HAZOP Training1

HAZOP Training Handbook Documentation to
NPC Iran
Arthur D. Little Limited
Science Park, Milton Road
Cambridge CB4 0XL
United Kingdom
Telephone +44 (0)1223 392090
Fax +44 (0)1223 420021
www.adlittle.uk.com
June 2005 Reference 20365
NPC/20365/127_Handbook_HAZOP.ppt 1
HAZOP NPC Arthur D. Little Limited
Science Park, Milton Road
Cambridge CB4 0XL
United Kingdom
Telephone +44 (0)1223 392090
Fax +44 (0)1223 420021
2005 www.adlittle.uk.com
Reference 20365
Contents
1. HAZOP Approach
2. HAZOP Team Member
3. HAZOP Recorder
4. HAZOP Leader
5. Manager Commissioning a HAZOP Study

1. HAZOP
2. HAZOP
3. HAZOP
4. HAZOP
5. HAZOP
HAZOP Approach Introduction 1
Purpose and Scope of this Training
This guidance has been prepared to help you play a full part in a HAZOP study as a
Team Member, HAZOP Recorder or Leader. It also explains what deliverables you
can expect as a Manager commissioning a HAZOP study
The course explains step by step how the technique works and gives guidance on
each role to achieve the best outcome working collaboratively
Preparation is vital and suggestions are made to get you off to the best start
Main Phases of How to conduct Exercises in Play a full

the HAZOP a HAZOP the HAZOP part in a
Process Technique HAZOP study
1 -HAZOP
HAZOP
HAZOP .
HAZOP .
HAZOP HAZOP
HAZOP . HAZOP .
HAZOP Approach - What is a HAZOP? 1
A HAZOP is a group technique for identifying hazards and operability

problems. It can be applied to operating process plants and to plants in
various stages of design
Basic
Basic Principles
Principles
ToToobtain
obtainaafull
fulldescription
descriptionofofthe
theprocess,
process,
including
includingthe
theintended
intendeddesign
designconditions
conditions
To
Tosystematically
systematicallyexamine
examineevery
everypart
partofof
the process, to discover how deviations
the process, to discover how deviations
from
fromthe
theintention
intentionofofthe
thedesign
designcan
canoccur
occur
To
Todecide
decidewhether
whetherthese
thesedeviations
deviationscan
can
give rise to hazards and/or operability
give rise to hazards and/or operability
problems
problems
1 HAZOP
HAZOP .
.

.
.

.
.
HAZOP Approach - How Risk Identification Fits Overall Safety Management 1
Hazard identification is the first step in a systematic process which aims to

improve the management of risk
Identify Monitor
Risks and
Review
Assess Risks Implement Control

Is Risk
As Low As Select Option
Frequency Incidents Reasonably Communicate Plan
Probability Outcome Practice- Yes Roll out and Implement
Size of consequences able
Additional No
Risk
Controls
Failure to thoroughly identify sources of risk is a widespread general concern in Risk

Management
1 -HAZOP .

) (

HAZOP Approach - Ways to Identify Risk 1
Several of these identification methods are incorporated into Process

Hazards Assessment
Use of a checklist
Probably the simplest method using a tabulated series of questions or
issues Exxons Knowledge based HAZOP
A What-if study
Carried out using a brainstorming technique typically starting from hazards
known to the group leading on to other potential scenarios
Cited in OSHA 1910.119
A Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)

A component by component assessment of the ways of failure of each
item of equipment in a system and the effects on system operate that result
A HAZOP study
A group review using structured questioning to focus on deviations from
design intent which may create hazard or operability problems
1 -HAZOP
HAZOP
) ( Exxon.
) (brainstorming
- .OHSA 1910-119
)(FMEA
HAZOP
HAZOP Approach - What Happens in a HAZOP? 1
In a HAZOP, the way the study team operates and the manner in which the
scope of work is defined are defining characteristics of the technique
The HAZOP team

Comprises a leader who asks questions of the team, a recorder who
records the discussion and team members who represent of each of the key
disciplines involved in the facility such as:
Process design
Operations
Safety and maintenance
The plant to be studied

Is defined at the beginning of the HAZOP typically using a Piping and
Instrumentation Diagram to clarify the battery limits and interfaces.
The team operates

A question and answer approach using guidewords to search for
deviations from design intent or failure modes of the plant
-HAZOP HAZOP
HAZOP
HAZOP .
HAZOP

:

P&I D HAZOP
.
.

.
HAZOP approach - What happens in a HAZOP? 1
The team for a HAZOP is selected from the available staff who will need to
be free of other duties for the period of the study
The HAZOP team members represent the main disciplines concerned with the
design and normal operation of the system such as a process plant
Specialists may be co-opted from time to time to strengthen the technical knowledge
of the team, for example particular aspects of equipment operation, maintenance or
utilities supply
Typical Core Team Disciplines Part-time co-opted specialists
Process design Instrumentation

Operations Rotating Equipment
Safety Mechanical, Electrical
Maintenance Control Systems Specialists
The team leader and recorder typically are independent of the plant but need to be
experienced in the HAZOP technique
Team size is typically 5-8. Greater numbers reduce the pace and inhibit discussion
but with too few members, the team may lack perspective
1 -HAZOP HAZOP
HAZOP .
HAZOP ) (
.
.

HAZOP
.
8-5
.
HAZOP Approach - What Happens in a HAZOP? 1
The method of working in a HAZOP is characterised by stepwise question

and answer between leader and team
The team works through the system design in a diagrammatic form such as plant
P&IDs. Each section is examined critically to understand the design intent of the
facilities between nodes selected by the leader
A series of questions is posed by the team leader and the team members respond
through joint discussion
The leaders questions are based on a systematic use of guidewords
The aim of the questions is to find out how the facility could fail to operate as
intended by the designer
For each deviation the team discusses if a hazard might arise
The recorder notes the main points of discussion around each guideword and any
recommendations for change
1 -HAZOP HAZOP
HAZOP .
) P & ID (.
.
.

.
.
.
HAZOP Approach - Flow Diagram 1
HAZOP study does not just involve the team meetings themselves.
Preparation and completion activities are an essential part of the study
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3

Manager Team member HAZOP recorder
HAZOP Leader HAZOP recorder HAZOP Leader
HAZOP leader Manager
Preparation for
the HAZOP
Conduct of the
HAZOP Team Meetings
Completion of
the study
22
1 -HAZOP
HAZOP .
.
1 2 3
HAZOP
HAZOP HAZOP HAZOP
HAZOP
HAZOP
HAZOP
23
Summary of Main Terms 1
The following Terms are used:
HAZOP
Hazard and Operability Study of a complex system by a specialist team
Hazard
An unwanted event in the system with the potential to cause injury or loss
Risk
The combination of size of loss and likelihood of that loss if a hazard occurs
Parameter
A physical property of a component of the system at risk
Guideword
The word or phrase expressing a deviation of a parameter from design intent
Leader
The HAZOP member who leads the discussion using parameter-guidewords
Recorder
The HAZOP member who keeps a record of the discussions
24
1
HAZOP
.
)(Hazard
.
)(Risk
) *

.

.

HAZOP .

HAZOP .
25
Contents
1. HAZOP Approach
3. HAZOP Recorder
4. HAZOP Leader
26

1. HAZOP
2. HAZOP
3. HAZOP
4. HAZOP
5. .HAZOP
27
HAZOP Team Member - Before the HAZOP 2
Before the meetings start, as a team member you can expect to receive
some information about the study
Activity Advantages
Memo About a week before the meeting you receive a memorandum describing
The date, time and place for the HAZOP
HAZOP study process
Study Plan
Meeting Rules
The HAZOP team meets to visit the plant

Plant Visit For those who do not know the facility this allows a basic description of the process to
be provided and gives members a mental model of the plant
Visit the control room as well as tour outside facilities
HAZOP Plan
Section Drawing Number Sheet Revision Date Sheet Description Node Node Description Da y
Feed section 58-GD-4993 FG 8 1 0 July-03 Plant feed 1 Storage pump J 5822N A/B 1
Feed section 58-GD-4993 FG 8 1 0 July-03 Plant feed 2 Surge drum F 5807 1
The plan shows the sections of the plant

Feed section 58-GD-4993 FG 8 1 0 July-03 Plant feed 3 Charge pump J 5802 1
Feed section 58-GD-4993 FG 8 1 0 July-03 Settler 4 C 5812 1
Feed section 58-GD-4993 FG 11 1 0 July-03 Main Column 5 C 5802 A/B 1
Feed section 58-GD-4993 FG 11 1 0 July-03 Main Column 6 C 5813 A/B 1
Reaction 58-GD-4993 FG 4 1 0 July-03 Reactor 7 MS Steam inlet 2
Reaction 58-GD-4993 FG 4/17 1 0 July-03 Reactor 8 Premix feed distributor 2
The way each section is broken into nodes for HAZOP study
Reaction 58-GD-4993 FG 4/17 1 0 July-03 Reactor 9 Riser Steam Injection 2
Reaction 58-GD-4993 FG 4 1 0 July-03 Reactor 10 Lift gas 2
Reaction 58-GD-4993 FG 4/17 1 0 July-03 Reactor 11 Riser feed injection 2
Reaction 58-GD-4993 FG 4 1 0 July-03 Reactor 12 Reactor/Disengagement D 5801 2
Reaction 58-GD-4993 FG 4/17 1 0 July-03 Reactor 13 Slide Valve /purge details 2
Regeneration 58-GD-4993 FG 19 1 0 July-03 Regenerator 14 Regen and Torch Oil D 5802 3
Reaction 58-GD-4993 FG 4/17 1 0 July-03 Reactor 15 Slide valve 3
Which day each node is expected to be examined

Regeneration 58-GD-4993 FG 2 1 0 July-03 Blower 16 Inlet filter L 5802 3
Regeneration 58-GD-4993 FG 2 1 0 July-03 Blower 17 Air Blower J 5801 3
Regeneration 58-GD-4993 FG 2 1 0 July-03 Blower 18 AncillariesJ 5801 3
Regeneration 58-GD-4993 FG 19 1 0 July-03 Regenerator 19 Burner B 5801 3
Regeneration 58-GD-4993 FG 19 1 0 July-03 Regenerator 20 Tertiary Cyclone F 5856 4
Regeneration 58-GD-4993 FG 3 1 0 July-03 Turbo-expander 21 Expander J 5801-EX 4
Regeneration 58-GD-4993 FG 3 1 0 July-03 Turbo-expander 22 Flue Gas bypass and Oriface Chamber 4
Details of the P&I Drawing related to the node

Regeneration 58-GD-4993 FG 3 1 0 July-03 Turbo-expander 23 Catalyst underflow and critical flow nozzle 4
Regeneration 58-GD-4993 FG 3 1 0 July-03 Turbo-expander 24 Diverter F 5851 4
Regeneration 58-GD-4993 FG 16 1 0 July-03 ESP 25 Stack 4
Plan of Nodes
28
HAZOP -HAZOP

:
HAZOP
HAZOP

. HAZOP

.
.
HAZOP Plan
Section Drawing Number Sheet Revision Date Sheet Description Node Node Description Da y
Feed section 58-GD-4993 FG 8 1 0 July-03 Plant feed 1 Storage pump J 5822N A/B 1

Feed section 58-GD-4993 FG 8 1 0 July-03 Plant feed 2 Surge drum F 5807 1
Feed section
Feed section
Feed section
Feed section
58-GD-4993 FG 8
58-GD-4993 FG 8
58-GD-4993 FG 11
58-GD-4993 FG 11
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
July-03
July-03
July-03
July-03
Plant feed
Settler
Main Column
Main Column
3
4
5
6
Charge pump J 5802
C 5812
C 5802 A/B
C 5813 A/B
1
1
1
1
.
Reaction 58-GD-4993 FG 4 1 0 July-03 Reactor 7 MS Steam inlet 2
Reaction 58-GD-4993 FG 4/17 1 0 July-03 Reactor 8 Premix feed distributor 2
. HAZOP
Reaction 58-GD-4993 FG 4/17 1 0 July-03 Reactor 9 Riser Steam Injection 2
Reaction 58-GD-4993 FG 4 1 0 July-03 Reactor 10 Lift gas 2
Reaction 58-GD-4993 FG 4/17 1 0 July-03 Reactor 11 Riser feed injection 2
Reaction 58-GD-4993 FG 4 1 0 July-03 Reactor 12 Reactor/Disengagement D 5801 2
Reaction 58-GD-4993 FG 4/17 1 0 July-03 Reactor 13 Slide Valve /purge details 2
Regeneration 58-GD-4993 FG 19 1 0 July-03 Regenerator 14 Regen and Torch Oil D 5802 3

Reaction 58-GD-4993 FG 4/17 1 0 July-03 Reactor 15 Slide valve 3
Regeneration
Regeneration
Regeneration
Regeneration
Regeneration
58-GD-4993 FG 2
58-GD-4993 FG 2
58-GD-4993 FG 2
58-GD-4993 FG 19
58-GD-4993 FG 19
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
July-03
July-03
July-03
July-03
July-03
Blower
Blower
Blower
Regenerator
Regenerator
16
17
18
19
20
Inlet filter L 5802
Air Blower J 5801
AncillariesJ 5801
Burner B 5801
Tertiary Cyclone F 5856
3
3
3
3
4
.
Regeneration 58-GD-4993 FG 3 1 0 July-03 Turbo-expander 21 Expander J 5801-EX 4
. P & I
Regeneration 58-GD-4993 FG 3 1 0 July-03 Turbo-expander 22 Flue Gas bypass and Oriface Chamber 4
Regeneration 58-GD-4993 FG 3 1 0 July-03 Turbo-expander 23 Catalyst underflow and critical flow nozzle 4
Regeneration 58-GD-4993 FG 3 1 0 July-03 Turbo-expander 24 Diverter F 5851 4
Regeneration 58-GD-4993 FG 16 1 0 July-03 ESP 25 Stack 4
29
Text 2
Text
Text
Text
Text Text Text
Text Text Text

Text Text Text
Text Text Text
Text Text Text
Text Text Text
Text Text Text
30
Text 2
Text
Text
Text
Text Text Text
Text Text Text

Text Text Text
Text Text Text
Text Text Text
Text Text Text
Text Text Text
31
HAZOP Team Member Guidewords 2
The leader will explain the guideword-parameter combinations he proposes

to use at the start of the meeting
The table can be applied to the plant in any configuration for example,
commissioning, start-up, shut down, emergency shutdown or regeneration as well
as the normal process flow
Parameter More Less No Reverse Part of Other than
Flow High Flow Low Flow No Flow Back Loss of

Flow containment
Pressure High Low Vacuum Partial
Pressure Pressure Pressure
Temperature High Low Cryogenic
Temperature Temperature (Sub Zero)
Level High Level Low Level No level
Composition Additional Loss of Change Wrong Contaminant
Phase Phase of State concentration Corrosive
Wrong
Material
Other parameters such as viscosity can also be used
32
2 -HAZOP

) (

33
HAZOP Team Member - How Guidewords Lead to Questions 2
The guideword-parameter combinations are applied to a section of plant

(called a node) selected by the HAZOP leader at the start of the study
HAZOP step Leader Action Specific example HAZOP team input
Apply parameter Leader selects How could feed pipe If there were a loss of supply pressure
guideword Flow-Reverse experience reverse flow?
combination
Develop a Leader probes What could cause the 1. Upstream pipe rupture
meaningful how deviation loss of supply pressure? 2. Inadvertent valve closure
cause for could occur 3. Pump failure
deviation
Examine Leader checks Could there be a hazard Depends on size of leak,

possible if hazardous if there were a pipe rupture location, chance of ignition
consequences and exposure of personnel
Discuss any Leader checks How do you plan to Design standards

protection on hazard protect against this Regular maintenance inspection
potential possibility Emergency response team
Deviations may have several causes each of which needs to be discussed
Whether or not the team considers there is a hazard depends on the specifics of
the situation
16
2 -HAZOP
) (
HAZOP .
HAZOP HAZOP

.
.
-1
.
. -2
-3

. .
.

. .

16
HAZOP Team Member - Guidewords for Special Situations 2
In addition to the parameter- guideword combinations, the HAZOP team can

also use special guidewords to consider specific failures
Loss of containment
Piping failures from corrosion induced leaks or mechanical impact
Failures of flanges and fittings
Leaks from valve stems or pump seals
Heat exchanger tube rupture or shell failure
Pressure vessel failure
Releases from small bore fittings, instrument bridles, drains and vents
Materials of construction, corrosion, embrittlement
Utilities failures
Instrument Air or Nitrogen
Power
Cooling water or Steam failure
Fuel Gas or Fuel Oil failures
Environment impact
Lightning, Wind or Flood
Earthquake
Noise
36
2 -HAZOP
HAZOP
.
37
Special guidewords can also be applied for activities or facilities which are
essential to the safe operation of the plant
These guidewords are not deviations from intent but act as reminders to consider plant hazards
under these conditions
Testing
Equipment such as alarms, trips PRV settings
Product or intermediate sampling and analysis
Maintenance
Access and means of isolation
Draining, Purging and drying
Cooling or warming of equipment
Availability of spares/replacement items
Special activities (for example Hot Tapping)
Electrical
Area classification
Isolation and earthing
Instrumentation
Suitability/reliability/sufficiency of sensors and transmitters
Location, failure modes and effect on any voting logic
Alarms, hierarchy and ability of operator to respond
38
2 -HAZOP
.

PRV
)(pressure regulation valve

) (Purging

/
) (Hot tapping

/ / .
.
.
39
Most process plant operations will involve exposure of operators to toxic or

other hazards
These guidewords are also reminders used at the appropriate point in the HAZOP
when considering sections of plant where exposure may occur. Typical deviation is no
personnel protection
Personnel protection
Basic equipment, boots, hard hats, gloves goggles
Escape masks, breathing apparatus (Toxics or confined entry)
Permit to work and requirements (escape routes, ladders, ropes etc)
Protective instruments (oxygen analysers, flammable/toxic gas detectors)
Plant protection
Fire and smoke detection
Flammable or toxic gas detection
Firewater systems, monitors, deluges and sprays
Passive fire protection
Chemicals storage and handling
Fences and measures against intruders, saboteurs
Housekeeping
40
2 -HAZOP
HAZOP
.
.

) (
) ... (

.
) (
41
Contents
1. HAZOP Approach
3. HAZOP Recorder
4. HAZOP Leader
42

1. HAZOP
2. HAZOP
3. HAZOP
4. HAZOP
5. HAZOP
43
The HAZOP Recorder - What the Recorder Does 3
The recorder needs to be a professional and is an important participant in

the proceedings
The recorder must maintain concentration to unravel the essential points made in
discussion by each participant
Respond attentively to the leader when he sums up discussion and proposes

recommendations
Provide the administrative support for the team including follow-up questions and
clarifications
Exercise discretion to prompt the leader where a possible oversight is spotted and to
participate in the discussions without undermining the leaders efforts to pace the
work of the group
Avoid interrupting the leaders flow to seek minor clarifications of the record (raise
these later when the days work is to be reviewed)
44
3 -NFDV HAZOP
)
(.
45
The discussion is recorded in a tabular fashion
Dra wing numbe r XXXXXX Re vis ion xx Title - P ipe line HAZOP illus tra tion
(Na me of S e ction unde r re vie w)
110 Ma in Line 18 Re ve rs e Flow 110. 1.Ups tre a m 110.1 P ote ntia l for 110.1 R110.1
Tra ns mis s ion XX-10-xxx pipe rupture ignition a nd fire with Routing Re comme nd
Line 110.2. S hut down a t ra dia tion to a dja ce nt s tudie s , ins ta lla tion of
inle t me te ring popula tion. De pe nds Re gula r non re turn va lve
s ta tion on s ize of le a k, pa trol , a t s ta tion outle t
110.3. Compre s s or loca tion, cha nce of Eme rge ncy
fa ilure ignition a nd public re s pons e
e xpos ure te a m
110.2......
110.3.......
46
3 -HAZOP
- HAZOP
xx xxxxxx

110 18 -110 -110-1 -110-1 R 110 -1
XX-10-XX
-110-2 .

-110-3
.
-...110-2
-...110-3
47
A line of enquiry usually results in one of four types of conclusion
A note (denoted N) simply recording how the system already operates or setting out
protective measures which are considered adequate
A recommendation (denoted R) where the HAZOP team agree to suggest an

improvement aimed at improving safety or plant performance
A question (denoted Q) where the team have insufficient information to respond

and require additional data from outside the meeting
An answer (denoted A) which records the answer to a question in the record.

Where the answer is considered to imply a hazard, a further recommendation may
follow
The record is numbered sequentially to aid subsequent action plans (e.g. N1, R2,
Q3, A4, etc)
48
3 -HAZOP
) ( N
.
HAZOP
.
) (Q
.
) (A
.
) .(A4 Q3 R2 N1
49
As well as the tabular section the recorder needs to complete the template
sections which explain the design intent of the node under review
General description of section and individual node

Company JGC Corporation
Facility Sohar Refinery Project - 2800 Huels Selective Hydrogenation Process Unit
HAZOP Date 06 - 09 Oct 2003 Team members: see attached list
Team Leader/Assistant Mr. Stevens/Ms. Tan

Section ID Reaction Section
General Section Feedstock comprising 4% C3 in C4 (n butane, iButane, butene and 0.17% butadiene is fed to a two stage reactor under hydrogen. The process conditions are
Description: very mild, temperature 80-100C . Butadiene is converted to butene and But-1-ene is isomerised to but-2-ene mainly in the second reactor. The catalyst is
nickel based. There is no presulphiding only a low temperature hydrogen strip below 100C. The reactors operate on 50% recycle
Drawing Number/Sheet Number D-280-1225-102 Rev.1 29 AUG '03

/Rev.Number/Date D-280-1225-103 Rev.1 29 AUG '03
D-280-1225-105 Rev.1 29 AUG '03
Design intent Holds feed and provided water boot for any entrained material
BL Pressure = 17.3 barg
Water Wash Column Design Pressure = 29 barg
BFW supply pressure = 21 barg
Node Equipment Surge Drum V 2802

Feed Pump P2802 A/B
23 Node 2 Water General P-2802A/B seal ruptures Leak of HC to surroundings with potential Hand switch HV-008 provided in the 280Q23.1 Clarify why the hand switch
Wash for ignition field HV-008 at is located in field and not in
Column (C- the control room.
2801) 280A23.1 ITT specify that all trips are
overhead activated by HS in field
line to FV-
010 280R23.1 Evaluate if better reliability is
obtained if HS-008 is provided in CR as
well as in field
50
3 -HAZOP
) (template
.

JGC
Z800

9-6 2003 . :
HAZOP Tan Stevens :

C3 4% n) C4 170% . C 100-80 .
:: But-2-ene . . C100 .
50% .
/ D-280-1225-102 Rev.1 29 AUG '03

D-280-1225-103 Rev.1 29 AUG '03

D-280-1225-105 Rev.1 29 AUG '03
entrain .
barg 17/3 =BL
= barg 29
barg 21 =BFW
V2802
P2802 A/B
23
Node 2V,I 2 -280 Q 23.1
)(C-2801 HV-008 HV-008
HC .
P-2802 ab .
FV-010 ITT-280 A23.1
HS .
-280R23.1 HS-
008 CR

.
51
Contents
1. HAZOP Approach
3. HAZOP Recorder
4. HAZOP Leader
52

1. HAZOP
2. HAZOP
3. HAZOP
4. HAZOP
5. HAZOP
53
The HAZOP Leader - What the Leader Does 4
The Team Leaders primary role is to facilitate the team discussion
Keep the team focused:

Concentrate on identifying hazards, not re-designing the plant
Where the data is insufficient, record questions and move on
Respond to team personalities:

Be tolerant and maintain a positive atmosphere
Restrain the extroverts
Draw out the quiet thinkers
Use own knowledge to:

Encourage thoroughness
Obtain consensus
Phrase recommendations
54
4 -HAZOP
:
.
.
.
:
.
). (
.
.
.
.
55
The HAZOP leader needs to define with the manager commissioning the
study the extent of the facilities to be studied before the HAZOP starts
Technical drawings of the facility such as Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams

(P&ID) are typically used to define the plant within battery limits
Supplementary materials are useful to clarify team discussions:

Process flow sheets
Equipment specifications and vendor detail drawings
Piping class and relief valve specifications
Plot layout and classification
Operating manuals and emergency shut down procedures
Working from incomplete or out-of-date documentation is a serious pitfall
For a HAZOP on an existing facility as built P&ID are essential; if the plant is
under design a consistent set of the latest revisions is required
56
4 -HAZOP
HAZOP HAZOP
HAZOP .
) (P & ID
.

)(
HAZOP P & ID
.
57
The HAZOP Leader must supervise study preparation
Prepare P&ID
diagrams for
HAZOP leaders Outline Plant Plan nodes
review Intention using and issue
Safeguarding Visit plant invitation
Process and notes
1.1 Flow Diagram to team
1.2 1.3 1.4
Ensure enough Organise Organise Organise

space for team computer and copy of P&ID team membership
and no template for on meeting room and additional
disturbances recording walls data
1.8 1.7 1.6 Manuals 1.5

Equipment Data sheets
PSV sizing sheets
Line specifications
Plot Plan
Electrical Division Diagram
Shut Down Logic
58
4 -HAZOP
HAZOP

P&ID

HAZOP

1.1
1.2 1.3 1.4
P&ID

1.8 1.7 1.6
1.5
PSV

59
The HAZOP meeting develops a rhythm after the first day which often
includes some introductory discussion to orient the team
First Day
Introduction and Typical Day

Orientation
First Node
Normal conduct of the

HAZOP Team Meetings
Special Topic Day
Days devoted to
Special Topics
60
4 -HAZOP
HAZOP
.
HAZOP
61
Steps in a normal HAZOP day
Select
P&ID
2.1 No
Last Yes
Select
P&ID?
plant
2.2 section
No
Last Yes
Explain Select next
design section? P&ID
2.3
intention
No
Last Yes Select next

Apply parameter
2.4 Guide plant section
guideword combination
Word? on P&ID
Develop a meaningful
cause for deviation
Examine possible Repeat for
consequences other parameter
Discuss any guideword 2.5
protection combinations
62
4 -HAZOP
P&ID
2.1

P & ID

2.2

P & ID

2.3

P&ID
2.4

.
2.5

63
Details for study of a single plant section
2.4.1
Select Parameter
or attribute 2.4.4
Discuss causes,
consequences, and
protection or
2.4.2 indication
Select Guideword Yes
No
2.4.3 2.4.5
Apply the Parameter No
Is deviation Documented by All interpretations
Guideword and illustrate credible? Recorder applied?
deviation by referring to
the plant section
Yes
If No select next guideword (2.5.1) All guide-
words applied?
Yes
If No select next parameter (2.5.2)
All parameters
considered?
Yes next plant section
64
4 -HAZOP
2.4.1

. 2.4.4

2.4.2 .
.

2.4.3
- 2.4.5

.

(2.5.1).

(2.5.2) .

65
The HAZOP is completed with some activities outside the HAZOP sessions
Apply guidewords
for special failures
or conditions other
than normal
operation
3.1
Collate Team to review

Follow up HAZOP
recommendations and complete Prepare Report
recommendations
and questions HAZOP record
3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5
66
-HAZOP -4
HAZOP HAZOP .
3.1
HAZOP
HAZOP
. . .
.
3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5
67
The HAZOP Leader - How to Propose Recommendations 4
The recommendations made by the HAZOP team may improve safety by

reducing either the likelihood or consequence of the hazard
There are a number of lines of approach:

More resistant equipment or safer materials
Standby equipment or instrumentation
More frequent testing of equipment, instrumentation and protective systems
Revised operating procedures or improved operator training
At the end of the study, it is desirable for the team to rank its recommendations as
an guide for implementation
Each recommendation needs to initiate action. Generally this is outside the remit of
the HAZOP team ( who may lack either budgets or authority to initiate mitigation
work). Nevertheless the organisation sponsoring the HAZOP should:
Institute an action program for each recommendation
Issue a close-out report to show how each issue has been resolved
68
4 -HAZOP
HAZOP
.
:
.

.
)(
. HAZOP )
( HAZOP:
.
.
69
Contents
1. HAZOP Approach
3. HAZOP Recorder
4. HAZOP Leader
70

1. HAZOP
2. HAZOP
3. HAZOP
4. HAZOP
5. HAZOP
71
Manager - Benefits From Commissioning a HAZOP 5
The HAZOP approach is a very well established and respected technique

which has been successfully applied to many different types of system
The method was developed in the Chemical Industry for examination of process
plant design and operation but has been widely applied elsewhere
The method works with any diagrammatic representation of a system. In the original
application these were Piping & Instrumentation Diagrams but the method is equally
effective with information flow diagrams for software, one line diagrams for power
distribution or task diagrams for operating manuals
Because the method is structured when properly conducted it provides

assurance of a comprehensive hazard identification
The method uses a team which shares its professional experience. It is less
vulnerable to oversight than other methods where individuals work alone
It readily forms part of an overall Risk Management approach incorporating hazard

identification, risk assessment and loss control
72
5 - HAZOP
HAZOP
.
.
) (P & ID
)( .
.
.
73
Manager - The Difficulties with HAZOP 5
Despite its strengths there are a number of characteristics which can

become a problem in certain circumstances
HAZOP is expensive. It takes time and requires the undisturbed concentration

of key personnel involved in plant operation. These people are often in
demand for other tasks
The HAZOP approach requires completeness of system description. This means the
diagrams and other documentation must be fully available to the team and up to
date. If they are not the process is greatly devalued
HAZOP is effective only where the participants are experienced and work openly
and in harmony. It is unsatisfactory if the team includes:
Trainees with little idea of the plant or its basis of operation
Contracts people or lawyers using the process in relation to a dispute
An inexperienced leader unable to guide the group effectively
HAZOP is not a substitute for design review. It works to examine a given design but
often goes astray when the team tries to redesign the plant
74
5 - HAZOP
HAZOP .
. .
HAZOP .
. .
HAZOP .
:

.
.
HAZOP .
.
75
HAZOP is not an approach which you can outsource entirely .The quality
of the internal resources you devote is a critical factor for success
Some managers imagine they can get a consultant in to do a HAZOP. This is not
the case
The leader and recorder may be from an outside firm (if, for example, you lack
sufficient in-house experience of HAZOP) but the main resource must come from
your own staff with first hand experience of the system under review
HAZOP requires your experts to participate. The leader may bring experience but it
is not his job to provide all the answers and recommendations. A team comprising
trainees is unlikely to conduct a thorough or worthwhile HAZOP
HAZOP requires open flow of information. If there are issues of confidentiality these
should be settled by appropriate agreement before the team meeting
HAZOP requires an honest admission of the potential for loss. In some legal
environments, counsel may advise, for example, that the possibility of fatal injury
should not be admitted. HAZOP cannot proceed on this basis
76
5 - HAZOP
HAZOP ) .(out source

.
HAZOP .
) HAZOP
( .
HAZOP .
. HAZOP .
HAZOP .
.
HAZOP .
HAZOP . .
77
The fact of completing a HAZOP in itself does little to improve safety or

performance
Some managers imagine they can tick the box - HAZOP completed and in this
way satisfy code or regulatory requirements. This is not the case
Essential to the HAZOP is the follow-up. Each of the recommendations made by the
team requires action. This means:
The action must be allocated to someone or some group with the resources to
take it forward. For example, few HAZOP recommendations are likely to be
implemented solely within the existing budget of the operations manager
A register of risks and control actions is useful as a way of monitoring progress.
This register starts with the HAZOP recommendations and shows who has been
allocated the action, when it is due, and records for audit any added risk controls
which have been implemented
78
5 - HAZOP
HAZOP .
HAZOP
. .
HAZOP . . :
.
HAZOP .
. HAZOP

.
79
The best results are not always achieved by HAZOP. Other approaches to
hazard identification may be just as effective in given circumstances
Design Review is the process of P&ID review and consideration of alternative

designs is an important but separate activity
The simplest method of hazard identification uses a checklist of hazards typically in

the form of a tabulated series of questions or issues. This approach can work for
simple or familiar situations if the checklist is comprehensive
Workshop approaches to hazard identification typically use a brainstorming

technique starting from hazards known to participants. This works well if there is
good facilitation, it is shorter than a HAZOP but is less systematic
A Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) provides an item by item listing of the
ways in which each item in a system can fail, the likelihood and the effect if it does
fail. The approach works well for electro-mechanical systems
The manager contemplating commissioning a HAZOP should consider if one of these

alternatives is more appropriate to the issue at hand
80
5 - HAZOP
HAZOP .
.
P&ID
.

. .
) (brainstorming
. .
HAZOP .
)( )Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA

.
- .
HAZOP
.
81
Manager - When are HAZOP Studies Best Carried Out? 5
HAZOP is a technique best applied infrequently to a system, at major points

in the facility lifecycle
Because it is expensive, HAZOP offers value when focussed on crucial points in a

project life-cycle:
When the design is fixed and P&IDs are ready for approval for construction
Prior to major plant modification when the design is fixed but not approved
At major plant turnaround to support investment and engineering planning
HAZOP may also be appropriate at other times, for example, decommissioning

when special procedures or special risks are experienced.The HAZOP procedure is
flexible and can be adapted to project phases
There is little value in commissioning another HAZOP on a plant a few years after
one was completed especially if there has been little change in operating procedures
or plant configuration
It is especially demoralising if a HAZOP is repeated when there has been little or no

follow-up to the recommendations in the earlier study
82
5 - HAZOP
HAZOP
.
HAZOP :
P&ID .
.
.
HAZOP
. HAZOP
.
HAZOP
HAZOP .
HAZOP
.
83
Manager - When are HAZOP studies best carried out? 5
In a phased approach to HAZOP, the technique is adapted to different

objectives and the scope of technical definition available at the time
Project Conceptual Front-end

Study Construction Commissioning and operation
design engineering design
Timing
HAZOP P&ID
Technical and upgrades
Definition
available HAZOP O&M
Manual
Cost benefit of
HAZOP P&ID proposals for
improvement
Checks Operating before turnaround
HAZOP at and maintenance
PFD level Manuals before
Checks design pre commissioning
before approval for
construction
Study Assists definition
Objective of alternative design
and control concepts
84
5 - HAZOP
HAZOP
.
)(

HAZOP P&ID

HAZOP O&M

HAZOP P&ID

HAZOP PFD
.

.
85
Manager - Ranking the HAZOP Recommendations 5
Those sponsoring a HAZOP study should take into account the large
amount of work involved in implementing the main findings
The following graph illustrates the relationship between numbers of

recommendations and study duration in past work
Recommendations per team day
350
Numbers of HAZOP recommendations
300 P
C
250
200
A
150
N
100
G
E
50 F O
D H
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Team Days
86
5 - HAZOP
HAZOP

350
300 P
C
250
200
A
150
N
HAZOP
100
G
E
50 F O
D H
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30

87
Each hazard identified during the HAZOP can be assessed according to the
frequency and consequence should the risk occur
The assessment can be done off line

as an extra to the HAZOP proceedings The output can be put into a matrix of
Frequency and
Consequence
where each range is quantified
C
y
on
nc
se
ue
qu
req
en
F
ce
Range of Loss per event How often events occur
NPC/20365/127_Handbook_HAZOP.ppt 882 43
- HAZOP
HAZOP ) (
:

HAZOP . )(
.
The assessment done after the HAZOP is preliminary and the approach can
be supplemented later by more sophisticated quantified risk analysis
Event Trees Pc
P1
Fault Trees
Database records
Quantitative Models
Ranking Matrices
Using ranges
between High and
Low extremes
Loss probability distribution
Judgement
High
cy Triangular Distribution
C
Medium en
on
Low u
se
eq
Fr
qu
en
ce
Uniform distribution Low High
Low
High
Low High
90
5 - HAZOP
HAZOP
.

Pc
P1

91
A better assessment can be obtained using matrices to indicate ranges of

frequency, probability and consequence
Risk Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
Typical size X Frequency of

X Probability of
of Loss Failure Loss
1. < $50K 1. < Once in 5 yr. 1. < 1 in 100
2. $50K to $ 250 K 2. Once in 3 - 5 yr. 2. 1 in 100 to 1 in 10
3. $250 K - 1 million 3. Once in 1 - 3 yr. 3. 1 in 10 to 1 in 3
4. $1 - 10 million 4. One failure a year 4. 0.3 - 0.6
5. > $10 million 5. Several failures a year 5. > 0.6
The "top event" which could Probability which could be

be derived using a Fault Tree derived using an event tree
92
- HAZOP
)(
.

1 2 3
X X
) (
1 < $ 50K 1 5 < 1 1 <100
2 250K $ 50K 2 5 3 2 1 1
3 1 $ 250K 3 3-1 3 1 1 3
4 10 $ 1 4 4 0/6 0/3
5 10 > $ 5 5 > 0/6

. .
93
Forms are used for tabulating recommendations according to risk aversion
Safety Related Reccommendations
No. Issue Recommendation Before Recommendation After Recommendation

Severity Likelihood Risk Rank Risk Matrix Severity Likelihood Risk Rank Risk Matrix d RM
105 33 R952.5: Connect PSVs to Blow
down and increase reliability of
LT. Use one LT from control of Lv
1203 and a second independent 5 4 20 Intolerable 1 4 4 Minor 16
LT for LAL. Consider variance
alarm to give further warning of
irregularity
122 33 R1040.2: Install silencers on
PSVs or ear protection required 5 3 15 Significant 2 3 6 Minor 9
for operators working near PSVs
125 33 R 1061.2 If vent close to platform
then install noise suppression to 5 3 15 Significant 2 3 6 Minor 9
PSV.
23 29 R214.1: Consider if emergency
4 3 12 Moderate 4 1 4 Minor 8
blowdown system is desirable
107 29 R954.1:Install check valve on
inlet to column or MOV or Blow 4 3 12 Moderate 4 1 4 Minor 8
Down protection for the column
109 29 R954.3: Agip to discuss
alternatives available for shut 4 3 12 Moderate 4 1 4 Minor 8
down systems in an emergency
8 34 R65.2 To avoid problem when
have two PSVs offset one PSV by 3 3 9 Moderate 3 1 3 Negligible 6
.5 bar,
94
5 - HAZOP

d RM
105 33 PSV :R952.2
LT . LT
LV 1203 LT
LAL . 5 4 20 1 4 4 16
.
122 33 :R1040.2 PSV

PSV 5 3 15 2 3 6 9
.
125 33 :R1061.2
PSV . 5 3 15 2 3 6 9
23 29 :R214.1
. 4 3 12 4 1 4 8
107 29 :R954.1
MOV 4 3 12 4 1 4 8
.
109 29 Agip :R954.3

4 3 12 4 1 4 8
.
8 34 :R65.2
PSV 3 3 9 3 1 3 6
).(50bar
95
Manager - Ranking the HAZOP recommendations 5
Typical tabulation ranking recommendations by benefit cost ratio
HAZOP P rope rty a nd BI P e rforma nce Cos t of Be ne fit Cos t

Incide nt De s cription S a fe ty Be ne fit Tota l Be ne fit
Is s ue Be ne fit Be ne fit Imple me nta tion Ra tio
Tota l S a ving
34 P S V me cha nica l a rra nge me nts L. 4,154,048 L. 131,622,814 L. 0 L. 135,776,862 L. 11,180,340 12.14 L. 124,596,522
40 P rote ction a ga ins t s e a l fa ilure L. 0 L. 13,012,141 L. 0 L. 13,012,141 L. 2,236,068 5.82 L. 10,776,073
23 Ma te ria ls s e le ction L. 0 L. 13,012,141 L. 0 L. 13,012,141 L. 2,236,068 5.82 L. 10,776,073
Ma king OM a be tte r ba s is for s a fe
8 ope ra tion L. 9,675,780 L. 1,366,002 L. 0 L. 11,041,782 L. 2,236,068 4.94 L. 8,805,714
30 P os itive is ola tion of utilitie s L. 8,308,096 L. 1,301,214 L. 0 L. 9,609,310 L. 2,236,068 4.30 L. 7,373,242
33 Dis cha rge from P S V L. 1,287,542 L. 192,668,726 L. 0 L. 193,956,268 L. 50,000,000 3.88 L. 143,956,268
38 Autos ta rt provis ions L. 0 L. 7,742,209 L. 520,670 L. 8,262,880 L. 2,236,068 3.70 L. 6,026,812
50 Improve me nts to pilot light L. 0 L. 8,105,184 L. 0 L. 8,105,184 L. 2,236,068 3.62 L. 5,869,116
31 P S V de s ign ca s e a nd s e tting L. 0 L. 38,225,538 L. 0 L. 38,225,538 L. 11,180,340 3.42 L. 27,045,198
27 Emmis ion re duction L. 0 L. 6,743,572 L. 497,491 L. 7,241,063 L. 2,236,068 3.24 L. 5,004,995
29 Eme rge ncy blowdown s ys te ms L. 12,351 L. 36,173,495 L. 0 L. 36,185,846 L. 11,180,340 3.24 L. 25,005,506
Improve me nt to re lia bility of
10 e quipme nt L. 0 L. 33,430,800 L. 0 L. 33,430,800 L. 11,180,340 2.99 L. 22,250,460
17 P roble ms with s ma ll bore tubing L. 0 L. 6,376,541 L. 0 L. 6,376,541 L. 2,236,068 2.85 L. 4,140,473
P rote ction a ga ins t tube rupture in
53 he a t e xcha nge rs L. 0 L. 6,374,621 L. 0 L. 6,374,621 L. 2,236,068 2.85 L. 4,138,553
69 Ina ppropria te fa ilure mode s L. 0 L. 5,207,846 L. 0 L. 5,207,846 L. 2,236,068 2.33 L. 2,971,778
Is ola tion of la rge ,toxic or fla mma ble
28 inve ntorie s L. 0 L. 3,970,606 L. 0 L. 3,970,606 L. 2,236,068 1.78 L. 1,734,538
Improve me nts to ma inte na nce of
11 pla nt ite ms of e quipme nt L. 0 L. 3,296,096 L. 47,513 L. 3,343,610 L. 2,236,068 1.50 L. 1,107,542
51 Tube rupture :Fin Fa ns L. 0 L. 3,291,840 L. 0 L. 3,291,840 L. 2,236,068 1.47 L. 1,055,772
36 P rote ction a ga ins t low flow L. 0 L. 13,575,320 L. 0 L. 13,575,320 L. 11,180,340 1.21 L. 2,394,980
41 Additiona l trip prote ction L. 0 L. 13,012,141 L. 0 L. 13,012,141 L. 11,180,340 1.16 L. 1,831,801
42 P rote ction a ga ins t othe r re la s e s L. 0 L. 13,012,141 L. 0 L. 13,012,141 L. 11,180,340 1.16 L. 1,831,801
Tota ls L. 23,437,816 L. 551,520,991 L. 1,065,674 L. 576,024,481 L. 157,331,263 L. 418,693,218
96
5 - HAZOP

BI
HAZOP

34 PSV L. 4,154,048 L. 131,622,814 L. 0 L. 135,776,862 L. 11,180,340 12.14 L. 124,596,522
40 L. 0 L. 13,012,141 L. 0 L. 13,012,141 L. 2,236,068 5.82 L. 10,776,073
23 L. 0 L. 13,012,141 L. 0 L. 13,012,141 L. 2,236,068 5.82 L. 10,776,073
OM
8 L. 9,675,780 L. 1,366,002 L. 0 L. 11,041,782 L. 2,236,068 4.94 L. 8,805,714
30 L. 8,308,096 L. 1,301,214 L. 0 L. 9,609,310 L. 2,236,068 4.30 L. 7,373,242
33 PSV L. 1,287,542 L. 192,668,726 L. 0 L. 193,956,268 L. 50,000,000 3.88 L. 143,956,268
38 L. 0 L. 7,742,209 L. 520,670 L. 8,262,880 L. 2,236,068 3.70 L. 6,026,812
50 L. 0 L. 8,105,184 L. 0 L. 8,105,184 L. 2,236,068 3.62 L. 5,869,116
31 PSV L. 0 L. 38,225,538 L. 0 L. 38,225,538 L. 11,180,340 3.42 L. 27,045,198
27 L. 0 L. 6,743,572 L. 497,491 L. 7,241,063 L. 2,236,068 3.24 L. 5,004,995
29 L. 12,351 L. 36,173,495 L. 0 L. 36,185,846 L. 11,180,340 3.24 L. 25,005,506

10 L. 0 L. 33,430,800 L. 0 L. 33,430,800 L. 11,180,340 2.99 L. 22,250,460
17 L. 0 L. 6,376,541 L. 0 L. 6,376,541 L. 2,236,068 2.85 L. 4,140,473

53 L. 0 L. 6,374,621 L. 0 L. 6,374,621 L. 2,236,068 2.85 L. 4,138,553
69 L. 0 L. 5,207,846 L. 0 L. 5,207,846 L. 2,236,068 2.33 L. 2,971,778
.
28 L. 0 L. 3,970,606 L. 0 L. 3,970,606 L. 2,236,068 1.78 L. 1,734,538
:
11 L. 0 L. 3,296,096 L. 47,513 L. 3,343,610 L. 2,236,068 1.50 L. 1,107,542
51 L. 0 L. 3,291,840 L. 0 L. 3,291,840 L. 2,236,068 1.47 L. 1,055,772
36 L. 0 L. 13,575,320 L. 0 L. 13,575,320 L. 11,180,340 1.21 L. 2,394,980
41 L. 0 L. 13,012,141 L. 0 L. 13,012,141 L. 11,180,340 1.16 L. 1,831,801
42 L. 0 L. 13,012,141 L. 0 L. 13,012,141 L. 11,180,340 1.16 L. 1,831,801
L. 23,437,816 L. 551,520,991 L. 1,065,674 L. 576,024,481 L. 157,331,263 L. 418,693,218
97
Manager - Implementing the HAZOP Recommendations 5
A Risk Register assists the monitoring of progress to implementation

ID Number Is s ue Revis ion G
23 33 Date 22-Apr-99
Is s ue Dis charge from P S V
Caus e PSV on debutaniser not connected to blowdown. If failure of level control liquid could be released
6 HAZOP items eg 952.5
Cons equence Potential for ignition of falling liquid and development of large fire
Recommendation Connect P S V on debutanis er to flare This is cons idered an intolerable ris k
Implementation Action S ummary

As igned to Date Due
Date Done
Verified by Date Verified
As s es s ment Notes Frequency 1 in 100 years - requires los s of level control
P robability low -operator likely to detect problem
Cons equence could be catas trophic in crowded proces s area
Before/After Implement Frequency P robability Cons equence Frequency P robability Cons equence Plant Benefit Indus try Benefit
Human Safety 1 3 4 1 1 4 1287541.675 540767503.4
Property Loss 3 3 5 3 3 1 96823465.62 40665855561

Business Interruption 3 3 5 3 3 1 95845260.38 40255009359
Catalyst life 0 0
Energy 0 0
Product Losses 0 0
Plant Utilisation 0 0
Plant Maintenance 0 0
Publicity
Environmental Impact
Cost of implementation Total Benefit Benefit/Cos t Total S aving

3 50000000 193956267.7 3.88 143956267.7
2
5 - HAZOP
.
G
23 33 22-Apr-99
PSV
PSV . .
HAZOP 6 952.5

PSV .

1 100 - .
- .
.
/
1 3 4 1 1 4 1287541.675 540767503.4
3 3 5 3 3 1 96823465.62 40665855561
3 3 5 3 3 1 95845260.38 40255009359
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0

3 50000000 193956267.7 3.88 143956267.7
99

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HAZOP Training Handbook Documentation to

2. HAZOP Team Member

5. Manager Commissioning a HAZOP Study

Purpose and Scope of this Training

Main Phases of How to conduct Exercises in Play a full

A HAZOP is a group technique for identifying hazards and operability

Hazard identification is the first step in a systematic process which aims to

Assess Risks Implement Control

Failure to thoroughly identify sources of risk is a widespread general concern in Risk

Several of these identification methods are incorporated into Process

A Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)

The HAZOP team

The plant to be studied

The team operates

Typical Core Team Disciplines Part-time co-opted specialists

Process design Instrumentation

The method of working in a HAZOP is characterised by stepwise question

Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3

The following Terms are used:

2. HAZOP Team Member

5. Manager Commissioning a HAZOP Study

The HAZOP team meets to visit the plant

The plan shows the sections of the plant

Which day each node is expected to be examined

Details of the P&I Drawing related to the node

Text Text Text

Text Text Text

Text Text Text

Text Text Text

The leader will explain the guideword-parameter combinations he proposes

Parameter More Less No Reverse Part of Other than

Flow High Flow Low Flow No Flow Back Loss of

Other parameters such as viscosity can also be used

The guideword-parameter combinations are applied to a section of plant

HAZOP step Leader Action Specific example HAZOP team input

Examine Leader checks Could there be a hazard Depends on size of leak,

Discuss any Leader checks How do you plan to Design standards

Deviations may have several causes each of which needs to be discussed

In addition to the parameter- guideword combinations, the HAZOP team can

Most process plant operations will involve exposure of operators to toxic or

2. HAZOP Team Member

5. Manager Commissioning a HAZOP Study

The recorder needs to be a professional and is an important participant in

Respond attentively to the leader when he sums up discussion and proposes

The discussion is recorded in a tabular fashion

A line of enquiry usually results in one of four types of conclusion

A recommendation (denoted R) where the HAZOP team agree to suggest an

A question (denoted Q) where the team have insufficient information to respond

An answer (denoted A) which records the answer to a question in the record.

General description of section and individual node

Team Leader/Assistant Mr. Stevens/Ms. Tan

Drawing Number/Sheet Number D-280-1225-102 Rev.1 29 AUG '03

Node Equipment Surge Drum V 2802

/ D-280-1225-102 Rev.1 29 AUG '03

2. HAZOP Team Member

5. Manager Commissioning a HAZOP Study

The Team Leaders primary role is to facilitate the team discussion

Keep the team focused:

Respond to team personalities:

Use own knowledge to: