Bengzon v Senate Blue Ribbon Committee

Digest
G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991
Padilla, J.:
Facts:
1. Petitioner was one of the defendants in a civil case filed by the government with the
Sandiganbayan for the alleged anomalous sale of Kokoy Romoaldez of several government
corporations to the group of Lopa, a brother-in-law of Pres. Aquino.
2.

By virtue of a privilege speech made by Sen. Enrile urging the Senate to look into the
transactions, an investigation was conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. Petitioners
and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what
they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez."

3.

At the hearing, Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may "unduly prejudice"
the defendants in civil case before the Sandiganbayan.

4.

Petitioner filed for a TRO and/or injunctive relief claiming that the inquiry was beyond the
jurisdiction of the Senate. He contended that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee acted in excess
of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose. One of the defendants in the case before the
Sandiganbayan, Sandejas, filed with the Court of motion for intervention. The Court granted it
and required the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to comment on the petition in
intervention.

ISSUE: W/N the Blue Ribbon inquiry was in aid of Legislation

1.

NO.
There appears to be no intended legislation involved. The purpose of the inquiry to be
conducted is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, it was conducted to find
out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr. Lopa had violated RA 3019
in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez to the Lopa Group.

2.

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not absolute
or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the Constitution. As provided therein, the
investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected." It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected,
including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self.

3.

The civil case was already filed in the Sandiganbayan and for the Committee to probe and
inquire into the same justiciable controversy would be an encroachment into the exclusive
domain of judicial jurisdiction that had already earlier set in. The issue sought to be investigated
has already been pre-empted by the Sandiganbayan. To allow the inquiry to continue would not
only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments between the legislative committee and a
judicial tribunal.

4.

Finally, a congressional committees right to inquire is subject to all relevant limitations placed
by the Constitution on governmental action including the relevant limitations of the Bill of
Rights. One of these rights is the right of an individual to against self-incrimination. The right to

remain silent is extended to respondents in administrative investigations but only if it partakes of

the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. Hence, the petitioners
may not be compelled by respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce evidence before
it only because the inquiry is not in aid of legislation and if pursued would be violative of the
principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government as ordained by the Constitution.

Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006A

report by Charles Aguilar
FACTS:
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to
various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a
public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the
China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project).On
September 28, 2005, t
he President then issued Executive Order 464, Ensuring Observance of the Principle of
Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the
Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution,
and For Other Purposes, which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately.
ISSUES:
1. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress;2.
2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern;
3. Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they
implemented E.O.464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
HELD:
1. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI
of the Constitution. This power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the
executive branch; it is co-extensive with the power to legislate. The matters which
may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a proper subject of
investigation are one. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate
subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.
2. Yes. Although there are clear distinctions between the right of Congress
to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to

information on matters of public concern, any executive issuance tending to unduly

limit disclosures of information in investigations in Congress necessarily deprives the
people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is
presumed to be a matter of public concern.3.
3. Yes. While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow
that the same is exempt from the need for publication. It has a direct effect on the
right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Due process requires
that the people should have been apprised of its issuance before it was implemented.

Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006

Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing
E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on
Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its
declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including
those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for
them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of
massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the socalled Gloriagate Scandal.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O.
464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent
of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.
ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure
the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and
constitutional?
RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege.
The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter
of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an
exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be
of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in
aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is
privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional
requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its
reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

Arturo Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance

Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value
Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of
Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as
HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for
after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own
version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197
by striking out its text and substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in that way the bill remains a House Bill and
the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB. (Its ironic however to note that Tolentino
and co-petitioner Raul Roco even signed the said Senate Bill.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.
HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was
consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the
HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the
HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than
having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by
substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is
no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been
done.Tolentino v. Secretary

of Finance

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance

Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and
properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of
the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal
Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various
grounds.
One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation
of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did
not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) ofthe Constitution
Held:
The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the
law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the
legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as
the House bill would be to deny the Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also
to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for
filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and
bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that,
elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more
sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitutionprohibit the filing in the
Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action
by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.
The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate

days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the
same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The
presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of
reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a billby the President the
requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed
with is supported by the weightof legislative practice.

Heherson Alvarez vs Teofisto

Guingona, Jr.
252 SCRA 695 Political Law Municipal Corporation LGU Requirement Income Inclusion of IRAs
FACTS:
In April 1993, House Bill 8817 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent
Component City to be known as the City of Santiago) was passed in the House of Representatives.
In May 1993, a Senate Bill (SB 1243) of similar title and content with that of HB 8817 was introduced in
the Senate.
In January 1994, HB 8817 was transmitted to the Senate. In February 1994, the Senate conducted a
public hearing on SB 1243. In March 1994, the Senate Committee on Local Government rolled out its
recommendation for approval of HB 8817 as it was totally the same with SB 1243. Eventually, HB 8817
became a law (RA 7720).
Now Senator Heherson Alvarez et al are assailing the constitutionality of the said law on the ground that
the bill creating the law did not originate from the lower house and that City of Santiago was not able to
comply with the income of at least P20M per annum in order for it to be a city. That in the computation of
the reported average income of P20,974,581.97, the IRA was included which should not be.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not RA 7720 is invalid for not being originally from the HOR.
2. Whether or not the IRA should be included in the computation of an LGUs income.
HELD: 1. NO. The house bill was filed first before the senate bill as the record shows. Further, the Senate
held in abeyance any hearing on the said SB while the HB was on its 1 st, 2nd and 3rd reading in the HOR.
The Senate only conducted its 1st hearing on the said SB one month after the HB was transmitted to the
Senate (in anticipation of the said HB as well).
2. YES. The IRA should be added in the computation of an LGUs average annual income as was
done in the case at bar. The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the
funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury
without need of any further action on the part of the local government unit. They thus constitute income
which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds.

To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the same as a
special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the
Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to
when the Code speaks of funding support from the national government, its instrumentalities and
government-owned-or-controlled corporations.

Garcia vs Mata Digest

G.R. No. L-33713 July 30, 1975
Facts:
The donation of the property to the government to make the property public does not cure
the constitutional defect. The fact that the law was passed when the said property was still
a private property cannot be ignored. In accordance with the rule that the taxing power
must be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expanded only
for public purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals. Inasmuch as the land
on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the
result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and void.
Issue:
Whether RA 1600 is valid. Does it contain rider in an appropriation bill?
Held:
The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. Section 11 of RA 1600 fails to disclose
the relevance to any appropriation item. RA 1600 is an appropriation law for the operation
of government while Section 11 refers to a fundamental governmental policy of calling to
active duty and the reversion of inactive statute of reserve officers in the AFP.
Hence it was A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEM INSERTED IN AN APPROPRIATION MEASURE,
in violation of the constitutional prohibition against RIDERS to the general appropriation
act. It was indeed a new and completely unrelated provision attached to the GAA.
It also violates the rule on one-bill, one subject. The subject to be considered must be
expressed in the title of the act. When an act contains provisions which are clearly not
embraced in the subject of the act, as expressed in the title, such provisions are void,
inoperative and without effect.
SECTION 11 is unconstitutional. Garcia cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him.

Atitiw V. Zamora
G.R. No. 143374En Banc, J. Tinga
Case Digest by: Gino Angelo P. Yanga
Facts:
The ratification of the 1987 Constitution ordains the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao
and in the Cordilleras mandating the Congress to enact organic acts pursuant to section 18 of article X
of the Constitution. Thus, by virtue of the residual powers of President Cory Aquino, she promulgated
E.O 220 creating CAR. Then the congress enacted R.A 6766, an act providing for organic act for the
cordillera autonomous region, a plebiscite was cast but was not approve by the people.
The court declared that E.O 220 to be still in force and effect until properly repealed or amended.
Later on February 15, 2000, President Estrada signed the General Appropriations Act of 2000 (GAA
2000) which includes the assailed special provisions, then issued an E.O 270 to extend the
implementation of the winding up of operations of the CAR and extended it by virtue of E.O 328.
The petitioners seek the declaration of nullity of paragraph 1 of the special provisions of RA 870
(GAA2000) directing that the appropriation for the CAR shall be spent to wind up its activities and pay
theseparation and retirement benefits of all the affected members and employees.
Issue:
1. Whether the assailed special provisions in RA 8760 is a rider and as such is unconstitutional.
2. Whether the Philippine Government, through Congress, can unilaterally amend/repeal EO 220.
3. Whether the Republic should be ordered to honor its commitments as spelled out in EO.220

Ruling:
In relation to article VI section 25(2) and section 26 the court said that xxx an appropriations bill
covers a broader range of subject matter and therefore includes more details compared to an ordinary
bill. The title of an appropriations bill cannot be any broader as it is since it is not feasible to come out
with a title that embraces all the details included in an appropriations bill xxx. The assailed paragraph 1
of theRA8760 does not constitute a rider; it follows the standard that a provision in an appropriations
bill must relate specifically to some particular appropriations.
On the other hand, the contention that Congress cannot amend or repeal E.O 220 is rejected, there is
no such thing as an irrepealable law. And nothing could prevent the Congress from amending or repealing
the E.O. 220 because it is no different from any other law.
The last issue, the court ruled that, the concept of separations of powers presupposes mutual respect.
Therefore, the implementation of E.O. 220 is an executive prerogative while the sourcing of funds is
within the powers of the legislature. In the absence of any grave abuse of discretion, the court cannot
correct the acts of either the Executive or the Legislative in respect to policies concerning CAR.

Bara Lidasan vs Commission on

Elections
21 SCRA 496 Political Law Effect if Title Does Not Completely Express the Subject
Bara Lidasan was a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, Republic Act No. 4790, entitled An Act Creating
the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur, was passed. Lidasan however discovered
that certain barrios located in Cotabato were included in Dianaton, Lanao Del Sur pursuant to RA
4790. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law,
COMELEC proceeded to establish precincts for voter registration in the said territories of Dianaton.
Lidasan then filed a case to have RA 4790 be nullified for being unconstitutional. He averred that the
law did not clearly indicate in its title that in creating Dianaton, it would be including in its territory
several barrios from Cotabato.
ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another province
Cotabato to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that No bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill?
HELD: No. The said law is void. The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to
perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not
apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself
that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent
Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually
affected by the bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is to
the prejudice of his own province. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the
constitutionality of RA 4790.
LINDASAN vs COMELEC
FACTS:
Lidasan is a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating
theMunicipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur," was passed. Lidasan came to know later onthat
barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon, Province
of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao,
Tiongko,Colodan, and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of
Parang,also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur. [Remarkably, even the
Congressman of Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to
establish precints for voter registration in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed that RA 4790 be
nullified forbeing unconstitutional because it did not clearly indicate in its title that it in creating Dianaton, it wouldbe including in the
territory thereof barrios from Cotabato.
ISSUE:
Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another province - Cotabato -to be spared from
attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that "No bill which may be enactedinto law shall embrace more than
one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill?
HELD:
The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did notinform
the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in thetowns of Buldon
and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being
taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the
public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected bythe bill that even a Congressman

from Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is to

thep r e j u d i c e o f h i s o w n p r o v i n c e . T h e s e a r e t h e p r e s s u r e s w h i c h h e a v i l y w e i g
h a g a i n s t t h e constitutionality of RA 4790.

PHILCONSA VS. GIMENEZ

FACTS
RA No. 3836, An Act Amending Subsection , Section 12 of Commonwealth Act Numbered 186. As
Amended by Republic Act Numbered 3096, allows a Senator or a member of the House of Representatives and
an elective officer of either House of Congress to retire regardless of age and whose service must be at least 12
years. Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. , a non-profit civic organization duly incorporated under
Philippine laws instituted this petition challenging the constitutionality of the law in question.
ISSUE
Whether or not the little of RA No. 3836 is germane to the subject matter expressed in the act.
HELD
No. It is to be observed that under RA No. 3836, amending the first paragraph of section 12, subsection c of CA
No. 186, retirement benefits are granted to members of GSIS. This paragraph is related and germane to the
subject of CA No. 186. The succeeding paragraph of RA. No 3836 refers to members of Congress and elective
in any manner to the subject of CA. No. 186 establishing the GSIS and which provides both retirement and
issuance benefits to its members.
The constitutionality requirement with respect to titles of statutes as sufficient to reflect their contents is
not met by the title of said RA. No. 3836, thus , void.

Tobias vs Abalos - A case digest

ROBERT V. TOBIAS, ET AL. vs. BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, ET AL.
Facts:
Mandaluyong and San Juan were one legislative district until the passage of the RA 7675 with title An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Same bill is now in question
at to its constitutionality by the petitioners by invoking their right as tax payers and residents of Mandaluyong.
With a plebiscite held on April 10, 1994, people of Mandaluyong voted to for the the conversion of Mandaluyong to a highly
urbanized city ratifying RA 7675 and making it in effect.
Issues:
WON RA 7675 is in:
1. Violation of Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution regarding 'one subject one bill rule".
2. Violation of Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) as to the number of members of the Congress to 250 and reappropriating the
legislative districts.

Ruling:
Applying liberal construction the Supreme Court dismissed the contention of constitutionality pertaining to Art VI 26(1) saying
"should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the
title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."

As to Article VI Sec 5(1), the clause "unless otherwise provided by law" was enforced justifying the act of the legislature to
increase the number of the members of the congress.
Article VI Sec 5 (4) was also overruled as it was the Congress itself which drafted the bill reapportioning the legislative district.
In view of the foregoing facts, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.