ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs.

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.
FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by
Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to
conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund
(JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for
"culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes."
The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and
Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee
on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in
form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House
in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four
months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October
23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied
by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House of Representatives.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided
in the Constitution.
2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis.
HELD:
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon,
the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint
has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine,
considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court,
on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the
second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable
officer within a one-year period.

2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is
clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be
abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief
Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended
to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are
two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not
truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason
for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by
virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not
truly political in nature.

Civil Liberties Union vs Executive Secretary

194 SCRA 317 Political Law Ex Officio Officials Members of the Cabinet Singularity of
Office EO 284
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed
members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to limitations
set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is
unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal
submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly
practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct
of their office.
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, the
only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those
provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member
of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio
member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding
during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those cases
specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as
examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive

officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the
constitutions manifest intent and the peoples understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of
the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of
positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in
addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and
government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or
employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS

Facts:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of
the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell
through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel
(MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITTSheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share,
or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the
winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila
Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a
letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a managers check to the
GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps
apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of
51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila
Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.
Issue(s):
Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are selfexecuting.
Whether the 51% share is part of the national patrimony.
Held: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the
1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself
and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that
which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or
protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and
extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so
that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is
no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In selfexecuting constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the

exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a
provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy
for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable
safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement
and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision
does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission
from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is
not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a
self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on
the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the
exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however
does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully
enforceable. As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally
drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws
intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory
enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like
that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of
the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second
paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but
also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to Filipinos intelligence in arts,
sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living
testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first
opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various
significant events which have shaped Philippine history. In the granting of economic rights,
privileges, and concessions, especially on matters involving national patrimony, when a
choice has to be made between a qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter
shall be chosen over the former.
The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation, the Committee on
Privatization and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel to cease and desist from
selling 51% of the Share of the MHC to Renong Berhad, and to accept the matching bid of
Manila Prince Hotel at P44 per shere and thereafter execute the necessary agreements and
document to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and
deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.

Josue Javellana vs Executive Secretary

50 SCRA 30 Political law Constitutional Law Political Question Validity of the 1973
Constitution Restriction to Judicial Power
In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new 1973 Constitution.
Javellana, a Filipino and a registered voter sought to enjoin the Exec Sec and other cabinet
secretaries from implementing the said constitution. Javellana averred that the said
constitution is void because the same was initiated by the president. He argued that the
President is w/o power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed
constitution. Further, the election held to ratify such constitution is not a free election there
being intimidation and fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition.
HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority of the SC justices
expressed the view that they were concluded by the ascertainment made by the president
of the Philippines, in the exercise of his political prerogatives. Further, there being no
competent evidence to show such fraud and intimidation during the election, it is to be
assumed that the people had acquiesced in or accepted the 1973 Constitution. The question
of the validity of the 1973 Constitution is a political question which was left to the people in
their sovereign capacity to answer. Their ratification of the same had shown such
acquiescence.

Pablito Sanidad vs Commission on Elections

73 SCRA 333 Political Law Constitutional Law Amendment to the Constitution
On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976
for the Citizens Assemblies (barangays) to resolve, among other things, the issues of
martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the
period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his
present powers. Twenty days after, the President issued another related decree, PD No.
1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229
providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in barangays applicable to the
national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter
alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033,
stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October
16, 1976. The Decree recites in its whereas clauses that the peoples continued opposition
to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body
abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim
legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite
of October 16.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to
enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite
on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033,
insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No.
1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and
conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that

under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to
exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a
consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.
The Soc-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence the court cannot take
cognizance of it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution.

HELD: Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial
question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the
amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the
legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to
propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the
period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular
National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso
facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI,
1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim
National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President
undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru
Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.
Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in
the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing
Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force
and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees
is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2)
Article X of the new Constitution provides: All cases involving the constitutionality of a
treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en
banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without
the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . .. The Supreme Court has the last word in the
construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The
amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and
hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine
whether that power has been discharged within its limits.
This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the
Constitution and he was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient time. The
President at that time also sits as the legislature.

Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC

140 SCRA 455
January 7, 1986
FACTS:

11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for
special national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the offices of President
and Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows
the President to continue holding office after the calling of the special election.
Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos letter of conditional resignation did not
create the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which could be
the basis of the holding of a special election for President and Vice President earlier than the
regular elections for such positions in 1987. The letter states that the President is:
irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President effective only when the election is held and
after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10)
days after his proclamation.
The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional
provision that the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and turn it over to
the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have not
filed any suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled
election. They have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the
election is clean, fair and honest.
ISSUE:
Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the
holding of the elections
HELD:
The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction
restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7, 1986, in as much as there
are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional.
The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not issue any restraining
order, have turned the issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of the
questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the
Presidents office) which can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity
at the scheduled election, since there is no issue more political than the election. The Court
cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the
incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new president.

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO

(G.R. No. 73748 - May 22, 1986)
Minute Resolutions
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986]

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES AND/OR OLIVER A. LOZANO VS. PRESIDENT
CORAZON C. AQUINO, ET AL.
SIRS/MESDAMES:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court MAY 22, 1986.
In G.R. No. 73748, Lawyers League for a Better Philippines vs. President Corazon C. Aquino,
et al.; G.R. No. 73972, People's Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution vs. Mrs. Cory
Aquino, et al., and G.R. No. 73990, Councilor Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et al.,
the legitimacy of the government of President Aquino is questioned. It is claimed that her
government is illegal because it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.

As early as April 10, 1986, this Court* had already voted to dismiss the petitions for the
reasons to be stated below. On April 17, 1986, Atty. Lozano as counsel for the petitioners in
G.R. Nos. 73748 and 73972 withdrew the petitions and manifested that they would pursue
the question by extra-judicial methods. The withdrawal is functus oficio.
The three petitions obviously are not impressed with merit. Petitioners have no personality
to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino
government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the
people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have
accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the
entire country so that it is not merely a de factogovernment but is in fact and law a de jure
government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the
present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to
uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government.
In view of the foregoing, the petitions are hereby dismissed.
* The Court was then composed of Teehankee, C.J. and Abad Santos., Melencio-Herrera,
Plana, Escolin, Gutierrez, Jr., Cuevas, Alampay and Patajo, JJ
DIGEST
FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that
she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed
through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New
Armed Forces of the Philippines."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
HELD:

Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the
realm of politics where only the people are the judge.
The Court further held that:
The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire
country;
It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.

De Leon v. Esguerra Case Digest

De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602, August, 31, 1987
(En Banc), J. Melencio-Herrera
Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain
together with the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores,
Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a Barangay election held under Batas Pambansa
Blg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay Election Act of 1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1,
1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987
designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores and
the other respondents as members of Barangay Council of the same Barangay and
Municipality.
Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be
declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited by taking over their positions of
Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen.
Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg.
222), their terms of office shall be six years which shall commence on June 7, 1988 and shall
continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified. It was also their
position that with the ratification of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, respondent OIC
Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive
officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of
the Provisional Constitution and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and
that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials
to six years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3
of the Provisional Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made
during the one-year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.
Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov on Feb
8, 1987 designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of
Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force and effect.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the Provisional
Constitution must be deemed to have superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent
OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to designate respondents to the
elective positions occupied by petitioners. Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution
further provides in part:
"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years x x x."

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw, therefore, the term
of office of 6 years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.

Lambino Vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 174153
Oct. 25 2006
Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition
to change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite
that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition
had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution.
Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections
1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameralpresidential form of government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition
due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs.
Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative.
Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause
on proposals to amend the Constitution.
Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to
the Lambino Groups petition.

Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements
for conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of
discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
Direct Proposal by the People
The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the
time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading
which renders the initiative void.
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision
through Initiatives
The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and
revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may
propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is
a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present
petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution
before complying with RA 6735
Petition is dismissed.

Restituto Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court

Police Power Not Validly Exercised
There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To
strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of
carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot
was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation
of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or
his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly
confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled
against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote
general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A
ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos
from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue.
Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred
before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid
exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not

reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due
process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be
heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a
clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of
powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties
arbitrarily taken.

Commissioner on Internal Revenue V. Court of Tax Appeals

FactsIn
Commissioner of Internal Revenue V. Manila Hotel Corporation
, SCoverruled Court of Tax Appeals decision that caterers tax under RA6110 is illegal
because it was vetoed by Former President Marcos andCongress had not taken steps to
override the veto. SC ruled in thiscase that the law has always imposed a 3% caterers tax,
as providedin Par 1, Sec 206 of the Tax Code.Presently, Manila Golf and Country Club, a nonstock corporationclaims that it is exempt from the 3% on gross receipts becausePresident
Marcos vetoed Sec 191-A of RA 6110 (Omnibus Tax Law).President Marcos vetoed Sec 191-A
because according to him it would1) shift the burden of taxation to the consuming public
and 2) restrainthe development of hotels which are essential to the tourist industry. The
protestation of the club was denied by petitioners saying that Sec42 was not entirely vetoed
but merely the words hotels, motels,resthouses. House of Ways and Means concurred with
petitionersstating that veto message only seems to object with certain portionsof 191-A and
that can be gleaned by the reasons given by thePresident.IssueWON veto referred to the
entire section or merely the 20% tax ongross receipts of operators and proprietors of eating
places withinhotels, motels and resthouses.Held and RatioPresident does not have the power
to repeal an existing tax. Therefore, he could not have repealed the 2% caterers tax.CTA
agreed with respondent club that president vetoed only a certainpart. CTA mentioned that
President can veto only an entire item, andnot just words. The President intentionally only
vetoed a few words inSec 191-A. Assuming that the veto could not apply to just oneprovision
but all would render the Presidential veto void and still infavor of petitioner.Inclusion of
hotels, motels, resthouses in the 20% caterers taxbracket are items. President has the
right to veto such item, thatwhich is subject to tax and tax rate. It does not refer to an
entiresection. To construe item as an entire section would be to tie hishands to either
completely agree with a section he has objectionswith or to disagree with an entire section
where he only has a portionhe disagrees with