Peace Promotion as

National Identity
The Emergence and Reproduction of Norways
Activist Peace and Reconciliation Efforts
Paper presented at the 2011 ECPR Conference,
Reykjavik

ystein Haga Sknland

Introduction
Active peace promotion and reconciliation efforts are among the most distinct features of Norways
post Cold War foreign policy. Norway has invested considerable resources in efforts to promote
peace in conflicts all over the world, and from the late 1990s, the engagement has increasingly been
institutionalized as part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs portfolio. Since Norways success in
facilitating the 1993 peace accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO),
peace promotion has been constructed as an important foreign policy priority and a centerpiece of
Norwegian national identity. The engagement has had very broad political support; all the political
parties in position since the early 1990s, including the Labour Party, the Conservative Party, the
Christian Democratic Party, the Center Party, and the Socialist Left Party, have supported it actively.
The peace engagement is also interesting in terms of the diplomatic practices and actors involved.
One of the most celebrated features of the engagement, and the so-called Norwegian Model it is
said to rest on, is the role of Norwegian NGOs and research institutions, and the close cooperation
between non-state actors and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Through their government-sponsored
involvement, non-state actors have become diplomatic actors exerting influence over Norwegian
foreign policy (Lie, 2006; Neumann 1999; forthcoming; Tvedt 2003; 2006).
In this paper, I explore the peace engagement on the basis of the following questions: What were the
central conditions of possibility for the peace engagement? How did it come into being, and how has
it been perpetuated? What does the engagement consist of?
With this starting point, an analytical framework capable of capturing the meaning of the
engagement, and the practices involved, is needed. Iver B. Neumanns (2002) poststructuralist model
of culture is my starting point here. The model was originally devised to complement the linguistic
turn in IR with a turn to practice. Its basic starting point is that the analysis of the preconditions for
social action must include the analysis of practice understood as the study of social action itself as
well as analysis of language. (Neumann, 2002: 628) Drawing on insights from Ludwig Wittgenstein,
Michel Focault, the social anthropologist Michel deCerteau, and practice analysts, Neumann suggests
that culture may be understood as a circuit of practice, discourse and stories, charged with power.
The centerpiece of the model is the use of deCerteaus concept of stories, which is employed to
account for changes in practice.1 Stories go in a procession ahead of practices, thus narrating into
existence a social field where practices may play themselves out. The model thus allows empirical
studies of changes in practice by analyzing the interplay between practice and discourse.

For a theoretical discussion of changes in practice, see Doty, 1997

As the model does not specify how discourses should be analyzed, I draw on a conventional
discourse analytic approach. Discourses are here seen as systems of knowledge and meaning
produced in and through language. Discourses are productive; they give practices and social relations
meaning, define what practices are possible, logical and legitimate, and produce knowledge and
social reality. Discourses are thus seen as fundamental preconditions for thinking and acting we
cannot grasp the world outside discourses. (Hansen, 2006: 17f, 213; Jrgensen & Phillips, 1999: 17f,
79; Milliken, 1999: 229; Neumann, 2001) In line with these basic tenets, the goal of discourse analysis
is to identify and analyze textual representations of the phenomena in question in this case the
peace engagement.
Apart from analyzes of the Norwegian role in the Middle East peace process, and of the Norwegian
Model, practices associated with the peace engagement have been subject to relatively few studies.2
Part of the explanation for this undoubtedly lies in the contemporary nature of the engagement and
the difficulty of getting access to detailed information. As active peace promotion is a relatively new
phenomenon in Norway, relevant archival material is generally not available.
With these limitations on the availability of empirical sources in mind, the practices of peace
promotion may nevertheless be fruitfully analyzed through studying their position within the peace
engagement discourse. In line with the analytical models emphasis on the interplay between
discourse and practice, I study what practices has been constructed as part of the Norwegian peace
engagement and imbricated in the peace engagement discourse. Government white papers, foreign
policy addresses, budget propositions, reports, action plans and Ministry of Foreign Affairs web
articles are the primary sources.
The first part of the paper explores the conditions of possibility for the emergence of the
engagement through analyzing development and humanitarian aid practices in the 1980s and
changes in the Norwegian foreign policy discourse in the last part of the same decade. The second
part focuses on the pioneering peace promotion practices and the emergence of an official
Norwegian peace promotion activism after the success of the 1993 Oslo Agreement between Israel
and the PLO. Finally, I look at the institutionalization of the engagement, the portfolio of peace
promotion practices, and the discursive developments over the last decade.

Exceptions include Srb et al, 1998. Accounts of Norways role in specific peace processes, such as the peace
processes in Sri Lanka (see for example Moolakkattu, 2005) and Sudan (Kelleher, 2006), are also available. The
academic literature on the engagement by and large emphasizes the strategic perspectives and motivation. See
for example Kristoffersen, 2009; Matlary, 2002; Riste, 2001; Osland (ed.), 2000.

Setting the stage aid practices and foreign policy discourse of the late 1980s and
early 1990s
Several accounts of the peace engagement suggest that Norways involvement as a facilitator or gobetween often has been initiated by individuals not associated with the government or the MFA. In
the words of the former Ministry of Foreign Affairs State Secretary Janne Haaland Matlary (2002: 5155), the peace processes and human rights dialogues did not come about as a result of a Ministry of
Foreign Affairs grand design. Rather, Norwegian involvement often came about by chance, and
personal initiatives from actors outside the traditional foreign policy elite called the tune. Iver B.
Neumann (1999; forthcoming; see also Kristoffersen 2009: 39-46; Liland & Kjerland 2003: 83, 252ff)
also emphasizes personal initiative, but underlines that the political leadership of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs generally, and political advisor and later State Secretary Jan Egeland in particular,
were central. Professional diplomats often got involved in the processes at a later stage, and
Neumann even notes that there was some resistance from senior diplomats towards the
engagement.
The ability of NGO personnel and researchers to engage the foreign policy elite and elicit support and
funding for their initiatives is indeed a remarkable feature of the history of the peace engagement. In
the following, I explore how this was possible by analyzing development and humanitarian aid
practices and foreign policy discourse of the late 1980s and early 1990s.
NGOs in development aid and humanitarian assistance
Norwegian NGOs has been involved in efforts to develop and improve living conditions in other parts
of the world since the 1860s, when the Norwegian missionary organizations began their diaconal
work abroad. However, NGO-run projects were generally not constructed as part of Norwegian
development aid until the early 1960s. State funding of development projects run by Norwegian
NGOs was initiated in 1962, at the same time as other Western governments initiated similar
practices. Such funding practices seems to have been inspired and spurred by an emerging
international consensus that NGO involvement in aid projects was beneficial to public support for
development aid (Tvedt, 1998: 113).
The Norwegian NGOs remained a marginal channel for state-funded development assistance up to
the early 1980s, the NGOs share of the total bilateral aid averaging at 7,2 per cent (Tvedt, 1995: 1f).
In 1978, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) established an NGO Division,
signaling its intention of institutionalizing the support for Norwegian NGOs. The policy guidelines for
the NGO field were fundamentally revised, allowing the NGOs to get a larger share of their funds
from the state. NGOs that had not previously been involved in aid were encouraged to establish
3

development projects, and frame agreements with the largest Norwegian NGOs were established
(Tvedt, 1995:2).
The growing emphasis on NGOs in development aid was part of a broader tendency within the aid
community. Internationally, neo-liberal ideology gained ground, and civil society, which the NGOs
were said to represent, was seen as a counterweight to the central state. (Bucher-Johannessen,
1999: 202; Ruud & Kjerland, 2003: 199ff) While direct references to neo-liberal tenets seem to be
less common in the Norwegian discourse on the development NGOs (Tvedt, 1995: 69), the NGOs
potentials in aid came to the fore in the early 1980s.
The political breakthrough of the NGO channel in Norwegian development aid came in 1984, with
the presentation of White Paper no. 36 (1984-1985). The White Paper, which was presented to the
parliament by the Christian-Conservative government, constructed the NGOs development
assistance as important. Advantages such as flexibility, long-term commitment, local knowledge and
networks, small and efficient administration, and ability to involve the local population were assigned
to the NGOs. NGOs were also represented as playing an important role in social, economic and
political developments, and the White Paper emphasized their usefulness as a channel for statefunded aid. (Bucher-Johannesen, 1999: 202; Tvedt, 1995: 69; Ruud & Kjerland, 2003: 204)
The White Papers representation of the NGO channel seemingly functioned as a story in deCerteaus
sense the 1980s saw a remarkable growth in state-funded NGO development aid. At the beginning
of the 1990s, more than 25 per cent of Norwegian bilateral aid (including emergency aid) was given
to the NGOs. The number of NGOs receiving state support for development projects nearly doubled
from 1981 to 1991, and the number of state-supported projects went from 273 to 1058 in the same
period (Tvedt, 1995; 1998: 105f).
Moreover, the most notable increase in funding did not come from NORAD, but from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. The MFA, which had previously been largely uninterested in the NGOs, increased its
funding dramatically. (Tvedt 1995: 100; Tvedt 1998: 112) Most of it was earmarked emergency relief
operations, and close cooperation between the humanitarian NGOs and the MFA was established.
As Tvedt (1995; 1998; see also Ruud & Kjerland, 2003: 219-225) has shown, the channeling of funds
through the NGOs meant that the NGOs in several situations influenced Norwegian foreign policy
towards countries in conflict. The NGOs operated in politically very demanding situations, and their
relief operations sometimes had a direct bearing on conflicts and wars. To the MFA, the channeling
of funds through the NGOs meant that it could support what it deemed to be important operations
in conflict areas while avoiding to be directly implicated. Through their local knowledge and contacts,
4

the NGOs often were more informed about developments on the ground than was the MFA, and the
government relied on information from the NGOs.
The discourse on NGOs in development aid and the increase in the state funding of NGO projects
thus brought into being practices of cooperation and close contact between the MFA and the large
Norwegian aid NGOs. The aid NGOs became relevant to Norways foreign relations. A similar pattern
is also discernible in the relation between the state and researchers and institutes involved in
research on development and aid. The number of researchers and research institutions grew, and
the government supported the establishment of research institutions producing policy-relevant
knowledge. (Fonn & Sending 2006) As its involvement in humanitarian assistance grew, knowledge of
the Third World became increasingly relevant to the government.
Foreign policy discourse of the late 1980s
The MFAs increasing interest and involvement in humanitarian assistance was also reflected in
official foreign policy discourse towards the end of the 1980s. The 1989 White Paper on foreign
policy, which is a comprehensive review of Norways foreign relations, repeatedly articulates the
position that security cannot be viewed in isolation from global challenges. This comprehensive
notion of security, which has later been rearticulated as an important basis for Norways foreign
policy, implies that Norways global engagement to help people in crisis improves its own security.
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1989: 44f; Knutsen et al, 1997: 21, 236; Tamnes, 1997: 444) It thus
introduced an interest-based motivation for humanitarian assistance, development aid and similar
global efforts.
Furthermore, the 1989 White Paper states that there are certain advantages to being a small,
homogenous state with substantial political consensus and no colonial past or great power liabilities.
It is underlined that despite its small state status, Norway may be an international frontrunner in
issue areas where it has experience, traditions, resources, and competence. Human rights advocacy,
humanitarian assistance, and sustainable development are singled out as such issue areas (Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, 1989: 11, 49-52). Interestingly, peace promotion is not mentioned in this context,
indicating that the Ministry at the time had no concrete plans for involving Norway in facilitation of
peace processes.
The 1989 White Papers construction of development aid, humanitarian assistance and human rights
advocacy as relevant to the promotion of Norways national interest was institutionalized in 1990,
when the Ministry of Development was integrated into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (Liland &
Kjerland, 2003: 91) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs portfolio was broadened, and contact with

humanitarian NGOs and development researchers, which had already been deepened in the late
1980s, was now intensified. (Tvedt, 1995; 1998)
It is noteworthy that the White Papers emphasis on Norways foreign policy potential, in line with
the general trend towards increasing relevance and influence for NGOs and academic institutions,
apparently draws heavily on notions articulated in an academic study. Jan Egeland, who was later to
become the key actor behind Norways activist peace and reconciliation efforts3, published his
academic dissertation as a book in 1988. Egeland here argues that Norway, by virtue of national
characteristics, has considerable foreign policy potential in issue areas such as human rights
advocacy. (Egeland, 1988)4
Egeland also emphasized that capacity and expertise building and closer cooperation between the
state, the NGOs and the academic institutions should be strengthened to enable Norway to tap the
potential. This agenda is noteworthy because it mirrors what later became celebrated characteristics
of Norways peace and reconciliation efforts. Drawing on Neumanns analytical framework, Jan
Egelands account of Norways foreign policy potential - and the importance he attaches to close
cooperation between NGOs, researchers, and the government to realize this potential - may be seen
as a story narrating into existence a social field where actors outside the traditional foreign policy
were enabled to engage the state in peace promotion.
To sum up; changes in development aid and foreign policy practices and discourse in the 1980s made
development researchers and NGOs involved in humanitarian assistance and development aid more
relevant to Norways foreign policy. A tendency towards decentralization of foreign policy practice
and expansion of the number of foreign policy actors emerged. As a result, NGOs and researchers
were empowered and got access to the traditional foreign policy elite. This may plausibly be seen as
an important precondition for the ability of NGO personnel and researchers to involve Norway in
peace processes.

For an account of Jan Egelands role in creating and sustaining Norways peace engagement, see Neumann, forthcoming
The construction of Norway as able to play an important role internationally due to national characteristics is not new in
Norwegian foreign policy discourse (Riste 2001: 255f; Tamnes, 1997). Egelands study actualized it and invested it with
academic legitimacy. It should also be noted that Egelands argument seems to draw on former Minister of Foreign Affairs
Knut Frydenlunds book on Norways international challenges from 1982, in which Frydenlund articulates similar notions.
(Frydenlund, Knut 1982, p. 190; Leira (ed.) 2007: 11)
4

Peace promotion revealed an emerging field of foreign policy activism

Pioneering peace and reconciliation practices
Norway had been involved in what may be termed international peace and reconciliation efforts
during the Cold War. In the 1960s, Norway facilitated meetings between parties to the war in
Vietnam, and in 1971 the Thai Foreign Minister suggested that Norway could act as a go-between vis-vis China (Tamnes, 1997: 355ff; Neumann, forthcoming). The historian Rolf Tamnes (1997) has
suggested that a policy of active international engagement marked Norwegian foreign policy from
1965 and onwards. Nevertheless, the peace processes Norway was involved in were few and far
between, and they mainly resulted from external initiatives.
In 1989, we see the beginning of the practices that are today recognized as the Norwegian peace
engagement. Norway got involved in attempts at conflict resolution in several conflicts, and as noted
previously, the efforts were initiated by actors outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The pioneering
efforts include initiatives towards peace and reconciliation in Sudan, Guatemala, Sri Lanka, Mali, and
the Middle East.
In 1989, academics at the University of Bergen attempted at facilitating negotiations between the
parties to the conflict in South Sudan. Funded by the Ministry of Development, they arranged a
forum where the government, the opposition, and the armed rebel movement were represented. In
1990, the directors of the Institute of Labour and Social Research (Fafo), Norwegian Institute of
International Affairs (NUPI), and Centre for Development Studies at the University of Bergen launced
a new peace initiative, this time funded by the MFA. In 1993, Norwegian Church Aid took steps
towards arranging a peace meeting in Oslo between the parties to the conflict in South Sudan.
Despite support from State Secretary Jan Egeland, the meeting never took place. Later the same
year, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Johan Jrgen Holst established a back channel which resulted in
several meetings between the Sudanese government and the rebel movement. (Kristoffersen, 2009:
45f; Srb et al. 1998: 28f) None of these efforts led to substantial progress in the peace process, but
they illustrate basic features of the efforts around 1990; researchers and NGO representatives
initiated them, and they were able to secure support from the political leadership of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.
The Norwegian involvement in the Guatemalan peace process followed the same path; NGO
representatives saw an opportunity for constructive contributions to peace and reconciliation, and
were able elicit support from the political leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry
thereafter gradually got more involved along with the NGO representatives.

Gunnar Stlsett, then Secretary General of Lutheran World Federation, in 1989 suggested a
negotiation meeting in Norway between the parties. The Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs and
his State Secretary agreed to support the meeting, which was held in Oslo in 1990. Petter Skauen,
Norwegian Church Aids (NCAs) representative in Guatemala, was drawn into the preparations.
Skauen had an extensive network of contacts on both sides of the conflict and knew the Guatemalan
society well. The parties had confidence in him, and his involvement seems to have been important
for the success of the meeting and for the following reconciliation process (Liland & Kjerland 2003:
104; Srb et al, 1998: 11-15; Tnnessen, 2007: 177-183) The meeting in Oslo resulted in a written
agreement laying down basic principles for the further negotiations. Norway was involved in
facilitation of both the resulting formal negotiations and of a back channel involving civil society and
faith-based organizations. On the part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State Secretary Jan Egeland
played a key role. Several professional diplomats were also involved. (Kristoffersen 2009: 39f)
In 1990, attempts were also made at involving Norway in facilitation of peace talks between the
parties to the civil war on Sri Lanka. And again, a well-connected individual played a key role. Arne
Fjrtoft, NGO representative and previous leader of the Liberal Party of Norway, was approached by
the Sri Lankan Minister of Foreign Affairs who suggested that Norway could facilitate contact with
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Fjrtoft secured support from the Norwegian Minister of
Foreign Affairs Kjell Magne Bondevik, who agreed to host a meeting between the Sri Lankan
government and the LTTE. The meeting was canceled, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Fjrtoft
continued their attempts at facilitating contact in the following years. (Kristoffersen 2009: 43f; Liland
& Kjerland, 2003: 104; Tamnes, 1997: 446)
The perhaps clearest illustration of the centrality of NGO workers and representatives in Norways
peace engagement is to be found in the peace process in northern Mali. And as in Guatemala,
Norwegian Church Aids (NCAs) long term presence, understanding of the situation, and network of
local contacts made up the base on which the efforts were built. From 1992, its staff - and its local
employees in particular - facilitated conciliation meetings between the local parties to the armed
conflict, acted as go-betweens, and conveyed information to the central government on the
situation. In 1994, NCA decided to step up its efforts. The historian and missionary Kre Lode was in
charge of the initiative, which culminated in a series of local reconciliation meetings in 1995 and
1996. The approach may be termed grass-roots, focusing on civil society and religious leaders. The
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other Western governments supported the initiative
financially, but was not involved on the ground. (Srb et al. 1998: 18-25; Tnnessen 2007: 168-177)

Taken together, these peace and reconciliation initiatives added up to a new field of foreign policy
activism, built on novel practices. Conflict resolution in armed conflicts, which has often been
thought of as the exclusive domain of states, was made subject to efforts resting on a close
cooperation between non-state actors and the government. NGO representatives and researchers
actively sought to involve the government, and the government willingly co-opted their initiatives.
The centrality of the non-state actors implies that they became diplomatic actors in their own right,
and that the Norwegian foreign policy agenda was widened. (Lie, 2006; Neumann 1999;
forthcoming; Tvedt 1998; 2003).
Nevertheless, these efforts received little public attention between 1989 and 1992. The Norwegian
initiatives were to a large extent kept secret, and the publicly known efforts were not constructed as
central to Norways development aid or foreign policy. While briefly mentioning the ongoing efforts
and the importance of peace to development, the 1992 White Paper on Norwegian development aid
does not view peace promotion as one of the areas where Norway has particular competence and
tradition. Rather, peace promotion is subsumed under the headlines of humanitarian assistance and
democracy promotion (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1992). In the Parliamentary debate over the White
Paper, peace promotion was hardly mentioned at all (Stortingstidende, 1992-1993: 4090-4134).
The Middle East peace process and the Oslo Accords: representation and discourse
The lack of attention to the peace efforts did not last long. Late in August 1993, it became publicly
known that Norway played a key facilitative role in the back channel between Israel and the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). On September 13th, the Declaration of Principles the
official agreement ever between Israel and the Palestinians was signed in Washington DC. The
signing was a world sensation, and the Norwegian third party role did not go unnoticed. The back
channel and the agreement was baptized the Oslo process and the Oslo Accords by the world
press, and Norways peace efforts were firmly placed in the public limelight both nationally and
internationally. (Waage, 2004: 221f; 2007: 157ff, 175)
The novelty of practices of active peace promotion in the form of facilitation of peace processes
notwithstanding, peace is a concept with a strong resonance in Norwegian foreign policy discourse
and political discourse more generally. The peacefulness of Norway as opposed to the European
warrior states was an important discursive construction in the political struggle that ultimately led to
the break-away from Sweden in 1905. Contributing to peace internationally has consequently been
constructed as an important or even primary goal of Norways foreign policy. What may be termed
the peace tradition and the related discourse has thus been an important part of Norwegian

national identity since independence. (Leira, 2005; Leira (ed.) 2007: 11-13; Pharo, 2005; Steine &
Vogt, 2005)
The news medias representation of Norways role in the Middle East peace process nevertheless
articulated several new discursive constructions that has been reproduced on a massive scale both in
official and public discourse, and that have had a strong bearing on Norwegian foreign policy ever
since.5 The most frequently articulated of these discursive constructions is that Norway has
contributed decisively to peace. Norways largest newspaper for example asserted that Norway
created the historical peace plan between Israel and the PLO (VG 1993, 2 Sept., my translation).
The Norwegian contribution was constructed as essential to the positive outcome of the process.
Against this backdrop, speculations about Norwegian involvement in other peace processes soon
started appearing. Norway was constructed as being able to contribute to peace more generally, and
as having particular qualifications in this respect.
In the media coverage of the event, it was also underlined that Norway has a unique approach to
peace promotion. This approach was constructed as a precondition for the success of the Oslo
Channel. Later, this construction was elaborated on, and the concept of the Norwegian Model6 was
introduced. The basic features of this model may be summarized as follows: 1) Norway possesses
certain small state advantages ensuring impartiality, neutrality, and confidence in Norway as a third
party; 2) close cooperation between the Norwegian government, NGOs, and academic institutions
allows the government to draw on non-state actors flexibility, experience and contacts; 3) Norways
approach rests on close contact with and confidence from the parties, enabling efficient facilitation
of peace processes; and 4) Norway has a long-term perspective on peace promotion, and the tools
include aid and economic support for reconstruction (compare Egeland, 1988). The underlying
implication of the model is that Norway may give unique contributions to peace.
A motivation for Norways involvement in peace processes was also articulated. Altruism, solidarity,
charity, and the moral duty to help, which have all been important in Norwegian development aid
discourse (Stokke, 2005: 450ff), was combined with instrumental self interested motivations
associated with foreign policy discourse (Tvedt, 2003). The peace engagement was constructed as
improving Norways international standing and prestige, which in turn gave access to important
decision makers. In line with the comprehensive notion of security, contributions to peace
internationally were also discursively linked to Norways security. The combination of what is often
5

For detailed discourse analytic readings of Norways involvement in the Middle East, the ensuing peace engagement
discourse and the discourses effects, see Sknland, 2009; 2010. The account of the discourse presented here draws on
these works.
6
The Norwegian Model in peace promotion has been subject to a number of academic analyzes. See for example BucherJohannessen, 1999; Dobinson & Dale, 2000; Kelleher & Taulbee, 2006; Tvedt, 2003

10

termed idealistic and self interested motivations made the engagement easy to defend, and has
been an important precondition for its expansion and perpetuation.
In the wake of the success of the Oslo back channel, peace engagement was also constructed as an
important part of Norways foreign policy. Statements from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the
State Secretary, both in news media and in the yearly foreign policy addresses to the parliament,
establish peace promotion as a central foreign policy practice. Contributing to peace is even
constructed as the primary goal of the foreign policy in some texts. The 1995 Official Report and
White Paper on Norways development aid and policy towards the global South similarly underline
that peace promotion is a major innovation in Norways international engagement, that peace
promotion is one of the main goals of Norwegian South policy, and that Norway should be prepared
to use more resources on peace and conflict resolution measures. (Norwegian Official Report, 1995:
5-8; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995: 6-16)
The prominence of the peace engagement in the years after the signing of the Oslo Accords is
vividly illustrated by a quote by Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik in his New Years Address 1
January 2000. When outlining his vision for Norway in the new millennium, Bondevik stated that
Norway must be a peace nation an actor for conflict resolution and peace creating efforts. () If
we are remembered as a peace nation, Norwegians have reason to be proud. (Bondevik, 2000, my
translation). The articulation of Norway as a peace nation was later repeated. Peace efforts were
established as one of the most important distinguishing characteristics of the nation, and as forming
a core part of Norwegian identity and self image.
Again, deCerteaus story concept and Neumanns model are useful for analyzing the relation
between discourse and practice. The story of Norways role in the Middle East peace process opened
up a and defined a new field of foreign policy practice not just in the Middle East, but in general. By
implication, this story also produced a distinct Norwegian peace engagement. The discursive
constructions that the story rested on laid the basis for the representation that dominated the
discourse on Norways peace engagement up to 2003. The effect of this discursive dominance has
been to naturalize the peace engagement and to make it an important part of Norways foreign
policy.

The maturation of the peace engagement

Gradual institutionalization
Since 1993, a process of institutionalization of the peace engagement has taken place. The first sign
of this process is to be found in budgetary allocations. Already in the 1994 budget proposition, which
11

was presented to the Storting (the Norwegian parliament) shortly after the revelation of Norways
role in the Middle East peace process, it was stated that funds would be available for measures
contributing to solve local and regional conflicts creating refugees. In the 1996 budget proposition, a
budget item termed measures supporting peace and democracy was introduced. The funds set
aside for peace promotion and related measures rose dramatically in the next decade, from about
NOK 92 mill. in 1996 to NOK 223 mill. in 2002 and close to NOK 821 mill. in 2008.7 The funding bears
testimony to a very strong growth in activities related to peace promotion, and political will to
prioritize the engagement.
Despite the growth in funding, the first decade after 1993 saw little formal institutionalization of the
efforts within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As noted above, the pioneering peace engagements in
Guatemala, the Middle East and Mali all rested on personal contacts and ad-hoc initiatives. State
Secretary Jan Egeland, who between 1992 and 1997 was the central driving force behind the
Norwegian governments involvement in peace promotion, seemingly preferred to avoid codification
and institutionalization of the efforts within the Ministry (Neumann, forthcoming).
The dependence on personal contacts and individuals, and the ad-hoc set-up of the initiatives, was
noted in the 1998 evaluation of the Norwegian efforts (Srb et al, 1998). The reports
recommendation of institutionalization was followed up in 2000, when four MFA employees was
mandated to work specifically on peace and reconciliation and to report directly to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs (Neumann, forthcoming). In 2003, a unit was formed within the MFA, and in 2004 it
was upgraded to a section (Section for peace and reconciliation). In 2010, the Norwegian
peacebuilding resource centre (NOREF) was established to improve the Ministrys contact with
research institutions and build relevant knowledge. The degree of formal institutionalization is thus
much stronger than a decade ago.
Growing diversity: the construction of a peace promotion portfolio
As already shown, the representation of Norways role as a third party and facilitator in the Middle
East peace process was the starting point for the new peace engagement discourse. Direct
involvement through facilitation of peace talks, shuttle diplomacy and reconciliation processes were
constructed as the essential practices of the peace engagement. Moreover, the Norwegian Model,
which has often been constructed as the basis of the Norwegian efforts, primarily concerns Norways
ability to act as a facilitator after the model of the involvement in Guatemala and the Middle East.
Direct third-party involvement in peace processes has therefore remained the privileged practice of
7

The last few years, the funding has been somewhat reduced. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this
is due to adjustments in the set-up of the budget. Measures previously belonging under the peace,
reconciliation and democracy budget item have been transferred to other budget items.

12

the peace engagement - and the focus of public attention as well as the majority of academic studies
of Norways peace promoting efforts (see also Lunde et al, 2008: 165).
However, facilitation is not the only practice associated with the modern Norwegian engagement for
peace. When analyzing what may be termed official discourse - government White Papers, foreign
policy addresses, budget propositions, reports, action plans and Ministry of Foreign Affairs web
articles it becomes clear that the engagement have been constructed as consisting of a broad array
of practices.
Facilitation, support for grass-roots level reconciliation, and repatriation and reintegration of
refugees were established as peace promotion practices after 1993. Around year 2000, securityrelated practices, such as observatory missions to conflict areas8, demobilization, disarmament and
reintegration of former soldiers (DDR) and support for judicial reform were written into the
engagement. Training of police officers and measures to combat sexualized violence have been
added to the other security-related practices later. Over the last decade, monitoring of the
implementation of peace agreements, interreligious dialogue and measures to support the interests
of women and children in conflict-torn societies have also been constructed as central peace
promoting practices. These diverse practices some of them entirely novel in a Norwegian context,
others with historical precedents are all funded as peace and reconciliation measures and
legitimized by reference to their peace promoting function.
Also practices existing before the peace engagement came into being have been written into the
portfolio of practices. The relationship between peace promotion and aid is particularly interesting in
this respect. As noted above, the pioneering peace promotion efforts of the early 1990s were to a
large extent built on Norwegian non-state actors involvement in development aid and humanitarian
assistance. Against this background, it is hardly surprising that aid-related practices were constructed
as part of the engagement. In the 1994 budged proposition, it was stated that peace processes that
Norway was involved in should be supported through aid. In the Middle East, aid would be used to
demonstrate to the people of Gaza and the West Bank that the peace agreement had tangible
economic and social effects. The large-scale humanitarian and development aid efforts in former
Yugoslavia were also associated with the peace engagement in a number of texts. Development aid
was thus introduced as a useful tool in the peace engagement a tool to be used strategically to
support political peace processes and practices associated with development aid were imbricated in
the peace engagement discourse. The available case studies suggest that provision of aid has been a

Norways participation and central role in the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) at the West
Bank is the prime example of such a mission.

13

central practice of the peace engagement ever since (Bucher-Johannessen 1999; Kelleher& Taulbee,
2006; Kristoffersen, 2009; Srb et al, 1998).
Development aid and humanitarian assistance has also been linked to peace promotion in a more
general sense. The government has repeatedly underlined that peace and development is mutually
dependent, and that development aid thus may contribute to peace and prevent conflict (see for
example Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995). The government has also stated that humanitarian aid
should be used as far as possible to reduce conflicts and promote peace, thus associating
humanitarian efforts in general with peace promotion.
In line with this, practices associated with aid have been constructed as contributing to peace also in
countries where Norway has not been involved in facilitation of peace processes. (Srb et al, 1998).
In 2004, the government presented a strategic framework termed Peacebuilding a Development
Perspective. The strategic framework states that development policy should be an important and
integral element of Norwegian foreign policy towards conflict-affected countries. Peacebuilding9 is
presented as an important supplement to facilitation of peace processes, and a large number of
measures to further security and political, social and economic development are thus constructed as
practices of peace promotion (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004). In line with this, the 2009 White
Paper on development aid presents conflict as one of three main challenges for Norwegian aid policy.
The link between diplomatic efforts and aid is also strongly underlined. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
2009a)
In other words; practices of peace promotion, humanitarian assistance and development aid have
been discursively intertwined at least since the Middle East peace process. The discursive
construction of development aid as relevant to peace promotion has been strengthened over the
years, and a broad array of development aid and humanitarian assistance practices are today also
associated with peace promotion.
Support for the UN in general, and for the UNs peace keeping operations and peace making efforts,
has been a central and stable feature of Norwegian foreign policy since 1945 (Tamnes, 1997; Riste,

The concept was introduced in 1992 by the Secretary General of the UN in the report An agenda for peace.
In the governments framework, the following measures are presented as peace building:
Security: Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; humanitarian mine action; control of small arms and
light weapons; and security system reform.
Political development: Support for political and administrative authorities and structures; reconciliation; good
governance, democracy and human rights; civil society; and judicial processes and truth commissions.
Social and economic development: Repatriation and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons;
reconstruction of infrastructure and important public functions; social development (education and health);
and economic development (private sector development, employment, trade and investment)

14

2001). The emergence of the Norwegian peace engagement coincided with a significant increase in
UN peace keeping operations after the end of the Cold War (Liland & Kjerland, 2003: 96), and
Norwegian support for such operations, in the form of funding and personnel, was constructed as
part of the engagement already in 1993. Norway has strongly supported the UN Peacebuilding Fund
and the Peacebuilding Commision, and the government has repeatedly underlined that a substantial
amount of the funding for peace and reconciliation measures is channeled through the UN. Support
for and active involvement in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peace building work of the
Organization for Safety and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has also been part of Norways peace
promotion efforts.
The 1990s saw an increase not only in traditional UN peace keeping operations, but also in peace
making or peace enforcing operations. In opposition to the traditional peace keeping operations, the
peace enforcement operations were robust military operations mandated to use force. The largest
Norwegian military contribution was given to the NATO and UN operations in former Yugoslavia, but
Norway also participated with military personnel in a host of other UN operations (Brresen et al,
2004: 185ff).
What is interesting here is that the military operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, which have
all been controversial in Norway, consistently have been constructed as peace operations. The
Norwegian immediate reaction force, which has formed the core of the Norwegian military
contingents in these operations, has also presented itself as part of the Norwegian peace tradition.
(Grger, 2006: 88-91; Leira, 2005: 153; Leira (ed), 2007: 14). As noted by Leira, these military
practices have nevertheless created tensions in the peace engagement discourse and in the
Norwegian peace nation self image. Participation in military operations other than UN peace keeping
operations does not seem to be broadly accepted as part of the peace engagement, and when the
peace engagement is presented, robust military operations are seldom constructed as part of the
peace engagement portfolio.
To sum up; since the early 1990s, both novel and long-standing practices have been written into the
peace engagement. The breadth of the engagement has been growing steadily. The 2009 White
Paper on Norwegian foreign policy illustrates this nicely; development assistance, humanitarian aid,
human rights and democracy promotion, and support for the UNs peacekeeping operations are all
treated as potential peace promoting measures (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009b).
Discursive developments since 2003
The representation of the peace engagement that was established after 1993 has remained
dominant up to today. Some notable discursive developments are nevertheless discernible since
15

2003. Spurred by the seeming lack of coherence between repeated articulations of Norway as a
peace nation and the conscious use of the peace engagement in international branding of Norway
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003; Leonard & Small, 2003: 3d) on the one hand, and Norwegian
participation in the military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan on the other, a reflexive strand
entered the discourse. The representation of Norway as a peace nation was critically examined by
academics and found to denote a national self image built up over the last years and shaping
Norwegian national identity (see for example Norwegian Official Reports, 2003: 51). It was
underlined that the image of Norway as a peace nation was not given, and the resulting
denaturalization of the engagement opened up the discourse and made it easier to criticize Norways
peace efforts (Sknland, 2009; 2010).
The criticism of the engagement mainly centered on four claims. First, it was asserted that the
Norwegian Model, with its close ties between the government and non-state actors, hindered
debate and critical evaluation of the peace engagement (Tvedt, 2003). Second, the engagement was
criticized for having few documented positive effects (sterud, 2006). The apparent lack of peace
agreements resulting from the efforts, and the negative developments in the Middle East and on Sri
Lanka, added to the criticism. Third, the claim that the peace engagement enabled Norway to further
its interests internationally was questioned. And fourth, it was suggested that the peace nation self
image was unrealistic, and that the emphasis on peace promotion had led to negligence of Norways
true national interests (Matlary, 2005; Udgaard, 2006).
The growing criticism of the peace engagement challenged the dominant representation of the
discourse. In response, its core discursive constructions were reproduced in a large number of texts,
and it was repeatedly stated that Norway is and should be a peace nation (see for example Stre,
2006). The different strands of criticism was also directly countered, and signs of discursive struggle
over the effects of the peace engagement thus emerged.
At the same time, some minor changes in the dominant representation of the engagement appeared.
The stated motivation for the peace engagement changed somewhat; while there has been a
tendency towards downplaying instrumental motivations such as promotion of international prestige
and standing, security has come to the fore as one of the most central motivations (Stre, 2006).It
has also been underlined that Norways efforts rely on close cooperation with other international
actors, and that Norway often supports other third parties facilitation or mediation rather than
being directly involved itself. In the same vein, practices other than facilitation, such as peace
building and development aid in general, have been emphasized as important parts of the peace
engagement. The long-term nature of the engagement has also been underlined repeatedly (see for
16

example Lunde et al, 2008: 165; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009b: 109). By implication, the peace
engagement does not rely on spectacular successes resulting from Norwegian facilitation to be
worthwhile.
These discursive changes all seem to make the engagement, and the dominant representation of it,
easier to defend in face of the criticism. The representation of the peace engagement as an
important foreign policy practice is still dominant 18 years after the signing of the Oslo Accords. It
should nevertheless be noted that peace promotion appears to be losing its position as a defining
feature of Norwegian foreign policy. The present Minister of Foreign Affairs has emphasized other
foreign policy projects such as Norwegian policy towards the High North, and peace promotion is
now placed under the more general category of engagement policy.
So far, there is no sign that these discursive changes have affected the practices of peace promotion.
Judging from the political support for the engagement, its institutionalization within the Ministry of
Foreign affairs, and from the funding for peace and reconciliation measures, the Norwegian peace
engagement is as strong as ever.

Conclusion
The Norwegian peace engagement has been one of the distinguishing characteristics of Norwegian
foreign policy for almost two decades. The peace promotion efforts generally have very broad
political support, and the funding has grown steadily since 1993.
In order to understand the strong position of the engagement, and its features in terms of modus
operandi, measures and involved actors, both practices and discourse need to be taken into account.
One of the central preconditions for the establishment of the peace engagement is to be found in the
development of aid practices and foreign policy discourse of the 1980. A dramatic increase in state
funding for NGO aid projects, and increasing interest in humanitarian aid on the part of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, brought into being new patterns of cooperation and contact. Changes in the
foreign policy discourse accentuated this tendency; development aid, humanitarian assistance and
human rights advocacy were singled out as fields where Norway had considerable potential
internationally. Hence, aid NGOs and development researchers became relevant to Norways foreign
relations and were empowered as foreign policy actors.
Through local contacts and knowledge of the situation on the ground, NGO personnel and
researchers were in a good position to identify possibilities for contributing to peace in conflict-torn
societies. Moreover, and as a result of the processes described above, they were able engage the
17

foreign policy elite and elicit support and funding for their initiatives. Through a close cooperation
between the Norwegian government and Norwegian non-state actors, Norway thus got involved in
peace efforts in Sudan, Guatemala, Sri Lanka and the Middle East.
The pioneering efforts were not well known in the public, and peace promotion was not a foreign
policy priority. This all changed with the revelation of the Norwegian contribution to the Middle East
peace process in 1993. The success received massive media attention, and the story of Norways
contribution opened up a new field for foreign policy activism. A very positive representation of
Norways efforts was established, and this representation has dominated the peace engagement
discourse ever since. By constructing and reproducing a rationale for the efforts, and by tying them
to Norwegian national identity, the representation has contributed to naturalizing and depoliticizing
the engagement. As such, the peace engagement discourse has been a central precondition for the
expansion and continuation of the practices of peace promotion (see also Sknland 2009; 2010).
The Norwegian role in the Middle East and Guatemalan peace processes has often been regarded as
the model upon which the engagement are built. Peace promotion Norwegian style is thus often
viewed as consisting mainly of direct third party involvement, and such involvement has indeed been
the discursively privileged practice of the engagement. However, a broad repertoire of other
practices has also been written into the engagement since 1993. Long-standing practices such as
development aid, humanitarian assistance, and support for the UNs peace efforts are now
associated with Norwegian peace promotion. So are a host of other practices such as monitoring of
the implementation of peace engagement, interreligious dialogue and practices directed at
improving security, political development, and social and economic development in conflict-torn
societies.
The peace engagement discourse has remained remarkably stable. Since 2003, there have
nevertheless been signs of discursive opening and struggle over the meaning of the engagement. It
has been repeatedly asserted that the engagement has become a national symbol shaping
Norwegians identity, and the efforts have been criticized. In response, some minor changes in the
dominant representation of the engagement have appeared. In terms of funding, the degree of
institutionalization, and the number of practices involved, the engagement nevertheless appears
stronger than ever.

18

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