Sto. Tomas vs.

Salac
Held:

1) Section 6 is valid and constitutional. “illegal recruitment” as defined in Section 6 is clear and
unambiguous and, contrary to the RTC’s finding, actually makes a distinction between licensed
and non-licensed recruiters. By its terms, persons who engage in “canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers” without the appropriate
government license or authority are guilty of illegal recruitment whether or not they commit the
wrongful acts enumerated in that section. On the other hand, recruiters who engage in the
canvassing, enlisting, etc. of OFWs, although with the appropriate government license or
authority, are guilty of illegal recruitment only if they commit any of the wrongful acts
enumerated in Section 6.

2) Section 7 is valid and constitutional. the RTC did not agree that the law can impose such
grave penalties upon what it believed were specific acts that were not as condemnable as the
others in the lists. But, in fixing uniform penalties for each of the enumerated acts under Section
6, Congress was within its prerogative to determine what individual acts are equally
reprehensible, consistent with the State policy of according full protection to labor, and
deserving of the same penalties. It is not within the power of the Court to question the wisdom of
this kind of choice. Notably, this legislative policy has been further stressed in July 2010 with the
enactment of R.A. 10022 which increased even more the duration of the penalties of
imprisonment and the amounts of fine for the commission of the acts listed under Section 7. in
fixing such tough penalties, the law considered the unsettling fact that OFWs must work outside
the country’s borders and beyond its immediate protection. The law must, therefore, make an
effort to somehow protect them from conscienceless individuals within its jurisdiction who,
fueled by greed, are willing to ship them out without clear assurance that their contracted
principals would treat such OFWs fairly and humanely. The State under its police power “may
prescribe such regulations as in its judgment will secure or tend to secure the general welfare of
the people, to protect them against the consequence of ignorance and incapacity as well as of
deception and fraud.” Police power is “that inherent and plenary power of the State which
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.”

3) Section 9 is valid and constitutional. SEC. 9. states that Venue. – A criminal action arising
from illegal recruitment as defined herein shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the
province or city where the offense was committed or where the offended party actually resides
at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That the court where the criminal action
is first filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts: Provided, however, That
the aforestated provisions shall also apply to those criminal actions that have already been filed
in court at the time of the effectivity of this Act. There is nothing arbitrary or unconstitutional in
Congress fixing an alternative venue for violations of Section 6 of R.A. 8042 that differs from the
venue established by the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Indeed, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the
latter Rules allows exceptions provided by laws. Thus: SEC. 15. Place where action is to be
instituted.— (a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its
essential ingredients occurred. (Emphasis supplied). Section 9 of R.A. 8042, as an exception to
the rule on venue of criminal actions is, consistent with that law’s declared policy15 of providing
a criminal justice system that protects and serves the best interests of the victims of illegal
recruitment.

NY Times vs. U.S.

The Court ruled 6-3 in New York Times v. United States that the prior restraint was
unconstitutional. Though the majority justices disagreed on some important issues, they agreed
that “Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government…In
revealing the workings of government that led to the Vietnam War, the newspapers nobly did
that which the Founders hoped and trusted they would do.” Dismissing the claimed threat to
national security, the Court continued, “The word ‘security’ is a broad, vague generality whose
contours should not be invoked to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First
Amendment.” New York Times v. United States remains one of the most important freedom of
the press case in American history.

PPI vs. COMELEC

HELD: No. The court held that the resolution does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of
eminent domain. To compel print media companies to donate “Comelec-space” amounts to
“taking” of private personal property for public use or purposes without the requisite just
compensation. The extent of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a
de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private property. The monetary
value of the compulsory “donation,” measured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by
newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may be very substantial indeed.

The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use are the necessity
for the taking and the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking
has not been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of
PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes.
Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the
problem. Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been
granted the power of eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A
reasonable relationship between that power and the enforcement and administration of election
laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed.

The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not
without payment of “just compensation” (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of
paying compensation for “Comelec space” is precisely what is sought to be avoided by
respondent Commission.

Tio vs. Videogram Regulatory Board

ISSUES:
The petioner, among others, raised the following issues:

1. Whether or not the imposition of the 30% tax is a rider and the same is not germane to the
subject matter of the law.

2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of power and authority; and

HELD:
1. No, the tax is not a rider and is germane to the purpose and subject of the law.

The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof" is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough
to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title
express each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied
if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the
title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title.

Reading section 10 of P.D. No. 1987 closely, one can see that the foregoing provision is allied
and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of
the law, which is the regulation of the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board
as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general
subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control
mechanisms scattered throughout the decree.

Aside from revenue collection, tax laws may also be enacted for the purpose of regulating an
activity. At the same time, the videogram industry is also an untapped source of revenue which
the government may validly tax. All of this is evident from preambulatory clauses nos. 2, 5, 6
and 8, quoted in part above.

The levy of the 30% tax is also for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the
need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the
flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes.
And while it was also an objective of the law to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a
valid imposition.

2. No. There was no undue delegation of law making authority.

Petitioner was concerned that Section 11 of P.D. No. 1987 stating that the videogram board
(Board) has authority to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the
government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such
agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board" is an undue delegation of
legislative power.

This is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or
discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is between
the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it
shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made."
Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the Board to solicit such assistance
is for a "fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the
direction and control of the Board."

The petition was DISMISSED.

DOCTRINES:
Validity of law; title of bill – The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" is sufficiently complied with if the title
be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is
not necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish.
The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the
subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the
general subject and title.
Taxation; security against oppressive taxation – The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited
in force and so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to declare that it is subject
to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the discretion of the authority which
exercises it. In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a
sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation.

Taxation as a revenue and regulatory measure – The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a
regulatory but also a revenue measure prompted by the realization that earnings of videogram
establishments of around P600 million per annum have not been subjected to tax, thereby
depriving the Government of an additional source of revenue. . . . The levy of the 30% tax is for
a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry,
particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property
rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of
the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.

Undue delegation of legislative power – The grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of authority to
the BOARD to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and
deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to
perform enforcement functions for the Board" is not a delegation of the power to legislate but
merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and
implementation. "The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as
to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to
the latter, no valid objection can be made." Besides, in the very language of the decree, the
authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with the
deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the direction and control of the BOARD." That
the grant of such authority might be the source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize the
DECREE as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not be
without adequate remedy in law.

Ortigas vs. Court of Appeals

ISSUE: Whether or not the zoning ordinance may impair contracts entered prior to its effectivity.

HELD: Yes. The zoning ordinance, as a valid exercise of police power may be given effect over
any standing contract. Hence, petition is denied.

RATIO:

A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or
transactions could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or
contracts. Police power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those
already in existence. Non-impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to
the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Moreover, statutes in
exercise of valid police power must be read into every contract. Noteworthy, in Sangalang vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, the Supreme Court already upheld subject ordinance as a
legitimate police power measure.

Chavez vs. Romulo

HELD:
Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted Constitutional provision. In evaluating a due
process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether life, liberty or property
interest exists. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain
privilege is neither a property nor property right. In Tan vs. The Director of Forestry, we ruled
that “a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not
a contract between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it
property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right.” In a more emphatic
pronouncement, we held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.that: “Needless to say, all licenses may thus
be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right
protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. ”xxx In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is
granted broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866which state that “the Chief
of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such conditions as
he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of residence.”
Following the American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not constitute a
property right protected under our Constitution. Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary
licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right,
but only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may
thereafter be reasonably imposed. A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the
Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license is that it might
be revoked by the select men at their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract, and a
revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege within the
meaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights. The US Supreme Court, in Doyle vs.
Continental Ins. Co, held: “The correlative power to revoke or recall a permission is a necessary
consequence of the main power. A mere license by the State is always revocable.”

Metro Manila Development Authority vs. Bel-Air Village Association

SSUES

1. Has the MMDA the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its
regulatory and police powers?
2. Is the passage of an ordinance a condition precedent before the MMDA may order the
opening of subdivision roads to public traffic?

HELD: The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, "development authority." All its functions
are administrative in nature.

The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a
system and administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police
power, let alone legislative power.

The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local
government units, acting through their respective legislative councils that possess legislative
power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not
pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed
opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so
ruling.
The MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation system but
unfortunately the powers granted by its charter are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the
opening for public use of a private street in a private subdivision without any legal warrant. The
promotion of the general welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law.

Professional Regulations Commission vs. De Guzman

Held:

It must be stressed that the power to regulate the practice of a profession or pursuit of an
occupation cannot be exercised by the State in an arbitrary, despotic or oppressive manner.
However, the regulating body has the right to grant or forbid such privilege in accordance with
certain conditions.

But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, their exercise may be regulated
pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order,
safety, and general welfare of the people. As such, mandamus will not lie to compel the Board
of Medicine to issue licenses for the respondents to practice medicine.

RA 2382 which prescribes the requirements for admission to the practice of medicine, the
qualifications of the candidates for the board examination, the scope and conduct of the
examinations, the grounds for the denying of the issuance of a physician’s license, or revoking a
license that has been issued. It is therefore clear that the examinee must prove that he has fully
complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by law and the licensing authority to
be granted the privilege to practice medicine. In short, he shall have all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications. The petition is therefore granted.

JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

ISSUE:

Whether or not the the said issuance is a valid exercise of Police Power.

RULING:

Yes, the ARB requirement and questioned Department Order related to its issuance were
issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of Police Power by the State. The
proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a
legitimate subject of a valid exercise of police power by the state particularly when their conduct
afffects either the execution of a legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the
State, the public health and welfare and public morals. According to the maxim sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas (use your property in such a fashion so as to not disturb others) it must of
course be within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in
which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others.

In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the right of property, the permissible
scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation
requirements violates due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of
the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or profession. Professional
leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written and practical exams before they are
deemed fit to practice their trade. It is not claimed that these requirements pose an unwarranted
deprivation of a property right under the due process clause. So long as professionals and other
workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such deprivation exists.

Dela Cruz vs. Paras

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid

NO. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves a measure not embraced within the regulatory
power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.

1. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof. "Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to
regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the
Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap
between the exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for the health and safety, promote the
prosperity, and improve the morals, in the language of the Administrative Code, such
competence extending to all "the great public needs.

2. In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that between two
possible interpretations by one of which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the
other tainted by such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would save
rather than one that would affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself.

3. Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the
operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their
business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under review were
sustained. All that petitioners would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate
night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally open, would
be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation
and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to
compel petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would
amount to no more than a temporary termination of their business.

4. Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an
exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.

Republic vs. PLDT

ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone System
can be a valid object for expropriation.

HELD: Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the Republic may require
the telephone company to permit interconnection as the needs of the government service may
require, subject to the payment of just compensation. The use of lines and services to allow
inter-service connection between the both telephone systems, through expropriation can be a
subject to an easement of right of way.

Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation vs. Municipality of Pasig

ISSUE: Whether or not a letter to purchase is sufficient enough as a definite and valid offer to
expropriate.

HELD: No. Failure to prove compliance with the mandatory requirement of a valid and definite
offer will result in the dismissal of the complaint. The purpose of the mandatory requirement to
be first made to the owner is to encourage settlements and voluntary acquisition of property
needed for public purposes in order to avoid the expense and delay of a court of action.

Republic vs. Legaspi

Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is
indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. It is likewise demanded by
the due process clause of the Constitution. The parties to a litigation should be informed of how
it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions
of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y
and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is
entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he
believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state
the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached
and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of
the court for review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the
parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It
is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse
dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested
with the sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his
fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public
confidence in the justness of his decision.

NPC vs. Ileto

NPC’s power of eminent domain

Republic Act No. 6395, entitled "An Act Revising the Charter of the National Power
Corporation," grants the NPC the power to acquire "property incident to, or necessary,
convenient or proper to carry out the purposes for which it was created,"22 namely: the
construction of generation and transmission facilities to provide electricity for the entire country.

In an effort to streamline the NPC’s exercise of this power, Section 3A of Republic Act No. 6395
provides:

Section 3A. In acquiring private property or private property rights through expropriation
proceedings where the land or portion thereof will be traversed by the transmission lines, only a
right-of-way easement thereon shall be acquired when the principal purpose for which such land
is actually devoted will not be impaired, and where the land itself or portion thereof will be
needed for the projects or works, such land or portion thereof as necessary shall be acquired.

Filstream International, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

ISSUES/HELD:
1. WON City of Manila may exercise right of eminent domain despite the existence of a final and
executory judgment ordering private respondents to vacate the lots.

YES. Petitioner Filstream anchors its claim by virtue of its ownership over the properties and the
existence of a final and executory judgment against private respondents ordering the latter’s
ejectment from the premises.

Private respondents’ claim on the other hand hinges on an alleged supervening event which has
rendered the enforcement of petitioner’s rights moot, that is, the expropriation proceedings
undertaken by the City of Manila over the disputed premises for the benefit of herein private
respondents. For its part, the City of Manila is merely exercising its power of eminent domain
within its jurisdiction by expropriating petitioner’s properties for public use.

There is no dispute as to the existence of a final and executory judgment in favor of petitioner
Filstream ordering the ejectment of private respondents from the properties subject of this
dispute. Thus, petitioner has every right to assert the execution of this decision as it had
already became final and executory.

However, it must also be conceded that the City of Manila has an undeniable right to exercise
its power of eminent domain within its jurisdiction. The right to expropriate private property for
public use is expressly granted to it under Sec 19 of the Local Government Code. Sec 100 of
the Revised Charter of the City of Manila further empowers the city government to expropriate
private property in the pursuit of its urban land reform and housing program. The city’s right to
exercise these prerogatives notwithstanding the existence of a final and executory judgment
over the property to be expropriated had already been previously upheld by the court in the
case of Philippine Columbian Association vs Panis:

“The City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has the express power to acquire
private lands in the city and subdivide these lands into home lots for sale to bona-fide tenants or
occupants thereof, and to laborers and low-salaried employees of the city.

That only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation of the property does not diminish its
public use character. It is simply not possible to provide all at once land and shelter for all who
need them (Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 [1987]).

Corollary to the expanded notion of public use, expropriation is not anymore confined to vast
tracts of land and landed estates. It is therefore of no moment that the land sought to be
expropriated in this case is less than the half a hectare only (Pulido v. Court of Appeals, 122
SCRA 63 [1983]).

2. WON expropriation of Filstream’s lots were legally and validly undertaken.

NO. We take judicial notice of the fact that urban land reform has become a paramount task in
view of the acute shortage of decent housing in urban areas particularly in Metro Manila.
Nevertheless, despite the existence of a serious dilemma, local government units are not given
an unbridled authority when exercising their power of eminent domain in pursuit of solutions to
these problems. Constitutional provisions on due process and just compensation for the
expropriation of private property must be complied with. Other laws have also set down specific
rules in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, to wit:
• Sec 19 of LGC provides that such exercise must be pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws.

• Sec 9 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (UDHA) provides an order of
priority in the acquisition of land for socialized housing, with private lands listed as the last
option.

• Sec 10 of UDHA provides that expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of
acquisition such as community mortgage, land swapping, donation to the government, etc. have
been exhausted, and, where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small
property owners shall be exempted.

Compliance with the above legislated conditions are deemed mandatory because these are the
only safeguards in securing the right of owners of private property to DUE PROCESS when
their property is expropriated for public use.

There is nothing in the records which would indicate that the City of Manila complied with the
above conditions. Filstream’s properties were expropriated and ordered condemned in favor of
the City of Manila sans any showing that resort to the acquisition of other lands listed under
Sec. 9 of RA 7279 have proved futile. Evidently, there was a violation of petitioner Filstream’s
right to due process.

It must be emphasized that the State has a paramount interest in exercising its power of
eminent domain for the general good considering that the right of the State to expropriate
private property as long as it is for public use always takes precedence over the interest of
private property owners. However we must not lose sight of the fact that the individual rights
affected by the exercise of such right are also entitled to protection, bearing in mind that the
exercise of this superior right cannot override the guarantee of due process extended by the law
to owners of the property to be expropriated.

Lagcao vs. Judge Labra

Issue: whether or not the intended expropriation by the City of Cebu of a 4,048-square-meter
parcel of land owned by petitioners contravenes the Constitution and applicable laws.

Held: We have found nothing in the records indicating that the City of Cebu complied strictly
with Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279. Ordinance No. 1843 sought to expropriate petitioners
property without any attempt to first acquire the lands listed in (a) to (e) of Section 9 of RA 7279.
Likewise, Cebu City failed to establish that the other modes of acquisition in Section 10 of RA
7279 were first exhausted. Moreover, prior to the passage of Ordinance No. 1843, there was no
evidence of a valid and definite offer to buy petitioners property as required by Section 19 of RA
7160.[20] We therefore find Ordinance No. 1843 to be constitutionally infirm for being violative
of the petitioners right to due process.

Eslaban vs. De Onorio

Issue: Whether the value of just compensation shall be determined from the time of the taking or
from the time of the finality of the decision?

Held: Yes, With respect to the compensation which the owner of the condemned property is
entitled to receive, it is likewise settled that it is the market value which should be paid or “that
sum of money which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not
compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor.”8 Further, just
compensation means not only the correct amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also
the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered “just” for then the property owner is made to suffer the
consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade
or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.9 Nevertheless,
there are instances where the expropriating agency takes over the property prior to the
expropriation suit, in which case just compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking,
not as of the time of filing of the action of eminent domain.

Republic (DAR) vs. Court of Appeals

Thus Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are given original and exclusive
jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) "all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners" and (2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses under [R.A. No.
6657]." 2 The provision of 50 must be construed in harmony with this provision by considering
cases involving the determination of just compensation and criminal cases for violations of R.A.
No. 6657 as excepted from the plenitude of power conferred on the DAR. Indeed, there is a
reason for this distinction. The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be granted
jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain (for such are takings under R.A. No. 6657) and over
criminal cases. Thus in EPZA v. Duly 3 and Sumulong v. Guerrero 4 we held that the valuation
of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which cannot be vested in
administrative agencies, while in Scoty's Department Store v. Micaller 5 we struck down a law
granting the then Court of Industrial Relations jurisdiction to try criminal cases for violations of
the Industrial Peace Act.

Land Bank vs. Court of Appeals

We are not persuaded. As an exercise of police power, the expropriation of private property
under the CARP puts the landowner, and not the government, in a situation where the odds are
already stacked against his favor. He has no recourse but to allow it. His only consolation is that
he can negotiate for the amount of compensation to be paid for the expropriated property. As
expected, the landowner will exercise this right to the hilt, but subject however to the limitation
that he can only be entitled to a "just compensation." Clearly therefore, by rejecting and
disputing the valuation of the DAR, the landowner is merely exercising his right to seek just
compensation. If we are to affirm the withholding of the release of the offered compensation
despite depriving the landowner of the possession and use of his property, we are in effect
penalizing the latter for simply exercising a right afforded to him by law.

Land Bank vs. Honeycomb Farms Corp

ISSUES: Did the CA commit a serious error of law when it failed to apply the mandatory formula
for determining just compensation fixed in DAR AO No. 11, series of 1994?

Did the RTC correctly take judicial notice of the nature of the subject land?

HELD: It is the RTC, sitting as a SAC, which has the power to determine just compensation for
parcels of land acquired by the State, pursuant to the agrarian reform program. In Land Bank of
the Philippines v. Sps. Banal, the DAR, as the administrative agency tasked with the
implementation of the agrarian reform program, already came up with a formula to determine
just compensation which incorporated the factors enumerated in Section 17 of RA 6657.
In Landbank of the Philippines v. Celada, the Court emphasized the duty of the RTC to apply
the formula provided in the applicable DAR AO to determine just compensation, stating that:
While [the RTC] is required to consider the acquisition cost of the land, the current value of like
properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax
declaration and the assessments made by the government assessors to determine just
compensation, it is equally true that these factors have been translated into a basic formula by
the DAR pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657. As the
government agency principally tasked to implement the agrarian reform program, it is the DAR's
duty to issue rules and regulations to carry out the object of the law. [The] DAR [Administrative
Order] precisely "filled in the details" of Section 17, R.A. No. 6657 by providing a basic formula
by which the factors mentioned therein may be taken into account. The [RTC] was at no liberty
to disregard the formula which was devised to implement the said provision.

These rulings plainly impose on the RTC the duty to apply the formula laid down in the pertinent
DAR administrative regulations to determine just compensation. Clearly, the CA and the RTC
acted with grievous error when they disregarded the formula laid down by the DAR, and chose
instead to come up with their own basis for the valuation of the subject land.

Land Bank vs. Heirs of Jesus Alsua

Settled is the rule that when the agrarian reform process is still incomplete, such as in this case
where the just compensation due the landowner has yet to be settled, just compensation should
be determined and the process be concluded under RA 6657.[49]

For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated
property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking,[50] or the "time when
the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property,"[51] such as when title is
transferred in the name of the beneficiaries, as in this case. In addition, the factors enumerated
under Section 17 of RA 6657, i.e., (a) the acquisition cost of the land, (b) the current value of
like properties, (c) the nature and actual use of the property and the income therefrom, (d) the
owner's sworn valuation, (e) the tax declarations, (f) the assessment made by government
assessors, (g) the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the
farmworkers, and by the government to the property, and (h) the non-payment of taxes or loans
secured from any government financing institution on the said land, if any, must be equally
considered.
(Philippines vs. Jesus G.R. No. 211351 February 04, 2015)

Film Development Council of the Philippines vs. Colon Heritage Realty Corporation

The power of taxation, being an essential and inherent attribute of sovereignty, belongs, as a
matter of right, to every independent government, and needs no express conferment by the
people before it can be exercised. It is purely legislative and, thus, cannot be delegated to the
executive and judicial branches of government without running afoul to the theory of separation
of powers. It, however, can be delegated to municipal corporations, consistent with the principle
that legislative powers may be delegated to local governments in respect of matters of local
concern. The authority of provinces, cities, and municipalities to create their own sources of
revenue and to levy taxes, therefore, is not inherent and may be exercised only to the extent
that such power might be delegated to them either by the basic law or by statute.
Under the regime of the 1935 Constitution, there was no constitutional provision on the
delegation of the power to tax to municipal corporations. They only derived such under a limited
statutory authority, outside of which, it was deemed withheld. Local governments, thus, had very
restricted taxing powers which they derive from numerous tax laws. This highly-centralized
government structure was later seen to have arrested the growth and efficient operations of
LGUs, paving the way for the adoption of a more decentralized system which granted LGUs
local autonomy, both administrative and fiscal autonomy.

Material to the case at bar is the concept and scope of local fiscal autonomy. In Pimentel v.
Aguirre, fiscal autonomy was defined as “the power [of LGUs] to create their own sources of
revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes released by the national
government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own
priorities. It extends to the preparation of their budgets, and local officials in turn have to work
within the constraints thereof.”

With the adoption of the 1973 Constitution,24 and later the 1987 Constitution, municipal
corporations were granted fiscal autonomy via a general delegation of the power to tax. Section
5, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution gave LGUs the “power to create its own sources of
revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.” This authority
was further strengthened in the 1987 Constitution, through the inclusion in Section 5, Article X
thereof of the condition that “[s]uch taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to local
governments.”

Accordingly, under the present Constitution, where there is neither a grant nor a prohibition by
statute, the tax power of municipal corporations must be deemed to exist although Congress
may provide statutory limitations and guidelines.27 The basic rationale for the current rule on
local fiscal autonomy is the strengthening of LGUs and the safeguarding of their viability and
self-sufficiency through a direct grant of general and broad tax powers. Nevertheless, the
fundamental law did not intend the delegation to be absolute and unconditional. The legislature
must still see to it that (a) the taxpayer will not be over-burdened or saddled with multiple and
unreasonable impositions; (b) each LGU will have its fair share of available resources; (c) the
resources of the national government will not be unduly disturbed; and (d) local taxation will be
fair, uniform, and just.

City of Manila vs. Prieto et.al.

The petition is bereft of merit.

In resolving expropriation cases, this Court has always been reminded that the exercise of the
power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of fundamental right. "The exercise
of the power of eminent domain drastically affects a landowner's right to private property, which
is as much a constitutionally-protected right necessary for the preservation and enhancement of
personal dignity and intimately connected with the rights to life and liberty." Therefore, the
exercise of such power must undergo painstaking scrutiny.

Such scrutiny is especially necessary when eminent domain is exercised by a local government
considering that it merely has a delegated power of eminent domain. A local government unit
has no inherent power of eminent domain. Such power is essentially lodged in the legislature
although it may be validly delegated to local government units, other public entities and public
utilities. Thus, inasmuch as the principal's exercise of the power of eminent domain is subject to
certain conditions, with more reason that the exercise of a delegated power is not absolute. In
fact, strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to the local government unit is, in
reality, not eminent but inferior since it must conform to the limits imposed by the principal.

Through the LGC, the national legislature delegated the power of eminent domain to the local
government units. Section 19 thereof provides:

SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. -A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting
pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose[,] or
welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation,
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the
power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local
government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the
expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen
percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the
property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated
property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of
the taking of the property.

From the foregoing, several requisites must concur before a local government unit can exercise
the power of eminent domain, to wit: (1) an ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council
authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the
power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property;
(2) the power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the
benefit of the poor and the landless; (3) there is payment of just compensation, as required
under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws; and (4) a valid and
definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated,
but said offer was not accepted.

Southern Luzon Drug Corporation vs. DSWD

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Petition for Prohibition may be filed to question the constitutionality of a
law;

2. Whether or not the case constitute stare decisis

3. Whether or not the 20% Sales Discount for Senior Citizens PWDs does not violate the
petitioner’s right to equal
protection of the law

4. Whether or not the definitions of Disabilities and PWDs are vague and violates the petitioners
right to due process of law

RULING:

1. Yes. Prohibition may be filed to question the constitutionality of a law. Generally, the office of
prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of authority and is directed against
proceedings that are done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion,
there being no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. It is the remedy to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards, or persons from usurping or
exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by the law. This is,
however, not the lone office of an action for prohibition. In Diaz, et al. v. The Secretary of
Finance, et al., prohibition was also recognized as a proper remedy to prohibit or nullify acts of
executive officials that amount to usurpation of legislative authority. And, in a number of
jurisprudence, prohibition was allowed as a proper action to assail the constitutionality of a law
or prohibit its implementation.

2. No. The Court agrees that the ruling in Carlos Superdrug does not constitute stare decisis to
the instant case, not because of the petitioner's submission of financial statements which were
wanting in the first case, but because it had the good sense of including questions that had not
been raised or deliberated in the former case of Carlos Superdrug, i.e., validity of the 20%
discount granted to PWDs, the supposed vagueness of the provisions of R.A. No. 9442 and
violation of the equal protection clause.

3. Yes. The subject laws do not violate the equal protection clause. The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real
differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another." For a
classification to be valid, (1) it must be based upon substantial distinctions, (2) it must be
germane to the purposes of the law, (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4)
it must apply equally to all members of the same class.

4. No. The definitions of "disabilities" and "PWDs" are clear and unequivocal. Section 4(a) of
R.A. No. 7277, the precursor of R.A. No. 94421 defines "disabled persons" as follows:
(a) Disabled persons are those suffering from restriction or different abilities, as a result of a
mental, physical or sensory impairment, to perform an activity in the manner or within the range
considered normal for a human being[.]

On the other hand, the term "PWDs" is defined in Section 5.1 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9442 as
follows:

5.1. Persons with Disability are those individuals defined under Section 4 of [R.A. No.] 7277 [or]
An Act Providing for the Rehabilitation, Self-Development and Self-Reliance of Persons with
Disability as amended and their integration into the Mainstream of Society and for Other
Purposes. This is defined as a person suffering from restriction or different abilities, as a result
of a mental, physical or sensory impairment, to perform an activity in a manner or within the
range considered normal for human being. Disability shall mean (1) a physical 1or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more psychological, physiological or anatomical
function of an individual or activities of such individual; (2) a record of such an impairment; or (3)
being regarded as having such an impairment.

In view of the foregoing disquisition, Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 9257 and Section 32 of
Republic Act No. 9442 are hereby declared CONSTITUTIONAL.