Failing, Failed, and Fragile States Conference Report

Failing, Failed, & Fragile
States Conference
Conference Report
March 2007
International Relations Students Association
FINAL CONFERENCE REPORT
Report Directors: Alia Dharssi and Kristian Jebsen
Contributors: Ana-Maria Chirila, Alia Dharssi, Nae English, Will Goldbloom, Robert Hartfiel, Kentaro
Ide, Kristian Jebsen, Vanessa Lunday, Leah Marchuk, Rahim Mohamed, Amir Musin, Alex Sales, and
Dave Steinbach
Report Design: Eleanor Cheng, Alia Dharssi, and Yifeng Song

Cover Photo by: Yifeng Song
Conference Director: Ana-Maria Chirila
Conference Organizers: Lammie Cheng, Alia Dharssi, Nae English, Rudy Irwin, Kristian Jebsen, Yifeng
Song, and Pamela Toor
Failing, Failed, and Fragile States Conference
at the
Liu Institute for Global Issues

University of British Columbia
March 8 – 10, 2007
Hosted by the
International Relations Students’ Association

www.irsa.ca
The International Relations Students’ Association would like to gratefully acknowledge the
specific contributions of the following sponsors:
The Centre of International Relations and the Liu Institute for Global Issues, for
providing the venue for the conference, financial contribution, and academic guidance;
The Canadian Department of National Defence for financial and speaker contributions
via the Security and Defence Forum – Special Projects Fund;
The University of British Columbia and its students for financial contribution via the
Walter H. Gage Memorial Fund and the Teaching and Learning Enhancement Fund;
The Canadian Consortium on Human Security and the Human Security Program of
the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade for financial
contribution via Complimentary Activities programme;
The Alma Mater Society of UBC for financial contribution via the Constituency Aid
Fund;
The Arts Undergraduate Society of UBC and the UBC Faculty of Arts for financial
contribution via the Dean of Arts Fund;
The International House of UBC for providing the venue for the conference;
The Canadian International Development Agency for speaker contribution.
We would also like the thank the International Relations Program, the Centre of International
Relations, the Alma Mater Society of UBC, and all members of the International Relations
Students’ Association for their continued support of all of our activities. Finally, our warmest
gratitude extends to Dr. Brian Job and Dr. Cameron Ortis, whose expert guidance throughout the
entire process proved essential to the success of the project.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………… 4
2. Executive Summary………………………………………………………………………. 5
3. Introduction……………………………………………………………………………….. 7
4. Conceptualizing Failing, Failed and Fragile States………………………………………. 11
5. Policy Recommendations………………………………………………………………… 15
5.1 Actors and Methods of Intervention
Summary of Discussion………………………………………………………………. 18
Policy Recommendations…………………………………………………………….. 20
5.2 Gender
5.3 Balance of Peace and Justice with Regards to Armed Groups
5.4 Democratization and the Role of Government
Summary of Discussion……………………………………………………………… 33
5.5 Natural Resources and the Private Sector
5.6 Afghanistan
5.7 Haiti
Summary of Discussion……………………………………………………………… 49
5.8 Sudan
6. Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………….. 63
7. Appendices……………………………………………………………………………….. 67
Appendix 1: Conference Schedule……………………………………………………….. 69
Appendix 2: Methodology………………………………………………………………... 75
Appendix 3: Participants………………………………………………………………….. 80
Appendix 4: Letters of Endorsement……………………………………………………... 90
8. Bibliography 95
Failing, Failed, and Fragile States Conference Report
4
Executive Summary
“All happy families are happy alike, all unhappy families

are unhappy in their own way.”
- Leo Tolstoy
Leo Tolstoy’s quotation from his world famous work, Anna Karenina, was separately used by
two speakers at the Failing, Failed, and Fragile States Conference. As the participants of the
conference learned, a focus on context is essential to understanding the problems faced by failing,
failed, and fragile states (FFFS). The purpose of the conference was to enhance the awareness
and understanding of the issues surrounding FFFS and their relation to Canada’s foreign policy.
This was achieved through presentations by top experts from academia, government, and non-
governmental organizations. These presentations were followed by discussions and policy
formulation sessions in which student delegates interacted with one another and the experts at
hand. The following is a list of the topics that were considered at the conference, with a summary
of policy recommendations for each:
Actors and Methods of Intervention

• Canada should move out of the “FFFS paradigm” and refocus its priorities on building
institutional capacity to recognize strengths and identify growth areas within FFFS. Canada
should achieve this by forming incentive-based proactive international partnerships that
strengthen the capacity of individual states to effectively respond to crises in the interest
of human security.
Gender
• Canada should increase investments in research on gender needs in FFFS and determine
how such information can be used to increase the effectiveness of Canada’s programs
within FFFS;
• Canada should support locally-driven initiatives and foster regional partnerships that focus
on strengthening, supporting, and diversifying women’s representation and leadership in
strategic sectors of the public sphere in FFFS in order to address gender inequity and
inequality.
Balance of Peace and Justice with Regard to Armed Groups

• Canada should invest in preventative measures in FFFS, help resolve existing conflicts,
and mitigate the negative impacts of violence in situations in which a balance between
peace and justice is required.
Democratization and the Role of Government

• Canada should look beyond Track-1 diplomacy with regard to FFFS and engage local
stakeholders in dialogue on democracy and openness.
5
Executive Summary
Natural Resources and the Private Sector

• Canada should undertake partnerships with relevant organizations and actors in order
to encourage market-based support for small, sustainable industries in FFFS, with an
emphasis on natural resource or extractive industries;
• Canada should implement both regulatory and non-regulatory measures to ensure the
corporate social responsibility and accountability of Canadian companies operating in
extractive industries in FFFS.
Afghanistan
• Canada should extend its military mandate in Afghanistan until at least 2011;
• Canada should increase communication between the government and the Canadian people
with the goal of increasing popular support for a sustainable long-term commitment to
Afghanistan.
Haiti
• Canada should help Haiti implement its plans in the area of judicial reform and should
make judicial reform an important part of its development commitment to Haiti;
• Canada should take the lead in helping Haiti implement its plans in the education
sector;
• Canada should increase its focus on the long-term nature of its commitment in Haiti to
ensure the sustainability of that commitment.
Sudan
• Canada should engage in diplomatic action to increase international support for the efforts
to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Sudan;
• Canada should engage in non-military actions that impose greater pressure on the
Sudanese government.
In discussing the topics considered at the conference, both delegates and experts refrained from
homogenizing the issues faced by FFFS. As can be seen in the report, two overarching themes
emerged: consideration of issues on a case-by-case basis and use of local resources to promote
stability and development. The two themes ensure that the policies followed by the Canadian
government do not misconstrue inherently complicated and diverse issues, while enhancing the
work of the Canadian government in FFFS.
6
Introduction
Failing, Failed, & Fragile States Conference

Introduction
Background
Failing, failed, and fragile states (FFFS) constitute a topic that is of utmost importance in today’s
increasingly interconnected world. Recent events have exposed the devastating effects of state
collapse on the citizens of affected states, as well as the ways in which FFFS threaten international
peace and stability. Human security is undermined by both the causes and consequences of state
failure. Violent conflict, environmental degradation, and lack of access to resources undermine
human security and can lead to state collapse. Meanwhile, characteristics of FFFS, such as
weak governance, corrupt military, inefficient financial institutions, and a lack of basic services,
adversely affect local populations. Threats to human security emanate from continued violence,
poverty, further environmental degradation, deterioration of human rights, and lack of access
to basic resources and services. Furthermore, the absence of order and security undermines the
successful implementation of development programs. Evaluating security situations and analyzing
the relationship between security and development, therefore, is fundamental to all international
efforts regarding FFFS.
It is for these reasons that the Government of Canada has made FFFS one of the key priorities
of its foreign policy. While many of the issues addressed at the conference are not necessarily
new, the way in which they apply to FFFS is of great relevance. As the Government of Canada is
currently developing its policies toward such states, now is the time for students to contribute to
this process. The student delegates’ ability to provide a unique and insightful perspective on the
issues discussed, aided by the guidance of high-level experts, have resulted in the valuable policy
recommendations presented in this report.
Conference Overview
The Failing, Failed, and Fragile States Conference was hosted by the International Relations
Students’ Association of the University of British Columbia (UBC) from March 8th to March
10th, 2007. The conference brought together 70 student delegates with numerous academics and
practitioners. The aim of the conference was to discuss and debate the overarching issues and case
studies of special relevance to Canada’s operations in FFFS in order to produce a series of foreign
policy recommendations regarding FFFS. The recommendations were designed to be presented to
the Canadian government, as well as to NGOs, lobby groups, and academic institutions that deal
with FFFS. This report outlines the foreign policy recommendations produced at the conference.
9
Conference Goals
The conference encouraged students to engage in constructive dialogue in order to build a deeper
understanding of FFFS, and to develop a vision for Canadian foreign policy with regard to FFFS.
This was necessary to achieve the following goals:
• Promote dialogue and increase awareness of the issues surrounding FFFS, especially in relation
to human security;
• Provide a forum for structured and critical analysis of the Canadian government's policies and
practices regarding FFFS, while promoting the collaboration of students, academia, NGOs, and
government agencies;
• Provide students with the tools and framework necessary to develop comprehensive policy
recommendations;
• Challenge students to actively participate in forming Canadian foreign policy;
• Provide the Canadian government, NGOs, academia, and the public with a Conference Report
detailing substantive policy recommendations made from an informed and unique perspective.
10
Concepts

Definition and Causes of State Fragility
The Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 provided the basis for the modern concept of the state as a
“sovereign territorially-based entity” and assumed that rulers had the responsibility of asserting
that sovereignty. This Western notion of the modern state has come to be considered as “the
solution to the political order,” because it provides an “efficient mechanism for ensuring property
rights and securing markets that allow capitalism (and imperialism) to flourish.”1 The creation of
the United Nations in 1945 cemented the Westphalian conception of the state by institutionalizing
a system of international cooperation that assumed such nation-states to be the building blocks of
the world order.2 Thus, even fragile colonial entities with no history as sovereign states, let alone
as democracies, were expected to function as such under the auspices of United Nations.3
State failure is generally associated with a weakening or complete lack of central authority.
However, the ability to “control and administer territory”4 is not the only important element of
a stable state. The terms “fragile,” “failed,” and “failing” have become shorthand for describing
states beset by a complex set of social, economic, political and environmental challenges or
deficiencies. In failing, failed, and fragile states (FFFS), human development has stalled or, in
some cases, begun to regress. The inability of state authorities to provide public services, such as
education and health care, leads to a decline in economic growth and increases in mortality and
morbidity. A government that cannot provide for its citizens lacks legitimacy and invites armed
challenges to its authority. The inability of a state to control its own territory can give rise to
violence and criminality. Spillover effects such as conflict, disease, and general unrest can spread
across borders, destabilizing entire regions.
Prior to the events of September 11th, 2001, scholars from varying disciplines were mapping links
between these various factors, as well as the relationships between these factors and “state capacity.”
Concepts such as “human security” and the “security-development nexus” attempted to capture the
crucial relationships between poverty, demographics, governance, displacement, environmental
degradation, human rights, and political and criminal violence. It became commonplace to read that
sustainable development could not take place without security, and that “state security” could not
be sustainable, or meaningful, if it came at the expense of the security of a state’s own citizens.
However, state failure took on a new level of salience after the attacks of 9/11. Afghanistan’s role
as a base for the recruitment and training of terrorists highlighted the risks involved in ignoring
1 Keith Krause and Jennifer Milliken, “State Failure, State Collapse and State Reconstruction: Concepts, Lessons
and Strategies,” Development and Change 33 (2002): 755.
2 “Failed and Collapsed States in the International System,” Report prepared by The African Studies Centre, Leiden,
The Transnational Institute, Amsterdam, and The Center of Social Studies, Coimbra Un. Global Policy Forum,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/sovereign/failed/2003/12failedcollapsedstates.pdf.
3 Robert I. Rotberg, “The Failure and Collapse of Nation States: Breakdown, Prevention and Repair,” When States
Fail: Causes and Consequences, ed. Robert I. Rotberg, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004, 27-8.
4 Jeffey Herbst, “Responding to State Failure in Africa,” International Security 21, no. 3 (1996): 120-44.
13
Concepts
FFFS. Since 9/11, preventing state failure has arguably become the new paradigm for international
security policy. The Bush administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy states, “the events of
September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to
our national interests as strong states.” Canada’s 2005 International Policy Statement states that
“security in Canada ultimately begins with stability abroad,”5 and that “failed states…plant the
seeds of threats to regional and global security.”6 Many governments have “significantly increased
their budgets in support of failed and fragile states and are shifting much of their diplomatic assets
into troubled regions.”7
The United Nations placed emphasis on the need for a comprehensive strategy to deal with new
security threats. In 2004, the United Nations released a high-level panel report on collective security
entitled A More Secure World: Our shared responsibility. In his Forward to the report, Kofi Annan
states: “[T]he front line in today’s combat must be manned by capable and responsible States
… The task of helping States improve their own capacities to deal with contemporary threats is
vital and urgent.” The report argues that with poverty comes a “fertile breeding-ground” for civil
conflict. Providing poor nations with the resources to develop, as recommended by the Millennium
Development Goals, enhances the security of wealthier countries. The report also emphasizes the
importance of post-conflict peace-building as a means of stabilizing states and is illustrative of the
growing consciousness regarding the links between development and security issues.8
The consequences of state fragility for Canada transcend the risk of terrorist attacks. The spillover
effects of state fragility or collapse can have both regional and global impacts on trade, global
energy supplies, crime networks, human and drug trafficking, the spread of infectious diseases,
and the flow of migrants and refugees.
5 Canada, DFAIT, “International Policy Statement; Defence: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World,” 2005,
http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports/dps/pdf/dps_e.pdf, 3.
6 Ibid., 5.
7 David Carment, “Guess what? We give more than 7% already,” Ottawa Citizen, 3 March 2007.
8 United Nations, “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,” http://www.un.org/secureworld/.
14
Policy
Recommendations

Policy Recommendations
Prior to the conference, delegates were each assigned to a specific issue area or geographic case
study for which they would formulate policy recommendations. They were also provided with
resources designed to prepare them for the discussion of all the topics, with emphasis on the
specific topic that was assigned to them.
On Friday, March 9th,1 Professor Stephen Nairne facilitated an introductory session to ensure that all
the participants adhered to the same methodology during the conference. Nairne provided a broad
working definition of FFFS, described the indicators used to measure state fragility, and provided
an overview of Canada’s involvement in FFFS. Nairne concluded by providing the delegates with
a set of guidelines for formulating recommendations.2
The introductory session was followed by panels of experts, which were composed of members
from the academic, governmental, non-governmental, and private sectors. The panels addressed
the five issue areas of the conference (Actors and Methods of Intervention; Gender; Balance of
Peace and Justice with Regard to Armed Groups; Democratization and the Role of Government;
and Natural Resources and the Private Sector). At the end of each panel session, delegates interacted
with the panellists during a question-and-answer period. Each delegate also participated in two
sets of break-out sessions, in which they each engaged in discussions with other delegates on two
of the five issue areas featured at the conference (one issue area for each set of break-out sessions).
Student co-chairs directed these discussions with the assistance of the experts. Through exposure
to the five issue areas, delegates strengthened their understanding of the complex links between the
issue areas and identified themes for policy recommendations.
During the morning of Saturday, March 10th, delegates engaged with panels on the three case
studies of the conference (Afghanistan, Haiti, and Sudan). These panels were followed by a set of
break-out sessions in which each delegate was assigned to a specific case study. These panels and
break-out sessions followed a similar format to those of the previous day and enabled delegates to
identify themes for policy recommendations.
The conference culminated with Policy Formulation Sessions during the afternoon of Saturday,
March 10th. During these sessions, delegates formulated policy recommendations on the issue areas
and case studies. Each policy session was co-chaired by a student well-versed in the topic, as well
as the respective panellists. The recommendations that follow were formulated through discussion
and collaboration between the student delegates and student co-chairs with the guidance of experts.
Each set of policy recommendations is preceded by an overview of the topic that integrates the
main points presented by the panellists and a summary of the key themes that came up in the
subsequent break-out sessions.
1 A detailed conference agenda is provided in Appendix I.

2 An overview of the key points made by Professor Nairne is provided in Appendix II.
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poLICY rECOMMENDATIONS
Summary of Issue Area 1: Actors and Methods of Intervention

One of the most important contemporary debates in International Relations is that of the timing
and method of intervention in FFFS. The norm of non-intervention has enabled states to justify
inaction in situations involving extreme human rights abuses, such as the events that took place in
Rwanda in 1994.
In 2000, the Canadian government sponsored the Independent International Commission on

Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) to confront this challenge and answer the questions
of when, how, and in what form the international community should intervene in another state’s
affairs, with a special focus on military action. After twelve months of intensive research, the
ICISS produced a report entitled The Responsibility to Protect. The report explores the notion of
the Responsibility to Protect, which suggests that in the event that a sovereign state does not protect
its own citizens from avoidable catastrophe, the international community has a responsibility to
intervene. The Responsibility to Protect is divided into three main components: the responsibility
to prevent, the responsibility to react, and the responsibility to rebuild. The bulk of the ICISS
report was completed prior to the attacks of September 11th. However, since 9/11, the debate over
the responsibility to intervene in situations of extreme human rights abuses in FFFS has come
to overlap with responses against terrorism in the policies of many developed nations, including
Canada.
Panellist Dr. Jane Boulden noted the securitization of the issue of FFFS, whereby a need to respond
to FFFS is identified because of the potential threats, such as terrorism, that these states can produce.
Dr. Boulden suggested that discussion of actors and methods of intervention be framed by asking
three questions: “who are the actors,” “how to intervene,” and “when to intervene.” Canadian
experience with intervention has generally involved multilateral actors such as the UN and NATO;
however, Dr. Boulden noted that Canada has been shifting its involvement in interventions from
those under a UN banner toward those under the banner of NATO, a military organization. Canada’s
role in intervention efforts have ranged from crisis and peace support to the use of military forces.
The timing of an intervention, such as whether the intervention happens prior to, during, or after a
conflict, affects the impact of the intervention and the range of resources required for a successful
conclusion. Dr. Boulden discussed the Responsibility to Protect report, noting its emphasis on
prevention, an area that is often disregarded in favour of an emphasis on crises. Dr. Boulden also
explained that it is crucial to understand the context of the situation on the ground in order to
implement a successful response.
Panellist Dr. David Carment emphasized that, when formulating recommendations, it is important
to know how one’s audience will perceive the recommendations. It is also imperative to recognize
that states fail for a variety of reasons, and to recognize the importance of different sources of
information, such as ground monitors and statistical information, in building a full picture of
the situation of the state in question. The analysis of FFFS for effective policy-making requires
recognition that each state is different, consideration of a wide range of factors, and an understanding
of what is strategically relevant to Canada.
Both panellists emphasized that Canada’s ability to assist FFFS is limited by Canada’s capacity;
this was also a theme that arose frequently during discussions. Dr. Carment explained that there
18
are many relevant actors that can be or are involved in FFFS. Thus, it is important for Canada to
consider questions such as how much development assistance Canada can allot to the nation in
question, whether Canada has the tools to make a difference, which organizations or branches
of government can provide assistance, whether Canada has prior experience in the area of the
proposed intervention, and whether the proposed intervention would garner sufficient political
support. An assessment of relevance combined with an assessment of Canada’s potential impact
can be used to gauge Canada’s potential net effectiveness, determining whether or not Canada
should participate in an intervention.
Common themes and questions emphasized during the Actors and Methods of Intervention
Break-Out Sessions included:
• What factors should determine Canada’s interest in a region? It is important to consider the
limitations of Canada’s capabilities and where Canada can make the most impact. Not all
delegates agreed with a focus on intervention for security issues. Some suggested that we should
also consider the preventative capacity of the military. Some delegates argued that Canada has
had mixed goals, resulting in a lack of a single unified method or statement of intent. Canada’s
interests in multilateralism and its ability to gather support from other regions may also impact
its ability to intervene. Delegates also debated the extent to which Canadian values, such as
democratization, should be involved in stabilization efforts.
• How can Canada’s impact be increased? Delegates identified a need to strengthen Canada’s
analytical and diplomatic capabilities. Delegates also noted that Canada’s impact can be
strengthened by incorporating local knowledge and local structures from the FFFS being
assisted.
• What makes an intervention legitimate? Delegates debated which actors had the legitimacy to
intervene in FFFS and whether it was always necessary for the UN Security Council to provide
a mandate for action.
• What actors are important? Delegates identified multilateral frameworks as important in the
context of Canada’s involvement. Recognizing both the private sector and diaspora linkages
was also seen to be important.
• The concept of intervention: Delegates suggested that “engagement” may be a more appropriate
term than “intervention,” because “intervention” indicates a violation of sovereignty and a lack
of consent.
• Military aid as a method of intervention: In terms of methods of intervention, concern was
voiced that the military might not be the most effective agent for delivering aid. Specifically,
while NGOs were typically identified as impartial, the partiality of the military was often seen
as questionable.
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Policy Recommendations: Actors and Methods of Intervention

Student Co-Chair: Alia Dharssi
Recommendation 1: Formulate Preventative Engagement
Preamble
The strategic philosophy of the government impacts the dynamics of Canada’s operations in other
states. In order to reach desirable outcomes, it is important to consider what philosophies and
values Canada wants its operational frameworks to be built upon.
Canada’s current paradigm for intervention is the “Triple-F (Failing, Failed, and Fragile) paradigm,”
which can be defined as an outlook that focuses on the failure or extreme fragility of a state as
a necessary prerequisite to engagement. Post-conflict engagement has been shown to be much
more costly then preventative measures, but moral and legal considerations have prevented states
from intervening before a state is deemed as “failed.” However, preventative engagement with
states that are on the threshold of disintegration would be more cost-effective, would prevent the
undesirable spillover effects of conflicts, and would enable Canada to exert its influence within a
peaceful environment by building positive relationships with FFFS.
While it is important for Canada to maintain an overarching sense of values in its engagement
with FFFS, it is also important for Canada to be aware of the unique nuances of each individual
situation. The issue areas and case studies of the conference illustrate that the most effective
operations necessitate a thorough understanding of the specific context of the state in question.
The issue areas and case studies also illustrate that a lack of sufficient and effective institutional
capacity-building has the potential to drive states into collapse. Canada’s relationships with weak
states could benefit from a framework that is conscious of context-specific factors and focuses on
preventative institutional capacity-building in the context of long-standing diplomatic relationships
for the purpose of mitigating institutional problems. For instance, one of the biggest problems
currently plaguing Haiti’s infrastructure and threatening its fragile stability is its legal codes, which
date back to 1804.3 However, Canada, which has had formal relations with Haiti since 1968, could
have aided in capacity-building by reforming the judicial system prior to Haiti’s collapse.
Review of Canadian Policies and Programs
In 2001, Canada sponsored the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
(ICISS) in response to former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s challenge to the international
community to come to a consensus on when, how, and under whose authority intervention
should occur. Through this action, Canada recognized the importance of having a framework for
engagement with FFFS. In December 2001, the ICISS produced a report entitled The Responsibility
to Protect.4 The report presents a framework that has been recognized by the Canadian government
3 International Crisis Group, “Haiti: Justice Reform and the Security Crisis.” Brussels: International Crisis Group,
2007. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4639&l=1.
4 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, “The Responsibility to Protect,” http://www.
iciss.ca/menu-en.asp.
20
as “a key component of Canada’s human security agenda.”5
The Responsibility to Protect is “the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect
their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe – from mass murder and rape, from starvation –
but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that the responsibility must be borne by the
broader community of states.”6 The mandate reframes the concept of intervention by shifting the
emphasis away from the actor(s) intervening to the individuals in need of protection.7 Moreover,
the emphasis on human security broadens the concept of intervention to include a responsibility to
prevent, a responsibility to react, and a responsibility to rebuild.
Currently, the majority of Canada’s engagements in FFFS have not been on a preventative level.
The case studies of the Conference (Afghanistan, Haiti, and Sudan), which constitute Canada’s
largest international commitments, all received significant Canadian attention only after the states
in question were either nearing failure or collapsing.
Policy Statement
Canada should move out of the “FFFS paradigm” and refocus its priorities on building
institutional capacity to recognize strengths and identify growth areas within FFFS. Canada
should achieve this by forming incentive-based proactive international partnerships that
strengthen the capacity of individual states to effectively respond to crises in the interest of
human security.
Policy Objectives
• To move toward a proactive engagement that focuses on prevention (rather than conflict
intervention) and positive bilateral and multilateral relationships with weak states;
• To encourage a philosophy of intervention that emphasizes the importance of a thorough
understanding of context-specific factors for successful engagement with FFFS;
• To engage select weak states by building their institutional capacities in order to strengthen
their resiliency and capability of absorbing external and internal shocks.
Policy Directives and Guidelines
• Canada should focus on “engagement,” rather than “intervention,” as its primary operative word
for interaction with weak states. Intervention has come to represent a breach of sovereignty
and tends to imply actions taken only when a state is nearing collapse or is committing grave
human rights violations. “Engagement” can be used to broadly imply the building of positive
relationships with weaker states that are on the threshold of failure;
• Recognizing that each state has unique needs, Canada should approach its engagement with
5 Canada, DFAIT, “Responsibility to Protect,” http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/library/canadaandresponsibility-
toprotect-en.asp.
6 Canada, International Development Research Centre, The Responsibility to Protect prepared by the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Ottawa: The International Development Research Centre, De-
cember 2001, vii.
7 Gareth Evans and Mahmoud Sahnoun,“The Responsibility to Protect,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 6 (2002): 99-110.
21
weak states on a case-by-case basis to ensure that it focuses on context-specific factors and
avoids actions based on generalities;
• When deciding how and when to engage with weak states, Canada should limit its use of
numerical indicators and indexes while taking advantage of other sources of information
that define the social, political, cultural and economic context of the state in question. These
context-specific sources are equally, if not more, important to numerical indicators that deal
with states by universalizing various risk factors. Diaspora groups may prove useful in this
regard; however, Canada should also be aware of the biases these groups may bring to the table
because of their own interests within the state in question;
• Canada should seek to build egalitarian dialogues with weaker states by finding common ground,
both through discussions of cultural differences and through recognition of the strengths of
other states. Canada should seek to involve the international community by conducting these
dialogues in multilateral, in addition to bilateral, frameworks;
• Canada should use an incentives-based approach in engaging relevant sectors within weak states
in order to build internal capacity and resilience. Some methods for building such relationships
may include, but are not limited to: trade agreements, membership in multilateral organizations,
and reduction of agricultural subsidies. In implementing this directive, Canada should take
advantage of resources it is already using. For instance, the Canadian government could adopt a
purchasing policy that requires government agencies to purchase only fair-trade products, such
as fair-trade coffee. With such policies, the government would purchase a product it already
uses while benefiting farmers in weak states;
• Canada should include an emphasis on institutional capacity-building in these relationships with
weak states as a means of combating potential weaknesses and corruption in specific sectors;
• Proactive, rather than reactive, measures that focus on the strengths, not weaknesses, of states
should be considered for Canada’s policy on engagement.
22
Summary of Issue Area 2: Gender
The issue of gender has become increasingly important in understanding the structural problems of
social policy in FFFS. Many studies have pointed to gender equality as an indicator of social and
economic viability in developing nations. Gender issues relate to both men and women in terms
of the differential effects of the socioeconomic problems that are faced by FFFS. The numerous
issues that affect men and women in FFFS must be solved in ways that consider gender issues in
the context of religious, cultural, and socioeconomic backgrounds.
Panellist Dr. Erin Baines explained that gender has presented an important approach to understanding
conflict situations; however, while gender is not completely absent from Canada’s foreign policy,
it has not been well-integrated or specifically articulated either. Dr. Baines argued that it is
problematic that “women” is often equated with “gender.” There is a need to take an approach to
gender that recognizes how men and women are impacted differently by conflict situations and
that recognizes the diversity within both of these gender categories. There are also issues that
come with conflict situations, such as the rape of men, that are typically absent from analysis. The
different experiences of men and women can impact the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance.
Consequently, it is important to consider whether Canada’s current approach to gender analysis is
working and to consider alternative models.
Panellist Lauryn Oates suggested that the concepts of gender and security need to be considered in
the context of human security, rather than traditional security. When focusing on gender in relation
to legal frameworks for international human rights, political participation, and civil society, barriers
to change are often created by religious and cultural expectations. Consequently, it is important to
find strategies for inciting change from the grassroots level, which is a perspective emphasized by
human security, rather than enforcing changes that are top-down, which tends to be seen as cultural
violation. This enables a dialogue that can focus on determining the priorities and needs of the
women on the ground. Ms. Oates also emphasized that it is also important to consider women in
terms of their capabilities, rather than viewing them only as victims.
Common themes and questions emphasized during the Gender Break-Out Sessions
included:
• The diversity of gender categories: Delegates noted that is important to remember the diversity
within gender categories. The divisions “men” and “women” apply to groups of people from a
wide range of socioeconomic categories.
• Consideration of context is crucial: Delegates noted that both students and policy-makers
are generally disconnected from the “realities on the ground”; moreover, 80% of CIDA’s
staff operates in Canada. These factors make awareness of context all the more important.
The importance of understanding context for effective operations may also indicate a need for
reform in CIDA’s operational strategies. Taking this into consideration, delegates suggested
that recommendations need to be designed so that they are adaptable to each unique situation.
Delegates also discussed how Canada could facilitate grassroots initiatives to create gender
equality.
• Gender mainstreaming: Delegates argued that the policy of gender mainstreaming is a step in
the right direction, but it has only been used to supplement pre-existing programs. Delegates
23
identified the need to consider reformulating or building new programs. Delegates also agreed
that recommendations that simply make generalizations about gender equality will not be useful,
as such generalizations are already embedded in Canadian policy.
• Reformulation of foreign policy implementation: Delegates suggested thinking in the long term
when considering gender issues, as this would facilitate a more natural change in a society.
Delegates also suggested encouraging interaction between the government, NGOs, and academia
to create more dynamic and comprehensive policies.
• Cultural relativism: With regard to Canadian values, delegates realized that culture can only be
relevant to a certain extent. At some point, when facing extremism, lines must be drawn when
dealing with human rights. However, it is also important to recognize the strength of cultural
factors and to find ways to initiate change from within.
• A need for more research and funding: Delegates suggested that Canada invest in projects
to increase understanding of the actual socioeconomic issues and structures with regard to
gender in FFFS and do this by building bridges across nongovernmental and governmental
sectors. Delegates also identified a need for more funding in general toward gender issues and
development in FFFS, noting that Canada is not meeting its commitment of spending 0.7% of
its gross national income on official development assistance (ODA).
• Importance of broadening understanding of sexual violence: Delegates argued that sexual
violence is an issue that must be addressed in conflict and post-conflict situations, using an
approach that recognizes how it affects men and women differently. Delegates identified a need
to openly address the issue and focus on educational initiatives to affect change. Delegates also
emphasized the importance of a focus on the perpetrator, rather than the victim.
24
Policy Recommendations: Gender

Student Co-chair: Will Goldbloom
Recommendation 1: Increase Funding for Research on Gender Issues in FFFS
Preamble
When examining gender within the realm of foreign policy, it is important to differentiate between
issues related to women and issues related to gender. Gender issues relate to both men and women
in terms of how socioeconomic problems in FFFS affect each differently. Women and men can be
adversely affected by gendered policies in FFFS. For instance, women in FFFS are more prone to
displacement, HIV/AIDS, poor education, sexual violence and a lack of economic opportunities;
whereas, men may be more heavily affected by policies that recruit young males to warring factions.
The issue of gender within FFFS is sensitive because cultural norms can form barriers against the
influence of the international community, particularly in regard to issues faced by women.
The issue of gender has become increasingly important in understanding the structural problems
of social policy in FFFS. Many studies have pointed to gender equality as an indicator of social
and economic viability in developing nations. The gender dynamics of a region have an impact
on which groups exercise power, how these groups exercise power, economic opportunities for
families, and the building of civil society. Consequently, a better understanding of gender issues is
crucial to increasing the effectiveness of Canada’s assistance to FFFS.
Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) has identified gender
mainstreaming, “a strategy to assess the implications for both men and women, of any planned
actions, policies, or programmes in all areas and at all levels,”8as one of its foreign policy
priorities.9 Additionally, CIDA places importance upon gender analysis as “an indispensable tool
for both understanding the local context, and promoting gender equality.”10 CIDA defines gender
analysis as “the variety of methods used to understand the relationships between men and women,
their access to resources, their activities, and the constraints they face relative to each other.”11
CIDA considers gender analysis to be “an essential element of socioeconomic analysis” because
it “provides information on the different conditions that women and men face, and the different
effects that policies and programs may have on them because of their situations.”12 In sum, Canada
has recognized that gender analysis can play a central role in ensuring effective policies and
programs.
8 Canada, DFAIT, “Mainstreaming of a Gender Perspective,” http://www.international.gc.ca/foreign_policy/human-

rights/Iwe5-mainstream-en.asp.
��
Canada, DFAIT, “Canada’s Commitment to Gender Equality and the Advancement of Women’s Rights Inter-
nationally,” http://www.international.gc.ca/foreign_policy/human-rights/Iwe1-equal-en.asp.
��
Canada, CIDA, “CIDA’s Policy on Gender Equality,” http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/EMA-
��
218123616-NN9#sum.
11 Canada, CIDA, “Gender Analysis,” http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/JUD-31194519-
KBD#1.
12 Ibid.
25
Between the fiscal years 1998-1999 and 2005-2006, an annual average of 4.68% of CIDA’s
ODA was allocated to programs aimed at increasing gender equality.13 Allocating more funding
specifically toward research on gender needs in FFFS has the potential to improve Canada’s
operations in FFFS because, as has been recognized by Canada, gender analysis can provide a
crucial perspective for understanding the impact of programs on the ground.
Policy Statement
Canada should increase investments in research on gender needs in FFFS and determine
how such information can be used to increase the effectiveness of Canada’s programs
within FFFS.
Policy Objectives
• To enhance the positive impact of Canadian interventions in FFFS;

• To increase focus on women’s issues in the media, government, and academia;
• To increase focus on how gendered policies impact men and women differently in FFFS;
• To build civil society instruments that emphasize gender equality.
• CIDA, DND, and DFAIT should devote increased funding to assess gender needs during the
development of Canada’s policies and programs for FFFS;
• CIDA, along with any other relevant government sectors, should build a stronger relationship
between policy-makers, academics, governments, and those on the ground with regard to
understanding the impact of gender on its operations in FFFS;
• CIDA should consult with local agencies and civil society organizations before moving ahead
with any projects that emphasize gender-based programs. This will help determine whether
the programs can be improved to better address the needs of the local populations and can also
review the practicality and necessity of the programs.
Recommendation 2: Foster Local Initiatives
Preamble
Each region has its own unique needs with regard to alleviating the negative impacts of gender
roles. Many countries have not benefited from gender empowerment; in some situations, there have
been backlashes against human rights values that are seen as “Western” and movements toward
more extreme and limited interpretations of rights that subjugate women. In other cases, boys have
been removed from schools and replaced by women. To effectively deal with gender issues, it is
important to consider each situation individually and to encourage a grassroots approach to the
development of gender equality.
13 Canada, CIDA, “Funding – CIDA’s Investment in Equality Between Women and Men,” http://www.acdi-cida.
gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/JUD-31195111-KF2.
26
Canada has signed both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, which are human rights instruments
that represent an international consensus on gender equality.14 Moreover, Canada, along with
the international community, has made important commitments to women through the Beijing
Platform for Action, the Millennium Development Goals, and UN Security Council Resolution
1325 on Women, Peace and Security.15 Additionally, CIDA has displayed a strong commitment to
gender equality through its Policy on Gender Equality, which states that “gender equality must be
considered as an integral part of all CIDA policies, programs and projects.”
UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which passed with a unanimous vote in 2000 when Canada
maintained a seat on the Security Council, “encourages the Secretary-General to implement his
strategic plan … calling for an increase in the participation of women at decision-making levels
in conflict resolution and peace processes.” Resolution 1325 also “urges the Secretary-General to
seek to expand the role and contribution of women in UN field-based operations, and especially
among military observers, civilian police, human rights, and humanitarian personnel.”16 While
these statements were directed at UN bodies, their intentions of strengthening and supporting
women’s representation and leadership in strategic sectors of peacekeeping and security are
relevant to Canada’s operations in FFFS.
Policy Statement
Canada should support locally-driven initiatives and foster regional partnerships that focus
on strengthening, supporting, and diversifying women’s representation and leadership
in strategic sectors of the public sphere in FFFS in order to address gender inequity and
inequality.
Policy Objectives
• To build civil-society instruments that emphasize gender equality;

• To support grassroots initiatives that enable people in FFFS to come to an understanding of
gender equality that fits into their own cultural context;
• To encourage a stronger female presence in strategic areas of leadership;
• To provide role models to encourage other women to seek out careers in these strategic sectors in
order to increase the proportion of women in society who can influence important decisions;
• To encourage female participation in all levels of decision-making processes.
14 ��
Canada, DFAIT, “Canada’s Commitment to Gender Equality and the Advancement of Women’s Rights Inter-
nationally,” http://www.international.gc.ca/foreign_policy/human-rights/Iwe1-equal-en.asp.
15 Canada, CIDA, “Equality Between Women and Men,” http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/
JUD-31192610-JXF.
16 ��
United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 1325,” http://www.unfpa.org/women/1325.htm.
27
• CIDA should continue to encourage microfinance and microcredit initiatives that provide
women with greater economic opportunities;
• CIDA and DFAIT should provide more direct funding to relevant accountable local organizations
that can allocate the funding according to local needs;
• Before moving ahead with any projects, CIDA and DFAIT should consult with local agencies
in order to determine the practicality and necessity of those projects;
• CIDA and DFAIT should encourage more funding for local advocacy and lobbying-based
organizations within FFFS, as opposed to service-based organizations;
• Through its programs, CIDA should seek methods to create physical spaces that can increase
women’s networking opportunities by enabling women to meet and interact without men;
• CIDA and DFAIT should connect women of varying socioeconomic backgrounds with
appropriate regional networks that can help them find ways to impact decision-making, while
allowing them the opportunity to find their own solutions;
• CIDA and DFAIT should provide funds specifically for training female personnel from
varying socioeconomic backgrounds in strategic fields such as security, medicine, and public
policy. Such policies should aim to decrease the number of violations made against women by
predominantly male institutions, such as the police system, and make it easier for women to
approach these institutions.
28
Summary of Issue Area 3: Balance of Peace and Justice with Regard to

Armed Groups
A society emerging from conflict is often faced with the question of how to deal with the perpetrators
of war crimes and the instigators of conflict. This question is laced with immediate difficulty, as
there is a fine balance that must be struck between forgiveness and punishment in order to bring
closure to the affected populace.
Canada is actively engaged in international efforts to bring to justice individuals who have
fomented hate and/or conflict and has joined efforts with organizations such as the International
Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Criminal Tribunal (ICT). Canada has also passed
the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, which it abides by in order to remain true
to the Rome Statute, the treaty that established the ICC. The problems faced by Canada in this
realm are numerous, as it is difficult to bridge the gaps between reconciliation and enforcement of
international law.
Panellist Dr. Marie-Joelle Zahar explained that the questions of how to achieve the balance between
peace and justice and for whom it is being achieved are of fundamental importance. The peace
structure has a tendency to be imposed by a foreign power or organization. This ultimately works
against the intent of the structure, as local populations feel alienated from the process, preventing
lasting stability from being achieved. Consequently, “peace and justice for whom and by whom?”
is one of the first questions that must be answered in any attempt to implement a balance of both
peace and justice. This question implies consideration of whether both state and non-state actors
should be included. In the event that non-state actors are included in the peace process, one must
decide whether or not to include militias. This has been marked as a contentious issue, as including
militias in the process involves the undesired risk of giving them political legitimacy.
Dr. Zahar noted that a second and equally important concern is the order in which peace and
justice are sought. Certain cases require a stable environment for any efforts toward justice to be
successful, while others require a sense of justice to satisfy the population before any peace can be
established. Both peace and justice, however, are preconditions to stability.
Panellist Dr. Jean-François Gareau explained that no specific formula exists that will ensure a
viable transition from a state of war to a state of stability, as all cases are drastically different.
However, despite the situational differences in each separate case, there exist certain continuities
in the processes of international law. The first one is the judicial process, which involves ad hoc
tribunals, the ICC, and hybrid tribunals. There are also non-judicial approaches to peace and justice
that are often ambiguous in their strengths, as they involve much trial and error. Non-judicial
processes involve Truth Commissions and Amenities. The issue of how to deal with non-entities,
such as armed groups, is also of vital importance, as the court has to hold them responsible without
granting them any legitimacy that may undermine the government.
Panellist Dr. Erin Baines spoke about the balance of peace and justice with regard to armed groups in
relation to her experiences working in Northern Uganda. Dr. Baines discussed the tension between
punishing those responsible for war crimes and reintegrating armed groups into the society, the
29
latter being an essential part of the peace process. Dr. Baines also discussed the difficulties that
come with the implementation of the international system of justice, noting that the ICC, which
focuses on indicting top leaders, may be unable to address the needs of the local populations
because it may undermine the local justice system. Such a situation may also fail to provide solace
to the families of victims and may be unable to provide answers as to why the conflict happened
in the first place.
Common themes and questions emphasized during the Balance of Peace and Justice Break-
Out Sessions included:
• The role of the ICC: Delegates argued that the ICC is an instrumental organization for establishing
a balance between peace and justice; however, conflicts can emerge between the ICC and local
traditional approaches to justice. There is often a pronounced friction between the two that
makes integration of the systems difficult, as the traditional approaches to justice do not always
run parallel to the ICC’s opinions on how justice should be achieved.
• Education of local populations: Delegates argued that people indigenous to the region in
question often do not know of the benefits or processes of the ICC tribunals. Delegates argued
that educating the locals in these processes is important.
• Canada’s role: Delegates questioned whether it is possible for Canada to act as a neutral mediator
in the justice process. Discussions revolved around what Canada can do to help mediation,
with an emphasis on how Canada can provide logistical support to the peace and/or judiciary
processes. The issue of capacity-building was central to this debate, as states must eventually
possess the capacity to conduct their own judicial processes. Education in this context can work
as a preventative measure, because educating locals on the importance of a functioning and
efficient justice system is intrinsic to maintaining peace and security.
30
Policy Recommendations: Balance of Peace and Justice with Regard to

Armed Groups
Student Co-Chair: Amir Musin
Recommendation 1: Invest in Preventative Measures, Resolve Existing Conflicts, and

Mitigate Violence
Preamble
A key challenge to peace processes in many FFFS is striking a balance between peace and justice.
Choosing a proper balance between punishing those responsible for heinous crimes and burying
grievances for the sake of peace is crucial to the future stability of a post-conflict state. There are
many factors that need to be considered in achieving this balance, and there is no all-encompassing
approach that will ensure a successful reconciliation process. Thus, consideration on a case-by-
case basis is essential.
Canada’s three largest international humanitarian and security commitments (Afghanistan, Haiti,
and Sudan) deal largely with warring or conflicting people within the borders of a single state.
The success of Canada’s involvement in countries that have different factions who have been
and continue to be at war with one another depends on the proper balance of peace and justice.
Old alliances and rivalries threaten the potential for peace and detract from Canada’s mission. In
countries that have experienced intrastate warfare, tensions between the warring parties remain
prevalent even after conflict comes to an end, especially when people from different communal
groups are living within a single area ruled by a single government. Reconciliation between these
parties is essential to guaranteeing stability. An increased level of stability decreases the potential
for future state weakness and ensures that the resources Canada diverts to the region have a positive
long-term impact.
Canada played an integral role in the efforts to create the ICC, and has been involved in international
war tribunals since 1945. The court, independent of any single government, has the capacity to
prosecute individuals accused of most grave human rights violations.
In conjunction with the Rome Statute, Canada has also adopted the Crimes Against Humanity and
War Crimes Act, which seeks to bring to justice those residing in Canada who are guilty of crimes
against humanity, regardless of where those crimes may have been committed.
Policy Statement
Canada should invest in preventative measures in FFFS, help resolve existing conflicts, and
mitigate the negative impacts of violence in cases in which a balance between peace and
justice is required.
31
Policy Objectives
• To prevent violent conflict by communicating to relevant segments of the population alternative

options, as well as the negative outcomes of violence;
• To expedite the conflict-resolution process in cases where conflict is occurring or reoccurring
by providing mediation services and/or good offices;
• To achieve successful reintegration of persons affected by violence (including perpetrators)
back into their societies upon cessation of conflict in order to ensure stable and lasting peace.
• Canada should promote understanding of legal options and obligations among people in FFFS.
These efforts should be attentive to the limited role the ICC and the international community
have in the domestic affairs of states;
• In cases where Canada has the ability to influence outcomes, Canada should seek to mediate
between conflicting parties in order to achieve a fair and realistic resolution;
• In cases were Canada has little or no influence, Canada should offer the use of its territory and
logistical support to the conflicting parties;
• Canada should provide significant support to local actors who seek to successfully reintegrate
conflict-affected persons into their communities. These efforts should include, but not be limited
to, financial, political, and logistical forms of support, as well provision of personnel, expertise,
and tangible resources;
• Canada should be aware and attentive of local customs involved in reintegration and rehabilitation
of perpetrators in order to avoid imposing a Western-centric view of reconciliation upon
culturally-sensitive regions;
• Canada should aim to implement this policy through a “whole-of-government approach” that
focuses on coordination between DND, DFAIT, and CIDA.
32
Summary of Issue Area 4: Democratization and the Role of Government
The international community regularly emphasizes the importance of promoting stable democracy
within FFFS. Democratization is also a value that has been articulated by the Canadian government.
Implementing democracy, however, is not always a fail-safe solution to regaining stability in
FFFS, which are often plagued by ethnic rivalries, unstable security sectors, histories of conflicting
ideologies, and warlordism. Western biases often misunderstand the difficulties of imposing
democracy upon an unstable state. At times, the belief in democratic elections and the power of
democracy as a whole has been driven more by ideological dogma rather than empirical evidence.
It is therefore in the interests of states intervening and/or involved in the peace and rebuilding
processes to determine under what circumstances democracy can and should be encouraged.
Important points that should be addressed in such a determination include: the legitimacy of the
nascent government in the eyes of the populace; the intricacies of holding elections in post-conflict
states; the importance of civil societies in the rebuilding process; and the role of the security sector
within the post-conflict state.
Panellist Dr. Sandra MacLean was concerned with how to promote democracy successfully
without harming or further dividing a post-conflict society and argued that the construction of civil
society is paramount to success. The development and construction of a viable democratic system
requires a long-term engagement and the receptiveness of the local population is a pre-condition
to success. Grassroots initiatives can create a foundation for a stable democracy. However, Dr.
MacLean explained that democracy can be impeded by non-democratic elements that influence the
state. Examples of such obstacles include radical nationalists, religious fanatics, and states such as
China that have models of political development that differ from those of most Western states.
Panellist Dr. Robert Miller argued that parliamentary institutions are necessary to ensure the
successful construction of a democracy and democratic governance. Parliaments serve as a forum
where people can debate issues of general concern and attempt to tackle the challenges that come
with building a nation. A focus on the creation of Parliamentary Committees can serve as a bridge
between two or more opposing parties, thereby ensuring that no one single faction dominates the
parliament. However, while parliamentary institutions are an intrinsic part of a viable democracy,
they cannot function alone as the sole solution, as parliaments are at risk of being controlled and
manipulated by a limited executive.
Panellist Stewart Prest also focused on local institutions, arguing that local democratic institutions
need to be built upward from the grassroots level in order to ensure successful democratization.
FFFS often lack institutional capacity, leading to the rise of single individuals or small groups of
elites that control every aspect of the country. There exists a certain danger, therefore, in trying to
implement democratic processes, as they can often lead to increased levels of instability. Mr. Prest
argued that the democratization of FFFS needs to be done on an incremental scale, by building
institutions that allow democracy to take hold gradually. The elements required to create an effective
democracy are: a local impetus, as the ultimate responsibility rests upon the people of the state in
question; the incorporation of local structures into any democratization initiative wherever possible;
prioritizing and sequencing issues based on context, as different issues are of varying importance
in different countries; constant monitoring and analysis of the situation, as there is no standard
33
formula for democratic reform; multidimensional coordination within and across governments,
particularly because the margin for error in FFFS is much smaller than in other situations; and
preparation for a long-term engagement in order to create effective, sustainable change. .
Common themes and questions emphasized during the Democratization Break-Out Sessions
included:
• How can the foundations for a viable democracy be laid in FFFS?: Delegates argued that
the construction of a civil society, combined with NGOs dedicated to promoting democracy
and democratic characteristics, are essential preconditions to a viable democracy. Delegates
discussed the positive effects of NGOs on the education of the populace, the potential dangers of
altering existing power structures (due to the introduction of an NGO), and finally, the barriers
to creating civil society in FFFS. The latter point pertains especially to states that are either
dependant or heavily engaged in extractive resources, as maintaining the status quo may be in
the interest of the elite groups who control those resources.
• What should Canada’s commitment to democratization be?: Much of the discussion focused
on Canada’s approach to democratization. Agreement was voiced that Canada should promote
and allow for the natural evolution of democratic institutions, rather than impose a standard
model of democracy that may not be applicable to all cases. A standard model may even be
counterproductive and create cultural conflict. Delegates argued that the impetus for democracy
should be both locally and internationally driven, as the creation of a stable democracy presents
security benefits to both the state and the international community.
34
Policy Recommendations: Democratization and the Role of Government

Student Co-Chair: Alex Sales
Recommendation 1: Engage Local Stakeholders in a Dialogue on Democracy
Preamble
Canada has made a considerable commitment to spreading democracy, both in terms of building
institutions and engaging local civil society in its policy formation. Canada has made a commitment
to democratization in the humanitarian efforts where it is most involved, such as Afghanistan
and Haiti. According to the Canadian government, the process of democratization is an essential
stepping-stone toward state stability; however, there are numerous obstacles to the democratization
of FFFS. Democracy is an evolutionary process that takes place over an extended period of time
and must, therefore, be contextualized in order to succeed. All states have to be considered on
an individual basis and the transfer to a stable and successful democracy has to consider cultural
sensitivities that may affect the outcome. Rather than exporting its own democratic model and
biases, Canada must develop models that fit with and prioritize local needs.
Canada must begin at the grassroots level by working with local structures and initiatives that engage
a majority of the people from different socioeconomic backgrounds. Building and encouraging
the development of local civil society organizations can create a stronger foundation for a viable
democracy that has roots in the culture of the society in question. Democracy should be built from
within, rather than enforced from above.
In order to better integrate local priorities, Canada must have a concrete understanding of local
power relations. Democratization can have a destabilizing affect and can, rather paradoxically,
interrupt its own progress. Specifically, this is likely to occur if the nation in question lacks the
necessary governmental and institutional structures to support the democratization process by itself.
Having a better understanding of the local context can help Canada to better allocate resources to
support institutions that are sustainable and meet the needs of the local population. Therefore, the
prioritization and sequencing of democratization must be done with consideration of the local
context and the needs of the people, rather than bureaucratic or ideological impulses.
Additionally, any policy should take into account unique resources that Canada may possess.
Diaspora populations have the potential to serve as a vital link between the country being engaged
and Canada itself. Support for democratization by diaspora populations may reinforce support for
democracy within FFFS and can potentially assist the construction of a stable democracy.
Canadian efforts at democratization began in the 1980s and were closely linked to human rights.
The belief was that protection of the rights of the individual was better served by promotion of
democratic institution-building. In 1988, the Canadian parliament created the International Centre
for Human Rights and Democratic Development (ICHRDD).17 The mission of ICHRDD is to
��
Gerald J. Schmitz, The Role of International Democracy Promotion in Canada’s Foreign Policy, (IRPP Policy
35
promote respect for human rights and democracy through engagement with local civil society and
governments.18
In October 2006, the Office for Democratic Governance was formed. The office defines democratic
governance according to four elements: respect for human rights; accountable public institutions;
freedom and democracy, including the promotion of the development of political parties and civil
society; and the establishment of the rule of law. The Office of Democratic Governance aims to
“develop and promote innovative and effective democratic governance programming across the
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA); be the hub for a community of Canadian
and international partners and experts active in democratic governance; expand the knowledge
base and good practices in Canada and link it with international knowledge; be an international
leader in elections programming; and be of service to the whole of government and to Canadians
involved in democratic governance programming.” 19
Policy Statement
Canada should look beyond Track-1 diplomacy with regard FFFS and engage local
stakeholders in dialogue on democracy and openness.
Policy Objectives
• To encourage policies that engage the local populations and civil societies of FFFS to better
gauge local needs and aspirations;
• To enable Canada to gain a better understanding of the local context and power structures in
order to enhance the impact of Canadian efforts, as local systems and codes can vary from
region to region.
• Canada should support polling of target societies in order to ascertain the local needs and desires
and avoid imposing Canadian ideas that may be inappropriate for the region. Polling can be done
through carefully selected local NGOs and civil society organizations. Polling can also make
use of cell phone networks and text messaging where available. Questions should be framed
to determine local attitudes toward democratization, attitudes toward Canadian engagement in
their country, and what issues the local population would like to address with the international
community and local actors.
• Canada should utilize Canadian diaspora populations as a less intrusive way of understanding the
context in order to smoothen the democratization process. However, it is important to approach
diasporas with prudence, as they may have strong personal biases regarding the situation at
hand.
• The Office of Democratic Governance should coordinate these efforts and seek the support of
NGOs, research institutes, universities, and other educational organizations.
Matters: Canada, 2004), 13.
18 Ibid, 15-16.
��
Canada, CIDA, “Office of Democratic Governance,” http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CanadaCorps.
36
Summary of Issue Area 5: Natural Resources and the Private Sector
Natural resources form an interesting perspective from which to analyze state weakness, as they
can have both stabilizing and destabilizing effects on a country. Afghanistan, Sudan, and Haiti all
face deep-rooted problems related to the issues arising from either the lack of or abundance of
natural resources. Natural resources can contribute to state failure because they may provide profit
for certain groups within a society at the expense of others, which can strongly influence political
institutions and cause violent conflict. Natural resources have been found to increase the duration
of a conflict by financing the conflict or reducing the impetus among the elite groups to help end
the conflict; that is, maintaining the state’s fragile situation may be in the interest of those in power,
who tend to profit enormously from their control of the natural resources. The enormous effects
of natural resources on economic, political, and social dynamics are important for the Canadian
government to consider in its efforts to engage and help rebuild FFFS.
Additionally, it is important to consider the implications of the actions of Canadian companies that
are engaged in natural resource industries abroad. For instance, important questions about corporate
responsibility arise in the case of Sudan, where Canadian oil companies have been accused of
contributing to the civil war in the region by not sufficiently investigating claims of government-
forced displacement, despite the fact that human right abuses in Sudan had been linked with the
oil industry. Human Rights Watch has accused the Canadian government of not responding with a
policy statement until after it would have been useful in ending the civil war. Moreover, Canadian
law does not provide any instrument whereby Canadian corporations operating abroad can be held
accountable for being complicit in or not acting against human rights violations.
Panellist Dr. Phillipe Le Billion explained that the impact of natural resources within fragile states
is of great relevance to Canada, which is itself a major producer of natural resources. In addition
to their domestic output, many Canadian companies are also involved in the extraction of natural
resources around the world. Dr. Le Billon explained that natural resources often increase state
fragility due to the economic dynamics created by resource dependency combined with poverty.
Dependence on natural resources can also create dynamics that are averse to the development of
democracy in FFFS. Countries dependent on natural resources tend to be poor states with volatile
economies. Such states may appear to be relatively strong during economic booms, but are easily
affected by economic downturns that can lead to high debt and over-extended fiscal spending.
Natural resources can also help fuel conflict by providing funding for competing groups and have
been increasingly used for this purpose since the collapse of the USSR. The situation may be
further complicated when other countries that wish to intervene take advantage of the resources of
the state in question.
Panellist Dr. Karen Ballentine explained that state fragility caused by natural resources is a product
of a number of factors, such as a highly underdeveloped national economy, a heavy dependency
on the resources in question, the physical location of the resources, and the extraction processes
necessary to acquire the resources. Consequently, it is important to analyze the situation carefully
and consider the actors who may be contributing to the problem at hand. Such actors include, but
are not limited to: multinational corporations (MNCs), various governments, groups within civil
society, and NGOs.
37
Dr. Ballentine explained that MNCs often complicate situations in FFFS by disregarding externalities
created through their operations or by displaying no sensitivity toward the environment and other
local issues. MNCs may also create problems unintentionally by trying to integrate their operations
into the local community. Despite this, Dr. Ballentine argued that the private sector can also play
a positive role in FFFS. MNCs often operate in regions that have no significant domestic actors
and may be able to utilize their own economic influence in a positive manner. Initiatives such as
the Kimberley Process have successfully involved some in the diamond industry as non-traditional
peace and security actors. Unfortunately, these initiatives are extremely difficult to enforce, as they
normally depend on the voluntary involvement of MNCs or other relevant actors. There is a need
to strengthen international norms, local ownership, incentive structures, and regulatory and legal
practices in order to ameliorate the negative impacts of natural resources in FFFS.
Panellist Christine Johnson emphasized the positive potential of the private sector, arguing that the
private sector is essential to reducing poverty and ensuring sustainability in the long term. Thus,
efforts to build the private sector must be fully integrated into poverty reduction initiatives in
FFFS. Private sector development is one of Canada’s aid priorities, and it encompasses promoting
entrepreneurship, creating enabling environments, and connecting entrepreneurs to new markets.
Ms. Johnson emphasized that private sector development should occur in concurrence with, rather
than after, the development of good governance and the basic well-being of the people. Conditions
in the local private sectors may be seen as causes, consequences, and indicators of fragility. They
must therefore be taken seriously in development solutions. Endowments of natural resources are
neither inherently bad nor good, and it is important to consider how natural resource development
can contribute to reducing poverty. Thus, it is important not to disregard the potential for business
leaders to catalyze change both locally and globally; that is, it is important to focus on both
microfinance and larger enterprises. Ms. Johnson also suggested that rapid change may be easier
in the private sector, rather than the public sector, and searching out “quick wins” could encourage
investor confidence.
Ms. Johnson also discussed several methods to engage MNCs, including: supporting public-private
dialogue with a diverse range of firms; recognizing the private sector as a resource for developing
both human and social capital while simultaneously promoting stability; supporting long-term
partnerships with local communities to identify local development challenges; and supporting
national or regional efforts to improve local business practices while levelling the playing field.
Ms. Johnson explained that donors can contribute by: developing sound strategies for supporting
private sector development in FFFS; supporting initiatives that encourage sustainable natural
resource development; supporting public-private dialogue on development issues; encouraging
global policy development and donor coordination; and encouraging dialogue between multiple
stakeholders.
Common themes and questions emphasized during the Natural Resources Break-Out
Sessions included:
• What enables stability?: Noting that scarcity of resources is a universal issue, delegates
explored several factors that might lead some natural resources to cause instability more so than
others. Delegates noted that instability may also have to do with the degree of segmentation and
38
animosity within a given population, as well as the nature of any colonial infrastructures that
still remain relevant. Canada may have useful knowledge to offer based on its own experience
as one of the few stable countries that is heavily reliant on its natural resources.
• Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): Delegates noted the difficulties experienced by
companies that wish to be socially responsible without losing competitiveness against other
companies that have no concern for CSR. Most companies may not be averse to acting ethically
if there is a level playing field; however, it is difficult to build an effective regulatory framework
that ensures such conditions. Delegates suggested that this stalemate might be overcome by
providing domestic incentives to socially responsible companies. Delegates also emphasized
that Canada needs to clean up its own act, especially in regard to the oil and mineral-extraction
sectors.
• The impact of trade and the private sector: Delegates noted that, while trade promotes growth, it
does not necessarily tackle poverty. Delegates considered whether the institutions behind trade
openness might be the key to success (e.g. regulatory practices or mechanisms to keep profits
within the country). Delegates noted that a grassroots-level private sector can be extremely
beneficial, as companies at that level are likely to have an interest in building civil society.
Delegates considered how DFAIT could create positive government-to-government incentives
for open trade to encourage other important goals such as social responsibility. Delegates also
noted that stability is necessary for the private sector to be willing to step in, and that conversely,
the private sector can also contribute to stability.
• Good governance: Delegates noted the difficulty of engaging a country in which elites have
an interest in maintaining the standing order because of a natural resource industry and do not
wish for foreign countries to intervene. Such conditions may make it more difficult to promote
democratization.
• Kimberley Process: The Kimberley Process was mentioned as an example of a success that
might have some application in other sectors; however, delegates recognized that diamonds are
a unique good.
39
Policy Recommendations: Natural Resources and the Private Sector

Student Co-Chair: Vanessa Lunday
Recommendation 1: Support Small Natural Resource Based Industries in FFFS
Preamble
While the private sector often exacerbates conflict, it can also exert a positive influence in FFFS
if encouraged to operate in an appropriate manner. One way this can be done is by aiding local
companies operating in FFFS. Support for local businesses can provide the local economy with
a much-needed boost while simultaneously empowering local owners. Moreover, programs used
to help start local businesses, such as microcredit programs, have proven successful in boosting
local economic resources and empowering citizens. This can further lead to a diminished need for
Canadian and international support in these countries.
CIDA’s Policy on Private Sector Development identifies the growth of the domestic private sector
as crucial to sustainable poverty reduction in a state. The policy places particular emphasis on: “the
importance of supporting small- and medium-sized enterprises, which represent the backbone of a
healthy, diversified, and resilient economy”; “the key role that credit and microfinance services can
play in empowering women and supporting community economic development”; “the importance
of rural agriculture, producers, and cooperatives”; and “the importance of access to international
markets and international institutions that work in the interests of all.”20
One example of a successful CIDA project that developed the local private sector was a joint
undertaking of CIDA, Druide Laboratories of Quebec, and an Afghan businessman named Waheed
Daqeeq. The project succeeded in encouraging the manufacture of soap products in Kabul in order
to combat unemployment and eliminate the need to import soap products.21 Further support for and
creation of initiatives such as these, as well as the expansion of these projects to the point where
the products are export-ready, can only help to divert the Afghan economy from its main source of
revenue, which is poppy production.
Policy Statement
Canada should undertake partnerships with relevant organizations and actors in order to
encourage market-based support of small, sustainable industries in FFFS, with emphasis on
those in natural resource or extractive industries.
��
Canada, CIDA, “CIDA’s Policy on Private Sector Development,” http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdi-
cida.nsf/En/REN-218124828-P9B.
��
Canada, CIDA, “Combating Unemployment in Afghanistan,” http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.
nsf/En/NAT-130111834-M5N.
40
Policy Objectives
• To increase stability by strengthening the economy and encouraging socially responsible

practices in FFFS through the implementation of policies that support small, sustainable natural
resource industries;
• To develop an approach that is driven by Canadian consumers and involves facilitating the
import of products from FFFS.
• CIDA should create a CIDA retail outlet or stock government-operated stores (such as museum
gift stores) with products that have been supported by CIDA programs in FFFS. This would
include agricultural products or artisan goods that primarily use natural resources and are
produced in an environmentally sustainable and socially responsible manner.
• CIDA should work with other government agencies to encourage Canadian stores to sell
and market products supported by CIDA programming, using advertising and point-of-sale
information that emphasize the role that CIDA and taxpayer dollars have in supporting these
products, as well as the products’ positive impacts on their source countries.
• CIDA should work with major retailers to implement a program similar to “air miles,” in which
points could be used to purchase CIDA-supported products or be converted into donations to
support CIDA’s projects in FFFS;
• CIDA or DFAIT should create a position for trade representatives, who would identify
opportunities for local industries in FFFS to produce products that could be exported to Canada
and find markets in Canada where these goods could be sold. The representatives would also
identify opportunities for Canadian businesses to partner with and assist business in FFFS, as
well as opportunities for CIDA to collaborate with NGOs or local civil society organizations
operating in FFFS.
• CIDA should provide public-awareness campaigns to promote CIDA’s initiatives in small-
scale private sector industries, focusing on promotion on the CIDA website and potentially
including national television or radio campaigns in order to encourage Canadian consumption
of CIDA-supported products. These public-awareness campaigns should emphasize how
citizens are empowered to promote a sustainable society through their consumption decisions.
The website could also provide information on the imported products, such as where they could
be purchased.
Recommendation 2: Implement Measures to Ensure Corporate Social Responsibility of

Canadian Companies
Preamble
Natural resources and private companies often have diverse interests in FFFS that can lead to
conflict or contribute to pre-existing conflicts. This is particularly true for private companies
involved in extractive industries, which can contribute to conflict by financing competing factions,
weaken the economy by creating a heavy dependency on the natural resource, or exacerbate
unsustainable environmental policies. However, in regard to those companies engaged in the
41
extractive industries, the private sector can also exert a positive influence in FFFS if encouraged
to operate in an appropriate manner. The impetus for corporations is most powerful when the call
for CSR is consumer-based, such as with the Kimberley Process; however the government must
play a role in building a framework that holds companies accountable for maintaining socially
responsible policies.
When Canadian companies are not socially responsible in FFFS, their operations may exacerbate
conflict. Avoiding this through stronger initiatives to foster CSR is an essential preventive measure
that complements Canadian values. Encouraging Canadian companies to operate in FFFS in a
sustainable and socially responsible manner may also provide economic benefits to the FFFS in
which they are involved. Lastly, as a country with a wealth of experience with regard to sustainability
and natural resources, Canada has the potential to serve as a leader in spearheading a better-defined
framework for CSR.
Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) has expressed its commitment to the concept of CSR22 and has
taken initiatives toward fulfilling that commitment, for example by creating a report in consultation
with several Canadian companies that have been deemed socially responsible.23 However, while
Canadian law does contain several indirect measures, it does not have any specific instrument
whereby Canadian corporations operating abroad can be regulated when they are “complicit in or
benefiting from human rights violations.”24 Canadian corporations should be held accountable for
such behaviour.
At the same time, the Canadian government recognizes the importance of the private sector in
development and poverty alleviation. CIDA supports the development of the private sector in
poor countries by encouraging regulatory reforms that will help small businesses, promote
entrepreneurship, and facilitate the integration of poor countries into regional and international
markets.25
It is important for the government to take initiative and build a framework that will hold Canadian
companies accountable. Moreover, relevant recommendations and research on some industries have
already been produced. The Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Development of the
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (now the Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs and International Development) published a report in June 2005 that puts forth a
series of recommendations to develop CSR among Canadian mining companies. The report was
��
Natural Resources Canada defines corporate social responsibility as “ the commitment and activities by an organ-
ization to meet stakeholder expectations on economic, environmental and social performance”. See Canada, Natural
Resources Canada, “Corporate Social Responsibility,” http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/sd-dd/csr-rse/csr_e.html.
��
Ibid.
��
Georgette Gagnon, Audrey Macklin and Penelope Simons, “Deconstructing Engagement: Corporate Self-Regu-
lation in Conflict Zones – Implications for Human Right and Canadian Public Policy,” Social Sciences and Humani-
ties Research Council and the Law Commission of Canada, 2003, http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/Mackin/
DeconstructingEngagement.pdf, 61-73.
��
Canada, CIDA, “Private Sector Development – Overview,” http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/
En/JUD-121155433-SJ9.
42
based on hearings regarding the activities of Canadian mining and other resource companies in
developing countries.26
One of the top priorities of NRCan is the Kimberley Process. The Kimberley Process ensures that
diamonds are neither being used to finance war economies nor being extracted by means of force.
It also requires the cooperation of government, industry, and NGOs in extraction and distribution
of this valued commodity.27 This represents an important commentary on the necessary approaches
to curbing the negative effects of natural resources on state failure and weakness. Perhaps most
significantly, in a discussion of the successes of the Kimberley Process, the Canadian government
has stated: “conflict diamonds do not represent the only occurrence of a link between the exploitation
of natural resources and human rights abuses. Canada will continue to be a proponent of harnessing
the social benefits of resource development around the world to secure greater equity.”28
Policy Statement
Canada should implement both regulatory and non-regulatory measures to ensure corporate
social responsibility and accountability of Canadian companies operating in natural resource
and extractive industries in FFFS.
Policy Objectives
• To prevent private Canadian industry interests from exacerbating conflict in FFFS;

• To encourage a corporate culture that is based on Canadian values, focuses on sustainability,
and values human rights.
• DFAIT, CIDA, and NRCan should promote CSR in natural resource industries in order to create
more responsible business practices;
• DFAIT, CIDA, and NRCan should seek to build and promote innovative certification practices
like the Kimberley Process to increase the ability and likelihood of Canadian citizens to consider
human rights in their consumption decisions;
• Canada should implement in full the recommendations found in the fourteenth report of the
Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Development of the Standing Committee
on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (now Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs
and International Development) of June 2005 on human rights issues and Canadian mining
companies operating abroad.29 The implementation of a CSR initiative for the mining industry
could be used as a stepping-stone for a broad, cross-industry implementation of a more robust
CSR initiative on the part of the Canadian government.
��
Canada, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Subcommittee on Human Rights and
International Development, “Fourteenth Report, Mining in Developing Countries-Corporate Social Responsibility,”
http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/cmte/CommitteePublication.aspx?COM=8979&Lang=1&SourceId=178650.
��
Ibid.
��
Canada, Natural Resources Canada, “SD Success Story - Curbing trade in conflict diamonds: The Kimberley
Process,” 15 Feb. 2004, http://www.nrcan-rncan.gc.ca/sd-dd/pubs/strat2004/english/kr3_ss_e.html.
��
Canada, “Fourteenth Report, Mining in Developing Countries-Corporate Social Responsibility.”
43
Summary of Geographic Case Study 1: Afghanistan
Canada has been involved in Afghanistan since Operation Enduring Freedom commenced in October
2001. Canada and the other international actors involved in Afghanistan have been confronted
with serious political, military and economic obstacles in stabilizing Afghanistan, including: the
resurgence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda; warlordism; poppy cultivation; gender inequality and
the socioeconomic imbalances that exist in Afghanistan due to a stratified female populace; and a
complete lack of infrastructure.
Panellist Brigadier-General Fraser explained that Canada is engaged in a mission that requires a
three-pronged strategy that fuses governance, security, and development. He argued that Canadian
success in Afghanistan will come more from advances in development, such as the building of
roads and a better education system, than from military action. Brigadier-General Fraser urged
the delegates to be more critical of the media’s coverage of Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan,
as it does not sufficiently shed light on developmental achievements. Brigadier-General Fraser
also emphasized cultural sensitivity as being crucial to a successful mission that can effectively
navigate the complexities of Afghan society and ensure that Afghanistan is built in the way that
Afghans want it to be built.
Brigadier-General Fraser also discussed the difficulties of building an effective counter-narcotics

policy. Eradication is a weak policy because eradicating a farmer’s poppy crop hurts a farmer who
has no other way to support his family. Brigadier-General Fraser touched on the idea of providing
farmers with alternative livelihoods through subsidies for alternate crops that would enable them
to earn the same amount as they would for planting a poppy crop.
Panellist Dr. Marc André Boivin explained that the current policies employed in Southern
Afghanistan, where Canada is operating, are not sufficiently winning the support of the Afghan
population, which will become alienated if policies do not change. This situation is compounded
by a flawed counter-narcotics policy being implemented by the US, the UK, and the Afghan
government. Dr. Boivin explained that part of the problem is that military and developmental
goals are under-resourced and under-funded. This is exemplified by the fact that Kosovo received
fifty times more troops per capita than Afghanistan for peacekeeping. The reduction of poverty
in Afghanistan is essential, but Afghanistan currently receives much less funding toward this
objective than many other post-conflict nations. Dr. Boivin also noted that the limited resources
going toward development are being further undermined by corruption. This is compounded by the
fact that not enough attention is being paid, either by the media or by the Canadian government, to
the developmental aspects of Canada’s involvement.
Panellist Richard Arbeiter argued that the focus of Canadian involvement in Afghanistan should
be on an Afghan perspective rather than a Canadian perspective, and that this would ensure that
the policies that CIDA implements will work not only in Kandahar but also throughout the other
regions of Afghanistan. The approach Canada needs to take, therefore, is an integrated one. The
current “3D approach” is insufficient because it takes on democracy, development, and defence as
separate issues, when in actuality they are all interlinked. An integrated approach needs to include
both Afghanistan and the international community, since decision-making occurs on a multilateral
44
level, and must influence all the regions in Afghanistan.
Common themes and questions emphasized during the Afghanistan Break-Out Sessions
included:
• The flaws of the current Canadian approach: Delegates argued that Canada’s involvement
in Afghanistan is seen by the majority of the Canadian public as a by-product of American
intervention and American interests. Delegates also noted that the majority of the Canadian
population views the mission in Afghanistan as an unsuccessful one, with few positive benefits
for the Canadian and the Afghan people. Delegates argued that this is a result of a media bias
that portrays the situation as one of a mostly military nature, when in reality the efforts involve
significant levels of humanitarian and developmental work as well.
• What issues should Canada address? Delegates argued that the manner in which gender issues
in Afghan society are addressed needs improvement. Delegates also felt that promotion of
civil society and education amongst Afghani youth should be emphasised to a higher degree.
Delegates noted that poppy cultivation is also fuelling instability, placing Canada in a difficult
dilemma because the Canadian military can neither accept the poppy production nor eradicate
the crops.
• The long-term nature of involvement: Delegates argued that Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan
necessitates a long-term commitment, which will be difficult to maintain with the growing
domestic discontent within Canada toward involvement in Afghanistan.
45
Policy Recommendations: Afghanistan

Student Co-Chair: Rahim Mohammed
Recommendation 1: Increase the mandate of the Canadian military until at least 2011
Preamble
The problems confronting both Canadians and Afghans in the areas of gender, democratization,
reconciliation of warring groups, and natural resources are complex. Though Canadian Forces are
committed to their mission in Afghanistan until 2009, it is highly unlikely that the complex security
issues faced in Kandahar will be resolved within the next two years. The Afghanistan Compact
aims for Afghanistan to achieve a self-sufficient Afghan National Army and Afghan National and
Border Police by the end of 2010; therefore, Canadian military commitment should be extended
until the projected point when Afghanistan will be able to maintain its own security.
Afghanistan is considered to be one of Canada’s top foreign policy priorities. As such, it is

Canada’s largest security commitment and the largest recipient of Canadian bilateral aid. Canada
first deployed troops to Afghanistan in 2001 and has since increased its financial, military, and
developmental commitments. The military mandate has, since the election of the Conservative
government, been extended until February 2009. The Conservative government has also increased
Canada’s pledge of aid to Afghanistan, committing approximately $1 billion CAD for the period
between 2001 and 2011.
Canada has pledged its full support to the Afghanistan Compact, which provides a detailed
framework for the international community’s engagement in Afghanistan for the period between
2006 and 2011. Security benchmarks of the Afghanistan Compact include the goal of establishing
an Afghan National Army that is “democratically accountable, organized, trained, and equipped
to meet the security needs of the country” by the end of 2010. The Afghanistan Compact also
aims for the establishment of an Afghan National and Border Police that “will be able to meet the
security needs of the country effectively and will be increasingly financially sustainable” by the
end of 2010.
Policy Statement
Canada’s should extend its military mandate in Afghanistan until at least 2011.
Policy Objectives
• To ensure the security of existing Canadian and multinational initiatives in Afghanistan;

• To create an atmosphere of security that is conducive to development in the region in order to
increase stability.
46
• Canada should extend Canada’s military mandate until at least 2011, and consider extending it
further if the objectives of the Afghanistan Compact have not been met by 2011;
• Canada should append its increased mandate with increased financial and personnel commitments
to the mission. While these levels cannot be determined at this point, taking into consideration
that there are currently 2,500 Canadian troops deployed in the area, this policy recommendation
calls for Canada to sustain a similar level of support until 2011.
Recommendation 2: Increase domestic communication
Preamble
Canada’s mission in Afghanistan faces rising challenges at home, where in recent months the
Canadian public has questioned the necessity of Canadian forces in Kandahar. A poll conducted
in February 2007 found that 49% of Canadians agreed with the statement, “Canada should pull its
military out of Afghanistan as soon as possible and abandon this mission.”30 Evidence indicates
that this attitude toward the mission in Afghanistan is likely a product of uneven media coverage
that focuses on combat as opposed to rebuilding efforts, as well as a lack of clear communication
on the part of the Canadian government about Canada’s role in Afghanistan.
The goal of stabilization that Canada wishes to achieve in Afghanistan is not a short-term, quick-
fix endeavour. It is an engagement that will require a long-term commitment, which can only
be sustained with strong public support for the mission. With increased and more balanced
communication between the government and the Canadian people, public opinion in favour of the
Canadian mission can be sustained.
An internal report commissioned by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
criticized the Canadian government’s approach to disseminating news regarding Afghanistan to
the public, explaining that an “absence of official government communication” has been filled by
“persistent negative media coverage.”31 A poll conducted in December 2006 indicated that 56% of
Canadians believe that “they are seeing more coverage about the combat element in Afghanistan
because the media are more interested in reporting on combat and deliberately ignoring the
rebuilding efforts.”32
CIDA has created initiatives aimed at providing Canadians with more thorough coverage of
international development issues. CIDA’s Mass Media Initiative (MMI) encourages more in-depth
coverage on international development issues by funding projects that seek to inform the Canadian
��
Ipsos Reid, “Most Canadians Support Troops in Light of Recent Investigation Into Afghanistan Abuses,” Feb.
��
2007, http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/pressrelease.cfm?id3374.
31 Allan Woods, “To sell Canada on war, try ‘hope’ but not ‘liberty,” Toronto Star, Feb 17, 2007, http://www.thestar.
com/article/182857.
��
Ipsos Reid, “Canadians Assess the Canadian Media and Its Coverage of the Afghanistan Mission,” ��
Dec. 2006,
http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/pressrelease.cfm?id=3303.
47
people on international development issues. The aim is to direct the projects through mass media
such as prime time television, radio shows, and articles in large market dailies and magazines.33
CIDA has also created the Journalism and Development Initiative (JDI), which aims to “support
activities proposed by Canadian journalists who are interested in enhancing their professional
experience in the field of international development and cooperation” in order to provide Canadians
with an “in-depth analysis of international issues.”34
Policy Statement
Canada should increase communication between the government and the Canadian people
with the goal of increasing popular support for a sustainable long-term commitment to
Afghanistan.
Policy Objectives
• To increase the Canadian public’s understanding of the military and non-military aspects of the
mission in Afghanistan, while emphasizing the importance of Canada’s presence;
• To increase Canadian public support for Canada’s mission.
Policy Directives and Objectives
• Canada should encourage media coverage of the war that places more emphasis on the
developmental goals and successes of Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan;
• The Federal Government and DND should communicate with the public more regularly through
press conferences and other public outlets to deepen the Canadian public’s understanding of the
scope, progress, and role of Canada in Afghanistan;
• CIDA should promote coverage of Canada’s work in Afghanistan through its MMI and JDI
programs among students, filmmakers, and, if possible, among Afghans themselves, with the goal
of increasing public awareness and understanding of the obstacles to rebuilding Afghanistan.
��
Canada, CIDA, “Mass Media Initative,” http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/mmi.
��
34 Canada, CIDA, “Journalism
��
and Development Initiative,” http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/
En/JUD-12184515-J5W.
48
Summary of Geographic Case Study 2: Haiti
Canada has a long history of contributing to security and development in Haiti. Following the Second
World War, many religious communities worked in Haiti in the areas of health and education. The
creation of CIDA in 1968 established formal government funding for the nation. Since then, Canada
has provided over $700 million in development assistance to Haiti. Today, Haiti is Canada’s most
important long-term beneficiary of development assistance in the Americas and is also Canada’s
second largest commitment after Afghanistan. Moreover, aside from government involvement,
members of the Haitian diaspora living within Canada provide significant financial and social
contributions for Haiti’s development, both directly and through regionally based NGOs.
Haiti, as a nation in which the immediate crisis is over, presents an interesting case study on
reconstruction initiatives in both the short and long term. Despite an inspiring beginning as the first
republic of former slaves to gain independence from a colonial power in 1804, Haiti has suffered
decades of unstable rule. Leadership has passed between numerous political and military powers
during Haiti’s turbulent history. A rebellion in 2004 had devastating effects on an already fragile
nation. Today, Haiti is plagued by prolonged security hazards and a tense political environment.
Haiti’s volatile political and security climate, particularly over the past half century, have left
the economy highly unstable. Close to 80% of Haitians live in poverty, with more than half of
the population living on less than one dollar a day. Given the precarious security and economic
climate, making progress in various areas of social development has been especially challenging
for Haiti. The education and healthcare systems are in need of major reform. At present, Haiti has
the highest incidence of HIV/AIDS outside of Sub-Saharan Africa. Political tensions between
opposing political parties, as well as the continued presence of MINUSTAH, the UN Stabilization
Mission in Haiti, suggest that the political situation in Haiti remains fragile even now in 2007.
Pannellist Darren Schemmer highlighted the specificities of Haiti as a fragile state in which the
immediate crisis is over and the underlying causes need to be addressed. There is currently no civil
war, and most of the territory is controlled by the officially elected government; however, there has
been no peace agreement, and Haitian infrastructure is in severe need of reform. CIDA has made
important contributions to Haiti in facilitating elections, providing access to medical services,
and building basic social infrastructure. Progress has been achieved in Haiti, but Canada needs
to remain committed and take a leadership role in both mitigating the larger crisis and avoiding
instability.
Panellist Carlo Dade focused on leadership in working with both the Haitian diaspora and the private
sector as a means of sustaining progress by stepping back to build support and new ideas. Remittances
by the Haitian diaspora amount to up to $1 billion CAD, dwarfing Canada’s development aid to the
region. While the Canadian government has taken some initiatives to involve the diaspora in its
development efforts in Haiti, there have been no initiatives that focus on sustained input from that
sector. Consequently, more could be done to institutionalize this relationship and take advantage
of the Haitian diaspora as a resource to maximize Canada’s impact. The diaspora could also play a
significant role in rebuilding the private sector of Haiti’s economy.
Common themes and questions emphasized during the Haiti Break-Out Sessions:
49
• The importance of a long-term commitment to Haiti by Canada and the international community:
Delegates considered how long-term commitments focused on stabilizing Haiti could be achieved
domestically and internationally. Concerns were voiced about a lack of media attention to the
region, which might weaken the Canadian government’s ability to make strong commitments
to the region on both the domestic and international fronts.
• The influence of the Haitian Diaspora: Delegates agreed that it is important to engage the
Haitian Diaspora, as they provide a means of enhancing the impact of Canada’s operations.
Delegates also noted that any government initiative involving the Diaspora groups must be
aware of the strong personal biases they may hold.
• The need for infrastructure: Delegates discussed the need to improve Haiti’s infrastructure.
Building better infrastructure can provide a boost to the Haitian economy by supporting and
encouraging private sector development and improving the ability of the government to conduct
necessary functions, such as collecting taxes.
• Crime and security: Delegates were concerned about the type of long-term engagement that
CIDA and similar agencies could undertake to decrease both trafficking and the influence of
street gangs. The provision of alternate economic options and private sector development were
seen as important components of a possible solution.
50
Policy Recommendations: Haiti

Student Co-Chair: Leah Marchuk
Recommendation 1: Assist Haiti with Judicial Reform
Preamble
At present, Haiti’s judicial system is not capable of keeping up to date with reforms in the country’s
security sector. The tradition of nepotism within the judiciary, combined with poor compensation
for the work of judges, creates corruption within the sector. Some of Haiti’s legal codes are highly
antiquated and in need of reform, with some codes dating as far back as the state’s original 1804
constitution.
Limited infrastructure also affects the ability of the judiciary to carry out its work. The state has
too few courthouses and prisons, particularly as many of the buildings it once had were looted and
destroyed during the 2004 rebellion. Haiti’s prison system is highly overcrowded, with 96% of its
inmates still awaiting trial. Inconsistent management of records has created additional problems
by generating confusion about the details of specific cases.
In September of 2006, Haiti’s Justice Minister approved a comprehensive plan to coordinate

domestic and international efforts in the area of legal and judicial reform. The plan attempts to take
a holistic approach, setting goals to combat corruption, create a system for handling transnational
crime, developing infrastructure, and reducing pre-trial detention periods.
The issue of judicial reform in Haiti is relevant for the overall sustainability of Canada’s development
commitment in the country. Canada has already made significant investments in the development
and reform of Haiti’s security sector, but in order for the gains in this sector to be lasting, parallel
reforms of Haiti’s judiciary must also take place.
Canadian values call for a humanitarian interest in assisting the reform of Haiti’s judiciary in light
of the human rights concerns that arise from Haiti’s overcrowded prison system and potentially
corrupt judicial bodies.
Today, Haiti is Canada’s most important long-term development-assistance beneficiary in the

Americas, and is also Canada’s second largest international commitment after Afghanistan. Canada
supports the Updated Interim Cooperation Framework and its four pillars, which are focused on
political governance, national reconstruction, economic recovery, and access to basic services. In
July 2006, the Government of Canada committed $520 million to Haiti for the period between
2006 and 2011, including money to be spent through both CIDA and DFAIT’s Global Peace and
Security Fund. Through the Canadian Policing Arrangement, Canada commits 100 police officers
as part of MINUSTAH, in addition to 4 Canadian Forces officers through Operation HAMLET.
51
During the 1990s, Canada provided funding to help develop Haiti’s judicial infrastructure, but
much of that work was destroyed in the hurricane and rebellion of 2004. Today, the Government
of Canada supports a UNDP program that assists Haiti’s justice sector in non-criminal arenas and
funds NGOs as a means of engaging civil society in judicial development.
Policy Statement
Canada should help Haiti implement its plans in the area of judicial reform and should make
judicial reform an important part of its development commitment to Haiti.
Policy Objectives
• To work with Haiti and international partners to coordinate efforts in the area of judicial reform,
helping to ensure that clear goals are laid and objectives are met;
• To meet Haiti’s need for judicial reform in order to enable long-term stability.
• Canada should support the development of infrastructure through actions including the building
of new courthouses, prisons, professional schools, and legal research facilities;
• Canada should help Haiti identify a leader, such as another state that has undergone widespread
judicial reform, to assist in focusing efforts to reform the judicial system;
• Canada should enhance the regulatory regime by facilitating the creation of new systems of
records-management and accreditation;
• Canada should incorporate an anti-corruption strategy into all judicial reform programming that
would include the vetting of judges and other professionals within the judiciary;
• Canada should support the development of a strategy for reducing the number of prisoners
awaiting trial. This could include programs such as amnesty for prisoners who have committed
non-violent property crimes, releasing prisoners who have already exceeded their maximum
sentence, or helping to establish a small claims court.
• Canada should consider engaging Canadian legal experts and professionals as resources to
provide expertise on judicial reform;
• CIDA should implement the bulk of this policy through consultations with the Government of
Haiti and Haiti’s partners in the Interim Cooperation Framework. CIDA should ensure thorough
consultation with MINUSTAH in areas where judicial reform overlaps with other development
efforts, particularly security sector reform.
Recommendation 2: Reform Haiti’s Education System
Preamble
Haiti’s education system is in need of major reform. Close to half the adult population of Haiti is
illiterate. Only two-thirds of primary-school-aged children are enrolled in school, and less than one-
third of those enrolled complete grade six. Schools are unevenly concentrated across the country,
with especially poor communities having limited access to schools. For many poor families, as
52
much as 40% of income goes to paying for education.
At least 80% of the education system in Haiti is privately run, causing wide variations in quality
across the state. The lack of any regulatory accreditation system limits the value of Haitian
diplomas internationally. These problems signal the need for a long-term national education plan
as an important component of reducing poverty within the country.
Over the past few years, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO), with the support of the European Union, has financed the Support Programme to
Strengthen Quality Education in Haiti (PARQE). The aim of the program is to promote universal
education in four specific regions of Haiti, concentrating on training teachers and building
infrastructure. Despite such efforts to help Haiti improve its education system, both security and
economic problems remain major impediments to progress in this sector.
Assisting with the improvement of the availability, accessibility, and quality of education in
Haiti is in keeping with Canada’s commitments to both addressing the country’s basic human
needs and the Millennium Development Goals. Programming in the area of education is also
consistent with the long-term nature of Canada’s commitment to Haiti. Canada’s experience in
the area of education reform, as well as its knowledge of the French language and the presence of
a significant Haitian diaspora in Canada, make Canada a valuable partner in the development of
Haiti’s education system.
As mentioned above, the Government of Canada has committed $520 million to Haiti for the
period between 2006 and 2011, including money to be spent through both CIDA and DFAIT’s
Global Peace and Security Fund.
Canada has repaired or built 252 schools in Haiti, and provided many others with much-needed
supplies. Canada also supports the World Food Programme’s School Canteen Program, which
provides food to Haitian schoolchildren. Other Canadian programs in Haiti related to education
include those that pay teachers’ salaries and provide children with school-supply kits.
Policy Statement
Canada should take the lead in helping Haiti implement its plans in the education sector.
Policy Objectives
• To take a leadership role in facilitating Haiti’s reform of its education system;

• To strive to help Haiti attain universal access to primary education, in accordance with the
Millennium Development Goals;
• To work with Haiti to refine and implement the education strategy currently under consideration
by Haiti and its other international partners.
53
• Canada should assist with the development of curriculum by providing expertise and helping to
establish standards within the private school system;
• Canada should raise standards for education professionals by subsidizing teachers’ salaries;
• Canada should decrease the language barrier for students by using its own experience as a
country with two official languages to help incorporate both of Haiti’s official languages into
curriculum materials;
• Canada should create a space for supporting the growth of public schools in Haiti to increase
the accessibility of educational institutions;
• Canada should incorporate the lessons learned from Canada’s other experiences with education
reform in developing countries, and the experiences of other states that have undertaken such
reforms;
• Canada should work with the Haitian Diaspora to help related groups effectively direct their
contributions to education reform in Haiti;
• CIDA should implement these directives in consultation with the Government of Haiti and
Haiti’s partners in the Interim Cooperation Framework.
Recommendation 3: Sustain Canada’s Commitment to Haiti
Preamble
There is no doubt that Haiti has a challenging road ahead. The nation’s prolonged political instability,
continued violence and shaky economy will demand a great deal of patience on the part of both
Haitians and the international community if progress is to be achieved. The history and current
climate of Haiti leave the state vulnerable to a number of significant risks. Without improvements
to education and health care, the level of poverty may continue to climb. Rising degrees of crime
and violence could prove detrimental to the state if security is not stabilized. For current progress
to have any lasting effect, change must be thought of in the very long term.
Haiti will continue to rely heavily on the contributions of international donors as it struggles to
meet these significant challenges. The state’s continued fragility thus highlights the importance of
a sustained commitment to Haiti on the part of the international community.
Given the extent of Canada’s commitment to Haiti, the long-term success of its efforts should be
a priority. The extent and long-term nature of the commitment requires continuous, well-informed
public dialogue to ensure that Canadians stay apprised of developments in Haiti as they take place.
Canada’s cultural ties to Haiti, both in the French-speaking community and, more specifically, the
Haitian Diaspora, also make Canada’s commitment to Haiti of cultural relevance to Canadians.
Canada faces some challenges to sustaining its commitment in Haiti. There is dissension against
Canada’s work in Haiti among some individuals and groups in Canada, most notably the Canada
Haiti Action Network, which is angered by accusations that Canadian-trained police in Haiti are
committing human rights abuses. There is also a risk of the Canadian public developing “Haiti
fatigue,” or a loss of interest and concern for Canada’s commitment in Haiti, as progress in Haiti
54
will take place slowly over a long period of time.
Although the Canadian government cannot commit funds to Haiti for more than a few years into
the future at a time, it can take measures to ensure that Canada’s work in Haiti remains forward-
looking.
Canada has already made significant contributions to Haiti’s security and development. As
mentioned above, in July 2006, the Government of Canada committed $520 million to Haiti for
the period between 2006 and 2011. This includes $135.5 million for the period between July 2006
and September 2007 to support the extended Interim Cooperation Framework.
In the initial mission to Haiti following President Aristide’s departure, 450 members of the
Canadian Forces went to Haiti to help stabilize the security situation. Currently, through Operation
HAMLET, Canadian Forces’ participation in MINUSTAH employs four officers in senior positions
at MINUSTAH Headquarters. Canada also contributes to MINUSTAH through the provision of
100 RCMP officers through the Canadian Policing Arrangement.
The Government of Canada also works with members of the Haitian Diaspora, who provide
significant financial and social contributions for Haiti’s development.
Policy Statement
Canada should increase its focus on the long-term nature of its commitment in Haiti to
ensure the sustainability of that commitment.
Policy Objectives
• To ensure that Canada maintains forward-looking policies concerning its commitment in

Haiti;
• To increase Canada’s efforts to engage and inform the Canadian public on the work Canada is
doing in Haiti.
• Canada should develop a sustained public relations campaign that emphasizes Canada’s cultural
links to Haiti for the purposes of facilitating increased and better-informed dialogue and debate
on the role of Canada in Haiti and enhancing the Canadian public’s understanding of Haitian
society and culture. Canada could also make use of such dialogue to help generate new ideas for
how Canada can effectively help Haiti achieve its development and security goals;
• Canada should continue engagement with the Haitian Diaspora in Canada;
• Canada should encourage Diaspora groups to share their experiences with other Canadians,
especially those in English-speaking Canada;
• Canada should continue working with existing stakeholders and simultaneously build new
stakeholder-relations to assist with the development of Haiti’s infrastructure in order to help
55
sustain the Canadian commitment;

• Canada should establish Canadian investors as stakeholders in Canada’s commitment to Haiti;
• Canada should encourage and/or commit resources to research and education programming
related to Haiti (e.g. courses and degree programs);
• Canada should create an exchange program to allow Canadians to visit Haiti contingent on
improvements in the security sector;
• Canada should commit funding to public talks and/or colloquia about Canada’s role and
commitment in Haiti;
• Canada should make funding available, through programs such as CIDA’s Mass Media
Initiative (MMI), for documentary filmmakers to create films about Haiti, specifically, the work
of Canadians in Haiti;
• Canada should ensure discussions about Haiti are included in the government’s foreign policy
dialogues.
56
Summary of Geographic Case Study 3: Sudan
Canada developed a formal relationship with Sudan in the late 1960s; however, this relationship
deteriorated beginning at the end of the 1980s through to the end of the 1990s because of Sudan’s
negative human rights record. Since then, Canada has only supported Sudan through humanitarian
relief activities and the Sudanese peace processes.
The Sudanese government has been in place since first winning power in a military coup in 1989
and benefits from the country’s growing oil revenue. However, intrastate conflict has stratified
the society into a rich, developing North and a poor, underdeveloped South. The North reaps the
benefits of economic progress while the South continues to suffer at the hands of the al-Bashir
government, who neglects the needs of the suffering populace. The government has economically
marginalized the poor, especially in Southern and Western Sudan, where the poor have revolted
against the al-Bashir government in order to ameliorate their conditions. This has led to the recent
genocide in Darfur, where, to date, 250,000 people have been murdered (estimates vary) and 2
million persons have been displaced.
Panellist Dr. David Ambrosetti argued that Sudan does not fit the typical definition of a “failed
state” because Sudan’s state institutions have demonstrated a permanency and ability to survive.
To classify FFFS, therefore, it is important to not only look at its inherent features, but also its
relations with external actors. Sudan has a strong internal leadership, but a low level of receptivity
to international norms.
Dr. Ambrosetti argued that, despite the apparent strength of the National Congress Party (NCP) in
Khartoum, the NCP is currently having a problem legitimizing and maintaining its power. These
problems emerge from several different areas. Firstly, the economic boom currently underway
in Sudan is mostly benefiting the economic elites of Northern Sudan, while the Southern
Sudanese people are being economically marginalized. Any possibility of genuine nationhood
is being destroyed by the systematic prioritization of the political and economic elites of Sudan.
Secondly, changes in the preferences of international actors are also weakening the elites. Thirdly,
the political and economic elites in Sudan are grounded in religious legitimacy. The elites are of
an Islamic/Arabic identity. As a consequence, this decreases the government’s legitimacy in the
eyes of the Southern Sudanese people, who predominantly hold Christian, animist, or traditional
indigenous beliefs. Lastly, the tendency of the NCP to rely on military solutions to problems faced
by the country has led to a problematic political internalization of the military as the long-lasting
solution.
Dr. Ambrosetti argued that the current problems in Darfur are not, as commonly assumed, purely
a result of internal divisions and inequality. They are in part a result of international and regional
interference in Darfur, as well as in Sudan as a whole. Libya, Chad, and France are all guilty
of interfering and exacerbating an already tense situation in Darfur. Outside influence has had a
destabilizing effect on the nation, highlighting the fact that the current instability is not a result of
internal weaknesses alone.
Panellist Dr. Stephen Brown noted that there are currently 7,000 African Union (AU) peacekeepers
57
in Darfur, whose limited mandate is to protect ceasefire monitors and not the Sudanese people
who are threatened by physical violence. The UN has as few as 55 people on the ground in Darfur,
which is inadequate considering that Darfur is the size of France. Canada’s response has been
mainly in the form of economic, humanitarian, and logistics aid to the people of Darfur and to the
AU mission. The effect that Canadian aid has had on the ground is minimal. Canada has also raised
the ICC as a possible venue for targeting those who are orchestrating the genocide; however, there
remains a fundamental question of how effective this would be in ending the conflict.
Dr. Brown argued that the measures taken by the international community and Canada have thus
far been inadequate. Labelling Sudan as an FFFS has caused another barrier to a solution in Darfur.
That is, by placing Sudan in the same group as Afghanistan, there is a temptation to believe that
what works in Afghanistan will work in Sudan; this, however, is not the case. Canada is heavily
engaged in Afghanistan and not Sudan, despite the Canadian government’s dedication to stabilizing
FFFS. Dr. Brown questioned whether Canada’s focus on FFFS as a security concern is a result of
Canada’s national interests or a product of a deeper desire to stabilize fragmented countries.
Common themes and questions emphasized during the Sudan Break-out Sessions:
• What should Canada do?: A recurring theme was the discussion of what Canada has and has
not done to stop the ongoing crisis in Darfur. Topics of discussion included putting pressure on
the Arab League, especially Egypt (which has a historic role in Sudan), to influence the actions
of Khartoum. The delegates also considered the possible need to put pressure on external actors
such as the ICC, China, and the UN in order to create a multilateral hybrid UN-AU intervention
in the Darfur region.
• Problems with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA): The CPA is viewed by many in
Khartoum as being overly generous to the people of Southern Sudan and the SPLA. The issue
of oil and the profits gleaned from Sudan’s oil contracts remain a contentious issue. It is mostly
Northern Sudan that benefits from the oil contracts, even though the geographic location of oil
reserves is in Southern Sudan.
• China’s role: Delegates discussed how China could be engaged and be made willing to support
a UN intervention in Darfur. Both Sudan and China possess a high capacity for change but
exhibit a very low willingness to acquiesce to the will of the international community.
• The Responsibility to Protect: Delegates discussed how the Responsibility to Protect doctrine
could be more prominently placed on the political agendas of both Canada and the UN in order
to prevent gross human rights violations such as those occurring in Darfur.
58
Policy Recommendations: Sudan

Student Co-Chair: Dave Steinbach
Recommendation 1: Increase Diplomacy to Ameliorate the Humanitarian Crisis in Darfur
Preamble
The situation in Darfur calls upon the principles espoused by the Responsibility to Protect, which
Canada was instrumental in engineering. Although the Canadian government has recognized the
framework of the Responsibility to Protect as “a key component of Canada’s human security
agenda,”35 Canada has not yet made any definitive statements regarding the humanitarian crisis in
Darfur. Canada’s foreign policy should work toward confronting this issue more directly, although
a heavy military commitment may be unrealistic due to Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan.
Canada’s foreign policy must also recognize that China currently presents the biggest obstacle to
a solution in the Darfur crisis. China’s economic leverage over Khartoum should be exploited in
order to halt the atrocities in Darfur that the government of Sudan is involved in. Lastly, Canada has
a legal commitment to the people of Darfur, as outlined by the Genocide Convention of 1948.
Canada’s involvement in Darfur has consisted mainly of financial contributions to the African Union
Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and to multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs), as well as further financial
contributions aimed at humanitarian assistance and relief in the area. Canada’s involvement in
Darfur, however, ends with financial contributions aimed at humanitarian relief and peacekeeping.
Canada should make more use of diplomatic channels to ameliorate the situation in Darfur.
Policy Statement
Canada should engage in more diplomatic action to increase international support for the
efforts to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Sudan.
Policy Objectives
• To increase the role of the international community in alleviation of the humanitarian crisis in
Darfur;
• To use the leverage and resources available to Canada to ameliorate the crisis.
• DFAIT should make use of diplomatic channels and multilateral forums to persuade middle
powers such as India, Norway, Australia, Brazil, and others to support the efforts to improve
the situation in Sudan.
• DFAIT should persuade China to allow a greater international role in Darfur through diplomatic
channels and multilateral forums.
��
Canada, DFAIT, “Responsibility to Protect.”
59
Recommendation 2: Pressure Khartoum
Preamble
Repeated efforts at opening Darfur to a UN peacekeeping force have been restricted by the Sudanese
government in Khartoum, which has frequently reneged on agreements after appearing to go along
with the will of the international community. Empirical evidence suggests that the only way to
effectively deal with Khartoum is by means of coercion and serious threats to both its expanding
economy and Sudan’s privileged elite. During the 1990s, the United States under President Bill
Clinton imposed sanctions, travel bans, and asset freezes on elites within the Khartoum government
(which remains in power today). This resulted in the expulsion of terrorist Osama bin Laden and
the Al Qaeda terrorist organization. Soft-handed, courteous diplomacy with government officials
has proven to be an insufficient mechanism for working toward a solution to the Darfur crisis
and past experience dictates the need for a tougher approach toward the National Congress Party
(NCP) in Khartoum. Since Canada has neither the military capacity nor the political will to send
its own troops into the region, a non-military approach to the situation must be taken.
Canada is a signatory of the Genocide Convention of 1948, which calls on Canada to act should
genocide present itself to the international community. Moreover, the Responsibility to Protect
has been affirmed by the Canadian government as “a key component of Canada’s human security
agenda.”36 For Canada, as a member state of the UN with a strong faith in multilateral institutions,
the crisis in Darfur presents a test for the international community to come together and affirm its
verbal commitments.
An end to the genocide would add stability to a nation that has been experiencing chronic
instability for decades. Ending the crisis would also reinforce Khartoum’s commitment to the
CPA, a commitment which is needed to decrease the friction currently present between Darfur,
Southern Sudan and Northern Sudan. Most importantly, it would save the lives of thousands of
persecuted, suffering and displaced individuals.
There have not yet been any significant moves by the Canadian government to address the need
for targeted sanctions, asset freezes, or travel restrictions on members of the NCP. Development
on this front has come in the form of NGOs encouraging students, businesses, and universities to
divest from Sudan and propagate the desperate need for economic sanctions against the Khartoum
government.
Policy Statement
Canada should engage in non-military actions that impose greater pressure on the Sudanese
government.
��
Ibid.
60
Policy Objectives
• To impose greater pressure on the Sudanese government and encourage the international
community to do the same;
• To reaffirm Canada’s commitments to the Genocide Convention and to maintaining human
security.
• Canada should impose incremental sanctions against the Sudanese government and encourage
other nations to follow suit. The sanctions should begin with visa restrictions and a termination
of all new Canadian investments in Sudan; ultimately, a move toward prohibiting Canadian
investment in Sudan altogether should be made.
• Canada should endorse a no-fly zone over Darfur as a form of diplomatic pressure against the
Sudanese government, as well as to prevent the use of airspace for military action.
61
Conclusion

CONCLUSION
The engaging discussions at the Failing, Failed and Fragile States Conference reinforced the fact
that Canadian students are passionate and interested in Canadian foreign policy. There were several
common themes that transcended all of the debates and disagreements:
• The importance of engaging local actors: Successful operations in FFFS require more than
simply working through international organizations. Elements of local civil society, grassroots
organizations, and local NGOS must be involved whenever possible to ensure that Canada lays
the foundations for a sustainable democratic tradition.
• The importance of long-term commitments: Successful operations in nations like Afghanistan,
Haiti, and Sudan require long-term commitments to ensure sustainable stability. Engagement
followed by premature withdrawal may do more harm than good.
• The importance of open dialogue between the Canadian public and the government:
An open dialogue from the moment an operation begins can help the government to ensure a
sustainable long-term commitment in FFFS and assure Canadians of the importance of Canada’s
involvement and sacrifices.
• The benefits of Canada’s role as a middle power: As a peaceful middle power, Canada brings
significant advantages to the negotiating table. Canada is perceived as a neutral mediator that
looks not to take sides, but aims to find a peaceful and viable solution to intrastate or interstate
conflict. Canada must take advantage of and maintain this position as much as possible to
generate positive discourses when building solutions for FFFS.
• The importance of engagement with the international community: The lone-actor model does
not apply to stabilizing FFFS, as FFFS tend to have deep-rooted problems that are difficult for
any single actor to solve. Canada is a country with a foreign policy that emphasizes multilateral
action, and FFFS are no exception. Different countries and organizations have vast and varied
experiences and knowledge that, once combined, can ensure more effective engagement with
FFFS.
The participants of the conference expanded upon these themes in an attempt to get to the root of
the problems faced by FFFS. Addressing these issues is of great importance to the international
community and to Canada itself, both in order to increase human security by decreasing the
human suffering that occurs in FFFS, as well as to increase global stability.
65
Appendices

Appendix i: ConferenCe SChedule
Thursday, March 8th, 2007
17:30 – 18:45 Delegate Registration, Liu Institute for Global Issues
19:00 – 19:30 Conference Welcome, Liu Institute for Global Issues
Welcoming remarks by Ms. Nae English, President of IRSA

19:30 – 20:30 Welcome Address, Liu Institute for Global Issues
Keynote Address by Lowell Bergman, investigative reporter with The New York Times, producer/
correspondent for the PBS documentary series Frontline, and the Reva and David Logan
Distinguished Professor at the UC Berkley Graduate School of Journalism.

20:30 – 22:00 Welcoming Reception, Liu Institute for Global Issues
Friday, March 9th, 2007 – Presentation of Issues
07:30 – 07:50 Breakfast, International House
08:00 – 8:25 Introductory Session, Liu Institute for Global Issues
The Introductory Session was designed to lay the groundwork for the rest of the conference.
Professor Stephen Nairne, Adjunct Faculty of UBC’s Department of Political Science, discussed
working definitions for FFFS and established the context of Canada’s role within the sphere of
FFFS.
08:30 – 09:25 Issue Panel 1: Actors and Methods of Intervention, Liu

Institute for Global Issues
Chair: Katharina Coleman

Panellists: Jane Boulden – Professor, Royal Military College
David Carment – Professor, Carleton University
9:30 – 10:25 Issue Panel 2: Gender, Liu Institute for Global Issues
Chair: Margery Fee

Panellists: Erin Baines – Assistant Professor, Liu Institute for Global Issues, UBC
Lauryn Oates – Vice President, Canadian Women for Women in Afghanistan
10:30 – 10:40 Break
10:45 – 11:55 Issue Panel 3: Balance of Peace & Justice with Regard to
69
Appendices
Armed Groups, Liu Institute for Global Issues

Chair: Alana Tiemessen
Panellists: Marie-Joelle Zahar – Professor, Université de Montréal
Erin Baines – Assistant Professor, Liu Institute for Global Issues, UBC
Jean-François Gareau – Researcher, opérations de paix, Université de Montréal
Delegates were each assigned to Break-Out Sessions on one of the three issue areas discussed
during the morning. During their respective Break-Out Sessions, delegates engaged in an in-
depth discussion with other students. The sessions were chaired by Student Co-Chairs who had
studied relevant materials and were knowledgeable in the issue area. An expert was also available
to provide guidance to the participants. The goal of the sessions was to engage students in a
discussion of what they had learned during the panel sessions, to deepen their knowledge of the
issues surrounding FFFS, and to help them identify key themes for policy recommendations.
12:00 – 13:15 Six Concurrent Break-Out Sessions
Gender (Session A), West Mall Annex (WMAX) 110

Student Co-Chair: Will Goldbloom
Expert: Erin Baines
Gender (Session B), Liu Institute Case Room

Student Co-Chair: Nae English
Expert: Lauryn Oates
Actors and Methods of Intervention (Session A), WMAX 140

Expert: Jane Boulden
Actors and Methods of Intervention (Session B), WMAX 150

Expert: David Carment
Balance of Peace & Justice with Regard to Armed Groups (Session A), WMAX 240
Expert: Marie-Joelle Zahar
Balance of Peace & Justice with Regard to Armed Groups (Session B), WMAX 216
Expert: Jean-François Gareau

13:15 – 13:50 Lunch, International House Upper Lounge
14:00 – 15:10 Issue Panel 4: Democratization and the Role of Government,

Liu Institute for Global Issues
70
Chair: Maxwell Cameron

Panellists: Sandra MacLean – Professor, Simon Fraser University
Robert Miller – Executive Director, Parliamentary Centre
Stewart Prest – Researcher, Carleton University

15:15 – 16:25 Issue Panel 5: Natural Resources, Liu Institute for Global
Issues
Chair: Peter Dauvergne

Panellists: Karen Ballentine – United Nations Development Programme’s Bureau of Crisis
Prevention and Recovery
Philippe Le Billon – Professor, University of British Columbia
Christine Johnson – Senior Policy Advisor, Private Sector Development, CIDA

16:30 – 16:40 Break
Delegates were once again each assigned to a Break-Out Session conducted in the same format as
those that occurred during the morning.
16:45 – 18:00 Six Concurrent Break Out Sessions
Democratization and the Role of Government (Session A), WMAX 110

Expert: Sandra MacLean
Democratization and the Role of Government (Session B), WMAX 140

Expert: Robert Miller
Democratization and the Role of Government (Session C), WMAX 150

Expert: Stewart Prest
Natural Resources (Session A), WMAX 240

Expert: Karen Ballentine
Natural Resources (Session B), WMAX 216

Expert: Philippe Le Billon

Natural Resources (Session C), Liu Institute Case Room
Expert: Christine Johnson
71
Appendices
18:00 – 19:30 Free Time
19:30 – 22:30 Formal Reception & Keynote Speaker
Keynote Address by Brigadier-General David Fraser, Commander, Task Force Afghanistan.
Saturday, March 10th, 2007 – Presentation of Case Studies and Policy Recommendations
08:00 – 08:25 Breakfast, International House Upper Lounge
08:30 – 09:40 Case Study Panel 1: Afghanistan, Liu Institute for Global
Issues
Chair: Gogi Bhullar

Panellists: Brigadier-General David Fraser – Department of National Defence
Marc André Boivin – Researcher, Opérations de Paix, Université de Montréal
Richard Arbeiter – Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
09:45 – 10:40 Case Study Panel 2: Haiti, Liu Institute for Global Issues
Chair: Catherine Kiszkiel

Panellists: Carlo Dade – Deputy Director, Canadian Foundation for the Americas
Darren Schemmer – Director General: Haiti, Cuba and Dominican Republic,
Americas Branch, CIDA

10:45 – 10:55 Break
11:00 – 11:55 Case Study Panel 3: Sudan, Liu Institute for Global Issues
Chair: Robert Miller

Panellists: David Ambrosetti – Post-Doctoral Fellow, opérations de paix, Université de
Montréal
Stephen Brown – Professor, University of Ottawa
12:00 – 12:10 Break
Delegates were each assigned to Break-Out Sessions on one of the three case studies. The Break-
Out Sessions followed the same format as those of the previous day.
12:15 - 13:25 Seven Concurrent Break-Out Sessions
Afghanistan (Session A), Continuing Studies Building (CSB) 213

Student Co-Chair: Rahim Mohamed
Expert: Brigadier-General David Fraser
72
Afghanistan (Session B), CSB 214

Expert: Richard Arbeiter
Afghanistan (Session C), CSB 215

Expert: Marc André Boivin
Haiti (Session A), CSB 216

Expert: Carlo Dade
Haiti (Session B), CSB 217

Expert: Darren Schemmer
Sudan (Session A), CSB 212

Expert: David Ambrosetti
Sudan (Session B), CSB 219

Expert: Stephen Brown
Delegates were each assigned to Policy Formulation Sessions on the five issue areas and three
case studies prior to the conference, allowing them to prepare beforehand. The sessions were
chaired by Student Co-Chairs who had a thorough knowledge of the topics discussed, as well as
the panellists from the corresponding panel. The goal of the sessions was to engage students in
focused discussions to formulate concrete policy recommendations.
13:30 – 15:30 Eight Concurrent Sessions: Working Lunch and Policy

Formulation Sessions
Actors & Methods of Intervention Policy Formation Group, CSB 216

Experts: Jane Boulden and David Carment
Gender Policy Formation Group, CSB 213

Experts: Erin Baines and Lauryn Oates
Balance of Peace & Justice with Regard to Armed Groups Policy Formation Group, CSB 215
Experts: Marie-Joelle Zahar and Jean-François Gareau
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Democratization and the Role of Government Policy Formation Group, CSB 217
Student Co-Chair: Alex Salez
Experts: Robert Miller and Stewart Prest
Natural Resources Policy Formation Group, CSB 214

Experts: Christine Johnson
Afghanistan Policy Formation Group, CSB 219

Student Co-Chair: Rahim Mohamed
Experts: Brigadier-General David Fraser, Richard Arbeiter, and Marc André Boivin
Haiti Policy Formation Group, CSB 212

Experts: Carlo Dade and Darren Schemmer
Sudan Policy Formation Group, CSB 218

Experts: David Ambrosetti and Stephen Brown
15:30 – 15:45 Break
15:45 – 16:30 Closing Session
Closing remarks by Ms. Nae English, President of IRSA
16:30 End of Conference
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Appendix II: Methodology
During the Introductory Session, Professor Stephen Nairne laid the groundwork for the Conference
by providing working definitions of FFFS and establishing the context of Canada’s role within
the sphere of FFFS. A handout provided by Professor Nairne summarized this information. It is
presented below.
1. Why Failed/Fragile States Matter
In recent years, the world has witnessed an increased incidence of intra-state conflict and state
failure. Both academics and policy-makers have identified fragile and failed states as vectors for
transnational security threats.
Linkages between state failure and terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, transnational crime
groups and the containment of pandemics (avian flu, HIV, transmission).
They also pose significant threats to their own people, due to the reinforcing nature of poverty
and state failure. Weak governments deprive groups within their country of the basic means for
survival, pushing groups into illicit activities in order to survive and create significant IDPs/
Refugee flows.
The core international policy issues follow directly:
1. Issue related to political will and the responsibility to protect at both national, regional,
and multilateral levels (arising principally from perceived failures in Rwanda, Sudan
and other jurisdictions) (DND)
2. The centrality of state capacity and governance (DFAIT)
3. Nature and level of development assistance (fragile vs. non-fragile states) and the need
for highly nuanced approaches (CIDA)
2. Working Definitions
The terms of fragile, failing, and failed states encompass a number of concepts related to state
vulnerability and state capacity. In general, the term is used to describe states in which institutions
are weak, the state is unable to deliver services of provide security to tall (or a significant portion)
of its population. In practice, while fragile states share a common vulnerability, they face very
different combinations of challenges.
Tolstoy’s homily to families may be easily translated to nations:
“All happy families resemble one another, each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.”
In this formulation we can turn the problem on its head and ask what functions are necessary for a
state to sustain itself despite inherent strains.
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While there is no universally accepted definitions it is generally accepted that a functioning state
is able to perform three central functions:
Authority: state possesses ability to enact binging legislation and provide a stable and secure
environment.
Legitimacy: ability of state to command public loyalty and generate domestic support.
Capacity: ability of state to mobilize public resources toward productive ends and to display basic
competence in political and economic management.
While conflict is not necessarily a direct cause of consequence of state failure, the correlation is,
unsurprisingly, very high (24/26 in 2006 World Bank Report).
3./4. Failed/Fragile Methodologies and Indices
PMSU Annotated Instability Framework
Ranking tables provide both overall risk scores and, through disaggregation, scores by risk
factor.
a. Structural Indicators
b. State Capacity
c. External Factors
d. Shocks/Sting Sensitivity Assessment
e. Event Monitoring
FUND FOR PEACE/FOREIGN POLICY METHODOLOGY

www.fundforpeace.org
The Twelve Indicators:
SOCIAL INDICATORS
• I1 – Mounting Demographic Pressures
• I2 – Massive Movement of Refugees and IDPs
• I3 – Legacy of Vengeance – Seeking Group Greivance
• I4 – Chronic and Sustained Human Flight
ECONOMIC INDICATORS
• I5 – Uneven Economic development Along Group Lines
• I6 – Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline
POLITICAL INDICATORS
• I7 - Criminalization or Delegitimization of the State
• I8 – Progressive Deterioration of Public Services
• I9 – Widespread Violation of Human Rights
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• I10 – Security Apparatus as “State within as State

• I11 – Rise of Factionalized Elite
• I12 – Intervention of Other States or External Actors
For Structural Indicators, it is critical to look at level, trend, and volatility.
For sustainable security, a state should have the following:

• A competent domestic police force and corrections system
• An efficient and functioning civil service or professional bureaucracy
• An independent judicial system that works under the rule of law
• A professional and disciplined military accountable to a legitimate civilian government
• A strong executive/legislative leadership capable of national governance
COUNTRY INDICATORS FOR FOREIGN POLICY METHODOLOGY (CIFP)
Uses 6 indicator clusters:

- Governance
- Economics
- Security and Crime
- Human Development
- Demography
- Environment
Explores Three Dimensions of Governance: Authority, Legitimacy, and Capacity
Inclusion of Gender as Cross-Cutting Theme
5. Issues Related to Canadian Engagement
Most Canadians agree that Canada should be involved in efforts to combat state fragility
and failure through prevention, intervention, and reconstruction. Given our limited military
capabilities and financial resources, selection criteria must be established, looking at factors
such as available resources, expertise, access points, needs of the state in question, and putative
impacts of our engagement. Generally, Canadians prefer multilateral engagements.
There is less agreement over whether Canada’s interventions should be guided by national vs.
moral/legal interests.
Lastly, effective communications are essential to sustaining political and public support for our
contributions.
IMPACT/RELEVANCY ASSESSMENT
A central focus of the CIFP and State Failure Committee’s work has been to sketch and define
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linkages between improved early warning capability and whole of government (and inter-
governmental approaches) to preventive actions.
Canada is not equipped to intervene prior to or after each instance of state fragility. Indeed, it
has increasingly concentrated its efforts in a smaller number of countries while simultaneously
increasing cooperation with donor partners.
This raises a critical question: how can we, as Canadians, make objective and transparent
decisions with respect to engagement in a given fragile or failed state?
Key Measures of Relevance
1. Measures related to Canada’s foreign policy interests and values

- Development Linkages (relative level of aid/aid effectiveness)
- Economic and Trade Linkages
- Security and Strategic Linkages (regional impacts)
- Demographic Linkages (Diaspora)
- Cultural/Organizational Linkages
2. Measures related to out global development mandate and, specifically, efforts aimed at
gender empowerment, poverty eradication, and human security.
Relevance must look both at relevance to Canadian interests and host country interests.
In instances where relative relevance is establishes, a second set of considerations related to
impact is required:
Key Measures of Impact
Impact assessment looks at international, regional, and national issues related to engagement/
consultation, coordination, legal frameworks.
Central idea is to match entry points for intervention with response options – be they primarily of
a security, development, or capacity building.
Fundamentally, how much will a situation improve as a result of our engagement and have
operational issues been systematically addressed?
Methods of Engagement: Policy Toolbox
Addresses issues related to engagement targeting and effectiveness.
Governance
- building democratic institutions
- legislative assistance
- judicial reform
- truth and reconciliation processes
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Economic
- private sector development
- financial sector strengthening
- small enterprise, micro-credit
- transparency/anti-corruption
- land administration/defining property rights
Security
- preventative deployments
- support for alternative livelihoods
Crime
- police, correctional, and legal training
Human Development
- health
- education
- humanitarian relief
Demography
- refugee and IDP assistance
- resettlement and reintegration
Environment
- natural resource management
- sustainable development
KEY SUCCESSFUL APPROACHES TO FRAGILE STATES
1. Understand the Problem – there is no policy template with universal application.

For example, a strong international presence, intrusive revenue controls and early
elections appear to have worked well in Liberia. But the same is certainly not true in
Iraq. As a direct consequence, approaches must be evidence-based and built on a strong
understanding of a country’s social, demographic, political, and economic dynamics.
2. Recognize that Prevention is Preferable to Cure – preventative actions (i.e.
Macedonia) versus hypothetical costs of intervention (despite heroic assumptions
involved) put forth a clear, and intuitively appealing, case.
3. Understand the Regional Context – experiences in Central Africa, the Balkans, Iraq,
and Afghanistan demonstrate clearly that greater attention must be paid to neighbouring
states.
4. Commit the Necessary Political, Financial and Security Resources – the key political
resource is a commitment to stay the course. It may take a decade or more to rebuild a
state and premature disengagement, as the case or Timor-Leste, is fraught with danger.
Also key are whole-of-government approaches (both internal and external) to address
complex challenges related to restoring security, establishing effective governance, and
promoting sustainable economic development.
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Appendix III: Participants
The following individuals organized the Failing, Failed and Fragile States Conference:
Conference Secretariat
Ana-Maria Chirila ~ Conference Coordinator
Lammie Cheng ~ Director of Delegates and Promotion
Rudy Irwin ~ Director of Finance and Fundraising
Pamela Toor ~ Director of Logistics
Yifeng Song ~ Director of Logistics
Alia Dharssi ~ Report Director
Kristian Jebsen ~ Report Director
Nae English ~ IRSA President 2006-2007
Amir Musin ~ Vice President Internal 2006-2007
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Conference Organizers
Conference Coordinator:
Ana-Maria Chirila is graduating this year with a BA in History from UBC.
Director of Delegates and Promotion:
Lammie Cheng is entering her fourth year at UBC. Majoring in International Relations and
minoring in U.S. Studies, her area of interest lies in peace and security, U.S.-Canada relations, and
Canada-East Asia relations. Lammie is also in the UBC Co-op program and will be working at the
U.S. Consulate General during the summer of 2007. Having worked in Asia, Europe, and Canada,
Lammie will consider entering the Canadian Foreign Service or another career that involves
international travel upon graduation.
Directors of Logistics:
Yifeng Song is graduating this year with a major in Electrical Engineering. During his years as a
student, he has been involved with Engineers Without Borders and Oxfam Canada. Some of his
areas of interest are energy trade, energy policy, and the economic development of third world
countries.
Pamela Toor is entering her third year at UBC and pursuing a double major in Sociology and
International Relations. Her areas of interest include international migration, ethnic/cultural
relations, international law, and urban development. Previously, she has been a participant in
student conferences, such as Model United Nations, and student exchanges, with the last one being
an interactive tour of the United Nations. Upon graduation, she plans to travel and work before
pursuing graduate studies.
Director of Finance and Fundraising:
Rudy Irwin is completing his final year of studies at UBC and pursuing a degree in International
Relations, with a specialization in international economy and development. His interest is in the
confluence of history, politics, and economics and how they shape events globally. After completing
his degree, he hopes to continue on to graduate studies.
Report Directors:
Alia Dharssi is entering her third year and pursuing a degree in History Honours and Economics.
Her passions include writing, learning languages and travelling. In September 2007, Alia will
be traveling to Spain to spend two semesters in an exchange program at the University of
Salamanca.
Kristian Jebsen is a fourth-year Political Science major and History minor. In his studies, he has
focused on issues of security in the developing world, the link between history and the corresponding
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evolution of literature, and the study of French and Spanish.
Nae English was the President for the International Relations Student’s Association (IRSA)
during the 2006-2007 Academic year. As President of IRSA, Nae helped to develop the idea and
gain initial support for the Failing, Failed, and Fragile States Conference. She participated in the
overall planning and chaired a break-out session on Gender. Nae is graduating this year with
a degree in International Relations with a focus on International Development and Economics.
In the fall of 2007, she will start a MSc in Development Management at the London School of
Economics. Having lived in Africa and studied Arabic for two years, she hopes to pursue a career
in development economics in the Middle East and Africa Regions.
Amir Musin is a graduating student this year with a degree in Political Science and International
Relations at UBC. His academic interests lie in the fields of International Law and Security Studies.
During the years of 2006-2007 he served as the Vice-President External of the International
Relations Students Association.
Student Co-Chairs
Actors and Methods of Intervention:
Alia Dharssi was also one of the Report Directors. See her biography above.
Gender:
Will Goldbloom is entering his third year and pursuing a major in International Relations with a
minor in Critical Studies in Sexuality. His interest in global issues regarding gender and sexuality
led him to participate in the Failing, Failed, and Fragile States Conference. Will also volunteers for
AIDS Vancouver and has performed in productions with UBC Theatre. Will is going to pursue his
studies at Uppsala Universitet in Sweden next year on exchange from UBC.
Balance of Peace and Justice with Regards to Armed Groups:
Amir Musin also helped to organize the conference. See his biography above.
Democratization:
Alex Sales is graduating from UBC with a major in International Relations. Most of his studies have
dealt with peace and security issues and he is particularly interested in peacekeeping operations.
In 2005-2006, Alex attained a position with the Democratic Institutions and Conflict Division
at CIDA, where he assisted on the conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and fragile states files. In
September 2007, Alex will be starting a MA in International Affairs at the Norman Patterson
School of International Affairs at Carleton University.
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Natural Resources:
Vanessa Lunday is graduating from UBC with a major in International Relations and a minor in
French. She has focused on international diplomacy, as well as security and peace studies. She has
also done research on environmental regimes and the role of business in international politics.
Afghanistan:
Rahim Mohamed is a third-year UBC student majoring in International Relations. He has been
an active participant in Model United Nations Conferences throughout the West Coast. He is
particularly interested in security issues relating to South Asia and the Middle East. Additionally,
Rahim has been involved with numerous on-campus groups such as the Forum on International
Cooperation and the International Relations Students’ Association.
Sudan:
Dave Steinbach is pursuing a major in International Relations at UBC with a focus on human
security and development in Africa. His research has centered on the themes of intra-state conflict,
ethnic and economic exclusion, and international intervention in countries across the African
continent, including Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, Rwanda, Sudan, Nigeria, and the DRC. With
numerous conferences, meetings, and research under his belt, Dave plans to put theory into action
with an internship in community development in Madagascar this summer.
Haiti:
Leah Marchuk is graduating this year with a degree in International Relations. Her primary
academic interests include conflict prevention, human security, and governance issues. In the past,
Leah has worked for both CIDA and DND.
Academic/Practitioner Panellists and Co-Chairs
Introductory Session:
Stephen Nairne is a Professor of Political Science at UBC with a focus on Country Risk Analysis.
Mr. Nairne is also a Deputy Director and Trade Commissioner at the Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade. He has previously worked as a Political Risk Analyst at the Export
Development Bank and has a MA in international relations form Carleton University.
Actors and Methods of Intervention:
Jane Boulden holds a Canada Research Chair in International Relations and Security Studies at
the Royal Military College of Canada and was a former MacArthur Research Fellow at the Centre
for International Relations in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Oxford
University. Dr. Boulden’s current research interests involve “examining the nature and scope of
the changes in thinking about national and international security since the end of the Cold War and
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the attacks of September 11” with a focus on the implications for Canadian national security and
policy.
David Carment is a full Professor of International Affairs at the Norman Paterson School of
International Affairs at Carleton University and a Fellow of the Canadian Defence and the Foreign
Affairs Institute. Mr. Carment is the principal investigator for the Country Indicators for Foreign
Policy project with current research focused on developing failed state risk assessment and early
warning methodologies evaluating models of third-party intervention. He has served as the Director
of the Centre for Security and Defence Studies at Carleton University. He is also the recipient of
a Carleton Graduate Students’ Teaching Excellence Award and Carleton University’s Research
Achievement Award.
Gender:
Erin Baines is the Research Director of the Conflict and Development Programme at the Liu
Institute for Global Issues. Her research interests include the politics of humanitarianism and
forced displacement, gender and IR, youth and human security issues. She has worked with
conflict affected populations in Guatemala, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, and Northern Uganda.
She is currently focusing on justice issues in Northern Uganda with an emphasis on youth and
gender. Baines is the recipient of a two-year interdisciplinary team research grant from Status of
Women Canada for a project entitled “Understanding the Effects of Canada’s New Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act on Women Asylum Seekers.” She was also awarded a post-doctoral
award from the Socials Studies and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Henry Frank
Guggenheim Prize on “The Role of the Academic in Reducing Violent Conflict.” Baines received
a PhD in International Relations from Dalhousie University in 2000.
Lauryn Oates is a professional human rights advocate and international development practitioner,
with particular expertise in gender and women’s human rights. Much of her work is focused on the
use of information communications technologies and language accessibility, and her skills include
the design and use of accessible information to advance human rights, particularly in the Muslim
world. She has been working as an activist on women’s rights in Afghanistan since 1996. She
founded the Vancouver and Montreal Chapters of Canadian Women for Women in Afghanistan, a
non-profit solidarity network, and also currently sits on their Board of Directors as Vice-President.
She managed the CIDA-funded Women’s Rights in Afghanistan Fund and other projects supporting
women’s movements and peacebuilding in the Middle East and Central Asia from 2002-2006 in
the Women’s Rights programme at the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic
Development. Lauryn holds a BA Honours in International Development Studies from McGill
University, an MA in Human Security and Peacebuilding from Royal Roads University, and will
commence PhD studies in Education in Fall 2007.
Balance of Peace and Justice with Regards to Armed Groups:
Jean-Francois Gareau is currently a post-doctoral researcher at CERIUM in Montreal. He holds

an LLB from the University of Sherbrooke, an MA from the School of Advanced International
Studies at Johns Hopkins University, and a PhD from L’Institute des Hautes Études Internationales
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de Geneve. He has previously held academic positions at the University of Montreal and
Northeastern University. He also worked for four years in the International Public Law Department
at the University of Geneva, Switzerland. He is a specialist in international public law with current
research interests in the juridical implications of international intervention in failed states, as well
as a critical analysis of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine.
Marie-Joelle Zahar is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Montreal. Her
research interests include civil conflict-resolution, peacebuilding, and post-conflict reconstruction.
She was a recipient of post-doctoral grants from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada, the Munk Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto, and the
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. During her post-doctoral studies, from 1998 to
2000, she was invited to be a researcher at the Centre for International Security and Cooperation
at Stanford University. In 1999, she worked as a consultant at the United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. She graduated form the American University in Beirut in
1984 with a BA in Political Science and received a PhD in Political Science from McGill University
in 2000.
Democratization:
Sandra Maclean holds an MA and a PhD from Dalhousie University and she is currently an
Associate Professor at Simon Fraser University. She specializes in international political economy
and comparative development. Her main topic of research is the impact of globalization upon
governance and security in developing countries and regions, with a particular focus on Southern
Africa. She is the co-editor of Crises of Governance in Asia and Africa and has been published
extensively in various edited volumes and journals.
Robert Miller is the Executive Director of the Parliamentary Centre. On joining the Centre in
1978, he became senior advisor to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. In that
capacity, he assisted the committee over the next decade in preparing a series of studies on foreign
aid, relations with Latin America, human rights and democratic development. Since the early
1990s, Mr. Miller has led the Centre in establishing an international reputation in the field of
democratic development, overseeing the building of programs in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, the
Middle East and the Americas. Mr. Miller has written extensively on democratic development and
peace-building.
Stewart Prest is a Senior Research Analyst at Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP),
a research project located at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton
University. His current focus includes the development of CIFP’s Fragile State Monitoring and
Assessment Methodology, a project undertaken in partnership with the Canadian International
Development Agency. As part of this work, he has co-authored “Failed and Fragile States: A
Concept Paper for the Canadian Government,” as well as “The 2006 Country Indicators for Foreign
Policy: Opportunities and Challenges for Canada,” an article appearing in the current edition
of Canadian Foreign Policy. He is also co-author of “Assessing Small Island Developing State
Fragility,” in Economic Vulnerability and Resilience of Small States, a volume jointly published
by The Commonwealth Secretariat and the University of Malta Press. In addition, he has written
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Appendices
“Upheaval in Haiti: The Criminal Threat to Canada,” a case study exploring the linkages between
state fragility and transnational crime, available on CIFP’s website at www.carleton.ca/cifp.
Natural Resources:
Karen Ballentine is a Project Manager for the Report on Fostering Post-Conflict Economic
Recovery with the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery at the United Nations Development
Programme. Ms. Ballentine has previously worked as a Senior Associate for the International
Peace Academy and as an Adjunct Professor at the School of International and Public Affairs
at Columbia University. Her research interests include war economies, business, conflict, and
human rights. She has consulted for the UN Global Compact, the New Security Programme at
the Fafo Institute of Applied International Studies, the Millenium Development Goals, the UN
Informal Working Group on the Political Economy of Armed Conflict, the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises, and the Human Security Network.
Philippe le Billon is an Assistant Professor at the University of British Columbia with the
Department of Geography and the Liu Institute for Global Issues. Mr. Le Billon has worked
for environmental and humanitarian organizations in Angola, Cambodia, Sierra Leone, and the
former-Yugoslavia. He is currently conducting research on the political economy and geography
of war, the role of primary commodities in armed conflict, and corporate social responsibility in
the extractive sectors.
Christine Johnson is a Senior Policy Advisor for Private Sector Development at CIDA. Her
work on a new strategic focus for private sector development was incorporated into Canada’s
international policy framework and a strategy to strengthen CIDA’s effectiveness and innovation
in private sector development. Her models focus on entrepreneurship, business and investment
climate reform, foreign direct investment, and corporate responsibility in developing countries. Ms.
Johnson graduated from Simon Fraser University with a BA in Political Science and is currently
working towards a postgraduate degree in International law.
Afghanistan:
Richard Arbeiter is the Deputy Director of Policy and Advocacy of the Afghanistan Task Force
with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Mr. Arbeiter has a MA in Conflict
Analysis from the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. He was previously a Policy
Advisor with the Afghanistan Unit of the South Asia Division of Foreign Affairs Canada.
Marc André Boivin is the Assistant-Director of the Peace Operations Research Network (Réseau
Francophone de Recherche sur les Opérations de Paix) and a fellow at the Research Group in
International Security (REGIS), both affiliates of the International Studies and Research Center of
the University of Montreal (CÉRIUM). He was recently part of a team headed by Former Deputy
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gordon Smith, that drafted a report based on the fundamental question
“is what Canada doing working in Afghanistan?”. The report was published on March 6, 2007 by
the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute.
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Brigadier-General David A. Fraser assumed command of the Regional Command South (Multi
National Brigade) Kandahar, Afghanistan in February 2006, a position he held for nine months
as part of the ongoing international commitment to the development and stability of the region.
Brigadier-General Fraser has previously served in Cyprus and Sarajevo in 1994/1995. He was
awarded the Meritorious Service Medal for his actions during the Bosnian Civil War. He has
worked as Director Land Force Readiness 3 responsible for all Army planning and tasks and in
this role played a major part in Canada’s participation in Kosovo and Honduras. He was then
assigned as the Project Director for Land Force Reserve Restructure, responsible for developing
new Army Capabilities and assignment of tasks for the Army Reserve. In 2003, Brigadier-General
Fraser was posted to the Bi-National Planning Group in Colorado Springs Colorado where he
served as the Co-Director until 2005. In June 2005, Brigadier-General Fraser assumed command
of 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group and was promoted to his current rank shortly thereafter.
Brigadier-General Fraser was also the recipient of the Vimy Award in 2006, which recognizes
one Canadian annually for making a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and
security of Canada and the preservation of democratic values.
Sudan:
David Ambrosetti is a post-doctorate researcher at CERIUM (Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches
Internactionales) at the University of Montreal. His current research focuses on “The Road for
Influence in UN Peace Support Operations: the Leadership within the UN Security Council and
Its Rules.” He has a PhD in Political Science from the University Montesquieu-Bordeaux IV for
“International Politics as a Sphere of Social Judgment: The French Diplomacy and UN Conflicts
Management.” His research interests include international response to armed conflict and political
violence in Rwanda and Sierra Leone, as well as field research in Sudan.
Stephen Brown is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Ottawa. He has
published on a range of issues relating to Africa, notably democratization, foreign aid, conflict, and
conflict prevention. He is currently working on a research project on transition violence in Angola,
Kenya, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe.
Haiti:
Carlo Dade is the Deputy Director of the Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL), where
he manages research initiatives in Afro-Latinos, Diaspora Engagement and Remittances, Corporate
Social Responsibility, and Canadian Engagement in Haiti. Prior to taking on his position at FOCAL,
Dade served at the Inter-American Foundation and the World Bank. He was also a founding
member of and served as a senior analyst at the Enterprise Research Institute and Foundation for
Latin America, a think tank focused on corporate social responsibility and the private sector. Dade
graduated from the University of Virginia in 1984 with a BA in International Affairs and a minor in
Middle Eastern Studies. He then pursued an MA in Arab Studies at Georgetown University, from
which he graduated in 1989.
Darren Schemmer is the Director General of Policy and Planning at the Americas Branch of
CIDA. He joined CIDA as a Foreign Service Officer in 1989, leaving a career in education in
Vancouver. He has served at CIDA headquarters in the Americas Branch as well as in the field in
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Honduras, Egypt, and at the Organization of American States. He was the Senior Departmental
Assistant to the Minister for International Cooperation from August 2002 to August 2004. Since
September 2004 he has been the Director General of Policy, Planning, and Management in CIDA’s
Americas Branch. Since July 2006 he joined the Haiti, Cuba, and Dominican Republic program
as Director General for the program. Mr. Schemmer has a BEd from the University of Alberta and
a MBA from Royal Roads University.
Keynote Speakers
Opening Reception:
Lowell Bergman is a producer/correspondent for the PBS documentary series Frontline and
a former investigative reporter for The New York Times and 60 Minutes. Mr. Bergman is
also the Reva and David Logan Distinguished Professor at the Graduate School of Journalism
at the University of California at Berkeley. He is the recipient of honours in both print and
broadcasting, including the Pulitzer Prize for Public Service, Emmys, and Peabodys. As a
producer for CBS News between 1983 and 1998, Bergman produced stories about organized
crime, international arms and drug trafficking, terrorism, and corporate crime. The story of his
investigation of the tobacco industry for 60 Minutes was chronicled in the Academy Award-
nominated feature film “The Insider.” Berman received a BA from the University of Wisconsin-
Madison in 1966 and pursued graduate studies at the UC San Diego.
Formal Reception:
Brigadier-General David A. Fraser was also a panelist. See his biography above.
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Participating Schools
Simon Fraser University – Burnaby, BC
University of Alberta – Edmonton, AB
University of British Columbia – Vancouver, BC
University of Calgary – Calgary, AB
University of Canterbury – New Zealand
University of Northern British Columbia – Prince George, BC
University of Otago – New Zealand
University of Saskatchewan – Saskatoon, SK
University of Toronto – Toronto, ON
University of Victoria – Victoria, BC
Western Oregon University – Monmouth, OR, USA
Wilfred Laurier University – Waterloo, ON
York University – Toronto, ON
List of Delegates
Aequitus, Matthew UBC Kerr, Sarah UBC

Albino, May U. Toronto Kim, Robert UBC
Alfalaij, Mona UBC Lam, Sienne UBC
Allen, Nikole Hermina Western Oregon University Lim,Tee University of Otago
Allen, Jared York University Macdonald, Sara UBC
Bacalso, Cristina U. Calgary McFadden, Katie University of Canterbury
Bandali, Naveed U. Alberta Peel, Melissa UBC
Bege, Roland UBC Petroutsas, Anthony U. Victoria
Bell, Adriana Wilfred Laurier University Phelps, Mark UBC
Bernovsky, Victor UBC Rai, Harkamal UBC
Berry, R. Dane SFU Ramze Rezaee, O.Jasmine UBC
Boothe, Alison UBC Renaud, Simone UNBC
Brebner, Sarah Merise SFU Rikoff, Heather UBC
Carr, Devon UBC Robbins, Lisa UBC
Chan, Damian UBC Rusko, Christopher UBC
Cheung, Christine UBC Ryffel, Pascal U. Alberta
Cooper, Tara UBC Seaborn, Claire UBC
Crossley, Ashley Lynn UBC Smith, Claire UBC
D’Arrigo, Marie UBC Snee, Iain UBC
De Silva, Shanila UBC Stendie, Larissa U. Alberta
De Visser, Katherine UBC Stiege, Tyson UBC
DeMarcus, Laura UBC Taneja, Trisha UBC
Earner,Gwendolen UBC Thomas, David UBC
Edgerton-McGhan, Janine UBC Triemstra, Melanie UBC
Elliot Harrison, Richard U. Calgary Turnbull, Ayako UBC
Geoghegan, Ronan UBC Tuytel, Dyna UBC
Gerlach, Annika UBC Wheler, Brett SFU
Haerthe, Natalie UBC Wiebe, Adam U. Saskatchewan
Hafeez, Waleed Wilfred Laurier University Winstanley, Marena UBC
Hallet, Alaina SFU Wong, Annabel UBC
Hamza, Veronika UBC Wong, Rosalind UBC
Harris-Ankerich, Brandon Western Oregon University Wong, Danica UBC
Jackson, Tessa UNBC Zanganehpour, Shoushiant UBC
James, Shannon U. Calgary
89
Appendices
Appendix IV: Letters of Endorsement
Letters in support of the conference were received from Prime Minister Stephen Harper, Minister
of Foreign Affairs Peter G. MacKay, BC Premier Gordon Campbell, and UBC President Stephen
Toope.
90

I am pleased to extend my warmest greetings to everyone attending the

University of British Columbia Failed, Failing and Fragile States Conference.
The International Relations Student Association of the University of

British Columbia, along with its supporting partners, has organized this meeting as a way
of connecting students who are interested in playing a constructive part in world affairs.
Over the next three days, students from a variety of disciplines will assemble to discuss the
human tragedy that results from the collapse of fragile nations. It is a wonderful
opportunity for participants to increase awareness and understanding of this complex
problem and to propose solutions and policy recommendations that are consistent with
Canada’s core ideals and values.
I would like to commend the organizers for putting together a program that
is sure to stimulate a great deal of thoughtful discussion. I am certain that delegates will
benefit from the exchange of ideas while enjoying the camaraderie and social interaction
that are an essential part of the experience.
On behalf of the Government of Canada, please accept my best wishes for a

memorable and productive conference.

OTTAWA
2007
February 3, 2007
A Message from the Premier
As Premier of the Province of British Columbia, I welcome everyone to the Failing, Failed and
Fragile States conference organized by the International Relations Students Association of the
University of British Columbia.
I understand that the event will bring together over 100 upper level undergraduate and graduate
students from across Canada. It is a valuable opportunity for everyone to meet, gain new knowledge
and discuss current issues in the Canadian government’s policies and practices highlighted on the
agenda.
I would like to recognize the volunteers and organizers of this event. I commend them for their
hard work and personal time that went into preparing all aspects of the program. I am sure there will
be a lot of constructive discussions.
Please accept my best wishes for an enjoyable and successful conference.
Sincerely,
ʳ
Gordon Campbell
Premier
Province of British Columbia Box 9041 Stn Prov Govt

Office of the Premier Victoria, B.C.
www.gov.bc.ca V8W 9E1
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108
Failing, Failed, & Fragile
States Conference
Conference Report
March 2007

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Failing, Failed, & Fragile

Report Directors: Alia Dharssi and Kristian Jebsen

Report Design: Eleanor Cheng, Alia Dharssi, and Yifeng Song

Conference Director: Ana-Maria Chirila

Failing, Failed, and Fragile States Conference

Liu Institute for Global Issues

International Relations Students’ Association

 The Canadian International Development Agency for speaker contribution.

4. Conceptualizing Failing, Failed and Fragile States………………………………………. 11

“All happy families are happy alike, all unhappy families

Actors and Methods of Intervention

Balance of Peace and Justice with Regard to Armed Groups

Democratization and the Role of Government

Natural Resources and the Private Sector

Failing, Failed, & Fragile States Conference

Failing, Failed, & Fragile States Conference

Definition and Causes of State Fragility

Failing, Failed, & Fragile States Conference

1 A detailed conference agenda is provided in Appendix I.

Summary of Issue Area 1: Actors and Methods of Intervention

In 2000, the Canadian government sponsored the Independent International Commission on

Policy Recommendations: Actors and Methods of Intervention

Recommendation 1: Formulate Preventative Engagement

Review of Canadian Policies and Programs

as “a key component of Canada’s human security agenda.”5

Policy Directives and Guidelines

Summary of Issue Area 2: Gender

Policy Recommendations: Gender

Recommendation 1: Increase Funding for Research on Gender Issues in FFFS

Review of Canadian Policies and Programs

8 Canada, DFAIT, “Mainstreaming of a Gender Perspective,” http://www.international.gc.ca/foreign_policy/human-

• To enhance the positive impact of Canadian interventions in FFFS;

Policy Directives and Guidelines

Recommendation 2: Foster Local Initiatives

Review of Canadian Policies and Programs

• To build civil-society instruments that emphasize gender equality;

Policy Directives and Guidelines

Summary of Issue Area 3: Balance of Peace and Justice with Regard to

Policy Recommendations: Balance of Peace and Justice with Regard to

Recommendation 1: Invest in Preventative Measures, Resolve Existing Conflicts, and

Review of Canadian Policies and Programs

• To prevent violent conflict by communicating to relevant segments of the population alternative

Policy Directives and Guidelines

Summary of Issue Area 4: Democratization and the Role of Government

Policy Recommendations: Democratization and the Role of Government

Recommendation 1: Engage Local Stakeholders in a Dialogue on Democracy

Review of Canadian Policies and Programs

Policy Directives and Guidelines

Summary of Issue Area 5: Natural Resources and the Private Sector

Policy Recommendations: Natural Resources and the Private Sector

Recommendation 1: Support Small Natural Resource Based Industries in FFFS

Review of Canadian Policies and Programs

• To increase stability by strengthening the economy and encouraging socially responsible

Policy Directives and Guidelines

Recommendation 2: Implement Measures to Ensure Corporate Social Responsibility of

Review of Canadian Policies and Programs

• To prevent private Canadian industry interests from exacerbating conflict in FFFS;

Policy Directives and Guidelines

Summary of Geographic Case Study 1: Afghanistan

Brigadier-General Fraser also discussed the difficulties of building an effective counter-narcotics

The Canadian International Development Agency for speaker contribution.