Kierkegaard's "New Argument" For Immortality, Tamara Monet Marks

KIERKEGAARDS NEW ARGUMENT
FOR IMMORTALITY jore_417 143..186
Tamara Monet Marks
ABSTRACT
This essay examines texts from Kierkegaards signed and pseudonymous
authorship on immortality and the resurrection, challenging the received
opinion that Kierkegaards account of eternal life merely connotes a
temporal, existential modality of experience as a present eternity.
Kierkegaards thoughts on immortality are more complicated than this
reading allows. I demonstrate that Kierkegaards ideas on the afterlife
emerge out of a context in which the topic had been vigorously debated
in both Germany and Denmark for more than a decade. In responding to
these debates, Kierkegaard establishes a new argument for immortality
that stands as a robust account of the Christian resurrection and high-
lights the power of a personal God at the center of life, death, and
post-mortem existence.
KEY WORDS: Kierkegaard, immortality, resurrection, judgment, eschatol-
ogy, grace
IN AN EARLY SKETCH for the third section of Christian Discourses,

Kierkegaard writes, Rejoice, you are not to ask for three
demonstrationsit is certain enough that you are immortalit is
absolutely certainbecause you must come up for judgment. This is a
new argument for immortality (1997, CD, 378).1 In contrast, the
published version of the discourse on resurrection offers a series of
considerations about why arguments for immortality should never be
brought forward. Regarding immortality, Kierkegaard states that he
does not want to demonstrate anything at all (CD, 202). Despite this
seeming contradiction, I maintain that Kierkegaard considers his new
argument as both a corrective to the left-wing Hegelian revisionist
notion of immortality, as well as an argument that aims to critique a
type of demonstration for immortality which was prevalent in his
time.
1
Citations to the works of Kierkegaard in English follow the standard abbreviations
adopted by the International Kierkegaard Commentary and the Kierkegaard Studies
Yearbook series. I include the date to the translations used for this essay the first time
each text is cited. Thereafter, only the standard abbreviation and page number(s) are
given.
JRE 38.1:143186. 2010 Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc.

144 Journal of Religious Ethics
Kierkegaards thoughts on immortality emerge out of a context in

which the topic had been vigorously debated both in Germany and
Denmark for more than a decade. Contextualizing Kierkegaards new
argument puts one in a better position to see what his argument claims
to supersede. The novelty Kierkegaard sees in his own approach to
immortality is largely lost to twenty-first-century readers who fail to
take into account the polemics on immortality in the early nineteenth
century. Therefore, the first section of this essay analyzes some of the
old arguments in the debate, focusing primarily on Poul Martin
Mllers treatise on immortality. Mllers essay is rarely discussed in
secondary literature on Kierkegaard, yet it profoundly influenced how
Kierkegaard would later formulate his thoughts on immortality both in
Christian Discourses as well as in his pseudonymous texts. The concept
of immortality occupies Kierkegaards thoughts as early as his disser-
tation, and his deliberations on the afterlife appear throughout his
pseudonymous and signed works, as well as in his journals.2 Given the
complexity of his authorship on this issue,3 arriving at a charitable
interpretation of Kierkegaards notion of immortality has its own
obstacles. His discourse on resurrection, however, builds upon his
previous thoughts on immortality and puts forward his only signed and
2
Kierkegaard began to formulate his position on the topic of immortality in his
dissertation. He appends a note stating that Platos Phaedo has two additional proofs
of immortality that are generally ignored. He acknowledges that the proofs have a
popular and more upbuilding than demonstrative form, and for that reason he does not
dismiss them (Kierkegaard 1992a, CI, 67). The constraints of the dissertation genre
prevent him from being able to follow up such leads. However, Kierkegaard returns to
his brief analysis of the proofs for immortality from Plato and Socrates in The Sickness
unto Death, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, and Christian Discourses. For an informa-
tive discussion on why the upbuilding appears in Kierkegaards dissertation, see Burgess
2001.
3
Evidence of Kierkegaards plan for his double (signed and pseudonymous) author-
ship appears in his first upbuilding discourse, The Expectancy of Faith, which ends
with almost the exact same wording as his remarks about Socratess proofs for immor-
tality in his dissertation, which also parallels his discussion of immortality in part two
of Either/Or. Toward the end of his first signed, upbuilding discourse, where Kierke-
gaard discusses the hope for eternal salvation in ones final hour, he repeats what he said
in the dissertation about immortality, but adds that the expectant one will understand
the full meaning of the same God who, after having led us by his hand through the
world, draws back his hand and opens his arms to receive in them the yearning soul
only after death (1992b, EUD, 29). In part two of Either/Or, Kierkegaards pseudonym,
Judge William, speaks in a similarly upbuilding way about immortality. The Judge
writes: The crux of the matter, then, is the energy by which I become ethically conscious
or, more correctly, I cannot become ethically conscious without energy. Therefore, I
cannot become ethically conscious without becoming conscious of my eternal being. This
is the true demonstration of the immortality of the soul. It is fully developed, of course,
only when the task is congruent with duty, but that to which I am duty bound for an
eternity is an eternal task (1988, EO, 2:270).
Kierkegaards New Argument for Immortality 145
sustained treatment of his understanding of the afterlife. Therefore,

focusing on Kierkegaards new argument in Christian Discourses has
three additional benefits that I address in the second and third
sections of this paper. First, it shows that his seeming conflation of
immortality with resurrection in the discourse is neither philosophi-
cally nave nor a confused return to the Hegelian understanding of
immortality as merely a present eternity. It is not an implicit denial
of post-mortem survival but rather an intentional rhetorical device on
Kierkegaards part meant to attune the reader to what he finds missing
in the old arguments about immortalitynamely, its relation to
concepts like sin, fear, anxiety, desire, grace, and judgment. Second, his
new argument illustrates that Kierkegaards understanding of the
afterlife is neither allegorical nor merely subjective but ethical and
doctrinal. Third, his new argument further dispels the idea that
Kierkegaard did not believe in traditional Christian notions of the
afterlife. Kierkegaards thoughts about the afterlife are more compli-
cated than one might think. His Christian Discourses illustrate that he
engages theologically challenging aspects of Christian eschatology and
philosophical debates of his time. While his conclusions on the subject
of immortality show him to uphold what, for the sake of this essay, can
be called traditional Christian notions of the afterlife, he also councils
against potentially harmful apocalyptic interpretations of Christian
eschatology.
1. A Glance at a Few of the Old Arguments

Early nineteenth-century European thought produced many argu-
ments claiming to prove or disprove the immortality of the soul. The
interest in objectively demonstrating the truth or falsity of post-
mortem existence resulted, in large part, from the debate concerning
Hegels revisionist notion of immortality and whether it was com-
patible with traditional Christian eschatology.4 Once one gains some
distance from that conversation, a few things become clear regarding
4
Scholars have pointed out that religious issues originally sparked the spilt between
so-called right and left Hegelians. For a brief analysis of the reasons for the debate in
Germany and Denmark, see Jon Stewarts Kierkegaards Relation to Hegel Reconsidered
(2003). He writes, The best known battlefield of the Hegelian factions was in the
political sphere, but it was in the fields of philosophy of religion and theology where the
distinctive schools of Hegelianism were originally formed. (In particular, the latter was
important for the discussion about Hegels thought in Denmark and thus for Kierke-
gaard.) The difficulty of Hegels varied pronouncements on religion made for fertile
ground for this debate (2003, 47). Also see Thulstrup 1984. Thulstrup writes, The
Hegelian school was divided over the problem of whether or not individual immortality
was taught in the system or whether it perhaps was a consequence of the system (1984,
243). Concerning the two sides of Hegelianism, William Brazill writes, The division was
what Hegel wrote on the subject. He argues that human beings are not
by nature immortal; the natural body dies. He also maintains that
there is a difference between spiritual and physical immortality, and he
draws this distinction from Genesis 3:2224. Hegel writes: Adam and
Eve were driven out of Paradise so that they would not also taste of the
tree of life. . . . This means that although individuals arrive at cogni-
tion, each remains a single [being] and hence a mortal one (1987,
3:208). Hegel, however, has a particular understanding of spirit, and it
is not intended to be understood in terms of individuals. After dis-
counting natural immortality, Hegel makes it clear that the type of
immortality that interests him is cognitive and spiritual, and not the
survival of any individual knower. As he puts it:
The immortality of the soul must not be imagined as though it first
emerges into actuality at some later time; rather it is a present quality.
Spirit is eternal, and for this reason it is already present; spirit in its
freedom does not lie within the sphere of limitation. As pure knowing or
as thinking, it has the universal for its objectthis is eternity. Eternity
is not mere duration but knowingthe knowing of what is eternal. Hence
the eternity of spirit is brought to consciousness at this point [1987,
3:2089, emphasis in original].
Hegel makes the radical claim that immortality has nothing to do with
duration, not now, nor for the future, but is instead a present quality
of spirit as pure knowing of what is eternal. What is confusing
about Hegels view is that he seems to equate knowing about the
eternal with being eternal. On the face of it, these two seem very
different: knowing about yellowness, for example, does not make one
yellow.5 What is evident is that according to Hegels revised notion,
immortality means some type of eternal life in this life only.6
precipitated by religious issues, but philosophy, aesthetics, politics, history, all ultimately
became involved in the cleavage (1970, 50). For a recent analysis of some of the debates
and their influence on issues of art and communication in the writings of Johan Ludwig
Heiberg, Poul Martin Mller, and Kierkegaard, see Kjaeldgaard 2005.
5
To be charitable, Hegel believes that his philosophy provides a justification for the
substitution of knowing about the eternal for being eternal. That is, his thought aims to
illustrate why one should view knowing the eternal as more desirable, and importantly,
more rational, than mere personal immortalitybut that does not make the jump here
any less startling.
6
In the 1827 version of his lectures on the philosophy of religion, Hegel clarifies his
stand on immortality when he states flatly that the wish to live eternally . . . is only a
childlike representation. Human being as a single living thing, its singular life, its
natural life, must die. . . . The fact of the matter is that humanity is immortal only
through cognitive knowledge, for only in the activity of thinking is its soul pure and free
rather than mortal and animallike [sic]. Cognition and thought are the root of human
life, of human immortality as a totality within itself (1987, 3:3034).
To sum up: his concept of immortality denies individual post-mortem

existence.7
7
Hegel rarely discusses the concept of immortality. When he does, it is mainly in
popular lectures rather than in technical philosophical works. For example, he briefly
mentions the concept with respect to its meaning in Indian, Greek, and Egyptian forms
of art. He also speculates about the difference between ancient Greek and Romantic
conceptions of immortality as determined by their understanding of death and finitude
(for example, see 1975, 1:332, 355, 376, 522-23). He also mentions the concept in his
lectures on the history of philosophy in connection with his treatment of Plato (for
example, see 1974, 2:3740). Hegel discusses the deficiencies of Egyptian and Hindu
conceptions of immortality in his 1827 lectures on the philosophy of religion (1985,
2:62730). The principal passage in which he discusses immortality in Judeo-Christian
thought is in his lectures on the philosophy of religion, nestled in his analysis of the
symbolic meaning of the primeval fall of humanity given in Genesis (1987, 3:20711).
Hegel delivered his lectures on the philosophy of religion four times between the years
1821 and 1831, and the majority of his remarks concerning future life refer to religions
other than Christianity, for example, the transmigration of souls in the Greek and Indian
traditions. In his lectures on The Consummate or Revealed Religion (that is, Chris-
tianity), however, he briefly discusses the concept of immortality three times, two of
which are in reference to his understanding of the biblical story of the fall as an allegory
for the estrangement brought about by consciousness (1987, 3:2079; 3:3034). Despite
Hegels clear statements to the contrary, some of the more conservative philosophers and
theologians in Germany who followed Hegel continued to affirm, and provide proofs for,
the immortality of the soul. The reasons for this move by the right-wing Hegelians are
not hard to find. Exactly what Hegel really said about the afterlife was in dispute for a
long time. His lectures on the philosophy of religion are very nearly the only place where
he takes a definitive stand on the issue, and these were not published until 1832, the
year after his death, and then only on the basis of a compilation of student notes. Even
the 1832 edition was so controversial that a second edition had to be made in 1840 (see
Hodgson 1984). Hegels apparent position seemed inconsistent with his own methods to
many philosophers influenced by him. In 1829, H. E. Schubart wrote a book in which he
questioned Hegels rejection of immortality, and in 1835, C. F. Gschel, writing in
response to Friedrich Richters 1833 attack on personal immortality, advanced three
Hegelian-sounding proofs for the immortality of the soul, modeled on the ontological,
cosmological, and teleological proofs of the existence of God (see Thulstrup 1984, 244).
Until the end of his life, however, and in spite of these confusions, Hegels own view
remained unequivocally against personal immortality. In response to Schubart, Hegel
wrote, The author allows his confusion to take the most sublime bounds . . . on the
occasion of his tirade against faith and the immortality of the soul. . . . To the author it
is not galimatias to call the universe one whole consisting only of components in which
each component nevertheless is itself supposed to be a whole. The greatest truth of each
component is [in turn] supposed to consist in a lack of reference to the other components,
so each part (since the whole abides in the interrelationship of the components) is
without reference to the whole of which it is a component. Such logic is supposed to teach
faith in the immortality of the soul (quoted in Thulstrup 1984, 244). For Hegel the basic
question at stake in this dispute is not so much immortality conceived of abstractly as
eternity, but more the problem of individuality in this equation. By insisting on personal
immortality, Schubart is setting himself against the thrust of the dialectic of spirit, which
moves ever higher away from individuality toward greater and greater universality and
unity.
In the anonymously published Thoughts on Death and Immortality

(1830), the left-wing Hegelian Ludwig Feuerbach set out to disprove
the doctrine of personal immortality. He accepts Hegels spirit monism
as a plausible account of Gods unity with this world and maintains
that our external, visible, and particular reality is only a fleeting
manifestation of the invisible, spiritual, and wholly unified reality of
spirit.8 For Hegel and Feuerbach, spirit, as the universal source for
individuality, is more real than impermanent individuals. According
to this view, only spirit is eternal or immortal, not any particular
manifestation of it. Feuerbach thus follows Hegel in asserting that
individual persons are not immortal.9 Even if human beings partake of
the unfolding of spirit throughout history in the forms of thinking,
willing, knowing, and creating, they are, nevertheless, only finite
representatives of this so-called eternal process. Thus, Feuerbach
writes, The individual dies because he is only a succeeding moment in
Spirits process (1980, 129). Should this seem a dismal prospect to an
individual who nonetheless longs for personal immortality, Feuerbach
would argue that he or she is longing for and believing in a phantom,
a figment of imagination. What one should strive for rests not in a
fantastical life in which no sensory perception is available but in the
perfection of ones self in this life, on earth, while alive.10 For Feuer-
bach, God alone is eternal, and therefore, the highest calling for
determinate beings that exist only for a limited time is contemplation
of God and submersion in God (1980, 21). Only when one realizes that
death is final and complete, thus ending ones belief in an unreal
8
Feuerbach interprets Hegels thought as denying individual immortality. This is
clear from a letter he wrote to Hegel after attending his lectures for two years. See Hegel
1984, 54650.
9
For Feuerbach, the species of human being is immortal, but not any particular
instantiation of it. In this way he claims that the true meaning of the religious term
immortality is found in the historical progress and continuation of the species. He writes,
[H]umanity itself is the ultimate of all individual beings, the highest of all individuals.
Thus, the highest life is life in religion, science, art, in the world-historical totality of
humanity. This is the life beyond the sensible and transitory life, the life beyond death.
Reason, will, freedom, science, art, and religion are the only real guardian angels of
humanity. . . . Infinite, everlasting life exists in these alone (1980, 71).
10
Although temporal, terrestrial activity is limited in its life span, for Feuerbach it
offers the only possibility of unlimited possibilities. He writes, [I]n its determinateness,
the earth is also a universal, infinite, meaningful measure; it is a measure that imparts,
engenders, and maintains within itself the most manifold kinds, distinctions, and
opposites; the earth is an organic and organizing measure, a system (1980, 76). Given
that, to Feuerbachs mind, the human species has developed all the possible modes of
life as they exist on the earth, he holds that the earth itself is the only measure, the
insuperable limit of all life. . . . Earth is the only possibility of life and its perfected
actuality; the only other possibility is that of the unnatural, irrational, spiritless, and
lawless possibility of the driveling imagination (1980, 77).
post-mortem life, will one, Feuerbach claims, acquire the courage to

begin a new life and to make the truly eternal ones most pressing
need to fulfill.
Poul Martin Mllers treatise on immortality, which appeared in
1837, was the first essay in Denmark to introduce its readers to the
German debate over Hegels notion of immortality. Mller engaged in
a full critique of the left Hegelians speculative philosophy, as well as
the right Hegelians supposedly Christian notion of immortality.11
Among other things, Mllers essay pursues two aspects of the problem
of immortality. He first provides a critical analysis of the historical
sources of the debate, and second, offers a two-pronged proposal for
dealing with the question in a new way. Leaving aside his analysis of
the historical debate, I will discuss some of the more salient features
of Mllers proposal, all of which had a decisive influence on how
Kierkegaard and some of his pseudonyms address the issue.
After concluding that Hegel nowhere in his writings endorses a
concept of immortality such as taught by Christianity (1837/n.d.,
82), Mller suggests an alternative position from which to reconsider
the doctrine of immortality. He reformulates immortality as a per-
sonal, subjective issue, not the sort for which a standard proof can
be given. Self-love, generally construed as self-interest and love of
others,12 is crucial to Mllers understanding of immortality, and it
was his realization of this in his personal life that led to his break
with Hegelianism.13 After the death of his first wife, Mller under-
went a radical shift in his philosophical perspective. In his treatise
on immortality, he alludes to this personal experience, using it as the
springboard for his criticism of the incompleteness in Hegels account
of knowledge:
11
All quotations from Mllers 1837 essay are taken from Reidar Thomtes unpub-
lished English translation of Mllers treatise entitled Thoughts on the Possibility of
Proofs of the Immortality of Human Beings with Reference to the Most Recent Literature
on the Subject (n.d.). Kierkegaard himself read the first edition of the treatise on
immortality (see Kierkegaard 196778, JP, 5:91).
12
Mller associates self-love with a deeper self-esteem in which the human being
knows itself as an individual that is a link in the perpetually existing [vaerende]
supersensuous world, in contrast to notions of self-love as the physical drive for
self-preservation (1837/n.d., 112).
13
Mllers early philosophic position was Hegelian. While he was a professor at the
University of Christiana he made a thorough study of Hegels writings and used them
as the basis for his lectures. See Uffe Andreasen 1973, 1920; Vilhelm Andersen 1944,
3089. Sometime prior to his wifes death Mller is said to have remarked to a friend that
one of the great benefits he had derived from his study of philosophy (i.e. Hegel) was
that he now knew that there was no personal immortality, and that he could now observe
the results of science with complete serenity (Thomte n.d., 3).
Those scientists who in their youth contributed the most to give philoso-
phy its form have in their old age relinquished the abstract pantheism
that was basic to their philosophy; of some of them it is known that the
bereavement of someone to whom they were linked with strong sympa-
thetic ties opened their eyes to the emptiness of their world-view. That
such occurrences are found in the realm of science indicates that the
systematic presentation of a world-view is not the ultimate ground upon
which the conviction of its validity can be based. . . . He who is capable of
reconciling himself with the doctrine of annihilation either fails to learn
from experience the knowledge of the infinity of human love, or he lacks
the intuitive representation of the brevity of life, or he composes his realm
of consciousness from obstinate fragments. The love that views its object
as perishable is by necessity of a different nature than the love that knows
its object to belong to what eternally exists [1837/n.d., 11516].
Ones decision either to accept or to reject the doctrine of immortality

is not merely an intellectual matter. No amount of argumentation,
according to Mller, can make a person believe in it. After all the proofs
are in, one still needs a further reason not provided by the systematic
presentation of a world-view to motivate one to accept it or to deny it.
On his view, believing in immortality is therefore a matter of anteced-
ent subjective attitudes and beliefs. Ones desires provide further
reasons or motivations to accept a philosophical view. In the above
quotation, Mller doubts whether pantheism is ultimately acceptable
given his awareness of a kind of human love so infinite that he will not
accept that the object of his love is perishable. By drawing on the role
of antecedent attitudes in forming beliefs Mller made the issue of
immortality subjective.
But there seems to be a problem here. Is Mller suggesting that
loving a person makes that person immortal or that being personally
interested in the doctrine makes one immortal? The answer to both of
these questions is no. Although he inserts personal narrative into his
otherwise philosophical treatise, the context here is Mllers criticisms
of the Hegelian and the left-wing Hegelian position that speculative
reason can seize everything there is to grasp in reality. He also
admonishes the right-wing Hegelians for identifying the Hegelian view
of immortality with traditional Christian thought on the afterlife.
Because the left-wing Hegelians fail to account for human desire
(personal interest and love), Mller argues that their claims of com-
pleteness or absolute knowledge are hollow and that their proofs for
immortality share nothing in common with the Christian ideas of a
higher future existence (1837/n.d., 83).14 He then takes the right-wing
14
In connection with the limits of the left-Hegelians method for arriving at knowl-
edge, he writes, Logical pantheism maintains that the scientific concept can penetrate
Hegelians to task for their belief that the Hegelian notion of immor-
tality is compatible with the Christian account of the afterlife. Argu-
ably, Hegels notion of absolute spirit may be said, in some sense, to
include eternity among its characteristics. In spite of this, Mller
maintains that it does not provide a full account of individual persons.
Therefore, the right-wing Hegelians beg the question whether persons
are immortal. Mller takes it for granted that the Christian account of
the afterlife includes persons. Allegedly then, demonstrations attempt-
ing to prove or disprove immortality that do not address the immor-
tality of persons ought to be jettisoned. They avoid the heart of the
issue.
According to Mller, the tenability of the doctrine of immortality
cannot rest on proofs, because there can be no apodictic proof of
human immortality (1837/n.d., 81). The absence of sound arguments
for immortality, however, does not entail that the doctrine is false or
lacks import. The case for or against personal immortality cannot be
established by proofs but, on this account, must be made by beginning
with a feeling of personal conviction about what kind of world this
would be if there is room for personal immortality in it. For Mller,
once one has lost the self-interested conviction in a personal immor-
tality, no amount of mere argumentation or proof-giving will recover
it.15 Mller agrees with the concerns that Johan Ludwig Heiberg
all of existence to the extent that knowledge and being become completely identical, with
no incomprehensible rest remaining. . . . It assumes that by immanent thinking . . . it is
possible to exhaust all determinants of existence, leaving no residuum for mere experi-
ence (1837/n.d., 95). However, for Mller, there is a type of thinking and a conviction
in which personal interest imperceptibly appears (1837/n.d., 107). A bit later he states,
Self-love is the indisputable condition for the living knowledge and sympathetic attach-
ment to perpetual being apart from which consciousness cannot correspond to its idea
(1837/n.d., 112). For Mller, Hegelianism claims to advance knowledge to its ultimate
culmination in which the real and the rational correspond. However, he argues that
without an account of personal interest in the matter, speculative idealism fails to
achieve absolute knowing because it cannot explain the individuals sympathetic attach-
ment to perpetual being. Recall that on Hegels reading of the fall, it is through the
exercise of the free and rational intellect that one is able to connect to, or participate in,
the eternal by grasping eternal truths, and that this is ones only share in immortality.
Mller, on the other hand, proposes that one cannot participate in eternal truths except
insofar as one is driven to do soand that precisely this account of motivation is missing
from Hegels analysis of knowledge.
15
It is important to note that, although Mller goes to great lengths in criticizing
the attempt to get immortality into a system of philosophy, at least as it had been
formulated, he is not necessarily opposed to systems altogether. Aside from developing an
account of desire, love, or personal interest in what he takes to be the proper relation to
immortality, Mller also suggests a turn to a type of theological holism as the solution
to the declining belief in immortality. He writes, Because the conviction of the reality of
the concept of immortality reposes in a world-view no other proof for its validity can be
expresses about relativism and nihilism in his 1833 lecture notes

entitled On the Significance of Philosophy for the Present Age
(Heiberg 2005). They both understood these trends to be the result of,
among other things, the decline of belief in the afterlife. Unlike
Heiberg, however, Mller did not consider objective philosophical proofs
for immortality, or any other theological doctrine, as part of the
solution (see Stewart 2003, 53).16
found than the organic cohesion of the presentation of such a world-view (1837/n.d., 98).
Treating immortality as if it were a mathematical proposition which can be proved strips
it of its interrelatedness to other Christian concepts, for example, a personal God and the
incarnation. Furthermore, Mller writes that those who attempt to prove immortality in
isolation of a complete system will fail to elicit conviction because it escapes their
attention that an evidential proof for an isolated proposition about supersensuous
reality cannot be furnished to an individual who lacks some kind of an assumption
of a supersensuous reality to which the proof can be tied (1837/n.d., 79). For Mller,
therefore, the kind of proof that can be given for personal immortality must be different
from what is commonly thought of as a proof. Mller did not develop a full analysis of
what such a new proof might look like, but Kierkegaard can be seen to take up his
proposal in his writings on immortality and resurrection.
16
Stewart writes that according to Heiberg, [R]eligion and art have lost their once
central importance in contemporary life and have been replaced by relativism and
nihilism. [Heiberg] thus sees his age as being in a period of crisis, which is in the process
of forming itself towards a new world-view. For Heiberg, Hegels philosophy alone can
provide the framework with which the contemporary chaos of thought can be overcome.
Only it offers a viable and stable truth (Stewart 2003, 53). See also Kjaeldgaard 2005,
9495: On several occasions [Heiberg] disclaimed the Christian doctrine of the immor-
tality of the soul and its inherent notion of an individual post-mortem judgment.
Nevertheless, Heibergs most seditious statements on the subject were not downright
disavowals of the immortality of the soul but rather matter-of-fact observations concern-
ing the overall loss of faith in this doctrine and concerning the undeniable decline of art
and religion. These statements were published in a small prospectus for a course of
lectures in 1833 entitled On the Significance of Philosophy for the Present Age. Here
Heiberg made a strong claim for the supremacy of philosophy over lower forms of
knowledge such as religion, poetry and art. Kjaeldgaard also mentions the very
interesting historical fact that the legal constraints upon the press in 1830s Denmark,
which prohibited any direct disavowal of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, were
actually designed specifically to exile Heibergs father in 1799. He interprets the
proscription against publicly denying immortality as one possible reason why refutations
were not particularly prominent in Denmark at that time (Kjaeldgaard 2005, 94). Mller
refers to the legal injunctions in the beginning of his treatise (1837/n.d., 56-59). He
advocates lifting the ban and for a free and open debate between the proponents on both
sides. Mller holds that what is at stake in denying personal immortality can best be
seen only when free speech on the issue is enforced. Philosophically inspired positive
proofs for immortality, however, were in vogue. Heiberg considered his lectures as
delivering what the Danish attendees desiredthe possibility of proofs. In On the
Significance of Philosophy for the Present Age, Heiberg asks, Is there anybody among
the honest believers of our timethat is, those who only fool themselves and not
otherswho, in the case that you could prove to him the existence of God so clearly, as
if it were a demonstration of a mathematical proof, would not with eagerness, indeed
Although the two friends shared similar intellectual concerns, in an

1837 article in his journal Perseus, Heiberg anonymously labels Mller
a deserter for his apparent break with Hegelianism over the issue of
immortality, and refers to his essay on immortality as an act of treason
(see Stewart 2003, 7576; Thulstrup 1984, 82). Frederik Sibbern, chair
and prominent philosopher at the University of Copenhagen, comes to
Mllers defense. In his review of Heibergs journal, Sibbern claims that
he was not surprised by Mllers break with Hegelianism, given the
latters originality and philosophical acumen (see Stewart 2003, 76;
Thulstrup 1984, 82). After Mllers death the following year, the
treatise continued to provoke debate over Hegels notion of immortality,
even beyond the traditional academic setting. Thulstrup cites a
passage from Johanne Luise Heibergs (Heibergs wife) memoirs that
illustrates how the debate over Hegels notion of immortality occupied
peoples daily lives:
Martensen often visited us in the evening and the conversation between

the two gentlemen turned heated and lively on Hegelian philosophy,
which we two women [Johanne Luise Heiberg and Mrs Gyllembourg] of
course had difficulty in following. Something or other, however, occurred
to our minds, making us uneasy. When Martensen took his leave, we
stormed in to Heiberg with questions. His mother in particular flew into
such a passion over what she had grasped of this doctrine, that she kept
returning from her bedroom to advance her objections. One evening is
unforgettable to me. Both of the gentlemen had discussed Hegels view
that the individuals immortality consisted in being merged with the
entire great universe. This made Heibergs mother completely beside
herself. Again and again she came in, in a worsening state of disarray,
attacking the doctrine. To this attack Heiberg made no reply other than,
Go to bed, its late.
Fuse together! she screamed, do you think I want to be fused together
with all those many nasty drops?
Go to bed! [quoted in Thulstrup 1984, 24445].
with thankfulness, seize upon this proof and feel infinitely happier than before (quoted
in Kjaeldgaard 2005, 95). Kjaeldgaard comments, The alleged absence of a person who
would not trade his intimations and emotions for genuine, robust knowledgepatterned
after the standards of mathematical proofwas, in Heibergs eyes, a clear indication that
the stocks of poetry and religion had gone down. . . . The adaptation of faith to math-
ematical truth was the desire for which Heiberg served as a self-appointed spokesman
(Kjaeldgaard 2005, 95). However, as I have shown thus far, Mller was one such person
who would not trade his intimations and emotions for genuine, robust knowledge,
partly because, as I have shown, he saw none forthcoming from Hegelian philosophy or
from proofs in general. Kierkegaard also rejects Hegelian-style proofs, arguments, and
demonstrations.
Apparently, whatever Mrs. Gyllembourg and Mrs. Heiberg understood

of Hegels notion of immortality was enough for them to conclude that
it was incompatible with their antecedent subjective attitudes about
the afterlife.
2. Kierkegaards Reflections on Proofs of Immortality

As though he were eavesdropping on the conversation and subse-
quently drew up a psychological report, in 1844 Kierkegaard, under the
pseudonym Vigilius Haufniensis, assesses the situation by claiming
that all the metaphysical and logical talk about immortality of the
soul, and the desire to produce proofs for it, belies the anxiety over the
lack of conviction in the doctrine. He continues:
Every such individuality . . . who knows how to set forth the proof for the
immortality of the soul but who is not himself convinced will always be
anxious about every phenomenon that affects him in such a way that he
is forced to seek a further understanding of what it means to say that a
man is immortal. This will disturb him. He will be depressingly affected
when a perfectly simple man talks quite simply of immortality [1980, CA,
139].17
The impact on Kierkegaard, as well as on the Heibergs and Martensen,

of the controversies stirred up by Hegel, the Hegelians, and Mller is
apparent. While Haufniensis agrees with Heiberg and Mllers nega-
tive assessment of the agein one direction truth increases in scope
and in quantity . . . while in the opposite direction certainty constantly
declines (CA, 139)he sides with Mllers remedy, that of theological
holism and the necessity of treating immortality as a subjective issue.
A subjective focus, however, does not preclude the fact that the
conceptual content of the meaning of the afterlife matters to Haufnien-
sis. Whoever holds an incorrect notion of eternity will lack inwardness,
earnestness, and certitude, and ultimately will remain in anxiety about
the good (CA, 151). According to Haufniensis then, erroneous concep-
tions of eternity are amenable to correction. Efforts to deny the eternal
in human beings betray a state of anxiety about the good (CA, 152).
Therefore, denying the nature of eternity does not resolve the issue of
arriving at the correct understanding of the eternal. Conceiving of
eternity abstractly, imaginatively, or metaphysically all miss the mark
(CA, 15154). With Heibergs interpretation of eternity in his play A
17
Kierkegaard dedicated this text to Mller. See his more personal draft of the
dedication (CA, Supplement, 178). Haufniensiss arguments about immortality in this
text closely mirror Mllers investigations and anticipate certain aspects of Kierkegaards
new argument for immortality in Christian Discourses.
Soul After Death (Heiberg 1841/1991)18 in mind, Haufniensis writes

that the formers omission of ethical judgment from his conception
of the eternal renders it of lesser value than Dantes imaginative
construction (CA, 153). Responding to J. G. Fichtes metaphysics,
Haufniensis writes, Despite all this, he suddenly discovers that he has
not succeeded in having immortality included in the system, and now
he is intent on assigning it a place in a supplement to the system.
Considering the ridiculousness of this, what Poul Mller said is true,
that immortality must be present everywhere (CA, 153). Saying that
immortality must be present everywhere (presumably as a matter of
doctrine and ones antecedent subjective attitudes) is Haufniensiss
way of expressing the importance of theological holism and inward-
ness. Following Mllers lead then, Haufniensiss talk about immor-
tality, inwardness, and certitude is also a way to talk about the
eternal, or God (CA, 14041; CA, Supplement, 20910).19 Anticipating
18
This was one of Heibergs most popular plays. Scholars consider it a key work of
late Danish Romanticism, and its performance enjoyed great success. For a brief yet
informative discussion of the play and Heibergs intentions for writing it, see Kirmmse
1990, 15255.
19
Later that year, 1844, Kierkegaards upbuilding discourse entitled The Expectancy
of an Eternal Salvation comes out. There he claims that eternal salvation is a matter
of course. I take this statement to entail, among other things, Kierkegaards belief in a
post-mortem existence. The discourse, however, has the expressed purpose to discuss the
meaning of expectancy for eternal salvation in this life only; that is, it elaborates an
understanding of salvation for the purposes of living this side of the eschaton. This stated
objective does not discount the fact that for Kierkegaard there are two sides, so to speak,
of the expectancy of an eternal salvation. He writes, The consequence of the expectancy,
then, is two-fold, but for the time being let us confine ourselves to deliberation on the
consequence for the present life (EUD, 259, my emphasis). Even if eternal salvation is
a given, and two-fold, it is still a good (EUD, 256), meaning, Kierkegaard thinks one
ought to see concern for eternal salvation in this life as desirable (EUD, 255). As a good,
or gift, from God, ones hope toward the expectancy of an eternal life should shape ones
temporal life because, Kierkegaard writes, eternal salvation is able to be in two places
at the same time: it works in heaven and it works on earth (EUD, 259). If the
expectancy for eternity does not change a persons temporal life, then Kierkegaard thinks
the expectancy is fraudulent; it is merely a superstitious belief in the future (EUD,
259). Genuine expectancy, according to Kierkegaard, profoundly comprehends the
anxiety of separation between this world and the next (EUD, 255, 259). The assumed
salvific and factual nature of the far off country about which Kierkegaard writes is
noted in his announcement that a sudden transition to eternal life will be a terrible
hazard for one who has not exercised the proper practice of concern for it in this life
(EUD, 257). Concern for eternal salvation, Kierkegaard writes, also makes one compe-
tent to deliberate about the consequences expectancy of eternal salvation has for this
earthly, troubled life. By contrast, those who live in conflict with that future life or
those who want to have it destroyed are, in his estimation, inept councilors on both
temporal and eternal aspects of salvation (EUD, 24455). Sharply put, those who
disregard post-mortem existence and its relation to temporal existence have little to offer
Kierkegaards manner of speaking about immortality in Christian

Discourses, and marking a difference from Mllers discussion,
Haufniensis claims that the concept of immortality connotes responsi-
bility, weightiness, and consequencesaspects which the previous
arguments for immortality neglect to mention. According to Haufnien-
sis, the thought of immortality is so powerful that the individual who
believes in it will recreate the whole of life in a way that is feared
(CA, 139). Haufniensis reminds his readers that the possibility of
fearing ones immortality results solely from having it in relation to
certain content (CA, 141). Abstract subjectivity, he writes, is not
responsible for thinking that the afterlife could be terrible or some-
thing to be feared; rather, a certain historical factor is required (CA,
141, 142). Haufniensis briefly indicates how Christian conceptions of
the afterlife (the historical factor) could cause fear in the living.
Christianity teaches that a person must render an account for every
idle word he has spoken and that judgment is essential (CA, 153,
154). That one should fear immortality because of its association with
post-mortem judgment is also part of Kierkegaards new argument
for immortality in Christian Discourses.
Mllers critical analysis of the previous proofs for immortality and
his proposal for treating it in a new, subjective way are both adopted
and developed by another of Kierkegaards pseudonyms, Johannes
Climacus. In 1846, the pseudonymous author of Concluding Unscien-
tific Postscript To Philosophical Fragments argues that recent specu-
lative proofs for the immortality of the soul are not directed at the
Christian notion of the afterlife or, as he calls it in this context, eternal
happiness. With Mllers criticism in mind, Climacus writes:
I know that some have found immortality in Hegel; others have not. I
know that I have not found it in the system, since it is unreasonable to
look for it there anyway, because in a fantastical sense all systematic
thinking is sub specie aeterni . . . and to that extent immortality is there
as eternity. But this immortality is not at all the one inquired about,
since the question is about the immortality of a mortal, and that question
is not answered by showing that the eternal is immortal, because the
eternal is, after all, not the mortal, and the immortality of the eternal is
a tautology and a misuse of words [Kierkegaard 1992c, CUP, 1:171].
For Climacus, the error in the old Hegelian-type argument for immor-
tality is that its notion of immortality does not capture the antecedent
and traditional conceptualization of it, namely, it does not refer to the
immortality of particular human beings, but merely that of an abstract
by way of explanation or guidance. Kierkegaard holds that only the goal of eternity has
the power to order a persons life and to save one from despair (EUD, 260).
conception of eternity. Therefore, Climacus argues, it merely provides

an inadequate revisionist formulation of the original concept, resulting
in a tautology at best. Both Mller and Climacus are concerned with
the very thing Hegel and Feuerbach deny. The Concluding Unscientific
Postscript, following Mller, argues that immortality is a subjective
issue. If one defines it in such a way as to preclude individual persons
then one no longer discusses personal immortality, but rather, some
philosophically inspired counterfeit. It is important to note, however,
that eternal happinesss subjectivity does not mean that it lacks
objectivity. In order to show that subjective issues include objectivity
Climacus tells a story about two persons who go to pray at church
(CUP, 1:201). If one of them is factually mistaken (that is, believes in
the wrong god) and the other is factually correct (believes in the
right God), then, as a simple matter of logic, there is a fact of the
matter.
In the chapter entitled Becoming Subjective, in which the above
quotation appears, Climacus directly refers to Mllers personal story20
about the latters break with Hegelianism in support of the thesis that
the real difficulty with immortality lay not with producing proofs but
with what it becomes for the individual when immortality is made
simple (CUP, 1:172).21 In that section he raises a series of questions,
all of which share a common focus on subjective or existence issues
(CUP, 1:16580). Among them, Climacus asks what it means to be
immortal. Much like Mller, Climacus surmises that scholars have
turned the issue of immortality into a problem to be settled by objective
proofs and as a result have distorted its traditional meaning. Detecting
their tendency to conflate the concepts of immortality and eternity
Climacus sharply distinguishes between the two. To conceptualize
immortality abstractly, in terms of generic eternity, is, according to
Climacus, improper because it begs the question at hand. Rather, he
maintains, immortality bears an authentic significance for persons.
Therefore, he argues that the subjective understanding of immortality
20
See also JP, 5:91. Kierkegaard approves of Mllers method of genre mixing, of
interweaving narrative and anecdotes within a formal philosophical treatise in order to
express life more fully. Climacus employs Mllers very own examples to recast the
ridiculous nature of a books ability to prove immortality (CUP, 1:173), and to expose the
lack of subjectivity in a man who would like to have his eternal happiness described in
a certain, clear, and brief manner while he shaves, just as one describes the loveliness
of a woman, the royal purple, or distant regions (CUP, 1:393).
21
Just before he mentions Mller in this passage, Climacus refers to Heibergs 1841
play A Soul After Death as an esthetic delight. Since he reads it as poetic work, he
dismisses it as incapable of illuminating the sort of immortality he is addressing. Recall
that in the Concept of Anxiety, Haufniensis dismisses Heibergs understanding of
immortality in this play as merely an imaginative construction which omits the dimen-
sion of ethical judgment.
can have an effect on individual temporal life. According to Climacus,

this aspect of immortality has not been previously addressed by the
speculative philosophers.
Speaking to a philosopher about immortality, Climacus writes, is
like someone visiting a family whose members speak a private lan-
guage and use the words of the mother tongue but understand some-
thing different by them (CUP, 1:172). It is very easy for philosophers
to churn out many proofs, Climacus insists, because they have already
ruled out the possibility of personal immortality and turned to solving
problems about the concept of eternity. According to Climacus, not only
has the philosopher missed where the real difficulty lies, but there is
even greater difficulty for the subjective thinker interested in his or her
own immortality. Somewhat counter-intuitively, Climacus identifies
this difficulty as the consequence of a persons attempts to make the
issue of immortality simple, that is to say, about him or herself.
For Climacus, the difficulty in simplifying the matter stems from
what he argues is the ever-increasing complexity of the inner dialogue
of one engaged in the quandary about ones own immortality. But
perhaps more to the point, the difficulty arises from ones inner
struggle to form not a cognitive but an existential relationship to
immortality or, in this context, the promise of an eternal happiness. As
Climacus sees it, the existentially engaged individual struggles to
answer questions such as these: How does immortality transform his
life; in what sense must he have the consciousness of immortality
present to him at all times . . . he asks how he, existing, is to conduct
himself in expressing his immortality (CUP, 1:17577). Clearly, Cli-
macus suggests that ones grasp of immortality needs to be something
more than the mere uttering of a proposition or proof. On this account,
what one wants out of immortality is not just a true proposition but a
personal transformation. Socrates, according to Climacus, exemplifies
what it means to address immortality simply. Unlike those who
endeavor to predicate their belief in immortality on objective demon-
strations, Socrates allows the objective uncertainty of immortality to
stand; nevertheless, Climacus finds that he ordered his whole life
with respect to its certainty (CUP, 1:201). The point here is not so much
that Socrates literally proves immortality by demonstrating it with
his life (although at times Climacus says as much), but that Socrates
thinks the thought of it, as it relates to him, requires some action on
his part so that his life might be acceptableif there is an immor-
tality (CUP, 1:201, emphasis in original).22 Climacus identifies the
22
[I]f the soul is immortal, Socrates says, then it requires our care not only for the
time we call our life, but for the sake of all time, and . . . one is in terrible danger if one
does not give it that care. If death were escape from everything, it would be a great boon
import of the Socratic (and also the Mllerian) relationship to immor-

tality as a move away from producing objective proofs and arguments
for it (whether of the revisionist or traditional type) and toward
creating a life worthy of such an exalted, yet uncertain, truth. That
is, Climacus sees Socrates as inverting the order of questions about
immortality and thereby finding or discovering the ethical import in
immortality. He does so by using the idea of immortality as a standard
to both guide and test his beliefs and actions in life.
Climacus holds that the question of immortality cannot even be
properly posed in objective form: Objectively the question cannot be
answered at all, because objectively the question of immortality cannot
be asked, since immortality is precisely the intensification and highest
development of the developed subjectivity (CUP, 1:173). In short,
according to Climacus, it is not so much that there is nothing objective
about immortality, but rather, methodologically there is nothing objec-
tive regarding ones grasp of ones own immortality.
In a journal entry from 1850, Kierkegaard refers to the subjective
appropriation of immortality in a similar way: Relating oneself to
to the wicked to get rid of the body and of their wickedness together with their soul. But
now that the soul appears to be immortal, there is no escape from evil or salvation for
it except by becoming as good and wise as possible (Phaedo, 107c, my emphasis). A bit
later, Socrates remarks on the importance of arranging ones life around the possibility
of immortality despite the fact that it seems unbelievable. He says, No sensible man
would insist that these things are as I have described them, but I think it is fitting for
a man to risk the belieffor the risk is a noble onethat this, or something like this, is
true about our souls and their dwelling places, since the soul is evidently immortal, and
a man should repeat this to himself as if it were an incantation (Phaedo, 114d, my
emphasis). Mller also refers to this passage from Plato in his treatise on immortality
and comments on the significance of imagining depictions of the afterlife (1837/n.d.,
13536). For a passage from Kierkegaard that describes what it means to demonstrate
a truth with ones actions and experiences in life, see The Joy of It: That One Suffers
Only Once But Is Victorious Eternally in Christian Discourses. Kierkegaard writes,
Therefore the youth who stands at the beginning of life says with the same right as the
old man who stands at the end of life and gazes out over the past: One suffers only once.
With the same rightthat is by virtue of the eternal, but not with the same truth, even
if the statement is equally true. The youth says what is true, but the old man has verified
it, has made true that which is indeed eternally true. This is the only difference,
something that has been overlooked in these times, in which people with all this
demonstrating and demonstrating have completely forgotten that the highest a person is
capable of is to make an eternal truth true, to make it true that it is trueby doing it,
by being oneself the demonstration, by a life that perhaps will also be able to convince
others (CD, 98). As far as the youth knows, life could turn out to be a long series of
separate episodes of suffering, but the old man has gone through life and looking back
on it says, with some authority, and from a particular perspective, that he suffered only
once. For a parallel passage see Kierkegaards The Expectancy of Faith. That one could
learn to experience multifarious and deep suffering throughout ones life in this way
directly results from the right relation to eternal salvation and ones post-mortem
existence (EUD, 28).
spirit means to be up for examination (JP, 1:28). Christians and

non-Christians are both capable of relating to a notion of immortality
as a test, but Kierkegaard thinks that the task of immortality
ultimately differs between them. As he sees it, Socrates relates himself
to the idea of immortality in order to appropriate it as a means to
change [his] life; a Christian, in contrast, relates to something his-
torical, the story of Christ, in order to change his or her life (JP,
1:27).23 The temporal task of immortality differs between them because
they face different points of departure, and thus different conceptions,
in relating to the afterlife. The distinction drawn here is similar to that
between religiousness A and B found in the Postscript. On this view, a
Christian should also relate to the uncertainty of eternity as a way to
test his or her actions,24 but the task differs because, unlike Socrates,
the possibility of eternal happiness is based on the historical events of
the incarnation and the resurrection of Christ.25 However, the fact that
23
The full quotation reads as follows: But with regard to becoming a Christian there
is a dialectical difference from Socrates which must be remembered. Specifically in the
relationship to immortalitya person relates himself to himself and the ideano
further. But when a man chooses upon an if to believe in Christthat is, chooses to wage
his life upon that, then he has permission to address himself directly to Christ in prayer.
Thus the historical is the occasion and also the object of faith (JP, 1:2728). Arguably,
Socrates does put forward persuasive reasons to accept belief in immortality for use in
this life, and in this way relates to his idea of it. For Climacus and Kierkegaard, the
content of Christs life necessitates that Christians consider their temporal actions with
respect to the possibility of an afterlife, but also to something other, the content of which
is not of their own making.
24
In the Postscript, Climacus argues that the relation to immortality is a task for
everyone because ethically everything culminates in immortality, without which the
ethical is merely custom and habit (CUP, 1:175). A bit further, making the point that
eternal happiness should alter ones temporal life, Climacus writes, If an existing person
is to relate himself with pathos to an eternal happiness, the point is that his existence
should express the relation. As soon as one knows how an individual exists, then one
knows how he relates himself to an eternal happiness, that is, whether he does or does
not (CUP, 1:393). Years later in a journal entry Kierkegaard would write, Immortality
this was once the high goal to which the heroes of the race looked forward, humbly
acknowledging that this reward was so high that it had no relationship to their most
strenuous strivingand now every louse is immortal (JP, 2:231). In the same year, 1854,
Kierkegaard notes this shift in perspective with a bit of humor: Immortality was once
the high goal of the greatest possible effort, relating to the entire formation of character
in this life. Nowadays if a man and woman merely couplean immortal creature
immediately results, and with a sprinkle of water on its heada Christian, with the
expectation of eternal happiness (JP, 2:38182).
25
On the Socratic account, one prepares for death and relates to the afterlife by
properly ordering ones soul which involves treating the pleasures of the body and its
ornamentation as of no concern, and likewise to concern oneself with the pleasures of
learning, and to adorn ones soul not with alien but with its own ornaments, namely
moderation, righteousness, courage, freedom, and truth, and in that state [one] awaits
[ones] journey to the underworld (Phaedo, 114e115a, my emphasis). In contrast, and
Climacus indicates the objective and historical nature of the content of

Christian afterlife does not result, in his hands, in further proofs or
demonstrations of immortality.26 According to Climacus, ones warrant
for choosing to have the possibility of an eternal happiness change
ones life has little to do with consenting to conclusions based on
objective demonstrations. While he claims that the historicity of
Christianity is true, every effort to establish the certainty of it proves
nothing beyond an approximation (CUP, 1:576). Even non-revisionist
proofs for eternal happiness never result in the certainty that the
arguments for them are sound. Therefore, merely understanding
eternal happiness along these lines does not explain how one comes
into relation to it. Furthermore, Climacus argues that focusing on what
eternal happiness is by trying to prove it draws one away from seeing
it as something that should change ones life. The idea is that things
spiritual require a personal response, not proofs.27 Although we readily
as we shall see in CD, the state in which a Christian, according to Kierkegaard, can be
said to await her journey to an afterlife is in fear. But already in CUP we see that
persons who choose to relate to the possibility of eternal life are prompted to become
aware of different sorts of actions and dispositional states from that of Socrates, namely,
renunciation (CUP, 1:431), suffering (CUP, 1:432), joyful suffering (CUP, 1:438), self-
annihilation (CUP, 1:461), guilt-consciousness (CUP, 1:526), sin-consciousness (CUP,
1:583). Furthermore, in referring to eternal happiness as the highest good, Climacus
also draws attention to what it means for one to thank God for the good that God
gives (CUP, 1:17778). A proper relationship to eternal happiness necessarily involves
seeing it as a gift. See also Kierkegaard 1993a, UDVS, 11, 16, 19. Ones relationship
to immortality requires that one repent, always thank God, and confess.
26
See Burgess 1975, 5253. Burgess writes, In Religiousness B the nature of eternal
happiness is specified in certain ways, but not so as to turn back to speculation. . . .
Although eternal happiness is further defined, this change does not lead away from
passion but to greater passion, not towards speculation but into concrete existence.
Accordingly, the positing of conditions defining eternal happiness does not stifle ethical
striving but presses it as far as possible. See also Barrett 2005, 271. Although Barrett
is discussing eternal bliss in Kierkegaards discourse The Gospel of Sufferings in
UDVS, I think what he says there about why Kierkegaard refrains from further
specifying the content of eternal bliss is akin to Climacuss reticence on this issue.
Kierkegaard says little about the nature of the state of exaltation, either Christs or the
followers, for he fears that spiritually premature speculations about eternal bliss could
denigrate into self-indulgent fantasies and distract the follower from the immediate
business of walking the difficult road. The joy cannot be precisely defined in advance, but
can only be discovered through the process of conforming to Christ. However, the follower
does need to be reassured that there is indeed an ultimate telos of joy. In the discourse
on resurrection, as I go on to show, the possible joy in immortality is simultaneously tied
to one being wounded by it.
27
In his treatise on immortality, Mller gives a humorous anecdote that speaks to
this situation. He describes a conversation between a bookkeeper and a theology student.
The bookkeeper asks that the student give him an irrefutable proof for the immortality
of the soul. The bookkeeper admits that he is not that religious, but receiving the proof
would settle the matter, since he has no time to think of such spiritual ideas on his own.
accept justified knowledge claims to guide our actions all the time,
when it comes to a lack of certainty about eternal happiness, Climacus
thinks that the difficulty of relating to it as a motivation for action does
not lie in further attempts to specify its content, but rather, arises
when the subjective passion is to be joined together with something
historical, and the task is not to relinquish the subjective passion
(CUP, 1:576). One can find, as did Mller, other reasons for rejecting
revisionist arguments. But for Climacus, that still does not correct the
content of the revisionist arguments. Nor does he set out to do so in the
Postscript; showing that the Hegelian notion of eternal life is a coun-
terfeit suffices. Thus, following Mller, Climacus does not offer objective
demonstrations for immortality or eternal happiness. Instead, Clima-
cus discusses the difficulty of relating to the promise of eternal
happiness.
Take Climacuss example of the difference between a woman who
has been told that her deceased beloved in fact loved her (although he
never said this to her while he was living) and that of a person
interested in his eternal happiness. The woman has a desire to know
for certain that she was loved, but the only one who can confirm this
to her is dead. With no way to satisfy her need for certainty (no amount
of reassurance from his friends and family can give it to her), the more
her interest grows, the more maddening the situation becomes. The
only way out of this situation, her only consolation, is to cease to search
for certainty on this issue and to find comfort elsewhere to confirm that
she was loved (for example, she can find comfort in the eternal . . .
which is the special happiness of being in love, whether she was loved
or was not loved [CUP, 1:577]). The person who has a desire for his
eternal happiness is confronted with the same obstacles to certainty.
But here there is no outlet from his desire for certainty because there
is no eternal which may be used to dissipate the interest outside of the
passion for his eternal happiness. That is, in relating to eternal
happiness, Climacus understands that a person relates eo ipso also to
God (CUP, 1:413). If there is any comfort in this situation to be found
at all, it remains in the intense desire for an eternal happiness which
is based on something historical, of which the knowledge, at its
maximum, is an approximation (CUP, 1:577). An approximation is to
be understood here as a justified belief which yet falls short of
certainty.
Climacus creates what seems to be an impossible situation for
persons interested in eternal happiness. A Christian, he writes, makes
the Socratic commitment to the possibility of immortality, but is also
required to venture to believe in an eternal life against [his or her]
understanding (CUP, 1:429). Given the difficult nature of this pre-
dicament, Climacus understands, with Heiberg, how one might feel
relieved to have an objective demonstration of the things Christianity

teaches. Unlike Heiberg, however, Climacus does not think demon-
strations, properly done, offer respite from the difficulty of relating
to immortality; rather, and with a note of irony, he maintains that,
properly done, they increase the difficulty.28 Foreshadowing how
Kierkegaards new argument for immortality may be said to wound
from behind, Climacus writes, To struggle through life, existing, on
the basis of the if of immortality might seem arduous enough, and to
obtain a demonstration of a resurrection an enormous reliefif the
demonstration itself were not the most difficult of all (CUP, 1:429, my
emphasis). The difficulty, I will go on to show, has less to do with
following the brilliance of a sophisticated argument or proof and more
with coming to terms with the entailments of post-mortem existence,
seen from Kierkegaards understanding of its traditional Christian
account. What, then, could the new argument for immortality, prom-
ised by Kierkegaard in the draft for Christian Discourses, look like?
Before any discussion of that question, there is one more lingering
issue which requires attention. How can the Concluding Unscientific
Postscript, which is a pseudonymous, philosophical, and objective
work, deal with personal immortality, which is said to be a subjective
concepteven to the extent of rejecting the philosophical notion of
immortality? If philosophy is only dealing with a counterfeit concept,
how can one philosophically compare this counterfeit with the so-called
real concept? Part of the answer may be that Climacus, while a
philosopher, is here writing upbuilding work. Embedded within the
Postscript is an allegorical narrative that explains Climacuss motiva-
tion for the project (CUP, 1:23439). Climacus tells a story about a
conversation he overheard between an old man and his grandson while
they were in the process of burying the boys father. The boys deceased
father had been taken with speculative philosophy and as a result left
his faith. The old man is fraught with the possibility of his own
inadequacy to instruct his grandson on the importance of faith for
salvation. The reason for the old mans doubt, Climacus surmises, is
28
Recall that Heiberg considered the audience for his intended lectures On the
Significance of Philosophy for the Present Age eager for philosophical proofs of theo-
logical doctrines, and that upon receiving them, they would be thankful and happier than
they were prior to hearing them. Climacus thinks such a desire for certainty is natural;
he writes, In a human being there is always a desire . . . to have something really firm
and fixed that can exclude the dialectical, but . . . even the most certain of all, a
revelation, eo ipso becomes dialectical when I appropriate it (CUP, 1:35 n). For Clima-
cus, certainty on matters theological does not even remotely begin to scratch the surface
of what is at stake in becoming a Christian. Furthermore, as I will show, Kierkegaard
disagrees with Heiberg in that a proper demonstration of the afterlife will incite fear and
concern. There will also be joy, but for reasons other than accomplishing a revisionist
portrayal, or philosophical proof, of immortality.
that the old man has been forced into a state of intimidation by the
sophistications of speculative philosophy on the issue of salvation, and
therefore, he is deeply troubled about how he might explain to his
grandson what is required for personal immortality. Climacus is moved
by this scene and vows to root out the misunderstanding in speculative
philosophys approach to immortality. Climacus also sets out to dis-
cover and reveal what would be the appropriate way the grandson
ought to relate himself to the prospect of an eternal happiness. In
many respects, it is for such ordinary people that he writes the book.
Another meaning of the project in the Concluding Unscientific
Postscript is that it sets out, to borrow an expression from Wittgen-
stein, to get rid of language gone on holiday (Wittgenstein 2001, 16).
According to Climacus, speculative philosophers make the mistake of
removing the concept of immortality from its original context. The
whole book is a gigantic fly bottle (Wittgenstein 2001, 309), and
Climacuss goal is to let the fly bump around at the limits of the
position until the fly sees the way out that was there right before it all
the time. Accordingly, in the end Climacus has to revoke everything
(CUP, 1:619), but to write a book and then revoke it is not the same as
not writing it at all (CUP, 1:621). For Climacus, after one reads
Concluding Unscientific Postscript, one no longer needs it.
3. New Argument, New Stage: Binding Immortality to

the Resurrection
Most of the previous arguments for or against immortality, according
to Kierkegaard, had little to do with Christian accounts of the afterlife.
Proving that the eternal is immortal still leaves open the question
whether human beings are immortal. By holding it up to his under-
standing of the Christian story of the resurrection, Kierkegaard, like
Climacus before him, can expose the revisionist notion of immortality
as a counterfeit and therefore incompetent in addressing the issue at
hand. With Mller, Kierkegaard maintains that a Christian conception
of the afterlife necessarily involves some type of post-mortem existence
for human beings. Traditionally, reference to the resurrection has been
the main Christian way for explaining this existence. Frustrated by the
increasing efforts of philosophers and philosophical theologians to
prove or disprove something that has nothing to do with what was
originally at stake, Kierkegaard draws a sharp distinction, early on in
the discourse on resurrection, between deciding immortality and
demonstrating immortality (CD, 204). Deciding immortality, properly
done, involves being anxious and afraid. Demonstrating immortality
involves letting the issue stand open as left up to everyones discre-
tion whether anyone will believe in it or not (CD, 204). The popularity
of doubting and proving immortality has turned it into a game, a kind

of luxury to people (CD, 204; 1983a, FT, 100). Therefore, Kierkegaard
sets out to give the matter another turn by talking about the
resurrection (CD, 205). However, in setting the stage anew for his
argument, he does not throw out all the old props. The first move of the
new argument binds the concept of immortality to the discussion of
resurrection, thereby grabbing the readers attention by what may
initially look like a return to demonstrations. But in fact the clause
immediately following Kierkegaards seeming conflation closes the
curtain on demonstrations, at least of previous kinds. The new argu-
ment for immortality is something to be feared (CD, 205).
Nevertheless, to the attentive reader, yoking immortality to resur-
rection looks like a strange move, since the doctrine of immortality is
a philosophical position that is supposed to avoid all sorts of problems
raised with the issue of resurrected bodies. Caroline Walker Bynum
points out, To twentieth-century non-Christians and Christians
alike, no tenet of Christianity has seemed more improbableindeed,
incrediblethan the doctrine of the resurrection of the body (1992,
239). As Gordon Marino puts it, besides belief in the devil, there is no
piece of Christian dogma more offensive, i.e. more intellectually repug-
nant than that of resurrection (2001, 63). The notion that dead bodies
can be raised from the grave cuts against reason, is not scientifically
supportable, and at bottom seems absurd. Kierkegaard could not agree
more. Furthermore, he is well aware of the conceptual problems
traditionally associated with the concept of resurrection. One of the
standard theology handbooks he had in his library lays out various
objections that may be raised against such a teaching (see Hase 1839,
sec. 130). And yet, he claims to believe it. Kierkegaard writes, But this
I do believe, that there will be the resurrection of the dead, of the
righteousand the unrighteous (CD, 212). For Kierkegaard, the truly
disturbing feature of the resurrection is not so much in the bizarre
details of dead bodies coming to life again, but rather that for which
they are raisedjudgment.
Kierkegaard tethers immortality to resurrection in order to fortify
his new argument from foreseeable philosophical and theological eva-
sions. Given the intellectually repellent features of resurrection, phi-
losophers of the age tended to focus on immortality, which, as we have
seen, easily becomes a puzzle for thought. Kierkegaard considers their
attempts to prove immortality to be distractions from the ethical
import of the teaching of eternal life. Arguments for the collective
achievements of humanity as eternal, or for biological immortality
(where one supposedly lives eternally in ones descendents), or for the
idea that individuals live on in their works, to name a few evasions,
all dodge what Kierkegaard sees as the most significant feature of
immortality, namely, its ability to test whether I am living in such a

way as my immortality requires of me (CD, 205). Insofar as demon-
strators change immortality from necessarily involving a duty to live
a certain way into a problematic thesis to be proved, Kierkegaard
writes that they commit the most egregious of errors and evasions
(CD, 205). The error signifies, to his mind, the corruption of the age,
which aims to level traditional accounts of authority. Similarly,
Kierkegaard counts theologically motivated questions about the feasi-
bility of raised body parts as distracting attention away from the
temporal import of Christian eschatology. That there is an afterlife, he
writes, should make us anxious and afraid about our actions rather
than invite debate over its logical possibility (CD, 204).
In fact, Kierkegaard is here much like Paul in the biblical text from
which the discourse is taken. When Paul spoke in Acts 2324, Kierke-
gaard points out that it was very likely that both the Pharisees and
the Sadducees became equally enraged at him (CD, 203). Paul could
have given a lecture on the immortality of the soul, providing evidence
for it, but he does not. He could also have assuaged doubts caused by
the seeming absurdity of dead bodies being raised from the grave by
fielding questions from the crowd such as: [Will] they actually recog-
nize one another again? or, how will they pass the time in eternity?
or, will [one] actually find oneself again in ones own person? Will one
be resurrected at the happiest moment of ones life . . . when one was
a bride? and so forth, but he does not (CD, 204). Similarly, Kierke-
gaard could have delivered a lecture with arguments both for the
philosophers promoting immortality and for the theologians promoting
resurrection, but he does not. What he says seems designed to make
them both mad; he sets out to abandon the scholarly and go over to
the personal (CD, 204), primarily because, for Kierkegaard, the dif-
ference between the teachings about immortality and resurrection are
here irrelevant.29 With immortality, everyone continues to live, in some
29
That is not to say that Kierkegaard is neither aware of differences nor interested
in questions concerning the nature of immortality per se. In a journal entry from 1839,
two years after Mllers treatise first appeared, he writes: The principal problem with
respect to the question of the immortality of the soul will probably center more upon the
nature of immortality than upon immortality itself, specifically, whether at death the
soul may be considered as tightly embracing the contents of its action or as dissolved in
the divine all. This is so remote from signifying that the soul thereby is surrendered that
within ourselves we can perceive analogies to this, in which the purely subjective
consciousness walks in the shadow ahead of a far more objective consciousness and in
which existence gains a transparency, and the question is still whether or not these
moments are not of a higher kind than the moments of action (JP, 2:379). Here
Kierkegaard can be seen to take issue with the left Hegelian position on immortality,
best seen in Feuerbachs treatise on death and immortality, where the latter writes that
sense, and therefore both the just and unjust do. The same holds with
resurrection; everyone can be said, at some point, and in some sense,
to live again. In this discourse, however, Kierkegaard reminds Chris-
tians of something he believes they often overlook. They are apt to
think, as with certain conceptions of immortality, that the resurrection
is always joyous and happy. For Kierkegaard the similarity between
the two theories joins together in support of one factthere is an
afterlife. Therefore, readers should rejoice (CD, Supplement, 378).
However, the very same facticity that causes comfort and elation also
confronts the reader with the frightening question about the type of
post-mortem life he or she will experience. Therefore, readers should
also fear it; their immortality should make them tremble (CD, 203,
205). It seems, then, that both immortality and resurrection should
cause the Christian to be anxious and afraid (CD, 204). In fact, from
the standpoint of traditional Lutheran theology, which Kierkegaard
accepts, the overwhelming likelihood is that every human being is
essentially guilty (CUP, 529), since each is a sinner (CD, 212; 1993b,
TDIO, 28) and only sin has the power to mark a person in such a way
that it is not immediately or totally, yes, in such a way that it perhaps
is never overcome in eternity (CD, 101). Thus, everyone is capable of
being wounded from behind by resurrection or immortality. On this
reading, Kierkegaard knew very well what he was doing by aligning
immortality so closely to resurrection. It was not a philosophically
nave move on his part. Neither was it meant to distract readers with
theoretical questions about how the two doctrines are related nor to
invite speculation about philosophical and theological differences.
Binding the concept of immortality to that of the resurrection sets the
stage for Kierkegaards new argument for immortality. It is a rhetorical
move on the part of Kierkegaard that is designed to assault idle
readers by pressing the new argument for immortality as close to
them as possible (CD, 203). Combining the two accounts into one
argument for the afterlife enables Kierkegaard to redirect the readers
attention away from abstract claims about the beyond and toward
there must be a place, so to speak, in God where all particular beings . . . become one,
where they are consumed and abolished (1980, 20). A bit later, Feuerbach states that
God not only orchestrates everyones death, but also that death is the total and complete
dissolution of your entire being (1980, 22). Kierkegaard would have read about this
position in Mllers treatise, for there he takes issue with pantheism and its account of
love as ending in complete annihilation of the subject. Mller writes, Only where the
concept of individual immortality is included as an element in the human beings world
consciousness can true self-love find its place in existence (1837/n.d., 112). In the new
argument Kierkegaard appears to side with the idea that the individuals moments of
action are judged at death (immortality is . . . a separation that results from the past
[CD, 205]). There he understands his conception of immortality to follow that of the New
Testaments: whole persons become immortal through the resurrection.
oneself. His discourse brings the afterlife down to earth so to speak by

forcing readers to regard what follows from the fact of their immor-
tality (CD, 203).
4. The New Argument

Although presented as a single new argument, there are actually
a series of related but distinct assertions in the discourse on resurrec-
tion. While this may contribute to multiple constructions and inter-
pretations of the argument, it should not impede an adequate
clarification of its general flow. There is, however, one possible obstacle
to presenting the general flow of the new argument that requires
attention. Kierkegaard (as do Haufniensis and Climacus) follows
Mller in thinking that the kind of argument that can be given for
immortality must be different from what is commonly thought of as a
proof or demonstration. For Kierkegaard, this is because immortality is
not just one thing. In Christian Discourses, especially in the new
argument, eternal life is both a fact and a test. Saying that Kierke-
gaard refers to it as a fact might seem uninformative; it may also
appear problematic given what Climacus has shown regarding the
difficulty of arriving at certainty with respect to so-called facts. Never-
theless, that Kierkegaard refers to immortality as a factyou are
immortal whether you want to be or not (CD, 212)illustrates his
adherence to a religious picture of the world with a living God at its
centerwith immortality . . . God is the lord and ruler (CD, 213).
From his point of view, then, the fact of immortality is not a trivial
matter; it illustrates his commitment to the doctrine of resurrection.
Immortality, regarded as a test, a task, or something for which persons
are also responsible, is likewise presented as a fact but cannot be
proved in any straightforward sense. How would one prove a test? The
point, rather, is to take the test. Thus, Kierkegaards argument for
immortality is also an invitation to take a test. This is indeed a strange
sort of argument. The matter is further complicated because, as
Kierkegaard understands it, the proper emotional response to the
double-sidedness of immortality, as we have seen, is complex; it should
prompt persons to rejoice and to fear. Thus, the double-sidedness of
immortality exhibits a tension in a way previously unseen in the
pseudonymous works. Why should persons rejoice about taking a test
for which they have good reasons for thinking they will fail? Why
should one feel happy about failing? For Kierkegaard, the conclusion of
his argument, itself presented as an invitation, is also the answer to
this question. If one chooses the proper option presented in the
conclusion, then one learns a lesson that Kierkegaard considers of
great value. When it comes to the issue of ones salvation, the lesson in
taking immortalitys examinationwhich one is, nevertheless, perhaps

bound to failis that it teaches one to rely on grace.
As I see it, given the complexity of Kierkegaards new argument,
there are various ways one could construe its general form. One way of
construing the argument would devalue the feature of immortality as
a test from God (also referred to as the eternal) with its own lesson.
This way of construing the argument would support the interpretation
that Kierkegaard considers eternity as merely a temporal event, which
he does not. A more charitable way of interpreting the argument takes
into account the fact that Kierkegaard sees it as both a God-given test,
which can neither be demonstrated nor proved, save for taking it, and
as a factthere is a post-mortem existence. Ignoring the importance of
judgment and of a personal God administering the test for Kierkegaard
runs the risk of making his statements about immortality susceptible
to a Feuerbachian criticism that the resurrection is a realized wish.
This more promising way of construing the argument also supports the
interpretation that Kierkegaard assumes salvation is ultimately uni-
versal, even if the quality of ones afterlife depends upon taking the
test in this life.30 One thing is clear, namely, Kierkegaards new
argument is not the standard sort of argument that one would assess
for soundness and validity. Rather, it is a series of considerations that,
he believes, better position one to make a decision regarding ones own
immortality. In spite of the unconventionality of this argument, it
would nevertheless be helpful to provide a schematization of its pre-
mises and conclusion. The argument may be schematized as follows:
(1) There is a difference between right and wrong (CD, 207)
(2) The difference between right and wrong cannot be known by us
in this life with certainty (CD, 207)
(3) The eternal establishes the difference between right and wrong
(CD, 208)
(4) The eternal is also righteousness itself (CD, 208)
(5) The eternal gives the test of immortality (CD, 209)
(6) The eternal lets itself be mocked in giving us the freedom to be
tested (CD, 209)
(7) Immortality and resurrection imply post-mortem existence
(CD, 205)
(8) Immortality and resurrection are something to fear (CD, 205)
(9) Immortality is a fact (CD, 205)
(10) Immortality is judgment (CD, 205, 206)
(11) Immortality is not temporal life continued (CD, 205)
30
Gregor Malantschuk draws attention to passages in Kierkegaards writing that
support the view that he believed all would be saved. Nevertheless, he holds that
Kierkegaard strongly rejects the idea of universal salvation (1963, 94).
(12) Immortality is a separation of the righteous and the unrigh-

teous (CD, 208)
(13) This separation results from temporal acts (CD, 205)
(14) Both the righteous and the unrighteous will be resurrected for
judgment (CD, 205)
(C) Either [a] (in fear and trembling and with self-concern, [CD,
210]) one can accept the test of immortality by attempting to
practice with ones actions as though there is a difference
between right and wrong in ones life or [b] one can assume that
the fact of immortality entails the certainty of ones salvation or
post-mortem existence (path [a] teaches one to flee to grace;
path [b] leads to perdition)
Perhaps the first thing to be noted is that at least premise 9 begs the
question. This is supposed to be an argument for immortality and yet
premise 9 assumes it to be an established fact. As noted, however,
Kierkegaard offers a series of considerations that present themselves to
the reader as a test and aims to draw out from each reader a personal
response based on these considerations. A brief glance at Kierkegaards
argument as I have construed it should remind one of Mllers conten-
tions that the doctrine of personal immortality, in a Christian context,
lacks both meaning and practical import outside of a larger theological
perspective. Kierkegaard attempts to accommodate Mllers proposal by
reconnecting immortality to other Christian concepts which, he
believes, originally gave it sense and meaning. Although it was new in
the philosophical debates of Kierkegaards context for an argument on
immortality to concern itself with fear and judgment, there is also
another sense in which it is novel. The novelty of the argument lies in
its direct engagement with readers (by assaulting them) and demand-
ing that they respond with a personal verdictdo you count yourself
among the righteous or the unrighteous? Kierkegaard queries readers
about whether their feelings of disquiet about judgment as a feature
of the afterlife do not expose their deceit in claiming to want a
demonstration for the purposes of reassuring themselves about the
blessedness of the Christian life (CUP, 212-13). He suspects that recent
interest in demonstrations for or against immortality really means to
disprove a personal God. Whereas Climacus felt he had to address
spiritual lassitude when it came to relating to eternal happiness, in the
discourse on resurrection Kierkegaard intends to address what he sees
as a direct attack on and disregard for Christian doctrine. Thus, if the
new argument wounds readers, it does so, he indicates, by showing
them that they have changed, that they no longer love God most.
Although he intends the new argument for immortality in the
discourse on resurrection to attack the reader and to wound [the
reader] from behind, what Kierkegaard writes about eternal life in

other parts of Christian Discourses is meant to strengthen the char-
acter of those who suffer and to reassure them of the blessedness of the
Christian life. These writings attempt to supply those that choose to
engage in a relationship with the eternal with the necessary skills to
avoid tormenting themselves with fear over the future. Therefore,
section six below looks outside the discourse on resurrection in order to
examine Kierkegaards further guidance on how one ought to think
about eternal life. Kierkegaard is troubled by apocalyptic inter-
pretations of Christian eschatology; his interests here are to develop
what he sees as a proper understanding of post-mortem events for the
temporal development of a spiritually healthy ethical existence. In
other words, whatever the end of time may in fact hold (and even
though Kierkegaard suggests that it will be terrible [CD, 209]), he
nevertheless maintains that the point of taking the test of immortality
is to imbue a Christians temporal life with a sense of blessedness and
healthy resolve. In section seven, I address the issue of whether
Kierkegaard himself believed in an afterlife and what bearing the
answer to this question has on how one should understand his argu-
ment for immortality.
5. First Comes the Objective, Then the Subjective

An important thing to notice in the new argument for immortality,
as I have construed it, is that desire for immortality is not included
among its premises; it is tucked away in the conclusion. Both Mller
and Climacus heavily stress the importance of subjective interest in
and desire for immortality, to the point of practically making it a
necessary condition for having it. Kierkegaard has not abandoned the
importance of self-concern or subjectivity in his signed account of
immortality. However, at this point in his thoughts on the subject, he
can take certain things for granted in his discourse on resurrection. In
the new argument Kierkegaard is concerned to critique, like Climacus
and Mller, the philosophical theology of the left-wing Hegelians. Such
concern on Kierkegaards part could explain why he addresses personal
interest in immortality only after strongly endorsing the doctrine of
resurrection. With Climacuss critique, Kierkegaards new argument
would provide a second attack on one of the more formidable old
arguments.
Toward the end of his discourse on resurrection Kierkegaard writes:
It is the human race that has wanted to rebel against God; it is the
human race that has wanted to abolish immortality and has managed to
have it made into a problem. With immortality (and what it implies, the
immortality of every individual), God is the lord and ruler, and the single
individual relates himself to him. But when immortality becomes a
problem, then God is abolished and the human race is God [CD, 213].
In effect, Kierkegaard says that the Hegelian approach to immortality

(turning it into a problem to be solved) leads to Feuerbachs thesis that
theology is anthropology given in the latters Essence of Christianity
(1841/1957).31 Although the desire for or interest in ones immortality
was not previously depicted as identical with ones immortality, seen in
this light it would better serve Kierkegaards new argument not to
predicate ones immortality on ones interest in it. Climacus had
already criticized Feuerbachs contention that the resurrection is a
realized wish in the Postscript by pointing out that the latter had
misunderstood the dialectical nature of passion for eternal happiness.
He had also criticized Feuerbachs broader mistake of changing Chris-
tianity from an existence-communication into an ingenious meta-
physical doctrine addressed to professors (CUP, 579).32 Therefore, in
the new argument, ones subjective appropriation of immortality, in
contrast to Climacuss emphasis, comes last, in the conclusion of the
argument. That means that the notion of immortality as a test from
God (the eternal) is prioritized in the new argument. This is not a
complete reversal of Climacuss ordering of events. Recall that the
individual responds to the possibility of an eternal happiness based
on a historical event. To view it as such would lend itself to seeing
the doctrine of resurrection as outside of any possible existence-
communication. Rather, it is a reversal of precedence which does not
call into question what is to Kierkegaards mind the factual nature of
the traditional understanding of eternal life. According to his new
argument for immortality, post-mortem existence is not a mere possi-
bility, and he shows this by insisting that the eternal tests people here
in earthly life; at times it lets itself be mocked here in earthly life, but
in the end, in the end it judges, because immortality is judgment (CD,
209). Part of what is new, then, in Kierkegaards argument is its
placement of traditional doctrinal concerns squarely before the reader
31
See also Kierkegaard 1998, BA. Kierkegaard thinks that the Danish theologian
Adolf Peter Adler has been led to misunderstand revelation due to the influence of
Hegelian philosophical theology, which to Kierkegaards mind, is a short step to Feuer-
bachs thesis. He writes, Here Hegelianism has helped him [Adler] into this mistake.
Hegel explains a revelation as immediacy. Hegelianism tends toward what Feuerbach
has expressed: to make theology into anthropology (BA, Supplement, 303). That the
problem of misrepresenting revelation and doctrine, instigated by Hegel and Feuerbach,
nevertheless does not stop with Feuerbach, see BA, 56.
32
See also Kierkegaard 1983b, SUD, 11719. Kierkegaards pseudonyms, Anti-
Climacus and Climacus, agree in their rejection of Feuerbachs thesis that all theology
is anthropology.
and prior to any questions of desire for it. The point is to be clear on
what one is about to accept or reject. Such a move on Kierkegaards
part also makes his statement that immortality is judgment cohere
with his doctrinal concerns. Underestimating Kierkegaards direct
support of the Christian doctrine of resurrection in the new argument
leads to misinterpreting what he means by claiming, Immortality is
not a continued life (CD, 205, premise 11). Such a misinterpretation
would amount to holding that eternal life is merely temporal life
spiritually qualified. On its face, this interpretation could make
Kierkegaards thoughts on immortality compatible with those of the
left Hegelians. Surely that would be to misread what he intended his
argument for immortality to connote. While Kierkegaard maintains
that ones temporal life may become spiritually qualified for the
eternal, this qualification only occurs through undergoing immortali-
tys examination. Kierkegaards contention that one can fail this test
points to his idea that, whatever post-mortem existence is actually like,
everyonetest-takers and test-rejecterswill be separated based on
their temporal actions. Post-mortem existence on this account entails
a new existence after death; it rejects the notion that immortality
means ones temporal life continues on after death in perpetuity (CD,
205). Thus, unlike Climacuss portrayal of immortality as a subjective
problem riddled with its own dialectical difficulties, the new argument
stresses the difficulty of coming to terms with what rejecting God (and
the test) would mean for the quality of ones temporal life and for ones
afterlife.
Now how does one know when or if one is taking the test? At least
part of taking the test entails that one behaves as a moral realist.
Ones actions should be guided by a belief that the moral properties
right and wrong are factual. Except for dyed-in-the-wool moral
skeptics intent on putting their philosophical beliefs consistently into
practice, this seems to be a reasonable enough venture for those
interested. Most people already live their lives thinking that there is
such a difference. However, the matter of deciding which actions are
right and which are wrong is complicated, according to Kierkegaard,
because persons have no way of accurately determining the difference
in this life. This is why he claims that only the eternal is righteousness
itself, as well as the difference between right and wrong (CD, 207, 208,
premises 3 and 4). In the temporal order of things, Kierkegaard claims,
righteousness cannot properly assert itself, presumably due to sin. On
this account Christians are nevertheless called to practice and to live
their lives as though there is such a difference (CD, 208). Therefore, it
seems the minimum requirement to know that one is taking eternitys
test is met when ones actions express belief that there is a difference
between right and wrong, and when one believes that God has created
moral difference, all the while knowing that one cannot prove moral
realism with any certainty.
In fact, the surest way to fail the test is for one to assume salvation
is predetermined because one is a righteous believer (CD, 20910).
Although Kierkegaard believes that one can begin to take the test in
temporal life, the only certainty he accords immortality is that it
involves judgment, separation, and some type of post-mortem exist-
ence. Although assurance of salvation is not forthcoming in this life,
Kierkegaards commitment to the idea that God is love implies that
everyone will be saved. He says as much in the discourse on resurrec-
tion where he writes, [N]othing has ever crossed my mind but that
every other person would easily be saved (CD, 209). However, Kierke-
gaard claims that the self-righteous make the error of assuming
something to be the case which has yet to be established. More
importantly, Kierkegaard states that self-proclaimed righteousness
shirks the task of immortality, thereby jeopardizing a joyous afterlife.
The proper way to take to the test, according to Kierkegaard, is to
remain in fear and trembling and with self-concerns thought
whether one will be saved (CD, 210). While the state of perpetual fear
and trembling, taken literally, sounds extreme and perhaps impos-
sible, self-concern, on the other hand, seems to hold out more practical
guidance. Abiding in self-concerns thought is best explained, as it
was for Mller, by what it means to love.
Kierkegaard uses the example of a womans waning love for her
husband to show that, with this waning, both she and the object of her
love transform into something different. Once, the young woman
shuddered at the thought of having displeased him in the slightest
way and could not sleep for having done it, but after many years of
marriage she becomes sure that she is indeed good enough for him
(CD, 210). The passing of her once affectionate and all-consuming
feelings for her beloved, Kierkegaard notes, not only changed her from
an engaged, loving person to an inattentive, unloving person with
respect to her husband, but it also left her without a belovedshe has
no beloved, even though she has him as a husband (CD, 211). Because
she neglects him, Kierkegaard says, it would be a misnomer to con-
tinue to call him her beloved; thus the object of her love is necessarily
altered for her, perhaps even without her recognizing the change. She
becomes so satisfied with herself in her marriage that she begins to
judge other wives (CD, 211). This situation is analogous to the differ-
ence between the one who humbly practices as though there is a
difference between right and wrong in ones life and the righteous
person who, in self-proclaimed righteous faith, feels assured of salva-
tion. Kierkegaard questions whether one can be said to love God if one
is not actively engaged in loving God. It is in this sense that he says
righteous faith throws its immortality away (CD, 211). Those who
never take the test (perhaps also those who have never heard of
Socrates nor have heard the Gospel), Kierkegaard claims, are not
disadvantaged with respect to immortality in the way those who scorn
the highest good are in their self-assured faith. The tension between
a guaranteed post-mortem existence which most people should fear
and the fact of universal salvation is not eased by his analogy of love.
Instead, for Kierkegaard, loving God puts one on the difficult road to
living as if one were immortal. The hardship experienced in this
undertaking, Kierkegaard believes, will teach one to flee to grace.
6. The Ethics of Immortality

Kierkegaards new argument insists that in choosing to take the test
of immortality one must remain in fear and trembling with respect
to ones salvation. Yet in the discourse entitled The Care of Self-
Torment, Kierkegaard aims to address fear and anxiety about the
future (CD, 73). The message is simple: focus on today. One should not
run ahead of oneself apocalyptically . . . in feelings, in delusions, in
intentions, in wishes, in longings toward the eternal (CD, 74). In
Christian thought, the apocalypse is best known as a day of cosmic
destruction, preceding the resurrection and the judgment of the righ-
teous and the unrighteous, both of which are said to precede the
coming of the new heaven and the new earth, where the death of death
occurs (Revelation 2021:5). Kierkegaard does not speak of the apoca-
lypse in these terms. Instead, he uses the word apocalypse mostly in
its adverbial form, in order to describe how misrelating to the eternal
may lead one to psychologically destroy oneself in self-torment about
what the future holds.
At first glance, his advice seems to contradict what it means to take
the test properly in the discourse on resurrection. The proper way to
work toward the goal of eternity, Kierkegaard writes, is for one to turn
[ones] back to eternity and to be resolute (CD, 73-74). In this way
one is said to be closest of all to the eternal (CD, 74). Is Kierkegaard
here suggesting something different from self-concerns unceasing
love for the eternal in the discourse on resurrection? I think not.
The discourse on The Care of Self-Torment further unpacks what
Kierkegaard means by gaining the eternal in temporality. With the
help of the eternal, or God, Kierkegaard writes, one should learn to be
totally contemporary with oneself in solving or addressing each days
troubles (CD, 74). This is not unlike the humble moral realist who
behaves as if a post-mortem existence is coming, though it further
specifies on what one should focus. The Gospel, Kierkegaard states,
teaches that each day is filled with enough troubles; therefore, one
should attend to them (CD, 72). Looking ahead of the day toward
future worries is the cause of ones self-torment (CD, 71, 72); in doing
so, one abandons the work that must be done each day. Therefore,
Kierkegaard states that one can be close to Gods kingdom today by
praying for and working to solve immediate problems (CD, 75). One is
said to ward off self-torment about the future by praying every day.
This is how one practices filling up ones temporal life with the eternal
(CD, 75). Kierkegaards call for contemporaneity also underscores his
criticism of the monastic, cloistered life. Dying to the world does not
mean escaping the world (CD, 72).
For Kierkegaard, the ethical import of Christian eschatology lies in
the tension one feels between temporal existence and the world to
come. On this account the eternal is now, but also not yet. In the new
argument for immortality, Kierkegaard emphasizes the future aspect of
eternity as that which motivates persons ethical striving to do the
good. In the discourse on self-torment, on the other hand, he focuses on
gaining eternity in temporality in order to motivate one to focus on
immediate troubles. However, in both discourses, while the message
that the work of the eternal is enough to fill a whole life is clearly
presented, Kierkegaards account of the work that must be done each
day seems abstract and individualistic.33 Despite his focus on
existence-issues with respect to a persons relationship to God, or the
eternal, in both discourses, it seems fair to point out that it remains
unclear exactly how Christian eschatology affects concrete, practical
33
One could argue that the ethics developed in Kierkegaards Works of Love diffuses
this problem. There Kierkegaard argues that loving God and the neighbor necessarily
entails that one take care to alleviate the material suffering of others. For an analysis
of Works of Love as a social and political text which could do much to allay the concern
I have raised here, see Ferreira 1997, 2001, and 1999. In her response to the latter
essay, Sylvia Walsh writes that while Works of Love certainly provides the necessary
theological underpinnings for a Christian social ethic, it falls short of articulating a
specific program of social-economic-political change consistent with that ethic. In fact, it
directs us away from such concern to one more fundamental to the realization of its
goal: a spiritual transformation of conscience (1999, 8485). While I agree with Fer-
reira and Walsh that Kierkegaards ethics in Works of Love does have social, economic,
and political interests, my concern in this essay is with what Kierkegaard has to say
about how facets of Christian eschatology ought to affect or motivate ethics. Given the
centrality of the concept of immortality to ethics for Kierkegaard and many of his
pseudonyms (because ethically everything culminates in immortality, without which
the ethical is merely custom and habit [CUP 1:175], to use one example from many
such quotations), it seems reasonable to think that one would find some type of
discussion about how the passive and active dimensions of appropriating immortality as
a task hang together with ones efforts to justify or sustain the task. How does and how
should the humble test-taker go about making concrete normative decisions in light of
their eschatological vision?over and above how it is said to cause a spiritual trans-
formation of conscience.
ethical decision making and/or behavior. Kierkegaards call for one to

be contemporaneous with oneself and his suggestion to be content
with suffering in order to defeat self-torment (CD, 73) are susceptible
to these criticisms, especially when read along with what he says in the
discourse entitled The Joy of It: That One Suffers Only Once But Is
Victorious Eternally. There the focus is again on how one can be said
to properly use the eternal to fortify ones temporal life. In this case,
with the help of the eternal, it is possible to see all suffering as a
one-time event that one must pass through in life in order to, with the
help of the eternal, enter into eternity unscathed by it (CD, 101).
Ultimately, Kierkegaard thinks that, compared to ones post-mortem
existence, one ought to see temporal suffering as occurring in no time
(CD, 101). He writes:
Oh, whoever you are, even if you feel ever so grievously trapped in the
lifelong confinement of suffering, alas, like a trapped animal in its
cagethis prisoner paces around the cage everyday, measures the length
of the chain in order to have movementso if you also measure the
length of the chain by proceeding to the thought of death and eternity,
you gain the movement enabling you to endure, and you gain zest for life!
Suffer patiently, but everything, everything that can be said about
suffering is actually and essentially contained in this one sentence: Let
eternity help you to suffer only once.
The one time of suffering is no time. . . . It is eternally certain and
never can it manifest itself as clearly and decisively that one time is no
time as when the relation istemporality/eternity. What indeed are
seventy years compared with an eternity! In eternity it will be manifest
that all this suffering, this one time, is no time. It will be altogether
impossible to perceive on the sainted ones that they have suffered,
perceive anything at all of what they have suffered. Every tear will be
wiped away from the eyes that now shine forth with joy; every need will
be satisfied in the heart that now blessedly possesses everything and
possesses it there [CD, 1001].
I quote Kierkegaard at length here because I believe this passage

highlights the individualistic nature of his ethics of immortality. First,
it must be said that Kierkegaard does not disregard the fact or the
severity of human suffering. But he thinks that as terrible as suffering
is, one can be built up from that very point (CD, 96). However, since
it appears that Kierkegaard is making normative claims about the
afterlife, one is entitled to further inquire into their status, that is, to
what extent they serve as an adequate guide for individuals and
communities in this life. I can only begin addressing the questions
here. Fully answering them is another project.
The first question that must be asked is whether Kierkegaards
normative stance on Christian eschatology has only an ethics of
endurance to offer practitioners. In this quotation, Kierkegaard sug-

gests that the thought of death and the afterlife (that it will last for
eternity) be considered in such a way as to enable the sufferer to
endure all kinds of misfortune (from the slightest to the most severe)
in life. There is no discussion of combating the causes of suffering
outside of those caused by ones personal sin, which, as I see it, is
another way of suggesting that the problem of suffering is individual-
istic.34 With the help of the eternal, Kierkegaard writes, the Christian
passes though [suffering]in the eternal sense, totally unscathed
(CD, 101). The focus here is on abiding, waiting, being content, because
in the afterlife there will be no sufferingEvery tear will be wiped
away from the eyes . . . every need will be satisfied in the heart that
now blessedly possesses everything and possesses it there (CD, 101).
Only in this way can the seventy years of suffering be considered
nothing. Only the afterlife, Kierkegaard writes, gives one the zest for
life and the capacity to endure suffering. But this makes it look as if
Kierkegaard dismisses seventy years of suffering as a jest compared
with the blessedness of eternity. How is one to think of this in
34
There is also an individualistic aspect to the point of upbuilding from suffering
discussed in Kierkegaards first upbuilding discourse, The Expectancy of Faith.
Kierkegaard suspects both older and younger members of the congregation of improperly
relating to a familiar phrase often said at the end of sermons, and then at last obtain
eternal salvation (EUD, 28). They do so, he surmises, because they neglect to heed the
temporal and eternal significance of this all too recognizable, well-worn phrase. For
Kierkegaard, the meaning of the content embedded in this statement is pregnant; for
the individual hearing it rightly, it is both quiet and stirring, calm and yet full of
longing (EUD, 28). Both old and young run the risk of misrelating to the phrase at last
when considered from their experience of the weariness of life. The one closer to death,
disillusioned and downtrodden from life, erred in not hearing the liberating aspects of
the phrase in his life. The younger person, exhausted before life has begun by worrying
about future suffering, is deaf to how at last may be said to refresh and comfort one
in lifes trials. In reading this passage and trying to understand what Kierkegaard means
by saying that there is a right and wrong way to understand and use this phrase, we
have to imagine both members of the congregation, his examples in this normative
picture, as Kierkegaard depicts them. They are not talking to each other. Indeed, they
cannot meaningfully teach each other anything about the efficacy of this phrase accord-
ing to Kierkegaard. He writes that it would indeed be a great gift if a person could
rightly use this phrase; yet no person learns this from another, but each one individually
learns it only from and through God (EUD, 28). Yet there must be two ways to hear the
phrase and then at last obtain eternal salvation. One hears it in church, from other
members of the community, and one hears it from and through God. Kierkegaard
prioritizes the latter as the condition for learning how to use the phrase in this life.
Therefore, to his way of thinking, what it means to use it rightly necessitates
commitment to a personal and powerful God, the one whom Kierkegaard refers to here
as you, Father in heaven (EUD, 28). One commits to God, Kierkegaard advises, so as
never to forget this liberating phrase when, in ones final hour, one is carried away
from this world, as it were, on this phrase to that place where we shall comprehend its
full meaning (EUD, 29).
comparison with Kierkegaards sober call for one to think of the

earnestness of death in his discourse at a graveside (TDIO, 69102)?
Compared to the afterlife, death is a buffoon and temporalitys
suffering is a mirage (CD, 102). As I have previously shown, Kierke-
gaards thoughts on the afterlife resist the interpretation that they are
allegorical. His new argument for immortality shows him to believe in
a post-mortem existence. Both early and late, Kierkegaards delibera-
tions on the subject of immortality illustrate his belief that the eternal
can be seen in such a way that it provides joy, fear, and comfort to the
individual struggling through existence. In this discourse on suffering,
Kierkegaard returns to what he sees as the upbuilding possibilities in
one of Platos arguments for the immortality of the soul (Republic,
608b609d) which he mentions in his dissertation and treats again in
The Sickness unto Death (SUD, 2021). Death and temporal suffering,
seen from Kierkegaards point of view, cleanse the soul, which
becomes purified in suffering (CD, 102). His main point here is not to
argue for the souls intrinsic separability, but rather, to claim that
persons are ultimately capable of being victorious over death and
that this capacity can be viewed by the sufferer as a comfort in this life.
On this account, the afterlife is understood to motivate Christians
toward using their capacity to see suffering in a different, and to
Kierkegaards mind, healthier way. Although it would be incorrect to
say that Kierkegaard thinks eternal life is a compensation for what
was lost or suffered in temporal life (CD, 13841), it seems that persons
must nevertheless count on eternal life to restore their fractured
selves. To sum up: my contention with Kierkegaard at this point and
on these matters is that I think there is more to say about suffering
than that persons should suffer it patiently.
7. Kierkegaards Belief in the Afterlife

Kierkegaards thoughts on the afterlife are complicated. In response
to the debates centered on proving or disproving post-mortem exist-
ence, and the efforts by some to reinterpret the content and meaning
of immortality, he develops a complex set of strategies to analyze and
arrive at what he takes to be the underlying ethical import of the
concepts of immortality and resurrection. I have shown that there are
good reasons for thinking that, despite their historical and conceptual
differences, for Kierkegaards new argument at least, these two con-
cepts are not necessarily contradictory with respect to how he thinks
the afterlife may or may not affect ones actions in temporality.
Furthermore, it seems clear that Kierkegaard believed in the events
of Christian eschatology. Despite such revealing statements from
Kierkegaard in his signed authorship, some scholars either explicitly or
implicitly claim that even if Kierkegaard was a Christian of sorts, he

was far too modern to have believed in a personal immortality or in the
resurrection. The consistently shared view on their reading argues that
eternal life ought to be understood as realizable temporally.35 More-
over, it appears that the current normative commitment and received
view in philosophy of religion seems to jettison belief in the resurrec-
tion, leaving practicing Christians who hold onto such beliefs in a
quandary.36 From this theologically revisionist perspective, it would
seem that they have either to update or to revise their beliefs to suit
modern theoretical tastes or redefine their once traditional perspective
as now fundamentalor presumably they could ignore the normative
agenda and shrug off being labeled such things as irrational, conser-
vative, outdated, and so forth. With a note of approval for this norma-
tive turn, John Hick writes that from the standpoint of a modern
biblically and theologically critical Christian faith the raising of dead
bodies is one of the elements of the tradition that has been filtered out
in the evolution of Christian thought.37 Regardless of any possible
merit this understanding may or may not offer people of faith today,
and whether it accurately depicts what most practicing Christians
actually believe about the resurrection, one question that comes to
mind is whether (and if so, why) contemporary scholars of this nor-
mative bent read their current theoretical, social, political, or religious
commitments back into older, perhaps more traditional accounts meant
to exclude the content of such theologically critical interpretations. As
35
Marino cites Don Cupitt and D. Z. Phillips, among others, as holding this view
(Marino 2001, 63, 72). See also Whittaker 2000. Those who promote this view of a
temporally realized eternal life in Kierkegaards thought tend to lack a broad perspective
(covering both the pseudonymous and signed works) with respect to his thoughts on the
subject and a reading that contextualizes Kierkegaards concerns within his historical
context. In general they tend to miss what Julia Watkin correctly highlighted: Immor-
tality and eternal life stand for the same thing in Kierkegaards authorshiplife with
God beginning in this world, and life with God in the next. Thus he speaks of the eternal
in terms of quality of life, and also using spatial terminology, though he is not trying to
provide a geography or metaphysic of the heavenly kingdom (1979, 189). She also
writes, In fact how Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms speak of . . . eternal life . . . de-
pends on the particular point of view he wishes to convey. . . . [F]or Kierkegaard, eternity
and eternal life do not only mean a quality of life now, belonging to immanence. Even if
one discounts clear references and allusions made by his pseudonyms, it comes out
clearly in his authorship, under his own name, that he believes in life after death (1979,
19091).
36
Or we at least have the situation where perhaps the concerns and pre-
commitments of certain contemporary philosophers and theologians and various reli-
gious beliefs of practicing Christians about post-mortem existence are out of step with
each other.
37
See Hicks response to Kai Nielsens argument that neither materialist nor dualist
claims about the afterlife are probable (Hick 1989, 32). For his full treatment on the
subject of the afterlife, see Hick 1994.
Stephen Evans rightfully argues, the adapters of a religious tradition,

while free to use theological language as they see fit, run the philo-
sophically dangerous risk of blurring distinctions between positions to
a point beyond meaningful recognition. The point, Evans states, is a
logical or philosophical one; one does not have to be religious to agree
with him that language can be misused or misrepresent an old or
currently held position. He considers a hypothetical example to dem-
onstrate what belief in resurrection has tended to mean for Christians
broadly construed:
[T]hose who originally affirmed that they believed in the bodily resur-
rection of the dead, and later Christians who maintained this belief,
intended to affirm that actual dead individuals will come to life again and
resume a bodily existence; therefore they meant to deny the thesis that
actual dead individuals do not come to life again [1989/2006, 99].
While he does not explicitly claim that Kierkegaard held this particular
meaning for resurrection, I do think that this quotation from Evans is
helpful for two reasons. First, it illustrates that the content of ones
beliefs matters. Evans understands Kierkegaards pseudonym Clima-
cus as engaged in a similar methodological critique against what the
latter sees as the Hegelian effort to reinterpret the content of Chris-
tianity. As Kierkegaards new argument shows, the content of his
beliefs about the afterlife are very much in line with traditional
Christian notions of the afterlife. Second, it may serve as a reminder
to Kierkegaards readers, particularly those of a liberal, adaptive bent,
of what is at stake in coming to terms with traditionally held Christian
notions of the afterlife. If one interprets the content of Kierkegaards
thoughts on the afterlife as supporting the thesis that the eternal is
merely temporal life, spiritually qualified, then one has read out of
Kierkegaards account the very thing that put his position at odds with
the revisionists formulations of his day. By ignoring Kierkegaards
later-signed authorship concerning what he himself thought and wrote
about eternal life, I suspect the tendency to read him as unconcerned
with doctrine, or with how a proper understanding of it is said to
shape existence, is too easily maintained.38
8. Concluding Thoughts
Kierkegaards thoughts on the afterlife in Christian Discourses show
a deep concern to retrieve what he considers a proper understanding of
38
I agree with Walsh who notes the tendency in Kierkegaards scholarship to ignore
the importance of Kierkegaards Christian motivations in his authorship due to its
overwhelming focus on his earlier pseudonymous works. See Walsh 2005, 1.
the doctrine of resurrection for its import in the ethical existence of the
Christian individual. Kierkegaards readers know well that he sought
to present Christianity not as a set of doctrines, but as an existence
communication (JP, 1:44, 1:75; CUP, 560; 1991, PC, 106). Neverthe-
less, a mere glance at the history of Christian thought reveals its
possession of doctrine, and Kierkegaard never denies this aspect of it.
Kierkegaard asks, Is there, then, nothing objective in Christianity or
is Christianity not the object of objective knowledge? And he answers,
Indeed, why not? (JP, 1:75). Given the double-sidedness of immortal-
ity in the new argument, I see no reason for thinking that Kierke-
gaards doctrinal concerns in the discourse on resurrection undo or
contradict Climacuss subjective understanding of eternal happiness.
In the foregoing analysis of the polemics over the correct interpreta-
tion of immortality in nineteenth-century thought in Germany and
Denmark, I showed that Mllers treatise is the springboard for
Kierkegaards dive into the discussion. Following Mllers emphasis on
ones subjective relationship to eternal life, Kierkegaard maintains
that the right attunement to the doctrine of resurrection best high-
lights the power of a personal and active God in ones life. In contrast
to Mllers treatment of the subject, Kierkegaards innovative argu-
ment for immortality introduced a new concernthat the resurrection
is a cause for both joy and fear. With his emphasis on immortality as
a task, a test in this life, and a fact in eternity, Kierkegaard desired to
put an end to mere demonstrations and erroneous conceptions of it. He
intended his argument to motivate one toward living a life in the belief
that eternity is ones final goal.39
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Kierkegaard's "New Argument" For Immortality, Tamara Monet Marks

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KIERKEGAARDS NEW ARGUMENT

FOR IMMORTALITY jore_417 143..186

Tamara Monet Marks

IN AN EARLY SKETCH for the third section of Christian Discourses,

JRE 38.1:143186. 2010 Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc.

Kierkegaards thoughts on immortality emerge out of a context in

sustained treatment of his understanding of the afterlife. Therefore,

1. A Glance at a Few of the Old Arguments

To sum up: his concept of immortality denies individual post-mortem

In the anonymously published Thoughts on Death and Immortality

post-mortem life, will one, Feuerbach claims, acquire the courage to

Ones decision either to accept or to reject the doctrine of immortality

expresses about relativism and nihilism in his 1833 lecture notes

Although the two friends shared similar intellectual concerns, in an

Martensen often visited us in the evening and the conversation between

Apparently, whatever Mrs. Gyllembourg and Mrs. Heiberg understood

2. Kierkegaards Reflections on Proofs of Immortality

The impact on Kierkegaard, as well as on the Heibergs and Martensen,

Soul After Death (Heiberg 1841/1991)18 in mind, Haufniensis writes

Kierkegaards manner of speaking about immortality in Christian

conception of eternity. Therefore, Climacus argues, it merely provides

can have an effect on individual temporal life. According to Climacus,

import of the Socratic (and also the Mllerian) relationship to immor-

spirit means to be up for examination (JP, 1:28). Christians and

Climacus indicates the objective and historical nature of the content of

relieved to have an objective demonstration of the things Christianity

3. New Argument, New Stage: Binding Immortality to

of doubting and proving immortality has turned it into a game, a kind

immortality, namely, its ability to test whether I am living in such a

oneself. His discourse brings the afterlife down to earth so to speak by

4. The New Argument

taking immortalitys examinationwhich one is, nevertheless, perhaps

(12) Immortality is a separation of the righteous and the unrigh-

reader] from behind, what Kierkegaard writes about eternal life in

5. First Comes the Objective, Then the Subjective

In effect, Kierkegaard says that the Hegelian approach to immortality

6. The Ethics of Immortality

ethical decision making and/or behavior. Kierkegaards call for one to

I quote Kierkegaard at length here because I believe this passage

endurance to offer practitioners. In this quotation, Kierkegaard sug-

comparison with Kierkegaards sober call for one to think of the

7. Kierkegaards Belief in the Afterlife

implicitly claim that even if Kierkegaard was a Christian of sorts, he

Stephen Evans rightfully argues, the adapters of a religious tradition,

Kierkegaard Commentary: Upbuilding Discourses in Various

1987 Hegels Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, vol. 3. Edited by

1993b Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions. Edited and translated

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