CATRE, MC VHARN

A. Penal Laws
>On the second issue, we find and so hold that the
international telephone calls placed by Bay Super Orient
Card holders, the telecommunication services provided
by PLDT and its business of providing said services are
not personal properties under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code. The construction by the respondents of
Article 308 of the said Code to include, within its
coverage, the aforesaid international telephone calls,
telecommunication services and business is contrary to
the letter and intent of the law.
The rule is that, penal laws are to be construed strictly.
Such rule is founded on the tenderness of the law for the
rights of individuals and on the plain principle that the
power of punishment is vested in Congress, not in the
judicial department. It is Congress, not the Court, which
is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment. 44 Due
respect for the prerogative of Congress in defining
crimes/felonies constrains the Court to refrain from a
broad interpretation of penal laws where a "narrow
interpretation" is appropriate. The Court must take heed
to language, legislative history and purpose, in order to
strictly determine the wrath and breath of the conduct
the law forbids.45 However, when the congressional
purpose is unclear, the court must apply the rule of
lenity, that is, ambiguity concerning the ambit of
criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.46
Penal statutes may not be enlarged by implication or
intent beyond the fair meaning of the language used; and
may not be held to include offenses other than those
which are clearly described, notwithstanding that the
Court may think that Congress should have made them
more comprehensive.47 Words and phrases in a statute
are to be construed according to their common meaning
and accepted usage.

of crime or multiply felonies. Hence, in the

interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to
subject it to careful scrutiny and to construe it with such
strictness as to safeguard the rights of the accused. If the
statute is ambiguous and admits of two reasonable but
contradictory constructions, that which operates in favor
of a party accused under its provisions is to be preferred.
The principle is that acts in and of themselves innocent
and lawful cannot be held to be criminal unless there is a
clear and unequivocal expression of the legislative intent
to make them such. Whatever is not plainly within the
provisions of a penal statute should be regarded as
without its intendment. 13
The purpose of strict construction is not to enable a
guilty person to escape punishment through a
technicality but to provide a precise definition of
forbidden acts.
B. Tax Laws
>A statute will not be construed as imposing a tax unless
does so clearly, expressly and it unambiguously. (82
C.J.S., 956) (Emphasis supplied) and that It is an
ancient principle that a tax can not be imposed without
clear and express words for that purpose. Accordingly,
the general rule of requiring adherence to the letter in
construing statutes applies with peculiar strictness to tax
laws and the provisions of a taxing act are not to be
extended by implication. (30 Am. Jur. 153; also
McQuillin on Municipal Corp., Vol. 16, p. 267; emphasis
ours)

>On the other hand, to subsume the "religious" purpose

of the solicitation within the concept of "charitable"
purpose which under Presidential Decree No. 1564
requires a prior permit from the Department of Social
Services and Development, under paid of penal liability
in the absence thereof, would be prejudicial to petitioner.
Accordingly, the term "charitable" should be strictly
construed so as to exclude solicitations for "religious"
purposes. Thereby, we adhere to the fundamental
doctrine underlying virtually all penal legislations that
such interpretation should be adopted as would favor the
accused.

A mere reading of the ordinance discloses that not only

are there no words therein imposing a tax but that the
peruser is left in doubt as to whether the intention is to
levy a tax for revenue or charge a fee for permitting the
business to be carried on; for section 2 declares that the
law "empowers the Municipal Council of Hinabangan,
Samar to impose graduated Municipal License Fecs."
Since the validity of taxes and license fees are governed
by different principles, the taxpayer is left in doubt as to
the true nature of the charge and whether he must bear it
or not. The rule is that taxes may not be imposed by
implication,1 and
"a
tax
statute
is
to
be
construed strictly andagainst the subjection to a tax
liability where the question is whether a matter, property
or person is subject to the tax" (82 C.J.S., p. 957).
Considering the avoidability of taxes by the citizen, it
seems that the least he is entitled to is to be expressly
required to pay a tax, which the words of the questioned
ordinance do not state. This is particularly true where the
ordinance, as in this case, carries penal provisions

For, it is a well-entrenched rule that penal laws are to be

construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor
of the accused. They are not to be extended or enlarged
by implications, intendments, analogies or equitable
considerations. They are not to be strained by
construction to spell out a new offense, enlarge the field

>In connection with what has been stated heretofore, we

have to bear in mind likewise that when the issue is
whether or not the exemption from a tax imposed by law
is applicable, the rule is that the exempting provision is
to be construed liberally in favor of the taxing authority
and strictly against exemption from tax liability, the

result being that statutory provisions for the refund of

taxes are strictly construed in favor of the State and
against the taxpayer (82 C.J.S. pp. 957-958; Helvering
vs. Northwest Steel Rolling Mills, 311 US 46 85 L. ed.
29 S. Ct., 51 Am. Jur. p. 526). Indeed, were we to adopt
appellants' construction of the law by exempting from
the 17% tax all fertilizers imported by planters or
farmers through any agent other than their cooperatives,
we would be rendering useless the only exception
expressly established in the case of fertilizers imported
by planters or farmers through their cooperatives.
>As a general rule, the power to tax is an incident of
sovereignty and is unlimited in its range, acknowledging
in its very nature no limits, so that security against its
abuse is to be found only in the responsibility of the
legislature which imposes the tax on the constituency
who are to pay it. Nevertheless, effective limitations
thereon may be imposed by the people through their
Constitutions. 13 Our Constitution, for instance, provides
that the rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable
and Congress shall evolve a progressive system of
taxation. 14 So potent indeed is the power that it was once
opined that "the power to tax involves the power to
destroy." 15 Verily, taxation is a destructive power which
interferes with the personal and property for the support
of the government. Accordingly, tax statutes must be
construed strictly against the government and liberally in
favor of the taxpayer. 16 But since taxes are what we pay
for civilized society, 17 or are the lifeblood of the nation,
the law frowns against exemptions from taxation and
statutes
granting
tax
exemptions
are
thus
construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayers and
liberally in favor of the taxing authority. 18 A claim of
exemption from tax payment must be clearly shown and
based on language in the law too plain to be
mistaken. 19 Elsewise stated, taxation is the rule,
exemption therefrom is the exception. 20However, if the
grantee of the exemption is a political subdivision or
instrumentality, the rigid rule of construction does not
apply because the practical effect of the exemption is
merely to reduce the amount of money that has to be
handled by the government in the course of its
operations. 21
The power to tax is primarily vested in the Congress;
however, in our jurisdiction, it may be exercised by local
legislative bodies, no longer merely by virtue of a valid
delegation as before, but pursuant to direct authority
conferred by Section 5, Article X of the
Constitution. 22 Under the latter, the exercise of the
power may be subject to such guidelines and limitations
as the Congress may provide which, however, must be
consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy.
There can be no question that under Section 14 of R.A.
No. 6958 the petitioner is exempt from the payment of
realty taxes imposed by the National Government or any
of its political subdivisions, agencies, and
instrumentalities. Nevertheless, since taxation is the rule

and exemption therefrom the exception, the exemption

may thus be withdrawn at the pleasure of the taxing
authority. The only exception to this rule is where the
exemption was granted to private parties based on
material consideration of a mutual nature, which then
becomes contractual and is thus covered by the nonimpairment clause of the Constitution. 23
>The assailed decision of the appellate court declares
that the prescribed procedure in auction sales of property
for tax delinquency being in derogation of property
rights should be followed punctiliously. Strict adherence
to the statutes governing tax sales is imperative not only
for the protection of the tax payers, but also to allay any
possible suspicion of collusion between the buyer and
the public officials called upon to enforce such laws.
Notice of sale to the delinquent land owners and to the
public in general is an essential and indispensable
requirement of law, the non-fulfillment of which initiates
the sale.
We give our stamp of approval on the aforementioned
ruling of the respondent court. In the case at bar, there is
no evidence that Nemesia Baltazar, who had obtained a
transfer certificate of title in her name on January 18,
1946, was notified of the auction sale which was
scheduled on October 30, 1956. Neither was she
furnished as the owner of the delinquent real property
with the certificate of sale as prescribed by Sec. 37 of
Commonwealth Act No. 470. These infirmities are fatal.
Worth mentioning also is the fact that Lopez Sugar
Central was not entirely negligent in its payment of land
taxes. The record shows that taxes were paid for the
years 1950 to 1953 and a receipt therefor was obtained
in its name. The sale therefore by the Province of Negros
Occidental of the land in dispute to the spouses Serfinos
was void since the Province of Negros Occidental was
not the real owner of the property thus sold. In turn, the
spouses Serfinos title which has been derived from that
of the Province of Negros Occidental is likewise void. A
purchaser of real estate at the tax sale obtains only such
title as that held by the taxpayer, the principle of caveat
emptor applies. Where land is sold for delinquency taxes
under the provisions of the Provincial Assessment Law,
rights of registered but undeclared owners of the land are
not affected by the proceedings and the sale conveys
only such interest as the person who has declared the
property for taxation has therein.

C. Social Legislation
>From the foregoing facts of record, it is clear that
Marcelino N. Villavert died of acute hemorrhagic
pancreatitis which was directly caused or at least
aggravated by the duties he performed as coder verifier,
computer operator and clerk typist of the Philippine
Constabulary. There is no evidence at all that Marcelino
N. Villavert had a "bout of alcoholic intoxication"
shortly before he died. Neither is there a showing that he
used drugs.
It should be noted that Article 4 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, as amended, provides that "All doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of this Code,
including its implementing rules and regulations shall be
resolved in favor of labor."
>Pursuant to such doctrine and applying now the
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act in this
case, the presumption of compensability subsists in favor
of the claimant.
In any case, We have always maintained that in case of
doubt, the same should be resolved in favor of the
worker, and that social legislations like the Workmen's
Compensation Act and the Labor Code should be
liberally construed to attain their laudable objective, i.e.,
to give relief to the workman and/or his dependents in
the event that the former should die or sustain an injury.
>Moreover, the rule is that all doubts in the
interpretation and implementation of labor laws should
be resolved in favor of labor. In upholding the assailed
orders of the Secretary, the Court is only giving meaning
to this rule. The Court should help labor authorities
provide workers immediate access to their rights and
benefits, without being hampered by arbitration or
litigation processes that prove to be not only nervewracking, but financially burdensome in the long
run. 13 Administrative rules of procedure should be
construed liberally in order to promote their object and
assist the parties, especially the workingman, in
obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
their respective claims and defenses. By virtue of the
assailed orders. The Union and its members are relieved
of the burden of litigating their interrelated cases in
different tribunals.
D. Rules of Court
>Rules prescribing the time within which certain acts
must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are
absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless
delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial
business. Strict compliance with such rules is mandatory
and imperative.18 Nevertheless, procedural rules were
conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent
application of the rules would hinder rather than serve
the demands of substantial justice, the former must yield

to the latter. Pursuant to this, Rule 1, Section 6, 19 of the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that:
SEC. 6. Construction. -These rules shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition
of every action and proceeding. (Emphasis ours)
The liberal construction of the rules with regard to
motions for reconsideration is set forth in the case
of Goldloop
Properties,
Inc. v. Court
of
20
Appeals, where this Court made the following
pointed statements, viz:
Admittedly, the filing of respondents-spouses' motion for
reconsideration did not stop the period of appeal because
xxx the reglementary period within which respondentsspouses should have appealed expired on 23 November
1989.
But where a rigid application of the rule will result in a
manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, then the rule
may be relaxed especially if a party successfully shows
that the alleged defect in the questioned final and
executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from
the recitals contained therein. Technicalities may thus be
disregarded in order to resolve the case. After all, no
party can even claim a vested right in technicalities.
Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on
the merits and not on technicalities.
In the case of Paz Reyes Aguam v. Court of Appeals, et
al.,21 this Court repeated what has been consistently
adhered to in a litany of cases that with regard to the
disposition of appeals filed with the appellate court:
>The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of
justice. The court's primary duty is to render or dispense
justice. "A litigation is not a game of technicalities."
"Law suits unlike duels are not to be won by a rapier's
thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as
an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and
chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from
courts." Litigations must be decided on their merits
and not on technicality. Every party litigant must be
afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and
just determination of his cause, free from the
unacceptable plea of technicalities. Thus, dismissal of
appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon
where the policy of the court is to encourage hearings of
appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought
not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of
procedure are used only to help secure, not override
substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent
course of action for the court to excuse a technical
lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on
appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose
of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice
to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy

disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay,

if not miscarriage of justice. (Emphasis and italics ours;
citations omitted)
_ In a long line of decisions, this Court has repeatedly
held that while the rules of procedure are liberally
construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are
strictly applied as they are "deemed indispensable to the
prevention of needless delays and necessary to the
orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business". The
same is true with respect to the rules on the manner and
periods for perfecting appeals.
It may not be amiss to point out that while the period to
appeal may be extended, such extension is addressed to
the sound discretion of the Court the mere filing and
pendency of the motion for extension of time does not
suspend the running of the reglementary period.
E. Law on Adoption
The trial court in its decision had sought refuge in the
ancient Roman legal maxim "Dura lex sed lex" to
cleanse its hands of the hard and harsh decision it
rendered. While this old adage generally finds apt
application in many other legal cases, in adoption of
children, however, this should be softened so as to apply
the law with less severity and with compassion and
humane understanding, for adoption is more for the
benefit of unfortunate children, particularly those born
out of wedlock, than for those born with a silver spoon
in their mouths. All efforts or acts designed to provide
homes, love, care and education for unfortunate children,
who otherwise may grow from cynical street urchins to
hardened criminal offenders and become serious social
problems, should be given the widest attitude of
sympathy, encouragement and assistance. The law is not,
and should not be made, an instrument to impede the
achievement of a salutary humane policy. As often as is
legally and lawfully possible, their texts and intendments
should be construed so as to give all the chances for
human life to exist with a modicum promise of a
useful and constructive existence. - It is Our view that it
is in consonance with the true spirit and purpose of the
law, and with the policy of the State, to uphold,
encourage and give life and meaning to the existence of
family relations.
F. Local Government/Autonomy
We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy.
Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in
favor of centralized power in Malacaang and the other
beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed
in favor of autonomy.
In his classic work "Philippine Political Law" Dean
Vicente G. Sinco stated that the value of local
governments as institutions of democracy is measured

by
the
degree
of
autonomy
that
they
enjoy. Citing Tocqueville, he stated that "local
assemblies of citizens constitute the strength of free
nations. . . . A people may establish a system of free
government but without the spirit of municipal
institutions, it cannot have the spirit of liberty." (Sinco,
Philippine Political Law, Eleventh Edition, pp. 705-706).
Our national officials should not only comply with the
constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should
also appreciate the spirit of liberty upon which these
provisions are based.
G. Insurance
>The main contention of appellant in these cases is that
in order that he may recover on the insurance policies
issued him for the loss of his left hand, it is not
necessary that there should be an amputation thereof, but
that it is sufficient if the injuries prevent him from
performing his work or labor necessary in the pursuance
of his occupation or business. Authorities are cited to the
effect that "total disability" in relation to one's
occupation means that the condition of the insurance is
such that common prudence requires him to desist from
transacting his business or renders him incapable of
working. (46 C.J.S., 970). It is also argued that obscure
words or stipulations should be interpreted against the
person who caused the obscurity, and the ones which
caused the obscurity in the cases at bar are the defendant
insurance companies.
While we sympathize with the plaintiff or his employer,
for whose benefit the policies were issued, we can not go
beyond the clear and express conditions of the insurance
policies, all of which define partial disability as loss of
either hand by amputation through the bones of the
wrist." There was no such amputation in the case at bar.
All that was found by the trial court, which is not
disputed on appeal, was that the physical injuries
"caused temporary total disability of plaintiff's left
hand." Note that the disability of plaintiff's hand was
merely temporary, having been caused by fracture of the
index, the middle and the fourth fingers of the left hand.
We might add that the agreement contained in the
insurance policies is the law between the parties. As the
terms of the policies are clear, express and specific that
only amputation of the left hand should be considered as
a loss thereof, an interpretation that would include the
mere fracture or other temporary disability not covered
by the policies would certainly be unwarranted.
>The terms "accident" and "accidental", as used in
insurance contracts, have not acquired any technical
meaning, and are construed by the courts in their
ordinary and common acceptation. Thus, the terms have
been taken to mean that which happen by chance or
fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is

unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen. An accident is an

event that takes place without one's foresight or
expectation an event that proceeds from an unknown
cause, or is an unusual effect of a known cause and,
therefore, not expected.
>Here, again, by reason of the exclusive control of the
insurance company over the terms and phraseology of
the contract, the ambiguity must be held strictly against
the insurer and liberraly in favor of the insured, specially
to avoid a forfeiture (44 C. J. S., pp. 1166-1175; 29 Am.
Jur. 180).
Insurance is, in its nature, complex and difficult for the
layman to understand. Policies are prepared by experts
who know and can anticipate the hearing and possible
complications of every contingency. So long as
insurance companies insist upon the use of ambiguous,
intricate and technical provisions, which conceal rather
than frankly disclose, their own intentions, the courts
must, in fairness to those who purchase insurance,
construe every ambiguity in favor of the insured.
An insurer should not be allowed, by the use of obscure
phrases and exceptions, to defeat the very purpose for
which the policy was procured

H. Naturalization Laws
Considering that "naturalization laws should be rigidly
enforced and strictly construed in favor of the
government and against the applicant".
I. Agrarian Reform Laws
Before we close this case, it is pertinent to reiterate that
the respondent's right as share tenant do not end with the
abolition of share tenancy. As the law seeks to "uplift the
farmers from poverty, ignorance and stagnation to make
them dignified, self-reliant, strong and responsible
citizens ... active participants in nation-building",
agricultural share tenants are given the right to leasehold
tenancy as a first step towards the ultimate status of
owner-cultivator, a goal sought to be achieved by the
government program of land reform.
J. Expropriation Laws
Statutes expropriating or authorizing the expropriation of
property are strictly construed against the expropriating
authority and liberally in favor of property owners.
The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether
directly by the State, or by its authorized agents, is
necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in
that case is that the authority must be strictly construed.
No species of property is held by individuals with
greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution
and laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold
of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that
right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the
land of an individual without his consent, the plain
meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtly
interpretation.
K. Wills
Thus, it has been held that "Statutes prescribing the
formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are
very strictly construed. As stated in 40 Cyc., at page
1097, 'A will must be executed in accordance with the
statutory requirements; otherwise it is entirely void.' All
these requirements stand as of equal importance and
must be observed, and courts cannot supply the defective
execution of a will. No power or discretion is vested in
them, either to superadd other conditions or dispence
with those enumerated in the statutes".

L. Constitution
>The
fundamental
principle
in
constitutional
construction, however, is that the primary source from
which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the
language of the provision itself. The presumption is that
the words in which the constitutional provisions are
couched express the objective sought to be attained. 46 In
other words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the
meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal
should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction
and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to
shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of
the provision being construed.
>In self-executing constitutional provisions, the
legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the
exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution,
further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a
practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a
convenient remedy for the protection of the rights
secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable
safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere
fact that legislation may supplement and add to or
prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing
constitutional provision does not render such a provision
ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The
omission from a constitution of any express provision
for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not
necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be
self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision
of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust
legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must
be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise
of constitutional right and make it more
available. 17 Subsequent legislation however does not
necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision
is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
>First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words
used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed.
Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief
Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in
our search for its meaning. We do not of course
stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be
assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective
sought to be attained. They are to be given
their ordinary meaningexcept where technical
terms are employed in which case the significance
thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution
is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being
essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should
ever be present in the people's consciousness, its

language as much as possible should be understood

in the sense they have in common use. What it says
according to the text of the provision to be
construed compels acceptance and negates the
power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate
that the framers and the people mean what they say.
Thus these are the cases where the need for
construction is reduced to a minimum. 37 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima.
The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this
Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary38 in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is
the intention underlying the provision under
consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in
construing a Constitution should bear in mind the
object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and
the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied.
A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of
the history of the times, and the condition and
circumstances under which the Constitution was
framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which
induced the framers of the Constitution to enact
the particular provision and the purpose sought to
be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the
whole as to make the words consonant to that
reason
and
calculated
to
effect
that
purpose.39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal
Revenue40 where, speaking through Madame Justice
Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping
with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it should
be given effect. The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the
realization of the purpose of the framers and of the
people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may
also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying
the Constitution were guided mainly by the
explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is
to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De
Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran
declared:
[T]he members of the Constitutional Convention
could not have dedicated a provision of our
Constitution merely for the benefit of one person
without considering that it could also affect

others.When they adopted subsection 2, they

permitted, if not willed, that said provision should
function to the full extent of its substance and its
terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with
all
other
provisions
of
that
great
document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional
construction that no one provision of the
Constitution is to be separated from all the others,
to be considered alone, but that all the provisions
bearing upon a particular subject are to be
brought into view and to be so interpreted as to
effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.
Sections bearing on a particular subject should be
considered and interpreted together as to
effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution
and one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another, if by any reasonable construction, the two
can be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if
practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction
which will render every word operative, rather than
one which may make the words idle and
nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found
to be clear, resort to other aids is available. In still the
same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, this Court expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult
the debates and proceedings of the constitutional
convention in order to arrive at the reason and
purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto
may be had only when other guides fail as said
proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the
Constitutionwhen the meaning is clear. Debates in
the constitutional convention "are of value as
showing the views of the individual members, and as
indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us
no light as to the views of the large majority who did
not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens
whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the
force of fundamental law. We think it safer to
construe the constitution from what appears upon
its face." The proper interpretation therefore
depends more on how it was understood by the
people adopting it than in the framers's
understanding thereof.

> Indeed, it is axiomatic in statutory construction that the

ascertainment of the purpose of the enactment is a step
in the process of ascertaining the intent or meaning of
the enactment, because the reason for the enactment
must necessarily shed considerable light on "the law of
the statute," i.e., the intent; hence, the enactment should
be construed with reference to its intended scope and
purpose, and the court should seek to carry out this
purpose rather than to defeat it.
This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part
of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context, i.e. that every part must be considered together
with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment. 84 It is absurd to assume
that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between
Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to
cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was
their intention in respect of appointments to the
Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have
easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article
VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
> One of the primary and basic rules in statutory
construction is that where the words of a statute are
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.32 It is a well-settled principle of
constitutional construction that the language employed
in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed. As much as
possible, the words of the Constitution should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What
it says according to the text of the provision to be
construed compels acceptance and negates the power of
the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers and the people mean what they say.33 Verba legis
non est recedendum from the words of a statute there
should be no departure.34
The raison d tre for the rule is essentially twofold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the
objective sought to be attained; 35 and second, because
the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document
but essentially that of the people, in whose
consciousness it should ever be present as an important
condition for the rule of law to prevail. 36
Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a
particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is
equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct
construction may be made clear and specific by
considering the company of words in which it is founded
or with which it is associated. 37 This is because a word
or phrase in a statute is always used in association with
other words or phrases, and its meaning may, thus, be
modified or restricted by the latter.38 The particular
words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as

detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and

every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a
harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to
harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever
possible.39 In short, every meaning to be given to each
word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of
the body of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute
is always used in association with other words or phrases
and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the
latter.
Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes
apparent that the word "Congress" used in Article VIII,
Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic
sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on
whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is
being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The
foregoing declaration is but sensible, since, as pointed
out by an esteemed former member of the Court and
consultant of the JBC in his memorandum, 40 "from the
enumeration of the membership of the JBC, it is patent
that each category of members pertained to a single
individual only."41
Indeed, the spirit and reason of the statute may be passed
upon where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
contradiction, injustice, or defeat the clear purpose of the
lawmakers.42 Not any of these instances, however, is
present in the case at bench. Considering that the
language of the subject constitutional provision is plain
and unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic
aids such as records of the Constitutional Commission.

VI. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION PRINCIPLES

A. Conflicting Provisions
> It is the general rule in the interpretation of statutes
levying taxes or duties not to extend their provisions
beyond the clear import of the language used. In every
case of doubt, such statutes are construed most strongly
against the Government and in favor of the citizen,
because burdens are not to be imposed, nor presumed to
be imposed, beyond what the statutes expressly and
clearly import.
Where there is in the same statute a particular enactment
and also a general one which is embraced in the former,
the particular enactment must be operative, and the
general enactment must be taken to effect only such
cases within its general language as are not within the
provisions of the particular enactment.
> Since courts are duty bound to adopt a construction
that will give effect to every part of a statute, if at all
possible, following the maxim "ut magis valeat quam
pereat" ("that construction [is to be] sought which gives
effect to the whole of the statute-its every word",
Tamayo vs. Gsell, 35 Phil. 953, 980), there is no
alternative but to interpret the charter as the lower court
has done, i.e., limiting the power of the Vice-Mayor
under section 12 (as amended) to the appointment of all
the employees of the Board other than the Secretary,
who is to be appointed by the Board itself, as
specifically prescribed by section 14 of the Pasay city
charter.
>Indeed, even disregarding their origin, the allegedly
conflicting sections, could be interpreted in the light of
the principle of statutory construction that when a
general and a particular provision are inconsistent the
latter is paramount to the former (sec. 288, Act 190). In
other words, section 2195 referring particularly to
vacancy in the office of mayor, must prevail over the
general terms of section 21 (a) as to vacancies of
municipal (local) offices. Otherwise stated, section 2195
may be deemed an exception to or qualification of the
latter.4 "Where one statute deals with a subject in general
terms, and another deals with a part of the same subject
in a more detailed way, the two should be harmonized if
possible; but if there is any conflict, the latter will
prevail, regardless of whether it was passed prior to the
general statute." (Sutherland Statutory Construction, sec.
5204)
In a recent decision,5 we had occasion to pass on a
similar situation repeal by subsequent general
provision of a prior special provision and we said,:
It is well-settled that a special and local statute,
providing for a particular case or class of cases,
is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general

in its terms, provisions and application, unless

the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although
the terms of the general act are broad enough to
include the cases embraced in the special
law. . . . It is a canon of statutory construction
that a later statute, general in its terms and not
expressly repealing a prior special statute, will
ordinarily not affect the special provisions, of
such earlier statute. (Steamboat Company vs.
Collector, 18 Wall. (U.S.), 478; Cass County vs.
Gillett, 100 U.S. 585; Minnesota vs. Hitchcock,
185 U.S. 373, 396.)
Where there are two statutes, the earlier special
and the later general the terms of the general
brood enough to include the matter provided for
in the special the fact that one is special and
the other is general creates a presumption that
the special is to be considered as remaining an
exception to the general, one as a general law of
the land, the other as the law of a particular case.
(State vs. Stoll, 17 Wall. (U.S.) 425)
B. Words construed in their ordinary sense
From the foregoing definitions, it is evident that the
plain ordinary meaning of "business" is restricted to
activities or affairs where profit is the purpose, or
livelihood is the motive. The term "business" being used
without any qualification in section 193 of the Tax Code
in relation to section 178 of the same, should therefore
be construed in its plain and ordinary meaning, restricted
to activities for profit or livelihood.
Undoubtedly, these definitions must be given all the
weight due thereto, in the interpretation of section 193 of
the Tax Code. As used therein, the phrases above
referred to are, however, part and parcel of the
provisions contained, not only in said section 193, but,
also, in section 178 and other parts of the Tax Code, all
of which must be given effect in their entirety as a
harmonious, coordinated and integrated unit, not as a
mass of heterogeneous and unrelated if not incongruous
terms, clauses and sentences. In other words, the phrases
in question should be construed in the light of the
context of the whole Tax Code, of which they are
integral parts. And when this is done when we
consider that section 193 requires "retail liquor dealers",
"retail dealers in fermented liquors" and "retail tobacco
dealers" to pay the taxes on business" therein specified;
that said section 193 is entitled "Amount of tax on
business", that said section 193 merely implements the
general provision in section 178, to the effect that "a
privilege tax must be paid in before any business or
occupation hereinafter specified can be lawfully begun
and pursued"; that the term "business" is used in said
section 178, six (6) times; and that the aforementioned
sections 178, 193 and 194 are part of Title V of the Tax
Code, entitled "Privilege taxes on business and

occupation" it becomes crystal clear that the "retail

liquor dealers", "retail dealers in fermented liquors" and
"retail tobacco dealers" alluded to in said section 193 are
those engaged in "business", not fraternal, civic, nonstock, non-profit organizations, like herein respondent,
which sells wines, distilled spirits, fermented liquors and
tobacco, exclusively to its members and their guests, at
such prices as are merely sufficient to cover operational
expenses.

C. General words construed generally

Thus, We held recently that the term "any election" in
Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution, which prohibits
officers and employees in the Civil Service, including
members of the Armed Forces, from engaging "directly
or indirectly in partisan political activities" or "taking
part in any election except to vote," comprehends or
applies to election of delegates Constitutional
Convention.1
The term "any election" in a statute making it criminal to
bet on any duel or on the result of any election includes
all elections held in the State. 2 It means not only any
election then provided by the laws and the Constitution,
but any election which may thereafter be established or
required to be held pursuant to law
Under Sec. 39 of Art. III of the Revised Election Code,
"the term "person" includes an individual, partnership,
committee, association, corporation and any other
organization or group of persons."4 Sec. 39 refers to
contributions from or expenditures by any person for the
purpose of influencing or attempting to influence the
election of candidates.
The contributors to electoral campaign funds are either
natural or artificial persons, or an organized group of
persons without separate legal personality. Sec. 39 even
goes further by including in the definition of the term
"person," a committee or any other group of persons
which may not have any juridical personality.
It has likewise been held that in the absence of an
expressed statutory provision or instruction the word
"person" comprehends private corporations unless it
appears that it is used in a more limited sense, and
that prima facie the word "person" under even a penal
statute which is intended to inhibit an act, must be a
"person in law" that is, an artificial as well as a natural
person and therefore includes corporations if they are
within the sphere and purpose of the statute.
There is nothing in the Revised Election Code, much
less in Sec. 56 itself, indicting that the term "foreigner"
is limited only to natural persons. Neither is there any
provision in the same Revised Election Code expressly
or impliedly suggesting that the circumstances of an
artificial person in law are not identical to those of
natural persons covered by the prohibition in the Revised
Election Code. On the contrary, there is greater
reason to believe that the law-maker feared more the
assistance and influence of artificial persons in the
elections than the aid of natural persons. Hence, the
law utilizes the more generic term "foreigner."

It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that a law is

understood to contain, by implication, if not by its
expressed terms, all such provisions as may be necessary
to effectuate its object and purpose. And that the whole
and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing
the meaning of its part.7
The law penalizing corrupt election practices should be
given a reasonable construction in the interests of the
purity of the elections. 8 Since, as heretofore stated, the
danger of desecration of the sanctity of the ballot is
greater from artificial persons by reason of their vastly
superior financial and other resources including the
combined voting power of their members and
employees, the term "foreigner" in Sec. 56 should be
understood to include artificial persons and other
organized groups, without distinct legal personality.
Hold that the donations of billboards to the Commission
by foreigners or companies or corporations owned and
controlled partially or wholly by foreigners are not
covered by the prohibition of Sec. 56 of the Revised
Election Code." (Emphasis supplied)
The term "any can candidate" should be construed also
to mean some or all candidates. It has been held that the
term "any candidate" voted for at any election refers to
"candidates"; 9 and that the term "any person" is not
limited to "any person" in the singular, but is applicable
as well to two or more persons. 10.
When the context so indicates, the word may be
construed to mean, and indeed it has been frequently
used in its enlarged and plural sense, as meaning "all,"
"all or every," "each," "each one of all," "every," without
limitation; indefinite number or quantity, an
indeterminate unit or number of units out of many or all,
one or more as the case may be, several, some.
D. Use of generic words include things that arise
after enactment of the law progressive
interpretation
It must be remembered that the Revised Administrative
Code is a general legislation. As such, it must have been
intended to meet not only the peculiar conditions
obtaining at the time of its enactment but also designed
to comprehend those that may normally arise after its
approval.
To our mind the term "merchandise of prohibited
exportation" used in the code is broad enough to
embrace not only those already declared prohibited at
the time of its adoption but also goods, commodities or
articles that may be the subject of activities undertaken
in violation of subsequent laws.