Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 142359

May 25, 2004

PASONG BAYABAS FARMERS ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by

DOMINGO BANAAG, JR., President; BERNARDO POBLETE, VicePresident, and its Members, petitioners,
vs.
The Honorable COURT OF APPEALS, CREDITO ASIATIC, INC.,
ERNESTO TANCHI, SR., GEN. DIONISIO OJEDA (deceased), ELENA
P. BIGAY, and LANRICO MINISTERIO, respondents.
x-----------------------------x
G.R. No. 142980

May 25, 2004

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM (DEPARTMENT OF

AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD),petitioners,
vs.
The Honorable COURT OF APPEALS, CREDITO ASIATIC, INC.,
ERNESTO TANCHI, SR., GEN. DIONISIO OJEDA (deceased), ELENA
P. BIGAY, and LANRICO MINISTERIO, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court are petitions for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals, in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 49363, which set aside and
reversed the decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB), in DARAB Case No. 5191, and reinstated the decision
of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAD) of Trece

Martirez City, in DARAB Case No. CA-0285-95 which, in turn, ordered

the dismissal of the complaint for Maintenance for Peaceful Possession
and Cultivation with Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction of petitioner Pasong
Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. (PBFAI).
The Antecedents
Sometime in 1964, Lakeview Development Corporation (LDC, for
brevity) bought a parcel of land with an area of 753,610 square meters
(75.3610 hectares) located at Barrio Kabilang-Baybay, Carmona,
Cavite,2 covered by Transfer Certificate of Titles (TCT) No. T- 91584 and
T-91585. On September 20, 1977, the aforesaid titles were cancelled by
TCT No. T-62972 issued to and in the name of the LDCs successor, the
Credito Asiatic, Incorporated (CAI).3 The property was subsequently
subdivided into two parcels of land, one of which was covered by TCT
No. 116658, with an area of 365,753 square meters, and the other
covered by TCT No. 116659 with an area of 387,853 square meters.4
Meanwhile, the LDC/CAI undertook to develop its 75-hectare property
into a residential and industrial estate, where industrial sites and a low
cost housing project inceptually called the Tamanli Housing Project
would be established. The LDC applied with the Municipal Council of
Carmona for an ordinance approving the zoning and the subdivision of
the property. The subdivision plan was referred by the council to the
National Planning Commission as mandated by Administrative Order No.
152, Series of 1968. The Commission approved the plan and on May 30,
1976, the Tanggapan Ng Sangguniang Bayan ng Karmona (Municipal
Council of Carmona) approved Kapasiyahang Bilang 30, granting the
application and affirming the project. The resolution reads:
Kapasiyahang Bilang 30
Sapagkat, ang TAMANLI HOUSING PROJECT at LAKEVIEW
DEVELOPMENT CORP. ay nagharap ng kanilang kahilingan dito

sa ating Kapulungan, sa pamamagitan ni G. BENJAMIN F.

GOMEZ, Chief, Physical Environmental Planning Service ng
DLGCD, upang makapagpatayo sila ng murang pabahay sa may
Lote Blg. E-Psd-11882, na nasa Bo. Cabilang Baybay ng bayang
ito at Lote Blg. 4 (LRC) PCS 15453 saklaw ng bayang ito, ayon sa
pagkakasunod-sunod;
SAPAGKAT, ang bagay na ito ay makatutulong ng malaki sa ating
mga kababayan, dahil sa ito ay nagbibigay ng murang pabahay;
SAPAGKAT, DAHIL DITO, sa mungkahi ni G. DOMINADOR
ESPIRITU na pinangalawahan ni G. MELQUIADES MAHABO, ay
pinagtibay, tulad nang itoy pinagtitibay, na pagtibayin ang
kahilingan ng Tamanli Housing Project at Lakeview Development
Corp. na makapaglagay ng murang pabahay dito sa ating bayan,
sa isang pasubaling ang mga ito ay kailangang pumailalim sa
hinihingi ng Administrative Order No. 152, S-1968 ng Pangulo ng
Bansang Pilipinas at sa umiiral ng mga kautusan at patakaran ng
ating Pamahalaang Pambansa at Pamahalaang Pambayan.5
Subsequently, after a consolidated survey was approved by the Bureau
of Lands, the lots were subdivided and the aforesaid titles were
cancelled. TCT Nos. 144149, 144150 and T-144151 were issued in lieu
of the said titles.6 The CAI embarked on the development of the housing
project into three phases: First Phase, the Hakone Subdivision; Second
Phase, the Sunshine Village & Casa de Monteverde; and, Third Phase,
the Mandarin Homes.7 The project was registered with the National
Housing Authority (NHA) as required by Presidential Decree No. 957
which issued, on July 7, 1977, a license in favor of the LDC to sell the
subdivision lots.
The property was subdivided into 728 residential lots per the
consolidation subdivision plan approved by the Bureau of Lands, each
with an average area of 240 square meters. Separate titles for each of

the 728 lots were issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite to and in the
name of the CAI on September 20, 1977.
Meanwhile, the CAI secured a locational clearance for the project from
the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC).8 Although the
Municipal Council of Carmona had already approved the conversion of
the property into a residential area, nevertheless, the CAI filed an
application under Republic Act No. 3844 with the Office of the Minister of
Agrarian Reform for the conversion of a portion of the 75-hectare
property consisting of 35.80 hectares covered by TCT No. 62972 located
in Barrio Kabilang-Baybay, Carmona, Cavite, from agricultural to
residential. The property was to be used for the Hakone Housing Project.
The Minister referred the matter to the Regional Director for investigation
and recommendation and to the Ministry of Local Government and
Community Development. On July 3, 1979, then Minister of Agrarian
Reform Conrado F. Estrella issued an Order granting the petition and
approved the conversion of the 35.80 hectare portion of TCT-62972 into
a residential subdivision, pursuant to Rep. Act No. 3844, as amended. In
so doing, it took into account the resolution of the Municipal Council of
Carmona, the recommendation of the Regional Director of the Ministry of
Agrarian Reform, the clearance from the HSRC as well as the Ministry of
Local Government and Community Development. The order in part
reads:
Considering the parcel of land to be not covered by P.D. 27, it
being untenanted and not devoted to the production of palay
and/or corn as reported by the Agrarian Reform Team Leader
concerned and favorably recommended for conversion by him and
further, by the Regional Director for Region IV, Pasig, Metro
Manila, and considering further, that the parcel of land subject
hereof was found to be suitable for conversion to residential
subdivision by the Ministry of Local Government and Community
Development and considering finally, that the herein petitioner was
issued a locational clearance by the Human Settlements

Regulatory Commission, the instant request of the petitioner is

hereby GRANTED pursuant to the provisions of R.A. 3844, as
amended, and P.D. 815.9
The grant was, however, subjected to the fulfillment of the following
conditions:
1. Physical development shall commence within one (1) year from
receipt hereof;
2. A setback of three (3) meters measured from the property lines
to the edge of the normal high waterline of the Pasong Bayabas
and Patayod Rivers shall be observed pursuant to the Water Code
(P.D. 705);
3. Applicant-proponent shall undertake flood protective measures
such as the construction of rip-rap walls or terracing and cribbing
along the river banks to avoid erosion and flood;
4. Clearance from the Laguna Lake Development Authority shall be
secured since the proposed project is within the Laguna Lake
Basin; and
5. A permit to operate from the National Pollution Control
Commission shall be secured and Anti-Pollution laws (R.A. 3981,
P.D. 984 and others) shall be strictly observed.
Failure, however, to comply with the aforestated terms and
conditions, this Ministry shall consider such violations as sufficient
ground for the cancellation of the permit-order and this Ministry by
reason thereof may take any or all course of action mentioned in
the Memorandum-Agreement between this Ministry, the Ministry of
Local Government and Community Development and the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission in addition to the penalties
provided for in Presidential Decree 815, if so applicable.10

On March 14, 1980, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Cavite

(Provincial Board of Cavite) passed Resolution No. 40 declaring the
midland areas composed of Carmona, Dasmarias, parts of Silang and
Trece Martirez (where the subject property is situated) and parts of Imus,
as industrial areas.11 Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 76, approved on June
13, 1980, the resettlement areas under the administration of the NHA in
the barangays of San Gabriel, San Jose and a portion of Cabilang
Baybay, all in the Municipality of Carmona, were separated from the said
municipality and constituted into a new and independent municipality
known as General Mariano Alvarez (GMA), Cavite.12 In 1983, Asiatic
Development Corporation (ADC), a sister company of CAI, started
developing the property located in GMA covered by TCT No. 144150 into
a residential housing project, called the Sunshine Village Phase IV
(originally Hakone) with an area of 20.05 hectares. The ADC also
secured in 198313 a preliminary approval and locational clearance from
the HSRC for Sunshine Village Phase IV.14
The CAI also secured the following for its Hakone Housing Project:
1. HLURB License to Sell No. 0613 on November 7, 1983
2. HSRC Development Permit on April 11, 1984
3. HLURB Preliminary Approval and Locational Clearance on
November 11, 1985
4. HSRC Preliminary Approval and Locational Clearance on
November 17, 1983
5. HSRC Certificate of Registration No. 1069 on February 1, 1985
6. HSRC License to Sell No. 1053 on March 18, 1985.15
In 1987, the CAI decided to continue with the development of its Hakone
Housing Project and contracted with E.M. Aragon Enterprises for the
bulldozing of the property. However, the project was stymied by a

Complaint for Damages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order

and Preliminary Injunction filed on May 22, 1987 against the CAI in the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite.16 The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. BCV-87-13 and was raffled to Branch 19.17
The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that while the defendant CAI was the
owner of the 75.36-hectare land covered by TCT-62972, they were the
actual tillers of the land. The defendant had surreptitiously applied for the
conversion of the 35.8-hectare portion of the aforesaid property from
agricultural to residential and the same was granted by the Ministry of
Agrarian Reform, as can be gleaned from the July 3, 1979 Order of
Agrarian Reform Minister Estrella. According to the plaintiffs, they came
to know of the conversion only in January 1987. Notwithstanding the
issuance of the order of conversion, Ramie Cabusbusan, the
representative of the CAI, allowed them to continue cultivating the
aforementioned property. They were, however, required to pay a rental
of P400 a year per hectare. They paid the rental and continued to
occupy and till the aforesaid property pursuant to the agreement. On
October 28, 1986 and November 11, 1986, the plaintiffs, together with
other tillers of the land, met Cabusbusan at the Municipal Branch of the
then Ministry of Agrarian Reform and reached an agreement that the
plaintiffs would remain in the peaceful possession of their farmholdings.
Notwithstanding such agreement, the defendant ordered the bulldozing
of the property, by reason of which the plaintiffs suffered actual
damages. Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that the bulldozing was
done without any permit from the concerned public authorities.
The plaintiffs, thus, prayed that a temporary restraining order be issued
against the CAI from continuing with the bulldozing of the property, and
that after due hearing, judgment be rendered in their favor, ordering the
defendants to refrain from implementing the July 3, 1979 Order of
Agrarian Reform Minister Estrella.18

In its answer to the complaint, the CAI admitted its ownership of the
753,610 square meter property covered and described under TCT No.
62972 and the issuance of the Order of Conversion of the 35.8 hectare
portion thereof. However, it denied that it allowed the plaintiffs to
possess and cultivate the landholding with fixed rentals therefor.19 The
CAI prayed that the prayer for preliminary injunction be denied and that
judgment be issued dismissing the complaint and absolving it from any
liability. It counterclaimed for the amount paid by it to E.M. Aragon
Enterprises for expenses for the rent of the bulldozer and moral
damages.20
Meanwhile, the CAI and six of the fourteen plaintiffs, namely, Medy
Vinzon, Luz Alvarez, Godofredo Inciong, Bernardo Poblete, Estelita Gaut
and Victoria Valerio, entered into a compromise agreement whereby the
defendant donated parcels of land in consideration of the execution of
deeds of quitclaims and waivers. Conformably to the said agreement,
the plaintiffs executed separate deeds of quitclaim in favor of the CAI
over the portion of the property which they claimed they occupied. The
six plaintiffs filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on June 19,
1989.21 On June 20, 1989, the RTC of Cavite issued an Order dismissing
the complaint but only insofar as the plaintiffs Vinzon, Alvarez, Inciong,
Poblete, Gaut and Valerio were concerned.22 With respect to the other
eight (8) plaintiffs, the court proceeded with the scheduled hearing.
The civil case notwithstanding, the CAI decided to proceed with the third
phase of its project. It developed its eleven-hectare property into a
residential property called the Mandarin Homes. The CAI applied for and
was granted a separate Order of Conversion on January 2, 1990 by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).23 In 1991, the CAI started selling
the houses in its Mandarin Homes Project.24
In the meantime, the remaining plaintiffs in Civil Case No. BCV-87-13
entered into a compromise agreement in which the CAI executed Deeds
of Donation25 in their favor over parcels of land. The said plaintiffs, in

turn, executed quitclaims26 and waivers over the portions of the property
which they claimed they occupied. Thereafter, the plaintiffs and the CAI
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The trial court issued an Order
granting the motion and dismissing the complaint on June 20,
1991.27 Consequently, all the plaintiffs were issued separate titles over
the parcels of land donated to them by the CAI which were declared, for
taxation purposes, in the names of the latter.28
With the settlement of the civil case, the CAI continued with its
development of the rest of the Hakone Housing Project by causing a
survey of the property. However, the CAI was stymied anew when, on
November 25, 1992, a Petition for Compulsory Coverage under Rep. Act
No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) was filed before the DAR by seventeen (17) individuals.29 They
alleged that they were farmers of Bo. 14, Pasong Bayabas River,
Barangay F. De Castro, GMA, Cavite.30 The petitioners claimed that
since 1961, they had been occupying a parcel of public agricultural land
originally owned by General Dionisio Ojeda with an area of twenty-seven
hectares, more or less, adjacent to Pasong Bayabas River. They tilled
the said agricultural lands and planted it with rice, corn, vegetables, root
crops, fruit trees and raised small livestock for daily survival.31
The petitioners requested that the DAR order an official survey of the
aforesaid agricultural lands. Pending resolution of their petition, the
petitioners and twenty (20) others banded together and formed a group
called Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. (PBFAI) affiliated with
Kalipunan ng Samahan ng Mamamayan, Inc. (KASAMA).32
On June 10, 1994, Domingo Banaag, in his capacity as President of
PBFAI, filed a petition for compulsory coverage of a portion of the CAI
property covered by TCT No. 91585,33 with an area of 47 hectares under
Rep. Act No. 6657. On August 18, 1994, Legal Officer Maria Laarni N.
Morallos of the DAR, in her Memorandum to Regional Director Percival
C. Dalugdug, reported that the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office

(MARO) had taken preliminary steps for the compulsory coverage of the
property and, in fact, had interviewed its occupants. The processing was
stalled, however, because documents such as the titles and tax
declarations covering the property had not yet been submitted, and the
formal application had yet to be made by the petitioners.34 She
recommended that the petition be indorsed to the MARO Office. Pending
the resolution of the petition of the PBFAI, the CAI decided to continue
with its Hakone Housing Project and ordered a survey of the property on
October 6, 1995. The survey was completed on October 9, 1995. On
October 14 and 15, 1995, the CAI caused the bulldozing and other
development activities, which resulted in the destruction of plants and
trees.
The PBFAI-KASAMA, representing the farmers-tenants, filed a complaint
for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession and Cultivation with Damages
with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction before the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB), Region IV, Trece Martirez City, Cavite,
against the CAI, Tan Chi, Dionisio Ojeda, Elena Bigay, Lanrico Ministerio
and Alfredo Espiritu over a portion of the property of the CAI. The case
was docketed as DARAB Case No. CA-0285-95.35
The plaintiffs therein alleged that since 1961, its members had been in
actual possession, as tenants of General Dionisio Ojeda, of the 27hectare property, located in Pasong Bayabas, Cabilang Baybay,
Carmona, Cavite36covered by TCT No. T-69813 in the name of Pan
Asiatic Commercial Co., Inc.;37 T-9158438 and T-69810 owned by the
LDC. They applied for the compulsory coverage of the property under
CARL before the DAR in 1992, and on October 6, 1995, the CAI caused
the survey of the property. The CAI commenced the bulldozing activities
on the property on October 14, 1995 without any permit from the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) or from the
Office of the Barangay Captain. According to the petitioners, the said
illegal bulldozing activities would convert the land from agricultural to

non-agricultural land, thereby depriving the members of the PBFAI of

their tenancy rights over the property. For this reason, the petitioners
prayed that a temporary restraining order be issued ex-parte to stop the
bulldozing of the property, and that a preliminary injunction or a
status quo order be later issued to enjoin the same.
The complainants prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be
rendered in their favor, viz:
...
3. That the Defendants Tan Chi and Dionisio Ojeda, as the most
responsible officers of the Defendant Corporation be ordered to
direct persons acting under their authority to respect the peaceful
possession and cultivation of the Plaintiffs, of the subject land;
4. That the Defendants Lanrico Ministerio and Alfredo Espiritu be
ordered to respect and maintain the peaceful tenancy of the
Plaintiffs, of the subject land;
5. That the Defendants be ordered jointly and severally to pay to
the Plaintiffs:
P500,000.00 as moral damages;
P250,000.00 by way of exemplary damages;
P50,000.00 in reimbursement of litigation expenses.
6. That the Defendants pay for the costs of this suit; and
7. That other reliefs and remedies be afforded to the Plaintiffs as
may be just and equitable under the premises.39
On October 27, 1995, Provincial Adjudicator Barbara P. Tan issued a
Temporary Restraining Order worded as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered let a TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING ORDER hereby issue to take effect for a period of
twenty (20) days from receipt hereof;
1) Enjoining the defendant landowner and any/all persons
acting for and in its behalf or under its authority to cease and
desist from further bulldozing the premises in question and
committing acts of dispossession or tending to disturb the
peaceful possession and cultivation of the complainants of
the landholdings in question.
Meantime, let the hearing of the Preliminary Injunction incident be
set on November 9, 1995 at 1:30 P.M.40
The defendants filed their Answer with Motion to Lift Restraining Order
and Preliminary Injunction.41 Therein, they denied the personal
circumstances of the plaintiffs and the personal circumstances of the
defendants Lanrico Ministerio and Alfredo Espiritu. The defendants
admitted that the CAI was the registered owner of the property, but
specifically denied that the plaintiffs were recognized by the CAI as
tenants-occupants of the aforesaid property since 1961. They asserted
that the CAI did not consent to the cultivation of the property nor to the
erection of the plaintiffs houses. They further averred that the CAI had
entered into a compromise agreement with the occupants of the
property, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. BCV-87-13 in the RTC of Cavite.
They also alleged that they secured a permit from the Municipal
Planning and Development Offices before bulldozing activities on the
property were ordered.
The defendants raised the following as their special and affirmative
defenses: (a) the plaintiffs action is barred by the dismissal of their
complaint in Civil Case No. BCV-87-13, per Order of the RTC of Cavite,
Branch 19, dated June 20, 1991; (b) the plaintiffs had waived their rights
and interests over the property when they executed deeds of waiver and
quitclaim in favor of the defendant CAI; (c) then Agrarian Reform Minister

Estrella had issued an Order dated July 3, 1979, converting the property
into a residential area and withdrawing the property from the coverage of
the CARL; (d) the defendant partitioned the development of the area into
Phase I, II, III and IV, while the residential property subject of the petition
is in Phase IV thereof; (e) before embarking in the development of the
property, the respondent CAI secured the following: (1) preliminary
approval and locational clearance for phase IV; (2) development permit
for 844 units; (3) Certificate of Registration No. 1069 issued by the
HSRC; and (4) License to Sell No. 1053.42 Finally, the defendants
contended that the property had an 18% slope and was undeveloped; as
such, it was exempt from the coverage of the CARL, under Section 10 of
Rep. Act No. 6657.
As compulsory counterclaim, the defendants alleged that it had entered
into an Equipment Rental Requisition Contract with E.M. Aragon
Enterprises for the bulldozing of the property, for which it incurred the
following expenses: an advance payment of P200,000; rental rate
of P1,000 per hour for 8 hours a day plus transportation of P50,000; and,
salaries of not less than P5,000 per month for the mechanics and
drivers. They prayed that after due proceedings, judgment be rendered
dismissing the plaintiffs complaint and absolving it of any liability.43
The plaintiffs, for their part, averred that Civil Case No. BCV-87-13 was
not decided on the merits, but was merely based upon a compromise
agreement between the parties. Moreover, there was no identity of
parties between Civil Case No. BCV-87-13 and the present case, as the
sole defendant was the CAI, while of the plaintiffs in DARAB Case No.
CA No. 0285-95, only Domingo Banaag and Leoncio Banaag were the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. BCV-87-13. On the claim of the defendants
that the CAI was released and discharged from any and all liabilities of
the plaintiffs by virtue of the Deeds of Waiver and Quitclaim executed by
the fourteen plaintiffs in Civil Case No. BCV-87-13, the plaintiffs averred
that only two of the plaintiffs, namely, Domingo Banaag and Leoncio

Banaag were among the thirty-seven (37) complainants-members of

PBFAI who filed the petition before the DARAB.
The plaintiffs posited that the conversion orders and other deeds issued
by the HSRC and its successor, the HLURB, were issued before the
effectivity of Rep. Act No. 6657 when agricultural land was limited to
those planted with rice and corn crops. But upon the enactment of Rep.
Act No. 6657, the reclassification of agricultural lands included those
planted with fruit-bearing trees, such as, the subject property. Hence,
Agrarian Reform Minister Estrella did not have the authority to exempt
the property from the coverage of Rep. Act No. 6657. The plaintiffs
averred that the documents procured by the respondents from the HSRC
and the HLURB cannot be given probative weight, as the authority to
issue the said clearance/license is vested solely in the DAR.
As to the defense that the property subject of the suit has some parts
with an 18% slope, the plaintiffs contended that what the law exempts
are undeveloped parcels of land with an 18% slope. The entire property,
however, was fully developed and planted with fruit-bearing trees of
varied kinds, with houses of strong materials constructed thereon by the
members of the PBFAI.
To determine the veracity of the conflicting claims of the parties, the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) issued an Order on
November 23, 1995, setting an ocular inspection of the property. The
parties were required to submit their respective position papers.44 The
ocular inspection proceeded as scheduled. On December 12, 1995, the
PARAD issued an Order45 containing the results of the inspection.
The individual tillages of the complainants were not inspected, and, as
agreed upon, the physical inventory thereof was to be undertaken by
Brgy. Captain Lanrico Ministerio. The inventory was designed to
determine who among the petitioners were actual tillers, the area of
tillage and the crops produced thereon; and to determine the value of the
improvements in connection with a possible pay off, as the landowner

had offered to reimburse the planters the value of their permanent

improvements. The PARAD noted that the area over which the
respondent CAI conducted quarrying activities had not been cultivated
by any of the members of the PBFAI, and permitted the grading and
leveling activities thereon.
On April 16, 1996, the PARAD issued an order directing the provincial
sheriff of Cavite to conduct a physical inventory of the permanent
improvements introduced by each of the complainants consisting of fruits
and other horticultural growths, in substitution of the Barangay Captain.
On July 15, 1996, the DAR Region IV issued a Cease and Desist Order
against the respondents.46 The defendants, in a Letter dated July 16,
1996, informed the DAR, Region IV Office, that the land subject of the
cease and desist order was also subject of DARAB Case No. 0285-95
and, as such, was under the jurisdiction of PARAD Barbara Tan. The
defendants, likewise, raised the issue of forum shopping, per our ruling
in Crisostomo v. SEC.47
After due hearings, PARAD Barbara P. Tan rendered a Decision on
August 8, 1996 in DARAB Case No. CA-0285-95 in favor of the
defendants. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is
hereby rendered:
1. Finding Plaintiffs Domingo Banaag, Conrado Banaag,
Leoncio Banaag, Herminia Demillo, Myrna Javier, Elena,
Layaban, Maria Layaban and Oscar Layaban to have
abandoned and renounced their tenancy rights over the land
in question and barred from instituting the instant complaint
on the ground of Res Judicata;

2. Finding the remaining Twenty-Nine (29) other Plaintiffs

not bonafide tenants but mere interlopers on the land in
question and consequently not entitled to security of tenure;
3. Ordering the instant complaint DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
No pronouncement as to damages, attorneys fees, litigation
expenses and cost of suit.48
The PARAD held that the plaintiffs were bound by the order of dismissal
of the RTC in Civil Case No. BCV-87-13. It declared that the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. BCV-87-13 were the kins, siblings or spouses of the
complainants in the case before it. Moreover, the complainants had
executed deeds of quitclaim or waiver covering the portions of the
property which they purportedly occupied. Thus, the complainants had
already waived their rights of possession and cultivation over the
portions of the property which they claimed to be occupying.
As to the remaining complainants, the PARAD ruled that they failed to
prove that their cultivation and possession, were based on a valid
agricultural tenancy. It held that the complainants were merely farm
helpers of their relatives. However, the PARAD ruled that it had no
jurisdiction to resolve the issues of whether the property was covered by
Rep. Act No. 6657 and exempted from the said coverage, or whether the
conversion of the property to non-agricultural was legal and efficacious;
hence, the PARAD declined to resolve the same.
Aggrieved, the plaintiffs interposed an appeal to the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board on the following grounds:
1. That errors in the findings of fact and conclusions of law were
committed which, if not corrected, would cause grave and
irreparable damage and injury to the plaintiffs/complainantsappellants; and

2. That there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the

Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Cavite.49
The appeal was docketed as DARAB Case No. 5191. The defendants,
for their part, filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, on the
ground that it failed to rule that the order of conversion of then Agrarian
Reform Minister Estrella merely confirmed the re-classification of the
property, from agricultural to residential, made by the Municipal Council
of Carmona, the HSRC and the HLURB as early as 1976, and that the
PARAD failed to order the eviction of the complainants despite its finding
that some had abandoned their tenancy rights by entering into a
compromise settlement and executing quitclaims with the CAI. The
respondents, thus, prayed:

a. That the subject property has been reclassified as residential

land as early as 30 May 1976;
b. That the Certificate of Registration No. RS-0495, dated 9 July
1977 and License to Sell LS-0449, dated 09 July 1977 were issued
in compliance to NHA Circular No. 1, Series of 1976;
c. That the approval of the Consolidation Subdivision Plan and the
consequent issuance of individual titles by the Bureau of Lands
were made in compliance of the requirements of NHA Circular No.
1;
d. That the Order of Conversion dated 3 July 1979 was merely a
confirmation of a 1976 valid re-classification of the subject property
from agricultural to residential and said Order is still valid and
subsisting;
e. That an Order of ejectment be issued against the complainants.

As a corollary, other reliefs which are just and proper under the
premises are likewise prayed.50
The PARAD treated the motion as an appeal, and transmitted the same
to the DARAB.51
On September 26, 1996, the plaintiffs Clarito Sanganbayan, Edgardo
Uniforme and Francisco Joven, in consideration of P40,000, executed
quitclaims, waiving their rights from the property in suit.52 Likewise,
plaintiffs Manuel Layaban, Dante Javier, Ederlinda dela Cruz, Conrado
Banaag, Eduardo Sabalsa, Diosdado Canaria, Herminia Demillo,
Elizabeth Cristo, Buena Layaban, Elena Layaban, Maria Layaban, Betty
Banaag, Oscar Layaban, Carmelita Caalete, Manuel Canaria, Alfredo
Diaz, Alejandro Sanganbayan, Soledad Alcantara, Felicisimo Galzote,
Vivencio Boral, Edilberto Banaag and Jose Canaria, executed quitclaims
in favor of the CAI after receiving money from it.53
On October 16, 1996, the respondents filed a Motion to Lift Status
Quo Order and Motion to Dismiss54 alleging that the status quo order
illegally extended the restraining order issued on September 13, 1996. It
was also alleged that the complainants-appellants were not qualified
beneficiaries of the CARL. The CAI asserted that the re-classification of
the land use was valid and legal, and concluded that since the property
was not agricultural, it was not covered by the CARL and, thus, beyond
the jurisdiction of the DARAB. The CAI, thus, prayed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that
the status quo order be immediately lifted and the writ of
preliminary injunction applied for be denied for utter lack of merit by
upholding the Decision of the Honorable Provincial Adjudicator
dated 8 August 1996 with a modification which shall include an
order of ejectment.55
In the meantime, more members of the PBFAI executed deeds of
quitclaims on October 1, 1996, October 9, 1996, November 18, 1996,

February 28, 1997 and March 6, 1997, respectively, all in favor of the
respondent CAI over the property subject of their petition. All in all,
during the period from September 26 1996 to March 6, 1997,56 twentyfive complainants (members of PBFAI) executed separate deeds of
quitclaims in favor of the CAI.57 The foregoing notwithstanding, the
DARAB rendered a Decision on September 2, 1997 reversing the
decision of PARAD. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the challenged decision is
hereby REVERSED and a new judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. Declaring the subject landholding to be within the coverage
of Section 4 of R.A. 6657;
2. Ordering the PARO, MARO and all DAR officials
concerned to take the necessary steps for the acquisition of
the subject land pursuant to Administrative Order No. 9,
Series of 1990; and
3. Ordering the PARO, MARO and all DAR officials
concerned to distribute the subject land to qualified farmerbeneficiaries pursuant to Administrative Order No. 10, series
of 1990, giving preference to the plaintiffs as actual
occupants and cultivators of the subject land.58
The respondents-appellees filed a motion for reconsideration59 of the
decision which was denied by the DARAB in a Resolution dated August
28, 1998.60
The Case in the Court of Appeals
Aggrieved, the CAI filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals
under Rule 4561 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
Resolution dated August 28, 1998. The following issues were raised:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE LAND IN SUIT IS COVERED BY

CARP;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE MEMBERS OF PBFAI NUMBERING
37 ARE LEGITIMATE TENANTS THEREOF;
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE DARAB APPRECIATED THE FACTS
AND LAW OF THE CASE;
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE DARAB IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS
POWERS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.62
On March 15, 2000, the CA rendered a Decision reversing the decision
of the DARAB and reinstating the decision of the PARAD, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE, the assailed
DARAB Decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, while the
PARO Decision is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.63
The CA ruled that under Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6657, all lands with
eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already developed,
shall be exempt from the coverage of the said Act. The CA noted that the
exception speaks of "18% in slope and undeveloped land." Per report of
the PARAD, the property subject of the suit has an 18% slope and was
still undeveloped; hence, it falls within the exemption.
Further, the CA held that as early as May 30, 1976, the Municipality of
Carmona, Cavite, already reclassified the land as residential in
Resolution No. 30, when it allowed the LDC to build low-cost housing
projects in the subject area. According to the Court, the ruling in Fortich
v. Corona64 and reiterated in Province of Camarines Sur, et al. v. Court of
Appeals,65 settled is the rule that local government units need not obtain
the approval of DAR to convert or reclassify lands from agricultural to
non-agricultural use. Thus, the subject land was validly declared

residential since 1976 by competent authority through Kapasiyahang

Bilang 30. As such, the DARAB erred in ruling that the land in suit was
still covered by Rep. Act No. 6657. Consequently, since the subject land
is not agricultural and not covered by the CARL, the PBFAI members
could not be considered tillers/beneficiaries thereof.66
Aggrieved, the PBFAI filed a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court on April 11, 2000 before this Court. For its part, DARAB
filed a motion for extension of time to file a petition for the reversal of the
decision in CA-GR SP No. 49363. The same was docketed as G.R. No.
142980. On May 11, 2000, the DARAB manifested that it was adopting
as its own the petition for review filed by PBFAI. In our Resolution dated
June 28, 2000, we granted the motion of the DARAB and ordered the
consolidation of G.R. Nos. 142980 and 142359.
The Issues
The core issues for resolution are the following: (1) whether the property
subject of the suit is covered by Rep. Act No. 6657, the Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL); (2) whether the DARAB had original and appellate
jurisdiction over the complaint of the petitioner PBFAI against the private
respondent; (3) whether the petitioners-members of the PBFAI have a
cause of action against the private respondent for possession and
cultivation of the property in suit; (4) whether the dismissal by the RTC of
the complaint in Civil Case No. BCV-87-13 is a bar to the complaint of
the petitioners-members of the PBFAI; and (5) whether the appellate
court committed a reversible error in dismissing the petition for review in
CA-G.R. SP No. 49363.
It is well-settled that in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised.67 We have time
and again ruled that the factual findings of fact by administrative
agencies are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the
courts68 because of the special knowledge and expertise of
administrative departments over matters falling under their

jurisdiction.69 However, due to the divergence of the findings of the

PARAD, on the one hand, and the DARAB on the other, and considering
the findings of the DARAB and the Court of Appeals, we are constrained
to review the records and resolve the factual and the legal issues
involved.
On the first and second issues, the petitioners contend that the property
subject of the suit is agricultural land; hence, covered by the CARL,
more particularly, Rep. Act No. 6657. They assert that the reclassification
of the property made by the Municipal Council of Carmona, Cavite,
under Kapasiyahang Blg. 30 on May 30, 1976 was subject to the
approval of the HSRC, now the HLURB, as provided for by Section 5 of
Executive Order No. 648.70Since there was no such approval, the said
resolution of the Municipal Council of Carmona was ineffective. The
petitioners aver that, the appellate courts reliance on the ruling of this
Court in Province of Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals, et al.71 is
misplaced because the said case involves the power of local
government units to initiate condemnation proceedings of properties for
public use or purpose. They argue that under Section 65 of Rep. Act No.
6657, the DAR is vested with exclusive authority to reclassify a
landholding from agricultural to residential. The petitioners submit that
the exclusive authority of the DAR is not negated by Section 20 of Rep.
Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.
They also insist that the conversion of the property under Kapasiyahang
Blg. 30 of the Municipal Council of Carmona on May 30, 1976, was
subject to the approval of the DAR, conformably to DOJ Opinion No. 44,
Series of 1990. Moreover, the development of the property had not yet
been completed even after Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect. Hence, it was
incumbent upon the respondent to secure an exemption thereto, after
complying with DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1994.
In its Comment on the petition, the respondent CAI asserts that the
property was validly reclassified by the Municipal Council of Carmona on
May 30, 1976, pursuant to its authority under Section 3, Rep. Act No.

2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act of 1959. Until

revoked, the reclassification made by the council remained valid. Per
DOJ Opinion No. 40, Series of 1990, the private respondent was not
required to secure clearance or approval from the DAR since the
reclassification took place on June 15, 1988, when Rep. Act No. 6657
took effect. The respondent asserts that it had complied with all the
requirements under P.D. No. 957, as amended.
The respondent contends that, aside from the Municipal Council of
Carmona, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform and administrative agencies
of the government such as the NHA, the Bureau of Lands, the HSRC,
and the HLURB, found the property unsuitable for agricultural purposes.
The respondent asserts that the petitioners-individuals are mere
squatters and not tenants on the property of the private respondent.
Hence, the PARAD had no jurisdiction over the petition of the PBFAI, as
well as the individual petitioners. Consequently, the DARAB had no
appellate jurisdiction over the appeals from the decision of the PARAD.
The Courts Ruling
The contention of the petitioners has no merit.
Under Section 3(c) of Rep. Act No. 6657, agricultural lands refer to lands
devoted to agriculture as conferred in the said law and not classified as
industrial land. Agricultural lands are only those lands which are arable
or suitable lands that do not include commercial, industrial and
residential lands.72 Section 4(e) of the law provides that it covers all
private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the
agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon. Rep. Act No.
6657 took effect only on June 15, 1988. But long before the law took
effect, the property subject of the suit had already been reclassified and
converted from agricultural to non-agricultural or residential land by the
following administrative agencies: (a) the Bureau of Lands, when it
approved the subdivision plan of the property consisting of 728
subdivision lots; (b) the National Planning Commission which approved

the subdivision plan subdivided by the LDC/CAI for the development of

the property into a low-cost housing project; (c) the Municipal Council of
Carmona, Cavite, when it approved Kapasiyahang Blg. 30 on May 30,
1976; (d) Agrarian Reform Minister Conrado F. Estrella, on July 3, 1979,
when he granted the application of the respondent for the development
of the Hakone Housing Project with an area of 35.80 hectares upon the
recommendation of the Agrarian Reform Team, Regional Director of
Region IV, which found, after verification and investigation, that the
property was not covered by P.D. No. 27, it being untenanted and not
devoted to the production of palay/or corn and that the property was
suitable for conversion to residential subdivision; (e) by the Ministry of
Local Government and Community Development; (f) the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission which issued a location clearance,
development permit, Certificate of Inspection and License to Sell to the
LDC/private respondent; and, (g) the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board which also issued to the respondent CAI/LDC a license to sell the
subdivision lots.
In issuing a location clearance, a development permit, a certificate of
inspection over the housing project, and a license to sell the subdivision
lots in favor of LDC/CAI pursuant to its charter, the HSRC approved and
confirmed the reclassification and conversion of the land made by the
Municipal Council of Carmona and Agrarian Reform Minister Estrella.
In Natalia Realty Inc. and Estate Developers and Investors Corp. v.
Department of Agrarian Reform, et al.,73 we held, thus:
We now determine whether such lands are covered by the CARL.
Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all
public and private agricultural lands." As to what constitutes
"agricultural land" it is referred to as "land devoted to agricultural
activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land. The deliberations of the

Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. "Agricultural

lands" are only those lands which are "arable and suitable
agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and
residential lands."
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of
the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language be
considered as "agricultural lands." These lots were intended for
residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval
of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Even today,
the areas in question continued to be developed as a low-cost
housing subdivision, albeit at a snails pace. This can readily be
gleaned from the fact that SAMBA members even instituted an
action to restrain petitioners from continuing with such
development. The enormity of the resources needed for developing
a subdivision may have delayed its completion but this does not
detract from the fact that these lands are still residential lands and
outside the ambit of the CARL.
Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the
coverage of CARL. These include lands previously converted
to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by
government agencies other than respondent DAR. In its
Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion of Private
Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses, DAR itself defined
"agricultural land" thus
x x x Agricultural land refers to those devoted to agricultural
activity as defined in R.A. 6657 and not classified as mineral
or forest by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and its predecessor agencies, and
not classified in town plans and zoning ordinances as
approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities

prior to 15 June 1988 for residential, commercial or

industrial use.74
Our ruling in Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR was reiterated in National
Housing Authority v. Allarde,75 and Sta. Rosa Realty Development
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,76 where we stated, viz:
The authority of the municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna to issue
zoning classification is an exercise of its police power, not the
power of eminent domain. "A zoning ordinance is defined as a local
city or municipal legislation which logically arranges, prescribed,
defines and apportions a given political subdivision into specific
land uses as present and future projection of needs.
Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 2264,77 amending the Local Government Code,
specifically empowers municipal and/or city councils to adopt zoning and
subdivision ordinances or regulations in consultation with the National
Planning Commission. A zoning ordinance prescribes, defines, and
apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present
and future projection of needs.78 The power of the local government to
convert or reclassify lands to residential lands to non-agricultural lands
reclassified is not subject to the approval of the Department of Agrarian
Reform.79 Section 65 of Rep. Act No. 6657 relied upon by the petitioner
applies only to applications by the landlord or the beneficiary for the
conversion of lands previously placed under the agrarian reform law
after the lapse of five years from its award. It does not apply to
agricultural lands already converted as residential lands prior to the
passage of Rep. Act No. 6657.80
When Agrarian Reform Minister Conrado F. Estrella confirmed the
reclassification of the property by the Municipal Council of Carmona to
non-agricultural land when he approved, on July 3, 1979, the application
of the private respondent/LDC for the conversion of 35.80 hectares of
the property covered by TCT No. 62972 into non-agricultural land, he did

so pursuant to his authority under Rep. Act No. 3844, as amended, by

P.D. No. 815 and P.D. No. 946.81
It bears stressing that in his Order, the Agrarian Reform Minister
declared that the property was not tenanted and not devoted to the
production of palay and/or corn, and that the land was suitable for
conversion to a residential subdivision. The order of the Minister was not
reversed by the Office of the President; as such, it became final and
executory. By declaring, in its Decision of September 2, 1997, that the
property subject of the suit, was agricultural land, the petitioner DARAB
thereby reversed the Order of Agrarian Reform Minister Estrella, issued
almost eighteen (18) years before, and nullified Resolution No. 30 of the
Municipal Council of Carmona, approved twenty-one (21) years earlier,
on May 30, 1976, as well as the issuances of the NHA, the HSRC, the
HLURB, the Ministry of Local Government and the National Planning
Commission. Thus, the petitioner DARAB acted with grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
The failure of the respondent to complete the housing project before
June 15, 1988, even if true, did not have the effect of reverting the
property as agricultural land.
The petitioners reliance on DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990 and
DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1994 is misplaced. In the said
opinion, the Secretary of Justice declared, viz:
Based on the foregoing premises, we reiterate the view that with
respect to conversions of agricultural lands covered by R.A. No.
6657 to non-agricultural uses, the authority of DAR to approve
such conversions may be exercised from the date of the laws
effectivity on June 15, 1988. This conclusion is based on a liberal
interpretation of R.A. No. 6657 in the light of DARs mandate and
the extensive coverage of the agrarian reform program.

Following the DOJ opinion, the DAR issued Administrative Order No. 6,
Series of 1994, stating that lands already classified as non-agricultural
before the enactment of Rep. Act No. 6657 no longer needed any
conversion clearance:
I. Prefatory Statement
In order to streamline the issuance of exemption clearances, based
on DOJ Opinion No. 44, the following guidelines are being issued
for the guidance of the DAR and the public in general.
II. Legal Basis
Sec. 3(c) of RA 6657 states that agricultural lands refers to the land
devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this act and not
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial
land.
Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, series of 1990 has ruled that, with
respect to the conversion of agricultural lands covered by RA No. 6657
to non-agricultural uses, the authority of DAR to approve such
conversion may be exercised from the date of its effectivity, on June 15,
1988. Thus, all lands that are already classified as commercial,
industrial, or residential before 15 June 1988 no longer need any
conversion clearance.
With our finding that the property subject of the suit was classified as
residential land since 1976, the DARAB had no original and appellate
jurisdiction over the property subject of the action of the petitioner PBFAI
and its members. Consequently, the DARAB should have ordered the
dismissal of the complaint.
The jurisdiction of a tribunal or quasi-judicial body over the subject
matter is determined by the averments of the complaint/petition and the
law extant at the time of the commencement of the

suit/complaint/petition.82 All proceedings before a tribunal or quasijudicial agency bereft of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
are null and void.83
Section 1, Rule II of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB
provides that:
SECTION 1. Primary. Original and appellate jurisdiction The
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction,
both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all
agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents
involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order
Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by
Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other
agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.
Section 3(d) of Rep. Act No. 6657 defines an agrarian dispute as:
(d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or
otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes
concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired
under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership
from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform
beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of
farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and
lessee.
In Monsanto v. Zerna,84 we held that for the DARAB to have jurisdiction
over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between the parties.

In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it is

essential to establish all the indispensable elements, to wit:
(1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee;
(2) The subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
(3) There is consent between the parties to the relationship;
(4) The purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production;
(5) There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and
(6) The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee.85
There is no allegation in the complaint of the petitioner PBFAI in DARAB
Case No. CA-0285-95 that its members were tenants of the private
respondent CAI. Neither did the petitioner adduce substantial evidence
that the private respondent was the landlord of its members from 1961,
nor at any time for that matter. Indeed, as found by the PARAD:
Moreover, their waiver of rights constitutes abandonment of their
rights of possession and cultivation which may yet be borne out of
a legitimate tenancy relationship. Their re-entry or continuous
possession and cultivation of the land in question without the
landowners knowledge and/or consent negates the existence of
tenancy relationship. Since security of tenure is a right to which
only a bona fide tenant farmer is entitled their lack of such tenurial
status denies them of its exercise and enjoyment.
As to the remaining twenty and more other complainants, it is
unfortunate that they have not shown that their cultivation,

possession and enjoyment of the lands they claim to till have been
by authority of a valid contract of agricultural tenancy. On the
contrary, as admitted in their complaint a number of them have
simply occupied the premises in suit without any specific area of
tillage being primarily mere farm helpers of their relatives. Banking
on their application for CARP coverage still awaiting action and
disposition in some DAR operations office, these complainants
have tenaciously held on to their occupied areas in the hope of
eventual redemption under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program. 86
Since the members of the petitioner PBFAI were not the tenants of the
private respondent CAI, the petitioners and its members had no cause of
action against the private respondent for possession of the landholding
to maintain possession thereof and for damages. Besides, when the
complaint was filed, twenty-five (25) of the thirty-seven (37) members of
the petitioners had already executed separate deeds of quitclaim in favor
of the private respondent CAI over the portions of the landholding they
respectively claimed, after receiving from the private respondent CAI
varied sums of money. In executing the said deeds, the members of the
petitioner PBFAI thereby waived their respective claims over the
property. Hence, they have no right whatsoever to still remain in
possession of the same.
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions are DENIED. The
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS. The complaint of the petitioner PBFAI in DARAB
Case No. CA-0285-95 is DISMISSED. The counterclaim of the private
respondent for damages in DARAB Case No. CA-0285-95 is,
likewise, DISMISSED. The thirty-seven (37) members of the petitioner
PBFAI and all those occupying the property subject of the complaint in
DARAB Case No. CA-0285-95 in their behalf are ORDERED to vacate
the landholding.

SO ORDERED.
Puno*, Quisumbing**, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.