ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs.

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.
FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William D.
Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June
2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and
seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high
crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,
and was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the
said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first
complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment
complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of
Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
HELD:
The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral
components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act
beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution. The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its
ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of
the House shall be necessary to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the
ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House
Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within
a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment
complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate
justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief
Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against
the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by
the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under
paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS
Facts:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under
Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding
shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00
per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning
bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of
P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a
managers check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps
apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be
hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and
mandamus.
Issue(s):

Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.

Whether the 51% share is part of the national patrimony.

Held:
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not selfexecuting. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is selfexecuting. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability
imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms,
and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional
provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution,
further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy
for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of
the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a selfexecuting constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The
omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an
indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not
necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further

the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean
that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the past, modern
constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws
intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of
constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided
that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing,
the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine, Section 10,
second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which
needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not
require any legislation to put it in operation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the
term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to Filipinos intelligence in arts, sciences
and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was
restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of
various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and
concessions, especially on matters involving national patrimony, when a choice has to be made between a qualified
foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former.
The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation, the Committee on Privatization and the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel to cease and desist from selling 51% of the Share of the MHC to Renong Berhad, and to
accept the matching bid of Manila Prince Hotel at P44 per shere and thereafter execute the necessary agreements and
document to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for
the purpose.
G.R. No. 161872

April 13, 2004

REV. ELLY CHAVEZ PAMATONG, ESQUIRE, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
FACTS:

Petitioner Rev. Elly Chavez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President on December 17, 2003.

Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due course of petitioners COC in its Resolution No.
6558 dated January 17, 2004.

On January 15, 2004, petitioner moved for reconsideration of its Resolution No. 6558. The Motion for Reconsideration
was docketed as SPP (MP) No. 04-111.

The COMELEC, acting on petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and on similar motions filed by other aspirants for
national elective positions, denied the same under the aegis of Omnibus Resolution No. 6604 dated February 11,
2004.

The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five (35) others nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide
campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a
national constituency.

By limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or
are nominated by political parties, petitioner argues that the COMELEC indirectly amended the constitutional
provisions on the electoral process and limited the power of the sovereign people to choose their leaders.
ISSUE:
1.
2.

Whether or not there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office.
Whether or not the right to equal access to opportunities for public service under Section 26, Article II of the
1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.

HELD:
1. There is no constitutional right to run for or hold public office.
The petitioner invoked the constitutional provision ensuring equal access to opportunities for public office claiming that he
has a constitutional right to run for president. However, the Court ruled that running for or holding a public office is a
privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor
elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right
2. No. The right to equal access to opportunities for public service under Section 26, Article II of the
1987 Constitution is NOT self-executing provision.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State
Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for
according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the
provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or
executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.
The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end,
the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of
candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and
resources in preparation for the election.
Therefore, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and was disqualified.
Nuisance candidates. - The Commission may motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party, refuse to give
due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that said certificate has been filed to put the election process
in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates
or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the
office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the
electorate.
Sec. 69 of the the Omnibus Election Code as amended by Section 5 of Republic Act No. 6646 (The Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987)

Miriam Defensor- Santiago vs. COMELEC

G.R No. 127325
March 19, 1997
FACTS:
On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, filed with the COMELEC
a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition
published. After the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the
oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam
Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising
the following arguments, among others:
1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by peoples initiative if there is an enabling law passed by Congress, to which
no such law has yet been passed; and
2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on peoples initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of
initiative.

ISSUE:
WON R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by peoples initiative.
WON RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and if so WON the Act as worded
adequately covers such initiative.
WON COMELEC Res. No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the constitution is valid, considering the
absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative?
WON the lifting of term limits of elective national and local official, as proposed in the draft petition would constitute a
revision of , or an amendment of the constitution.
WON the COMELEC can take cognizance of or has jurisdiction over the petition.
WON it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case before the COMELEC.
HELD:
NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the
power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative.
They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be
enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.
Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no
subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum
on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the
primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far
more important than the initiative on national and local laws.
While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on national and local laws, it
intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the respondent to forthwith dismiss the Delfin Petition .
TRO issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent.
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.
RAUL L. LAMBINO, et al vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC)
GR No. 174153, 25 October 2006, 505 SCRA 160
FACTS:
A group led by Raul L. Lambino asked the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to hold a plebiscite to ratify the petition under
Section 5 (b) and (c) and Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) 6735. Lambino claimed his group has the support of 6,327,902
individuals constituting at least 12% of all registered voters with each legislative district represented by at least 3% of all
registered voters. They petitioned to modify Sections 1 to 7 of Article VI (Legislative Department) and Sections 1 to 4 of
Article VII (Executive Department) from present Bicameral Presidential to Unicameral Parliamentary form of government.
The COMELEC denied their petition for lack of enabling law governing the initiative petitions to amend the Constitution.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the Lambino group petition complies with Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution through a
Peoples Initiative.
(2) Whether a peoples initiative petition can propose an amendment or revision to the constitution.
HELD:
(1) No. The Lambino Group petition does not comply with Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution through a
peoples initiative since the petition does not indicate the full text of the proposed changes to the constitution.
The signatory must be informed at the time of the signing the nature and effects of the proposal. Otherwise,
such proposal is deceptive and misleading, thereby rendering the initiative void. The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the people must first see the full
text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition
containing such full text. (Underscoring and emphasis supplied)
(2) NO. The process of peoples initiative is only limited to an amendment of the Constitution, and not a
revision. The change from a bicameralpresidential to a unicameral-parliamentary form of
government is indeed a revision, as it seeks to overhaul the entire constitutional structure, affecting two (2)
of the three (3) branches of government the executive and the legislative. (Underscoring and emphasis
supplied)
MIRASOL v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 128448, 1 February 2001

FACTS:
Spouses Alejandro and Lilia Mirasol are sugarland owners and planters. In 1973-1974, they produced a total of 70,501.08
piculs of sugar, where 25,662.36 of which was assigned for export. The following year, they produced a lower figure of
65,100 piculs, with 23,696.40 for export.
Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasol's sugar production for the two periods, under a crop loan financial
scheme, which authorizes PNB as the Mirasol's attorney-in-fact to negotiate and sell the sugar in both domestic and export
markets and apply the proceeds to the payment of their obligations.
Presidential Decree (PD) 579 was issued in November 1974, authorizing Philippine Exchange Co., Inc (PHILEX) to purchase
sugar allocated for export to the United States and to other foreign markets. The price and quantity shall be determined by
the Sugar Quota Administration, PNB, the Department of Trade and Industry and by the Office of the President.
PNB continued to finance the sugar production of the Mirasols for the next two (2) years. In return, the Mirasols secured the
loans through real estate and chattel mortgages.
The Mirasols requested PNB for an accounting of the proceeds of the sale of their export sugar believing that the same were
more than enough to pay their obligations. PNB, on the other hand, ignored the request. The Mirasols, nonetheless,
continued to avail of other loans from PNB.
In 1977, when PNB demanded for the payments of their loans, the Mirasols conveyed real properties to PNB valued at 1.4
million pesos, leaving unpaid obligation of 1.5 million pesos.
When the Mirasols failed to settle their obligations despite demand, PNB foreclosed the properties and applied the proceeds
to the obligations. This time, the PNB had a deficiency claim of P12.5 million. The Mirasols insisted on the proper accounting
and liquidation of the export sales believing that the export sales would be more than enough to answer their obligations.
With PNB's insistence that nothing is to be accounted under PD 579 since the earning from the export sales accrue to the
National Government and is under disposal of the President, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance and
damages against PNB with the RTC Bacolod City. They contended that PD 579 and its related issuances are
unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional.
RULING:
Yes, the RTC has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional.
The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive
agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance or regulation not only in the Supreme Court, but in all RTCs.
Plainly, the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving the constitutionality
of any treat, or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality
happens to be in issue.
Furthermore, Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129 grants the RTC the authority to rule on the conformity of laws or treaties with the
Constitution.
BIRAOGO VS. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION
G.R. No. 192935 and G.R. No. 193036; December 10, 2010
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010. It is a mere ad
hoc body with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by public officers and employees
during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress, and the
Ombudsman.
Petitioner Louis C. Biraogo and the petitioner-legislators asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional. The Respondents,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, essentially questioned the legal standing of the petitioners for failure to
demonstrate their personal stake in the outcome of the case. It argues that the petitioners have not shown that they have
sustained or in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PTC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the requisites for the court to exercise its power of judicial review are present due to the validity of the
legal standing of the petitioners.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject
act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Among all these limitations, only the legal standing of the petitioners has been put at issue.
The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. To the
extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their
office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action on which, to their mind, infringes
on their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury
attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition
covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional
issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents.
Where the issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar,
they should be resolved for the guidance of all. Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than interested to know the status
of the Presidents first effort to bring about a promised change to the country. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not
due to overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the Court stands firm in
its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching significance to society. Therefore,
the power of the court to exercise its power of judicial review is valid.
LACSON V. PEREZ
357 SCRA 756 (G.R No. 147880)
May 10 2001
Facts:
On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an angry mob assaulting and attempting to break into
Malacaang. She declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) in the entire National Capital Region. She likewise
issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to
suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the rebellion were
thereafter effected.
Petitioners (Lacson, Aquino and Mancao) filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an
application for the issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction. They assail the declaration of
Proclamation No. 38 and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Furthermore, petitioners pray that the
appropriate court, wherein the information against them was filed to cease arraignment and trial until the resolution of the
instant petition. They also contended that the hold departure orders issued against them be declared null and void ab initio.
Issue:
Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy on the filed petitions.
Held:
No. The lifting of the Proclamation No. 38 on May 6, 2006 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, accordingly the
instant petition was rendered moot and academic.
As a rule, the Supreme Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The SC is not empowered to decide
moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law. In other words, when a case is moot, it
becomes non-justiciable.
As to definition of a moot and academic case to be one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. It goes on to state that generally,
courts decline jurisdiction over such cases and dismiss it on the ground of mootness. This pronouncement traces its current
roots from the express constitutional rule under the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution that
judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights, which are legally
demandable and enforceable.
Petitioners prayer for relief regarding their alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being that no
complaints have been filed against them for any crime, furthermore, the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for since its
purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint, which the petitioners are not subjected.
Petitions dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier adverted to, together with
their agents, representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting petitioners without
the require judicial warrants for all acts committed in relation to or connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacaang.
G.R. No. 132986
May 19, 2004
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner,
vs.
SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., respondents.
FACTS:
On January 20, 1995, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, private respondent herein, filed with the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) an
election protest against Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, petitioner, and other senatorial candidates who won in the May 1995
senatorial elections.
Issues having been joined, the SET required the parties to submit the list of pilot precincts involved in respondents protest.
Subsequently, the SET conducted the revision of ballots in the pilot precincts, where on August 21, 1997, the SET, made a
press release announcing the partial and tentative results of the revision of ballots in the pilot precincts showing therein a
tabulationon of votes.
In the said tabulation, the name of petitioner dropped from number 11 to number 15.
Petitioner filed a motion to set aside said partial results alleging that the partial results were manifestly erroneous.
In its assailed Resolution No. 97-22, the SET, while, admitting that there was an "oversight," denied petitioners motion,
holding that there is no sufficient basis to discard its partial tabulation. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the
petitioner but the same was denied by SET.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the SET committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners "Motion To Set Aside Partial Results in
Pimentels Protest and to Conduct Another Appreciation of Ballots in the Presence of all Parties."
HELD:
At any rate, we agree with the Solicitor General that the petition has become moot and academic. The tenure of the
contested senatorial position subject of this petition expired as early as June 30, 1998.
A case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can
be served in passing upon the merits.
In Garcia vs. COMELEC, we held that "where the issues have become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy,
thereby rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use or value."
Likewise, in Gancho-on vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment, we ruled:

"It is a rule of universal application that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider
questions in which no actual interests are involved; they decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has become
moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
There is no actual substantial relief to which petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of
the petition."
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
RANDOLF DAVID, et al. v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, et al.
G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 and 171424, 3 May 2006, Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
(En Banc)
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers.
From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it
becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. But the President must be careful in the exercise of her powers. Every act that goes beyond the President callingout power is considered illegal or ultra vires. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are
the limitations.
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20t h Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, in a move to suppress alleged plans to overthrow the government, issued Presidential Proclamation No.
1017 (PP 1017), declaring a state of national emergency. She cited as factual bases for the said issuance the escape of the
Magdalo Group and their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day; the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine
Marines; and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. On the same day, she issued General Order No. 5 (G.O.
No. 5) setting the standards which the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) should
follow in the suppression and prevention of acts of lawless violence. The following were considered as additional factual
bases for the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5: the bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and
Bataan; the raid of an army outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of three soldiers; and the directive of the Communist
Party of the Philippines ordering its front organizations to join 5,000 Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the
provinces in mass protests.
Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20t h People
Power I anniversary celebration. It revoked permits to hold rallies. Members of the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) and the National
Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), who marched from various parts of Metro Manila to converge at
the EDSA Shrine, were violently dispersed by anti-riot police. Professor Randolf David, Akbayan party list president Ronald
Llamas, and members of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU were arrested without a warrant. In the early morning of February 25,
2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and
confiscated news stories, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen were stationed inside the
editorial and business offices, as well as outside the building. A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune
offices, the police surrounded the premises of another pro-opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid
Abante. The PNP warned that it would take over any media organization that would not follow standards set by the
government during the state of national emergency.
On March 3, 2006, exactly one week from the declaration of a state of national emergency and after all the present petitions
had been filed, President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1021 (PP 1021), declaring that the state of national
emergency has ceased to exist and lifting PP 1017. These consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in
issuing PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, President Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. It is contended that respondent
officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually trampling
upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such issuances are void for being
unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
WON the issuance of PP 1021 rendered the present petitions moot and academic
HELD:
The Petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. The issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic because
all the exceptions to the moot and academic principle are present.
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts from resolving a
case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: (1)there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2)the
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; (3)the constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4)the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review. All these exceptions are present here. It is alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
violates the Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public interest, involving as they do the
people basic rights to the freedoms of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to
formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the
bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by
constitutional guarantees. Lastly, the contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the present petitions are subject
to judicial review.
Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004
Facts:
Midnight of July 27, 2003, some three hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
stormed into the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City armed with high-powered ammunitions and explosives. Due to
rampant corruption in the AFP, soldiers demanded the resignation of the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of
the Philippine National Police (PNP).
In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President issued later in the day Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4,
both declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.
By the evening of July 27, 2003, the Oakwood occupation had ended. After hours-long negotiations, the soldiers agreed to
return to barracks. The President, however, did not immediately lift the declaration of a state of rebellion and did so only on
August 1, 2003, through Proclamation No. 435.

Since there were several petitions filed on the case, the following issues were raised:
Issue:
Whether there exists no sufficient factual basis for the proclamation by the President of a state of rebellion for an
indefinite period.
Whether Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not authorize the declaration of a state of rebellion
Whether the declaration of a state of rebellion is a superfluity, and is actually an exercise of emergency powers.
Whether the subject presidential issuances as an unwarranted, illegal and abusive exercise of a martial law power that has
no basis under the Constitution.
Ruling for the case:
The Supreme Court and the Solicitor General, who was required to comment, both rendered the case moot as the
declaration of the state of rebellion has already ceased. Courts do not adjudicate moot cases, since judicial power is only
limited to actual controversies. Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is capable of repetition yet
evading review. The case at bar is one such case.
The foregoing discussion, in calling out the armed forces, a declaration of a state of rebellion is an utter superfluity. At most,
it only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it.
But this Courts mandate is to probe only into the legal consequences of the declaration. This Court finds that such a
declaration is devoid of any legal significance. For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not written.
Should there be any confusion generated by the issuance of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, we clarify that,
the mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. Indeed, if a state of
martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution or automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, then it is with more reason that a simple declaration of a state of rebellion could not bring about these conditions. At
any rate, the presidential issuances themselves call for the suppression of the rebellion with due regard to constitutional
rights.
For the same reasons, apprehensions that the military and police authorities may resort to warrantless arrests are likewise
unfounded. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a state of rebellion. A person
may be subjected to a warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion whether or not the President has declared a state of
rebellion, so long as the requisites for a valid warrantless arrest are present.
The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial law and, therefore, is a
circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap of logic. There is no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil
courts in the theater of war or that military authorities have taken over the functions of civil government. There is no
allegation of curtailment of civil or political rights. There is no indication that the President has exercised judicial and
legislative powers. In short, there is no illustration that the President has attempted to exercise or has exercised martial law
powers.
The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President has attempted to or has exercised powers beyond her
powers as Chief Executive or as Commander-in-Chief. The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the
armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely
executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers
contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez vs. The House Of Representatives Committee On Justice, et.al.
G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011
Facts:
On July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, et.al. (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint
against the petitioner (Ombudsman).
On August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes et.al. (Reyes group) filed another impeachment complaint. Both
impeachment complaints were endorsed by different Party-List Representatives.
On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as chairperson of the Committee on Rules, instructed the
Deputy Secretary General for Operations to include the two complaints in the Order of Business, which was complied
with by their inclusion in the Order of Business for the following day.
On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the House of Representatives simultaneously referred both
complaints to public respondent.
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both complaints sufficient in form,
which complaints it considered to have been referred to it at exactly the same time.
On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider the September 1, 2010 Resolution of public respondent.
Public respondent refused to accept the motion, however, for prematurity; instead, it advised petitioner to await the
notice for her to file an answer to the complaints, drawing petitioner to furnish copies of her motion to each of the 55
members of public respondent.
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, 2010, found the two complaints, which both allege
culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance. The determination of the
sufficiency of substance of the complaints by public respondent, which assumed hypothetically the truth of their allegations,
hinged on the issue of whether valid judgment to impeach could be rendered thereon. Petitioner was served also on
September 7, 2010 a notice directing her to file an answer to the complaints within 10 days.
Six days following her receipt of the notice to file answer or on September 13, 2010, petitioner filed in the Supreme Court the
present petition with application for injunctive reliefs.
Respondents asserted that the petition is premature and not yet ripe for adjudication since petitioner has at her disposal a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of the proceedings before public respondent. Public respondent argues that
when petitioner filed the present petition on September 13, 2010, it had not gone beyond the determination of the
sufficiency of form and substance of the two complaints.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition consist an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power? (This is
not the main issue in this case but it is patterned based on the course outline)
Held:
Yes. The petition consist an actual controversy or calling for the exercise of judicial power.
An aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement is the requisite
of ripeness. The question of ripeness is especially relevant in light of the direct, adverse effect on an individual by the
challenged conduct. In the present petition, there is no doubt that questions on, inter alia, the validity of the simultaneous
referral of the two complaints and on the need to publish as a mode of promulgating the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings of the House (Impeachment Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for immediate interpretation.

The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to
invoke judicial power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted prematurely when she took the cue
from the constitutional limitation that only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an
impeachable officer within a period of one year (Section 3(5) Article XI, 1987 Constitution, No impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year).
Arturo M. De Castro v Judicial and Bar Council, et at.,
G.R. No. 191002, 191032, 191057, 191149, 191342 and A.M. 10-2-5-SC
March 17, 2010
Facts:
This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory
requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days after the presidential election. On December 22, 2009,
Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process
for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately. In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the
JBC passed a resolution which stated that they have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief
Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice. As a result, the JBC opened the
position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star. In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next
step of announcing the names of the following candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn complaint, written report,
or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010. Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position
of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of
nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being unresolved. The compiled cases which led to this case
and the petitions of intervenors called for either the prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass
the shortlist, or that the act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment. A precedent frequently
cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta
as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as the
Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to
appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed.
Issue:
Whether or not there is actual case or controversy that warrants judicial review. (Petitions of Tolentino and Soriano)
Held:
There is an actual case or controversy that warrants judicial review. The court holds that the petitions set forth an actual case
or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The reality is that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the
selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to be submitted to the President for consideration of which of them
will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began
the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of
nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination,
because the next steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the
interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed. The resolution of the controversy will surely settle with finality the
nagging questions that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it already began, or that are reasons
persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process.
Note: All the petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition were dismiss for lack of merits and being premature except
A.M. 10-2-5-SC which was granted.