision
for the postponement or adjournment of its meetings
and such other provisions as may be necessary to deal
with difficulties that may arise in the carrying out of
elections under this Chapter.
5. Ten Senators, the Speaker and twelve other members of the House of Representatives shall constitute a
quorum of the Electoral College.
Article 29
The President shall be elected by the Electoral College
voting by secret ballot.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 77
1. Where the House of Representatives passes a resolution, supported by the votes of a majority of all the
members of the House, declaring that it has no confidence in the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister
does not within seven days of the passing of such a resolution either resign or advise the President to dissolve
Parliament, the President shall revoke the appointment
of the Prime Minister.

No. The president, acting on the advice of the

prime minister, can dissolve the legislature.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks veto power. Formally, the
president can withhold assent from a bill. In practice, it would be unthinkable for the president to
do so.
Article 61
1. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the
power of Parliament to make laws shall, except where
otherwise authorized by statute, be exercised by Bills
passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate
and assented to by the President.
2. When a bill is presented to the President for assent,
he shall signify that he assents or that he withholds
assent.
3. A Bill shall not become law unless it has been duly
passed and assented to in accordance with this Constitution.
4. A Bill may be assented to during the period occurring
between the end of one session of Parliament and the
beginning of the next or at any subsequent time during
the life of that Parliament.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The judiciary can review the constitutionality
of laws.
14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all
policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.

Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago

16. The legislature controls the resources that finance

its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislative immunity extends to official parliamentary business only. Legislators are subject to
arrest for common crimes.
Article 55
2. No civil or criminal proceedings may be instituted
against any member of either House for words spoken
before, or written in a report to, the House of which
he is a member or in which he has a right of audience under section 62 or a committee thereof or any
joint committee or meeting of the Senate and House
of Representatives or by reason of any matter or thing
brought by him therein by petition, bill, resolution,
motion or otherwise; or for the publication by or under
the authority of either House of any report, paper, votes
or proceedings.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
No. All members of the Senate are appointed.
All members of the House of Representatives are
elected.
Article 46
1. Subject to the provisions of this section, the House
of Representatives shall consist of members who shall
be elected in the manner provided by Parliament.
2. There shall be thirty-six members of the House of
Representatives or such other number of members as
corresponds with the number of constituencies as provided for by an Order made by the President under
section 72.
3. Where any person who is not a member of the House
of Representatives is elected to be Speaker of the House
he shall, by virtue of holding the office of Speaker, be
a member of the House in addition to the thirty-six or
other number of members aforesaid.
Article 40
1. The Senate shall consist of thirty-one members who
shall be appointed by the President in accordance with
this section.
2. Of the thirty-one Senators
(a) sixteen shall be appointed by the President acting
in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister;
(b) six shall be appointed by the President acting in
accordance with the advice of the Leader of the Opposition; and
(c) nine shall be appointed by the President in his discretion from outstanding persons from economic or
social or community organizations and other major
fields of endeavour.

679

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
through the normal legislative process.
Article 54
1. Subject to the provisions of this section, Parliament
may alter any of the provisions of this Constitution
or (in so far as it forms part of the law of Trinidad
and Tobago) any of the provisions of the Trinidad and
Tobago Independence Act, 1962.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. There is no provision for the declaration of
war, although the president can declare a state of
emergency without the legislatures approval. The
state of emergency lapses after fifteen days if it is
not subsequently extended by the legislature.
Part III
8.
(1) Subject to this section, for the purposes of this
Chapter, the President may from time to time make a
Proclamation declaring that a state of public emergency
exists.
(2) A Proclamation made by the President under subsection (1) shall not be effective unless it contains a
declaration that the President is satisfied
(a) that a public emergency has arisen as a result of
the imminence of a state of war between Trinidad
and Tobago and a foreign State;
(b) that a public emergency has arisen as a result of
the occurrence of any earthquake, hurricane, flood,
fire, outbreak of pestilence or of infectious disease,
or other calamity whether similar to the foregoing or
not; or
(c) that action has been taken, or is immediately
threatened, by any person, of such a nature and on
so extensive a scale, as to be likely to endanger the
public safety or to deprive the community or any
substantial portion of the community of supplies or
services essential to life.
9.
(1) Within three days of the making of the Proclamation, the President shall deliver to the Speaker for presentation to the House of Representatives a statement
setting out the specific grounds on which the decision
to declare the existence of a state of public emergency
was based, and a date shall be fixed for a debate on this
statement as soon as practicable but in any event not
later that fifteen days from the date of the Proclamation.
(2) A Proclamation made by the President for the purposes of and in accordance with this section shall,
unless previously revoked, remain in force for fifteen
days.
10.
(1) Before its expiration the Proclamation may be
extended from time to time by resolution supported by

680
a simple majority vote of the House of Representatives,
so however, that no extension exceeds three months
and the extensions do not in the aggregate exceed six
months.
(2) The Proclamation may be further extended from
time to time for not more than three months at any
one time, by a resolution passed by both Houses of
Parliament and supported by the votes of not less that
three-fifths of all the members of each House.
(3) The Proclamation may be revoked at any time by a
resolution supported by a simple majority vote of the
House of Representatives.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.
No. Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 87
1. The President may grant to any person a pardon,
either free or subject to lawful conditions, respecting
any offences that he may have committed. The power
of the President under this subsection may be exercised
by him either before or after the person is charged with
any offence and before he is convicted thereof.
2. The President may
(a) grant to any person convicted of any offence
against the law of Trinidad and Tobago a pardon,
either free or subject to lawful conditions;
(b) grant to any person a respite, either indefinite
or for a specified period, from the execution of any
punishment imposed on that person for such an offence;
(c) substitute a less severe form of punishment for
that imposed by any sentence for such an offence;
or
(d) remitted the whole or any part of any sentence
passed for such an offence or any penalty or forfeiture
otherwise due to the State on account of such an
offence.
3. The power of the President under subsection (2) may
be exercised by him in accordance with the advice of a
Minister designated by him, acting in accordance with
the advice of the Prime Minister.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The president appoints the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court after consultation with the prime
minister and the leader of the opposition. Other

Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago

judges are appointed by the president on the advice

of the Judicial and Legal Service Commission. The
legislatures approval is not required for judicial
appointments.
Article 102
The Chief Justice shall be appointed by the President
after consultation with the Prime Minister and the
Leader of the Opposition.
Article 104
1. The Judges, other than the Chief Justice, shall be
appointed by the President, acting in accordance with
the advice of the Judicial and Legal Service Commission.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The legislature does not have a role in the
appointment of the governor of the Central Bank
of Trinidad and Tobago.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.
Article 67
1. Each session of Parliament shall be held at such
place within Trinidad and Tobago and shall commence
at such time as the President may by Proclamation
appoint.
2. There shall be a session of each House once at least
in every year, so that a period of six months shall not
intervene between the last sitting of Parliament in one
session and the first sitting thereof in the next session.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature

National Parliament of Tunisia (Majlis al-Nuwaab)

681

contains a significant number of highly experienced

members.

Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

NATIONAL PARLIAMENT OF TUNISIA (MAJLIS AL-NUWAAB)

Expert consultants: Michele Penner Angrist, Jean-Philippe Bras, Mujeeb R. Khan, Amer K. Mohsen,
Kenneth Perkins, Peter J. Schraeder
Score: .28
Influence over
executive (2/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Institutional
autonomy (1/9)

Specified
powers (1/8)

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity
X

23. pardon
24. judiciary

Institutional
capacity (5/6)
X

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

X
X
X

25. central bank

26. media

18. all elected

The National Parliament (Majlis al-Nuwaab) of

Tunisia was established in the 1959 constitution
upon independence from France. The document
called for a unicameral legislature with a directly
elected president. Since then the legislature has
played a small role in national politics, as the country has been ruled by two successive autocratic
presidents: Habib Bourguiba (195687) and Zine El
Abidine Ben Ali (1987present). A constitutional
amendment in 2005 created an upper house, the
Chamber of Advisers (Majlis al-Mustasharin).
The legislature exerts little influence in national
politics. It cannot choose, effectively oversee, or
remove the executive. Its own institutional autonomy is eviscerated by executive powers of decree,
dissolution, veto, and review, as well as by the presidents right to appoint one-third of the members
of the Chamber of Advisers. The legislature exercises only a single specified power, the right to
change the constitution. Perhaps surprisingly, the
legislature does enjoy some institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can impeach the president or

replace the prime minister.
No. The legislature cannot remove the president.
It can remove the prime minister with a motion of
censure.
Article 62
(1) The National Parliament may, by a vote on a motion
of censure, oppose the continuation of the responsibilities of the government, if it finds that the government
is not following the general policy and the fundamental
options provided for in Articles 49 and 58.
(2) The motion is not receivable unless it is motivated
and signed by at least half of the membership of the
National Parliament.
(3) The vote may not take place until 48 hours have
elapsed after the motion of censure.
(4) When a motion of censure is adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the deputies, the President of the
Republic accepts the resignation of the government presented by the Prime Minister.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Legislators may serve simultaneously in ministerial positions.

682

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
No. According to the constitution, the legislature
can address questions to executive branch officials,
but in practice, this power is not effectively exercised.
Article 61
(2) Any deputy may address written or oral questions
to the Government.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister.
Article 50
(1) The President of the Republic nominates the Prime
Minister, and on his suggestion, the other members of
the Government.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers on the recommendation of the prime minister, and ministerial appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 50
(1) The President of the Republic nominates the Prime
Minister, and on his suggestion, the other members of
the Government.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 37
The executive power is vested in the President of the
Republic assisted by a Government directed by a Prime
Minister.
Article 39
(1) The President of the Republic is elected for five years
by universal, free, direct, and secret suffrage, within the

National Parliament of Tunisia (Majlis al-Nuwaab)

last thirty days of the term of office and under the conditions specified by the electoral law.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can pass a motion of censure
in the government. It bears note, however, that it
has never done so.
Article 62
(1) The National Parliament may, by a vote on a motion
of censure, oppose the continuation of the responsibilities of the government, if it finds that the government
is not following the general policy and the fundamental
options provided for in Articles 49 and 58.
(2) The motion is not receivable unless it is motivated
and signed by at least half of the membership of the
National Parliament.
(3) The vote may not take place until 48 hours have
elapsed after the motion of censure.
(4) When a motion of censure is adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the deputies, the President of the
Republic accepts the resignation of the government presented by the Prime Minister.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 63
(1) If the National Parliament has adopted a second
motion of censure with a two-thirds majority during the
same legislative period, the President of the Republic
may either accept the resignation of the government or
dissolve the National Parliament.
(2) The decree dissolving the National Parliament must
include the calling of new elections within a maximum
period of thirty days.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The president can issue decrees that have the
force of law while the legislature is out of session. The decrees lapse if they are not subsequently
approved by the legislature. The legislature can also
delegate temporary decree powers to the president.
Article 28
(2) The National Parliament may authorize the President of the Republic to issue decree-laws within a fixed
time limit and for a specific purpose which must be submitted for ratification to the National Parliament upon
expiration of that time limit.
Article 31
During the vacation of the National Parliament, the
President of the Republic may, with the consent of
the interested permanent committee, issue decree-laws
which must be submitted to the ratification by the
National Parliament during the next ordinary session.

National Parliament of Tunisia (Majlis al-Nuwaab)

683

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.

Article 27
No deputy can be arrested or prosecuted for the duration of his mandate for a crime or misdemeanor as long
as the National Parliament has not lifted the immunity
which covers him. However, in the event of flagrante
delicto, arrest procedure is permitted, in such a case, the
National Parliament is to be informed without delay.
The detention of a deputy is suspended if the National
Parliament so requests.

No. A two-thirds majority vote is required to override a presidential veto.

Article 52
(1) The President of the Republic promulgates constitutional, organic, or ordinary laws and ensures their publication in the Official Journal of the Tunisian Republic within a maximum period of fifteen days counting
from the transmission by the President of the National
Parliament.
(2) The President of the Republic may, during this
period, return the bill to the National Parliament for
a second reading. If the bill is adopted by the National
Parliament with a majority of two-thirds of its members, the law is promulgated and published within a
second period of fifteen days.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The legislatures laws are not subject to judicial review, but they are not supreme. They can
be overruled on legal grounds by the executive
branch.
14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all
policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
No. One-third of the members of the newly created
Chamber of Advisers are to be appointed by the
president. All members of the lower chamber are
elected.
Article 19
The members of the National Parliament are elected
by universal, free, direct, and secret suffrage, according
to the modalities and conditions determined by the
Electoral Law.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution in
multiple readings with a two-thirds majority vote.
Article 72
The initiative for the amendment of the Constitution
belongs to the President of the Republic or to at least
one-third of the members of the National Parliament,
with the reservation that it does not affect the republican form of the State.

No. The legislature is dependent on the executive

for the resources that finance its own operations.

Article 73
(1) The National Parliament may not deliberate on the
proposed amendment except following a resolution
passed by an absolute majority and after a special ad
hoc committee has determined and studied the objective.
(2) The Constitution cannot be amended except following the adoption by the National Parliament of the
amendment proposal with a majority of two-thirds of
its members after two readings, the second of which
may not take place until at least three months after the
first.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. Formally, legislators are immune with the common exception for flagrante delicto, but in practice,
members of the opposition have been arrested.

No. Formally, the legislatures approval is necessary

for presidential war declarations. In practice, the
president can declare war without the legislatures
approval.

No. The president can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.

16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.

Article 26
A deputy cannot be prosecuted, arrested, or tried for
opinions expressed, proposals made, or acts carried out
in the exercise of his mandate in the National Parliament.

Article 48
(1) The President of the Republic ratifies the treaties.
(2) He declares war and concludes peace with the
approval of the National Parliament.

684

National Parliament of Tunisia (Majlis al-Nuwaab)

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.

No. The president appoints the governor of the

Central Bank of Tunisia.

No. Formally, treaties are approved by law. In

practice, the legislatures approval is not necessary
to ratify international treaties.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

Article 32
Treaties do not have the force of law until after their ratification. Treaties duly ratified have an authority superior to laws.
Article 33
The treaties are approved by law.
Article 48
(1) The President of the Republic ratifies the treaties.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Formally, amnesty is regulated by law. In practice, the legislature lacks this power.
Article 34
Matters relating to the following are regulated in the
form of laws:
amnesty.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 48
(3) [The President of the Republic] exercises the right
of pardon.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The president appoints the judiciary, and
the appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 66
Magistrates are nominated by decree of the President of
the Republic upon the recommendation of the Superior
Council of the Magistrature.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

No. The president tightly controls the staterun Tunisian Radio and Television Establishment
(ERTT).
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session for
about nine months each year.
Article 29
(1) The National Parliament meets each year in ordinary session which begins during the month of October
and ends during the month of July.
(2) However, the first session of every legislature begins
during the first fifteen days of November.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Since 1987 members of President Ben Alis
hegemonic political party, the Democratic Constitutional Rally, have rarely been defeated at the
polls, providing the legislature with a significant
number of highly experienced members.

Turkish Grand National Assembly (B

uy
uk Millet Meclisi)

685

UK
MILLET MECLISI)
TURKISH GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (BUY

Expert consultants: Sener Akt
urk, Do
gu Ergil, Omer
Genckaya, Kerim Can Kavakli, Ziya Onis
Score: .78
Influence over
executive (7/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

Institutional
autonomy (8/9)

Institutional
capacity (6/6)

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

26. media

18. all elected

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Specified
powers (4/8)

The Turkish Grand National Assembly (Buyuk Millet Meclisi) was established in the 1920s following the breakup of the Ottoman Empire. The 1962
constitution established a Constitutional Court to
review the constitutionality of laws. Prior to 1962
the legislatures laws were supreme. Turkeys current constitution was adopted in 1982. It calls for
a unicameral legislature, a prime minister as the
head of government, and a president, elected by
the legislature, as the head of state. The document gave the president the power to submit constitutional amendments proposed by the legislature to popular referendum. Prior to 1982 the legislature could, acting alone, change the constitution.
The Assembly wields broad powers. It influences
the executive with, among other powers, the right
to choose the president, oversee the executive
branch, and remove the president and the prime
minister from office. The Assemblys laws are subject to judicial review, but otherwise the Assembly possesses complete institutional autonomy. It
exercises some specified powers and enjoys every
measure of institutional capacity captured in this
survey.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

27. sessions
28. secretary

X
X

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X
X

any other agencies, can impeach the president or

replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can remove the prime minister
with a vote of no confidence. It can impeach the
president with a three-fourths majority vote of its
total membership.
Article 105
(3) The President of the Republic may be impeached
for high treason on the proposal of at least one-third
of the total number of members of the Turkish Grand
National Assembly, and by the decision of at least threequarters of the total number of members.
Article 111
(1) If the Prime Minister deems it necessary, and after
discussing the matter in the Council of Ministers,
he/she may ask for a vote of confidence in the Turkish Grand National Assembly.
(2) The request for a vote of confidence shall not be
debated before one full day has elapsed from the time it
was submitted to the Turkish Grand National Assembly
and shall not be put to the vote until one full day has
passed after debate.
(3) A request for a vote of confidence shall be rejected
only by an absolute majority of the total number of
members.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Legislators may serve simultaneously in ministerial positions.

686

Turkish Grand National Assembly (B

uy
uk Millet Meclisi)

Article 109
(1) The Council of Ministers shall consist of the Prime
Minister and the ministers.
(2) The Prime Minister shall be appointed by the President of the Republic from among the members of the
Turkish Grand National Assembly.
(3) The ministers shall be nominated by the Prime Minister and appointed by the Turkish Grand National
Assembly, or from among those eligible for election as
deputies; and they can be dismissed, by the President of
the Republic, upon the proposal of the Prime Minister
when deemed necessary.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 98
(1) The Turkish Grand National Assembly shall exercise its supervisory power by means of questions, parliamentary inquiries, general debates interpellation and
parliamentary investigations.
(2) A question is a request for information addressed to
the Prime Minister or ministers to be answered orally
or in writing on behalf of the Council of Ministers.
(3) A parliamentary inquiry is an examination conducted to obtain information on a specific subject.
(4) A general debate is the consideration of a specific
subject relating to the community and the activities of
the State at the plenary sessions of the Turkish Grand
National Assembly.
(5) The form of presentation, content, and scope of the
motions concerning questions, parliamentary inquiries
and general debates, and the procedures for answering,
debating and investigating them, shall be regulated by
the Rules of Procedure.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
Article 98
(1) The Turkish Grand National Assembly shall exercise its supervisory power by means of questions, parliamentary inquiries, general debates interpellation and
parliamentary investigations.
(2) A question is a request for information addressed to
the Prime Minister or ministers to be answered orally
or in writing on behalf of the Council of Ministers.
(3) A parliamentary inquiry is an examination conducted to obtain information on a specific subject.
(4) A general debate is the consideration of a specific
subject relating to the community and the activities of
the State at the plenary sessions of the Turkish Grand
National Assembly.

(5) The form of presentation, content, and scope of the

motions concerning questions, parliamentary inquiries
and general debates, and the procedures for answering,
debating and investigating them, shall be regulated by
the Rules of Procedure.
Article 100
(1) Parliamentary investigation concerning the Prime
Minister or other ministers may be requested with a
motion tabled by at least one-tenth of the total number
of members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly.
The Assembly shall consider and decide on this request
within one month at the latest.
(2) In the event of a decision to initiate an investigation, this investigation shall be conducted by a commission of fifteen members chosen by lot on behalf of each
party from among three times the number of members the party is entitled to have on the commission,
representation being proportional to the parliamentary
membership of the party. The commission shall submit its report on the result of the investigation to the
Assembly within two months. If the investigation is
not completed within the time allotted, the commission shall be granted a further and final period of two
months.
(3) The Assembly shall debate the report with priority
and, if found necessary, may decide to bring the person
involved before the Supreme Court. The decision to
bring a person before the Supreme Court shall be taken
only by an absolute majority of the total number of
members.
(4) Political party groups in the Assembly shall not hold
discussions or take decisions regarding parliamentary
investigations.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister.
Article 104
(2) To this end, the duties [the President] shall perform,
and the powers he/she shall exercise, in accordance
with the conditions stipulated in the relevant articles
of the Constitution are as follows:
b) Those relating to the executive functions:
To appoint the Prime Minister and to accept
his/her resignation.
Article 109
(2) The Prime Minister shall be appointed by the President of the Republic from among the members of the
Turkish Grand National Assembly.
(3) The ministers shall be nominated by the Prime Minister and appointed by the Turkish Grand National
Assembly, or from among those eligible for election as

Turkish Grand National Assembly (B

uy
uk Millet Meclisi)
deputies; and they can be dismissed, by the President of
the Republic, upon the proposal of the Prime Minister
when deemed necessary.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The legislatures approval is required to confirm ministerial appointments.
Article 104
(2) To this end, the duties [the President] shall perform,
and the powers he/she shall exercise, in accordance
with the conditions stipulated in the relevant articles
of the Constitution are as follows:
b) Those relating to the executive functions:
To appoint and dismiss Ministers on the proposal
of the Prime Minister.
Article 109
(1) The Council of Ministers shall consist of the Prime
Minister and the ministers.
(2) The Prime Minister shall be appointed by the President of the Republic from among the members of the
Turkish Grand National Assembly.
(3) The ministers shall be nominated by the Prime Minister and appointed by the Turkish Grand National
Assembly or from among those eligible for election as
deputies; and they can be dismissed, by the President of
the Republic, upon the proposal of the Prime Minister
when deemed necessary.
Article 110
(1) The complete list of members of the Council of Ministers shall be submitted to the Turkish Grand National
Assembly. If the Turkish Grand National Assembly is in
recess, it shall be summoned to meet.
(2) The Government Programme of the Council of
Ministers shall be read by the Prime Minister or by
one of the ministers before the Turkish Grand National
Assembly within a week of the formation of the Council of Ministers following which a vote of confidence
shall be taken. Debate on the vote of confidence shall
begin two full days after the reading of the programme
and the vote shall be taken one full day after the end of
debate.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The legislature elects the president. In a referendum held in October 2007, however, voters
endorsed holding direct popular elections for the
president. Future elections may be held on such a
basis, in which case parliament will lose its power
of presidential election.
Article 101
(1) The President of the Republic shall be elected for
a term of office of seven years by the Turkish Grand
National Assembly from among its own members who

687
are over 40 years of age and who have completed their
higher education or from among Turkish citizens who
fulfill these requirements and are eligible to be deputies.
Article 102
(1) The President of the Republic shall be elected by
a two-thirds majority of the total number of members
of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and by secret
ballot. If the Turkish Grand National Assembly is not
in session, it shall be summoned immediately to meet.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 111
(1) If the Prime Minister deems it necessary, and after
discussing the matter in the Council of Ministers,
he/she may ask for a vote of confidence in the Turkish Grand National Assembly.
(2) The request for a vote of confidence shall not be
debated before one full day has elapsed from the time it
was submitted to the Turkish Grand National Assembly
and shall not be put to the vote until one full day has
passed after debate.
(3) A request for a vote of confidence shall be rejected
only by an absolute majority of the total number of
members.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.
11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power. The legislature can, however, grant temporary decree powers
to the president to deal with specific issue areas.
Article 91
(1) The Turkish Grand National Assembly may
empower the Council of Ministers to issue decrees having force of law. However, the fundamental rights, individual rights and duties included in the First and Second
Chapter of the Second Part of the Constitution and the
political rights and duties listed in the Fourth Chapter, cannot be regulated by decrees having force of law
except during periods of martial law and states of emergency.
(2) The empowering law shall define the purpose,
scope, principles, and operative period of the decree
having force of law, and whether more than one decree
will be issued within the same period.
(4) When approving a decree having force of law before
the end of the prescribed period, the Turkish Grand
National Assembly shall also state whether the power
has terminated or will continue until the expiry of the
said period.

688

Turkish Grand National Assembly (B

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uk Millet Meclisi)

(5) Provisions relating to the decrees having force of

law issued by the Council of Ministers meeting under
the chairmanship of the President of the Republic in
time of martial law or states of emergency, are reserved.
(6) Decrees having force of law shall come into force
on the day of their publication in the Official Gazette.
However, a later date may be indicated in the decree as
the date of entry into force.
(7) Decrees are submitted to the Turkish Grand
National Assembly on the day of their publication in
the Official Gazette.
(8) Laws of empowering and decrees having force of
law which are based on these, shall be discussed in the
committees and in the plenary session of the Turkish
Grand National Assembly with priority and urgency.
(9) Decrees not submitted to the Turkish Grand
National Assembly on the day of their publication shall
cease to have effect on that day and decrees rejected
by the Turkish Grand National Assembly shall cease
to have effect on the day of publication of the decision in the Official Gazette. The amended provisions
of the decrees which are approved as amended shall go
into force on the day of their publication in the Official
Gazette.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote of its present members.
Article 89
(1) The President of the Republic shall promulgate the
laws adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly
within fifteen days.
(2) He shall, within the same period, refer to the Turkish Grand National Assembly for further consideration, laws which he deems unsuitable for promulgation,
together with a statement of his reasons. Budget laws
shall not be subject to this provision.
(3) If the Turkish Grand National Assembly adopts in
its unchanged form the law referred back, the President of the Republic shall promulgate it; if the Assembly
amends the law which was referred back, the President
of the Republic may again refer the amended law back
to the Assembly.
(4) Provisions relating to Constitutional amendments
are reserved.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 104
(2) To this end, the duties [the president] shall perform,
and the powers he/she shall exercise, in accordance
with the conditions stipulated in the relevant articles
of the Constitution are as follows:
a) Those relating to legislation:

To appeal to the Constitutional Court for the

annulment in part or entirety of certain provisions
of laws, decrees having force of law, and the Rules
of Procedure of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on the grounds that they are unconstitutional
in form or in content.
Article 148
(1) The Constitutional Court shall examine the constitutionality, in respect of both form and substance, of
laws, decrees having force of law, and the Rules of Procedure of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Constitutional amendments shall be examined and verified only with regard to their form. However, no action
shall be brought before the Constitutional Court alleging unconstitutionality as to the form or substance of
decrees having force of law issued during a state of emergency, martial law or in time of war.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,
including control over members salaries.
Article 86
(1) The salaries and allowances of the members of the
Turkish Grand National Assembly shall be regulated by
law. The monthly amount of the salary shall not exceed
the salary of the most senior civil servant; the travel
allowance shall not exceed half of that salary.
(2) The salaries and allowances paid to the members of
the Turkish Grand National Assembly shall not necessitate the suspension of payments of pensions and similar
benefits by social security agencies.
(3) A maximum of three months salaries and
allowances may be paid in advance.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto, here
expressed as caught in the act of committing a
crime punishable by a heavy penalty.
Article 83
(1) Members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly shall not be liable for their votes and statements

Turkish Grand National Assembly (B

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concerning parliamentary functions, for the views they
express before the Assembly, or unless the Assembly
decides otherwise on the proposal of the Bureau for
that sitting, for repeating or revealing these outside the
Assembly.
(2) A deputy who is alleged to have committed an
offence before or after election, shall not be arrested,
interrogated, detained or tried unless the Assembly
decides otherwise. This provision shall not apply in
cases where a member is caught in the act of committing a crime punishable by a heavy penalty and in cases
subject to Article 14 of the Constitution if an investigation has been initiated before the election. However,
in such situations the competent authority shall notify
the Turkish Grand National Assembly immediately and
directly.
(3) The execution of a criminal sentence imposed on
a member of the Turkish Grand National Assembly
either before or after his election shall be suspended
until he ceases to be a member; the statute of limitations does not apply during the term of membership.
(4) Investigation and prosecution of a re-elected deputy
shall be subject to the renewed waiver of immunity by
the Assembly.
(5) Political party groups in the Turkish Grand National
Assembly shall not hold discussions or take decisions
regarding parliamentary immunity.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 75
The Turkish Grand National Assembly shall be composed of five hundred fifty deputies elected by universal
suffrage.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. The legislature alone cannot change the constitution without the approval of the president. If the
president objects to a constitutional amendment
that has been passed by the legislature, he or she
can choose to put the amendment to a nationwide
referendum.
Article 175
(1) The constitutional amendment shall be proposed
in writing by at least one-third of the total number
of members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly.
Proposals to amend the Constitution shall be debated
twice in the Plenary Session. The adoption of a proposal
for an amendment shall require a three-fifths majority
of the total number of members of the Assembly by a
secret ballot.
(2) The consideration and adopting of proposals for the
amendment of the Constitution shall be subject to the
provisions governing the consideration and adoption

689
of legislation, with the exception of the conditions set
forth in this article.
(3) The President of the Republic may refer the laws
related to the Constitutional amendments for further
consideration. If the Assembly adopts the draft law
referred by the President by a two-thirds majority, the
President may submit the law to referendum.
(4) If a law is adopted by a three-fifths or less than
two-thirds majority of the total number of votes of the
Assembly and is not referred by the President for further consideration, it shall be published in the Official
Gazette and shall be submitted to referendum.
(5) A law on the Constitutional amendment adopted
by a two-thirds majority of the total number of members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly directly
or if referred by the President for further consideration,
or its articles as considered necessary may be submitted
to a referendum by the President. Laws or related articles of the Constitutional amendment not submitted to
referendum shall be published in the Official Gazette.
(6) Laws related to Constitutional amendment which
are submitted to referendum, shall require the approval
of more than half of the valid votes cast.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for presidential war declarations with the common exception for cases of foreign invasion.
Article 92
(1) The Power to authorise the declaration of a state
of war in cases deemed legitimate by international law
and, except where required by international treaties to
which Turkey is a party or by the rules of international
courtesy to send Turkish Armed Forces to foreign countries and to allow foreign armed forces to be stationed in
Turkey, is vested in the Turkish Grand National Assembly.
(2) If the country is subjected, while the Turkish Grand
National Assembly is adjourned or in recess, to sudden
armed aggression and it thus becomes imperative to
decide immediately on the use of the armed forces, the
President of the Republic can decide on the use of the
Turkish Armed Forces.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties on most major issues.
Article 90
(1) The ratification of treaties concluded with foreign
states and international organisations on behalf of the
Republic of Turkey, shall be subject to adoption by the
Turkish Grand National Assembly by a law approving
the ratification.
(2) Agreements regulating economic, commercial and
technical relations, and covering a period of no
more than one year, may be put into effect through

690

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promulgation, provided they do not entail any financial commitment by the State, and provided they do
not infringe upon the status of individuals or upon the
property rights of Turkish citizens abroad. In such cases,
these agreements must be brought to the knowledge
of the Turkish Grand National Assembly within two
months of their promulgation.
(3) Agreements in connection with the implementation of an international treaty, and economic, commercial, technical, or administrative agreements which
are concluded depending on an authorisation given by
law shall not require approval by the Turkish Grand
National Assembly. However, agreements concluded
under the provision of this paragraph and affecting the
economic, or commercial relations and private rights of
individuals shall not be put into effect unless promulgated.
(4) Agreements resulting in amendments to Turkish
laws shall be subject to the provisions of the first paragraph.
(5) International agreements duly put into effect carry
the force of law. No appeal to the Constitutional Court
can be made with regard to these agreements, on the
ground that they are unconstitutional.
Article 104
(2) To this end, the duties [the president] shall perform,
and the powers he/she shall exercise, in accordance
with the conditions stipulated in the relevant articles
of the Constitution are as follows:
b) Those relating to the executive functions:
To ratify and promulgate international treaties.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.
Article 87
The functions and powers of the Turkish Grand
National Assembly comprise . . . deciding on the proclamation of amnesties and pardons excluding those who
have been convicted for activities set out in Article 14
of the Constitution.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

Yes. The legislature has the power of pardon.
Article 87
The functions and powers of the Turkish Grand
National Assembly comprise . . . deciding on the proclamation of amnesties and pardons excluding those who
have been convicted for activities set out in Article 14
of the Constitution.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The president and members of the judiciary
make judicial appointments, and the appointments do not require the legislatures approval.

Article 104
(2) To this end, the duties [the president] shall perform,
and the powers he/she shall exercise, in accordance
with the conditions stipulated in the relevant articles
of the Constitution are as follows:
c) Those relating to the judiciary:
To appoint the members of the Constitutional Court,
one-fourth of the members of the Council of State, the
Chief Public Prosecutor and the Deputy Chief Public
Prosecutor of the High Court of Appeals, the members
of the Military High Court of Appeals, the members
of the Supreme Military Administrative Court and the
members of the Supreme Council of Judges and Public
Prosecutors.
Article 146
(1) The Constitutional Court shall be composed of
eleven regular and four substitute members.
(2) The President of the Republic shall appoint two regular and two substitute members from the High Court
of Appeals, two regular and one substitute member
from the Council of State, and one member each from
the Military High Court of Appeals, the High Military
Administrative Court and the Audit Court, three candidates being nominated for each vacant office by the Plenary Assemblies of each court from among their respective presidents and members, by an absolute majority
of the total number of members; the President of the
Republic shall also appoint one member from a list of
three candidates nominated by the Higher Education
Council from among members of the teaching staff of
institutions of higher education who are not members
of the Council, and three members and one substitute
member from among senior administrative officers and
lawyers.
Article 154
(2) Members of the High Court of Appeals shall be
appointed by the Supreme Council of Judges and Public
Prosecutors from among first category judges and public prosecutors of the Republic, of the courts of justice,
or those considered to be members of this profession,
by secret ballot and by an absolute majority of the total
number of members.
Article 156
(2) Members of the Military High Court of Appeals shall
be appointed by the President of the Republic from
among three candidates nominated for each vacant
office by the Plenary Assembly of the Military High
Court of Appeals from among military judges of the first
category, by secret ballot and by an absolute majority
of the total number of members.
Article 157
(2) Members of the High Military Administrative Court
of Appeals who are military judges shall be appointed
by the President of the Republic from a list of three candidates nominated for each vacant office by the president and members of the Court, who are also military judges, by secret ballot and by an absolute majority of the total number of such members, from among

Turkish Grand National Assembly (B

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military judges of the first category; members who are
not military judges shall be appointed by the President
of the Republic from a list of three candidates nominated for each vacant office by the Chief of the General
Staff from among officers holding the rank and qualifications prescribed by law.
Article 159
(1) The Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors shall be established and shall exercise its functions
in accordance with the principles of the independence
of the courts and the security of tenure of judges.
(2) The President of the Council is the Minister of Justice. The Undersecretary to the Minister of Justice shall
be an ex-officio member of the Council. Three regular
and three substitute members of the Council shall be
appointed by the President of the Republic for a term
of four years from a list of three candidates nominated
for each vacant office by the Plenary Assembly of the
High Court of Appeals from among its own members
and two regular and two substitute members shall be
similarly appointed from a list of three candidates nominated for each vacant office by the Plenary Assembly of
the Council of State. They may be re-elected at the end
of their term of office. The Council shall elect a deputy
president from among its elected regular members.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The government appoints the governor of the
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The government appoints the head of the
Turkish Radio-Television Corporation.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session for
nine months each year.

691
Article 93
(1) The Turkish Grand National Assembly shall convene of its own accord on the first day of October each
year.
(2) The Assembly may be in recess for a maximum of
three months in the course of a legislative year. During
an adjournment and recess it may be summoned by the
President of the Republic either on his own initiative or
at the request of the Council of Ministers.
(3) The President of the Assembly may also summon
the Assembly either on his own initiative or at the written request of one- fifth of the members.
(4) If the Turkish Grand National Assembly is convened
during an adjournment or recess, it shall not adjourn or
go into recess again before having given priority consideration to the matter requiring the summons.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
Yes.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

692

Peoples Council of Turkmenistan (Khalk Maslakhaty)

PEOPLES COUNCIL OF TURKMENISTAN (KHALK MASLAKHATY)

Expert consultants: Sener Akt
urk, Robia Charles, Michael J. Denison, Jody LaPorte, Regine Spector
Score: .06
Influence over
executive (1/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Institutional
autonomy (0/9)

Specified
powers (0/8)

Institutional
capacity (1/6)

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

24. judiciary

25. central bank

26. media

18. all elected

The Peoples Council (Khalk Maslakhaty) of Turkmenistan was established in the countrys 1992
constitution following independence from the
Soviet Union. The constitution calls for two legislative bodies: the Majlis (parliament) and the more
expansive Peoples Council. The latter includes
all of the members of the Majlis, the president,
the cabinet, judges, leaders of political parties,
and local representatives. In 2003 a constitutional
amendment clarified the powers of the two bodies
and named the Peoples Council, led by the president, the nations supreme legislative authority.
The Peoples Council is the body whose powers are
assessed here.
The Peoples Council is not a genuine legislature. The Peoples Council has been merely a decoration in a firmament of adornments that make
up the cult of the president, Saparmurat Niyazov.
Between the dissolution of the USSR at the end
of 1991 and Niyazovs death in December 2006,
Turkmenistan endured the erection of the modern worlds most all-embracing and farcical personality cult. The legislatures functions, in practice,
have been limited to bestowing awards upon and
singing the praises of Niyazov, who was referred
to universally in Turkmenistans press as Turkmenbashi (Father of the Turkmen) the Great, and
whom the legislature made president for life in
1999. The death of Niyazov in December 2006
presents the possibility of a more meaningful role

for the legislature in Turkmenistan, but what part

it might play in the future remains open.
The legislature lacks a voice in the formation of
the executive branch and cannot effectively oversee or remove executive branch officials. The president decrees legislation, appoints members of the
legislature, and can dissolve the legislature, leaving the legislature without institutional autonomy.
The legislature does not exercise any of the specified powers measured in this survey and has minimal institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires approval in
a national referendum.
Article 59
In case of violation of the Constitution and laws by the
President of Turkmenistan, the Khalk Maslakhaty may
express no confidence in the President of Turkmenistan
and put the issue of his removal to a national vote. The
issue of no confidence in the President of Turkmenistan
may be considered upon the request of no less than
one-third of the established number of members of the
Khalk Maslakhaty. The decision of no confidence in the
President of Turkmenistan is adopted by no less than
two-thirds of the votes of the established number of
members of the Khalk Maslakhaty.

Peoples Council of Turkmenistan (Khalk Maslakhaty)

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Ministers are prohibited from serving simultaneously in the Majlis but are automatically members of the Khalk Maslakhaty.
Article 46
The members of the Khalk Maslakhaty are:
The President of Turkmenistan;
Deputies of the Majlis, the Chairman of the Supreme
Court, the General Procurator, members of the Cabinet
of Ministers, khyakims of velayets [and] the khyakim of
the city of Ashgabat;
Khalk vekilleri;
Leaders of political parties, the Youth Organization,
professional unions, the Union of Women, who are
members of the Nation-wide Movement Galkynysh,
leaders of public organizations in the State [and] the
representatives of the elders of Turkmenistan;
Khyakims of cities that are administrative centers of
velayets and etraps [and] archyns of cities and villages
that are administrative centers of etraps.
The Khalk Maslakhaty consists of 2,507 members.

693

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 74
The Cabinet of Ministers includes Deputy Chairmen of
the Cabinet of Ministers and minister. The President
of Turkmenistan may appoint other officials who are
the heads of central executive bodies of government to
the Cabinet of Ministers. The Cabinet of Ministers is
formed by the President within one month after taking
office and is dissolved before a newly elected President
takes office.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.

Article 70
The Majlis is a standing body of state, and a deputy may
not simultaneously serve as a member of the Cabinet
of Ministers, the hyakim of a velayat, city, or etrap, an
archyn or kazy, or a prosecutor.

No. The president is directly elected. President

Niyazov served as an elected president from 1992
to 1999. From 1999 to 2006 President Niyazov
ruled as president for life, a position granted to
him by the Peoples Council. Presidential elections to replace Niyazov were held in February
2007.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.

Article 54
The President of Turkmenistan is elected directly by
the people of Turkmenistan for a term of five years and
enters office immediately after taking an oath at a session of the Khalk Maslakhaty.

No. Formally, legislators can question executive

branch officials, but in practice, ministers rarely
undergo questioning before the legislature.
Article 68
Deputies of the Majlis have the right of inquiry [in form
of] oral or written questions to the Cabinet of Ministers,
the ministers [and] the leaders of other State organs.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in
the government.
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the
executive.
No. The president can dissolve the Majlis.
Article 63
The Majlis may be dissolved early:
1. By the decision of a referendum;
2. By a resolution of the Khalk Maslakhaty;
3. By a resolution of the Majlis, adopted by a majority
of no less than two-thirds of the established number of
deputies (self-dissolution);
4. By the President of Turkmenistan, in cases of not
forming within six months the leadership of the Majlis.

6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires

ratification or approval by the legislature before
it takes effect; that is, the executive lacks decree
power.

No. There is no prime minister. The president is

the head of the cabinet of ministers.

No. The president issues decrees that have the force

of law.

No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.

694
Article 56
The President of Turkmenistan issues decrees, ordinances and orders, which are binding throughout Turkmenistan.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority is required to override a
presidential veto.
Article 55
The President of Turkmenistan:
6. Signs laws [and] has the right, within a two-week
period to the use of the delaying veto to return legislation with his objections to the Majlis for a repeated
debate and vote. If the Majlis confirms its previously
adopted decision by a majority of two-thirds of the
votes of the deputies, the President of Turkmenistan
shall sign the law. The President of Turkmenistan does
not have the right of delaying veto in respect to laws
on amendments and supplements to the Constitution
adopted by the Khalk Maslakhaty.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The legislatures laws are not supreme. Formally, the legislature is granted the power to review
the constitutionality of laws. In practice, the legislatures laws do not exist, as the president is the
countrys sole lawgiver.
Article 66
The competence of the Majlis includes:
7. Determining whether the normative acts of organs of
State power and administration are in accordance with
the Constitution.
Article 111
Laws [and] other legal acts of State organs and officials
are issued on the basis of and in accordance with the
Constitution.
In case of a discrepancy between the provisions indicated by the Constitution and laws, the provisions of
the Constitution are in effect.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. The legislature is prohibited from initiating
bills beyond a restricted domain of issues.
Article 48
The competence of the Khalk Maslakhaty includes:
1. Adoption of the Constitution of Turkmenistan, constitutional laws [and] the introductions of amendments
and supplements to them;
2. Creation of the Central Commission for Elections
and Conduct of Referenda in Turkmenistan [and] making changes to its composition;

Peoples Council of Turkmenistan (Khalk Maslakhaty)

3. Decision on the issue of conducting nation-wide referenda;
4. Calling the election of the President of Turkmenistan,
deputies of the Mejlis, khalk vekilleri and members of
Gengeshes;
5. Consideration and approval of programs of basic
directions of political, economic and social development of the country;
6. Change of the State border and administrativelyterritorial division of Turkmenistan;
9. Declaration of individual unlawful acts as treason
against the Homeland, declaration as traitors of the
Homeland of persons recognized as guilty and convicted of committing such acts and the decision on the
issue of permitting the application of an exceptional
measure of punishment in the form of life-long deprivation of liberty. The right to apply the exceptional
measure of punishment in the form of life-long deprivation of liberty belongs to the Supreme Court of Turkmenistan with the subsequent consideration at a session of the Khalk Maslakhaty of the issue of approving
such sentences pronounced by the court.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The president can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
No. The legislature is dependent on the executive
for the resources that finance its own operations.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Formally, members of the Majlis are immune,
but in practice, legislators enjoy immunity only at
the pleasure of the president.
Article 69
A deputy may be deprived of his deputy powers only
by the Majlis. The decision on this issue is adopted by
a majority of no less than two-thirds of the votes of the
established number of deputies of the Majlis. A deputy
may not be brought to criminal responsibility, arrested
or in another manner deprived of liberty without the
consent of the Majlis.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
No. The members of the legislature include the
president and officials appointed by him, including ministers and judges. Even the formally elected
members are indirectly selected by the executive
branch. For example, the government chooses the
candidates eligible for election to the Majlis.

Peoples Council of Turkmenistan (Khalk Maslakhaty)

Article 46
The members of the Khalk Maslakhaty are:
The President of Turkmenistan;
Deputies of the Majlis, the Chairman of the Supreme
Court, the General Procurator, members of the Cabinet
of Ministers, khyakims of velayets [and] the khyakim of
the city of Ashgabat;
Khalk vekilleri;
Leaders of political parties, the Youth Organization,
professional unions, the Union of Women, who are
members of the Nation-wide Movement Galkynysh,
leaders of public organizations in the State [and] the
representatives of the elders of Turkmenistan;
Khyakims of cities that are administrative centers of
velayets and etraps [and] archyns of cities and villages
that are administrative centers of etraps.
The Khalk Maslakhaty consists of 2,507 members.
Article 62
The Majlis consists of 50 deputies elected by territorial
districts, which contain an approximately equal number of electors, for a term of five years.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. In practice, it would be unthinkable for
the legislature to change the constitution without the presidents approval. Formally, the Khalk
Maslakhaty can change the constitution with a twothirds majority vote.
Article 113
A law on the amendment to the Constitution is considered adopted if no less than two-thirds of the established number of members of the Khalk Maslakhaty
voted in its favor.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. The constitution does not contain a provision
addressing the declaration of war. In practice, the
president could declare war without the legislatures approval.
21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
treaties with foreign countries.
No. Formally, the Khalk Maslakhaty has the power
to ratify international treaties. In practice, the president concludes international treaties without the
legislatures approval.
Article 48
The competence of the Khalk Maslakhaty includes:
10. Ratification and denunciation of treaties on international unions and other formations.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. The president has the power to grant amnesty.
Article 55
The President of Turkmenistan:

695
11. Grants pardons and amnesty.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 55
The President of Turkmenistan:
11. Grants pardons and amnesty.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The president appoints the judiciary, and
the appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 100
Judges of all courts are appointed by the President of
Turkmenistan for a term of five years.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the chairman of the
State Central Bank of Turkmenistan.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
No. The legislature is called into session by the
president and meets infrequently and for short sessions.
Article 50
The Khalk Maslakhaty is convened by the Chairman of
the Khalk Maslakhaty or the President of Turkmenistan
as necessary but not less frequently than once a year by
the Chairman of the Khalk Maslakhaty, the President
of Turkmenistan, the Majlis or one-third of the Khalk
Maslakhaty members.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
No. There are no elections for the vast majority of
seats in the legislature.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
No. The vast majority of seats in the legislature are
filled by appointment rather than election so one

696

Peoples Council of Turkmenistan (Khalk Maslakhaty)

cannot speak of re-election. It is also impossible

to know with certainty whether members seek reappointment. The stipends that members receive
may be sufficient to make membership attractive,
and a seat may be regarded as prestigious. It is normally obtained through service to the president or
by virtue of tribal or clan seniority.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature

contains a significant number of highly experienced

members.
Yes. Despite frequent shuffles and purges by the
president, there remains a core of experienced presidential loyalists in the legislature. Most members of the legislature are experienced in managing
affairs at local or district levels, but do not necessarily have competence or expertise in matters of
legislation.

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF UGANDA

Expert consultants: Onek Adyanga, Giovanni Carbone, David K. Leonard, Anne Mugisha, Zahara
Nampewo
Score: .44
Influence over
executive (3/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)
X
X

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

X
X

Specified
powers (2/8)

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

18. all elected

24. judiciary

25. central bank

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

26. media
X

The National Assembly of Uganda was established

upon the countrys independence from Great
Britain in 1962. For most of its history, the National
Assembly was sidelined as the country suffered military coups, international and civil wars, and dictatorial rulers. Beginning in 1986, with the coming
to power of Yoweri Museveni, Uganda underwent
gradual reforms that culminated in the 1995 constitution. The document calls for a unicameral legislature and a directly elected president.
The legislature has middling powers. Its influence over the executive is not extensive. It cannot choose the president, oversee the executive
branch, or remove executive branch officials from
office. The legislature does have some institutional
autonomy, although that autonomy is limited by
presidential veto and gatekeeping powers. It exercises few specified powers, yet it does have a

role in approving judicial branch appointments.

Its institutional capacity is limited by a lack of
staff.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires
involvement of the Supreme Court.

the

Article 107
(1) The President may be removed from office in
accordance with this article on any of the following
grounds
(a) abuse of office or willful violation of the oath of
allegiance and the presidential oath or any provision
of this Constitution;

National Assembly of Uganda

(b) misconduct or misbehavior
(i) that he or she has conducted himself or herself
in a manner which brings or is likely to bring the
office of President into hatred, ridicule, contempt
or disrepute; or
(ii) that he or she has dishonestly done any act
or omission which is prejudicial or inimical to the
economy or security of Uganda; or
(2) For the purpose of removal of the President under
paragraph (a) or (b) of clause (1) of this article, a notice
in writing signed by not less than one-third of all
the members of Parliament shall be submitted to the
Speaker
(a) stating that they intend to move a motion for a
resolution in Parliament for the removal of the President on the charge that the President has
(i) wilfully abused his or her office or wilfully violated the oath of allegiance and the Presidential
oath or any other provision of this Constitution in
terms of paragraph (a) of clause (1) of this article;
(ii) misconducted himself or herself or misbehaved
in terms of paragraph (b) of clause (1) of this article;
and
(b) setting out the particulars of the charge supported
by the necessary documents on which it is claimed
that the conduct of the President be investigated for
the purposes of his or her removal.
(3) The Speaker shall, within twenty-four hours after
receipt of the notice referred to in clause (2) of this
article, cause a copy to be transmitted to the President
and the Chief Justice.
(4) The Chief Justice shall, within seven days after
receipt of the notice transmitted under clause (3) of
this article, constitute a tribunal comprising three Justices of the Supreme Court to investigate the allegation
in the notice and to report its findings to Parliament
stating whether or not there is a prima facie case for the
removal of the President.
(6) If the tribunal determines that there is a prima facie
case for the removal of the President under paragraph
(a) or (b) of clause (1) of this article, then if Parliament
passes the resolution supported by the votes of not less
than two-thirds of all members of Parliament, the President shall cease to hold office.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Legislators may serve simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 113
(1) Cabinet Ministers shall be appointed by the President with the approval of Parliament from among
members of Parliament or persons qualified to be
elected members of Parliament.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.

697

Yes. The legislature regularly questions executive

branch officials.
Article 89
(3) The functions of standing committees shall include
the following
(c) to assess and evaluate activities of Government and
other bodies;
(4) In the exercise of their functions under this article,
committees of Parliament
(a) may call any Minister or any person holding public office and private individuals to submit memoranda or appear before them to give evidence;
(c) shall have the powers of the High Court for
(i) enforcing the attendance of witnesses and
examining them on oath, affirmation or otherwise;
(ii) compelling the production of documents.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. There is no prime minister.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The legislatures approval is required to confirm the presidents ministerial appointments.
Article 113
(1) Cabinet Ministers shall be appointed by the President with the approval of Parliament from among
members of Parliament or persons qualified to be
elected members of Parliament.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 103
(1) The election of the President shall be by universal
adult suffrage through a secret ballot.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in
the government. It can pass a motion of censure

698

against individual ministers, but it cannot pass a

motion of censure in the government as a whole.
Article 118
(1) Parliament may, by resolution supported by more
than half of all members of Parliament, pass a vote
of censure against a Minister on any of the following
grounds
(a) abuse of office or wilful violation of the oath of
allegiance or oath of office;
(b) misconduct or misbehaviour;
(c) physical or mental incapacity, namely, that he or
she is incapable of performing the functions of his or
her office by reason of physical or mental incapacity;
(d) mismanagement; or
(e) incompetence.
(2) Upon a vote of censure being passed against a Minister, the President shall, unless the Minister resigns his
or her office, take appropriate action in the matter.
(3) Proceedings for censure of a Minister shall be initiated by a petition to the President through the Speaker
signed by not less than one-third of all members of Parliament giving notice that they are dissatisfied with the
conduct or performance of the Minister and intend to
move a motion for a resolution of censure and setting
out particulars of the grounds in support of the motion.
(4) The President shall, upon receipt of the petition,
cause a copy of it to be given to the Minister in question.
(5) The motion for the resolution of censure shall not
be debated until the expiry of thirty days after the petition was sent to the President.
(6) A Minister in respect of whom a vote of censure is
debated under clause (5) of this article is entitled during
the debate to be heard in his or her defence.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.
Article 96
Parliament shall stand dissolved upon the expiration of
its term as prescribed by article 77 of this Constitution.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.
Article 79
(2) Except as provided in this Constitution, no person
or body other than Parliament shall have power to make
provisions having the force of law in Uganda except
under authority conferred by an Act of Parliament.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority vote is required to override a presidential veto.

National Assembly of Uganda

Article 91
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the
power of Parliament to make laws shall be exercised
through bills passed by Parliament and assented to by
the President.
(2) A bill passed by Parliament shall, as soon as possible,
be presented to the President for assent.
(3) The President shall, within thirty days after a bill is
presented to him or her
(a) assent to the bill; or
(b) return the bill to Parliament with a request that
the bill or a particular provision of it be reconsidered
by Parliament; or
(c) notify the Speaker in writing that he or she refuses
to assent to the bill.
(4) Where a bill has been returned to Parliament under
paragraph (b) of clause (3) of this article, Parliament
shall reconsider it and if passed again, it shall be presented for a second time to the President for assent.
(5) Where the President returns the same bill twice
under paragraph (b) of clause (3) of this article and
the bill is passed for the third time, with the support
of at least two-thirds of all members of Parliament, the
Speaker shall cause a copy of the bill to be laid before
Parliament and the bill shall become law without the
assent of the President.
(6) Where the President
(a) refuses to assent to a bill under paragraph (c) of
clause (3) of this article, Parliament may reconsider
the bill and if passed, the bill shall be presented to
the President for assent;
(b) refuses to assent to a bill which has been reconsidered and passed under paragraph (a) of this clause or
under clause (4) of this article, the Speaker shall, upon
the refusal, if the bill was so passed with the support
of at least two-thirds of all members of Parliament,
cause a copy of the bill to be laid before Parliament
and the bill shall become law without the assent of
the President.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 137
(1) Any question as to the interpretation of this Constitution shall be determined by the Court of Appeal
sitting as the Constitutional Court.
(2) When sitting as a Constitutional Court, the Court
of Appeal shall consist of a bench of five members of
that Court.
(3) A person who alleges that
(a) an Act of Parliament or any other law or anything
in or done under the authority of any law; or
(b) any act or omission by any person or authority, is
inconsistent with or in contravention of a provision
of this Constitution, may petition the Constitutional
Court for a declaration to that effect, and for redress
where appropriate.

National Assembly of Uganda

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. The legislature is prohibited from introducing
legislation related to taxation, public expenditure,
or government debt.
Article 93
Parliament shall not, unless the bill or the motion is
introduced on behalf of the Government
(a) proceed upon a bill, including an amendment
bill, that makes provision for any of the following

(i) the imposition of taxation or the alteration of

taxation otherwise than by reduction; or
(ii) the imposition of a charge on the Consolidated
Fund or other public fund of Uganda or the alteration of any such charge otherwise than by reduction; or
(iii) the payment, issue or withdrawal from the
Consolidated Fund or other public fund of Uganda
of any moneys not charged on that fund or any
increase in the amount of that payment, issue or
withdrawal; or
(iv) the composition or remission of any debt due
to the Government of Uganda; or
(b) proceed upon a motion, including an amendment to a motion, the effect of which would be to
make provision for any of the purposes specified in
paragraph (a) of this article.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,
including control over members salaries.
Article 85
(1) A member of Parliament shall be paid such emoluments and such gratuity and shall be provided with
such facilities as may be determined by Parliament.
(2) A member of Parliament shall not hold any office
of profit or emolument likely to compromise his or her
office.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. The constitution states that parliament shall
prescribe immunities by law, but in practice, legislators are subject to arrest.
Article 97
The Speaker, the Deputy Speaker, members of Parliament and any other person participating or assisting

699
in or acting in connection with or reporting the proceedings of Parliament or any of its committees shall
be entitled to such immunities and privileges as Parliament shall by law prescribe.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected with
the exception of the vice president and the ministers, who, if not already members of the legislature,
become ex-officio members without voting rights.
Article 78
(1) Parliament shall consist of
(a) members directly elected to represent constituencies;
(b) one woman representative for every district;
(c) such numbers of representatives of the army,
youth, workers, persons with disabilities and other
groups as Parliament may determine; and
(d) the Vice-President and Ministers, who, if not
already elected members of Parliament, shall be exofficio members of Parliament without the right to
vote on any issue requiring a vote in Parliament.
Article 81
(1) A general election of members of Parliament shall
be held within thirty days before the expiration of the
term of Parliament.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. In practice, any substantial constitutional
change would be impossible without the presidents blessing. Formally, the legislature can
change most of the articles of the constitution in
multiple readings with a two-thirds majority vote.
Amendments to select articles of the constitution
require approval in either a popular referendum or
by regional representative bodies.
Article 258
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Parliament may amend by way of addition, variation or
repeal, any provision of this Constitution in accordance
with the procedure laid down in this Chapter.
(2) This Constitution shall not be amended except by
an Act of Parliament
(a) the sole purpose of which is to amend this Constitution; and
(b) the Act has been passed in accordance with this
Chapter.
Article 259
(1) A bill for an Act of Parliament seeking to amend any
of the provisions specified in clause (2) of this article
shall not be taken as passed unless
(a) it is supported at the second and third readings in
Parliament by not less than two-thirds of all members
of Parliament; and

700
(b) it has been referred to a decision of the people
and approved by them in a referendum.
(2) The provisions referred to in clause (1) of this article
are
(a) this article;
(b) Chapter One articles 1 and 2;
(c) Chapter Four article 44;
(d) Chapter Five articles 69, 74 and 75;
(e) Chapter Six article 79 clause (2);
(f) Chapter Seven article 105 clause (1);
(g) Chapter Eight article 128 clause (1); and
(h) Chapter Sixteen.
Article 260
(1) A bill for an Act of Parliament seeking to amend any
of the provisions specified in clause (2) of this article
shall not be taken as passed unless
(a) it is supported at the second and third readings in
Parliament by not less than two-thirds of all members
of Parliament; and
(b) it has been ratified by at least two-thirds of the
members of the district council in each of at least
two-thirds of all the districts of Uganda.
(2) The provisions referred to in clause (1) of this article
are
(a) this article;
(b) Chapter Two article 5, clause (2);
(c) Chapter Nine article 152;
(d) Chapter Eleven article 176, clause (1) and articles 178, 189 and 197.
Article 261
A bill for an Act of Parliament to amend any provision
of the Constitution, other than those referred to in articles 259 and 260 of this Constitution, shall not be taken
as passed unless it is supported at the second and third
readings by the votes of not less than two-thirds of all
members of Parliament.
Article 262
(1) The votes on the second and third readings referred
to in articles 259 and 260 of this Constitution shall be
separated by at least fourteen sitting days of Parliament.
(2) A bill for the amendment of this Constitution
which has been passed in accordance with this Chapter
shall be assented to by the President only if
(a) it is accompanied by a certificate of the Speaker
that the provisions of this Chapter have been complied with in relation to it; and
(b) in the case of a bill to amend a provision to which
article 259 or 260 of this Constitution applies, it is
accompanied by a certificate of the Electoral Commission that the amendment has been approved at
a referendum or, as the case may be, ratified by the
district councils in accordance with this Chapter.
(3) Where the provisions of clause (2) of this article are
complied with in the case of a bill to which article 259
or 260 of this Constitution applies, the President shall
not refuse to assent to the bill.
(4) Where in the case of a bill to which clause (3) of
this article applies the President
(a) refuses to assent to the bill; or

National Assembly of Uganda

(b) fails to assent to the bill within thirty days after
the bill is submitted, the President shall be taken to
have assented to the bill and the Speaker shall cause
a copy of the bill to be laid before Parliament and
the bill shall become law without the assent of the
President.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. The president can declare war without the
legislatures approval when consulting the legislature would be impracticable. The president then
must seek retroactive approval within seventy-two
hours.
Article 124
(1) The President may, with the approval of Parliament,
given by resolution supported by not less than twothirds of all the members of Parliament, declare that
a state of war exists between Uganda and any other
country.
(2) Where it is impracticable to seek the approval of
Parliament before declaration of a state of war, the President may declare a state of war without the approval
but shall seek the approval immediately after the declaration and in any case not later than seventy-two hours
after the declaration.
(3) Where the President makes the declaration of a state
of war under clause (2) when Parliament is in recess, the
Speaker shall, immediately summon Parliament to an
emergency session to sit within seventy-two hours after
the declaration of a state of war.
(4) The President may, with the approval of Parliament,
given by resolution, revoke a declaration of a state of
war made under clause (1) or (2) of this article.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 123
(1) The President or a person authorised by the President may make treaties, conventions, agreements, or
other arrangements between Uganda and any other
country or between Uganda and any international
organisation or body, in respect of any matter.
(2) Parliament shall make laws to govern ratification
of treaties, conventions, agreements or other arrangements made under clause (1) of this article.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 22.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The president, acting on the advice of the Advisory Committee on the Prerogative of Mercy, has
the power of pardon (mercy).

National Assembly of Uganda

Article 121
(1) There shall be an Advisory Committee on the Prerogative of Mercy which shall consist of
(a) the Attorney-General who shall be Chairperson;
and
(b) six prominent citizens of Uganda appointed by
the President.
(2) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as
a member of the Committee if he or she is a member of
Parliament, the Uganda Law Society or a District Council.
(3) A member appointed under paragraph (b) of clause
(1) of this article shall serve for a period of four years
and shall cease to be a member of the Committee
(a) if circumstances arise that would disqualify him
or her from appointment; or
(b) if removed by the President for inability to perform the functions of his or her office arising from
infirmity of body or mind or for misbehaviour, misconduct or incompetence.
(4) The President may, on the advice of the Committee
(a) grant to any person convicted of an offence, a
pardon either free or subject to lawful conditions;
(b) grant to a person a respite, either indefinite or for
a specified period, from the execution of punishment
imposed on him or her for an offence;
(c) substitute a less severe form of punishment for a
punishment imposed on a person for an offence; or
(d) remit the whole or part of a punishment imposed
on a person or of a penalty or forfeiture otherwise due
to Government on account of any offence.
(5) Where a person is sentenced to death for an offence,
a written report of the case from the trial judge or judges
or person presiding over the court or tribunal, together
with such other information derived from the record of
the case or elsewhere as may be necessary, shall be submitted to the Advisory Committee on the Prerogative
of Mercy.
(6) A reference in this article to conviction or imposition of a punishment, sentence, or forfeiture includes
conviction or imposition of a punishment, penalty,
sentence or forfeiture by a court martial or other military tribunal except a Field Court Martial.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for the
presidents judicial appointments.
Article 142
(1) The Chief Justice, the Deputy Chief Justice, the Principal Judge, a Justice of the Supreme Court, a Justice of
Appeal and a Judge of the High Court shall be appointed
by the President acting on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission and with the approval of Parliament.
Article 148
Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Judicial Service Commission may appoint persons to hold

701
or act in any judicial office other than the offices specified in clause (3) of article 147 of this Constitution and
confirm appointments in and exercise disciplinary control over persons holding or acting in such offices and
remove such persons from office.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the governor of the
Bank of Uganda with the approval of parliament.
Article 161
(1) The Bank of Uganda shall be the central bank of
Uganda and it shall be the only authority to issue the
currency of Uganda.
(2) The authority of the Bank of Uganda shall vest in
a Board which shall consist of a Governor, a Deputy
Governor and not more than five other members.
(3) The Governor, the Deputy Governor and all other
members of the Board shall
(a) be appointed by the President with the approval
of Parliament.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The president and the Ministry of Information
control the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.
Article 95
(1) Where a new Parliament is elected, the President
shall, by proclamation, appoint the place and a date
not beyond seven days after the expiry of the term of
Parliament or of the extended period, as the case may
be, for the first sitting of the new Parliament.
(2) A session of Parliament shall be held at such place
within Uganda and shall commence at such time as the
Speaker may, by proclamation, appoint.
(3) The Speaker may, after consultation with the President, prorogue Parliament by proclamation.
(4) A session of Parliament shall be held at least once a
year but the period between one session and the next
following session shall be less than twelve months.
(5) Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, at least one-third of all members of Parliament
may, in writing signed by them, request a meeting
of Parliament; and the Speaker shall summon Parliament to meet within twenty-one days after receipt of
the request.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.

702

National Assembly of Uganda

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.

contains a significant number of highly experienced

members.

Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

Yes. Uganda held parliamentary elections in 1996,

2001, and 2006. There was considerable stability in
membership across elections, contributing to the
formation of a sizable cohort of highly experienced
members. The ostensibly nonpartisan organization of President Yoweri Museveni, the National
Resistance Movement, functions as the legislatures
hegemonic party.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature

SUPREME COUNCIL OF UKRAINE (VERKHOVNA RADA)

Expert consultants: Nadia Diuk, Andrew Konitzer-Smirnov, Oleh Protsyk, A. Tobias Schedlbauer,
Lucan A. Way
Score: .59
Influence over
executive (4/9)

Institutional
autonomy (4/9)

Specified
powers (6/8)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no confidence

X
X

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

Institutional
capacity (5/6)

23. pardon
24. judiciary

25. central bank

26. media

The Supreme Council (Verkhovna Rada) of Ukraine

traces its roots to the Central Council set up in
Kiev following the collapse of the Russian Empire
in 1917. Independence was short lived, as Ukraine
was incorporated into the Soviet Union at the
beginning of the 1920s. During the collapse of
the Soviet Union in late 1991, Ukraine declared
independence. In 1996 the country adopted its
post-independence constitution, which called for
a unicameral legislature. Some constitutional
amendments that were passed during the Orange
Revolution of 2004 strengthened the legislature.
The legislature gained the power to choose the
prime minister and the other ministers of the cabinet. Prior to that time, the president appointed the
prime minister and the government. Not all constitutional changes bolstered the legislatures powers, however. The president obtained the power

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X

X
X
X

to dissolve the legislature, whereas prior to 2004

the legislature was immune from dissolution.
The legislature enjoys considerable clout. Influence over the executive is ensured by powers to
choose the prime minister and government, question executive branch officials, and remove the
government with a vote of no confidence. The
legislature possesses a fair degree of institutional
autonomy and five of the eight specified powers
assessed in this survey. It has considerable institutional capacity, lacking only personal staff with
policy expertise.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.

Supreme Council of Ukraine (Verkhovna Rada)

No. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of the Constitutional Court. The legislature can remove the prime minister with a vote
of no confidence.
Article 87
The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, on the proposal of no
fewer National Deputies of Ukraine than one-third of
its constitutional composition, may consider the issue
of responsibility of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine
and adopt a resolution of no confidence in the Cabinet
of Ministers of Ukraine by the majority of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.
The issue of responsibility of the Cabinet of Ministers
of Ukraine shall not be considered by the Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine more than once during one regular
session, and also within one year after the approval of
the Programme of Activity of the Cabinet of Ministers
of Ukraine.
Article 111
The President of Ukraine may be removed from office
by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by the procedure of
impeachment, in the event that he or she commits state
treason or other crime.
The issue of the removal of the President of Ukraine
from office by the procedure of impeachment is initiated by the majority of the constitutional composition
of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.
To conduct the investigation, the Verkhovna Rada
of Ukraine establishes a special temporary investigatory commission whose composition includes a special
procurator and special investigators. The conclusions
and proposals of the temporary investigatory commission are considered at a meeting of the Verkhovna Rada
of Ukraine. For cause, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine,
by no less than two-thirds of its constitutional composition, adopts a decision on the accusation of the
President of Ukraine. The decision on the removal of
the President of Ukraine from office by the procedure
of impeachment is adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine by no less than three-quarters of its constitutional composition, after the review of the case by the
Constitutional Court of Ukraine and the receipt of its
opinion on the observance of the constitutional procedure of investigation and consideration of the case
of impeachment, and the receipt of the opinion of the
Supreme Court of Ukraine to the effect that the acts,
of which the President of Ukraine is accused, contain
elements of state treason or other crime.
Article 115
The adoption of a resolution of no confidence in the
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine by the Verkhovna Rada
of Ukraine results in the resignation of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Ministers are prohibited from serving in the
legislature.

703
Article 78
Requirements concerning the incompatibility of the
mandate of the deputy with other types of activity are
established by law.
Article 120
Members of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and
chief officers of central and local bodies of executive
power do not have the right to combine their official activity with other work, except teaching, scholarly
and creative activity outside of working hours, or to be
members of an administrative body or board of supervisors of an enterprise that is aimed at making profit.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 86
At a session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, a
National Deputy of Ukraine has the right to present
an inquiry to the bodies of the Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, chief officers of other bodies of state power and bodies of local
self-government, and also to the chief executives of
enterprises, institutions and organisations located on
the territory of Ukraine, irrespective of their subordination and forms of ownership. Chief officers of bodies of
state power and bodies of local self-government, chief
executives of enterprises, institutions and organisations
are obliged to notify a National Deputy of Ukraine of
the results of the consideration of his or her inquiry.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. Since 2006 the legislature selects the prime
minister. Prior to 2006 the president appointed the
prime minister with the consent of the legislature.
Article 85
Powers of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine shall include:
(12) appointing to office upon the submission by the
President of Ukraine the Prime Minister of Ukraine,
the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Foreign Affairs
of Ukraine; appointing to office upon the submission

704
by the Prime Minister of Ukraine other members of
the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.
Article 106
The President of Ukraine:
(9) puts forward, following the relevant proposal by
the parliamentary coalition formed in the Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine as provided for by Article 83 of the
Constitution of Ukraine, the name of a candidate to be
appointed to the office of the Prime Minister of Ukraine
by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, no later than fifteen
days after the receipt of such a proposal.
Article 114
The Prime Minister of Ukraine is appointed by the
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine upon the submission by
the President of Ukraine.
The name of a candidate for the office of the Prime
Minister of Ukraine shall be put forward by the President of Ukraine following the relevant proposal by the
parliamentary coalition formed in the Verkhovna Rada
of Ukraine as provided for in Article 83 of the Constitution of Ukraine or by a parliamentary faction whose
National Deputies of Ukraine make up a majority of
the constitutional membership of the Verkhovna Rada
of Ukraine.
Article 83
A coalition of parliamentary groups in the Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine submits to the President of Ukraine, in
accordance with this Constitution, proposals concerning a persons candidature for the office of the Prime
Minister of Ukraine and also, in accordance with this
Constitution, proposes candidates for the membership
of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. Since 2006 the legislature appoints ministers.
Prior to 2006 the president appointed ministers,
and the appointments did not require the legislatures approval.
Article 85
Powers of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine shall include:
(12) appointing to office upon the submission by the
President of Ukraine the Prime Minister of Ukraine,
the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Foreign Affairs
of Ukraine; appointing to office upon the submission
by the Prime Minister of Ukraine other members of
the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.
Article 106
The President of Ukraine:
(10) puts forward to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
the name of a candidate to be appointed to the office
of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine and the Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.
Article 114
The Minister of Defense and the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Ukraine are appointed by the Verkhovna

Supreme Council of Ukraine (Verkhovna Rada)

Rada of Ukraine upon proposal by the President of
Ukraine; the other members of the Cabinet of Ministers
of Ukraine are appointed upon proposal by the Prime
Minister of Ukraine.
Article 83
A coalition of parliamentary groups in the Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine submits to the President of Ukraine, in
accordance with this Constitution, proposals concerning a persons candidature for the office of the Prime
Minister of Ukraine and also, in accordance with this
Constitution, proposes candidates for the membership
of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 103
The President of Ukraine is elected by the citizens of
Ukraine for a five-year term, on the basis of universal,
equal and direct suffrage, by secret ballot.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 87
The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, on the proposal of no
fewer National Deputies of Ukraine than one-third of
its constitutional composition, may consider the issue
of responsibility of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine
and adopt a resolution of no confidence in the Cabinet
of Ministers of Ukraine by the majority of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.
The issue of responsibility of the Cabinet of Ministers
of Ukraine shall not be considered by the Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine more than once during one regular
session, and also within one year after the approval of
the Programme of Activity of the Cabinet of Ministers
of Ukraine.
Article 115
The adoption of a resolution of no confidence in the
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine by the Verkhovna Rada
of Ukraine results in the resignation of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. A constitutional amendment passed in 2004
granted the president the power to dissolve the
legislature. Prior to that time the legislature was
immune from dissolution.
Article 90
Powers of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine shall terminate on the date when the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
of a new convocation opens its first meeting.

Supreme Council of Ukraine (Verkhovna Rada)

The President of Ukraine may order the early termination of powers of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine where:
(1) there is a failure to form within one month a coalition of parliamentary factions in the Verkhovna Rada
of Ukraine as provided for in Article 83 of this Constitution;
(2) there is a failure, within sixty days following the
resignation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine,
to appoint members of the Cabinet of Ministers of
Ukraine;
(3) the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine fails, within thirty
days of a single regular session, to commence its plenary
meetings.
The early termination of powers of the Verkhovna Rada
of Ukraine shall be decided by the President of Ukraine
following relevant consultations with the Chairperson
and Deputy Chairpersons of the Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine and with Chairpersons of Verkhovna Rada parliamentary factions.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The president issues decrees that have the force
of law.
Article 106
The President of Ukraine, on the basis and for the execution of the Constitution and the laws of Ukraine, issues
decrees and directives that are mandatory for execution
on the territory of Ukraine.
Acts issued by the President of Ukraine within the scope
of his or her competence as provided for in subparagraphs 5, 18, 21, 22, and 23 of this Article shall be cosigned by the Prime Minister of Ukraine and the Minister responsible for the act and its implementation.
CHAPTER XV [from Transitional Provisions portion
of the constitution]
4. The President of Ukraine, within three years after the
Constitution of Ukraine enters into force, has the right
to issue decrees approved by the Cabinet of Ministers
of Ukraine and signed by the Prime Minister of Ukraine
on economic issues not regulated by laws, with simultaneous submission of the respective draft law to the
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, by the procedure established by Article 93 of this Constitution. Such a decree
of the President of Ukraine takes effect, if within thirty
calendar days from the day of submission of the draft
law (except the days between sessions), the Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine does not adopt the law or does not
reject the submitted draft law by the majority of its
constitutional composition, and is effective until a law
adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on these
issues enters into force.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.

705

No. A two-thirds majority vote is required to override a presidential veto.

Article 94
The Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine signs
a law and forwards it without delay to the President of
Ukraine.
Within fifteen days of the receipt of a law, the President of Ukraine signs it, accepting it for execution, and
officially promulgates it, or returns it to the Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine with substantiated and formulated proposals for repeat consideration.
In the event that the President of Ukraine has not
returned a law for repeat consideration within the established term, the law is deemed to be approved by the
President of Ukraine and shall be signed and officially
promulgated.
If a law, during its repeat consideration, is again adopted
by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by no less than twothirds of its constitutional composition, the President
of Ukraine is obliged to sign and to officially promulgate
it within ten days.
A law enters into force in ten days from the day of
its official promulgation, unless otherwise envisaged by
the law itself, but not prior to the day of its publication.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 147
The Constitutional Court of Ukraine is the sole body of
constitutional jurisdiction in Ukraine.
The Constitutional Court of Ukraine decides on issues
of conformity of laws and other legal acts with the Constitution of Ukraine and provides the official interpretation of the Constitution of Ukraine and the laws of
Ukraine.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The executive can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
Article 85
The authority of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine comprises:

706
35) approving the budget of the Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine and the structure of its staff.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune. By law, members are
not exempted from liability for insult or defamation, but in practice, this exception is not used
as a basis for arresting and prosecuting members.
Article 80
National Deputies of Ukraine are guaranteed parliamentary immunity.
National Deputies of Ukraine are not legally liable for
the results of voting or for statements made in Parliament and in its bodies, with the exception of liability
for insult or defamation.
National Deputies of Ukraine shall not be held criminally liable, detained or arrested without the consent of
the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 76
The constitutional composition of the Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine consists of 450 National Deputies of
Ukraine who are elected for a four-year term on the
basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage, by secret
ballot.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments require approval
from the Constitutional Court. Amendments to
select articles of the constitution also require
approval in a popular referendum.
Article 154
A draft law on introducing amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine may be submitted to the Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine by the President of Ukraine, or by no
fewer National Deputies of Ukraine than one-third of
the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada
of Ukraine.
Article 155
A draft law on introducing amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine, with the exception of Chapter I
General Principles, Chapter III Elections. Referendum, and Chapter XIII Introducing Amendments
to the Constitution of Ukraine, previously adopted by
the majority of the constitutional composition of the
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, is deemed to be adopted,
if at the next regular session of the Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine, no less than two-thirds of the constitutional
composition of the Verkhovyna Rada of Ukraine have
voted in favour thereof.

Supreme Council of Ukraine (Verkhovna Rada)

Article 156
A draft law on introducing amendments to Chapter I
General Principles, Chapter III Elections. Referendum, and Chapter XIII Introducing Amendments
to the Constitution of Ukraine, is submitted to the
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by the President of Ukraine,
or by no less than two-thirds of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and on the
condition that it is adopted by no less than two-thirds of
the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada
of Ukraine, and is approved by an All-Ukrainian referendum designated by the President of Ukraine. The repeat
submission of a draft law on introducing amendments
to Chapters I, III and XIII of this Constitution on one
and the same issue is possible only to the Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine of the next convocation.
Article 157
The Constitution of Ukraine shall not be amended, if
the amendments foresee the abolition or restriction of
human and citizens rights and freedoms, or if they are
oriented toward the liquidation of the independence
or violation of the territorial indivisibility of Ukraine.
The Constitution of Ukraine shall not be amended in
conditions of martial law or a state of emergency.
Article 158
The draft law on introducing amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine, considered by the Verkhovna Rada
of Ukraine and not adopted, may be submitted to
the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine no sooner than one
year from the day of the adoption of the decision on
this draft law. Within the term of its authority, the
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine shall not amend twice the
same provisions of the Constitution.
Article 159
A draft law on introducing amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine is considered by the Verkhovna Rada
of Ukraine upon the availability of an opinion of the
Constitutional Court of Ukraine on the conformity of
the draft law with the requirements of Articles 157 and
158 of this Constitution.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for presidential war declarations.
Article 85
The authority of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine comprises:
9) declaring war upon the submission of the President
of Ukraine and concluding peace, approving the decision of the President of Ukraine on the use of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine and other military formations in the
event of armed aggression against Ukraine.
Article 106
The President of Ukraine:
19) forwards the submission to the Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine on the declaration of a state of war, and adopts

Supreme Council of Ukraine (Verkhovna Rada)

the decision on the use of the Armed Forces in the event
of armed aggression against Ukraine.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 85
The authority of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine comprises:
32) granting consent to the binding character of international treaties of Ukraine within the term established by law, and denouncing international treaties
of Ukraine.
Article 106
The President of Ukraine:
3) represents the state in international relations,
administers the foreign political activity of the State,
conducts negotiations and concludes international
treaties of Ukraine.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.
Article 92
The following are determined exclusively by the laws
of Ukraine:
Amnesty is declared by the law of Ukraine.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 106
The President of Ukraine:
27) grants pardons.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislature appoints some members of the
judiciary, including six of the eighteen members of
the Constitutional Court.
Article 85
The authority of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine comprises:
26) appointing one-third of the composition of the
Constitutional Court of Ukraine.
Article 128
The first appointment of a professional judge to office
for a five-year term is made by the President of Ukraine.
All other judges, except the judges of the Constitutional
Court of Ukraine, are elected by the Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine for permanent terms by the procedure established by law. The Chairman of the Supreme Court of
Ukraine is elected to office and dismissed from office by
the Plenary Assembly of the Supreme Court of Ukraine
by secret ballot, by the procedure established by law.

707
Article 148
The Constitutional Court of Ukraine is composed of
eighteen judges of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine.
The President of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine and the Congress of Judges of Ukraine each
appoint six judges to the Constitutional Court of
Ukraine.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
Yes. The legislature, on the recommendation of the
president, appoints the chairman of the National
Bank of Ukraine.
Article 85
The authority of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine comprises:
18) appointing to office and dismissing from office the
Chairman of the National Bank of Ukraine on the submission of the President of Ukraine.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
Yes. The legislature influences the public media
through its power to appoint half the members of
the National Council of Ukraine on Television and
Radio Broadcasting.
Article 85
The authority of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine comprises:
20) appointing one-half of the composition of the
National Council of Ukraine on Television and Radio
Broadcasting.
Article 106
The President of Ukraine:
13) appoints and dismisses one-half of the membership
of the National Council of Ukraine on Television and
Radio Broadcasting.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.
Article 83
Regular sessions of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine commence on the first Tuesday of February and on the
first Tuesday of September each year. Special sessions
of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, with the stipulation of their agenda, are convoked by the Chairman
of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, on the demand of
no fewer National Deputies of Ukraine than one-third
of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine, or on the demand of the President
of Ukraine.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes. The legislature provides each legislator with
four staff members.

708

Supreme Council of Ukraine (Verkhovna Rada)

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.
No. Despite a state-funded legislative staff, not
every legislator has at least one policy expert.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Many legislators have maintained their seat
for over a decade, resulting in a significant number
of highly experienced members.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.

FEDERAL NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (MAJLIS

AL-ITTIHAD AL-WATANI)
Expert consultants: Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, Abdulrazak Al-Faris, Ebtisam Al-Kitbi, Mariam Gamal,
Michael Herb
Score: .06
Influence over
executive (0/9)

Institutional
autonomy (1/9)

Specified
powers (0/8)

Institutional
capacity (1/6)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

24. judiciary

25. central bank

X

26. media

18. all elected

The Federal National Council (Majlis Al-Ittihad AlWatani) of the United Arab Emirates was established in the 1971 constitution upon independence from Great Britain and the formation of the
United Arab Emirates. The document calls for a
unicameral body appointed by the leaders of the
constituent states (emirates) and a large executive
branch that includes a president, a government
(the Council of Ministers), and a supreme executive body (the Supreme Council). The countrys
first-ever legislative elections were held in December 2006. Candidates vied for twenty seats that
were chosen by 6,700 eligible voters handpicked
by the government out of a national population
of 800,000. The other twenty seats on the Federal

National Council will still be appointed by their

respective emirates.
The Federal National Council serves an advisory
role and has no real legislative power. It lacks the
powers to introduce and pass legislation; laws are
normally made by executive decree. The Federal
National Council has no ability to choose, oversee,
or remove executive branch officials. It can debate
legislation, but the Council of Ministers may halt
debate if it decides that it is contrary to the highest interests of the union. The legislature does not
meet regularly; a year or more sometimes passes
between the end of one session and the beginning
of another. It has negligible institutional capacity.

Federal National Council of the United Arab Emirates (Majlis Al-Ittihad Al-Watani)

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. The legislature cannot remove the president or
the prime minister (the chairman of the Council
of Ministers) from office.
2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of
the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 71
Membership of the Federal National Council may not
be combined with the holding of any public office in
the Union, including Ministerial positions.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
No. The legislature can submit questions, and the
relevant minister formally is obliged to answer
them, but in practice, this power is not effectively
exercised.
Article 93
The Government of the Union shall be represented
at sessions of the Federal National Council by the
Chairman of the Council of Ministers or his deputy
or one member of the Union Cabinet at least. The
Prime Minister or his deputy or the competent Minister shall answer questions put to them by any member of the Council requesting explanation of any matters within its jurisdiction, in accordance with the procedures prescribed in the internal regulations of the
Council.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The chairman of the Council of Ministers is
appointed by the president with the agreement of
the Supreme Council.

709

Article 47
The Supreme Council of the Union shall be responsible
for the following matters:
5. Agreement to the appointment of the Chairman of
the Council of Ministers of the Union, acceptance of
his resignation and his dismissal from office, following
a proposal from the President of the Union.
Article 54
The President of the Union shall have the following
responsibilities:
5. He shall appoint the Chairman of the Council of
Ministers, receive his resignation and dismiss him from
office with the agreement of the Supreme Council. He
shall also appoint the Deputy Chairman of the Council
of Ministers and the Ministers.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 54
The President of the Union shall have the following
responsibilities:
5. He shall appoint the Chairman of the Council of
Ministers, receive his resignation and dismiss him from
office with the agreement of the Supreme Council. He
shall also appoint the Deputy Chairman of the Council
of Ministers and the Ministers.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The Supreme Council elects the president.
Article 51
The Supreme Council of the Union shall elect from
among its members a President of the Union and a
Deputy to the President of the Union.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in
the government.
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the
executive.
No. The president, with the agreement of the
Supreme Council, can dissolve the legislature.
Article 88
The Federal National Council may also be dissolved by a
decree promulgated by the President of the Union with
the agreement of the Supreme Council of the Union,
provided that the decree of dissolution includes a summons to the new Council to come into session within
sixty days of the date of the decree of dissolution. The

710

Federal National Council of the United Arab Emirates (Majlis Al-Ittihad Al-Watani)

Council may not be dissolved again for the same reasons.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The executive issues decrees that have the force
of law. When the legislature is not in session, the
Council of Ministers can issue decrees through
the Supreme Council and the president. When
the Supreme Council is not in session, the president and the Council of Ministers can issue decree
laws.
Article 110
4. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the situation
demands the promulgation of Union laws when the
Federal National Council is not sitting, the Council of
Ministers of the Union may issue them through the
Supreme Council and the President of the Union, provided that the Federal National Council are advised of
them at their next meeting.
Article 113
If, between meetings of the Supreme Council, the
speedy promulgation of Union laws, which cannot be
delayed, is required, the President of the Union and the
Council of Ministers may together promulgate the necessary laws in the form of decrees which shall have the
force of law, provided they are not inconsistent with
the Constitution.
Such decree laws must be submitted to the Supreme
Council within a week at the maximum for assent or
rejection. In the case of assent the force of law shall
be confirmed and the Federal National Council shall be
informed accordingly at its next meeting.
In the event that the Supreme Council does not assent,
such decree laws shall cease to have force of law, except
that it may be decided to sanction their effectiveness
during the earlier period, or to sanction adjustment of
their effects.
Article 115
The Supreme Council may authorise the President of
the Union and the Council of Ministers collectively to
promulgate, when the Supreme Council is not in session, such decrees as necessity dictates and whose ratification is within the power of the Supreme Council.
Provided that such authority shall not include authority to conclude international agreements and treaties,
to impose or rescind martial law, to declare a state of
defensive war or to appoint the President or Judges of
the Supreme Union Court.

Article 110
2. A draft law shall become law after the adoption of
the following procedure:
a. The Council of Ministers shall prepare a draft law
and submit it to the Federal National Council.
b. The Council of Ministers shall submit the draft
law to the President of the Union for his agreement
and presentation to the Supreme Council for their
ratification.
c. The President of the Union shall sign the law after
ratification by the Supreme Council and shall promulgate it.
3. a. If the Federal National Council inserts any amendment in the draft law and this amendment is not acceptable to the President of the Union or the Supreme Council, or if the Federal National Council rejects the draft,
the President of the Union or the Supreme Council shall
refer it back to the Federal National Council. If the Federal National Council inserts any amendment on that
occasion which is not acceptable to the President of
the Union or the Supreme Council, or if the Federal
National Council deems fit to reject the draft, the President of the Union may promulgate the law after ratification by the Supreme Council.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Supreme Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 99
The Supreme Court of the Union shall be competent to
render judgment in the following matters:
2. Examination of the constitutional legality of Union
laws, if they are challenged by one or more of the Emirates on the grounds of violating the Constitution of
the Union.
Examination of the constitutional legality of legislation
promulgated by one of the Emirates, if it is challenged
by one of the Union authorities on the grounds of violation of the Constitution of the Union or of Union
laws.
3. Examination of the constitutional legality of laws,
legislation and regulations generally, if such a request
is remitted to it by any State Court during a case under
consideration before it. The Court aforesaid shall be
bound to accept the ruling of the Supreme Court of the
Union in this case.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.

No. The legislature is prohibited from initiating legislation at all. It merely debates bills under consideration by the government and provides recommendations.

No. The president has absolute veto power. The

Federal National Council does not legislate at
all.

Article 89
Insofar as this does not conflict with the provisions of
Article 110, draft Union laws, including draft financial

Federal National Council of the United Arab Emirates (Majlis Al-Ittihad Al-Watani)
laws, shall be submitted to the Federal National Council
before their submission to the President of the Union
for presentation to the Supreme Council for ratification.
The Federal National Council shall debate these drafts
and may agree to them, amend them or reject them.
Article 92
The Federal National Council shall debate any general
subject pertaining to the affairs of the Union unless
the Council of Ministers informs the Federal National
Council that debate of any subject is contrary to the
highest interests of the Union. The Prime Minister or
the competent Minister shall attend the debates. The
Federal National Council may express its recommendations and may define the subjects for debate. If the
Council of Ministers does not approve of these recommendations, it shall notify the Federal National Council
of its reasons.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The executive can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
No. The legislature is dependent on the other
organs of government for the resources that
finance its own operations.
Article 83
The Chairman of the Council and its other members
shall be entitled, from the date of taking the oath before
the Council, to a salary which shall be determined by
law, and to traveling expenses from their place of residence to the place in which the Council is meeting.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto.
Article 81
Members of the Council shall not be censured for any
opinions or views expressed in the course of carrying
out their duties within the Council or its Committees.
Article 82
No penal proceedings may be instituted against any
member while the Council is in session, except in cases
of flagrante delicto, without the permission of the
Council. The Council must be informed if such proceedings are instituted while it is not in session.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
No. Half of the legislators are appointed by
the members of the constituent states (emirates).

711

In 2006 the countrys first legislative elections

selected the other half of the members of the legislature. Prior to 2006 all legislators were appointed
by the members of the constituent states (emirates).
Article 69
Each Emirate shall be left to determine the method of
selection of the citizens who shall represent it on the
Federal National Council.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments can be initiated
only by the Supreme Council and require the
approval of the president.
Article 144
2. a. If the Supreme Council considers that the supreme
interests of the Union require the amendment of
this Constitution it shall submit a draft constitutional
amendment to the Federal National Council.
b. The procedure for approving the constitutional
amendment shall be the same as the procedure for
approving the law.
c. The approval of the Federal National Council for
a draft constitutional amendment shall require the
agreement of two-thirds of the votes of members
present.
d. The President of the Union shall sign the constitutional amendment in the name of the Supreme Council and as its representative and shall promulgate the
amendment.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. The president can declare war without the legislatures approval. Presidential war declarations
require the approval of the Supreme Council but
do not require the approval of the Federal National
Council.
Article 140
The declaration of a state of defensive war shall be made
by means of a Union decree issued by the President of
the Union after its approval by the Supreme Council.
Offensive war shall be prohibited in accordance with
the provisions of international charters.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
No. The legislatures approval is not necessary to
ratify international treaties, although the government is responsible for informing the legislature of
international agreements.
Article 47
The Supreme Council of the Union shall be responsible
for the following matters:
4. The ratification of treaties and international agreements. Such ratification shall be accomplished by
decree.

712

Federal National Council of the United Arab Emirates (Majlis Al-Ittihad Al-Watani)

Article 91
The Government shall be responsible for informing the
Federal National Council of international treaties and
agreements concluded with other states and the various
international organisations, together with appropriate
explanations.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Amnesty laws are passed like other pieces
of legislation. They require the approval of the
Supreme Council, the president, and the Council
of Ministers, but not the legislature.
Article 109
There shall be no general amnesty for crimes generally or for specified crimes except by law. The promulgation of an amnesty law shall result in such crimes
being deemed never to have been committed, and in
the remission of sentences imposed therefore in full or
to the extent of that part remaining to be served.
Article 110
2. A draft law shall become law after the adoption of
the following procedure:
a. The Council of Ministers shall prepare a draft law
and submit it to the Federal National Council.
b. The Council of Ministers shall submit the draft
law to the President of the Union for his agreement
and presentation to the Supreme Council for their
ratification.
c. The President of the Union shall sign the law after
ratification by the Supreme Council and shall promulgate it.
3. a. If the Federal National Council inserts any amendment in the draft law and this amendment is not acceptable to the President of the Union or the Supreme Council, or if the Federal National Council rejects the draft,
the President of the Union or the Supreme Council shall
refer it back to the Federal National Council. If the Federal National Council inserts any amendment on that
occasion which is not acceptable to the President of
the Union or the Supreme Council, or if the Federal
National Council deems fit to reject the draft, the President of the Union may promulgate the law after ratification by the Supreme Council.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 54
The President of the Union shall have the following
responsibilities:
10. He shall exercise the right of pardon and commutation of sentences and confirm capital sentences according to the provisions of this Constitution and Union
laws.
Article 107
The President of the Union may grant pardon from the
execution of any sentence passed by the Union judicature before it is carried out or while it is being served
or may reduce such sentence, on the basis of the rec-

ommendation of the Union Minister of Justice, after

obtaining the approval of a committee formed under
the chairmanship of the Minister and consisting of six
members selected by the Union Council of Ministers
for a term of three years which may be renewed.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The president appoints members of the judiciary with the approval of the Supreme Council,
and the appointments do not require the legislatures approval.
Article 47
The Supreme Council of the Union shall be responsible
for the following matters:
6. Agreement to the appointment of the President and
Judges of the Supreme Union Court, acceptance of
their resignations and their dismissal in the circumstances stipulated by this Constitution. These acts shall
be accomplished by decrees.
Article 96
The Supreme Court of the Union shall consist of a President and a number of Judges, not exceeding five in
all, who shall be appointed by decree, issued by the
President of the Union after approval by the Supreme
Council.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The legislature lacks a role in the appointment
of the governor of the Central Bank of the United
Arab Emirates.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
No. Legislative sessions are mandated by the constitution to last not less than six months. Gaps of
a year or more between the end of one session and
the beginning of a new one, however, are common.
Article 78
The Council shall hold an annual ordinary session lasting not less than six months, commencing in the third
week of November each year. It may be called into
extraordinary session whenever the need arises.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.

Parliament of the United Kingdom

713

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
No. There has only been one legislative election,
held in December 2006, so it is impossible yet to
speak of re-election. It bears note, however, that
members of the Federal National Council generally
have welcomed reappointment.

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
No. There has only been one legislative election,
which was held in December 2006. Reappointment
to the Federal National Council has been common,
but it is too early to speak of re-election or of the
accumulation of legislative experience on the part
of members.

PARLIAMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

Expert consultants: Philip Cowley, Frank Cranmer, Thomas Lundberg, Bryn Morgan, David J. Sanders
Score: .78
Influence over
executive (8/9)

Institutional
autonomy (7/9)

Specified
powers (4/8)

Institutional
capacity (6/6)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

X
X

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

X
X

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

X
X

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

18. all elected

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

26. media

X
X

The Parliament of the United Kingdom has its

origins in the thirteenth century, when English
nobles met with the king to discuss matters of
mutual interest. These informal parleys eventually
became the first formal parliament in 1295.
Many of the features of modern legislatures
developed organically in England over the course
of centuries. Parliaments legislative role originated in the 1362 statute requiring parliamentary
approval for all lay taxation. The origins of legislative oversight over the government can be traced
to the good parliament of 1376 that accused
the royal government of corruption and fraud and
impeached some officials in a trial before the House
of Lords. Parliamentary immunity was established
in 1513, when parliament passed a bill to release
one of its members, Richard Strode, who had been

jailed for introducing a bill alleged to hurt the tin

mining industry. Following the Glorious Revolution, in 1689 the Bill of Rights and the Crown and
Parliament Recognition Act encoded the distribution of power between parliament and the crown
that had evolved over the previous centuries. In
1721 King George I turned over the task of running
the governments day-to-day affairs to a member of
parliament, Sir Robert Walpole. This move established the position of prime minister and began
the gradual transfer of executive power from the
monarch to the parliament.
To this day the United Kingdom lacks a formal constitution. Instead, the fundamental law is
a compilation of evolving conventions, customs,
and statutes. The constitutional citations below
come from a compilation of material originally

714

provided by the British government for purposes

of publication. The bicameral parliament consists
of a lower house, the House of Commons, and an
upper house, the House of Lords.
Parliament is the supreme political power in the
United Kingdom. It has broad sway over the executive, which is bolstered by its right to interpellate and investigate the government and to remove
the government from office with a vote of no confidence. Parliament also enjoys a high degree of
institutional autonomy. Among other sources of
autonomy, parliaments laws are supreme and not
subject to judicial review. Parliament has several of
the specified powers assessed here and a high level
of institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The legislature can replace the prime minister
if the governing party votes to replace its leader or
with a vote of no confidence in the government.
2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of
the legislature.
Yes. Ministers are selected from, and required to
serve simultaneously serve in, the legislature.
Section 42
(1) The Prime Minister is appointed by the Queen, and
all other ministers are appointed by the Queen on the
recommendation of the Prime Minister. Most ministers
are members of the Commons, although the Government is also fully represented by ministers in the Lords.
The Lord Chancellor is always a member of the House
of Lords.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. Parliament regularly questions the government during weekly question time.

Parliament of the United Kingdom

Yes. The legislature can establish select committees

to scrutinize the work of the government and its
agencies. The committees conduct investigations,
request written evidence, and summon witnesses.
Section 36
(2) Select committees are appointed, normally for the
duration of a Parliament, to examine subjects by taking
written and oral evidence.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. Parliamentary committees have effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
Yes. Formally, the British monarch appoints the
prime minister. In practice, the monarch appoints
the candidate who enjoys the support of parliament.
Section 42
(1) The Prime Minister is appointed by the Queen, and
all other ministers are appointed by the Queen on the
recommendation of the Prime Minister.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The British monarch appoints ministers on
the recommendation of the prime minister, and
the appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Section 42
(1) The Prime Minister is appointed by the Queen, and
all other ministers are appointed by the Queen on the
recommendation of the Prime Minister.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
Yes. The country lacks a presidency. The British
monarch is the head of state.

Section 37
There are opportunities for criticism and examination of government policy in the House of Lords at
daily question time and during debates on general
motions. Other opportunities include unstarred questions, which can be debated at the end of the days
business, and debates on proposed legislation.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.

No. The British monarch, on the advice of the

prime minister, can dissolve the legislature. The
maximum length of a parliament is five years.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the

government.
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the
executive.

Parliament of the United Kingdom

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks veto power. Bills must
receive royal assent, but this requirement is purely
a formality.
Section 35
(3) Bills must normally be passed by both Houses. They
must then receive the Royal Assent before becoming
Acts. In practice this is a formality.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
Yes. Parliaments laws are supreme. The judiciary
reviews the conformity of the decisions of public
bodies with the law but does not review the law
itself.
14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all
policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.

715

Yes. All members of the House of Commons are

elected. The House of Lords is a much less powerful
body whose members are appointed.
Section 32
(3) Elections: For electoral purposes Britain is divided
into 651 constituencies, each of which returns one
member to the House of Commons . . . Candidates are
elected if they have more votes than any of the other
candidates, although not necessarily an absolute majority over all other candidates.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the fundamental
law through the normal legislative process.
20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.
No. The British monarch, on the governments recommendation, can declare war without the legislatures approval.
21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. Formally, the power to make treaties is vested
in the prime minister on behalf of the crown.
Treaties that require a change in the law or the
expenditure of public funds must be approved
through normal parliamentary legislation.
22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.
Yes. A general amnesty can be granted only
through legislation.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The British monarch has the power of pardon.

16. The legislature controls the resources that finance

its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.

Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.

No. The Constitutional Reform Act of 2005 created a special commission independent from parliament to make judicial appointments. Prior to
2005 the British monarch appointed members of
the judiciary based on the recommendation of the
prime minister.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislators enjoy civil immunity but are subject
to criminal prosecution.
Section 40
(2) The privileges of the members of the Commons
include freedom of speech; freedom from arrest in civil
actions; exemption from serving on juries, or being
compelled to attend court as witnesses; and the right
of access to the Crown, which is a collective privilege
of the House.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The British monarch, on the recommendation
of the prime minister, appoints the governor of the
Bank of England.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
Yes. The British Broadcasting Committee (BBC)
has operational independence, but its work is

716

Parliament of the United Kingdom

scrutinized by select committees in the legislature.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.
28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.
Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
Yes.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.

Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Expert consultants: Richard F. Fenno, Richard G. Niemi, Eric Schickler, Charles R. Shipan, Raymond
E. Wolfinger
Score: .63
Influence over
executive (5/9)

Institutional
autonomy (6/9)
10. no dissolution
11. no decree

Specified
powers (3/8)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

19. amendments
20. war

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

23. pardon

24. judiciary

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

25. central bank

18. all elected

21. treaties
22. amnesty

Institutional
capacity (6/6)
X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary

X
X

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X
X

26. media

The Congress of the United States of America traces

its origins to the Continental Congress established
at the onset of Americas war of independence with
Great Britain in the mid-1770s. In 1781 the legislature was formalized in the countrys first postindependence constitution, the Articles of Confederation. The current constitution was adopted in
1787. It calls for a bicameral legislature consisting
of a lower house, the House of Representatives, and
an upper house, the Senate. In 1803 the Marbury v.
Madison court decision established judicial review,
providing the Supreme Court with the power to
pass judgment on the constitutionality of laws.

Prior to 1803 judicial review had not yet been created, and the legislatures laws were supreme. The
seventeenth amendment to the constitution, ratified in 1913, provided for direct election of the
Senate. Prior to that time Senators were elected or
appointed by state legislators. Other amendments
to the constitution did not directly alter the legislatures power.
Congress has significant authority. Its influence over the executive branch includes powers to review ministerial appointments, question
and investigate agencies of the executive, and impeach the president. The legislatures institutional

Congress of the United States of America

autonomy is protected by a lack of presidential

decree, dissolution, and gatekeeping powers. The
president does enjoy veto powers, however, and
legislators are not immune from arrest and prosecution. The legislature exercises three of the eight
specified powers and prerogatives assessed in this
survey. It has a very high level of institutional
capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The House of Representatives can impeach the
president. The Senate, presided over by the chief
justice of the Supreme Court, can try and remove
the president from office by a two-thirds majority
vote of its present members.
Article 1, Section 2
(5) The House of Representatives shall chuse their
Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole
Power of Impeachment.
Article 2, Section 4
(4) The President, Vice President and all civil Officers
of the United States, shall be removed from Office on
Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery,
or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.
Article 1, Section 3
(6) The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all
Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they
shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of
the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside:
And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.
(7) Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not
extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor,
Trust, or Profit under the United States: but the Party
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
Indictment, Trial, Judgment, and Punishment, according to Law.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 1, Section 6
(2) No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time
for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil
Office under the Authority of the United States, which
shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof
shall have been increased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall
be a Member of either House during his Continuance
in Office.

717

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. The legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. There is no prime minister.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The Senates consent is required to confirm the
presidents ministerial appointments.
Article 2, Section 2
(2) [The president] shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of
the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by Law;
but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of
such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is elected by popular vote
through an electoral college.
Article 2, Section 1
(1) The executive Power shall be vested in a President
of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office
during the Term of four Years, and, together with the
Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as
follows:
3) The Electors shall meet in their respective States,
and vote by Ballot for two Persons, of whom one
at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State
with themselves. And they shall make a List of all
the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes
for each; which List they shall sign and certify, and
transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government of the

718

Congress of the United States of America

United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence
of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all
the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted.
The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall
be the President, if such Number be a Majority of the
whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there be
more than one who have such Majority, and have
an equal Number of Votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of
them for President; and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five highest on the List the said
House shall in like Manner chuse the President. But
in chusing the President, the Votes shall be taken by
States the Representation from each State having one
Vote; A quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a
Member or Members from two thirds of the States,
and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to
a Choice. In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the greater Number of Votes
of the Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there
should remain two or more who have equal Votes,
the Senate shall chuse from them by Ballot the Vice
President.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in
the government.
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the
executive.
Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.
11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.

tions, to the other House, by which it shall likewise

be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that
House, it shall become a Law.
(3) Every Order, Resolution, or Vote, to Which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives
may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United
States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be
approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall
be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of
Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations
prescribed in the Case of a Bill.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. Since 1803 the Supreme Court has possessed
the power to review the constitutionality of laws.
Prior to 1803 the institution of judicial review had
not yet been created.
Article 3, Section 2
(1) The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws
of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their Authority; to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;
to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;
to Controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party; to Controversies between two or more States;
between a State and Citizens of another State; between
Citizens of different States, between Citizens of the
same State claiming Lands under the Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof,
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.

Yes. The executive lacks decree power.

Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy

jurisdictions.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.

No. A two-thirds majority vote in both houses is

required to override a presidential veto.
Article 1, Section 7
(2) All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the
House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose
or concur with Amendments as on other Bills. Every
Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be
presented to the President of the United States; If he
approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it,
with his Objections to the House in which it shall have
originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on
their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such
Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to
pass the Bill, it shall be sent together with the Objec-

Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound

funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,
including control over members salaries.
Article 1, Section 6
(1) The Senators and Representatives shall receive a
Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by
Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States.
They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and
Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective

Congress of the United States of America

Houses, and in going to and returning from the same;
and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall
not be questioned in any other Place.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislators are subject to arrest and prosecution. Immunity is in force only while legislators are
in, or traveling to and from, the legislative buildings, and for speeches and debates made in the
legislature.
Article 1, Section 6
(1) The Senators and Representatives shall receive a
Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by
Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States.
They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and
Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective
Houses, and in going to and returning from the same;
and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall
not be questioned in any other Place.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 1, Section 2
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of
Members chosen every second Year by the People of
the several States, and the Electors in each State shall
have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most
numerous Branch of the State Legislature.
Article 1, Section 3
(1) The Senate of the United States shall be composed of
two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature
thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one
Vote.
Amendment XVII
(1) The Senate of the United States shall be composed
of two Senators from each State, elected by the people
thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one
vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch
of the State legislatures.
(2) When vacancies happen in the representation of
any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such
State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may
empower the executive thereof to make temporary
appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.
(3) This amendment shall not be so construed as to
affect the election or term of any Senator chosen before
it becomes valid as part of the Constitution.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.

719

No. Constitutional amendments require the

approval of three-fourths of the fifty states in the
federation.
Article 5
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall
deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this
Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures
of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case,
shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as part of this
Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three
fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three
fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that
no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year
One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any
Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth
Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its
Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the
Senate.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislature declares war.
Article 1, Section 8
(11) The Congress shall have Power:
To declare War.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The Senates approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 2, Section 2
(2) [The president] shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties,
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Amnesty and pardon are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 2, Section 2
(1) The President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia
of the several States, when called into the actual Service
of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in
writing, of the principal Officer in each of the Executive
Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties
of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to
grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the
United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.

720

Congress of the United States of America

Yes. The Senates consent is necessary to confirm the presidents appointments to the Supreme
Court.
Article 2, Section 2
(2) [The president] shall nominate, and by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
appoint . . . Judges of the Supreme Court.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the chairman of the
Federal Reserve Bank with the approval of the Senate.

3d day of January, unless they shall by law appoint

a different day.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
Yes.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.

No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the

operation of the public media.

Yes.

Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session for

about ten months each year.

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.

Amendment 20
(2) The Congress shall assemble at least once in every
year, and such meeting shall begin at noon on the

Yes. The re-election of incumbent legislators is

exceedingly common, resulting in a very large
number of highly experienced legislators.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

URUGUAYAN GENERAL ASSEMBLY (ASAMBLEA GENERAL)

Expert consultants: David Altman, Scott Morgenstern, Francisco Panizza, Juan Rial, Karen van
Rompaey
Score: .66
Influence over
executive (6/9)

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM

7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

Specified
powers (5/8)

Institutional
capacity (5/6)

19. amendments
20. war

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

26. media

18. all elected

27. sessions
28. secretary

X
X

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X
X

Uruguays bicameral General Assembly (Asamblea

General) was established under the 1830 constitution upon independence from Brazil and

Argentina. Uruguay subsequently promulgated

four more constitutions, in 1917, 1934, 1952, and
1967.

Uruguayan General Assembly (Asamblea General)

The 1967 constitution, in effect today, resembles its predecessors in calling for a presidential
system with a bicameral legislature, composed of
the Chamber of Representatives (Camara de Representantes) and the Chamber of Senators (Camara
de Senadores). A military takeover in 1976 stripped
the Assembly of power and granted legislative and
executive authority to an oligarchic body named
the Council of the Nation. Civilian rule and the
constitution were restored in 1985. Amendments
made in 1996 altered the legislative procedures
for overriding a presidential veto and for influencing a presidentially declared state of emergency,
although these amendments did not appreciably
affect the legislatures power.
The Assembly enjoys substantial muscle. It has
some influence over the executive, which it holds
by virtue of its ability to impeach the president,
interpellate ministers, investigate the government,
oversee the agencies of coercion, and vote no confidence in the government. Its institutional autonomy is not expansive, however, and is limited by
the presidents veto, gatekeeping, and dissolution
powers. The Assembly holds five of the eight specified powers assessed in this survey. Its institutional
capacity is substantial and limited only by the relative dearth of highly experienced members.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. The Chamber of Representatives can impeach
the president, and the Chamber of Senators can
then remove the president from office by a twothirds majority vote of its total membership.
Article 93
The Chamber of Representatives has the exclusive right
of impeachment . . . of the President . . . of the Republic . . . for violation of the Constitution or for other serious offenses.
Article 102
The Chamber of Senators is competent to initiate the
public trial of those impeached by the Chamber of Representatives . . . and to pronounce sentence, by a twothirds vote of its full membership, and such sentence
shall have the sole effect of removal from office.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators who serve in government have a
sleeping mandate, meaning that they may join the
government but forfeit their voting rights in the
legislature during their government service. They

721

may return to the legislature when their government service ends.

Article 122
Whenever Senators and Representatives are called to
serve as Ministers or Under Secretaries of State, their
legislative functions are suspended, and during such
suspension their corresponding alternates shall replace
them.
Article 174
The President of the Republic shall allot the Ministries
to citizens who, by virtue of their parliamentary support, are assured of remaining in office.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 119
Each Chamber has the right, by a resolution of onethird of its full membership, to require the presence on
its floor of the Ministers of state in order to question
them and receive from them information which it considers appropriate, whether for legislative purposes or
for purposes of inspection or investigation.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can establish committees to
investigate the executive.
Article 118
Any Legislator may ask a Minister of state, the Supreme
Court of Justice, the Electoral Court, the ContentiousAdministrative Tribunal, and the Tribunal of Accounts,
for such data and information as he may consider necessary for the discharge of his duties.
Article 119
Each Chamber has the right, by a resolution of onethird of its full membership, to require the presence on
its floor of the Ministers of state in order to question
them and receive from them information which it considers appropriate, whether for legislative purposes or
for purposes of inspection or investigation.
Article 120
Each Chamber may appoint parliamentary committees
for making investigations or for obtaining data for legislative purposes.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. The legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.

722

6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

No. There is no prime minister.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The legislatures approval is required to confirm ministerial appointments.
Article 168
26) The President of the Republic may freely appoint a
Secretary and an Assistant Secretary, who shall serve as
such in the Council of Ministers.
Both shall cease to serve along with the President and
they may be removed or replaced by him at any time.
Article 174
The President of the Republic shall allot the Ministries
to citizens who, by virtue of their parliamentary support, are assured of remaining in office. The President
of the Republic may require an express vote of confidence from the General Assembly for the Council of
Ministers. For this purpose, he shall appear before the
General Assembly, which shall make a decision without
debate, by a vote of the absolute majority of all of its
members and within a period not longer than seventytwo hours from when the General Assembly receives
the communication from the President of the Republic. If the [General Assembly] does not meet within the
stipulated period or, having met, does not adopt a decision, it shall be understood that the vote of confidence
is granted.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 151
The President . . . shall be elected jointly and directly by
the people by an absolute majority of voters.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can pass a motion of censure
against the government.
Article 147
Either of the Chambers may pass judgment on the conduct of Ministers of State by proposing that the General
Assembly in joint session shall declare that their acts of
administration or of government are censured.
Article 148
The disapproval may be individual, plural, or collective, but in all cases it must be adopted by an absolute
majority of the votes of the full membership of the General Assembly, at a special and public session. Individual disapproval is one that affects one Minister; plural
disapproval one that affects more than one Minister;

Uruguayan General Assembly (Asamblea General)

and collective disapproval is one that affects a majority of the Council of Ministers. Disapproval adopted in
accordance with the foregoing articles shall mean the
resignation of the Minister, the Ministers, or the Council of Ministers, as the case may be. The President of
the Republic may veto the vote of disapproval whenever it has been adopted by less than two-thirds of the
full membership of the body . . . If the General Assembly maintains its vote by less than three-fifths of its full
membership, the President of the Republic, within the
next forty-eight hours, may, by express decision, retain
the censured Minister, Ministers, or Council of Ministers, and dissolve the Chambers.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the Assembly. It
bears note, however, that the requirements for dissolution are quite stringent.
Article 148
The disapproval may be individual, plural, or collective, but in all cases it must be adopted by an absolute
majority of the votes of the full membership of the General Assembly, at a special and public session. Individual disapproval is one that affects one Minister; plural
disapproval one that affects more than one Minister;
and collective disapproval is one that affects a majority of the Council of Ministers. Disapproval adopted in
accordance with the foregoing articles shall mean the
resignation of the Minister, the Ministers, or the Council of Ministers, as the case may be. The President of
the Republic may veto the vote of disapproval whenever it has been adopted by less than two-thirds of the
full membership of the body . . . If the General Assembly maintains its vote by less than three-fifths of its full
membership, the President of the Republic, within the
next forty-eight hours, may, by express decision, retain
the censured Minister, Ministers, or Council of Ministers, and dissolve the Chambers.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires

ratification or approval by the legislature before
it takes effect; that is, the executive lacks decree
power.
Yes. The executive lacks decree power, with one
minor exception. If the legislature does not act
quickly enough (within thirty days) to reconsider
a bill vetoed by the president, the bill becomes
law with the presidents suggested changes included.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. The General Assembly can override a presidential veto only with a three-fifths majority vote.

Uruguayan General Assembly (Asamblea General)

723
of the succeeding term. This compensation shall be paid
with absolute independence from the Executive Power.

Article 138
Whenever a bill shall have been returned by the Executive Power with total or partial objections or observations, the General Assembly shall be convoked and
the matter shall be decided by a three-fifths vote of the
members present of each of the Chambers, who may
incorporate the observations or reject them, maintaining the adopted bill.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.

Article 112
Senators and Representatives shall never be held liable
for the votes they cast or opinions expressed during the
discharge of their duties.

No. The Supreme Court can review the constitutionality of laws.

Article 256
Laws may be declared unconstitutional by reason of
form or content, in accordance with the provisions of
the following articles.
Article 257
The Supreme Court of Justice has original and exclusive
jurisdiction in the hearing and decision of such matters;
and must render its decision in accordance with the
requirement for final decisions.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. The legislature is prohibited from introducing
legislation related to tax exemptions or to price
floors and ceilings, including the minimum wage.
Article 133
The initiative of the Executive Power shall be required
for any bill specifying tax exemptions or fixing minimum wages or prices for the purchase of the products
or goods of public or private enterprise. The Legislative
Power may not increase the tax exemptions nor the
minimums proposed by the Executive Power for wages
and prices, nor may it lower the proposed maximum
prices.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy,
including control over members salaries.
Article 117
Senators and Representatives shall be compensated for
their services by a monthly salary which they shall
receive during their term of office . . . The salary shall
be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the full membership of
the General Assembly, meeting in joint session, during
the last period of each legislative term, for the members

Yes. Legislators are immune with the common

exception for cases of flagrante delicto.

Article 113
No Senator or Representative, from the day of his election until that of his termination, may be arrested
except in case of flagrante delicto and then notice shall
immediately be given to the respective Chamber, with
a summary report of the case.
Article 114
No Senator or Representative, from the day of his election until that of his termination, may be indicted on
a criminal charge, or even for common offenses which
are not specified in Article 93 [dealing with impeachment for serious offenses], except before his own
Chamber, which, by two-thirds of the votes of its full
membership, shall decide whether or not there are
grounds for prosecution and if so, shall declare him
suspended from office, and he shall be placed at the
disposition of a competent Tribunal.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 88
The Chamber of Representatives shall consist of ninetynine members elected directly by the people.
Article 94
The Chamber of Senators shall be composed of thirty
members, elected directly by the people.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments require approval
in a popular referendum.
Article 331
The present Constitution may be amended, in whole or
in part, in accordance with the following procedures:
a) Upon the initiative of ten percent of the citizens
inscribed in the National Civil Register, by presenting
a detailed proposal which shall be referred to the President of the General Assembly, to be submitted for popular decision at the next election.
b) By proposal of amendment approved by two-fifths
of the full membership of the General Assembly, presented to the President thereof, and submitted to
plebiscite at the next ensuing election.

724
c) The Senators, Representatives, and the Executive
Power may present proposed amendments which must
be approved by an absolute majority of the full membership of the General Assembly . . . Upon the approval
of a proposal and its promulgation by the President
of the General Assembly, the Executive Power, within
ninety days thereafter, shall call for the election of a
National Constituent Convention, which shall consider
and decide upon approved proposals for amendment as
well as upon any other proposals that may be presented
to the Convention . . . The proposal or proposals drawn
up by the Convention must be ratified by the body
electorate.
d) The Constitution may be amended, also, by constitutional laws which shall require for their sanction
two-thirds of the full membership of each Chamber in
the same legislative period. Constitutional laws may
not be vetoed by the Executive Power and shall take
effect as soon as the electorate specially convoked on
the date specified in such laws shall have expressed their
approval by an absolute majority of the votes cast.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislature declares war.
Article 85
The General Assembly is competent:
7) To declare war and to approve or disapprove, by
an absolute majority of the full membership of both
Chambers, the treaties of peace, alliance, commerce,
and conventions or contracts of any nature which the
Executive Power may make with foreign powers.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
treaties.
Article 168
The President of the Republic, acting with the respective
Minister or Ministers, or with the Council of Ministers,
has the following duties:
20) To conclude and sign treaties, the approval of the
Legislative Power being necessary for their ratification.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.
Article 85
The General Assembly is competent:
14) To grant pardons by a two-thirds vote of the full
membership of the General Assembly in joint session,
and to grant amnesties in extraordinary cases, by an
absolute majority vote of the full membership of each
Chamber.

Uruguayan General Assembly (Asamblea General)

Article 85
The General Assembly is competent:
14) To grant pardons by a two-thirds vote of the full
membership of the General Assembly in joint session,
and to grant amnesties in extraordinary cases, by an
absolute majority vote of the full membership of each
Chamber.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. Members of the Supreme Court of Justice are
appointed by the General Assembly by a two-thirds
vote of its members.
Article 85
The General Assembly is competent:
18) To elect, in joint session of both Chambers, the
members of the Supreme Court of Justice [and] of
the Electoral Court . . . subject to the provisions of the
respective Sections.
Article 236
The members of the Supreme Court of Justice shall be
appointed by the General Assembly by a two-thirds vote
of its full membership.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the governor of the
Central Bank of Uruguay with the approval of the
Senate.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The specified length of legislative sessions is
from March to December. A permanent committee
functions during summer breaks and other times
when there is no regular session. There can also be
extra sessions.
Article 104
The General Assembly shall begin its sessions on the
first of March of each year, meeting until the fifteenth of
December, or only until the fifteenth of September, in
the event that there are elections, and the new Assembly
must in that event begin its sessions on the fifteenth of
the following February.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes. Each legislator has a budget to hire up to five
advisors and secretaries.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.

Yes. The legislature has the power of pardon.

Yes. See item 28.

Supreme Assembly of Uzbekistan (Oliy Majlis)

725

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
No. The rate of turnover is quite high, leading to a
relatively small cohort of experienced members.

Yes. A seat in the legislature is attractive even

though salaries are quite low.

SUPREME ASSEMBLY OF UZBEKISTAN (OLIY MAJLIS)

Expert consultants: Rustam Burnashev, Bakhodirzhon Ergashev, Bakhtiyor Ergashev, Pauline Jones
Luong, Vladimir Paramonov
Score: .28
Influence over
executive (1/9)

Institutional
autonomy (3/9)

Specified
powers (2/8)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

23. pardon
24. judiciary

Institutional
capacity (3/6)
X
X

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

25. central bank

X

The Supreme Assembly (Oliy Majlis) of Uzbekistan traces its origins to the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republics Supreme Soviet that operated during the time of the Soviet Union. The Supreme
Assembly was established in Uzbekistans constitution in 1992 following the dissolution of the Soviet
Union. The document calls for a unicameral legislature. Constitutional amendments in 1995 and
2002 extended the presidents term in office and
created a bicameral legislature.
The legislature has minimal powers. It has no
ability to influence the executive branch save
the power to confirm the presidents ministerial appointments. Its institutional autonomy is
diminutive and is circumscribed by presidential
decree, dissolution, impoundment, and veto powers. The legislature exercises a few specified powers
and has a bit of institutional capacity.

26. media

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. The legislature cannot impeach the president.
Article 91
The President shall enjoy personal immunity and protection under law.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 87
The expenses of the deputies connected with their work
for the Oliy Majlis shall be reimbursed in prescribed
manner. The deputies working for the Oliy Majlis on
a permanent basis may not hold any other paid posts,

726
nor engage in commercial activity during their term of
office.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
No. The legislature does not regularly question
executive branch officials.
4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. The president appoints the prime minister.
Article 78
The exclusive powers of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic
of Uzbekistan shall include:
16) ratification of the decrees of the President of
the Republic of Uzbekistan on the appointment and
removal of the Prime Minister, the First Deputy Prime
Minister, the Deputy Prime Ministers and the members
of the Cabinet of Ministers.

Supreme Assembly of Uzbekistan (Oliy Majlis)

9) appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister, his First
Deputy, the Deputy Prime Ministers, the members of
the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan,
the Procurator-General of the Republic of Uzbekistan
and his Deputies, with subsequent confirmation by the
Oliy Majlis.
Article 98
The Cabinet of Ministers shall be formed by the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan and approved by the
Oliy Majlis.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 90
The President of the Republic of Uzbekistan shall be
elected for a term of five years. He shall be elected by
citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the basis of
the universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot.
The procedure for electing President shall be specified
by the electoral law of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in
the government.
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the
executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.

Article 93
The President of the Republic of Uzbekistan shall:
9) appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister, his First
Deputy, the Deputy Prime Ministers, the members of
the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan,
the Procurator-General of the Republic of Uzbekistan
and his Deputies, with subsequent confirmation by the
Oliy Majlis.

Article 95
Should any insurmountable differences arise between
the deputies of the Oliy Majlis, jeopardizing its normal
functioning, or should it repeatedly make decisions in
opposition to the Constitution, the Oliy Majlis may be
dissolved by a decision of the President, sanctioned by
the Constitutional Court. In the event of the dissolution of the Oliy Majlis, elections shall be held within
three months. The Oliy Majlis may not be dissolved
during a state of emergency.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to confirm the presidents ministerial appointments.

No. The president issues decrees that have the force

of law.

Article 78
The exclusive powers of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic
of Uzbekistan shall include:
16) ratification of the decrees of the President of
the Republic of Uzbekistan on the appointment and
removal of the Prime Minister, the First Deputy Prime
Minister, the Deputy Prime Ministers and the members
of the Cabinet of Ministers.

Article 94
The President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, shall issue
decrees, enactments and ordinances binding on the
entire territory of the Republic on the basis of and for
enforcement of the Constitution and the laws of the
Republic of Uzbekistan.

Article 93
The President of the Republic of Uzbekistan shall:

Article 98
The Cabinet of Ministers shall provide guidance for
the economic, social and cultural development of the
Republic of Uzbekistan. It should also be responsible for

Supreme Assembly of Uzbekistan (Oliy Majlis)

the execution of the laws and other decisions of the Oliy
Majlis, as well as of the decrees and other enactments
issued by the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority vote is required to override a presidential veto.
Article 93
The President of the Republic of Uzbekistan shall:
14) sign the laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The
President may refer any law, with his own amendments,
to the Oliy Majlis for additional consideration and vote.
Should the Oliy Majlis confirm its earlier decision by a
majority of 2/3 of its total voting power, the President
shall sign the law.

727

16. The legislature controls the resources that finance

its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
No. The legislature is dependent on the president
for the resources that finance its own operations.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune.
Article 88
Deputies of the Oliy Majlis shall have the right of
immunity. They may not be prosecuted, arrested or
incur a court-imposed administrative penalty without
the sanction of the Oliy Majlis.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
Article 108
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan
shall hear cases relating to the Constitutionality of acts
passed by the legislative and executive branches.
Article 109
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan
shall:
1) judge the constitutionality of the laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan and other acts passed by the Oliy
Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the decrees issued
by the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the
enactments of the government and the ordinances of
local authorities, as well as obligations of the Republic
of Uzbekistan under inter-state treaties and other documents;
2) conform the constitutionality of the Constitution
and laws of the Republic of Karakalpakstan to the Constitution and laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan;
3) interpret the Constitution and the laws of the
Republic of Uzbekistan.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions.
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The president can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.

Article 77
The Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan shall consist of 150 deputies, elected by territorial constituencies
on a multi-party basis for a term of five years.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Formally, the legislature can change the constitution with a two-thirds majority vote, but in practice, it would be unthinkable for the legislature to
change the constitution except on the presidents
instruction.
Article 127
The Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan shall be
amended by laws, passed by at least 2/3 of the deputies
of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic.
Article 128
The Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan may pass
a law altering or amending the Constitution within six
months of submission of the relevant proposal, with
due regard for its nation-wide discussion. Should the
Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan reject an
amendment to the Constitution, a repeated proposal
may not be submitted for one year.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary for presidential war declarations.
Article 93
The President of the Republic of Uzbekistan shall:
17) proclaim a state of war in the event of an armed
attack on the Republic of Uzbekistan or when it is
necessary to meet international obligations relating to
mutual defence against aggression, and submit the decision to the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan for
confirmation.

728

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 78
The exclusive powers of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic
of Uzbekistan shall include:
21) ratification and denouncement of international
treaties and agreements.
Article 93
The President of the Republic of Uzbekistan shall:
4) conduct negotiations, sign treaties and agreements
on behalf of the Republic of Uzbekistan, and ensure the
observance of the treaties and agreements signed by the
Republic and the fulfilment of its commitments.

Supreme Assembly of Uzbekistan (Oliy Majlis)

and the Higher Economic Court, as well as the Chairman of the Board of the Central Bank of the Republic of
Uzbekistan, and the Chairman of the State Committee
for the Protection of Nature of the Republic of Uzbekistan;
11) appoint and dismiss judges of regional, district, city
and arbitration courts.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the chairman of the
Central Bank of Uzbekistan.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the

operation of the public media.

No. The president has the power to grant amnesty.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Article 93
The President of the Republic of Uzbekistan shall:
20) issue acts of amnesty and grant pardon to citizens
convicted by the courts of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

No. The legislature meets irregularly and is in session for less than half the year.
28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No.

No. The president has the power of pardon.

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.

Article 93
The President of the Republic of Uzbekistan shall:
20) issue acts of amnesty and grant pardon to citizens
convicted by the courts of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. Formally, the president nominates members
of the judiciary, who are then elected by the legislature. In practice, the presidents nominations are
the last word; the legislature does not scrutinize
the presidents choices.
Article 78
The exclusive powers of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic
of Uzbekistan shall include:
12) election of the Constitutional Court of the Republic
of Uzbekistan;
13) election of the Supreme Court of the Republic of
Uzbekistan;
14) election of the Higher Arbitration Court of the
Republic of Uzbekistan.
Article 93
The President of the Republic of Uzbekistan shall:
10) present to the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan his nominees for the posts of Chairman and members of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court,

No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members. Maintaining a seat is the legislature,
however, is strictly a matter of loyalty to the president, Islam Karimov. The presidents party, the
Peoples Democratic Party, and several minor satellite parties that also support the president are the
sole presence in the legislature. Any party that pretends to genuine opposition status is banned from
participation.

National Assembly of Venezuela (Asamblea Nacional)

729

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF VENEZUELA (ASAMBLEA NACIONAL)

Expert consultants: Michael Coppedge, Daniel Hellinger, Jose Molina, David Myers, Jason Seawright
Score: .53
Influence over
executive (3/9)

Institutional
autonomy (6/9)

Specified
powers (4/8)

1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

21. treaties
22. amnesty

X
X

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

X
X

12. no veto
13. no review

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

24. judiciary

25. central bank

26. media

18. all elected

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

The National Assembly (Asamblea Nacional) of

Venezuela was established in the countrys 1830
constitution adopted upon independence from
Gran Colombia. For the next century, Venezuela
suffered political instability and military rule, and
the legislature did not play a major role in national
politics. In 1961 a new constitution reinstated
civilian authority. For the next three decades, the
bicameral legislature and national politics were
controlled by two political parties, the Democratic
Action Party and the Social Christian Party. In 1998
Hugo Chavez, a populist leftist, was elected president. Chavez broke the control of the previously
dominant parties over politics. He pushed for a
constitutional change to increase the powers of the
president and obtained it in a popular referendum
at the end of 1999. Prior to that year the legislature
was immune from dissolution by the president,
but the amendment approved in the referendum
disbanded one house of the legislature to create
a unicameral body and granted the president the
power to dissolve it. The amendment also created
the office of the executive vice president, who is
appointed by the president, serves as a top aide to
him or her, and presides over the cabinet.
The National Assembly has a moderate amount
of power, although its influence over the executive
is sharply limited. It cannot shape the formation of
the government or remove the government from
office, yet it does hold some powers of oversight.

The legislature enjoys a fair amount of institutional

autonomy, but on this score its strength is limited
by presidential decree and dissolution powers. It
exercises some specified powers and has a moderate
amount of institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. The legislature cannot impeach the president.
2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of
the legislature.
No. Legislators are prohibited from serving simultaneously in ministerial positions.
Article 189
[The following] cannot be elected deputies:
1. Ministers.
Article 191
The deputies to the National Assembly cannot accept
or perform public positions without losing their investiture, except in teaching, academic, incidental or assistance activities, as long as they do not involve exclusive
dedication.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive

730

branch officials testifying before the legislature or its

committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly interpellates officials
from the executive.
Article 222
The National Assembly can perform its function of control by means of the following mechanisms: parliamentarian interpellations, authorizations and approvals
provided in this Constitution and in the law and any
other mechanism that the laws and its Regulations
establish. In exercise of the parliamentary control they
can declare the political responsibility of the public
functionaries and request the Civic Power to try the
actions for which there is cause to make such responsibility effective.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
Yes. The legislature can investigate the executive.
Article 193
The National Assembly will name Permanent Commissions, ordinary and special commissions. The Permanent Commissions, in a number no greater than fifteen,
will correspond to the sectors of national activity. Likewise, it can create Commissions with a temporary character for investigation and study, all of which in conformity with its Regulations. The National Assembly can
create or suppress Permanent Commissions with the
favorable vote of two-thirds of its members.
Article 223
The Assembly or its Commissions can make the investigations that they deem fitting in the matters of their
competence, in conformity with the Regulations.
All public functionaries are obligated, under the sanctions that the laws establish, to appear before said Commissions and to provide them with the information and
documents they require for the fulfillment of their functions.
This obligation also comprises the individuals; preserving the rights and guarantees that this Constitution
consecrates.
Article 224
The exercise of the faculty of investigation does not
affect the attributions of the other public powers. The
judges will be obligated to furnish the evidence for
which they receive [the] commission of the legislative
bodies.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
Yes. Legislative commissions have effective powers
of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

National Assembly of Venezuela (Asamblea Nacional)

No. There is no prime minister.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 243
The President of the Republic can appoint Ministers of
State, who, in addition to participating in the Council
of Ministers will advise the President of the Republic
and the Executive Vice President in the matters assigned
to them.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 228
The election of the President of the Republic will be
made by universal, direct and secret ballot, in conformity with the law. The candidate who has obtained
the majority of the valid votes will be proclaimed elected.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature can pass a vote of censure
against the executive vice president and individual ministers but cannot vote no confidence in the
government as a whole.
Article 187
It corresponds to the National Assembly:
10. To express a vote of censure [against] the Executive
Vice President and [against] the Ministers. The motion
of censure can only be discussed two days after being
presented to the Assembly, which can decide, by threefifths of the deputies, that the vote of censure leads
to the dismissal of the Executive Vice President or the
Minister.
Article 240
The approval of a motion of censure [against] the Executive Vice President, by a vote [of] no less than two-thirds
of the members of the National Assembly, implies his
removal. The removed functionary cannot opt for the
position of Executive Vice President or Minister for the
rest of the presidential term.
The removal of the Executive Vice President on three
occasions within the same constitutional term, as a consequence of the approval of motions of censure, enables
the President of the Republic to dissolve the National
Assembly. The decree of dissolution gives rise to the
convocation of elections for a new legislature within
the sixty days following its dissolution. The Assembly
cannot be dissolved in the last year of its constitutional
term.

National Assembly of Venezuela (Asamblea Nacional)

Article 246
The approval of a motion of censure [against] a Minister
by a vote [of] no less than three-fifths of the members
present of the National Assembly, implies his removal.
The removed functionary cannot opt for the position
of Minister or Executive Vice President for the rest of
the presidential term.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.

731
Assembly, by means of a reasoned exposition, to modify any of the provisions of the law or raise the sanction
to the entire law or to part of it. The National Assembly
will decide on the issues posed by the President of the
Republic, by absolute majority of the deputies present
and will submit the law to him for promulgation. The
President of the Republic must proceed to promulgate
the law within the five days following its receipt, without being able to formulate new observations.

No. The president can dissolve the legislature.

Article 236
Attributions and obligations of the President of the
Republic are:
21. To dissolve the National Assembly in the case established in this Constitution.
Article 240
The approval of a motion of censure [against] the Executive Vice President, by a vote [of] no less than two-thirds
of the members of the National Assembly, implies his
removal. The removed functionary cannot opt for the
position of Executive Vice President or Minister for the
rest of the presidential term. The removal of the Executive Vice President on three occasions within the same
constitutional term, as a consequence of the approval of
motions of censure, enables the President of the Republic to dissolve the National Assembly. The decree of dissolution gives rise to the convocation of elections for a
new legislature within the sixty days following its dissolution.
The Assembly cannot be dissolved in the last year of its
constitutional term.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. Formally, the president can issue decrees that
have the force of law only when authorized to do
so by the legislature. In practice, the president regularly issues decree-laws.
Article 236
Attributions and obligations of the President of the
Republic are:
8. To issue, with prior authorization by an enabling law,
decrees with the force of law.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote of its present members.
Article 214
The President of the Republic will promulgate the law
within the ten days following that in which he has
received it. Within this period he can, with the agreement of the Council of Ministers, request the National

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme
Tribunal of Justice can review the constitutionality
of laws.
Article 214
When the President of the Republic considers that
the law or any of its articles is unconstitutional he
will request the pronouncement of the Constitutional
Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, in the
period of ten days that he has to promulgate the same.
The Supreme Tribunal of Justice will decide in the
period of fifteen days counting from the receipt of
the communication from the President of the Republic. Should the Tribunal deny the unconstitutionality
invoked or should it not decide in the aforementioned
period, the President of the Republic will promulgate
the law within the five days following the decision of
the Tribunal or the expiration of said period.
Article 334
All the judges of the Republic, within the scope of their
competences and in conformity with that provided in
this Constitution and in the law, have the obligation to
ensure the integrity of the Constitution.
In case of incompatibility between this Constitution
and some law or other juridical norm, the constitutional provisions will be applied, corresponding to the
tribunals in any cause, even of office, to decide what is
fitting.
It corresponds exclusively to the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice as constitutional
jurisdiction, to declare the nullity of the laws and other
acts of the organs that exercise the Public Power dictated in direct and immediate execution of the Constitution or that have rank of law.
Article 336
Attributions of the Constitutional Chamber of the
Supreme Tribunal of Justice are:
1. To declare the total or partial nullity of the national
laws and other acts with rank of law from the national
legislative bodies that conflict with this Constitution.
2. To declare the total or partial nullity of the Constitutions and state laws, municipal ordinances and other
acts of the deliberative bodies of the States and Municipalities dictated in direct and immediate execution of
the Constitution and that conflict with the latter.

732
3. To declare the total or partial nullity of the acts with
rank of law dictated by the National Executive that conflict with this Constitution.

National Assembly of Venezuela (Asamblea Nacional)

personalized and secret vote with proportional representation, according to a population base of one
point one per cent of the total population of the
country.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.

Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy

jurisdictions.

No. Constitutional amendments require approval

in a popular referendum.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto, here
expressed as flagrant crime.
Article 199
The deputies to the National Assembly are not responsible for votes and opinions expressed in the performance
of their functions. They will only be responsible before
the electors and the legislative body in accordance with
the Constitution and the Regulations.
Article 200
The deputies to the National Assembly will enjoy
immunity in the performance of their functions from
their proclamation until the conclusion of their mandate or the renunciation of the same. The Supreme Tribunal of Justice will hear the alleged crimes that the
members of the National Assembly commit, [which is
the] only authority that will be able to order, with prior
authorization from the National Assembly, their detention and continue their judgment. In case of flagrant
crime committed by a parliamentarian, the competent
authority will put him in custody in his residence and
will communicate the fact to the Supreme Tribunal of
Justice. The public functionaries who violate the immunity of the members of the National Assembly will incur
in penal responsibility and will be punished in conformity with the law.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected.
Article 186
The National Assembly will be composed of deputies
elected in each federal entity by universal, direct,

Article 341
The amendments to the Constitution will be transacted
in the following form:
1. The initiative can come from fifteen per cent of the
citizens registered in the Civil and Electoral Register;
or by thirty per cent of the members of the National
Assembly or [from] the President of the Republic in the
Council of Ministers.
2. When the initiative comes from the National Assembly, the amendment will require the approval of the
latter by the majority of its members and will be discussed, according to the procedure established in this
Constitution for the formation of laws.
3. The Electoral Power will submit the amendments to
referendum in thirty days following their formal reception.
4. The amendments will be considered approved in
accordance with that established in this Constitution
and the law regarding the approving referendum.
5. The amendments will be numbered consecutively
and will be published after the Constitution without
altering the text of the latter, but noting [in] a foot[note]
to the amended article or articles the reference of the
number and date of the amendment that modified
it.
Article 342
The Constitutional Reform has for its object a partial
revision of this Constitution and the substitution of one
or several of its norms that do not modify the structure
and fundamental principles of the Constitutional text.
The initiative of the Reform of the Constitution is exercised by the National Assembly by means of an agreement approved by the vote of the majority of its members, by the President of the Republic in the Council of
Ministers or by request of a number no less than the
fifteen per cent of the electors registered in the Civil
and Electoral Register.
Article 343
The initiative of Constitutional Reform will be transacted by the National Assembly in the following form:
1. The Bill of Constitutional Reform will have a first
debate in the period of sessions corresponding to the
presentation of the same.
2. A second debate by Title or Chapter, as the case may
be.
3. A third and final debate article by article.
4. The National Assembly will adopt the Bill of Constitutional Reform in a period [of] no greater than two
years, counted from the date on which it took cognizance of and approved the request for [the] reform.

National Assembly of Venezuela (Asamblea Nacional)

5. The bill of reform will be considered adopted with
the vote of two-thirds of the members of the National
Constituent Assembly.
Article 344
The Bill of Constitutional Reform approved by the
National Assembly will be submitted to referendum
within the thirty days following its sanction. The referendum will pronounce on the entirety of the Reform,
but it will be possible to vote separately [on] up to onethird of it, if a number no less than one-third of the
National Assembly so approved or if in the initiative of
the reform the President of the Republic or a number
no less than five per cent of the electors registered in
the Civil and Electoral Registry so requested.
Article 345
The Constitutional Reform will be declared approved
if the number of affirmative votes is greater than the
number of negative votes. The initiative of revised
Constitutional Reform cannot be presented again in
the same constitutional term of the National Assembly.
Article 346
The President of the Republic will be obligated to promulgate the Amendments and Reforms within the ten
days following their approval. Should he not do it, that
provided in this Constitution will be applied.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

Yes. The constitution does not specifically address
the declaration war. The legislatures approval is
required to authorize the deployment of military
forces abroad.
Article 187
It corresponds to the National Assembly:
11. To authorize the deployment of Venezuelan military missions abroad or foreign ones in the country.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 154
The treaties concluded by the Republic must be
approved by the National Assembly before their ratification by the President of the Republic, with the exception of those by means of which it is attempted to execute or perfect preexisting obligations of the Republic, apply principles expressly recognized in it, execute
ordinary acts in the international relations to exercise
powers that the law expressly attributes to the National
Executive.
Article 187
It corresponds to the National Assembly:
18. To approve by law the international treaties or
covenants that the National Executive makes, save the
exceptions consecrated in this Constitution.

733

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature has the power to grant
amnesty.
Article 187
It corresponds to the National Assembly:
5. To decree amnesties.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 236
Attributions and obligations of the President of the
Republic are:
19. To grant pardons.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislature appoints the members of the
Supreme Tribunal of Justice on the recommendation of the Judicial Postulations Committee and
the Civic Power.
Article 264
The magistrates of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice will
be elected for a sole period of twelve years. The law will
determine the procedure of election. In any case, candidates will be able to submit their candidature before the
Committee of Judicial Postulations, by their own initiative or by organizations linked to the juridical activity.
The Committee, after hearing the opinion of the community, will make a pre-selection for its presentation to
the Civic Power, which will make a second pre-selection
that will be presented to the National Assembly, which
will make a third pre-selection for the definitive selection. Citizens can present objections on good grounds
[concerning] any of the candidatures before the Committee of Judicial Postulations, or before the National
Assembly.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the governor of the
Central Bank of Venezuela.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. A new law passed in December 2004 effectively
expanded the presidents control over the public
media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature meets in ordinary session for
about nine months each year.
Article 219
The first period of the ordinary sessions of the National
Assembly will begin, without prior convocation, [on]
the fifth of January of every year or [on] the subsequent

734

National Assembly of Venezuela (Asamblea Nacional)

most immediately possible day and will last until the

fifteenth of August.
The second period will begin [on] the fifteenth of
September or [on] the subsequent most immediate possible day and will end [on] the fifteenth of December.

Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.

No.

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.

Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

ho
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF VIETNAM (Quoc
. i)
Expert consultants: Pach Ngoc Chien, David Payne, Pete Peterson, Tuong Vu
Score: .34
Influence over
executive (3/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)
X
X

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Specified
powers (0/8)

Institutional
capacity (3/6)

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

18. all elected

23. pardon
24. judiciary

X
X
X

25. central bank

X

The National Assembly (Quoc ho.i) of Vietnam

traces its origins to the bodies established by the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam upon its declaration of independence from France in 1945.
After decades of war, the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam in the north and the Republic of South
Vietnam were united to form the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1976. The unicameral legislature
was established in its current form in the countrys
1992 constitution.
Power is concentrated in the Communist Party
of Vietnam (CPV), leaving the National Assembly
without a major role. As is typical in Soviet-style

26. media

systems, the party is the source of legislation as

well as personnel decisions and administration.
Notably, however, the legislature occasionally has
been able to influence the CPVs ministerial
appointments. Legislative oversight over the executive has also improved in recent years; some
hearings with executive branch officials testifying before the legislature have been televised. The
legislature basically lacks institutional autonomy,
although it cannot be dissolved and its members enjoy immunity. The legislatures institutional
capacity is restricted by exceedingly short sessions
and the lack of staff.

National Assembly of Vietnam (Quoc ho.i)

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Formally, the legislature can remove the president and the prime minister from office, but in
practice, the Communist Party of Vietnam makes
all personnel decisions.
Article 84
The National Assembly has the following duties and
powers:
7. To . . . remove from office the State President and
Vice-President, . . . the Prime Minister . . . [and] to cast a
vote of confidence on persons holding positions elected
or approved by the National Assembly.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Ministers may, but with the exception of the
prime minister are not required to, serve simultaneously in the National Assembly.
Article 110
(1) The Government shall be composed of the Prime
Minister, the Deputy Prime Ministers, the Cabinet Ministers, and other members. With the exception of the
Prime Minister, its members are not necessarily members of the National Assembly.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. Ministers often testify before the legislature.
In recent years some hearings have even been televised.
Article 98
(1) The deputy to the National Assembly has the right
to interpellate the State President, the Chairman of the
National Assembly, the Prime Minister, Cabinet Ministers and other members of the Government, the President of the Supreme Peoples Court, and the Head of the
Supreme Peoples Office of Supervision and Control.
(2) The interpellated officials must give an answer at
the current session; in case an inquiry is needed the
National Assembly may decide that the answer should
be given to its Standing Committee or at one of its
own subsequent sessions, or may allow the answer to
be given in writing.
(3) The deputy to the National Assembly has the right
to request State organs, social organizations, economic
bodies, and units of the armed forces to answer questions on matters with which he is concerned. The people in charge of those organs, organizations, bodies and
units have the responsibility to answer questions put by
the deputy within the time limit set by the law.

735

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. Formally, the legislature can investigate the
executive, but in practice, this power does not
exist.
Article 96
(1) The Nationalities Council and the Committees of
the National Assembly can require members of the Government, the President of the Supreme Peoples Court,
the Head of the Supreme Peoples Office of Supervision
and Control, and other State officials to report or supply documents on certain necessary matters. Those to
whom such requests are made must satisfy them.
(2) It is the responsibility of State organs to examine
and answer the proposals made by the Nationalities
Council and the Committees of the National Assembly.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The military reports solely to the CPV. The
legislature does have some oversight power over
the other agencies.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. Formally, the legislature elects the prime minister, but in fact, the CPV chooses the prime minister.
Article 84
The National Assembly has the following duties and
powers:
7. To elect . . . the Prime Minister.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm

the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to
confirm the ministers chosen by the CPV and
appointed by the president. Generally, the legislature rubber-stamps the CPVs decisions, but in
rare instances the legislature has prevailed upon
the party to change its choice of candidates.
Article 103
The State President has the following duties and powers:
4. On the basis of resolutions of the National Assembly,
to appoint, release from duty or dismiss Deputy Prime
Ministers, Ministers and other members of the Government.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.

736

No. Formally, the National Assembly elects the

president, but in practice, its decision is entirely
predetermined by the CPV leadership, and the legislature plays no meaningful role.
Article 84
The National Assembly has the following duties and
powers:
7. To elect . . . the State President.
Article 102
(1) The State President shall be elected by the National
Assembly from among its members.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature can vote no confidence in individual ministers, but not in the government as a
whole.
Article 84
The National Assembly has the following duties and
powers:
7. to cast a vote of confidence on persons holding positions elected or approved by the National Assembly.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.

National Assembly of Vietnam (Quoc ho.i)

Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto

by a majority vote of its present members. One
should note, however, that bills are written and
approved by the CPV before being submitted to
the legislature.
Article 103
The State President has the following duties and powers:
7. To propose to the National Assembly Standing Committee to revise its ordinances within ten days from the
date these ordinances were passed; if such ordinances
are still voted for by the National Assembly Standing
Committee against the State Presidents disapproval,
the State President shall report it to the National Assembly for decision at its nearest session.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. Judicial review is not practiced, but the laws are
in no respect the handiwork of the National Assembly. Rather, they are the products of the CPVs decisions.
14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all
policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.

Yes. The legislature is immune from dissolution.

Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy

jurisdictions.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.

No. The government and the president can issue

decrees that have the force of law.

No. The CPV can impound funds appropriated by

the legislature.

Article 91
The Standing Committee of the National Assembly has
the following duties and powers:
3. To interpret the Constitution, the law, and decreelaws;
4. To enact decree-laws on matters entrusted to it by
the National Assembly.
Article 103
The State President has the following duties and powers:
1. To promulgate the Constitution, laws and decreelaws.
Article 115
(1) On the basis of the Constitution, the law, and the
resolutions of the National Assembly, the decree-laws
and resolutions of the latters Standing Committee, the
orders and decisions of the State President, the Government shall issue resolutions and decrees, the Prime
Minister shall issue decisions and directives and shall
supervise the execution of those formal written orders.

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.

16. The legislature controls the resources that finance

its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
No. The legislature is dependent on the executive
and the CPV for the resources that finance its own
operations.
Article 100
(1) The deputy to the National Assembly must devote
the necessary time to his work.
(2) It is the responsibility of the Standing Committee of
the National Assembly, the Prime Minister, the Cabinet
Ministers, the other members of the Government, and
the other State organs to supply him with the material
he requires and to create the necessary conditions for
him to fulfill his duty.
(3) The State shall ensure that he has the money necessary to his activities.

17. Members of the legislature are immune from

arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune. Even in cases of flagrante delicto, here expressed as flagrant offence,
an arrest must be reported to the legislature for a

National Assembly of Vietnam (Quoc ho.i)

decision on whether to lift the legislators immunity.

Article 99
(1) A member of the National Assembly cannot be
arrested or prosecuted without the consent of the
National Assembly and, in the intervals between its sessions, without the consent of its Standing Committee.
(2) In case of a flagrant offence and the deputy is
taken into temporary custody, the organ effecting his
arrest must immediately report the facts to the National
Assembly or its Standing Committee for it to examine
them and take a decision.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the legislature are elected. It
is worthy of mention, however, that in legislative
elections voters choose from among a narrow range
of CPV-approved candidates.
Article 85
(1) The duration of each National Assembly is five
years.
(2) Two months before the end of its tenure, a new
National Assembly shall have been elected. The electoral procedure and the number of members of the
National Assembly shall be established by law.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Formally, the legislature can change the constitution with a two-thirds majority vote. In practice, it would be unthinkable for the legislature
to change the constitution without the CPVs
approval.
Article 84
The National Assembly has the following duties and
powers:
1. To make and amend the Constitution; to make and
amend laws; to work out a programme for making laws
and decree-laws.
Article 147
The National Assembly alone shall have the right to
amend the Constitution. An amendment to the Constitution must be approved by at least two-thirds of its
total membership.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

737
12. To decide issues of war and peace.
Article 103
The State President has the following duties and powers:
5. On the basis of resolutions of the National Assembly
or its Standing Committee to proclaim a state of war.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
No. Formally, the legislatures approval is necessary to ratify international treaties. In practice, the
president can conclude treaties without the legislatures approval.
Article 84
The National Assembly has the following duties and
powers:
13. To decide on fundamental policies in external relations; to ratify or nullify international treaties signed
directly by the State President; to ratify or nullify other
international treaties signed or acceded to at the proposal of the State President.
Article 103
The State President has the following duties and powers:
10. To . . . negotiate and conclude international agreements in the name of the State of the Socialist Republic
of Vietnam with the heads of other States; to submit
to the National Assembly for ratification international
agreements directly signed by him/her; to decide on ratification of, or accession to international treaties, except
where they must be submitted to the National Assembly
for decision.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Formally, the president declares amnesty on
the recommendation of the legislature. In practice,
the president can declare amnesty without involvement of the legislature.
Article 84
The National Assembly has the following duties and
powers:
10. To proclaim an amnesty.
Article 103
The State President has the following duties and powers:
5. On the basis of resolutions of the National Assembly
or its Standing Committee . . . to proclaim an amnesty.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.

No. Formally, the president declares war on the

recommendation of the legislature. In practice, the
president can declare war without the legislatures
approval.

Article 103
The State President has the following duties and powers:
12. To grant pardons.

Article 84
The National Assembly has the following duties and
powers:

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.

738

No. Formally, the legislature elects the president of

the Supreme Peoples Court. In practice, all personnel decisions are made by the CPV.
Article 103
The State President has the following duties and powers:
3. To propose to the National Assembly to elect . . . the
President of the Supreme Peoples Court.
8. To appoint, release from duty, dismiss the VicePresidents and judges of the Supreme Peoples Court,
the Deputy Head and members of the Supreme Peoples
Office of Supervision and Control.
Article 84
The National Assembly has the following duties and
powers:
7. To elect . . . the President of the Supreme Peoples
Court.

National Assembly of Vietnam (Quoc ho.i)

ship of the National Assembly, or in pursuance of its
own decision, the Standing Committee may convene
an extraordinary session of the National Assembly.
(3) The first session of the newly-elected National
Assembly shall be convened two months after its election at the latest; it shall be opened and presided over
by the chairman of the outgoing Assembly until the
election by the incoming Assembly of its chairman.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No. Only legislators in leadership positions have a
personal staff.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No. See item 28.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.

30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any

restriction.

No. Formally, the prime minister appoints the governor of the State Bank of Vietnam. In practice, all
personnel decisions are made by the CPV.

Yes. Provided that legislators can remain in the

good graces of the CPV, there are no restrictions
on re-election.

26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough

position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.

No. The CPV controls the public media.

27. The legislature is regularly in session.

Yes.

No. The legislature meets in two ordinary sessions

each year, lasting about one month each. The
Standing Committee of the legislature, however,
is regularly in session.

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.

Article 86
(1) The National Assembly shall hold two sessions each
year, to be convened by its Standing Committee.
(2) When so required by the State President, the Prime
Minister, or at least one-third of the total member-

Yes. The legislature contains many multiterm

members. It merits mention, however that few
members are full-time lawmakers. Almost all also
work in the executive branch, the CPV, or other
professions.

Parliament of Yemen (Majlis Al-Nuwaab)

739

PARLIAMENT OF YEMEN (MAJLIS AL-NUWAAB)

Expert consultants: Sheila Carapico, Iris Glosemeyer, Jefferson Morton Gray, Paul Harris, Jillian
Schwedler
Score: .44
Influence over
executive (4/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

X
X

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Institutional
autonomy (5/9)

Specified
powers (1/8)

Institutional
capacity (4/6)

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

27. sessions
28. secretary

12. no veto
13. no review

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

18. all elected

21. treaties
22. amnesty
23. pardon
24. judiciary

25. central bank

26. media

The Parliament of Yemen was established in the

countrys 1991 constitution upon the unification
of North and South Yemen. It took the form of an
Assembly of Deputies (Majlis Al-Nuwaab, which is
also translated, as it is in the constitutional excerpts
cited below, as House of Representatives). A constitutional amendment in 2001 added an upper
house, the Consultative Council (Majlis Al-Shura),
which is appointed by the president and performs
a purely advisory role. The parliament as a whole
is still usually referred to as the Majlis Al-Nuwaab.
The legislatures powers are not expansive. Its
influence over the executive is not great. The legislature has some institutional autonomy, but that
autonomy is limited by presidential decree and dissolution powers. It is very short on specified powers; of the eight such powers assessed in this survey,
Yemens legislature has but one, the responsibility
for ratifying international treaties. The legislature
has some institutional capacity, although its members lack staff.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires the
involvement of the judiciary. The legislature can

29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

remove the prime minister with a vote of no confidence.

Article 97
The House of Representatives may withdraw confidence
from the government. The House may not withdraw
confidence from the government before an interpolation directed at the Prime Minister or he who is acting
on his behalf. The request for interpolation must by
signed by a third of the members of the House. The
House cannot vote on the issue of no-confidence in the
government without seven days notification of such
a vote. A majority is necessary to pass a vote of noconfidence.
Article 126
The President of the Republic may be charged with
grand treason, violation of the Constitution, or any
other action that prejudices the independence and
sovereignty of the country. Such a charge requires the
petitioning of half of the House of Representatives. The
indictment decision on this matter requires the support
of two thirds of the House of Representatives and the
law stipulates the procedures of the trial. If the charge is
directed at the President and his deputy, then the Presidency Board of the House of Representatives temporarily assumes the duties of the President and until the giving of the courts verdict on the charges brought against
the President. The House of Representatives shall pass
the above mentioned law in the first regular round of
its sessions once this Constitution takes effect. If the
courts verdict finds either of the two guilty, then he
is relieved of his post by the Constitution, and is then

740
subject to the normal penalties of the law. In all cases,
Prescription shall not be applied to crimes stipulated in
this article.
Article 140
If the Prime Minister becomes unable to carry out his
responsibilities, or if the House of Representatives withdraws confidence from the Council of Ministers, or
a general election for the House of Representatives is
undertaken, the Prime Minister is obliged to tender the
resignation of his government to the President of the
Republic.

Parliament of Yemen (Majlis Al-Nuwaab)

agency, board, public/mixed corporation, or local councils. To carry out such investigations, the committee
may gather proof and hold hearings by seeking testimony from any party/person it deems necessary. All
executive and special authorities shall comply by laying all information or documentation they possess at
the disposal of the relevant committee.

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.

No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.

Yes. Legislators may serve simultaneously in ministerial positions.

6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.

Article 79
Membership of the Council of Ministers may concur
with membership of the House of Representatives.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature regularly questions executive
branch officials.
Article 95
The responsibility of the Council of Ministers is both
collective and individual. Every member of the House of
Representatives may pose questions to the Prime Minister, any of his deputies, ministers or deputy ministers
on any matter falling within their responsibilities and
they are under obligation to provide answers accordingly. The questioning may not be converted into an
interpolation during the same sitting.
Article 96
Every member of the House has the right to direct an
interpolation to the Prime Minister, his deputies and
ministers to hold them accountable for matters under
their charge. Responses to and discussions of such interpolations shall take place after at least one week, except
in cases which the House deems urgent, and to which
the government agrees.

4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. Formally, the legislature can investigate the
executive, but in practice, this power does not
exist.
Article 94
Upon a request signed by at least ten of its members,
the House of Representatives may create a special committee or instruct one of its committees to investigate
any issue which is contrary to public interest or to
investigate the actions of any ministry, government

No. The president appoints the prime minister.

7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
Yes. The legislatures approval is required to confirm ministerial appointments.
Article 130
In consultation with the President of the Republic, the
Prime Minister chooses the members of his cabinet, and
seeks the confidence of the House of Representatives on
the basis of a program he submits to the House.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 105
The President of the Republic is the President of the
state and shall be elected according to the Constitution.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 97
The House of Representatives may withdraw confidence
from the government. The House may not withdraw
confidence from the government before an interpolation directed at the Prime Minister or he who is acting
on his behalf. The request for interpolation must by
signed by a third of the members of the House. The
House cannot vote on the issue of no-confidence in the
government without seven days notification of such
a vote. A majority is necessary to pass a vote of noconfidence.
Article 140
If the Prime Minister becomes unable to carry out his
responsibilities, or if the House of Representatives withdraws confidence from the Council of Ministers, or
a general election for the House of Representatives is

Parliament of Yemen (Majlis Al-Nuwaab)

undertaken, the Prime Minister is obliged to tender the
resignation of his government to the President of the
Republic.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature with
the support of a popular referendum.
Article 100
The President of the Republic may not dissolve the
House of Representatives except in urgent circumstances and only after a nation-wide referendum on the
reasons for the dissolution. The President of the Republic shall issue a decree that suspends the sessions of the
House and calls for the referendum within thirty days.
If an absolute majority of the voters are in favour of the
dissolution, the President shall issue a decree of dissolution. The decree shall simultaneously call voters to elect
a new House of Representatives within a date that does
not exceed sixty days from the date of the announcement of the results of the referendum. If the dissolution
decree does not include the above-mentioned call, or
elections did not take-place, the dissolution is considered void and null and the House shall meet by under
the power of the Constitution. The House shall also
meet under the power of the Constitution if a referendum does not take place within thirty days or does
not gain the required majority. If elections are held, the
new House must hold its first session within ten days
following the completion of elections. If the House is
not called to meet, it must hold its first session by the
end of the said ten days in accordance with the rules
of the Constitution. Once the House of Representatives
is dissolved, the new House of Representatives may not
be dissolved again for the same reason. In all cases, the
House of Representatives may not be dissolved in its
first session.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The president can issue decree-laws when the
legislature is not in session. The decrees lapse if
they are not subsequently approved by the legislature.
Article 119
If, while the House of Representatives is in recess or
under dissolution, urgent decisions are required, then
the President of the Republic can issue decrees which
have the power of law, provided such decrees do not
contradict the Constitution or the budgetary estimates.
Such decrees have to be presented to the first meeting of
the House of Representatives. If they are not presented,
the House may discuss them and take appropriate decisions thereon. If the House of Representatives rejects
those decrees, they become null and void from the date
the House decides and the House of Representatives
determines how the consequences are to be settled.

741

12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or

essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
Yes. The legislature can override a presidential veto
by a majority vote of its present members.
Article 101
The President of the Republic has the right to request
a review of any bill which is approved by the House.
Based on a reasoned decision, he must then return the
bill to the House of Representatives within thirty days
of its submission. If he does not return the bill to the
House within this period, or if the requested review is
not heeded the Bill is then approved once again by the
majority of the House, it shall be considered a law, and
the President shall issue it within two weeks. If the President does not issue the law, it comes into effect under
the power of the Constitution, and is, at once, published in the Official Gazette and come into operation
two weeks later.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Supreme Court of the Republic can review
the constitutionality of laws.
Article 151
The Supreme Court of the Republic is the highest judicial authority. The law shall specify how it can be
formed, clarify its functions and the procedures to be
followed before it. It shall undertake to do the following:
a. Judge cases and pleas that laws, regulations, bylaws
and decisions are not constitutional.

14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all

policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
Yes. The legislature can initiate bills in all policy
jurisdictions. Bills related to taxation and public
expenditure, however, must be proposed by either
the government or at least 20 percent of the representatives.
Article 61
The House of Representatives is the legislative authority
of the state. It shall enact laws, sanction general state
policy and the socio-economic plan, and approve government budgets and final accounts. It shall also direct
and monitor the activities of the Executive Authority as
stipulated in this constitution.
Article 84
A member of the House of Representatives and the government has the right to propose bills for laws, and their
amendments. In the case of financial laws that aim at
increasing or abolishing an existing tax, or decrease or
give exemption from part of it, or aim at allocating part
of the state funds for a certain project, these may only
be proposed by the government or by at least 20% of

742
the representatives. All the proposed laws presented by
a member or additional members of the House shall not
be referred to one of the committees of the House before
being studied by a special committee which will determine whether the proposal meets the requirements for
action by the House. If the House decides to discuss any
of these it can be transferred to the committee responsible for examining and reporting thereon. Any proposed
law submitted by others than the government may not
be submitted again during the same session.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The president can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
Yes. Legislators are immune with the common
exception for cases of flagrante delicto, here
expressed as being caught in the act.
Article 81
A member of the House of Representatives may not
be subject to procedures of investigation, inspection,
arrest, imprisonment, or punishment except with the
permission of the House of Representatives save in the
case his being caught in the act, and in such a case,
the House shall be notified forthwith. The House shall
make sure of the rectitude of the procedures followed
in such cases. If the House is in recess, permission shall
be sought from the Presidency Board of the House, and
the House of Representatives shall be notified at the first
meeting following the procedures taken.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
Yes. All members of the House of Representatives
are elected. The president appoints the members of
the Consultative Council, but this body lacks real
legislative power and serves a mere advisory role.
Article 62
The House of Representatives consists of 301 members,
who shall be elected in a secret, free and equal vote
directly by the people.
Article 125
A decree by the President of the Republic shall form a
Consultative Council from experienced and qualified
specialists in order to expand the base of participation through consultation and to make use of national
expertise and qualifications available in different areas

Parliament of Yemen (Majlis Al-Nuwaab)

of Yemen. The law shall clarify the special rules that
concern the Council.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
No. Constitutional amendments require approval
in a popular referendum.
Article 156
The President of the Republic and the House of Representatives have the right to request an amendment to
one or more articles of the Constitution. The request
must mention the articles that require amendment,
the reasons and justification for this amendment. If
the request was issued by the House of Representatives it must be signed by a third of its members, and
in all cases, the House shall discuss the principle of
amendment and take a decision only with a majority of its members. If the request is rejected, another
request for the amendment of the same articles may
not be submitted until the lapse of one year. If the
House of Representatives agrees to the principle of the
amendment, the House shall discuss the articles which
require amendment after a break of two months. If
three quarters of the House agree on the amendment,
it shall be presented to the people in a general referendum. If the absolute majority of those who vote are
in favour of the amendment, the amendment is considered valid as of the date of announcing the results of the
referendum.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. In circumstances of war, internal discord, or
natural disasters the president can declare a state
of emergency without the legislatures consent.
The legislatures subsequent approval is required,
but a time frame for approval is not specified.
Article 118
The responsibilities of the President of the Republic are
as follows:
17) To proclaim states of emergency and general mobilization according to the Law.
Article 121
The President declares a state of emergency by a republican decree according to the law. The House of Representatives shall be called to session within one week
and be presented with the declaration of emergency.
If the House of Representatives is dissolved, then the
old House of Representatives is called to session by the
Constitution. If the House is not called to session, or
the declaration of the state of emergency has not been
presented to it, then the state of emergency shall cease
to exist according to the Constitution. In all cases, a
state of emergency is only declared in circumstances of
war, internal discord, or natural disasters. Declaring the
state of emergency shall only be for a limited time, and
may not be extended, except with the approval of the
House of Representatives.

Parliament of Yemen (Majlis Al-Nuwaab)

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
Yes. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify
international treaties.
Article 91
The House of Representatives shall ratify international
political and economic treaties and conventions of a
general nature, of whatsoever form or level, and in
particular those connected to defense, alliance, truce,
peace or border alterations, and those, which involve
financial commitments on the slate or for which their
execution needs the enactment of a law.
Article 118
The responsibilities of the President of the Republic are
as follows:
12) To issue decrees endorsing Treaties and Conventions approved by the House of Representatives.
Article 135
The Council of Ministers is responsible for the execution of overall state policies in the political, economic,
social, cultural, and defense fields, according to the laws
and regulations. In particular, it shall exercise the following:
d. To approve Treaties and Conventions before presenting them to the House of Representatives or the President of the Republic according to the responsibilities of
each.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

743
and procedures of appointment, transfer and promotion of judges, and their other privileges and guarantees. Exceptional courts may not be established under
any conditions.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the governor of the
Central Bank of Yemen.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The Ministry of Information controls the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.
Article 73
The House shall annually hold two ordinary sessions. It
may be called to hold extraordinary sessions. The internal regulations of the House shall specify the dates of
the ordinary sessions and their duration. In times of
necessity, the House may call for extraordinary sessions
by Presidential decree, a decision by the Presiding Board
of the House, or a written request from one third of the
members. The House session shall not be adjourned
during the last quarter of the year before the endorsement of the General Budget of the state.

No. The president has the power to grant amnesty.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The president has the power of pardon.
24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject
appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The constitution states only that the appointment of judges will be determined by law. In practice, the executive controls the judiciary, and the
legislature does not have a role in selecting or confirming judicial appointments.
Article 147
The Judiciary authority is an autonomous authority in
its judicial, financial and administrative aspects and the
General Prosecution is one of its sub-bodies. The courts
shall judge all disputes and crimes. The judges are independent and not subject to any authority, except the
law. No other body may interfere in any way in the
affairs and procedures of justice. Such interference shall
be considered a crime that must be punished by law. A
charge regarding such interference cannot be nullified
with the passing of time.
Article 148
The judiciary is an integrated system. The law organizes
this system in terms of ranks, responsibilities, the terms

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Although there is a fair degree of turnover in
the legislature, the leadership of the General Peoples Congress, the hegemonic party in the legislature, remains largely constant, producing a significant number of highly experienced legislators.

744

National Assembly of Zambia

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF ZAMBIA

Expert consultants: Peter Burnell, Leonard Mulenga, Adrian Muunga, Naison Ngoma, Lise Rakner
Score: .28
Influence over
executive (1/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate
5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

Institutional
autonomy (2/9)

Specified
powers (2/8)

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon
X

24. judiciary

25. central bank

Institutional
capacity (4/6)
X

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

26. media

18. all elected

The National Assembly of Zambia was founded

upon independence from Great Britain in 1964. For
the next few decades the legislature was shunted
aside, and the country ruled as an official oneparty state. New constitutions in 1991 and 1996
allowed for multiparty politics but did not redistribute power from the presidency to the legislature. The 1996 constitution, which is currently in
force, calls for a unicameral legislature.
The National Assembly is virtually devoid of
power. It has little control over the executive, and
its institutional autonomy is restricted by presidential dissolution, decree, veto, and gatekeeping powers. Most of the specified powers measured in this
survey are reserved for the president rather than
the legislature. Apart from a lack of personal legislative staff, however, the legislature does have some
institutional capacity.

SURVEY
1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of
any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
No. Presidential impeachment requires the involvement of a special tribunal appointed by the
chief justice of the Supreme Court.
Article 37
(1) If notice in writing is given to the Speaker of the
National Assembly signed by not less than one-third of

all the members of the Assembly of a motion alleging

that the President has committed any violation of the
Constitution or any gross misconduct and specifying
the particulars of the allegations and proposing that a
tribunal be established under this Article to investigate
those allegations, the Speaker shall
(a) if Parliament is then sitting or has been summoned to meet within five days, cause the motion
to be considered by the Assembly within seven days
of the notice;
(b) if Parliament is not then sitting (and notwithstanding that it may be prorogued) summon the
Assembly to meet within twenty-one days of the
notice and cause the motion to be considered at that
meeting.
(2) Where a motion under this Article is proposed for
consideration by the National Assembly, the Assembly
shall not debate the motion but the person presiding in
the Assembly shall forthwith cause a vote to be taken
on the motion and if the motion is supported by the
votes of not less than two-thirds of all the members of
the Assembly, shall declare the motion to be passed.
(3) If the motion is declared to be passed under clause
(2)
(a) the Chief Justice shall appoint a tribunal which
shall consist of a Chairman and not less than two
other members selected by the Chief Justice from
among persons who hold or have held high judicial
office;
(b) the tribunal shall investigate the matter and shall
report to the National Assembly whether it finds the
particulars of the allegations specified in the motion
to have been substantiated;

National Assembly of Zambia

(c) the President shall have the right to appear and
be represented before the tribunal during its investigation of the allegations against him.
(4) If the tribunal reports to the National Assembly that
the tribunal finds that the particulars of any allegation against the President specified in the motion have
not been substantiated no further proceedings shall be
taken under this Article in respect of that allegation.
(5) If the tribunal reports to the National Assembly that
the tribunal finds that the particulars of any allegation
specified in the motion have been substantiated, the
Assembly may, on a motion supported by the votes
of not less than three-quarters of all members of the
Assembly, resolve that the President has been guilty of
such violation of the Constitution or, as the case may
be such gross misconduct as it is incompatible with his
continuance in office as President and, if the Assembly
so resolves, the President shall cease to hold office upon
the third day following the passage of the resolution.
(6) No proceedings shall be taken or continued under
this Article at any time when Parliament is dissolved.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.
Yes. Ministers are chosen from, and required to
serve simultaneously in, the legislature.
Article 46
(1) There shall be such Ministers as may be appointed
by the President.
(2) Appointment to the office of Minister shall be made
from among the members of the National Assembly.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
No. The legislature does not regularly question
executive branch officials.
4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive.
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight
over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).
No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. There is no prime minister.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.

745

No. The president appoints ministers, and the

appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 46
(1) There shall be such Ministers as may be appointed
by the President.
(2) Appointment to the office of Minister shall be
made from among the members of the National Assembly.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 33
(1) There shall be a President of the Republic of Zambia
who shall be the Head of State and of the Government
and the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces.
Article 34
(1) The election of the President shall be direct by universal adult suffrage and by secret ballot and shall be
conducted in accordance with this Article and as may
be prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

No. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in
the government.
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the
executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 44
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of clause (1),
the President may preside over meetings of the Cabinet
and shall have the power, subject to this Constitution,
to
(a) dissolve the National Assembly as provided in
Article 88.
Article 88
(6) Subject to clause (9) the National Assembly
(c) may be dissolved by the President at any time.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires

ratification or approval by the legislature before
it takes effect; that is, the executive lacks decree
power.
No. Formally, the president lacks decree power. In
practice, the president issues decrees that have the
force of law.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto
power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.

746

No. The legislature cannot override a presidential

veto. After the legislature passes a bill for the second time, the president can choose to dissolve
the legislature rather than assent to the legislation.
Article 78
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the
legislative power of Parliament shall be exercised by
bills passed by the National Assembly and assented to
by the President.
(2) No bill (other than such a bill as is mentioned in
Article 27 (8)) shall be presented to the President until
after the expiration of three days from the third reading of the bill by the National Assembly, and where a
bill is referred to a tribunal in accordance with Article
27 that bill shall not be presented to the President for
assent until the tribunal has reported on the bill or the
time for making a report has expired, whichever is the
earlier.
(3) Where a bill is presented to the President for assent
he shall either assent or withhold his assent.
(4) Where the President withholds his assent to a bill,
the bill shall be returned to the National Assembly: Provided that if the President withholds his assent to a bill
in respect of which a tribunal has reported under Article
27 that it would, if enacted, be inconsistent with Part
III, the bill shall be returned to the Assembly only if the
President so directs.
(6) Where a bill is again presented to the President for
assent in accordance with the provisions of clause (5)
the President shall assent to the bill within twenty-one
days of its presentation, unless he sooner dissolves Parliament.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. An ad hoc Constitutional Council can review
the constitutionality of laws.
14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all
policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. The legislature is prohibited from initiating legislation related to taxation, public expenditures, or
government debt.
Article 81
Except upon the recommendation of the President signified by the Vice President or a Minister, the National
Assembly shall not
(a) proceed upon any bill (including any amendment
to a bill) that, in the opinion of the person presiding,
makes provision for any of the following purposes:
(i) for the imposition of taxation or the alteration
of taxation otherwise than by reduction;
(ii) for the imposition of any charge upon the general revenues of the Republic or the alteration of
any such charge otherwise than by reduction;

National Assembly of Zambia

(iii) for the payment, issue or withdrawal from the
general revenues of the Republic of any moneys not
charged thereon or any increase in the amount of
such payment, issue or withdrawal; or
(iv) for the composition or remission of any debt
due to the Government; or
(b) proceed upon any motion (including any amendment to a motion) the effect of which, in the opinion
of the person presiding, would be to make provision
for any of those purposes.

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
Yes. The executive lacks the power to impound
funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. According to the constitution, legislative
immunity will be prescribed by an Act of Parliament following law and custom of the Parliament of England. In practice, legislators are subject to arrest and criminal prosecution.
Article 87
Privileges and Immunities of National Assembly
(1) The National Assembly and its members shall have
such privileges, powers and immunities as may be prescribed by an Act of Parliament.
(2) Notwithstanding subclause (1) the law and custom
of the Parliament of England shall apply to the National
Assembly with such modifications as may be prescribed
by or under an Act of Parliament.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
No. The president appoints eight of the 158 members of the National Assembly.
Article 63
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the
election of members of the National Assembly shall be
direct, by universal adult suffrage and by secret ballot
and shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution and as may be prescribed by
or under an Act of Parliament.
Article 68
(1) The President may, at any time after a general election to the National Assembly and before the National
Assembly is next dissolved, appoint such number of
persons as he thinks fit to be nominated members of

National Assembly of Zambia

the National Assembly, so, however, that there are not
more than eight such members as any one time.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
in multiple readings with a two-thirds majority
vote. Amendments to the part of the constitution
that deals with fundamental rights also require
approval in a popular referendum.
Article 79
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Article, Parliament
may alter this Constitution or the Constitution of Zambia Act, 1991.
(2) Subject to cause (3) a bill for the alteration of this
Constitution or the Constitution of Zambia Act, 1991
shall not be passed unless
(a) not less than thirty days before the first reading
of the bill in the National Assembly the text of the
bill is published in the Gazette; and
(b) the bill is supported on second and third readings
by the votes of not less than two thirds of all the
members of the Assembly.
(3) A bill for the alteration of Part III of this Constitution or of this Article shall not be passed unless before
the first reading of the bill in the National Assembly it
has been put to a National referendum with or without
amendment by not less than fifty per cent of persons
entitled to be registered as voters for the purposes of
Presidential and parliamentary elections.
(4) Any referendum conducted for the purposes of
clause (3) shall be so conducted and supervised in such
manner as may be prescribed by or under an Act of
Parliament.
(5) In this Article
(a) references to this Constitution or the Constitution of Zambia Act, 1991 include reference to any
law that amends or replaces any of the provisions of
this Constitution or that Act; and
(b) references to the alteration of this Constitution or
the Constitution of Zambia Act, 1991 or of any Part of
Article include references to the amendment, modification or re-enactment with or without amendment
or modification, of any provision for the time being
contained in this Constitution, that Act, Part or Article, the suspension or repeal or any such provision
and the making of different provision in lieu of such
provision, and the addition of new provisions, to this
Constitution, that Act, Part or Article.
(6) Nothing in this Article shall be so construed as to
require the publication of any amendment to any such
bill as is referred to in clause (2) proposed to be moved
in the National Assembly.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. The president can declare war without the legislatures approval.

747
Article 29
(1) The President may, in consultation with Cabinet,
at any time, by Proclamation published in the Gazette
declare war.
(2) A declaration made under clause (1) shall continue
in force until the cessation of hostilities.
(3) An Act of Parliament shall provide for the conditions and circumstances under which a declaration may
be made under clause (1).

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
No. The president can conclude international
treaties without legislative approval.
Article 44
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of clause (1),
the President may preside over meetings of the Cabinet
and shall have the power, subject to this Constitution,
to
(d) negotiate and sign international agreements and to
delegate the power to do so.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. Pardon and amnesty are not treated separately, and the legislature lacks the power to grant
amnesty. See item 23.
23. The legislature has the power of pardon.
No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 44
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of clause (1),
the President may preside over meetings of the Cabinet
and shall have the power, subject to this Constitution,
to
(c) pardon or reprieve offenders, either unconditionally or subject to such conditions as he may consider
fit.
Article 59
The President may
(a) grant to any person convicted of any offence a
pardon, either free or subject to lawful conditions.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
Yes. The legislatures consent is needed for the
presidents nominations to the Supreme Court.
Other judges are appointed by the president on the
recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission.
Article 93
(1) The Chief Justice shall be appointed by the President subject to ratification by the National Assembly.
(2) The judges of the Supreme Court shall, subject to
ratification by the National Assembly, be appointed by
the President.

748

National Assembly of Zambia

Article 95
(1) The puisne judges shall, subject to ratification by
the National Assembly, be appointed by the President
on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the governor of the
Bank of Zambia.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The government controls the Zambia National
Broadcasting Corporation and has influence over
two widely circulated newspapers.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.
Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.
Article 88
(1) Subject to the provisions of clauses (2) and (8), each
session of Parliament shall be held at such place within
Zambia and shall commence at such time as the President may appoint.
(2) There shall be a session of Parliament at least once
every year so that a period of twelve months shall
not intervene between the last sitting of the National

Assembly in one session and the commencement of the

next session.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

No.
29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial
staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.
Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.
Yes.
32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.
Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

PARLIAMENT OF ZIMBABWE
Expert consultants: Annie Dzenga, Liisa Laakso, Adrienne LeBas, Valerie Tsanga, Joel Zowa
Score: .31
Influence over
executive (4/9)
1. replace
2. serve as
ministers
3. interpellate
4. investigate

Institutional
autonomy (1/9)

Specified
powers (1/8)

X
X

10. no dissolution
11. no decree

19. amendments
20. war

12. no veto
13. no review

21. treaties
22. amnesty

14. no
gatekeeping
15. no
impoundment
16. control
resources
17. immunity

23. pardon

5. oversee
police
6. appoint PM
7. appoint
ministers
8. lack
president
9. no
confidence

24. judiciary
X

Institutional
capacity (4/6)
X

27. sessions
28. secretary
29. staff
30. no term
limits
31. seek
re-election
32. experience

X
X
X

25. central bank

26. media

18. all elected

The Parliament of Zimbabwe traces its origins to

the Legislative Council of Southern Rhodesia established by Great Britain in the late nineteenth

century to represent the colony in the British

Empire. Zimbabwe did not receive formal independence from Great Britain until 1980. The countrys

Parliament of Zimbabwe

749

first constitution called for a Westminster-style

system with a bicameral legislature consisting of
a lower house, the House of Assembly, and an
upper house, the Senate. Over time, the powers
of the figurehead president gradually increased,
until a 1987 constitutional amendment abolished
the Senate and the office of prime minister and
made the president the head of government. The
change enabled Robert Mugabe, theretofore the
prime minister, to assume the office of president
and augment his own powers in the process. During the subsequent two decades, Mugabes rule
became increasingly arbitrary and authoritarian.
Mugabe has used his party, the Zimbabwe African
National Union/Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), as his
organizational weapon. Engineering large majorities for the party in parliamentary elections by
means of fraud and coercion, Mugabe has maintained effective control of the legislature. ZANUPFs large majority in the House of Assembly
enabled it, at Mugabes urging, to amend the constitution to reestablish the Senate in August 2005,
and elections were held for it in November of that
year. Both houses of parliament contain popularly
elected members as well as members appointed by
the president.
The legislature is nearly impotent. It cannot
effectively oversee the executive, protect its own
institutional autonomy, or exercise specified powers and prerogatives. The minimal power it does
have includes the formal right to remove the president from office and some institutional capacity.

2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of

the legislature.

SURVEY

5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight

over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of
law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret
police).

1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can impeach the president or
replace the prime minister.
Yes. Both houses of the legislature, sitting in plenary session, can remove the president with a twothirds majority vote of their total membership.
Article 29
(3) The President shall cease to hold office if a report
prepared by a joint committee of the Senate and the
House of Assembly, appointed by the Speaker in consultation with the President of Senate upon the request
of not fewer than one-third of the members of House of
Assembly, has recommended the removal of the President on the ground
(a) that he has acted in willful violation of this Constitution; or
(c) of gross misconduct; and the Senators and members of the House of Assembly sitting together have
resolved by the affirmative votes of not less than twothirds of their total number that the President should
be removed from office.

Yes. Ministers are required to serve simultaneously

in the legislature.
Article 31E
(1) The office of a Vice-President, Minister or Deputy
Minister shall become vacant
(2) No person shall hold office as Vice-President, Minister or Deputy Minister for longer than three months
unless he is a member of Parliament:
Provided that, if during that period Parliament is dissolved, he may continue to hold such office without
being a member of Parliament until Parliament first
meets after the dissolution.
(3) A person who has held office as Vice-President, Minster or Deputy Minister without also being a member
of Parliament shall not be eligible for reappointment
to that office before Parliament is next dissolved unless
in the meantime he has become a member of Parliament.

3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive
branch officials testifying before the legislature or its
committees are regularly held.
Yes. The legislature questions executive branch
officials during regular question time.
4. The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the
executive.
No. The legislature cannot investigate the executive.

No. The legislature lacks effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion.
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister.
No. There is no prime minister.
7. The legislatures approval is required to confirm
the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself
appoints ministers.
No. The president appoints ministers, and the
appointments do not require the legislatures
approval.
Article 31
(1) The President
(a) shall appoint Ministers and may assign functions
to such Ministers, including the administration of
any Act of Parliament or of any Ministry or department; and

750

Parliament of Zimbabwe
(b) may appoint Deputy Ministers of any Ministry or
department or of such other description as the President may determine, and may authorize any Deputy
Minister to exercise or perform on behalf of a Minister
any of the functions entrusted to such Minister.

8. The country lacks a presidency entirely or there

is a presidency, but the president is elected by the
legislature.
No. The president is directly elected.
Article 28
(2) The President shall be elected by voters.

9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.

Yes. The legislature can vote no confidence in the
government.
Article 31F
(1) Parliament may, by resolution supported by the
votes of not less than two-thirds of all the members
of each House, pass a vote of no confidence in the Government.
(2) A motion for the resolution referred to in subsection
(1) shall not be moved in the House of Assembly unless

(a) not less than seven days notice of the motion has
been given to the Speaker; and
(b) the notice of the motion has been signed by not
less than one-third of all the members of the House
of Assembly; and shall be debated in the House of
Assembly within twenty-one days after the receipt by
the Speaker of the notice of the motion.
(3) Where a vote of no confidence in the Government
is passed by Parliament in terms of this section, the President shall within fourteen days do one of the following

(a) dissolve Parliament; or

(b) remove every Vice-President, Minister and
Deputy Minister from his office unless he has earlier
resigned in consequence of the resolution; or
(c) himself resign his office.

10. The legislature is immune from dissolution by the

executive.
No. The president can dissolve the legislature.
Article 63
(1) The President may at any time prorogue Parliament.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the
President may at any time dissolve Parliament.

11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes
effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.
No. The president issues decrees that have the force
of law.
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or
essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto

power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.
No. A two-thirds majority vote is required to override a presidential veto. Even after such an override,
the president can decide to dissolve the legislature
rather than assent to the bill.
Article 51
(1) Subject to the provisions of section 52 and Schedule 4, the power of Parliament to make laws shall be
exercised by Bills passed by the House of Assembly and
the Senate and assented to by the President.
(2) When a Bill is presented to the President for assent
he shall, subject to the provisions of this section, within
twenty-one days, either assent or withhold his assent.
(3) Where this Constitution provides that a Bill of a
specified description shall not be presented to the President for assent unless it is accompanied by a certificate,
the President shall not assent to such Bill unless it is
accompanied by the said certificate.
(3a) Where the President withholds his assent to a Bill,
the Bill shall be returned to the House of Assembly and,
subject to the provisions of subsection (3b), the Bill
shall not again be presented for assent.
(3b) If, within six months after a Bill has been returned
to the House of Assembly in terms of subsection (3a),
the House of Assembly resolves upon a motion supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds of all
the members of the House of Assembly that the Bill
should again be presented to the President for assent,
the Bill shall be so presented and, on such presentation,
the President shall assent to the Bill within twenty-one
days of the presentation, unless he sooner dissolves Parliament.

13. The legislatures laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.
No. The Supreme Court can review the constitutionality of laws.
14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all
policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping
authority.
No. The legislature is prohibited from introducing
legislation related to taxation, public expenditures,
or government debt.
Schedule Four
(4) Except on the recommendation of a Vice-President,
Minister or Deputy Minister, Parliament shall not
(a) proceed upon any Bill, including any amendment
to a Bill, which, in the opinion of the President of
the Senate or the Speaker, as the case may be, makes
provision for any of the following matters
(i) imposing or increasing any tax;
(ii) imposing or increasing any charge on the Consolidated Revenue Fund or other public funds of the
State or varying any such charge otherwise than by
reducing it;

Parliament of Zimbabwe
(iii) compounding or remitting any debt due to the
State or condoning any failure to collect taxes;
(iv) authorising the making or raising of any loan
by the State;
(v) condoning unauthorised expenditure;
(b) proceed upon any motion, including any amendment to a motion, the effect of which, in the opinion
of the President of the Senate or the Speaker, as the
case may be, is that provision should be made for any
of the matters specified in subparagraph (a); or
(c) receive any petition which, in the opinion of the
President of the Senate or Speaker, as the case may
be, requests that provision be made for any of the
matters specified in subparagraph (a).

15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to
impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
No. The president can impound funds appropriated by the legislature.
16. The legislature controls the resources that finance
its own internal operation and provide for the
perquisites of its own members.
Yes. The legislature enjoys financial autonomy.
17. Members of the legislature are immune from
arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
No. Legislators are subject to arrest, and legislators
who oppose the president have regularly been subject to persecution.
Article 42
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, in the event
of a member of Parliament being convicted
(a) within Zimbabwe of a criminal offence; or
(b) outside Zimbabwe of an offence, by whatever
name called, which if committed within Zimbabwe
would have been a criminal offence; and being sentenced by a court to death or imprisonment, by whatever name called, for a term of six months or more,
such member shall cease forthwith to exercise his
functions and to be entitled to any remuneration as a
member and his seat shall become vacant at the expiration of thirty days from the date of such sentence.

18. All members of the legislature are elected; the

executive lacks the power to appoint any members of
the legislature.
No. The president appoints six of the sixty-six senators and twelve of the 150 members of the House
of Assembly.
Article 34
(1) The Senate shall consist of sixty-six Senators, of
whom
(a) five shall be elected in each of the ten provinces by
voters registered in the fifty senatorial constituencies
referred to in subsection (4); and

751
(b) two shall be the President and the Deputy President of the Council of Chiefs; and
(c) eight shall be Chiefs representing each of the
provinces, other than the metropolitan provinces,
elected in accordance with the Electoral Law; and
(d) six shall be appointed by the President.
Article 38
(1) There shall be a House of Assembly which, subject to the provisions of section 76(3b), shall consist
of one hundred and fifty members qualified in accordance with Schedule 3 for election or appointment to
the House of Assembly, of whom
(a) one hundred and twenty shall be elected by voters in the one hundred and twenty constituencies
delimited in accordance with section 60; and
(b) ten shall be Provincial Governors; and
(c) eight shall be Chiefs representing each of the
provinces, other than the metropolitan provinces,
elected in accordance with the Electoral Law; and
(d) twelve shall be appointed by the President.

19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of

any other agencies, can change the Constitution.
Yes. The legislature can change the constitution
with a two-thirds majority vote in each house.
Article 52
(1) Parliament may amend, add to or repeal any of the
provisions of this Constitution:
Provided that, except as provided in subsection (6), no
law shall be deemed to amend, add to or repeal any provision of this Constitution unless it does so in express
terms.
(2) A Constitutional Bill shall not be introduced into
the Senate or the House of Assembly unless the text of
the Bill has been published in the Gazette not less than
thirty days before it is so introduced.
(3) A Constitutional Bill shall not be deemed to have
been duly passed by Parliament unless, at the final vote
thereon in the Senate and the House of Assembly, it
received the affirmative votes of not less than two-thirds
of the total membership of each House.
(4) If in the case of a Constitutional Bill which has been
passed by the House of Assembly in accordance with
subsection (3) but has not been passed by the Senate
in accordance with that subsection within a period of
one hundred and eighty days beginning on the day on
which the Bill was first introduced into the Senate, the
House of Assembly resolves after the expiration of that
period by the affirmative votes of not less than twothirds of its members that the Bill be presented to the
President for assent in the form in which it was passed
by the House of Assembly, except for minor changes
required by the passage of time, and with such amendments, if any, as the Senate and the House of Assembly
may have agreed, the Bill shall be deemed to have been
duly passed in the form in which it is presented to the
President.
(5) A Constitutional Bill shall not be submitted to the
President for assent unless

752
(a) it is accompanied by
(i) a certificate from the President of the Senate
that at the final vote thereon in the Senate the Bill
received the affirmative votes of not less than twothirds of the total membership of the Senate; and
(ii) a certificate from the Speaker that at the final
vote thereon in the House of Assembly the Bill
received the affirmative votes of not less than twothirds of the total membership of the House of
Assembly;
or
(b) it is accompanied by the certificate referred to
in paragraph (a)(ii) and a further certificate from the
Speaker stating that the Bill is a Bill to which the provisions of subsection (4) apply and that the Bill may
lawfully be presented for assent by virtue of those
provisions.
(6) An Act of Parliament that provides for a revision of
the written law such as is referred to section 53(2) may
make provision for
(a) renumbering the provisions of this Constitution
so as to reflect amendments that have been made
thereto; and
(b) amending the provisions of this Constitution
where it is necessary to do so as a consequence of
any renumbering referred to in paragraph (a); and
any such renumbering or amendment shall be valid
as if it had been effected by means of an Act of Parliament passed in accordance with the provisions of
this section.

20. The legislatures approval is necessary for the declaration of war.

No. The president can declare war without the legislatures approval.
Article 31H
(4) The President shall have power, subject to the provisions of this Constitution
(d) to declare war and to make peace.

21. The legislatures approval is necessary to ratify

treaties with foreign countries.
No. The president can conclude international
treaties without the legislatures approval.
Article 31H
(4) The President shall have power, subject to the provisions of this Constitution
(b) to enter into international conventions, treaties and
agreements.

Parliament of Zimbabwe
(b) grant a respite, either indefinite or for a specified
period, from the execution of any sentence for such
an offence; or
(c) substitute a less severe punishment for that
imposed by any sentence for such an offence; or
(d) suspend for a specified period or remit the whole
or part of any sentence for such an offence or any
penalty of forfeiture otherwise imposed on account
of such an offence.

23. The legislature has the power of pardon.

No. The president has the power of pardon.
Article 31I
(1) The President may, subject to such lawful conditions as he may think fit to impose
(a) grant a pardon to any person concerned in or
convicted of a criminal offence against any law; or
(b) grant a respite, either indefinite or for a specified
period, from the execution of any sentence for such
an offence; or
(c) substitute a less severe punishment for that
imposed by any sentence for such an offence; or
(d) suspend for a specified period or remit the whole
or part of any sentence for such an offence or any
penalty of forfeiture otherwise imposed on account
of such an offence.

24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject

appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself
appoints members of the judiciary.
No. The president makes judicial appointments,
and the appointments do not require the legislatures approval.
Article 84
(1) The Chief Justice and other judges of the Supreme
Court and the High Court shall be appointed by the
President after consultation with the Judicial Service
Commission.

25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by

the legislature.
No. The president appoints the governor of the
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe.
26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.
No. The legislature lacks a substantial voice in the
operation of the public media.
27. The legislature is regularly in session.

22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.

No. The president has the power to grant amnesty.

Yes. The legislature regularly meets in ordinary session.

Article 31I
(1) The President may, subject to such lawful conditions as he may think fit to impose
(a) grant a pardon to any person concerned in or
convicted of a criminal offence against any law; or

Article 62
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection 2, the sessions of Parliament shall be held in such place and shall
begin at such time as the President may, by proclamation in the Gazette, fix.

Parliament of Zimbabwe
(2) There shall be a session of Parliament beginning in
every calendar year so that a period of more than one
hundred and eighty days shall not intervene between
the last sitting of either House in any one session and
the first sitting of Parliament in the next session.

753

Yes. There are no restrictions on re-election.

31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough
position that legislators are generally interested in and
seek re-election.

28. Each legislator has a personal secretary.

Yes.

No.

32. The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature
contains a significant number of highly experienced
members.

29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial

staff member with policy expertise.
No.
30. Legislators are eligible for re-election without any
restriction.

Yes. Re-election rates are sufficiently high to produce a significant number of highly experienced
members.

Comprehensive Lists of Country Scores

Parliamentary Powers Index Scores by Country,

in Alphabetical Order
COUNTRY

National Assembly of Afghanistan

Assembly of Albania
Parliament of Algeria
National Assembly of Angola
Argentine National Congress
Armenian National Assembly
Parliament of Australia
Austrian Parliament
Parliament of Azerbaijan
National Assembly of Bahrain
Bangladesh Parliament
National Assembly of Belarus
Federal Parliament of Belgium
National Assembly of Benin
National Assembly of Bhutan
Bolivian National Congress
Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and
Herzegovina
National Assembly of Botswana
National Congress of Brazil
National Assembly of Bulgaria
National Assembly of Burkina Faso
Parliament of Burundi
National Assembly of Cambodia
National Assembly of Cameroon
Parliament of Canada
National Assembly of the Central African
Republic
National Assembly of Chad
Congress of Chile
Chinese National Peoples Congress
Congress of Colombia
Assembly of Comoros
Parliament of Congo-Brazzaville (Republic
of Congo)
National Assembly of Congo-Kinshasa
(DRC)
Legislative Assembly of Costa Rica
National Assembly of C
ote dIvoire
Parliament of Croatia

754

PPI

0.38
0.75
0.25
0.44
0.50
0.56
0.63
0.72
0.44
0.19
0.59
0.25
0.75
0.56
0.22
0.44
0.63
0.44
0.56
0.78
0.53
0.41
0.59
0.25
0.72
0.34
0.22
0.56
0.34
0.56
0.38
0.38
0.25
0.53
0.38
0.78

COUNTRY

National Assembly of Peoples Power of

Cuba
House of Representatives of Cyprus
Parliament of the Czech Republic
Parliament of Denmark
National Congress of the Dominican
Republic
National Congress of Ecuador
Peoples Assembly of Egypt
Legislative Assembly of El Salvador
National Assembly of Eritrea
Parliament of Estonia
Parliament of Ethiopia
Parliament of Fiji
Parliament of Finland
Parliament of France
Parliament of Gabon
National Assembly of The Gambia
Parliament of Georgia
Parliament of the Federal Republic of
Germany
Parliament of Ghana
Parliament of Greece
Congress of Guatemala
National Assembly of Guinea
National Peoples Assembly of
Guinea-Bissau
National Assembly of Guyana
National Assembly of Haiti
National Congress of Honduras
National Assembly of Hungary
Parliament of India
House of Representatives of Indonesia
Islamic Consultative Assembly of the
Islamic Republic of Iran
Council of Representatives of Iraq
Parliament of Ireland
Parliament of Israel
Parliament of Italy
Parliament of Jamaica
National Diet of Japan
National Assembly of Jordan
Parliament of Kazakhstan

PPI

0.28
0.41
0.81
0.78
0.41
0.53
0.28
0.59
0.25
0.75
0.50
0.63
0.72
0.56
0.44
0.31
0.59
0.84
0.47
0.81
0.50
0.31
0.25
0.38
0.44
0.53
0.75
0.63
0.56
0.44
0.63
0.66
0.75
0.84
0.63
0.66
0.22
0.38

Comprehensive Lists of Country Scores

COUNTRY

National Assembly of Kenya

Supreme Peoples Assembly of the DPRK
(North Korea)
National Assembly of the ROK (South
Korea)
National Assembly of Kuwait
Legislative Assembly of Kyrgyzstan
National Assembly of Laos
Parliament of Latvia
National Assembly of Lebanon
Parliament of Lesotho
National Assembly of Liberia
General Peoples Congress of Libya
Parliament of Lithuania
Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia
National Assembly of Madagascar
National Assembly of Malawi
Parliament of Malaysia
National Assembly of Mali
Parliament of Mauritania
National Assembly of Mauritius
Mexican Congress
Parliament of Moldova
Great State Assembly of Mongolia
Parliament of Morocco
Assembly of Mozambique
Peoples Assembly of Myanmar (Burma)
National Assembly of Namibia
Parliament of Nepal
States-General of the Netherlands
Parliament of New Zealand
National Assembly of Nicaragua
National Assembly of Niger
National Assembly of Nigeria
Parliament of Norway
Council of Oman
Parliament of Pakistan
National Assembly of Panama
National Parliament of Papua New Guinea
Congress of Paraguay
Congress of Peru
Congress of the Philippines
Parliament of Poland
Assembly of Portugal
Consultative Council of Qatar

755
PPI

0.31
0.13
0.59
0.38
0.47
0.28
0.78
0.50
0.53
0.44
0.13
0.78
0.81
0.41
0.38
0.34
0.34
0.31
0.66
0.44
0.75
0.84
0.31
0.44
0.00
0.50
0.44
0.78
0.69
0.69
0.50
0.47
0.72
0.16
0.44
0.50
0.66
0.56
0.66
0.56
0.75
0.63
0.22

COUNTRY

Parliament of Romania
Federal Assembly of the Russian
Federation
Parliament of Rwanda
Consultative Council of Saudi Arabia
National Assembly of Senegal
National Assembly of Serbia
Parliament of Sierra Leone
Parliament of Singapore
National Council of the Slovak Republic
Parliament of Slovenia
Transitional Federal Assembly of Somalia
Parliament of South Africa
The General Courts of Spain
Parliament of Sri Lanka
National Legislature of Sudan
Parliament of Swaziland
Parliament of Sweden
Federal Assembly of Switzerland
Peoples Assembly of Syria
Legislative Yuan of Taiwan, Republic of
China
Supreme Assembly of Tajikistan
National Assembly of Tanzania
National Assembly of Thailand
National Parliament of Timor-Leste
National Assembly of Togo
Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago
National Parliament of Tunisia
Turkish Grand National Assembly
Peoples Council of Turkmenistan
National Assembly of Uganda
Supreme Council of Ukraine
Federal National Council of the United
Arab Emirates
Parliament of the United Kingdom
Congress of the United States of
America
Uruguayan General Assembly
Supreme Assembly of Uzbekistan
National Assembly of Venezuela
National Assembly of Vietnam
Parliament of Yemen
National Assembly of Zambia
Parliament of Zimbabwe

PPI

0.72
0.44
0.47
0.09
0.44
0.69
0.41
0.38
0.72
0.75
0.00
0.63
0.72
0.50
0.22
0.25
0.72
0.72
0.31
0.59
0.31
0.31
0.59
0.47
0.38
0.53
0.28
0.78
0.06
0.44
0.59
0.06
0.78
0.63
0.66
0.28
0.53
0.34
0.44
0.28
0.31

756

The Handbook of National Legislatures

Parliamentary Powers Index Scores by Country,

in Order of Scores
COUNTRY

Parliament of the Federal Republic of

Germany
Parliament of Italy
Great State Assembly of Mongolia
Parliament of the Czech Republic
Parliament of Greece
Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia
National Assembly of Bulgaria
Parliament of Croatia
Parliament of Denmark
Parliament of Latvia
Parliament of Lithuania
States-General of the Netherlands
Turkish Grand National Assembly
Parliament of the United Kingdom
Assembly of Albania
Federal Parliament of Belgium
Parliament of Estonia
National Assembly of Hungary
Parliament of Israel
Parliament of Moldova
Parliament of Poland
Parliament of Slovenia
Austrian Parliament
Parliament of Canada
Parliament of Finland
Parliament of Norway
Parliament of Romania
National Council of the Slovak Republic
The General Courts of Spain
Parliament of Sweden
Federal Assembly of Switzerland
Parliament of New Zealand
National Assembly of Nicaragua
National Assembly of Serbia
Parliament of Ireland
National Diet of Japan
National Assembly of Mauritius
National Parliament of Papua New Guinea
Congress of Peru
Uruguayan General Assembly
Parliament of Australia
Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Parliament of Fiji
Parliament of India
Council of Representatives of Iraq
Parliament of Jamaica
Assembly of Portugal
Parliament of South Africa

PPI

0.84
0.84
0.84
0.81
0.81
0.81
0.78
0.78
0.78
0.78
0.78
0.78
0.78
0.78
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.72
0.72
0.72
0.72
0.72
0.72
0.72
0.72
0.72
0.69
0.69
0.69
0.66
0.66
0.66
0.66
0.66
0.66
0.63
0.63
0.63
0.63
0.63
0.63
0.63
0.63

COUNTRY

Congress of the United States of America

Bangladesh Parliament
National Assembly of Cambodia
Legislative Assembly of El Salvador
Parliament of Georgia
National Assembly of the ROK (South
Korea)
Legislative Yuan of Taiwan, Republic of
China
National Assembly of Thailand
Supreme Council of Ukraine
Armenian National Assembly
National Assembly of Benin
National Congress of Brazil
Congress of Chile
Congress of Colombia
Parliament of France
House of Representatives of Indonesia
Congress of Paraguay
Congress of the Philippines
National Assembly of Burkina Faso
Legislative Assembly of Costa Rica
National Congress of Ecuador
National Congress of Honduras
Parliament of Lesotho
Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago
National Assembly of Venezuela
Argentine National Congress
Parliament of Ethiopia
Congress of Guatemala
National Assembly of Lebanon
National Assembly of Namibia
National Assembly of Niger
National Assembly of Panama
Parliament of Sri Lanka
Parliament of Ghana
Legislative Assembly of Kyrgyzstan
National Assembly of Nigeria
Parliament of Rwanda
National Parliament of Timor-Leste
National Assembly of Angola
Parliament of Azerbaijan
Bolivian National Congress
National Assembly of Botswana
Parliament of Gabon
National Assembly of Haiti
Islamic Consultative Assembly of the
Islamic Republic of Iran
National Assembly of Liberia
Mexican Congress
Assembly of Mozambique
Parliament of Nepal
Parliament of Pakistan

PPI

0.63
0.59
0.59
0.59
0.59
0.59
0.59
0.59
0.59
0.56
0.56
0.56
0.56
0.56
0.56
0.56
0.56
0.56
0.53
0.53
0.53
0.53
0.53
0.53
0.53
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.47
0.47
0.47
0.47
0.47
0.44
0.44
0.44
0.44
0.44
0.44
0.44
0.44
0.44
0.44
0.44
0.44

Comprehensive Lists of Country Scores

COUNTRY

Federal Assembly of the Russian

Federation
National Assembly of Senegal
National Assembly of Uganda
Parliament of Yemen
Parliament of Burundi
House of Representatives of Cyprus
National Congress of the Dominican
Republic
National Assembly of Madagascar
Parliament of Sierra Leone
National Assembly of Afghanistan
Assembly of Comoros
Parliament of Congo-Brazzaville (Republic
of Congo)
National Assembly of C
ote dIvoire
National Assembly of Guyana
Parliament of Kazakhstan
National Assembly of Kuwait
National Assembly of Malawi
Parliament of Singapore
National Assembly of Togo
National Assembly of the Central African
Republic
Chinese National Peoples Congress
Parliament of Malaysia
National Assembly of Mali
National Assembly of Vietnam
National Assembly of The Gambia
National Assembly of Guinea
National Assembly of Kenya
Parliament of Mauritania
Parliament of Morocco

757
PPI

0.44
0.44
0.44
0.44
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.38
0.38
0.38
0.38
0.38
0.38
0.38
0.38
0.38
0.38
0.34
0.34
0.34
0.34
0.34
0.31
0.31
0.31
0.31
0.31

COUNTRY

Peoples Assembly of Syria

Supreme Assembly of Tajikistan
National Assembly of Tanzania
Parliament of Zimbabwe
National Assembly of Peoples Power of Cuba
Peoples Assembly of Egypt
National Assembly of Laos
National Parliament of Tunisia
Supreme Assembly of Uzbekistan
National Assembly of Zambia
Parliament of Algeria
National Assembly of Belarus
National Assembly of Cameroon
National Assembly of Congo-Kinshasa (DRC)
National Assembly of Eritrea
National Peoples Assembly of Guinea-Bissau
Parliament of Swaziland
National Assembly of Bhutan
National Assembly of Chad
National Assembly of Jordan
Consultative Council of Qatar
National Legislature of Sudan
National Assembly of Bahrain
Council of Oman
Supreme Peoples Assembly of the DPRK
(North Korea)
General Peoples Congress of Libya
Consultative Council of Saudi Arabia
Peoples Council of Turkmenistan
Federal National Council of the United Arab
Emirates
Peoples Assembly of Myanmar (Burma)
Transitional Federal Assembly of Somalia

PPI

0.31
0.31
0.31
0.31
0.28
0.28
0.28
0.28
0.28
0.28
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.22
0.22
0.22
0.22
0.22
0.19
0.16
0.13
0.13
0.09
0.06
0.06
0.00
0.00

List of Expert Consultants

Kees Aarts

Gloria Ardaya

Harry Bhaskara

Shain Abbasov

Esteban Areco

Stephen Bloom

Jon Abbink

Charles K. Armstrong

Jonathan Boston

Abdulkhaleq Abdulla

Gorkhmaz Askerov

Igor Botan

Ron Abney

Nizam Assaf

Youcef Bouandel

Andres Meja Acosta

Artur Atanesyan

Jean-Philippe Bras

Thomas Adelskov

Canan Atilgan

John Bridge

Onek Adyanga

Daunis Auers

Robin S. Brooks

Osita George Afoaku

Hermenegildo Avelino

Sylvain Brouard

Julio Javier Aguayo

Nicholas Aylott

Nathan J. Brown

Q. K. Ahmad

Vitus A. Azeem

Jason Brownlee

Robert Akoko

Elisabete Azevedo

Kathleen Bruhn

Sener Akt
urk

Rokia Ba

Alessandro Bruno

Sophia A. B. Akuffo

Greg Basue Babu-Kazadi

Robert Buddan

Achieng Akumu

David Bach

L. Burma

Emmanuel Akwetey

H. Badje

Rustam Burnashev

Muthiah Alagappa

Aghi Bahi

Peter Burnell

Awadh Al-Badi

Chris Baker

Jennifer L. Butz

Etannibi Alemika

Richard Balme

D. Byambajav

Monique Alexis

Sanaullah Baloch

Jean-Pierre Cabestan

Abdulrazak Al-Faris

Lok Raj Baral

Joy Cadogan-Logie

Essa Al-Ghazali

Naazneen Barma

Pietro Calogero

Kake Makanera Al-Hassan

Matthias Basedau

Mohamed Saliou Camara

Intigam Aliyev

Francesco Battegazzorre

Roderic A. Camp

Taima Aljayoush

Remy Bazenguissa-Ganga

David Campbell

Ebtisam Al-Kitbi

Peter Beck

Carles Campuzano

Jaak Allik

Abdallah Bedaida

Giliberto Capano

Hind Al-Sheikh

Ahmad Behzad

Sheila Carapico

Alison B. Alter

Ana Maria Bejarano

Giovanni Carbone

David Altman

Souhal Belhadj

Guy Carcassonne

Inge Amundsen

David S. Bell

Dominic Cardy

Leslie E. Anderson

Kenneth Benoit

John M. Carey

Rudy B. Andeweg

Saltanat Berdikeeva

William Case

Michele Penner Angrist

Deryck M. Bernard

Ernesto Castaneda

Milica Antic-Gaber

Desiree Bernard

Colin S. Cavell

Hilary Appel

Michael Bernhard

Paul Chambers

758

Expert Consultants

759

Jonathan Chang

Scott W. Desposato

Max Fira

Robia Charles

Sanket Dhruva

Alfred Fofie

Tun-jen Cheng

Malick Diakite

Marco Fonseca

Arkady Cherepansky

P. Nikiforos Diamandouros

Joshua B. Forrest

Irina Chernykh

Eduardo Daz Reyna

Jon Fraenkel

John Chesterman

Maria Socorro I. Diokno

Ana Freitas

Pach Ngoc Chien

Mamadou Diouf

Natalia Ajenjo Fresno

Lazhar Chine

Giuseppe Di Palma

June Gachui

Blessings Chinsinga

Nadia Diuk

Alvaro Galvez

Jamshed S. A. Choudhury

Ursula Dorfinger

Mariam Gamal

Yvonne T. Chua

Michael Dowdle

Georgi Ganev

Clive H. Church

Ida-Denise Drameh

Venelin I. Ganev

John F. Clark

John Dugas

Guillermo Garcia

Terry D. Clark

Annie Dzenga

Caty Clement

Gerald M. Easter

F. Gregory Gause

Joao Carlos Colaco

Camille Edmond

Daniel Gbondo

Dan Connell

Piret Ehin

Sisay Gebre-Egziabher

Earl Conteh-Morgan

Robert Elgie

Omer
Genckaya

V. Coopoomootoo

Mohamed Abdellahi Mohamed

James Georgas

Michael Coppedge

Elhacen

Dorde Gardasevic

Richard Gerding

Sheryl Cowan

Zachary Elkins

Angelos S. Gerontas

Philip Cowley

Jrgen Elklit

Pepijn Gerrits

Noel Cox

Silam El Yaghmouri

Peter Gey

Stuart Crampton

N. Enhbold

Bruce Gilley

Frank Cranmer

B. Enkhbat

Jane Rebecca Gingrich

Harold Crouch

Matyas E
orsi

Georgia Gionna

Sally N. Cummings

Bakhodirzhon Ergashev

Brian Girvin

Mary Cummins

Bakhtiyor Ergashev

Marco Giuliani

Ruzica Dabic

Do
gu Ergil

Iris Glosemeyer

Markoua Dadjo

Hans J. Esderts

Martha Gning

Momodou N. Darboe

Navabeh Espahbodi

Thomas B. Gold

Paolo Dardanelli

Flavio Dario Espinal

Grigorii Golosov

Nestor Davilo

Abdoulaye Essy

Ch. Didier Gondola

Adeed Dawisha

Chris Fadzel

Lameck Gondwe

Brionne Dawson

Yun Fan

Charles Gonthier

Wondem Asres Degu

Foukori Fati

Maria Del Pilar Gonzalez Morales

Juan del Aguila

Alain Faupin

Radu Gorincioi

Blanca Martin Delgado

Richard F. Fenno

Lawrence S. Graham

Michael J. Denison

Natalia Ferretti

R
udiger Graichen

Donald Denoon

Florin Fesnic

Jefferson Morton Gray

Sam Depauw

Jan Fidrmuc

Theocharis Grigoriadis

Kris Deschouwer

Abdou Filali-Ansary

Jean-Germain Gros

Sunanda Deshapriya

Rafael Filizzola

Yonko Grozev

760

Anna M. Grzymaa-Busse
Armando Marques

The Handbook of National Legislatures

Muhamad Nadratuzzaman
Hosen

Charles H. Kennedy
Apollonia Kerenge

Mathurin Houngnikpo

Dimitris Keridis

Carlos Guevara Mann

Lidija Hristova

Joseph Ketan

Ram Guragain

Eugene Huskey

Abd al-Hadi Khalaf

Lus Humberto Guzman

Adem Huskic

Mona Khalaf

Deepak Gyawali

Adnan Huskic

Mujeeb R. Khan

Sten Hagberg

Christian H
utterer

Nina Khatiskatsi

Magnus Hagevi

Elda Hysenllari

Sarmad Khawaja

Mehrdad Haghayeghi

Ari Hyytinen

Samuel S. Kim

Samuel Haile

Giuseppe Ieraci

Andreas Klein

Ivlian Haindrava

Janis Ikstens

Jacques Paul Klein

Zuhra Halimova

Basil Ilangakoon

James R. Klein

Peter Hallahan

Altin Ilirjani

Cassie Knight

Lawrence Harding

Ivars Indans

Tim Knudsen

Robert Harding

Christine Ingebritsen

Qayyum Kochai

Erika Harris

Lidia Isamova

Thomas A. Koelble

Paul Harris

Mohammad Isaqzadeh

Andrew Konitzer-Smirnov

Ernest Harsch

Jacqueline S. Ismael

Elahe Koolaee

Jonathan Hartlyn

Nicholas Jabko

Elena A. Korosteleva-Polglase

Christof Hartmann

Jakes Jacobs

Neam Koy

Zijad Hasic

Rob Jamieson

Ellis S. Krauss

Graham Hassall

Krzysztof Jasiewicz

Amie Kreppel

Kathryn Hawley

Maiah Jaskoski

Andrej Krickovic

Andrew Heard

Niraja Gopal Jayal

Algis Krupavicius

John R. Heilbrunn

Nikola Jelic

Andrei Kunov

Daniel Hellinger

Jadranka Jelincic

Kenji Kushida

Gretchen Helmke

E. G. H. Joffe

Liisa Laakso

Shahnaz Hemmati

Mark P. Jones

Mikko Lagerspetz

Michael Herb

Cedric Jourde

Damjan Lajh

Victor Hermosillo

Benedict Jua

Brij V. Lal

Hartmut Hess

Mayke Kaag

Moktar Lam

Gerti Hesseling

Paul J. Kaiser

Bolvar Lamounier

Allen Hicken

David C. Kang

Carl H. Lande

Ernst Hillebrand

Katerina Karakehagia

Nick Langton

Dragica Hinic

Georgi Karasimeonov

Remzi Lani

Jonas Hinnfors

Sebastian Karcher

Mong Hay Lao

Percy C. Hintzen

Kerim Can Kavakli

Jody LaPorte

Hans Hirter

Jens Kayser

Peter Larmour

Robert Hislope

Solomon Kebede

Adrienne LeBas

Jakob From Heg

Mari-Ann Kelam

Gerardo Le Chevallier

Barrie Hofmann

Tunne Kelam

Hong Yung Lee

David Holiday

Marisa Kellam

Pei-Shan Lee

John Holm

Phil Kelly

Nairobi Legis

Guedes

Expert Consultants

761

Fabrice E. Lehoucq

Paul Christopher Manuel

Fatima Mojaddedi

David K. Leonard

Denis Marantz

Jose Molina

Leonard Letsepe

Eleanor Marchant

Ricardo Sosa Montas

Peter Lewis

Richard R. Marcus

Chelete Monyane

Yury Likhtarovich

Alexander Markarov

Jeremy Moon

Seong-ho Lim

David R. Marples

Pete W. Moore

Fernando Limongi

Perry Mars

Maggy Morales

Staffan I. Lindberg

Michael Marsh

Erika Moreno

Wolf Linder

Desir`ee Masi

Bryn Morgan

Nicole Lindstrom

Mikitaka Masuyama

Michael Morgan

Johannes Lindvall

Kuldeep Mathur

Scott Morgenstern

I-Chou Liu

Peter Matijek

Leonardo Morlino

Augustin Loada

Khabele Matlosa

Minion K. C. Morrison

Richard Lobban

Mikko Mattila

Tor Arne Morskogen

Gerhard Loewenberg

Zibani Maundeni

Robert Mortimer

Francis Loh

Diane K. Mauzy

Homeira Moshirzadeh

Timothy Longman

Demis Mavrellis

Tamir Moustafa

Hugo Lopez

Rene Mayorga

Nancy Msibi

Nehemas Lopez
Carrion

Cedric Mayrargue

Aloys Muberanziza

Laurence Louer

Maxime-Faustin Mbringa-

Anne Mugisha

Claudiu Lucaci

Takama

Rwekaza Mukandala

Russell E. Lucas

Cynthia McClintock

Bhaswar Mukhopadhyay

Oscar Luengo

Elizabeth McLeay

Pascal Musulay Mukonde

Alexander Lukashuk

Edward McMahon

Leonard Mulenga

Alvidas Lukosaitis

Alan McRobie

Mark Mullen

Thomas Lundberg

Brendan McSherry

Wolfgang C. M
uller

Pauline Jones Luong

Percy Medina

Alina Mungiu-Pippidi

Ellen Lust-Okar

Andreas Mehler

Derwin Munroe

Jimmy MacClure

Pratap Bhanu Mehta

Gary Murphy

Malcolm Mackerras

Kirk Meighoo

Michael Murphy

Jok Madut

Heiko Meinhardt

H. M. Mushala

Roberta Maffio

Albert P. Melone

Tamara Music

Pedro Magalhaes

Nimmith Men

Ana M. Mustapic

Nanfadima Magassouba

Ivona Mendes

Adrian Muunga

Abdeslam M. Maghraoui

P. M. Karibe Mendy

Koen Muylle

Bruce A. Magnusson

Kidane Mengisteab

David Myers

Jose M. Magone

El Hadj Kassim Mensah

Benito Nacif

Gregory S. Mahler

Immanuel Tatah Mentan

Zahara Nampewo

Bettina Malka-Igelbusch

Sheku Mesali

Faizullokhodzha Nasrulloev

Darina Malov`a

Grigorij Meseznikov

Boris Navasardian

Fode Mane

Sabine Mietzner

Patricio D. Navia

Christopher P. Manfredi

Jose Manuel Minjares Jimenez

Boubacar NDiaye

Carrie L. Manning

Ahmed Mohamed

Daniel Neep

Zdenka Mansfeldova

Amer K. Mohsen

Gabriel Negretto

762

The Handbook of National Legislatures

Michael Nelson

Anbal S. Perez-Li
na n

Eelis Roikonen

Nemanja Nenadic

Robert Peri

Gerard Roland

Francois Ngolet

Kenneth Perkins

Hilmar Rommetvedt

Naison Ngoma

Tim Pershing

Mark Y. Rosenberg

Boubacar Niane

Pete Peterson

Frances M. Rosenbluth

Richard G. Niemi

Vladimir Petrovic

Guy Rossatanga-Rignault

Louis-Marie Nindorera

Ana Petruseva

Robert I. Rotberg

Ghia Nodia

Pasuk Phongpaichit

Sebastian Royo

Akbar Noman

Jon Pierre

Lars Rudebeck

Charles Ntampaka

Natalia Pisareva

Tito Rutaremara

Artur Nura

Eduardo Pizarro

Selwyn D. Ryan

Francis B. Nyamnjoh

Grigore Pop-Eleches

Hawa Sisay Sabally

Kevin J. OBrien

Marina Popescu

Alen Sabyrov

Gideon Ochanda

Margaret Popkin

Ros Sagnelli

Conor ODwyer

Natalia Postica

Sebastian M. Saiegh

George Ola-Davies

Rodger Potocki

Reinaldo Saily

Eoin OMalley

Amit Prakash

Abdoulaye Saine

Ziya Onis

Ralph R. Premdas

Rebecca Sako-John

Joel M. Ostrow

Robert M. Price

Marwan Sakr

Emanuele Ottolenghi

Geoffrey Pridham

Alaksandar Salajka

Olly Owen

Oleh Protsyk

Abdi Ismail Samatar

Philip Oxhorn

James Putzel

Peter R. Sampson

Oyeleye Oyediran

Babak Rahimi

David Samuels

Simon
Pachano

Saumura Rainsy

Richard J. Samuels

Sari Pajula

Lise Rakner

David J. Sanders

Francisco Panizza

Dominique Rakotomalala

Andre de Oliveira Sango

Danijel Pantic

Shinasi A. Rama

Prakash Raj Sapkota

Dennis Pantin

Pai Ramachandra

A. Tobias Schedlbauer

Dimitris G. Papadimitriou

Solofo Randrianja

Eric Schickler

Katia Papagianni

Bjrn Erik Rasch

Vivien Ann Schmidt

Vladimir Paramonov

Sophoan Rath

Carsten Schneider

Chan Wook Park

Adrien M. Ratsimbaharison

Gerald Schneider

Andrew Parkin

Steven Ratuva

Michael Schoiswohl

Haslyn Parris

Tapio Raunio

Peter J. Schraeder

Jack D. Parson

Atiur Rehman

Robert Schrire

David Patel

Megan Reif

Richard Schultz

Andrius Pauga

Thomas F. Remington

Tobias Schulze-Cleven

David Payne

Andrei Riabov

Jillian Schwedler

Peter Peetz

Juan Rial

Jason Seawright

Eric Pelser

Roberta L. Rice

Christophe Sebudandi

Rita Pemberton

Jose Luis Rivas Calero

Nicole Seibel

T. J. Pempel

R. H. O. Robbin-Coker

Colette Selman

Jehan Perera

Jaime Rodrguez-Arana

Jean-Francois Seznec

Orlando J. Perez

Philip G. Roessler

Masoud Shafigh

Expert Consultants

763

Michael Shafir

L. Sumati

Elysa Vieira

Nadia Shafiullah

Yves Surel

Kenneth Vigeant

Aqil Shah

Lars Svasand

Steven K. Vogel

Dina Sharipova

Diana Swain

Tuong Vu

Robert Sharlet

Richard N. Swett

Darren Wagner

Nicholas Shaxson

Marc Swyngedouw

Ian Walker

Nadim Shehadi

Rein Taagepera

Vibeke Wang

Samer Shehata

Alexander C. Tan

Wei-fang Wang

Nusrat Sheikh

Ern Ser Tan

Leonard Wantchekon

Nadav Shelef

Kevin Tan

Roshanak Wardak

David H. Shinn

Moussa Michel Tapsoba

Colin Waugh

Charles R. Shipan

Harold Tarver

Lucan A. Way

Hubert Sickinger

Nargess Tavassolian

Regina Wegemund

Rachel Sieder

Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson

Richard F. Weisfelder

Jelena Simjanovic

G
unes Murat Tezc
ur

Jeffrey A. Weldon

Wendy M. Sinek

Deepak Thapa

Susanne Alice Wengle

Anil Kumar Sinha

Li-ann Thio

Kurt Weyland

Abdulkader Sinno

Michael Thurman

Erik Wibbels

Eduardo Sitoe

Goce Todoroski

Hasitha Wickremasinghe

Asbjrn Skjveland

Jurij Toplak

Bruce M. Wilson

Richard L. Sklar

Bjarte Tra

Susanna Wing

Vanja Skoric

Arne Tostensen

Jason Wittenberg

Kimberly Smiddy

Comi M. Toulabor

Raymond E. Wolfinger

Nicola Jo-Anne Smith

Linda Trudel

Yu-Shan Wu

Susan M. Smith

Valerie Tsanga

Dali L. Yang

Christian Soe

Dennis Tull

Douglas A. Yates

Otton Sols

Aigul Turgunbaeva

Mossa Yattara

Vladimir Solonari

Brian Turner

Sovandara Yin

Roger Southall

Karen Turner

Crawford Young

Regine Spector

Renata Uitz

Reza Yousefian

Marc Spindler

Peter Ulram

Maureen Zamora

Eva Stabell

Elizabeth Ungar

Rodrigo Zarazaga

Joshua Stacher

Rodrigo Uprimny

Mara T. Zegada

William Stanley

Jayadeva Uyangoda

Saloua Zerhouni

Aaron M. Stern

Virgis Valentinavicius

Darius Zeruolis

Ronald Bruce St. John

Ellie Valentine

J. Nicholas Ziegler

Leo Stollwitzer

Jeff VanDenBerg

Jakub Zielinski

Bruce Stone

Diederik Vandewalle

Ricardo Israel Zipper

G. J. C. Strydom

Nicholas van de Walle

Eyal Zisser

Anja Stuckert

Jan Nico van Overbeeke

Joel Zowa

Fuad Suleymanov

Karen van Rompaey

Alan S. Zuckerman

David Sullivan

Alison Vasconez

Zaida Maria Sultanegy

Geronimo Velasco

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INDEX

Abboud, Ibrahim, 621

Afghanistan, 10, 22, 264, 754
Albania, 26, 754, 756
al-Bashir, Umar Hassan Ahmad, 621
Algeria, 15, 31, 754
al-Khalifa family, 56
Al Saud, Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz, 353
Angola, 35, 754, 756
Anschluss, 48
Argentina, 40, 720, 754, 756
Aristide, Jean-Bertrand, 297
Armenia, 5, 44, 754, 756
Arroyo, Gloria Macapagal, 534
Australia, 2, 3, 47, 754, 756
Austria, 2, 51, 754, 756
Azerbaijan, 15, 56, 754, 756
Bahrain, 60, 754
Bainimarama, Frank, 229
Bakiyev, Kurmanbek, 379
Banda, Hastings, 423
Bangladesh, 15, 65, 508, 754, 756
Bank of Central African States, 120, 130, 158,
249
Barre, Siad, 604
Belarus, 2, 5, 15, 69, 754
Belgium, 74, 159, 565, 754,
756
Ben Ali, Zine El Abidine, 681, 684
Benin, 78, 754, 756
Berlusconi, Silvio, 340
Bhutan, 4, 81, 754
Biya, Paul, 119, 120
Bokassa, Jean-Bedel, 125
Bolivia, 85, 754, 756
Bongo, Omar, 245, 249
Bootoo a Ngon, Andre, 119
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 89, 754, 756
Botswana, 93, 397, 754, 756
Bourguiba, Habib, 681
Bozize, Francois, 125
Brazil, 98, 720, 754, 756
Bulgaria, 2, 103, 754, 756
Burkina Faso, 5, 107, 754, 756
Burundi, 111, 754

Cambodia, 116, 754, 756

Cameroon, 15, 120, 754
Canada, 124, 754, 756
Canadian Broadcasting Company, 124
Castro, Fidel, 178, 179
Castro, Raul, 178
Central African Republic, 130, 754
Central Bank of West African States, 77, 106, 436,
495, 577, 675
Chad, 4, 134, 754
Chile, 140, 754, 756
China, 15, 144, 644, 754
Collor de Mello, Fernando, 94
Colombia, 15, 150, 514, 754, 756
Comoros, 4, 15, 154, 754
Conde, Alpha, 285
Congo, Democratic Republic of, 164, 754
Congo, Republic of, 159, 754
constitutional systems
parliamentary system, 3, 6, 9, 15, 16, 61, 173,
240, 495, 645
premier-presidential system, 2
presidential system, 3, 6, 14, 16, 61, 495, 645,
721
president-parliamentary system, 2
semipresidential system, 3, 6, 14, 16, 48, 173,
240, 292, 545, 645
Conte, Lasana, 283, 287
Costa Rica, 169, 754, 756
C
ote dIvoire, 4, 173, 754
Croatia, 178, 754, 756
Cuba, 4, 182, 754
Cyprus, 182, 754
Czechoslovakia, 187, 595
Czech Republic, 191, 754, 756
Daddah, Moktar Ould, 437
Darfur, 131
Dayton Peace Accords, 86
democratic peace, 16
Denmark, 191, 754, 756
Diniz, Waldomiro, 95
Dominican Republic, 199, 754
Dosa, Ali, 624
Duverger, Maurice, 2
797

798

Ecuador, 204, 754, 756

Egypt, 15, 209, 621, 640, 754
el-Nimeiri, Gaafar Mohamed, 621
El Salvador, 15, 214, 754, 756
Eritrea, 4, 217, 754
Estonia, 224, 754, 756
Ethiopia, 2, 214, 228, 605, 754, 756
Etonde Ekoto, Edouard, 119
Eyadema, Gnassingbe, 671
Fiji, 15, 234, 754, 756
Finland, 239, 754, 756
Fox, Vicente, 447
France, 2, 15, 150, 244, 392, 418, 432, 436, 574,
681, 734, 754, 756
Franco, Francisco, 610
Franco, Itamar, 94
French Union of Indochina, 112
Fujimori, Alberto, 529
Gabon, 249, 754, 756
Gambia, 254, 754
George I, King of Great Britain, 713
Georgia, 2, 261, 754, 756
Germany, 2, 6, 265, 754, 756
Ghana, 15, 271, 754, 756
Gnassingbe, Faure, 672
Greece, 278, 754, 756
Guatemala, 283, 754, 756
Guei, Robert, 169
Guinea, 287, 754
Guinea-Bissau, 291, 754
Gulf States, 9
Guyana, 296, 754
Haiti, 4, 195, 301, 754, 756
Hayastani Hanrapetutyun (newspaper),
43
Honduras, 2, 305, 754, 756
Houphouet-Boigny, Felix, 169
Howard, John, 45
Hungary, 305, 754, 756
Hun Sen, 112, 116
Hussein, Saddam, 325
India, 10, 310, 508, 754, 756
Indonesia, 2, 15, 320, 666, 754, 756
Iran, 15, 324, 754, 756
Iraq, 4, 45, 329, 754, 756
Ireland, 2, 333, 754, 756
Israel, 15, 333, 392, 754, 756
Italy, 10, 15, 342, 754, 756
Jamaica, 3, 4, 348, 754, 756
Jammeh, Yahya, 250

Index

Japan, 3, 348, 754, 756

Jordan, 357, 754
Kabila, Laurent, 160
Kazakhstan, 2, 10, 362, 754
Kejie, Chen, 143
Kenya, 2, 366, 605, 755
Kerekou, Mathieu, 74
Khmer Rouge, 112
Kiev, 702
Kim Il Sung, 3667
Kim Jong Il, 368, 369
Korea, North, 4, 369, 755
Korea, South, 2, 15, 369, 755, 756
Kuwait, 15, 374, 755
Kyrgyzstan, 383, 755, 756
Laos, 4, 387, 755
Latvia, 392, 755, 756
Lebanon, 396, 755, 756
Legislative Powers Survey, 1, 13, 16
Lesotho, 401, 755, 756
Liberia, 4, 405, 755, 756
Libya, 408, 755
Lithuania, 414, 755, 756
Macedonia, 2, 418, 755, 756
Madagascar, 422, 755
Malakal, Sudan, 622
Malawi, 428, 755
Malaysia, 2, 432, 590, 755
Mali, 5, 436, 755
mani pulite (scandal), 342
Mao Zedong, 140
Marbury vs. Madison, 716
Marcos, Ferdinand, 534
Mauritania, 441, 755
Mauritius, 447, 755, 756
Mexico, 450, 755, 756
Mobutu, Joseph, 159
Moldova, 455, 755, 756
Mongolia, 2, 460, 755, 756
Montenegro, 578
Morales, Evo, 82
Morocco, 464, 755
Mozambique, 468, 755, 756
Museveni, Yoweri, 696
Musharraf, Pervez, 508, 510
Myanmar, 4, 469, 755
Namibia, 2, 475, 755, 756
Nasser, Gamel Abdel, 205
Nazarbaev, Nursultan, 362
Nazi Germany, 48, 218
Nepal, 480, 755, 756

Index

Netherlands, 484, 755, 756

New Zealand, 486, 755, 756
Nicaragua, 3, 491, 755, 756
Niger, 495, 755, 756
Nigeria, 500, 755, 756
Niyazov, Saparmurat, 693
Nkrumah, Kwame, 266
Noriega, Manuel, 514
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 264
Norway, 755, 756
Nyerere, Julius, 653
Oman, 4, 507, 755
Ontario, 121
Orange Revolution, 702
Ottoman Empire, 272, 685
Pakistan, 61, 514, 755, 756
Panama, 15, 518, 755, 756
Papua New Guinea, 523, 755, 756
Paraguay, 528, 755, 756
parliamentary peace, 16
Parliamentary Powers Index, 1, 2, 15, 16
parliamentary system. See constitutional
systems
Peron,
Juan Domingo, 36
Persian Gulf, 14
Peru, 15, 534, 755, 756
Philippines, 539, 755, 756
Pinochet, Augusto, 135
Poland, 544, 755, 756
Pol Pot, 112
Portugal, 465, 550, 755, 756
premier-presidential system. See constitutional
systems
presidential system. See constitutional systems
president-parliamentary system. See constitutional
systems
Qadhafi, Muammar, 408
Qatar, 4, 554, 755
Quebec, 121
Rakhmon, Emomali, 648
Ranariddh, Norodom, 116
Ratsiraka, Didier, 418
Rodrguez de Francia, Jose Gaspar, 524
Romania, 559, 755, 756
Rose Revolution, 255
Russia, 2, 235, 565, 702, 755
Rwanda, 160, 570, 755, 756
Salazar, Antonio
de Oliveira, 545

Sassou-Nguesso, Denis, 155

Saudi Arabia, 4, 573, 755

799

Scottish parliament, 1
semipresidential system. See constitutional
systems
Senegal, 578, 755
Serbia, 583, 755, 756
Sharif, Nawaz, 508
Sierra Leone, 590, 755
Singapore, 595, 755
Slovakia, 187, 599, 755, 756
Slovenia, 604, 755, 756
Somalia, 4, 605, 755
Somoza family, 487
South Africa, 3, 397, 470, 610, 755, 756
Soviet Union, 40, 52, 98, 187, 218, 255, 357, 388,
409, 451, 456, 554, 560, 648, 692, 702, 725
Spain, 144, 487, 524, 529, 615, 755, 756
Sri Lanka, 620, 755, 756
Strode, Richard, 713
Stroessner, Alfredo, 524
Sudan, 4, 131, 626, 755
Suharto, 316
Swaziland, 631, 755
Sweden, 636, 755, 756
Switzerland, 640, 755, 756
Syria, 392, 393, 644, 755
Taiwan, 2, 648, 755, 756
Tajikistan, 652, 755
Taliban, 18
Tanzania, 659, 755
Tashkent, 648
Taya, Maaouya Ould SidAhmed, 437, 441
Taylor, Charles, 402
Thailand, 2, 5, 666, 755, 756
Thaksin Shinawatra, 660
Three Gorges Dam, 142
Timor-Leste, 4, 671, 755, 756
Togo, 676, 755
Torrijos Herrera, Omar, 514
Toure, Ahmed Sekou, 283
Trinidad and Tobago, 681, 755, 756
Trujillo Molina, Rafael Leonidas,
195

Tunisia, 684, 755

Turkey, 691, 755, 756
Turkmenistan, 696, 755
Uganda, 160, 702, 755
Ukraine, 3, 708, 755, 756
United Arab Emirates, 713, 755
United Kingdom, 1, 5, 44, 89, 121, 182, 205, 330,
343, 362, 397, 428, 484, 495, 508, 584, 616,
621, 626, 652, 676, 696, 708, 716, 744, 755,
756
United States of America, 3, 5, 12, 94, 514, 534,
720, 755, 756

800

Uruguay, 3, 725, 755, 756

Uzbekistan, 2, 728, 755
Vall, Ely Ould Mohamed, 437
Venezuela, 734, 755, 756
Vietnam, 4, 112, 738, 755
Walpole, Robert, 713

Index

Weber, Max, 6
Yemen, 743, 755
Yugoslavia, 86, 264, 414, 578
Zambia, 15, 748, 755
Zenawi, Meles, 224
Zimbabwe, 748, 755