Case Digests in Polirev

Alliance for Alternative Action
THE ADONIS CASES 2014-2015
The act of ratification is the act of voting

by the people. The canvass of the votes
thereafter is merely the mathematical
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
confirmation of what was done during the date of
PHILIPPINES
the plebiscite, and the proclamation of the
President is merely the official confirmatory
*Effectivity of the 1987 Constitution declaration of an act which was actually done by
(Sec.27, Art. 18, 1987 Constitution) the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution
when they cast their votes on the date of the
DE LEON VS. ESGUERRA plebiscite.
(G.R. NO. 78059. AUGUST 31, 1987)
*Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: *Concept of Self Executing Provisions
FACTS: MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS

In the May 17, 1982 Barangay elections, (G.R. NO. 122156, FEB. 3, 1997)
petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected
Barangay Captain and the other petitioners Angel BELLOSILLO, J.:
S. Salamat, et al., as Barangay Councilmen of
Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. FACTS:
On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo The controversy arose when respondent
M, de Leon received a Memorandum antedated Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC pursuant to the privatization program under
Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, Proclamation No. 50 decided to sell through
1987 designating respondent Florentino G. public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The
Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by winning bidder, or the eventual strategic
the OIC Governor was "by authority of the partner, is to provide management expertise
Minister of Local Government." and/or an international marketing/reservation
Also on February 8, 1987, Esguerra system, and financial support to strengthen the
signed a Memorandum, antedated December 1, profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.
1986 designating respondents Remigio M. Tigas, In a close bidding only two (2) bidders
et al., as members of the Barangay Council of the participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
same Barangay and Municipality. Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered
Petitioners maintain that with the to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, Esguerra no P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
longer has the authority to replace them and to Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel
designate their successors. operator, which bid for the same number of
However, respondents rely on Section shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than
2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution, which the bid of petitioner.
provided:
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive Pending the declaration of Renong
officials and employees under the 1973 Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner
Constitution shall continue in office until matched the bid price tendered by Renong
otherwise provided by proclamation or executive Berhad.
order or upon the designation or appointment and Apprehensive that respondent GSIS has
qualification of their successors, if such disregarded the tender of the matching bid and
appointment is made within a period of one year that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be
from February 25, 1986. hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated
with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this
ISSUE: Whether the designation of the Court on prohibition and mandamus.
respondents to replace petitioners was validly
made during the one-year period which ended on ISSUE:
February 25, 1987.
1.Whether or not the disposition of 51% of
HELD: Manila Hotel falls under the application
NO. While February 8, 1987 is ostensibly of Sec. 10, par. 2, Art. XII of the 1987
still within the one year deadline under the Constitution.
Provisional Constitution, the same must be 2. Whether or not Sec. 10, par. 2, Art. XII
deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-
Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution reading: executing provision. Whether MH would fall
This Constitution shall take HELD:
effect immediately upon its under the phrase national patrimony
ratification by a majority of the 1. Yes. Manila Hotel has been identified
votes cast in a plebiscite held with the Filipino nation and has
for the purpose and shall practically become a historical
supersede all previous monument which reflects the vibrancy of
Constitutions. Philippine heritage and culture. It is a
proud legacy of an earlier generation of
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a Filipinos who believed in the nobility and
plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, the sacredness of independence and its
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have power and capacity to release the full
been superseded. Having become inoperative, potential of the Filipino people. To all
Section 2, Article III of the Provisional intents and purposes, it has become a
Constitution could not be relied on by the part of the national patrimony. Since
respondent OIC Governor. The memorandum 51% of the shares of the MHC carries
dated February 8, 1987 by the respondent OIC with it the ownership of the business of
Governor could no longer have any legal force the hotel which is owned by respondent
and effect. GSIS, a government-owned and
controlled corporation, the hotel
San Beda College of Law 1

Based on ATTY. ADONIS V. GABRIEL lectures
business of respondent GSIS being a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is

part of the tourism industry is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
unquestionably a part of the national executing. If the constitutional provisions are
economy. Thus, any transaction treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
involving 51% of the shares of stock of executing, the legislature would have the power
the MHC is clearly covered by the term to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of
national economy, to which Sec. 10, the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic.
second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, That is why the prevailing view is, as it has
applies. Hence, since Manila Hotel is always been, that -
part of the national patrimony and its
business also unquestionably part of the x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should
national economy petitioner should be be considered self-executing rather than non-
preferred after it has matched the bid self-executing x x x x Unless the contrary is
offer of the Malaysian firm. For the clearly intended, the provisions of the
bidding rules mandate that if for any Constitution should be considered self-executing,
reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be as a contrary rule would give the legislature
awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may discretion to determine when, or whether, they
offer this to the other Qualified Bidders shall be effective. These provisions would be
that have validly submitted bids subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body,
provided that these Qualified Bidders which could make them entirely meaningless by
are willing to match the highest bid in simply refusing to pass the needed implementing
terms of price per share. statute.
2. A constitution is a system of
fundamental laws for the governance *Principles of Constitutional Construction
and administration of a nation. It is
supreme, imperious, absolute and FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REP.
unalterable except by the authority from (GR NO. 160261, Nov. 10, 2003)
which it emanates. It has been defined
as the fundamental and paramount law CARPIO MORALES, J.:
of the nation. It prescribes the
permanent framework of a system of FACTS:
government, assigns to the different
departments their respective powers On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives
and duties, and establishes certain fixed adopted a Resolution, which directed the
principles on which government is Committee on Justice "to conduct an
founded. The fundamental conception investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner
in other words is that it is a supreme law of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
to which all other laws must conform Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
and in accordance with which all private Development Fund (JDF).
rights must be determined and all public On June 2, 2003, former President
authority administered. Under the Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment
doctrine of constitutional supremacy, complaint4 (first impeachment complaint) against
if a law or contract violates any norm of Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven
the constitution that law or contract Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable
whether promulgated by the legislative violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public
or by the executive branch or entered trust and other high crimes." The complaint was
into by private persons for private endorsed by Representatives Suplico, Zamora
purposes is null and void and without and Dilangalen, and was referred to the House
any force and effect. Thus, since the Committee on Justice in accordance with Section
Constitution is the fundamental, 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
paramount and supreme law of the The House Committee on Justice ruled
nation, it is deemed written in every that the first impeachment complaint was
statute and contract. "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same
for being insufficient in substance.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely On October 23, 2003, the second
declarations of policies and principles. Their impeachment complait was filed with the
provisions command the legislature to enact laws Secretary General of the House against Chief
and carry out the purposes of the framers who Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
merely establish an outline of government alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated
providing for the different departments of the by above-mentioned House Resolution. This
governmental machinery and securing certain second impeachment complaint was
fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens.A accompanied by a "Resolution of
provision which lays down a general principle, Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least
such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Constitution is usually not self-executing. But a Representatives.
provision which is complete in itself and becomes Thus arose the instant petitions against
operative without the aid of supplementary or the House of Representatives, et. al., most of
enabling legislation, or that which supplies which petitions contend that the filing of the
sufficient rule by means of which the right it second impeachment complaint is
grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self- unconstitutional as it violates the provision of
executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self- Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that
executing if the nature and extent of the right "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by against the same official more than once within a
the constitution itself, so that they can be period of one year."
determined by an examination and construction
of its terms, and there is no language indicating ISSUE:
that the subject is referred to the legislature for Whether or not Constitution has
action. excluded impeachment proceedings from the
coverage of judicial review.
Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a
legislative act is necessary to enforce a
HELD: held that the Court in construing a Constitution

No. In cases of conflict, the judicial should bear in mind the object sought to be
department is the only constitutional organ which accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if
can be called upon to determine the proper any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A
allocation of powers between the several doubtful provision will be examined in the light of
departments and among the integral or the history of the times, and the condition and
constituent units thereof. circumstances under which the Constitution was
The Constitution is a definition of the framed. The object is to ascertain the reason
powers of government. Who is to determine the which induced the framers of the Constitution to
nature, scope and extent of such powers? The enact the particular provision and the purpose
Constitution itself has provided for the sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational construe the whole as to make the words
way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate consonant to that reason and calculated to effect
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any that purpose.
superiority over the other departments; it does Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat.
not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the The Constitution is to be interpreted as a
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and whole.
sacred obligation assigned to it by the It is a well-established rule in
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of constitutional construction that no one provision
authority under the Constitution and to establish of the Constitution is to be separated from all the
for the parties in an actual controversy the rights others, to be considered alone, but that all the
which that instrument secures and guarantees to provisions bearing upon a particular subject are
them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is to be brought into view and to be so interpreted
termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is as to effectuate the great purposes of the
the power of judicial review under the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular
Constitution. More than that, courts accord the subject should be considered and interpreted
presumption of constitutionality to legislative together as to effectuate the whole purpose of
enactments, not only because the legislature is the Constitution and one section is not to be
presumed to abide by the Constitution but also allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable
because the judiciary in the determination of construction, the two can be made to stand
actual cases and controversies must reflect the together.
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed In other words, the court must
through their representatives in the executive and harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in
legislative departments of the government. favor of a construction which will render every
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this word operative, rather than one which may make
"moderating power" to "determine the proper the words idle and nugatory.
allocation of powers" of the different branches of If, however, the plain meaning of the
government and "to direct the course of word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids
government along constitutional channels" is is available. While it is permissible in this
inherent in all courts as a necessary jurisdiction to consult the debates and
consequence of the judicial power itself, which is proceedings of the constitutional convention in
"the power of the court to settle actual order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the
controversies involving rights which are legally resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had
demandable and enforceable." only when other guides fail as said proceedings
To determine the merits of the issues are powerless to vary the terms of the
raised in the instant petitions, this Court must Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates
necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which in the constitutional convention "are of value as
employs the well-settled principles of showing the views of the individual members,
constitutional construction. and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but
First, verba legis, that is, wherever they give us no light as to the views of the large
possible, the words used in the Constitution majority who did not talk, much less of the mass
must be given their ordinary meaning except of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls
where technical terms are employed. gave that instrument the force of fundamental
We look to the language of the law. We think it safer to construe the constitution
document itself in our search for its meaning. We from what appears upon its face." The proper
do not of course stop there, but that is where we interpretation therefore depends more on how it
begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which was understood by the people adopting it than in
constitutional provisions are couched express the the framers's understanding thereof.
objective sought to be attained. They are to be
given their ordinary meaning except where *Power to Amend the Constitution by the
technical terms are employed in which case the Legislature (Sec.1 & 2, Art. 17, 1987
significance thus attached to them prevails. As Constitution)
the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's
document, it being essential for the rule of law to GONZALES VS. COMELEC
obtain that it should ever be present in the (GR. NO L-28196, NOVEMBER 9, 1967)
people's consciousness, its language as much as
possible should be understood in the sense they CONCEPCION, C.J.:
have in common use. What it says according to FACTS:
the text of the provision to be construed compels The Congress passed 3 resolutions
acceptance and negates the power of the courts simultaneously. The first, proposing amendments
to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers to the Constitution so as to increase the
and the people mean what they say. Thus these membership of the House of Representatives
are the cases where the need for construction is from a maximum of 120, as provided in the
reduced to a minimum. present Constitution, to a maximum of 180. The
Second, where there is ambiguity, second, calling a convention to propose
ratio legis est anima. The words of the amendments to said Constitution, the convention
Constitution should be interpreted in to be composed of two (2) elective delegates
accordance with the intent of its framers. from each representative district, to be elected in
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional the general elections. And the third, proposing
construction is the intention underlying the that the same Constitution be amended so as to
provision under consideration. Thus, it has been
authorize Senators and members of the House of Convention, filed separate petitions for
Representatives to become delegates to the declaratory relief, impugning the constitutionality
aforementioned constitutional convention, without of RA 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights
forfeiting their respective seats in Congress. as candidates.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, Congress, acting as a Constituent
upon approval by the President, became Assembly, passed Resolution No.2 which called
Republic Act No. 4913 providing that the for the Constitutional Convention to propose
amendments to the Constitution proposed in the Constitutional amendments. After its adoption,
aforementioned resolutions be submitted, for Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted
approval by the people, at the general elections. R.A. 4914 implementing said resolution, restating
The petitioner assails the constitutionality of the entirely the provisions of said resolution.
said law contending that the Congress cannot Thereafter, Congress, acting as a
simultaneously propose amendments to the Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4
Constitution and call for the holding of a amending the Resolution No. 2 by providing that
constitutional convention. xxx any other details relating to the specific
apportionment of delegates, election of delegates
ISSUES: to, and the holding of the Constitutional
(1) Is Republic Act No. 4913 constitutional? Convention shall be embodied in an
(2) WON Congress can simultaneously propose implementing legislation xxx
amendments to the Constitution and call for the Congress, acting as a legislative body,
holding of a constitutional convention? enacted R.A. 6132, implementing Resolution
Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A. 4914.
HELD:
YES as to both issues. The constituent
power or the power to amend or revise the ISSUE: May Congress in acting as a legislative
Constitution, is different from the law-making body enact R.A.6132 to implement the resolution
power of Congress. Congress can directly passed by it in its capacity as a Constituent
propose amendments to the Constitution and at Assembly?
the same time call for a Constitutional
Convention to propose amendments. HELD:
Indeed, the power to amend the YES. The Court declared that while the
Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is authority to call a Constitutional Convention is
not included in the general grant of legislative vested by the Constitution solely and exclusively
powers to Congress. It is part of the inherent in Congress acting as a constitutional assembly,
powers of the people as the repository of the power to enact the implementing details or
sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours specifics of the general law does not exclusively
to make, and, hence, to amend their own pertain to Congress, the Congress in exercising
Fundamental Law. Congress may propose its comprehensive legislative power (not as a
amendments to the Constitution merely because Constitutional Assembly) may pass the
the same explicitly grants such power. Hence, necessary implementing law providing for the
when exercising the same, it is said that Senators details of the Constitutional Conventions, such as
and Members of the House of Representatives the number, qualification, and compensation of
act, not as members of Congress, but as its member.
component elements of a constituent assembly. The reasons cited by the Court in
When acting as such, the members of Congress upholding the constitutionality of the enactment of
derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike R.A. 6132 are as follows:
the people, when performing the same function, 1. Congress, acting as a Constituent
for their authority does not emanate from the Assembly pursuant to Article XV of the
Constitution they are the very source of all Constitution, has authority to propose
powers of government, including the Constitution constitutional amendments or call a
itself . convention for the purpose by votes
Since, when proposing, as a constituent of each house in joint session
assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the assembled but voting separately.
members of Congress derive their authority from 2. Such grant includes all other powers
the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that essential to the effective exercise of the
they do not have the final say on whether or not principal power by necessary
their acts are within or beyond constitutional implication.
limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set 3. Implementing details are within the
the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet authority of the Congress not only as a
that ours is a government of laws, not of men, Constituent Assembly but also in the
and to the rigid nature of our Constitution. Such exercise of its comprehensive legislative
rigidity is stressed by the fact that, the power which encompasses all matters
Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme not expressly or by necessary
Court, the power to declare a treaty implication withdrawn or removed by the
unconstitutional, despite the eminently political Constitution from the ambit of legislative
character of treaty-making power. action so long as it does not contravene
any provision of the Constitution; and
*The Congress acting as a constituent assembly, 4. Congress as a legislative body may thus
may propose amendments to the Constitution, enact necessary implementing
and exercising its general legislative power, legislation to fill in the gaps which
provide for the details of the Constitutional Congress as a Constituent Assembly
Convention. has omitted.
IMBONG VS. COMELEC

(GR NO. L-32432, SEPT. 11, 1970) THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES
ARTICLE XVII, SECTION 15, 1973
FACTS: CONSTITUTION
Petitioners Manuel Imbong and Raul OCCENA VS. COMELEC
Gonzales, both interested in running as G.R. NO. L-56350, APRIL 2, 1981
candidates in the 1971 Constitutional

FERNANDO, C.J.: President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E.

FACTS: Marcos, met as a constituent body it acted by
The challenge in these two prohibition virtue Of such impotence Its authority to do so is
proceedings is against the validity of three clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose
Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing the amendments embodied in the resolutions
constitutional amendments. Petitioners urged that now being assailed.
the amendments proposed are so extensive in
character that they go far beyond the limits of the 3. Yes.The question of whether the proposed
authority conferred on the Interim Batasang resolutions constitute amendments or revision is
Pambansa as successor of the Interim National of no relevance. It suffices to quote from the
Assembly. For them, what was done was to opinion of Justice Makasiar, speaking for the
revise and not to amend. Court, in Del Rosario v. Commission on Elections
Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon to dispose of this contention. Whether the
A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar Constitutional Convention will only propose
and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional amendments to the Constitution or entirely
Convention that framed the present Constitution, overhaul the present Constitution and propose an
are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox entirely new Constitution based on an Ideology
aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the foreign to the democratic system, is of no
1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law. moment; because the same will be submitted to
The suits for prohibition were filed respectively on the people for ratification. Once ratified by the
March 6 and March 12, 1981. sovereign people, there can be no debate about
the validity of the new Constitution. The fact that
ISSUES: the present Constitution may be revised and
Whether or not the 1973 Constitution is replaced with a new one ... is no argument
already in effect. against the validity of the law because
Whether or not the Interim Batasang 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total
Pambansa has the power to propose overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate,
amendments. whether the Constitution is merely amended in
Whether or not the three resolutions are part or revised or totally changed would become
valid. immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the
sovereign people."
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petitions are
1.Yes. it is much too late in the day to deny the dismissed for lack of merit.
force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In
the dispositive portion of Javellana v. The
Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES
prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its SECTIONS 1 & 2 ARTICLE 17, 1987
ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a CONSTITUTION
vote of six to four. It then concluded: "This being TOLENTINO VS. COMMISSION ON
the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial ELECTIONS
obstacle to the new Constitution being (GR. NO. L-34150, OCTOBER 16, 1971)
considered in force and effect."
With such a pronouncement by the BARREDO, J.:
Supreme Court and with the recognition of the FACTS:
cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court A Constitutional Convention was called
says is not only entitled to respect but must also upon to propose amendments to the Constitution
be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. of the Philippines, in which, the delegates to the
The Supreme Court can check as well as said Convention were all elected under and by
legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not virtue of resolutions and the implementing
only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132. The
may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1,
there is an affirmation that what was done cannot amending section one of article 5 of the
be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The Constitution of the Philippines so as to lower the
mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. voting age to 18. Said resolution also provided in
That is the meaning of the concluding statement its Section 3 that the partial amendment, which
in Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably refers only to the age qualification for the
applied the present Constitution. The latest case exercise of suffrage shall be without prejudice to
in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely two other amendments that will be proposed in the
weeks ago. During the first year alone of the future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on
effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten other portions of the amended Section or on
cases may be cited. other portions of the entire Constitution.
The main thrust of the petition is that
2. Yes.The existence of the power of the Interim Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other
Batasang Pambansa is indubitable. The implementing resolutions thereof subsequently
applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is approved by the Convention have no force and
quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus: effect as laws in so far as they are in
"The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the contravention to Section 1 Article XV of the
same powers and its Members shall have the Constitution. Under the said provision, the
same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, proposed amendment in question cannot be
and disqualifications as the interim National presented to the people for ratification separately
Assembly and the regular National Assembly and from each and all of the other amendments to be
the Members thereof." One of such powers is drafted and proposed by the Convention.
precisely that of proposing amendments. Article
XVII, Section 15 of the 1973 Constitution in its ISSUE:
Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Is the Resolution approved by the 1971
Assembly with the power to propose Constitutional Convention constitutional?
amendments upon special call by the Prime
Minister by a vote of the majority of its members HELD:
to be ratified in accordance with the Article on NO. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the
Amendments. When, therefore, the Interim Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the
Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the implementing acts and resolutions of the
Convention, insofar as they provide for the basis that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitution,
holding of a plebiscite, as well as the resolution of there is no grant to the incumbent President to
the respondent Comelec complying therewith are exercise the constituent power to propose
null and void. amendments to the new Constitution, hence, the
The Court is of the opinion that in Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no
providing for the questioned plebiscite before it legal basis.
has finished, and separately from, the whole draft Petitioner Guzman filed another action
of the constitution it has been called to formulate, asserting that the power to propose amendments
the Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 and to or revision of the Constitution during the
all subsequent acts of the Convention transition period is expressly conferred to the
implementing the same violate the condition in interim National Assembly under sec.16, Art. XVII
Section 1, Article XV that there should only be of the Constitution.
one "election" or plebiscite for the ratification of A similar action was instituted by
all the amendments the Convention may petitioners Gonzales and Salapantan arguing
propose. We are not denying any right of the that:
people to vote on the proposed amendment; We 1. Even granting him legislative powers under
are only holding that under Section 1, Article XV the martial law, the incumbent President
of the Constitution, the same should be submitted cannot act as a constituent assembly to
to them not separately from but together with all propose amendments to the Constitution,
the other amendments to be proposed by this 2. A referendum-plebiscite is untenable under
present Convention. the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973,
Prescinding already from the fact that 3. The submission of the proposed
under Section 3 of the questioned resolution, it is amendments in such a short period of time
evident that no fixed frame of reference is for deliberation renders the plebiscite a
provided the voter, as to what finally will be nullity,
concomitant qualifications that will be required by 4. To lift martial law, the President need not
the final draft of the constitution to be formulated consult the people via referendum, and
by the Convention of a voter to be able to enjoy 5. Allowing 15-year-olds to vote would amount
the right of suffrage, there are other to an amendment of the Constitution, which
considerations which make it impossible to vote confines the right of suffrage to those
intelligently on the proposed amendment. No one citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age
knows what changes in the fundamental and above.
principles of the constitution the Convention will The Solicitor General, in his comment
be minded to approve. To be more specific, we for respondent COMELEC, maintains that:
do not have any means of foreseeing whether the 1. Petitioners have no standing to sue
right to vote would be of any significant value at 2. The issue raised is political in nature, beyond
all. Who can say whether or not later on the judicial cognizance of the court
Convention may decide to provide for varying 3. At this state of the transition period, only the
types of voters for each level of the political units incumbent President has the authority to
it may divide the country into. The root of the exercise constituent power
difficulty in other words, lies in that the 4. The referendum-plebiscite is a step towards
Convention is precisely on the verge of normalization.
introducing substantial changes, if not radical
ones, in almost every part and aspect of the ISSUES:
existing social and political order enshrined in the Do the petitioners have the standing to sue?
present Constitution. How can a voter in the 1. Is the question of the constitutionality of the
proposed plebiscite intelligently determine the Presidential Decrees 991, 1031, and 1033
effect of the reduction of the voting age upon the political or judicial?
different institutions which the Convention may 2. Does the President possess the power to
establish and of which presently he is not given propose amendments to the Constitution as
any idea? Clearly, there is improper submission. well as set up the required machinery and
prescribe the procedure for the ratification of
his proposal, in the absence of an interim
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES National Assembly?
SANIDAD VS. COMELEC 3. Is the submission to the people of the
73 SCRA 333 (1976) proposed amendments within the time frame
FACTS: allowed therefore a sufficient and proper
President Marcos issued P.D. 991 calling for submission?
a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for
the Citizens Assemblies (Barangay) to resolve, HELD:
among other things, the issues of martial law, the 1. YES. At the instance of taxpayers, laws
interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of providing for the disbursement of public
such replacement, the period of its existence, the funds may be enjoined upon the theory that
length of the period for the exercise by the the expenditure of public funds by the State
President of his present powers. for the purpose of executing an
Thereafter, P.D.1031 was issued, unconstitutional act constitutes a
amending P.D. 991 by declaring the provisions of misapplication of such funds.
P.D. 229 applicable as to the manner of voting 2. It is a judicial question.
and canvassing of votes in barangays for the 3. YES. If the President has been legitimately
national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, discharging the legislative functions of the
1976. P.D. 1033 was also issued, declaring Interim Assembly, there is no reason why he
therein that the question of the continuance of cannot validly discharge the function of that
martial law will be submitted for referendum at assembly to propose amendments to the
the same time as the submission of his Constitution, which is but adjunct, although
(President) proposed amendments to the peculiar, to its gross legislative power. This
Constitution through a plebiscite on October 16, is not to say that the President has
1976. converted his office into a constituent
Petitioner Sanidad filed suit for assembly of that nature normally constituted
Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction, seeking to by the legislature. Rather, with the Interim
enjoin the COMELEC from holding and Assembly not convened and only the
conducting said Referendum-Plebiscite on the Presidency and Supreme Court in operation,
the urges of absolute necessity render it only laws and not constitutional amendments
imperative upon the President to act as because the latter takes effect only upon
agent for and in behalf of the people to ratification and not after publication.
propose amendments to the Constitution. 3. COMELEC Resolution No.2300, adopted on
Parenthetically, by its very constitution, the January 16, 1991 to govern the conduct of
Supreme Court possesses no capacity to initiative on the Constitution and initiative
propose amendments without constitutional and referendum on national and local laws,
infractions. For the President to shy away is ultra vires insofar as initiative or
from that actuality and decline to undertake amendments to the Constitution are
the amending process would leave the concerned, since the COMELEC has no
governmental machinery at a stalemate or power to provide rules and regulation for the
create in the powers of the State a exercise of the right of initiative to amend the
destructive vacuum. After all, the constituent Constitution. Only the Congress is
assemblies or constitutional conventions, like authorized by the Constitution to pass the
the President now, are mere agents of the implementing law.
people. 4. The peoples initiative is limited to
4. YES. Art. XVI of the Constitution makes no amendments to the Constitution, to the
provision as to the specific date when the revision thereof. Extending or lifting of the
plebiscite shall be held, but simply states term limits constitutes a revision and is
that it shall be held not later than 3 months therefore outside the power of the peoples
after the approval of such amendment or initiative.
revision. The period from September 21 to 5. Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated
October 16, or a period of three weeks is not funds for peoples initiative, neither the
too short for free debates or discussions on COMELEC nor any other department,
the referendum-plebiscite issues. The agency or office of the government has
issues are not new. They are the issues of realigned funds for the purpose.
the day, and the people have been living The Supreme Court gave due course to
with this petition and granted the Motions for
5. them since the proclamation of martial law Intervention filed by Petitioners-Intervenors DIK,
four years ago. The referendums of 1973 MABINI, IBP, LABAN, and Senator Roco.
and 1975 carried the same issue of martial
law. That notwithstanding, the contested ISSUES:
brief period for discussion is not without 1. Whether Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987
counterparts in previous plebiscites for Constitution is a self-executing provision?
constitutional amendments. 2. Whether R.A.6735 is a sufficient statutory
implementation of the said constitutional
provision?
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES 3. Whether the COMELEC resolution is valid?
SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC 4. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective
270 SCRA 106, MARCH 19, 1997 national and local officials as proposed
would constitute a revision, or an
FACTS: amendment to the Constitution?
Private respondent Delfin filed with the
COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution, HELD:
to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by NO. Although the mode of amendment
Peoples amendments to the Constitution granted which bypasses congressional action, in the last
under Section 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 analysis, it is still dependent on congressional
Constitution. R.A. 6735 and COMELEC action. While the Constitution has recognized or
Resolution No. 2300. The proposed granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if
amendments consist of the submission of this the Congress for whatever reason, does not
proposition to the peopleDo you approve the provide for its implementation.
lifting of the term limits of all elective officials, 1. NO. R.A. 6735 is insufficient and incomplete
amending for the purpose section 4 and 7 of to fully comply with the power and duty of the
Art.VI, Section 4 of Art.VII, and Section 8 of Art. X Congress to enact the statutory
of the Philippine Constitution? implementation of sec.2, Art.XVII of the
The COMELEC issued an order Constitution. Although said Act intended to
directing the publication of the petition and the include the system of initiative on
notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for amendments to the Constitution, it is
hearing. At the hearing, Senator Raul Roco, the deemed inadequate to cover that system
IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon and accordingly provide for a local initiative
(DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng required for proposing Constitutional
Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN) appeared as changes.
intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco moved to 2. NO. The COMELEC Resolution insofar as it
dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is prescribes rules and regulations on the
not the initiatory party cognizable by the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
COMELEC. Constitution is void, as expressed
Petitioners filed a special civil action in the Latin maxim Potestas delegate non
directing respondents COMELEC and Delfins delegari potest. In every case of permissible
Petition to directly propose amendments to the delegation, it must be shown that the
Constitution through the system of initiative under delegation itself is valid.
sec.2 of Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution. 3. The resolution of this issue is held to be
Petitioners raise the following arguments: unnecessary, if not academic, as the
1. The constitutional provision on peoples proposal to lift the term limits of elective local
initiative to amend the Constitution can only and national officials is an amendment to the
be implemented by law to be passed by Constitution and not a revision. Thus, the
Congress. No such law has been passed. petition was granted, and the COMELEC is
2. R.A. 6735 failed to provide subtitle initiative permanently enjoined from taking
on the Constitution, unlike in the other cognizance of any petition for initiative on
modes of initiative. It only provides for the amendments to the Constitution until a
effectivity of the law after the publication in sufficiently law shall have been validly
print media indicating that the Act covers
enacted to provide for the implementation of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the
the system. petition must state the fact of such attachment.
This is an assurance that every one of the
several millions of signatories to the petition had
LAMBINO VS. COMELEC seen the full text of the proposed amendments
G.R. NO. 174153, OCTOBER 25, before signing. Otherwise, it is physically
2006 impossible, given the time constraint, to prove
that every one of the millions of signatories had
FACTS: seen the full text of the proposed amendments
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in before signing.
G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Section 2, Article XVII of the
Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with Constitution does not expressly state that the
other groups and individuals, commenced petition must set forth the full text of the proposed
gathering signatures for an initiative petition to amendments. However, the deliberations of the
change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August framers of our Constitution clearly show that the
2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the framers intended to adopt the relevant American
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their jurisprudence on people's initiative. In particular,
initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) and the deliberations of the Constitutional
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Commission explicitly reveal that the framers
Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735"). intended that the people must first see the full
The Lambino Group alleged that their text of the proposed amendments before they
petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals sign, and that the people must sign on a petition
constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of
all registered voters, with each legislative district Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes
its registered voters. The Lambino Group also as valid, requires that the people must sign the
claimed that COMELEC election registrars had "petition x x x as signatories."
verified the signatures of the 6.3 million The proponents of the initiative secure
individuals. the signatures from the people. The proponents
The Lambino Group's initiative petition secure the signatures in their private capacity
changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying and not as public officials. The proponents are
Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative not disinterested parties who can impartially
Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII explain the advantages and disadvantages of the
(Executive Department) and by adding Article proposed amendments to the people. The
XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions." These proponents present favorably their proposal to
proposed changes will shift the present the people and do not present the arguments
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral- against their proposal. The proponents, or their
Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino supporters, often pay those who gather the
Group prayed that after due publication of their signatures.
petition, the COMELEC should submit the Thus, there is no presumption that the
following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' proponents observed the constitutional
ratification. requirements in gathering the signatures. The
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group proponents bear the burden of proving that they
filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC complied with the constitutional requirements in
indicating modifications in the proposed Article gathering the signatures - that the petition
XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative. contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full
text of the proposed amendments.
ISSUE: For sure, the great majority of the 6.3
Whether the Lambino Group's initiative million people who signed the signature sheets
petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of did not see the full text of the proposed changes
the Constitution on amendments to the before signing. They could not have known the
Constitution through a people's initiative. nature and effect of the proposed changes,
among which are:
HELD: 1. The term limits on
NO. The court declared that Lambino members of the legislature will
Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional be lifted and thus members of
because it dismally fails to comply with the Parliament can be re-
requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the elected indefinitely;
Constitution that the initiative must be "directly 2. The interim
proposed by the people through initiative upon a Parliament can continue to
petition." function indefinitely until its
The essence of amendments "directly members, who are
proposed by the people through initiative upon a almost all the present
petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a members of Congress, decide
petition by the people. This means two essential to call for new parliamentary
elements must be present. First, the people must elections. Thus, the
author and thus sign the entire proposal. No members of the interim
agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Parliament will determine the
Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the expiration of their own
proposal must be embodied in a petition. term of office;
These essential elements are present 3. Within 45 days from
only if the full text of the proposed amendments the ratification of the proposed
is first shown to the people who express their changes, the interim
assent by signing such complete proposal in a Parliament shall
petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly convene to propose further
proposed by the people through initiative upon a amendments or revisions to the
petition" only if the people sign on a petition that Constitution.
contains the full text of the proposed These three specific amendments are
amendments. not stated or even indicated in the Lambino
The full text of the proposed Group's signature sheets. The people who signed
amendments may be either written on the face of the signature sheets had no idea that they were
proposing these amendments. These three

proposed changes are highly controversial. The HELD:
people could not have inferred or divined these Yes. It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign
proposed changes merely from a reading or country is to be identified with a state, it is
rereading of the contents of the signature sheets. required in line with Pound's formulation that it be
The Constitution entrusts to the people a politically organized sovereign community
the power to directly propose amendments to the independent of outside control bound by ties of
Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of the nationhood, legally supreme within its territory,
people even if the members of this Court do not acting through a government functioning under a
personally know the people who sign the petition. regime of law. 9 It is thus a sovereign person
However, this trust emanates from a fundamental with the people composing it viewed as an
assumption: the full text of the proposed organized corporate society under a government
amendment is first shown to the people before with the legal competence to exact obedience its
they sign the petition, not after they have signed commands. It has been referred to as a body-
the petition. politic organized by common consent for mutual
defense and mutual safety and to promote the
THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE general welfare. Correctly has it been described
by Esmein as "the juridical personification of the
THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE nation." This is to view it in the light its historical
COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. development. The stress is on its being a nation,
CAMPOS RUEDA its people occupying a definite territory, politically
(G.R. No. L-13250, Oct. 29, 1971) organized, exercising by means of its
government its sovereign will over the individuals
FACTS: within it and maintaining its separate international
This is an appeal interposed by petitioner Antonio personality. Laski could speak of it then as a
Campos Rueda, administrator of the estate of the territorial society divided into government and
deceased Doa Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. subjects, claiming within its allotted area a
de Cerdeira, from the decision of the respondent supremacy over all other institutions. McIver
Collector of Internal Revenue, assessing against similarly would point to the power entrusted to its
and demanding from the former the sum government to maintain within its territory the
P161,874.95 as deficiency state and inheritance conditions of a legal order and to enter into
taxes, including interests and penalties, on the international relations. With the latter
transfer of intangible personal properties situated requisites satisfied, international law does not
in the Philippines and belonging to said Maria de exact independence as a condition of
la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira. Maria de la statehood. So Hyde did opine.
Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira (Maria
Cerdeira for short) is a Spanish national, by Even on the assumption then that Tangier is
reason of her marriage to a Spanish citizen and bereft of international personality petitioner has
was a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up not successfully made out a case. It bears
to her death on January 2, 1955. At the time of repeating that four days after the filing of this
her demise she left, among others, intangible petition on January 6, 1958 in Collector of
personal properties in the Philippines." Then Internal Revenue v. De Lara, it was specifically
came this portion: "On September 29, 1955, held by us: "Considering the State of California
petitioner filed a provisional estate and as a foreign country in relation to section 122 of
inheritance tax return on all the properties of the our Tax Code we believe and hold, as did the
late Maria Cerdeira. On the same date, Tax Court, that the Ancilliary Administrator is
respondent, pending investigation, issued an entitled to exemption from the inheritance tax on
assessment for estate and inheritance taxes the intangible personal property found in the
which tax liabilities were paid by petitioner. Philippines." There can be no doubt that
On November 17, 1955, an amended California as a state in the American Union was
return was filed . . . where intangible personal lacking in the alleged requisite of international
properties with were claimed as exempted from personality. Nonetheless, it was held to be a
taxes. On November 23, 1955, respondent, foreign country within the meaning of Section 122
pending investigation, issued another of the National Internal Revenue Code.
assessment for estate and inheritance taxes. In a
letter dated January 11, 1956, respondent denied
the request for exemption on the ground that the THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE
law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 of BACANI V. NACOCO
the National Internal Revenue Code. Hence, [GRN L-9657 NOVEMBER 29, 1956]
respondent demanded the payment OF
deficiency estate and inheritance taxes including BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
ad valorem penalties, surcharges, interests and FACTS:
compromise penalties . . . . In a letter dated The plaintiffs are court stenographers
February 8, 1956, and received by respondent on assigned in Branch VI of the Court of First
the following day, petitioner requested for the Instance of Manila. During the pendency of Civil
reconsideration of the decision denying the claim Case No. 2293 of said court, entitled Francisco
for tax exemption of the intangible personal Sycip vs. National Coconut Corporation,
properties and the imposition of the 25% and 5% Assistant Corporate Counsel Federico Alikpala,
ad valorem penalties. However, respondent counsel for defendant, requested said
denied this request, in his letter dated May 5, stenographers for copies, of the transcript of the
1956 . . . and received by petitioner on May 21, stenographic notes taken by them during the
1956. Respondent premised the denial on the hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by
grounds that there was no reciprocity [with delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed
Tangier, which was moreover] a mere transcript containing 714 pages and thereafter
principality, not a foreign country. Consequently, submitted to him their bills for the payment of
respondent demanded the payment of deficiency their fees. The National Coconut Corporation
estate and inheritance taxes including paid the amount of P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacani
surcharges, interests and compromise penalties and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said transcript
at the rate of P1 per page.
ISSUE: Upon inspecting the books of this
Is Tangier a foreign country? corporation, the Auditor General disallowed the
payment of these fees and sought the recovery of Company, the Government divested itself of its
the amounts paid. The respondents argue that sovereign character so far as respects the
National Coconut Corporation may be considered transactions of the corporation. Unlike the
as included in the term "Government of the Government, the corporation may be sued
Republic of the Philippines" for the purposes of without its consent, and is subject to taxation. Yet
the exemption of the legal fees provided for in the National Coal Company remains an agency
Rule 1-30 of the Rules of Court. or instrumentality of government." (Government
of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer, 50 Phil.,
ISSUE: Whether or not NACOCO is a part of the 288.)
Government of the Philippines by virtue of its
performance of government functions.
HELD:
No, NACOCO does not acquire that
status for the simple reason that it does not come THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE
under the classification of municipal or public PVTA VS.CIR
corporation. To resolve the issue in this case [GRN L-32052 JULY 25, 1975]
requires a little digression on the nature and
functions of our government as instituted in our FACTS:
Constitution. To begin with, we state that the term Private respondents filed with the CIR a
"Government" may be defined as "that institution petition, alleging their employment relationship,
or aggregate of institutions by which an the overtime services in excess of the regular
independent society makes and carries out those eight hours a day rendered by them, and the
rules of action which are necessary to enable failure to pay them overtime compensation in
men to live in a social state, or which are accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444.
imposed upon the people forming that society by Their prayer was for the differential between the
those who possess the power or authority of amount actually paid to them and the amount
prescribing them" (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332). allegedly due them. Petitioner Philippine Virginia
This institution, when referring to the national Tobacco Administration denied the allegations.
government, has reference to what our The then Presiding Judge Arsenio T. Martinez of
Constitution has established composed of three respondent Court sustained the claims of private
great departments, the legislative, executive, and respondents for overtime services from
the judicial, through which the powers and December 23, 1963 up to the date the decision
functions of government are exercised. These was rendered on March 21, 1970, and directing
functions are twofold: constitute and ministrant. petitioner to pay the same, minus what it had
The former are those which constitute the very already paid. Petitioner claims that the matter is
bonds of society and are compulsory in nature; beyond the jurisdiction of the CIR as it is
the latter are those that are undertaken only by exercising governmental functions and that it is
way of advancing the general interests of society, exempt from the operation of C.A. 444, invoking
and are merely optional. the doctrine announced in the leading Agricultural
To this latter class belongs the Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration
organization of those corporations owned or decision, and the distinction between constituent
controlled by the government to promote certain and ministrant functions of governments as set
aspects of the economic life of our people such forth in Bacani v. National Coconut Corporation.
as the National Coconut Corporation. These are
what we call government-owned or controlled ISSUE: Whether or not the traditional
corporations which may take on the form of a classification of function of government as
private enterprise or one organized with powers ministrant and constituent applicable in the case
and formal characteristics of a private corporation at bar.
under the Corporation Law.
But while NACOCO was organized for HELD:
the ministrant function of promoting the coconut No. The irrelevance of such a
industry, however, it was given a corporate power distinction considering the needs of the times
separate and distinct from our government, for it was clearly pointed out by the present Chief
was made subject to the provisions of our Justice. Under this traditional classification, such
Corporation Law in so far as its corporate constituent functions are exercised by the State
existence and the powers that it may exercise are as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to
concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of
No. 518). the people - these latter functions being
Government of the Republic of the ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on
Philippines" used in section 2 of the Revised the part of the government."
Administrative Code refers only to that Nonetheless, as he explained so
government. entity through which the functions of persuasively: "The growing complexities of
the government are exercised as an attribute of modern society, however, have rendered this
sovereignty, and in this are included those arms traditional classification of the functions of
through which political authority is made effective government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete.
whether they be provincial, municipal or other The areas which used to be left to private
form of local government. These are what we call enterprise and initiative and which the
municipal corporations. They do not include government was called upon to enter optionally,
government entities which are given a corporate and only 'because it was better equipped to
personality. separate and distinct from the administer for the public welfare than is any
government and 'which are governed by the private individual or group of individuals,'
Corporation Law. Their powers, duties and continue to lose their well-defined boundaries
liabilities have to be determined in the light of that and to be absorbed within activities that the
law and of their corporate charters. government must undertake in its sovereign
As this Court has aptly said, "The mere capacity if it is to meet the increasing social
fact that the Government happens to be a challenges of the times. Here as almost
majority stockholder does not make it a public everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly
corporation" (National Coal Co. vs. Collector of towards a greater socialization of economic
Internal Revenue, 46 Phil., 586-597). "By forces. Here of course this development was
becoming a stockholder in the National Coal envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy,
by the Constitution itself in its declaration of Government, even considering it a loan, was
principle concerning the promotion of social wiped out on the change of sovereignty.
justice." Whether or not the Government is a proper party
Thus was laid to rest the doctrine in to the case under the doctrine of parens
Bacani v. National Coconut Corporation, based patriae.
on the Wilsonian classification of the tasks Whether or not the Philippine Government is
incumbent on government into constituent and bound by the statute of limitations.
ministrant in accordance with the laissez faire
principle. HELD:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Order of 1.No.Documentary evidence shows that Monte
March 21, 1970 and the Resolution of respondent de Piedad, after setting forth in its petition to the
Court, denying a motion for reconsideration are Governor-General its financial condition and its
hereby affirmed. absolute necessity for more working capital,
asked that out of the sum of $100,000 held in the
Treasury of the Philippine Islands, there be
THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE transferred to it the sum of $80,000. The Monte
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHIL. ISLANDS V. de Piedad agreed that if the transfer of these
MONTE DE PIEDAD funds should not be approved by the Government
(G.R. NO. L-9959, DECEMBER 13, 1916) of Spain, the same would be returned forthwith. It
did not ask that the $80,000 be given to it as a
TRENT, J.: donation.
FACTS: The Department of Finance, acting
About $400,000, were subscribed and under the orders of the Governor-General,
paid into the treasury of the Philippine Islands by understood that the $80,000 was transferred to
the inhabitants of the Spanish Dominions of the the Monte de Piedad well knew that it received
relief of those damaged by the earthquake which this sum as a loan interest." Furthermore, the
took place in the Philippine Islands on June 3, Monte de Piedad recognized and considered as
1863. Subsequent thereto a central relief board late as March 31, 1902, that it received the
was appointed to distribute the moneys thus $80,000 "as a returnable loan, and without
voluntarily contributed and allotted $365,703.50 interest." Thus, there cannot be the slightest
to the various sufferers named in its resolution. doubt the fact that the Monte de Piedad received
By order of the Governor-General of the the $80,000 as a mere loan or deposit and not as
Philippine Islands, a list of these allotments, a donation.
together with the names of those entitled thereto,
was published in the Official Gazette of Manila. 2.No. Court ruled that if legal provisions are in
These were later distributed up to the sum of conflict with the political character, constitution or
$30,299.65, leaving a balance of $365,403.85. institutions of the new sovereign, they became
Upon the petition of the governing body inoperative or lost their force upon the cession of
of the Monte de Piedad, the Philippine the Philippine Islands to the United States, but if
Government, by order, directed its treasurer to they are among "that great body of municipal law
turn over to the former the sum of $80,000 of the which regulates private and domestic rights," they
relief fund in installments of $20,000 each and continued in force and are still in force unless
were received on the following dates: February they have been repealed by the present
15, March 12, April 14, and June 2, 1883, and Government.
are still in the possession of the Monte de From the nature and class of the subject
Piedad. On account of various petitions of the matter, it is clear that it falls within the latter class.
persons, and heirs of others to whom the above- They are laws which are not political in any sense
mentioned allotments were made, the Philippine of the word. They conferred upon the Spanish
Islands filed a suit against the Monte de Piedad a Government the right and duty to supervise,
recover, "through the Attorney-General and in regulate, and to some extent control charities and
representation of the Government of the charitable institutions. The present sovereign, in
Philippine Islands," the $80.000, together with exempting "provident institutions, savings banks,
interest. After due trial, judgment was entered in etc.," all of which are in the nature of charitable
favor of the plaintiff. Defendant appealed and institutions, from taxation, placed such
made the following contentions: institutions, in so far as the investment in
that the $80,000, given to the Monte de securities are concerned, under the general
Piedad y Caja de Ahorros, were so supervision of the Insular Treasurer.
given as a donation, and that said
donation had been cleared; 3.Yes.The ground upon which the right of the
that the Government of the Philippine Islands Government to maintain the action rests on the
has not subrogated the Spanish fact that the money, being given to a charity
Government in its rights, as regards an became a public property, only applicable to the
important sum of money specific purposes to which it was intended to be
abovementioned; devoted. It is but within those limits consecrated
that the only persons who could claim to be to the public use, and became part of the public
damaged by this payment to the Monte, resources for promoting the happiness and
if it was unlawful, are the donors or the welfare of the Philippine Government. To deny
cestuis que trustent, thus, the plaintiff is the Government's right to maintain this action
not the proper party to bring the action; would be contrary to sound public policy.
that the court erred in holding in its decision The Supreme Court of the United States
that there is no title for the prescription in Sohier vs. Mass. General Hospital, ruled that:
of this suit brought by the Insular insane persons and person not known, or not in
Government against the defendant being, apply to the beneficiaries of charities, who
appellant. are often in capable of vindicating their rights,
and justly look for protection to the sovereign
ISSUES: authority, acting as parens patriae. They show
Whether or not the $80,000 received by Monte that this beneficient functions has not ceased to
de Piedad was in form of donation. exist under the change of government from a
Whether or not the obligation on the part of the monarchy to a republic; but that it now resides in
Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000 to the the legislative department, ready to be called into
exercise whenever required for the purposes of
justice and right, and is a clearly capable of being Commonwealth are null and void and without
exercised in cases of charities as in any other legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of
cases whatever. enemy occupation and control has
Chancelor Kent says: In this country, the invalidated al judgments and judicial acts
legislature or government of the State, as parens and proceedings of the said courts.
patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of 4. Whether the courts of Commonwealth, which
public nature, by virtue of its general were the same courts existing prior to and
superintending authority over the public interests, continue during the Japanese military
where no other person is entrusted with it. (4 occupation of the Philippines may continue
Kent Com., 508, note.) those proceedings in said courts at the time
the Philippines were reoccupied and
4.No. In 25 Cyc., 1006, the rule, supported by liberated by the US and Filipino forces and
numerous authorities, is stated as follows: the Commonwealth of the Philippines were
In the absence of express statutory provision to reestablished.
the contrary, statute of limitations do not as a
general rule run against the sovereign or HELD:
government, whether state or federal. But the 1. YES. The government established
rule is otherwise where the mischief to be under the names of Philippine Executive
remedied are of such a nature that the state must Commission and Republic of the Philippines
necessarily be included, where the state goes during the Japanese occupation was a civil
into business in concert or in competition with her government and a de facto government of the
citizens, or where a party seeks to enforces his second kind: that which is established and
private rights by suit in the name of the state or maintained by military forces who invade and
government, so that the latter is only a nominal occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of
party. war. The distinguishing characteristics of this
In the instant case the Philippine kind of de facto government are; (1) that its
Government is not a mere nominal party because existence is maintained by active military
it, in bringing and prosecuting this action, is power within the territories, and against the
exercising its sovereign functions or powers and rightful authority of an established and lawful
is seeking to carry out a trust developed upon it government; and (2) that while it exists it must
when the Philippine Islands were ceded to the necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by
United States. private citizens who, by acts of obedience
For the foregoing reasons the judgment rendered in submission to such force, do not
appealed from is affirmed. become responsible, as wrongdoers, for those
acts, though not warranted by the laws of the
rightful government.
THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE
CO KIM CHAN V. VALDEZ TAN KEH 2. YES. Being a de facto government, it
75 PHIL 113, SEPTEMBER 17, 1945 necessarily follows that the judicial acts and
proceedings of the courts of justice of those
FERIA, J: governments, which are not of a political
FACTS: complexion, were good and valid, and, by
Petitioner filed a motion for mandamus virtue of the well known principle of postliminy
praying that the respondent judge be ordered to in international law, remained good and valid
continue the proceedings in civil case no. 3012 after the liberation or reoccupation of the
which was initiated under the regime of the so- Philippines by the American and Filipino
called Republic of the Philippines established forces.
during the Japanese military occupation of the
islands. 3. NO. The phrase processes of any other
The respondent judge refused to take government is broad and may refer not only to
cognizance of and continue the proceedings on judicial processes, but also to administrative or
the following grounds: (1) the proclamation legislative, as well as constitutional processes
issued on October 23, 1944 by Gen. Mac Arthur of the Republic of the Philippines or other
had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all governmental agencies established in the
judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts Islands during the Japanese occupation.
of the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Taking into consideration the fact that,
Commission and the Republic established during according to the well-known principles of
the Japanese occupation;(2) the lower courts international law, all judgments and judicial
have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and proceedings, which are not of a political
continue judicial proceedings pending in the complexion, of the de facto government during
courts of the defunct Republic in the absence of the Japanese occupation were good and valid
enabling law granting such authority; (3) the before and remained so after the occupied
government established in the Philippines during territory had come again into the power of the
the Japanese occupation was not a de facto titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it
government. was not, and could not have been, the intention
of the Gen. Mac Arthur, in using the phrase
ISSUES: processes of any government to refer to
1. Whether the government established during judicial processes, in violation of said principles
the Japanese occupation was a de facto of international law. The only reasonable
government. construction of the said phrase is that it refers
2. Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of to governmental processes other than judicial
the courts existing in the Philippines under processes, or court proceedings, for according
the Phil. Executive Commission and the to a well-known statutory construction, statute
Republic of the Philippines were good and ought never to be construed to violate the law
valid and remained so even after the of nations if any other possible construction
liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines remains.
by the US and Filipino forces.
3. Whether the proclamation issued by Gen. 4. YES. Although in theory, the authority of
Mac Arthur declaring all laws, regulations the local civil and judicial administration is
and processes of any other government in suspended as a matter of course as soon as
the Philippines than that of the military occupation takes place, in practice, the
invader does not usually take the Moreover, the concept of sovereignty
administration of justice into his own hands, but as auto-limitation, is the property of a state-
continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to force due to which it has the exclusive capacity
administer the laws of the country to which he of legal self-determination and self-restriction. x
is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented. If the x x A state is not precluded from allowing
proceedings pending in the different courts of another power to participate in the exercise of
the Islands prior to the Japanese military jurisdictional right over certain portions of its
occupation had been continued during the territory. If it does so, it by no means follows
Japanese military administration, the that such areas become impressed with an
Philippine Executive Commission and the so- alien character. They retain their status as
called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to native soil. They are still subject to its authority.
reason the same courts, which become Its jurisdiction may be dimished, but it does not
reestablished and conceived of as having been disappear. So it is with the bases under lease
in continued existence upon the reoccupation to the American armed forces by virtue of the
and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. they are not
principle of postliminy, may continue the and cannot be foreign territory.
proceedings in cases then pending in said
courts, without necessity of enacting laws
conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue CONCEPT OF THE STATE
said proceedings. LAUREL V. MISA
77 PHIL 856, JANUARY 30, 1947
CONCEPT OF THE STATE PER CURIAM:

PEOPLE V. GOZO FACTS:
53 SCRA 476, OCTOBER 26, 1973 Sometime in May 1945, Anastacio
Laurel, herein petitioner, a Filipino citizen, was
FERNANDO, J: arrested by the US Army and was interned, under
FACTS: a commitment order for his active collaboration
Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot with the Japanese during the Japanese
located inside the US Naval Reservation within occupation. He was charged with treason as
the territorial jurisdiction of Olangapo City. She defined and penalized by Art. 114 of the Penal
demolished the house and built another one in its Code. But in September 1945, he was turned
place without securing a building permit from the over to the Commonwealth government and
City Mayor of Olangapo City. The City Court of since then he has been under the custody of the
Olangapo found her guilty of violating a municipal Director of Prisons.
ordinance that requires permit from the municipal Petitioner then filed a petition for habeas
mayor for construction of building as well as any corpus mainly asserting that he cannot be
modification, repairs or demolition thereof. prosecuted for the crime of treason for the reason
On appeal with the Court of Appeals, (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate
Gozo put in issue the validity of such ordinance government in the Philippines and, consequently,
by invoking due process. She likewise the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens
questioned the applicability of the ordinance to thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there
her in view of the location of her dwelling within was a change of sovereignty over these Islands
the naval base leased to the American Armed upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.
Forces; she contended that the municipal
government cannot exercise therein ISSUES:
administrative jurisdiction. 1. Whether the sovereignty of the legitimate
government in the Philippines and,
ISSUES: consequently, the correlative allegiance of
1. Whether municipal ordinance is valid? Filipino citizens were suspended during the
2. Whether the municipal corporation retains its Japanese occupation.
administrative jurisdiction over the area 2. Whether the petitioner can be prosecuted for
where Gozos house was located? the crime of treason by giving aid and
support to the enemy during the Japanese
HELD: occupation.
1. YES, the municipal ordinance is valid.
The authority to require building permits is HELD:
predicated upon the general welfare clause. Its 1. NO. The absolute and permanent
scope is wide, well-nigh all embracing, allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory
covering every aspect of public health, public occupied by the enemy to their legitimate
morals, public safety, and the well being and government or sovereign is not abrogated or
good order of the community. severed by the enemys occupation,
because the sovereignty of the government
2. YES, the municipal corporation retains or sovereign de jure is not transferred
its administrative jurisdiction over the said thereby to the occupier and if its is not
area. By the agreement, the Philippine transferred to the occupant it must
Government merely consents that the United necessarily remain vested in the legitimate
States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. government; that the sovereignty vested in
This consent was given purely as a matter of the titular government must be distinguished
comity, courtesy or expediency. The Philippine from the exercise of the rights inherent
Government has not abdicated its sovereignty thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed
over the bases as part of the Philippine territory and transferred to another, but it cannot be
or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over suspended because the existence of
offenses committed therein. Under the terms of sovereignty cannot be suspended without
the treaty, the United States Government has putting it out of existence or divesting the
prior or preferential but not exclusive possessor thereof at least during the so-
jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine called period of suspension; that what may
jurisdiction retains not only jurisdictional rights be suspended is the exercise of the rights of
not granted, but also such ceded rights as the sovereignty with the control and government
United States Military authorities for reasons of of the territory occupied by the enemy
their own decline to make use of. passes temporarily to the occupant; x x x
and that as a corollary of the conclusion that 1. YES, petitioner was subject to military
the sovereignty itself is not suspended and law at the time the alleged offense was
subsists during the enemy occupation, the committed. The rule that laws of political nature
allegiance of the inhabitants to their or affecting political relations are considered
legitimate government or sovereign subsists, superseded or in abeyance during the military
and therefore there is no such thing as occupation, is intended for the governing of the
suspended allegiance. civil inhabitants of the occupied territory. It is
not intended for and does not bind the enemies
2. YES. Article 114 of the Revised Penal in arms.
Code was applicable to treason committed By the occupation of the Philippines by
against the national security of the legitimate Japanese forces, the officers and men of the
government because the inhabitants of the Philippine army did not cease to be fully in the
occupied territory were still bound by their service, though, in a measure, only in
allegiance to the latter during the enemys measure, they were not subject to the military
occupation. jurisdiction, if they were not in active duty. In
Just as a citizen or subject of a the latter case, like officers and soldiers on
government or sovereign may be prosecuted leave of absence or held as prisoners of war,
for and convicted of treason committed in a they could not be held guilty of breach of the
foreign country, in the same way a inhabitant discipline of the command or of a neglect of
of a territory occupied by the military forces duty x x x; but for an act unbecoming of a
of the enemy may commit treason against gentleman or an act which constitutes an
th
his own legitimate or sovereign if he adheres offense of the class specified in the 95 Article
to the enemies of the latter by giving them of War, they may in general be legally held
aid and comfort. subject to military jurisdiction and trial.
Moreover, petitioners, by their acceptance
of appointments as officers in the Bolo Area
th
CONCEPT OF THE STATE from the General Headquarters of the 6
RUFFY VS. CHIEF OF STAFF Military District, they became members of the
75 PHIL 875, AUGUST 20, 1946 Philippine Army amenable to the Articles of
War. x x x As officers in the Bolo Area and the
th
TUASON, J: 6 Military District, the petitioners operated
FACTS: under the orders of a duly established and duly
During the Japanese occupation, herein appointed commanders of the United States
petitioner, Ramon Ruffy, a Provincial Army and thus covered by Article 2 of the
Commander of the Philippine Constabulary, Articles of War which provides for persons
retreated in the mountains instead of subject to military law.
surrendering to the enemy. He organized and led
a guerrilla outfit known as Bolo Combat Team or 2. YES, 93d of the Articles of War was
Bolo Area. The said Bolo Area was a contingent constitutional. It does not violate Article VII,
th
of the 6 Military District, which has been section 2 of the Constitution which provides
recognized and placed under the operational that the National Assembly may not deprive
control of the US Army in the South Pacific. the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction
Sometime later, Col. Jurado effected a over all criminal cases in which the penalty
change of command in the Bolo Area. Major imposed is death or life imprisonment. Court
Ruffy who was then acting as Commanding Martial are agencies of executive character,
Officer for the Bolo Area was relieved of his and one of the authorities for ordering of
position. Later on or on October 19, 1944, Lieut. courts martial has been held to be attached to
Col Jurado was slain allegedly by the petitioners. the constitutional functions of the President as
It was this murder which gave rise to petitioners Commander in Chief, independently of
trial. legislation. Unlike courts of law, they are not a
The trial court convicted petitioner and portion of the judiciary.
he now filed this instant petition with the x x x court martial are in fact simply
contention that he was not subject to military law instrumentalities of the executive power,
at the time the offense for which he had been provided by Congress for the President as
placed on trial was committed. Petitioners Commander in Chief, to aid him in properly
contended that by the enemy occupation of the commanding the army and navy and enforcing
Philippines, the National Defense Act and all laws discipline therein, and utilized under his orders
and regulations creating and governing the or those of his authorized military
existence of the Philippine Army including the representatives.
Articles of War, were suspended and in
abeyance during such belligerent occupation. He
also assailed the constitutionality of 93d Article of THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
War which provides that any person subject to
military law who commits murder in the time of
war should suffer death or imprisonment for life, THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
as the court martial may direct. Petitioner argued SANDERS VS. VERIDIANO II
that the said law was in violation of Article VII, 162 SCRA 88 (1988)
section 2 of the Constitution since 93d of Article
of War fails to allow a review by the Supreme FACTS:
Court of judgments of courts martial imposing Private respondents Anthony Rossi and
death or life imprisonment. Ralph Wyers (deceased) were both employed as
game room attendants in the special services
ISSUES: department of the US Naval Station (NAVSTA).
1. Whether petitioner was subject to military They were advised that their employment had
law at the time the alleged offense was been converted from permanent full-time to
committed. permanent part-time. Their reaction was to
2. Whether 93d of Articles of War was protect the conversion and to institute grievance
constitutional. proceedings. The hearing officer recommended
the reinstatement of private respondents to
HELD: permanent full-time status plus back wages.

In a letter addressed to petitioner Secondly, whatever acts or utterances

Moreau, Commanding Officer of Subic Naval that then President Aquino may have said or
Base, petitioner Sanders, Special Services done, the same are not tantamount to the state
Director of NAVSTA, disagreed with the having waived its immunity from suit.
recommendation and asked for its rejection. The principle of state immunity from suit
Moreau, even before the start of the does not apply in this case, as when the relief
grievance hearings, sent a letter to the Chief of demanded by the suit requires no affirmative
Naval Personnel explaining the change of the official action on the part of the state nor the
private respondents status and requested affirmative discharge of any obligation which
concurrence therewith. belongs to the state in its political capacity, even
Private respondents filed suit for though the officers or agents who are made
damages claiming that the letters contained defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue of a
libelous imputations that had exposed them to title of the state and as its agents and servants.
ridicule and had caused them mental anguish,
and prejudgment of the grievance proceedings
was an invasion of their personal and proprietary THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
rights. They make it clear that petitioners were FESTEJO VS. FERNANDO
being sued in their personal capacity. A motion to 94 PHIL 504 (1954)
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction was
filed by the petitioner and was denied. FACTS:
Plaintiff Carmen Festejo filed an action
ISSUE: Were the petitioners performing their against defendant Isaias Fernando, Director of
official duties when they did the acts for which Bureau of Public Works for unlawfully taking
they are being sued for damages? possession of portions of her three parcels of
land and causing the construction of irrigation
HELD: canal without obtaining right of way and without
YES. It is clear in the present case that her consent or knowledge.
the acts for which the petitioners are being called The lower court ruled in favor of plaintiff
to account were performed by them in the Festejo. On appeal, defendant Fernando
discharge of their official duties. Sanders as invoked his being a public officer of the
director of the special services department of government of the Philippines and thus, enjoys
NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its immunity from suit and should be absolved from
personnel including the private respondents and liability for damages.
had a hand in their employment, work,
assignments, discipline, dismissal and other ISSUE: May defendant invoke immunity from
related matters. The act of Moreau is deadly suit?
official in nature, performed by him as the
immediate superior of Sanders and directly HELD:
answerable to Naval Personnel in matters NO. Ordinarily, the officer or employee
involving the special department of NAVSTA. committing the tort is personally liable and may
be sued as any other citizen and held answerable
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY for whatever injury.
REPUBLIC VS. SANDOVAL
220 SCRA 124 (1993)
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
FACTS: SECTION 3, ARTICLE XVI, 1987 PHILIPPINE
By reason of the Mendiola massacre, CONSTITUTION
wherein 12 rallyists died in their quest for U.S.A VS. GUINTO
genuine agrarian reform, President Aquino (G.R. NO. 76607 FEBRUARY 26, 1990)
issued Administrative Order No.11 which created
the Citizens Mendiola Commission for the CRUZ, J.
purpose of conducting an investigation for the FACTS:
disorders, death and casualties that took place. In the first case, the private respondents
The most significant recommendation of are suing several officers of the U.S. Air Force
the Commission was for the deceased and other stationed in Clark Air Base in connection with the
victims of Mendiola incident to be compensated bidding conducted by them for contracts for
by the government. barber services in the base.
Due to the recommendation, petitioners In the second case, private respondents
filed a formal letter of demand for compensation filed a complaint for damages against private
from the government to which the latter did not petitioners for his dismissal as cook in the U.S.
take heed. The group then instituted an action Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air
for damages against the Republic of the Station.
Philippines together with military officers and In the third case, private respondent,
personnel involved in Mendiola incident. who was employed as a barracks boy in a U.S.
Respondent Judge Sandoval dismissed Base, was arrested following a buy-bust
the complaint as against the Republic of the operation conducted by the individual petitioners,
Philippines on the basis that there was no waver officers of the U.S. Air Force and special agents
by the state. Hence, the petition for certiorari. of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators.
He then filed a complaint for damages against
ISSUE: the individual petitioners claiming that it was
Whether the State by virtue of the administrative because of their acts that he was removed.
order waived its immunity from suit? In the fourth case, a complaint for
damages was filed by the private respondents
HELD: against the private petitioners, for injuries
NO. Firstly, recommendation made by allegedly sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of
the commission does not in any way mean that the acts of the defendants. According to the
liability automatically attaches to the state. In plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up,
effect, the same shall only serve as a cause of handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them
action on the event that any party decides to which bit them in several parts of their bodies and
litigate his or her claim. The commission is caused extensive injuries to them.
merely a preliminary venue.
These cases have been consolidated state has allowed itself to be sued. When the
because they all involve the doctrine of state state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only
immunity. The United States of America was not giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can,
impleaded in the complaints below but has that the defendant is liable.
moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in The said article establishes a rule of
effect suits against it to which it has not liability, not suability. The government may be
consented. It is now contesting the denial of its held liable under this rule only if it first allows
motions by the respondent judges. itself to be sued through any of the accepted
forms of consent. Moreover, the agent performing
ISSUE: Whether or not the Doctrine of State his regular functions is not a special agent even if
Immunity is not applicable thereby making the he is so denominated, as in the case at bar. No
State liable less important, the said provision appears to
regulate only the relations of the local state with
HELD: its inhabitants and, hence, applies only to the
NO. While suable, the petitioners are Philippine government and not to foreign
nevertheless not liable. It is obvious that the governments impleaded in our courts.
claim for damages cannot be allowed on the The complaints against the petitioners in
strength of the evidence, which have been the court below were aptly dismissed.
carefully examined.
The traditional rule of immunity exempts
a State from being sued in the courts of another THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a SECTION 3, ARTICLE XVI, 1987 PHILIPPINE
necessary consequence of the principles of CONSTITUTION
independence and equality of States. However, VETERANS MANPOWER AND PROTECTIVE
the rules of International Law are not petrified; SERVICE, INC. VS CA
they are constantly developing and evolving. And (G.R. NO. 91359, SEPTEMBER 25, 1992)
because the activities of states have multiplied, it
has been necessary to distinguish them - FACTS:
between sovereign and governmental acts (jure A suit was filed against the PC Chief for
imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary failure to act on the request by petitioner seeking
acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State to set aside the findings of PADPAO expelling it
immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. from PADPAO and considering its application for
The restrictive application of State immunity is renewal of its license even without a certificate of
now the rule in the United States, the United membership from PADPAO. A Motion to Dismiss
Kingdom and other states in Western Europe. was filed invoking that it is a suit against the
The restrictive application of State State which had not given its consent.
immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial ISSUES:
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its Whether or not the action taken by the
commercial activities or economic affairs. petitioners is a suit against the State.
Stated differently, a State may be said to have Whether of not the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA
descended to the level of an individual and can are liable in their private capacities.
thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent Whether or not the Memorandum of
to be sued only when it enters into business Agreement constitute as an implied
contracts. It does not apply where the contract consent of the State to be sued
relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
In this case the projects are an integral part of the HELD:
naval base which is devoted to the defense of Yes, it is a suit against the State, the PC Chief
both the United States and the Philippines, and PC-SUSIA being instrumentalities of the
indisputably a function of the government of the State exercising the governmental function of
highest order; they are not utilized for nor regulating the organization and operation of
dedicated to commercial or business purposes. private detective watchmen or security guard
There is no question that the United agencies. Even if its action prospers, the
States of America, like any other state, will be payment of its monetary claims may not be
deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability enforced because the State did not consent to
if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or appropriate the necessary funds for the
private capacity, as in the cases at bar. It is only purpose.
when the contract involves its sovereign or
governmental capacity that no such waiver may No, since the acts for which the PC Chief and
be implied. A State may be said to have PC-SUSIA are being called to account in this
descended to the level of an individual and can case, were performed by them as part of their
thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent official duties, without malice, gross negligence
to be sued only when it enters into business or bad faith, no recovery may be held against
contracts. them in their private capacities.
The private respondents invokes Article
2180 of the Civil Code which holds the No, the Memorandum of Agreement did not
government liable if it acts through a special constitute an implied consent by the State to
agent. The argument, it would seem, is premised be sued because it was intended to
on the ground that since the officers are professionalize the industry and to
designated "special agents," the United States standardized the salaries of the security
government should be liable for their torts. guards. It is merely incidental to the purpose of
There seems to be a failure to RA No. 5487 which is to regulate the
distinguish between suability and liability and a organization and operation of private security
misconception that the two terms are agencies.
synonymous. Suability depends on the consent The State is deemed to have given
of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable tacitly its consent to be sued when it enters into
law and the established facts. The circumstance a contract. However, it does not apply where
that a state is suable does not necessarily mean the contact relates to the exercise of its
that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be sovereign functions.
held liable if it does not first consent to be sued.
Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
SECTION 3, ARTICLE XVI, 1987 PHILIPPINE right or interest in the property appears at the
CONSTITUTION back of the certificate. Without prior expropriation
MERRITT vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE or negotiated sale, the government used a
PHILIPPINES portion of said lot for the construction of the
(G.R. NO. L-11154, MARCH 21, 1916) Mango and Gorordo Avenues.
It appears that said avenues already
TRENT, J. existed since 1921. In 1958, Amigable's counsel
FACTS: wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting
Merritt, while riding his motorcycle was payment of the portion of her lot which had been
hit by an ambulance owned by the Philippine appropriated by the government. The claim was
General Hospital. A driver employed by the indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed
hospital drove it. In order for Merritt to sue the it. Amigable then filed in the court a quo a
Philippine government, Act No. 2457 was complaint against the Republic of the Philippines
enacted by the Philippine Legislature authorizing and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as
Merritt to bring suit against the Government of Commissioner of Public Highways for the
the Philippine Islands and authorizing the recovery of ownership and possession of the land
Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said traversed by the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.
suit. A suit was then filed before the CFI of She also sought the payment of compensatory
Manila, which fixed the responsibility for the damages for the illegal occupation of her land,
collision solely on the ambulance driver and moral damages, attorney's fees and the costs of
determined the amount of damages to be the suit. The Government had not given its
awarded to Merritt. Both parties appealed from consent to be sued.
the decision, plaintiff Merritt as to the amount of
damages and defendant in rendering the amount ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant may
against the government. properly sue the government under the facts of
the case
ISSUE: Whether or not defendant, Government
of the Philippines, waived its immunity from suit HELD:
as well as conceded its liability to the plaintiff YES. Where the government takes
when it enacted Act No. 2457 away property from a private landowner for public
use without going through the legal process of
HELD: expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved
NO. By consenting to be sued, a state party may properly maintain a suit against the
simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not government without thereby violating the doctrine
thereby concede its liability to the plaintiff, or of governmental immunity from suit without its
create any cause of action in his favor, or extend consent. The doctrine of governmental immunity
its liability to any cause not previously from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the
a pre-existing liability and submit itself to the government followed the procedure indicated by
jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to the governing law at the time, a complaint would
interpose any lawful defense. have been filed by it, and only upon payment of
The Government of the Philippines the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after
Islands is only liable, for the acts of its agents, tender to the party entitled to such payment of
officers and employees when they act as special the amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter
agents. A special agent is one who receives a in and upon the land so condemned, to
definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to appropriate the same to the public use defined in
the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a the judgment." If there were an observance of
special official. The special agent acts in procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in
representation of the state and being bound to the sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then
act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust that precisely because there was a failure to
confided to him. This concept does not apply to abide by what the law requires, the government
any executive agent who is an employee of the would stand to benefit. It is not too much to say
acting administration and who on his own that when the government takes any property for
responsibility performs the functions which are public use, which is conditioned upon the
inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and payment of just compensation, to be judicially
which are regulated by law and the regulations. ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to
The responsibility of the state is limited to that the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought
which it contracts through a special agent, duly then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could
empowered by a definite order or commission to still be appropriately invoked.
perform some act or charged with some definite
purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not
where the claim is based on acts or omissions THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
imputable to a public official charged with some REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
administrative or technical office who can be held 204 SCRA 212 (1991)
to the proper responsibility in the manner laid
down by the law of civil responsibility. The FACTS:
chauffeur of the ambulance of the General The PCGG filed with the
Hospital was not such an agent. Sandiganbayan a complaint for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages
against private respondents Bienvenido Tantoco
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY and Dominador Santiago, et al.
SECTION 3, ARTICLE XVI, 1987 PHILIPPINE Private respondents jointly moved to
CONSTITUTION strike out some portions of the complaint and for
AMIGABLE VS. CUENCA bill of particulars of other portions, which motion
(G.R. NO. L-26400 FEBRUARY 29, 1972) was opposed by the PCGG. The Sandiganbayan
gave the PCGG 45 days to expand its complaint
MAKALINTAL, J. to make more specific certain allegations.
FACTS: Private respondents then presented a
Amigable is the registered owner of a lot Motion to leave to file interrogatories under Rule
covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title, where 25 of the Rules of Court.
no annotation in favor of the government of any
The Sandiganbayan denied private Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.

respondents motions. Feliciano alleged that he bought the property in
Private respondents filed an Answer to question from Victor Gardiola by virtue of a
with Compulsory Counterclaim. In response, the Contract of Sale dated May 31, 1952, followed by
PCGG presented a Reply to Counterclaim with a Deed of Absolute Sale on October 30, 1954;
Motion to Dismiss compulsory counterclaim. that Gardiola had acquired the property by
Private respondents filed a pleading purchase from the heirs of Francisco Abrazado
denominated Interrogatories to Plaintiff, and whose title to the said property was evidenced by
Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff as well as a an informacion posesoria that upon his purchase
motion for production and inspection of of the property, he took actual possession of the
documents. same, introduced various improvements therein
The Sandiganbayan admitted the and caused it to be surveyed in July 1952, which
Amended Interrogatories and granted the motion survey was approved by the Director of Lands on
for production and inspection of documents October 24,1954.
respectively. On November 1, 1954, President
The PCGG moved for reconsideration, Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 90
arguing that the documents are privileged in reserving for settlement purposes, under the
character since they are intended to be used administration of the National Resettlement and
against the PCGG and/or its Commission in Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA), a tract of
violation of Sec.4 of EO No. 1, V12: land situated in the Municipalities of Tinambac
a) No civil action shall lie against the and Siruma, Camarines Sur, after which the
Commission or any member thereof for anything NARRA and its successor agency, the Land
done or omitted in the discharge of the task Authority, started sub-dividing and distributing the
contemplated by this Order. land to the settlers; that the property in question,
b) No member or staff by the Commission while located within the reservation established
shall be required to testify or produce evidence in under Proclamation No. 90, was the private
any judicial, legislative or administrative property of Feliciano and should therefore be
proceedings concerning matter within its official excluded therefrom. Feliciano prayed that he be
cognizance. declared the rightful and true owner of the
The Sandiganbayan promulgated two property in question consisting of 1,364.4177
Resolutions. The first, denying reconsideration of hectares; that his title of ownership based
the Resolution allowing production of the on informacion posesoria of his predecessor-in-
documents, and the second, reiterating, by interest be declared legally valid and subsisting
implication the permission to serve the amended and that defendant be ordered to cancel and
interrogatories on the plaintiff. nullify all awards to the settlers.
ISSUE: Is the PCGG immune from suit? ISSUE:

Whether or not the State can be sued
HELD: for recovery and possession of a parcel of land
NO. The state is of course immune HELD:
from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule, be A suit against the State, under settled
sued without its consent. But it is axiomatic that jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a
in filing an action, it divests itself of its sovereign showing that the State hasconsented to be sued,
character and sheds its immunity from suit, either expressly or by implication through the use
descending to the level of an ordinary litigant. of statutory language too plain to be
The PCGG cannot claim a superior or preferred misinterpreted. It may be invoked by the
status to the State, even while assuming of an courts sua sponte at any stage of the
act for the State. The suggestion that the State proceedings. Waiver of immunity, being a
makes no implied waiver of immunity by filing a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred
suit except when in doing so it acts in, or in lightly, but must be construed instrictissimi
matters concerning, its proprietary or non- juris (of strictest right). Moreover, the
governmental capacity, is unacceptable. It Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent
attempts a distinction without support in principle of the State to be sued must emanate from
or precedent. On the contrary, the consent of statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can
the State to be sued may be given expressly or only be made by an act of the legislative body.
impliedly. Express consent may be manifested Also, it is noteworthy, that as pointed out by the
either through a general law or a special law. Solicitor General, that the informacion
Implied consent is given when the State itself posesoria registered in the Office of the Register
commences litigation or when it enters into a of Deed of Camarines Sur on September 23,
contract. 1952 was a "reconstituted" possessory
information; it was "reconstituted from the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PABLO duplicate presented to this office (Register of
FELICIANO Deeds) by Dr. Pablo Feliciano," without the
AND INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT submission of proof that the alleged duplicate
G.R. NO. 70853; MARCH 12, 1987 was authentic or that the original thereof was lost.
Reconstitution can be
FACTS: validly made only in case of loss of the original.
Petitioner seeks the review of the These circumstances raise grave doubts as to
decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court the authenticity and validity of the "informacion
dated April 30, 1985, which dismissed the posesoria" relied upon by respondent Feliciano.
complaint of respondent Pablo Feliciano for Adding to the dubiousness of said document is
recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel the fact that "possessory information calls for an
of land on the ground of non-suability of the area of only 100 hectares," whereas the land
State. On January 22, 1970, Feliciano filed a claimed by respondent Feliciano comprises
complaint with then Court of First Instance of 1,364.4177 hectares, later reduced to 701-9064
Camarines Sur against the RP, represented by hectares.
the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership
and possession of a parcel of land, consisting of
four (4) THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
lots with an aggregate area of 1,364.4177 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS. RUIZ
hectares, situated in the Barrio of Salvacion, 136 SCRA 487 (1985)
FACTS: THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY

Petitioner invited the submission of bids THE HOLY SEE VS. DEL ROSARIO JR
for repair of its wharves and shoreline in the 238 SCRA 524 (1994)
Subic Bay Area. Eligion and Co. responded to
the invitation and submitted bids. Said company FACTS:
was requested by telegram to confirm its price Lot 5-A is registered under the name of
proposals and for the name of its bonding the petitioner The Holy See. This lot is
company, and from which it complied. contiguous to lots 5-B and 5-D registered in the
Later, the United States, through its name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).
agents, informed said company that it was not These three lots were sold through an agent
qualified to receive an award at the project for the Msgr. Domingo Cirilos Jr. to Ramon Licup. Licup
poorly completed projects it awarded to third assigned his rights to private respondent
parties. The company sued petitioner for specific Starbright Sales Ent. Inc. (SSEI).
performance and if no longer possible, for Due to refusal of the squatters to vacate
damages. It also asked for a writ of preliminary the lots, a dispute arose as to who of the parties
injunction to restrain the defendants from has the responsibility of eviction and clearing the
entering into contracts with others. land. SSEI insists that petitioner should clear the
The United States entered a special property of the squatters. Petitioner refused and
appearance for the purpose only of questioning proposed that either SSEI undertake the eviction
the jurisdiction of the court over the subject or that the earnest money be returned. Msgr.
matter of the complaint and the persons of the Cirilos returned the P100,000.00 earnest money,
defendants, the subject matter of the complaint and the property was sold to Tropicana
being acts and omissions of the individual Properties and Development Corporation
defendants as agents of the defendant United (Tropicana).
States of America, a foreign sovereign which has SSEI filed suit for annulment of sale,
not given its consent to this suit or any other suit specific performance and damages against Msgr.
for the cause of action asserted in the complaint. Cirilos, PRC, and Tropicana.
US filed a motion to dismiss and The petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos moved
opposed the writ. The trial court denied the to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based on
motion and issued a writ. sovereign immunity from suit. It was denied on
the ground that petitioner shed off its sovereign
ISSUE: Whether the US may be sued? immunity by entering into the business contract
in question.
HELD: A motion for reconsideration was also
No. The traditional rule of State denied. Hence, this special civil action for
immunity exempts a State from being sued in the certiorari.
courts of another State without its consent or
waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of ISSUE: Did the Holy See properly invoke
the principles of independence and equality of sovereign immunity for its non-suability?
States. However, the rules of International Law
are not petrified; they are constantly developing HELD:
and evolving. And because the activities of states YES. In the case at bar, lot 5-A was
have multiplied, it has been necessary to acquired as a donation from the archdiocese of
distinguish them between sovereign and Manila for the site of its mission or the Apostolic
governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, Nuniciature in the Philippines. The subsequent
commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). disposal was made because the squatters living
The result is that State immunity now extends thereon made it impossible for petitioner to use it
only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive for the purpose of the donation. Petitioner did not
application of State immunity is now the rule in sell lot 5-A for profit or gain.
the United States, the United Kingdom and other There are two conflicting concepts of
states in western Europe. (See Coquia and sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly
Defensor-Santiago, Public International Law, pp. established. According to the classical or
207-209 [1984].) absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its
The restrictive application of state consent, be made a respondent in the courts of
immunity is proper only when the another sovereign. According to the newer or
proceedings arise out of commercial restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its is recognized only with regard to public acts or
commercial activities or economic affairs. acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to
Stated differently, a state may be said to have private acts or acts jure gestionis (United States
descended to the level of an individual and can of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 [1987];
be thus deemed to have tacitly given its consent Coquia and Defensor-Santiago, Public
to be sued only when the contract relates to the International Law 194 [1984]).
exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case, The restrictive theory, which is
the projects are an integral part of the naval base intended to be a solution to the host of problems
which is devoted to the defense of both the US involving the issue of sovereign immunity, has
and the Philippines, undisputed a function of the created problems of its own. Legal treatises and
government of the highest order, they are not the decisions in countries which follow the
utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or restrictive theory have difficulty in characterizing
business purposes. The correct test for the whether a contract of a sovereign state with a
application of State immunity is not the private party is an act jure gestionis or an act jure
conclusion of a contract by a State but the imperii.
legal nature of the act is shown in Syquia vs. The restrictive theory came about
Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 (1949). In that case the because of the entry of sovereign states into
plaintiffs leased three apartment buildings to the purely commercial activities remotely connected
United States of America for the use of its military with the discharge of governmental functions.
officials. The plaintiffs sued to recover This is particularly true with respect to the
possession of the premises on the ground that Communist states which took control of
the term of the leases had expired, They also nationalized business activities and international
asked for increased rentals until the apartments trading.
shall have been vacated.
This Court has considered the following Moreover the Department of the Foreign
transactions by a foreign state with private parties Affairs has formally intervened and officially
as acts jure imperii: (1) the lease by a foreign certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a
government of apartment buildings for use of its duly accredited diplomatic missionary to the
military officers (Syquia v. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 Republic of the Philippines and as such is
[1949]; (2) the conduct of public bidding for the exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all
repair of a wharf at a United States Naval Station the rights, privileges and immunities of a
(United States of America v. Ruiz, supra.); and diplomatic mission or embassy in this court.
(3) the change of employment status of base The determination of the executive arm
employees (Sanders v. Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88 of the government that a state or instrumentality
[1988]). is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is
On the other hand, this Court has a political question that is conclusive upon the
considered the following transactions by a foreign courts. Where the plea of immunity is reacquired
state with private parties as acts jure gestionis: and affirmed by the executive branch, it is the
(1) the hiring of a cook in the recreation center, duty of the courts to accept this claim so as not to
consisting of three restaurants, a cafeteria, a embarrass the executive arm of the government
bakery, a store, and a coffee and pastry shop at in conducting the countrys foreign relations.
the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City, to cater
to American servicemen and the general public
(United States of America v. Rodrigo, 182 SCRA THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
644 [1990]); and (2) the bidding for the operation REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR
of barber shops in Clark Air Base in Angeles City 54 SCRA 84 (1973)
(United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA
644 [1990]). The operation of the restaurants and FACTS:
other facilities open to the general public is A decision was rendered in a Special
undoubtedly for profit as a commercial and not a Proceeding against the Republic of the
governmental activity. By entering into the Philippines thereby confirming the arbitration
employment contract with the cook in the award of P1,712,396.40 in favor of respondent
discharge of its proprietary function, the United corporation. After the decision became final and
States government impliedly divested itself of its executory, respondent judge issued an order
sovereign immunity from suit. directing the sheriff to execute the said decision,
In the absence of legislation defining and the corresponding alias writ of execution was
what activities and transactions shall be thus issued.
considered "commercial" and as constituting acts Hence the sheriff served notices of
jure gestionis, we have to come out with our own garnishment with several banks especially the
guidelines, tentative they may be. monies due to the AFP in the form of deposits
Certainly, the mere entering into a sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the
contract by a foreign state with a private party writ. PNB and Philippine Veterans Bank received
cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only such notice. As certified by the AFP Comptroller,
be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is these funds of the AFP with the said banks are
whether the foreign state is engaged in the public funds for the pensions, pay, and
activity in the regular course of business. If the allowances of its military and civilian personnel.
foreign state is not engaged regularly in a The petitioner, in this certiorari and
business or trade, the particular act or transaction prohibition proceedings, challenges the validity of
must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in the Order issued by Judge Villasor declaring the
pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident decision final and executory and subsequently
thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially issuing an alias writ of execution directed against
when it is not undertaken for gain or profit. the funds of the AFP in pursuance thereof.
As held in United States of America v. ISSUE:

Guinto, (supra): May the writs of execution and notices of
garnishment be sued against public funds?
"There is no question that the United
States of America, like any other state, will be HELD:
deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability NO. Although the State may give its
if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or consent to be sued by private parties, there is
private capacity. It is only when the contract corollary that public funds cannot be the object of
involves its sovereign or governmental capacity garnishment proceedings even if the consent to
that no such waiver may be implied." be sued has been previously granted and the
In the case at bench, if petitioner has states liability has been adjudged.
bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a Thus in the case of Commission of
real estate business, surely the said transaction Public Highways vs. San Diego, such a well-
can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. settled doctrine was restated in the opinion of
However, petitioner has denied that the Justice Teehankee. The universal rule that
acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A where the state gives its consent to be sued by
were made for profit but claimed that it acquired private parties either by general or special law, it
said property for the site of its mission or the may limit claimants action only up to the
Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of
respondent failed to dispute said claim. execution and that the power of the courts ends
Under Art.31(A) of the 1961 Vienna when the judgment is rendered, since the
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic government funds and properties may not be
envoy is granted immunity from the civil and seized under writs of execution or garnishment to
administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state satisfy such judgment, is based on obvious
over any real action relating to private immovable considerations of public policy. Disbursement of
property situated in the territory of the receiving public funds must be covered by the
state which the envoy holds on behalf of the corresponding appropriations as required by law.
sending state for the purposes of the mission. If The functions and public services rendered by
this immunity is provided for a diplomatic envoy the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or
with all the more reason should immunity be disrupted by diversion of public funds from their
recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which legitimate and specific object is appropriated by
in this case is the Holy See. law.
PNB VS. PABALAN

83 SCRA 595 (1978)
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE VS. NLRC FACTS:
227 SCRA 693 (1993) A judgment was rendered against
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration
FACTS: (PVTA). Judge Javier Pabalan issued a writ of
The DAR and Sultan Security Agency execution followed thereafter by a notice of
entered into a contract for security services to be garnishment of the funds of respondent PVTA
provided by the latter to the said governmental which were deposited with the Philippine National
entity. Several guards of the agency assigned to Bank (PNB). PNB objected on the constitutional
the petitioners premises filed a complaint for law doctrine of non-suability of a state. It alleged
th
underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13 that such funds are public in character.
month pay, uniform allowances, night shift
differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay as ISSUE: Was the contention of PNB correct?
well as for damages, before the Regional
Arbitration, against the petitioner and the agency. HELD:
The Executive Labor arbiter rendered a decision NO. It is to be admitted that under the
finding the petitioner and the agency jointly and present Constitution, what was formerly implicit
severally liable for the payment of the money as a fundamental doctrine in constitutional law
claims. The decision became final and executory. has been set forth in express terms: The State
The Labor Arbiter then issued a writ of execution may not be sued without its consent. If the
which resulted in the property of the petitioner funds appertained to one of the regular
being levied. The petitioner asserts the rule of departments or offices in the government, then,
non-suability of the State. certainly such a provision would lie a bar to
garnishment. Such is not the case here.
ISSUE: Garnishment would lie. The Supreme Court, in a
Can the Department of Agriculture be sued under case brought by the same petitioner precisely
the contract entered with the agency? invoking such doctrine, left no doubt that the
funds of a public corporation could properly be
HELD: made the object of a notice of garnishment.
YES. The basic postulate under Art. X It is well settled that when the
section 3 of the Constitution that the State may government enters into commercial business, its
not be sued without its consent is not absolute abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be
for it does not say that the State may not be sued treated like any other corporation. (Manila Hotel
under any circumstances. On the contrary, as Employees Association vs. Manila Hotel
correctly phrased, the doctrine only conveys that Company)
the State may not be sued without its consent.
Its import then is that the State may at times be
sued. The States consent may be given either
expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be
made through a general law waiving the immunity
of the State from suit which is found in Act 3083,
where the Philippine government consents and
submits to be sued upon any money claim THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
involving liability arising from contract, express or RAYO VS. CFI OF BULACAN
implied, which could serve as basis of civil action 110 SCRA 460 (1981)
between private parties. Implied consent on the
other hand, is conceded when the State itself FACTS:
commences litigation, thus opening itself to During the height of the infamous
counterclaim or when it enters into a contract. typhoon Kading, the NPC, acting through its plant
In this situation, the government is superintendent, Benjamin Chavez, opened or
deemed to have descended to the level of the caused to be opened simultaneously all the three
other contracting party and to have divested itself floodgates of the Angat Dam. The many
of its sovereign immunity. The rule relied upon by unfortunate victims of the man-caused flood filed
the NLRC is not, however, without qualification. with the respondent court eleven complaints for
Not all contracts entered into by the government damages against the NPC and Benjamin
operate as a waiver of its non-suability. Chavez. NPC filed separate answers to each of
Distinction must still be made between one which the eleven complaints and invoked in each
was executed in the exercise of its sovereign answer a special and affirmative defense that in
function and another which is done in its the operation of the Angat Dam, it is performing a
proprietary capacity. In the instant case, the purely governmental function. Hence, it cannot
petitioner has not pretended to have assumed a be sued without the express consent of the State.
capacity apart from its being a governmental The respondent court dismissed the case on the
entity when it entered into the questioned grounds that said defendant performs a purely
contract, not that it could have in fact performed governmental function in the operation of the
any act proprietary in character, but be that as it Angat Dam and cannot therefore be sued for
may, the claims of private respondents arising damages in the instant cases in connection
from the contract for security services clearly therewith.
constitute money claims for which Act 3083 gives
the consent of the state to be sued. ISSUE: Was the NPC performing a governmental
However, when the State gives its function with respect to the management and
consent to be sued, it does not thereby operation of the Angat Dam?
necessarily consent to an unrestricted execution
against it. When the State waives immunity, all it HELD:
does, in effect, is to give the other party an YES. However, it is not necessary to
opportunity to prove, if it can, that the state has determine whether NPC performs a
any liability. governmental function with respect to the
management and operation of the Angat Dam. It
is sufficient to say that the government has
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY organized a private corporation, put money in it
and has allowed itself to sue and be sued in any ISSUE: Can the Customs Arrastre Service or the
court under its charter. As a government owned Bureau of Customs be sued?
and controlled corporation, it has personality of
its own, distinct and separate from that of the HELD:
government. Moreover, the charter provision that NO. The Bureau of Customs, acting as
the NPC can sue and be sued in any court is part of the machinery of the national government
without qualification on the cause of action as the in the operations of arrastre service, pursuant to
one instituted by the petitioners. express legislative mandate and a necessary
incident of its prime governmental function, is
immune from suit, there being no statute to the
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY contrary.
BUREAU OF PRINTING VS. BUREAU OF The Bureau of Customs has no
PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION personality of its own apart from that of the
1 SCRA 340 (1961) government. Its primary function is
governmental, that of assessing and collecting
FACTS: lawful revenues from imported articles and all
Bureau of Printing Employees other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges,
Association filed a case against herein petitioners fines, and penalties. To this function, arrastre is a
Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador, and necessary incident. Although said arrastre
Mariano Ledesma. The complaint alleged that function is deemed proprietary, it is necessarily
Salvador and Ledesma have been engaging in an incident of the primary and governmental
unfair labor practices by interfering with, or function of the Bureau of Customs, so that
coercing the employees of the Bureau of Printing, engaging in the same does not necessarily
particularly the members of the complaining render said Bureau liable to suit. For otherwise, it
association, in the exercise of their right to self- could not perform its governmental function
organization, and by discriminating in regard to without necessarily exposing itself to suit.
hiring and tenure of their employment in order to Sovereign immunity granted as to the end should
discourage them from pursuing their union not be denied as to the necessary means to that
activities. Answering the complaint, Salvador end.
and Ledesma denied the charges, and
contended that the Bureau of Printing has no
juridical personality to sue and be sued. THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION VS
ISSUE: Can the Bureau of Printing be sued? COURT OF APPEALS
167 SCRA 28 (1988)
HELD:
NO. As a government office, without FACTS:
any juridical capacity, it cannot be sued. Ernest Simke went to Manila
The Bureau of Printing is an International Airport to meet his future son-in-law.
instrumentality of the government; it operates While walking towards the viewing deck or the
under the direct supervision of the Executive terrace to get a better view of the incoming
Secretary. It is designed to meet the printing passengers, he slipped over an elevation about
needs of the government. It is primarily a service four inches high, and he fell on his back and
bureau. It is obviously not engaged in business or broke his thigh bone.
occupation for pecuniary profit. It has no He filed an action for damages based on
corporate existence. Its appropriations are quasi-delict with the CFI of Rizal against the Civil
provided for in the budget. It is not subject to the Aeronautics Administration or CAA as the entity
jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations. empowered to administer, operate, manage,
Any suit, action or proceeding against control, maintain, and develop the MIA.
the Bureau of Printing would actually be a suit, Judgment was rendered in his favor, and on
action or proceeding against the government appeal to the Court of Appeals, judgment was
itself. The government cannot be sued without its affirmed.
consent, much less over its objection.
ISSUE: Whether the CAA, being an agency of

THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY the government, can be made a party defendant?
MOBIL PHILS. EXPLORATION, INC. VS.
CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE HELD:
18 SCRA 1120 (1966) YES. Not all government entities
whether corporate or not are immune from suits.
FACTS: Immunity from suits is determined by the
Four cases of rotary drill parts were character of the objects for which the entity was
shipped from abroad consigned to Mobil organized. The CAA is not immune from suit it
Philippines. The Customs Arrastre later being engaged in functions pertaining to a private
delivered to the broker of the consignee three entity. It is engaged in an enterprise which, far
cases only of the shipment. Mobil Philippines from being the exclusive prerogative of the state,
Exploration Inc. may more than the construction of public roads,
filed suit in the CFI against the Customs Arrastre be undertaken by private concerns. The CAA
Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover was created not to maintain a necessity of the
the value of the undelivered cases plus other government, but to run what is essentially a
damages. business even if the revenues be not its prime
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss objective but rather the promotion of travel and
the complaint on the ground that not being a the convenience of the traveling public.
person under the law, defendants cannot be
sued.
After the plaintiff opposed the motion, THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
the court dismissed the complaint on the ground MUN. OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION VS.
that neither the Customs Arrastre Service nor the JUDGE FIRME
Bureau of Customs is suable. 195 SCRA 692 (1991)
FACTS:
Petitioner Municipality of San Fernando, death of the passenger, tragic and deplorable
La Union, is a municipality corporation. though, it may be imposed on the municipality no
Respondent Judge Romeo N. Firme is impleaded duty to pay the monetary compensation.
in his official capacity as the presiding judge,
while private respondents are heirs of the
deceased Laureano Banina, Sr. THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
On December 16, 1965, a collision MUNICIPALITY OF SAN MIGUEL, BULACAN
occurred involving a passenger jeep, a gravel VS. FERNANDEZ
and sand truck, and a dump truck of the 130 SCRA 56 (1984)
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union which
was driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, FACTS:
several passengers of the jeep including Banina, In Civil Case No. 604-B, the then CFI of
Sr. died. Bulacan rendered judgment holding herein
The heir of Banina, Sr. instituted a petitioner municipality liable to respondents
complaint for damages against the owner and Imperio, et al. When the judgment became final,
driver of the passenger jeep. However, the respondent judge issued a writ of execution to
aforesaid defendant filed a third party complaint satisfy the same. Petitioner municipality filed a
against the petitioner and the driver of the dump motion to quash the writ on the ground that the
truck of the petitioner. municipalitys property or funds are public exempt
Thereafter, the private respondents from execution. The motion was denied. The
amended the complaint wherein the petitioner respondent judge issued another order requiring
and its regular employee Alfredo Bislig were both the municipal and provincial treasurer to
impleaded for the first time as defendants. comply with the money judgment. When the
Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative treasurers failed to do so, respondent judge
defenses such as lack of cause of action, non- issued an order for their arrest and that they will
suability of the state, prescription of cause of be released upon compliance, hence the present
action, and the negligence of the owner and petition.
driver of the passenger jeep as the proximate
cause of the collision. ISSUE: Whether the funds of the municipality in
On October 10, 1979, the trial court the hands of the Provincial and Municipal
rendered a decision for the plaintiffs, and Treasurers of Bulacan and San Miguel,
defendants Municipality of san Fernando, La respectively are public funds which are exempt
Union and Alfredo Bislig are ordered to pay jointly from execution?
and severally the plaintiffs. The complaint
against the driver and the owner of the HELD:
passenger jeep was dismissed. YES. Municipal funds in possession of
Petitioner filed a motion for municipal and provincial treasurers are public
reconsideration and for a new trial. However, funds exempt from execution. The reason for
respondent judge issued another order denying those was explained in the case of Municipality of
the motion for reconsideration of the order for Paoay vs. Manaois that are held in trust for the
having been filed out of time. Hence, this people intended and used for the accomplices of
petition. the purposes for which municipal corporations
are created and that to subject said properties
ISSUE: Whether the municipality is liable for the and public funds to execution would materially
tort committed by its employee? impede, even defeat and in some instance
destroy said purpose. Thus it is clear that all the
HELD: funds of petitioner municipality in the possession
NO. The test of liability of the of the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel as well
municipality depends on whether or not the driver as those in the possession of the Provincial
acting in behalf of the municipality is performing Treasurer of Bulacan are also public funds and
governmental or proprietary functions. It has as such they are exempt from execution.
already been remarked that municipal Besides PD 447, known as the Decree
corporations are suable because their charters on Local Fiscal Administration, provides in
grant them the competence to sue and be sued. section 3 (a) that no money shall be paid out of
Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for the treasury except in pursuance of a lawful
torts committed by them in the discharge of appropriation or other specific statutory
governmental functions and can be held authority. Otherwise stated, there must be a
answerable only if it can be shown that they were corresponding appropriation in the form of an
acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting ordinance duly passed by the Sangguniang
such entities to be sued, the state merely gives Bayan before any money of the municipality may
the claimants the right to show the defendant was be paid out. In the case at bar, it has not been
not acting in its governmental capacity when the shown that the Sangguniang Bayan has passed
injury was inflicted or that the case comes under any ordinance to this effect.
the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this,
the claimants cannot recover.
In the case at bar, the driver of the THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
dump truck of the municipality insists that he was MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI VS. COURT OF
on his way to Naguilan River to get a load of APPEALS
sand and gravel for the repair of the San 190 SCRA 206 (1990)
Fernando municipal street. FACTS:
In the absence of any evidence to the An expropriation proceeding was
contrary, the regularity of the performance of initiated by petitioner Municipality of Makati
official duty is presumed. Hence, the driver of the against private respondent Admiral Finance
dump truck was performing duties or tasks Creditors Consortium Inc., Home Building
pertaining to his office. System and Reality Corp., and Arceli P. Jo
After careful examination of existing involving a parcel of land and improvements
laws and jurisprudence, we arrive at the thereon located at San Antonio Village, Makati.
conclusion that the municipality cannot be held An action for eminent domain was filed.
liable for the torts committed by its regular Attached to the petitioners complaint was a
employee, who was then engaged in the certification that a bank account had been
discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the opened with the PNB. After the decision has
become final and executory, a writ of execution G.R. NO. 107271; SEPTEMBER 10, 2003
was issued and a notice of garnishment was
served upon the manager of PNB where the FACTS:
petitioner had bank accounts. However, the In 1972, Mayor Marcial Samson of
sheriff was informed that a hold code was placed Caloocan abolished the position of Assistant City
on the account of the petitioner. Administrator and 17 other positions via
The petitioner contended that its funds Ordinance No. 1749. The affected employees
at the PNB cocked neither be garnished nor assailed the legality of the abolition. The CFI in
levied upon execution for to do so would result in 1973 declared abolition illegal and ordered the
the disbursement of public funds without the reinstatement of all the dismissed employees and
proper appropriation required under the law. the payment of their back-wages and other
In a petition with the Court of Appeals, emoluments. The City Government appealed the
petitioner alleges for the first time that it has decision but such was dismissed. In 1986 the
actually two accounts with the PNB, one City paid Santiago P75,083.37 as partial payment
exclusively for the expropriation of the subject of her back-wages. The others were paid in full.
property with the outstanding balance of P99, In 1987 the City appropriated funds for her
743. 94. The other account was for the unpaid back salaries (supplemental budget #3)
obligations and other purposes of the municipal but the City refused to release the money to
government with a balance of P170,098,421.72. Santiago. The City of Caloocan argued that
Santiago was not entitled to back wages. On July
ISSUE: Whether the bank account of a 27, 1992 Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at public
municipality may be levied on execution to satisfy auction one of the motor vehicles of the City
a money judgment against it absent showing that Government for P100,000. The amount was
the municipal council has passed an ordinance given to Santiago. The City Government
appropriating from its public funds an amount questioned the validity of the sale of motor
corresponding to the balance due to the RTC vehicle; properties of the municipality were
decision? exempt from execution. Judge Allarde denied the
motion and directed the sheriff to levy and
HELD: schedule at public auction 3 more vehicles. On
YES. Since the first PNB account was October 5, 1993 the City Council of Caloocan
specifically opened for expropriation proceedings passed Ordinance No. 0134 which included the
it has initiated over the subject property, there is amount of P439,377.14 claimed by Santiago as
no objection to the garnishment or levy under back-wages, plus interest. Judge Allarde issued
execution of funds therein amounting to an order to the City Treasurer to release the
P4,965,506.40, the funds garnished in excess of check but the City Treasurer cant do so because
P99,743.94, which are public funds earmarked the Mayor refuses to sign the check. On May 7,
for the municipal government. Other statutory 1993. Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to
obligations are exempted from execution without immediately garnish the funds of the City
the proper appropriation required under the law. Government of Caloocan corresponding to the
nd
The funds deposited in the 2 PNB claim of Santiago. Notice of garnishment was
account are public funds of the municipal forwarded to the PNB but the City Treasurer sent
government. The rule is well-settled that public an advice letter to PNB that the garnishment was
funds are not subject to levy and execution, illegal and that it would hold PNB liable for any
unless otherwise provided by the statute. More damages which may be caused by the
particularly, the properties of a municipality, withholding the funds of the city.
whether real or personal, which are necessary for
public use cannot be attached and sold on
execution sale to satisfy a money judgment ISSUE:
against the municipality. Municipal revenues Whether or not the funds of City of
derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, Caloocan, in PNB, may be garnished (i.e. exempt
and which are intended primarily and exclusively from execution), to satisfy Santiagos claim.
for the purpose of financing governmental
activities and functions of the municipality are HELD:
exempt from execution. The foregoing rule finds Garnishment is considered a specie of
application in the case at bar. attachment by means of which the plaintiff seeks
This is not to say that private to subject to his claim property of the defendant
respondents are left with no legal recourse. in the hands of a third person, or money owed by
When a municipality fails or refuses without such third person or garnishee to the defendant.
justifiable reason to effect payment of a final The rule is and has always been that all
money judgment rendered against it, the claimant government funds deposited in the PNB or any
may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to other official depositary of the Philippine
compel the enactment and approval of the Government by any of its agencies or
necessary appropriation ordinance and the instrumentalities, whether by general or special
corresponding disbursement of municipal funds. deposit, remain government funds and may not
The court will not condone petitioners blatant be subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence
refusal to settle its obligation arising from an of a corresponding appropriation as required by
expropriation proceeding it has in fact initiated. law. Even though the rule as to immunity of a
Within the context of the states inherent power of state from suit is relaxed, the power of the courts
eminent domain, just compensation means not ends when the judgment is rendered. Although
only the correct determination of the amount to the liability of the state has been judicially
be paid to the owner of the land but also the ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for
payment of the land within a reasonable time itself whether to pay the judgment or not, and
from its taking. The states power of eminent execution cannot issue on a judgment against the
domain should be exercised within the bounds of state. Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of
fair play and justice. In the case at bar, state property to satisfy judgments recovered,
considering that valuable property has been and only convey an implication that the
taken, the compensation to be paid is fixed, and legislature will recognize such judgment as final
the municipal has had more than reasonable time and make provision for the satisfaction thereof.
to pay full compensation. However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a
well-defined exception, that is, when there is a
CITY OF CALOOCAN VS. ALLARDE corresponding appropriation as required by law.
In such a case, the monetary judgment may be AND STATE POLICIES

legally enforced by judicial processes. Herein, the KURODA VS. JALANDONI
City Council of Caloocan already approved and 83 PHIL. 171
passed Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992,
allocating the amount of P439,377.14 for FACTS:
Santiagos back-wages plus interest. This case, Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a
thus, fell squarely within the exception. The Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial
judgment of the trial court could then be validly Army and Commanding General of the Japanese
enforced against such funds. Imperial Forces in the Philippines during a period
covering 1943 and 1944, who is now charged
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES before a Military Commission with having
AND STATE POLICIES unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge
his duties as such commander to control the
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES operations of members of his command,
AND STATE POLICIES permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and
VILLAVICENCIO VS. LUKBAN other high crimes against noncombatant civilians
(39 PHIL 778) and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces, in
violation of the laws and customs of war"
FACTS: comes before this Court seeking to establish the
Respondent Justo Lukban, Mayor of the illegality of EO No. 68, which established a
city of Manila, for the best of all reasons, to National War Crimes Offices and provides that
exterminate vise, ordered the segregated district persons accused as war criminals shall be tried
for women of ill repute, which had been permitted by military commission; and to permanently
for a number of years in the City of Manila, prohibit respondents from proceeding with the
closed. The women were kept confined to their case of petitioner.
houses in the district by the police. At about Kuroda argues that EO No. 68 is illegal
midnight of October 25, the police, acting on the ground that it violates not only the
pursuant to the orders from the chief of the police provisions of our constitutional law but also our
and Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, local laws, to say nothing of the fact (that) the
hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent to
and placed them aboard the steamers the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations
Corregidor and Negros. They had no covering Land Warfare and, therefore, petitioner
knowledge that they were destined for a life in is charged of `crimes' not based on law, national
Mindanao. The two steamers with their unwilling and international. Hence, petitioner argues
passengers sailed for Davao during the night of "That in view of the fact that this commission has
October 25, 1918. been empanelled by virtue of an unconstitutional
law and an illegal order, this commission is
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the Mayor of without jurisdiction to try herein petitioner."
the City of Manila is constitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippines can adopt
HELD: the rules and regulations laid down on The
The Supreme Court condemned the Hague and Geneva Conventions notwithstanding
mayors act. Respondents intention to suppress that it is not a signatory thereto and whether it
the social evil was commutable. But his methods can create a Military Commission to try violations
were unlawfull. of the Hague Convention?
Alien prostitutes can be expelled from
the Philippines in conformity with an act of HELD:
Congress. The Governor-General can order the Yes. Executive Order No. 68, establishing a
eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing from National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules
the Islands. One can search in vain for any law, and regulations governing the trial of accused
order, or regulation, which even hints at the right war criminals, was issued by the President of the
of the Mayor of the City of Manila or the Chief of Philippines on the 29th day of July, 1947. This
Police of that City to force citizens of the Court holds that this order is valid and
Philippine Islands, and these women despite their constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution
being in a sense, lepers of society are provides in its section 3, that
nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens
protected by the same constitutional guarantees "The Philippines renounces war as an instrument
as other citizens. of national policy, and adopts the generally
Law defines power. The law is the only accepted principles of international law as part of
supreme power in our system of government, the law of the nation."
and every man who by accepting office
participates in its functions is only the more In accordance with the generally accepted
strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and principles of international law of the present day,
to observe the limitations which gives itself and including the Hague Convention, the Geneva
imposes upon the exercise of the authority which Convention and significant precedents of
it gives. international jurisprudence established by the
The fundamental rights of life, liberty United Nations, all those persons, military or
and the pursuit of happiness, considered as civilian, who have been guilty of planning,
individual possessions, are secured by those preparing or waging a war of aggression and of
maxims of constitutional law which are the the commission of crimes and offenses
monuments showing the victorious progress of consequential and incidental thereto, in violation
the race in securing to men the blessings of of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and
civilization under the reign of just and equal laws, civilization, are held accountable therefor.
so that, in the famous language of the Consequently, in the promulgation and
Massachusetts Bill of Rights, the government of enforcement of Executive Order No. 68, the
the commonwealth may be government of laws President of the Philippines has acted in
and not of men. conformity with the generally accepted principles
and policies of international law which are part of
our Constitution.
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES The promulgation of said executive order is an

exercise by the President of his powers as early warning devices to prevent vehicular
Commander in Chief of all our armed forces, as accidents was assailed for the lack of a
upheld by this Court in the case of Yamashita vs. legislative enactment that would authorize the
Styer L-129, 42 Off. Gaz., 654) 1 when we said issuance of said LOI. The petition quoted two
whereas clauses of the assailed LOI: [Whereas],
"War is not ended simply because hostilities have the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic
ceased. After cessation of armed hostilities, have been recognized by international bodies
incidents of war may remain pending which concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna
should be disposed of as in time of war. `An Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the
important incident to a conduct of war is the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas],
adoption of measures by the military command the said Vienna Convention which was ratified by
not only to repel and defeat the enemies but to the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207,
seize and subject to disciplinary measures those recommended the enactment of local legislation
enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede for the installation of road safety signs and
our military effort have violated the law of war.' devices.
(Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S., 1; 63 Sup. Ct., 2.)
Indeed, the power to create a military ISSUE: Whether or not a legislative enactment is
commission for the trial and punishment of war necessary in order to authorize the issuance of
criminals is an aspect of waging war. And, in the said LOI based on the 1968 Vienna Convention
language of a writer, a military commission `has on Road Signs and Signals and the United
jurisdiction so long as a technical state of war Nations Organization (U.N.).
continues. This includes the period of an
armistice, or military occupation, up to the HELD:
effective date of a treaty of peace, and may Not anymore. The petition must be dismissed for
extend beyond, by treaty agreement.' (Cowls, lack of merit. It cannot be disputed that this
Trial of War Criminals by Military Tribunals, Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution
American Bar Association Journal, June, 1944.)" possesses relevance: "The Philippines * * *
adopts the generally accepted principles of
Consequently, the President as Commander in international law as part of the law of the land, * *
Chief is fully empowered to consummate this *." The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs
unfinished aspect of war, namely, the trial and and Signals is impressed with such a character. It
punishment of war criminals, through the is not for this country to repudiate a commitment
issuance and enforcement of Executive Order to which it had pledged its word. The concept of
No. 68. Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such
an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the
Petitioner argues that respondent Military principle of international morality.
Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner
for acts committed in violation of the Hague
Convention and the Geneva Convention because ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and AND STATE POLICIES
signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ
denied that the rules and regulations of the 101 PHIL. 1155
Hague and Geneva conventions form part of and
are wholly based on the generally accepted FACTS:
principles of international law. In fact, these rules Petitioner filed a suit to invalidate the
and principles were accepted by the two Retail Trade Nationalization Law, on the premise
belligerent nations, the United States and Japan, that it violated several treaties which under the
who were signatories to the two Conventions. rule of pacta sunt servanda, a generally accepted
Such rules and principles, therefore, form principle of international law, should be observed
part of the law of our nation even if the by the Court in good faith.
Philippines was not a signatory to the
conventions embodying them, for our ISSUE: Whether or not the Retail Trade
Constitution has been deliberately general Nationalization Law is unconstitutional for it is in
and extensive in its scope and is not confined conflict with treaties which are generally accepted
to the recognition of rules and principles of principles of international law.
international law as contained in treaties to
which our government may have been or HELD:
shall be a signatory. The Supreme Court said it saw no
conflict. The reason given by the Court was that
Furthermore, when the crimes charged against the Retail Trade National Law was passed in the
petitioner were allegedly committed, the exercise of the police power which cannot be
Philippines was under the sovereignty of the bargained away through the medium of a treaty
United States, and thus we were equally bound or a contract.
together with the United States and with Japan, The law in question was enacted to
to the rights and obligations contained in the remedy a real actual threat and danger to
treaties between the belligerent countries. These national economy posed by alien dominance and
rights and obligations were not erased by our control of the retail business and free citizens and
assumption of full sovereignty. If at all, our country from such dominance and control; that
emergence as a free state entitles us to enforce the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the
the right, on our own, of trying and punishing police power of the State, thru which and by
those who committed crimes against our people. which it protects its own personality and insures
its security and future.
Resuming what we have set forth above
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES we hold that the disputed law was enacted to
AND STATE POLICIES remedy a real actual threat and danger to
AGUSTIN VS. EDU national economy posed by alien dominance and
88 SCRA 195 control of the retail business and free citizens and
country from such dominance and control; that
FACTS: the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the
A presidential letter of instruction (LOI) police power of the state, through which and by
prescribing the use of triangular reflectorized which it protects its own personality and insures
its security and future; that the law does not of conflict between Republic Act Nos. 2207 and
violate the equal protection clause of the 3452 on the one hand, and the aforementioned
Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for contracts, on the other, the latter should prevail,
the distinction between alien and citizen in the because, if a treaty and a statute are inconsistent
exercise of occupation regulated, nor the due with each other, the conflict must be resolved
process of the law clause; because the law is under the American jurisprudence in favor of
prospective in operation and recognizes the the one which is latest in point of time; that
privilege of aliens already engaged in the petitioner herein assails the validity of acts of the
occupation and reasonably protects their executive relative to foreign relations in the
privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law conduct of which the Supreme Court cannot
to carry out its objectives appear to us to be interfere; and that the aforementioned contracts
plainly evident - as a matter of fact it seems not have already been consummated, the
only appropriate but actually necessary - and that Government of the Philippines having already
in any case such matter falls within the paid the price of the rice involved therein through
prerogative of the legislature, with whose power irrevocable letters of credit in favor of the sellers
and discretion the judicial department of the of said commodity. We find no merit in this
Government may not interfere; that the provisions pretense.
of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and The Court is not satisfied that the status
this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled of said contracts as alleged executive
the legislature of the segment of the population agreements has been sufficiently established.
affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for The parties to said contracts do not appear to
supposed conflict with treaty obligations because have regarded the same as executive
no treaty has actually been entered into on the agreements. But, even assuming that said
subject and the police power may not be curtailed contracts may properly be considered as
or surrendered by any treaty or any other executive agreements, the same are unlawful,
conventional agreement. as well as null and void, from a constitutional
viewpoint, said agreements being
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES inconsistent with the provisions of Republic
AND STATE POLICIES Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the
GONZALES VS. HECHANOVA President may, under the American
9 SCRA 230 constitutional system, enter into executive
agreements without previous legislative
FACTS: authority, he may not, by executive
Respondent Executive Secretary agreement, enter into a transaction which is
authorized the importation of tons of foreign rice prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto.
to be purchased from private sources. Petitioner Under the Constitution, the main function of the
Gonzales - a rice planter, and president of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by
Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association filed Congress. The former may not interfere in the
this petition, averring that, in making or performance of the legislative powers of the
attempting to make said importation of foreign latter, except in the exercise of his veto
rice, the aforementioned respondents "are, power. He may not defeat legislative
acting without jurisdiction or in excess of enactments that have acquired the status of
jurisdiction", because RA No. 3452 which laws, by indirectly repealing the same
allegedly repeals or amends RA No. 2207 - through an executive agreement providing for
explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and the performance of the very act prohibited by
corn by "the Rice and Corn Administration or said laws.
any other government agency. The American theory to the effect that,
Respondent contended among others in the event of conflict between a treaty and a
that the Government of the Philippines has statute, the one which is latest in point of time
already entered into two contracts for the shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar,
purchase of rice, one with the Republic of for respondents not only admit, but, also, insist
Vietnam, and another with the Government of that the contracts adverted to are not treaties.
Burma; that these contracts constitute valid Said theory may be justified upon the ground that
executive agreements under international law; treaties to which the United States is signatory
that such agreements became binding and require the advice and consent of its Senate,
effective upon signing thereof by representatives and, hence, of a branch of the legislative
of the parties thereto; that in case of conflict department. No such justification can be given as
between Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3452 on regards executive agreements not authorized by
the one hand, and the aforementioned contracts, previous legislation, without completely upsetting
on the other, the latter should prevail, because, if the principle of separation of powers and the
a treaty and a statute are inconsistent with each system of checks and balances which are
other, the conflict must be resolved - under the fundamental in our constitutional set up and that
American jurisprudence - in favor of the one of the United States.
which is latest in point of time.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents, in ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

attempting to import foreign rice, are acting AND STATE POLICIES
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. IN RE: GARCIA
2 SCRA 984, 1961
HELD:
Yes. The respondents acted without FACTS:
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. It is Under the Treaty on Academic Degrees
respondents contend that the Government of the and the Exercise of Professions between the
Philippines has already entered into two (2) Philippines and Spain, nationals of each of the
contracts for the purchase of rice, one with the two countries who have obtained the required
Republic of Viet Nam, and another with the degrees can practice their professions within the
Government of Burma; that these contracts territory of the other. Efren Garcia, a Filipino,
constitute valid executive agreements under finished law in the University of Madrid, Spain
international law; that such agreements became and was allowed to practice the law profession
binding and effective upon signing thereof by therein. He invokes the treaty in order for him to
representatives of the parties thereto; that in case
be allowed to practice in the Philippines without its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with
taking the bar examinations. its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of
the citizen
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Treaty can modify regulations
governing admission to Philippine Bar.
HELD: ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

No. It is clear, under Article 1 of the AND STATE POLICIES
Treaty, that the privileges provided therein are AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ
made expressly subject to the laws and, 64 PHIL 201
regulations of the contracting State in whose
territory it is desired to exercise the legal FACTS:
profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay,
connection with Sections 2, 9, and 16 thereof, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent
which have the force of law, require that before Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a
anyone can practice the legal profession in the writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent
Philippines he must first successfully pass the Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage
required bar examinations. stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third
Moreover, the Treaty was intended to International Eucharistic Congress.
govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice their In May, 1936, the Director of Posts
profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain announced in the dailies of Manila that he would
desiring to practice their profession in the order the issuance of postage stamps
Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino Citizen desiring commemorating the celebration in the City of
to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. Manila of the Thirty- third International
He is therefore subject to the laws of his own Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman
country and is not entitled to the privileges Catholic Church. In spite of the protest of the
extended to Spanish nationals desiring to petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly
practice in the Philippines. announced having sent to the United States the
The aforementioned Treaty, concluded designs of the postage for printing
between the Republic of the Philippines and the
Spanish State could not have been intended to ISSUE: Is there a violation of principle of
modify the laws and regulations governing separation of church and state?
admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines, for the reason that the Executive HELD:
Department may not encroach upon the In the case at bar, it appears that the
constitutional prerogative of the Supreme respondent Director of Posts issued the postage
Court to promulgate rules for admission to stamps in question under the provisions of Act.
the practice of law in the Philippines, the No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature.
power to repeal, alter or supplement such Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious
rules being reserved only to the Congress of purpose in view. What it gives the Director of
the Philippines. Posts is the discretionary power to determine
when the issuance of special postage stamps
would be "advantageous to the Government." Of
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES course, the phrase "advantageous to the
AND STATE POLICIES Government" does not authorize the violation of
PEOPLE VS. LAGMAN AND ZOSA the Constitution. It does not authorize the
66 PHIL 13, 1938 appropriation, use or application of public money
or property for the use, benefit or support of a
FACTS: particular sect or church. In the present case,
Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de however, the issuance of the postage stamps in
Sosa are charged with and convicted of refusal question by the Director of Posts and the
to register for military training as required by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
above-mentioned statute. On appeal, Zosa was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to
argued that he was fatherless and had a mother favor a particular church or religious
and eight brothers to support, while Lagman denominations. The stamps were not issued
alleged that he had a father to support, had no and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic
military leanings, and did not wish to kill or be Church. Nor were money derived from the
killed; and both claimed that the statute was sale of the stamps given to that church. On
unconstitutional. the contrary, it appears from the letter of the
Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated
ISSUE: Whether or not the the National Defense on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the
Law is valid, under which the accused were only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps
sentenced. was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more
tourists to this country." The officials concerned
HELD: merely took advantage of an event considered of
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed their international importance "to give publicity to the
conviction, holding that the law in question was Philippines and its people". It is significant to note
based on the afore-cited constitutional principle. that the stamps as actually designed and printed,
The National Defense Law, in so far as instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as
it establishes compulsory military service, does originally planned, contains a map of the
not go against this constitutional provision but is, Philippines and the location of the City of Manila,
on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII
The duty of the Government to defend the State International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7,
cannot be performed except through an army. To 1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic
leave the organization of an army to the will of Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the
the citizens would be to make this duty of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is
Government excusable should there be no obvious that while the issuance and sale of the
sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. stamps in question may be said to be inseparably
The right of the Government to require linked with an event of a religious character, the
compulsory military service is a consequence of resulting propaganda, if any, received by the
Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and The National Traffic Commission, in its
purpose of the Government. We are of the resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to
opinion that the Government should not be recommend to the Director of Public Works and
embarrassed in its activities simply because of to the Secretary of Public Works and
incidental results, more or less religious in Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be
character, if the purpose had in view is one which prohibited from passing along Rosario Street
could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to
legislation. The main purpose should not be Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m.
frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal
results not contemplated. Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at
There is no violation of the principle of Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to
separation of church and state. The issuance and 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date
sale of the stamps in question maybe said to be of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic;
separably linked with an event of a religious that the Chairman of the National Traffic
character, the resulting propaganda, if any, Commission, on July 18, 1940 recommended to
received by the Catholic Church, was not the aim the Director of Public Works the adoption of the
and purpose of the government (to promote measure proposed in the resolution
tourism). aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes
said Director of Public Works, with the approval
TARUC VS. DE LA CRUZ of the Secretary of Public Works and
G.R. NO. 144801; MARCH 10, 2005 Communications, to promulgate rules and
CORONA, J.: regulations to regulate and control the use of and
traffic on national roads; that on August 2, 1940,
FACTS: the Director of Public Works, in his first
Petitioners were lay members of the indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works
Philippine Independent Church (PIC). On June and Communications, recommended to the latter
28, 1993, Due to petitioners adamant drive to the approval of the recommendation made by the
create dissension within the diocese by Chairman of the National Traffic Commission as
celebrating their own open mass without aforesaid, with the modification that the closing of
participation from the parish priest, Bishop de la Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles
Cruz declared petitioners be limited to the portion thereof extending from
expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Independent Church. The good Bishop did so as Azcarraga Street; that on August 10, 1940, the
a last resort, as he first pleaded to the petitioners Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
to cease from riling up the community against the in his second indorsement addressed to the
diocese. Because of the order of Director of Public Works, approved the
expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street
complaint for damages with preliminary injunction and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-
against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional drawn vehicles, between the points and during
Trial Court. They contended that their expulsion the hours as above indicated, for a period of one
was illegal because it was done without trial thus year from the date of the opening of the Colgante
violating their right to due process of law. Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and the
Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced
ISSUE: and caused to be enforced the rules and
Whether or not the courts have regulations thus adopted; that as a consequence
jurisdiction to hear a case involving the of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles
expulsion/excommunication of members of a are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers
religious institution? in the places above-mentioned to the detriment
HELD: not only of their owners but of the riding public as
The Court rules that they do not have well.
such jurisdiction. The expulsion/excommunication The petitioner further contends that the
of members of a religious institution/organization rules and regulations promulgated by the
is a matter best left to the discretion of the respondents pursuant to the provisions of
officials, and the laws and canons, of said Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an
institution/organization. It is not for the courts to unlawful interference with legitimate business or
exercise control over church authorities in the trade and abridge the right to personal liberty and
performance of their discretionary and official freedom of locomotion. Commonwealth Act No.
functions. Rather, it is for the members of 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the
religious institutions/organizations to conform to exercise of the paramount police power of the
just church regulations. state.
Civil Courts will not interfere in the
internal affairs of a religious organization except
for the protection of civil or property rights. Those ISSUE: Whether the rules & regulations
rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil promulgated pursuant to the provisions of
court, and the courts have jurisdiction to Commonwealth Act No. 548 considered as
determine controverted claims to the title, use, or constitutional?
possession of church property.
Obviously, there was no violation of a HELD: Yes. Said Act, by virtue of which the rules
civil rights in the present case. and regulations complained of were promulgated,
aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on national roads, in the interest and
convenience of the public. In enacting said law,
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES therefore, the National Assembly was prompted
AND STATE POLICIES by considerations of public convenience and
welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve
CALALANG VS. WILLIAMS congestion of traffic. which is, to say the least, a
70 Phil. 726, 1940 menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies
at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and
FACTS: the state in order to promote the general welfare
may interfere with personal liberty, with property,
and with business and occupations. Persons and him with the Clerk of Court within 15 days from
property may be subjected to all kinds of receipt of the decision.
restraints and burdens, in order to secure the On appeal, the CA affirmed the assailed
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the decision. Their motion for reconsideration was
state (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To denied. Hence, the present petition for review.
this fundamental aim of our Government the
rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty ISSUE: Is there a tenant's right of redemption in
is a blessing without which life is a misery, but sugar and coconut lands?
liberty should not be made to prevail over
authority because then society will fall into
anarchy. Neither should authority be made to HELD:
prevail over liberty because then the individual Yes. Among those exempted from the
will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve automatic conversion to agricultural leasehold
the required balance of liberty and authority in his upon the effectivity of the Agricultural Land
mind through education and personal discipline, Reform Code in 1963 or even after its
so that there may be established the resultant amendments (Code of Agrarian Reforms) are
equilibrium, which means peace and order and sugar lands. Section 4 thereof states:
happiness for all. The moment greater authority "Agricultural share tenancy throughout the
is conferred upon the government, logically so country, as herein defined, is hereby declared
much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty contrary to public policy and shall be
which resides in the people. The paradox lies in automatically converted to agricultural
the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is leasehold upon the effectivity of this section. . . .
precisely the very means of insuring its Provided, That in order not to jeopardize
preservation. international commitments, lands devoted to
Petitioner finally avers that the rules and crops covered by marketing allotments shall be
regulations complained of infringe upon the made the subject of a separate proclamation by
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of the President upon recommendation of the
social justice to insure the well-being and department head that adequate provisions, such
economic security of all the people. The as the organization of cooperatives marketing
promotion of social justice, however, is to be agreement, or similar other workable
achieved not through a mistaken sympathy arrangements, have been made to insure
towards any given group. Social justice is efficient management on all matters requiring
"neither communism, nor despotism, nor synchronization of the agricultural with the
atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization processing phases of such crops . . ."
of laws and the equalization of social and Sugar is, of course, one crop covered by
economic forces by the State so that justice marketing allotments. In other words, this section
in its rational and objectively secular recognizes share tenancy in sugar lands until
conception may at least be approximated. after a special proclamation is made, which
Social justice means the promotion of the proclamation shall have the same effect of an
welfare of all the people, the adoption by the executive proclamation of the operation of the
Government of measures calculated to insure Department of Agrarian Reform in any region or
economic stability of all the competent locality; the share tenants in the lands affected
elements of society, through the maintenance will become agricultural lessees at the beginning
of a proper economic and social equilibrium of the agricultural year next succeeding the year
in the interrelations of the members of the in which the proclamation is made. But, there is
community, constitutionally, through the nothing readable or even discernible in the law
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or denying to tenants in sugar lands the right of pre-
extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of emption and redemption under the Code.
powers underlying the existence of all The exemption is purely limited to the
governments on the time-honored principle of tenancy system; it does not exclude the other
salus populi est suprema lex. rights conferred by the Code, such as the right of
pre-emption and redemption. In the same
ALMEDA VS. COURT OF APPEALS manner, coconut lands are exempted from the
78 SCRA 194, 1977 Code only with respect to the consideration and
tenancy system prevailing, implying that in other
FACTS: matters the right of pre-emption and redemption
Respondent Gonzales is a share tenant which does not refer to the consideration of the
of Angeles et al., on land devoted to sugar cane tenancy the provisions of the Code apply. Thus,
and coconuts. The landowners sold the property Section 35 states: "Notwithstanding the
to petitioners Almeda without notifying provisions of the preceding Sections, in the case
respondent in writing of the sale. The sale was of fishponds, saltbeds and lands principally
registered with the Register of Deeds. planted to citrus, coconuts, cacao, coffee, durian,
Respondent thus sued for redemption before the and other similar permanent trees at the time of
CAR. the approval of this Code, the consideration, as
Petitioners counter that long before the well as the tenancy system prevailing, shall be
execution of the deed of sale, Glicerio Angeles governed by the provisions of Republic Act
and his nephew Cesar Angeles first offered the Numbered Eleven Hundred and Ninety-Nine, as
sale of the land to respondent but the latter said amended."
that he had no money; that respondent, instead, It is to be noted that under the new
went personally to the house of petitioners and Constitution, property ownership is
implored them to buy the land for fear that if impressed with social function. Property use
someone else would buy the land, he may not be must not only be for the benefit of the owner
taken in as tenant; that respondent is a mere but of society as well. The State, in the
dummy of someone deeply interested in buying promotion of social justice, may "regulate the
the land; that respondent made to tender of acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and
payment or any valid consignation in court at the disposition of private property, and equitably
time he filed the complaint for redemption. diffuse property . . . ownership and profits."
The Agrarian Court rendered judgment One governmental policy of recent date projects
authorizing respondent to redeem the land for the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of
P24,000.00, the said amount to be deposited by the soil and the transfer to them of the ownership
of the land they till. This is Presidential Decree
No. 27 of October 21, 1972, ordaining that all poor and unlettered, and the employer, who
tenant farmers "of private agricultural lands has resources to secure able legal advice, the
devoted to rice and corn under a system of law has reason to demand from the latter
sharecrop or lease-tenancy, whether classified as stricter compliance. Social justice in these
landed estates or not" shall be deemed "owner of cases is not equality but protection.
a portion constituting a family-size farm of five (5)
hectares if not irrigated and there (3) hectares if
irrigated."
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
AND STATE POLICIES
SALONGA VS. FARRALES
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 105 SCRA 359, 1981
AND STATE POLICIES
ONDOY VS. IGNACIO FACTS:
97 SCRA 611, 1980 Defendant Farrales is the titled owner of
a parcel of residential land. Even prior to the
FACTS: acquisition by defendant Farrales of the land
Petitioner Estrella Ondoy filed a claim aforesaid, plaintiff Salonga was already in
for compensation for the death of her son, Jose possession as lessee of some 156 square meters
Ondoy, who drowned while in the employ of thereof, on which she had erected a house,
respondent Virgilio Ignacio. Respondent moved paying rentals thereon first to the original owners
to dismiss on the ground of lack of employer- and later to defendant Farrales.
employee relationship. However, during the Farrales filed an ejectment case for non-
hearing of the case, respondent submitted payment of rentals against plaintiff. Judgment
affidavits executed by the chief engineer and oiler was later rendered in favor of defendant Farrales
of the fishing vessel that the deceased, a and ordering the therein defendants, including
fisherman, was in that ship, undeniably a plaintiff herein and her husband, to vacate the
member of the working force, but after being portion occupied by them and to pay rentals in
invited by friends to a drinking spree, left the arrears.
vessel, and thereafter was found dead. The Evidence showed that plaintiff offered to
referee summarily ignored the affidavit of the purchase from said defendant the land in dispute,
chief-mate of respondent employer to the effect but, defendant, despite the fact that said plaintiff's
"that sometime in October, 1968, while Jose order to purchase was just, fair and reasonable
Ondoy, my co-worker, was in the actual persistently refused such offer, and instead,
performance of his work with said fishing insisted to execute the judgment rendered in the
enterprises, he was drowned and died on ejectment case.
October 22, 1968. That the deceased died in line Plaintiff then filed a complaint against
of Duty." The hearing officer or referee defendant Farrales praying the latter be ordered
dismissed the claim for lack of merit. A motion for to sell to plaintiff the parcel of land in question.
reconsideration was duly filed, but the then
Secretary of Labor, denied such motion for ISSUE: Is the plaintiff entitled for specific
reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence this performance?
petition for review.
HELD:
ISSUE: Whether or not the claim for No. If plaintiff's offer to purchase was, as
compensation was validly dismissed. aforesaid persistently refused by defendant, it is
obvious that no meeting of the minds took place
HELD: and, accordingly, no contract, either to sell or of
There is evidence, direct and sale, was ever perfected between them.
categorical, to the effect that the deceased was Since contracts are enforceable only
drowned while "in the actual performance of his from the moment of perfection, and there is here
work" with the shipping enterprise of private no perfected contract at all, it goes without saying
respondent. Even without such evidence, the that plaintiff has absolutely nothing to enforce
petitioner could have relied on the presumption against defendant Farrales, and the fact that
of compensability under the Act once it is defendant Farrales previously sold portions of the
shown that the death or disability arose in the land to other lessees similarly situated as plaintiff
course of employment, with the burden of herein, does not change the situation because,
overthrowing it being cast on the person or entity as to said other lessees, a perfected contract
resisting the claim. existed which is not the case with plaintiff.
This Court, in recognizing the right of It must be remembered that social
petitioner to the award, merely adheres to the justice cannot be invoked to trample on the
interpretation uninterruptedly followed by this rights of property owners who under our
Court resolving all doubts in favor of the Constitution and laws are also entitled to
claimant. What was said in Victorias Milling Co., protection. The social justice consecrated in our
Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission is constitution was not intended to take away rights
not amiss: "There is need, it seems, even at this from a person and give them to another who is
late date, for [private respondent] and other not entitled thereto. Evidently, the plea for
employers to be reminded of the high estate social justice cannot nullify the law on
accorded the Workmen's Compensation Act in obligations and contracts, and is, therefore,
the constitutional scheme of social justice and beyond the power of the Court to grant.
protection to labor." No other judicial attitude may
be expected in the face of a clearly expressed
legislative determination which antedated the ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
constitutionally avowed concern for social justice AND STATE POLICIES
and protection to labor. It is easily SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE VS.
understandable why the judiciary frowns on MANALO
resort to doctrines, which even if deceptively G.R. No. L-47841, October 7, 2008
plausible, would result in frustrating such a
national policy." To be more specific, the principle FACTS:
of social justice is in this sphere strengthened
and vitalized. As between a laborer, usually
The case at bar involves the rights to least, he was aware of the petitioners captivity at
life, liberty and security in the first petition for a the hands of men in uniform assigned to his
writ of amparo filed before this Court. command. In fact, he or any other officer
This case was originally a Petition for tendered no controversion to the firm claim of
Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Raymond that he (Gen. Palparan) met them in
Restraining Order to stop herein petitioners person in a safehouse in Bulacan and told them
and/or their officers and agents from depriving what he wanted them and their parents to do or
them of their right to liberty and other basic rights not to be doing. Gen. Palparans direct and
and enjoined them from causing the arrest of personal role in the abduction might not have
therein petitioners, or otherwise restricting, been shown but his knowledge of the dire
curtailing, abridging, or depriving them of their situation of the petitioners during their long
right to life, liberty, and other basic rights as captivity at the hands of military personnel under
guaranteed under Article III, Section 1 of the his command bespoke of his indubitable
1987 Constitution. command policy that unavoidably encouraged
While the August 23, 2007 Petition was and not merely tolerated the abduction of civilians
pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took without due process of law and without probable
effect on October 24, 2007. Forthwith, therein cause.
petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus We now come to the right of the
Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo respondents to the privilege of the writ of amparo.
Petition. There is no quarrel that the enforced
On October 25, 2007, the Court disappearance of both respondents Raymond
resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition as and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as they
a petition under the Amparo Rule have escaped from captivity and surfaced. But
On December 26, 2007, the Court of while respondents admit that they are no
Appeals rendered a decision in favor of herein longer in detention and are physically free,
respondents. Hence, this appeal. they assert that they are not free in every
This pertains to the abduction of sense of the word as their movements
RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO continue to be restricted for fear that people
who were forcibly taken from their respective they have named in their Judicial Affidavits
homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, and testified against (in the case of Raymond)
Bulacan on 14 February 2006 by unidentified are still at large and have not been held
armed men and thereafter were forcibly accountable in any way. These people are
disappeared. After the said incident, relatives of directly connected to the Armed Forces of the
the victims filed a case for Abduction in the civil Philippines and are, thus, in a position to
court against the herein suspects: Michael dela threaten respondents rights to life, liberty
Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Puti Dela Cruz, Pula and security. Respondents claim that they
Dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza are under threat of being once again
as alleged members of the Citizen Armed Forces abducted, kept captive or even killed, which
Geographical Unit (CAFGU). constitute a direct violation of their right to
The abduction was perpetrated by security of person.
armed men who were sufficiently identified by the Elaborating on the right to security, in
petitioners (herein respondents) to be military general, respondents point out that this right is
personnel and CAFGU auxiliaries. Raymond often associated with liberty; it is also seen as
recalled that the six armed men who barged into an expansion of rights based on the prohibition
his house through the rear door were military against torture and cruel and unusual
men based on their attire of fatigue pants and punishment. Conceding that there is no right to
army boots, and the CAFGU auxiliaries, namely: security expressly mentioned in Article III of the
Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, Puti de 1987 Constitution, they submit that their rights to
la Cruz and Pula de la Cruz, all members of the be kept free from torture and from
CAFGU and residents of Muzon, San Ildefonso, incommunicado detention and solitary detention
Bulacan, and the brothers Randy Mendoza and places fall under the general coverage of the right
Rudy Mendoza, also CAFGU members, served to security of person under the writ of Amparo.
as lookouts during the abduction. Raymond was They submit that the Court ought to give an
sure that three of the six military men were expansive recognition of the right to security of
Ganata, who headed the abducting team, Hilario, person in view of the State Policy under Article II
who drove the van, and George. Subsequent of the 1987 Constitution which enunciates that,
incidents of their long captivity, as narrated by the The State values the dignity of every human
petitioners, validated their assertion of the person and guarantees full respect for human
participation of the elements of the 7th Infantry rights.
Division, Philippine Army, and their CAFGU In sum, respondents assert that their
auxiliaries. cause of action consists in the threat to their right
We are convinced, too, that the reason to life and liberty, and a violation of their right to
for the abduction was the suspicion that the security.
petitioners were either members or sympathizers
of the NPA, considering that the abductors were ISSUE: Whether the Petition for issuance of Writ
looking for Ka Bestre, who turned out to be Amparo should be granted?
Rolando, the brother of petitioners.
The efforts exerted by the Military HELD: Yes. While the right to life under Article III,
Command to look into the abduction were, at Section 1[120] guarantees essentially the right to
best, merely superficial. The investigation of the be alive- upon which the enjoyment of all other
Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division rights is preconditioned - the right to security of
focused on the one-sided version of the CAFGU person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this
auxiliaries involved. This one-sidedness might life, viz: The life to which each person has a
be due to the fact that the Provost Marshall could right is not a life lived in fear that his person and
delve only into the participation of military property may be unreasonably violated by a
personnel, but even then the Provost Marshall powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the
should have refrained from outrightly exculpating assurance that the government he established
the CAFGU auxiliaries he perfunctorily and consented to, will protect the security of his
investigate. person and property. The ideal of security in life
Gen. Palparans participation in the and property pervades the whole history of
abduction was also established. At the very man. It touches every aspect of mans
existence. In a broad sense, the right to security injuries constitute a crime against persons
of person emanates in a persons legal and because they are an affront to the bodily integrity
uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his or security of a person.
body, his health, and his reputation. It includes
the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe
while existing, and it is invaded not only by a invasion of bodily integrity. When employed to
deprivation of life but also of vitiate the free will such as to force the victim to
those things which are necessary to the admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating
enjoyment of life according to the nature, information, it constitutes an invasion of both
temperament, and lawful desires of the bodily and psychological integrity as the dignity of
individual. the human person includes the exercise of free
will. Article III, Section 12 of the 1987
A closer look at the right to security of person Constitution more specifically proscribes bodily
would yield various permutations of the exercise and psychological invasion, viz:
of this right.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat or
First, the right to security of person is freedom intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the
from fear. In its whereas clauses, the Universal free will shall be used against him (any person
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates under investigation for the commission of an
that a world in which human beings shall enjoy offense). Secret detention places, solitary,
freedom of speech and belief and freedom from incommunicado or other similar forms of
fear and want has been proclaimed as the detention are prohibited.
highest aspiration of the common people.
emphasis supplied) Some scholars postulate that Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and
freedom from fear is not only an aspirational intimidation that vitiate the free will - although
principle, but essentially an individual not involving invasion of bodily integrity -
international human right.[124] It is the right to nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to
security of person as the word security itself security in the sense of freedom from threat as
means freedom from fear. Article 3 of the afore-discussed.
UDHR provides, viz:
Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security dehumanizing abuses of persons under
of person.[126] emphasis supplied) investigation for the commission of an offense.
Victims of enforced disappearances who are not
In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, even under such investigation should all the more
Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil be protected from these degradations.
and Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the
right to security of person, viz: An overture to an interpretation of the right to
security of person as a right against torture was
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of made by the European Court of Human Rights
person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary (ECHR) in the recent case of Popov v.
arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of Russia.[130] In this case, the claimant, who was
his liberty except on such grounds and in lawfully detained, alleged that the state
accordance with such procedure as are authorities had physically abused him in prison,
established by law. emphasis supplied) thereby violating his right to security of person.
Article 5(1) of the European Convention on
The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR Human Rights provides, viz: Everyone has the
and the ICCPR. right to liberty and security of person. No one
shall be deprived of his liberty save in the
In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, following cases and in accordance with a
freedom from fear is the right and any threat to procedure prescribed by law ... (emphases
the rights to life, liberty or security is the supplied) Article 3, on the other hand, provides
actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a that (n)o one shall be subjected to torture or to
reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
Fear caused by the same stimulus can range Although the application failed on the facts as the
from being baseless to well-founded as people alleged ill-treatment was found baseless, the
react differently. The degree of fear can vary ECHR relied heavily on the concept of security in
from one person to another with the variation of holding, viz:
the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of
character or past experience with the stimulus. ...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the
Thus, in the amparo context, it is more correct to attention of domestic authorities at the time when
say that the right to security is actually the they could reasonably have been expected to
freedom from threat. Viewed in this light, the take measures in order to ensure his security and
threatened with violation Clause in the latter to investigate the circumstances in question.
part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of xxx xxx xxx
violation of the right to security mentioned in the
earlier part of the provision. ... the authorities failed to ensure his security in
custody or to comply with the procedural
Second, the right to security of person is a obligation under Art.3 to conduct an effective
guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or investigation into his allegations.[131] (emphasis
security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 supplied)
Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule,
ones body cannot be searched or invaded The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of
without a search warrant. Physical injuries Discrimination against Women has also made a
inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and statement that the protection of the bodily
enforced disappearances constitute more than a integrity of women may also be related to the
search or invasion of the body. It may constitute right to security and liberty, viz:
dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful
physical intrusion. As the degree of physical gender-based violence which impairs or
injury increases, the danger to life itself nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights
escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical and fundamental freedoms under general
international law or under specific human rights constructed and equipped for the school
conventions is discrimination within the meaning purposes. The law has already caused the
of article 1 of the Convention (on the Elimination withdrawal from its school of children, who would
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women). other wise continue attending the same school.
These rights and freedoms include . . . the right Society then filed a suit to enjoin the enforcement
to liberty and security of person. of the law contending that the same
unconstitutional.
Third, the right to security of person is a
guarantee of protection of ones rights by the ISSUE: May the State require children to attend
government. In the context of the writ of amparo, only public schools before they reach a certain
this right is built into the guarantees of the right to age?
life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the
1987 Constitution and the right to security of HELD:
person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of The fundamental theory of liberty upon
bodily and psychological integrity) under Article which the government under the Constitution
III, Section 2. The right to security of person reposes excludes any general power of the State
in this third sense is a corollary of the policy to standardize its children by enforcing them to
that the State guarantees full respect for accept instruction from public teachers only. The
human rights under Article II, Section 11 of child is not the mere creature of the State; those
the 1987 Constitution. As the government is who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
the chief guarantor of order and security, the right coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, prepare him for additional obligations.
liberty and security of person is rendered
ineffective if government does not afford
protection to these rights especially when ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
they are under threat. Protection includes AND STATE POLICIES
conducting effective investigations, VIRTUOSO VS. MUNICIPAL JUDGE
organization of the government apparatus to 82 SCRA 191, 1978
extend protection to victims of extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances (or FACTS:
threats thereof) and/or their families, and Petitioner Francisco Virtouso, Jr. filed an
bringing offenders to the bar of justice. application for the writ of habeas corpus on the
ground that the preliminary examination which
led to the issuance of a warrant of arrest against
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES him was a useless formality as respondent
AND STATE POLICIES Municipal Judge failed to meet the strict standard
MEYER VS. NEBRASKA required by the Constitution to ascertain whether
262 US 390 [1922] there was a probable cause. He likewise alleged
that aside from the constitutional infirmity that
FACTS: tainted the procedure followed in the preliminary
Robert Meyer, while an instructor in Zion examination, the bail imposed was clearly
Parochial School, was tried and convicted in the excessive. It was in the amount of P16,000.00,
district of Hamilton, Nebraska under an the alleged robbery of a TV set being imputed to
information which charged him for unlawfully petitioner
teaching reading German language to Raymond It was later ascertained that the
Partpar, a ten year old child who had not petitioner is a seventeen year old minor entitled
successfully reached the eight grade. The to the protection and benefits of the child and
information was based upon An Act Relating to Youth Welfare Code.
the Teaching of Foreign Language in the State of
Nebraska, which prohibited any subject in any ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners application for
language other than English to any person who release should be granted.
has not successfully passed the eight grade.
HELD:
ISSUE: May the State prohibit the teaching of Yes. As a minor, he could be
foreign language to children who has not reach a provisionally released on recognizance in the
certain grade level? discretion of a court. This Court should,
whenever appropriate, give vitality and force
HELD: to the Youth and Welfare Code, which is an
It was held that it is incompetent for the implementation of this specific constitutional
government to prohibit the teaching of the mandate. "The State recognizes the vital role
German language to students between certain of the youth in nation-building and shall
age levels since there is nothing inherently promote their physical, intellectual, and social
harmful in the language that will impair the well-being."
upbringing of the child; and in fact such a subject
could improve his academic background.
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

AND STATE POLICIES
PIERCE VS. SOCIETY OF SISTERS ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
262 US 390 AND STATE POLICIES
OPOSA VS. FACTORAN
FACTS: 224 SCRA 792, 1993
The State of Oregon passed a law
requiring parents/guardians of children ages 8-16 FACTS:
to send their child to public school. The manifest The petitioner, all minors and alleges
purpose is to compel general attendance at that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic
public schools by children 8-16 who have not of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the
th
completed their 8 grade. full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural
Society of Sisters operates a private resource treasure that is the country's virgin
school. It owns valuable building, especially tropical rainforests, duly joined and represented
by their parents instituted a complained as a natural resources. The right of the petitioners and
taxpayers class suit and prayed for the rendering all they represent to a balanced and healthful
of judgment ordering defendant Factoran, then ecology is as clear as the DENRs duty to protect
Secretary of the DENR, his agents, and advance the said right.
representatives and other persons acting in his A denial or violation of that right by the
behalf to cancel all existing timber license owner who has the correlative duty or obligation
agreements in the country and to cease and to respect or protect the same gives rise to a
desist form receiving, accepting, processing, cause of action.
renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.
The defendant moved for the dismissal
of the complaint on two grounds: 1) lack of cause
of action against him and 2) the issue raised was ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
a political question which properly pertains to the AND STATE POLICIES
legislative or executive branches. The trial court LLDA VS. CA
dismissed the complaint based on the 231 SCRA 292, 1994
aforementioned grounds. Thus, the petitioners
filed a special civil action for certiorari seeking to FACTS:
rescind and set aside. The Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of
Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin,
ISSUE: Whether or not the said petitioners have Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint with the
a cause of action to prevent the misappropriation petitioner, seeking to stop the operation of the
or impairment of the Philippine rainforests and open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay
have the defendant stop form receiving, Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects
processing and approving timber license on the health of the residents and the possibility
agreements. of pollution of the water content of the
surrounding area. The LLDA conducted an on-
HELD: site investigation, monitoring and test sampling of
Yes. The petitioners have a cause of the leachate that seeps from said dumpsite to the
action. The complaint focuses on one specific nearby creek which is a tributary of the Marilao
fundamental legal right-the right to a balanced River. The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel
and healthful ecology which, for the first time in found that the City Government of Caloocan was
our constitutional history, is solemnly maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, area without first securing an Environmental
Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the
provides that the State shall protect and advance Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the
the right of the people to a balanced and healthful Department of Environment and Natural
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony Resources, and clearance from LLDA as required
of nature.This right unites with the right to health under Republic Act No. 4850, 5 as amended by
which is provided for in SEC. 15 of Article 2. Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order
While the right to a balanced and No. 927
healthful ecology is to be found under the The LLDA issued a Cease and Desist
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and Order ordering the City Government of Caloocan,
not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors,
it is less important than any of the civil and and other entities, to completely halt, stop and
political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage
right belongs to a different category of rights and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite.
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self- However, the City Government of Caloocan filed
preservation and self-perpetuation -- aptly and with the RTC an action for the declaration of
fittingly stressed by the petitioners -- the nullity of the cease and desist order with prayer
advancement of which may even be said to for the issuance of a writ of injunction. LLDA then
predate all governments and constitutions. As a filed a motion of Dismiss on the ground that their
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even order was merely subject to review of the CA and
be written in the Constitution for they are not the RTC.
assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned ISSUE:
in the fundamental charter, it is because of the Whether or not the LLDA have the power and
well-founded fear of its framers that unless the authority to issue a cease and desist order
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to
health are mandated as state policies by the HELD:
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their Yes. The LLDA, as a specialized
continuing importance and imposing upon the administrative agency, is specifically mandated
state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory
protect and advance the second, the day would laws to carry out and make effective the declared
not be too far when all else would be lost not national policy of promoting and accelerating the
only for the present generation, but also for development and balanced growth of the Laguna
those to come -- generations which stand to Lake including Caloocan City with due regard
inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of and adequate provisions for environmental
sustaining life. management and control, preservation of the
The right to a balanced and healthful quality of human life and ecological systems, and
ecology carries with it the correlative duty to the prevention of undue ecological disturbances,
refrain from impairing the environment. The said deterioration and pollution. Under RA 4850 it
right implies, among many other things, the authorizes LLDA to make, alter or modify orders
judicious management and conservation of the requiring the discontinuance of pollution.
country's forests. Assuming arguendo that the
E.O. No.192 and the Administrative authority to issue a "cease and desist order"
Code of 1987 have set the objectives which were not expressly conferred by law, there is
serve as the bases for policy formulation and jurisprudence enough to the effect that the
have defined the powers and functions of the rule granting such authority need not
DENR, the primary government agency for the necessarily be express. While it is a
proper use and development of the countries fundamental rule that an administrative
agency has only such powers as are would have been necessary.
expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a
settled rule that an administrative agency has The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as
also such powers as are necessarily implied amended, instead of conferring upon the LLDA
in the exercise of its express powers. In the the means of directly enforcing such orders, has
exercise, therefore, of its express powers under provided under its Section 4 (d) the power to
its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body institute "necessary legal proceeding against any
with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna person who shall commence to implement or
Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue continue implementation of any project, plan or
a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, program within the Laguna de Bay region without
implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to previous clearance from the LLDA."
a "toothless" paper agency.
In this connection, it must be noted that Clearly, said provision was designed to
in Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of invest the LLDA with sufficiently broad powers in
Appeals, et al., 27 the Court ruled that the the regulation of all projects initiated in the
Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has the Laguna Lake region, whether by the government
power to issue an ex-parte cease and desist or the private sector, insofar as the
order when there is prima facie evidence of an implementation of these projects is concerned. It
establishment exceeding the allowable standards was meant to deal with cases which might
set by the anti-pollution laws of the country. The possibly arise where decisions or orders issued
ponente, Associate Justice Florentino P. pursuant to the exercise of such broad powers
Feliciano, declared: may not be obeyed, resulting in the thwarting of
its laudable objective. To meet such
"Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted contingencies, then the writs of mandamus and
by law and regulations in situations like that here injunction which are beyond the power of the
presented precisely because stopping the LLDA to issue, may be sought from the proper
continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated courts.
effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of
the Philippines cannot be made to wait until ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness AND STATE POLICIES
or propriety of such orders has run its full course, GARCIA VS. BOARD OF INVESTMENTS
including multiple and sequential appeals such as 191 SCRA 288, 1990
those which Solar has taken, which of course
may take several years. The relevant pollution FACTS:
control statute and implementing regulations This is a petition to annul and set aside the
were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of decision of the Board of Investments
that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the (BOI)/Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)
safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of approving the transfer of the site of the proposed
the public, as well as the protection of plant and petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and
animal life, commonly designated as the police the shift of feedstock for that plant from naphtha
power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the only to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas
ordinary requirements of procedural due process (LPG).
yield to the necessities of protecting vital public
interests like those here involved, through the Under P.D. No. 1803 dated January 16, 1981,
exercise of police power. . . ." 576 hectares of the public domain located in
Lamao, Limay, Bataan were reserved for the
The immediate response to the demands of Petrochemical Industrial Zone under the
"the necessities of protecting vital public administration, management, and ownership of
interests" gives vitality to the statement on the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC).
ecology embodied in the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies or the 1987 The Bataan Refining Corporation (BRC) is a
Constitution. Article II, Section 16 which wholly government owned corporation, located at
provides: Bataan. It produces 60% of the national output of
naphtha.
"The State shall protect and advance the right
of the people to a balanced and healthful Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project
ecology in accord with the rhythm and formed the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation
harmony of nature." (BPC) and applied with BOI for registration as a
new domestic producer of petrochemicals. Its
As a constitutionally guaranteed right of application specified Bataan as the plant site.
every person, it carries the correlative duty of One of the terms and conditions for registration of
non-impairment. This is but in consonance the project was the use of "naphtha cracker" and
with the declared policy of the state "to "naphtha" as feedstock or fuel for its
protect and promote the right to health of the petrochemical plant. The petrochemical plant was
people and instill health consciousness to be a joint venture with PNOC. BPC was issued
among them." 28 It is to be borne in mind a certificate of registration on February 24, 1988
that the Philippines is party to the Universal by BOI.
Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma
Conference Declaration of 1978 which BPC was given pioneer status and accorded
recognize health as a fundamental human fiscal and other incentives by BOI, like, (1)
right. 29 exemption from taxes on raw materials, (2)
repatriation of the entire proceeds of liquidation
The issuance, therefore, of the cease and investments in currency originally made and at
desist order by the LLDA, as a practical the exchange rate obtaining at the time of
matter of procedure under the circumstances repatriation; and (3) remittance of earnings on
of the case, is a proper exercise of its power investments. As additional incentive, the House
and authority under its charter and its of Representatives approved a bill introduced by
amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist the petitioner eliminating the 48% ad valorem tax
order issued by the LLDA been complied with on naphtha if and when it is used as raw
by the City Government of Caloocan as it did materials in the petrochemical plant.
in the first instance, no further legal steps
However, in February, 1989, A.T. Chong,

chairman of USI Far East Corporation, the major The Court, therefore, holds and finds that the BOI
investor in BPC, personally delivered to Trade committed a grave abuse of discretion in
Secretary Jose Concepcion a letter dated approving the transfer of the petrochemical plant
January 25, 1989 advising him of BPC's desire to from Bataan to Batangas and authorizing the
amend the original registration certification of its change of feedstock from naphtha only to
project by changing the job site from Limay, naphtha and/or LPG for the main reason that the
Bataan, to Batangas. The reason adduced for the final say is in the investor all other circumstances
transfer was the insurgency and unstable labor to the contrary notwithstanding. No cogent
situation, and the presence in Batangas of a advantage to the government has been shown by
huge liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) depot owned this transfer. This is a repudiation of the
by the Philippine Shell Corporation. independent policy of the government expressed
in numerous laws and the Constitution to run its
The petitioner vigorously opposed the proposal own affairs the way it deems best for the national
and no less than President Aquino expressed her interest.`
preference that the plant be established in
Bataan in a conference with the Taiwanese One can but remember the words of a great
investors, the Secretary of National Defense and Filipino leader who in part said he would not
The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. mind having a government run like hell by
Filipinos than one subservient to foreign
Despite speeches in the Senate and House dictation. In this case, it is not even a foreign
opposing the transfer of the project to Batangas, government but an ordinary investor whom
BPC filed its request for approval of the the BOI allows to dictate what we shall do
amendments. Its application is as follows: "(1) with our heritage.
increasing the investment amount from US$220
million to US$320 million; (2) increasing the
production capacity of its naphtha cracker, ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
polythylene plant and polypropylene plant; (3) AND STATE POLICIES
changing the feedstock from naphtha only to ASSO. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. SEC.
"naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas;" and (4) OF AGRARIAN REFORM
transferring the job site from Limay, Bataan, to 175 SCRA 343, 1989
Batangas. BOI states that it has taken a public
position preferring Bataan over Batangas as the FACTS:
site of the petrochemical complex, as this would In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible
provide a better distribution of industries around giant who blocked and challenged Hercules for
the Metro Manila area. In advocating the choice his life on his way to Mycenae after performing
of Bataan as the project site for the his eleventh labor. The two wrestled mightily and
petrochemical complex, the BOI, however, made Hercules flung his adversary to the ground
it clear in its view that the BOI or the government thinking him dead, but Antaeus rose even
for that matter could only recommend as to stronger to resume their struggle. This happened
where the project should be located. The BOI several times to Hercules' increasing
recognizes and respects the principle that the amazement. Finally, as they continued grappling,
final choice is still with the proponent who would it dawned on Hercules that Antaeus was the son
in the final analysis provide the funding or risk of Gaea and could never die as long as any part
capital for the project. of his body was touching his Mother Earth. Thus
forewarned, Hercules then held Antaeus up in the
ISSUE: air, beyond the reach of the sustaining soil, and
Whether or not there was abuse of discretion on crushed him to death.
the part of the Board of Investments for yielding
to the wishes of the investor, the national interest Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of
notwithstanding? life, without whose invigorating touch even the
powerful Antaeus weakened and died.
HELD:
YES. under Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 The cases before us are not as fanciful as the
Constitution, it is the duty of the State to "regulate foregoing tale. But they also tell of the elemental
and exercise authority over foreign investments forces of life and death, of men and women who,
within its national jurisdiction and in accordance like Antaeus, need the sustaining strength of the
with its national goals and priorities." The precious earth to stay alive.
development of a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by "Land for the Landless" is a slogan that
Filipinos is mandated in Section 19, Article II of underscores the acute imbalance in the
the Constitution. distribution of this precious resource among our
people. But it is more than a slogan. Through the
A petrochemical industry is not an ordinary brooding centuries, it has become a battlecry
investment opportunity. It should not be treated dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of
like a garment or embroidery firm, a shoe-making the dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as
venture, or even an assembler of cars or their place in the sun.
manufacturer of computer chips, where the BOI
reasoning may be accorded fuller faith and credit. Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935
The petrochemical industry is essential to the mandated the policy of social justice to "insure
national interest. the well-being and economic security of all the
people," especially the less privileged. In 1973,
In this particular BPC venture, not only has the new Constitution affirmed this goal, adding
the Government given unprecedented favors, specifically that "the State shall regulate the
but through its regulatory agency, the BOI, it acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and
surrenders even the power to make a disposition of private property and equitably
company abide by its initial choice, a choice diffuse property ownership and profits.'
free from any suspicion of unscrupulous Significantly, there was also the specific
machinations and a choice which is injunction to "formulate and implement an
undoubtedly in the best interests of the agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating
Filipino people. the tenant from the bondage of the soil."
The expropriation before us affects all private

The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. agricultural lands whenever found and of
Besides echoing these sentiments, it also whatever kind as long as they are in excess of
adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on the maximum retention limits allowed their
Social Justice and Human Rights, containing owners. This kind of expropriation is intended for
grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions for the benefit not only of a particular community or
the uplift of the common people. These include a of a small segment of the population but of the
call in the following words for the adoption by the entire Filipino nation, from all levels of our
State of an agrarian reform program. society, from the impoverished farmer to the
land-glutted owner. Its purpose does not cover
The cases involved have been consolidated only the whole territory of this country but goes
because they concern common legal questions, beyond in time to the foreseeable future, which it
including serious challenges to the hopes to secure and edify with the vision and the
constitutionality of RA 6657 otherwise known as sacrifice of the present generation of Filipinos.
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of Generations yet to come are as involved in this
1988 and other supplementary to RA 6657 such program as we are today, although hopefully only
as PD 27 (providing for the compulsory as beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfilling life
acquisition of private lands for distribution among we will guarantee to them tomorrow through our
tenant-farmers and to specify maximum land thoughtfulness today. And, finally, let it not be
ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27) forgotten that it is no less than the Constitution
Pres. Proc. 131 (instituting CARP) and EO 229 itself that has ordained this revolution in the
(providing the mechanics of implementation of farms, calling for "a just distribution" among the
CARP) RA 6657 is the most recent legislation, farmers of lands that have heretofore been the
signed into law by Pres. Aquino on June 10, prison of their dreams but can now become the
1988. key at least to their deliverance.
ISSUE: WON RA 6657, PD 57, Proc. 31 & Eos Such a program will involve not mere millions of
228 & 229 considered as valid and pesos. The cost will be tremendous. Considering
constitutional? the vast areas of land subject to expropriation
under the laws before us, we estimate that
HELD: hundreds of billions of pesos will be needed, far
YES. The assailed laws are considered as a valid more indeed than the amount of P50 billion
exercise of both police power and of eminent initially appropriated, which is already staggering
domain. The extent that it sets retention limits is as it is by our present standards. Such amount is
an exercise of police power. It must be noted that in fact not even fully available at this time.
like taxation, the power of eminent domain could
be used as an implement of police power of the We assume that the framers of the Constitution
state. The expressed objective of the law was the were aware of this difficulty when they called for
promotion of the welfare of the farners, which agrarian reform as a top priority project of the
came clearly under the police power of the state. government. It is a part of this assumption that
To achieve this purpose, the law provided for the when they envisioned the expropriation that
expropriation of agricultural lands (subject to would be needed, they also intended that the just
minimum retention limits for the landowner) to be compensation would have to be paid not in the
distributed among the peasantry. As the orthodox way but a less conventional if more
ponencia observed: practical method. There can be no doubt that
they were aware of the financial limitations of the
The cases before us present no knotty government and had no illusions that there would
complication insofar as the question of be enough money to pay in cash and in full for
compensable taking is concerned. To the extent the lands they wanted to be distributed among
that the measures under challenge merely the farmers. We may therefore assume that their
prescribe retention limits for landowners, intention was to allow such manner of payment
there is an exercise of the police power for as is now provided for by the CARP Law,
the regulation of private property in particularly the payment of the balance (if the
accordance with the Constitution. But where, owner cannot be paid fully with money), or
to carry out such regulation, it becomes indeed of the entire amount of the just
necessary to deprive such owners of compensation, with other things of value. We
whatever lands they may own in excess of the may also suppose that what they had in mind
maximum area allowed, there is definitely a was a similar scheme of payment as that
taking under the power of eminent domain for prescribed in P.D. No. 27, which was the law in
which payment of just compensation is force at the time they deliberated on the new
imperative. The taking contemplated is not a Charter and with which they presumably agreed
mere limitation of the use of the land. What is in principle.
required is the surrender of the title to and the
physical possession of the said excess and all In relation thereto, the just compensation to be
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of made by the Government in the form of financial
the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an instruments and not money is justified by the
exercise not of the police power but of the power revolutionary character of of the scheme and the
of eminent domain. need to allow the government time to raise the
funds needed.
It bears repeating that the measures
challenged in these petitions contemplate ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
more than a mere regulation of the use of AND STATE POLICIES
private lands under the police power. We deal BASCO VS. PAGCOR
here with an actual taking of private 197 SCRA 52, 1991
agricultural lands that has dispossessed the
owners of their property and deprived them of FACTS:
all its beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle Petitioners seek to annul the Philippine
them to the just compensation mandated by Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)
the Constitution. Charter - PD 1869, because it is allegedly
contrary to morals, public policy and order.
Petitioners also claim that said PD has a
"gambling objective" and that Section 13 par 2 of Petitioner sent a telegram through the
the same PD which exempts PAGCOR from Secretary of the Assembly to all the members
paying any tax, any kind of term income or thereof informing that there will be no session
otherwise as well as fees, charges as levies of this November in view of the invitation of Cong.
whatever nature whether national or local is Matalam. However, on November 2, 1987, the
violative of the principles of local autonomy for it Assembly held session and declared the seat of
is a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to the Speaker vacant. This was reiterated in
impose taxes and legal fees. another session on November 5 of same year.
ISSUE: Whether or not the local autonomy Respondents allege that because the
clause is violated by PD 1869 Sangguniang Pampook(s) are "autonomous," the
courts may not rightfully intervene in their affairs,
HELD: much less strike down their acts.
The petitioners contentions are without
merit for the following reasons: ISSUE:
1. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal Are the so-called autonomous governments of
corporation hits no inherent right to impose Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject to
taxes the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other
2. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject words, what is the extent of self-government
to control by Congress. It should be stressed given to the two autonomous governments of
that "municipal corporations are mere Region IX and XII?
creatures of Congress" which has the
power to "create and abolish municipal HELD:
corporations" due to its "general Yes, it may assume jurisdiction. In
legislative powers". Congress, therefore, resolving this case the SC made a differentiation
has the power of control over Local between decentralization of administration and
governments. And if Congress can grant decentralization of power.
the City of Manila the power to tax certain There is Decentralization of
matters, it can also provide for administration when the central government
exemptions or even take back the power. delegates administrative powers to political
3. The City of Manila's power to impose license subdivisions in order to broaden the base of
fees on gambling, has long been revoked. government power and in the process to make
Only the National Government has the local governments "more responsive and
power to issue "licenses or permits" for the accountable," and "ensure their fullest
operation of gambling. Necessarily, the development as self-reliant communities and
power to demand or collect license fees make them more effective partners in the pursuit
which is a consequence of the issuance of of national development and social progress." At
"licensesor permits" is no longer vested in the same time, it relieves the central government
the City of Manila. of the burden of managing local affairs and
4. Local governments have no power to tax enables it to concentrate on national concerns.
instrumentalities of the National The President exercises "general supervision"
Government. PAGCOR is a government over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs
owned or controlled corporation with an are administered according to law." He has no
original charter. control over their acts in the sense that he can
5. The power of local government to substitute their judgments with his own.
"impose taxes and fees" is always Decentralization of power, on the other hand,
subject to "limitations" which Congress involves an abdication of political power in the
may provide by law. Since PD 1869 favor of local governments units declared to be
remains an "operative'' law, its "exemption autonomous. In that case, the autonomous
clause" remains as an exception to the government is free to chart its own destiny and
exercise of the power of local governments shape its future with minimum intervention from
to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore central authorities.
be violative but rather is consistent with the An examination of the very Presidential
principle of local autonomy. Besides, the Decree creating the autonomous governments of
principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Mindanao persuades us that they were never
Constitution simply means "decentralization". meant to exercise autonomy in the second
It does not make local governments sense, that is, in which the central government
sovereign within the slate or an - imperiurn in commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential
imperio. Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates
that "the President shall have the power of
general supervision and control over
Autonomous Regions." In the second place, the
Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES made to discharge chiefly administrative
AND STATE POLICIES services.
LIMBONA VS. MANGELIN
170 SCRA 786, 1989 ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
AND STATE POLICIES
FACTS: PAMATONG VS. COMELEC
Petitioner is the elected speaker of the G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
Batangas, pampook of Central Mindanao
(Assembly for brefity). Respondents are FACTS:
members of said Assembly.
Congressman Matalam, Chairman of Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong
the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President.
Representative invited the petitioner in his Respondent Commission on Elections
capacity as speaker of the Assembly to (COMELEC) refused to give due course to
participate in consultation and dialogue regarding petitioners Certificate of Candidacy in its
the charting of the autonomous government of Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004.
Muslim Mindanao to be held in Manila. The decision, however, was not unanimous since
Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and
Mehol K. Sadain voted to include petitioner as provision. Like the rest of the policies
they believed he had parties or movements to enumerated in Article II, the provision does not
back up his candidacy. contain any judicially enforceable constitutional
On January 15, 2004, petitioner moved right but merely specifies a guideline for
for reconsideration of Resolution No. 6558. legislative or executive action.[3] The disregard of
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was the provision does not give rise to any cause of
docketed as SPP (MP) No. 04-001. The action before the courts.
COMELEC, acting on petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration and on similar motions filed by An inquiry into the intent of the framers
other aspirants for national elective positions, produces the same determination that the
denied the same under the aegis of Omnibus provision is not self-executory. The original
Resolution No. 6604 dated February 11, 2004. wording of the present Section 26, Article II had
The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five read, The State shall broaden opportunities
(35) others nuisance candidates who could not to public office and prohibit public
wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not dynasties. Commissioner (now Chief Justice)
nominated by a political party or are not Hilario Davide, Jr. successfully brought forth an
supported by a registered political party with a amendment that changed the word broaden to
national constituency. Commissioner Sadain the phrase ensure equal access, and the
maintained his vote for petitioner. By then, substitution of the word office to service. He
Commissioner Tancangco had retired. explained his proposal in this wise:
In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari,
petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions which I changed the word broaden
were allegedly rendered in violation of his right to to ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO
equal access to opportunities for public service because what is important would be
under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 equal access to the opportunity. If
Constitution,[by limiting the number of qualified you broaden, it would necessarily
candidates only to those who can afford to wage mean that the government would be
a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by mandated to create as many offices
political parties. In so doing, petitioner argues as are possible to accommodate as
that the COMELEC indirectly amended the many people as are also possible.
constitutional provisions on the electoral process That is the meaning of broadening
and limited the power of the sovereign people to opportunities to public service. So, in
choose their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly order that we should not mandate the
erred in disqualifying him since he is the most State to make the government the
qualified among all the presidential candidates, number one employer and to limit
i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal offices only to what may be
qualifications for the office of the president, he is necessary and expedient yet offering
capable of waging a national campaign since he equal opportunities to access to it, I
has numerous national organizations under his change the word broaden. [7]
leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an mphasis supplied)
international campaign since he has practiced
law in other countries, and he has a platform of Obviously, the provision is not intended
government. Petitioner likewise attacks the to compel the State to enact positive
validity of the form for the Certificate of measures that would accommodate as many
Candidacy prepared by the COMELEC. people as possible into public office. The
Petitioner claims that the form does not provide approval of the Davide amendment
clear and reasonable guidelines for determining indicates the design of the framers to cast the
the qualifications of candidates since it does not provision as simply enunciatory of a desired
ask for the candidates bio-data and his program policy objective and not reflective of the
of government. imposition of a clear State burden.
ISSUE: Moreover, the provision as written leaves

Whether the constitutional provision ensuring much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the
equal access to opportunities for public office source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret
creates a constitutional right to run for or hold the clause as operative in the absence of
public office and, particularly in his case, to seek legislation since its effective means and reach
the presidency? are not properly defined. Broadly written, the
myriad of claims that can be subsumed under
HELD: this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended.[8]
NO.Implicit in the petitioners invocation Words and phrases such as equal access,
of the constitutional provision ensuring equal opportunities, and public service are
access to opportunities for public office is the susceptible to countless interpretations owing to
claim that there is a constitutional right to run for their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was
or hold public office and, particularly in his case, not the intention of the framers to inflict on the
to seek the presidency. There is none. What is people an operative but amorphous foundation
recognized is merely a privilege subject to from which innately unenforceable rights may be
limitations imposed by law. Section 26, sourced.
Article II of the Constitution neither bestows
such a right nor elevates the privilege to the
level of an enforceable right. There is nothing As earlier noted, the privilege of equal
in the plain language of the provision which access to opportunities to public office may be
suggests such a thrust or justifies an subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations
interpretation of the sort. specifically on the privilege to seek elective office
are found in the provisions[9] of the Omnibus
The equal access provision is a Election Code on Nuisance Candidates and
subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, COMELEC Resolution No. 6452[10] dated
entitled Declaration of Principles and State December 10, 2002 outlining the instances
Policies. The provisions under the Article are wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse
generally considered not self-executing, and to give due course to or cancel a Certificate of
there is no plausible reason for according a Candidacy.
different treatment to the equal access As long as the limitations apply to
everybody equally without discrimination, Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by

however, the equal access clause is not violated. law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens full public disclosure of all its transactions
engendered by the limitations are meant to be involving public interest. (Art. II, Sec. 28).
borne by any one who is minded to file a
certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there In the Tanada case, supra, the constitutional
is no showing that any person is exempt from the guarantee was bolstered by what this Court
limitations or the burdens which they create. declared as an imperative duty of the government
officials concerned to publish all important
legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES as well as all executive orders and proclamations
AND STATE POLICIES of general applicability. We granted Mandamus in
LEGASPI VS. CIVIL SEVICE COMMISSION said case, and in the process, We found
150 SCRA 530, 1987 occasion to expound briefly on the nature of said
duty:
FACTS:
The fundamental right of the people to . . . That duty must be enforced if the
information on matters of public concern is Constitutional right of the people to be informed
invoked in this special civil action for Mandamus on matters of public concern is to be given
instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi substance and reality. The law itself makes a list
against the Civil Service Commission. The of what should be published in the Official
respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves
for information on the civil service eligibilities of respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to
certain persons employed as sanitarians in the what must be included or excluded from such
Health Department of Cebu City. These publication. (Tanada v. Tuvera, supra, at 39)
government employees had allegedly
represented themselves as civil service eligibles The absence of discretion on the part of
who passed the civil service examinations for government agencies in allowing the
sanitarians. examination of public records, specifically,
the records in the Office of the Register of
ISSUE: Whether or not Legaspi should be Deeds, is emphasized in Subido vs. Ozaeta,
allowed such right supra:
HELD: Except, perhaps when it is clear that the

The constitutional right to information on purpose of the examination is unlawful, or
matters of public concern is recognized in the Bill sheer, idle curiosity, we do not believe it is
of Rights. These constitutional provisions are the duty under the law of registration officers
self-executing. They supply the rules by means to concern themselves with the motives,
of which the right to information may be enjoyed reasons, and objects of the person seeking
by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty access to the records. It is not their
to afford access to sources of information. prerogative to see that the information which
Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized the records contain is not flaunted before
may be asserted by the people upon the public gaze, or that scandal is not made of it.
ratification of the constitution without need for any If it be wrong to publish the contents of the
ancillary act of the Legislature. What may be records, it is the legislature and not the
provided for by the Legislature are reasonable officials having custody thereof which is
conditions and limitations upon the access to be called upon to devise a remedy. . . . (Subido v.
afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent Ozaeta, supra at 388).
with the declared State policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public It is clear from the foregoing pronouncements
interest. of this Court that government agencies are
For every right of the people without discretion in refusing disclosure of,
recognized as fundamental, there lies a or access to, information of public concern.
corresponding duty on the part of those who This is not to lose sight of the reasonable
govern, to respect and protect that right. That regulations which may be imposed by said
is the very essence of the Bill of Rights in a agencies in custody of public records on the
constitutional regime. Only governments manner in which the right to information may
operating under fundamental rules defining the be exercised by the public. In the Subido case,
limits of their power so as to shield individual We recognized the authority of the Register of
rights against its arbitrary exercise can properly Deeds to regulate the manner in which persons
claim to be constitutional. Without a government's desiring to do so, may inspect, examine or copy
acceptance of the limitations imposed upon it by records relating to registered lands. However, the
the Constitution in order to uphold individual regulations which the Register of Deeds may
liberties, without an acknowledgment on its part promulgate are confined to:
of those duties exacted by the rights pertaining to
the citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes a . . . prescribing the manner and hours of
sophistry, and liberty, the ultimate illusion. examination to the end that damage to or loss of,
In recognizing the people's right to the records may be avoided, that undue
be informed, both the 1973 Constitution and interference with the duties of the custodian of
the New Charter expressly mandate the duty the books and documents and other employees
of the State and its agents to afford access to may be prevented, that the right of other persons
official records, documents, papers and in entitled to make inspection may be insured . . .
addition, government research data used as (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387).
basis for policy development, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law. The Applying the Subido ruling by analogy, We
guarantee has been further enhanced in the New recognized a similar authority in a municipal
Constitution with the adoption of a policy of full judge, to regulate the manner of inspection by the
public disclosure, this time "subject to reasonable public of criminal docket records in the case of
conditions prescribed by law," in Article II, Baldoza vs. Dimaano (Adm. Matter No. 1120-MJ,
Section 28 thereof, to wit: May 5, 1976, 71 SCRA 14). Said administrative
case was filed against the respondent judge for
his alleged refusal to allow examination of the second sentence). The law may therefore
criminal docket records in his sala. Upon a exempt certain types of information from public
finding by the Investigating Judge that the scrutiny, such as those affecting national
respondent had allowed the complainant to open security. It follows that, in every case, the
and view the subject records, We absolved the availability of access to a particular public record
respondent. In effect, We have also held that the must be circumscribed by the nature of the
rules and conditions imposed by him upon the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public
manner of examining the public records were concern or one that involves public interest, and,
reasonable. (b) not being exempted by law from the operation
of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold
In both the Subido and the Baldoza cases, We question is, therefore, whether or not the
were emphatic in Our statement that the authority information sought is of public interest or public
to regulate the manner of examining public concern.
records does not carry with it the power to
prohibit. A distinction has to be made between This question is first addressed to the
the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of government agency having custody of the
or access to a particular information and the desired information. However, as already
authority to regulate the manner in which the discussed, this does not give the agency
access is to be afforded. The first is a limitation concerned any discretion to grant or deny
upon the availability of access to the information access. In case of denial of access, the
sought, which only the Legislature may impose government agency has the burden of showing
(Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution). The second that the information requested is not of public
pertains to the government agency charged with concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the
the custody of public records. Its authority to same has been exempted by law from the
regulate access is to be exercised solely to the operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will
end that damage to, or loss of, public records serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly
may be avoided, undue interference with the observed, ". . . the government is in an
duties of said agencies may be prevented, and advantageous position to marshall and interpret
more importantly, that the exercise of the same arguments against release . . ." To safeguard the
constitutional right by other persons shall be constitutional right, every denial of access by the
assured (Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra). government agency concerned is subject to
review by the courts, and in the proper case,
Thus, while the manner of examining public access may be compelled by a writ of
records may be subject to reasonable Mandamus.
regulation by the government agency in
custody thereof, the duty to disclose the In determining whether or not a
information of public concern, and to afford particular information is of public concern there is
access to public records cannot be no rigid test which can be applied. "Public
discretionary on the part of said agencies. concern" like "public interest" is a term that
Certainly, its performance cannot be made eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a
contingent upon the discretion of such broad spectrum of subjects which the public may
1
agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the want to know, either because these directly
2
constitutional right may be rendered nugatory affect their lives, or simply because such
by any whimsical exercise of agency matters naturally arouse the interest of an
discretion. The constitutional duty, not being ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for
discretionary, its performance may be the courts to determine in a case by case
compelled by a writ of Mandamus in a proper basis whether the matter at issue is of
case. interest or importance, as it relates to or
affects the public.
But what is a proper case for Mandamus to
issue? In the case before Us, the public right to The public concern invoked in the case of
be enforced and the concomitant duty of the Taada v. Tuvera, supra, was the need for
State are unequivocably set forth in the adequate notice to the public of the various laws
Constitution. The decisive question on the which are to regulate the actions and conduct of
propriety of the issuance of the writ of Mandamus citizens. In Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra, the public
in this case is, whether the information sought by concern deemed covered by the statutory right
the petitioner is within the ambit of the was the knowledge of those real estate
constitutional guarantee. transactions which some believed to have been
registered in violation of the Constitution.
The incorporation in the Constitution of
a guarantee of access to information of public The information sought by the petitioner in this
concern is a recognition of the essentiality of the case is the truth of the claim of certain
free flow of ideas and information in a democracy government employees that they are civil service
(Baldoza v. Dimaano, Adm. Matter No. 1120-MJ, eligibles for the positions to which they were
May 5, 1976, 17 SCRA 14). In the same way that appointed. The Constitution expressly declares
free discussion enables members of society to as a State policy that:
cope with the exigencies of their time (Thornhill
vs. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 [1939]), access to Appointments in the civil service shall be made
information of general interest aids the people in only according to merit and fitness to be
democratic decision-making (87 Harvard Law determined, as far as practicable, and except as
Review 1505 [1974] by giving them a better to positions which are policy determining,
perspective of the vital issues confronting the primarily confidential or highly technical, by
nation. competitive examination. (Art. IX, B, Sec. 2. [2]).
But the constitutional guarantee to Public office being a public trust, [Const., Art.
information on matters of public concern is XI, Sec: 1] it is the legitimate concern of
not absolute. It does not open every door to citizens to ensure that government positions
any and all information. Under the requiring civil service eligibility are occupied
Constitution, access to official records, only by persons who are eligibles. Public
papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as officers are at all times accountable to the
may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7,
people even as to their eligibilities for their The public nature of the loanable funds
respective positions. of the GSIS and the public office held by the
alleged borrowers make the information sought
But then, it is not enough that the information clearly a matter of public interest and concern.
sought is of public interest. For Mandamus to Furthermore, the "constituent-ministrant"
lie in a given case, the information must not dichotomy characterizing government function
be among the species exempted by law from has long been repudiated. That the GSIS, in
the operation of the constitutional guarantee. granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary
function would not justify the exclusion of the
In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or transactions from the coverage and scope of the
deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has right to information.
failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Respondent next asserts that the
Law which would limit the petitioner's right to documents evidencing the loan transactions of
know who are, and who are not, civil service the GSIS are private in nature and hence, are not
eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that covered by the Constitutional right to information
the names of those who pass the civil service on matters of public concern which guarantees
examinations, as in bar examinations and "(a)ccess to official records, and to documents,
licensure examinations for various professions, and papers pertaining to official acts,
are released to the public. Hence, there is transactions, or decisions" only.
nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility,
if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, It is argued that the records of the GSIS,
therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And a government corporation performing proprietary
when, as in this case, the government employees functions, are outside the coverage of the
concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the people's right of access to official records. It is
public, through any citizen, has a right to verify further contended that since the loan function of
their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service the GSIS is merely incidental to its insurance
Commission. function, then its loan transactions are not
covered by the constitutional policy of full public
The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian disclosure and the right to information which is
being of public concern, and in the absence applicable only to "official" transactions.
of express limitations under the law upon
access to the register of civil service eligibles First of all, the "constituent ----
for said position, the duty of the respondent ministrant" dichotomy characterizing government
Commission to confirm or deny the civil function has long been repudiated. In ACCFA v.
service eligibility of any person occupying the Confederation of Unions and Government
position becomes imperative. Mandamus, Corporations and Offices [G.R. Nos. L-21484 and
therefore lies. L-23605, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 644], the
Court said that the government, whether carrying
out its sovereign attributes or running some
business, discharges the same function of
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES service to the people.
AND STATE POLICIES
VALMONTE VS. BELMONTE Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting
170 SCRA 256, 1989 the loans, was exercising a proprietary function
would not justify the exclusion of the transactions
FACTS: from the coverage and scope of the right to
Petitioner Valmonte wrote a letter to information.
respondent Belmonte, General Manager of GSIS,
requesting the latter to furnish him the list of the Moreover, the intent of the members
names of the Batasang Pambansa members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, to
belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who include government-owned and controlled
were able to secure clean loans immediately corporations and transactions entered into by
before the February 7 election thru the them within the coverage of the State policy
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady of full public disclosure is manifest from the
Imelda Marcos. records of the proceedings
The Deputy General counsel of the Considering the intent of the framers of
GSIS wrote back the petitioner turning down his the Constitution which, though not binding upon
request on the ground that there exists a the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and
confidential relationship between the GSIS and considering further that government-owned and
all those who borrow from it, which confidence it controlled corporations, whether performing
is the GSIS is duty bound to preserve. proprietary or governmental functions are
accountable to the people, the Court is
ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus lies to compel convinced that transactions entered into by
respondent to perform the acts sought by the GSIS, a government-controlled
petitioner to be done, in pursuance of their right corporation created by special legislation are
to information within the ambit of the people's right to be
informed pursuant to the constitutional policy
HELD: of transparency in government dealings.
Yes. The peoples right to information is In fine, petitioners are entitled to access
limited to matters of public concern and is further to the documents evidencing loans granted by
subject to such limitations as may be provided by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that
law. The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the latter may promulgate relating to the manner
the government and its employees and and hours of examination, to the end that
administration of various insurance programs for damage to or loss of the records may be avoided,
the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds that undue interference with the duties of the
assume a public character. It is the legitimate custodian of the records may be prevented and
concern of the public to ensure that these that the right of other persons entitled to inspect
funds are managed properly with the end in the records may be insured
view of maximizing the benefits to insured However, although citizens are
government employees. afforded the right to information and,
pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to
official records," the Constitution does not GRP.

accord them a right to compel custodians of The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March
official records to prepare lists, abstracts, 24, 2001, with the talks being facilitated by the
summaries and the like in their desire to Malaysian government, the parties signing on the
acquire information on matters of public same date the Agreement on the General
concern. Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks
Between the GRP and the MILF. The MILF
thereafter suspended all its military actions.
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES Formal peace talks between the parties
AND STATE POLICIES were held in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22, 2001,
AQUINO-SARMIENTO VS. MORATO the outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli
203 SCRA 515, 1991 Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001)
containing the basic principles and agenda on the
FACTS: following aspects of the negotiation: Security
Petitioner, a member of respondent Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral
MTRCB, wrote its records officer requesting that Domain Aspect. With regard to the Ancestral
she be allowed to examine the board's records Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli Agreement
pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the 2001 simply agreed that the same be discussed
individual board members after a review of the further by the Parties in their next meeting.
movies and television productions. It is on the A second round of peace talks was held in
basis of said slips that films are either banned, Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001 which
cut or classified accordingly. Petitioner's request ended with the signing of the Implementing
was denied by respondent Morato on the ground Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli
that whenever the members of the board sit in Agreement 2001 leading to a ceasefire status
judgment over a film, their decisions as reflected between the parties. This was followed by the
in the individual voting slips partake the nature of Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian
conscience votes and as such, are purely and Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the
completely private and personal. Tripoli Agreement 2001, which was signed on
Petitioner counters that the records she May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia.
wishes to examine are public in character and Nonetheless, there were many incidence of
other than providing for reasonable conditions violence between government forces and the
regulating the manner and hours of examination, MILF from 2002 to 2003. Meanwhile, then MILF
respondents have no authority to deny any Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away on July
citizen seeking examination of the board's 13, 2003 and he was replaced by Al Haj Murad,
records. who was then the chief peace negotiator of the
MILF. Murads position as chief peace negotiator
ISSUE: Was the respondents denial of was taken over by Mohagher Iqbal.
petitioners request proper? In 2005, several exploratory talks were held
between the parties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually
HELD: leading to the crafting of the draft MOA-AD in its
We find respondents' refusal to allow final form, which, as mentioned, was set to be
petitioner to examine the records of respondent signed last August 5, 2008.
MTRCB, pertaining to the decisions of the review Before the Court is what is perhaps the most
committee as well as the individual voting slips of contentious consensus ever embodied in an
its members, as violative of petitioner's instrument the MOA-AD which is assailed
constitutional right of access to public records. principally by the present petitions bearing docket
May the decisions of respondent Board numbers 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951 and
and the individual members concerned, arrived at 183962. Commonly impleaded as respondents
in an official capacity, be considered private? are the GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain
Certainly not. As may be gleaned from the and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace
decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent Process (PAPP) Hermogenes Esperon, Jr. On
classification board, there is no doubt that its very July 23, 2008, the Province of North
existence is public in character; it is an office Cotabato[and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piol
created to serve public interest. it being the case, filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for
respondents can Jay no valid claim to privacy. Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the
The right to privacy belongs to the individual Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
acting in his private capacity and not to a Temporary Restraining Order. Invoking the right
governmental agency or officers tasked with, and to information on matters of public concern,
acting in, the discharge of public duties. petitioners seek to compel respondents to
disclose and furnish them the complete and
official copies of the MOA-AD including its
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of
AND STATE POLICIES the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTOBATO VS. GRP contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a
PEACE PANEL public consultation thereon. Supplementarily,
GR No. 183591, October 14, 2008 petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared
unconstitutional. This initial petition was followed
by several other petitions by other parties. The
FACTS: Court ordered the consolidation of the petitions.
When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
assumed office, the military offensive against the ISSUE:
MILF was suspended and the government sought Whether there is a violation of the peoples right
a resumption of the peace talks. The MILF, to information on matters of public concern (1987
according to a leading MILF member, initially Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state
responded with deep reservation, but when policy of full disclosure of all its transactions
President Arroyo asked the Government of involving public interest (1987 Constitution,
Malaysia through Prime Minister Mahathir Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation
Mohammad to help convince the MILF to return under Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL
to the negotiating table, the MILF convened its GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991?
Central Committee to seriously discuss the
matter and, eventually, decided to meet with the HELD:
YES. The right of the people to information on inclusion of negotiations leading to the
matters of public concern shall be recognized. consummation of the transaction. Certainly, a
Access to official records, and to documents, and consummated contract is not a requirement for
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or the exercise of the right to information.
decisions, as well as to government research Otherwise, the people can never exercise the
data used as basis for policy development, shall right if no contract is consummated, and if one is
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations consummated, it may be too late for the public to
as may be provided by law. expose its defects.
As early as 1948, in Subido v. Ozaeta, the
Court has recognized the statutory right to Requiring a consummated contract
examine and inspect public records, a right which will keep the public in the dark until the
was eventually accorded constitutional status. contract, which may be grossly
The right of access to public disadvantageous to the government or even
documents, as enshrined in both the 1973 illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates
Constitution and the 1987 Constitution, has the State policy of full transparency on
been recognized as a self-executory matters of public concern, a situation which
constitutional right. the framers of the Constitution could not have
In the 1976 case of Baldoza v. Hon. Judge intended. Such a requirement will prevent the
Dimaano,the Court ruled that access to public citizenry from participating in the public
records is predicated on the right of the people to discussion of any proposed contract,
acquire information on matters of public concern effectively truncating a basic right enshrined
since, undoubtedly, in a democracy, the pubic in the Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an
has a legitimate interest in matters of social and emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a
political significance. The incorporation of this retreat by the State of its avowed policy of full
right in the Constitution is a recognition of the disclosure of all its transactions involving public
fundamental role of free exchange of information interest.
in a democracy. There can be no realistic Intended as a splendid symmetry to the
perception by the public of the nations problems, right to information under the Bill of Rights is the
nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if policy of public disclosure under Section 28,
they are denied access to information of general Article II of the Constitution. The policy of full
interest. Information is needed to enable the public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted
members of society to cope with the exigencies Section 28 complements the right of access to
of the times. As has been aptly observed: information on matters of public concern found in
Maintaining the flow of such information the Bill of Rights. The right to information
depends on protection for both its acquisition and guarantees the right of the people to demand
its dissemination since, if either process is information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty
interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases. of officialdom to give information even if nobody
In the same way that free discussion demands.
enables members of society to cope with the The policy of public disclosure establishes
exigencies of their time, access to information of a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of
general interest aids the people in democratic public affairs in a genuinely open democracy,
decision-making by giving them a better with the peoples right to know as the
perspective of the vital issues confronting the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be
nation, so that they may be able to criticize and accountable by following such policy. These
participate in the affairs of the government in a provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom
responsible, reasonable and effective manner. It of expression and essential to hold public officials
is by ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited at all times accountable to the people.
exchange of ideas among a well-informed public Whether Section 28 is self-executory, the
that a government remains responsive to the records of the deliberations of the Constitutional
changes desired by the people. Commission so disclose.
The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
That the subject of the information
sought in the present cases is a matter of POLICE POWER
public concern faces no serious challenge. In
fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE
indeed of public concern. In previous cases, EXPORTERS, INC vs. HON. DRILON
the Court found that the regularity of real G.R. No. 81958, June 30, 1988, SARMIENTO,
estate transactions entered in the Register of J.
Deeds, the need for adequate notice to the
public of the various laws, the civil service Facts:
eligibility of a public employee, the proper
management of GSIS funds allegedly used to The petitioner, Philippine Association of
grant loans to public officials, the recovery of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm
the Marcoses alleged ill-gotten wealth,[120] "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino
and the identity of party-list nominees, among workers, male and female, for overseas
others, are matters of public concern. placement," challenges the Constitutional validity
Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the
present cases is of public concern, involving Department of Labor and Employment, in the
as it does the sovereignty and territorial character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE
integrity of the State, which directly affects TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF
the lives of the public at large. DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND
HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for
Matters of public concern covered by certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the
the right to information include steps and measure is assailed for "discrimination against
negotiations leading to the consummation of males or females;" that it "does not apply to all
the contract. In not distinguishing as to the Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and
executory nature or commercial character of females with similar skills;" and that it is violative
agreements, the Court has categorically ruled of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an
that the right to information contemplates invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police
power being legislative, and not executive, in unrestricted license to act according to one's
character. will." It is subject to the far more overriding
In this petition for certiorari and demands and requirements of the greater
prohibition, PASEI, challenges the validity of number.
Department Order No. 1 (deployment ban) of the Notwithstanding its extensive sweep,
DOLE on the following grounds: 1) it is police power is not without its own
discriminatory as it only applies to female limitations. For all its awesome
workers; 2) it is an invalid exercise of the consequences, it may not be exercised
lawmaking power. The respondents invoke the arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in
police power of the Philippine State. that event, it defeats the purpose for which it
is exercised, that is, to advance the public
Issue: Whether or not the enactment of DO No. 1 good. Thus, when the power is used to further
is a valid exercise of police power. private interests at the expense of the
citizenry, there is a clear misuse of the power.
Held: Yes, it is a valid exercise of police power. DO No. 1 applies only to "female
Police power has been defined as the "state contract workers," but it does not thereby make
authority to enact legislation that may interfere an undue discrimination between the sexes.
with personal liberty or property in order to Equality before the law" admits of classifications,
promote the general welfare." It finds no specific provided that (1) such classifications rest on
Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to
does not owe its origin to the Charter. It is a the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined
fundamental attribute of government that has to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally
enabled it to perform the most vital functions of to all members of the same class. It is the
governance. It constitutes an implied limitation on avowed objective of DO No. 1 to "enhance the
the Bill of Rights. However, police power is not protection for Filipino female overseas workers.
without its own limitations. It may not be Discrimination in this case is justified.
exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Police power is the domain of the
It is admitted that Department Order No. legislature, but it does not mean that such an
1 is in the nature of a police power measure. The authority may not be lawfully delegated. The
only question is whether or not it is valid under Labor Code itself vests the DOLE with
the Constitution. rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof.
The concept of police power is well- Hence it is a valid exercise of police power.
established in this jurisdiction. It has been
defined as the "state authority to enact ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ
legislation that may interfere with personal 101 PHIL. 1155
liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) FACTS:
an imposition of restraint upon liberty or Republic Act 1180 or commonly known
property, (2) in order to foster the common as An Act to Regulate the Retail Business was
good. It is not capable of an exact definition passed. The said law provides for a prohibition
but has been, purposely, veiled in general against foreigners as well as corporations owned
terms to underscore its all-comprehensive by foreigners from engaging from retail trade in
embrace. our country.
"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the Petitioner filed a suit to invalidate the
exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the Retail Trade Nationalization Law, on the premise
future where it could be done, provides enough that it violated several treaties which under the
room for an efficient and flexible response to rule of pacta sunt servanda, a generally accepted
conditions and circumstances thus assuring the principle of international law, should be observed
greatest benefits." by the Court in good faith.
It finds no specific Constitutional
grant for the plain reason that it does not owe ISSUE: Whether or not the Retail Trade
its origin to the Charter. Along with the taxing Nationalization Law is unconstitutional for it is in
power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the conflict with treaties which are generally accepted
very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a principles of international law.
fundamental attribute of government that has
enabled it to perform the most vital functions of HELD:
governance. Marshall, to whom the expression The Supreme Court said it saw no
has been credited, refers to it succinctly as the conflict. The reason given by the Court was that
plenary power of the State "to govern its the Retail Trade National Law was passed in the
citizens." exercise of the police power which cannot be
"The police power of the State . . . is a bargained away through the medium of a treaty
power coextensive with self-protection, and it is or a contract.
not inaptly termed the 'law of overwhelming The law in question was enacted to
necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and remedy a real actual threat and danger to
plenary power in the State which enables it to national economy posed by alien dominance
prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and control of the retail business and free the
and welfare of society." citizens and country from such dominance
It constitutes an implied limitation on and control; that the enactment clearly falls
the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is within the scope of the police power of the
"rooted in the conception that men in State, thru which and by which it protects its
organizing the state and imposing upon its own personality and insures its security and
government limitations to safeguard future.
constitutional rights did not intend thereby to Resuming what we have set forth above
enable an individual citizen or a group of we hold that the disputed law was enacted to
citizens to obstruct unreasonably the remedy a real actual threat and danger to
enactment of such salutary measures national economy posed by alien dominance and
calculated to ensure communal peace, safety, control of the retail business and free citizens and
good order, and welfare." Significantly, the Bill country from such dominance and control; that
of Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the
guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even police power of the state, through which and by
liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not which it protects its own personality and insures
its security and future; that the law does not compensable taking is concerned. To the extent
violate the equal protection clause of the that the measures under challenge merely
Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for prescribe retention limits for landowners,
the distinction between alien and citizen in the there is an exercise of the police power for
exercise of occupation regulated, nor the due the regulation of private property in
process of the law clause; because the law is accordance with the Constitution. But where,
prospective in operation and recognizes the to carry out such regulation, it becomes
privilege of aliens already engaged in the necessary to deprive such owners of
occupation and reasonably protects their whatever lands they may own in excess of the
privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law maximum area allowed, there is definitely a
to carry out its objectives appear to us to be taking under the power of eminent domain for
plainly evident - as a matter of fact it seems not which payment of just compensation is
only appropriate but actually necessary - and that imperative. The taking contemplated is not a
in any case such matter falls within the mere limitation of the use of the land. What is
prerogative of the legislature, with whose power required is the surrender of the title to and the
and discretion the judicial department of the physical possession of the said excess and
Government may not interfere; that the provisions all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in
of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is
this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled definitely an exercise not of the police power
the legislature of the segment of the population but of the power of eminent domain.
affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for Wherefore, the Court holds the constitutionality of
supposed conflict with treaty obligations because R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and
no treaty has actually been entered into on the E.O. Nos. 228 and 229. However, the title to all
subject and the police power may not be curtailed expropriated properties shall be transferred to the
or surrendered by any treaty or any other State only upon full payment of compensation to
conventional agreement. their respective owners.
WALTER LUTZ, et. al vs. ANTONIO ARANETA, FLORENTINA A. LOZANO vs. HONORABLE
G.R. No. L-7859, December 22, 1955, REYES, ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, et.al
J.B L., J. G.R. No. L-63419 December 18, 1986, YAP, J.
Facts: Plaintiffs seek to recover tax from the Facts: Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for
respondent alleging that such is unconstitutional short), popularly known as the Bouncing Check
and void, being levied for the aid and support of Law punishes a person "who makes or draws
the sugar industry exclusively, which in plaintiff's and issues any check on account or for value,
opinion is not a public purpose for which a tax knowing at the time of issue that he does not
may be constitutionally levied. The action having have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
been dismissed by the Court of First Instance, bank for the payment of said check in full upon
the plaintiffs appealed the case directly to the presentment, which check is subsequently
Supreme Court. dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency
of funds or credit or would have been dishonored
Issue: Whether or not the imposition of tax under for the same reason had not the drawer, without
the CA No. 567 is a valid exercise of police any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
power. payment." Those who question the
constitutionality of BP 22 insist that it offends the
Held: Yes. The tax is levied with a regulatory constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment
purpose, to provide means for the for debt and it contravenes the equal protection
rehabilitation and stabilization of the clause.
threatened sugar industry. In other words, the
act is primarily an exercise of the police Issue: Whether or not the enactment of BP 22 is
power. The protection of a large industry a valid exercise of police power.
constituting one of the great sources of the
state's wealth and therefore directly or indirectly Held: Yes. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid
affecting the welfare of so great a portion of the exercise of the police power and is not
population of the State is affected to such an repugnant to the constitutional inhibition
extent by public interests as to be within the against imprisonment for debt. It may be
police power of the sovereign.The decision constitutionally impermissible for the
appealed from is affirmed. legislature to penalize a person for non-
payment of a debt ex contractu. But certainly
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking
THE PHILIPPINES, INC., et. al body to proscribe certain acts deemed
vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN pernicious and inimical to public welfare.
REFORM Acts mala in se are not the only acts which
G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989, CRUZ, J. the law can punish. An act may not be
considered by society as inherently wrong,
Facts: In these consolidated cases, petitioners hence, not malum in se but because of the
primarily assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. harm that it inflicts on the community, it can
6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. be outlawed and criminally punished as
228 and 229 arguing that no private property malum prohibitum. The state can do this in
shall be taken for public use without just the exercise of its police power. There is no
compensation. The respondent invokes the substance in the claim that the statute in question
police power of the State. denies equal protection of the laws or is
discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of
Issue: Whether or not the taking of property the check, but not the payee. Wherefore, the
under the said laws is a valid exercise of police decision rendered by the respondent judge is
power or of the power of eminent domain. hereby set aside.
Recent statistics of the Central Bank
Held: It is an exercise of the power of eminent show that one-third of the entire money supply of
domain. The cases present no knotty the country, roughly totalling P32.3 billion,
complication insofar as the question of consists of peso demand deposits; the remaining
two-thirds consists of currency in circulation. province to another for the purpose of

These demand deposits in the banks constitute preventing indiscriminate slaughter of these
the funds against which, among others, animals. The petitioner had transported six
commercial papers like checks, are drawn. The carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo where they were
magnitude of the amount involved amply justifies confiscated for violation of the said order. He
the legitimate concern of the state in preserving sued for recovery and challenges the
the integrity of the banking system. Flooding the constitutionality of the said order. The lower court
system with worthless checks is like pouring sustained the confiscation of the carabaos. He
garbage into the bloodstream of the nation's appealed the decision to the Intermediate
economy. Appellate Court which upheld the lower court.
The effects of the issuance of a Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
worthless check transcends the private interests
of the parties directly involved in the transaction Issue: Whether or not the purpose of E.O. 626-A
and touches the interests of the community at is a valid exercise of police power.
large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong
to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the Held: No. We do not see how the prohibition
public. The harmful practice of putting of the interprovincial transport of carabaos
valueless commercial papers in circulation, can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter,
multiplied a thousandfold, can very well considering that they can be killed anywhere,
pollute the channels of trade and commerce, with no less difficulty in one province than in
injure the banking system and eventually hurt another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in
the welfare of society and the public interest. one province will not prevent their slaughter
In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 there, any more than moving them to another
a valid exercise of the police power and is not province will make it easier to kill them there.
repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to
imprisonment for debt. apply to it as otherwise, so says executive
order, it could be easily circumvented by
simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However,
DECS v San Diego if the movement of the live animals for the
180 SCRA 233, Cruz, J. purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be
prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason
Facts: The petitioner disqualified the private either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be
respondent who had actually taken and failed flippant, dead meat.
four times the National Medical Admission Test Even if a reasonable relation between
from taking it again under its regulation. But the the means and the end were to be assumed, we
private respondent contends that he is still would still have to reckon with the sanction that
entitled and hence, applied to take a fifth the measure applies for violation of the
examination based on constitutional grounds: prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of
right to academic freedom and quality education, the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be
due process and equal protection. He filed a meted out by the executive authorities, usually
petition for mandamus. The respondent judge the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute
declared the said rule invalid and granted the was sustained because the penalty prescribed
petition. was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the
court after trial and conviction of the accused.
Issue: Whether or not the three flunk rule is a Under the challenged measure, significantly, no
valid exercise of police power. such trial is prescribed, and the property being
transported is immediately impounded by the
Held: Yes. The police power is validly exercised police and declared, by the measure itself, as
if (a) the interests of the public generally, as forfeited to the government.
distinguished from those of a particular class, In the instant case, the carabaos were
require the interference of the State, and (b) the arbitrarily confiscated by the police station
means employed are reasonably necessary to commander, were returned to the petitioner only
the attainment of the object sought to be after he had filed a complaint for recovery and
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which
individuals. Thus, the subject of the challenged was ordered confiscated upon his failure to
regulation is certainly within the ambit of the produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial
police power. It is the right and indeed the court. The executive order defined the
responsibility of the State to insure that the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and
medical profession is not infiltrated by immediately imposed punishment, which was
incompetents to whom patients may unwarily carried out forthright. The measure struck at once
entrust their lives and health. While every and pounced upon the petitioner without giving
person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the
does not have a constitutional right to be a centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
doctor. The private respondent has failed the In the instant case, the challenged
NMAT five times and this is sufficed to say that measure is an invalid exercise of the police
he must yield to the challenged rule and give way power because the method employed to
to those better prepared. The Court upheld the conserve the carabaos is not reasonably
constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse,
intended to limit the admission to medical schools is unduly oppressive. Moreover, there was no
only to those who have initially proved their such pressure of time or action calling for the
competence and preparation for a medical petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties
education. The decision of the respondent judge involved were not even inimical per se as to
is reversed. require their instant destruction. Thus, the Court
cannot say with equal certainty that it complies
with the second requirement, that there be a
Ynot v IAC lawful method. The reasonable connection
148 SCRA 659, Cruz, J. between the means employed and the purpose
sought to be achieved by the questioned
Facts: President Marcos issued E.O. 626-A measure is missing. Executive Order No. 626-A
amending E.O. 626, which prohibits the is hereby declared unconstitutional.
transport of carabaos or carabeefs from one
City Govt of Quezon City v Ericta The general power to exercise the right
122 SCRA 759, Gutierrez, Jr., J of eminent domain must not be confused with the
right to exercise it in a particular case. The
Facts: Respondent Himlayang Pilipino filed a power of the legislature to confer, upon
petition seeking to annul Section 9 of Ordinance municipal corporations and other entities
No. 6118, S-64, requiring private cemeteries to within the State, general authority to exercise
reserve 6% of its total area for the burial of the right of eminent domain cannot be
paupers, on the ground that it is contrary to the questioned by courts, but the general
Constitution. The petitioner contends that the authority of municipalities or entities must
said order was a valid exercise of police power not be confused with the right to exercise it in
under the general welfare clause. The particular instances. The moment the municipal
respondent court declared the said order null and corporation or entity attempts to exercise the
void. Hence, this instant petition. authority conferred, it must comply with the
conditions accompanying the authority. The
Issue: Whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance necessity for conferring the authority upon a
in question is a valid exercise of police power. municipal corporation to exercise the right of
eminent domain is admittedly within the power of
Held: No. Section 9 cannot be justified under the the legislature. But whether or not the
power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the municipal corporation or entity is exercising
license fee, and regulate such other business, the right in a particular case under the
trades, and occupation as may be established or conditions imposed by the general authority,
practice in the City.' (Subsections 'C', Sec. 12, is a question which the courts have the right
R.A. 537). The ordinance in question not only to inquire into.
confiscates but also prohibits the operation When the courts come to determine the
of a memorial park cemetery. As defined, question, they must only find (a) that a law or
police power is 'the power of promoting the authority exists for the exercise of the right of
public welfare by restraining and regulating eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or
the use of liberty and property'. In the instant authority is being exercised in accordance with
case, Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series the law. In the present case there are two
of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police conditions imposed upon the authority conceded
regulation but an outright confiscation. It to the City of Manila: First, the land must be
deprives a person of his private property without private; and, second, the purpose must be public.
due process of law, nay, even without The authority of the city of Manila to expropriate
compensation. There is no reasonable relation private lands for public purposes, is not denied as
between the setting aside of at least six (6) provided in its Charter. However, if the court,
percent of the total area of an private upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it
deceased paupers and the promotion of cannot be contended that the right is being
health, morals, good order, safety, or the exercised in accordance with law. In the instant
general welfare of the people. The ordinance case, the record does not show conclusively that
is actually a taking without compensation of a the plaintiff has definitely decided that there
certain area from a private cemetery to benefit exists a necessity for expropriation. The decision
paupers who are charges of the municipal of the lower court is affirmed.
corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a
public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes
the burden to private cemeteries. As a matter of Republic v PLDT
fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general 26 SCRA 620, Reyes, J.B.L., J.
welfare clause or on implied powers of the
municipal corporation, not on any express Facts: The petitioner, Republic of the Philippines,
provision of law as statutory basis of their is a political entity exercising governmental
exercise of power. The petition for review is powers through its branches and
hereby dismissed instrumentalities, one of which is the Bureau of
Telecommunications. While the respondent,
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN Philippine Long Distance Telephone has the
power to install, operate and maintain a
City of Manila v Chinese Community telephone system throughout the Philippines and
40 Phil 349, Johnson, J. to carry on the business of electrical transmission
of messages within the Philippines and between
Facts: The plaintiff prayed that certain lands be the Philippines and the telephone systems of
expropriated for the purpose of constructing a other countries. Sometime in 1933, the defendant
public improvement into an extension of Rizal and the RCA Communications, Inc., entered into
Avenue, Manila which is necessary for the an agreement whereby telephone messages,
plaintiff to exercise in fee simple of certain could automatically be transferred to the lines of
parcels of land. The defendant on the other hand, PLDT; and vice-versa. The Bureau of
contends that the expropriation was not Telecommunications set up its own
necessary as a public improvement and that the Government Telephone System by utilizing its
plaintiff has no right to expropriate the said own appropriation and equipment and by
cemetery or any part or portion thereof for street renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable
purposes. The lower court declared that there government offices to call private parties. The
was no necessity for the said expropriation. respondent said that the bureau was violating the
Hence, this appeal. conditions under which their Private Branch
Exchange (PBX) is inter-connected with the
Issue: Whether or not the Courts can inquire into PLDT's facilities. The petitioner prayed
the necessity of expropriation of delegate, such commanding the PLDT to execute a contract with
as the City of Manila? it, through the Bureau, for the use of the facilities
of defendant's telephone system. The lower court
Held: The right of expropriation is not an rendered judgment that it could not compel the
inherent power in a municipal corporation, PLDT to enter into an agreement with the Bureau
and before it can exercise the right some law because the parties were not in agreement. Both
must exist conferring the power upon it. parties appealed.

Issue: Whether or not the Bureau of

Telecommunications has the right to demand
interconnection between the Government
Telephone System and the PLDT. Republic v. Vda. De Castellvi
GR No. 20620, Aug.15, 1974
Held: Yes. It is true that parties cannot be
coerced to enter into a contract where no Facts: The Republic of the Philippines occupied
agreement was made between them. Freedom to the land of Carmen M. vda. de Castellvi from 1
stipulate such terms and conditions is of the July 1947, by virtue of a contract of lease, on
essence of our contractual system, and by a year to year basis (from July 1 of each year to
express provision of the statute, a contract may June 30 of the succeeding year). The Republic
be annulled if tainted by violence, intimidation or sought to renew the same but Castellvi refused.
undue influence (Articles 1306, 1336, 1337, Civil The AFP refused to vacate the leased premises
Code of the Philippines). But the court a quo has after the termination of the contract because it
apparently overlooked that while the Republic would difficult for the army to vacate the premises
may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract in view of the permanent installations and other
with it, the Republic, in the exercise of the facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were
sovereign of eminent domain, may require the erected and already established on the property.
telephone company to permit interconnection Castellvi then brought suit to eject the
of the Government Telephone System and Philippine Air Force from the land. While this
that of PLDT, as the needs of the government ejectment case was pending, the Republic
service may require, subject to the payment filed on 26 June 1959 complaints for eminent
of just compensation. Ultimately, the domain against the respondents over the 3
beneficiary of the interconnecting service would parcels of land. In its complaint, the Republic
be the users of both telephone systems, so that alleged, among other things, that the fair market
condemnation would be for public use. value of the above-mentioned lands, according to
the Committee on Appraisal for the Province of
Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per
People v. Fajardo hectare.The court authorizes the Republic to take
GR 12172, Aug. 29 1958 immediate possession of the lands upon deposit
of that amount with the Provincial Treasurer of
Facts: The municipal council of Baao, Camarines Pampanga.In 1961, the trial court, rendered its
Sur stating among others that construction of a decision in the ejectment case, finding that the
building, which will destroy the view of the plaza, unanimous recommendation of the
shall not be allowed and therefore be destroyed commissioners of P10.00 per square meter for
at the expense of the owner, enacted an the 3 lots subject of the action is fair and just; and
ordinance. Herein appellant filed a written required the Republic to pay interests.
request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a
permit to construct a building adjacent to their Issue: Whether the taking of Castellvis property
gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in occurred in 1947 or in 1959.
Fajardo's name, located along the national
highway and separated from the public plaza by Held: The Republic urges that the "taking " of
a creek. The request was denied, for the reason Castellvi's property should be deemed as of the
among others that the proposed building would year 1947 by virtue of afore-quoted lease
destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza. agreement. In American Jurisprudence, Vol. 26,
Defendants reiterated their request for a building 2nd edition, Section 157, on the subject of
permit, but again the mayor turned down the "Eminent Domain, we read the definition of
request. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with "taking" (in eminent domain) as follows:
the construction of the building without a permit,
because they needed a place of residence very "Takingunder the power of eminent domain
badly, their former house having been destroyed may be defined generally as entering upon
by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on private property for more than a momentary
leased property. Thereafter, defendants were period, and, under the warrant or color of legal
charged in violation of the ordinance and authority, devoting it to a public use, or otherwise
subsequently convicted. Hence this appeal. informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it
in such a way as substantially to oust the owner
Issue: Whether or not the ordinance is a valid and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment
exercise of police power. thereof."
Held: No. It is not a valid exercise of police Pursuant to the aforecited authority, a number of
power. The ordinance is unreasonable and circumstances must be present in the "taking" of
oppressive, in that it operates to permanently property for purposes of eminent domain.
deprive appellants of the right to use their own
property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police First, the expropriator must enter a private
power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property. This circumstance is present in the
property without just compensation. We do not instant case, when by virtue of the lease
overlook that the modern tendency is to regard agreement the Republic, through the AFP, took
the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive possession of the property of Castellvi.
to the comfort and happiness of residents.
As the case now stands, every structure Second, the entrance into private property must
that may be erected on appellants' land, be for more than a momentary period.
regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned "Momentary" means, "lasting but a moment; of
under the ordinance in question, because it but a moment's duration" (The Oxford English
would interfere with the view of the public plaza Dictionary, Volume VI, page 596); "lasting a very
from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, short time; transitory; having a very brief life;
be constrained to let their land remain idle and operative or recurring at every moment"
unused for the obvious purpose for which it is (Webster's Third International Dictionary, 1963
best suited, being urban in character. To legally edition.) The word "momentary" when applied to
achieve that result, the municipality must give possession or occupancy of (real) property
appellants just compensation and an should be construed to mean "a limited period"
opportunity to be heard. not indefinite or permanent. The aforecited lease
contract was for a period of one year, renewable monthly rentals until the time when it filed the
from year to year. The entry on the property, complaint for eminent domain on June 26, 1959.
under the lease, is temporary, and considered
transitory. The fact that the Republic, through It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Castellvi's
the AFP, constructed some installations of a property for purposes of eminent domain cannot
permanent nature does not alter the fact that be considered to have taken place in 1947 when
the entry into the land was transitory, or the Republic commenced to occupy the property
intended to last a year, although renewable as lessee thereof. We find merit in the contention
from year to year by consent of the owner of of Castellvi that two essential elements in the
the land. By express provision of the lease "taking" of property under the power of eminent
agreement the Republic, as lessee, undertook domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and
to return the premises in substantially the occupation by the condemnor must be for a
same condition as at the time the property permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that in
was first occupied by the AFP. It is claimed devoting the property to public use the owner
that the INTENTION of the lessee was to was ousted from the property and deprived of its
occupy the land permanently, as may be beneficial use, were not present when the
inferred from the construction of permanent Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi
improvements. But this "INTENTION" cannot property in 1947.
prevail over the clear and express terms of
the lease contract. Intent is to be deduced Untenable also is the Republic's contention that
from the language employed by the parties, although the contract between the parties was
and the terms of the contract, when one of lease on a year to year basis, it was "in
unambiguous, as in the instant case, are reality a more or less permanent right to occupy
conclusive in the absence of averment and the premises under the guise of lease with the
proof of mistake or fraud the question being 'right and privilege' to buy the property should the
not what the intention wag, but what is lessor wish to terminate the lease," and "the right
expressed in the language used. Moreover, in to buy the property is merged as an integral part
order to judge the intention of the contracting of the lease relationship . . . so much so that the
parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent fair market value has been agreed upon, not as
acts shall be principally considered (Art. 1371, of the time of purchase, but as of the time of
Civil Code). If the intention of the lessee occupancy". 15 We cannot accept the Republic's
(Republic) in 1947 was really to occupy contention that a lease on a year to year basis
permanently Castellvi's property, why was the can give rise to a permanent right to occupy,
contract of lease entered into on year to year since by express legal provision a lease made for
basis? Why was the lease agreement renewed a determinate time, as was the lease of
from year to year? Why did not the Republic Castellvi's land in the instant case, ceases upon
expropriate this land of Castellvi in 1949 when, the day fixed, without need of a demand (Article
according to the Republic itself, it expropriated 1669, Civil Code). Neither can it be said that the
the other parcels of land that it occupied at the right of eminent domain may be exercised by
same time as the Castellvi land, for the purpose simply leasing the premises to be expropriated
of converting them into a jet air base?" It might (Rule 67, Section 1, Rules of Court). Nor can it
really have been the intention of the Republic to be accepted that the Republic would enter into a
expropriate the lands in question at some future contract of lease where its real intention was to
time, but certainly mere notice much less an buy, or why the Republic should enter into a
implied notice of such intention on the part of the simulated contract of lease ("under the guise of
Republic to expropriate the lands in the future did lease", as expressed by counsel for the Republic)
not, and could not, bind the landowner, nor bind when all the time the Republic had the right of
the land itself. The expropriation must be actually eminent domain, and could expropriate
commenced in court. Castellvi's land if it wanted to without resorting to
any guise whatsoever. Neither can we see how a
Third, the entry into the property should be under right to buy could be merged in a contract of
warrant or color of legal authority. This lease in the absence of any agreement between
circumstance in the "taking" may be considered the parties to that effect. To sustain the
as present in the instant case, because the contention of the Republic is to sanction a
Republic entered the Castellvi property as practice whereby in order to secure a low price
lessee. for a land which the government intends to
expropriate (or would eventually expropriate) it
Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public would first negotiate with the owner of the land to
use or otherwise informally appropriated or lease the land (for say ten or twenty years) then
injuriously affected. It may be conceded that the expropriate the same when the lease is about to
circumstance of the property being devoted to terminate, then claim that the "taking" of the
public use is present because the property was property for the purposes of the expropriation be
used by the air force of the AFP. reckoned as of the date when the Government
started to occupy the property under the lease,
Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use and then assert that the value of the property
must be in such a way as to oust the owner and being expropriated be reckoned as of the start of
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the the lease, in spite of the fact that the value of the
property. In the instant case, the entry of the property, for many good reasons, had in the
Republic into the property and its utilization of the meantime increased during the period of the
same for public use did not oust Castellvi and lease. This would be sanctioning what obviously
deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the is a deceptive scheme, which would have the
property. Castellvi remained as owner, and was effect of depriving the owner of the property of its
continuously recognized as owner by the true and fair market value at the time when the
Republic, as shown by the renewal of the lease expropriation proceedings were actually instituted
contract from year to year, and by the provision in in court. The Republic's claim that it had the "right
the lease contract whereby the Republic and privilege" to buy the property at the value
undertook to return the property to Castellvi when that it had at the time when it first occupied the
the lease was terminated. Neither was Castellvi property as lessee nowhere appears in the lease
deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the contract. What was agreed expressly in
property, because the Republic was bound to paragraph No. 5 of the lease agreement was
pay, and had been paying, Castellvi the agreed that, should the lessor require the lessee to
return the premises in the same condition as at portion of said lot for the construction of the
the time the same was first occupied by the AFP, Mango and Gorordo Avenues. Amigable's
the lessee would have the "right and privilege" (or counsel wrote to the President of the Philippines,
option) of paying the lessor what it would fairly requesting payment of theportion of her lot which
cost to put the premises in the same condition as had been appropriated by the government. The
it was at the commencement of the lease, in lieu claim was indorsed tothe Auditor General, who
of the lessee's performance of the undertaking to disallowed it in his 9th Endorsement. Thus,
put the land in said condition. The "fair value" at Amigable filed in thecourt a quo a complaint,
the time of occupancy, mentioned in the lease against the Republic of the Philippines and
agreement, does not refer to the value of the Nicolas Cuenca(Commissioner of Public
property if bought by the lessee, but refers to the Highways) for the recovery of ownership and
cost of restoring the property in the same possession of her lot.
condition as of the time when the lessee took On July 29, 1959, the court rendered its
possession of the property. Such fair value decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over
cannot refer to the purchase price, for purchase the plaintiff's cause of action for the recovery of
was never intended by the parties to the lease possession and ownership of the lot on the
contract. It is a rule in the interpretation of ground that the government cannot be sued
contracts that "However general the terms of a without its consent, that it had neither original nor
contract may be, they shall not be understood to appellate jurisdiction to hear and decide plaintiff's
comprehend things that are distinct and cases claim for compensatory damages, being a money
that are different from those upon which the claim against the government; and that it had
parties intended to agree" (Art. 1372, Civil Code). long prescribed, nor did it have jurisdiction over
said claim because the government had not
given its consent to be sued. Accordingly, the
(A number of circumstances must be complaint was dismissed.
present in the taking of property for purposes of
eminent domain. First, the expropriator must Issue: Can the appellant sue the government?
enter a private property. Second, the entrance
into private property must be for more than a Ruling: Yes. Considering that no annotation in
momentary period. Third, the entry into the favor of the government appears at the back of
property should be under warrant or color of legal her certificate of title and that she has not
authority. Fourth, the property must be devoted executed any deed of conveyance of any portion
to a public use or otherwise informally of her lot to the government, the appellant
appropriated or injuriously affected. Fifth, the remains the owner of the whole lot. As
utilization of the property for public use must be registered owner, she could bring an action to
in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive recover possession of the portion of land in
him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. question at anytime because possession is
It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" one of the attributes of ownership. However,
of Castellvi's property for purposes of since restoration of possession of said
eminent domain cannot be considered to portion by the government is neither
have taken place in 1947 when the Republic convenient nor feasible at this time because it
commenced to occupy the property as lessee is now and has been used for road purposes,
thereof. We find merit in the contention of the only relief available isfor the government
Castellvi that two essential elements in the to make due compensation which it could and
"taking" of property under the power of eminent should have done years ago. To determine
domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and the due compensation for the land, the basis
occupation by the condemnor must be for a should be the price or value thereof at the
permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that in time of the taking.
devoting the property to public use the owner As regards the claim for damages, the
was ousted from the property and deprived of its plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal
beneficial use, were not present when the interest on the price of the land from the time it
Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi was taken up to the time that payment is made
property in 1947. by the government. In addition, the government
Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules should pay for attorney's fees, the amount of
of Court, the just compensation is to be which should be fixed by the trial court after
determined as of the date of the filing of the hearing.
complaint. This Court has ruled that when the (NOTE: The owner does not need to file
taking of the property sought to be the usual claim for recovery of just compensation
expropriated coincides with the with the Commission on Audit if the government
commencement of the expropriation takes over his property and devotes it to public
proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the use without the benefit of expropriation. He may
filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the immediatetly file a complaint with the proper court
just compensation should be determined as of for payment of his property as the arbitrary action
the date of the filing of the complaint. Herein, it of the government shall be deemed a waiver of
is undisputed that the Republic was placed in its immunity from suit.) Cruz, pg. 74)
possession of the Castellvi property, by Philippine Press Institute vs. COMELEC
authority of the court, on 10 August 1959. The GR No. 119694, May 22, 1995
taking of the Castellvi property for the
purposes of determining the just Facts:
compensation to be paid must, therefore, be The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. ("PPI") is
reckoned as of 26 June 1959 when the before this Court assailing the constitutional
complaint for eminent domain was filed.) validity of resolution No. 2772 issued by
respondent Commission on Elections
("Comelec") and its corresponding Comelec
directive dated 22 March 1995, through a Petition
Amigable v. Cuenca for Certiorari and Prohibition. Petitioner PPI is a
GR No. 26400, August 15, 1974 non-stock, non-profit organization of news paper
and magazine publishers.
Facts: Victoria Amigable, is the registered owner On 2 March 1995, Comelec
of a lot in Cebu City. Without prior expropriation promulgated Resolution No. 2772, providing for a
or negotiated sale, the government used a Comelec Space, which is a free print space of
not less than one half (1/2) page in at least one or other imperious public necessity,
newspaper of general circulation in every indiscriminately and without regard the the
province or city. individual business condition of particular
In this Petition for Certiorari and newspapers or magazines located in different
Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a parts of the country, to take private property of
Temporary restraining order, PPI asks us to newspaper or magazine publishers. No attempt
declare Comelec resolution No. 2772 was made to demonstrate that a real and
unconstitutional and void on the ground that it palpable or urgent necessity for the taking of
violates the prohibition imposed by the print space confronted the Comelec and that
Constitution upon the government, and any of its Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself
agencies, against the taking of private property the only reasonable and calibrated response
for public use without just compensation. to such necessity available to Comelec.
Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise
Issue: May COMELEC compel the members of of the police power of the State.
print media to donate Comelec Space?
Held: NO. To compel print media companies to Sumulong v. Guerrero

donate "Comelec space" amounts to "taking" of GR 48685, Sept 30,1987
private personal property for public use or
purposes. The taking of print space here sought Facts: On December 5,1977, the National
to be effected may first be appraised under the Housing Authority (NHA) filed a complaint for
public of expropriation of private personal expropriation of parcels of land covering
property for public use. The threshold approximately 25 hectares, (in Antipolo Rizal)
requisites for a lawful taking of private including the lots of Lorenzo Sumulong and
property for public use need to be examined Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing with an area of 6,667
here: one is the necessity for the taking; square meters and 3,333 square meters
another is the legal authority to effect the respectively. The land sought to be expropriated
taking. The element of necessity for the were valued by the NHA at P1.00 per square
taking has not been shown by respondent meter adopting the market value fixed by the
Comelec. It has not been suggested that the provincial assessor in accordance with
members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space presidential decrees prescribing the valuation of
at their normal rates to Comelec for election property in expropriation proceedings. Together
purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance with the complaint was a motion for immediate
of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of possession of the properties. The NHA deposited
the problem. Similarly, it has not been the amount of P158,980.00 with the Philippine
suggested, let alone demonstrated, that Comelec National Bank, representing the total market
has been granted the power of imminent domain value of the subject 25 hectares of land,
either by the Constitution or by the legislative pursuant to Presidential Decree 1224 which
authority. A reasonable relationship between that defines the policy on the expropriation of private
power and the enforcement and administration of property for socialized housing upon payment of
election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is just compensation. On 17 January 1978, Judge
not casually to be assumed. Buenaventura Guerrero issued the order issuing
The taking of private property for public a writ of possession in favor of NHA. Sumulong
use it, of course, authorized by the Constitution, and Vidanes-Balaoing filed a motion for
but not without payment of "just compensation" reconsideration on the ground that they had been
(Article III, Section 9). And apparently the deprived of the possession of their property
necessity of paying compensation for "Comelec without due process of law. This was, however,
space" is precisely what is sought to be avoided denied. They filed a petition for certiorari with the
by respondent Commission. There is nothing at Supreme Court.
all to prevent newspaper and magazine
publishers from voluntarily giving free print space Issue: Whether the taking of private property for
to Comelec for the purposes contemplated in socialized housing, which would benefit a few
Resolution No. 2772. Section 2 of resolution No. and not all citizens, constitutes taking for public
2772 does not, however, provide a constitutional use.
basis for compelling publishers, against their will,
in the kind of factual context here present, to Held: Yes. The exercise of the power of eminent
provide free print space for Comelec purposes. domain is subject to certain limitations imposed
Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of by the constitution (1973), i.e. that private
the power of eminent domain. property shall not be taken for public use without
As earlier noted, the Solicitor General just compensation (Art. IV, sec. 9); and that no
also contended that Section 2 of Resolution No. person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
2772, even if read as compelling publishers to property without due process of law, nor shall any
"donate" "Comelec space," may be sustained as person be denied the equal protection of the
a valid exercise of the police power of the state. laws (Art. IV, sec. 1).
This argument was, however, made too casually The term public use has acquired a
to require prolonged consideration on their part. more comprehensive coverage. To the literal
Firstly, there was no effort (and apparently no import of the term signifying strict use or
inclination on the part of Comelec) to show employment by the public has been added the
that the police power - essentially a power of broader notion of indirect public benefit or
legislation - has been constitutionally advantage. Specifically, urban renewal or
delegated to respondent Commission. redevelopment and the construction of low-cost
Secondly, while private property may indeed housing is recognized as a public purpose, not
be validly taken in the legitimate exercise of only because of the expanded concept of public
the police power of the state, there was no use but also because of specific provisions in the
attempt to show compliance in the instant Constitution. The 1973 Constitution made it
case with the requisites of a lawful taking incumbent upon the State to establish, maintain
under the police power. and ensure adequate social services including
housing [Art. II, sec. 7]. Shortage in housing is
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a a matter of state concern since it directly and
blunt and heavy instrument that purports, without significantly affects public health, safety, the
a showing of existence of a national emergency environment and in sum, the general welfare.
The public character of housing measures does considered in its general concept of meeting a
not change because units in housing projects public need or a public exigency. 16 Black
cannot be occupied by all but only by those who summarizes the characterization given by various
satisfy prescribed qualifications. A beginning has courts to the term; thus:
to be made, for it is not possible to provide Public Use. Eminent domain.
housing for all who need it, all at once. The constitutional and statutory
Socialized housing falls within the confines of basis for taking property by
public use. eminent domain. For
Various factors can come into play in condemnation purposes, "public
the valuation of specific properties singled out for use" is one which confers same
expropriation. The values given by provincial benefit or advantage to the
assessors are usually uniform for very wide public; it is not confined to actual
areas covering several barrios or even an use by public. It is measured in
entire town with the exception of the terms of right of public to use
poblacion. Individual differences are never proposed facilities for which
taken into account. The value of land is based condemnation is sought and, as
on such generalities as its possible cultivation for long as public has right of use,
rice, corn, coconuts, or other crops. Very often whether exercised by one or
land described as "cogonal" has been cultivated many members of public, a
for generations. Buildings are described in terms "public advantage" or "public
of only two or three classes of building materials benefit" accrues sufficient to
and estimates of areas are more often inaccurate constitute a public use. Montana
than correct. Tax values can serve as guides Power Co. vs. Bokma, Mont. 457
but cannot be absolute substitutes for just P. 2d 769, 772, 773.
compensation.
To say that the owners are estopped Public use, in constitutional provisions
to question the valuations made by assessors restricting the exercise of the right to take private
since they had the opportunity to protest is property in virtue of eminent domain, means a
illusory. The overwhelming mass of landowners use concerning the whole community as
accept unquestioningly what is found in the tax distinguished from particular individuals. But each
declarations prepared by local assessors or and every member of society need not be equally
municipal clerks for them. They do not even look interested in such use, or be personally and
at, much less analyze, the statements. The idea directly affected by it; if the object is to satisfy a
of expropriation simply never occurs until a great public want or exigency, that is sufficient.
demand is made or a case filed by an agency Rindge Co. vs. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S.
authorized to do so. 700, 43 S.Ct. 689, 692, 67 L.Ed. 1186. The term
may be said to mean public usefulness, utility, or
advantage, or what is productive of general
Manosca vs. Court of Appeals benefit. It may be limited to the inhabitants of a
G.R. No. 106440 , 29 January 1996 small or restricted locality, but must be in
common, and not for a particular individual. The
Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land which use must be a needful one for the public, which
was later declared as national landmark due to cannot be surrendered without obvious general
being ascertained by National Historic Institute loss and inconvenience. A "public use" for which
(NHI) as the birthplace of Felix Y. Manalo, the land may be taken defies absolute definition for it
founder of Iglesia ni Cristo. On the opinion of changes with varying conditions of society, new
Secretary of Justice, he said that the place must appliances in the sciences, changing conceptions
be subjected to the power of eminent domain of scope and functions of government, and other
since places invested with unusual historical differing circumstances brought about by an
interest is a public use which such power may be increase in population and new modes of
authorized. Thus, Republic, through the office of communication and transportation. Katz v.
Solicitor General instituted a complaint for Brandon, 156 Conn., 521, 245 A.2d 579,586. 17
expropriation and filed an urgent motion for the The validity of the exercise of the power
issuance for an order to permit it to take of eminent domain for traditional purposes is
immediate possession of the property. The trial beyond question; it is not at all to be said,
court issued an order authorizing Republic to however, that public use should thereby be
take over the property once the required sum restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that
would have been deposited with the Municipal "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of
Treasurer of Taguig, Metro Manila. The "use by the public" has long been discarded.
petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint since The taking to be valid must be for public
such expropriation would constituted an use. There was a time when it was felt that a
application of funds directly or indirectly for the literal meaning should be attached to such a
use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, which requirement. Whatever project is undertaken
is contrary to the provision of Section 29 (2) must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not
allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the
Issue: Whether or not the public use purpose of the taking is public, then the power of
requirement of Eminent Domain is extant in the eminent domain comes into play. As just noted,
attempted expropriation by the Republic of a 492- the constitution in at least two cases, to remove
square-meter parcel of land as declared by the any doubt, determines what is public use. One is
NHI as a national landmark? the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into
small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The
Held: Yes.According to Justice Black, term other is the transfer, through the exercise of this
public use means one which confers benefit power, of utilities and other private enterprise to
or advantage to the public and it is not the government. It is accurate to state then that
confined to actual use by public. It may also at present whatever may be beneficially
be said to mean public usefulness, utility or employed for the general welfare satisfies the
advantage, or what is productive of general requirement of public use.
benefit. Chief Justice Fernando, writing the
The term "public use," not having been ponencia in J.M. Tuason & Co. vs. Land Tenure
otherwise defined by the constitution, must be Administration, has viewed the Constitution a
dynamic instrument and one that "is not to be the Rules of Court, is unconstitutional and void,
construed narrowly or pedantically" so as to since constitutes an impermissible encroachment
enable it "to meet adequately whatever problems on judicial prerogatives. The determination of
the future has in store." Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a
noted constitutionalist himself, has aptly judicial function. The executive department or the
observed that what, in fact, has ultimately legislature may make the initial determinations
emerged is a concept of public use which is just but when a party claims a violation of the
as broad as "public welfare." guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private
Petitioners ask: But "(w)hat is the so- property may not be taken for public use without
called unusual interest that the expropriation of just compensation, no statute, decree, or
(Felix Manalo's) birthplace become so vital as to executive order can mandate that its own
be a public use appropriate for the exercise of the determination shag prevail over the court's
power of eminent domain" when only members of findings. Much less can the courts be
the Iglesia ni Cristo would benefit? This attempt
to give some religious perspective to the case Municipality of Paraaque vs. V.M. Realty
deserves little consideration, for what should be Corporation
significant is the principal objective of, not the G.R. No. 127820, 20 July 1998
casual consequences that might follow from, the
exercise of the power. The purpose in setting Facts: A complaint for expropriation was filed by
up the marker is essentially to recognize the the Municipality of Paraaque against V.M.
distinctive contribution of the late Felix Realty Corporation involving two parcels of land
Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, located at Paraaque, Metro Manila. The
rather than to commemorate his founding and complaint was in pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan
leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993. The
The practical reality that greater complaint was for the purpose of alleviateing the
benefit may be derived by members of the living conditions of the underprivileged by
Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could providing homes for the homeless through a
well be true but such a peculiar advantage socialized housing project. Previously, an offer
still remains to be merely incidental and for the sale of the property was made by the
secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few petitioner, however, the latter did not accept. The
would actually benefit from the expropriation Regional Trial Court of Makati issued order
of property does not necessarily diminish the authorizing the petitioner to take possession of
essence and character of public use. the subject property upon deposit to the Clerk of
Court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its
fair market value base on its current tax
declaration. However, upon the private
EPZA vs. Dulay respondents motion to dismiss, the trial court
G.R. No. L-59609, 29 April 1987 nullified its previous order and dismissed the
case. Thus, petitioner appealed to the Court of
Facts: A certain parcel of land was reserved by Appeals. But the appellate court affirmed in toto
the President of the Philippines for petitioner the trial courts decision.
Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) for the
establishment of an export processing zone.
However, not all of the reserved area was public Issue: Whether or not the exercise of the power
land. The petitioner made an offer to purchase of eminent domain is valid.
the lands registered in the name of the private
respondent, but, the parties failed to have an Held:The following essential requisites must
agreement on the sale of the property. Thus, the concur before an LGU can exercise the power
petitioner filed a complaint for expropriation with of eminent domain: (1) An ordinance is
a prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession enacted by the local legislative council
against private respondent on the Court of First authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf
Instance of Cebu. The respondent judge favored of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent
the petition and issued a writ of possession domain or pursue expropriation proceedings
authorizing the petitioner to take into possession over a particular private property.(2) The
the said property. Having determined the just power of eminent domain is exercised for
compensation as only the issue to be resolved, public use, purpose or welfare, or for the
the respondent judge issued an order regarding benefit of the poor and the landless.(3) There
the appointment of certain persons as is payment of just compensation, as required
commissioners who are tasked to report to the under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution,
court the just compensation for the properties and other pertinent laws.(4) A valid and
sought to be expropriated. Consequently, definite offer has been previously made to the
commissioners were appointed and, afterwards, owner of the property sought to be
recommended in their report that the amount of expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
P15.00 per square meter as the fair and
reasonable value of just compensation for the The Supreme Court ruled that there was
properties. Subsequently, petitioners objected to no compliance with the first requisite since the
the said order on the grounds that P.D. No. 1533 mayor sought to exercise the power of eminent
has superseded Section 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the domain pursuant to a resolution only. Ordinance
Rules of court on the ascertainment of just is not synonymous to resolution. An ordinance is
compensation through commissioners. a law, possesses a general or permanent
character, and makes third reading for its
Issue: Whether or not Sections 5 to 8, Rule 67 enactment necessary. On the other hand, a
of the Revised Rules of Court had been repealed resolution is merely a declaration of the
or deemed amended by P.D. No. 1533 insofar as sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a
the appointment of commissioners to determine specific matter, temporary in nature and its
the just compensation is concerned. enactment required only the decision of majority
of all the Sanggunian members
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the P.D.
No. 1533, which eliminates the courts discretion
to appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of

POWER OF TAXATION prohibiting members of Congress from being

directly or indirectly financially interested in
Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works and any contract with the Government, and,
Communications hence, is unconstitutional, as well as null and
G.R. No. L10405, 29 December 1960 voidab initio, for the construction of the
projected feeder roads in question with public
Facts: funds would greatly enhance or increase the
value of the aforementioned subdivision of
On August 31, 1954, petitioner respondent Zulueta,
Wenceslao Pascual, as Provincial Governor of
Rizal, instituted this action for declaratory relief, Issue: Whether the contested item of Republic
with injunction, upon the ground that Republic Act Act No. 920 unconstitutional and, therefor,
No. 920, entitled "An Act Appropriating Funds for illegal?
Public Works", approved on June 20, 1953,
contained, in section 1-C (a) thereof, an item Held: No. The P85,000.00 appropriation for the
(43[h]) of P85,000.00 "for the construction, projected feeder roads in question, the legality
reconstruction, repair, extension and thereof depended upon whether said roads were
improvement" of Pasig feeder road terminals, public or private property when the bill, which,
that, at the time of the passage and approval of latter on, became Republic Act 920, was passed
said Act, the said feeder roads were "nothing but by Congress, or, when said bill was approved by
projected and planned subdivision roads within the President and the disbursement of said sum
the Antonio Subdivision situated at Pasig, Rizal" became effective, or on June 20, 1953 (see
near Shaw Boulevard, not far away from the section 13 of said Act). Inasmuch as the land on
intersection between the latter and EDSA, which which the projected feeder roads were to be
projected feeder roads "do not connect any constructed belonged then to respondent
government property or any important premises Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation
to the main highway"; that the aforementioned sought a private purpose, and hence, was null
Antonio Subdivision (as well as the lands on and void.
which said feeder roads were to be construed)
were private properties of respondent Jose C. The donation to the Government, over five (5)
Zulueta, who, at the time of the passage and months after the approval and effectivity of said
approval of said Act, was a member of the Act, made, according to the petition, for the
Senate of the Philippines; that on May, 1953, purpose of giving a "semblance of legality", or
respondent Zulueta, addressed a letter to the legalizing, the appropriation in question, did not
Municipal Council of Pasig, Rizal, offering to cure its aforementioned basic defect.
donate said projected feeder roads to the Consequently, a judicial nullification of said
municipality of Pasig, Rizal; that, on June 13, donation need not precede the declaration of
1953, the offer was accepted by the council, unconstitutionality of said appropriation.
subject to the condition "that the donor would
submit a plan of the said roads and agree to Again, it is well-stated that the validity of a
change the names of two of them"; that no deed statute may be contested only by one who
of donation in favor of the municipality of Pasig will sustain a direct injury in consequence of
was, however, executed; that on July 10, 1953, its enforcement. Yet, there are many
respondent Zulueta wrote another letter to said decisions nullifying, at the instance of
council, calling attention to the approval of taxpayers, laws providing for the
Republic Act. No. 920, and the sum of disbursement of public funds, upon the
P85,000.00 appropriated therein for the theory that "the expenditure of public funds
construction of the projected feeder roads in by an officer of the State for the purpose of
question; that the municipal council of Pasig administering an unconstitutional act
endorsed said letter of respondent Zulueta to constitutes a misapplication of such funds,"
the District Engineer of Rizal, who, up to the which may be enjoined at the request of a
present "has not made any endorsement taxpayer.
thereon" that inasmuch as the projected Republic Act No. 920 is unconstitutional, since
feeder roads in question were private the legislature is without power to appropriate
property at the time of the passage and public revenue for anything but a public purpose
approval of Republic Act No. 920, the and the project feeder roads are at the time
appropriation of P85,000.00 therein made, for private properties. The right of the legislature
the construction, reconstruction, repair, to appropriate funds is correlative with its
extension and improvement of said projected right to tax, and, under constitutional
feeder roads, was illegal and, therefore, provisions against taxation except for public
void ab initio"; that said appropriation of purposes and prohibiting the collection of a
P85,000.00 was made by Congress because tax for one purpose and the devotion thereof
its members were made to believe that the to another purpose, no appropriation of state
projected feeder roads in question were funds can be made for other than for a public
"public roads and not private streets of a purpose.
private subdivision"'; that, "in order to give a
semblance of legality, when there is
absolutely none, to the aforementioned Punsalan vs. Municipal Board of the City of
appropriation", respondents Zulueta executed Manila
on December 12, 1953, while he was a G.R. No. L-4817, 26 May 1954
member of the Senate of the Philippines, an
alleged deed of donation of the four (4) Facts: An ordinance was approved by the
parcels of land constituting said projected Municipal Board of the City of Manila which
feeder roads, in favor of the Government of imposes a municipal occupation tax on persons
the Republic of the Philippines; that said exercising various professions in the city and
alleged deed of donation was, on the same penalizes non-payment of the tax by a fine of not
date, accepted by the then Executive more than two hundred pesos or by
Secretary; that being subject to an onerous imprisonment of not more than six months or by
condition, said donation partook of the nature both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion
of a contract; that, such, said donation of the court. The ordinance was in pursuance to
violated the provision of our fundamental law paragraph (1) Section 18 of the Revised Charter
of the City of Manila which empowers the Manila. What constitutes exercise or pursuit of a
Municipal Board of said city to impose a profession in the city is a matter of judicial
municipal occupation tax, not to exceed P50 per determination. The argument against double
annum, on persons engaged in the various taxation may not be invoked where one tax is
professions above referred to the plaintiffs, after imposed by the state and the other is imposed by
having paid their occupation tax, now being the city (1 Cooley on Taxation, 4th ed., p. 492), it
required to pay the additional tax prescribed in being widely recognized that there is nothing
the ordinance. The plaintiffs paid the said tax inherently obnoxious in the requirement that
under protest. The lower court declared the license fees or taxes be exacted with respect
validity of the law authorizing the enactment of to the same occupation, calling or activity by
the ordinance, but declared the latter illegal and both the state and the political subdivisions
void since its penalty provided for the non- thereof.
payment of tax was not legally authorized.
Issue: Is this ordinance and the law authorizing it

constitute class legislation, are unjust and
oppressive, and authorize what amounts to Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
double taxation? GR L-19201, 16 June 1965
Held: NO. To begin with defendants' appeal, we Facts: In 1957, the MB Estate Inc., of Bacolod
find that the lower court was in error in saying City, donated P10,000.00 in cash to Fr. Crispin
that the imposition of the penalty provided for in Ruiz then parish priest of Victorias, Negros
the ordinance was without the authority of law. Occidental, and predecessor of Fr. Casimiro
The last paragraph (kk) of the very section that Lladoc, for the construction of a new Catholic
authorizes the enactment of this tax ordinance Church in the locality. The total samount was
(section 18 of the Manila Charter) in express actually spent for the purpose intended. On 3
terms also empowers the Municipal Board "to fix March 1958, MB Estate filed the donors gift tax
penalties for the violation of ordinances which return. Under date of 29 April 1960, the
shall not exceed to(sic) two hundred pesos fine Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued as
or six months" imprisonment, or both such fine assessment for donees gift tax against the
and imprisonment, for a single offense." Hence, Catholic Parish of Victorias, Negros Occidental,
the pronouncement below that the ordinance in of which petitioner was the priest. The tax
question is illegal and void because it imposes a amounted to P1,370.00 including surcharges,
penalty not authorized by law is clearly without interest of 1% monthly from 15 May 1958 to 15
basis. June 1960, and the compromise for the late filing
of the return. Petitioner lodged a protest to the
Secondly, In raising the hue and cry of "class assessment and requested the withdrawal
legislation", the burden of plaintiffs' complaint is thereof. The protest and the motion for
not that the professions to which they reconsideration presented to the Commissioner
respectively belong have been singled out for the of Internal Revenue were denied. The petitioner
imposition of this municipal occupation tax; and in appealed to the CTA on 2 November 1960. After
any event, the Legislature may, in its hearing, the CTA affirmed the decision of the
discretion, select what occupations shall be Commissioner of Internal Revenue except the
taxed, and in the exercise of that discretion it imposition of compromise penalty of P20. Fr.
may tax all, or it may select for taxation Lladoc appealed to the Supreme Court.
certain classes and leave the others untaxed.
(Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 4, 4th ed., pp. 3393- Issue: Whether a donees gift tax may be
3395.) Plaintiffs' complaint is that while the law assessed against the Catholic Church.
has authorized the City of Manila to impose the
said tax, it has withheld that authority from other Held: Yes. The phrase exempt from taxation,
chartered cities, not to mention municipalities. as employed in the Constitution should not be
We do not think it is for the courts to judge interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of
what particular cities or municipalities should taxes. Section 22(3), Art. VI of the Constitution of
be empowered to impose occupation taxes in the Philippines, exempts from taxation
addition to those imposed by the National cemeteries, churches and personages or
Government. That matter is peculiarly within convents, appurtenant thereto, and all lands,
the domain of the political departments and buildings, and improvements used exclusively for
the courts would do well not to encroach religious purposes. The exemption is only from
upon it. Moreover, as the seat of the National the payment of taxes assessed on such
Government and with a population and properties enumerated, as property taxes, as
volume of trade many times that of any other contra-distinguished from excise taxes. A
Philippine city or municipality, Manila, no donees gift tax is not a property tax but an excise
doubt, offers a more lucrative field for the tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of
practice of the professions, so that it is but gift inter vivos. Its assessment was not on the
fair that the professionals in Manila be made property themeselves. It does not rest upon
to pay a higher occupation tax than their general ownership, but an excise upon the use
brethren in the provinces. made of the properties, upon the exercise of the
privilege of receiving the properties. The
Thirdly, Plaintiffs brand the ordinance unjust and imposition of such excise tax on property used for
oppressive because they say that it creates religious purposes does not constitute an
discrimination within a class in that while impairment of the Constitution.
professionals with offices in Manila have to pay
the tax, outsiders who have no offices in the city
but practice their profession therein are not Abra Valley College vs. Aquino
subject to the tax. Plaintiffs make a distinction GR L-39086, 15 June 1988
that is not found in the ordinance. The ordinance
imposes the tax upon every person "exercising" Facts: Petitioner Abra Valley College is an
or "pursuing" in the City of Manila naturally educational corporation and institution of higher
any one of the occupations named, but does not learning duly incorporated with the SEC in 1948.
say that such person must have his office in On 6 July 1972, the Municipal and Provincial

treasurers (Gaspar Bosque and Armin Cariaga, answer, the respondents contend that the Act
respectively) and issued a Notice of Seizure upon was passed in the valid exercise of the police
the petitioner for the college lot and building power of the State, which exercise is authorized
(OCT Q-83) for the satisfaction of said taxes in the Constitution in the interest of national
thereon. The treasurers served upon the economic survival.
petitioner a Notice of Sale on 8 July 1972, the
sale being held on the same day. Dr. Paterno Issue: Whether or not the enactment of R.A No.
Millare, then municipal mayor of Bangued, Abra, 1180 is constitutional.
offered the highest bid of P 6,000 on public
auction involving the sale of the college lot and Held: Yes. The disputed law was enacted to
building. The certificate of sale was remedy a real actual threat and danger to
correspondingly issued to him. national economy posed by alien dominance and
The petitioner filed a complaint on 10 control of the retail business and free citizens and
July 1972 in the court a quo to annul and declare country from dominance and control; that the
void the Notice of Seizure and the Notice of enactment clearly falls within the scope of the
Sale of its lot and building located at Bangued, police power of the State, thru which and by
Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes and which it protects its own personality and insures
penalties amounting to P5,140.31. On 12 April its security and future; that the law does not
1973, the parties entered into a stipulation of violate the equal protection clause of the
facts adopted and embodied by the trial court in Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for
its questioned decision. The trial court ruled for the distinction between alien and citizen in the
the government, holding that the second floor of exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due
the building is being used by the director for process of law clause, because the law is
residential purposes and that the ground floor prospective in operation and recognizes the
used and rented by Northern Marketing privilege of aliens already engaged in the
Corporation, a commercial establishment, and occupation and reasonably protects their
thus the property is not being used exclusively privilege. The petition is denied.
for educational purposes. Instead of perfecting an
appeal, petitioner availed of the instant petition Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf
for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary of other alien residents corporations and
injunction before the Supreme Court, by filing partnerships adversely affected by the provisions
said petition on 17 August 1974. of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to
obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is
Issue: Whether the College is exempt from unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of
taxes. Finance and all other persons acting under him,
particularly city and municipal treasurers, from
Held: Yes. While the Court allows a more liberal enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the
and non-restrictive interpretation of the phrase constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it
exclusively used for educational purposes, denies to alien residents the equal protection of
reasonable emphasis has always been made that the laws and deprives of their liberty and property
exemption extends to facilities which are without due process of law ; In answer, the
incidental to and reasonably necessary for the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of
accomplishment of the main purposes. While the Manila contend that: (1) the Act was passed in
second floors use, as residence of the director, is the valid exercise of the police power of the
incidental to education; the lease of the first floor State, which exercise is authorized in the
cannot by any stretch of imagination be Constitution in the interest of national economic
considered incidental to the purposes of survival;
education. The test of exemption from taxation is
the use of the property for purposes mentioned in a. The police power.
the Constititution. There is no question that the Act was approved in
the exercise of the police power, but petitioner
Adonis Notes: The SC stated that if only the claims that its exercise in this instance is
judge had read the 1973 Constitution, he should attended by a violation of the constitutional
have known the difference between the 1935 and requirements of due process and equal
the 1973 Constitution and he could not have protection of the laws. But before proceeding to
summarily dismissed the case. There is a the consideration and resolution of the ultimate
substantial distinction between the 1935 and the issue involved, it would be well to bear in mind
1973 Constitution. In the 1935 Constitution the certain basic and fundamental, albeit preliminary,
requirement for exemption for real property taxes considerations in the determination of the ever
is exclusively , while the 1973 Constitution recurrent conflict between police power and the
requires actually, directly & exclusively. The SC guarantees of due process and equal protection
remanded to the Court of Origin for further of the laws. What is the scope of police power,
hearing. (excerpts from Sababan Notes) and how are the due process and equal
protection clauses related to it? What is the
province and power of the legislature, and what is
the function and duty of the courts? These
consideration must be clearly and correctly
ART. III BILL OF RIGHTS understood that their application to the facts of
the case may be brought forth with clarity and the
SEC.1 DUE PROCESS OF LAW issue accordingly resolved.
Ichong vs. Hernandez It has been said the police power is so far -
GR L-7995; 31 May 1957 reaching in scope, that it has become almost
impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its
Facts: Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act existence from the very existence of the State
to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined
nationalizes the retail trade business. Petitioner in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with self-
attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending protection and survival, and as such it is the most
that it denies to alien residents the equal positive and active of all governmental
protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty processes, the most essential, insistent and
and property without due process of law. In illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern
democratic framework where the demands of tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute
society and of nations have multiplied to almost liberty, for that would mean license and
unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of
police power has become almost boundless, just life, liberty and property, provided there is due
as the fields of public interest and public welfare process of law; and persons may be classified
have become almost all-embracing and have into classes and groups, provided everyone is
transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, given the equal protection of the law. The test or
as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of standard, as always, is reason. The police
public interest and welfare in this constantly power legislation must be firmly grounded on
changing and progressive world, so we cannot public interest and welfare, and a reasonable
delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police relation must exist between purposes and
power by which and through which the State means. And if distinction and classification
seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So has been made, there must be a reasonable
it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or basis for said distinction.
extent of the police power of the State; what they
do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial
important of these are the due process clause review.
and the equal protection clause. Now, in this matter of EQUITABLE
BALANCING, what is the proper place and role
b. Limitations on police power. of the courts? It must not be overlooked, in the
The basic limitations of due process and equal first place, that the legislature, which is the
protection are found in the following provisions of constitutional repository of police power and
our Constitution: exercises the prerogative of determining the
SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be policy of the State, is by force of circumstances
deprived of life, liberty or property primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy or
without due process of law, nor any reasonableness and wisdom, of any law
person be denied the equal protection of promulgated in the exercise of the police power,
the laws. (Article III, Phil. Constitution) or of the measures adopted to implement the
These constitutional guarantees which embody public policy or to achieve public interest. On the
the essence of individual liberty and freedom in other hand, courts, although zealous guardians of
democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but individual liberty and right, have nevertheless
are admittedly universal in their application, evinced a reluctance to interfere with the exercise
without regard to any differences of race, of color, of the legislative prerogative. They have done so
or of nationality. early where there has been a clear, patent or
palpable arbitrary and unreasonable abuse of the
c. The, equal protection clause. legislative prerogative. Moreover, courts are not
The equal protection of the law clause is against supposed to override legitimate policy, and courts
undue favor and individual or class privilege, as never inquire into the wisdom of the law.
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of
inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, f. Law enacted in interest of national
which is limited either in the object to which it is economic survival and security.
directed or by territory within which is to operate. We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all
It does not demand absolute equality among the facts and circumstances that the disputed law
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall is not the product of racial hostility, prejudice or
be treated alike, under like circumstances and discrimination, but the expression of the
conditions both as to privileges conferred and legitimate desire and determination of the people,
liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is thru their authorized representatives, to free the
not infringed by legislation which applies only to nation from the economic situation that has
those persons falling within a specified class, if it unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or
applies alike to all persons within such class, and wrongly, to its disadvantage. The law is clearly in
reasonable grounds exists for making a the interest of the public, nay of the national
distinction between those who fall within such security itself, and indisputably falls within the
class and those who do not. scope of police power, thru which and by which
the State insures its existence and security and
d. The due process clause. the supreme welfare of its citizens.
The due process clause has to do with the
reasonableness of legislation enacted in The Due Process of Law Limitation.
pursuance of the police power. Is there public
interest, a public purpose; is public welfare a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation;
involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the determination by legislature decisive.
accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it We now come to due process as a limitation on
not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is the exercise of the police power. It has been
there sufficient foundation or reason in stated by the highest authority in the United
connection with the matter involved; or has there States that:
not been a capricious use of the legislative . . . . And the guaranty of due process,
power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by as has often been held, demands only
the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified that the law shall not be unreasonable,
interference with private interest? These are the arbitrary or capricious, and that the
questions that we ask when the due process test means selected shall have a real and
is applied. substantial relation to the subject sought
to be attained. . . . .
The conflict, therefore, between police power and xxx xxx xxx
the guarantees of due process and equal So far as the requirement of due
protection of the laws is more apparent than real. process is concerned and in the
Properly related, the power and the guarantees absence of other constitutional
are supposed to coexist. THE BALANCING IS restriction a state is free to adopt
THE ESSENCE or, shall it be said, the whatever economic policy may
indispensable means for the attainment of reasonably be deemed to promote
legitimate aspirations of any democratic public welfare, and to enforce that policy
society. There can be no absolute power, by legislation adapted to its purpose.
whoever exercise it, for that would be The courts are without authority either to
declare such policy, or, when it is subject matter. Mr. Milado, allowing the
declared by the legislature, to override membership of other employees as stated,
it. If the laws passed are seen to have a granted the petition of PMPI. Petitioner then
reasonable relation to a proper moved to have the technical, professional and
legislative purpose, and are neither confidential employees removed from the
arbitrary nor discriminatory, the membership of the PMPI on April 16, 1990 to the
requirements of due process are Secretary of Labor and Employment and a
satisfied, and judicial determination to decision was made on August 7, 1990 dismissing
that effect renders a court functus the appeal and the subsequent motion for
officio. . . . (Nebbia vs. New York, 78 L. reconsideration. Then on July 8, 1991 the Court
ed. 940, 950, 957.) issued a temporary restraining order against the
holding of the certification election scheduled on
The test of reasonableness of a law is the July 12, 1991 pending judicial review.
appropriateness or adequacy under all
circumstances of the means adopted to carry out Issue: Whether or not PHILPHOS was denied
its purpose into effect. Judged by this test, due process when respondent Mediator-Arbiter
disputed legislation, which is not merely granted the amended petition of respondent
reasonable but actually necessary, must be PMPI without according PHILPHOS a new
considered not to have infringed the opportunity to be heard.
constitutional limitation of reasonableness.
The necessity of the law in question is explained Held: No. The essence of due process is simply
in the explanatory note that accompanied the bill, an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
which later was enacted into law: administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
This bill proposes to regulate the explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a
retail business. Its purpose is to reconsideration of the action or ruling
prevent persons who are not citizens complained of. Where, as in the instant case,
of the Philippines from having a petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its
strangle hold upon our economic life. position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter and
If the persons who control this vital to consider the case submitted for decision
artery of our economic life are the on the basis of the position papers filed by
ones who owe no allegiance to this the parties, there was sufficient compliance
Republic, who have no profound with the requirement of due process, as
devotion to our free institutions, and petitioner was afforded reasonable
who have no permanent stake in our opportunity to present its side. Moreover,
people's welfare, we are not really the petitioner could have, if it so desired, insisted on
masters of our destiny. All aspects of a hearing to confront and examine the witnesses
our life, even our national security, of the other party. But it did not; instead, it opted
will be at the mercy of other people. to submit its position paper with the Mediator-
In seeking to accomplish the Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the opportunity
foregoing purpose, we do not to ventilate its arguments in its appeal to the
propose to deprive persons who are Secretary of Labor
not citizens of the Philippines of their
means of livelihood. While this bill
seeks to take away from the hands of
persons who are not citizens of the Ynot vs IAC
Philippines a power that can be GR No. 74457, 20 March 1987
wielded to paralyze all aspects of our
national life and endanger our Facts: Executive Order No. 626-A prohibited the
national security it respects existing transportation of carabaos and carabeef from one
rights. province to another. The carabaos of petitioner
The approval of this bill is necessary were confiscated for violation of Executive Order
for our national survival. No 626-A while he was transporting them from
Masbate to Iloilo. Petitioner challenged the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.
The government argued that Executive Order No.
Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corp. v. 626-A was issued in the exercise of police power
Torres to conserve the carabaos that were still fit for
GR 98050, 17 March 1994 farm work or breeding.
Facts: The PhilPhos Movement for Progress Issue: Whether or Not EO No. 626-A is a
(PMPI), a labor organization composed of violation of Substantive Due Process.
supervisory employees of the Philippine
Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation, filed a Held: Yes. The thrust of his petition is that the
certification election on July 7, 1989 with the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it
Department of Labor and Employment. The move authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or
was not contested by the Philippine Phosphate carabeef being transported across provincial
Fertilizer Corporation management and in fact boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid
was supported by a position paper submitted to because it is imposed without according the
the Mediator-Arbiter on August 11, 1989. The owner a right to be heard before a competent and
management hailed the creation of a supervisors impartial court as guaranteed by due process.
union provided that they meet all the necessary
legal requirements. The closed mind has no place in the open
On October 13, 1989 the Mediator-Arbiter Milado society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play
issued an order for the holding of the elections to hear "the other side" before an opinion is
excluding the technical, professional and formed or a decision is made by those who sit in
confidential employees. Then on November15, judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of
1989 respondent PMPI prayed for the inclusion of the question; the other half must also be
technical, professional and confidential considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached
employees. On December 14, 1989 both parties based on an informed appreciation of the issues
submitted their position papers on the said in contention. It is indispensable that the two

sides complement each other, as unto the bow action may be validly taken in administrative
the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after proceedings as procedural due process is not
examination of the problem not from one or the necessarily judicial only. In the exceptional cases
other perspective only but in its totality. A accepted, however. there is a justification for the
judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit,
the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or the immediacy of the problem sought to be
useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or corrected and the urgency of the need to correct
intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in it.
repressive regimes, the insolence of power.
The minimum requirements of due process

are notice and hearing which, generally Alonte v. Savellano
speaking, may not be dispensed with because GR 131652, March 9, 1998
they are intended as a safeguard against
official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying Facts: On December 5, 1996, an information for
commentary on our judicial system that the rape was filed against petitioners Bayani M.
jurisprudence of this country is rich with Alonte, an incumbent Mayor of Bian Laguna and
applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty Buenaventura Concepcion predicated on a
to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair complaint filed by Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan.
play. We have consistently declared that every On December 13, 1996, Juvie-lyn
person, faced by the awesome power of the Punongbayan, through her counsel Attorney
State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Remedios C. Balbin, and Assistant Chief State
Daniel Webster described almost two hundred Prosecutor Leonardo Guiab, Jr., filed with the
years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Office of the Court Administrator a petition for a
Case, as "the law which hears before it change of venue and to have the case
condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and transferred and tried by any of the Regional Trial
renders judgment only after trial." It has to be Courts in Metro Manila.
so if the rights of every person are to be secured During the pendency of the petition for
beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken change of venue, or on 25 June 1997, Juvie-lyn
zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due Punongbayan, assisted by her parents and
process clause into a worn and empty catchword. counsel, executed an affidavit of desistance.
On June 28, 1997, Atty. Ramon
This is not to say that notice and hearing are C.Casano on behalf of petitioners, moved to have
imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are the petition for change of venue dismissed on the
a number of admitted exceptions. (1)The ground that it had become moot in view of
conclusive presumption, for example, bars the complainants affidavit of desistance.
admission of contrary evidence as long as such On August 22, 1997, ACSP Guiab filed
presumption is based on human experience or his comment on the motion to dismiss. Guiab
there is a rational connection between the fact asserted that he was not aware of the desistance
proved and the fact ultimately presumed of private complainant and opined that the
therefrom. (2)There are instances when the need desistance, in any case, would not produce any
for expeditions action will justify omission of legal effect since it was the public prosecutor who
these requisites, as in the summary abatement of had direction and control of the prosecution of the
a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, criminal action. He prayed for the denial of the
which may be killed on sight because of the motion to dismiss. The court granted the motion
immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives to change venue.
of the people. (3)Pornographic materials, On September 17, 1997, the case was
contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are assigned by raffle to Branch 53, RTC Manila, with
inherently pernicious and may be summarily respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano,
destroyed. (4)The passport of a person sought Jr.,presiding.
for a criminal offense may be cancelled without On October 7, 1997, Juvie-lyn
hearing, to compel his return to the country he Punongbayan, through Atty. Balbin, submitted to
has fled. (5) Filthy restaurants may be summarily the Manila court, a compliance where she
padlocked in the interet of the public health and reiterated her decision to abide by her Affidavit of
bawdy houses to protect the public morals. In Desistance.
such instances, previous judicial hearing may However, in an Order, dated 09 October
be omitted without violation of due process in 1997, Judge Savellano found probable cause for
view of the nature of the property involved or the issuance of warrants for the arrest of
the urgency of the need to protect the general petitioners Alonte and Concepcion without
welfare from a clear and present danger. prejudice to, and independent of, this Courts
separate determination as the trier of facts, of the
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily voluntariness and validity of the [private
confiscated by the police station commander, complainant's] desistance in the light of the
were returned to the petitioner only after he had opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief
filed a complaint for recovery and given State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiyab.
a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was On 02 November 1997, Alonte
ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce voluntarily surrendered himself to Director
the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The Santiago Toledo of the National Bureau of
executive order defined the prohibition, Investigation (NBI), while Concepcion, in his
convicted the petitioner and immediately case, posted the recommended bail
imposed punishment, which was carried out of P150,000.00.
forthright. The measure struck at once and On 07 November 1997, petitioners were
pounced upon the petitioner without giving him arraigned and both pleaded not guilty to the
a chance to be heard, thus denying him the charge. The parties manifested that they were
centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play. waiving pre-trial. The proceedings forthwith went
on. Per Judge Savellano, both parties agreed to
It has already been remarked that there are proceed with the trial of the case on the
4
occasions when notice and hearing may be merits. According to Alonte, however, Judge
validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual Savellano allowed the prosecution to present
requirement for these minimum guarantees of evidence relative only to the question of the
due process. It is also conceded that summary
voluntariness and validity of the affidavit of The respondent Judge committed

desistance grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
It would appear that immediately or excess of jurisdiction when he rendered a
following the arraignment, the prosecution Decision in the case a quo without
presented private complainant Juvie-lyn conducting a trial on the facts which would
Punongbayan followed by her parents. During establish that complainant was raped by
this hearing, Punongbayan affirmed the validity petitioner (Rule 119, Article III, 1, Constitution),
and voluntariness of her affidavit of desistance. thereby setting a dangerous precedent where
She stated that she had no intention of giving heinous offenses can result in conviction without
positive testimony in support of the charges trial (then with more reason that simpler offenses
against Alonte and had no interest in further could end up with the same result).
prosecuting the action. Punongbayan confirmed: Jurisprudence acknowledges that
(i) That she was compelled to desist because of DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS,
the harassment she was experiencing from the in particular, require (a) that the court or
media, (ii) that no pressures nor influence were tribunal trying the case is properly clothed
exerted upon her to sign the affidavit of with judicial power to hear and determine the
desistance, and (iii) that neither she nor her matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is
parents received a single centavo from anybody lawfully acquired by it over the person of the
to secure the affidavit of desistance. accused; (c) that the accused is given an
Assistant State Prosecutor Marilyn opportunity to be heard; and (d) that
Campomanes then presented, in sequence: (i) judgment is rendered only upon lawful
Punongbayans parents, who affirmed their hearing.
signatures on the affidavit of desistance and their The Court must admit that it is puzzled
consent to their daughters decision to desist from by the somewhat strange way the case has
the case, and (ii) Assistant Provincial Prosecutor proceeded below. Per Judge Savellano, after the
Alberto Nofuente, who attested that the affidavit waiver by the parties of the pre-trial stage, the
of desistance was signed by Punongbayan and trial of the case did proceed on the merits but
her parents in his presence and that he was that-
satisfied that the same was executed freely and The two (2) accused did not
voluntarily. Finally, Campomanes manifested that present any countervailing
in light of the decision of private complainant and evidence during the trial. They
her parents not to pursue the case, the State had did not take the witness stand
no further evidence against the accused to prove to refute or deny under oath
the guilt of the accused. She, then, moved for the the truth of the contents of the
"dismissal of the case" against both Alonte and private complainant's
Concepcion. aforementioned affidavit which
Thereupon, respondent judge said that she expressly affirmed and
"the case was submitted for decision." confirmed in Court, but,
On 10 November 1997, petitioner Alonte filed an instead, thru their respective
"Urgent Motion to Admit to Bail." During the lawyers, they rested and
pendency thereof, Attorney Philip Sigfrid A. submitted the case for decision
Fortun, the lead counsel for petitioner Alonte merely on the basis of the
received a notice from the RTC Manila, Branch private complainant's so called
53, notifying him of the schedule of promulgation, 'desistance' which, to them,
on 18 December 1997, of the decision on the was sufficient enough for their
case. The counsel for accused Concepcion purposes. They left everything
denied having received any notice of the to the so-called 'desistance' of
scheduled promulgation. the private complainant.
On 18 December 1997, after the case
was called, Atty. Sigrid Fortun and Atty. Jose According to petitioners, however,
Flaminiano manifested that Alonte could not there was no such trial for what was
attend the promulgation of the decision because conducted on 07 November 1997, aside from
he was suffering from mild hypertension and was the arraignment of the accused, was merely a
confined at the NBI clinic and that, upon the other proceeding to determine the validity and
hand, petitioner Concepcion and his counsel voluntariness of the affidavit of desistance
would appear not to have been notified of the executed by Punongbayan.
proceedings. The promulgation, nevertheless, of While Judge Savellano has claims that
the decision proceeded in absentia; the reading petitioners-accused were each represented
concluded: during the hearing on 07 November 1997 with
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered their respective counsel of choice; that none of
finding the two (2) accused Mayor Bayani Alonte their counsel interposed an intention to cross-
and Buenaventura `Wella Concepcion guilty examine rape victim Juvielyn Punongbayan, even
beyond reasonable doubt of the heinous after she attested, in answer to respondent
crime of RAPE, judge's clarificatory questions, the voluntariness
and truth of her two affidavits - one detailing the
Issue: Was petitioner deprived of rape and the other detailing the attempts to buy
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS? her desistance; the opportunity was missed/not
used, hence waived. The rule of case law is that
Held: Yes. The respondent Judge committed the right to confront and cross-examine a witness
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or 'is a personal one and may be waived.
excess of jurisdiction when, in total disregard of It should be pointed out, however,
the Revised Rules on Evidence and existing that the existence of the waiver must be
doctrinal jurisprudence, he rendered a Decision positively demonstrated. The standard of
in the case a quo on the basis of two (2) affidavits waiver requires that it "not only must be
(Punongbayans and Balbins) which were neither voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent,
marked nor offered into evidence by the and done with sufficient awareness of the
prosecution, nor without giving the petitioner relevant circumstances and likely
an opportunity to cross-examine the consequences." Mere silence of the holder of
affiants thereof, again in violation of petitioners the right should not be so construed as a
right to due process (Article III, 1, Constitution). waiver of right, and the courts must indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver.
The Solicitor General has aptly the due process clause of the Constitution
discerned a few of the deviations from what The facts show that petitioner was not among
otherwise should have been the regular those charged by the PNP with violation of
course of trial: (1) Petitioners have not been the Omnibus Election Code. Nor was he
directed to present evidence to prove their subjected by the City Prosecutor to a
defenses nor have dates therefor been preliminary investigation for such offense.
18
scheduled for the purpose; (2) the parties The non-disclosure by the City Prosecutor to
have not been given the opportunity to the petitioner that he was a respondent in the
present rebutting evidence nor have dates preliminary investigation is violative of due
been set by respondent Judge for the process which requires that the procedure
purpose; and (3) petitioners have not established by law should be obeyed.
admitted the act charged in the Information The COMELEC argues that petitioner
so as to justify any modification in the order was given the chance to be heard because he
20
of trial. There can be no short-cut to the was invited to enlighten the City Prosecutor
legal process, and there can be no excuse for regarding the circumstances leading to the arrest
not affording an accused his full day in court. of his driver, and that petitioner in fact submitted
Due process, rightly occupying the first and a sworn letter of explanation regarding the
foremost place of honor in our Bill of Rights, incident. This does not satisfy the requirement
is an enshrined and invaluable right that of due process the essence of which is the
cannot be denied even to the most reasonable opportunity to be heard and to
undeserving. submit any evidence one may have in support
This case, in fine, must be remanded for further of his defense. Due process guarantees the
proceedings. observance of both substantive and
procedural rights, whatever the source of
such rights, be it the Constitution itself or
only a statute or a rule of court.
Aniag vs. Commission on Elections Such constituted a violation of his right
GR 104961, 7 October 1994 to due process. Hence, it cannot be contended
that petitioner was fully given the opportunity to
Facts: In preparation for the synchronized meet the accusation against him as he was not
national and local elections scheduled on 11 May informed that he was himself a respondent in
1992, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) the case. Thus, the warrantless search
issued Resolution 2323 (Gun Ban), conducted by the PNP is declared illegal and the
promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, firearms seized during the search cannot be used
carrying and transporting of firearms or other as evidence in any proceeding against the
deadly weapons, on security personnel or petitioner. Resolution No. 92-0829 is
bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of unconstitutional, and therefore, set aside.
security agencies or police organizations, and
organization or maintenance of reaction forces
during the election period. Pursuant to the Gun Philippine Communication Satellite Corp. v.
Ban, Mr. Serapio P. Taccad, Sergeant-at-Arms, Alcuaz
House of Representatives, wrote Congressman GR 84818, Dec 18, 1989
Francisc B. Aniag Jr., who was then
Congressman of the 1st District of Bulacan Facts: By virtue of Republic Act 5514, the
requesting the return of the 2 firearms issued to Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
him by the House of Representatives. Aniag (PHILCOMSAT) was granted a franchise to
immediately instructed his driver, Ernesto establish, construct, maintain and operate in the
Arellano, to pick up the firearms from his house Philippines, at such places as the grantee may
at Valle Verde and return them to Congress. The select, station or stations and associated
policemen manning the outpost flagged down the equipment and facilities for international satellite
car driven by Arellano as it approached the communications. Since 1968, It has been
checkpoint. They searched the car and found the leasing its satellite circuits to PLDT, Philippine
firearms neatly packed in their gun cases and Global Communications, and other
placed in a bag in the trunk of the car. Arellano telecommunication companies. It was exempt
was then apprehended and detained. Thereafter, from the jurisdiction of the National
the police referred Arellanos case to the Office of Telecommunications Commission (NTC).
the City Prosecutor for inquest. The referral did However, pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 196,
not include Aniag as among those charged with it was placed under the jurisdiction, control and
an election offense. The City Prosecutor invited regulation of NTC, including all its facilities and
Aniag to shed light on the circumstances services and the fixing of rates. Implementing
mentioned in Arellanos sworn explanation. Aniag said executive order, NTC required
explained that Arellano did not violate the PHILCOMSAT to apply for the requisite
firearms ban as he in fact was complying with it certificate of public convenience.. On 9
when apprehended by returning the firearms to September 1987, PHILCOMSAT filed with NTC
Congress. The Office of the City Prosecutor an application for authority to continue operating
issued a resolution recommending that the case and maintaining the same facilities, to continue
against Arellano be dismissed and that the providing the international satellite
unofficial charge against Aniag be also communications services, and to charge the
dismissed. Nevertheless, the COMELEC current rates applied for in rendering such
directing the filing of information against Aniag services. Pending hearing, it also applied for a
and Arellano for violation of Sec. 261, par. (q), of provisional authority so that it can continue to
BP 881 otherwise known as the Omnibus operate and maintain the facilities, provide the
Election Code, in relation to Sec. 32 of RA 7166 services and charge therefor the aforesaid rates
therein applied for. The NTC extended the
Issue: Whether or not the manner by which provisional authority of PHILCOMSAT, but it
COMELEC proceeded against petitioner runs directed PHILCOMSAT to charge modified
counter to the due process clause of the reduced rates through a reduction of 15% on the
Constitution present authorized rates. PHILCOMSAT assailed
said order.
Held: Yes. The manner by which COMELEC
proceeded against petitioner runs counter to
Issue: Whether the NTC is required to provide

notice and hearing to PHILCOMSAT in its rate-
fixing order, which fixed a temporary rate pending
final determination of PHILCOMSATs ANG TIBAY VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
application. RELATIONS (CIR)
69 PHIL 635; G.R. NO. 46496; 27 FEB 1940
Held: YES. The order in question which was
issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains Facts: There was agreement between Ang Tibay
all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. and the National Labor Union, Inc (NLU). The
Foremost is the fact that said order pertains NLU alleged that the supposed lack of leather
exclusively to petitioner and to no other. Further, material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a
it is premised on a finding of fact, although scheme adopted to systematically discharge all
patently superficial, that there is merit in a the members of the NLU, from work. And this
reduction of some of the rates charged- based on averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner
an initial evaluation of petitioner's financial with the records of the Bureau of Customs and
statements-without affording petitioner the benefit Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.
of an explanation as to what particular aspect or That National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang
aspects of the financial statements warranted a Tibay is a company or employer union dominated
corresponding rate reduction. No rationalization by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the
was offered nor were the attending NLU as an illegal one. The CIR, decided the case
contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a
respondents to impose as much as a fifteen motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But
percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not far-fetched the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said
to assume that petitioner could be in a better motion.
position to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the
viability of its business requirements. The rates it Issue: Whether or not the motion for new trial
charges result from an exhaustive and detailed should be granted.
study it conducts of the multi-faceted intricacies
attendant to a public service undertaking of such Held: Yes. The interest of justice would be better
nature and magnitude. We are, therefore, served if the movant is given opportunity to
inclined to lend greater credence to petitioner's present at the hearing the documents referred to
ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its in his motion and such other evidence as may be
rates would adversely affect its operations and relevant to the main issue involved.
the quality of its service to the public considering It must be noted that the CIR is a
the maintenance requirements, the projects it still special court. It is more an administrative board
has to undertake and the financial outlay than a part of the integrated judicial system of the
involved. Notably, petitioner was not even nation. CIR is not narrowly constrained by
afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the technical rules of procedure, and equity and
inspector who issued the report on which substantial merits of the case, without regard to
respondent NTC based its questioned order. technicalities or legal forms and shall not be
At any rate, there remains the bound by any technical rules of legal evidence
categorical admission made by respondent NTC but may inform its mind in such manner as it may
that the questioned order was issued pursuant deem just and equitable. The fact, however, that
to its QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS. It, the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of
however, insists that notice and hearing are not certain procedural requirements does not mean
necessary since the assailed order is merely that it can in justiciable cases coming before it,
incidental to the entire proceedings and, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and
therefore, temporary in nature. This postulate is essential requirements of due process in trials
bereft of merit. and investigations of an administrative character.
The NTC, in the exercise of its rate- There are cardinal primary rights which must
fixing power, is limited by the requirements of be respected even in proceedings of this
public safety, public interest, reasonable character:
feasibility and reasonable rates, which
conjointly more than satisfy the requirements (1) the right to a hearing, which includes the
of a valid delegation of legislative power. The right to present one's cause and submit
NTC order violates procedural due process evidence in support thereof;
because it was issued motu proprio, without (2) The tribunal must consider the evidence
notice to PHILCOMSAT and without the presented;
benefit of a hearing. Said order was based (3) The decision must have something to
merely on an initial evaluation, which is a support itself;
unilateral evaluation, but had PHILCOMSAT (4) The evidence must be substantial;
been given an opportunity to present its side (5) The decision must be based on the
before the order in question was issued, the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least
confiscatory nature of the rate reduction and contained in the record and disclosed to the
the consequent deterioration of the public parties affected;
service could have been shown and (6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges
demonstrated to NTC. Reduction of rates was must act on its own independent
made without affording PHILCOMSAT the consideration of the law and facts of the
benefit of an explanation as to what particular controversy, and not simply accept the views
aspect or aspects of the financial statements of a subordinate;
warranted a corresponding rate reduction. (7) The Board or body should, in all
PHILCOMSAT was not even afforded the controversial questions, render its decision in
opportunity to cross-examine the inspector such manner that the parties to the
who issued the report on which NTC based its proceeding can know the various Issue
questioned order. While the NTC may fix a involved, and the reason for the decision
temporary rate pending final determination of rendered.
the application of PHILCOMSAT, such rate-
fixing order, temporary though it may be, is
not exempt from the statutory procedural ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON.
requirements of notice and hearing, as well as JUDGE IGNACIO CAPULONG
the requirement of reasonableness. 222 SCRA 644; G.R. 99327; 27 MAY 1993
of the death of Leonardo Villa, petitioner Cynthia

Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student del Castillo, as Dean of the Ateneo Law School,
of Petitioner University, died of serious physical notified and required respondent students on
injuries at Chinese General Hospital after the February 11, 1991 to submit within twenty-four
initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido hours their written statement on the incident, the
Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol records show that instead of filing a reply,
Medical Center. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del respondent students requested through their
Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty- counsel, copies of the charges. While of the
Student Investigating Committee which was students mentioned in the February 11, 1991
tasked to investigate and submit a report within notice duly submitted written statements, the
72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the others failed to do so. Thus, the latter were
death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also required granted an extension of up to February 18, 1991
respondent students to submit their written to file their statements.
statements within twenty-four (24) hours from Indubitably, the nature and cause of the
receipt. Although respondent students received a accusation were adequately spelled out in
copy of the written notice, they failed to file a petitioners' notices dated February 14 and 20,
30
reply. In the meantime, they were placed on 1991. It is to be noted that the February 20,
preventive suspension. The Investigating 1991 letter which quoted Rule No. 3 of its Rules
Committee found a prima facie case against of Discipline as contained in the Ateneo Law
respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the School Catalogue was addressed individually to
Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." respondent students. Petitioners' notices/letters
Respondent students were then required to file dated February 11, February 14 and 20 clearly
their written answers to the formal charge. show that respondent students were given ample
Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to opportunity to adduce evidence in their behalf
hear the charges against respondent students. and to answer the charges leveled against them.
The Board found respondent students guilty of The requisite assistance of counsel was
violating Rules on Discipline which prohibits met when, from the very start of the
participation in hazing activities. However, in view investigations before the Joint Administration
of the lack of unanimity among the members of Faculty-Student Committee, the law firm of
the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board Gonzales Batiler and Bilog and Associates put in
left the imposition of the penalty to the University its appearance and filed pleadings in behalf of
Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed respondent students.
the penalty of dismissal on all respondent Respondent students may not use
students. Respondent students filed with RTC the argument that since they were not
Makati a TRO since they are currently enrolled. accorded the opportunity to see and examine
This was granted. A day after the expiration of the written statements which became the
the temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo basis of petitioners' February 14, 1991 order,
created a Special Board to investigate the they were denied procedural due process.
charges of hazing against respondent students Granting that they were denied such
Abas and Mendoza. This was requested to be opportunity, the same may not be said to
stricken out by the respondents and argued that detract from the observance of due process,
the creation of the Special Board was totally for disciplinary cases involving students need
unrelated to the original petition which alleged not necessarily include the right to cross
lack of due process. This was granted and examination. An ADMINISTRATIVE
reinstatement of the students was ordered. PROCEEDING conducted to investigate
students' participation in a hazing activity need
Issue: Was there denial of due process against not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial
the respondent students. proceeding. A closer examination of the March 2,
1991 hearing which characterized the rules on
Held: There was no denial of due process, more the investigation as being summary in nature
particularly procedural due process. The Dean of and that respondent students have no right to
the Ateneo Law School, notified and required examine affiants-neophytes, reveals that this is
respondent students to submit their written but a reiteration of our previous ruling in Alcuaz.
statement on the incident. Instead of filing a Respondent students' contention that
reply, respondent students requested through the investigating committee failed to consider
their counsel, copies of the charges. The nature their evidence is far from the truth because the
and cause of the accusation were adequately February 14, 1992 ordered clearly states that it
spelled out in petitioners' notices. Present is the was reached only after receiving the written
twin elements of notice and hearing. statements and hearing the testimonies of
The Minimum standards to be satisfied several witnesses. Similarly, the Disciplinary
in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in Board's resolution dated March 10, 1991 was
academic institutions, such as petitioner preceded by a hearing on March 2, 1991 wherein
university herein, thus: respondent students were summoned to answer
clarificatory questions.
(1) the students must be informed in WRITING
of the nature and cause of any accusation
against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
charges against them with the assistance of
counsel, if desired: People vs. Vera
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence GR 45685, Nov. 16, 1937
against them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce Facts: The instant petition stems from the
evidence in their own behalf; and application for bail filed by Co Unjieng. He claims
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by that he is innocent of the crime charged against
the investigating committee or official him, that he has no existing criminal record and
designated by the school authorities to hear that he would observe proper conduct in the
and decide the case. future if his application for bail is granted. The
application was referred to the Insular Probation
It cannot seriously be asserted that the Office, but was consequently denied. The denial
above requirements were not met. When, in view was premised on the ground that Act No. 4221
provides probation only to those provinces with distinction between those who fall within
available funds for the salary of probation such class and those who do not.
officers, and the province referred to has no
sufficient funds. Thus, petitioner now comes
before the Court assailing the constitutionality of VI. The Equal Protection Limitation
the Act for being violative of the equal protection a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade.
clause. The next question that now poses solution is,
Does the law deny the equal protection of the
Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the laws? As pointed out above, the mere fact of
equal protection guarantee? alienage is the root and cause of the distinction
between the alien and the national as a trader.
Held: Yes. The probation act is in violation of the The alien resident owes allegiance to the
said constitutional guarantee. It constitutes as a country of his birth or his adopted country;
class legislation which discriminates against his stay here is for personal convenience; he
persons of the same class and favor others. is attracted by the lure of gain and profit. His aim
Persons with similar circumstances may be or purpose of stay, we admit, is neither
afforded with the privilege of probation merely illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally
due to the discretion of the provincial officers. lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for
Hence, the Court ruled that the said order is not this country where he temporarily stays and
constitutional. makes his living, or of that spirit of regard,
In the case at bar, the resultant sympathy and consideration for his Filipino
inequality may be said to flow from the customers as would prevent him from taking
unwarranted delegation of legislative power, advantage of their weakness and exploiting them.
although perhaps this is necessarily the result in The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can the
every case. In the instant case, one province may alien go back to his beloved country and his
appropriate the necessary fund to defray the beloved kin and countrymen. The experience of
salary of a probation officer, while another the country is that the alien retailer has shown
province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a such utter disregard for his customers and the
case, the Probation Act would be in operation in people on whom he makes his profit, that it has
the former province but not in the latter. This been found necessary to adopt the legislation,
means that a person otherwise coming within the radical as it may seem.
purview of the law would be able to enjoy the Another objection to the alien retailer in this
benefits of probation in one province while country is that he never really makes a
another person similarly situated in another genuine contribution to national income and
province would be denied those same benefits. wealth. He undoubtedly contributes to
This is obnoxious discrimination. While inequality general distribution, but the gains and profits
may result in the application of the law and in the he makes are not invested in industries that
conferment of the benefits therein provided, would help the country's economy and
inequality is not in al cases the necessary result. increase national wealth. The alien's interest in
Whatever may be the case, it is clear that Section this country being merely transient and
11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to
which discrimination and inequality are permitted continue entrusting the very important function of
or allowed. retail distribution to his hands.
We are of the opinion that Section 11 of The practices resorted to by aliens in the control
Act. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal of distribution, as already pointed out above, their
protection of the law and is on that account bad. secret manipulations of stocks of commodities
We see no difference BETWEEN A LAW and prices, their utter disregard of the welfare of
WHICH DENIES EQUAL PROTECTION and a their customers and of the ultimate happiness of
LAW WHICH PERMITS OF SUCH DENIAL. A the people of the nation of which they are mere
law may appear to be fair on its face and guests, which practices, manipulations and
impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of disregard do not attend the exercise of the trade
unjust and illegal discrmmination, it is within by the nationals, show the existence of real and
the constitutional prohibition. actual, positive and fundamental differences
between an alien and a national which fully justify
the legislative classification adopted in the retail
trade measure. These differences are certainly a
Ichong vs. Hernandez valid reason for the State to prefer the national
GR 7995, May 31, 1957 over the alien in the retail trade. We would be
doing violence to fact and reality were we to hold
Facts: -supra- that no reason or ground for a legitimate
distinction can be found between one and the
Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the other.
equal protection clause?
b. Difference in alien aims and purposes
Held: None. The equal protection of the law sufficient basis for distinction.
clause is against undue favor and individual or The above objectionable characteristics of the
class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which
the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to are actual and real, furnish sufficient grounds for
prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the legislative classification of retail traders into
object to which it is directed or by territory within nationals and aliens. Some may disagree with
which is to operate. It does not demand absolute the wisdom of the legislature's classification. To
equality among residents; it merely requires that this we answer, that this is the prerogative of the
all persons shall be treated alike, under like law-making power. Since the Court finds that the
circumstances and conditions both as to classification is actual, real and reasonable,
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The and all persons of one class are treated alike,
equal protection clause is not infringed by and as it cannot be said that the classification is
legislation which applies only to those patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in
persons falling within a specified class, if it duty bound to declare that the legislature acted
applies alike to all persons within such class, within its legitimate prerogative and it can not
and reasonable grounds exists for making a declare that the act transcends the limit of equal
protection established by the Constitution.
legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is

Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature being collected from every employed alien,
to make distinctions and classifications whether he is casual or permanent, part time
among persons is not curtailed or denied by or full time or whether he is a lowly employee
the equal protection of the laws clause. The or a highly paid executive.
legislative power admits of a wide scope of Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay
discretion, and a law can be violative of the down any criterion or standard to guide the
constitutional limitation only when the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. It has
classification is without reasonable basis. been held that where an ordinance of a
municipality fails to state any policy or to set up
(Adonis Notes: Under the abovementioned any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action,
case, the case was decided under the 1935 expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring
Constitution wherein PARITY RIGHTS were a permit, enumerates no conditions for its
granted to U.S. Citizens.) grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard,
thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and
Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho unrestricted power to grant or deny the
GR 29646, Nov. 10,1978 issuance of building permits, such ordinance
is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited
Facts: City ordinance No 6537, prohibits delegation of power to allow or prevent an
aliens from being employed or engaged or activity per se lawful.
participate in any position or association or In Chinese Flour Importers Association
business enumerated therein, whether vs. Price Stabilization Board, where a law
permanent, temporary or casual, without first granted a government agency power to
securing an employment permit from the Mayor determine the allocation of wheat flour among
of Manila is being questioned by the private importers, the Supreme Court ruled against the
respondent for allegedly in violation of the equal interpretation of uncontrolled power as it vested
protection guarantee. The trial court ruled in favor in the administrative officer an arbitrary discretion
of the nullity of the ordinance. On appeal, to be exercised without a policy, rule, or standard
petitioner argues that the ordinance cannot be from which it can be measured or controlled.
invalidated on the ground that it violated the rule It was also held in Primicias vs. Fugoso
on uniformity of taxation, because it apples to that the authority and discretion to grant and
pure tax or revenues measures and said refuse permits of all classes conferred upon the
ordinance is not such but is an exercise of the Mayor of Manila by the Revised Charter of Manila
police power of the state. is not uncontrolled discretion but legal discretion
to be exercised within the limits of the law.
Issue: Whether or not the said ordinance Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it
is unconstitutional? does not contain or suggest any standard or
criterion to guide the mayor in the exercise of the
Held: The ordinance is unconstitutional. power which has been granted to him by the
The contention that it was not purely a tax or ordinance.
revenue measure because its principle purpose The ordinance in question violates
was for regulation has no merit. It is obvious the due process of law and equal protection
that THE ORDINANCE WAS PURPOSELY FOR rule of the Constitution.
THE RAISING OF MONEY UNDER THE GUISE
OF A REGULATION. Further, the assailed (Requiring a person before he can be
ordinance violates the equal protection employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of
clause. To require a person to get a work Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is
permit before he can be employed from the tantamount to denying him the basic right of the
Mayor who may withhold or refuse it at will is people in the Philippines to engage in a means of
tantamount to the denial of the basic right of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a
a person to engage in a means of livelihood. State is not obliged to admit aliens within its
Aliens once admitted cannot be deprived of territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be
life without due process of law. deprived of life without due process of law. This
The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The
is not a purely tax or revenue measure because shelter of protection under the due process and
its principal purpose is regulatory in nature has equal protection clause is given to all persons,
no merit. While it is true that the first part which both aliens and citizens.)
requires that the alien shall secure an
employment permit from the Mayor involves the Dumlao vs. Comelec
exercise of discretion and judgment in the GR 52245, Jan. 22, 1980
processing and approval or disapproval of
applications for employment permits and Facts: The Petition alleges that petitioner,
therefore is regulatory in character the second Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva
part which requires the payment of P50.00 as Vizcaya. Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions
employee's fee is not regulatory but a revenue the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas
measure. There is no logic or justification in Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary
exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been to the equal protection and due process
CLEARED for employment. It is obvious guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4
that the purpose of the ordinance is to raise provides:
money under the guise of regulation.
The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not "Sec. 4. Special Disqualification - In
only because it is excessive BUT BECAUSE addition to violation of section 10 of Art.
IT FAILS TO CONSIDER VALID SUBSTANTIAL XII-C of the Constitution and
DIFFERENCES IN SITUATION AMONG disqualification mentioned in existing
INDIVIDUAL ALIENS WHO ARE REQUIRED laws, which are hereby declared as
TO PAY IT. Although the equal protection disqualification for any of the elective
clause of the Constitution does not forbid officials enumerated in section 1 hereof.
classification, it is imperative that the
classification, should be based on real and Any retired elective provincial, city of
substantial differences having a reasonable municipal official (1)who has received
relation to the subject of the particular payment of the retirement benefits to
which he is entitled under the law and [1933]). Persons similarly situated are similarly
(2)who shall have been 65 years of age treated.
at the commencement of the term of In fine, it bears reiteration that the
office to which he seeks to be elected, equal protection clause does not forbid all
shall not be qualified to run for the same legal classification. What is proscribes is a
elective local office from which he has classification which is arbitrary and
retired." unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee
is not violated by a reasonable classification
Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited is germane to the purpose of the law and
provision is directed insidiously against him, and applies to all those belonging to the same.
that the classification provided therein is based The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence
on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class of younger blood in local governments. The
legislation. classification in question being pursuant to that
purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even if
Issue: Whether or not said provision violates at times, it may be susceptible to the objection
the equal protection guarantee? that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies.
Held: No. Petitioner Dumlao's contention that (NOTE: The questioned law is germane to the
section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is discriminatory against purposes for which it was enacted)
him personally is belied by the fact that several
petitions for the disqualification of other
candidates for local positions based on the
challenged provision have already been filed with Philippine Association of Service Exporters,
the COMELEC. This tellingly overthrows inc. vs. Drillon
Dumlao's contention of intentional or purposeful GR 81958, June 30, 1988
discrimination.
The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. Facts: Philippine Association of Service
52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal Exporters, inc. (PASEI), is a domestic corporation
protection is neither well taken. The constitutional engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino
guarantee of equal protection of the laws is workers, male and female for overseas
subject to rational classification. If the groupings employment. PASEI seeks to challenge the
are based on reasonable and real constitutionality of the Department Order No. 1
differentiations, one class can be treated and series of 1998 of the Department of Labor. Said
regulated differently from another class. For order prohibited and suspended the overseas
purposes of public service, employees 65 deployment of Filipina Domestic and household
years of age, have been validly classified workers. Their main contention is that the order is
differently from younger employees. invalid for the DOLE erroneously exercised police
Employees attaining that age are subject to power, which is an adjunct on the powers of
compulsory retirement, while those of congress, and not executive in character.
younger ages are not so compulsorily Moreover, it alleged that there was a violation of
retirable. the equal protection clause for it only sought to
In respect of election to provincial, city, suspend the deployment of Filipina workers, thus
or municipal positions, to require that candidates there was discrimination.
should not be more than 65 years of age at the
time they assume office, if applicable to Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the
everyone, might or might not be a reasonable equal protection clause?
classification although, as the Solicitor General
has intimated, a good policy of the law should Held: No. The Court is satisfied that the
be to promote the emergence of younger classification madeN - the preference for female
blood in our political elective echelons. On the workers - rests on substantial distinctions.
other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 As a matter of judicial notice, the Court
years old may also be good elective local is well aware of the unhappy plight that has
officials. befallen our female labor force abroad, especially
Coming now to the case of retirees. domestic servants, amid exploitative working
Retirement from government service may or may conditions marked by, in not a few cases,
not be a reasonable disqualification for elective physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of
local officials. For one thing, there can also be maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina
retirees from government service at ages, say workers, even rape and various forms of torture,
below 65. It may neither be reasonable to confirmed by testimonies of returning workers,
disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old are compelling motives for urgent Government
retiree could be a good local official just like one, action. As precisely the caretaker of
aged 65, who is not a retiree. Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that
local official, who has retired from a provincial, duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts.
city or municipal office, there is reason to The same, however, cannot be said of
disqualify him from running for the same our male workers. In the first place, there is no
office from which he had retired, as provided evidence that, except perhaps for isolated
for in the challenged provision. The need for instances, our men abroad have been afflicted
new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness with an identical predicament. The petitioner has
of the retiree for government work is present, proffered no argument that the Government
and what is emphatically significant is that should act similarly with respect to male workers.
the retired employee has already declared The Court, of course, is not impressing some
himself tired and unavailable for the same male chauvinistic notion that men are
government work, but, which, by virtue of a superior to women. What the Court is saying
change of mind, he would like to assume is that it was largely a matter of evidence (that
again. It is for the very reason that inequality will women domestic workers are being ill-treated
neither result from the application of the abroad in massive instances) and not upon
challenged provision. Just as that provision does some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the
not deny equal protection, neither does it permit Government acted in this case. It is evidence
such denial (see People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 capable indeed of unquestionable demonstration
and evidence this Court accepts. The Court
cannot, however, say the same thing as far as suspension from office of the member of the PNP
men are concerned. There is simply no evidence charged with grave offense where the penalty is
to justify such an inference. Suffice it to state, six years and one day or more shall last until the
then, that insofar as classifications are termination of the case. The suspension cannot
concerned, this Court is content that be lifted before the termination of the case. The
distinctions are borne by the evidence. second sentence of the same Section providing
Discrimination in this case is justified. that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90)
There is likewise no doubt that such a days from arraignment does not qualify or limit
classification is germane to the purpose behind the first sentence. The two can stand
the measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed independently of each other. The first refers to
objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the period of suspension. The second deals with
the protection for Filipino female overseas the time from within which the trial should be
workers." 17 This Court has no quarrel that in the finished.
midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers
have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety
be for their own good and welfare. days from arraignment, should the suspension of
accused be lifted? The answer is certainly no.
While the law uses the mandatory word "shall"
before the phrase "be terminated within ninety
HIMAGAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (90) days", there is nothing in R.A. 6975 that
G.R. No. 113811 October 7, 1994, KAPUNAN, suggests that the preventive suspension of the
J.: accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated
within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who
Facts: Petitioner, a policeman was implicated fails to decide the case within the period without
in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the justifiable reason may be subject to
attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the administrative sanctions and, in appropriate
informations for murder and attempted murder cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal or
were filed, the trial court issued an Order civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably delayed
suspending petitioner until the termination of the without fault of the accused such that he is
case on the basis of Section 47, R.A. 6975. In deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not
response, petitioner filed a motion to lift the order without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal
for his suspension, relying on Section 42 of P.D. of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss
807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his the case, the accused can compel its dismissal
suspension should be limited to 90 days. by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure
Respondent judge denied the motion pointing out his liberty by habeas corpus.
that under Section 47 of R.A. 6975, the accused
shall be suspended from office until his case is Second. Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD
terminated. The motion for reconsideration of the 807. A meticulous reading of the section clearly
order of denial was, likewise, denied. Hence, the shows that it refers to the lifting of preventive
petition for certiorari and mandamus to set aside suspension in pending administrative
the orders of respondent Judge and to command investigation, not in criminal cases, as here.
him to lift petitioner's preventive suspension. What is more, Section 42 expressly limits the
Petitioner posits that as a member of the period of preventive suspension to ninety (90)
Philippine National Police, he is covered by the days. Sec. 91 of R.A. 6975 which states that "The
Civil Service Law, particularly Sec. 42 of PD 807 Civil Service Law and its implementing rules shall
of the Civil Service Decree, which limits the apply to all personnel of the Department" simply
maximum period of suspension to ninety (90) means that the provisions of the Civil Service
days. He claims that an imposition of preventive Law and its implementing rules and regulations
suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the are applicable to members of the Philippine
Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his National Police insofar as the provisions, rules
constitutional right to equal protection of laws. and regulations are not inconsistent with R.A.
6975. Certainly, Section 42 of the Civil Service
Decree which limits the preventive suspension to
Issue: Whether or not the imposition of ninety (90) days cannot apply to members of the
preventive suspension of over 90 days is a PNP because Sec. 47 of R.A. 6995 provides
violation of his constitutional right to equal differently, that is, the suspension where the
protection of laws? penalty imposed by law exceeds six (6) years
shall continue until the case is terminated.
Held No. He claims that an imposition of
preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary Third. Petitioner's reliance on Layno and Deloso
to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation is misplaced. These cases all stemmed from
of his constitutional right to equal protection of charges in violation of R.A. 3019 (1060),
laws. He further asserts that the requirements in otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 that "the court shall Practices Act which, unlike R.A. 6975, is silent on
immediately suspend the accused from office the duration of the preventive suspension. Sec.
until the case is terminated" and the succeeding 13 of R.A. 3019 reads as follows:
sentence, "Such case shall be subject to
continuous trial and shall be terminated within Fourth. From the deliberations of the Bicameral
ninety (90) days from arraignment of the Conference Committee on National Defense
accused" are both substantive and should be relative to the bill that became R.A. 6975, the
taken together to mean that if the case is not meaning of Section 47 of R.A. 6975 insofar as
terminated within 90 days, the period of the period of suspension is concerned becomes
preventive suspension must be lifted because of all the more clear.
the command that the trial must be terminated
within ninety (90) days from arraignment. The foregoing discussions reveal the legislative
intent to place on preventive suspension a
We disagree. member of the PNP charged with grave felonies
where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six
First. The language of the first sentence of Sec. years of imprisonment and which suspension
47 of R.A. 6975 is clear, plain and free from continues until the case against him is
ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the terminated.
intervenors with their own motion for

The reason why members of the PNP reconsideration-in-intervention.
are treated differently from the other classes
of persons charged criminally or ISSUES: 1) Whether the assailed decision is
administratively insofar as the application of contrary to the constitutional proscription against
the rule on preventive suspension is the participation of public appointive officials and
concerned is that policemen carry weapons members of the military in partisan political
and the badge of the law which can be used activity.
to harass or intimidate witnesses against 2) Whether the assailed provisions do
them, as succinctly brought out in the not violate the equal protection clause when they
legislative discussions. accord differential treatment to elective and
If a suspended policeman criminally appointive officials.
charged with a serious offense is reinstated 3) Whether the assailed provisions do
to his post while his case is pending, his not suffer from the infirmity of overbreadth.
victim and the witnesses against him are
obviously exposed to constant threat and HELD: YES to all.
thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact
that the accused is in uniform and armed. The Court now rules that Section 4(a) of
The equal protection clause exists to Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus
prevent undue favor or privilege. Recognizing the Election Code, and the second proviso in the
existence of real differences among men, the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not
equal protection clause does not demand unconstitutional.
absolute equality. It merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like *Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678
circumstances and conditions both as to the Compliant with Law
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 is a
Thus, the equal protection clause does not faithful reflection of the present state of the law
absolutely forbid classifications, such as the and jurisprudence on the matter, viz.:
one which exists in the instant case. If the
classification is based on real and substantial Incumbent Appointive Official. - Under Section
differences; is germane to the purpose of the 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates Section 66 of the
law; applies to all members of the same class; Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a
and applies to current as well as future public appointive office or position, including
conditions, the classification may not be active members of the Armed Forces of the
impugned as violating the Constitution's equal Philippines, and officers and employees in
protection guarantee. government-owned or -controlled corporations,
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
office upon the filing of his certificate of
Quinto vs. COMELEC candidacy.
G.R. No. 189698, February, 22. 2010
Puno. CJ: Incumbent Elected Official. Upon the other
hand, pursuant to Section 14 of RA 9006 or the
Note: The SC reversed its December 1, 2009 Fair Election Act, which repealed Section 67 of
decision via the MRs of COMELEC and movant- the Omnibus Election Code and rendered
intervenors ineffective Section 11 of R.A. 8436 insofar as it
considered an elected official as resigned only
FACTS: In preparation for the 2010 elections, the upon the start of the campaign period
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued corresponding to the positions for which they are
Resolution No. 8678 the Guidelines on the running, an elected official is not deemed to have
Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and resigned from his office upon the filing of his
Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered certificate of candidacy for the same or any other
Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, elected office or position. In fine, an elected
2010 National and Local Elections. Sec. 4 of official may run for another position without
Resolution No. 8678 provides that Any person forfeiting his seat.
holding a public appointive office or position x x x
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his These laws and regulations implement
office upon the filing of his certificate of Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987
candidacy (automatic resignation) however it Constitution, which prohibits civil service
exempts those elected officials saying that Any officers and employees from engaging in any
person holding an elective office or position shall electioneering or partisan political campaign.
not be considered resigned upon the filing of his The intention to impose a strict limitation on
certificate of candidacy for the same or any other the participation of civil service officers and
elective office or position. employees in partisan political campaigns is
Sec.13(par. 3) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9369 unmistakable.
provides: x x x any person holding a public
appointive office or position x x x shall be To emphasize its importance, this constitutional
considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office ban on civil service officers and employees is
x x x. presently reflected and implemented by a number
Sec. 66 of BP Blg. 881, or the Omnibus Election of statutes. (e.g. Section 46(b)(26), Chapter 7
Code, reads: x x x Any person holding a public and Section 55, Chapter 8 both of Subtitle A,
appointive office or position x x x shall be Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of
considered ipso facto resigned from his office 1987). Section 261(i) of Batas Pambansa Blg.
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. 881 (the Omnibus Election Code) further makes
Petitioners were appointive officers of the intervention by civil service officers and
government who were planning to run in the 2010 employees in partisan political activities an
elections sought the nullification of Sec. 4(a) on election offense. The intent of both Congress
the ground, among others, that it is discriminatory and the framers of our Constitution to limit
and violates the equal protection clause of the the participation of civil service officers and
Constitution. The Supreme Court ruled in their employees in partisan political activities is
favor. This prompted the COMELEC to file a too plain to be mistaken.
motion for reconsideration and the movant-
But Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 pass upon or look into the wisdom of this
Constitution and the implementing statutes apply classification. Since the classification justifying
only to civil servants holding apolitical offices. Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected
Stated differently, the constitutional ban does officials vis--vis appointive officials, is anchored
not cover elected officials, notwithstanding upon material and significant distinctions and
the fact that [t]he civil service embraces all all the persons belonging under the same
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, classification are similarly treated, the equal
and agencies of the Government, including protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not
government-owned or controlled infringed.
corporations with original charters. This is
because elected public officials, by the very The Court declared these provisions compliant
nature of their office, engage in partisan with the equal protection clause. It held that (i) in
political activities almost all year round, even regulating the speech of its employees, the state
outside of the campaign period. Political as employer has interests that differ significantly
partisanship is the inevitable essence of a from those it possesses in regulating the speech
political office, elective positions included. of the citizenry in general; (ii) the courts must
therefore balance the legitimate interest of
*Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 employee free expression against the interests of
of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus the employer in promoting efficiency of public
Election Code Do Not Violate the Equal services; (iii) if the employees expression
Protection Clause interferes with the maintenance of efficient and
regularly functioning services, the limitation on
In truth, this Court has already ruled squarely on speech is not unconstitutional; and (iv) the
whether these deemed-resigned provisions Legislature is to be given some flexibility or
challenged in the case at bar violate the equal latitude in ascertaining which positions are to be
protection clause of the Constitution in Farias, et covered by any statutory restrictions. Therefore,
al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. insofar as government employees are concerned,
the correct standard of review is an INTEREST-
The petitioners in Farias thus brought an equal BALANCING APPROACH, a means-end
protection challenge against Section 14, with the scrutiny that examines the closeness of fit
end in view of having the deemed-resigned between the governmental interests and the
provisions apply equally to both elected and prohibitions in question.
appointive officials. We held, however, that the
legal dichotomy created by the Legislature is a
reasonable classification, as there are material
and significant distinctions between the two *Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13
classes of officials. Consequently, the contention of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus
that Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation Election Code Do Not Suffer from
to Sections 66 and 67 of the Omnibus Election Overbreadth
Code, infringed on the equal protection clause of
the Constitution, failed muster. First, according to the assailed Decision, the
challenged provisions of law are overly broad
In said case, the Court ruled that: because they apply indiscriminately to all civil
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between servants holding appointive posts, without due
elective officials and appointive officials. The regard for the type of position being held by the
former occupy their office by virtue of the employee running for elective office and the
mandate of the electorate. They are elected to degree of influence that may be attendant
an office for a definite term and may be thereto. Such a myopic view obviously fails to
removed therefrom only upon stringent consider a different, yet equally plausible,
conditions. On the other hand, appointive threat to the government posed by the
officials hold their office by virtue of their partisan potential of a large and growing
designation thereto by an appointing bureaucracy: the danger of systematic abuse
authority. Some appointive officials hold their perpetuated by a powerful political machine
office in a permanent capacity and are that has amassed the scattered powers of
entitled to security of tenure while others government workers so as to give itself and
serve at the pleasure of the appointing its incumbent workers an unbreakable grasp
authority. on the reins of power.
Another substantial distinction between the Second, the assailed Decision also held that the
two sets of officials is that under Section 55, challenged provisions of law are overly broad
Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service because they are made to apply indiscriminately
Commission, Book V of the Administrative to all civil servants holding appointive offices,
Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), without due regard for the type of elective office
appointive officials, as officers and being sought, whether it be partisan or
employees in the civil service, are strictly nonpartisan in character, or in the national,
prohibited from engaging in any partisan municipal or barangay level. The Court ruled that:
political activity or take (sic) part in any A perusal of Resolution 8678 will immediately
election except to vote. Under the same disclose that the rules and guidelines set forth
provision, elective officials, or officers or therein refer to the filing of certificates of
employees holding political offices, are candidacy and nomination of official
obviously expressly allowed to take part in candidates of registered political parties, in
political and electoral activities. connection with the May 10, 2010 National
and Local Elections. Obviously, these rules
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section and guidelines, including the restriction in
66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, were issued
legislators deemed it proper to treat these two specifically for purposes of the May 10, 2010
classes of officials differently with respect to National and Local Elections, which, it must
the effect on their tenure in the office of the be noted, are decidedly partisan in character.
filing of the certificates of candidacy for any Thus, it is clear that the restriction in Section
position other than those occupied by them. 4(a) of RA 8678 applies only to the
Again, it is not within the power of the Court to candidacies of appointive officials vying for
partisan elective posts in the May 10, 2010 alleging that funds representing savings from
National and Local Elections. On this score, unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally
the overbreadth challenge leveled against disbursed. There were unfilled positions because
Section 4(a) is clearly unsustainable. Similarly, one hundred ninety (190) personnel were
a considered review of Section 13 of RA 9369 dismissed, and allegedly, these 190 personnel
and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, in continued to receive their salaries as ghost
conjunction with other related laws on the matter, agents.
will confirm that these provisions are likewise Petitioner Almonte denied the
not intended to apply to elections for allegations and asked that the complaint be
nonpartisan public offices. The only elections dismissed and the case considered closed.
which are relevant to the present inquiry are Similarly petitioner Perez, budget chief of the
the elections for barangay offices, since these EIIB, denied savings had been realized from the
are the only elections in this country which implementation of of E.O. No. 127 (dismissal of
involve nonpartisan public offices. In this 190 personnel.)
regard, it is well to note that from as far back T he Graft Investigation Officer of the
as the enactment of the Omnibus Election Ombudsman's office, Jose F. Sao asked for
Code in 1985, Congress has intended that authority to conduct a preliminary investigation.
these nonpartisan barangay elections be Anticipating the grant of his request, he issued a
governed by SPECIAL RULES, including a subpoena to petitioners Almonte and Perez,
separate rule on deemed resignations which requiring them to submit their counter-affidavits
is found in Section 39 of the Omnibus and the affidavits of their witnesses, as well as a
Election Code. subpoena duces tecum to the Chief of the EIIB's
Accounting Division ordering him to bring "all
In the United States, claims of facial overbreadth documents relating to Personal Services Funds
have been entertained only where, in the for the year 1988 and all evidence, such as
judgment of the court, the possibility that vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB
protected speech of others may be muted and for 1988."
perceived grievances left to fester (due to the Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved to quash
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad the subpoena and the subpoena duces
statutes) outweighs the possible harm to society tecum. Respondent Ombudsman granted the
in allowing some unprotected speech or conduct motion to quash the subpoena in view of the fact
to go unpunished. Facial overbreadth has that there were no affidavits filed against
likewise not been invoked where a limiting petitioners. But he denied their motion to quash
construction could be placed on the challenged the subpoena duces tecum. He ruled that
statute, and where there are readily apparent petitioners were not being forced to produce
constructions that would cure, or at least evidence against themselves, since the
substantially reduce, the alleged overbreadth of subpoena duces tecum was directed to the Chief
the statute. Accountant, petitioner Nerio Rogado. In addition
the Ombudsman ordered the Chief of the
In the case at bar, the probable harm to Records a Section of the EIIB, petitioner Elisa
society in permitting incumbent appointive Rivera, to produce before the investigator "all
officials to remain in office, even as they documents relating to Personnel Service Funds,
actively pursue elective posts, far outweighs for the year 1988, and all documents, salary
the less likely evil of having arguably vouchers for the whole plantilla of the EIIB for
protected candidacies blocked by the 1988, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof."
possible inhibitory effect of a potentially Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved for
overly broad statute. reconsideration, stating that, the Ombudsman
can act only "in any appropriate case, and
subject to such limitations as may be provided by
Biraogo et al. v. The Philippine Truth law" and that the complaint in this case is
Commission unsigned and unverified, thus the case is not an
GR No. 192935; December 7, 2010 appropriate one. According to them, those
J. Mendoza complainants who wrote the letter should be
identified and should sign the complaint.
FACTS: Otherwise, their right under the equal protection
clause of the Constitution will be violated. The
motion for reconsideration, having been denied,
hence, this petition.
COMMISSIONER JOSE T. ALMONTE vs.
HONORABLE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ and Issue: WoN petitoners right to equal protection
CONCERNED CITIZENS of the laws has been violated.
G.R. No. 95367 May 23, 1995
Held: NO. The Constitution expressly enjoins the
To put this case in perspective it should be stated Ombudsman to act on any complaint filed "in
at the outset that it does not concern a demand any form or manner" concerning official acts or
by a citizen for information under the freedom of omissions. (Art. XI, 12): The Ombudsman and
information guarantee of the Constitution. Rather his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall
it concerns the power of the Office of the act promptly on complaints filed in any form or
Ombudsman to obtain evidence in connection manner against public officials or employees of
with an investigation conducted by it vis-a-vis the the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
claim of privilege of an agency of the instrumentality thereof, including government-
Government. owned or controlled corporations and shall
in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of
Facts: Petitioner Almonte was formerly the action taken and the result thereof.
Commissioner of the Economic Intelligence and The Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides
Investigation Bureau (EIIB), while Perez is Chief in 26(2): The Office of the Ombudsman shall
of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management receive complaints from any source in whatever
Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued form concerning an official act or omission. It
by the Ombudsman in connection with his shall act on the complaint immediately and if it
investigation of an anonymous letter, written by finds the same entirely baseless, it shall dismiss
an employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen, the same and inform the complainant of such
dismissal citing the reasons therefor. If it finds a complainants are more often than not
reasonable ground to investigate further, it shall poor and simple folk who cannot
first furnish the respondent public officer or afford to hire lawyers
employee with a summary of the complaint and .
require him to submit a written answer within The Ombudsman is designated by the
seventy-two hours from receipt thereof. If the Constitution "protectors of the people" and as
answer is found satisfactory, it shall dismiss the such they are required by it "to act promptly on
case. complaints in any form or manner against public
Accordingly, in Diaz officials or employees of the Government, or any
v. Sandiganbayan the Court held that testimony subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
given at a fact-finding investigation and charges including government-owned or controlled
made in a pleading in a case in court constituted corporation." Even if the subpoenaed documents
a sufficient basis for the Ombudsman to are treated as presumptively privileged, this
commence investigation, because a formal decision would only justify ordering their
complaint was really not necessary. Rather than inspection in camera but not their nonproduction.
referring to the form of complaints, therefore, the Above all, there must be a scrupulous protection
phrase "in an appropriate case" in Art. XI, 12 of the documents delivered. The Court thus
means any case concerning official act or dismissed the petition, but it is directed that the
omission which is alleged to be "illegal, unjust, inspection of subpoenaed documents be made
improper, or inefficient." The phrase "subject to personally in camera by the Ombudsman, and
such limitations as may be provided by law" with all the safeguards outlined in this decision.
refers to such limitations as may be provided by
Congress or, in the absence thereof, to such
limitations as may be imposed by the courts. (NOTE: Petitioners complain that "in all forum
Such limitations may well include a and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can
requirement that the investigation be only hale respondents via their verified
concluded in camera, with the public complaints or sworn statements with their
excluded, as exception to the general nature identities fully disclosed," while in
of the proceedings in the Office of the proceedings before the Office of the
Ombudsman. A reconciliation is thereby Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to
made between the demands of national start an investigation. In the first place, there
security and the requirement of accountability can be no objection to this procedure because it
enshrined in the Constitution. is provided in the Constitution itself. In the
What has been said above disposes of second place, it is apparent that in permitting
petitioners' contention that the anonymous letter- the filing of complaints "in any form and in a
complaint against them is nothing but a vexatious manner," the framers of the Constitution took
prosecution. It only remains to say that the into account the well-known reticence of the
general investigation in the Ombudsman' s people which keep them from complaining
office is precisely for the purpose of against official wrongdoings. As this Court had
protecting those against whom a complaint is occasion to point out, the Office of the
filed against hasty, malicious, and oppressive Ombudsman is different from the other
prosecution as much as securing the State investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the
from useless and expensive trials. There may government because those subject to its
also be benefit resulting from such limited in jurisdiction are public officials who, through
camera inspection in terms of increased public official pressure and influence, can quash, delay
confidence that the privilege is not being abused or dismiss investigations held against them. On
and increased likelihood that no abuse is in fact the other hand complainants are more often than
occurring. not poor and simple folk who cannot afford to hire
Nor is there violation of petitioner's lawyers. )
right to the equal protection of the laws.
Petitioners complain that "in all forum and
tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., vs.
only hale respondents via their verified TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY
complaints or sworn statements with their G.R. No. L-23794, February 17, 1968,
identities fully disclosed," while in BENGZON, J.P., J.:
proceedings before the Office of the
Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to Facts: In1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc
start an investigation. City passed Ordinance No. 4 imposing "on any
and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at
In the first place, there can be no the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a
objection to this procedure because municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%)
it is provided in the Constitution per export sale to USA and other foreign
itself. countries." Payments for said tax were made,
In the second place, it is apparent under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.
that in permitting the filing of Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed
complaints "in any form and in a before the CFI with service of a copy upon the
manner," the framers of the Solicitor General, a complaint against the City of
Constitution took into account the Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board
well-known reticence of the people and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated
which keep them from complaining ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of
against official wrongdoings. the equal protection clause and the rule of
uniformity of taxation, aside from being an export
Thirdly, the Office of the Ombudsman tax forbidden under Section 2287 of the Revised
is different from the other Administrative Code.The respondent asserted
investigatory and prosecutory that the tax ordinance was within the city's power
agencies of the government because to enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that
those subject to its jurisdiction are the same did not violate the afore-cited
public officials who, through official constitutional limitations.
pressure and influence, can quash,
delay or dismiss investigations held Issue: Whether or not the ordinance violates
against them. On the other hand the equal protection clause.

constitutional rights, be invoked against the

Held: Yes. The Constitution in the bill of rights state?
provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws." The equal RULING: NO. In the absence of governmental
protection clause applies only to persons or interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
things identically situated and does not bar a Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
reasonable classification of the subject of This constitutional right refers to the
legislation, and a classification is reasonable immunity of one's person, whether citizen or
where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions alien, from interference by government.The
which make real differences; (2) these are contraband in the case at bar came into
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the possession of the government without the
classification applies not only to present latter transgressing appellant's rights against
conditions but also to future conditions which are unreasonable searches and seizures.
substantially identical to those of the present; (4) The constitutional proscription against
the classification applies only to those who unlawful searches and seizures applies as a
belong to the same class. restraint directed only against the government
A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that and its agencies tasked with the enforcement
the questioned ordinance does not meet them, of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against
for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary
and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing If the search is made at the behest or
ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, initiation of the proprietor of a private
Inc., was the only sugar central in the city of establishment for its own and private
Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be purposes, as in the case at bar, and without
reasonable, should be in terms applicable to the intervention of police authorities, the right
future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance against unreasonable searches and seizures
should not be singular and exclusive as to cannot be invoked for only the act of private
exclude any subsequently established sugar individuals, not law enforcers, is involved. In
central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the sum, the protection against unreasonable
coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a searches and seizures cannot be extended to
similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to acts committed by private individuals so as to
the tax because the ordinance expressly points bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the intrusion by the government.
entity to be levied upon.
STONEHILL vs. DIOKNO
ART.2 SEARCHES & SEIZURES G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967
PEOPLE vs. MARTI Facts: Upon application of the officers of the

G.R. No. 81561, January 18,1991 government (respondent prosecutors), several
judges (respondent judges) issued a total of 42
FACTS: Andre Marti went to the booth of the search warrants against petitioners & or the
Manila Packing and Export Forwarders in the corporations of which they were officers, directed
Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, to any peace officer, to search the persons
carrying with them 4 gift- wrapped packages. named and/ or the premises of their offices,
The packages were not inspected by Anita warehouses, and/ or residences, and to seize
Reyes, the proprietress, as Marti refused, who several personal properties as the "subject of
assured her that the packages simply contained the offense; stolen or embezelled or the fruits
books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his of the offense," or "used or intended to be
friend in Zurich. However, before delivery of used as the means of committing the offense"
appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/ or as violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes, proprietor and Customs Laws (TCC), NIRC and the RPC."
husband of Anita Reyes, following standard Alleging that the aforementioned search
operating procedure, opened the boxes for final warrants are null & void, said petitioners
inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a Stonehill, et.al. filed w/ the SC this original action
peculiar order emitted therefrom. His curiosity for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and
aroused. He squeezed one of the bundles injunction.
allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves
inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out Issues:
a cellophane wrapper protruding from the 1. Whether the right against unlafwful search
opening of one of the gloves. He made an and seizures may be invoked by artificial
opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and beings?
took several grams of the contents thereof. Job 2. Whether or not the search warrants in
Reyes reported the incident to the NBI and question were validly issued?
requested a laboratory examination of the 3. Whether or not the articles seized by virtue
samples he extracted from the cellophane of the warrants are admissible in evidence?
wrapper. It turned out that the dried leaves were
marijuana flowering tops as certified by the Held:
forensic chemist of the Narcotics Section of the 1. YES. Artificial beings are also entitiled to
NBI. the guarantee although they may be required to
` Thereafter, an information was filed open their books of accounts for examination by
against appellant for violation of R.A. 6425 the State in the exercise of POLICE POWER.
(Dangerous Drugs Act). Appellant contends that
the evidence subject of the imputed offense had 2. YES. Two points must be stressed in
been obtained in violation of his constitutional connection with Art. III, Section 2 of the
rights against unreasonable searches and Constitution: (a) that no warrant shall issue but
seizures and privacy of communication and upon probable cause to be determined by the
therefore argues that the same should be held judge in the manner set forth therein; and (b) that
inadmissible in evidence. the warrant shall particularly describe the things
to be seized.
ISSUE: Whether or not an act of a private None of these requirements has been
individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's complied with. Indeed, the same were issued
upon applications stating that the natural and DESCRIBED-- as well as tending to defeat its
juridical persons therein named had committed a major objective: the elimination of general
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and warrants.
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code."No specific offense had 3. NO. Relying upon Moncado vs. People's
been alleged in said applications. The Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondent- Prosecutors
averments thereof with respect to the offense maintain that, even if the searches and seizures
committed were abstract. As a consequence, it under consideration were unconstitutional, the
was impossible for the judges who issued the documents, papers and things thus seized are
warrants to have found the existence of a admissible in evidence against petitioners herein.
probable cause, for the same presupposes the Upon mature deliberation, however, we are
introduction of competent proof that the party unanimously of the opinion that the position taken
against whom it is sought has performed in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said
particular acts, or committed specific omissions, position was in line with the American common
violating a given provision of our criminal laws. law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed
To uphold the validity of the warrants in to go free merely "because the constable has
question would be to wipe out completely one of blundered," upon the theory that the
the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the searches and seizures is protected by means
domicile and the privacy of communication and other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully
correspondence at the mercy of the whims, obtained, such as the common-law action for
caprice or passion of peace officers. This is damages against the searching officer, against
precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the party who procured the issuance of the
the constitutional provision above quoted search warrant and against those assisting in the
to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is execution of an illegal search, their criminal
not difficult to imagine what would happen, in punishment, resistance, without liability to an
times of keen political strife, when the party in unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies
power feels that the minority is likely to wrest as may be provided by other laws.
it, even though by legal means. However, most common law
Such is the seriousness of the jurisdictions have already given up this approach
irregularities committed in connection with the and eventually adopted THE EXCLUSIONARY
disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed RULE, realizing that this is the only practical
it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former means of enforcing the constitutional
Rules of Court 14 by providing in its injunction against unreasonable searches
counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned
15 that "a search warrant shall not issue upon Hand:
probable cause in connection with one specific "As we understand it, the reason for
offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the the exclusion of evidence competent as such,
Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that which has been unlawfully acquired, is that
"no search warrant shall issue for more than exclusion is the only practical way of
one specific offense." enforcing the constitutional privilege. In
The grave violation of the Constitution earlier times the action of trespass against
made in the application for the contested search the offending official may have been
warrants was compounded by the description protection enough; but that is true no longer.
therein made of the effects to be searched for Only in case the prosecution which itself
and seized, to wit: controls the seizing officials, knows that it
"Books of accounts, financial cannot profit by their wrong, will that wrong
records, vouchers, journals, be repressed".
correspondence, receipts, We hold, therefore, that the doctrine
ledgers, portfolios, credit adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is
journals, typewriters, and hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the
other documents and/or search of three (3) residences of herein
papers showing all business petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June
transactions including 29, 1962 are null and void.
disbursement receipts,
balance sheets and related Soliven vs. Makasiar
profit and loss statements." GR No. 82585, November 14, 1988
Thus, the warrants authorized the Facts: Petitioner Luis Beltran contends, among
search for and seizure of records pertaining to others, that his constitutional rights were violated
ALL business transactions of petitioners herein, when respondent judge issued a warrant of arrest
regardless of whether the transactions were against him without personally examining the
legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to
seizure of all records of the petitioners and the determine probable cause. Petitioner contends
aforementioned corporations, whatever their that the Constitution now requires the judge to
nature, thus openly contravening the explicit personally examine the complainant and his
command of our Bill of Rights that the things witnesses in his determination of probable cause
to be seized be particularly described as well for the issuance of warrants of arrests. The basis
as tending to defeat its major objective: the for his contention was the fact that the word
elimination of general warrants. personally was added after the word
General search warrants are determined, and the phrase other responsible
outlawed because they place the sanctity of officers as may be authorized by law was
the domicile and the privacy of omitted.
communication and correspondence at the
mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of Issue: Is the petitioners contention correct?
peace officers. The warrants sanctioned the
seizure of all records of the petitioners and the Held: No. The pertinent Constitutional provision
aforementioned corporations, whatever their is highlighted herein below:
nature, thus openly contravening the explicit
command of our Bill of Rights-- THAT THE Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the
THINGS TO BE SEIZED BE PARTICULARLY people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and

effects against unreasonable Issue: Whether or not petitioners right to
searches and seizures of personal liberty and security of homes against
whatever nature and for any unreasonable searches and seizures as
purpose shall be inviolable, contemplated in Art. III, Sec. 2 of the 1987
and no search warrant or Constitution was violated.
warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause Held: Yes. The abovementioned section and
to be determined personally Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
by the judge after examination provide that the judge must, before issuing a
under oath or affirmation of search warrant, determine, whether there is
the complainant and the probable cause by examining the complainant
witnesses he may produce, and witness through searching questions and
and particularly describing the answers.The Court held that the judge failed to
place to be searched and the comply with the legal requirement that he must
persons or things to be examine the applicant and his witness in the form
seized. of searching questions and answers in order to
determine the existence of probable causes as
The addition of the word "personally" provided in the said statutory provision.
after the word "determined" and the deletion of The depositions of the witnesses did
the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to not only contain leading questions but it was
issue warrants to "other responsible officers as also very broad. The questions propounded
may be authorized by law", has apparently to the witnesses were in fact, not probing but
convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution were merely routinary. The deposition was
now requires the judge to personally examine the already mimeographed and all that the
complainant and his witnesses determination of witnesses had to do was fill in their answers
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of on the blanks provided.
arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation. The 'probable cause' required to
What the Constitution underscores is justify the issuance of a search warrant
the exclusive and personal responsibility of comprehends such facts and circumstances as
the issuing judge to satisfy himself the will induce a cautious man to rely upon them and
existence of probable cause. In satisfying act in pursuant thereof.Of the 8 questions asked,
himself of the existence of probable cause for the the 1st, 2nd and 4th pertain to identity. The 3rd
issuance of a warrant of arrest, THE JUDGE IS and 5th are leading not searching questions. The
NOT REQUIRED TO PERSONALLY EXAMINE 6th, 7th and 8th refer to the description of the
THE COMPLAINANT AND HIS WITNESSES. personalities to be seized, which is identical to
Following established doctrine and that in the Search Warrant and suffers from the
procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the same lack of particularity. The examination
report and the supporting documents conducted WAS GENERAL IN NATURE AND
submitted by the fiscal regarding the MERELY REPETITIOUS of the deposition of
existence of probable cause and, on the basis said witness. Mere generalization will not
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on suffice and does not satisfy the requirements
the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, or probable cause upon which a warrant may
he may disregard the fiscal's report and issue."
require the submission of supporting Likewise, this Court previously declared
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at that search warrants issued are invalid if it is due
a conclusion as to the existence of probable to the failure of the judge to examine the witness
cause. in the form of searching questions and answers.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, Pertinent portion of the decision reads:
otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the "Moreover, a perusal of the deposition of
preliminary examination and investigation of P/Lt. Florencio Angeles shows that it was too
criminal complaints instead of concentrating on brief and short. RESPONDENT JUDGE DID
hearing and deciding cases filed before their NOT EXAMINE HIM 'IN THE FORM OF
courts. SEARCHING QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS'.
ON THE CONTRARY, THE QUESTIONS
ASKED WERE LEADING AS THEY CALLED
Silva vs. Honorable Presiding Judge of RTC FOR A SIMPLE 'YES' OR 'NO' ANSWER. As
of Negros Oriental held in Quintero vs. NBI, 'the questions
GR No. 81756, October 21, 1991 propounded by respondent Executive Judge to
the applicant's witness are not sufficiently
Facts: On June 12, 1986, Villamor, Jr., chief of searching to establish probable cause. Asking of
the PC Narcom Detachment in Dumaguete City, leading questions to the deponent in an
Province of Negros Oriental, filed an Application application for search warrant, and
for Search Warrant with the RTC against conducting of examination in a general
petitioners Silva. Respondent Judge, on the manner, would not satisfy the requirements
same day issued Search Warrant No. 1, directing for issuance of a valid search warrant."
the police officers to search the room of Marlon Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the
Silva in the residence of Nicomedes Silva for judge must strictly comply with the
violation of RA 6425 otherwise known as constitutional and statutory requirement that
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. During the search he must determine the existence of probable
conducted by the police officers, they also seized cause by personally examining the applicant
money belonging to petitioner Antonieta Silva and his witnesses in the form of searching
amounting to P1,231.40. questions and answers. His failure to comply
Thereafter, Antonieta Silva filed a with this requirement constitutes grave abuse
motion for the return of the said amount on the of discretion. As "the capricious disregard by the
ground that the search warrant only authorized judge in not complying with the requirements
the police officers to seize marijuana dried before issuance of search warrants constitutes
leaves, cigarettes and joint, and that said officers abuse of discretion".
failed or refused to make a return of the said The officers implementing the search
search warrant in violation of Sec. 11, Rule 126 warrant clearly abused their authority when they
of the Rules of Court. seized the money of Antonieta Silva. This is
highly irregular considering that Antonieta Silva fact, after A fair though summary hearing, are
was not even named as one of the respondents, made conclusive.
that the warrant did not indicate the seizure of The determination of the propriety of
money but only of marijuana leaves, cigarettes deportation is not a prosecution for, or a
and joints, and that the search warrant was conviction of, crime; nor is the deportation a
issued for the seizure of personal property (a) punishment, even though the facts underlying
subject of the offense and (b) used or intended to the decision may constitute a crime under
be used as means of committing an offense and local law. The proceeding is in effect simply a
NOT for personal property stolen or embezzled refusal by the government to harbor persons
or other proceeds of fruits of the offense. Thus, whom it does not want. The coincidence of
the then presiding Judge Ontal likewise abused local penal law with the policy of congress is
his discretion when he rejected the motion of purely accidental, and, though supported by the
petitioner Antonieta Silva seeking the return of same facts, a criminal prosecution and a
her seized money. proceeding for deportation are separate and
independent.
In consequence, the constitutional
Morano vs. Vivo guarantee set forth in Section 1(3), Article III
GR no. L-22196, June 30, 1967 of the Constitution aforesaid requiring that
the issue of probable cause be determined by
Facts: On November 23, 1961, Petititoner Chan a judge, does not extend to deportation
Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen, arrived in the proceedings.
Philippines to visit her cousin, Sameul Malaps, The view, we, here express funds
together with her minor son, with her first support in the discussions during the
marriage, Fu Yan Fun. They were permitted in constitutional convention. The convention
the Philippines under a temporary visitors visa recognized, as sanctioned by due process,
for 2 months after they posted a cash bond of possibilities and cases of deprivation of liberty,
P4,000.00. She married Morano, a Filipino other than by order of a competent court.
citizen. The Commissioner of Immigration asked Indeed, the power to deport or expel
them to leave the country due to the expiration of aliens is an attribute of sovereignty. Such power
the extensions they applied for. is planted on the "accepted maxim of
Instead of leaving, they petitioned the international law, that every sovereign nation has
CFI of Manila for mandamus to compel the the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and
Commissioner to cancel petitioners Alien essential to self-preservation, to forbid the
Certificate of Registration; prohibition to stop the entrance of foreigners within its dominions." So
Commissioner from issuing a warrant of arrest. it is, that this Court once aptly remarked that
The trial court ruled in favour of Chan but there can be no controversy on the fact that
dismissed the petition with respect to Fu Yan where aliens are admitted as temporary visitors,
Fun. Both petitioners and respondent appealed. "the law is to the effect that temporary visitors
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of who do not depart upon the expiration of the
Sec. 37 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1940, which period of stay granted them are subject to
states that, The following aliens shall be arrested deportation by the Commissioner of Immigration,
upon the warrant of the Commissioner of for having violated the limitation or condition
Immigration or any other officer designated by under which they were admitted as non-
him for the purpose and deported upon the immigrants (Immigration Law, Sec. 37(a),
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after subsection (7) C.A. 613, as amended).
a determination by the Board of Commissioners And, in a case directly in point, where
of the existence of the ground deportation as the power of the Commissioner to issue warrants
charged against the alien xxx. Petitioners of arrest was challenged as unconstitutional
contend that the above provision trenches upon because "such power is only vested in a judge by
the constitutional mandate in Art. III, Sec. 1 (3). Section 1, paragraph 3, Article III of our
They say that the Constitution limits to judges Constitution", this Court declared
the authority to issue warrants of arrest. "This argument overlooks the fact
that the stay of appellant Ng Hua To as
Issue: Whether or not Sec. 37 (a) of the temporary visitor is subject to certain
Immigration Act of 1940 is unconstitutional. contractual stipulations as contained in the
cash bond put up by him, among them, that in
Held: No. The Court held that, Sec. 1 (3), Art. III case of breach the Commissioner may require
does not require judicial intervention in the the recommitment of the person in whose
execution of a final order of deportation issued in favor the bond has been filed. The
accordance with law. The constitutional Commissioner did nothing but to enforce
limitation contemplates an order of arrest in such condition. Such a step is necessary to
the exercise of judicial power AS A STEP enable the Commissioner to prepare the
PRELIMINARY OR INCIDENTAL TO ground for his deportation under section 37
PROSECUTION OR PROCEEDINGS FOR A (a) of Commonwealth Act 613. A contrary
GIVEN OFFENSE OR ADMINISTRATIVE interpretation would render such power
ACTION, not as A MEASURE nugatory to the detriment of the State."
INDISPENSABLE TO CARRY OUT A VALID It is in this context that we rule that
DECISION BY A COMPETENT OFFICIAL, such Section 37 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1940 is
as legal order of deportation, issued by the not constitutionally proscribed.
Commissioner of Immigration, in pursuance
of a valid legislation. Harvey vs. Santiago
It is thoroughly established that GR No. 82544, June 28, 1988
Congress has power to order the deportation
of aliens whose presence in the country it Facts: Petitioners were among the twenty-two
deems hurtful. Owing to the nature of the suspected pedophiles who were apprehended
proceeding, the deportation of an alien who is after a three-month surveillance by the
found in this country in violation of law is not Commission on Immigration and Deportation
a deprivation of liberty without due process of (CID) in Pagsanjan, Laguna. They were
law. This is so, although the inquiry devolves apprehended by virtue of Mission Orders issued
upon executive officers, and their findings of by respondent Santiago. Petitioner contends the
validity of their detention in CID Detention Center,
assailing, inter alia, that respondent violated Art. beginning" (Matsura vs. Director of Prisons, 77
III, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting Phil. 1050 [1947]).
unreasonable searches and seizures since CID That petitioners were not "caught in the
agents were not clothed with valid Warrants of act" does not make their arrest illegal.
arrest, search and seizures as required by the Petitioners were found with young boys in
said provision. their respective rooms, the ones with John
Sherman being naked, Under those
Issues: circumstances the CID agents had reasonable
1. Whether or not there was a valid warrantless grounds to believe that petitioners had
arrest? committed "pedophilia" defined as "psycho-
2. Assuming arguendo that the arrest was not sexual perversion involving children" (Kraft-
valid, is there a valid basis for the Ebbing Psychopatia Sexualis, p. 555; "Paraphilia
confinement of herein petitioner? (or unusual sexual activity) in which children are
3. Is the Constitutional prohibition against the preferred sexual object" (Webster's Third
warrantless arrest & searches applicable New International Dictionary, 1971 ed., p. 1665)
herein? [Solicitor General's Return of the Writ, on p. 10].
While not a crime under the Revised Penal
Code, it is behavior offensive to public morals
and violative of the declared policy of the
Held: State to promote and protect the physical,
1. YES. There can be no question that the right moral, spiritual, and social well-being of our
against unreasonable searches and seizures youth (Article II, Section 13, 1987
guaranteed by Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution).
Constitution, is available to all persons, including At any rate, the filing by petitioners of
aliens, whether accused of crime or not a petition to be released on bail should be
(Moncado vs. People's Court, 80 Phil. 1 [1948]. considered as a waiver of any irregularity
One of the constitutional requirements of a valid attending their arrest and estops them from
search warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must questioning its validity (Callanta v. Villanueva,
be based upon probable cause. Probable cause L-24646 & L-24674, June 20, 1977, 77 SCRA
has been defined as referring to "such facts and 377; Bagcal vs. Villaraza, L-61770, January 31,
circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the 1983, 120 SCRA 525).
warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce
a cautious man to rely on them and act in
pursuance thereof. 3. NO. The deportation charges instituted by
The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure respondent Commissioner are in accordance with
also provide that an arrest without a warrant may Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of
be effected by a peace officer or even a private 1940, in relation to Section 69 of the Revised
person (1) when such person has committed, Administrative Code. Section 37(a) provides in
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an part:
offense in his presence; and (2) when an offense (a) The following aliens shall
has, in fact, been committed and he has personal be arrested upon the warrant
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to of the Commissioner of
be arrested has committed it (Rule 113, Section Immigration and Deportation
5). or any other officer
In this case, the arrest of petitioners designated by him for the
was based on probable cause determined purpose and deported upon
after close surveillance for three (3) months the warrant of the
during which period their activities were Commissioner of
monitored. The existence of probable cause Immigration and Deportation
justified the arrest and the seizure of the after a determination by the
photo negatives, photographs and posters Board of Commissioners of
without warrant. Those articles were seized the existence of the ground
as an incident to a lawful arrest and, are for deportation as charged
therefore, admissible in evidence (Section 12, against the alien;
Rule 126, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure).
The foregoing provision should be construed in
2. YES. Even assuming arguendo that the its entirety in view of the summary and indivisible
arrest of petitioners was not valid at its nature of a deportation proceeding, otherwise,
inception, the records show that formal the very purpose of deportation proceedings
deportation charges have been filed against would be defeated.
them, as undesirable aliens, on 4 March 1988.
Warrants of arrest were issued against them on 7 Section 37(a) is not constitutionally
March 1988 "for violation of Section 37, 45 and proscribed (Morano vs. Vivo, L-22196, June
46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 562). The specific
Administrative Code." A hearing is presently constraints in both the 1935 and 1987
being conducted by a Board of Special Constitutions, which are substantially
Inquiry. The restraint against their persons, identical, contemplate prosecutions
therefore, has become legal. The Writ has essentially criminal in nature. Deportation
served its purpose. The process of the law is proceedings, on the other hand, are
being followed (Cruz vs. Montoya, L-39823, administrative in character. An order of
February 25, 1975, 62 SCRA 543). "Where a deportation is never construed as a
person's detention was later made by virtue punishment. It is preventive, not a penal
of a judicial order in relation to criminal cases process. It need not be conducted strictly in
subsequently filed against the detainee, his accordance with ordinary Court proceedings.
petition for habeas corpus becomes moot and
academic" (Beltran vs. Garcia, L-49014, April "It is of course well-settled that deportation
30, 1979, 89 SCRA 717). "It is a fundamental rule proceedings do not constitute a criminal
that a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted action. The order of deportation is not a
when the confinement is or has become legal, punishment, it being merely the return to his
although such confinement was illegal at the country of an alien who has broken the
conditions upon which he could continue to
reside within our borders. The deportation be declared guilty of contempt for having
proceedings are administrative in character, disobeyed the order of the court.
summary in nature, and need not be The petitioner asks that the warrant of
conducted strictly in accordance with the June 3, 1936, issued by the Court of First
ordinary court proceedings. It is essential, Instance of Tayabas, ordering the search of his
however, that the warrant of arrest shall give house and the seizure, at any time of the day or
the alien sufficient information about the night, of certain accounting books, documents
charges against him, relating the facts relied and papers belonging to him in his residence
upon. It is also essential that he be given a situated in Infanta, Province of Tayabas, as well
fair hearing with the assistance of counsel, if as the order of a later date, authorizing the
he so desires, before unprejudiced agents of the Anti-Usury Board to retain the
investigators. However, all the strict rules of articles seized, be declared illegal and set aside,
evidence governing judicial controversies do and prays that all the articles in question be
not need to be observed; only such as are returned to him.
fundamental and essential, like the right of
cross-examination. Issue: Is the warrant of arrest herein illegally
issued?
Held: YES. Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III

of the Constitution, relative to the bill of rights,
provides that "The right of the people to be
Alvarez vs. CFI secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
G.R. No. 45358, January 29, 1937 effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
Facts: On June 3, 1936, the chief of the secret determined by the judge after examination under
service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
Department of Justice, presented to Judge witnesses he may produce, and particularly
Eduardo Gutierrez David then presiding over the describing the place to be searched, and the
Court of First Instance of Tayabas, an affidavit persons or things to be seized." Section 97 of
alleging that according to reliable information, the General Orders, No. 58 provides that "A search
petitioner kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, warrant shall not issue except for probable
books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other cause and upon application supported by
papers used by him in connection with his oath particularly describing the place to be
activities as a money-lender, charging usurious searched and the person or thing to be
rates of interest in violation of the law. In his oath seized." It will be noted that both provisions
at the end of the affidavit, the chief of the secret require that there be not only probable cause
service stated that his answers to the questions before the issuance of a search warrant but
were correct to the best of his knowledge and that the search warrant must be based upon
belief. He did not swear to the truth of his an application supported by oath of the
statements upon his own knowledge of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce.
facts but upon the information received by In its broadest sense, an OATH includes
him from a reliable person. Upon the affidavit in any form of attestation by which a party
question the judge, on said date, issued the signifies that he is bound in conscience to
warrant which is the subject matter of the petition, perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it
ordering the search of the petitioner's house at is sometimes defined as an outward pledge
any time of the day or night, the seizure of the given by the person taking it that his
books and documents above-mentioned and the attestation or promise is made under an
immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed immediate sense of his responsibility to God.
of in accordance with the law. With said warrant, The oath required must refer to the truth of
several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the facts within the personal knowledge of the
the petitioner's store and residence at seven petitioner or his witnesses, because the
o'clock on the night of June 4, 1936, and seized purpose thereof is to convince the
and took possession of the following articles: committing magistrate, not the individual
internal revenue licenses for the years 1933 to making the affidavit and seeking the issuance
1936, one ledger, two journals, two cashbooks, of the warrant, of the existence of probable
nine order books, four notebooks, four check cause .The true test of sufficiency of an
stubs, two memorandums, three bankbooks, two affidavit to warrant issuance of a search
contracts, four stubs, forty-eight stubs of warrant is whether it has been drawn in such
purchases of copra, two inventories, two bundles a manner that PERJURY could be charged
of bills of lading, one bundle of credit receipts, thereon and affiant be held liable for damages
one bundle of stubs of purchases of copra, two caused.
packages of correspondence, one receipt book
belonging to Luis Fernandez, fourteen bundles of It will likewise be noted that section 1,
invoices and other papers, many documents and paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution
loan contracts with security and promissory prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.
notes, 504 chits, promissory notes and stubs of Unreasonable searches and seizures are a
used checks of the Hongkong & Shanghai menace against which the constitutional
Banking Corporation. The search for and seizure guaranties afford full protection. The term
of said articles were made with the opposition of "unreasonable search and seizure" is not
the petitioner who stated his protest below the defined in the Constitution or in General Orders,
inventories on the ground that the agents seized No. 58, and it is said to have no fixed, absolute or
even the originals of the documents. As the unchangeable meaning, although the term has
articles had not been brought immediately to the been defined in general language. All illegal
judge who issued the search warrant, the searches and seizures are unreasonable
petitioner, through his attorney, filed a motion on while lawful ones are reasonable. What
June 8, 1936, praying that the agent Emilio L. constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable
Siongco, or any other agent, be ordered search or seizure in any particular case is
immediately to deposit all the seized articles in purely a judicial question, determinable from
the office of the clerk of court and that said agent a consideration of the circumstances
involved, including the purpose of the search,
the presence or absence of probable cause, insufficient and the warrant issued exclusively
the manner in which the search and seizure upon it illegal, our conclusion is that the
was made, the place or thing searched, and contention is equally well founded and that the
the character of the articles procured search could not legally be made at night.
In view of the foregoing and under the One of the grounds alleged by the
above-cited authorities, it appears that THE petitioner in support of his contention that the
AFFIDAVIT, which served as the exclusive warrant was issued illegally is the lack of an
basis of the search warrant, is insufficient adequate description of the books and
and fatally defective by reason of the manner documents to be seized. Section 1, paragraph
in which the oath was made, and therefore, it 3, of Article III of the Constitution, and section 97
is hereby held that the search warrant in of General Orders, No. 58 provide that the
question and the subsequent seizure of the affidavit to be presented, which shall serve as the
books, documents and other papers are basis for determining whether probable cause
illegal and do not in any way warrant the exists and whether the warrant should be issued,
deprivation to which the petitioner was must contain a particular description of the
subjected. place to be searched and the person or thing
Another ground alleged by the petitioner to be seized. These provisions are mandatory
in asking that the search warrant be declared and must be strictly complied with but where,
illegal and cancelled is that it was not supported by the nature of the goods to be seized, their
by other affidavits aside from that made by the description must be rather general, it is not
applicant. In other words, it is contended that the required that a technical description be given,
search warrant cannot be issued unless it be as this would mean that no warrant could
supported by affidavits made by the applicant issue. The only description of the articles given
and the witnesses to be presented necessarily by in the affidavit presented to the judge was as
him. Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the follows: "that there are being kept in said
Constitution provides that no warrants shall issue premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits
but upon probable cause, to be determined by and other papers used by him in connection with
the judge after examination under oath or his activities as money-lender, charging a
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law."
he may produce. Section 98 of General Orders, Taking into consideration the nature of the
No. 58 provides that the judge or justice must, articles so described, it is clear that no other
before issuing the warrant, examine under oath more adequate and detailed description could
the complainant and any witnesses he may have been given, particularly because it is
produce and take their depositions in writing. It is difficult to give a particular description of the
the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the contents thereof. The description so made
affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to substantially complies with the legal
the application. It is admitted that the judge who provisions because the officer of the law who
issued the search warrant in this case, relied executed the warrant was thereby placed in a
exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent position enabling him to identify the articles,
Mariano G. Almeda and that he did not require which he did.
nor take the deposition of any other witness. The last ground alleged by the
Neither the Constitution nor General Orders, No. petitioner, in support of his claim that the search
58 provides that it is of imperative necessity to warrant was obtained illegally, is that the
take the depositions of the witnesses to be articles were seized in order that the Anti-
presented by the applicant or complainant in Usury Board might provide itself with
addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose evidence to be used by it in the criminal case
of both in requiring the presentation of or cases which might be filed against him for
depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the violation of the Anti-Usury Law. (fishing
committing magistrate of the existence of expedition) At the hearing of the incidents of the
probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the case raised before the court, it clearly appeared
applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge that the books and documents had really been
may dispense with that of other witnesses. seized to enable the Anti-Usury Board to conduct
Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent an investigation and later use all or some of the
in this case was insufficient because HIS articles in question as evidence against the
KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS WAS NOT petitioner in the criminal cases that may be filed
PERSONAL but merely HEARSAY, it is the against him. The seizure of books and
duty of the judge to require the affidavit of documents by means of a search warrant, for the
one or more witnesses for the purpose of purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal
determining the existence of probable cause case against the person in whose possession
to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. they were found, is unconstitutional because it
When the affidavit of the applicant or makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is
complainant contains sufficient facts within equivalent to a violation of the constitutional
his personal and direct knowledge, it is provision prohibiting the compulsion of an
sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there accused to testify against himself. Therefore, it
exists probable cause; when the applicant's appearing that at least nineteen of the documents
knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the in question were seized for the purpose of using
affidavit of one or more witnesses having a them as evidence against the petitioner in the
personal knowledge of the facts is necessary. criminal proceeding or proceedings for violation
We conclude, therefore, that the warrant of the Anti-Usury Law, which it is attempted to
issued is likewise illegal because it was institute against him, we hold that the search
based only on the affidavit of the agent who warrant issued is illegal and that the documents
had no personal knowledge of the facts. should be returned to him.
The petitioner alleged as another
ground for the declaration of the illegality of the NOTE: In sum, the ruling may be summarized as
search warrant and the cancellation thereof, the follows:
fact that it authorized its execution at night.
Section 101 of General Orders, No. 58 authorizes 1. That the provisions of the Constitution
that the search be made at night when it is and General Orders, No. 58, relative to search
positively asserted in the affidavit that the and seizure, should be given a liberal
property is on the person or in the place ordered construction in favor of the individual in order
to be searched. As we have declared the affidavit
to maintain the constitutional guaranties Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
whole and in their full force; motion was denied by the Judge, stating that the
court has made a thorough investigation and
2. That since the provisions in question are examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles
drastic in their form and fundamentally and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the
restrict the enjoyment of the ownership, Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police
possession and use of the personal property District II INP; that in fact the court made a
of the individual, they should be strictly certification to that effect; and that the fact that
construed; documents relating to the search warrant were
not attached immediately to the record of the
3. That the search and seizure made are criminal case is of no moment, considering that
illegal for the following reasons: (a) Because the rule does not specify when these documents
the warrant was based solely upon the are to be attached to the records. Mata came to
affidavit of the petitioner who had NO the Supreme Court and prayed that the search
personal knowledge of the facts necessary to warrant be declared invalid for its alleged failure
determine the existence or non-existence of to comply with the requisites of the Constitution
probable cause, and (b) because the warrant and the Rules of Court
was issued for the sole purpose of seizing
evidence which would later be used in the Issue: Whether or not the search warrant was
criminal proceedings that might be instituted valid.
against the petitioner, for violation of the Anti-
Usury Law;
Held: NO. We hold that the search warrant is
4. That as the warrant had been issued tainted with illegality for being violative of the
unreasonably, and as it does not appear Constitution and the Rules of Court.
positively in the affidavit that the articles were Under the Constitution "no search
in the possession of the petitioner and in the warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to
place indicated, neither could the search and be determined by the Judge or such other
seizure be made at night; responsible officer as may be authorized by law
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
5. That although it is not mandatory to complainant and the witnesses he may produce".
present affidavits of witnesses to corroborate More emphatic and detailed is the
the applicant or complainant in cases where implementing rule of the constitutional injunction,
the latter has personal knowledge of the Section 4 of Rule 126 which provides that the
facts, when the applicant's or complainant's judge must before issuing the warrant personally
knowledge of the facts is merely hearsay, it is examine on oath or affirmation the complainant
the duty of the judge to require affidavits of and any witnesses he may produce and take
other witnesses so that he may determine their depositions in writing, and attach them to
whether probable cause exists; the record, in addition to any affidavits presented
to him.
6. That a detailed description of the person Mere affidavits of the complainant
and place to be searched and the articles to and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
be seized is necessary, but where, by the examining Judge has to take depositions in
nature of the articles to be seized, their writing of the complainant and the witnesses
description must be rather general, it is not he may produce and to attach them to the
required that a technical description be given, record. Such written deposition is necessary
as this would mean that no warrant could in order that the Judge may be able to
issue; properly determine the existence or non-
existence of the probable cause, to hold liable
(Adonis Notes: The conjunctive word AND in for perjury the person giving it if it will be
Art. 3, sec.3 is not to be meant as BOTH found later that his declarations are false.
Complainant & Witness should each produce We, therefore, hold that the search
affidavits. The Judge may require the affidavit warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of
solely of the complainant if it is itself sufficient to the Judge to conform with the essential requisites
establish probable cause. Alvarez vs. CFI) of taking the depositions in writing and attaching
them to the record, rendering the search warrant
Soriano Mata vs. Judge Josephine Bayona invalid.
GR 50720, March 26, 1984, De Castro J. The judge's insistence that she
examined the complainants under oath has
Facts: Soriano Mata was accused under become dubious by petitioner's claim that at
Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as amended by the particular time when he examined all the
PD 1306, the information against him alleging relevant papers connected with the issuance
that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged of the questioned search warrant, after he
bets on the Jai Alai game by selling illegal tickets demanded the same from the lower court
known as Masiao tickets without any authority since they were not attached to the records,
from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement he did not find any certification at the back of
Corporation or from the government authorities the joint affidavit of the complainants. As
concerned. stated earlier, before he filed his motion to quash
Petitioner claims that during the hearing the search warrant and for the return of the
of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the articles seized, he was furnished, upon his
records of the said case could be found the request, certified true copies of the said affidavits
search warrant and other pertinent papers by the Clerk of Court but which certified true
connected to the issuance of the same, so that copies do not bear any certification at the back.
he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its Petitioner likewise claims that his xerox copy of
whereabouts, and to which inquiry Judge the said joint affidavit obtained at the outset of
Josephine K. Bayona replied, it is with the court. this case does not show also the certification of
The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal respondent judge. This doubt becomes more
who attached them to the records. This led Mata confirmed by respondent Judge's own admission,
to file a motion to quash and annul the search while insisting that she did examine thoroughly
warrant and for the return of the articles seized, the applicants, that "she did not take the
citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of deposition of Mayote and Goles because to have

done so would be to hold a judicial proceeding shabu, an aluminum foil, a paltik .22 caliber atop
which will be open and public", such that, the TV set, three used ammunitions in a cup and
according to her, the persons subject of the three wallets, one containing the marked money.
intended raid will just disappear and move his SPO1 Novero found inside a show box aluminum
illegal operations somewhere else. foils, napkins and a burner.
Could it be that the certification was Normando del Rosario was charged
made belatedly to cure the defect of the warrant? with Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Be that as it may, there was no "deposition in Ammunitions and Illegal Sale of Regulated
writing" attached to the records of the case in Drugs.
palpable disregard of the statutory prohibition
heretofore quoted. Issues:
Respondent Judge impresses this Court 1. Whether or not the implementation of the
that the urgency to stop the illegal gambling that search warrant was lawful and that the
lures every man, woman and child, and even the object seized may be used to prove Del
lowliest laborer who could hardly make both ends Rosarios guilt?
meet justifies her action. She claims that in order 2. Whether the ammunition was validly
to abate the proliferation of this illegal "masiao" seized as an incident to a lawful arrest?
lottery, she thought it more prudent not to
conduct the taking of deposition which is done
usually and publicly in the court room. Held:
Two points must be made clear. The 1. No. According to the version of the
term "depositions" is sometimes used in a broad prosecution, during the alleged buy-bust
sense to describe any written statement verified operation, accused-appellant handed over to
by oath; but in its more technical and appropriate Veneracion Luna, the alleged poseur-buyer, a
sense the meaning of the word is limited to quantity of shabu, and Luna in turn paid accused-
written testimony of a witness given in the course appellant a marked 100 bill and then returned to
of a judicial proceeding in advance of the trial or the police station and informed the raiding team
hearing upon oral examination. 4 A deposition is that he had already bought the shabu from
the testimony of a witness, put or taken in writing, accused-appellant. Thereupon, the raiding team
under oath or affirmation before a commissioner, proceeded to the house of accused-appellant to
examiner or other judicial officer, in answer to implement the search warrant. The version of the
interlocutory and cross interlocutory, and usually prosecution is highly incredible. The record is
subscribed by the witnesses. 5 The searching devoid of any reason why the police officers did
questions propounded to the applicants of the not make any attempt to arrest accused-appellant
search warrant and his witnesses must depend to at the time he allegedly sold the shabu to
a large extent upon the discretion of the Judge Veneracion Luna who was accompanied by
just as long as the answers establish a another police officer. That was the opportune
reasonable ground to believe the commission of moment to arrest accused-appellant. The
a specific offense and that the applicant is one version foisted by the prosecution upon this
authorized by law, and said answers particularly Court is contrary to human experience in the
describe with certainty the place to be searched ordinary course of human conduct. The usual
and the persons or things to be seized. The procedure in a buy-bust operation is for the
examination or investigation which must be under police officers to arrest the pusher of drugs at
oath may not be in public. It may even be held in the very moment he hands over the
the secrecy of his chambers. Far more important dangerous drug to the poseur-buyer. That is
is that the examination or investigation is not the every reason why such a police operation
merely routinary but one that is thorough and is called a "BUY-BUST" operation. The police
elicit the required information. To repeat, it must poseur-buyer "buys dangerous drugs from
be under oath and must be in writing. the pusher and "bust" (arrests) him the
moment the pusher hands over the drug to
the police officer.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs We thus entertain serious doubts that
NORMANDO DEL ROSARIO the shabu contained in a small canister was
G.R. No. 109633, July 20, 1994, MELO, J. actually seized or confiscated at the residence of
accused-appellant. in consequence, the manner
Facts: Upon application of SPO3 Raymundo the police officers conducted the subsequent and
Untiveros, RTC Judge Arturo de Guia issued in much-delayed search is highly irregular. Upon
the morning of September 4, 1991 a search barging into the residence of accused-appellant,
warrant authorizing the search and seizure of an the police officers found him lying down and they
"undetermined quantity of Methamphetamine immediately arrested and detained him in the
Hydrochloride commonly known as shabu and its living room while they searched the other parts of
paraphernalias" in the premises of appellant's the house. Although they fetched two persons to
house. However, the search warrant was not witness the search, the witnesses were called in
implemented immediately due to the lack of only after the policemen had already entered
police personnel to form the raiding team. At accused-appellant's residence (pp. 22-23, tsn,
about 9 o'clock in the evening of that day, a December 11, 1991), and, therefore, the
raiding team was finally organized. In the final policemen had more than ample time to plant the
briefing of the raiding team at the police station, it shabu.
was agreed upon that PO1 Venerando Luna will At any rate, accused-appellant
buy shabu from appellant and after his return cannot be convicted of possession of the
from appellant's house, the raiding team will shabu contained in a canister and allegedly
implement the search warrant. A marked money seized at his house, for the charge against
consisting of a P100 bill bearing serial no. PQ him was for selling shabu. Sale is totally
329406 was given by the Station Commander to different from possession.
PO1 Luna and entered in the police logbook Moreover, the search warrant
PO1 Luna with a companion proceeded to implemented by the raiding party authorized only
appellant's house to implement the search the search and seizure shabu and
warrant. Barangay Capt. Maigue, Norma del paraphernalia for the use thereof and no
Rosario and appellant witnessed the search at other. the described quantity of
appellant's house. SPO3 de la Cruz and PO3 Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly
Francisco found a black canister containing known as shabu and its paraphernalia". A search
warrant is not a sweeping authority purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court

empowering a raiding party to undertake a for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore,
finishing expedition to seize and confiscate need not follow the usual procedure in the
any and all kinds of evidence or articles prosecution of offenses which requires the
relating to a crime. The Constitution itself and determination by a judge of the existence of
the Rules of Court, specifically mandate that probable cause before the issuance of a
the search warrant must particularly describe judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of
the things to be seized. Thus, the search bail if the offense is bailable. The absence of a
warrant was no authority for the police judicial warrant is no legal impediment to
officers to seize the firearm which was not arresting or capturing persons committing overt
mentioned, much less described with acts of violence against government forces, or
particularity, in the search warrant. any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of
the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is
2. NO. Neither may it be maintained that the thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation
gun was seized in the course of an arrest, for that involves the very survival of society and its
as earlier observed, Del Rosario's arrest was government and duly constituted authorities.
far from regular and legal. Said firearm,
having been illegally seized, the same is not People v. Sucro
admissible in evidence. GR 93239, 18 March 1991
Facts: Pat. Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalados

Umil v. Ramos house at C. Quimpo to monitor activities of
GR 81567, 9 June 1990 Edison SUCRO (accused). Sucro was reported to
be selling marijuana at a chapel 2 meters away
Facts: The Regional Intelligence Operations Unit from Regalados house. Sucro was monitored to
of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) have talked and exchanged things three times.
received confidential information about a member These activities are reported through radio to
of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) P/Lt. Seraspi. A third buyer was transacting with
being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. appellant and was reported and later identified as
Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon Ronnie Macabante. From that moment,
City. Upon verification, it was found that the P/Lt.Seraspi proceeded to the area. While the
wounded person, who was listed in the hospital police officers were at the Youth Hostel in
records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Maagama St. Fulgencio told Lt. Seraspi to
Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad, intercept. Macabante was intercepted at Mabini
responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM soldiers and Maagama crossing in front of Aklan Medical
the day before. Dural was then transferred to the center. Macabante saw the police and threw a
Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for tea bag of marijuana on the ground. Macabante
security reasons. While confined thereat, Dural admitted buying the marijuana from Sucro in front
was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the of the chapel.
gunman who went on top of the hood of the The police team intercepted and
CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the 2 arrested SUCRO at the corner of C. Quimpo and
CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the Veterans. Recovered were 19 sticks and 4
car.Consequently, Dural was referred to the teabags of marijuana from a cart inside the
Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest chapel and another teabag from Macabante.
and thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Caloocan City an information charging Issue: Whether or not the arrest without warrant
Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the is lawful.
crime of Double Murder with Assault Upon
Agents of Persons in Authority. Held: Yes. Search and seizures supported by
A petition for habeas corpus was filed a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute
with the Supreme Court on behalf of Roberto rule. Rule 126, Sec 12 of Rules of Criminal
Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The Procedure provides that a person lawfully
Court issued the writ of habeas corpus. A Return arrested may be searched for dangerous
of the Writ was filed. Umil and Villanueva posted weapons or anything, which may be used as
bail before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City proof of the commission of an offense,
where charges for violation of the Anti- without a search warrant.(People v. Castiller.
Subversion Act had been filed against them, and The failure of the police officers to secure a
they were accordingly released. warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge
required from the surveillance was insufficient to
Issue: Whether Dural can be validly arrested fulfill requirements for its issuance. However,
without any warrant of arrest for the crime of warantless search and seizures are legal as
rebellion. long as PROBABLE CAUSE existed. The
police officers have personal knowledge of
Held: Yes. Dural was arrested for being a the actual commission of the crime from the
member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an surveillance of the activities of the accused.
outlawed subversive organization. Subversion As police officers were the ones conducting
being a continuing offense, the arrest of the surveillance, it is presumed that they are
Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as regularly in performance of their duties.
it can be said that he was committing an
offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, (It was held that when a police officer
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears
such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in the distrurbances created thereby, and proceeds
furtherance thereof or in connection therewith at once to the scene thereof, he may effect an
constitute direct assaults against the State and arrest without a warrant. The offense is deemed
are in the nature of continuing crimes. The arrest committed in the presence or within the view of
of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its the officer.)
fighting armed elements, or for committing non-
violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is
more an act of capturing them in the course of an PEOPLE v. RODRIGUEZA
armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the

G.R. No. 95902, February 4, 1992, Regalado, sanitary and building regulations, a search
J.: may be validly made even without a search
warrant.
Facts: CIC Taduran together with S/Sgt. In the case at bar, however, the raid
Molinawe and other officers received from a conducted by the NARCOM agents in the
confidential informer that there was an ongoing house of Jovencio Rodrigueza was not
illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, authorized by any search warrant. It does not
Daraga, Albay. Sgt. Molinawe gave the money to appear, either, that the situation falls under
Taduran who acted as the poseur buyer. He was any of the aforementioned cases. Hence,
told to look for a certain Don, the alleged seller of appellant's right against unreasonable search
prohibited drugs. After agreeing on the price of and seizure was clearly violated. The NARCOM
P200.00 for 100 grams of marijuana, Don halted agents could NOT have justified their act by
and later on Don gave Taduran "a certain object invoking the urgency and necessity of the
wrapped in a plastic" which was later identified as situation because the testimonies of the
marijuana, and received payment therefor. prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had
Thereafter, Taduran returned to the headquarters already been put under surveillance for quite
and made a report regarding his said purchase of some time. Had it been their intention to
marijuana. Subsequently, Major Zeidem ordered conduct the raid, then they should, because
a team to conduct an operation to apprehend the they easily could, have first secured a search
suspects. In the evening of the same date, warrant during that time.
appellant, Lonceras and Segovia was arrested.
The constables were not, however, armed with a (In the case at bar, the police officer,
warrant of arrest when they apprehended the acting as poseur-buyer in a buy-bust operation,
three accused. inst5ead of arresting the suspect and taking him
Thereafter, agents of the Narcotics into custody after the sale, returned to police
Command (NARCOM) conducted a raid in the headquarters and filed his report. It was only in
house of Jovencio Rodrigueza, father of the evening of the same day that the police
appellant. During the raid, they were able to officer, without a warrant, arrested the suspect at
confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a plastic the latters house where dried marijuana leaves
syringe, among others. The search, however, were found and confiscated. It was held that the
was not authorized by any search warrant. The arrest and the seizure were unlawful.)
RTC found Rodrigueza guilty of violating the
Dangerous Drug Act. Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992,
Issue: Whether or not the evidence confiscated FELICIANO, J.:
during the raid conducted in the house of
Jovencio Rodrigueza is admissible in evidence. Facts: On July 2, 1991, petitioner entered Wilson
St., where it is a one-way street and started
Held: NO. A buy-bust operation is a form of travelling in the opposite or "wrong" direction. At
entrapment employed by peace officers to the corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts.,
trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante petitioner's and Eldon Maguan's cars nearly
delicto. Applied to the case at bar, the term in bumped each other. Petitioner alighted from his
flagrante delicto requires that the suspected drug car, walked over and shot Maguan inside his car.
dealer must be caught redhanded in the act of Petitioner then boarded his car and left the
selling marijuana or any prohibited drug to a scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant
person acting or posing as a buyer. was able to take down petitioner's car plate
In the instant case, however, the number. Verification at the LTO showed that the
procedure adopted by the NARCOM agents car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go.The
failed to meet this qualification. Based on the security guard of the bake shop positively
very evidence of the prosecution, after the identified Go as the same person who had shot
alleged consummation of the sale of dried Maguan.
marijuana leaves, CIC Taduran immediately The police launched a manhunt for petitioner.
released appellant Rodrigueza instead of On July 8, 1991, Petitioner presented himself
arresting and taking him into his custody. This act before the San Juan Police Station to verify news
of CIC Taduran, assuming arguendo that the reports that he was being hunted by the police;
supposed sale of marijuana did take place, is he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The
decidedly contrary to the natural course of things police forthwith detained him. That same day, the
and inconsistent with the aforestated purpose of police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated
a buy-bust operation. It is rather absurd on his homicide against petitioner with the Office of the
part to let appellant escape without having Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. The Prosecutor
been subjected to the sanctions imposed by filed an information for murder before the RTC.
law. It is, in fact, a dereliction of duty by an Counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an
agent of the law. omnibus motion for immediate release and
As provided in the present proper preliminary investigation, alleging that the
Constitution, a search, to be valid, must warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful and
generally be authorized by a search warrant that no preliminary investigation had been
duly issued by the proper government conducted before the information was filed.
authority. True, in some instances, this Court
has allowed government authorities to Issue: W/N a lawful warrantless arrest had been
conduct searches and seizures even without effected by the San Juan Police in respect of
a search warrant. Thus, (1) when the owner of petitioner Go.
the premises waives his right against such
incursion; (2) when the search is incidental to Held: NO. Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985
a lawful arrest; (3) when it is made on vessels Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that a
and aircraft for violation of customs laws; (4) peace officer or a private person may, without
when it is made on automobiles for the warrant, arrest a person:
purpose of preventing violations of (a) When, in his presence, the
smuggling or immigration laws; (5) when it person to be arrested has
involves prohibited articles in plain view; or committed, is actually
(6) in cases of inspection of buildings and committing, or is attempting to
other premises for the enforcement of fire, commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact between a warrantless search and seizure
just been committed, and he conducted at military or police checkpoints
has personal knowledge of and the search thereat in the case at bar, there
facts indicating that the person is no question that, indeed, the latter is more
to be arrested has committed reasonable considering that unlike in the former,
it; and it was effected on the basis of a probable cause.
(c) xxx The probable cause is that when the
petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted
In this case, there was no lawful to flee with the buri bag there was a probable
warrantless arrest of petitioner within the cause that he was concealing something
meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. Petitioner's illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty
"arrest" took place six (6) days after the of the police officers to inspect the same.
shooting of Maguan. The "arresting" officers It is too much indeed to require the
obviously were not present, within the meaning of police officers to search the bag in the
Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly possession of the petitioner only after they
shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" shall have obtained a search warrant for the
effected six (6) days after the shooting be purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be
reasonably regarded as effected "when [the useless, futile and much too late.
shooting had] in fact just been committed" Clearly, the search in the case at bar
within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, can be sustained under the exceptions
none of the "arresting" officers had any heretofore discussed, and hence, the
"personal knowledge" of facts indicating that constitutional guarantee against
petitioner was the gunman who had shot unreasonable searches and seizures has not
Maguan. The information upon which the police been violated.
acted had been derived from statements made
by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting. That there are many instances where a
information did not, however, constitute warrant and seizure can be effected without
"personal knowledge." necessarily being preceded by an arrest,
foremost of which is the "stop and search"
without a search warrant at military or police
checkpoints, the constitutionality or validity of
ROMEO POSADAS vs. CA which has been upheld by this Court in Valmonte
G.R. No. 89139, August 2, 1990, GANCAYCO, vs. de Villa, 7 as follows:
J.
"Petitioner Valmonte's general
Facts: On October 16, 1986, Patrolman Ursicio allegation to the effect that he had
Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar, both members of been stopped and searched
the Integrated National Police (INP) of Davao without a search warrant by the
assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, were military manning the checkpoints,
conducting a surveillance along Magallanes without more, i.e., without stating
Street, Davao City. While they were within the the details of the incidents which
premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges they amount to a violation of his right
spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they against unlawful search and
noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They seizure, is not sufficient to enable
approached the petitioner and identified the Court to determine whether
themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner there was a violation of
attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was Valmonte's right against unlawful
thwarted by the two notwithstanding his search and seizure. Not all
resistance.They then checked the "buri" bag of searches and seizures are
the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber prohibited. Those which are
.38 Smith & Wesson revolver, two (2) rounds of reasonable are not forbidden. A
live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun, a smoke reasonable search is not to be
(tear gas) grenade, and two (2) live ammunitions determined by any fixed formula
for a .22 caliber gun. They brought the petitioner but is to be resolved according to
to the police station for further investigation and the facts of each case.
asked him to show the necessary license or
authority to possess firearms and ammunitions Where, for example, the officer
found in his possession but he failed to do so. merely draws aside the curtain of
He was prosecuted for illegal a vacant vehicle which is parked
possession of firearms and ammunitions in the on the public fair grounds, or
RTC wherein after a plea of not guilty.Petitioner simply looks into a vehicle or
was found guilty of the offense charged. flashes a light therein, these do
not constitute unreasonable
Issue: W/N the warrantless search on the person search.
of petitioner is valid.
The setting up of the questioned
Held: Yes. At the time the peace officers in this checkpoints in Valenzuela (and
case identified themselves and apprehended the probably in other areas) may be
petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not considered as a security measure
know that he had committed, or was actually to enable the NCRDC to pursue its
committing the offense of illegal possession of mission of establishing effective
firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected territorial defense and
that he was hiding something in the buri bag. maintaining peace and order for
The said circumstances did not justify an the benefit of the public.
arrest without a warrant. Checkpoints may also be regarded
However, there are many instances as measures to thwart plots to
where a warrant and seizure can be effected destabilize the government in the
without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, interest of public security. In this
foremost of which is the "STOP AND SEARCH" connection, the Court may take
(a.k.a. STOP & FRISK without a search judicial notice of the shift to urban
warrant at military or police checkpoints. As centers and their suburbs of the
insurgency movement, so clearly whose object is either to determine the identity of

reflected in the increased killings in a suspicious individual or to maintain the status
cities of police and military men by quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to
NPA "sparrow units," not to mention obtain more information. This is illustrated in the
the abundance of unlicensed case of Terry vs. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In this
firearms and the alarming rise in case, two men repeatedly walked past a store
lawlessness and violence in such window and returned to a spot where they
urban centers, not all of which are apparently conferred with a third man. This
reported in media, most likely aroused the suspicion of a police officer. To the
brought about by deteriorating experienced officer, the behavior of the men
economic conditions - which all sum indicated that they were sizing up the store for an
up to what one can rightly consider, armed robbery. When the police officer
at the very least, as abnormal times. approached the men and asked them for their
Between the inherent right of the names, they mumbled a reply. Whereupon, the
state to protect its existence and officer grabbed one of them, spun him around
promote public welfare and an and frisked him. Finding a concealed weapon in
individual's right against a one, he did the same to the other two and found
warrantless search which is another weapon. In the prosecution for the
however reasonably conducted, offense of carrying a concealed weapon, the
the former should prevail. defense of illegal search and seizure was put up.
The United States Supreme Court held that "a
True, the manning of checkpoints by police officer may in appropriate circumstances
the military is susceptible of abuse by and in an appropriate manner approach a person
the men in uniform in the same for the purpose of investigating possible criminal
manner that all governmental power behavior even though there is no probable cause
is susceptible of abuse. But, at the to make an arrest." In such a situation, it is
cost of occasional inconvenience, reasonable for an officer rather than simply to
discomfort and even irritation to the shrug his shoulder and allow a crime to occur, to
citizen, the checkpoints during these stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to
abnormal times, when conducted determine his identity or maintain the status quo
within reasonable limits, are part of while obtaining more information. . . .
the price we pay for an orderly
society and a peaceful community." Clearly, the search in the case at bar
can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore
Thus, as between a warrantless search and discussed, and hence, the constitutional
seizure conducted at military or police guarantee against unreasonable searches and
checkpoints and the search thereat in the case at seizures has not been violated."
bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter is
more reasonable considering that unlike in the PEOPLE vs. ROGELIO MENGOTE
former, it was effected on the basis of a probable G.R. No. 87059, June 22, 1992, CRUZ, J.
cause. The probable cause is that when the
petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to Facts: On August 8, 1987, the Western Police
flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause District (WPD) received a telephone call from
that he was concealing something illegal in the an informer that there were three suspicious-
bag and it was the right and duty of the police looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna
officers to inspect the same. and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A
surveillance team of plainclothesmen was
It is too much indeed to require the police officers forthwith dispatched to the place. Patrolmen
to search the bag in the possession of the Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan narrated that
petitioner only after they shall have obtained a they saw two men "looking from side to side," one
search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise of whom was holding his abdomen. They
may prove to be useless, futile and much too approached these persons and identified
late. themselves as policemen, whereupon the two
tried to run away but were unable to escape
In People vs. CFI of Rizal, this Court held as because the other lawmen had surrounded them.
follows: The suspects were then searched. One of them,
who turned out to be the accused-appellant, was
". . . In the ordinary cases where warrant is found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson
indispensably necessary, the mechanics revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His
prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in companion, later identified as Nicanor Morellos,
the Rules of Court must be followed and had a fan knife secreted in his front right pants
satisfied. But We need not argue that there are pocket. The weapons were taken from them.
exceptions. Thus in the extraordinary events An information was filed against the
where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid accused-appellant before the RTC for illegal
search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be possession of firearms. The Court convicted
performed except without warrant, what Mengote for violation of PD 1866 and sentenced
constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search to reclusion perpetua. It is submitted in the
or seizure becomes purely a judicial question, Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have
determinable from the uniqueness of the been admitted in evidence because of its illegal
circumstances involved, including the purpose of seizure. No warrant therefor having been
the search or seizure, the presence or absence previously obtained. Neither could it have been
of probable cause, the manner in which the seized as an incident of a lawful arrest because
search and seizure was made, the place or thing the arrest of Mengote was itself unlawful, having
searched and the character of the articles been also effected without a warrant.
procured."
Issue: W/N Mengote can be held liable for illegal
The Court reproduces with approval the following possession of firearms.
disquisition of the Solicitor General:
Held: NO. There is no question that evidence
"The assailed search and seizure may still be obtained as a result of an illegal search or
justified as akin to a "stop and frisk" situation seizure is inadmissible in any proceeding for any
purpose. That is the absolute prohibition of Article might have been different if Mengote had been
III, Section 3(2), of the Constitution. This is the apprehended at an ungodly hour and in a place
celebrated exclusionary rule based on the where he had no reason to be, like a darkened
justification given by Judge Learned Hand that alley at 3 o'clock in the morning. But he was
"only in case the prosecution, which itself controls arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in a
the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by crowded street shortly after alighting from a
their wrong will the wrong be repressed." passenger jeep with his companion. He was not
skulking in the shadows but walking in the clear
The Solicitor General, while conceding the rule, light of day. There was nothing clandestine about
maintains that it is not applicable in the case at his being on that street at that busy hour in the
bar. His reason is that the arrest and search of blaze of the noonday sun.
Mengote and the seizure of the revolver from him
were lawful under Rule 113, Section 5, of the On the other hand, there could have been a
Rules of Court reading as follows: number of reasons, all of them innocent, why his
eyes were darting from side to side and he was
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. holding his abdomen. If they excited suspicion in
A peace officer or private person may without a the minds of the arresting officers, as the
warrant, arrest a person: prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not
been shown what their suspicion was all about.
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be In fact, the policemen themselves testified
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or that they were dispatched to that place only
is attempting to commit an offense; because of the telephone call from the
informer that there were "suspicious-looking"
(b) When an offense has in fact just been persons in that vicinity who were about to
committed, and he has personal knowledge of commit a robbery at North Bay
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has Boulevard.(COMPARE THIS WITH PP vs.
committed it; and POSADAS). The caller did not explain why he
thought the men looked suspicious nor did he
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner elaborate on the impending crime.
who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or could be summarily arrested and searched
has escaped while being transferred from one just because he is holding his abdomen, even
confinement to another. if it be possibly because of a stomach-ache,
or if a peace officer-could clamp handcuffs on
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) any person with a shifty look on suspicion
hereof, the person arrested without a warrant that he may have committed a criminal act or
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police is actually committing or attempting it. This
station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against simply cannot be done in a free society. This is
in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. not a police state where order is exalted over
We have carefully examined the wording of this liberty or, worse, personal malice on the part of
rule and cannot see how we can agree with the the arresting officer may be justified in the name
prosecution. of security.
Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as In the recent case of People v. Malmstedt, the
Mengote was not an escapee from a penal Court sustained the warrantless arrest of the
institution when he was arrested. We therefore accused because there was a bulge in his
confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness waist that excited the suspicion of the
of his arrest under either Par. (a) or Par. (b) of arresting officer and, upon inspection, turned
this section. out to be a pouch containing hashish. In People
v. Claudio, the accused boarded a bus and
Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) placed the buri bag she was carrying behind the
after he has committed or while he is actually seat of the arresting officer while she herself sat
committing or is at least attempting to commit an in the seat before him. His suspicion aroused, he
offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting surreptitiously examined the bag, which he found
officer. to contain marijuana. He then and there made
the warrantless arrest and seizure that we
These requirements have not been established in subsequently upheld on the ground that probable
the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in cause had been sufficiently established.
question, the accused-appellant was merely
"looking from side to side" and "holding his The case before us is different because there
abdomen," according to the arresting officers was nothing to support the arresting officers'
themselves. There was apparently no offense suspicion other than Mengote's darting eyes
that had just been committed or was being and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch
actually committed or at least being attempted by of the imagination could it have been inferred
Mengote in their presence. from these acts that an offense had just been
committed, or was actually being committed,
The Solicitor General submits that the actual or was at least being attempted in their
existence of an offense was not necessary as presence.
long as Mengote's acts "created a reasonable
suspicion on the part of the arresting officers and This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin,
induced in them the belief that an offense had where the Court held that the warrantless arrest
been committed and that the accused-appellant of the accused was unconstitutional. This was
had committed it." The question is, What effected while he was coming down a vessel, to
offense? What offense could possibly have been all appearances no less innocent than the other
suggested by a person "looking from side to side" disembarking passengers. He had not committed
and "holding his abdomen" and in a place not nor was he actually committing or attempting to
exactly forsaken? commit an offense in the presence of the
arresting officers. He was not even acting
These are certainly not sinister acts. And the suspiciously. In short, there was no probable
setting of the arrest made them less so, if at all. It cause that, as the prosecution incorrectly
suggested, dispensed with the constitutional Issue: W/N the warrantless arrest of petitioner is
requirement of a warrant. valid.
Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less Held: No. Even granting ex gratia that petitioner
stringent requirements have also not been was in possession of a grenade, the arrest and
satisfied. The prosecution has not shown that at search of petitioner were invalid, as will be
the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in discussed below.
fact just been committed and that the arresting The general rule as regards arrests,
officers had personal knowledge of facts searches and seizures is that a warrant is
indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they needed in order to validly effect the same. The
had was hearsay information from the telephone Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
caller, and about a crime that had yet to be arrests, searches and seizures refers to those
committed. effected without a validly issued warrant, subject
to certain exceptions. As regards valid
The truth is that they did not know then what warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5,
offense, if at all, had been committed and neither Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in
were they aware of the participation therein of the part:
accused-appellant. It was only later, after
Danganan had appeared at the police Sec. 5. Arrest, without
headquarters, that they learned of the robbery in warrant; when lawful A peace
his house and of Mengote's supposed officer or a private person may,
involvement therein. 8 As for the illegal without a warrant, arrest a
possession or the firearm found on Mengote's person:
person, the policemen discovered this only after
he had been searched and the investigation (a) When, in his presence,
conducted later revealed that he was not its the person to be arrested has
owners nor was he licensed to possess it. committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to
Before these events, the peace officers had no commit an offense;
knowledge even of Mengote' identity, let alone
the fact (or suspicion) that he was unlawfully (b) When an offense has in
carrying a firearm or that he was involved in fact just been committed, and he
the robbery of Danganan's house. has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be
At the time of the arrest in question, arrested has committed it; and
the accused-appellant was merely "looking
from side to side" and "holding his (c) When the person to be
abdomen," according to the arresting officers arrested is a prisoner who has
themselves. There was apparently no offense escaped . . .
that had just been committed or was being
actually committed or at least being A warrantless arrest under the circumstances
attempted by Mengote in their presence. contemplated under Section 5(a) has been
There was nothing to support the arresting denominated as one "in flagrante delicto,"
officers' suspicion other than Mengote's while that under Section 5(b) has been described
darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. as a "hot pursuit" arrest.
Par. (b) is no less applicable because has not Turning to valid warrantless
been shown that at the time of Mengote's searches, they are limited to the following: (1)
arrest an offense had in fact just been customs searches; (2) search of moving
committed and that the arresting officers had vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view;
personal knowledge of facts indicating that (4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental
Mengote had committed it. All they had was to a lawful arrest; and (6) a "stop and frisk."
hearsay information from the telephone In the instant petition, the trial court
caller, and about a crime that had yet to be validated the warrantless search as a "stop and
committed. frisk" with "the seizure of the grenade from the
accused as an appropriate incident to his arrest,"
hence necessitating a brief discussion on the
SAMMY MALACAT vs. CA nature of these exceptions to the warrant
G.R. No. 123595, December 12, 1997, DAVIDE, requirement.
JR., J. At the outset, we note that the trial court
confused the concepts of a "STOP-AND-FRISK"
Facts: In response to bomb threats reported and of a SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL
seven days earlier, Rodolfo Yu, a member of the ARREST. These two types of warrantless
WPD, along with 3 other policemen were on foot searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum
patrol along Quezon Blvd, Quiapo when they of proof before they may be validly effected and
chanced upon 2 groups of Muslim-looking men in their allowable scope.
posted at opposite sides of Quezon Blvd. The In a SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A
men were acting suspiciously with their eyes LAWFUL ARREST, as the precedent arrest
moving very fast. Yu and his companions determines the validity of the incidental search,
observed the groups for about 30 mins. The the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large
members fled when they approached one of the majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest
groups. However, Yu caught up with the was merely used as a pretext for conducting a
petitioner. Upon searching the latter, he found a search. In this instance, the law requires that
fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioner's there first be a lawful arrest before a search can
"front waist line." One of Yus companions be made the process cannot be reversed. At
apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting
caliber pistol was recovered. officer may search the person of the arrestee and
Sammy Malacat was charged with the area within which the latter may reach for a
violation of Sec.3 of PD 1866 for illegal weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any
possession of hand grenade. money or property found which was used in the
commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime,
or that which may be used as evidence, or which
might furnish the arrestee with the means of Second, there was nothing in petitioner's
escaping or committing violence. behavior or conduct which could have reasonably
Here, there could have been no valid elicited even mere suspicion other than that his
in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest eyes were "moving very fast" an observation
preceding the search in light of the lack of which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his
personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it
arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk.
the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime Petitioner and his companions were merely
had just been committed, was being standing at the corner and were not creating any
committed or was going to be committed. commotion or trouble, as Yu explicitly declared
Having thus shown the invalidity of the on cross-examination:
warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search
conducted on petitioner could not have been one Q And what were they doing?
incidental to a lawful arrest. A They were merely standing.
We now proceed to the justification for
and allowable scope of a "STOP-AND-FRISK" Q You are sure of that?
as a "limited protective search of outer clothing A Yes, sir.
for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a Q And when you saw them standing, there were
police officer observes unusual conduct which nothing or they did not create any commotion.
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his A None, sir.
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and
that the persons with whom he is dealing may be Q Neither did you see them create commotion?
armed and presently dangerous, where in the A None, sir.
course of investigating this behavior he identifies
himself as a policeman and makes reasonable Third, there was at all no ground, probable or
inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages otherwise, to believe that petitioner was
of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable armed with a deadly weapon. None was
fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged
the protection of himself and others in the area to grenade was "discovered" "inside the front
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as
clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any
weapons which might be used to assault him. telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was
Such a search is a reasonable search under the indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been
Fourth Amendment . . . visible to Yu. In fact, as noted by the trial court:
Other notable points of Terry are that When the policemen approached the accused
while probable cause is not required to and his companions, they were not yet aware
conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless that a handgrenade was tucked inside his
holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not waistline. They did not see any bulging object in
validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine his person.
reason must exist, in light of the police
officer's experience and surrounding What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant
conditions, to warrant the belief that the violations of petitioner's rights solemnly
person detained has weapons concealed guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III
about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a of the Constitution.
TWO-FOLD INTEREST: (1) the general interest
of effective crime prevention and detection, which
underlies the recognition that a police officer PEOPLE vs. IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI
may, under appropriate circumstances and in an G.R.No. 74869, July 6, 1988, CRUZ, J.
appropriate manner, approach a person for
purposes of investigating possible criminal Facts: Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25,
behavior even without probable cause; and (2) 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V
the more pressing interest of safety and self- Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo
preservation which permit the police officer to City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for
take steps to assure himself that the person with him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and
whom he deals is not armed with a deadly finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be him to their headquarters for investigation.
used against the police officer. The two bundles of suspect articles were
confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI
Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the laboratory for examination. When they were
"stop-and-frisk" was invalid: verified as marijuana leaves, an information for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed
First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yu's claim against him.
that petitioner was a member of the group which According to the prosecution, the PC
attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days officers had earlier received a tip from one of
earlier. This claim is neither supported by any their informers that the accused-appellant was on
police report or record nor corroborated by any board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was
other police officer who allegedly chased that carrying marijuana. Acting on this tip, they waited
group. Aside from impairing Yu's credibility as a for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and
witness, this likewise diminishes the probability approached him as he descended from the
that a genuine reason existed so as to arrest and gangplank after the informer had pointed to him.
search petitioner. If only to further tarnish the They detained him and inspected the bag he was
credibility of Yu's testimony, contrary to his claim carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of
that petitioner and his companions had to be what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by
chased before being apprehended, the affidavit an NBI forensic examiner. In his defense,
of arrest expressly declares otherwise, i.e., upon Aminnudin alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested
arrival of five (5) other police officers, petitioner and immediately handcuffed. His bag was
and his companions were "immediately collared." confiscated without a search warrant.
Issues:
1. W/N the arrest was legal? FACTS: Accused- appellant Mikael Malmstead
2. W/N the seized effects may be used as was charged for violation of Section 4, Art. II of
evidence as the search was allegedly an Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise
incident to a lawful arrest? known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended. Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish
Held: national, entered the Philippines for the third time
in December 1988 as a tourist. On May 11, 1989,
1. No. There was no warrant of arrest or search the accused went to Nangonogan bus stop in
warrant issued by a judge after personal Sagada. An order to establish a checkpoint in the
determination by him of the existence of probable said area was because it was reported that in
cause. The accused-appellant was not caught in that same morning a Caucasian coming from
flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.
or had just been committed to justify the During the inspection, suspecting the
warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the bulge on accused's waist, CIC Galutan required
Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging
invoked to dispense with the obtention of the on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be
warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, for a pouch bag with objects wrapped in brown
example. It was held that vessels and aircraft packing tape, prompting the officer to open one
are subject to warrantless searches and of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects
seizures for violation of the customs law turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of
because these vehicles may be quickly marijuana. Before the accused alighted from the
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction bus, he stopped to get two (2) travelling bags
before the warrant can be secured. from the luggage carrier. Upon stepping out of
The present case presented no such the bus, the officers got the bags and opened
urgency. From the conflicting declarations of them. A teddy bear was found in each bagand
the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at when the officers opened the teddy bears it also
least two days within which they could have contained hashish.
obtained a warrant to arrest and search
Aminnudin. His name was known. The vehicle ISSUE: Whether the search made by the
was identified. The date of its arrival was NARCOM officer was illegal having no search
certain. And from the information they had warrant issued.
received, they could have persuaded a judge
that there was probable cause, indeed, to HELD: No. The Constitution guarantees the right
justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did of the people to be secure in their persons,
nothing to comply Moreover, the accused- houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
appellant was not, at the moment of his searches and seizures. However, where the
arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there
that he was about to do so or that he had just is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful
done so. arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace
In the many cases where this Court has officer or a private person under the following
sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of circumstances stated in Sec. 5, Rule 110 of the
the Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been rules on criminal procedure.
shown that they were caught red-handed, as Accused was searched and arrested
result of what are popularly called "buy-bust" while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A
operations of the narcotics agents. Rule 113 was crime was actually being committed by the
clearly applicable because at the precise time of accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto.
arrest the accused was in the act of selling the Thus, the search made upon his personal effects
prohibited drug. falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the
In the case at bar, the accused- foregoing provisions of law, which allow a
appellant was not, at the moment of his warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown While it is true that the NARCOM officers were
that he was about to do so or that he had just not armed with a search warrant when the
done so. What he was doing was descending search was made over the personal effects of
the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there accused, however, under the circumstances
was no outward indication that called for his of the case, there was sufficient probable
arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of cause for said officers to believe that accused
the other passengers innocently was then and there committing a crime.
disembarking from the vessel. It was only Probable cause has been defined
when the informer pointed to him as the as such facts and circumstances which could
carrier of the marijuana that the suddenly lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to
became suspect and so subject to believe that an offense has been committed, and
apprehension. It was the furtive finger that that the objects sought in connection with the
triggered his arrest. The identification by the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
informer was the probable cause as determined Warrantless search of the personal effects of an
by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized accused has been declared by this Court as
them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately valid, because of existence of probable cause,
arrest him. where the smell of marijuana emanated from
a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where
2. NO. The search was not an incident of a lawful the accused was acting suspiciously and
arrest because there was no warrant of arrest attempted to flee.
and the warrantless arrest did not come under Warrantless search of the personal
the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. effects of an accused has been declared by this
Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal Court as valid, because of existence of probable
and the evidence obtained thereby was cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated
inadmissible. from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or
where the accused was acting suspiciously, and
attempted to flee.
PEOPLE VS. MALMSTEDT Aside from the persistent reports
198 SCRA 401, G.R. No. 91107, 19 Jun 1991 received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming
from Sagada were transporting marijuana and
other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer
also received information that a Caucasian Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports of
coming from Sagada on that particular day had drug pushing in the area. They saw petitioner
prohibited drugs in his possession. selling "something" to another person. After the
Said information was received by the alleged buyer left, they approached petitioner,
Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same identified themselves as policemen, and frisked
morning that accused came down by bus from him. The search yielded two plastic cellophane
Sagada on his way to Baguio City. tea bags of marijuana . When asked if he had
When NARCOM received the more marijuana, he replied that there was more
information, a few hours before the apprehension in his house. The policemen went to his
of herein accused, that a Caucasian travelling residence where they found ten more cellophane
from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner was brought to
him prohibited drugs, there was no time to obtain the police headquarters where he was charged
a search warrant. In the Tangliben case, the with possession of prohibited drugs. On July 24,
police authorities conducted a surveillance at the 1991, petitioner posted bail 3 and the trial court
Victory Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San issued his order of release on July 29, 1991.
Nicolas, San Fernando Pampanga, against
persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous Petitioner contends that the trial and
drugs, based on information supplied by some appellate courts erred in convicting him on the
informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting basis of the following: (a) the pieces of evidence
suspiciously and pointed out by an informer was seized were inadmissible; (b)
apprehended and searched by the police
authorities. It was held that when faced with on- ISSUE: W/N the marijuana confiscated from the
the spot information, the police officers had to act house in addition to the marijuana confiscated
quickly and there was no time to secure a search while Espano waa frisked may be used as
warrant. evidence?
It must be observed that, at first, the
NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine HELD: NO. The 1987 Constitution guarantees
check of the bus (where accused was riding) freedom against unreasonable searches and
and the passengers therein, and no extensive seizures under Article III, Section 2 which
search was initially made. It was only when provides:
one of the officers noticed a BULGE on the
waist of accused, during the course of the "The right of the people to be secure in their
inspection, that accused was required to persons, houses, papers and effects against
present his passport. The failure of accused unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
to present his identification papers, when nature and for any purposes shall be inviolable,
ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
suspicion of the officer that accused was issue except upon probable cause to be
trying to hide his identity. For is it not a determined personally by the judge after
regular norm for an innocent man, who has examination under oath or affirmation of the
nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
present his identification papers when and particularly describing the place to be
required to do so? searched and the persons or things to be seized."
(1)The receipt of information by
NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from An exception to the said rule is a warrantless
Sagada had prohibited drugs in his search incidental to a lawful arrest for
possession, plus (2) the suspicious failure of dangerous weapons or anything which may
the accused to produce his passport, taken be used as proof of the commission of an
together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers offense. It may extend beyond the person of
to reasonably believe that the accused was the one arrested to include the premises or
trying to hide something illegal from the surroundings under his immediate control. In
authorities. From these circumstances arose a this case, the ten cellophane bags of
probable cause which justified the warrantless marijuana seized at petitioner's house after
search that was made on the personal effects of his arrest at Pandacan and Zamora Streets do
the accused. In other words, the acts of the not fall under the said exceptions.
NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to
open his pouch bag and in opening one of the As regards the brick of marijuana found inside
wrapped objects found inside said bag (which the appellant's house, the trial court correctly
was discovered to contain hashish) as well as the ignored it apparently in view of its inadmissibility.
two (2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy While initially the arrest as well as the body
bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were search was lawful, the warrantless search
prompted by accused's own attempt to hide his made inside the appellant's house became
identity by refusing to present his passport, and unlawful since the police operatives were not
by the information received by the NARCOM that armed with a search warrant. Such search
a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited cannot fall under "SEARCH MADE
drugs in his possession. To deprive the INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST," the
NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act same being limited to body search and to that
accordingly, including, to search even without point within reach or control of the person
warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would arrested, or that which may furnish him with
be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in the means of committing violence or of
law enforcement, to the detriment of society. escaping. In the case at bar, appellant was
admittedly outside his house when he was
Espano vs. CA arrested. Hence, it can hardly be said that the
G.R. No. 120431. April 1, 1998 inner portion of his house was within his reach or
control.
FACTS: The evidence for the prosecution,
based on the testimony of Pat. Romeo The articles seized from petitioner during his
Pagilagan, shows that on July 14, 1991, at about arrest were valid under the DOCTRINE OF
12:30 a.m., he and other police officers, namely, SEARCH MADE INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL
Pat. Wilfredo Aquilino, Simplicio Rivera, and ARREST. The warrantless search made in his
Erlindo Lumboy of the Western Police District house, however, which yielded ten cellophane
(WPD), Narcotics Division went to Zamora and bags of marijuana became unlawful since the
police officers were not armed with a search taken to the Manila Police, where they were
warrant at the time. Moreover, it was beyond the detained."
reach and control of petitioner.
But even if there was a search, there is still
authority to the effect that no search warrant
Papa vs. Mago would be needed under the circumstances
G.R. No. L-27360, February 28, 1968 obtaining in the instant case. The guaranty of
freedom from unreasonable searches and
FACTS: Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the seizures is construed as recognizing a
counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police necessary difference between a search of a
Department, acting upon a reliable information dwelling house or other structure in respect
received on November 3, 1966 to the effect that a of which a search warrant may readily be
certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat,
misdeclared and undervalued, would be released wagon, or automobile for contraband goods,
the following day from the customs zone of the where it is not practicable to secure a
port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly
upon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of which the warrant must be sought.
the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance
at gate No. 1 of the customs zone. When the The question whether a seizure or a search is
trucks left gate No. 1 at about 4:30 in the unreasonable in the language of the Constitution
afternoon of November 4, 1966, elements of the is a judicial and not a legislative question; but in
counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and determining whether a seizure is or is not
intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, unreasonable, all of the circumstances under
Manila. The load of the two trucks, consisting of which it is made must be looked to.
nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were
seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. "The automobile is a swift and powerful
Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership vehicle of recent development, which has
of the goods and showed to the policemen a multiplied by quantity production and taken
"Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on possession of our highways in battalions,
Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the until the slower, animal- drawn vehicles, with
Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain their easily noted individuality, are rare.
Bienvenido Naguit. Constructed as covered vehicles to standard
Claiming to have been prejudiced by the form in immense quantities, and with a
seizure and detention of the two trucks and their capacity for speed rivaling express trains,
cargo, Remedios Mago filed charges against the they furnish for successful commission of
Chief of Police and the Customs Commissioner. crime a disguising means of silent approach
and swift escape unknown in the history of
ISSUE: Where petitioners allowed to search and the world before their advent. The question of
seize the questioned artices even without a their police control and reasonable search on
warrant? highways or other public places is a serious
question far deeper and broader than their
HELD: Yes. The policemen had authority to use in so-called "bootlegging' or 'rum
effect the seizure without any search warrant running,' which is itself is no small matter.
issued by a competent court. The Tariff and While a possession in the sense of private
Customs Code does not require said warrant in ownership, they are but a vehicle constructed
the instant case. The Code authorizes persons for travel and transportation on highways.
having police authority under Section 2203 of Their active use is not in homes or on private
the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass premises, the privacy of which the law
through or search any land, inclosure, especially guards from search and seizure
warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling without process. The baffling extent to which
house; and also to inspect, search and examine they are successfully utilized to facilitate
any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, commission of crime of all degrees, from
box or envelope or any person on board, or stop those against morality, chastity, and decency,
and search and examine any vehicle, beast or to robbery, rape, burglary, and murder, is a
person suspected of holding or conveying any matter of common knowledge. Upon that
dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the problem a condition, and not a theory,
Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning confronts proper administration of our
the need of a search warrant in said cases. But criminal laws. Whether search of and seizure
in the search of a dwelling house, the Code from an automobile upon a highway or other
provides that said "dwelling house may be public place without a search warrant is
entered and searched only upon warrant issued unreasonable is in its final analysis to be
by a judge or justice of the peace . . ." It is our determined as a judicial question in view of
considered view, therefore, that except in the all the circumstances under which it is made."
case of the search of a dwelling house,
persons exercising police authority under the Having declared that the seizure by the members
customs law may effect search and seizure of the Manila Police Department of the goods in
without a search warrant in the enforcement question was in accordance with law and by that
of customs laws. seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired
jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the
In the instant case, we note that petitioner Martin enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, to the
Alagao and his companion policemen did not exclusion of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
have to make any search before they seized the We have thus resolved the principal and decisive
two trucks and their cargo. In their original issue in the present case.
petition, and amended petition, in the court below
Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa did not
even allege that there was a search. All that People vs. Musa
they complained of was, "That while the trucks G.R. No. 96177, January 27, 1993
were on their way, they were intercepted without
any search warrant near the Agrifina Circle and FACTS: In the morning of December 13, 1989,
T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, leader of a NARCOTICS
COMMAND (NARCOM) team based at Calarian, NARCOM agents, the latter moved in and
Zamboanga City, instructed Sgt. Amado Ani to arrested the appellant inside the house. They
conduct surveillance and test buy on a certain searched him to retrieve the marked money but
Mari Musa of Suterville, Zamboanga City. didn't find it. Upon being questioned, the
Information received from civilian informer was appellant said that he gave the marked money to
that this Mari Musa was engaged in selling his wife. Thereafter, T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego
marijuana in said place. So Sgt. Amado Ani, went to the kitchen and noticed what T/Sgt.
another NARCOM agent, proceeded to Suterville, Belarga described as a "cellophane colored white
in company with a NARCOM civilian informer, to and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen."
the house of Mari Musa to which house the They asked the appellant about its contents but
civilian informer had guided him. The same failing to get a response, they opened it and
civilian informer had also described to him the found dried marijuana leaves. At the trial, the
appearance of Mari Musa. Amado Ani was able appellant questioned the admissibility of the
to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana plastic bag and the marijuana it contains but the
for P10.00. Sgt. Ani returned to the NARCOM trial court issued an Order ruling that these are
office and turned over the newspaper-wrapped admissible in evidence.
marijuana to T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga. Sgt. Belarga
inspected the stuff turned over to him and found it
to be marijuana. ISSUE: May all the evidence herein confiscated
The next day, December 14, 1989, be exluded under the exclusionary rule?
about 1:30 P.M., a buy-bust was planned. Sgt.
Amado Ani was assigned as the poseur buyer for HELD: NO. Built into the Constitution are
which purpose he was given P20.00 (with SN guarantees on the freedom of every individual
GA955883) by Belarga. The buy-bust money had against unreasonable searches and seizures by
been taken by T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga from M/Sgt. providing in Article III, Section 2, the following:
Noh Sali Mihasun, Chief of Investigation Section,
and for which Belarga signed a receipt. The team "The right of the people to be secure in their
under Sgt. Foncargas was assigned as back-up persons, houses, papers, and effects against
security. A pre-arranged signal was arranged unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
consisting of Sgt. Ani's raising his right hand, nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
after he had succeeded to buy the marijuana. and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
The two NARCOM teams proceeded to the target issue except upon probable cause to be
site in two civilian vehicles. Belarga's team was determined personally by the judge after
composed of Sgt. Belarga, team leader, Sgt. examination under oath or affirmation of the
Amado Ani, poseur buyer, Sgt. Lego and Sgt. complainant and the witness he may produce,
Biong. and particularly describing the place to be
Arriving at the target site, Sgt. Ani searched and the persons or things to be seized."
proceeded to the house of Mari Musa, while the
rest of the NARCOM group positioned Furthermore, the Constitution, in conformity with
themselves at strategic places about 90 to 100 the doctrine laid down in Stonehill v. Diokno, 34
meters from Mari Musa's house. T/Sgt. Belarga declares inadmissible, any evidence obtained in
could see what went on between Ani and suspect violation of the freedom from unreasonable
Mari Musa from where he was. Ani approached searches and seizures.
Mari Musa, who came out of his house, and
asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted While a valid search warrant is generally
some more stuff. Ani gave Mari Musa the P20.00 necessary before a search and seizure may
marked money. After receiving the money, Mari be effected, exceptions to this rule are
Musa went back to his house and came back and recognized. Thus, in Alvero v. Dizon, the
gave Amado Ani two newspaper wrappers Court stated that "[t]he most important
containing dried marijuana. Ani opened the two exception to the necessity for a search
wrappers and inspected the contents. Convinced warrant is the right of search and seizure as
that the contents were marijuana, Ani walked an incident to a lawful arrest."
back towards his companions and raised his right
hand. The two NARCOM teams, riding the two Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court
civilian vehicles, sped towards Sgt. Ani. Ani expressly authorizes a warrantless search and
joined Belarga's team and returned to the house. seizure incident to a lawful arrest, thus:
At the time Sgt. Ani first approached
Mari Musa, there were four persons inside his There is no doubt that the warrantless search
house: Mari Musa, another boy, and two women, incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes the
one of whom Ani and Belarga later came to know arresting officer to make a search upon the
to be Mari Musa's wife. The second time, Ani with person of the person arrested. As early as
the NARCOM team returned to Mari Musa's 1909, the Court has ruled that "[a]n officer
house, the woman, who was later known as Mari making an arrest may take from the person
Musa's wife, slipped away from the house. Sgt. arrested and money or property found upon
Belarga frisked Mari Musa but could not find the his person which was used in the
P20.00 marked money with him. Mari Musa was commission of the crime or was the fruit of
then asked where the P20.00 was and he told the the crime or which might furnish the prisoner
NARCOM team he has given the money to his with the means of committing violence or of
wife (who had slipped away). Sgt. Belarga also escaping, or which may be used as evidence
found a plastic bag containing dried marijuana in the trial of the cause." Hence, in a buy-bust
inside it somewhere in the kitchen. Mari Musa operation conducted to entrap a drug-pusher,
was then placed under arrest and brought to the the law enforcement agents may seize the
NARCOM office. At Suterville, Sgt. Ani turned marked money found on the person of the
over to Sgt. Belarga the two newspaper-wrapped pusher immediately after the arrest even
marijuana he had earlier bought from Mari Musa. without arrest and search warrants.
The appellant assails the seizure and admission In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents
as evidence of a plastic bag containing marijuana searched the person of the appellant after
which the NARCOM agents found in the arresting him in his house but found nothing.
appellant's kitchen. It appears that after Sgt. Ani They then searched the entire house and, in the
gave the pre-arranged signal to the other
kitchen, found and seized a plastic bag hanging in this case could not have discovered the
in a corner. inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag
had they not forcibly opened it. Even assuming
The warrantless search and seizure, as an then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently
incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend came across the plastic bag because it was
beyond the person of the one arrested to include within their "plain view," what may be said to be
the premises or surroundings under his the object in their "plain view" was just the plastic
immediate control. Objects in the "plain view" bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating
of an officer who has the right to be in the nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not
position to have that view are subject to immediately apparent from the "plain view" of
seizure and may be presented as evidence. said object. It cannot be claimed that the
plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents,
The "PLAIN VIEW" doctrine may not, however, whether by its distinctive configuration, its
be used to launch unbridled searches and transparency, or otherwise, that its contents
indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general are obvious to an observer.
exploratory search made solely to find evidence
of defendant's guilt. The "PLAIN VIEW" We, therefore, hold that under the circumstances
DOCTRINE is usually applied where a police of the case, the "plain view" doctrine does not
officer is not searching for evidence against apply and the marijuana contained in the plastic
the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented
comes across an incriminating object. in evidence pursuant to Article III, Section 3(2) of
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the the Constitution.
following limitations on the application of the
doctrine: The exclusion of this particular evidence does
not, however, diminish, in any way, the damaging
"What the 'plain view' cases have in common is effect of the other pieces of evidence presented
that the police officer in each of them had a prior by the prosecution to prove that the appellant
justification for an intrusion in the course of which sold marijuana, in violation of Article II, Section 4
he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. We hold
incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to that by virtue of the testimonies of Sgt. Ani and
supplement the prior justification - whether it be a T/Sgt. Belarga and the two wrappings of
warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search marijuana sold by the appellant to Sgt. Ani,
incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate among other pieces of evidence, the guilt of the
reason for being present unconnected with a appellant of the crime charged has been proved
search directed against the accused - and beyond reasonable doubt.
permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the
extension of the original justification is legitimate VALMONTE VS. DE VILLA
only where it is immediately apparent to the G.R. NO. 83988 SEPTEMBER 29, 1989
police that they have evidence before them; the
'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a FACTS: On 20 January 1987, the National
general exploratory search from one object to Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was
another until something incriminating at last activated to maintain peace and order, the
emerges." NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Petitioners aver that,
It has also been suggested that even if an because of the installation of said checkpoints,
object is observed in "plain view," the "plain the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being
view" doctrine will not justify the seizure of harassed and of their safety being placed at the
the object where the incriminating nature of arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of
the object is not apparent from the "plain the military manning the checkpoints, considering
view" of the object. Stated differently, it must that their cars and vehicles are being subjected
be IMMEDIATELY APPARENT to the police to regular searches and check-ups, especially at
that the items that they observe may be night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search
evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for
subject to seizure. their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July
1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the
In the instant case, the appellant was arrested Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned
and his person searched in the living room. down allegedly in cold blood by the members of
Failing to retrieve the marked money which they the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along
hoped to find, the NARCOM agents searched the McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for
whole house and found the plastic bag in the ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the
kitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore, not within checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire
their "plain view" when they arrested the of warning shots fired in the air. Petitioner
appellant as to justify its seizure. The NARCOM Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions,
agents had to move from one portion of the he had gone thru these checkpoints where he
house to another before they sighted the plastic was stopped and his car subjected to
bag. Unlike Ker v. California, where the police search/check-up without a court order or search
officer had reason to walk to the doorway of warrant.
the adjacent kitchen and from which position
he saw the marijuana, the NARCOM agents in ISSUE: Whether the warrantless search and
this case went from room to room with the seizure without in the present case is illegal.
obvious intention of fishing for more
evidence. HELD: No. Petitioners' concern for their safety
and apprehension at being harassed by the
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the military manning the checkpoints are not
plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as
they had no clue as to its contents. They had to per se illegal. No proof has been presented
ask the appellant what the bag contained. When before the Court to show that, in the course of
the appellant refused to respond, they opened it their routine checks, the military indeed
and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v. committed specific violations of petitioners' right
California, where the marijuana was visible to against unlawful search and seizure or other
the police officer's eyes, the NARCOM agents rights. The constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures is a and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to
personal right invocable only by those whose petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to
rights have been infringed, or threatened to be morals, good customs and public policy."
infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or In support of her claim, petitioner
unreasonable search and seizure in any produced a verbatim transcript of the event and
particular case is purely a judicial question, sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other
determinable from a consideration of the expenses of litigation in the amount of
circumstances involved. P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation other reliefs awardable at the trial court's
to the effect that he had been stopped and discretion. The transcript on which the civil case
searched without a search warrant by the military was based was culled from a tape recording of
manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., the confrontation made by petitioner.
without stating the details of the incidents which (Conversation attached below)
amount to a violation of his right against unlawful As a result of petitioner's recording of
search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the the event and alleging that the said act of secretly
Court to determine whether there was a violation taping the confrontation was illegal, private
of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and respondent filed a criminal case before the
seizure. Not all searches and seizures are Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of
prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not Republic Act 4200,
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the
determined by any fixed formula but is to be Information on the ground that the facts charged
resolved according to the facts of each case. do not constitute an offense, particularly a
Where, for example, the officer violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989,
merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant the trial court granted the Motion to Quash,
vehicle which is parked on the public fair agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged
grounds, 7 or simply looks into a vehicle, or do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200;
flashes a light therein, these do not constitute and that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200
unreasonable search. refers to a the taping of a communication by a
The setting up of the questioned person other than a participant to the
checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in communication.
other areas) may be considered as a security Private respondent filed a Petition for
measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its Review on Certiorari with SC, which forthwith
mission of establishing effective territorial referred the case to the CA.
defense and maintaining peace and order for CA promulgated its assailed Decision
the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may declaring the trial court's order is null and void.
also be regarded as measures to thwart plots Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
to destabilize the government, in the interest which CA denied. Hence, this petition.
of public security. In this connection, the Court
may take judicial notice of the shift to urban ISSUE:
centers and their suburbs of the insurgency Whether or not the applicable provision
movement, so clearly reflected in the increased of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping
killings in cities of police and military men by NPA of a private conversation by one of the parties to
"sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of the conversation.
unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in
lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, HELD:
not all of which are reported in media, most likely First, legislative intent is determined
brought about by deteriorating economic principally from the language of a statute. Where
conditions ---- which all sum up to what one can the language of a statute is clear and
rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal unambiguous, the law is applied according to its
times. Between the inherent right of the state express terms, and interpretation would be
to protect its existence and promote public resorted to only where a literal interpretation
welfare and an individual's right against a would be either impossible or absurd or would
warrantless search which is however lead to an injustice.
reasonably conducted, the former should Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act
prevail. to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and
True, the manning of checkpoints by Other Related Violations of Private
the military is susceptible of abuse by the Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
men in uniform, in the same manner that all Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for
governmental power is susceptible of abuse. any person, not being
But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, authorized by all the parties to
discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, any private communication or
the checkpoints during these abnormal times, spoken word, to tap any wire or
when conducted within reasonable limits, are cable, or by using any other
part of the price we pay for an orderly society device or arrangement, to
and a peaceful community. secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or
spoken word by using a device
SEC. 3 PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND commonly known as a
CORRESPONDENCE dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or
tape recorder, or however
RAMIREZ vs. CA otherwise described.
G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995
The aforestated provision clearly and
FACTS: unequivocally makes it illegal for any person,
A civil case for damages was filed by not authorized by all the parties to any private
petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional communication to secretly record such
Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the communication by means of a tape recorder.
private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a The law makes no distinction as to whether
confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly the party sought to be penalized by the
vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile statute ought to be a party other than or
different from those involved in the private agreeable falsehoods, and the
communication. The statute's intent to penalize expression of anti-social desires of
all persons unauthorized to make such recording views not intended to be taken
is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". seriously. The right to the privacy
Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals of communication, among others,
correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a has expressly been assured by our
communication who records his private Constitution. Needless to state
conversation with another without the knowledge here, the framers of our
of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" under this Constitution must have recognized
provision of R.A. 4200. the nature of conversations
A perusal of the Senate between individuals and the
Congressional Records, moreover, supports significance of man's spiritual
the respondent court's conclusion that in nature, of his feelings and of his
enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed intellect. They must have known
contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized that part of the pleasures and
tape recording of private conversations or satisfactions of life are to be found
communications taken either by the parties in the unaudited, and free
themselves or by third persons. exchange of communication
The unambiguity of the express words between individuals free from
of the provision, taken together with the every unjustifiable intrusion by
deliberations from the Congressional Record, whatever means.
therefore plainly supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, a
penalize even those privy to the private case which dealt with the issue of telephone
communications. Where the law makes no wiretapping, we held that the use of a
distinctions, one does not distinguish. telephone extension for the purpose of
Second, the nature of the conversations overhearing a private conversation without
is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The authorization did not violate R.A. 4200
substance of the same need not be specifically because a telephone extension devise was
alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 neither among those "device(s) or
penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, arrangement(s)" enumerated therein,
intercepting or recording private communications following the principle that "penal statutes
by means of the devices enumerated therein. must be construed strictly in favor of the
The mere allegation that an individual made a accused."
secret recording of a private communication The instant case turns on a different note,
by means of a tape recorder would suffice to because the applicable facts and circumstances
constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no
4200. ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly
Finally, petitioner's contention that the mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private
phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of communications with the use of tape-recorders
R.A. 4200 does not include "private as among the acts punishable.
conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of
the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. CONVERSATION:
The word COMMUNICATE comes from the latin Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) Good
word communicare, meaning "to share or to Afternoon M'am.
impart." In its ordinary signification, Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) Ano ba ang
communication connotes the act of sharing or nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na kung paano ka
imparting signification, , as in a napunta rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong
CONVERSATION, or signifies the "process by ka kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.
which meanings or thoughts are shared CHUCHI Kasi, naka duty ako noon.
between individuals through a common ESG Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)
system of symbols (as language signs or CHUCHI Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila
gestures)". akong binalikan, sabing ganoon
ESG Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw
These definitions are broad enough to kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi hanggang 10:00
include verbal or non-verbal, written or p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon
expressive communications of "meanings or ako ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States,
thoughts" which are likely to include the nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung kakailanganin
emotionally-charged exchange, on February ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi
22, 1988, between petitioner and private ka sa akin makakahingi.
respondent, in the privacy of the latter's CHUCHI Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga
office. Any doubts about the legislative noon i-cocontinue ko up to 10:00 p.m.
body's meaning of the phrase "private ESG Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung
communication" are, furthermore, put to rest paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel. Magsumbong
by the fact that the terms "conversation" and ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na
"communication" were interchangeably used kung paano ka nakapasok dito "Do you think that
by Senator Taada in his Explanatory Note to on your own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako.
the bill quoted below: Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).
CHUCHI Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty
It has been said that innocent ko.
people have nothing to fear from ESG Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan
their conversations being doon ng mga no (sic) ko.
overheard. But this statement ESG Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka
ignores the usual nature of pumasok sa hotel, kung on your own merit alam
conversations as well the ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami
undeniable fact that most, if not all, ang nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.
civilized people have some aspects CHUCHI Kumuha kami ng exam noon.
of their lives they do not wish to ESG Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
expose. Free conversations are CHUCHI Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr.
often characterized by Tamayo
exaggerations, obscenity, ESG Kukunin ka kasi ako.
CHUCHI Eh, di sana individual and the constitutional protection is ever

ESG Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka available to him or to her.
kasi wala kang utak. Akala mo ba makukuha ka
dito kung hindi ako. The law insures absolute freedom of
CHUCHI Mag-eexplain ako. communication between the spouses by making
ESG Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify
sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung paano ka puma-rito. for or against the other without the consent of the
"Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng affected spouse while the marriage subsists.
nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko. Neither may be examined without the consent of
ESG Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito the other as to any communication received in
ka sa loob, nasa labas ka puwede ka ng hindi confidence by one from the other during the
pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon. marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one
CHUCHI Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga thing is freedom of communication; quite
taga Union. another is a compulsion for each one to share
ESG Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong what one knows with the other. And this has
kalimutan na hindi ka makakapasok kung hindi nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each
ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa owes to the other.
akin, dahil tapos ka na.
CHUCHI Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.
ESG Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, FELIPE NAVARRO vs COURT OF APPEALS
kasi kung baga sa no, nilapastangan mo ako. G.R. No. 121087, August 26, 1999,MENDOZA,
CHUCHI Paano kita nilapastanganan? J.
ESG Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako
makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka na. Facts:
Magsumbong ka. Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique Ike
Lingan, who were reporters of the radio station
Cecilia Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals together with one Mario Ilagan, went to the
(G.R. No. 107838, February 20, 1996) Entertainment City following reports that it was
showing nude dancers. After the three had
Mendoza, J., seated themselves at a table and ordered beer, a
scantily clad dancer appeared on stage and
FACTS: Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Alfredo began to perform a strip act. As she removed her
Martin. On March 26, 1982, Cecilia entered the brassieres, Jalbuena brought out his camera and
clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and took a picture. This called the attention of Dante
in the presence of her mother, a driver and Liquin, the floor manager, who together with a
private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened security guard, Alex Sioco, approached Jalbuena
the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and demanded to know why he took a picture
and took 157 documents consisting of private which resulted to a heated argument. When
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his Jalbuena saw that Sioco was about to pull out his
alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled gun, he ran out of the joint followed by his
checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and companions. They went to the police station to
photographs. The documents and papers were report the matter. In a while, Liquin and Sioco
seized for use in evidence in a case for legal arrived on a motorcycle who were met by
separation and for disqualification from the petitioner Navarro who talked with them in a
practice of medicine which petitioner had filed corner for around fifteen minutes. Afterwards,
against her husband. Dr. Martin, hence brought petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and,
an action for the recovery of the documents and pushing him to the wall, cursed him. Petitioner
papers and for damages against Cecilia. The trial Navarro then pulled out his firearm and cocked it,
court rendered its judgment declaring Dr. Martin and, pressing it on the face of Jalbuena. At this
as the capital/exclusive owner of the said point, Lingan intervened. The two then had a
properties. The Court of Appeals affirmed the heated exchange. As Lingan was about to turn
decision of the trial court. away, petitioner Navarro hit him with the handle
of his pistol. Lingan fell on the floor, blood flowing
down his face. He tried to get up, but petitioner
ISSUE: Whether or not the documents and Navarro gave him a fist blow on the forehead
papers seized by Cecilia are admissible in which floored him. Unknown to petitioner
evidence against Dr. Martin. Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the
exchange between petitioner and the deceased.
HELD: NO. The documents and papers in This was submitted as evidence.
question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of Issue:
communication and correspondence [to be] Whether or not the tape is admissible as
inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it evidence in view of RA 4200 which prohibit wire
is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her tapping?
husband's infidelity) who is the party against
whom the constitutional provision is to be Held: No, it may not. Sec. 1 of RA 4200 provides
enforced. The only exception to the that It shall also be unlawful for any person, be
prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized
"lawful order [from a] court or when public in the next preceding sentence to knowingly
safety or order requires otherwise, as possess any tape record, wire record, disc
prescribed by law."Any violation of this record, or any other such record, or copies
provision renders the evidence obtained thereof, of any communication or spoken word
inadmissible "for any purpose in any secured either before or after the effective date of
proceeding." this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to
replay the same for any other person or persons;
The intimacies between husband and wife do not or to communicate the contents thereof, either
justify any one of them in breaking the drawers verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions
and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other
for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person: Provided, That the use of such record or
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed any copies thereof as evidence in any civil,
his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an criminal investigation or trial of offenses
mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be will not be used solely for identification but
covered by this prohibition the generation of other data with remote
The law prohibits the overhearing, relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No.
intercepting, or recording of PRIVATE 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No.
COMMUNICATIONS. Since the exchange 308 can give the government the roving
between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was authority to store and retrieve information for
not private, its tape recording is not a purpose other than the identification of the
prohibited. Nor is there any question that it was individual through his PRN.
duly authenticated. A voice recording is
authenticated by the testimony of a witness (1) The potential for misuse of the data to be
that he personally recorded the conversation; (2) gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be
that the tape played in court was the one he underplayed as the dissenters do. Pursuant to
recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are said administrative order, an individual must
those of the persons such are claimed to belong. present his PRN every time he deals with a
government agency to avail of basic services and
OPLE v. TORRES security. His transactions with the government
G.R. No. 127685; July 23, 1998; Puno, J. agency will necessarily be recorded whether it
be in the computer or in the documentary file of
FACTS: the agency. The individual's file may include his
Petitioner Blas Ople prays that the SC invalidate transactions for loan availments, income tax
Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption returns, statement of assets and liabilities,
of a National Computerized Identification reimbursements for medication, hospitalization,
Reference System" on two important etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN, the
constitutional grounds: one, it is a usurpation of better the chance of building a huge
the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it formidable information base through the
impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's electronic linkage of the files. The data may
protected zone of privacy. be gathered for gainful and useful
government purposes; but the existence of
this vast reservoir of personal information
ISSUE: constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a
Whether AO 308 violates the constitutionally temptation that may be too great for some of
mandated right to privacy our authorities to resist. It does not provide
who shall control and access the data, under
HELD. Yes. Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. what circumstances and for what purpose.
No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still These factors are essential to safeguard the
it cannot pass constitutional muster as an privacy and guaranty the integrity of the
administrative legislation because facially it information. THERE ARE ALSO NO
violates the right to privacy. The essence of CONTROLS TO GUARD AGAINST LEAKAGE
privacy is the "right to be let alone." OF INFORMATION. When the access code of
the control programs of the particular
The SC prescinds from the premise computer system is broken, an intruder,
that the right to privacy is a fundamental right without fear of sanction or penalty, can make
guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is use of the data for whatever purpose, or
the burden of government to show that A.O. worse, manipulate the data stored within the
No. 308 is justified by some COMPELLING system.
STATE INTEREST and that it is NARROWLY
DRAWN. It is plain and the SC held that A.O. No. 308 falls
short of assuring that personal information which
A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two will be gathered about our people will only be
considerations: (1) the need to provide our processed for unequivocally specified
citizens and foreigners with the facility to purposes. The lack of proper safeguards in this
conveniently transact business with basic regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the
service and social security providers and individual's liberty of abode and travel by
other government instrumentalities and (2) enabling authorities to track down his
the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, movement; it may also enable unscrupulous
fraudulent transactions and persons to access confidential information
misrepresentations by persons seeking basic and circumvent the right against self-
services. It is debatable whether these interests incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing
are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of expeditions" by government authorities and
A.O. No. 308. BUT WHAT IS NOT ARGUABLE evade the right against unreasonable searches
IS THE BROADNESS, THE VAGUENESS, THE and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and
OVERBREADTH OF A.O. NO. 308 WHICH IF misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer
IMPLEMENTED WILL PUT OUR PEOPLE'S technology are accentuated when we
RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN CLEAR AND PRESENT consider that the individual lacks control over
DANGER. what can be read or placed on his ID, much
less verify the correctness of the data
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the
which provides for a Population Reference Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.
Number (PRN) as a "common reference number
to establish a linkage among concerned The SC rejected the argument of the Solicitor
agencies" through the use of "Biometrics General that an individual has a reasonable
Technology" and "computer application designs." expectation of privacy with regard to the National
A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a ID and the use of biometrics technology as it
further look will show that it does not state stands on quicksand. THE REASONABLENESS
whether encoding of data is limited to biological OF A PERSON'S EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
information alone for identification purposes. In DEPENDS ON A TWO-PART TEST: (1)
fact, the Solicitor General claims that the whether by his conduct, the individual has
adoption of the Identification Reference exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2)
System will contribute to the "generation of whether this expectation is one that society
population data for development recognizes as reasonable. The factual
planning." This is an admission that the PRN circumstances of the case determine the
reasonableness of the expectation. However, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking
other factors, such as customs, physical for his removal.
surroundings and practices of a particular activity, The Executive Secretary referred the
may serve to create or diminish this papers to the judge of first instance for the 7th
expectation. The use of biometrics and computer Judicial District requesting investigation, proper
technology in A.O. No. 308 does not assure the action, and report. The justice of the peace was
individual of a reasonable expectation of privacy. notified and denied the charges. The judge of first
instance, having established guilt, recommended
Next, the Solicitor General urges the SC to to the Governor-General that the respondent be
validate A.O. No. 308's abridgment of the right of removed from his position as justice of the peace
privacy by using THE RATIONAL and it is ordered that the proceedings had in this
RELATIONSHIP TEST. He stressed that the case be transmitted to the Executive
purposes of A.O. No. 308 are: (1) to streamline Secretary.Later the justice of the peace filled a
and speed up the implementation of basic motion for a new trial; the judge of first instance
government services, (2) eradicate fraud by granted the motion, documents were introduced
avoiding duplication of services, and (3) generate asserting that the justice of the peace was the
population data for development planning. He victim of prosecution, and that charges were
concludes that these purposes justify the made for personal reasons. He was then
incursions into the right to privacy for the means acquitted. Thereafter, in 1916, a criminal action
are rationally related to the end. The SC was not for libel against the defendants who earlier
impressed by the argument. In Morfe v. initiated the petition for the judges removal was
Mutuc, the SC upheld the constitutionality of R.A. instituted. The CFI of Pampanga found the
3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, defendants guilty.
as a valid police power measure. We declared
that the law, in compelling a public officer to Issue: Whether or not the defendants are guilty
make an annual report disclosing his assets and of a libel of Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace
liabilities, his sources of income and expenses, of Macabebe and Masantol, Province of
did not infringe on the individual's right to privacy. Pampanga.
The law was enacted to promote morality in
public administration by curtailing and minimizing Held: No.The Constitution of the United States
the opportunities for official corruption and and the State constitutions guarantee the right of
maintaining a standard of honesty in the public freedom of speech and press and the right of
service. The same circumstances do not obtain in assembly and petition. We are therefore, not
the case at bar. For one, R.A. 3019 is a statute, surprised to find President McKinley in that
not an administrative order. Secondly, R.A. Magna Charta of Philippine Liberty, the
3019 itself is sufficiently detailed. The law is Instruction to the Second Philippine Commission,
clear on what practices were prohibited and of April 7, 1900, laying down the inviolable rule
penalized, and it was narrowly drawn to avoid "That no law shall be passed abridging the
abuses. In the case at bar, A.O. No. 308 may freedom of speech or of the press or of the
have been impelled by a worthy purpose, but, rights of the people to peaceably assemble
it cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for it is and petition the Government for a redress of
not narrowly drawn. They must satisfactorily grievances."
show the presence of compelling state
interests and that the law, rule or regulation is The Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1,
narrowly drawn to preclude abuses. This 1902, and the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of
approach is demanded by the 1987 Constitution August 29, 1916, in the nature of organic acts for
whose entire matrix is designed to protect human the Philippines, continued this guaranty. The
rights and to prevent authoritarianism. In case of words quoted are not unfamiliar to students of
doubt, the least we can do is to lean towards the Constitutional Law, for they are the counterpart of
stance that will not put in danger the rights the first amendment to the Constitution of the
protected by the Constitutions. United States, which the American people
demanded before giving their approval to the
In the case at bar, the threat comes from the Constitution.
executive branch of government which by
issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to These paragraphs found in the Philippine Bill of
surrender their privacy by giving information Rights are not threadbare verbiage. The
about themselves on the pretext that it will language carries with it all the applicable
facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the jurisprudence of great English and American
record-keeping power of the computer, only the Constitutional cases. And what are these
indifferent fail to perceive the danger that A.O. principles? Volumes would inadequately answer.
No. 308 gives the government the power to But included are the following:
compile a devastating dossier against
unsuspecting citizens. The interest of society and the maintenance
of good government demand a full discussion
Thus, the petition was GRANTED. of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment
on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in
SECTION 4 the case of free speech. The sharp incision of
its probe relieves the abscesses of
officialdom. Men in public life may suffer
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the
wound can be assuaged with the balm of a
THE UNITED STATES vs FELIPE BUSTOS, clear conscience. A public officer must not be
ET AL. too thin-skinned with reference to comment
G.R. No. L-12592, March 8, 1918. upon his official acts. Only thus can the
intelligence and dignity of the individual be
Facts: In the latter part of 1915, numerous exalted. Of course, criticism does not
citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, authorized defamation. Nevertheless, as the
and prepared and signed a petition to the individual is less than the State, so must
Executive Secretary charging Roman Punsalan, expected criticism be born for the common good.
justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Rising superior to any official, or set of
officials, to the Chief Executive, to the
Legislature, to the Judiciary - to any or all the A pertinent illustration of the application of
agencies of Government - PUBLIC OPINION qualified privilege is a complaint made in good
should be the constant source of liberty and faith and without malice in regard to the
democracy. character or conduct of a public official when
addressed to an officer or a board having some
The guaranties of a free speech and a free interest or duty in the matter. Even when the
press include the right to criticize judicial statements are found to be false, if there is
conduct. The administration of the law is a probable cause for belief in their truthfulness
matter of vital public concern. Whether the and the charge is made in good faith, the
law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of
fit subject for proper comment. If the people the individual. But the statements must be
cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a made under an honest sense of duty; a self-
judge the same as any other public officer, seeking motive is destructive. Personal injury
public opinion will be effectively muzzled. is not necessary. All persons have an interest
Attempted terrorization of public opinion on the in the pure and efficient administration of
part of the judiciary would be tyranny of the justice and of public affairs. The DUTY under
basest sort. The sword of Damocles in the hands which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is
of a judge does not hang suspended over the social or moral in its nature and this person in
individual who dares to assert his prerogative as good faith believe he is acting in pursuance
a citizen and to stand up bravely before any thereof although in fact he is mistaken. The
official. On the contrary, it is a DUTY which privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that
every one owes to society or to the State to the communication is made in intemperate
assist in the investigation of any alleged terms. A further element of the law of privilege
misconduct. It is further the duty of all know concerns the person to whom the complaint
of any official dereliction on the part of a should be made. The rule is that if a party applies
magistrate or the wrongful act of any public to the wrong person through some natural and
officer to bring the facts to the notice of those honest mistake as to the respective functions of
whose duty it is to inquire into and punish various officials such unintentional error will not
them. In the words of Mr. Justice Gayner, who take the case out of the privilege.
contributed so largely to the law of libel. "The
people are not obliged to speak of the In the usual case MALICE can be presumed
conduct of their officials in whispers or with from defamatory words. PRIVILEGE destroys
bated breath in a free government, but only in that PRESUMPTION. The onus of proving
a despotism." malice then lies on the plaintiff.
The RIGHT TO ASSEMBLE AND PETITION is The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant
the necessary consequence of republican the existence of malice as the true motive of his
institutions and the complement of the right conduct. Falsehood and the absence of
of free speech. ASSEMBLY means a right on probable cause will amount to proof of
the part of citizens to meet peaceably for malice.
consultation in respect to public affairs.
PETITION means that any person or group of A privileged communication should not be
persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to subjected to microscopic examination to discover
the appropriate branch or office of the grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive
government for a redress of grievances. The scrutiny would defeat the protection which the
persons assembling and petitioning must, of law throws over privileged communications. The
course, assume responsibility for the charges ultimate test is that of bona fides.
made.
Having ascertained the attitude which should be
(1)Public policy, (2)the welfare of society, and assumed relative to the basic rights of freedom of
(3)the orderly administration of government have speech and press and of assembly and petition,
demanded protection for public opinion. The having emphasized the point that our Libel Law
inevitable and incontestable result has been the as a statute must be construed with reference to
development and adoption of the DOCTRINE OF the guaranties of our Organic Law, and having
PRIVILEGE. sketched the doctrine of privilege, we are in a
position to test the facts of this case with these
"The DOCTRINE OF PRIVILEGED principles.
COMMUNICATIONS rests upon public policy,
'which looks to the free and unfettered It is true that the particular words set out in the
administration of justice, though, as an information, if said of a private person, might well
incidental result, it may in some instances be considered libelous per se. The charges might
afford an immunity to the evil-disposed and also under certain conceivable conditions convict
malignant slanderer.'" one of a libel of a government official. As a
general rule words imputing to a judge or a
Privilege is classified as either ABSOLUTE or justice of the peace dishonesty or corruption
QUALIFIED. With the first, we are not concerned. or incapacity or misconduct touching him in
As to qualified privilege, it is as the words his office are actionable. But as suggested in
suggest a prima facie privilege which may be the beginning we do not have present a
lost by proof of malice. The rule is thus stated simple case of direct and vicious accusations
by Lord Campbell, C. J. published in the press, but of charges
predicated on affidavits made to the proper
"A communication made bona fide upon any official and thus qualifiedly privileged.
subject-matter in which the party Express malice has not been proved by the
communicating has an interest, or in prosecution. Further, although the charges
reference to which he has a duty, is are probably not true as to the justice of the
privileged, if made to a person having a peace, they were believed to be true by the
corresponding interest or duty, although it petitioners. Good faith surrounded their
contained incriminatory matter which without action. Probable cause for them to think that
this privilege would be slanderous and malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed
actionable." is apparent. The ends and the motives of
these citizens - to secure the removal from
office of a person thought to be venal - were appear that such publications do impede,
justifiable. In no way did they abuse the interfere with, and embarrass the
privilege. These respectable citizens did not administration of justice before the author of
eagerly seize on a frivolous matter but on the publications should be held for contempt.
instances which not only seemed to them of a What is thus sought to be shielded against
grave character, but which were sufficient in the influence of newspaper comments is the
an investigation by a judge of first instance to all-important duty of the court to administer
convince him of their seriousness. No undue justice in the decision of a pending case.
publicity was given to the petition. The There is no pending case to speak of when and
manner of commenting on the conduct of the once the court has come upon a decision and
justice of the peace was proper. And finally has lost control either to reconsider or amend it.
the charges and the petition were submitted That, we believe, is the case at bar, for here we
through reputable attorneys to the proper have a concession that the letter complained of
functionary, the Executive Secretary. was published after the Court of First Instance of
The present facts are further essentially Pampanga had decided the aforesaid criminal
different from those established in other cases in case for robbery in band, and after that decision
which private individuals have been convicted of had been appealed to the Court of Appeals. The
libels of public officials. Malice, traduction, fact that a motion to reconsider its order
falsehood, calumny, against the man and not confiscating the bond of the accused therein was
the officer, have been the causes of the subsequently filed may be admitted; but, the
verdict of guilty. important consideration is that it was then without
power to reopen or modify the decision which it
We find the defendants and appellants entitled to had rendered upon the merits of the case, and
the protection of the rules concerning qualified could not have been influenced by the
privilege, growing out of constitutional guaranties questioned publication.
in our bill of rights. Instead of punishing citizens If it be contended, however, that the
for an honest endeavor to improve the public publication of the questioned letter constitutes
service, we should rather commend them for their contempt of the Court of Appeals where the
good citizenship. The defendants and appellants appeal in the criminal case was then pending, as
are acquitted. was the theory of the provincial fiscal below
which was accepted by the lower court, we take
the view that in the interrelation of the
different courts forming our integrated
People vs. Alarcon judicial system, one court is not an agent or
GR 46551, Dec. 12, 1939 representative of another and may not, for
this reason, punish contempts in vindication
FACTS: As an aftermath of the decision of the authority and de corum which are not
rendered by the Court of first Instance of its own. The appeal transfers the proceedings to
Pampanga in criminal case No. 5733, The the appellate court, and this last court be comes
People of the Philippines vs. Salvador Alarcon, et thereby charged with the authority to deal with
al., convicting the accused therein except one contempts committed after the perfection of the
of the crime of robbery committed in band, a appeal.
denunciatory letter, signed by Luis M. Taruc, was The Solicitor-General, in his brief,
addressed to His Excellency, the President of the suggests that "even if there had been nothing
Philippines. more pending before the trial court, this still had
A copy of said letter found its way to the jurisdiction to punish the accused for contempt,
herein respondent, Federico Magahas who, as for the reason that the publication scandalized
columnist of the Tribune, a newspaper of general the court. The rule suggested, which has its
circulation in the Philippines, quoted the letter in origin at common law, is involved in some doubt
an article published by him in the issue of that under modern English law and in the United
paper of September 23, 1937. The objectionable States, "the weight of authority, however, is
portion, written in Spanish, is inserted in the clearly to the effect that comment upon
following petition of the provincial fiscal of concluded cases is unrestricted under our
Pampanga, filed with the Court of First Instance constitutional guaranty of the liberty of the
of that province on September 29, 1937. On the press." Other considerations argue against our
same date, the lower court ordered the adoption of the suggested holding. As stated, the
respondent to appear and show cause. The rule imported into this jurisdiction is that
respondent appeared and filed an answer, "newspaper publications tending to impede,
alleging that the publication of the letter in obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in
question is in line with the constitutional administering justice in a pending suit or
guarantee of freedom of the press. proceeding constitute criminal contempt which is
summarily punishable by the courts; that the rule
ISSUE: is otherwise after the case is ended. In at least
two instances, this Court has exercised the
Whether the publication of the letter in power to punish for contempt "on the
question is within the purview of constitutional preservative and on the vindicative principle,
guarantee of freedom of the press, hence the on the corrective and not on the retaliatory
accused cannot be held guilty in contempt of idea of punishment". Contempt of court is in
court? the nature of a criminal offense, and in
considering the probable effects of the article
HELD: alleged to be contemptuous, every fair and
1. YES. The elements of reasonable inference consistent with the theory
contempt by newspaper publications are well of defendant's innocence will be indulged, and
defined by the cases adjudicated in this as in where a reasonable doubt in fact or in law exists
other jurisdictions. Newspaper publications as to the guilt of one of constructive contempt for
tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or interfering with the due administration of justice
influence the courts in administering justice the doubt must be resolved in his favor, and he
in a pending suit or proceeding constitutes must be acquitted.
criminal contempt which is summarily punish
able by the courts. The rule is otherwise after
the cause is ended. It must, however, clearly
Ayer Production PTY Ltd. vs. Capulong sought to be elicited from him or to be
GR 82380, April, 29, 1988, FELICIANO, J. published about him constitute of apublic
character. Succinctly put, THE RIGHT OF
FACTS: PRIVACY cannot be invoked resist
The petitioner informed private publication and dissemination of MATTERS
respondent Juan Ponce Enrile about the OF PUBLIC INTEREST. The interest sought to
projected motion picture entitled "The Four Day be protected by the right of privacy is the
Revolution" enclosing a synopsis of it, the full text right to be free from unwarranted publicity,
of which is set out below: The Four Day from the wrongful publicizing of the private
Revolution is a six hour mini-series about People affairs and activities of an individual which
Powera unique event in modern history that- are outside the realm of legitimate public
made possible the Peaceful revolution in the concern.
Philippines in 1986. Faced with the task of Lagunzad v. Vda. de Gonzales, on
dramatizing these remarkable events, which private respondent relies heavily,
screenwriter David Williamson and history Prof Al recognized a right to privacy in a context which
McCoy have chosen a "docu-drama" style and included a claim to freedom of speech and of
created [four] fictitious characters to trace the expression. Lagunzad involved a suit for
revolution from the death of Senator Aquino, to enforcement of a licensing agreement between a
the Feb revolution and the fleeing of Marcos from motion picture producer as licensee and the
the country. widow and family of the late Moises Padilla as
Private respondent Enrile replied that licensors. This agreement gave the licensee the
"he would not and will not approve of the use, right to produce a motion picture portraying the
appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of life of Moises Padilla, a mayoralty candidate of
his name, or picture, or that of any member of his the Nacionalista Party for the Municipality of
family in any cinema or television production, film Magallon, Negros Occidental during the
or other medium for advertising or commercial November 1951 elections and for whose murder,
exploitation". Petitioners acceded to this demand Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of the Liberal
and the name of private respondent Enrile was Party then in power and his men were tried and
deleted from the movie script. On 23 February convicted. In affirming the judgment of the lower
1988, private respondent filed a Complaint with court enforcing the licensing agreement against
application for Temporary Restraining Order and the licensee who had produced the motion
Wilt of Pretion with the Regional Trial Court of picture and exhibited it but refused to pay the
Makati seeking to enjoin petitioners from stipulated royalties, the Court, through Mme.
producing the movie "The Four Day Revolution". Justice Melencio-Herrera, said:
The complaint alleged that petitioners' production "Neither do we agree with
of the mini-series without private respondent's petitioner's submission that the
consent and over his objection, constitutes an Licensing Agreement is null
obvious violation of his right of privacy. and void for lack of, or for
having an illegal cause or
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners right to consideration, while it is true
freedom of expression outweigh private that petitioner had purchased
respondent Enriles right to privacy? the rights to the book entitled
'The Moises Padilla Story,' that
HELD: YES. The freedom of speech includes the did not dispense with the need
freedom to film and produce motion pictures for prior consent and authority
and to exhibit such motion pictures in from the deceased heirs to
theaters or to diffuse them through television. portray publicly episodes in
In our day and age, motion pictures are a said deceased's life and in that
universally utilized vehicle of communication and of his mother and the members
medium of expression. Along with the press, of his family. As held in
radio and television, motion pictures constitute a Schuyler v. Curtis, ([1895], 147
principal medium of mass communication for NY 434, 42 NE, 31 LRA 286.
information, education and entertainment. Motion 49 Am St Rep 671), 'a privilege
pictures are important both as a medium for the may be given the surviving
communication of ideas and the expression of relatives of a deceased person
the artistic impulse. Their effects on the to protect his memory, but the
perception by our people of issues and public privilege exists for the benefit
officials or public figures as well as the prevailing of the living, to protect their
cultural traits is considerable. Importance of feelings and to prevent a
motion pictures as an organ of public opinion violation of their own rights in
lessened by the fact that they are designed to the character and memory of
entertain as well as to inform. There is no clear the deceased.'
dividing line between what involves knowledge
and what affords pleasure. If such a distinction Petitioner's averment that
were sustained, there is a diminution of the basic private respondent did not
right to free expression."This freedom is have any property right over
available in our country both to locally-owned the life of Moises Padilla since
and to foreign-owned motion picture the latter was a public figure, is
companies. Furthermore, the circumstance neither well taken. Being a
that the production of motion picture films is public figure ipso facto does
a commercial activity expected to yield not automatically destroy in
monetary profit, is not a disqualification for toto a person's right to privacy.
availing of freedom of speech and of The right to invade a person's
expression. privacy to disseminate public
The counter-balancing claim of private information does not extend to
respondent is to a right of privacy. The right of a fictional or novelized
privacy or "the right to be let alone," like the right representation of a person, no
of free expression, is not an absolute right. A matter how public a figure he
limited intrusion into a person's privacy has or she may be (Garner v.
long been regarded as permissible where that Triangle Publications, DCNY,
person is a public figure and the information 97 F. Supp., 564, 549 [1951]).
In the case at bar, while it is projected motion picture "The Four Day
true that petitioner exerted Revolution" does not, in the circumstances of this
efforts to present a true-to-life case, constitute an unlawful intrusion upon
story of Moises Padilla, private respondent's "right of privacy."
petitioner admits that he
included a little romance in the 1. It may be observed at the outset that what
film because without it, it would is involved in the instant case is a prior and
be a drab story of torture and direct restraint on the part of the respondent
brutality." Judge upon the exercise of speech and of
expression by petitioners. The respondent
In Lagunzad, the Court had need, as we have Judge has restrained petitioners from filming and
in the instant case, to deal with contraposed producing the entire proposed motion picture. It is
claims to freedom of speech and of important to note that in Lagunzad, there was no
expression and to privacy. Lagunzad the prior restrain of any kind imposed upon the movie
licensee in effect claimed, in the name of producer who in fact completed and exhibited the
freedom of speech and expression, a right to film biography of Moises Padilla. Because of the
produce a motion picture biography at least preferred character of the constitutional rights of
partly "fictionalized" of Moises Padilla without freedom of speech and of expression, a weighty
the consent of and without paying pre-agreed presumption of invalidity vitiates measures of
royalties to the widow and family of Padilla. In prior restraint upon the exercise of such
rejecting the licensee's claim, the Court said: freedoms. The invalidity of a measure of prior
restraint does not, of course, mean that no
Lastly, neither do we find merit subsequent liability may lawfully be imposed
in petitioner's contention that upon a person claiming to exercise such
the Licensing Agreement constitutional freedoms. The respondent Judge
infringes on the constitutional should have stayed his hand, instead of
right of freedom of speech and issuing an ex-parte Temporary Restraining
of the press, in that, as a Order one day after filing of a complaint by
citizen and as a the private respondent and issuing a
newspaperman, he had the Preliminary Injunction twenty (20) days later;
right to express his thoughts in for the projected motion picture was as yet
film on the public life of Moises uncompleted and hence NOT exhibited to any
Padilla without prior restraint. audience. Neither private respondent nor the
The right of freedom of respondent trial Judge knew what the
expression, indeed, occupies a completed film would precisely look like.
preferred position in the There was, in other words, NO "CLEAR AND
'hierarchy of civil liberties' PRESENT DANGER" of any violation of any
right to privacy that private respondent could
The prevailing doctrine is that lawfully assert.
the CLEAR AND PRESENT
DANGER RULE is such a 2. The subject matter of "The Four Day
limitation. Another criterion for Revolution" relates to the non-bloody change of
permissible limitation on government that took place at Epifanio de los
freedom of speech and of the Santos Avenue in February 1986, and the train of
press, which includes such events which led up to that denouement. Clearly,
vehicles of the mass media as such subject matter is one of public interest and
radio, television and the concern. Indeed, it is, petitioners' argue, of
movies, is the 'BALANCING- international interest. The subject thus relates
OF-INTERESTS TEST'. The to a highly critical stage in the history of this
principle 'requires a court to country and as such, must be regarded as
take conscious and detailed having passed into the public domain and as
consideration of the interplay of an appropriate subject for speech and
interests observable in a given expression and coverage by any form of
situation or type of situation' mass media. The subject matter, as set out in
the synopsis provided by the petitioners and
In the case at bar, the interests quoted above, does not relate to the
observable are the right to individual life and CERTAINLY NOT TO THE
privacy asserted by respondent PRIVATE LIFE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT
and the right of freedom of PONCE ENRILE. Unlike in Lagunzad, which
expression invoked by concerned the life story of Moises Padilla
petitioner. Taking into account necessarily including at least his immediate
the interplay of those interests, family, what we have here is not a film
we hold that under the biography, more or less fictionalized, of
particular circumstances private respondent Ponce Enrile. "The Four
presented and considering the Day Revolution" is not principally about, nor is it
obligations assumed in the focused upon, the man Juan Ponce Enrile; but it
Licensing Agreement entered is compelled, if it is to be historical, to refer to the
into by petitioner, the validity of role played by Juan Ponce Enrile in the
such agreement will have to be precipitating and the constituent events of the
upheld particularly because the change of government in February 1986.
limits of freedom of expression
are reached when expression 3. The extent of the intrusion upon the life of
touches upon matters of private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile that would
essentially private concern. be entailed by the production and exhibition of
"The Four Day Revolution" would, therefore, be
Whether the "BALANCING OF INTERESTS LIMITED IN CHARACTER. The extent of that
TEST" or the "CLEAR AND PRESENT intrusion, as this Court understands the synopsis
DANGER TEST" be applied in respect of the of the proposed film, may be generally described
instant Petitions, the Court believes that a as such intrusion as is reasonably necessary
different conclusion must here be reached: The to keep that film a truthful historical account.
production and filming by petitioners of the Private respondent does not claim that
petitioners threatened to depict in "The Four that fails to make reference to the role played
Day Revolution" any part of the private life of by private respondent would be grossly
private respondent or that of any member of unhistorical. The right of privacy of a "public
his family. figure" is necessarily NARROWER than that
of an ordinary citizen. Private respondent has
4. At all relevant times, during which the not retired into the seclusion of simple private
momentous events, clearly of public concern, that citizenship. He continues to be a "public
petitioners propose to film were taking place, figure." After a successful political campaign
private respondent was what Profs. Prosser and during which his participation in the EDSA
Keeton have referred to as a "public figure:" Revolution was directly or indirectly referred
to in the press, radio and television, he sits in
"A PUBLIC FIGURE has been defined as a a very public place, the Senate of the
person who, by his accomplishments, fame, Philippines.
or mode of living, or by adopting a profession
or calling which gives the public a legitimate 5. The line of equilibrium in the specific context
interest in his doings, his affairs, and his of the instant case between the constitutional
character, has become a 'public personage.' freedom of speech and of expression and the
He is, in other words, a celebrity. Obviously to right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a
be included in this category are those who have requirement that the proposed motion picture
achieved some degree of reputation by must be fairly truthful and historical in its
appearing before the public, as in the case of an presentation of events. There must, in other
actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or words, be no knowing or reckless disregard
any other entertainer. The list is, however, of truth in depicting the participation of
broader than this. It includes public officers, private respondent in the EDSA Revolution.
famous inventors and explorers, war heroes There must, further, be no presentation of the
and even ordinary soldiers, an infant prodigy, private life of the unwilling private respondent
and no less a personage than the Grand and certainly no revelation of intimate or
Exalted Ruler of a lodge. It includes, in short, embarrassing personal facts. The proposed
anyone who has arrived at a position where motion picture should not enter into what
public attention is focused upon him as a Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera in Lagunzad
person. referred to as "matters of essentially private
concern." To the extent that "The Four Day
Such public figures were held to have lost, to Revolution" limits itself in portraying the
some extent at least, their right of privacy. participation of private respondent in the
Three reasons were given, more or less EDSA Revolution to those events which are
indiscrimately, in the decisions" that they had directly and reasonably related to the public
sought publicity and consented to it, and so could facts of the EDSA Revolution, the intrusion
not complain when they received it; that their into private respondent's privacy cannot be
personalities and their affairs had already regarded as unreasonable and actionable.
become public, and could no longer be regarded Such portrayal may be carried out even without a
as their own private business; and that the press license from private respondent.
had a privilege, under the Constitution, to inform
the public about those who have become
legitimate matters of public interest. On one or
another of these grounds, and sometimes all, it Borjal vs. Court of Appeals
was held that there was no liability when they GR 126466, Jan. 14, 1999, BELLOSILLO, J.
were given additional publicity, as to matters
legitimately within the scope of the public interest FACTS: Petitioners Arturo Borjal and Maximo
they had aroused. Soliven are among the incorporators of
Philippines Today, Inc. (PTI), now PhilSTAR
The privilege of giving publicity to news, and Daily, Inc., owner of The Philippine Star. Between
other matters of public interest, was held to May and July 1989 a series of articles written by
arise out of the desire and the right of the petitioner Borjal was published on different dates
public to know what is going on in the world, in his column Jaywalker. The articles dealt with
and the freedom of the press and other the alleged anomalous activities of an "organizer
agencies of information to tell it. 'NEWS' of a conference" without naming or identifying
includes all events and items of information private respondent. Neither did it refer to the
which are out of the ordinary humdrum FNCLT as the conference therein mentioned.
routine, and which have 'that indefinable quality Thereafter, private respondent filed a complaint
of information which arouses public attention.' To with the National Press Club (NPC) against
a very great extent the press, with its experience petitioner Borjal for unethical conduct. He
or instinct as to what its readers will want, has accused petitioner Borjal of using his column as a
succeeded in making its own definition of news, form of leverage to obtain contracts for his public
as a glance at any morning newspaper will relations firm, AA Borjal Associates. In turn,
sufficiently indicate. It includes homicide and petitioner Borjal published a rejoinder to the
other crimes, arrests and police raides, suicides, challenge of private respondent not only to
marriages and divorces, accidents, a death from protect his name and honor but also to refute the
the use of narcotics, a woman with a rare claim that he was using his column for character
disease, the birth of a child to a twelve year old assassination. 7
girl, the reappearance of one supposed to have Apparently not satisfied with his complaint with
been murdered years ago, and undoubtedly the NPC, private respondent filed a criminal case
many other similar matters of genuine, if more or for libel against petitioners Borjal and Soliven,
less deplorable, popular appeal. among others.
Private respondent is a "public figure" ISSUE: Whether the disputed articles constitute
precisely because, inter alia, of his privileged communications as to exempt the
participation as a principal actor in the author from liability.
culminating events of the change of
government in February 1986. Because his HELD: YES. In order to maintain a libel suit, it
participation therein was major in character, a is essential that the victim be identifiable
film reenactment of the peaceful revolution although it is not necessary that he be
named. It is also not sufficient that the justifiable motive for making it
offended party recognized himself as the is shown, except in the
person attacked or defamed, but it must be following cases:
shown that at least a third person could
identify him as the object of the libelous 1) A private communication
publication. made by any person to another
in the performance of any
Regrettably, these requisites have not been legal, moral or social duty; and,
complied with in the case at bar.
2) A fair and true report, made
The questioned articles written by Borjal do in good faith, without any
not identify private respondent Wenceslao as comments or remarks, of any
the organizer of the conference. The first of judicial, legislative or other
the Jaywalker articles which appeared in the official proceedings which are
31 May 1989 issue of The Philippine Star not of confidential nature, or of
yielded nothing to indicate that private any statement, report or
respondent was the person referred to speech delivered in said
therein. Surely, as observed by petitioners, proceedings, or of any other
there were millions of "heroes" of the EDSA act performed by public officers
Revolution and anyone of them could be in the exercise of their
"self-proclaimed" or an "organizer of functions.
seminars and conferences." As a matter of fact,
in his June 1989 column petitioner Borjal wrote
about the "so-called First National Conference on A PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION may be
Land Transportation whose principal organizers either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly
are not specified" . Neither did the disclose the privileged. ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED
identity of the conference organizer since these COMMUNICATIONS are those which are not
contained only an enumeration of names where actionable even if the author has acted in bad
private respondent Francisco Wenceslao was faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art. VI,
described as Executive Director and Spokesman of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a
and not as a conference organizer. The printout member of Congress from liability for any
and tentative program of the conference were speech or debate in the Congress or in any
devoid of any indication of Wenceslao as Committee thereof. Upon the other hand,
organizer. The printout which contained an article QUALIFIEDLY PRIVILEGED
entitled "Who Organized the NCLT?" did not even COMMUNICATIONS containing defamatory
mention private respondent's name, while the imputations are not actionable unless found
tentative program only denominated private to have been made without good intention or
respondent as "Vice Chairman and Executive justifiable motive. To this genre belong
Director," and not as organizer. "private communications" and "fair and true
report without any comments or remarks."
No less than private respondent himself
admitted that the FNCLT had several Indisputably, petitioner Borjal's questioned
organizers and that he was only a part of the writings are not within the exceptions of Art.
organization, thus - 354 of The Revised Penal Code for, as
correctly observed by the appellate court,
Significantly, private respondent himself they are neither private communications nor
entertained doubt that he was the person fair and true report without any comments or
spoken of in Borjal's columns. The former remarks. However this does not necessarily
even called up columnist Borjal to inquire if he mean that they are not privileged. To be sure,
(Wenceslao) was the one referred to in the the enumeration under Art. 354 is not an
subject articles. His letter to the editor published exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged
in the 4 June 1989 issue of The Philippine Star communications since FAIR COMMENTARIES
even showed private respondent Wenceslao's ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST are
uncertainty - likewise privileged. The rule on privileged
communications had its genesis not in the
Identification is grossly inadequate when nation's penal code but in the Bill of Rights of
even the alleged offended party is himself the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of
unsure that he was the object of the verbal speech and of the press. Art. III, Sec. 4,
attack. It is well to note that the revelation of the provides: No law shall be passed abridging the
identity of the person alluded to came not from freedom of speech, of expression, or of the
petitioner Borjal but from private respondent press, or the right of the people to peaceably
himself when he supplied the information through assemble and petition the government for
his 4 June 1989 letter to the editor. Had private redress of grievances. In the case of U.S vs.
respondent not revealed that he was the Bustos, this Court ruled that publications
"organizer" of the FNCLT referred to in the Borjal which are privileged for reasons of public
articles, the public would have remained in policy are protected by the constitutional
blissful ignorance of his identity. It is therefore guaranty of freedom of speech. This
clear that on the element of identifiability alone constitutional right cannot be abolished by
the case falls. the mere failure of the legislature to give it
express recognition in the statute punishing
We now proceed to resolve the other issues and libels.
pass upon the pertinent findings of the courts a
quo on wether the disputed articles constitute The concept of privileged communications is
privileged communications as to exempt the implicit in the freedom of the press. To be
author from liability. more specific, no culpability could be
imputed to petitioners for the alleged
Art. 354. Requirement for offending publication without doing violence
publicity. - Every defamatory to the concept of privileged communications
imputation is presumed to be implicit in the freedom of the press. As was so
malicious, even if it be true, if well put by Justice Malcolm in Bustos:
no good intention and
'Public policy, the welfare of

society, and the orderly
administration of government
have demanded protection of REYES vs.BAGATSING
public opinion. The inevitable GR 65366, Nov. 9, 1983, Fernando, J.
and incontestable result has
been the development and FACTS:
adoption of the doctrine of Petitioner, retired Justice JB L. Reyes,
privilege.' on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a
permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful
march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to
The doctrine formulated in these two (2) 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta, a
cases resonates the rule that privileged public park, to the gates of the United States
communications must, sui generis, be Embassy, hardly two blocks away. Once there,
protective of public opinion. and in an open space of public property, a short
program would be held.
To reiterate, FAIR COMMENTARIES ON The filing of this suit for mandamus with
MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST are alternative prayer for writ of preliminary
privileged and constitute a valid defense in an mandatory injunction on October 20, 1983 was
action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair due to the fact that as of that date, petitioner had
comment means that while in general every not been informed of any action taken on his
discreditable imputation publicly made is request on behalf of the organization to hold a
deemed false, because every man is rally. It turned out that on October 19, such
presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially permit was denied. Petitioner was unaware of
proved, and every false imputation is deemed such a fact as the denial was sent by ordinary
malicious, nevertheless, when the mail. The reason for refusing a permit was due to
discreditable imputation is directed against a police intelligence reports which strongly militate
PUBLIC PERSON IN HIS PUBLIC CAPACITY, against the advisability of issuing such permit at
it is not necessarily actionable. In order that this time and at the place applied for." To be
such discreditable imputation to a public more specific, reference was made to persistent
official may be actionable, it must either be a intelligence reports affirm[ing] the plans of
false allegation of fact or a comment based subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate and/or
on a false supposition. If the comment is an disrupt any assembly or congregations where a
expression of opinion, based on established large number of people is expected to attend."
facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion
happens to be mistaken, as long as it might ISSUE: Whether or not there was a denial of
reasonably be inferred from the facts. freedom of expression arising from the denial of
the permit?
There is no denying that the questioned
articles dealt with matters of public interest. HELD: Yes. The Constitution is quite explicit: "No
In his testimony, private respondent spelled out law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
the objectives of the conference thus - speech, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the
x x x x The principal conference Government for redress of grievances." Free
objective is to come up with a speech, like free press, may be identified with
draft of an Omnibus Bill that will the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully
embody a long term land any matter of public concern without
transportation policy for censorship or punishment. There is to be then
presentation to Congress in its no previous restraint on the communication of
next regular session in July. views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits,
Since last January, the National prosecution for sedition, or action for damages,
Conference on Land or contempt proceedings unless there be a
Transportation (NCLT), the "clear and present danger of a substantive
conference secretariat, has been evil that [the State] has a right to prevent."
enlisting support from all sectors Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the
to ensure the success of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and
project.25 [TSN, 29 July 1991, p. discussion of matters of public concern. It is
15.] entitled to be accorded the utmost deference
and respect. It is not to be limited, much less
Private respondent likewise testified that the denied, except on a showing, as is the case
FNCLT was raising funds through solicitation with freedom of expression, of a clear and
from the public - present danger of a substantive evil that the
state has a right to prevent. Even prior to the
The declared objective of the conference, the 1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion
composition of its members and participants, to stress that it is a necessary consequence of
and the manner by which it was intended to our republican institutions and complements the
be funded no doubt lend to its activities as right of free speech. To paraphrase the opinion
being genuinely imbued with PUBLIC of Justice Rutledge, speaking for the majority of
INTEREST. An organization such as the FNCLT the American Supreme Court in Thomas v.
aiming to reinvent and reshape the transportation Collins, it was not by accident or coincidence that
laws of the country and seeking to source its the rights to freedom of speech and of the press
funds for the project from the public at large were coupled in a single guarantee with the rights
cannot dissociate itself from the public character of the people peaceably to assemble and to
of its mission. As such, it cannot but invite close petition the government for redress of
scrutiny by the media obliged to inform the public grievances. All these rights, while not identical,
of the legitimacy of the purpose of the activity and are inseparable. In every case, therefore, where
of the qualifications and integrity of the there is a limitation placed on the exercise of this
personalities behind it. right, the judiciary is called upon to examine the
effects of the challenged governmental actuation.
The sole justification for a limitation on the
exercise of this right, so fundamental to the
maintenance of democratic institutions, is the from ancient times, been a part of the
danger, of a character both grave and privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of
imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United
public morals, public health, or any other States to use the streets and parks for
legitimate public interest. communication of views on national questions
may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not
2. Nowhere is the rationale that underlies the absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in
freedom of expression and peaceable assembly subordination to the general comfort and
better expressed than in this excerpt from an convenience, and in consonance with peace and
opinion of Justice Frankfurter: "It must never be good order; but it must not, in the guise of
forgotten, however, that the Bill of Rights was the regulation, be abridged or denied." The above
child of the Enlightenment. Back of the guaranty excerpt was quoted with approval in Primicias v.
of free speech lay faith in the power of an appeal Fugoso. Primicias made explicit what was implicit
to reason by all the peaceful means for gaining in Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, a 1915
access to the mind. It was in order to avert force decision, where this Court categorically affirmed
and explosions due to restrictions upon rational that plazas or parks and streets are outside the
modes of communication that the guaranty of commerce of man and thus nullified a contract
free speech was given a generous scope. But that leased Plaza Soledad of plaintiff-
utterance in a context of violence can lose its municipality. Reference was made to such plaza
significance as an appeal to reason and become "being a promenade for public use," which
part of an instrument of force. Such utterance certainly is not the only purpose that it could
was not meant to be sheltered by the serve. To repeat, there can be no valid reason
Constitution." What was rightfully stressed is the why a permit should not be granted for the
abandonment of reason, the utterance, whether proposed march and rally starting from a public
verbal or printed, being in a context of violence. It park that is the Luneta.
must always be remembered that this right
likewise provides for a safety valve, allowing 4. Neither can there be any valid objection to
parties the opportunity to give vent to their views, the use of the streets to the gates of the US
even if contrary to the prevailing climate of Embassy, hardly two blocks away at the
opinion. For if the peaceful means of Roxas Boulevard. Primicias v. Fugoso has
communication cannot be availed of, resort to resolved any lurking doubt on the matter. In
non-peaceful means may be the only alternative. holding that the then Mayor Fugoso of the City of
Nor is this the sole reason for the expression of Manila should grant a permit for a public meeting
dissent. It means more than just the right to be at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo, this Court
heard of the person who feels aggrieved or who categorically declared: "Our conclusion finds
is dissatisfied with things as they are. Its value support in the decision in the case of Willis Cox
may lie in the fact that there may be vs. State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S., 569. In
something worth hearing from the dissenter. that case, the statute of New Hampshire P. L.
That is to ensure a true ferment of ideas. chap. 145, section 2, providing that `no parade or
There are, of course, well-defined limits. What procession upon any ground abutting thereon,
is guaranteed is peaceable assembly. One shall be permitted unless a special license
may not advocate disorder in the name of therefor shall first be obtained from the selectmen
protest, much less preach rebellion under the of the town or from licensing committee,' was
cloak of dissent. The Constitution frowns on construed by the Supreme Court of New
disorder or tumult attending a rally or Hampshire as not conferring upon the licensing
assembly. Resort to force is ruled out and board unfettered discretion to refuse to grant the
outbreaks of violence to be avoided. The license, and held valid. And the Supreme Court
utmost calm though is not required. As pointed of the United States, in its decision (1941)
out in an early Philippine case, penned in 1907 to penned by Chief Justice Hughes affirming the
be precise, United States v. Apurado: "It is rather judgment of the State Supreme Court, held that
to be expected that more or less disorder will `a statute requiring persons using the public
mark the public assembly of the people to protest streets for a parade or procession to procure
against grievances whether real or imaginary, a special license therefor from the local
because on such occasions feeling is always authorities is not an unconstitutional
wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the abridgment of the rights of assembly or of
greater the grievance and the more intense the freedom of speech and press, where, as the
feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be the statute is construed by the state courts, the
disciplinary control of the leaders over their licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the
irresponsible followers." It bears repeating that issuance of licenses, to a consideration of the
for the constitutional right to be invoked, time, place, and manner of the parade or
riotous conduct, injury to property, and acts procession, with a view to conserving the
of vandalism must be avoided. To give free public convenience and of affording an
rein to one's destructive urges is to call for opportunity to provide proper policing, and
condemnation. It is to make a mockery of the are not invested with arbitrary discretion to
high estate occupied by intellectual liberty in our issue or refuse license, . . .'" Nor should the
scheme of values. point made by Chief Justice Hughes in a
subsequent portion of the opinion be ignored.
3. There can be no legal objection, absent "Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the
the existence of a clear and present danger of Constitution, imply the existence of an
a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as organized society maintaining public order
the place where the peace rally would start. without which liberty itself would be lost in
The Philippines is committed to the view the excesses of unrestricted abuses. The
expressed in the plurality opinion, of 1939 authority of a municipality to impose
vintage, of Justice Roberts in Hague v. CIO: regulations in order to assure the safety and
"Whenever the title of streets and parks may convenience of the people in the use of public
rest, they have immemorially been held in highways has never been regarded as
trust for the use of the public and, time out of inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as
mind, have been used for purposes of one of the means of safeguarding the good
assembly, communicating thoughts between order upon which they ultimately depend. The
citizens, and discussing public questions. control of travel on the streets of cities is the most
Such use of the streets and public places has, familiar illustration of this recognition of social
need. Where a restriction of the use of highways the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring
in that relation is desired to promote the public respect for and deference to such preferred
convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase
disregarded by the attempted exercise of some can, of course, dispense with what has been so
civil right which in other circumstances would be felicitiously termed by Justice Holmes "as the
entitled to protection." sovereign prerogative of judgment." Nonetheless,
the presumption must be to incline the weight of
5. There is a novel aspect to this case. If the the scales of justice on the side of such rights,
rally were confined to Luneta, no question, as enjoying as they do precedence and primacy.
noted, would have arisen. So, too, if the march Clearly then, to the extent that there may be
would end at another park. As previously inconsistencies between this resolution and
mentioned though, there would be a short that of Navarro v. Villegas, that case is pro
program upon reaching the public space tanto modified. So it was made clear in the
between the two gates of the United States original resolution of October 25, 1983.
Embassy at Roxas Boulevard. That would be
followed by the handing over of a petition 9. Respondent Mayor posed the issue of the
based on the resolution adopted at the applicability of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of
closing session of the Anti-Bases Coalition. Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies
The Philippines is a signatory of the Vienna or demonstrations within a radius of five hundred
Convention on Diplomatic Relations and binding (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery;
on the Philippines. The second paragraph of its and for other purposes. It is to be admitted that it
Article 22 reads: "2. The receiving State is under finds support in the previously quoted Article 22
a special duty to take appropriate steps to protect of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
the premises of the mission against any intrusion Relations. There was no showing, however,
or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the that the distance between the chancery and
peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity." the embassy gate is less than 500 feet. Even if
The Constitution "adopts the generally accepted it could be shown that such a condition is
principles of international law as part of the law of satisfied, it does not follow that respondent
the land, " To the extent that the Vienna Mayor could legally act the way he did. The
Convention is a restatement of the generally validity of his denial of the permit sought
accepted principles of international law, it should could still be challenged. It could be argued
be a part of the law of the land. That being the that a case of unconstitutional application of
case, if there were a clear and present danger such ordinance to the exercise of the right of
of any intrusion or damage, or disturbance of peaceable assembly presents itself. As in this
the peace of the mission, or impairment of its case there was no proof that the distance is
dignity, there would be a justification for the less than 500 feet, the need to pass on that
denial of the permit insofar as the terminal issue was obviated. Should it come, then the
point would be the Embassy. Moreover, qualification and observation of Justices
respondent Mayor relied on Ordinance No. Makasiar and Plana certainly cannot be
7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the summarily brushed aside. The high estate
holding or staging of rallies or accorded the rights to free speech and
demonstrations within a radius of five peaceable assembly demands nothing less.
hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission
or chancery; and for other purposes. Unless
the ordinance is nullified, or declared ultra Pita vs. Court of Appeals
vires, its invocation as a defense is GR 80806, Oct. 5, 1989
understandable but not decisive, in view of
the primacy accorded the constitutional Facts: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an
rights of free speech and peaceable Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the
assembly. Even if shown then to be City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of
applicable, that question still confronts this the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxiliary
Court. Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP of
the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized
By way of a summary. The applicants for a and confiscated from dealers, distributors,
permit to hold an assembly should inform the newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila
licensing authority of (1)the date, (2)the sidewalks, magazines, publications and other
PUBLIC PLACE where and (3)the time when it reading materials believed to be obscene,
will take place. If it were a PRIVATE PLACE, pornographic and indecent and later burned the
only the consent of the owner or the one seized materials in public at the University belt
entitled to its legal possession is required. along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the
Such application should be filed well ahead in presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers
time to enable the public official concerned to and members of various student organizations.
appraise whether there may be valid Among the publications seized, and later burned,
objections to the grant of the permit or to its was Pinoy Playboy magazines published and
grant but at another public place. It is an co-edited by Leo Pita. On 7 December 1983, Pita
indispensable condition to such refusal or filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance
modification that the clear and present of the writ of preliminary injunction seeking to
danger test be the standard for the decision enjoin and or restrain Bagatsing, Cabrera and
reached. If he is of the view that there is such their agents from confiscating his magazines or
an imminent and grave danger of a from otherwise preventing the sale or circulation
substantive evil, the applicants must be heard thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent,
on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, artistic and educational magazine which is not
whether favorable or adverse, must be per se obscene, and that the publication is
transmitted to them at the earliest protected by the Constitutional guarantees of
opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have freedom of speech and of the press.
recourse to the proper judicial authority. Free
speech and peaceable assembly, along with the Issue: Whether the Mayor can order the seizure
other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in of obscene materials as a result of an anti-smut
our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be campaign.
too strongly stressed that on the judiciary, - even
more so than on the other departments - rests
Held: NO. We cannot quarrel with the basic As the Court declared, the issue is a complicated
postulate suggested by appellant that seizure of one, in which the fine lines have neither been
allegedly obscene publications or materials drawn nor divided. It is easier said than done to
deserves close scrutiny because of the say, indeed, that if "the pictures here in
constitutional guarantee protecting the right question were used not exactly for art's sake
to express oneself in print (Sec. 9, Art. IV), but rather for commercial purposes," the
and the protection afforded by the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional
constitution against unreasonable searches protection.
and seizure (Sec. 3, Art. IV). It must be equally
conceded, however, that freedom of the press It was People v. Padan y Alova, 13 however, that
is not without restraint, as the state has the introduced to Philippine jurisprudence the
right to protect society from pornographic "redeeming" element that should accompany
literature that is offensive to public morals, the work, to save it from a valid prosecution. We
Also well settled is the rule that the right quote:
against unreasonable searches and seizures
recognizes certain exceptions, as when there . . . We have had occasion to consider
is consent to the search or seizure, or search offenses like the exhibition of still or
is an incident to an arrest, or is conducted in moving pictures of women in the nude,
a vehicle or movable structure which we have condemned for
obscenity and as offensive to morals.
The Court states at the outset that it is not the In those cases, one might yet claim
first time that it is being asked to pronounce what that there was involved the element
"OBSCENE" means or what makes for an of art; that connoisseurs of the
obscene or pornographic literature. Early on, in same, and painters and sculptors
People vs. Kottinger, the Court laid down THE might find inspiration in the
TEST, in determining the existence of showing of pictures in the nude, or
obscenity, as follows: "whether the tendency the human body exhibited in sheer
of the matter charged as obscene, is to nakedness, as models in tableaux
deprave or corrupt those whose minds are vivants. But an actual exhibition of
open to such immoral influences and into the sexual act, preceded by acts of
whose hands a publication or other article lasciviousness, can have no
charged as being obscene may fall." redeeming feature. In it, there is no
"ANOTHER TEST," so Kottinger further room for art. One can see nothing in it
declares, "is that which shocks the ordinary but clear and unmitigated obscenity,
and common sense of men as an indecency." indecency, and an offense to public
Kottinger hastened to say, however, that morals, inspiring and causing as it
"[w]hether a picture is obscene or indecent does, nothing but lust and lewdness,
must depend upon the circumstances of the and exerting a corrupting influence
case," and that ultimately, the question is to specially on the youth of the land. . . .
be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate
sense of the community reached by it." In a much later decision, Gonzalez v. Kalaw
Katigbak, the Court, following trends in the
About three decades later, this Court United States, adopted the test: "Whether to
promulgated People v. Go Pin, 10 a prosecution the average person, applying contemporary
under Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. Go standards, the dominant theme of the material
Pin was also even hazier: taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."
Kalaw-Katigbak represented a marked
. . . We agree with counsel for appellant departure from Kottinger in the sense that it
in part. If such pictures, sculptures and measured obscenity in terms of the
paintings are shown in art exhibits and "DOMINANT THEME" of the work rather than
art galleries for the cause of art, to be isolated passages, which were central to
viewed and appreciated by people Kottinger (although both cases are agreed
interested in art, there would be no that "contemporary community standards"
offense committed. However, the are the final arbiters of what is "obscene").
pictures here in question were used not Kalaw-Katigbak undertook moreover to make the
exactly for art's sake but rather for determination of obscenity essentially a judicial
commercial purposes. In other words, question and as a consequence, to temper the
the supposed artistic qualities of said wide discretion Kottinger had given unto law
pictures were being commercialized so enforcers.
that the cause of art was of secondary
or minor importance. Gain and profit The lack of uniformity in American
would appear to have been the main, if jurisprudence as to what constitutes
not the exclusive consideration in their "obscenity" has been attributed to the
exhibition; and it would not be surprising reluctance of the courts to recognize the
if the persons who went to see those constitutional dimension of the problem.
pictures and paid entrance fees for the Apparently, the courts have assumed that
privilege of doing so, were not exactly "obscenity" is not included in the guaranty of free
artists and persons interested in art and speech, an assumption that, as we averred, has
who generally go to art exhibitions and allowed a climate of opinions among magistrates
galleries to satisfy and improve their predicated upon arbitrary, if vague theories of
artistic tastes, but rather people what is acceptable to society. And "[t]here is little
desirous of satisfying their morbid likelihood," says Tribe, "that this development has
curiosity and taste, and lust, and for love reached a state of rest, or that it will ever do so
for excitement, including the youth who until the Court recognizes that obscene speech is
because of their immaturity are not in a speech nonetheless, although it is subject ---- as
position to resist and shield themselves in all speech ---- to regulation in the interests of
from the ill and perverting effects of [society as a whole] ---- but not in the interest of a
these pictures. uniform vision of how human sexuality should be
regarded and portrayed."

In the case at bar, there is no challenge on the The Court is not convinced that the private
right of the State, in the legitimate exercise of respondents have shown the required proof
police power, to suppress smut ---- provided to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of
it is smut. For obvious reasons, smut is not the literature for which mandatory injunction had
smut simply because one insists it is smut. been sought below. First of all, they were not
So is it equally evident that individual tastes possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the
develop, adapt to wide-ranging influences, said materials to be pornography, and (2)
and keep in step with the rapid advance of authorizing them to carry out a search and
civilization. What shocked our forebears, say, seizure, by way of a search warrant.
five decades ago, is not necessarily repulsive
to the present generation. James Joyce and The Court of Appeals has no "quarrel that . . .
D.H. Lawrence were censored in the thirties freedom of the press is not without restraint, as
yet their works are considered important the state has the right to protect society from
literature today. 29 Goya's La Maja desnuda pornographic literature that is offensive to public
was once banned from public exhibition but morals." 36 Neither do we. But it brings us back
now adorns the world's most prestigious to square one: were the "literature" so
museums. confiscated "pornographic"? That "we have laws
punishing the author, publisher and sellers of
But neither should we say that "obscenity" is a obscence publications (Sec. 1, Art. 201, Revised
bare (no pun intended) matter of opinion. As we Penal Code, as amended by P.D. No. 960 and
said earlier, it is the divergent perceptions of men P.D. No. 969)," is also fine, but the question,
and women that have probably compounded the again, is: Has the petitioner been found guilty
problem rather than resolved it. under the statute?
What the Court is impressing, plainly and simply, The fact that the former respondent Mayor's
is that the question is not, and has not been, an act was sanctioned by "police power" is no
easy one to answer, as it is far from being a license to seize property in disregard of due
settled matter. We share Tribe's disappointment process.
over the discouraging trend in American
decisional law on obscenity as well as his
pessimism on whether or not an "acceptable"
solution is in sight. Hence, we make this resume.
In the final analysis perhaps, the task that 1. The authorities must apply for the
confronts us is less heroic than rushing to a issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if
"perfect" definition of "obscenity", if that is in their opinion, an obscenity rap is in order;
possible, as evolving standards for proper
police conduct faced with the problem, which, 2. The authorities must convince the court
after all, is the plaint specifically raised in the that the materials sought to be seized are
petition. "obscene", and pose a clear and present
danger of an evil substantive enough to
However, this much we have to say. warrant State interference and action;
Undoubtedly, "immoral" lore or literature 3. The judge must determine whether or not
comes within the ambit of free expression, the same are indeed "obscene:" the question
although not its protection. In free expression is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and
cases, this Court has consistently been on on His Honor's sound discretion. (a matter of
the side of the exercise of the right, barring a judicial determination)
"clear and present danger" that would
warrant State interference and action. But, so 4. If, in the opinion of the court, probable
we asserted in Reyes v. Bagatsing, "the cause exists, it may issue the search warrant
burden to show the existence of grave and prayed for;
imminent danger that would justify adverse
action . . . lies on the . . . authorit[ies]." 5. The proper suit is then brought in the court
under Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code;
"There must be objective and convincing, not
subjective or conjectural, proof of the 6. Any conviction is subject to appeal. The
existence of such clear and present danger." appellate court may assess whether or not
"It is essential for the validity of . . . previous the properties seized are indeed "obscene"
restraint or censorship that the . . . authority does
not rely solely on his own appraisal of what the These do not foreclose, however, defenses
public welfare, peace or safety may require." under the Constitution or applicable statutes,
or remedies against abuse of official power
"To justify such a limitation, there must be proof under the Civil Code or the Revised Penal
of such weight and sufficiency to satisfy the clear code.
and present danger test."
As we so strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case NOTE: In other words, the determination of what
involving the delivery of a political speech, the is obscene is a judicial function.
presumption is that the speech may validly be
said. The burden is on the State to SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INC. V.
demonstrate the existence of a danger, a COMELEC
danger that must not only be (1) clear but G.R. No.147571; May 5, 2001
also, (2) present, to justify State action to stop
the speech. Meanwhile, the Government must Facts: Petitioners brought this action for
allow it (the speech). It has no choice. However, prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections
if it acts notwithstanding that (absence of from enforcing 5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election
evidence of a clear and present danger), it Act). Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to
must come to terms with, and be held conduct an election survey throughout the period
accountable for, DUE PROCESS. of the elections both at the national and local
levels and release to the media the results of
such survey as well as publish them directly. free speech cases. Hence, while it may be useful
Petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation, on for determining the validity of laws dealing with
the other hand, states that it intends to publish inciting to sedition or incendiary speech, it may
election survey results up to the last day of the not be adequate for such regulations as the one
elections on May 14,2001. Petitioners claimed in question. For such a test is concerned with
that said provision, which prohibited the questions of the gravity and imminence of the
publication of surveys affecting national danger as basis for curtailing free speech, which
candidates fifteen days before an election, is not the case of 5.4 and similar regulations.
and surveys affecting local candidates seven
days before an election. Respondent Instead, MR. JUSTICE KAPUNAN purports to
Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions engage in a form of balancing by weighing and
in 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 as necessary to prevent balancing the circumstances to determine
the manipulation and corruption of the electoral whether public interest [in free, orderly,
process by unscrupulous and erroneous surveys honest, peaceful and credible elections] is
just before the election. served by the regulation of the free enjoyment
of the rights. After canvassing the reasons for
Issue: Whether or not 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 the prohibition, i.e., to prevent last-minute
constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon
freedom of speech, expression, and the press. effect to favor candidates, misinformation, the
junking of weak and losing candidates by their
Held: YES. The Supreme Court in its majority parties, and the form of election cheating called
opinion concluded that the disputed provision dagdag-bawas and invoking the States power
constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of to supervise media of information during the
the freedom of speech, expression and the election period (pages 11-16), the dissenting
press. opinion simply concludes:
To be sure, 5.4 lays a prior restraint on freedom Viewed in the light of the legitimate and
of speech, expression, and the press by significant objectives of Section 5.4, it may be
prohibiting the publication of election survey seen that its limiting impact on the rights of free
results affecting candidates within the prescribed speech and of the press is not unduly repressive
periods of fifteen (15) days immediately or unreasonable. Indeed, it is a mere restriction,
preceding a national election and seven (7) days not an absolute prohibition, on the publication of
before a local election. Because of the election surveys. It is limited in duration; it applies
preferred status of the constitutional rights of only during the period when the voters are
speech, expression, and the press, such a presumably contemplating whom they should
measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption elect and when they are most susceptible to such
of invalidity. Indeed, any system of prior unwarranted persuasion. These surveys may be
restraints of expression comes to this Court published thereafter. (Pages 17-18)
bearing a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity. . . . . The Government The dissent does not, however, show why, on
thus carries a heavy burden of showing balance, these considerations should
justification for the enforcement of such outweigh the value of freedom of expression.
restraint.There is thus a reversal of the normal Instead, reliance is placed on Art. IX-C, 4. As
presumption of validity that inheres in every already stated, the purpose of Art. IX-C, 4 is
legislation. to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space
and the right of reply, including reasonable,
Nor may it be argued that because of Art. IX-C, equal rates therefor for public information
4 of the Constitution, which gives the campaigns and forums among candidates.
COMELEC supervisory power to regulate the Hence the validity of the ban on media
enjoyment or utilization of franchise for the advertising. It is noteworthy that R.A. No. 9006,
operation of media of communication, no 14 has lifted the ban and now allows
presumption of invalidity attaches to a measure candidates to advertise their candidacies in print
like 5.4. For as we have pointed out in and broadcast media. Indeed, to sustain the ban
sustaining the ban on media political on the publication of survey results would
advertisements, the grant of power to the sanction the censorship of all speaking by
COMELEC under Art. IX-C, 4 is limited to candidates in an election on the ground that the
ensuring equal opportunity, time, space, and usual bombasts and hyperbolic claims made
the right to reply as well as uniform and during the campaigns can confuse voters and
reasonable rates of charges for the use of thus debase the electoral process.
such media facilities for public information
campaigns and forums among candidates. In sum, the dissent has engaged only in a
This Court stated: balancing at the margin. This form of ad hoc
balancing predictably results in sustaining
The technical effect of Article IX (C) (4) the challenged legislation and leaves freedom
of the Constitution may be seen to be of speech, expression, and the press with
that no presumption of invalidity arises little protection. For anyone who can bring a
in respect of exercises of supervisory plausible justification forward can easily show a
or regulatory authority on the part of rational connection between the statute and a
the Comelec for the purpose of legitimate governmental purpose. In contrast, the
securing equal opportunity among balancing of interest undertaken by then Justice
candidates for political office, although Castro in Gonzales v. COMELEC,[7] from which
such supervision or regulation may the dissent in this case takes its cue, was a
result in some limitation of the rights of strong one resulting in his conclusion that 50-B
free speech and free press. of R.A. No. 4880, which limited the period of
election campaign and partisan political activity,
MR. JUSTICE KAPUNAN dissents. He rejects was an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of
as inappropriate the test of clear and present expression.
danger for determining the validity of 5.4.
Indeed, as has been pointed out in Osmea v.
COMELEC, this test was originally formulated for The OBrian Test
the criminal law and only later appropriated for
The United States Supreme Court, through Chief [S]uch utterances are no essential part of any
Justice Warren, held in United States v. O'Brien: exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
"[A] government regulation is sufficiently value as a step to truth that any benefit that may
justified [1] if it is within the constitutional be derived from them is clearly outweighed by
power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an the social interest in order and morality.
important or substantial governmental interest;
[3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to Nor is there justification for the prior restraint
the suppression of free expression; and [4] if which 5.4 lays on protected speech. In Near v.
the incidental restriction on alleged First Minnesota,[13] it was held:
Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression
and press] is no greater than is essential to the [The] protection even as to previous restraint is
furtherance of that interest." not absolutely unlimited. But the limitation has
been recognized only in exceptional cases. . . .
This is so far the most influential test for No one would question but that a government
distinguishing content-based from content-neutral might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting
regulations and is said to have "become canonical service or the publication of the sailing dates of
in the review of such laws." It is noteworthy that the transports or the number and location of troops.
O'Brien test has been applied by this Court in at On similar grounds, the primary requirements of
least two cases. Under this test, even if a law decency may be enforced against obscene
furthers an important or substantial publications. The security of the community life
governmental interest, it should be invalidated may be protected against incitements to acts of
if such governmental interest is "not unrelated violence and the overthrow by force of orderly
to the suppression of free expression." government . . . .
Moreover, even if the purpose is unrelated to
the suppression of free speech, the law should Thus, contrary to the claim of the Solicitor
nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on General, the prohibition imposed by 5.4
freedom of expression is greater than is cannot be justified on the ground that it is
necessary to achieve the governmental only for a limited period and is only
purpose in question. incidental. The prohibition may be for a
limited time, but the curtailment of the right of
Our inquiry should accordingly focus on these expression is direct, absolute, and
two considerations as applied to 5.4. To substantial. It constitutes a total suppression of
summarize then, we hold that 5.4 is invalid a category of speech and is not made less so
because According to the Court, Section 5.4 was because it is only for a period of fifteen (15) days
invalid because of three reasons: (1) it imposed immediately before a national election and seven
a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (7) days immediately before a local election.
(2) it was a direct and total suppression of a
category of expression even though such This sufficiently distinguishes 5.4 from R.A. No.
suppression was only for a limited period, and 6646, 11(b), which this Court found to be valid
(3) the governmental interest sought to be in National Press Club v. COMELEC and
promoted could be achieved by means other Osmea v. COMELEC] For the ban imposed
than the suppression of freedom of by R.A. No. 6646, 11(b) is not only authorized
expression. The petition for prohibition was by a specific constitutional provision, but it
granted. also provided an alternative so that, as this
Court pointed out in Osmea, there was
First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion of the actually no ban but only a substitution of
OBrien test because the causal connection of media advertisements by the COMELEC
expression to the asserted governmental space and COMELEC hour.
interest makes such interest not unrelated to
the suppression of free expression. By Second. Even if the governmental interest
prohibiting the publication of election survey sought to be promoted is unrelated to the
results because of the possibility that such suppression of speech and the resulting
publication might undermine the integrity of restriction of free expression is only
the election, 5.4 actually suppresses a whole incidental, 5.4 nonetheless fails to meet
class of expression, while allowing the criterion of the OBrien test, namely, that the
expression of opinion concerning the same restriction be not greater than is necessary to
subject matter by NEWSPAPER further the governmental interest. As already
COLUMNISTS, RADIO AND TV stated, 5.4 aims at the prevention of last-minute
COMMENTATORS, ARMCHAIR THEORISTS, pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon
AND OTHER OPINION MAKERS. In effect, effect, junking of weak or losing candidates,
5.4 shows a BIAS for a particular subject and resort to the form of election cheating called
matter, if not viewpoint, by preferring dagdag-bawas. Praiseworthy as these aims
PERSONAL OPINION to STATISTICAL of the regulation might be, they cannot be
RESULTS. The constitutional guarantee of attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental
freedom of expression means that the right of expression, when such aim can be
government has no power to restrict expression more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful
because of its message, its ideas, its subject acts, rather than speech because of
matter, or its content.[11] The inhibition of apprehension that such speech creates the
speech should be upheld only if the expression danger of such evils. Thus, under the
falls within one of the few unprotected categories Administrative Code of 1987,[17] the COMELEC
dealt with in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,[12] is given the power:
thus:
To stop any illegal activity, or
There are certain well-defined and narrowly confiscate, tear down, and stop
limited classes of speech, the prevention and any unlawful, libelous, misleading
punishment of which have never been thought to or false election propaganda, after
raise any Constitutional problem. These include due notice and hearing.
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous,
and the insulting or fighting words those This is surely a less restrictive means than the
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend prohibition contained in 5.4. Pursuant to this
to incite an immediate breach of the peace. power of the COMELEC, it can confiscate bogus
survey results calculated to mislead voters. city shall be kept free and clear for the use of the
Candidates can have their own surveys public, and the sidewalks and crossings for the
conducted. No right of reply can be invoked by pedestrians, and the same shall only be used or
others. No principle of equality is involved. It is a occupied for other purposes as provided by
free market to which each candidate brings his ordinance or regulation Provided that the
ideas. As for the purpose of the law to prevent holding of any parade or procession in any street
bandwagon effects, it is doubtful whether the or public places shall only be done if a Mayors
Government can deal with this natural-enough permit is secured
tendency of some voters. Some voters want to be
identified with the winners. Some are The Mayors reason for refusing the permit was
susceptible to the herd mentality. Can these be his reasonable ground to believe, based on
legitimately prohibited by suppressing the previous utterances and the fact that passions on
publication of survey results which are a form of the part of the losing groups remains bitter and
expression? It has been held that [mere] high, that similar speeches will be delivered
legislative preferences or beliefs respecting tending to undermine the faith and confidence of
matters of public convenience may well support the people in their government, and in the duly
regulation directed at other personal activities, constituted authorities, which might threaten
but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes breaches of the peace and a disruption of public
the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance order. However, petitioners request was for a
of democratic institutions. permit "to hold a peaceful public meeting."
Because of the preferred status of the ISSUE: Was the Mayors refusal to grant the
constitutional rights of speech, expression, and permit to peaceably assemble violative of the
the press, such a measure is vitiated by a Constitution?
weighty presumption of invalidity. Indeed, "any
system of prior restraints of expression comes to HELD: YES. The rights of freedom of speech
this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its and to peacefully assemble and petition the
constitutional validity. . . . The Government 'thus government for redress of grievances are
carries a heavy burden of showing justification for fundamental personal rights of the people
the enforcement of such restraint.'" There is thus a recognized and guaranteed by the
reversal of the normal presumption of validity that Constitution. The exercise of those rights is
inheres in every legislation. Nor may it be argued not absolute; it may be regulated so that it
that because of Art. IX-C, 4 of the Constitution, shall injure the equal enjoyment of others
which gives the COMELEC supervisory power having equal rights, or the rights of the
to regulate the enjoyment or utilization of community or society. The power to regulate
franchise for the operation of media of the exercise of such rights is the "police power"---
communication, no presumption of invalidity the power to prescribe regulations, to promote
attaches to a measure like 5.4. For as we have the health, morals, peace, education, good order
pointed out in sustaining the ban on media or safety, and general welfare of the people---
political advertisements, the grant of power to exercised by the legislative branch by the
the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, 4 is limited to enactment of laws regulating those rights, and it
ensuring "equal opportunity, time, space, and may be delegated to political subdivisions, such
the right to reply" as well as uniform and as towns, municipalities, and cities authorizing
reasonable rates of charges for the use of such their legislative bodies, called municipal and city
media facilities for "public information councils to enact ordinances for the purpose.
campaigns and forums among candidates."
SEC. 1119 is susceptible to two constructions:
NOTE: The power to regulate, does not
include the power to prohibit. (1)That the Mayor has unregulated discretion
to grant or refuse to grant permit for the
holding of a lawful assembly;
ASSEMBLY & PETITION -or-
(2)That the applicant has the right to a permit,
PRIMICIAS V. FUGOSO which shall be granted by the Mayor, subject
G.R. No. L-1800, January 27, 1948,Feria, J. only to the latter's reasonable discretion to
determine or specify the streets or public
FACTS: Primicias, via petition for mandamus, places to be used for the purpose, to secure
sought to compel Fugoso to issue a permit for the convenient use of the streets and public
holding of a public meeting at Plaza Miranda to places by others, and to provide adequate
petition the government for redress of and proper policing to minimize the risk of
grievances. disorder.
The Philippine legislature has delegated the The Court adopted the second construction;
exercise of the police power to the Municipal the ordinance only confers upon the Mayor
Board of the City of Manila, the legislative body of the discretion, in issuing the permit, to
the City. It has been granted the following determine or specify the streets or public
legislative powers, to wit: "(p) to provide for the places where the meeting may be held. It
prohibition and suppression of riots, affrays, does not confer upon him unfettered
disturbances, and disorderly assemblies, (u) to discretion to refuse to grant the license. A
regulate the use of streets, avenues ... parks, statute requiring persons using the public
cemeteries and other public places." Thus, the streets to procure a special license therefor
Municipal Board enacted sections 844 and 1119 from the local authorities is not an
of the Revised Ordinances of 1927, which unconstitutional abridgement of the rights of
prohibit, as an offense against public peace, and assembly, WHERE THE LICENSING
penalize as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any AUTHORITIES ARE STRICTLY LIMITED, in the
public place, meeting, or procession, tending to issuance of licenses, to consider the time,
disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with place, and manner of the parade and
other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful procession, with a view to conserving the
purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation public convenience and of affording an
engaged in any lawful assembly." SEC. 1119 opportunity to provide proper policing.
states that the streets and public places of the Otherwise, it would be tantamount to
authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge the right of
the streets and other public places for assembly and the opportunities for the
holding of meetings. communication of thought and the discussion of
public questions immemorially associated with
The Municipal Board is empowered only to resort to public places.
regulate the use of streets, parks, and the
other public places. "REGULATE" includes The Court, citing a U.S. case, held: A
the power to control, govern, and restrain, but municipal ordinance requiring the obtaining
not suppress or prohibit. The legislative of a permit for a public assembly in or upon
police power of the Municipal Board to enact the public streets, highways, public parks, or
ordinances regulating reasonably the exercise of public buildings of the city and authorizing
the fundamental personal rights of the citizens in the director of public safety, for the purpose
the streets and other public places cannot be of preventing riots, disturbances, or
delegated to the Mayor by conferring upon disorderly assemblage, to refuse to issue a
him unregulated discretion or without laying permit (and not merely to regulate) when after
down rules to guide and control his action by investigation of all the facts and
which its impartial execution can be secured or circumstances pertinent to the application, he
partiality and oppression prevented. believes it to be proper to refuse to issue a
permit, is not a valid exercise of the police
An ordinance in that case subjects to the power.
unrestrained will of a single public officer the
power to determine the rights of parties under Streets and parks have immemorially been
it, when there was nothing in the ordinance to held in trust for the use of the public and have
guide or control his action. His action or non- been used for purposes of assembly,
action may proceed from enmity or prejudice, communicating thoughts between citizens,
from partisan zeal or animosity, from favoritism and discussing public questions. Such use of
and other improper influences and motives easy the streets and public places has been a part
of concealment. of the privileges, immunities, rights, and
liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen
An ordinance which clothes a single to use the streets and parks for
individual with such power is void. In the communication of views on national
exercise of police power, the council may, in questions may be regulated in the interest of
its discretion, regulate the exercise of such all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must
rights in a reasonable manner, but cannot be exercised in subordination to the general
suppress them, directly or indirectly, by comfort and convenience, and in consonance
attempting to commit the power of doing so with peace and good order; BUT IT MUST
to the mayor or any other officer. The NOT, IN THE GUISE OF REGULATION, BE
discretion with which the council is vested is ABRIDGED OR DENIED.
a legal discretion, to be exercised within the
limits of the law, and not discretion to If the Ordinance does not make comfort or
transcend it or to confer upon any city officer convenience in the use of streets or parks the
and arbitrary authority, making him in its standard of official action, instead, it enables
exercise a petty tyrant. a single official to refuse a permit on his
MERE OPINION that such refusal will prevent
"It is only when political, religious, social, or 'riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage,
other demonstrations create public IT IS VOID. It can be an instrument of arbitrary
disturbances, or operate as a nuisance, or suppression of free expression of views on
create or manifestly threaten some tangible national affairs.
public or private mischief that the law
interferes." Moreover, the power conferred upon the
Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated
"Ordinances to be valid must be reasonable; by that department to any other body or
they must not be oppressive; they must be fair authority, except police regulation which are
and impartial; they must not be so framed as conferred upon the legislative body of a municipal
to allow their enforcement to rest on official corporation. The police power to regulate the use
discretion of streets and other public places has been
conferred by the Legislature upon the Municipal
Where the granting of the permit is left to the Board of the City. The Legislature has not
unregulated discretion of a small body of city conferred upon the Mayor the same power.
eldermen, the ordinance cannot be other than
partial and discriminating in its practical Besides, a grant of unregulated and unlimited
operation. (The Court cited a U.S. case) power to grant or refuse a permit for the use of
The power of municipalities to regulate the streets and other public places for processions,
use of public streets is conceded. The parades, or meetings, would be null and void.
privilege of a citizen to use the streets may be Under our democratic system of government, no
regulated in the interest of all; it is not such unlimited power may be validly granted to
absolute. The authority of a municipality to any officer of the government, except perhaps in
impose regulations in order to assure the cases of national emergency.
safety and convenience of the people in the
use of public highways is consistent with civil "FEAR OF SERIOUS INJURY cannot alone
liberties, a means of safeguarding the good justify suppression of free speech and
order upon which they ultimately depend. assembly. It is the function of speech to free
Where a restriction of the use of highways is men from the bondage of irrational fears. To
designed to promote the public convenience in justify suppression of free speech, there must
the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil
attempted exercise of some civil right which in will result if free speech is practiced; that the
other circumstances would be entitled to danger apprehended is imminent and the evil
protection. As regulation of the use of the streets to be prevented is a serious one. Imminent
for parades and processions is a traditional danger can justify prohibition ONLY IF the evil
exercise of control by local government, the apprehended is relatively serious. That speech
question is whether that control is exerted so as is likely to result in some violence or in
destruction of property is not enough to justify its applicants for a permit to hold an assembly
suppression. There must be the probability of should inform the licensing authority of the
serious injury to the state. date, the public place where and the time
when it will take place. If it were a private
place, only the consent of the owner or the
MALABANAN v. RAMENTO one entitled to its legal possession is
G.R. No. L-62270; May 21, 1984, Fernando, J. required." Petitioners did seek such consent. It
was granted. According to the petition: "On
Facts: Petitioners were students of Gregorio August 27, 1982, by virtue of a permit granted to
Araneta University, granted by the school them by the school administration, the Supreme
authorities to hold a meeting, however they must Student Council where your petitioners are
comply with some terms and conditions. Instead among the officers, held a General Assembly at
of following the terms and conditions, the the VMAS basketball court of the respondent
students continued their march to the Life University." There was an express admission in
Science building, outside the area stated in the the Comment of private respondent University as
permit. Classes were disturbed due to the noise. to a permit having been granted for petitioners to
It was outside the area covered by their permit. hold a student assembly. The specific question
They continued their demonstration, giving to be resolved then is whether on the facts as
utterance to language severely critical of the disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action
University authorities and using megaphones in and the penalty imposed, there was an
the process. There was, as a result, disturbance infringement of the right to peaceable
of the classes being held. Also, the non- assembly and its cognate right of free
academic employee, within hearing distance, speech.
stopped their work because of the noise created.
Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable
through a memorandum that they were under assembly and free speech. They were entitled to
preventive suspension for their failure to explain do so. They enjoy the said right like the rest of
the holding of an illegal assembly in front of the the citizens the freedom to express their views
Life Science Building. The validity thereof was and communicate their thoughts to those
challenged by petitioners both before the CFI of disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held
Rizal and before the Ministry of Education, in this case. They do not, shed their constitutional
Culture and Sports. Respondent, Ramento, as rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
director of the National Capital Region, found schoolhouse gate. While, therefore, the
petitioners guilty of the charge of holding an authority of educational institutions over the
illegal assembly which was characterized by the conduct of students must be recognized, it
violation of the permit granted resulting in the cannot go so far as to be violative of
disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The constitutional safeguards. On a more specific
penalty was suspension for one academic year. level, there is persuasive force to this formulation
in the Fortas opinion: The principal use to
Issues: which the schools are dedicated is to
1. Whether or not the decision of accommodate students during prescribed
responded violates the constitutional hours for the purpose of certain types of
rights of freedom of peaceable activities. Among those activities is personal
assembly and free speech? intercommunication among the students. This
2. Whether or not the suspension meted is not only an inevitable part of the process of
out by the school authorities are not attending school; it is also an important part
violative of due process? of the educational process. A student's rights,
therefore, do not embrace merely the
Held: classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or
on the playing field, or on the campus during the
1. NO. As is quite clear from the opinion in Reyes authorized hours, he may express his opinions,
v. Bagatsing, the invocation of the right to even on controversial subjects like the conflict in
freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it Vietnam, if he does so without 'materially and
the implication that the right to free speech has substantially interfer[ing] with the
likewise been disregarded. Both are embraced in requirements of appropriate discipline in the
the concept of freedom of expression, which is operation of the school' and without colliding
identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and with the rights of others. . . . But conduct by
truthfully, any matter of public interest without the student, in class or out of it, which for any
censorship or punishment and which "is not to reason - whether it stems from time, place, or
be limited, much less denied, except on a type of behavior - materially disrupts
showing . . . of a clear and present danger of classwork or involves substantial disorder or
a substantive evil that the state has a right to invasion of the rights of others is, of course,
prevent." In the above case, a permit was not immunized by the constitutional
sought to hold a peaceful march and rally from guarantee of freedom of speech."
the Luneta public park to the gates of the United
States Embassy, hardly two blocks away, where Objection is made by private respondents to the
in an open space of public property, a short tenor of the speeches by the student leaders. If
program would be held, Necessarily then, the in the course of such demonstration, with an
question of the use of a public park and of the enthusiastic audience goading them on,
streets leading to the United States Embassy utterances, extremely critical, at times even
was before this Court. We held that streets vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite
and parks have immemorially been held in understandable. Student leaders are hardly the
trust for the use of the public and have been timid, diffident types. They are likely to be
used for purposes of assembly to assertive and dogmatic. They would be
communicate thoughts between citizens and ineffective if during a rally they speak in the
to discuss public issues. guarded and judicious language of the academe.
The situation here is different. The At any rate, even a sympathetic audience is not
assembly was to be held NOT in a public place disposed to accord full credence to their fiery
but in private premises, property of respondent exhortations. They take into account the
University. There is in the Reyes opinion as part excitement of the occasion, the propensity of
of the summary this relevant excerpt: "The speakers to exaggerate, the exuberance of
youth. They may give the speakers the benefit dictate of fairness calls for a much lesser
of their applause, but with the activity taking penalty. If the consent of proportionally
place in the school premises and during the between the offense committed and the
daytime, no clear and present danger of sanction imposed is not followed, an element
public disorder is discernible. This is without of arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise
prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action to a due process question. To avoid this
for conduct, which "materially disrupts constitutional objection, it is the holding of
classwork or involves substantial disorder or this court that a one-week suspension would
invasion of the rights of others." be punishment enough.
One last matter. The objection was raised that

petitioners failed to exhaust administrative DELA CRUZ v. COURT OF APPEALS
remedies, That is true, but hardly decisive. G.R. No. 126183, March 25, 1999, Bellosillo, J.
Here, a purely legal question is presented.
Such being the case, especially so where a FACTS:
decision on a question of law is imperatively The respective school principals
called for, and time being of the essence, this submitted reports to the Secretary of DECS
Court has invariably viewed the issue as ripe regarding the participation of public school
for adjudication. What cannot be too sufficiently teachers (petitioners) in an illegal strike and their
stressed is that the constitutional rights to defiance to the return-to-work order issued by the
peaceable assembly and free speech are DECS Secretary. The Sec. of DECS on his own
invoked by petitioners. Moreover, there was, filed an administrative complaint against the
and very likely there will continue to be in the petitioners for the said acts which were
future, militancy and assertiveness of considered as a violation of the Civil Service
students on issues that they consider of great Decree of the Philippines. For failure to submit
importance, whether concerning their welfare their answers the Sec. of DECS issued an order
or the general public. That they have a right to of dismissal against the teachers which was
do as citizens entitled to all the protection in implemented immediately. Petitioners appealed
the Bill of Rights. to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB)
and then to the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
It would be most appropriate then, as The CSC found petitioners guilty of "conduct
was done in the case of Reyes v. Bagatsing, for prejudicial to the best interest of the service" for
this Court to lay down the principles for the having participated in the mass actions and
guidance of school authorities and students alike. imposed upon them the reduced penalty of six (6)
The rights to peaceable assembly and free months' suspension. However, in view of the
speech are guaranteed to students of length of time that petitioners had been out of the
educational institutions. Necessarily, their service by reason of the immediate
exercise to discuss matters affecting their implementation of the dismissal orders of
welfare or involving public interest is not to Secretary Cario, the CSC likewise ordered
be subjected to previous restraint or petitioners' automatic reinstatement in the service
subsequent punishment unless there be a without back wages. Petitioners were unhappy
showing of a clear and present danger to a with the CSC decision. They initially filed petitions
substantive evil that the state has a right to for certiorari with the SC which were all referred
present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and to the CA. The CA ruled that the questioned
scope is accorded the content of the placards resolutions of the Civil Service Commission
displayed or utterances made. The peaceable finding petitioners guilty of conduct prejudicial to
character of an assembly could be lost, the best interest of the service were based on
however, by an advocacy of disorder under reasonable and justifiable grounds; that
the name of dissent, whatever grievances that petitioners' perceived grievances were no excuse
may be aired being susceptible to correction for them not to conduct classes and defy the
through the ways of the law. If the assembly return-to-work order issued by their superiors;
is to be held in school premises, permit must that the immediate execution of the dismissal
be sought from its school authorities, who are orders of Secretary Cario was sanctioned under
devoid of the power to deny such request law.
arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such Petitioners contend that the Court of
permit, there may be conditions as to the time Appeals grievously erred in affirming the CSC
and place of the assembly to avoid disruption resolutions finding them guilty of conduct
of classes or stoppage of work of the non- prejudicial to the best interest of the service when
academic personnel. their only "offense" was to exercise their
constitutional right to peaceably assemble and
petition the government for redress of their
2. YES. Even if, however, there be violations grievances. Moreover petitioners insist that the
of its terms, the penalty incurred should not mass actions of September/October 1990 were
be disproportionate to the offense. It does not not "strikes" as there was no actual disruption of
follow however, that the petitioners can be classes. Petitioners therefore ask for exoneration
totally absolved for the events that transpired. or, in the alternative, award of back wages for the
Admittedly, there was a violation of the terms period of three (3) years when they were not
of the permit. The rally was held at a place allowed to work while awaiting resolution of their
other than that specified, in the second floor appeals by the MSPB and CSC, deducting the
lobby, rather than the basketball court, of the period of six (6) months' suspension eventually
VMAS building of the University. Moreover, it meted them.
was continued longer than the period
allowed. According to the decision of Ramento, ISSUES:
the concerted activity went on until 5:30pm. 1. WON the public school teachers were
Private respondent could thus, take disciplinary involved in a strike?
action. On those facts, however, an admonition, 2. WON the teachers should be penalized
even a censure certainly not a suspension could for participating in the strike?
be the appropriate penalty. While the discretion 3. WON penalizing the teachers for
of both respondent University and responded participation in the strike amounts to a
Ramento is recognized, the rule of reason, the
denial of their right to peaceably to prejudice the public welfare. The public
assemble? school teachers in the case of the 1990 mass
actions did not exercise their constitutional rights
HELD: within reasonable limits. On the contrary, they
committed acts prejudicial to the best interest
1. YES. The persistent refusal of the striking of the service by staging the mass protests
teachers to call the mass actions by the on regular school days, abandoning their
conventional term "strike" did not erase the true classes and refusing to go back even after
nature of the mass actions as unauthorized they had been ordered to do so. Had the
stoppages of work the purpose of which was teachers availed of their free time recess,
to obtain a favorable response to the after classes, weekends or holidays to
teachers' economic grievances. The mass dramatize their grievances and to dialogue
actions staged by Metro Manila public school with the proper authorities within the bounds
teachers amounted to a strike in every sense of law, no one not the DECS, the CSC or
of the term, constituting as they did, a even the Supreme Court could have held
concerted and unauthorized stoppage of or them liable for their participation in the mass
absence from work which it was said actions.
teachers' sworn duty to perform, carried out
for essentially economic reasons to protest The argument that the rights of free
and pressure the Government to correct what, expression and assembly could not be lightly
among other grievances, the strikers perceived to disregarded as they occupy a preferred position
be the unjust or prejudicial implementation of the in the hierarchy of civil liberties is not applicable
salary standardization law insofar as they were to defend the validity of the 1990 mass actions
concerned, the non-payment or delay in payment because there is a higher consideration involved
of various fringe benefits and allowances to here which is the education of the youth.
which they were entitled, and the imposition of
additional teaching loads and longer teaching
hours. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES
ORGANIZATION v. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING
MILLS CO. INC.
2. YES. The teachers were penalized not G.R. No. L-31195, June 5, 1973, Makasiar, J.
because they exercised their right to peaceably
assemble but because of the manner by which Facts: Sometime in 1969, petitioner decided to
such right was exercised, i.e., going on stage a mass demonstration in Malacaang in
unauthorized and unilateral absences thus protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig
disrupting classes in various schools in Metro Police. Respondent Company, however
Manila which produced adverse effects upon the requested petitioner that the first-shift workers
students for whose education the teachers were should not participate in the strike for it will
responsible. unduly prejudice the normal operation of the
Although petitioners contend that company. Despite the warning, all the workers
classes were not actually disrupted because including those who were in first-shift still
substitute teachers were immediately participated in the rally. Prior to that, respondent
appointed by Secretary Cario, that the company informed that workers who belong in
prompt remedial action taken by Secretary the first-shift, who were without previous leave of
Cario might have partially deflected the absence approved by the company, who shall
adverse effects of the mass protests did not participate in the rally shall be dismissed for it is a
erase the administrative liability of petitioners clear violation of the existing CBA and is
for the intended consequences thereof which tantamount to an illegal strike. Respondent
were the very reason why such prompt company then filed a charge against petitioners
remedial action became necessary. This and later dismissed some of its employees.
Court denies the claim that the teachers were
thereby denied their rights to peaceably Issues: Whether or not the constitutional
assemble and petition the government for freedoms of speech and expression of the
redress of grievances reasoning that this petitioner were violated by the respondent
constitutional liberty to be upheld, like any company in preventing some of its employees to
other liberty, must be exercised within participate in the rally and later dismissed some
reasonable limits so as not to prejudice the of them.
public welfare. The public school teachers in
these mass actions did not exercise their Held: No. There is need of briefly restating basic
constitutional rights within reasonable limits. concepts and principles which underlie the issues
On the contrary, they committed acts posed by the case at bar.
prejudicial to the best interest of the service
by staging the mass protests on regular (1) In a democracy, the preservation and
school days, abandoning their classes and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the
refusing to go back even after they had been human personality is the central core as well as
ordered to do so. Had the teachers availed of the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The
their free time - recess, after classes, weekends inviolable character of man as an individual must
or holidays - to dramatize their grievances and to be "protected to the largest possible extent in his
dialogue with the proper authorities within the thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his
bounds of law, no one - not the DECS, the CSC person.
or even the Supreme Court - could have held
them liable for their participation in the mass (2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve
actions. the ideals of liberty, equality and security
"against the assaults of opportunism, the
3. NO. In Rolando Gan v. Civil Service expediency of the passing hour, the erosion
Commission, it was held that for the right to of small encroachments, and the scorn and
peaceably assemble and petition the derision of those who have no patience with
government for redress of grievances to be general principles.
upheld, like any other liberty, it must be
exercised within reasonable limits so as not

In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert purpose that the law is neither arbitrary nor
Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to discriminatory nor oppressive would suffice
withdraw "certain subjects from the to validate a law which restricts or impairs
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place property rights. On the other hand, a
them beyond the reach of majorities and constitutional or valid infringement of human
officials, and to establish them as legal rights requires a more stringent criterion,
principles to be applied by the courts. One's namely existence of a grave and immediate
rights to life, liberty and property, to free danger of a substantive evil which the State
speech, or free press, freedom of worship and has the right to prevent.
assembly, and other fundamental rights may
not be submitted to a vote; they depend on So it has been stressed that the (1)FREEDOMS
the outcome of no elections." Laski OF SPEECH and (2)OF THE PRESS as well
proclaimed that "the happiness of the individual, as (3)OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND OF
not the well-being of the State, was the criterion PETITION FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES
by which its behaviour was to be judged. His are absolute when directed against public
interests, not its power, set the limits to the officials or "when exercised in relation to our
authority it was entitled to exercise. right to choose the men and women by whom
we shall be governed," even relying on the
(3) The freedoms of expression and of balancing-of-interests test.
assembly as well as the right to petition are The respondent Court of Industrial Relations,
included among the immunities reserved by after opining that the mass demonstration was
the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism not a declaration of strike, concluded that by their
of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas that we "concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary
abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish; stoppage of work," herein petitioners are guilty of
or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the
minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the collective bargaining agreement with private
majority who refuse to listen. And as Justice respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.
Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one Set against and tested by the foregoing principles
are the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are governing a democratic society, such a
not safe unless the liberties of all are protected. conclusion cannot be sustained. The
demonstration held by petitioners was
(4) The rights of free expression, free against alleged abuses of some Pasig
assembly and petition, are not only civil policemen, NOT against their employer,
rights but also political rights essential to herein private respondent firm, said
man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness demonstration was purely and completely an
and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru exercise of their freedom of expression in
these freedoms the citizens can participate general and of their right of assembly and of
not merely in the periodic establishment of petition for redress of grievances in particular
the government through their suffrage but before the appropriate governmental agency,
also in the administration of public affairs as the Chief Executive, against the police
well as in the discipline of abusive public officers of the municipality of Pasig. They
officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so exercised their civil and political rights for
that he can appeal to the appropriate their mutual aid and protection from what
governmental officers or agencies for redress they believe were police excesses. As a
and protection as well as for the imposition of the matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private
lawful sanctions on erring public officers and respondent firm to protect herein petitioner
employees. Union and its members from the harassment
of local police officers. It was to the interest
(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects of herein private respondent firm to rally to
property rights, the primacy of human rights the defense of, and to take up the cudgels for,
over property rights is recognized. Because its employees, so that they can report to work
these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, free from harassment, vexation or peril and as
as well as supremely precious in our society" a consequence perform more efficiently their
and the "threat of sanctions may deter their respective tasks to enhance its productivity
exercise almost as potently as the actual as well as profits. Herein respondent employer
application of sanctions," they "need did not even offer to intercede for its employees
breathing space to survive," permitting with the local police. Was it securing peace for
government regulation only "with narrow itself at the expense of its workers? Was it also
specificity." intimidated by the local police or did it encourage
the local police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its
Property and property rights can be lost thru failure to defend its own employees all the
prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. more weakened the position of its laborers
If human rights are extinguished by the passage vis-a-vis the alleged oppressive police, who
of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless might have been all the more emboldened
attempt to limit the power of government and thereby to subject its lowly employees to
ceases to be an efficacious shield against the further indignities.
tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential
and powerful, and of oligarchs - political, In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of
economic or otherwise. expression as well as their right of assembly
and of petition against alleged persecution of
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of local officialdom, the employees and laborers
free expression and of assembly occupy a of herein private respondent firm were
preferred position as they are essential to the fighting for their very survival, utilizing only
preservation and vitality of our civil and the weapons afforded them by the
political institutions; and such priority "gives Constitution he untrammelled enjoyment of
these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not their basic human rights. The pretension of
permitting dubious intrusions." The superiority their employer that it would suffer loss or
of these freedoms over property rights is damage by reason of the absence of its
underscored by the fact that a mere employees, is a plea for the preservation
reasonable or rational relation between the merely of their property rights. Such
means employed by the law and its object or apprehended loss or damage would not spell the
difference between the life and death of the firm especially by a labor union, namely the
or its owners or its management. The employees' complete unity of the Union members as well
pathetic situation was a stark reality abused, as their total presence at the demonstration
harassed and persecuted as they believed they site in order to generate the maximum
were by the peace officers of the municipality. As sympathy for the validity of their cause but
above intimated, the condition in which the also immediate action on the part of the
employees found themselves vis-a-vis the corresponding government agencies with
local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally jurisdiction over the issues they raised
affected their right to individual existence as against the local police. Circulation is one of
well as that of their families. Material loss can the aspects of freedom of expression. If
be repaired or adequately compensated. The demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by
debasement of the human being broken in that much the circulation of the issues raised by
morale and brutalized in spirit can never be the demonstration is diminished. The more the
fully evaluated in monetary terms. The participants, the more persons can be apprised of
wounds fester and the scars remain to the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence
humiliate him to his dying day, even as he of one-third of their members will be regarded as
cries in anguish for retribution, denial of a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks
which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues. which will enervate their position and abet
continued alleged police persecution. At any rate,
As heretofore stated, THE PRIMACY OF the Union notified the company two days in
HUMAN RIGHTS, FREEDOM OF advance of their projected demonstration and the
EXPRESSION, OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY company could have made arrangements to
AND OF PETITION FOR REDRESS OF counteract or prevent whatever losses it might
GRIEVANCES over PROPERTY RIGHTS has sustain by reason of the absence of its workers
been sustained. Emphatic reiteration of this basic for one day, especially in this case when the
tenet as a coveted boon at once the shield and Union requested it to excuse only the day-shift
armor of the dignity and worth of the human employees who will join the demonstration on
personality, the all-consuming ideal of our March 4, 1969 which request the Union reiterated
enlightened civilization becomes Our duty, if in their telegram received by the company at 9:50
freedom and social justice have any meaning at in the morning of March 4, 1969, the day of the
all for him who toils so that capital can produce mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There was
economic goods that can generate happiness for a lack of human understanding or compassion on
all. To regard the demonstration against police the part of the firm in rejecting the request of the
officers, not against the employer, as evidence of Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in
bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a order to carry out its mass demonstration. And to
violation of the collective bargaining agreement regard as a ground for dismissal the mass
and a cause for the dismissal from employment demonstration held against the Pasig police, not
of the demonstrating employees, stretches against the company, is gross vindictiveness on
unduly the compass of the collective bargaining the part of the employer, which is as unchristian
agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting as it is unconstitutional.
speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well
as mortal wound on the constitutional III
guarantees of free expression, of peaceful
assembly and of petition. The respondent company is the one guilty of
unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the part of the respondent firm to permit all its
the working shifts of the employees, according to employees and workers to join the mass
the respondent Court of Industrial Relations, in demonstration against alleged police abuses
effect imposes on the workers the "duty . . . to and the subsequent separation of the eight (8)
observe regular working hours." The strained petitioners from the service constituted an
construction of the Court of Industrial Relations unconstitutional restraint on their freedom of
that such stipulated working shifts deny the expression, freedom of assembly and
workers the right to stage a mass demonstration freedom to petition for redress of grievances,
against police abuses during working hours, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor
constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to
of the workers and deserves severe Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise
condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of
should not be predicated on such a slender Republic Act No. 875 guarantees to the
ground. employees the right "to engage in concerted
activities for . . . mutual aid or protection"; while
The mass demonstration staged by the Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice
employees on March 4, 1969 could not have for an employer "to interfere with, restrain or
been legally enjoined by any court, for such an coerce employees in the exercise of their rights
injunction would be trenching upon the freedom guaranteed in Section Three."
of expression of the workers, even if it legally
appears to be an illegal picketing or strike. The We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass
respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the demonstration staged by the workers of the
case at bar concedes that the mass respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was for their
demonstration was not a declaration of a strike mutual aid and protection against alleged police
"as the same is not rooted in any industrial abuses, denial of which was interference with or
dispute although there is a concerted act and the restraint on the right of the employees to engage
occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work." in such a common action to better shield
themselves against such alleged police
The respondent firm claims that there was no indignities. The insistence on the part of the
need for all its employees to participate in the respondent firm that the workers for the morning
demonstration and that they suggested to the and regular shifts should not participate in the
Union that only the first and regular shift from mass demonstration, under pain of dismissal,
6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in was as heretofore stated, "a potent means of
order that loss or damage to the firm will be inhibiting speech."
averted. This stand failed to appreciate the
sine qua non of an effective demonstration
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and materials ordered; or that its own equipment or
protection, deserves at least equal protection as materials or products were damaged due to
the concerted action of employees in giving absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the
publicity to a letter complaint charging a bank contrary, the company saved a sizable amount in
president with immorality, nepotism, favoritism the form of wages for its hundreds of workers,
and discrimination in the appointment and cost of fuel, water and electric consumption that
promotion of bank employees. We further ruled in day. Such savings could have amply
the Republic Savings Bank case, supra, that for compensated for unrealized profits or damages it
the employees to come within the protective might have sustained by reason of the absence
mantle of Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1) of of its workers for only one day.
Republic Act No. 875, "it is not necessary that
union activity be involved or that collective IV
bargaining be contemplated," as long as the
concerted activity is for the furtherance of their Apart from violating the constitutional
interests. guarantees of free speech and assembly as
well as the right to petition for redress of
As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts grievances of the employees, the dismissal of
embodied in the questioned order of respondent the eight (8) leaders of the workers for
Court dated September 15, 1969, the company, proceeding with the demonstration and
"while expressly acknowledging, that the consequently being absent from work,
demonstration is an inalienable right of the Union constitutes a denial of social justice likewise
guaranteed by the Constitution," nonetheless assured by the fundamental law to these
emphasized that "any demonstration for that lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the
matter should not unduly prejudice the normal Constitution imposes upon the State "the
operation of the company" and "warned the promotion of social justice to insure the well-
PBMEO representatives that workers who belong being and economic security of all of the people,"
to the first and regular shifts, who without which guarantee is emphasized by the other
previous leave of absence approved by the directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the
Company, particularly the officers present who Constitution that "the State shall afford protection
are the organizers of the demonstration, who to labor . . ." Respondent Court of Industrial
shall fail to report for work the following morning Relations as an agency of the State is under
(March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because obligation at all times to give meaning and
such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, substance to these constitutional guarantees in
therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike favor of the working man; for otherwise these
(;)" (p. III, petitioner's brief). Such threat of constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of
dismissal tended to coerce the employees from "meaningless constitutional patter." Under the
joining the mass demonstration. However, the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial
issues that the employees raised against the Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the
local police, were more important to them law "to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest
because they had the courage to proceed with by encouraging and protecting the exercise by
the demonstration, despite such threat of employees of their right to self-organization for
dismissal. The most that could happen to them the purpose of collective bargaining and for the
was to lose a day's wage by reason of their promotion of their moral, social and economic
absence from work on the day of the well-being." It is most unfortunate in the case at
demonstration. One day's pay means much to a bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations,
laborer, more especially if he has a family to the very governmental agency designed therefor,
support. Yet, they were willing to forego their failed to implement this policy and failed to keep
one-day salary hoping that their demonstration faith with its avowed mission its raison d'etre as
would bring about the desired relief from police ordained and directed by the Constitution.
abuses. But management was adamant in
refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of It has been likewise established that a
their right of free speech, free assembly and the violation of a constitutional right divests the
right to petition for redress. court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence
its judgment is null and void and confers no
Because the respondent company ostensibly did rights. Relief from a criminal conviction secured
not find it necessary to demand from the workers at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be
proof of the truth of the alleged abuses inflicted obtained through habeas corpus proceedings
on them by the local police, it thereby concedes even long after the finality of the judgment. Thus,
that the evidence of such abuses should properly habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the
be submitted to the corresponding authorities release of an individual, who is convicted by final
having jurisdiction over their complaint and to judgment through a forced confession, which
whom such complaint may be referred by the violated his constitutional right against self-
President of the Philippines for proper incrimination; or who is denied the right to
investigation and action with a view to disciplining present evidence in his defense as a deprivation
the local police officers involved. of his liberty without due process of law, even
after the accused has already served sentence
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of for twenty-two years.
Industrial Relations found that the demonstration
"paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the Both the respondents Court of Industrial
complainant company," the respondent Court of Relations and private firm trenched upon these
Industrial Relations did not make any finding as constitutional immunities of petitioners. Both
to the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. failed to accord preference to such rights and
This significant circumstance can only mean that aggravated the inhumanity to which the
the firm did not sustain any loss or damage. It did aggrieved workers claimed they had been
not present evidence as to whether it lost subjected by the municipal police. Having
expected profits for failure to comply with violated these basic human rights of the laborers,
purchase orders on that day; or that penalties the Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself
were exacted from it by customers whose orders of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it
could not be filled that day of the demonstration; issued in the instant case are a nullity.
or that purchase orders were cancelled by the Recognition and protection of such freedoms are
customers by reason of its failure to deliver the imperative on all public offices including the
28
courts as well as private citizens and It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of
corporations, the exercise and enjoyment of action and defenses presently available must be
which must not be nullified by mere procedural specifically raised in the complaint or answer; so
rule promulgated by the Court Industrial that any cause of action or defense not raised in
Relations exercising a purely delegate legislative such pleadings, is deemed waived. However, a
power, when even a law enacted by Congress constitutional issue can be raised any time, even
must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of for the first time on appeal, if it appears that the
these human rights. There is no time limit to determination of the constitutional issue is
the exercise of the freedoms. The right to necessary to a decision of the case, the very lis
enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of mota of the case without the resolution of which
one speech, the printing of one article or the no final and complete determination of the
staging of one demonstration. It is a dispute can be made. It is thus seen that a
continuing immunity to be invoked and procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme
exercised when exigent and expedient Court gives way to a constitutional right. In the
whenever there are errors to be rectified, instant case, the procedural rule of the Court of
abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress, must
condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in likewise yield to the constitutional rights invoked
the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by rule on by herein petitioners even before the institution of
procedure prescribing the period for appeal. the unfair labor practice charged against them
The battle then would be reduced to a race for and in their defense to the said charge.
time. And in such a contest between an
employer and its laborer, the latter eventually
loses because he cannot employ the best an Bayan vs. Ermita
dedicated counsel who can defend his G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006, Azcuna, J.
interest with the required diligence and zeal,
bereft as he is of the financial resources with Facts: Petitioners allege that they are citizens
which to pay for competent legal services. and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their
rights as organizations and individuals were
VI. violated when the rally they participated in on
October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by
Does the mere fact that the motion for policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.)
reconsideration was filed two (2) days late defeat No. 880. Malacanang also issued a policy
the rights of the petitioning employees? Or more denominated as Calibrated Pre-emptive
directly and concretely, does the inadvertent Response (CPR) on all rallies. Said CPR
omission to comply with a mere Court of Policy provides, among others:
Industrial Relations procedural rule governing the
period for filing a motion for reconsideration or The rule of calibrated
appeal in labor cases, promulgated pursuant to a preemptive response is now in
legislative delegation, prevail over constitutional force, in lieu of maximum
rights? The answer should be obvious in the light tolerance. The authorities will
of the aforecited cases. To accord supremacy not stand aside while those
to the foregoing rules of the Court of with ill intent are herding a
Industrial Relations over basic human rights witting or unwitting mass of
sheltered by the Constitution, is not only people and inciting them into
incompatible with the basic tenet of actions that are inimical to
constitutional government that the public order, and the peace of
Constitution is superior to any statute or mind of the national
subordinate rules and regulations, but also community.
does violence to natural reason and logic.
The dominance and superiority of the Unlawful mass actions
constitutional right over the aforesaid Court will be dispersed. The
of Industrial Relations procedural rule of majority of law-abiding
necessity should be affirmed. Such a Court of citizens have the right to be
Industrial Relations rule as applied in this protected by a vigilant and
case does not implement or reinforce or proactive government.
strengthen the constitutional rights affected,'
but instead constrict the same to the point of We appeal to the
nullifying the enjoyment thereof by the detractors of the government
petitioning employees. Said Court of to engage in lawful and
Industrial Relations rule, promulgated as it peaceful conduct befitting of a
was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, democratic society.
is unreasonable and therefore is beyond the
authority granted by the Constitution and the
law. A period of five (5) days within which to They assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 as well as
file a motion for reconsideration is too short, the policy of Calibrated Preemptive
especially for the aggrieved workers, who Response" or CPR and seek to stop violent
usually do not have the ready funds to meet dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no
the necessary expenses therefor. In case of rally" policy and the CPR policy recently
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, a announced.
period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the
filing of the motion for re hearing or Petitioners contend that Batas
reconsideration (See. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the
52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The Constitution and the International Covenant on
delay in the filing of the motion for Civil and Political Rights and other human rights
reconsideration could have been only one day if treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory.
September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit
accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court before one can stage a public assembly
of Industrial are concerned. regardless of the presence or absence of a clear
and present danger. It also curtails the choice of
venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of

expression clause as the time and place of a meaning of the clear and present
public assembly form part of the message for danger test.
which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is 7. CPR is simply the responsible and
not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass judicious use of means allowed by
actions in support of the government. The words existing laws and ordinances to protect
"lawful cause," "opinion," "protesting or public interest and restore public order.
influencing" suggest the exposition of some Thus, it is not accurate to call it a new
cause not espoused by the government. Also, the rule but rather it is a more pro-active
phrase "maximum tolerance" shows that the law and dynamic enforcement of existing
applies to assemblies against the government laws, regulations and ordinances to
because they are being tolerated. As a content- prevent chaos in the streets. It does not
based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny replace the rule of maximum tolerance
test. in B.P. No. 880.
Respondents argue: Respondent Mayor Joselito Atienza, for his part,

submitted in his Comment that the petition in
1. Petitioners have no standing because G.R. No. 169838 should be dismissed on the
they have not presented evidence that ground that Republic Act No. 7160 gives the
they had been injured, arrested or Mayor power to deny a permit independently
detained because of the CPR, and that of B.P. No. 880; that his denials of permits
those arrested stand to be charged with were under the clear and present danger
violating Batas Pambansa [No.] 880 and rule as there was a clamor to stop rallies that
other offenses. disrupt the economy and to protect the lives
2. Neither B.P. No. 880 nor CPR is void of other people; that J. B. L. Reyes v.
on its face. Petitioners cannot honestly Bagatsing,[11] Primicias v. Fugoso,[12] and
claim that the time, place and manner Jacinto v. CA,[13] have affirmed the
regulation embodied in B.P. No. 880 constitutionality of requiring a permit; that the
violates the three-pronged test for such permit is for the use of a public place and not
a measure, to wit: (a) B.P. No. 880 is for the exercise of rights; and that B.P. No.
content-neutral, i.e., it has no reference 880 is not a content-based regulation because
to content of regulated speech; (b) B.P. it covers all rallies.
No. 880 is narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, i.e., The petitions were ordered consolidated on
the interest cannot be equally well February 14, 2006. After the submission of all
served by a means that is less intrusive the Comments, the Court set the cases for oral
of free speech interests; and (c) B.P. arguments on April 4, 2006,[14] stating the
No. 880 leaves open alternative principal issues, as follows:
channels for communication of the
information.
3. B.P. No. 880 is content-neutral as seen Issues:
from the text of the law. Section 5
requires the statement of the public 1. On the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa
assemblys time, place and manner of No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12 13(a)
conduct. It entails traffic re-routing to and 14(a) thereof, and Republic Act No. 7160:
prevent grave public inconvenience and
serious or undue interference in the free (a) Are these content-neutral or content-based
flow of commerce and trade. regulations?
Furthermore, nothing in B.P. No. 880 (b) Are they void on grounds of overbreadth or
authorizes the denial of a permit on the vagueness?
basis of a rallys program content or the (c) Do they constitute prior restraint?
statements of the speakers therein, (d) Are they undue delegations of powers to
except under the constitutional precept Mayors?
of the clear and present danger test. (e) Do they violate international human rights
The status of B.P. No. 880 as a content- treaties and the Universal Declaration of Human
neutral regulation has been recognized Rights?
in Osmea v. Comelec.
4. Adiong v. Comelec held that B.P. No. 2. On the constitutionality and legality of the
880 is a content-neutral regulation of the policy of Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR):
time, place and manner of holding public
assemblies and the law passes the test (a) Is the policy void on its face or due to
for such regulation, namely, these vagueness?
regulations need only a substantial (b) Is it void for lack of publication?
governmental interest to support them. (c) Is the policy of CPR void as applied to the
5. Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate rallies of September 26 and October 4, 5 and 6,
Court[9] held that a local chief executive 2005?
has the authority to exercise police
power to meet the demands of the
common good in terms of traffic Held:
decongestion and public convenience.
Furthermore, the discretion given to the Petitioners standing cannot be seriously
mayor is narrowly circumscribed by challenged. Their right as citizens to engage in
Sections 5 (d), and 6 (a), (b), (c), (d), peaceful assembly and exercise the right of
(e), 13 and 15 of the law. petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is
6. The standards set forth in the law are directly affected by B.P. No. 880 which requires a
not inconsistent. Clear and convincing permit for all who would publicly assemble in the
evidence that the public assembly will nations streets and parks. They have, in fact,
create a clear and present danger to purposely engaged in public assemblies without
public order, public safety, public the required permits to press their claim that no
convenience, public morals or public such permit can be validly required without
health and imminent and grave danger violating the Constitutional guarantee.
of a substantive evil both express the Respondents, on the other hand, have
challenged such action as contrary to law and speech and to assembly and petition over
dispersed the public assemblies held without the comfort and convenience in the use of streets
permit. and parks.
Next, however, it must be remembered that the

I. B.P. 880 IS CONSTITUTIONAL right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. In
Primicias, this Court said:
The first point to mark is that the right to
peaceably assemble and petition for redress of The right to freedom of speech, and
grievances is, together with freedom of speech, to peacefully assemble and petition
of expression, and of the press, a right that the government for redress of
enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional grievances, are fundamental
protection. For these rights constitute the very personal rights of the people
basis of a functional democratic polity, without recognized and guaranteed by the
which all the other rights would be meaningless constitutions of democratic
and unprotected. As stated in Jacinto v. CA, the countries. But it is a settled
Court, as early as the onset of this century, in principle growing out of the nature
U.S. v. Apurado, already upheld the right to of well-ordered civil societies that
assembly and petition, as follows: the exercise of those rights is not
absolute for it may be so regulated
There is no question as to the petitioners that it shall not be injurious to the
rights to peaceful assembly to petition the equal enjoyment of others having
government for a redress of grievances and, equal rights, nor injurious to the
for that matter, to organize or form rights of the community or society.
associations for purposes not contrary to law, The power to regulate the exercise
as well as to engage in peaceful concerted of such and other constitutional
activities. These rights are guaranteed by no rights is termed the sovereign
less than the Constitution, particularly Sections police power, which is the power
4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of to prescribe regulations, to promote
Article IX, and Section 3 of Article XIII. the health, morals, peace,
Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed education, good order or safety,
pronouncements defending and promoting the and general welfare of the people.
peoples exercise of these rights. As early as the This sovereign police power is
onset of this century, this Court in U.S. vs. exercised by the government through
Apurado, already upheld the right to assembly its legislative branch by the enactment
and petition and even went as far as to of laws regulating those and other
acknowledge: constitutional and civil rights, and it
may be delegated to political
It is rather to be expected that subdivisions, such as towns,
more or less disorder will mark the municipalities and cities by authorizing
public assembly of the people to their legislative bodies called municipal
protest against grievances and city councils enact ordinances for
whether real or imaginary, purpose.
because on such occasions
feeling is always wrought to a high
pitch of excitement, and the 1. It is thus clear that the Court is called
greater, the grievance and the upon to protect the exercise of the cognate rights
more intense the feeling, the less to free speech and peaceful assembly, arising
perfect, as a rule will be the from the denial of a permit. The Constitution is
disciplinary control of the leaders quite explicit: No law shall be passed abridging
over their irresponsible followers. the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the
But if the prosecution be permitted right of the people peaceably to assemble and
to seize upon every instance of petition the Government for redress of
such disorderly conduct by grievances. Free speech, like free press, may
individual members of a crowd as be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly
an excuse to characterize the and truthfully any matter of public concern
assembly as a seditious and without censorship or punishment. There is to be
tumultuous rising against the then no previous restraint on the communication
authorities, then the right to of views or subsequent liability whether in libel
assemble and to petition for suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for
redress of grievances would damages, or contempt proceedings unless there
expose all those who took part be a clear and present danger of a substantive
therein to the severest and most evil that [the State] has a right to prevent.
unmerited punishment, if the Freedom of assembly connotes the right of
purposes which they sought to the people to meet peaceably for consultation
attain did not happen to be and discussion of matters of public concern.
pleasing to the prosecuting It is entitled to be accorded the utmost
authorities. If instances of deference and respect. It is not to be limited,
disorderly conduct occur on such much less denied, except on a showing, as is
occasions, the guilty individuals the case with freedom of expression, of a
should be sought out and clear and present danger of a substantive evil
punished therefor, but the utmost that the state has a right to prevent. Even
discretion must be exercised in prior to the 1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm
drawing the line between had occasion to stress that it is a necessary
disorderly and seditious conduct consequence of our republican institutions and
and between an essentially complements the right of free speech. To
peaceable assembly and a paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge,
tumultuous uprising. speaking for the majority of the American
Supreme Court in Thomas v. Collins, it was not
Again, in Primicias v. Fugoso, the Court by accident or coincidence that the rights to
likewise sustained the primacy of freedom of freedom of speech and of the press were coupled
in a single guarantee with the right of the people vintage of, Justice Roberts in Hague v. CIO:
peaceably to assemble and to petition the Whenever the title of streets and parks may rest,
government for redress of grievances. All these they have immemorially been held in trust for the
rights, while not identical, are inseparable. In use of the public and, time out of mind, have
every case, therefore, where there is a limitation been used for purposes of assembly,
placed on the exercise of this right, the judiciary communicating thoughts between citizens, and
is called upon to examine the effects of the discussing public questions. Such use of the
challenged governmental actuation. The sole streets and public places has, from ancient times,
justification for a limitation on the exercise of this been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights
right, so fundamental to the maintenance of and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen
democratic institutions, is the danger, of a of the United States to use the streets and parks
character both grave and imminent, of a serious for communication of views on national questions
evil to public safety, public morals, public health, may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not
or any other legitimate public interest. absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in
subordination to the general comfort and
2. Nowhere is the rationale that convenience, and in consonance with peace and
underlies the freedom of expression and good order; but must not, in the guise of
peaceable assembly better expressed than in this respondents, be abridged or denied. The above
excerpt from an opinion of Justice Frankfurter: It excerpt was quoted with approval in Primicias v.
must never be forgotten, however, that the Bill of Fugoso. Primicias made explicit what was
Rights was the child of the Enlightenment. Back implicit in Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, a 1915
of the guaranty of free speech lay faith in the decision, where this Court categorically affirmed
power of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful that plazas or parks and streets are outside the
means for gaining access to the mind. It was in commerce of man and thus nullified a contract
order to avert force and explosions due to that leased Plaza Soledad of plaintiff-
restrictions upon rational modes of municipality. Reference was made to such plaza
communication that the guaranty of free speech being a promenade for public use, which
was given a generous scope. But utterance in a certainly is not the only purpose that it could
context of violence can lose its significance as an serve. To repeat, there can be no valid reason
appeal to reason and become part of an why a permit should not be granted for the
instrument of force. Such utterance was not proposed march and rally starting from a
meant to be sheltered by the Constitution. What public park that is the Luneta.
was rightfully stressed is the abandonment of
reason, the utterance, whether verbal or printed, 4. Neither can there be any valid
being in a context of violence. It must always be objection to the use of the streets to the gates
remembered that this right likewise provides for a of the US embassy, hardly two blocks away at
safety valve, allowing parties the opportunity to the Roxas Boulevard. Primicias v. Fugoso has
give vent to their views, even if contrary to the resolved any lurking doubt on the matter. In
prevailing climate of opinion. For if the peaceful holding that the then Mayor Fugoso of the
means of communication cannot be availed of, City of Manila should grant a permit for a
resort to non-peaceful means may be the only public meeting at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo,
alternative. Nor is this the sole reason for the this Court categorically declared: Our
expression of dissent. It means more than just conclusion finds support in the decision in the
the right to be heard of the person who feels case of Willis Cox v. State of New Hampshire,
aggrieved or who is dissatisfied with things as 312 U.S., 569. In that case, the statute of New
they are. Its value may lie in the fact that there Hampshire P.L. chap. 145, section 2, providing
may be something worth hearing from the that no parade or procession upon any ground
dissenter. That is to ensure a true ferment of abutting thereon, shall be permitted unless a
ideas. There are, of course, well-defined limits. special license therefor shall first be obtained
What is guaranteed is peaceable assembly. One from the selectmen of the town or from licensing
may not advocate disorder in the name of committee, was construed by the Supreme Court
protest, much less preach rebellion under the of New Hampshire as not conferring upon the
cloak of dissent. The Constitution frowns on licensing board unfettered discretion to refuse to
disorder or tumult attending a rally or assembly. grant the license, and held valid. And the
Resort to force is ruled out and outbreaks of Supreme Court of the United States, in its
violence to be avoided. The utmost calm though decision (1941) penned by Chief Justice Hughes
is not required. As pointed out in an early affirming the judgment of the State Supreme
Philippine case, penned in 1907 to be precise, Court, held that a statute requiring persons using
United States v. Apurado: It is rather to be the public streets for a parade or procession to
expected that more or less disorder will mark the procure a special license therefor from the local
public assembly of the people to protest against authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgment
grievances whether real or imaginary, because of the rights of assembly or of freedom of speech
on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a and press, where, as the statute is construed by
high pitch of excitement, and the greater the the state courts, the licensing authorities are
grievance and the more intense the feeling, the strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a
less perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary consideration of the time, place, and manner of
control of the leaders over their irresponsible the parade or procession, with a view to
followers. It bears repeating that for the conserving the public convenience and of
constitutional right to be invoked, riotous conduct, affording an opportunity to provide proper
injury to property, and acts of vandalism must be policing, and are not invested with arbitrary
avoided. To give free rein to ones destructive discretion to issue or refuse license, * * *. Nor
urges is to call for condemnation. It is to make a should the point made by Chief Justice Hughes in
mockery of the high estate occupied by a subsequent portion of the opinion be ignored:
intellectual liberty in our scheme of values. Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution,
imply the existence of an organized society
There can be no legal objection, maintaining public order without which liberty
absent the existence of a clear and present itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestricted
danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose
Luneta as the place where the peace rally regulations in order to assure the safety and
would start. The Philippines is committed to the convenience of the people in the use of public
view expressed in the plurality opinion, of 1939 highways has never been regarded as
inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of incline the weight of the scales of justice on
the means of safeguarding the good order upon the side of such rights, enjoying as they do
which they ultimately depend. The control of precedence and primacy. x x x.
travel on the streets of cities is the most
familiar illustration of this recognition of B.P. No. 880 was enacted after this Court
social need. Where a restriction of the use of rendered its decision in Reyes.
highways in that relation is designed to
promote the public convenience in the The provisions of B.P. No. 880 practically
interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the codify the ruling in Reyes:
attempted exercise of some civil right which
in other circumstances would be entitled to
protection. It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No.
880 is NOT AN ABSOLUTE BAN OF PUBLIC
xxx ASSEMBLIES BUT A RESTRICTION THAT
SIMPLY REGULATES THE TIME, PLACE AND
6. x x x The principle under MANNER OF THE ASSEMBLIES. This was
American doctrines was given utterance by Chief adverted to in Osmea v. Comelec,[20] where
Justice Hughes in these words: The question, if the Court referred to it as a content-neutral
the rights of free speech and peaceable regulation of the time, place, and manner of
assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the holding public assemblies
auspices under which the meeting is held but as
to its purpose; not as to the relations of the A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880
speakers, but whether their utterances transcend thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of
the bounds of the freedom of speech which the public assemblies[22] that would use public
Constitution protects. There could be danger to places. The reference to lawful cause does not
public peace and safety if such a gathering were make it content-based because assemblies really
marked by turbulence. That would deprive it of have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they
its peaceful character. It is true that the licensing would not be peaceable and entitled to
official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of protection. Neither are the words opinion,
discretion in determining whether or not a permit protesting and influencing in the definition of
would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered public assembly content based, since they can
discretion. While prudence requires that there be refer to any subject. The words petitioning the
a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly government for redress of grievances come from
occur but of what may probably occur, given all the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot
the relevant circumstances, still the assumption be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for
especially so where the assembly is scheduled the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is
for a specific public place is that the permit independent of the content of the expressions in
must be for the assembly being held there. The the rally.
exercise of such a right, in the language of
Justice Roberts, speaking for the American Furthermore, THE PERMIT can only be
Supreme Court, is not to be abridged on the plea denied on the ground of clear and present
that it may be exercised in some other place. danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health.
xxx This is a recognized exception to the exercise of
the right even under the Universal Declaration
8. By way of a summary. The of Human Rights and the International
applicants for a permit to hold an assembly Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
should inform the licensing authority of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
date, the public place where and the time
when it will take place. If it were a private Article 20
place, only the consent of the owner or the
one entitled to its legal possession is 1. Everyone has the right to
required. Such application should be filed freedom of peaceful assembly and
well ahead in time to enable the public official association.
concerned to appraise whether there may be
valid objections to the grant of the permit or xxx
to its grant but at another public place. It is
an indispensable condition to such refusal or Article 29
modification that the clear and present
danger test be the standard for the decision 1. Everyone has duties to the
reached. If he is of the view that there is such community in which alone the free and full
an imminent and grave danger of a development of his personality is
substantive evil, the applicants must be heard possible.
on the matter. Thereafter, his decision,
whether favorable or adverse, must be 2. In the exercise of his rights and
transmitted to them at the earliest freedoms, everyone shall be subject only
opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can to such limitations as are determined by
have recourse to the proper judicial authority. law solely for the purpose of securing due
Free speech and peaceable assembly, along recognition and respect for the rights and
with the other intellectual freedoms, are freedoms of others and of meeting the
highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional just requirements of morality, public order
values. It cannot be too strongly stressed and the general welfare in a democratic
that on the judiciary, -- even more so than on society.
the other departments rests the grave and
delicate responsibility of assuring respect for 3. These rights and freedoms may in
and deference to such preferred rights. No no case be exercised contrary to the
verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of purposes and principles of the United
course, dispense with what has been so Nations.
felicitiously termed by Justice Holmes as the
sovereign prerogative of judgment. The International Covenant on Civil and
Nonetheless, the presumption must be to Political Rights
this Act establish or designate

Article 19. at least one suitable freedom
park or mall in their
1. Everyone shall have the right to respective jurisdictions which,
hold opinions without interference. as far as practicable, shall be
centrally located within the
2. Everyone shall have the poblacion where
right to freedom of expression; this right demonstrations and meetings
shall include freedom to seek, receive may be held at any time
and impart information and ideas of all without the need of any prior
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, permit.
in writing or in print, in the form of art, or
through any other media of his choice. In the cities and
municipalities of Metropolitan
3. The exercise of the rights Manila, the respective mayors
provided for in paragraph 2 of this article shall establish the freedom
carries with it special duties and parks within the period of six
responsibilities. It may therefore be months from the effectivity
subject to certain restrictions, but these this Act.
shall only be such as are provided by law
and are necessary: This brings up the point, however, of
compliance with this provision.
(a) For respect of the rights or The Solicitor General stated during the oral
reputations of others; arguments that, to his knowledge, only Cebu City
(b) For the protection of national has declared a freedom park Fuente Osmea.
security or of public order (ordre public),
or of public health or morals. That of Manila, the Sunken Gardens, has since
been converted into a golf course, he added.
Contrary to petitioners claim, THE LAW
IS VERY CLEAR and is nowhere vague in its If this is so, the degree of observance of B.P.
provisions. Public does not have to be No. 880s mandate that every city and
defined. Its ordinary meaning is well-known. municipality set aside a freedom park within
Websters Dictionary defines it, thus: six months from its effectivity in 1985, or 20
years ago, would be pathetic and regrettable.
public, n, x x x 2a: an organized The matter appears to have been taken for
body of people x x x 3: a group granted amidst the swell of freedom that rose
of people distinguished by from the peaceful revolution of 1986.
common interests or
characteristics x x x. Considering that the existence of such
freedom parks is an essential part of the laws
Not every expression of opinion is a public system of regulation of the peoples exercise
assembly. The law refers to rally, of their right to peacefully assemble and
demonstration, march, parade, procession or any petition, the Court is constrained to rule that
other form of mass or concerted action held in a after thirty (30) days from the finality of this
public place. So it does not cover any and all Decision, no prior permit may be required for
kinds of gatherings. the exercise of such right in any public park
or plaza of a city or municipality until that city
Neither is the law overbroad. It or municipality shall have complied with
regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful Section 15 of the law. For without such
assembly and petition only to the extent alternative forum, to deny the permit would in
needed to avoid a clear and present danger of effect be to deny the right. Advance
the substantive evils Congress has the right notices should, however, be given to the
to prevent. authorities to ensure proper coordination and
orderly proceedings.
There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the
content of the speech is not relevant to the
regulation.
II. THE CPR IS NULL & VOID
As to the delegation of powers to the
mayor, the law provides a precise and
sufficient standard the clear and present The Court now comes to the matter of the CPR.
danger test stated in Sec. 6(a). The reference As stated earlier, the Solicitor General has
to imminent and grave danger of a substantive conceded that the use of the term should now be
evil in Sec. 6(c) substantially means the same discontinued, since it does not mean anything
thing and is not an inconsistent standard. As to other than the maximum tolerance policy set forth
whether respondent Mayor has the same power in B.P. No. 880. This is stated in the Affidavit of
independently under Republic Act No. 7160[24] is respondent Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita,
thus not necessary to resolve in these submitted by the Solicitor General, thus:
proceedings, and was not pursued by the parties
in their arguments. At any rate, the Court rules that in
view of the maximum tolerance mandated by
Finally, for those who cannot wait, Section 15 B.P. No. 880, CPR serves no valid purpose if it
of the law provides for an alternative forum means the same thing as maximum tolerance
through the creation of freedom parks where and is illegal if it means something else.
no prior permit is needed for peaceful Accordingly, what is to be followed is and
assembly and petition at any time: should be that mandated by the law itself,
namely, maximum tolerance, which
Sec. 15. Freedom parks. specifically means the following:
Every city and municipality in
the country shall within six Sec. 3. Definition of terms. For purposes of this
months after the effectivity of Act:
contingent shall call the attention of

xxx the leaders of the public assembly
and ask the latter to prevent any
(c) Maximum possible disturbance;
tolerance means the highest
degree of restraint that the military, (b) If actual violence starts
police and other peace keeping to a point where rocks or other
authorities shall observe during a harmful objects from the
public assembly or in the dispersal participants are thrown at the police
of the same. or at the non-participants, or at any
property causing damage to such
xxx property, the ranking officer of the
law enforcement contingent shall
Sec. 9. Non-interference by law audibly warn the participants that if
enforcement authorities. Law the disturbance persists, the public
enforcement agencies shall not assembly will be dispersed;
interfere with the holding of a public
assembly. However, to adequately (c) If the violence or
ensure public safety, a law disturbance prevailing as stated in
enforcement contingent under the the preceding subparagraph should
command of a responsible police not stop or abate, the ranking
officer may be detailed and officer of the law enforcement
stationed in a place at least one contingent shall audibly issue a
hundred (100) meters away from warning to the participants of the
the area of activity ready to public assembly, and after allowing
maintain peace and order at all a reasonable period of time to
times. lapse, shall immediately order it to
forthwith disperse;
Sec. 10. Police assistance when
requested. It shall be imperative (d) No arrest of any leader,
for law enforcement agencies, organizer or participant shall also
when their assistance is requested be made during the public
by the leaders or organizers, to assembly unless he violates during
perform their duties always mindful the assembly a law, statute,
that their responsibility to provide ordinance or any provision of this
proper protection to those Act. Such arrest shall be governed
exercising their right peaceably to by Article 125 of the Revised Penal
assemble and the freedom of Code, as amended;
expression is primordial. Towards
this end, law enforcement agencies (d) Isolated acts or
shall observe the following incidents of disorder or breach of
guidelines: the peace during the public
assembly may be peacefully
(a) Members of the law dispersed.
enforcement contingent who deal
with the demonstrators shall be in xxx
complete uniform with their
nameplates and units to which they Sec. 12. Dispersal of public
belong displayed prominently on assembly without permit. When
the front and dorsal parts of their the public assembly is held without
uniform and must observe the a permit where a permit is required,
policy of maximum tolerance as the said public assembly may be
herein defined; peacefully dispersed.
(b) The members of the law Sec. 13. Prohibited acts. The
enforcement contingent shall not following shall constitute violations
carry any kind of firearms but may of the Act:
be equipped with baton or riot
sticks, shields, crash helmets with (e) Obstructing, impeding,
visor, gas masks, boots or ankle disrupting or otherwise denying the
high shoes with shin guards; exercise of the right to peaceful
assembly;
(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades,
water cannons, or any similar anti- (f) The unnecessary firing
riot device shall not be used unless of firearms by a member of any law
the public assembly is attended by enforcement agency or any person
actual violence or serious threats of to disperse the public assembly;
violence, or deliberate destruction
of property. (g) Acts described hereunder if
committed within one hundred (100)
Sec. 11. Dispersal of public meters from the area of activity of
assembly with permit. No public the public assembly or on the
assembly with a permit shall be occasion thereof:
dispersed. However, when an
assembly becomes violent, the xxx
police may disperse such public
assembly as follows: 4. the carrying of firearms by
members of the law enforcement
(a) At the first sign of unit;
impending violence, the ranking
officer of the law enforcement
5. the interfering with or Be it enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in

intentionally disturbing the holding session assembled:
of a public assembly by the use of a
motor vehicle, its horns and loud Section 1. Title . This Act shall be
sound systems. known as The Public Assembly Act of 1985.
Furthermore, there is need to address the Sec. 2. Declaration of policy. The

situation adverted to by petitioners where constitutional right of the people peaceably to
mayors do not act on applications for a assemble and petition the government for
permit and when the police demand a permit redress of grievances is essential and vital to
and the rallyists could not produce one, the the strength and stability of the State. To this
rally is immediately dispersed. In such a end, the State shall ensure the free exercise
situation, as a necessary consequence and of such right without prejudice to the rights of
part of maximum tolerance, rallyists who can others to life, liberty and equal protection of
show the police an application duly filed on the law.
a given date can, after two days from said
date, rally in accordance with their application Sec. 3. Definition of terms. For
without the need to show a permit, the grant purposes of this Act:
of the permit being then presumed under the
law, and it will be the burden of the (a) Public assembly means any rally,
authorities to show that there has been a demonstration, march, parade, procession or
denial of the application, in which case the any other form of mass or concerted action
rally may be peacefully dispersed following held in a public place for the purpose of
the procedure of maximum tolerance presenting a lawful cause; or expressing an
prescribed by the law. opinion to the general public on any
particular issue; or protesting or influencing
In sum, this Court reiterates ITS BASIC POLICY any state of affairs whether political,
OF UPHOLDING THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS economic or social; or petitioning the
OF OUR PEOPLE, ESPECIALLY FREEDOM government for redress of grievances.
OF EXPRESSION AND FREEDOM OF
ASSEMBLY. In several policy addresses, Chief The processions, rallies, parades,
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban has repeatedly demonstrations, public meetings and
vowed to uphold the liberty of our people and to assemblages for religious purposes shall be
nurture their prosperity. He said that in cases governed by local ordinances; Provided,
involving liberty, the scales of justice should however, That the declaration of policy as
weigh heavily against the government and in provided in Section 2 of this Act shall be
favor of the poor, the oppressed, the faithfully observed.
marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak.
Indeed, laws and actions that restrict The definition herein contained shall
fundamental rights come to the courts with a not include picketing and other concerted
heavy presumption against their validity. These action in strike areas by workers and
laws and actions are subjected to heightened employees resulting from a labor dispute as
scrutiny. defined by the Labor Code, its implementing
rules and regulations, and by the Batas
SUMMARY: Pambansa Bilang 227.
1. For this reason, the so-called (b) Public place shall include
calibrated preemptive response any highway, boulevard, avenue, road, street,
policy has no place in our legal bridge or other thoroughfare, park, plaza
firmament and must be struck down square, and/or any open space of public
as a darkness that shrouds freedom. ownership where the people are allowed
It merely confuses our people and is access.
used by some police agents to justify
abuses. (c) Maximum tolerance means
the highest degree of restraint that the
2. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 military, police and other peace keeping
cannot be condemned as authorities shall observe during a public
unconstitutional; it does not curtail or assembly or in the dispersal of the same.
unduly restrict freedoms; it merely
regulates the use of public places as (d) Modification of a permit shall
to the time, place and manner of include the change of the place and time of
assemblies. Far from being the public assembly, rerouting of the parade
insidious, maximum tolerance is or street march, the volume of loud-speakers
for the benefit of rallyists, not the or sound system and similar changes.
government.
Sec. 4. Permit when required and
3. The delegation to the mayors of the when not required.-- A written permit shall be
power to issue rally permits is valid required for any person or persons to
because it is subject to the organize and hold a public assembly in a
constitutionally-sound clear and public place. However, no permit shall be
present danger standard. required if the public assembly shall be done
or made in (1) a freedom park duly
established by law or ordinance or (2) in
private property, in which case only the
Batas Pambansa Blg. 880 consent of the owner or the one entitled to its
legal possession is required, or (3) in the
An Act Ensuring The Free Exercise By The campus of a government-owned and operated
People Of Their Right Peaceably To Assemble educational institution which shall be subject
And Petition The Government [And] For Other to the rules and regulations of said
Purposes educational institution. Political meetings or
rallies held during any election campaign
period as provided for by law are NOT eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No
covered by this Act. appeal bond and record on appeal shall be
required. A decision granting such permit or
Sec. 5. Application requirements.-- All modifying if in terms satisfactory to the
applications for a permit shall comply with applicant shall be immediately executory.
the following guidelines:
(g) All cases filed in court under this
(a) The applications shall be in section shall be decided within twenty-four
writing and shall include the names of the (24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed
leaders or organizers; the purpose of such hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to
public assembly; the date, time and duration the executive judge for disposition or, in his
thereof, and place or streets to be used for absence, to the next in rank.
the intended activity; and the probable
number of persons participating, the (h) In all cases, any decision may be
transport and the public address systems to appealed to the Supreme Court.
be used.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be
(b) The application shall incorporate the followed by formal appeals are hereby
duty and responsibility of applicant under allowed.
Section 8 hereof.
Sec. 7. Use of Public throroughfare.
(c) The application shall be filed with Should the proposed public assembly involve
the office of the mayor of the city or the use, for an appreciable length of time, of
municipality in whose jurisdiction the any public highway, boulevard, avenue, road
intended activity is to be held, at least five (5) or street, the mayor or any official acting in
working days before the scheduled public his behalf may, to prevent grave public
assembly. inconvenience, designate the route thereof
which is convenient to the participants or
(d) Upon receipt of the application, which reroute the vehicular traffic to another
must be duly acknowledged in writing, the direction so that there will be no serious or
office of the city or municipal mayor shall undue interference with the free flow of
cause the same to immediately be posted at a commerce and trade.
conspicuous place in the city or municipal
building. Sec. 8. Responsibility of applicant. It shall
be the duty and responsibility of the leaders
Sec. 6. Action to be taken on the application. and organizers of a public assembly to take
all reasonable measures and steps to the end
that the intended public assembly shall be
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor conducted peacefully in accordance with the
or any official acting in his behalf to issue or terms of the permit. These shall include but
grant a permit unless there is clear and not be limited to the following:
convincing evidence that the public assembly
will create a clear and present danger to (a) To inform the participants of their
public order, public safety, public responsibility under the permit;
convenience, public morals or public health.
(b) To police the ranks of the
(b) The mayor or any official acting in demonstrators in order to prevent non-
his behalf shall act on the application within demonstrators from disrupting the lawful
two (2) working days from the date the activities of the public assembly;
application was filed, failing which, the permit
shall be deemed granted. Should for any (c) To confer with local government
reason the mayor or any official acting in his officials concerned and law enforcers to the
behalf refuse to accept the application for a end that the public assembly may be held
permit, said application shall be posted by the peacefully;
applicant on the premises of the office of the
mayor and shall be deemed to have been (d) To see to it that the public
filed. assembly undertaken shall not go beyond the
time stated in the permit; and
(c) If the mayor is of the view that
there is imminent and grave danger of a (e) To take positive steps that
substantive evil warranting the denial or demonstrators do not molest any person or
modification of the permit, he shall do any act unduly interfering with the rights
immediately inform the applicant who must of other persons not participating in the
be heard on the matter. public assembly.
(d) The action on the permit shall be Sec. 9. Non-interference by law enforcement
in writing and served on the applica[nt] within authorities. Law enforcement agencies shall
twenty-four hours. not interfere with the holding of a public
assembly. However, to adequately ensure
(e) If the mayor or any official acting public safety, a law enforcement contingent
in his behalf denies the application or under the command of a responsible police
modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the officer may be detailed and stationed in a
applicant may contest the decision in an place at least one hundred (100) meters away
appropriate court of law. from the area of activity ready to maintain
peace and order at all times.
(f) In case suit is brought before the
Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Sec. 10. Police assistance when requested.
Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the It shall be imperative for law enforcement
Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate agencies, when their assistance is requested
Appellate court, its decisions may be by the leaders or organizers, to perform their
appealed to the appropriate court within forty- duties always mindful that their responsibility
to provide proper protection to those Sec. 13. Prohibited acts. The following shall
exercising their right peaceably to assemble constitute violations of the Act:
and the freedom of expression is primordial.
Towards this end, law enforcement agencies (a) The holding of any public
shall observe the following guidelines: assembly as defined in this Act by any leader
or organizer without having first secured that
(a) Members of the law enforcement written permit where a permit is required from
contingent who deal with the demonstrators the office concerned, or the use of such
shall be in complete uniform with their permit for such purposes in any place other
nameplates and units to which they belong than those set out in said permit: Provided,
displayed prominently on the front and dorsal however, That no person can be punished or
parts of their uniform and must observe the held criminally liable for participating in or
policy of maximum tolerance as herein attending an otherwise peaceful assembly;
defined;
(b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or
(b) The members of the law modification of a permit in violation of the
enforcement contingent shall not carry any provisions of this Act by the mayor or any
kind of firearms but may be equipped with other official acting in his behalf;
baton or riot sticks, shields, crash helmets
with visor, gas masks, boots or ankle high (c) The unjustified and arbitrary
shoes with shin guards; refusal to accept or acknowledge receipt of
the application for a permit by the mayor or
(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water any official acting in his behalf;
cannons, or any similar anti-riot device shall
not be used unless the public assembly is (d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting
attended by actual violence or serious threats or otherwise denying the exercise of the right
of violence, or deliberate destruction of to peaceful assembly;
property.
(e) The unnecessary firing of
Sec. 11. Dispersal of public assembly with firearms by a member of any law enforcement
permit. No public assembly with a permit agency or any person to disperse the public
shall be dispersed. However, when an assembly;
assembly becomes violent, the police may
disperse such public assembly as follows: (f) Acts in violation of Section 10
hereof;
(a) At the first sign of impending
violence, the ranking officer of the law (g) Acts described hereunder if
enforcement contingent shall call the committed within one hundred (100) meters
attention of the leaders of the public from the area of activity of the public
assembly and ask the latter to prevent any assembly or on the occasion thereof:
possible disturbance;
1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive
(b) If actual violence starts to a point weapon or device such as firearm, pillbox,
where rocks or other harmful objects from the bomb, and the like;
participants are thrown at the police or at the
non-participants, or at any property causing 2. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the
damage to such property, the ranking officer like;
of the law enforcement contingent shall
audibly warn the participants that if the 3. the malicious burning of any object in the
disturbance persists, the public assembly will streets or thoroughfares;
be dispersed;
4. the carrying of firearms by members of
(c) If the violence or disturbance the law enforcement unit;
prevailing as stated in the preceding
subparagraph should not stop or abate, the 5. the interfering with or intentionally
ranking officer of the law enforcement disturbing the holding of a public assembly
contingent shall audibly issue a warning to by the use of a motor vehicle, its horns and
the participants of the public assembly, and loud sound systems.
after allowing a reasonable period of time to
lapse, shall immediately order it to forthwith Sec. 14. Penalties. Any person found guilty
disperse; and convicted of any of the prohibited acts
defined in the immediately preceding section
(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer shall be punished as follows:
or participant shall also be made during the
public assembly unless he violates during the (a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be
assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any punished by imprisonment of one month and
provision of this Act. Such arrest shall be one day to six months;
governed by Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended; (b) violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d),
(e), (f), and item 4, subparagraph (g) shall be
(e) Isolated acts or incidents of punished by imprisonment of six months and
disorder or breach of the peace during the one day to six years;
public assembly may be peacefully dispersed.
(c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall
Sec. 12. Dispersal of public assembly without be punished by imprisonment of six months
permit. When the public assembly is held and one day to six years without prejudice to
without a permit where a permit is required, prosecution under Presidential Decree No.
the said public assembly may be peacefully 1866;
dispersed.

(d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of guaranteed by our Constitution is RELIGIOUS

subparagraph (g) shall be punished by LIBERTY, not mere RELIGIOUS TOLERATION.
imprisonment of one day to thirty days.
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, however, as a
Sec. 15. Freedom parks. Every city and constitutional mandate is not inhibition of
municipality in the country shall within six profound reverence for religion and is not a
months after the effectivity of this Act denial of its influence in human affairs.
establish or designate at least one suitable Religion as a profession of faith to an active
freedom park or mall in their respective power that binds and elevates man to his
jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills
shall be centrally located within the poblacion into the minds the purest principles of morality, its
where demonstrations and meetings may be influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated.
held at any time without the need of any prior When the Filipino people, in the preamble of
permit. their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine
Providence, in order to establish a government
In the cities and municipalities of that shall embody their ideals, conserve and
Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the
shall establish the freedom parks within the general welfare, and secure to themselves and
period of six months from the effectivity this their posterity the blessings of independence
Act. under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy,"
they thereby manifested their intense
Sec. 16. Constitutionality.Should any religious nature and placed unfaltering
provision of this Act be declared invalid or reliance upon Him who guides the destinies
unconstitutional, the validity or of men and nations. The elevating influence of
constitutionality of the other provisions shall religion in human society is recognized here as
not be affected thereby. elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions
are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects
Sec. 17. Repealing clause. All laws, and denominations. Our Constitution and laws
decrees, letters of instructions, resolutions, exempt from taxation properties devoted
orders, ordinances or parts thereof which are exclusively to religious purposes (sec. 14,
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines
are hereby repealed, amended, or modified and sec. 1, subsec. Ordinance appended thereto;
accordingly. Assessment Law, sec. 344, par [c], Adm. Code)
sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest,
Sec. 18. Effectivity. This Act shall preacher, minister or other religious teacher or
take effect upon its approval. dignitary as such is assigned to the armed forces
or to any penal institution, orphanage or
Approved, October 22, 1985. leprosarium (sec. 13, subsec. 3 Art. VI,
Constitution of the Philippines). Optional religious
instruction in the public schools is by
constitutional mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII,
Gregorio Aglipay vs. Juan Ruiz Constitution of the Philippines, in relation to sec.
G.R. No. L-45459, March 13, 1937, Laurel, J. 928, Ad. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy
Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and
Facts: -supra- Sundays are made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm.
Code) because of the secular idea that their
Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the observance is conducive to beneficial moral
freedom of religion? results. The law allows divorce but punishes
polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against
Held: No. The prohibition herein expressed is religious worship are considered crimes against
a direct corollary of the principle of the fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132
separation of church and state. Without the and 133, Revised Penal Code).
necessity of adverting to the historical Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious
background of this principle in our country, it is purpose in view. What it gives the Director of
sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of Posts is the discretionary power to determine
the history of mankind, has taught us that the when the issuance of special postage stamps
union of church and state is prejudicial to both, would be "advantageous to the Government." Of
for occasions might arise when the state will use course, the phrase "advantageous to the
the church, and the church the state, as a Government" does not authorize the violation of
weapon in the furtherance of their respective the Constitution. It does not authorize the
ends and aims. The Malolos Constitution appropriation, use or application of public money
recognized this principle of separation of church or property for the use, benefit or support of a
and state in the early stages of our constitutional particular sect or church. In the present case,
development; it was inserted in the Treaty of however, the issuance of the postage stamps in
Paris between the United States and Spain of question by the Director of Posts and the
December 10, 1898, reiterated in President Secretary of Public Works and Communications
McKinley's Instructions to the Philippine was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to
Commission, reaffirmed in the Philippine Bill of favor a particular church or religious
1902 and in the Autonomy Act of August 29, denominations. The stamps were not issued
1916, and finally embodied in the Constitution of and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic
the Philippines as the supreme expression of the Church. Nor were money derived from the
Filipino People. It is almost trite to say now that in sale of the stamps given to that church. On
this country we enjoy both religious and civil the contrary, it appears from the letter of the
freedom. All the officers of the Government, from Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated
the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath to on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the
support and defend the Constitution, bind only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps
themselves to recognize and respect the was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, tourists to this country." The officials concerned
with its inherent limitations and recognized merely took advantage of an event considered of
implications. It should be stated that what is international importance "to give publicity to the
Philippines and its people". It is significant to note
that the stamps as actually designed and printed, Instance at Ormoc City, praying for the
instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as annulment of the said resolutions. The lower
originally planned, contains a map of the court dismissed the complaint. lt upheld the
Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, validity of the resolutions.
and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII
International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, ISSUE: Whether the resolutions contravene
1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Section 5 of Article III of the Constitution.
Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the
Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is HELD: NO. The wooden image was purchased
obvious that while the issuance and sale of the in connection with the celebration of the
stamps in question may be said to be inseparably barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San
linked with an event of a religious character, the Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of
resulting propaganda, if any, received by the favoring any religion nor interfering with
Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and religious matters or the religious beliefs of
purpose of the Government. We are of the the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the
opinion that the Government should not be fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of
embarrassed in its activities simply because of the patron saint had to be placed in the church
incidental results, more or less religious in when the mass was celebrated. If there is nothing
character, if the purpose had in view is one which unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and
could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate having a patron saint for the barrio, then any
legislation. The main purpose should not be activity intended to facilitate the worship of the
frustrated by its subordination to mere patron saint (such as the acquisition and display
incidental results not contemplated. of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. As
noted in the first resolution, the barrio fiesta
is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an
Andres Garces, et. al, vs. Hon. Numeriano G. ingrained tradition in rural communities. The
Estenzo, et. al. fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of
G.R. No. L-53487, May 25, 1981,Aquino, J. the lives of the masses.
The barangay council designated a
FACTS: The barangay council of Valencia, layman as the custodian of the wooden image in
Ormoc City issued four (4) resolutions order to forestall any suspicion that it is favoring
regarding the acquisition of the wooden the Catholic church. A more practical reason
image of San Vicente Ferrer to be used in the for that arrangement would be that the image,
celebration of his annual feast day. One of the if placed in a layman's custody, could easily
resolutions further provided that the barangay be made available to any family desiring to
council, in accordance with the practice in borrow the image in connection with prayers
Eastern Leyte, Councilman Tomas Cabatingan, and novenas.
the Chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta, The contradictory positions of the
would be the caretaker of the image of San petitioners are shown in their affidavits. Petitioner
Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain Garces swore that the said resolutions favored
in his residence for one year and until the the Catholic church. On the other hand,
election of his successor as chairman of the next petitioners Dagar and Edullantes swore that the
feast day. resolutions prejudiced the Catholics because
Several days after the fiesta or on April they could see the image in the church only once
11, 1976, on the occasion of his sermon during a a year or during the fiesta. The Court finds that
mass, Father Osmea allegedly uttered the momentous issues of separation of
defamatory remarks against the barangay church and state, freedom of religion annd
captain, Manuel C. Veloso, apparently in the use of public money to favor any sect or
connection with the disputed image. That incident church are not involved at all in this case
provoked Veloso to file against Father Osmea in even remotely or indirectly. lt is not a
the city court of Ormoc City a charge for grave microcosmic test case on those issues. This
oral defamation. Father Osmea retaliated by filing case is a petty quarrel over the custody of a
administrative complaints against Veloso on the saint's image. lt would never have arisen if
grounds of immorality, grave abuse of authority, the parties had been more diplomatic and
acts unbecoming a public official and ignorance tactful and if Father Osmea had taken the
of the law. Meanwhile, the image of San Vicente trouble of causing contributions to be
Ferrer remained in the Catholic church of solicited from his own parishioners for the
Valencia. Because Father Osmea did not accede purchase of another image of San Vicente
to the request of Cabatingan to have custody of Ferrer to be installed in his church.
the image and "maliciously ignored" the council's There can be no question that the
resolutions, the council enacted another image in question belongs to the barangay
resolution, authorizing the hiring of a lawyer to file council. Father Osmea claim that it belongs to
a replevin case against Father Osmea for the his church is wrong. The barangay council, as
recovery of the image. On June 14, 1976, the owner of the image, has the right to determine
barangay council passed another resolution, who should have custody thereof. If it
appointing Veloso as its representative in the chooses to change its mind and decides to
replevin case. give the image to the Catholic church that
The replevin case was filed in the city action would not violate the Constitution
court of Ormoc City against Father Osmea and because the image was acquired with private
Bishop Cipriano Urgel. After the barangay council funds and is its private property. The council
had posted a cash bond of eight hundred pesos, has the right to take measures to recover
Father Osmea turned over the image to the possession of the image by enacting Resolutions
council. ln his answer to the complaint for Nos. 10 and 12.
replevin, he assailed the constitutionality of the Not every governmental activity
said resolutions library which involves the expenditure of public
Later, he and three other persons, funds and which has some religious tint is
Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan violative of the constitutional provisions
Church, and two Catholic laymen, Jesus regarding separation of church and state,
Edullantes and Nicetas Dagar, filed against the freedom of worship and banning the use of
barangay council and its members (excluding two public money or property. In Aglipay vs. Ruiz,
members) a complaint in the Court of First 64 Phil. 201, what was involved was Act No.
4052 which appropriated sixty thousand

pesos for the cost of plates and the printing of As to Ordinance No. 3000 requiring the
postage stamps with new designs. Under the law, obtention of a mayors permit before any
the Director of Posts, with the approval of the person can engage in any of the businesses,
Department Head and the President of the trades or occupations enumerated therein, we
Philippines, issued in 1936 postage stamps to do not find that it imposes any charge upon
commemorate the celebration in Manila of the the enjoyment of a right granted by the
33rd International Eucharistic Congress Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious
sponsored by the Catholic Church. The purpose practices. Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be
of the stamps was to raise revenue and considered unconstitutional, even if applied
advertise the Philippines. The design of the to plaintiff Society. But as Ordinance No. 2529
stamps showed a map of the Philippines and of the City of Manila, as amended, is not
nothing about the Catholic Church. No applicable to plaintiff-appellant and
religious purpose was intended. The instant defendant-appellee is powerless to license or
case is easily distinguishable from Verzosa vs. tax the business of plaintiff Society involved
Fernandez, 49 Phil., 627 and 55 Phil. 307, where herein for, as stated before, it would impair
a religious brotherhood, La Archicofradia del plaintiff's right to the free exercise and
Santisimo Sacramento, organized for the enjoyment of its religious profession and
purpose of raising funds to meet the expenses for worship, as well as its rights of dissemination
the annual fiesta in honor of the Most Holy of religious beliefs, We find that Ordinance No.
Sacrament and the Virgin Lady of Guadalupe, 3000, as amended, is also inapplicable to said
was held accountable for the funds which it held business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff.
as trustee.
Finding that the petitioners have no "In the case of Murdock vs. Pennsylvania, it was
cause of action for the annulment of the held that an ordinance requiring that a license be
barangay resolutions, the lower court's judgment obtained before a person could canvass or solicit
dismissing their amended petition is affirmed. orders for goods, paintings, pictures, wares or
merchandise cannot be made to apply to
members of Jehovah's Witnesses who went
American Bible Society vs. City of Manila about from door to door distributing literature and
G.R. No. L-9637, April 30, 1957, Felix, J. soliciting people to 'purchase' certain religious
books and pamphlets, all published by the Watch
Facts: Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non- Tower Bible & Tract Society. The 'price' of the
stock, non-profit, religious, missionary books was twenty-five cents each, the 'price' of
corporation duly registered and doing business in the pamphlets five cents each. It was shown that
the Philippines. In the course of its ministry, in making the solicitations there was a request for
plaintiff's Philippine agency has been distributing additional 'contribution' of twenty-five cents each
and selling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof for the books and five cents each for the
(except during the Japanese occupation) pamphlets. Lesser sum were accepted, however,
throughout the Philippines and translating the and books were even donated in case interested
same into several Philippine dialects. On May 29 persons were without funds.
1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of
Manila informed plaintiff that it was conducting On the above facts the Supreme Court held
the business of general merchandise since that it could not be said that petitioners were
November, 1945, without providing itself with the engaged in commercial rather than a religious
necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license. venture. Their activities could not be
Plaintiff protested against this requirement, but described as embraced in the occupation of
the City Treasurer demanded that plaintiff deposit selling books and pamphlets. Then the Court
and pay the sum of P5, 891.45 which it paid continued:
under protest. A suit was brought by plaintiff
against defendant. 'We do not mean to say that religious groups
and the press are free from all financial
Issue: WON the imposition of the fees constitute burdens of government. See Grosjean vs.
an impairment of the free-exercise of religion of American Press Co., 297 U.S., 233, 250, 80 L.
the petitioner as imposed on its sale and ed. 660, 668, 56 S. Ct. 444. We have here
distribution of bibles. something quite different, for example, from a tax
on the income of one who engages in religious
Held: YES. The constitutional guaranty of the activities or a tax on property used or employed
free exercise and enjoyment of religious in connection with those activities. It is one thing
profession and worship carries with it the to impose a tax on the income or property of a
right to disseminate religious information. preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax
Any restraint of such right can only be from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon.
justified like other restraints of freedom of The tax imposed by the City of Jeannette is a flat
expression on the grounds that there is a license tax, payment of which is a condition of the
clear and present danger of any substantive exercise of these constitutional privileges. The
evil which the State has the right to prevent. power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the
power to control or suppress its enjoyment. . .
The fees under Ordinance No. 2529, as . Those who can tax the exercise of this
amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for religious practice can make its exercise so
in doing so it would impair its free exercise costly as to deprive it of the resources
and enjoyment of its religious profession and necessary for its maintenance. Those who
worship as well as its rights of dissemination can tax the privilege of engaging in this form
of religious beliefs. There is a difference when of missionary evangelism can close all its
the tax is imposed upon the income or property of doors to all 'those who do not have a full
the religious organization and one imposed purse. Spreading religious beliefs in this
against the acts of disseminating religious ancient and honorable manner would thus be
information. To tax the latter is impair the free denied the needy. . . .
exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession
and worship as well as its rights of dissemination It is contended however that the fact that the
of religious beliefs regardless of the amount of license tax can suppress or control this
such fees. activity is unimportant if it does not do so.
But that is to disregard the nature of this tax. We thus reject petitioner's postulate
It is a license tax - a flat tax imposed on the that its religious program is per se beyond
exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of review by the respondent Board. Its public
Rights . . . The power to impose a license tax broadcast on TV of its religious program
on the exercise of these freedoms is indeed brings it out of the bosom of internal belief.
as potent as the power of censorship which Television is a medium that reaches even the
this Court has repeatedly struck down. . . . It is eyes and ears of children. The Court
not a nominal fee imposed as a regulatory reiterates the rule that the exercise of
measure to defray the expenses of policing the religious freedom can be regulated by the
activities in question. It is in no way apportioned. State when it will bring about the clear and
It is flat license tax levied and collected as a present danger of some substantive evil
condition to the pursuit of activities whose which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e.,
enjoyment is guaranteed by the constitutional serious detriment to the more overriding
liberties of press and religion and inevitably tends interest of public health, public morals, or
to suppress their exercise. That is almost public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the
uniformly recognized as the inherent vice and evil exercise of religion can be seductive to the
of this flat license tax.' liberal mind but history counsels the Court
against its blind adoption as religion is and
Nor could dissemination of religious continues to be a volatile area of concern in
information be conditioned upon the approval our country today. Across the sea and in our
of an official or manager even if the town shore, the bloodiest and bitterest wars fought by
were owned by a corporation as held in the men were caused by irreconcilable religious
case of Marsh vs. State of Alabama (326 U.S. differences. Our country is still not safe from the
501) or by the United States itself as held in the recurrence of this stultifying strife considering our
case of Tucker vs. Texas (326 U.S. 517). In the warring religious beliefs and the fanaticism with
former case the Supreme Court expressed the which some of us cling and claw to these beliefs.
opinion that the right to enjoy freedom of the Even now, we have yet to settle the near century
press and religion occupies a preferred position old strife in Mindanao, the roots of which have
as against the constitutional right of property been nourished by the mistrust and
owners. misunderstanding between our Christian and
Muslim brothers and sisters. The bewildering rise
of weird religious cults espousing violence as an
article of faith also proves the wisdom of our rule
Iglesia ni Cristo vs. CA rejecting a strict let alone policy on the exercise
G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996, Puno, J. of religion. For sure, we shall continue to subject
any act pinching the space for the free exercise
Facts: Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, a duly of religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall
organized religious organization, has a television not leave its rational exercise to the irrationality of
program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on man. For when religion divides and its
Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 exercise destroys, the State should not stand
every Sunday. The program presents and still.
propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines
and practices often times in comparative studies 2. NO. First, The evidence shows that the
with other religions. Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV
respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures series for "attacking" either religions,
and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program especially the Catholic church. An
Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board examination of the evidence will show that
classified the series as "X" or not for public the so-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of
viewing on the ground that they "offend and some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets
constitute an attack against other religions which of other religions. The videotapes were not
is expressly prohibited by law." viewed by the respondent court as they were not
In its first course of action against presented as evidence. Yet they were considered
respondent Board, INC appealed to the Office of by the respondent court as indecent, contrary to
the President where it was favored and then law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited
again, before the Quezon City RTC alleging that from public viewing under section 3(c) of PD
the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses
with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes
petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV with its right to free exercise of religion.
program and in x-rating them, where it INC again
won but was directed to refrain from attacking Second, even a sideglance at section 3 of
other religions. The Court of Appeals reversed PD No. 1986 will reveal that, the ground "attacks
the same. against another religion" in x-rating the
religious program of petitioner, is not among the
Issue: grounds to justify an order prohibiting the
1. Whether the MTRCB has jurisdiction to review broadcast of petitioner's television program.
petitioner's TV program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni The ground "attack against another religion" was
Cristo? merely added by the respondent Board in its
2. Whether the action of respondent MTRCB x- Rules. This rule is void for it runs smack against
rating petitioner's TV Program Series Nos. 115, the hoary doctrine that administrative rules and
119, and 121 should be sustained? regulations cannot expand the letter and spirit of
the law they seek to enforce.
Held:
1. YES. The right to religious profession and Third, in x-rating the TV program of the
worship has a TWO-FOLD ASPECT, viz., (1) petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the
freedom to believe and (2) freedom to act on clear and present danger rule. In American
one's beliefs. The first is absolute as long Bible Society v. City of Manila, this Court held:
as the belief is confined within the realm of "The constitutional guaranty of free exercise
thought. The second is subject to and enjoyment of religious profession and
regulation where the belief is translated into worship carries with it the right to
external acts that affect the public welfare. disseminate religious information. Any
restraint of such right can be justified like
other restraints on freedom of expression on conscience of the present generation of

the ground that there is aclear and present Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill of
danger of any substantive evil which the State Rights which guarantees their rights to free
has the right to prevent." In Victoriano speech ** and the free exercise of religious
vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, we further profession and worship (Sec. 5, Article III, 1987
ruled that ". . . it is only where it is unavoidably Constitution; Article IV, Section 8, 1973
necessary to prevent animmediate and grave Constitution; Article III, Section 1[7], 1935
danger to the security and welfare of the Constitution).
community that infringement of religious freedom Religious freedom is a fundamental
may be justified, and only to the smallest extent right which is entitled to the highest priority
necessary to avoid the danger." and the amplest protection among human
Lastly, the records show that the decision of rights, for it involves the relationship of man
the respondent Board, affirmed by the to his Creator (Chief Justice Enrique M.
respondent appellate court, is completely bereft Fernando's separate opinion in German vs.
of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 530-531).
the subject video tapes constitute impermissible The right to religious profession and
attacks against another religion. There is no worship has a TWO-FOLD ASPECT, vis.,
showing whatsoever of the type of harm the freedom to believe and freedom to act on
tapes will bring about especially the gravity and one's belief. The first is absolute as long as
imminence of the threatened harm. Prior the belief is confined within the realm of
restraint on speech, including religious thought. The second is subject to regulation
speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical where the belief is translated into external
fears but only by the showing of a acts that affect the public welfare
substantive and imminent evil which has The sole justification for a prior
taken the life of a reality already on ground. restraint or limitation on the exercise of
religious freedom (according to the late Chief
Justice Claudio Teehankee in his dissenting
EBRALINAG et. al. vs. THE DIVISION opinion in German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514,
SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU 517) is the existence of a grave and present
G.R No. 95770, March 1, 1993 danger of a character both grave and
imminent, of a serious evil to public safety,
FACTS: public morals, public health or any other
All the petitioners in these two cases legitimate public interest, that the State has a
were expelled from their classes by the public right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a
school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute threat to public safety, the expulsion of the
the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the petitioners from the schools is not justified.
patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. The SC is not persuaded that by
1265 and by Department Order No. 8 of DECS exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses from
making the flag ceremony compulsory in all saluting the flag, singing the national anthem
educational institutions. and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious
Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their group which admittedly comprises a "small
children not to salute the flag, sing the national portion of the school population" will shake
anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they up our part of the globe and suddenly
believe that those are "acts of worship" or produce a nation "untaught and uninculcated
"religious devotion" which they "cannot in and unimbued with reverence for the flag,
conscientiously give . . . to anyone or anything patriotism, love of country and admiration for
except God". They feel bound by the Bible's national heroes" (Gerona vs. Sec. of Education,
command to "guard ourselves from idols 1 106 Phil. 2, 24). After all, what the petitioners
John 5:21". They consider the flag as an image seek only is exemption from the flag
or idol representing the State. They think the ceremony, not exclusion from the public
action of the local authorities in compelling the schools where they may study the
flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional Constitution, the democratic way of life and
limitations on the State's power and invades the form of government, and learn not only the
sphere of the intellect and spirit which the arts, sciences, Philippine history and culture
Constitution protect against official control but also receive training for a vocation of
However, the petitioners herein have not profession and be taught the virtues of
raised in issue the constitutionality of the above "patriotism, respect for human rights,
provision of the new Administrative Code of appreciation for national heroes, the rights
1987. They have targeted only Republic Act No. and duties of citizenship, and moral and
1265 and the implementing orders of the DECS. spiritual values (Sec. 3[2], Art. XIV, 1987
Constitution) as part of the curricula. Expelling
ISSUE: or banning the petitioners from Philippine
Whether or not the expulsion of students schools will bring about the very situation
by reason of not upholding the flag salute law is that this Court had feared in Gerona. Forcing
unconstitutional? a small religious group, through the iron hand
of the law, to participate in a ceremony that
HELD: violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be
YES. The 30-year old decision of SC in Gerona conducive to love of country or respect for
upholding the flag salute law and approving the dully constituted authorities.
expulsion of students who refuse to obey it, is not As Mr. Justice Jackson remarked in West Virginia
lightly to be trifled with. vs. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943):
It is somewhat ironic however, that after . . . To believe that patriotism will not flourish if
the Gerona ruling had received legislative cachet patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and
by its in corporation in the Administrative Code of spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is
1987, the present Court believes that the time to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of
has come to re-examine it. The idea that one our institutions to free minds. . . . When they
may be compelled to salute the flag, sing the [diversity] are so harmless to others or to the
national anthem, and recite the patriotic State as those we deal with here, the price is not
pledge, during a flag ceremony on pain of too great. But freedom to differ is not limited to
being dismissed from one's job or of being things that do not matter much. That would be a
expelled from school, is alien to the mere shadow of freedom. The test of its
substance is the right to differ as to things that still alive but living with another woman. She also
touch the heart of the existing order. admitted that she and Quilapio have a son. But
Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity as a member of the religious sect known as the
and loyalty even to the country, . . . Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and
assuming that such unity and loyalty can be Bible Tract Society, respondent asserted that
attained through coercion is not a goal that their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with
is constitutionally obtainable at the expense their religious beliefs and has the approval of her
of religious liberty. A desirable end cannot be congregation. In fact, after ten years of living
promoted by prohibited means. (Meyer vs. together, she executed on July 28, 1991, a
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 67 L. ed. 1042, 1046.) Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness.
Moreover, the expulsion of members of For Jehovahs Witnesses, the Declaration allows
Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where members of the congregation who have been
they are enrolled will violate their right as abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital
Philippine citizens, under the 1987 relations. The Declaration thus makes the
Constitution, to receive free education, for it resulting union moral and binding within the
is the duty of the State to "protect and congregation all over the world except in
promote the right of all citizens to quality countries where divorce is allowed. As laid out by
education . . . and to make such education the tenets of their faith, the Jehovahs
accessible to all (Sec. 1, Art. XIV). congregation requires that at the time the
declarations are executed, the couple cannot
SC holds that a similar exemption may be secure the civil authorities approval of the
accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with marital relationship because of legal
regard to the observance of the flag impediments. Only couples who have been
ceremony out of respect for their religious baptized and in good standing may execute the
beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may Declaration, which requires the approval of the
seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not elders of the congregation. As a matter of
to participate in the flag ceremony does not practice, the marital status of the declarants and
give them a right to disrupt such patriotic their respective spouses commission of adultery
exercises. It is appropriate to recall the are investigated before the declarations are
Japanese occupation of our country in 1942-1944 executed. Escritor and Quilapios declarations
when every Filipino, regardless of religious were executed in the usual and approved form
persuasion, in fear of the invader, saluted the prescribed by the Jehovahs Witnesses,
Japanese flag and bowed before every Japanese approved by elders of the congregation where
soldier. Perhaps, if petitioners had lived through the declarations were executed, and recorded in
that dark period of our history, they would not the Watch Tower Central Office.
quibble now about saluting the Philippine flag.
For when liberation came in 1944 and our own Moreover, the Jehovahs congregation believes
flag was proudly hoisted aloft again, it was a that once all legal impediments for the couple are
beautiful sight to behold that made our hearts lifted, the validity of the declarations ceases, and
pound with pride and joy over the newly-regained the couple should legalize their union. In
freedom and sovereignty of our nation. Escritors case, although she was widowed in
1998, thereby lifting the legal impediment to
Although the Court upholds in this decision the marry on her part, her mate was still not
petitioners' right under our Constitution to refuse capacitated to remarry. Thus, their declarations
to salute the Philippine flag on account of their remained valid. In sum, therefore, insofar as the
religious beliefs, we hope, nevertheless, that congregation is concerned, there is nothing
another foreign invasion of our country will not be immoral about the conjugal arrangement
necessary in order for our countrymen to between Escritor and Quilapio and they remain
appreciate and cherish the Philippine flag. members in good standing in the congregation.
Estrada vs. Escritur ISSUE:

A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006 Whether or not the Administrative case herein
should be dismissed?
(NOTE: Strict neutral benevolence vis--vis
Strict Separation/ Strict Neutrality) HELD:
YES. In our decision dated August 4, 2003, after
FACTS: a long and arduous scrutiny into the origins and
In a sworn-letter complaint dated July 27, 2000, development of the religion clauses in the United
complainant Alejandro Estrada requested Judge States (U.S.) and the Philippines, we held that in
Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., presiding judge of Branch resolving claims involving religious freedom (1)
253, Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, for BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY OR
an investigation of respondent Soledad Escritor, ACCOMMODATION, whether mandatory or
court interpreter in said court, for living with a permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework
man not her husband, and having borne a child underlying the religion clauses in our
within this live-in arrangement. Estrada believes Constitution; and (2) in deciding respondents
that Escritor is committing an immoral act that plea of exemption based on the Free
tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should Exercise Clause (from the law with which
not be allowed to remain employed therein as it she is administratively charged), it is the
might appear that the court condones her act.[2] COMPELLING STATE INTEREST TEST, the
Consequently, respondent was charged with strictest test, which must be applied.
committing disgraceful and immoral conduct
under Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Sec. 46(b)(5) of In sum, a review of the Old World antecedents of
the Revised Administrative Code. religion shows the movement of establishment of
religion as an engine to promote state interests,
Respondent Escritor testified that when she to the principle of non-establishment to allow the
entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a free exercise of religion.
widow, her husband having died in 1998. She
admitted that she started living with Luciano (1) Religion Clauses in the U.S. Context
Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage more
than twenty years ago when her husband was
U.S. history has produced TWO identifiably neutrality approach is not hostile to religion,
different, even opposing, strains of but it is strict in holding that religion may not
jurisprudence on the religion clauses. be used as a basis for classification for
purposes of governmental action, whether the
1. First is THE STANDARD OF action confers rights or privileges or imposes
SEPARATION, which may take the form of duties or obligations. Only secular criteria may
either (a) strict separation or (b) the be the basis of government action. It does not
tamer version of strict neutrality or permit, much less require, accommodation of
separation, or what Mr. Justice Carpio secular programs to religious belief.
refers to as the second theory of
governmental neutrality. Although the The problem with the strict neutrality
latter form is not as hostile to religion as the approach, however, is if applied in
former, both are anchored on the interpreting the Establishment Clause, it
Jeffersonian premise that a wall of could lead to a de facto voiding of religious
separation must exist between the expression in the Free Exercise Clause. As
state and the Church to protect the state pointed out by Justice Goldberg in his concurring
from the church. Both protect the principle opinion in Abington School District v. Schempp]
of church-state separation with a rigid strict neutrality could lead to a brooding and
reading of the principle. pervasive devotion to the secular and a
passive, or even active, hostility to the
2. On the other hand, the second religious which is prohibited by the
standard, the BENEVOLENT Constitution.Professor Laurence Tribe
NEUTRALITY OR ACCOMMODATION, is commented in his authoritative treatise, viz:
buttressed by the view that the wall of
separation is meant to protect the To most observers. . . strict neutrality has
church from the state. seemed incompatible with the very idea of a
free exercise clause. The Framers, whatever
specific applications they may have intended,
FIRST STANDARD: Strict Separation and clearly envisioned religion as something special;
Strict Neutrality/Separation they enacted that vision into law by
guaranteeing the free exercise of religion but
The STRICT SEPARATIONIST believes that not, say, of philosophy or science. The strict
the Establishment Clause was meant to neutrality approach all but erases this
protect the state from the church, and the distinction. Thus it is not surprising that the
states hostility towards religion allows no [U.S.] Supreme Court has rejected strict
interaction between the two. According to this neutrality, permitting and sometimes mandating
Jeffersonian view, an absolute barrier to religious classifications.
formal interdependence of religion and state
needs to be erected. Religious institutions Thus, the dilemma of the separationist
could not receive aid, whether direct or approach, whether in the form of strict
indirect, from the state. Nor could the state separation or strict neutrality, is that while the
adjust its secular programs to alleviate Jeffersonian wall of separation captures the
burdens the programs placed on believers. spirit of the American ideal of church-state
Only the complete separation of religion from separation, in real life, church and state are
politics would eliminate the formal influence of not and cannot be totally separate. This is all
religious institutions and provide for a free choice the more true in contemporary times when
among political views, thus a strict wall of both the government and religion are growing
separation is necessary. and expanding their spheres of involvement
and activity, resulting in the intersection of
Strict separation faces difficulties, however, as it government and religion at many points.
is deeply embedded in American history and
contemporary practice that enormous amounts of
aid, both direct and indirect, flow to religion from
government in return for huge amounts of mostly SECOND STANDARD: Benevolent
indirect aid from religion. For example, less than Neutrality/Accommodation
twenty-four hours after Congress adopted the
First Amendments prohibition on laws respecting The theory of benevolent neutrality or
an establishment of religion, Congress decided to accommodation is premised on a different view of
express its thanks to God Almighty for the many the wall of separation, associated with Williams,
blessings enjoyed by the nation with a resolution founder of the Rhode Island colony. Unlike the
in favor of a presidential proclamation declaring a Jeffersonian wall that is meant to protect the
national day of Thanksgiving and Prayer. Thus, state from the church, the wall is meant to
strict separationists are caught in an awkward protect the church from the state
position of claiming a constitutional principle that
has never existed and is never likely to. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that religion
plays an important role in the public life of the
The tamer version of the strict separationist United States as shown by many traditional
view, the STRICT NEUTRALITY OR government practices which, to strict neutrality,
SEPARATIONIST VIEW, (or, the governmental pose Establishment Clause questions. Among
neutrality theory) finds basis in Everson v. Board these are the inscription of In God We Trust on
of Education, where the Court declared that American currency; the recognition of America as
Jeffersons wall of separation encapsulated the one nation under God in the official pledge of
meaning of the First Amendment. However, allegiance to the flag; the Supreme Courts time-
unlike the strict separationists, the strict honored practice of opening oral argument with
neutrality view believes that the wall of the invocation God save the United States and
separation does not require the state to be this Honorable Court; and the practice of
their adversary. Rather, the state must be Congress and every state legislature of paying a
NEUTRAL in its relations with groups of chaplain, usually of a particular Protestant
religious believers and non-believers. State denomination, to lead representatives in prayer.
power is no more to be used so as to handicap These practices clearly show the preference for
religions than it is to favor them. The strict one theological viewpointthe existence of
and potential for intervention by a godover burdensome effect, whether by the

the contrary theological viewpoint of atheism. legislature or the courts. Most of the free
Church and government agencies also cooperate exercise claims brought to the U.S. Court are for
in the building of low-cost housing and in other exemption, not invalidation of the facially neutral
forms of poor relief, in the treatment of alcoholism law that has a burdensome effect.
and drug addiction, in foreign aid and other
government activities with strong moral (2) FREE EXERCISE Jurisprudence: Sherbert,
dimension. Yoder and Smith
Examples of accommodations in American The pinnacle of free exercise protection and

jurisprudence also abound, including, but not the theory of accommodation in the U.S.
limited to the U.S. Court declaring the blossomed in the case of Sherbert v. Verner,
following acts as constitutional: a state hiring which ruled that state regulation that
a Presbyterian minister to lead the legislature indirectly restrains or punishes religious
in daily prayers, or requiring employers to belief or conduct must be subjected to strict
pay workers compensation when the scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause.
resulting inconsistency between work and According to Sherbert, when a law of general
Sabbath leads to discharge; for government application infringes religious exercise, albeit
to give money to religiously-affiliated incidentally, the state interest sought to be
organizations to teach adolescents about promoted must be so paramount and
proper sexual behavior; or to provide compelling as to override the free exercise
religious school pupils with books; or bus claim. Otherwise, the Court itself will carve
rides to religious schools; or with cash to out the exemption.
pay for state-mandated standardized tests.
It is certain that not every conscience can be
accommodated by all the laws of the land; but
(1) Legislative Acts and the Free Exercise when general laws conflict with scruples of
Clause conscience, exemptions ought to be granted
unless some compelling state interest
As with the other rights under the Constitution, intervenes.
the rights embodied in the Religion clauses are
invoked in relation to governmental action, almost Thus, Sherbert and subsequent cases held
invariably in the form of legislative acts. that when government action burdens, even
inadvertently, a sincerely held religious belief
Generally speaking, a legislative act that or practice, the state must justify the burden
purposely aids or inhibits religion will be by demonstrating that the law embodies a
challenged as unconstitutional, either compelling interest, that no less restrictive
because it violates the Free Exercise Clause alternative exists, and that a religious
or the Establishment Clause or both. This is exemption would impair the states ability to
true whether one subscribes to the effectuate its compelling interest. As in other
separationist approach or the benevolent instances of state action affecting fundamental
neutrality or accommodationist approach. rights, negative impacts on those rights demand
the highest level of judicial scrutiny. After
But the more difficult religion cases involve Sherbert, this strict scrutiny balancing test
legislative acts which have a secular purpose and resulted in court-mandated religious exemptions
general applicability, but may incidentally or from facially-neutral laws of general application
inadvertently aid or burden religious exercise. whenever unjustified burdens were found.
Though the government action is not religiously
motivated, these laws have a burdensome Then, in the 1972 case of Wisconsin v.
effect on religious exercise. Yoder,[61] the U.S. Court again ruled that
religious exemption was in order,
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that notwithstanding that the law of general
with respect to these governmental actions, application had a criminal penalty. Using
accommodation of religion may be allowed, heightened scrutiny, the Court overturned the
not to promote the governments favored conviction of Amish parents for violating
form of religion, but to allow individuals and Wisconsin compulsory school-attendance
groups to exercise their religion without laws. The Court, in effect, granted exemption
hindrance. The purpose of accommodations from a neutral, criminal statute that punished
is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the religiously motivated conduct.
exercise of, a persons or institutions
religion. As Justice Brennan explained, the The cases of Sherbert and Yoder laid out the
government [may] take religion into following doctrines: (a) free exercise clause
accountto exempt, when possible, from claims were subject to heightened scrutiny or
generally applicable governmental regulation compelling interest test if government
individuals whose religious beliefs and substantially burdened the exercise of
practices would otherwise thereby be religion; (b) heightened scrutiny or
infringed, or to create without state compelling interest test governed cases
involvement an atmosphere in which where the burden was direct, i.e., the exercise
voluntary religious exercise may flourish. In of religion triggered a criminal or civil penalty,
the ideal world, the legislature would as well as cases where the burden was
recognize the religions and their practices indirect, i.e., the exercise of religion resulted
and would consider them, when practical, in in the forfeiture of a government benefit; and
enacting laws of general application. But (c) the Court could carve out
when the legislature fails to do so, religions accommodations or exemptions from a
that are threatened and burdened may turn to facially neutral law of general application,
the courts for protection. whether general or criminal.
Thus, what is sought under the theory of The Sherbert-Yoder doctrine had five main
accommodation is not a declaration of components. First, action was protected
unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, conduct beyond speech, press, or worship was
but an exemption from its application or its included in the shelter of freedom of religion.
Neither Sherberts refusal to work on the Sabbath accommodation to religion are by no means co-
nor the Amish parents refusal to let their children extensive with the noninterference mandated by
attend ninth and tenth grades can be classified the Free Exercise Clause. Other examples are
as conduct protected by the other clauses of the Zorach v. Clauson, allowing released time in
First Amendment. Second, indirect impositions public schools and Marsh v. Chambers, allowing
on religious conduct, such as the denial of payment of legislative chaplains from public
twenty-six weeks of unemployment insurance funds. Parenthetically, the Court in Smith has
benefits to Adel Sherbert, as well as direct ruled that this is the only accommodation allowed
restraints, such as the criminal prohibition at by the Religion Clauses.
issue in Yoder, were prohibited. Third, as the
language in the two cases indicate, the C. PROHIBITED ACCOMMODATION. as when
protection granted was extensive. Only the Court finds no basis for a mandatory
extremely strong governmental interests accommodation, or it determines that the
justified impingement on religious conduct, legislative accommodation runs afoul of the
as the absolute language of the test of the establishment or the free exercise clause, it
Free Exercise Clause suggests. results to a In this case, the Court finds that
establishment concerns prevail over potential
accommodation interests. To say that there
are valid exemptions buttressed by the Free
Exercise Clause does not mean that all claims for
free exercise exemptions are valid. An example
(3) ACCOMMODATION under the Religion where accommodation was prohibited is
Clauses McCollum v. Board of Education, where the
Court ruled against optional religious
A free exercise claim could result to THREE instruction in the public school premises.
KINDS OF ACCOMMODATION: (a) those
which are found to be constitutionally Given that a free exercise claim could lead to
compelled, i.e., required by the Free Exercise three different results, the question now remains
Clause; (b) those which are discretionary or as to how the Court should determine which
legislative, i.e., not required by the Free action to take. In this regard, it is the strict
Exercise Clause but nonetheless permitted by scrutiny-compelling state interest test which is
the Establishment Clause; and (c) those most in line with the benevolent neutrality-
which the religion clauses prohibit. accommodation approach.
A. MANDATORY ACCOMMODATION results Under the benevolent-neutrality theory, the

when the Court finds that accommodation is principle underlying the First Amendment is that
required by the Free Exercise Clause, i.e, freedom to carry out ones duties to a
when the Court itself carves out an exemption. Supreme Being is an inalienable right, not
This accommodation occurs when all three one dependent on the grace of legislature.
conditions of the compelling interest test are Religious freedom is seen as a substantive right
met: and not merely a privilege against discriminatory
legislation. With religion looked upon with
(1) a statute or government action has burdened benevolence and not hostility, benevolent
claimants free exercise of religion, and there is neutrality allows accommodation of religion
no doubt as to the sincerity of the religious belief; under certain circumstances.
(2) the state has failed to demonstrate a

particularly important or compelling governmental 3. Religion Clauses in the Philippine Context:
goal in preventing an exemption; and Constitution, Jurisprudence and Practice
(3) that the state has failed to demonstrate that it a. US Constitution and jurisprudence vis--vis
used the least restrictive means. Philippine Constitution
In these cases, the Court finds that By juxtaposing the American Constitution and
the injury to religious conscience is so great jurisprudence against that of the Philippines, it is
and the advancement of public purposes is immediately clear that one cannot simply
incomparable that only indifference or conclude that we have adoptedlock, stock and
hostility could explain a refusal to make barrelthe religion clauses as embodied in the
exemptions. Thus, if the states objective could First Amendment, and therefore, the U.S. Courts
be served as well or almost as well by granting interpretation of the same. Unlike in the U.S.
an exemption to those whose religious beliefs are where legislative exemptions of religion had to be
burdened by the regulation, the Court must grant upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court as constituting
the exemption. The Yoder case is an example permissive accommodations, similar exemptions
where the Court held that the state must for religion are mandatory accommodations
accommodate the religious beliefs of the under our own constitutions. Thus, our 1935,
Amish who objected to enrolling their 1973 and 1987 Constitutions contain provisions
children in high school as required by law. on tax exemption of church property,[123] salary
The Sherbert case is another example where the of religious officers in government
Court held that the state unemployment institutions,[124] and optional religious
compensation plan must accommodate the instruction.[125] Our own preamble also invokes
religious convictions of Sherbert. the aid of a divine being.[126] These
constitutional provisions are wholly ours and
B. PERMISSIVE ACCOMMODATION, the Court have no counterpart in the U.S. Constitution or its
finds that the State may, but is not required to, amendments. They all reveal without doubt that
accommodate religious interests. The U.S. the Filipino people, in adopting these
Walz case illustrates this situation where the U.S. constitutions, manifested their adherence to the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of tax benevolent neutrality approach that requires
exemption given by New York to church accommodations in interpreting the religion
properties, but did not rule that the state was clauses.
required to provide tax exemptions. The Court
declared that (t)he limits of permissible state
The argument of Mr. Justice Carpio that the exempt religion. Philippine jurisprudence
August 4, 2003 ponencia was erroneous insofar shows that the Court has allowed exemptions
as it asserted that the 1935 Constitution from a law of general application, in effect,
incorporates the Walz ruling as this case was interpreting our religion clauses to cover both
decided subsequent to the 1935 Constitution is a mandatory and permissive accommodations.
misreading of the ponencia. What the ponencia
pointed out was that even as early as 1935, or To illustrate, in American Bible Society v. City of
more than three decades before the U.S. Court Manila, the Court granted to plaintiff exemption
could validate the exemption in Walz as a form or from a law of general application based on the
permissible accommodation, we have already Free Exercise Clause. In this case, plaintiff was
incorporated the same in our Constitution, as a required by an ordinance to secure a mayors
mandatory accommodation. permit and a municipal license as ordinarily
required of those engaged in the business of
There is no ambiguity with regard to the general merchandise under the citys ordinances.
Philippine Constitutions departure from the U.S. Plaintiff argued that this amounted to religious
Constitution, insofar as religious censorship and restrained the free exercise and
accommodations are concerned. It is indubitable enjoyment of religious profession, to wit: the
that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, distribution and sale of bibles and other religious
whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, literature to the people of the Philippines.
intent and framework underlying the Philippine Although the Court categorically held that the
Constitution.[128] As stated in our Decision, questioned ordinances were not applicable to
dated August 4, 2003: plaintiff as it was not engaged in the business or
occupation of selling said merchandise for
The history of the religion clauses in the 1987 profit, it also ruled that applying the ordinance to
Constitution shows that these clauses were plaintiff and requiring it to secure a license and
largely adopted from the First Amendment of pay a license fee or tax would impair its free
the U.S. Constitution xxxx Philippine exercise of religious profession and worship and
jurisprudence and commentaries on the religious its right of dissemination of religious beliefs as
clauses also continued to borrow authorities from the power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the
U.S. jurisprudence without articulating the stark power to control or suppress its enjoyment. The
distinction between the two streams of U.S. decision states in part, viz:
jurisprudence [i.e., separation and benevolent
neutrality]. One might simply conclude that the The constitutional guaranty of the free
Philippine Constitutions and jurisprudence also exercise and enjoyment of religious
inherited the disarray of U.S. religion clause profession and worship carries with it the
jurisprudence and the two identifiable streams; right to disseminate religious information.
thus, when a religion clause case comes before Any restraint of such right can only be
the Court, a separationist approach or a justified like other restraints of freedom of
benevolent neutrality approach might be adopted expression on the grounds that there is a
and each will have U.S. authorities to support it. clear and present danger of any substantive
Or, one might conclude that as the history of the evil which the State has the right to prevent.
First Amendment as narrated by the Court in
Everson supports the separationist approach, At this point, we must emphasize that
Philippine jurisprudence should also follow this the adoption of the benevolent neutrality-
approach in light of the Philippine religion accommodation approach does not mean that
clauses history. As a result, in a case where the the Court ought to grant exemptions every
party claims religious liberty in the face of a time a free exercise claim comes before it.
general law that inadvertently burdens his This is an erroneous reading of the framework
religious exercise, he faces an almost which the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio seems to
insurmountable wall in convincing the Court that entertain. Although benevolent neutrality is
the wall of separation would not be breached if the lens with which the Court ought to view
the Court grants him an exemption. These religion clause cases, the interest of the state
conclusions, however, are not and were never should also be afforded utmost protection.
warranted by the 1987, 1973 and 1935 This is precisely the purpose of the testto
Constitutions as shown by other provisions on draw the line between mandatory, permissible
religion in all three constitutions. It is a cardinal and forbidden religious exercise.
rule in constitutional construction that the
constitution must be interpreted as a whole and xxx While the Court cannot adopt a doctrinal
apparently conflicting provisions should be formulation that can eliminate the difficult
reconciled and harmonized in a manner that will questions of judgment in determining the degree
give to all of them full force and effect. From this of burden on religious practice or importance of
construction, it will be ascertained that the the state interest or the sufficiency of the means
intent of the framers was to adopt a adopted by the state to pursue its interest, the
benevolent neutrality approach in interpreting Court can set a doctrine on the ideal towards
the religious clauses in the Philippine which religious clause jurisprudence should be
constitutions, and the enforcement of this directed. We here lay down the doctrine that
intent is the goal of construing the in Philippine jurisdiction, we adopt the
constitution benevolent neutrality approach not only
because of its merits as discussed above, but
We therefore reject Mr. Justice Carpios total more importantly, because our constitutional
adherence to the U.S. Courts interpretation of history and interpretation indubitably show
the religion clauses to effectively deny that benevolent neutrality is the launching
accommodations on the sole basis that the law in pad from which the Court should take off in
question is neutral and of general application. interpreting religion clause cases. The ideal
For even if it were true that an unbroken line of towards which this approach is directed is the
U.S. Supreme Court decisions has never held protection of religious liberty not only for a
that an individuals religious beliefs [do not] minority, however small- not only for a
excuse him from compliance with an otherwise majority, however large but for each of us to
valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free the greatest extent possible within flexible
to regulate, our own Constitutions have made constitutional limits.
significant changes to accommodate and
II. THE CURRENT PROCEEDINGS August 4, 2003, to deny the exemption would
effectively break up an otherwise ideal union of
We now resume from where we ended in our two individuals who have managed to stay
August 4, 2003 Decision. As mentioned, what together as husband and wife [approximately
remained to be resolved, upon which remand twenty-five years] and have the effect of
was necessary, pertained to the final task of defeating the very substance of marriage and the
subjecting this case to the careful application of family.
the compelling state interest test, i.e.,
determining whether respondent is entitled to The Solicitor General also argued against
exemption, an issue which is essentially factual respondents religious freedom on the basis of
or evidentiary in nature. morality, i.e., that the conjugal arrangement of
respondent and her live-in partner should not be
There has never been any question that the condoned because adulterous relationships are
state has an interest in protecting the constantly frowned upon by society; and that
institutions of marriage and the family, or State laws on marriage, which are moral in
even in the sound administration of justice. nature, take clear precedence over the religious
Indeed, the provisions by which respondents beliefs and practices of any church, religious sect
relationship is said to have impinged, e.g., Book or denomination on marriage. Verily, religious
V, Title I, Chapter VI, Sec. 46(b)(5) of the beliefs and practices should not be permitted to
Revised Administrative Code, Articles 334 and override laws relating to public policy such as
349 of the Revised Penal Code, and even the those of marriage.
provisions on marriage and family in the Civil
Code and Family Code, all clearly demonstrate The above arguments are mere reiterations of
the States need to protect these secular the arguments raised by Mme. Justice Ynares-
interests. Santiago in her dissenting opinion to our Decision
dated August 4, 2003, which she offers again in
Be that as it may, the free exercise of religion toto. These arguments have already been
is specifically articulated as one of the addressed in our decision dated August 4,
fundamental rights in our Constitution. It is a 2003.[154] In said Decision, we noted that Mme.
fundamental right that enjoys a preferred Justice Ynares-Santiagos dissenting opinion
position in the hierarchy of rights the dwelt more on the standards of morality, without
most inalienable and sacred of human categorically holding that religious freedom is not
rights, in the words of Jefferson. Hence, it is in issue.] We, therefore, went into a discussion
not enough to contend that the states on morality, in order to show that:
interest is important, because our
Constitution itself holds the right to religious (a) The public morality expressed in the law is
freedom sacred. The State must articulate in necessarily secular for in our constitutional order,
specific terms the state interest involved in the religion clauses prohibit the state from
preventing the exemption, which must be establishing a religion, including the morality it
compelling, for only the gravest abuses, sanctions. Thus, when the law speaks of
endangering paramount interests can limit immorality in the Civil Service Law or immoral
the fundamental right to religious freedom. To in the Code of Professional Responsibility for
rule otherwise would be to emasculate the lawyers, or public morals in the Revised Penal
Free Exercise Clause as a source of right by Code, or morals in the New Civil Code,[159] or
itself. moral character in the Constitution,[160] the
distinction between public and secular morality
Thus, it is not the States broad interest in on the one hand, and religious morality, on the
protecting the institutions of marriage and other, should be kept in mind;
the family, or even in the sound
administration of justice that must be (b) Although the morality contemplated by
weighed against respondents claim, but the laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could
States narrow interest in refusing to make an allow for accommodation of morality based
exception for the cohabitation which on religion, provided it does not offend
respondents faith finds moral. In other compelling state interests;
words, the government must do more than
assert the objectives at risk if exemption is (c) The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to
given; it must precisely show how and to public and secular morality. Whatever
what extent those objectives will be pronouncement the Court makes in the case at
undermined if exemptions are granted. This, bar should be understood only in this realm
the Solicitor General failed to do. where it has authority.
To paraphrase Justice Blackmuns application of (d) Having distinguished between public and
the compelling interest test, the States interest secular morality and religious morality, the more
in enforcing its prohibition, in order to be difficult task is determining which immoral acts
sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free under this public and secular morality fall under
exercise claim, cannot be merely abstract or the phrase disgraceful and immoral conduct for
symbolic. The State cannot plausibly assert which a government employee may be held
that unbending application of a criminal administratively liable.Only one conduct is in
prohibition is essential to fulfill any question before this Court, i.e., the conjugal
compelling interest, if it does not, in fact, arrangement of a government employee whose
attempt to enforce that prohibition. In the partner is legally married to another which
case at bar, the State has not evinced any Philippine law and jurisprudence consider both
concrete interest in enforcing the immoral and illegal.
concubinage or bigamy charges against
respondent or her partner. The State has While there is no dispute that under settled
never sought to prosecute respondent nor her jurisprudence, respondents conduct
partner. The States asserted interest thus constitutes disgraceful and immoral
amounts only to the symbolic preservation of an conduct, the case at bar involves the
unenforced prohibition. Incidentally, as echoes of defense of religious freedom, therefore none
the words of Messrs. J. Bellosillo and Vitug, in of the cases cited by Mme. Justice Ynares-
their concurring opinions in our Decision, dated Santiago apply. There is no jurisprudence in
Philippine jurisdiction holding that the STATE INTEREST sought to be upheld must
defense of religious freedom of a member of be so compelling that its violation will erode
the Jehovahs Witnesses under the same the very fabric of the state that will also
circumstances as respondent will not prevail protect the freedom. IN THE ABSENCE OF A
over the laws on adultery, concubinage or SHOWING THAT SUCH STATE INTEREST
some other law. We cannot summarily EXISTS, MAN MUST BE ALLOWED TO
conclude therefore that her conduct is SUBSCRIBE TO THE INFINITE.
likewise so odious and barbaric as to be
immoral and punishable by law.
In this case, the governments conduct may ESTRADA vs. ESCRITUR SUMMARY:
appear innocent and nondiscriminatory but in
effect, it is oppressive to the minority. In the Benevolent Neutrality recognizes that
interpretation of a document, such as the Bill the government must pursue its secular
of Rights, designed to protect the minority goals and interests, but at the same
from the majority, the question of which time, strive to uphold religious liberty to
perspective is appropriate would seem easy the greatest extent possible within
to answer. Moreover, the text, history, structure flexible constitutional limits. Thus,
and values implicated in the interpretation of the although the morality contemplated by
clauses, all point toward this perspective. Thus, laws is secular (secular morality),
substantive equalitya reading of the religion benevolent neutrality could allow for
clauses which leaves both politically dominant accommodation of morality based n
and the politically weak religious groups equal in religion (religious secularity), provided it
their inability to use the government (law) to does not offend compelling state
assist their own religion or burden others interests.
makes the most sense in the interpretation of The COMPELLING STATE INTEREST
the Bill of Rights, a document designed to TEST involves a three-step process.
protect minorities and individuals from The Court explained this process in
mobocracy in a democracy (the majority or a detail, by showing the questions which
coalition of minorities). must be answered in each step, viz:
As previously discussed, our Constitution 1. Has the statute or government

adheres to THE BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY action created a burden on the
APPROACH that gives room for free exercise of religion? The
accommodation of religious exercises as courts often look into the
required by the Free Exercise Clause.Thus, in sincerity of the religious belief,
arguing that respondent should be held but without inquiring into the
administratively liable as the arrangement she truth of the belief. The FREE
had was illegal per se because, by universally EXERCISE CLAUSE prohibits
recognized standards, it is inherently or by its inquiring about its truth.
very nature bad, improper, immoral and contrary 2. The Court then asks: Is there
to good conscience, the Solicitor General failed a sufficiently compelling state
to appreciate that benevolent neutrality could interest to justify the
allow for accommodation of morality based infringement of religious
on religion, provided it does not offend liberty? In this step, THE
compelling state interests. GOVERNMENT HAS TO
ESTABLISH THAT ITS
Finally, even assuming that the OSG has PURPOSES ARE
proved a compelling state interest, it has to LEGITIMATE FOR THE
further demonstrate that the state has used STATE AND THAT THEY ARE
the least intrusive means possible so that the COMPELLING.
free exercise is not infringed any more than 3. The Court asks: Has the state
necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of in achieving its legitimate
the state, i.e., it has chosen a way to achieve purposes used the least
its legitimate state end that imposes as little instrusive means possible so
as possible on religious liberties. Again, the that the free exercise is not
Solicitor General utterly failed to prove this infringed any more thanh
element of the test. Other than the two necessary to achieve the
documents offered as cited above which legitimate goal of the state?
established the sincerity of respondents religious The analysis requires the state
belief and the fact that the agreement was an to show that the means in
internal arrangement within respondents which it is achieveing its
congregation, no iota of evidence was offered. In legitimate state objective is the
fact, the records are bereft of even a feeble LEAST INTRUSIVE MEANS,
attempt to procure any such evidence to show i.e., it has chosen a way to
that the means the state adopted in pursuing this achieve its legitimate state end
compelling interest is the least restrictive to that imposes as little as
respondents religious freedom. possible on religious liberties.
Thus, we find that in this particular case and

under these distinct circumstances, MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS
respondent Escritors conjugal arrangement GR NO. 88211, September. 15, 1989
cannot be penalized as she has made out a
case for exemption from the law based on her Facts: Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from
fundamental right to freedom of religion. The the presidency via the non-violent people power
Court recognizes that state interests must be revolution and forced into exile. Pres. Corazon C.
upheld in order that freedoms - including religious Aquino was declared President of the Phils under
freedom - may be enjoyed. In the area of a revolutionary government. However, the
religious exercise as a preferred freedom, ratification of the 1987 Constitution further
however, man stands accountable to an strengthened the legitimacy of Mrs Aquinos
authority higher than the state, and so THE authority. The country was far from being
stabilized, though, as continued threats from laws as "are necessary to protect national
various sectors ranging from the rebels to the security, public order, public health or morals or
followers of the Marcoses and even those that the separate rights and freedoms of others." [Art.
were initiators of the people power revolution. Mr. 12(3)] as distinguished from the "right to enter his
Marcos has signified, in his deathbed, to return to own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily
the Phils. But Mrs Aquino considering the dire deprived." [Art. 12(4).] It would therefore be
consequences to the nation of his return has inappropriate to construe the limitations to
stood firmly on the decision to bar the his and his the right to return to one's country in the
familys return. same context as those pertaining to the
The case for petitioners is founded on liberty of abode and the right to travel.
the assertion that the right of the Marcoses to
return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the The right to return to one's country is
following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit: not among the rights specifically guaranteed
in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the
Section 1. No person shall be liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it
deprived of life, liberty, or property is our well-considered view that the right to
without due process of law, nor return may be considered, as a generally
shall any person be denied the accepted principle of international law and,
equal protection of the laws. under our Constitution, is part of the law of
the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.]
xxx xxx xxx However, it is distinct and separate from the
right to travel and enjoys a different
Section 6. The liberty of abode and protection under the International Covenant
of changing the same within the of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being
limits prescribed by law shall not be "arbitrarily deprived" thereof.
impaired except upon lawful order
of the court. Neither shall the right 2. YES. To the President, the problem is one of
to travel be impaired except in the balancing the general welfare and the common
interest of national security, public good against the exercise of rights of certain
safety, or public health, as may be individuals. The power involved is the
provided by law. President's residual power to protect the
general welfare of the people. It is founded on
The petitioners contend that the President is the duty of the President, as steward of the
without power to impair the liberty of abode of the people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is
Marcoses because only a court may do so not only the power of the President but also his
"within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the duty to do anything not forbidden by the
President impair their right to travel because no Constitution or the laws that the needs of the
law has authorized her to do so. They advance nation demand. It is a (1) power borne by the
the view that before the right to travel may be President's duty to preserve and defend the
impaired by any authority or agency of the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a (2)
government, there must be legislation to that power implicit in the President's duty to take
effect. care that the laws are faithfully executed.
It would not be accurate, however, to
The petitioners further assert that under state that "executive power" is the power to
international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his enforce the laws, for the President is head of
family to return to the Philippines is guaranteed. state as well as head of government and
whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain
Issue: to the office unless the Constitution itself
1. Whether or not the right of the Marcoses withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself
of the liberty of abode and the right to provides that the execution of the laws is only
travel are violated? one of the powers of the President. It also
2. Whether the President has the power to grants the President other powers that do not
bar the petitioners from returning home? involve the execution of any provision of law,
e.g., his power over the country's foreign
Held: relations.
Although the 1987 Constitution imposes
1. NO. It must be emphasized that the limitations on the exercise of specific powers of
individual right involved is not the right to the President, it maintains intact what is
travel from the Philippines to other countries traditionally considered as within the scope of
or within the Philippines. These are what the "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the
right to travel would normally connote. President cannot be said to be limited only to
Essentially, the right involved is the right to the specific powers enumerated in the
return to one's country, a totally distinct right Constitution. Faced with the problem of
under international law, independent from whether or not the time is right to allow the
although related to the right to travel. Thus, Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the
the Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and President is, under the Constitution,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political constrained to consider these basic
Rights treat the right to freedom of movement principles in arriving at a decision. More than
and abode within the territory of a state, the right that, having sworn to defend and uphold the
to leave a country, and the right to enter one's Constitution, the President has the obligation
country as separate and distinct rights. The under the Constitution to protect the people,
Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of promote their welfare and advance the national
movement and residence within the borders interest. It must be borne in mind that the
of each state" [Art. 13(1)] separately from the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of
"right to leave any country, including his own, power is also a social contract whereby the
and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).] On people have surrendered their sovereign powers
the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the to the State for the common good. Hence, lest
"right to liberty of movement and freedom to the officers of the Government exercising the
choose his residence" [Art. 12(1)] and the right to powers delegated by the people forget and the
"be free to leave any country, including his own." servants of the people become rulers, the
[Art. 12(2)] which rights may be restricted by such Constitution reminds everyone that "[s]overeignty
resides in the people and all government

authority emanates from them." [Art. II, Sec. 1.] Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the
Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be
placed beyond the reach of the courts.
RICARDO L. MANOTOC, JR. vs. THE COURT
OF APPEALS "The effect of a recognizance or bail bond,
G.R. No. L-62100, May 30, 1986, FERNAN, J.: when fully executed or filed of record, and the
prisoner released thereunder, is to transfer
FACTS: Petitioner Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is the custody of the accused from the public
one of the two principal stockholders of Trans- officials who have him in their charge to
Insular Management, Inc. and the Manotoc keepers of his own selection. Such custody
Securities, Inc., a stock brokerage house. has been regarded merely as a continuation
Following the "run" on stock brokerages caused of the original imprisonment. The sureties
by stock broker Santamaria's flight from this become invested with full authority over the
jurisdiction, petitioner, who was then in the United person of the principal and have the right to
States, came home, and together with his co- prevent the principal from leaving the state."
stockholders, filed a petition with the Securities
and Exchange Commission for the appointment If the sureties have the right to prevent the
of a management committee for Manotoc principal from leaving the state, more so then
Securities, Inc and for Trans-Insular has the court from which the sureties merely
Management, Inc. The petition relative to the derive such right, and whose jurisdiction over
Manotoc Securities, Inc. was granted and a the person of the principal remains
management committee was organized and unaffected despite the grant of bail to the
appointed. latter. In fact, this inherent right of the court is
recognized by petitioner himself, notwithstanding
Pending disposition of SEC Case, the SEC his allegation that he is at total liberty to leave the
requested the Commissioner of Immigration not country, for he would not have filed the motion for
to clear petitioner for departure and a permission to leave the country in the first place,
memorandum to this effect was issued by the if it were otherwise.
Commissioner. When a Torrens title submitted to
and accepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc. was Also, petitioner's case is not on all fours with the
suspected to be a fake, six of its clients filed six Shepherd case. In the latter case, the accused
separate criminal complaints against petitioner was able to show the urgent necessity for her
and one Raul Leveriza, Jr., as president and travel abroad, the duration thereof and
vice-president, respectively, of Manotoc the conforme of her sureties to the proposed
Securities, Inc. In due course, corresponding travel thereby satisfying the court that she would
criminal charges for estafa were filed by the comply with the conditions of her bail bond. In
investigating fiscal. In all cases, petitioner has contrast, petitioner in this case has not
been admitted to bail with FGU Instance satisfactorily shown any of the above. As aptly
Corporation as surety. observed by the Solicitor General in his
comment:
Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a
motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave A perusal of petitioner's 'Motion for
the country," stating as ground therefor his desire Permission to Leave the Country' will
to go to the United States, "relative to his show that it is solely predicated on
business transactions and opportunities." The petitioner's wish to travel to the United
prosecution opposed said motion and after due States where he will, allegedly attend to
hearing, both trial judges denied the same. some business transactions and search
for business opportunities. From the
ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional right of tenor and import of petitioner's motion,
liberty of abode is herein violated? no urgent or compelling reason can be
discerned to justify the grant of judicial
HELD: NO. A court has the power to prohibit imprimatur thereto. Petitioner has not
a person admitted to bail from leaving the sufficiently shown that there is absolute
Philippines. This is a necessary consequence necessity for him to travel abroad.
of the nature and function of a bail bond. Petitioner's motion bears no indication
The object of a bail bond is to relieve that the alleged business transactions
the accused of imprisonment and the state of could not be undertaken by any other
the burden of keeping him, pending the trial, person in his behalf. Neither is there any
and at the same time, to put the accused as hint that petitioner's absence from the
much under the power of the court as if he were United States would absolutely preclude
in custody of the proper officer, and to secure the him from taking advantage of business
appearance of the accused so as to answer the opportunities therein, nor is there any
call of the court and do what the law may require showing that petitioner's non-presence
of him." in the United States would cause him
The condition imposed upon irreparable damage or prejudice.
petitioner to make himself available at all
times whenever the court requires his Petitioner has not specified the duration of
presence operates as a valid restriction on the proposed travel or shown that his surety
his right to travel. The result of the obligation has agreed to it. He merely alleges that his
assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the surety has agreed to his plans as he had
accused amenable at all times to the orders posted cash indemnities. The court cannot
and processes of the lower court, was to allow the accused to leave the country without
prohibit said accused from leaving the the assent of the surety because in accepting a
jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, bail bond or recognizance, the government
otherwise, said orders and processes will be impliedly agrees "that it will not take any
nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of proceedings with the principal that will increase
the courts from which they issued does not the risks of the sureties or affect their remedies
extend beyond that of the Philippines they against him.
would have no binding force outside of said
jurisdiction.
The constitutional right to travel being

invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right. "The liberty of abode and of travel shall
Petitioners contention that having been not be impaired except upon lawful
admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the order of the court or when necessary in
courts which granted him bail nor the Securities the interest of national security, public
and Exchange Commission which has no safety, or public health" (Article IV,
jurisdiction over his liberty, could not prevent him Section 5).
from exercising his constitutional right to travel, is
untenable. The 1987 Constitution has split the two freedoms
into two distinct sentences and treats them
The constitutional right to travel being invoked by differently, to wit:
petitioner is not an absolute right. Section 5,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution states: "Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of
changing the same within the limits
"The liberty of abode and of travel shall prescribed by law shall not be impaired
not be impaired except upon lawful except upon lawful order of the court.
order of the court, or when necessary Neither shall the right to travel be
in the interest of national security, impaired except in the interest of
public safety or public health." national security, public safety, or public
health, as may be provided by law."
To our mind, the order of the trial court releasing
petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987
contemplated by the above-quoted constitutional Constitution, Courts can impair the right to travel
provision. only on the grounds of "national security, public
safety, or public health."
RICARDO C. SILVERIO vs. THE COURT OF ISSUE: Whether or not the right to travel can be
APPEALS impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on
G.R. No. 94284, April 8, 1991, MELENCIO- grounds other than the "interest of national
HERRERA, J. security, public safety or public health"
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with violation of HELD: YES. Article III, Section 6 of the 1987
Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act. In Constitution should be interpreted to mean
due time, he posted bail for his provisional liberty. that while the liberty of travel may be
More than two (2) years after the filing of the impaired even without Court Order, the
Information, respondent People of the Philippines appropriate executive officers or
filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the administrative authorities are not armed with
passport of and to issue a hold-departure Order arbitrary discretion to impose limitations.
against accused-petitioner on the ground that he They can impose limits only on the basis of
had gone abroad several times without the "national security, public safety, or public
necessary Court approval resulting in health" and "as may be provided by law," a
postponements of the arraignment and limitive phrase which did not appear in the
scheduled hearings. 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G.,
The Regional Trial Court issued an S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263).
Order directing the Department of Foreign Affairs
to cancel Petitioner's passport or to deny his Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987
application therefor, and the Commission on Constitution was a reaction to the ban on
Immigration to prevent Petitioner from leaving the international travel imposed under the
country. This order was based primarily on the previous regime when there was a Travel
Trial Court's finding that since the filing of the Processing Center, which issued certificates
Information "the accused has not yet been of eligibility to travel upon application of an
arraigned because he has never appeared in interested party
Court on the dates scheduled for his arraignment
and there is evidence to show that accused Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution
Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. has left the country and should by no means be construed as
has gone abroad without the knowledge and delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to
permission of this Court". Petitioner's Motion for use all means necessary to carry their orders
Reconsideration was denied. Petitioner's into effect in criminal cases pending before
Certiorari Petition before the Court of Appeals them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a
was likewise denied. Court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, process
and other means necessary to carry it into effect
Petitioner takes the posture, that while the 1987 may be employed by such Court or officer (Rule
Constitution recognizes the power of the Courts 135, Section 6, Rules of Court).
to curtail the liberty of abode within the limits
prescribed by law, it restricts the allowable Petitioner's argument that the ruling in
impairment of the right to travel only on grounds Manotoc, Jr., v. Court of Appeals, et al.
of interest of national security, public safety or (supra), to the effect that the condition
public health, as compared to the provisions on imposed upon an accused admitted to bail to
freedom of movement in the 1935 and 1973 make himself available at all times whenever
Constitutions. the Court requires his presence operates as a
valid restriction on the right to travel no
Under the 1935 Constitution, the liberty of abode longer holds under the 1987 Constitution, is
and of travel were treated under one provision. far from tenable. The nature and function of a
Article III, Section 1 (4) thereof reads: bail bond has remained unchanged whether
under the 1935, the 1973, or the 1987
"The liberty of abode and of changing Constitution. Besides, the Manotoc ruling on
the same within the limits prescribed by that point was but a re-affirmation of that laid
law shall not be impaired." down long before in People v. Uy Tuising, 61
Phil. 404 (1935).
The 1973 Constitution altered the 1935 text by
explicitly including the liberty of travel, thus:
Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has conditions prescribed by law," in Article II,
posted bail but has violated the conditions Section 28 thereof, to wit:
thereof by failing to appear before the Court
when required. Warrants for his arrest have Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
been issued. Those orders and processes law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
would be rendered nugatory if an accused full public disclosure of all its transactions
were to be allowed to leave or to remain, at involving public interest. (Art. II, Sec. 28).
his pleasure, outside the territorial confines
of the country. Holding an accused in a criminal In the Tanada case, supra, the constitutional
case within the reach of the Courts by preventing guarantee was bolstered by what this Court
his departure from the Philippines must be declared as an imperative duty of the government
considered as a valid restriction on his right to officials concerned to publish all important
travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature
with law. The offended party in any criminal as well as all executive orders and proclamations
proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It of general applicability. We granted Mandamus in
is to their best interest that criminal said case, and in the process, We found
prosecutions should run their course and occasion to expound briefly on the nature of said
proceed to finality without undue delay, with duty:
an accused holding himself amenable at all
times to Court Orders and processes. . . . That duty must be enforced if the
Constitutional right of the people to be informed
on matters of public concern is to be given
substance and reality. The law itself makes a list
SEC. 7 RIGHT TO INFORMATION of what should be published in the Official
Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves
respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to
LEGASPI VS. CIVIL SEVICE COMMISSION what must be included or excluded from such
150 SCRA 530, 1987 publication. (Tanada v. Tuvera, supra, at 39)
The absence of discretion on the part of

FACTS: -SUPRA- government agencies in allowing the
examination of public records, specifically,
ISSUE: Whether or not Legaspi should be the records in the Office of the Register of
allowed such right Deeds, is emphasized in Subido vs. Ozaeta,
supra:
HELD:
The constitutional right to information on Except, perhaps when it is clear that the
matters of public concern is recognized in the Bill purpose of the examination is unlawful, or
of Rights. These constitutional provisions are sheer, idle curiosity, we do not believe it is
self-executing. They supply the rules by means the duty under the law of registration officers
of which the right to information may be enjoyed to concern themselves with the motives,
by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty reasons, and objects of the person seeking
to afford access to sources of information. access to the records. It is not their
Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized prerogative to see that the information which
may be asserted by the people upon the the records contain is not flaunted before
ratification of the constitution without need for any public gaze, or that scandal is not made of it.
ancillary act of the Legislature. What may be If it be wrong to publish the contents of the
provided for by the Legislature are reasonable records, it is the legislature and not the
conditions and limitations upon the access to be officials having custody thereof which is
afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent called upon to devise a remedy. . . . (Subido v.
with the declared State policy of full public Ozaeta, supra at 388).
disclosure of all transactions involving public
interest. It is clear from the foregoing pronouncements
For every right of the people of this Court that government agencies are
recognized as fundamental, there lies a without discretion in refusing disclosure of,
corresponding duty on the part of those who or access to, information of public concern.
govern, to respect and protect that right. That This is not to lose sight of the reasonable
is the very essence of the Bill of Rights in a regulations which may be imposed by said
constitutional regime. Only governments agencies in custody of public records on the
operating under fundamental rules defining the manner in which the right to information may
limits of their power so as to shield individual be exercised by the public. In the Subido case,
rights against its arbitrary exercise can properly We recognized the authority of the Register of
claim to be constitutional. Without a government's Deeds to regulate the manner in which persons
acceptance of the limitations imposed upon it by desiring to do so, may inspect, examine or copy
the Constitution in order to uphold individual records relating to registered lands. However, the
liberties, without an acknowledgment on its part regulations which the Register of Deeds may
of those duties exacted by the rights pertaining to promulgate are confined to:
the citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes a
sophistry, and liberty, the ultimate illusion. . . . prescribing the manner and hours of
In recognizing the people's right to examination to the end that damage to or loss of,
be informed, both the 1973 Constitution and the records may be avoided, that undue
the New Charter expressly mandate the duty interference with the duties of the custodian of
of the State and its agents to afford access to the books and documents and other employees
official records, documents, papers and in may be prevented, that the right of other persons
addition, government research data used as entitled to make inspection may be insured . . .
basis for policy development, subject to such (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387).
limitations as may be provided by law. The
guarantee has been further enhanced in the New Applying the Subido ruling by analogy, We
Constitution with the adoption of a policy of full recognized a similar authority in a municipal
public disclosure, this time "subject to reasonable judge, to regulate the manner of inspection by the
public of criminal docket records in the case of
Baldoza vs. Dimaano (Adm. Matter No. 1120-MJ, Constitution, access to official records,
May 5, 1976, 71 SCRA 14). Said administrative papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as
case was filed against the respondent judge for may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7,
his alleged refusal to allow examination of the second sentence). The law may therefore
criminal docket records in his sala. Upon a exempt certain types of information from public
finding by the Investigating Judge that the scrutiny, such as those affecting national
respondent had allowed the complainant to open security. It follows that, in every case, the
and view the subject records, We absolved the availability of access to a particular public record
respondent. In effect, We have also held that the must be circumscribed by the nature of the
rules and conditions imposed by him upon the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public
manner of examining the public records were concern or one that involves public interest, and,
reasonable. (b) not being exempted by law from the operation
of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold
In both the Subido and the Baldoza cases, We question is, therefore, whether or not the
were emphatic in Our statement that the authority information sought is of public interest or public
to regulate the manner of examining public concern.
records does not carry with it the power to
prohibit. A distinction has to be made between This question is first addressed to the
the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of government agency having custody of the
or access to a particular information and the desired information. However, as already
authority to regulate the manner in which the discussed, this does not give the agency
access is to be afforded. The first is a limitation concerned any discretion to grant or deny
upon the availability of access to the information access. In case of denial of access, the
sought, which only the Legislature may impose government agency has the burden of showing
(Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution). The second that the information requested is not of public
pertains to the government agency charged with concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the
the custody of public records. Its authority to same has been exempted by law from the
regulate access is to be exercised solely to the operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will
end that damage to, or loss of, public records serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly
may be avoided, undue interference with the observed, ". . . the government is in an
duties of said agencies may be prevented, and advantageous position to marshall and interpret
more importantly, that the exercise of the same arguments against release . . ." To safeguard the
constitutional right by other persons shall be constitutional right, every denial of access by the
assured (Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra). government agency concerned is subject to
review by the courts, and in the proper case,
Thus, while the manner of examining public access may be compelled by a writ of
records may be subject to reasonable Mandamus.
regulation by the government agency in
custody thereof, the duty to disclose the In determining whether or not a
information of public concern, and to afford particular information is of public concern there is
access to public records cannot be no rigid test which can be applied. "Public
discretionary on the part of said agencies. concern" like "public interest" is a term that
Certainly, its performance cannot be made eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a
contingent upon the discretion of such broad spectrum of subjects which the public may
1
agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the want to know, either because these directly
2
constitutional right may be rendered nugatory affect their lives, or simply because such
by any whimsical exercise of agency matters naturally arouse the interest of an
discretion. The constitutional duty, not being ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for
discretionary, its performance may be the courts to determine in a case by case
compelled by a writ of Mandamus in a proper basis whether the matter at issue is of
case. interest or importance, as it relates to or
affects the public.
But what is a proper case for Mandamus to
issue? In the case before Us, the public right to The public concern invoked in the case of
be enforced and the concomitant duty of the Taada v. Tuvera, supra, was the need for
State are unequivocably set forth in the adequate notice to the public of the various laws
Constitution. The decisive question on the which are to regulate the actions and conduct of
propriety of the issuance of the writ of Mandamus citizens. In Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra, the public
in this case is, whether the information sought by concern deemed covered by the statutory right
the petitioner is within the ambit of the was the knowledge of those real estate
constitutional guarantee. transactions which some believed to have been
registered in violation of the Constitution.
The incorporation in the Constitution of
a guarantee of access to information of public The information sought by the petitioner in this
concern is a recognition of the essentiality of the case is the truth of the claim of certain
free flow of ideas and information in a democracy government employees that they are civil service
(Baldoza v. Dimaano, Adm. Matter No. 1120-MJ, eligibles for the positions to which they were
May 5, 1976, 17 SCRA 14). In the same way that appointed. The Constitution expressly declares
free discussion enables members of society to as a State policy that:
cope with the exigencies of their time (Thornhill
vs. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 [1939]), access to Appointments in the civil service shall be made
information of general interest aids the people in only according to merit and fitness to be
democratic decision-making (87 Harvard Law determined, as far as practicable, and except as
Review 1505 [1974] by giving them a better to positions which are policy determining,
perspective of the vital issues confronting the primarily confidential or highly technical, by
nation. competitive examination. (Art. IX, B, Sec. 2. [2]).
But the constitutional guarantee to Public office being a public trust, [Const., Art.
information on matters of public concern is XI, Sec: 1] it is the legitimate concern of
not absolute. It does not open every door to citizens to ensure that government positions
any and all information. Under the requiring civil service eligibility are occupied
only by persons who are eligibles. Public on matters of public concern which guarantees
officers are at all times accountable to the "(a)ccess to official records, and to documents,
people even as to their eligibilities for their and papers pertaining to official acts,
respective positions. transactions, or decisions" only.
But then, it is not enough that the information It is argued that the records of the GSIS,
sought is of public interest. For Mandamus to a government corporation performing proprietary
lie in a given case, the information must not functions, are outside the coverage of the
be among the species exempted by law from people's right of access to official records. It is
the operation of the constitutional guarantee. further contended that since the loan function of
the GSIS is merely incidental to its insurance
In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or function, then its loan transactions are not
deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has covered by the constitutional policy of full public
failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service disclosure and the right to information which is
Law which would limit the petitioner's right to applicable only to "official" transactions.
know who are, and who are not, civil service
eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that First of all, the "constituent ----
the names of those who pass the civil service ministrant" dichotomy characterizing government
examinations, as in bar examinations and function has long been repudiated. In ACCFA v.
licensure examinations for various professions, Confederation of Unions and Government
are released to the public. Hence, there is Corporations and Offices [G.R. Nos. L-21484 and
nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, L-23605, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 644], the
if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, Court said that the government, whether carrying
therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And out its sovereign attributes or running some
when, as in this case, the government employees business, discharges the same function of
concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the service to the people.
public, through any citizen, has a right to verify
their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting
Commission. the loans, was exercising a proprietary function
would not justify the exclusion of the transactions
The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian from the coverage and scope of the right to
being of public concern, and in the absence information.
of express limitations under the law upon
access to the register of civil service eligibles Moreover, the intent of the members
for said position, the duty of the respondent of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, to
Commission to confirm or deny the civil include government-owned and controlled
service eligibility of any person occupying the corporations and transactions entered into by
position becomes imperative. Mandamus, them within the coverage of the State policy
therefore lies. of full public disclosure is manifest from the
records of the proceedings
Considering the intent of the framers of
the Constitution which, though not binding upon
VALMONTE VS. BELMONTE the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and
170 SCRA 256, 1989 considering further that government-owned and
controlled corporations, whether performing
FACTS: proprietary or governmental functions are
-SUPRA- accountable to the people, the Court is
convinced that transactions entered into by
ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus lies to compel the GSIS, a government-controlled
respondent to perform the acts sought by corporation created by special legislation are
petitioner to be done, in pursuance of their right within the ambit of the people's right to be
to information informed pursuant to the constitutional policy
of transparency in government dealings.
HELD: In fine, petitioners are entitled to access
Yes. The peoples right to information is to the documents evidencing loans granted by
limited to matters of public concern and is further the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that
subject to such limitations as may be provided by the latter may promulgate relating to the manner
law. The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from and hours of examination, to the end that
the government and its employees and damage to or loss of the records may be avoided,
administration of various insurance programs for that undue interference with the duties of the
the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds custodian of the records may be prevented and
assume a public character. It is the legitimate that the right of other persons entitled to inspect
concern of the public to ensure that these the records may be insured
funds are managed properly with the end in However, although citizens are
view of maximizing the benefits to insured afforded the right to information and,
government employees. pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to
The public nature of the loanable funds official records," the Constitution does not
of the GSIS and the public office held by the accord them a right to compel custodians of
alleged borrowers make the information sought official records to prepare lists, abstracts,
clearly a matter of public interest and concern. summaries and the like in their desire to
Furthermore, the "constituent-ministrant" acquire information on matters of public
dichotomy characterizing government function concern.
has long been repudiated. That the GSIS, in
granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary
function would not justify the exclusion of the
transactions from the coverage and scope of the
right to information.
Respondent next asserts that the
documents evidencing the loan transactions of
the GSIS are private in nature and hence, are not
covered by the Constitutional right to information PROVINCE OF NORTH COTOBATO VS. GRP
PEACE PANEL public consultation thereon. Supplementarily,

GR No. 183591, October 14, 2008 petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared
unconstitutional. This initial petition was followed
by several other petitions by other parties. The
FACTS: Court ordered the consolidation of the petitions.
When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
assumed office, the military offensive against the ISSUE:
MILF was suspended and the government sought Whether there is a violation of the peoples right
a resumption of the peace talks. The MILF, to information on matters of public concern (1987
according to a leading MILF member, initially Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state
responded with deep reservation, but when policy of full disclosure of all its transactions
President Arroyo asked the Government of involving public interest (1987 Constitution,
Malaysia through Prime Minister Mahathir Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation
Mohammad to help convince the MILF to return under Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL
to the negotiating table, the MILF convened its GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991?
Central Committee to seriously discuss the
matter and, eventually, decided to meet with the HELD: YES. The right of the people to
GRP. information on matters of public concern shall be
The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March recognized. Access to official records, and to
24, 2001, with the talks being facilitated by the documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
Malaysian government, the parties signing on the transactions, or decisions, as well as to
same date the Agreement on the General government research data used as basis for
Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
Between the GRP and the MILF. The MILF subject to such limitations as may be provided by
thereafter suspended all its military actions. law.
Formal peace talks between the parties As early as 1948, in Subido v. Ozaeta, the
were held in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22, 2001, Court has recognized the statutory right to
the outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli examine and inspect public records, a right which
Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) was eventually accorded constitutional status.
containing the basic principles and agenda on the The right of access to public
following aspects of the negotiation: Security documents, as enshrined in both the 1973
Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Constitution and the 1987 Constitution, has
Domain Aspect. With regard to the Ancestral been recognized as a self-executory
Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli Agreement constitutional right.
2001 simply agreed that the same be discussed In the 1976 case of Baldoza v. Hon. Judge
further by the Parties in their next meeting. Dimaano,the Court ruled that access to public
A second round of peace talks was held in records is predicated on the right of the people to
Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001 which acquire information on matters of public concern
ended with the signing of the Implementing since, undoubtedly, in a democracy, the pubic
Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli has a legitimate interest in matters of social and
Agreement 2001 leading to a ceasefire status political significance. The incorporation of this
between the parties. This was followed by the right in the Constitution is a recognition of the
Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian fundamental role of free exchange of information
Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the in a democracy. There can be no realistic
Tripoli Agreement 2001, which was signed on perception by the public of the nations problems,
May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia. nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if
Nonetheless, there were many incidence of they are denied access to information of general
violence between government forces and the interest. Information is needed to enable the
MILF from 2002 to 2003. Meanwhile, then MILF members of society to cope with the exigencies
Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away on July of the times. As has been aptly observed:
13, 2003 and he was replaced by Al Haj Murad, Maintaining the flow of such information
who was then the chief peace negotiator of the depends on protection for both its acquisition and
MILF. Murads position as chief peace negotiator its dissemination since, if either process is
was taken over by Mohagher Iqbal. interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases.
In 2005, several exploratory talks were held In the same way that free discussion
between the parties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually enables members of society to cope with the
leading to the crafting of the draft MOA-AD in its exigencies of their time, access to information of
final form, which, as mentioned, was set to be general interest aids the people in democratic
signed last August 5, 2008. decision-making by giving them a better
Before the Court is what is perhaps the most perspective of the vital issues confronting the
contentious consensus ever embodied in an nation, so that they may be able to criticize and
instrument the MOA-AD which is assailed participate in the affairs of the government in a
principally by the present petitions bearing docket responsible, reasonable and effective manner. It
numbers 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951 and is by ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited
183962. Commonly impleaded as respondents exchange of ideas among a well-informed public
are the GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain that a government remains responsive to the
and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace changes desired by the people.
Process (PAPP) Hermogenes Esperon, Jr. On
July 23, 2008, the Province of North The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern
Cotabato[and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piol
filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for That the subject of the information
Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the sought in the present cases is a matter of
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and public concern faces no serious challenge. In
Temporary Restraining Order. Invoking the right fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is
to information on matters of public concern, indeed of public concern. In previous cases,
petitioners seek to compel respondents to the Court found that the regularity of real
disclose and furnish them the complete and estate transactions entered in the Register of
official copies of the MOA-AD including its Deeds, the need for adequate notice to the
attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of public of the various laws, the civil service
the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the eligibility of a public employee, the proper
contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a management of GSIS funds allegedly used to
grant loans to public officials, the recovery of Petitioner duly filed a Motion for Reconsideration
the Marcoses alleged ill-gotten wealth,[120] raising mainly factual issues, and on its heels, a
and the identity of party-list nominees, among Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising
others, are matters of public concern. for the first time the issue of the constitutionality
Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the of Republic Act No. 7659 (the death penalty law)
present cases is of public concern, involving and the imposition of the death penalty for the
as it does the sovereignty and territorial crime of rape.
integrity of the State, which directly affects
the lives of the public at large. On February 7, 1998, this Court denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and
Matters of public concern covered by Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with a
the right to information include steps and finding that Congress duly complied with the
negotiations leading to the consummation of requirements for the reimposition of the death
the contract. In not distinguishing as to the penalty and therefore the death penalty law is not
executory nature or commercial character of unconstitutional.
agreements, the Court has categorically ruled
that the right to information contemplates In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to
inclusion of negotiations leading to the change the mode of execution of the death
consummation of the transaction. Certainly, a penalty from electrocution to lethal injection,[4]
consummated contract is not a requirement for and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT
the exercise of the right to information. DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION
Otherwise, the people can never exercise the AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT
right if no contract is consummated, and if one is CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE
consummated, it may be too late for the public to PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED
expose its defects. PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24
OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659.[5] Pursuant to the
Requiring a consummated contract provisions of said law, the Secretary of Justice
will keep the public in the dark until the promulgated the Rules and Regulations to
contract, which may be grossly Implement Republic Act No. 8177 ("implementing
disadvantageous to the government or even rules")[6] and directed the Director of the Bureau
illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection
the State policy of full transparency on Manual.
matters of public concern, a situation which
the framers of the Constitution could not have On March 2, 1998, petitioner filed a Petition for
intended. Such a requirement will prevent the Prohibition, Injunction and/or Temporary
citizenry from participating in the public Restraining Order to enjoin respondents
discussion of any proposed contract, Secretary of Justice and Director of the Bureau of
effectively truncating a basic right enshrined Prisons from carrying out the execution by lethal
in the Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an injection of petitioner under R.A. No. 8177 and its
emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a implementing rules as these are unconstitutional
retreat by the State of its avowed policy of full and void for being, among others: (d)an undue
disclosure of all its transactions involving public delegation of legislative power by Congress, (e)
interest. an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of
Intended as a splendid symmetry to the the power to legislate, and (f) an unlawful
right to information under the Bill of Rights is the delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary
policy of public disclosure under Section 28, of Justice to respondent Director.
Article II of the Constitution. The policy of full
public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted ISSUE: Was there undue delegation with respect
Section 28 complements the right of access to to the restriction imposed on the accessibility of
information on matters of public concern found in the Manual of Execution?
the Bill of Rights. The right to information
guarantees the right of the people to demand HELD: YES. A careful reading of R.A. No. 8177
information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty would show that there is no undue delegation of
of officialdom to give information even if nobody legislative power from the Secretary of Justice to
demands. the Director of the Bureau of Corrections for the
The policy of public disclosure establishes simple reason that under the Administrative Code
a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of of 1987, the Bureau of Corrections is a mere
public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, constituent unit of the Department of Justice.
with the peoples right to know as the Further, the Department of Justice is tasked,
centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be among others, to take charge of the
accountable by following such policy. These "administration of the correctional system."
provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom Hence, the import of the phraseology of the law is
of expression and essential to hold public officials that the Secretary of Justice should supervise the
at all times accountable to the people. Director of the Bureau of Corrections in
Whether Section 28 is self-executory, the promulgating the Lethal Injection Manual, in
records of the deliberations of the Constitutional consultation with the Department of Health.
Commission so disclose.
However, the Rules and Regulations to
Implement Republic Act No. 8177 suffer serious
Echagaray vs. Secretary of Justice flaws that could not be overlooked. To begin
G.R. No. 132601, October 12, 1998 with, something basic appears missing in Section
19 of the implementing rules which provides:
FACTS: "SEC. 19. EXECUTION PROCEDURE.

On June 25, 1996, this Court affirmed the - Details of the procedure prior to,
conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for during and after administering the lethal
the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of injection shall be set forth in a manual to
his common-law spouse and the imposition upon be prepared by the Director. The
him of the death penalty for the said crime. manual shall contain details of, among
others, the sequence of events before
and after execution; procedures in
setting up the intravenous line; the as regards their alleged ill-gotten wealth?
administration of the lethal drugs; the More specifically, are the "General Agreement"
pronouncement of death; and the and "Supplemental Agreement," both dated
removal of the intravenous system. December 28, 1993 and executed between the
PCGG and the Marcos heirs, valid and binding?
Said manual shall be confidential and its
distribution shall be limited to authorized The Case
prison personnel." These are the main questions raised in this
original action seeking
Thus, the Courts finds in the first paragraph
of Section 19 of the implementing rules a (1) to prohibit and "[e]njoin respondents [PCGG
veritable vacuum. The Secretary of Justice and its chairman] from privately entering into,
has practically abdicated the power to perfecting and/or executing any greement with
promulgate the manual on the execution the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E.
procedure to the Director of the Bureau of Marcos . . . relating to and concerning the
Corrections, by not providing for a mode of properties and assets of Ferdinand Marcos
review and approval thereof. Being a mere located in the Philippines and/or abroad
constituent unit of the Department of Justice, including the so-called Marcos gold hoard"; and
the Bureau of Corrections could not (2) to "[c]ompel respondent[s] to make public all
promulgate a manual that would not bear the negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or
imprimatur of the administrative superior, the perfected, and all documents related to or
Secretary of Justice as the rule-making relating to such negotiations and agreement
authority under R.A. No. 8177. Such apparent between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs."
abdication of departmental responsibility
renders the said paragraph invalid. The Facts
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as "taxpayer,
As to the second paragraph of section 19, the citizen and former government official who
Court finds the requirement of confidentiality initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and
of the contents of the manual even with their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder
respect to the convict unduly suppressive. It of the public treasury and the systematic
sees no legal impediment for the convict, subjugation of the country's economy," alleges
should he so desire, to obtain a copy of the that what impelled him to bring this action were
manual. The contents of the manual are matters several news reports 2 bannered in a number of
of public concern "which the public may want to broadsheets sometime in September 1997.
know, either because these directly affect their These news items referred to (1) the alleged
lives, or simply because such matters naturally discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets
arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen."[62] deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss
Section 7 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution banks; and (2) the reported execution of a
provides: compromise, between the government (through
PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or
"SEC. 7. The right of the people to share these assets.
information on matters of public concern Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to
shall be recognized. Access to official information 3 and the correlative duty of the state
records, and to documents and papers to disclose publicly all its transactions involving
pertaining to official acts, transaction, or the national interest, 4 demands that respondents
decisions, as well as to government make public any and all negotiations and
research data used as a basis for policy agreements pertaining to PCGG's task of
development, shall be afforded the recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He
citizen, subject to such limitation as may claims that any compromise on the alleged
be provided by law." billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of
"paramount public interest," since it has a
The incorporation in the Constitution of a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that
guarantee of access to information of public would be greatly prejudicial to the national
concern is a recognition of the essentiality of interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people
the free flow of ideas and information in a in general have a right to know the transactions
democracy. In the same way that free or deals being contrived and effected by the
discussion enables members of society to government.
cope with the exigencies of their time, access Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny
to information of general interest aids the forging a compromise agreement with the Marcos
people in democratic decision-making by heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner's action
giving them a better perspective of the vital is premature, because there is no showing that
issues confronting the nation. he has asked the PCGG to disclose the
negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he
has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make
any disclosure, since the proposed terms and
conditions of the Agreements have not become
Chavez vs. PCGG effective and binding.
G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998,
PANGANIBAN, J.: ISSUE:
Whether or not this Court could require the
FACTS: PCGG to disclose to the public the details of any
Petitioner asks this Court to define the nature and agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses?
the extent of the people's constitutional right to
information on matters of public concern. Does HELD:
this right include access to the terms of
government negotiations prior to their First Substantive Issue:
consummation or conclusion? May the Public Disclosure of Terms of Any Agreement,
government, through the Presidential Perfected or Not
Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
be required to reveal the proposed terms of a In seeking the public disclosure of negotiations
compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs and agreements pertaining to a compromise
settlement with the Marcoses as regards their Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act 28) are also
alleged ill-gotten wealth, petitioner invokes the exempted from compulsory disclosure.
following provisions of the Constitution:
(3) Criminal Matters
Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the Also excluded are classified law enforcement
people to information on matters of matters, such as those relating to the
public concern shall be recognized. apprehension, the prosecution and the detention
Access to official records, and to of criminals, which courts may nor inquire into
documents, and papers pertaining to prior to such arrest, detention and prosecution.
official acts, transactions, or decisions, Efforts at effective law enforcement would be
as well as to government research data seriously jeopardized by free public access to, for
used as basis for policy development, example, police information regarding rescue
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to operations, the whereabouts of fugitives, or leads
such limitations as may be provided by on covert criminal activities.
law.
(4) Other Confidential Information
Sec. 28 [Article II]. Subject to The Ethical Standards Act further prohibits public
reasonable conditions prescribed by officials and employees from using or divulging
law, the State adopts and implements a "confidential or classified information officially
policy of full public disclosure of all its known to them by reason of their office and not
transactions involving public interest. made available to the public." Other
acknowledged limitations to information access
Respondents' opposite view is that the above include diplomatic correspondence, closed door
constitutional provisions refer to completed and Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of
operative official acts, not to those still being either house of Congress, as well as the internal
considered. As regards the assailed Agreements deliberations of the Supreme Court.
entered into by the PCGG with the Marcoses,
there is yet no right of action that has accrued, Scope: Matters of Public Concern and
because said Agreements have not been Transactions Involving Public Interest
approved by the President, and the Marcos heirs
have failed to fulfill their express undertaking In Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr., the Court
therein. Thus, the Agreements have not become emphasized that the information sought must be
effective. Respondents add that they are not "matters of public concern," access to which
aware of any ongoing negotiation for another may be limited by law. Similarly, the state policy
compromise with the Marcoses regarding their of full public disclosure extends only to
alleged ill-gotten assets. "transactions involving public interest" and
may also be "subject to reasonable conditions
The "information" and the "transactions" prescribed by law." As to the meanings of the
referred to in the subject provisions of the terms "PUBLIC INTEREST" and "PUBLIC
Constitution have as yet no defined scope and CONCERN," the Court, in Legaspi v. Civil
extent. Service Commission, elucidated:
There are no specific laws prescribing the In determining whether or not a

exact limitations within which the right may particular information is of public
be exercised or the correlative state duty may concern there is no rigid test which can
be obliged. However, the following are some be applied. "Public concern" like "public
of the recognized restrictions: interest" is a term that eludes exact
definition. Both terms embrace a
(1) national security matters and intelligence broad spectrum of subjects which
information the public may want to know, either
(2) trade secrets and banking transactions because these directly affect their
(3) criminal matters, and lives, or simply because such
(4) other confidential information. matters naturally arouse the interest
of an ordinary citizen. In the final
analysis, it is for the courts to determine
Limitations to the Right: on a case by case basis whether the
matter at issue is of interest or
(1) National Security Matters importance, as it relates to or affects the
At the very least, this jurisdiction recognizes the public.
common law holding that there is a governmental
privilege against public disclosure with respect to Considered a public concern in the above-
state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and mentioned case was the "legitimate concern of
other national security matters. But where there citizens to ensure that government positions
is no need to protect such state secrets, the requiring civil service eligibility are occupied
privilege may not be invoked to withhold only by persons who are eligibles." So was the
documents and other information, provided that need to give the general public adequate
they are examined "in strict confidence" and notification of various laws that regulate and
given "scrupulous protection." affect the actions and conduct of citizens, as held
Likewise, information on inter-government in Taada. Likewise did the "public nature of
exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public
executive agreements may be subject to office held by the alleged borrowers
reasonable safeguards for the sake of national (members of the defunct Batasang
interest. Pambansa)" qualify the information sought in
Valmonte as matters of public interest and
(2) Trade Secrets and Banking Transactions concern. In Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato, the
The drafters of the Constitution also Court also held that official acts of public
unequivocally affirmed that, aside from national officers done in pursuit if their official
security matters and intelligence information, functions are public in character; hence, the
trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the records pertaining to such official acts and
Intellectual Property Code and other related laws) decisions are within the ambit of the
as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the
constitutional right of access to public wealth" refers to assets and properties

records. purportedly acquired, directly or indirectly, by
former President Marcos, his immediate
Under Republic Act No. 6713, public officials family, relatives and close associates through
and employees are mandated to "provide or as a result of their improper or illegal use
information on their policies and procedures of government funds or properties; or their
in clear and understandable language, [and] having taken undue advantage of their public
ensure openness of information, public office; or their use of powers, influences or
consultations and hearings whenever relationships, "resulting in their unjust
appropriate . . .," except when "otherwise enrichment and causing grave damage and
provided by law or when required by the prejudice to the Filipino people and the
public interest." In particular, the law Republic of the Philippines." Clearly, the
mandates free public access, at reasonable assets and properties referred to supposedly
hours, to the annual performance reports of originated from the government itself. To all
offices and agencies of government and intents and purposes, therefore, they belong
government-owned or controlled to the people. As such, upon reconveyance they
corporations; and the statements of assets, will be returned to the public treasury, subject
liabilities and financial disclosures of all only to the satisfaction of positive claims of
public officials and employees. certain persons as may be adjudged by
competent courts. Another declared overriding
In general, writings coming into the hands of consideration for the expeditious recovery of ill-
public officers in connection with their official gotten wealth is that it may be used for national
functions must be accessible to the public, economic recovery.
consistent with the policy of transparency of
governmental affairs. This principle is aimed We believe the foregoing disquisition settles the
at affording the people an opportunity to question of whether petitioner has a right to
determine whether those to whom they have respondents' disclosure of any agreement that
entrusted the affairs of the government are may be arrived at concerning the Marcoses'
honesty, faithfully and competently purported ill-gotten wealth.
performing their functions as public servants.
Undeniably, the essence of democracy lies in
the free flow of thought; but thoughts and Access to Information on Negotiating Terms
ideas must be well-informed so that the
public would gain a better perspective of vital But does the constitutional provision likewise
issues confronting them and, thus, be able to guarantee access to information regarding
criticize as well as participate in the affairs of ongoing negotiations or proposals prior to
the government in a responsible, reasonable the final agreement? This same clarification
and effective manner. Certainly, it is by was sought and clearly addressed by the
ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited exchange constitutional commissioners during their
of ideas among a well-informed public that a deliberations, which we quote hereunder:
government remains responsive to the changes
desired by the people. MR. SUAREZ. And when we say
"transactions" which should be
distinguished from contracts,
The Nature of the Marcoses' Alleged Ill-Gotten agreements, or treaties or whatever,
Wealth does the Gentleman refer to the steps
leading to the consummation of the
Executive Order No. 1, promulgated on February contract, or does he refer to the contract
28, 1986, only two (2) days after the Marcoses itself?
fled the country, created the PCGG which was MR. OPLE. The "transactions" used
primarily tasked to assist the President in the here, I suppose, is generic and,
recovery of vast government resources allegedly therefore, it can cover both steps
amassed by former President Marcos, his leading to a contract, and already a
immediate family, relatives and close associates consummated contract, Mr. Presiding
both here and abroad. Officer.
MR. SUAREZ. This contemplates
Under Executive Order No. 2, issued twelve (12) inclusion of negotiations leading to the
days later, all persons and entities who had consummation of the transaction?
knowledge or possession of ill-gotten assets and MR. OPLE. Yes, subject to reasonable
properties were warned and, under pain of safeguards on the national interest.
penalties prescribed by law, prohibited from
concealing, transferring or dissipating them or Considering the intent of the Constitution, we
from otherwise frustrating or obstructing the believe that it is incumbent upon the PCGG
recovery efforts of the government. and its officers, as well as other government
On May 7, 1986, another directive (EO No. 14) representatives, to disclose sufficient public
was issued giving additional powers to the PCGG information on any proposed settlement they
which, taking into account the overriding have decided to take up with the ostensible
considerations of national interest and national owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such
survival, required it to achieve expeditiously and information, though, must pertain to definite
effectively its vital task of recovering ill-gotten propositions of the government, not
wealth. necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency
recommendations or communications during
With such pronouncements of our the stage when common assertions are still in
government, whose authority emanates from the process of being formulated or are in the
the people, there is no doubt that the "exploratory" stage. There is a need, of course,
recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of
wealth is a matter of public concern and information in general, as discussed earlier
imbued with public interest. We may also add such as on matters involving national security,
that "ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH," by its very diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and
nature, assumes a public character. Based on other classified information.
the aforementioned Executive Orders, "ill-gotten
employees, it does not mean that

Section 8 Right to Form Association because they have the right to
organize, they also have the right to
SSS Employees Association vs. Court of strike. That is a different matter. We are
Appeals only talking about organizing, uniting as a
GR 85279, July 28,1989 union. With regard to the right to strike,
everyone will remember that in the Bill of
FACTS: A complaint for damages was filed by Rights, there is a provision that the right
the SSS against the officers and members of the to form associations or societies whose
SSS Employees Association alleging that on purpose is not contrary to law shall not be
June 9, 1987, said officers and members staged abridged. Now then, if the purpose of the
an illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to state is to prohibit the strikes coming from
the SSS building. Said action prevented non- employees exercising government
striking employees from reporting for work and functions, that could be done because the
clients from transacting with the SSS. Said strike moment that is prohibited, then the union
was reported to the Public Sector Labor which will go on strike will be an illegal
Management Council that ordered the strikers to union. And that provision is carried in
return to work. Strikers refused consequently Republic Act 875. In Republic Act 875,
incurring damages for the SSS. workers, including those from the
government-owned and controlled, are
ISSUE: Whether or not SSS employees have allowed to organize but they are
the right to strike. prohibited from striking. So, the fear of
our honorable Vice-President is
HELD: NO. The 1987 Constitution, in the Article unfounded. It does not mean that
on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides because we approve this resolution, it
that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all carries with it the right to strike. That is a
workers to self-organization, collective bargaining different matter. As a matter of fact, that
and negotiations, and peaceful concerted subject is now being discussed in the
activities, including the right to strike in Committee on Social Justice because we
accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 3]. are trying to find a solution to this
problem. We know that this problem
By itself, this provision would seem to exists; that the moment we allow anybody
recognize the right of all workers and in the government to strike, then what will
employees, including those in the public happen if the members of the Armed
sector, to strike. But the Constitution itself Forces will go on strike? What will happen
fails to expressly confirm this impression, for to those people trying to protect us? So
in the Sub-Article on the Civil Service that is a matter of discussion in the
Commission, it provides, after defining the Committee on Social Justice. But, I
scope of the civil service as "all branches, repeat, the right to form an
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies organization DOES NOT CARRY with it
of the Government, including government- the right to strike. [Record of the
owned or controlled corporations with Constitutional Commission, vol. I, p. 569].
original charters," that "[t]he right to self-
organization shall not be denied to But are employees of the SSS covered by the
government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(1) prohibition against strikes?
and (50)]. Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights
also provides that "[t]he right of the people, The Court is of the considered view that they are.
including those employed in the public and Considering that under the 1987 Constitution
private sectors, to form unions, associations, "[t]he civil service embraces all branches,
or societies for purposes not contrary to law subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies
shall not abridged" [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, of the Government, including government-
while there is no question that the owned or controlled corporations with
Constitution recognizes the right of original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(1); see
government employees to organize, it is silent also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the
as to whether such recognition also includes employees in the civil service are
the right to strike. denominated as "government employees"]
and that the SSS is one such government-
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic controlled corporation with an original
law becomes helpful in understanding the charter, having been created under R.A. No.
meaning of these provisions. A reading of the 1161, its employees are part of the civil
proceedings of the Constitutional service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 &
Commission that drafted the 1987 70295, November 24, 1988] and are covered by
Constitution would show that in recognizing the Civil Service Commission's memorandum
the right of government employees to prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike
organize, the commissioners intended to limit staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
the right to the formation of unions or
associations only, without including the right The general rule in the past and up to the
to strike. present is that "the terms and conditions of
employment in the Government, including
Thus, Commissioner Eulogio R. Lerum, one of any political subdivision or instrumentality
the sponsors of the provision that "[t]he right to thereof are governed by LAW" (Section 11, the
self-organization shall not be denied to Industrial Peace Act, R.A. No. 875, as amended
government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(5)], in and Article 277, the Labor Code, P.D. No. 442,
answer to the apprehensions expressed by as amended). Since the terms and conditions
Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla, Vice- of government employment are fixed by law,
President of the Commission, explained: government workers cannot use the same
weapons employed by workers in the private
MR. LERUM. I think what I will try to say sector to secure concessions from their
will not take that long. When we employers.
proposed this amendment providing
for self-organization of government
The principle behind labor unionism in Management Council for appropriate action.
PRIVATE INDUSTRY is that industrial peace But employees in the civil service may not
cannot be secured through compulsion by resort to strikes, walkouts and other
law. Relations between private employers and temporary work stoppages, like workers in
their employees rest on an essentially the private sector, to pressure the
voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum Government to accede to their demands.
requirements of wage laws and other labor
and welfare legislation, the terms and
conditions of employment in the unionized
private sector are settled through the process
of collective bargaining.
Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union
In GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT, however, it GR 25246, Sept. 12,1974
is the legislature and, where properly given
delegated power, the administrative heads of FACTS: Appellee Benjamin Victoriano is a
government which fix the terms and member of "Iglesia ni Cristo", an employee of the
conditions of employment. And this is Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc, and a member of the
effected through statutes or administrative Elizalde Rope Workers' Union which had with the
circulars, rules, and regulations, not through Company a CBA containing a closed shop
collective bargaining agreements. provision which states that Membership in the
Union shall be required as a condition of
It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that employment for all permanent employees
BY REASON OF THE NATURE OF THE workers covered by this Agreement.
PUBLIC EMPLOYER and THE PECULIAR Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of RA 875, the
CHARACTER OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE, it employer was not precluded "from making an
must necessarily regard the right to strike agreement with a labor organization to require as
given to unions in private industry as not a condition of employment membership therein, if
applying to public employees and civil such labor organization is the representative of
service employees. It has been stated that the the employees." When RA 3350 was enacted, it
Government, in contrast to the private introduced an amendment: ... "but such
employer, protects the interest of all people in agreement shall not cover members of any
the public service, and that accordingly, such religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
conflicting interests as are present in private members in any such labor organization".
labor relations could not exist in the relations As a member of a sect that prohibits the affiliation
between government and those whom they of its members with any labor organization,
employ. appellee resigned from the Union. Thereafter, the
Union asked the Company to separate Appellee
E.O. No. 180, which provides guidelines for the from service in view of the fact that he was
exercise of the right to organize of government resigning from the Union as a member. Appellee
employees, while clinging to the same filed an action for injunction.
philosophy, has, however, relaxed the rule to
allow negotiation where the terms and conditions ISSUE: WON RA 3350 is unconstitutional since it
of employment involved are not among those infringes on the right to form lawful associations?
fixed by law. Thus:
HELD: No. RA 3350 does not infringe right to
SECTION 13. Terms and conditions of association. Both the Constitution and RA 875
employment or improvements thereof, recognize freedom of association. What the
except those that are fixed by law, may Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act
be the subject of negotiations between recognize and guarantee is the "right" to form
duly recognized employees' or join associations. a right comprehends at
organizations and appropriate least two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or
government authorities. freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint,
whereby an employee may act for himself
The same executive order has also without being prevented by law; and second,
provided for the general mechanism for power, whereby an employee may, as he
the settlement of labor disputes in the pleases, join or refrain from Joining an
public sector, to wit: association. It is, therefore, the employee who
should decide for himself whether he should
SECTION 16. The Civil Service and join or not an association; and should he
labor laws and procedures, whenever choose to join, he himself makes up his mind
applicable, shall be followed in the as to which association he would join; and
resolution of complaints, grievances and even after he has joined, he still retains the
cases involving government employees. liberty and the power to leave and cancel his
In case any dispute remains unresolved membership with said organization at any
after exhausting all the available time. It is clear, therefore, that the right to join
remedies under existing laws and a union includes the right to abstain from
procedures, the parties may jointly refer joining any union. Inasmuch as what both the
the dispute to the [Public Sector Labor- Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act have
Management] Council for appropriate recognized, and guaranteed to the employee, is
action. the "right" to join associations of his choice, it
would be absurd to say that the law also
Government employees may, therefore, imposes, in the same breath, upon the employee
through their unions or associations, either the duty to join associations.
petition the Congress for the betterment of The right to refrain from joining labor
the terms and conditions of employment orgs recognized by of the Industrial Peace Act is
which are within the ambit of legislation or limited. The legal protection granted to such
negotiate with the appropriate government right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by
agencies for the improvement of those which operation of law, where a union and an
are not fixed by law. If there be any employer have agreed on a closed shop. By
unresolved grievances, the dispute may be virtue, of a closed shop agreement, before RA
referred to the Public Sector Labor- 3350, if any person, regardless of his
religious beliefs, wishes to be employed or to

keep his employment, he must become a Integration does not make a lawyer a member
member of the collective bargaining union. of any group of which he is not already a
Hence, the right of said employee not to join member. He became a member of the Bar
the labor union is curtailed and withdrawn. To when he passed the Bar examinations. All
that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop that integration actually does is to provide an
arrangement, RA 3350 introduced an exception: official national organization for the well-
"but such agreement shall not cover defined but unorganized and incohesive
members of any religious sects which group of which every lawyer is already a
prohibit affiliation of their members in any member.
such labor organization". It merely excludes
ipso jure from the application and coverage of the Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to
closed shop agreement the employees belonging associate with anyone. He is free to attend or
to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar
their members with any labor organization. What Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
the exception provides, therefore, is that elections as he chooses. The only
members of said religious sects cannot be compulsion to which he is subjected is the
compelled or coerced to join labor unions even payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court,
when said unions have closed shop agreements in order to further the State's legitimate
with the employers; that in spite of any closed interest in elevating the quality of
shop agreement, members of said religious sects professional legal services, may require that
cannot be refused employment or dismissed from the cost of improving the profession in this
their jobs on the sole ground that they are not fashion be shared by the subjects and
members of the collective bargaining union. It is beneficiaries of the regulatory program the
clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from lawyers.
infringing the constitutional provision on
freedom of association, upholds and Assuming that the questioned provision does in a
reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the
of said RELIGIOUS SECTS from affiliating Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as
with labor unions. It still leaves to said an exercise of the police power of the state
members the liberty and the power to affiliate,
or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, The Court further maintains that said IBP fees is
notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the a regulatory measure intended to raise funds for
members of said religious sects prefer to sign up carrying out its objectives and purposes of the
with the labor union, they can do so. If in integration. The Court carries the constitutional
deference and fealty to their religious faith, they power and duty to promulgate rules that concern
refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does admissions and practice of law, including the
not coerce them to join; neither does the law integration of the Philippine Bar.
prohibit them from joining; and neither may
the employer or labor union compel them to
join. RA 3350, therefore, does not violate the Section 10 Non-Impairment Clause
constitutional provision on freedom of
association. Rutter vs. Esteban
G.R. No. L- 3708 May 18, 1953
In re: IBP membership dues delinquency of FACTS: On 20 August 1941, Royal L. Rutter sold
Atty Marcial Edillion to Placido J. Esteban two (2) parcels of land
A.C 1928, August 3 1978 situated in the City of Manila. To secure the
payment of said balance of P4,800, a first
FACTS: The IBP unanimously adopted a mortgage over the same parcels of land was
resolution commending to the SC to remove constituted in favor of Rutter. The deed of sale
Marcial Edillion, a duly licensed practising lawyer, having been registered, a new title was issued in
from the roll of attorneys because of his stubborn favor of Placido J. Esteban with the mortgage
refusal to pay his membership dues despite due duly annotated on the back thereof. Esteban
notice. Edillon refused to pay believing it to be an failed to pay the two installments as agreed upon,
invasion of his constitutional rights as he was as well as the interest that had accrued thereon,
being compelled to be a member of the IBP and and so on 2 August 1949, Rutter instituted an
to pay its dues was a precondition to maintaining action in the Court of First Instance (CFI) Manila
his status as a lawyer. to recover the balance due, the interest due
thereon, and the attorneys fees stipulated in the
ISSUE: Is compelling a lawyer to be a member contract. The complaint also contains a prayer for
of the IBP violating ones constitutional freedom the sale of the properties mortgaged in
to associate? accordance with law. Esteban admitted
averments of the complaint but set up defense on
HELD: No. The SC maintains that the IBP the moratorium clause embodied in RA 342
does not make a lawyer a member of any (approved 26 July 1948), allowing a war sufferer
group of which he is not already a member of. eight (8) years from the settlement of his claim by
By virtue of his passing the Bar exams, the Philippine War Damage Commission. After a
Edillon automatically becomes an IBP motion for summary judgment has been
member. presented by Esteban, and the requisite evidence
submitted covering the relevant facts, the court
The first objection posed by the respondent is rendered judgment dismissing the complaint
that the Court is without power to compel him to holding that the obligation which Rutter seeks to
become a member of the Integrated Bar of the enforce is not yet demandable under the
Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is moratorium law. Rutter filed a motion for
unconstitutional for it impinges on his reconsideration wherein he raised for the first
constitutional right of freedom to associate (and time the constitutionality of the moratorium law,
not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a but the motion was denied. Rutter appealed.
lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is
not violative of his constitutional freedom to ISSUE: Whether Republic Act 342 is
associate. unconstitutional for being violative of the
constitutional provision forbidding the impairment maintains that the area along the western part of
of the obligation of contracts? EDSA from Shaw Blvd. to Pasig River, where the
lots were located, has been declared a
HELD: YES. Statutes declaring a moratorium on commercial and industrial zone per Resolution 27
the enforcement of monetary obligations are not of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong. So, it
of recent enactment. Moratorium laws have been started constructing a bank on the lots. Plaintiff
adopted during times of financial distress, demanded that Feati stop its construction. The
especially when incident to, or caused by, a war. latter refused, arguing that the building was in
The Moratorium Law is a valid exercise by the accordance with the zoning regulations and it had
State of its police power, being an emergency obtained building and planning permits.
measure. Although conceding that the Plaintiff sought the help of the court to command
obligations of the contract were impaired, the Feati to comply with the restrictions annotated in
impairment was within the police power of the its title. The trial court held that the
State as that power was called into exercise restrictions were subordinate to the
by the public economic emergency which the Resolution, which was a valid exercise of
legislature had found to exist. police power. It upheld the classification by
The true test, therefore, of the the Municipal Council as having rendered
constitutionality of a moratorium statute lies ineffective the restrictions. But plaintiff, in a
in the determination of THE PERIOD OF motion for reconsideration which was
SUSPENSION OF THE REMEDY. It is required subsequently denied, argued that said Council
that such suspension be definite and had no power to nullify the contractual obligations
reasonable, otherwise it would be violative of assumed by Feati.
the constitution.
Herein, obligations had been pending ISSUE: Whether the Municipal Resolution,
since 1945 as a result of the issuance of declaring the lots as part of the commercial and
Executive Orders 25 and 32 and at present their industrial zone of the municipality, superseded
enforcement is still inhibited because of the the restrictions imposed by Ortigas, which
enactment of Republic Act 342 and would was a contractual undertaking between the
continue to be unenforceable during the 8-year parties to the sale
period granted to prewar debtors to afford them
an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which HELD: YES! The Local Autonomy Act
in plain language means that the creditors empowers a Municipal Council to adopt
would have to observe a vigil of at least 12 zoning and subdivision ordinances or
years before they could effect a liquidation of regulations for the municipality. Granting that
their investment dating as far back as 1941. the Resolution is not an ordinance, it is a
This period seems to be unreasonable, if not regulatory measure. The general welfare clause
oppressive. is liberally interpreted in case of doubt to give
While the purpose of Congress is more power to local governments in promoting its
plausible, and should be commended, the economic conditions, the social welfare and
relief accorded works injustice to creditors material progress of the people in the community.
who are practically left at the mercy of the The exceptions are existing vested rights
debtors. Their hope to effect collection becomes arising out of a contract between a province,
extremely remote, more so if the credits are city or municipality on one hand and a 3rd
unsecured. And the injustice is more patent party on the other, in which case, the original
when, under the law, the debtor is not even terms and provisions of the contract should
required to pay interest during the operation govern. While non-impairment of contracts is
of the relief. Thus, the Court declared that the constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute
continued operation and enforcement of Republic since it has to be reconciled with the
Act 342 at the present time is unreasonable and legitimate exercise of police power. The
oppressive, and should not be prolonged a exercise of this power may be judicially
minute longer, and the same should be declared inquired into and corrected only if it is
null and void and without effect. This also holds capricious, whimsical, unjust or
true as regards Executive Orders 25 and 32, unreasonable, there having been a denial of
considering that said Orders contain no limitation due process or violation of applicable
whatsoever in point of time as regards the constitutional guarantees.
suspension of the enforcement and effectivity of The Resolution was passed in the
monetary obligations. This pronouncement is exercise of police power to safeguard or
most especially needed in view of the revival promote the health, safety, peace, good order
clause embodied in said Act if and when it is and general welfare of the people in the
declared unconstitutional or invalid. locality. The lots in question not only front the
highway; industrial and commercial
complexes have flourished about the place.
EDSA was a main traffic artery. The resulting
Ortigas and Co. Ltd. Partnership vs. Feati activity, noise and pollution are hardly
Bank and Trust Co. conducive to the health, safety or welfare of
GR 24670, Dec. 14, 1979 the residents in its route. The right to exercise
the police power is a continuing one and a
FACTS: Plaintiff Ortigas was engaged in the business lawful today may in the future, because
business of developing and selling residential lots of changed situation/ growth of population,
in Highway Hills Subdivision, Mandaluyong. It become a menace to the public health and
sold to vendees Padilla and Angeles two lots welfare, and be required to yield to the public
(Lots 5 and 6) in installments under separate good.
agreements of sale. The vendees transferred The State, to promote the general
their rights to Chavez. Upon completion of welfare, may interfere with personal liberty,
payment, plaintiff executed the deeds of sale property, business and occupations. The
which contained a restriction, inter alia, that the Resolution was reasonable, a legitimate
lots shall be used by the buyer exclusively for response to a felt public need, not whimsical or
residential purposes. The restriction was oppressive. The non-impairment of contracts
annotated in the titles of Chavez. Defendant Feati clause will not bar a police power legislation,
bought from her the lots and the building which is not likely to succumb to the
restrictions were also annotated in its titles. Feati
challenge that because of it, contractual Estate Mortgage executed between Randolph
rights are rendered nugatory. Tajanlangit and Esteban Tajanlangit as
Existing laws are read into contracts mortgagors on one hand and Rodolfo Ganzon as
agreed upon by the parties to fix obligations mortgagee on the other hand was to secure the
between them. The reservation of essential payment by the Tajanlangits of a promissory note
attributes of sovereign power is also read intro amounting to P40,000.00 in favor of Ganzon.
contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The
policy of protecting contracts against Thereafter, petitioner Gregorio Lira, in his
impairments presupposes the maintenance of capacity as ex-oficio provincial sheriff of Iloilo
a government by virtue of which contractual served personal notice of the foreclosure
relations are worthwhile a government, which proceedings on the private respondents. A day
retains adequate authority to secure the before the scheduled public auction, the private
peace and good order of society. The law respondents filed a civil action for specific
forms part of, and is read into every contract performance, damages, and prohibition with
unless clearly excluded therefrom in those cases preliminary injunction against the petitioners with
allowed. the respondent court. The action, sought to
Equity will not enforce a restriction upon declare the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings
the use of property by injunction where the and all proceedings taken in connection therewith
property has so changed in character and null and void. The trial court issued an order
environment as to make it unfit or unprofitable for enjoining the provincial sheriff from proceeding
use should the restriction be enforced. Since it is with the scheduled auction sale.
now unprofitable and a health-and-comfort
hazard to use lots 5 and 6 for strictly residential Before actual trial, the private respondents filed a
purposes, Feati should be permitted, on the "Motion For Release Of Real Estate And For The
strength of the Resolution, to use the same for Clerk Of Court To Accept Bond Or Cash In Lieu
commercial purposes. There is no proviso in the Thereof," to which the petitioners interposed an
Resolution expressly declaring that the ordinance Opposition. The respondent court granted the
was not intended to interfere with the agreement respondents' motion.
between the parties. Thus, even if the
restrictions where assumed by Feati, the Issue: Whether or not the trial court may order
contractual undertaking cannot be enforced the cancellation of a mortgage lien annotated in a
as against the police power legislation. Torrens Certificate of Title to secure the payment
of a promissory note and substitute such
mortgage lien with a surety bond approved by the
LOZANO vs. THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. same court to secure the payment of the
MARTINEZ promissory note?
G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986, YAP, J
Held: No. The questioned court orders violate
Facts: -supra- the non-impairment of contracts clause
guaranteed under the Constitution. Substitution
Issue: Whether or not BP 22 impairs freedom of of the mortgage with a surely bond to secure the
contract? payment of the P40.000.00 note would in effect
change the terms and conditions of the mortgage
Held: No. The gravamen of the offense punished contract. Even before trial on the very issues
by B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing a affecting the contract, the respondent court has
worthless check or a check that is dishonored directed a deviation from its terms, diminished its
upon its presentation for payment. It is not the efficiency and dispensed with a primary
non-payment of an obligation which the law condition.
punishes. The law is not intended or designed A mortgage is but an accessory contract. The
to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust consideration of the mortgage is the same
of the law is to prohibit, under pain of consideration of the principal contract
sanctions, the making of worthless checks without which it cannot exist as an
and putting them is circulation. Because of its independent contract. The mortgage lien in
deleterious effects on the public interest, the favor of petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon is
practice is proscribed by the law. The law inseparable from the mortgaged property. It is
punishes the act not as an offense against a right in rem, a lien on the property. To
property, but an offense against public order. substitute the mortgage with a surety bond
The freedom of contract which is would convert such lien from a right in rem,
constitutionally protected is freedom to enter to a right in personam. This conversion can
into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which not be ordered for it would abridge the rights
contravene public policy are not lawful. We of the mortgagee under the mortgage
must bear in mind that checks can not be contract.
categorized as mere contracts. It is a
commercial instrument which, in this modern Moreover, the questioned orders violate the
day and age, has become a convenient non-impairment of contracts clause
substitute for money; it form part of the guaranteed under the Constitution.
banking system and therefore not entirely Substitution of the mortgage with a surety
free from the regulatory power of the state. bond to secure the payment of the P40,000.00
note would in effect change the terms and
conditions of the mortgage contract. Even
before trial on the very issues affecting the
RODOLFO T. GANZON vs. THE HONORABLE contract, the respondent court has directed a
SANCHO Y. INSERTO deviation from its terms, diminished its efficiency,
G.R. No. L-56450. July 25, 1983, GUTIERREZ, and dispensed with a primary condition
JR., J
Facts: Petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon initiated

proceedings to extra-judicially foreclose a real
estate mortgage executed by the private
respondents in his favor. The Deed of Real
CRISTOPHER GAMBOA vs. HON. ALFREDO FACTS: The accused appellant was charged
CRUZ with the crime of robbery with homicide. Accused
G.R. No. L-56291. June 27, 1988,PADILLA, J and his brother was suddenly apprehended by
the security guards and brought to the police
Facts: On July 19, 1979, he was arrested for headquarters in Quezon City. They were also
vagrancy, without a warrant of arrest, by forced to admit certain things, after which, he
Patrolman Arturo Palencia. Thereafter, petitioner together with all the accused were in handcuffs
was brought to Precinct 2, Manila, where he was bore contusions caused by blows indicted on
booked for vagrancy and then detained therein their faces during custodial investigation.
together with several others.The following day, Thereafter, they was brought to hospital before
July 20,1979, during the lineup of five (5) each surviving victims and made to line-up for
detainees, including petitioner, complainant identification.
Erlinda B. Bernal pointed to petitioner and said,
"that one is a companion." After the identification, ISSUE: Whether or not the right to counsel has
the other detainees were brought back to their been violated during custodial investigation.
cell but petitioner was ordered to stay on. While
the complainant was being interrogated by the RULING: Yes. It is appropriate to extend
police investigator, petitioner was told to sit down the counsel guarantee to critical stages of
in front of her. prosecution even before the trial. The law
On July 23, 1979, an information for robbery was enforcement machinery at present involves
filed against the petitioner. critical confrontations of the accused by the
On August 22, 1979, petitioner was arraigned. prosecution at pre-trial proceedings "where the
Thereafter, hearings were held. On April 2, 1980, result might well settle the accused's fate and
the prosecution formally offered its evidence and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality." A police
then rested its case. line-up is considered a "critical" stage of the
On July 14, 1980, petitioner, by counsel, instead proceedings. After the start of the custodial
of presenting his defense, manifested in open investigation, any identification of an
court that he was filing a Motion to Acquit or uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is
Demurrer to Evidence. On August 13, 1980, inadmissible.
petitioner filed said Motion predicated on the
ground that the conduct of the line-up, without
notice to, and in the absence of, his counsel
violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to
due process.
Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of

petitioners constitutional right to counsel?
Ruling: No. The right to counsel attaches upon

the start of an investigation, i.e. when the
investigating officer starts to ask questions to
elicit information and/or confessions or
admissions from the respondent/accused. At
such point or stage, the person being
interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid
the pernicious practice of extorting false or
coerced admissions or confessions from the lips
of the person undergoing interrogation, for the
commission of an offense.
The Court has consistently held that no custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in
the presence of counsel, engaged by the person
arrested, or by any person in his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the
detainee himself or by anyone in his behalf, and People vs. Judge Ayson
that, while the right may be waived, the waiver 175 SCRA 216, Narvasa, J.
shall not be valid unless made in writing and in
the presence of counsel. Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of
As aptly observed, however, by the Solicitor the Philippines Airlines assigned at its Baguio
General, the police line-up was not part of the station. It was alleged that he was involved in
custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet irregularities in the sales of a plane tickets, The
entitled, at such stage, to counsel. When the PAL notified him of an investigation to be
process had not yet shifted from the investigatory conducted. The investigation was scheduled in
to the accusatory as when police investigation accordance with PALs code of conduct. A letter
does not elicit a confession the accused may not was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to
yet avail of the services of his lawyer. Since settle the amount. Two months after a crime of
petitioner in the course of his identification in the Estafa was charged against Ramos. Evidence
police line-up had not yet been held to answer for was presented by the prosecution containing
a criminal offense, he was, therefore, not Ramos admission and statement, to which
deprived of his right to be assisted by counsel defendants argued that the confession was
because the accusatory process had not yet set taken without the accused being represented by
in. The police could not have violated petitioner's a lawyer and right to remain silent.
right to counsel and due process as the
confrontation between the State and him had not Issue: Whether or not right to custodial
begun. investigation has been violated.
Held: NO. The rights above specified, to

repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations," or
People vs. Macam "in-custody interrogation of accused persons." As
238 SCRA 306,Quiason, J. the Court has already stated, by custodial
interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been truly be said that the person has been "informed"
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his of his rights.
freedom of action in any significant way."It is Furthermore, the accused was not assisted by
avowedly derived from the decision of the U.S. counsel and his alleged waiver was made without
Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, a decision the assistance of counsel. The record of the case
described as an "earthquake in the world of law is also replete with evidence which was not
enforcement." satisfactorily rebutted by the prosecution, that the
Section 20 states that whenever any person is accused was maltreated and tortured for seven
"under investigation for the commission of an (7) solid hours before he signed the prepared
offense"-- extra-judicial confession.
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right,
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiates the free will shall be
used against him; and
3) any confession obtained in violation of x x
(these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the
procedural safeguards laid down for a person in
police custody, "in-custody interrogation" being
regarded as the commencement of an adversary
proceeding against the suspect.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENNY DY

G.R. No. 74517, February 23, 1988, MELENCIO-
HERRERA, J.
Facts: Felled by a gunshot wound on the neck,

which caused his death approximately, was
Christian Langel y Philippe, a Swiss tourist who
was vacationing on the Boracay Island together
with his sister and some friends. A police report
was entered in the police blotter of the Malay
Police Sub-station, Malay, Aklan. Suspect Benny
Dy voluntarily surrendered to the sub-station
People vs Pinlac commander with his caliber 38.
165 SCRA 674, PARAS, J. Acting on the report, Chief of Police
Tambong prepared a Complaint charging the
Facts: Accused Ronilo Pinlac y Libao was Accused, Benny Dy, the owner of "Benny's Bar"
charged in two (2) separate information. The trial situated on the Island, with the crime of Murder
court found the accused guilty. Hence the With the Use of Unlicensed firearms.
automatic review. According to Pinlac, at about After trial, the lower Court find the
2:00 P.M., April 9, 1986, three (3) Policemen, accused guilty of the crime of Murder. Hence, this
came to his house in Taguig and arrested the appeal.
accused for robbing Mr. Sato and for killing Mr.
Osamu, without any Warrant of Arrest shown to Issue Whether the trial court erred in holding
him despite his demand. Before he was brought that compliance with the constitutional procedure
first to the houses of Mr. Sato and Mr. Osamu, on custodial interrogation is not applicable in the
they walked him around and showed him the case.
destroyed window; and thereafter brought him
inside the house. In short, he was ordered to Held: No. The case history and the
reenact according to what the police theorized documentary evidence attest strongly to
how the crime was committed. It was at this Appellant's oral confession and voluntary
moment that the prints of the sole of accused's surrender. The sworn Complaint for
shoes were all over the premises of Osamu and "Murder with Use of Unlicensed Firearm" signed
Sato's houses. That during the investigation at by the Chief of Police also attests to Appellant's
the Police Headquarters, he was tortured and oral confession.That Complaint forms part of the
forced to admit the crimes charged. record of the proceedings before the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga, Aklan, and is
Issue:Is the constitutional right of the accused prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
Pinlac under custodial investigation to be The fact of Appellant's surrender is further borne
informed of his right to remain silent and to out by the Order of the Municipal Circuit Trial
counsel complied with? Court Judge, categorically reciting that "no
warrant of arrest is issued for the apprehension
Held: NO. The right must be presumed to of the accused for the reason that he is already
contemplate the transmission of meaningful under police custody before the filing of the
information rather than just the ceremonial and complaint."
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional Contrary to the defense contention, the
principle. As a rule, therefore, it would not be oral confession made by the accused to Pat.
sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the Padilla that he had shot a tourist and that the gun
person under investigation the provisions of the he had used in shooting the victim was in his bar
Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell the which he wanted surrendered to the Chief of
person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he Police is competent evidence against him. The
must also explain their effects in practical terms. declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt
The right of a person under interrogation "to be of the offense charged may be given in evidence
informed" implies a correlative obligation on the against him (See. 29, Rule 130, Rules of Court).
part of the police investigator to explain, and It may in a sense be also regarded as part of the
contemplates an effective communication that res gestae. The rule is that, any person,
results in understanding what is conveyed. Short otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the
of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot confession, is competent to testify as to the
substance of what he heard if he heard and
understood all of it. An oral confession need not and in the presence of counsel. In the case at
be repeated verbatim, but in such a case it must bar, the records show that the prosecution utterly
be given in substance. What was told by the failed to discharge this burden.
Accused to Pat, Padilla was a spontaneous
statement not elicited through questioning, but
given an ordinary manner. No written confession
was sought to be presented in evidence as a
result of formal custodial investigation.
INOCENCIO BASCO vs. JUDGE LEO H.

RAPATALO
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1335. March 5, 1997,
ROMERO, J.
Since the determination of whether or not the

evidence of guilt against the accused is strong is
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARNEL a matter of judicial discretion, the judge is
ALICANDO y BRIONES mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases
G.R. No. 117487, December 12, 1995, PUNO, J. where the prosecution chooses to just file a
comment or leave the application for bail to the
Facts: The appelant Arnel Alicando was charged discretion of the court.
with the crime of rape with homicide against the
person of a minor Khazie Mae Penecilla (four Facts: The complainant Inocencio Basco, father
years old). Alicando was arrested and of the victim, charged respondent Judge Leo M.
interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan. He verbally Rapatalo of RTC, Branch 32, Agoo, La Union
confessed his guilt without the assistance of with gross ignorance or willful disregard of
counsel. On the basis of his uncounselled verbal established rule of law for granting bail to an
confession and follow up interrogations, the accused Roger Morente in a murder case without
police came to know and recovered from receiving evidence and conducting a hearing.
appellant's house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a In his comment, respondent Judge
pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow alleged that he granted the petition based on the
and a stained T-shirt all of which were presented prosecutor's option not to oppose the petition as
as evidence for the prosecution. well as the latter's recommendation setting the
The appellant was arraigned and bailbond in the amount of P80,000.00. He
pleaded guilty. The trial court found appellant averred that when the prosecution chose not to
guilty and sentenced him to death. The case is oppose the petition for bail, he had the discretion
on automatic review considering the death on whether to approve it or not.
penalty imposed by the trial court.
Issue: Whether a petition for bail can be granted
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in without conducting a hearing.
convicting the accused.
Held: No. When the grant of bail is
Held: Yes. Some prosecution evidence, discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of
offered independently of the plea of guilt of the showing that the evidence of guilt against the
appellant, were inadmissible, yet, were accused is strong. However, the determination of
considered by the trial court in convicting the whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong,
appellant. It is now familiar learning that the being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with
Constitution has stigmatized as inadmissible the judge. "This discretion by the very nature of
evidence uncounselled confession or admission things, may rightly be exercised only after the
as provided under Section 12 paragraphs (1) and evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing.
(3) of Article III of the Constitution. It is not only Since the discretion is directed to the weight of
the uncounselled confession that is condemned the evidence and since evidence cannot properly
as inadmissible, but also evidence derived be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced
therefrom. The pillow and the T-shirt with the before the court, it is obvious that a proper
alleged bloodstains were evidence derived from exercise of judicial discretion requires that the
the uncounselled confession illegally extracted by evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the
the police from the appellant. petitioner having the right of cross examination
The Court have not only and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal."
constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our Consequently, in the application for bail
jurisdiction. They have also adopted the of a person charged with a capital offense
libertarian exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
the poisonous tree". According to this rule, once imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or
the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have otherwise in the discretion of the court, must
been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or actually be conducted to determine whether or
derivative evidence (the " fruit " ) derived from it is not the evidence of guilt against the accused is
also inadmissible. The rule is based on the strong. If a party is denied the opportunity to be
principle that evidence illegally obtained by the heard, there would be a violation of procedural
State should not be used to gain other evidence due process.
because the originally illegally obtained evidence A hearing is likewise required if the
taints all evidence subsequently obtained. prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in
The burden to prove that an accused opposition to the application to grant and fix bail.
waived his right to remain silent and the right to Corollarily, another reason why hearing of a
counsel before making a confession under petition for bail is required is for the court to take
custodial interrogation rests with the prosecution. into consideration the guidelines set forth in
It is also the burden of the prosecution to show Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in fixing
that the evidence derived from confession is not the amount of bail. The absence of
tainted as "fruit of the poisonous tree." The objection from the prosecution is never a basis
burden has to be discharged by clear and for granting bail to the accused. It is the court's
convincing evidence. Indeed, par. 1 of Section 12 determination after a hearing that the guilt of the
of Article III of the Constitution provides only one accused is not strong that forms the basis for
mode of waiver the waiver must be in writing granting bail.
Facts: The conviction of Agustin Fortes for the

rape of a 13-year old sixth grade pupil and the
denial by the trial court of his application for bail
People vs. Donato pending his appeal from the judgment of
G.R. No. 79269, June 5, 1991,Davide, Jr., J. conviction are questioned in these consolidated
cases.
Facts: In the criminal case filed with the Regional In G.R. No. 90643, the accused appeals from the
Trial Court of Manila, private respondent Salas decision of the Regional Trial Court. The court a
and his co-accused were charged for the crime of quo, in its Decision, found the accused guilty
rebellion under Article 134, in relation to Article beyond reasonable doubt of rape and sentenced
135 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). At the him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
time the Information was filed, Salas and his co- perpetua and pay the victim the sum of
accused were in military custody following their P20,000.00.
arrest. A day after the filing of the original In G.R. No. 91155, the subject matter we are
information, a petition for habeas corpus for concerned with, the accused seeks to annul and
Salas and his co-accused was filed with the set aside two related orders of the said trial court
Supreme Court which was dismissed in the denying his application for bail, filed after his
Courts Resolution on the basis of the agreement conviction, to secure his provisional liberty
of the parties under which Salas "will remain in pending the resolution of his appeal.
legal custody and will face trial before the court
having custody over his person" and the warrants Issue: Whether or not before conviction by final
for the arrest of his co-accused are deemed judgment, the accused enjoys the constitutional
recalled and they shall be immediately released presumption of innocence, and is therefore
but shall submit themselves to the court having entitled to bail as a matter of right
jurisdiction over their person.Salas filed with the
trial court a Motion to Quash the Information. Ruling: No. It is clear from Section 13, Article III
Respondent Judge denied the motion to quash. of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114
Subsequently, Salas filed a petition for bail, which of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that:
herein petitioner opposed on the ground that . . . before conviction, bail is either a matter of
since rebellion became a capital offense under right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when
the provisions of Presidential Decrees (PD), the offense charged is punishable by any penalty
which amended Article 135 of the RPC, by lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to right is absolute.
death on those who promote, maintain, or head a xxx xxx xxx
rebellion so the accused is no longer entitled to Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is
bail as evidence of his guilt is strong. punishable by reclusion perpetua, bail becomes a
On 5 June 1987, the President issued an matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the
Executive Order (EO) repealing, among others, evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion
the PDs and restoring to full force and effect is limited to determining whether or not evidence
Article 135 of the RPC. Thus, the original penalty of guilt is strong. But once it is determined that
for rebellion, prision mayor and a fine not to the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also
exceed P20,000.00, was restored. becomes a matter of right. . . .
Issue: Whether or not the right to bail may, under The clear implication, therefore is that if an
certain circumstances, be denied to a person accused who is charged with a crime punishable
who is charged with a bailable offense by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial
court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail
Held: Yes. Bail cannot be denied to Salas for he is neither a matter of right on the part of the
is charged with the crime of rebellion as defined accused nor of discretion on the part of the court.
in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code to which In such a situation, the court would not have only
is attached the penalty of prision mayor and a determined that the evidence of guilt is strong
fine not exceeding P20,000.00. It is, therefore, a which would have been sufficient to deny bail
bailable offense under Section 13 of Article III of even before conviction it would have likewise
the 1987 Constitution which provides thus: All ruled that the accused's guilt has been proven
persons, except those charged with offenses beyond reasonable doubt. Bail must not then be
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence granted to the accused during the pendency of
of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be his appeal from the judgment of conviction.
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on In the instant case, the rape for which the
recognizance as may be prescribed by law. The accused was indicted is punishable by reclusion
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the perpetua pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is Penal Code; he was convicted therefor and
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. subsequently sentenced to serve that penalty. It
Salas has, however, waived his right to bail in the is thus evident that the trial court correctly denied
criminal case. In agreeing to remain in legal his application for bail during the pendency of the
custody even during the pendency of the trial of appeal.
his criminal case, he has expressly waived his
right to bail.This Court has recognized waivers of
constitutional rights such as, for example, the Comendador vs. De Villa
right against unreasonable searches and G.R. No. 93177, August 2, 1991, Cruz, J.
seizures; the right to counsel and to remain
silent; and the right to be heard. The only Facts: These four cases have been consolidated
limitation to the waiver of right to bail is that because they involve practically the same parties
provide in Art. 6 of the Civil Code. Rights may be and related issues arising from the same
waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, incident.
public order, public policy, morals, or good The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948
customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a and the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020
right recognized by law. and 97454 are officers of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines facing prosecution for their
People vs. Fortes alleged participation in the failed coup d' etat that
G.R. No. 90643, June 25, 1993, Davide, JR., J. took place on December 1 to 9, 1989.

In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition granting bail, and that denying reconsideration
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, they are thereof, became the subject of a petition for
questioning the conduct of the Pre-Trial certiorari filed by the prosecution and were
Investigation (PTI) Panel constituted to subsequently annulled and set aside by CA. The
investigate the charges against them and the private complainant filed a motion for respondent
creation of the General Court Martial (GCM) judge to inhibit himself from the case.
convened to try them. Respondent judge denied the motion to inhibit
In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners, besides and later also denied the motion for
challenging the legality of GCM No. 14, reconsideration. To support and justify his grant
seek certiorari against its ruling denying them the of bail to the accused, respondent judge avers
right to peremptory challenge as granted by that time was of the essence, considering that the
Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408. accused had been detained since October 21,
In G.R. No. 95020, the subject matter we are 1991 and that the prosecution failed to interpose
concerned with, the orders of the respondent an objection to the granting of bail and to ask for
judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City an opportunity to prove the strength of the
are assailed on certiorari on the ground that he evidence of guilt against the accused.
has no jurisdiction over GCM No. 14 and no
authority either to set aside its ruling denying bail Issue: Whether or not respondent judge was
to the private respondents. justified in his grant of bail to the accused.
Issue: Whether or not the right to bail invoked by Held: While the determination of whether or not
the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of
traditionally not been recognized and is not judicial discretion, this discretion may be
available in the military, as an exception to the exercised only after evidence is submitted to the
general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights court. The prosecution must be given an
opportunity to present, within a reasonable time,
Held: Yes. The right to bail invoked by the private all the evidence that it may desire to introduce
respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally before the court may resolve the motion for bail.
not been recognized and is not available in the If the prosecution should be denied such an
military, as an exception to the general rule opportunity, there would be a violation of
embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a procedural due process, and the order of the
speedy trial is given more emphasis in the court granting bail should be considered void on
military where the right to bail does not exist. The that ground. Even if the prosecution refuses to
unique structure of the military should be enough adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection
reason to exempt military men from the to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the
constitutional coverage on the right to bail. court to conduct a hearing or ask searching and
National security considerations should also clarificatory questions from which it may infer the
impress upon this Honorable Court that release strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it,
on bail of respondents constitutes a damaging against the accused.
precedent. The obstinate persistence of respondent judge in
The argument that denial from the posturing that he did conduct a hearing is belied
military of the right to bail would violate the equal by the fact that the order granting bail leaves
protection clause is not acceptable. This guaranty much to be desired. It does not contain the
requires equal treatment only of persons or requisite summary of the evidence presented by
things similarly situated and does not apply the parties and necessary to support the grant of
where the subject of the treatment is substantially bail.
different from others. The accused officers can
complain if they are denied bail and other
members of the military are not. But they cannot
say they have been discriminated against
because they are not allowed the same right that
is extended to civilians. MANOTOC V. CA
G.R. No. L-62100, May 30, 1986, Fernan, J.
Facts: Petitioner Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is one

of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular
Management, Inc., where he acts as president
BAYLON V. SISON and the Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock
A.M. No. 92-7-360-0, April 6, 1995, Regalado, J. brokerage house. Together with his co-
stockholders, he filed a petition with the
Facts: The Office of the City Prosecutor in Securities and Exchange Commission for the
Dagupan City filed an information for double appointment of a management committee for the
murder against several accused and thereafter aforesaid companies, which petition was granted.
raffled to respondent judge. The accused filed a Pending disposition of the SEC case, SEC
petition for reinvestigation which was granted by requested the then Commissioner of Immigration
the trial court. During the reinvestigation, the not to clear petitioner for departure and a
accused filed a petition for bail on a Saturday, memorandum to this effect was issued. When a
and requested that it be set for hearing the Torrens title submitted to and accepted by
immediately following Monday. On this latter Manotoc Securities, Inc. was suspected to be
date, the prosecution filed an opposition to the fake, six of its clients filed six separate criminal
petition for bail alleging, among others, that the complaints against petitioner and the vice-
information was filed on the bases of the sworn president of Manotoc Securities, Inc.
statements of several eyewitnesses to the Corresponding criminal charges for estafa were
incident which constitutes clear and strong filed and in all cases, petitioner was admitted to
evidence of the guilt of all the accused. bail. Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts
Nevertheless, a hearing on the petition was a motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave
purportedly held by the trial court and bail was the country," stating as ground therefor his desire
granted for the provisional liberty of each of the to go to the United States, "relative to his
accused. A motion for reconsideration was filed business transactions and opportunities." The
by the prosecution but the same was denied by prosecution opposed said motion and both trial
respondent judge. Significantly, the orders judges denied the same. Petitioner likewise wrote
the Immigration Commissioner requesting the Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of
withdrawal of the latter's memorandum, but said his constitutional right to due process.
request was denied. Petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus before the CA seeking Held: The long delay in the termination of the
to annul the orders of the trial courts. CA denied preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan is
the petition. Petitioner filed the instant petition for violative of the constitutional right of the accused
review on certiorari. Petitioner filed a motion for to due process. Substantial adherence to the
leave to go abroad pendente lite, but the Court requirements of the law governing the conduct of
denied said motion. Petitioner contends that preliminary investigation, including substantial
having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, compliance with the time limitation prescribed by
neither the courts which granted him bail nor the the law for the resolution of the case by the
Securities and Exchange Commission which has prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process
no jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent him constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental
from exercising his constitutional right to travel. law. It has been suggested that the long delay in
terminating the preliminary investigation should
Issue: Does a person facing a criminal indictment not be deemed fatal, for even the complete
and provisionally released on bail have an absence of a preliminary investigation does not
unrestricted right to travel? warrant dismissal of the information. True-but the
absence of a preliminary investigation can be
Held: No. The object of bail is to relieve the corrected by giving the accused such
accused of imprisonment and the state of the investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct
burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at of a preliminary investigation can not be
the same time, to put the accused as much under corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented
the power of the court as if he were in custody of a device for setting back time.
the proper officer, and to secure the appearance
of the accused so as to answer the call of the
court and do what the law may require of him.
The condition imposed upon petitioner to make
himself available at all times whenever the court
requires his presence operates as a valid
restriction on his right to travel. To allow the
accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the
Philippines would render nugatory the courts'
orders and processes and inasmuch as the
jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued GALMAN vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
does not extend beyond that of the Philippines GR 72670, Sept. 12, 1986
they would have no binding force outside of said
jurisdiction. Indeed, if the accused were allowed Facts: On October 22, 1983, then President
to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, Marcos created a Fact-Finding Board to
he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts. investigate the assassination of Ninoy Aquino.
The minority and majority reports of the Board
both agreed that Rolando Galman was not the
assassin but was merely a fall guy of the military
which plotted the assassination itself. The
TATAD V. SANDIGANBAYAN minority report tags 26 persons, headed by
G.R. No. 72335-39, March 21, 1988, Yap, J. General Ver, as respondents to the case. Marcos
rejected the reports of the Board and stuck to his
Facts: Complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, claim that it was Galman who killed Aquino.
originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Thereafter, Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan
Legal Panel of PSC on October 1974, containing acquitted the respondents of the crime charged,
charges of alleged violations of RA No. 3019 declaring them innocent and totally absolving
against then Secretary of Public Information them of any civil liability. In this petition,
Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to Petitioners Saturnina Galman, wife of the late
"sleep" in the office of the PSC until December Rolando Galman, and 29 others filed the present
1979, when the 1974 complaint was resurrected action alleging that respondent courts committed
in the form of a formal complaint filed with the serious irregularities constituting mistrial and
Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross
complaint in April 1980 by referring the complaint violation of the constitutional rights of the
to the CIS, PSC, for investigation and report. In sovereign people of the Philippines to due
June 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the process of law. Allegedly, then President Marcos
Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges had ordered the respondent courts to whitewash
for graft and corrupt practices against former the criminal cases against the 26 respondents
Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By accused and produce a verdict of acquittal. In his
October 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits comment, the Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel
were in the case was already for disposition by Herrera, affirmed the allegations and revealed
the Tanodbayan. However, it was only in July that Malacaang had planned the scenario of the
1985 that a resolution was approved by the trial. Respondents-accused prayed for its denial.
Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of the Issue: Whether or not the trial was a mock trial
corresponding criminal informations against the and that the pre-determined judgment of acquittal
accused Francisco Tatad. Five (5) criminal was unlawful and void ab initio.
informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan Held: Yes. The Supreme Court cannot permit
in June 1985, all against petitioner Tatad. such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of
Petitioner claims that the Tanodbayan culpably justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land
violated the constitutional mandate of "due under its aegis are courts of law and justice and
process" in unduly prolonging the termination of equity. They would have no reason to exist if they
the preliminary investigation and in filing the were allowed to be used as mere tools of
corresponding informations only after more than injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and
a decade from the alleged commission of the suppress the truth, instead of repositories of
purported offenses. judicial power whose judges are sworn and
committed to render impartial justice to all alike
who seek the enforcement or protection of a right
or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without automatically exclude the original testimony
fear or favor and removed from the pressures of solely on the basis of the recantation. They
politics and prejudice. More so, in the case at bar should determine which testimony should be
where the people and the world are entitled to given credence through a comparison of the
know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial original testimony and the new testimony,
system is at stake. In life, as an accused before applying the general rules of evidence.
the military tribunal, Ninoy had pleaded in vain
that as a civilian he was entitled to due process
of law and trial in the regular civil courts before
an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. In PEOPLE vs. DRAMAYO
death, Ninoy, as the victim of the "treacherous GR 21325, Oct. 29, 1971
and vicious assassination" and the relatives and
sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead Facts: In a drinking session, Pableo Dramayo
once more for due process of law and a retrial and Paterno Ecubin brought up the idea of killing
before an impartial court with an unbiased Estelito Nogaliza so that he could not testify in
prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the robbery case which Dramayo and Ecubin was
the sham trial a mock trial the non-trial of the a prime suspect thereof. That same night, Ecubin
century-and that the pre-determined judgment of hit Estelito with a piece of wood on the side of the
acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio. head while Dramayo repeatedly stabbed him with
a short pointed bolo. The next morning, Dramayo
went to the house of the deceased and informed
ALONTE vs. SAVELLANO the latter's widow Corazon that he had just seen
GR 131652, March 9, 1998 the cadaver of Estelito. Upon interview, the Chief
of Police noticed blood stains on the trousers of
Facts: Juvie-lyn Punongbayan charged Bayani Dramayo and asked the latter to explain where
Alonte, the incumbent mayor of Bian, Laguna, he obtained it. Dramayo answered that it was
with the crime of rape. According to caused by his daughter who has a skin ailment. It
Punongbayan, on or about September 12, 1996, was on this basis that Dramayo and Ecubin were
Alonte offered her a drinking water which made charged of the crime of murder. Upon trial, the
her dizzy and weak. Thereafter, Alonte unlawfully lower court found Dramayo and Ecubin guilty
and feloniously had carnal knowledge with her beyond reasonable doubt basing on the
against her will and consent. During the testimonies offered by the prosecution. In this
pendency case, however, Juvie-lyn appeal, Accused-Appellants invoke their
Punongbayan, assisted by her parents and constitutional right to be declared presumptively
counsel, executed an affidavit desisting her innocent.
testimonies against Alonte. Nonetheless,
respondent Judge Savellano found Alonte guilty Issue: Whether or not the Accussed-Appellants
beyond reasonable doubt of the heinous crime of constitutional right to be presumed innocent can
rape. Accordingly, the accused did not present stand against judgment of conviction against
any countervailing evidence during the trial. They them.
did not take the witness stand to refute or deny
under oath the truth of the contents of the private Held: NO. The presumption of innocence could
complainant's aforementioned affidavit. They left not come to appellants rescue as it was more
everything to the so-called "desistance" of the than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was
private complainant. In this petition, Alonte avers offered by the prosecution. Accusation is not,
that respondent Judge committed grave abuse of according to the fundamental law, synonymous
discretion amounting to lack or excess of with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to
jurisdiction when respondent Judge rendered a demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were
decision in the case thereby depriving him of his not even called upon then to offer evidence on
Constitutional right to be presumed innocent. their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the
Issue: Whether or not the presumption of requisite quantum of proof necessary for
innocence stands in favor of Alonte. conviction be in existence. Their guilt must be
Held: NO. In the trial of criminal cases, the shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a
constitutional presumption of innocence in favor standard, this Court has always been committed.
of an accused requires that an accused be given There is need, therefore, for the most careful
sufficient opportunity to present his defense. So, scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral
with the prosecution as to its evidence. Hence, and documentary, independently of whatever
any deviation from the regular course of trial defense is offered by the accused. Only if the
should always take into consideration the rights judge below and the appellate tribunal could
of all the parties to the case, whether in the arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been
prosecution or defense. There can be no short- committed precisely by the person on trial under
cut to the legal process, and there can be no such an exacting test should the sentence be one
excuse for not affording an accused his full day in of conviction. It is thus required that every
court. Due process, rightly occupying the first and circumstance favoring his innocence be duly
foremost place of honor in our Bill of Rights, is an taken into account. The proof against him must
enshrined and invaluable right that cannot be survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion
denied even to the most undeserving. In the case must not be permitted to sway judgment. The
at bar, the affidavit of desistance of Juvie-Lyn conscience must be satisfied that on the
Punongbayan does not contain any statement defendant could be laid the responsibility for the
that disavows the veracity of her complaint offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate
against petitioners but merely seeks to "be the act that it amounted to a crime. What is
allowed to withdraw" her complaint and to required then is moral certainty. With the
discontinue with the case for varied other testimony of record pointing to no other
reasons. In People vs. Ballabare we have said conclusion except the perpetration of the killing
that any recantation must be tested in a public by appellants, the effort of their counsel should
trial with sufficient opportunity given to the party not be attended with success.
adversely affected by it to cross-examine the By reasonable doubt is not meant that which of
recanting witness. A retraction does not possibility may arise, but it is that doubt
necessarily negate an earlier declaration. Hence, engendered by an investigation of the whole
when confronted with a situation where a witness proof and an inability, after such investigation, to
recants his testimony, courts must not let the mind rest easy upon the certainly of guilt.
Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the A.M. No. RTJ-97-137, January 22, 1999,
law to convict of any criminal charge but moral Martinez, J.
certainty is required, and this certainty is required
as to every proposition of proof requisite to Doctrine:
constitute the offense. The accused's discretion in a criminal
prosecution with respect to his choice of counsel
People v. Holgado is not so much as to grant him a plenary
GR 2809, March 22, 1950 prerogative which would preclude other equally
competent and independent counsels from
Facts: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged representing him.
in the court of First Instance of Romblon with
slight illegal detention because according to the Facts: At the scheduled hearing of the criminal
information, being a private person, he did case against Amion, trial was not held because
"feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap on the day before the scheduled hearing, he was
and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of informed that his retained counsel, Atty.
Antero Holgado for about eight hours. On the day Depasucat, was ill. The hearing was reset with a
set for trial, he appeared alone without the warning that no further postponement would be
assistance of a lawyer. He was subsequently entertained. On the date of re-scheduled hearing,
arraigned and pleaded guilty upon the instruction Atty. Depasucat again failed to appear. To avoid
of a certain Mr. Numeriano Ocampo. .Judgement further delay, the court appointed Atty. Jacildo of
was rendered convicting him of the crime of PAO as counsel de oficio who was however,
kidnapping and serious illegal detention. prohibited to represent a party who has retained
the services of a counsel of his own choice. At
Issue: Whether the accused was the next scheduled hearing Atty. Depasucat still
afforded of his right to be heard by himself and did not show up in court. In view of the fact that
counsel? the victim's wife, Mrs. Vaflor and another
government witness both reside about 70 to 80
Held: No. Under the circumstances, kilometers from Bacolod City, and that the
particularly the qualified plea given by the appearance of Atty. Depasucat remained
accused who was unaided by counsel, it was not uncertain, Judge Chiongson, appointed Atty. Lao-
prudent, to say the least, for the trial court to Ong from the Free Legal Aid Office to represent
render such a serious judgment finding the Amion without prejudice to the appearance of
accused guilty of a capital offense, and imposing Amion's counsel de parte. Amion filed a
upon him such a heavy penalty as ten years and complaint charging respondent judge with
one day of prision mayor to twenty years, without Ignorance of the Law and Oppression relative to
absolute any evidence to determine and clarify the former's criminal case. Amion asserts that his
the true facts of the case. right to due process was violated and that he was
The proceedings in the trial court are deprived of his constitutional and statutory right
irregular from the beginning. It is expressly to be defended by counsel of his own choice.
provided in our rules of Court, Rule 112, section
3, that: If the defendant appears without attorney, Issue: Whether or not respondent judge's
he must be informed by the court that it is his appointment of a counsel de oficio constitutes a
right to have attorney being arraigned., and must violation of accused-complainant's right to due
be asked if he desires the aid of attorney, the process and a deprivation of his constitutional
Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend right to be defended by counsel of his own
him. A reasonable time must be allowed for choice.
procuring attorney.
Under this provision, when a defendant appears Held: The concept of "preference in the choice of
without attorney, the court has four important counsel" pertains more aptly and specifically to a
duties to comply with: 1 It must inform the person under investigation. Even if application
defendant that it is his right to have attorney would be extended to an accused in a criminal
before being arraigned; 2 After giving him prosecution, such preferential discretion cannot
such information the court must ask him if he partake of one so absolute and arbitrary as would
desires the aid of an attorney; 3 If he desires make the choice of counsel refer exclusively to
and is unable to employ attorney, the court must the predilection of the accused and thus make
assign attorney de oficio to defend him; and 4 the pace of criminal prosecution entirely dictated
If the accused desires to procure an attorney of by the accused to the detriment of the eventual
his own the court must grant him a reasonable resolution of the case. Moreover, Amion was not
time therefor. deprived of his substantive and constitutional
Not one of these duties had been complied with right to due process as he was duly accorded all
by the trial court. The record discloses that said the opportunities to be heard and to present
court did not inform the accused of his right to evidence to substantiate his defense but he
have an attorney nor did it ask him if he desired forfeited this right, for not appearing in court
the aid of one. The trial court failed to inquire together with his counsel at the scheduled
whether or not the accused was to employ an hearings. Finally, there is no denial of the right to
attorney, to grant him reasonable time to procure counsel where a counsel de oficio was appointed
or assign an attorney de oficio. The question during the absence of the accused's counsel de
asked by the court to the accused was "Do you parte pursuant to the court's desire to finish the
have an attorney or are you going to plead case as early as practicable under the continuous
guilty?" Not only did such a question fail to inform trial system. The administrative complaint is
the accused that it was his right to have an dismissed.
attorney before arraignment, but, what is worse,
the question was so framed that it could have
been construed by the accused as a suggestion
from the court that he plead guilt if he had no PECHO V. PEOPLE
attorney. And this is a denial of fair hearing in G.R. No. 111399, September 27, 1996, Davide
violation of the due process clause contained in Jr., J
our Constitution.
FACTS: Petitioner and his co-accused Joe Catre
AMION V. CHIONGSON were alleged to have conspired in representing
Pecho as a representative of Everson
Commercial Trading of Cotabato City, which The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner

turned out to be not-existent. Pecho was then as guilty for violation of Section 3, paragraph (b)
tried and convicted by the Sandiganbayan for of R.A. 3019 which penalizes: "Directly or
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A No. 3019. indirectly requesting or receiving any gift,
The SC modified the Sandiganbayan present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself
decision, holding the petitioner guilty of the or for any other person, in connection with any
complex crime of attempted estafa through contract or transaction between the Government
falsification of official and commercial documents. and any other party, wherein the public officer in
Although the petitioner could not be convicted of his official capacity has to intervene under the
the crime charged, viz., violation of Section 3(e) law."
of R.A No. 3019, as amended because the Petitioner contends that the preliminary
said section penalizes only consummated investigation of a complaint does not constitute a
offenses and the offense charged in this case "contract or transaction" and thus he cannot be
was not consummated he could, nevertheless, convicted for violation of R.A. 3019. And if
be convicted of the complex crime of attempted acquitted, he cannot be subsequently convicted
estafa through falsification of official and of direct bribery because that would violate his
commercial documents, which is necessarily right to be informed of the nature of the
included in the crime charged. accusation against him.
Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration as the conviction for estafa after ISSUES:(1) Whether or not preliminary
his acquittal from violation of R.A. 3019 investigation constitutes a "transaction or
constitutes double jeopardy. As such, he could contract."
not be convicted without violating his right to be (2) Whether or not, if previous conviction
informed of the accusation against him. for violation of R.A. 3019 were wrong, he can
now be convicted for direct bribery without
ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction for estafa violating his right to be informed.
after acquittal from the original crime charged
violates his right to be informed of the nature of HELD: (1) NO. The term 'transaction' as used
the accusation against him? thereof is not limited in its scope or meaning to a
commercial or business transaction but includes
HELD: NO. Under the Rules of Court, when all kinds of transaction, whether commercial, civil
there is variance between the offense charged in or administrative in nature, pending with the
the complaint of information, and that proved or government. This must be so, otherwise, the Act
established by the evidence, and the offense as would have so stated in the "Definition of Terms",
charged is included in or necessarily includes the Section 2 thereof. But it did not. The investigation
offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of was also not a contract. Neither was it a
the offense proved included in that which is transaction because this term must be construed
charged, or of the offense charged included in as analogous to the term which precedes it. A
that which is proved. transaction, like a contract, is one which involves
The Court explained the objectives of some consideration as in credit transactions and
the right to be informed: to furnish the accused this element (consideration) is absent in the
with such a description of the charge against him investigation conducted by the petitioner.
as will enable him to make his defense; second, We agree with the petitioner that it was
to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for error for the Sandiganbayan to have convicted
protection against a further prosecution for the him of violating Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019.
same cause; and third, to inform the court of the
facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they (2) YES. The petitioner also claims that
are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one he cannot be convicted of bribery under the
should be had. Revised Penal Code because to do so would be
In order that this requirement may be violative of as constitutional right to be informed
satisfied facts must be stated: not conclusions of of the nature and cause of the accusation against
law. What determines the real nature and cause him. Wrong. A reading of the information which
of accusation against an accused is the actual has been reproduced herein clearly makes out a
recital of facts stated in the information or case of bribery so that the petitioner cannot claim
complaint and not the caption or preamble of the deprivation of the right to be informed.
information.
It follows then that an accused may be
convicted of a crime which although not the one
charged, is necessarily included in the latter. BORJA V. MENDOZA
G.R. No. L-45667, June 20, 1977, FERNANDO,
J.
FACTS: Petitioner Manuel Borja, accused of

slight physical injuries, was convicted and
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period of
twenty days of arresto menor by respondent
Judge Senining, despite the absence of an
SORIANO V. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE arraignment.. The judge proceeded with the trial
G.R. No. L-65952, July 31, 1984, ABAD in absentia and promulgated the assailed
SANTOS, J. decision. An appeal was duly elevated to the
Court of First Instance of Cebu presided by
FACTS: Thomas Tan was accused of qualified respondent Judge Mendoza. Without any notice
theft in a complaint lodged with the City Fiscal of to petitioner and without requiring him to submit
Quezon City, assigned for investigation to the his memorandum, a decision on the appealed
petitioner who was then an Assistant City Fiscal. case was rendered against him.
In the course of the investigation the petitioner
demanded P4,000.00 from Tan as the price for ISSUE: Whether or not the decision was validly
dismissing the case. Tan reported the demand to rendered despite the absence of an arraignment.
the National Bureau of Investigation which set up
an entrapment. HELD: NO. Arraignment is an indispensable
requirement in any criminal prosecution. The
Constitution requires that the accused be Under the Constitution, the members of
arraigned so that he may be informed as to why the Supreme Court and other courts established
he was indicted and what penal offense he has to by law shall not be designated to any agency
face. This duty is an affirmative one which the performing quasi-judicial or administrative
court, on its own motion, must perform, unless functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).
waived. To emphasize its importance, no such Considering that membership of Judge Manzano
duty is laid on the court with regard to the rights in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on
of the accused which he may be entitled to Justice, which discharges administrative
exercise during the trial. Those are rights which functions, will be in violation of the Constitution.
he must assert himself and the benefits of which This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges
he himself must demand. In other words, in the should adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility
arraignment the court must act of its own volition. or unbecoming indifference to Province/City
It is imperative that he is thus made fully Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC
aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his Judges, they form part of the structure of
life, depending on the nature of the crime government. Their integrity and performance in
imputed to him. At the very least then, he must the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity
be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of of such structure. As public officials, they are
the state is mobilized against him. He is thus in a trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-
position to enter his plea with full knowledge of members of Provincial/City Committees on
the consequences. He is not even required to do Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to
so immediately. He may move to quash. said Committees to help promote the landable
purposes for which they exist, but only when
such assistance may be reasonably incidental to
the fulfillment of their judicial duties.
SEPARATION OF POWERS
ANGARA VS. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION
G.R. NO. 45081. JULY 15, 1936
LAUREL, J:
FACTS:
Petitioner Jose Angara and respondents
Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor,
were candidates voted for the position of member
of the National Assembly for the first district of
the Province of Tayabas in the September 17,
1395 election. Petitioner was proclaimed to be a
member-elect of the National Assembly by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers. Thereafter,
petitioner took his oath.
The National Assembly passed a
Resolution, confirming proclamation of Angara.
Ynsua filed before the respondent Electoral
Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the
election of petitioner, and praying that said
respondent be declared elected member, or that
the election of said position be nullified.
The respondent denied petitioner's
"Motion to Dismiss the Protest." Petitioner argues
that: the Constitution confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely
as regards the merits of contested elections to
the National Assembly, and that the Constitution
SEPARATION OF POWERS excludes from said jurisdiction the power to
IN RE: MANZANO regulate the proceedings of said election
166 SCRA 246, 1988 contests, which power has been reserved to the
Legislative Department of the Government or the
FACTS: National Assembly.
Judge Manzano was designated The Solicitor-General appeared and
member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee filed an answer in behalf of the respondent,
on Justice by the Provincial Governor. The interposing the special defense that the
function of the Committee is to receive Commission has been created by the
complaints and make recommendations towards Constitution as an instrumentality of the
the speedy disposition of cases of detainees, Legislative Department invested with the
particularly those who are poor. jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the
ISSUE: May the Judge accept the designation? members of the National Assembly"; that in
adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935,
HELD: fixing this date as the last day for the
No. The committee performs presentation of protests against the election of
administrative functions, that is, functions which any member of the National Assembly, it acted
involve the regulation and control over the within its jurisdiction and in the legitimate
conduct and affairs of individuals for their own exercise of the implied powers granted it by the
welfare and the promulgation of rules and Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations
regulations to better carry out the policy of the essential to carry out the powers and functions
legislature or such as are devoted upon the conferred upon the same by the fundamental law;
administrative agency by the organic law of its that in adopting its resolution of January 23,
existence. 1936, overruling the motion of the petitioner to
dismiss the election protest in question, and
declaring itself with jurisdiction to take minority parties are equally represented to off-set
cognizance of said protest, it acted in the partisan influence in its deliberations was
legitimate exercise of its quasi-judicial functions created, and further endowed with judicial temper
as an instrumentality of the Legislative by including in its membership three justices of
Department of the Commonwealth Government, the Supreme Court.
and hence said act is beyond the judicial The grant of power to the Electoral
cognizance or control of the Supreme Court, Commission to judge all contests relating to the
among others. election, returns and qualifications of members of
Petitioner prayed for the issuance of a the National Assembly, is intended to be as
preliminary writ of injunction against the complete and unimpaired as if it had remained
Commission, which petition was denied "without originally in the Legislature. The express lodging
passing upon the merits of the case." of that power in the Electoral Commission is an
implied denial of the exercise of that power by the
ISSUE: Whether or not the Electoral Commission National Assembly. If the power claimed for the
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in National Assembly to regulate the proceedings of
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed the Electoral Commission and cut off the power
against the election of the herein petitioner of the Electoral Commission to lay down a period
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such within which protest should be filed were
election by resolution of the National Assembly. conceded, the grant of power to the commission
would be ineffective.
HELD: The Electoral Commission in such a case
The separation of powers is a would be invested with the power to determine
fundamental principle in our system of contested cases involving the election, returns,
government. It obtains not through express and qualifications of the members of the National
provision but by actual division in our Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative
Constitution. Each department of the government power of the National Assembly. Not only would
has exclusive cognizance of matters within its the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. totally transferring this authority from the
But it does not follow from the fact that the three legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that would be created with the resultant inevitable
the Constitution intended them to be absolutely clash of powers from time to time. A sad
unrestrained and independent of each other. The spectacle would then be presented of the
Constitution has provided for an elaborate Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority
system of checks and balances to secure of taking cognizance of cases referred to, but in
coordination in the workings of the various reality without the necessary means to render
departments of the government. that authority effective whenever and wherever
The issue hinges on the interpretation of the National Assembly has chosen to act, a
section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution. The situation worse than that intended to be remedied
nature of the present controversy shows the by the framers of our Constitution. The power to
necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to regulate on the part of the National Assembly in
determine the conflict of authority between two procedural matters will inevitably lead to the
agencies created by the Constitution. If the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire
conflict were left undecided and undetermined, a proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and,
void would be created in our constitutional by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the
system, which may in the long run prove constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result
destructive of the entire framework. Upon should not be permitted.
principle, reason and authority, the Supreme
Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the SEPARATION OF POWERS
present controversy for the purpose of EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. VS. POEA
determining the character, scope and extent of G.R. NO. 76633, OCTOBER 18, 1988
the constitutional grant to the Electoral
Commission as "the sole judge of all contests CRUZ, J.:
relating to the election, returns and qualifications FACTS:
of the members of the National Assembly." Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the
The transfer of the power of determining M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an
the election, returns and qualifications of the accident. His widow sued for damages under
members of the Legislature long lodged in the E.O. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the
legislative body, to an independent, impartial and POEA. The petitioner, as the vessel owner,
non-partisan tribunal, is by no means a mere argued that the complaint was cognizable not by
experiment in the science of government. The the POEA but by the Social Security System and
members of the Constitutional Convention who should have been filed against the State
framed our fundamental law were in their majority Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless
men mature in years and experience. The assumed jurisdiction and after considering the
creation of the Electoral Commission was position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the
designed to remedy certain evils of which the complainant.
framers of our Constitution were cognizant. From Petitioner came to this Court, prompting
the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention the Solicitor General to move for dismissal on the
it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its ground of non-exhaustion of administrative
totality all the powers previously exercised by the remedies. Ordinarily, the decisions of the POEA
Legislature in matters pertaining to contested should first be appealed to the National Labor
elections of its members, to an independent and Relations Commission, on the theory inter alia
impartial tribunal. It was not so much the that the agency should be given an opportunity to
knowledge and appreciation of contemporary correct the errors, if any, of its subordinates. This
constitutional precedents, however, as the long- case comes under one of the exceptions,
felt need of determining legislative contests however, as the questions the petitioner is raising
devoid of partisan considerations which prompted are essentially questions of law. Moreover, the
the people acting through their delegates to the private respondent himself has not objected to
Convention to provide for this body known as the the petitioner's direct resort to this Court,
Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a observing that the usual procedure would delay
composite body in which both the majority and the disposition of the case to her prejudice.
by the employer. The power of the POEA (and

ISSUE: Whether or not there had been a valid before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring
delegation of power. the model contract is not unlimited as there is a
sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the
HELD: exercise of the said authority. That standard is
What can be delegated is the discretion discoverable in the executive order itself which, in
to determine how the law may be enforced, not creating the Philippine Overseas Employment
what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the Administration, mandated it to protect the rights
latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable
This prerogative cannot be abdicated or employment practices."
surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.
There are two accepted tests to
determine whether or not there is a valid SEPARATION OF POWERS
delegation of legislative power, viz, the CASIBANG VS. AQUINO
completeness test and the sufficient standard G.R. NO. L-38025. AUGUST 20, 1979
test. Under the first test, the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions when it MAKASIAR, J P:
leaves the legislature such that when it reaches FACTS:
the delegate the only thing he will have to do is Respondent Remigio Yu was
enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, proclaimed as the elected Mayor of Rosales,
there must be adequate guidelines or stations in Pangasinan over his rival, petitioner, who
the law to map out the boundaries of the seasonably filed a protest with the trial court,
delegate's authority and prevent the delegation presided by respondent Judge, who initially took
from running riot. Both tests are intended to cognizance of the same as it is unquestionably a
prevent a total transference of legislative justiciable controversy.
authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to In the meantime, President Marcos
step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise issued Proclamation No. 1081, placing the entire
a power essentially legislative. country under Martial Law; thereafter, a new
The principle of non-delegation of Constitution was adopted. Yu moved to dismiss
powers is applicable to all the three major powers the election protest on the ground that the trial
of the Government but is especially important in court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view
the case of the legislative power because of the of the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by
many instances when its delegation is permitted. reason of which (principally) Section 9 of
The occasions are rare when executive or judicial Article XVII [Transitory Provisions] and Section 2
powers have to be delegated by the authorities to of Article XI a political question has intervened
which they legally certain. In the case of the in the case. Yu contended that "the provisions in
legislative power, however, such occasions have the 1935 Constitution relative to all local
become more and more frequent, if not governments have been superseded by the 1973
necessary. This had led to the observation that Constitution.
the delegation of legislative power has become Respondent Judge sustained the
the rule and its non-delegation the exception. political question theory and ordered the
The reason is the increasing complexity dismissal of the electoral protest. Hence, this
of the task of government and the growing petition.
inability of the legislature to cope directly with the
myriad problems demanding its attention. The ISSUE: Whether or not the electoral protest filed
growth of society has ramified its activities and by the petitioner remained a justiciable question
created peculiar and sophisticated problems that even after the 1973 Constitution was adopted,
the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to thus remains to be under the jurisdiction of the
comprehend. Specialization even in legislation Court of First Instance.
has become necessary. To many of the problems
attendant upon present-day undertakings, the HELD:
legislature may not have the competence to The thrust of the aforesaid political
provide the required direct and efficacious, not to question theory of respondent Yu is that the 1973
say, specific solutions. These solutions may, Constitution, through Section 9 of Article XVII
however, be expected from its delegates, who thereof, protected only those incumbents, like
are supposed to be experts in the particular fields him, at the time of its ratification and effectivity
assigned to them. and are the only ones authorized to continue in
The reasons for the delegation of office and their term of office as extended now
legislative powers in general are particularly depends on the pleasure of, as the same has
applicable to administrative bodies. With the been entrusted or committed to, the incumbent
proliferation of specialized activities and their President of the Philippines or the Legislative
attendant peculiar problems, the national Department; and that Section 2 of Article XI
legislature has found it more and more necessary thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the
to entrust to administrative agencies the authority revamp of the entire local government structure
to issue rules to carry out the general provisions by the enactment of a local government code,
of the statute. This is called the "power of thus presenting a question of policy, the
subordinate legislation." necessity and expediency of which are outside
With this power, administrative bodies may the range of judicial review. In short, for the
implement the broad policies laid down in a respondent Judge to still continue assuming
statute by "filling in' the details which the jurisdiction over the pending election protest of
Congress may not have the opportunity or petitioner is for him to take cognizance of a
competence to provide. This is effected by their question or policy "in regard to which full
promulgation of what are known as discretionary authority has been delegated to the
supplementary regulations, such as the Legislative or Executive branch of the
implementing rules issued by the Department of government."
Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations The electoral protest case herein involved
have the force and effect of law. has remained a justiciable controversy. No
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such political question has ever been interwoven into
administrative regulation. The model contract this case. Nor is there any act of the incumbent
prescribed thereby has been applied in a President or the Legislative Department to be
significant number of the cases without challenge indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the
respondent Judge decides the election protest. set of facts exists or that a given status exists,
The term "political question" connotes what it and these determinations, together with the
means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question consequences that flow therefrom, may not be
of policy. It refers to those questions which under traversed in the courts." (Willoughby on the
the Constitution, are to be decided by the people Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, p. 1326;
in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which emphasis supplied.). To the same effect is the
full discretionary authority has been delegated to language used in Corpus Juris Secundum, from
the legislative or executive branch of the which we quote:. "It is well-settled doctrine that
government. It is concerned with issues political questions are not within the province of
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a the judiciary, except to the extent that power to
particular measure" (Taada vs. Cuenco, L-1052, deal with such questions has been conferred
Feb. 28, 1957). upon the courts by express constitutional or
statutory provisions. "It is not easy, however, to
define the phrase `political question', nor to
SEPARATION OF POWERS determine what matters, fall within its scope. It is
TAADA VS. CUENCO frequently used to designate all questions that lie
G.R. NO. L-10520, FEBRUARY 28, 1957 outside the scope of the judicial questions, which
under the constitution, are to be decided by the
CONCEPCION, J.: people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
FACTS: which full discretionary authority has been
Petitioners Lorenzo M. Taada and delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
Diosdado Macapagal sought to oust respondent the government."
senators from the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Thus, it has been repeatedly held that
Petitioners allege that the that the Committee on the question whether certain amendments to the
Rules for the Senate, in nominating Senators Constitution are invalid for non-compliance with
Cuenco and Delgado, and the Senate, in the procedure therein prescribed, is not a political
choosing these respondents, as members of the one and may be settled by the Courts.
Senate Electoral Tribunal, had "acted absolutely The term "political question" connotes,
without power or color of authority and in clear in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
violation .. of Article VI, Section 11 of the parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other
Constitution"; that "in assuming membership in words, in the language of Corpus Juris
the Senate Electoral Tribunal, by taking the Secundum (supra), it refers to "those questions
corresponding oath of office therefor", said which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
respondents had "acted absolutely without color by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
of appointment or authority and are unlawfully, regard to which full discretionary authority has
and in violation of the Constitution, usurping, been delegated to the Legislature or executive
intruding into and exercising the powers of branch of the Government." It is concerned with
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal." issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality,
Respondents assail the courts of a particular measure.
jurisdiction to entertain the petition, upon the Such is not the nature of the question
ground that the power to choose six (6) Senators for determination in the present case. Here, the
as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal has court is called upon to decide whether the
been expressly conferred by the Constitution election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the
upon the Senate, despite the fact that the draft Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral
submitted to the constitutional convention gave to Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a
the respective political parties the right to elect member and spokesman of the party having the
their respective representatives in the Electoral largest number of votes in the Senate-on behalf
Commission provided for in the original of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the
Constitution of the Philippines, and that the only constitutional mandate that said members of the
remedy available to petitioners herein "is not in Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon
the judicial forum", but "to bring the matter to the nomination .. of the party having the second
bar of public opinion." largest number of votes" in the Senate, and
hence, is null and void. This is not a political
ISSUE: Whether or not the case at bar raises question. The Senate is not clothed with "full
merely a political question. discretionary authority" in the choice of members
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of
HELD: its power thereon is subject to constitutional
Willoughby lucidly states: "Elsewhere in limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in
this treatise the well-known and well-established nature. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of
principle is considered that it is not within the the judicial department to pass upon the validity
province of the courts to pass judgment upon the the proceedings in connection therewith.
policy of legislative or executive action. Where,
therefore, discretionary powers are granted by
the Constitution or by statute, the manner in SEPARATION OF POWERS
which those powers are exercised is not subject SANIDAD V. COMELEC
to judicial review. The courts, therefore, concern G.R. NO. L-44640. OCTOBER 12, 1976
themselves only with the question as to the
existence and extent of these discretionary FACTS:
powers. Pablito Sanidad, a newspaper columnist
"As distinguished from the judicial, the of Overview, a weekly newspaper circulating in
legislative and executive departments are spoken Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the
of as the political departments of government Constitutionality of Sec 19 of the Comelec
because in very many cases their action is Resolution 2167 which provides that during the
necessarily dictated by considerations of public plebiscite campaign period, on the day before
or political policy. These considerations of public and on plebiscite day, no mass media columnist,
or political policy of course will not permit the commentator, announcer or personality shall use
legislature to violate constitutional provisions, or his column or radio or television time to campaign
the executive to exercise authority not granted for or against the plebiscite issue. Petitioner
him by the Constitution or by, statute, but, within contends that it violates the freedom of
these limits, they do permit the departments, expression and of the press. Hence, constitutes
separately or together, to recognize that a certain as a prior restraint in his constitutional right.
Solicitor General contends that it does not violate of developing a self-reliant and independent
the Constitution for it is a valid implementation of national economy effectively controlled by
the power of Comelec to supervise and regulate Filipinos and the protection of Filipino enterprises
media during election or plebiscite period and against unfair foreign competition and trade
can express his news through the Comelec practices. He claims that the law abdicates all
space & airtime. regulation of foreign enterprises in this country
and gives them unfair advantages over local
ISSUE: Whether or not Comelec is granted the investments which are practically elbowed out in
power to regulate mass media during election or their own land with the complicity of their own
plebiscite period under Article 9C of the 19987 government. Specifically, he argues that under
Constitution. Section 5 of the said law a foreign investor may
do business in the Philippines or invest in a
HELD: domestic enterprise up to 100% of its capital
It is given that what was granted to without need of prior approval. The said section
Comelec was the power to supervise and makes certain that "the SEC or BTRCP, as the
regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, case may be, shall not impose any limitations on
permits, or other grants issued for the operation the extent of foreign ownership in an enterprise
of transportation or other public utilities, media additional to those provided in this Act."
communication or information to the end that The petitioner also attacks Section 9
equal opportunity, time and space, and the right because if a Philippine national believes that an
to reply, including reasonable, equal rates area of investment should be included in List C,
therefore, for public information campaign and the burden is on him to show that the criteria
forums among candidates are ensured. The evil enumerated in said section are met. It is alleged
sought to be prevented is the possibility that a that Articles 2, 32, & 35 of the Omnibus
franchise holder may favor or give any undue Investments Code of 1982 are done away with by
advantage to a candidate. RA 7042. It is also argued that by repealing
Neither the Constitution nor RA 6646 Articles 49, 50, 54 and 56 of the 1987 Omnibus
can be construed to mean that the Comelec has Investments Code, RA No. 7042 further
also been granted the right to supervise and abandons the regulation of foreign investments
regulate the exercise by media practitioners by doing away with important requirements for
themselves of their right to expression during doing business in the Philippines.
plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising Finally, the petitioner claims that the
their freedom of expression during plebiscite transitory provisions of RA 7042, which allow
periods are neither the franchise holders nor the practically unlimited entry of foreign investments
candidates. In fact, there are no candidates for three years, subject only to a supposed
involved in a plebiscite. Comelec Resolution No Transitory Foreign Investment Negative List, not
2167 has no statutory basis. only completely deregulates foreign investments
but would place Filipino enterprises at a fatal
disadvantage in their own country.
SEPARATION OF POWERS
DAZA VS. SINGSON ISSUE: Whether or not there is a justiciable
180 SCRA 496, 1989 question present in the case at bar.
FACTS: HELD:
Petitioner was a member of the What is present in the case at bar is not
Commission on Appointments representing the a debate on the wisdom or the efficacy of the Act,
Liberal Party. With the organization of the LDP but this is a matter on which the Court is not
(Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino), some competent to rule. As Cooley observed:
congressional members belonging to the Liberal "Debatable questions are for the legislature to
Party resigned from said party to join the LDP. decide. The courts do not sit to resolve the merits
When the Commission on Appointments were of conflicting issues." In Angara v. Electoral
reorganized, petitioner was replaced by an LDP Commission, Justice Laurel made it clear that
representative. "the judiciary does not pass upon questions of
Petitioner contends that the organization wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation." And
of the LDP cannot affect the composition of the fittingly so for in the exercise of judicial power, we
Commission on Appointments because LDP is are allowed only "to settle actual controversies
not a registered party and has not yet shown the involving rights which are legally demandable
stability of a party. and enforceable," and may not annul an act of
the political departments simply because we feel
ISSUE: Does the situation present a political it is unwise or impractical. It is true that, under the
question? expanded concept of the political question, we
may now also "determine whether or not there
HELD: has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
The question is justiciable. The issue is to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
one of legality not of wisdom. The ascertainment branch or instrumentality of the Government."
of the manner of forming the Commission on The Court, however, did not find any irregularity
Appointments is distinct from the discretion of the that exist in the case at bar.
parties to designate there representatives. And The petitioner is commended for his
even if the question were political in nature, it high civic spirit and his zeal in the protection of
would still come under the expanded power of the Filipino investors against unfair foreign
review in Article VIII, Section 1. competition. His painstaking study and analysis
of the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 reveals
not only his nationalistic fervor but also an
DELEGATION OF POWER impressive grasp of this complex subject. But his
GARCIA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY views are expressed in the wrong forum. The
G.R. NO. 100883. DECEMBER 2, 1991 Court is not a political arena. His objections to the
law are better heard by his colleagues in the
CRUZ, J P: Congress of the Philippines, who have the power
FACTS: to rewrite it, if they so please, in the fashion he
The petitioner challenges RA 7042 on suggests.
the ground that it defeats the constitutional policy
pursuance of it, a clear manifestation of the belief

DELEGATION OF EMERGENCY POWERS held by the National Assembly that there was no
ARANETA V. DINGLASAN necessity to provide for the former. It would be
(G.R. NO. L-2044 AUGUST 26, 1949) strange if having no idea about the time the
Emergency Powers Act was to be effective the
TUASON, J.: National Assemble failed to make a provision for
FACTS: this termination in the same way that it did for the
The petitions challenge the validity of termination of the effects and incidents of the
executive orders of the President avowedly delegation. There would be no point in repealing
issued in virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 671. or annulling the rules and regulations
Involved in cases Nos. L-2044 and L-2756 is promulgated under a law if the law itself was to
Executive Order No. 62, which regulates rentals remain in force, since, in that case, the President
for houses and lots for residential buildings. could not only make new rules and regulations
Concerned in case L-3055 is Executive Order but he could restore the ones already annulled by
No. 192, which aims to control exports from the the legislature.
Philippines. On the other hand, case No. L-3054 It is our considered opinion, and we so hold, that
relates to Executive Order No. 225, which Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative
appropriates funds for the operation of the when Congress met in regular session on May
Government of the Republic of the Philippines 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62,
during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority
1950, and for other purposes. Affected in case of law. In setting the session of Congress instead
No. L-3056 is Executive Order No. 226, which of the first special session preceded it as the
appropriates P6,000,000 to defray the expenses point of expiration of the Act, we think giving
in connection with, and incidental to, the hold lug effect to the purpose and intention of the National
of the national elections to be held in November, Assembly. In a special session, the Congress
1949. may "consider general legislation or only such as
Petitioners rest their case chiefly on the he (President) may designate." (Section 9, Article
proposition that the Emergency Powers Act VI of the Constitution.) In a regular session, the
(Commonwealth Act No. 671) has ceased to power Congress to legislate is not circumscribed
have any force and effect. except by the limitations imposed by the organic
law.
ISSUE: Whether or the Emergency Powers Act Upon the foregoing considerations, the petitions
has ceased to have any force and effect. will be granted.
HELD:
Yes. Section 26 of Article VI of the 1935 DELEGATION OF EMERGENCY POWERS
Constitution provides: In time of war or other RODRIGUEZ V. GELLA
national emergency, the Congress may by law (G.R. NO. L-6266 FEBRUARY 2, 1953)
authorize the President, for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to PARAS, C.J.
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a FACTS:
declared national policy. Petitioners herein seek to invalidate
Article VI of the Constitution provides Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 issued on
that any law passed by virtue thereof should be November 10, 1952, the first appropriating the
"for a limited period." "Limited" has been defined sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential
to mean "restricted; bounded; prescribed; public works, and the second setting aside the
confined within positive bounds; restrictive in sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces
duration, extent or scope." The words "limited and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts,
period" as used in the Constitution are beyond earthquakes, volcanic action and other
question intended to mean restrictive in duration. calamities. Such Executive Orders were issued in
Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 671, also known
emergency powers, "must be temporary or it can as the Emergency Powers Act.
not be said to be an emergency." Petitioners primary contention rests on
It is to be presumed that Commonwealth the fact that the National Assembly intended such
Act No. 671 was approved with this limitation in powers to exist only for a limited period.
view. The opposite theory would make the law
repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Orders Nos.
the principle that the legislature is deemed to 545 and 546 are valid.
have full knowledge of the constitutional scope of
its powers. The assertion that new legislation is HELD:
needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony No. Section 26 of Article VI of the
with the Constitution either. If a new and different Constitution provides that "in times of war or
law were necessary to terminate the delegation, other national emergency, the Congress may by
the period for the delegation, it has been correctly law authorize the President, for a limited period
pointed out, would be unlimited, indefinite, and subject to such restrictions as it may
negative and uncertain. Furthermore, this would prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to
create the anomaly that, while Congress might carry out a declared national policy." Accordingly
delegate its powers by simple majority, it might the National Assembly passed Commonwealth
not be able to recall them except by a two-third Act No. 671, declaring (in section 1) the national
vote. In other words, it would be easier for policy that "the existence of war between the
Congress to delegate its powers than to take United States and other countries of Europe and
them back. Asia, which involves the Philippines makes it
Section 4 of the Act goes far to settle necessary to invest the President with
the legislative intention of this phase of Act No. extraordinary powers in order to meet the
671. Section 4 stipulates that "the rules and resulting emergency," and (in section 2)
regulations promulgated thereunder shall be in authorizing the President, "during the existence
full force and effect until the Congress of the of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and
Philippines shall otherwise provide." The silence regulations as he may deem necessary to carry
of the law regarding the repeal of the authority out the national policy declared in section 1."
itself, in the face of the express provision for the Act No. 671 was expressly in pursuance
repeal of the rules and regulations issued in of the constitutional provision, it has to be
assumed that the National Assembly intended it deem necessary to enable the Government to
to be only for a limited period. If it be contended fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and
that the Act has not yet been duly repealed, and enforce its authority." Indeed, to hold that
such step is necessary to a cessation of the although the Congress has, for about seven
emergency powers delegated to the President, years since liberation, been normally functioning
the result would be obvious unconstitutionality, and legislating on every conceivable field, the
since it may never be repealed by the Congress, President still has any residuary powers under
or if the latter ever attempts to do so, the the Act, would necessarily lead to confusion and
President may wield his veto. This eventuality overlapping, if not conflict.
has in fact taken place when the President Shelter may not be sought in the
disapproved House Bill No. 727, repealing all proposition that the President should be allowed
Emergency Powers Acts. The situation will make to exercise emergency powers for the sake of
the Congress and the President or either as the speed and expediency in the interest and for the
principal authority to determine the indefinite welfare of the people, because we have the
duration of the delegation of legislative powers, Constitution, designed to establish a government
in palpable repugnance to the constitutional under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy.
provision that any grant thereunder must be for a In line with such primordial objective, our
limited period, necessarily to be fixed in the law Government is democratic in form and based on
itself and not dependent upon the arbitrary or the system of separation of powers. Unless and
elastic will of either the Congress or the until changed or amended, we shall have to
President. abide by the letter and spirit of the Constitution
The logical view consistent with and be prepared to accept the consequences
constitutionality is to hold that the powers lasted resulting from or inherent in disagreements
only during the emergency resulting from the last between, inaction or even refusal of the
world war which factually involved the Philippines legislative and executive departments. Much as it
when Act No. 671 was passed on December 16, is imperative in some cases to have prompt
1941. That emergency, which naturally official action, deadlocks in and slowness of
terminated upon the ending of the last world war, democratic processes must be preferred to
was contemplated by the members of the concentration of powers in any one man or group
National Assembly on the foresight that the of men for obvious reasons. The framers of the
actual state of war could prevent it from holding Constitution, however, had the vision of and were
its next regular session careful in allowing delegation of legislative
Moreover, Section 26 of Article VI of the powers to the President for a limited period "in
1935 constitution, in virtue of which Act No. 671 times of war or other national emergency." They
was passed, authorizes the delegation of powers had thus entrusted to the good judgment of the
by the Congress (1) in times of war or (2) other Congress the duty of coping with any national
national emergency. The emergency expressly emergency by a more efficient procedure; but it
spoken of in the title and in section 1 of the Act is alone must decide because emergency in itself
one "in time of war," as distinguished from "other cannot and should not create power. In our
national emergency" that may arise as an after- democracy the hope and survival of the nation lie
effect of war or from natural causes such as in the wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all
widespread earthquakes, typhoons, floods, and officials and in their faithful adherence to the
the like. Certainly the typhoons that hit some Constitution.
provinces and cities in 1952 not only did not Wherefore, Executive Orders Nos. 545
result from the last world war but were and could and 546 are hereby declared null and void, and
not have been contemplated by the legislators. At the respondents are ordered to desist from
any rate, the Congress is available for necessary appropriating, releasing, allotting, and expending
special sessions, and it cannot let the people the public funds set aside therein.
down without somehow being answerable
thereover.
Even under the theory of some DELEGATION OF POWERS; PROBATION
members of this court that insofar as the PEOPLE V. VERA
Congress had shown its readiness or ability to (G.R. NO. L-45685 NOVEMBER 16, 1937)
act on a given matter, the emergency powers
delegated to the President had been pro tanto LAUREL, J.
withdrawn, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 FACTS:
must be declared as having no legal anchorage. Petitioners, the People of the
We can take judicial notice of the fact that the Philippines and the Hongkong and Shanghai
Congress has since liberation repeatedly been Banking Corporation, are respectively the plaintiff
approving acts appropriating funds for the and the offended party, and the respondent
operation of the Government, public works, and herein Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the
many others purposes, with the result that as to defendants, in a criminal case. Respondent Jose
such legislative task the Congress must be O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh
deemed to have long decided to assume the branch of the trial court who heard the application
corresponding power itself and to withdraw the of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for
same from the President. If the President had probation in the aforesaid criminal case.
ceased to have powers with regards to general The trial court rendered judgment,
appropriations, none can remain in respect of convicting Unjieng. Upon appeal, the court
special appropriations; otherwise he may modified the sentence to an indeterminate
accomplish indirectly what he cannot do directly. penalty of from five years and six months of
Besides, it is significant that Act No. 671 prision correccional to seven years, six months
expressly limited the power of the President to and twenty-seven days of prision mayor, but
that continuing "in force" appropriations which affirmed the judgment in all other respects.
would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, so The instant proceedings have to do with
that, even assuming that the Act is still effective, the application for probation filed by Unjieng
it is doubtful whether the President can by before the trial court, under the provisions of Act
executive orders make new appropriations. The No. 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature.
specific power "to continue in force laws and Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is
appropriations which would lapse or otherwise innocent of the crime of which he was convicted,
become inoperative" is a limitation on the general that he has no criminal record and that he would
power "to exercise such other powers as he may observe good conduct in the future. However, the
Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a
the granting of probation to the Unjieng. The declared national policy." It is beyond the scope
private prosecution also filed an opposition, of this decision to determine whether or not, in
elaborating on the unconstitutionality of Act No. the absence of the foregoing constitutional
4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power provisions, the President could be authorized to
to the provincial boards of several provinces exercise the powers thereby vested in him. Upon
the other hand, whatever doubt may have existed
ISSUE: Whether or not Act No. 4221 constitutes has been removed by the Constitution itself.
an undue delegation of legislative power. The case before us does not fall under any
of the exceptions hereinabove mentioned.
HELD: The challenged section of Act No. 4221
Yes. Under the constitutional system, in section 11 which reads as follows:
the powers of government are distributed among This Act shall apply only in those provinces in
three coordinate and substantially independent which the respective provincial boards have
organs: the legislative, the executive and the provided for the salary of a probation officer at
judicial. Each of these departments of the rates not lower than those now provided for
government derives its authority from the provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be
Constitution which, in turn, is the highest appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall
expression of popular will. Each has exclusive be subject to the direction of the Probation Office.
cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction, In testing whether a statute constitute an
and is supreme within its own sphere. undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is
The power to make laws the legislative usual to inquire whether the statute was complete
power is vested in a bicameral Legislature by in all its terms and provisions when it left the
the Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a unicameral hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to
National Assembly by the Constitution (Act. VI, the judgment of any other appointee or delegate
sec. 1, Constitution of the Philippines). The of the legislature. In the United States vs. Ang
Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly Tang Ho ([1922], 43 Phil., 1), this court adhered
may not escape its duties and responsibilities by to the foregoing rule when it held an act of the
delegating that power to any other body or legislature void in so far as it undertook to
authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is authorize the Governor-General, in his discretion,
unconstitutional and void, on the principle that to issue a proclamation fixing the price of rice and
potestas delegata non delegare potest. "One of to make the sale of it in violation of the
the settled maxims in constitutional law is that the proclamation a crime. The general rule, however,
power conferred upon the legislature to make is limited by another rule that to a certain extent
laws cannot be delegated by that department to matters of detail may be left to be filled in by rules
any other body or authority. Where the sovereign and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by
power of the state has located the authority, there executive officers and administrative boards.
it must remain; and by the constitutional agency For the purpose of Probation Act, the
alone the laws must be made until the provincial boards may be regarded as
Constitution itself is charged. The power to administrative bodies endowed with power to
whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this determine when the Act should take effect in their
high prerogative has been entrusted cannot respective provinces. They are the agents or
relieve itself of the responsibilities by choosing delegates of the legislature in this respect. The
other agencies upon which the power shall be rules governing delegation of legislative power to
devolved, nor can it substitute the judgment, administrative and executive officers are
wisdom, and patriotism of any other body for applicable or are at least indicative of the rule
those to which alone the people have seen fit to which should be here adopted. An examination of
confide this sovereign trust." a variety of cases on delegation of power to
The rule, however, which forbids the administrative bodies will show that the ratio
delegation of legislative power is not absolute decidendi is at variance but, it can be broadly
and inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An asserted that the rationale revolves around the
exceptions sanctioned by immemorial practice presence or absence of a standard or rule of
permits the central legislative body to delegate action or the sufficiency thereof in the
legislative powers to local authorities. "It is a statute, to aid the delegate in exercising the
cardinal principle of our system of government, granted discretion. In some cases, it is held that
that local affairs shall be managed by local the standard is sufficient; in others that is
authorities, and general affairs by the central insufficient; and in still others that it is entirely
authorities; and hence while the rule is also lacking. As a rule, an act of the legislature is
fundamental that the power to make laws cannot incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay
be delegated, the creation of the municipalities down any rule or definite standard by which the
exercising local self government has never been administrative officer or board may be guided in
held to trench upon that rule. Such legislation is the exercise of the discretionary powers
not regarded as a transfer of general legislative delegated to it.
power, but rather as the grant of the authority to In the case at bar, what rules are to
prescribed local regulations, according to guide the provincial boards in the exercise of
immemorial practice, subject of course to the their discretionary power to determine whether or
interposition of the superior in cases of not the Probation Act shall apply in their
necessity." Doubtless, also, legislative power respective provinces? What standards are fixed
may be delegated by the Constitution itself. by the Act? We do not find any and none has
Section 14, paragraph 2, of article VI of the been pointed to us by the respondents. The
Constitution of the Philippines provides that "The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its
National Assembly may by law authorize the provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial
President, subject to such limitations and boards any standard or guide in the exercise of
restrictions as it may impose, to fix within their discretionary power. What is granted, if we
specified limits, tariff rates, import or export may use the language of Justice Cardozo in the
quotas, and tonnage and wharfage dues." And recent case of Schecter, supra, is a "roving
section 16 of the same article of the Constitution commission" which enables the provincial boards
provides that "In times of war or other national to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if
emergency, the National Assembly may by law the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its
authorize the President, for a limited period and own authority extend the benefits of the
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribed, Probation Act to the provinces but in reality
leaves the entire matter for the various provincial No. The authority to issue the said
boards to determine. In other words, the regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of
provincial boards of the various provinces are to Executive Order No. 797, reading as follows: ...
determine for themselves, whether the Probation The governing Board of the Administration
Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. (POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate
The applicability and application of the Probation the necessary rules and regulations to govern the
Act are entirely placed in the hands of the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the
provincial boards. If the provincial board does not Administration (POEA).
wish to have the Act applied in its province, all Legislative discretion as to the
that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the substantive contents of the law cannot be
needed amount for the salary of a probation delegated. What can be delegated is the
officer. The plain language of the Act is not discretion to determine how the law may be
susceptible of any other interpretation. This, to enforced, not what the law shall be. The
our minds, is a virtual surrender of legislative ascertainment of the latter subject is a
power to the provincial boards. prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative
It should be observed that in the case at cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the
bar we are not concerned with the simple legislature to the delegate.
transference of details of execution or the There are two accepted tests to
promulgation by executive or administrative determine whether or not there is a valid
officials of rules and regulations to carry into delegation of legislative power, viz , the
effect the provisions of a law. If we were, completeness test and the sufficient standard
recurrence to our own decisions would be test. Under the first test, the law must be
sufficient. complete in all its terms and conditions when it
We conclude that section 11 of Act No. leaves the legislature such that when it reaches
4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful the delegate the only thing he will have to do is
delegation of legislative authority to the provincial enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test,
boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional there must be adequate guidelines or stations in
and void. the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate's authority and prevent the delegation
from running riot. Both tests are intended to
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER prevent a total transference of legislative
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. POEA authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to
(G.R. NO. 76633 OCTOBER 18, 1988) step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise
a power essentially legislative.
CRUZ, J.: The principle of non-delegation of
FACTS: powers is applicable to all the three major powers
The private respondent in this case was of the Government but is especially important in
awarded the sum of P192,000.00 by the POEA the case of the legislative power because of the
for the death of her husband. The decision is many instances when its delegation is permitted.
challenged by the petitioner on the principal The occasions are rare when executive or judicial
ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over powers have to be delegated by the authorities to
the case as the husband was not an overseas which they legally certain. In the case of the
worker. legislative power, however, such occasions have
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the become more and more frequent, if not
M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an necessary. This had led to the observation that
accident in Tokyo, Japan on March 15, 1985. His the delegation of legislative power has become
widow sued for damages under Executive Order the rule and its non-delegation the exception.
No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the The reason is the increasing complexity
POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, of the task of government and the growing
argued that the complaint was cognizable not by inability of the legislature to cope directly with the
the POEA but by the Social Security System and myriad problems demanding its attention. The
should have been filed against the State growth of society has ramified its activities and
Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless created peculiar and sophisticated problems that
assumed jurisdiction and after considering the the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to
position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the comprehend. Specialization even in legislation
complainant. The award consisted of has become necessary. To many of the problems
P180,000.00 as death benefits and P12,000.00 attendant upon present-day undertakings, the
for burial expenses. legislature may not have the competence to
The petitioner does not contend that provide the required direct and efficacious, not to
Saco was not its employee or that the claim of his say, specific solutions. These solutions may,
widow is not compensable. What it does urge is however, be expected from its delegates, who
that he was not an overseas worker but a are supposed to be experts in the particular fields
'domestic employee and consequently his assigned to them.
widow's claim should have been filed with Social The reasons given above for the
Security System, subject to appeal to the delegation of legislative powers in general are
Employees Compensation Commission. particularly applicable to administrative bodies.
Furthermore, the petitioner questions the validity With the proliferation of specialized activities and
of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative their attendant peculiar problems, the national
of the principle of non-delegation of legislative legislature has found it more and more necessary
power. It contends that no authority had been to entrust to administrative agencies the authority
given the POEA to promulgate the said to issue rules to carry out the general provisions
regulation; and even with such authorization, the of the statute. This is called the "power of
regulation represents an exercise of legislative subordinate legislation." With this power,
discretion which, under the principle, is not administrative bodies may implement the broad
subject to delegation. policies laid down in a statute by "filling in' the
details which the Congress may not have the
ISSUE: Whether or not Memorandum Circular opportunity or competence to provide. This is
No. 2 is violative of the principle of non- effected by their promulgation of what are known
delegation of legislative power. as supplementary regulations, such as the
implementing rules issued by the Department of
HELD:
Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations not "a cause," and what is or what is not "an
have the force and effect of law. extraordinary rise in the price of rice," and as to
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such what is a temporary rule or an emergency
administrative regulation. The model contract measure for the carrying out the purposes of the
prescribed thereby has been applied in a Act. Under this state of facts, if the law is valid
significant number of the cases without challenge and the Governor-General issues a proclamation
by the employer. The power of the POEA (and fixing the minimum price at which rice should be
before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring sold, any dealer who, with or without notice, sells
the model contract is not unlimited as there is a rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There may not
sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the have been any cause, and the price may not
exercise of the said authority. That standard is have been extraordinary, and there may not have
discoverable in the executive order itself which, in been an emergency, but, if the Governor-General
creating the Philippine Overseas Employment found the existence of such facts and issued a
Administration, mandated it to protect the rights proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price,
of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable the seller commits a crime.
employment practices."
WHEREFORE, the petition is
DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not the legislature under Act
. No. 2868 has delegated its power to the
Governor-General
DELEGATION OF POWER
SECTION 1, ARTICLE VI, 1987 CONSTITUTION HELD:
UNITED STATES VS. ANG TANG HO Yes. The law says that the Governor-
G.R. NO. 17122, FEBRUARY 27, 1922 General may fix "the maximum sale price that the
industrial or merchant may demand." The law is a
JOHNS, J.: general law and not a local or special law.
FACTS: The proclamation undertakes to fix one
At its special session of 1919, the price for rice in Manila and other and different
Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, prices in other and different provinces in the
entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly and Philippine Islands, and delegates the power to
holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and determine the other and different prices to
corn under extraordinary circumstances, provincial treasurers and their deputies. Here,
regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and then, you would have a delegation of legislative
authorizing the Governor-General, with the power to the Governor-General, and a delegation
consent of the Council of State, to issue the by him of that power to provincial treasurers and
necessary rules and regulations therefor, and their deputies, who "are hereby directed to
making an appropriation for this purpose," the communicate with, and execute all instructions
material provisions of which are enumerated. emanating from the Director of Commerce and
August 1, 1919, the Governor-General Industry, for the most effective and proper
issued a proclamation (Executive Order No. 53) enforcement of the above regulations in their
fixing the price at which rice should be sold. respective localities." The issuance of the
August 8, 1919, Ang Tang Ho charged with the proclamation by the Governor-General was the
sale of rice at an excessive price and was exercise of the delegation of a delegated power,
accordingly convicted. and was even a sub delegation of that power.
The question here involves an analysis When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the
and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as it violation of the proclamation of the Governor-
authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price General which constitutes the crime. Without that
at which rice should be sold. It will be noted that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any
section 1 authorizes the Governor-General, with price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the
the consent of the Council of State, for any cause sole discretion of the Governor-General to say
resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of what was and what was not "any cause" for
palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate enforcing the act, and what was and what was
temporary rules and emergency measures for not "an extraordinary rise in the price of palay,
carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very rice or corn," and under certain undefined
terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and conditions to fix the price at which rice should be
emergency measures is left to the discretion of sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to
the Governor-General. The Legislature does not say whether a proclamation should be issued, if
undertake to specify or define under what so, when, and whether or not the law should be
conditions or for what reasons the Governor- enforced, how long it should be enforced, and
General shall issue the proclamation, but says when the law should be suspended. The
that it may be issued "for any cause," and leaves Legislature did not specify or define what was
the question as to what is "any cause" to the "any cause," or what was "an extraordinary rise in
discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also the price of rice, palay or corn," Neither did it
says: "For any cause, conditions arise resulting in specify or define the conditions upon which the
an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or proclamation should be issued. In the absence of
corn." The Legislature does not specify or define the proclamation no crime was committed. The
what is "an extraordinary rise." That is also left to alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because
the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act the Governor-General issued the proclamation.
also says that the Governor-General, "with the The act or proclamation does not say anything
consent of the Council of State," is authorized to about the different grades or qualities of rice, and
issue and promulgate "temporary rules and the defendant is charged with the sale "of one
emergency measures for carrying out the ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos
purposes of this Act." It does not specify or define (P0.80) which is a price greater than that fixed by
what is a temporary rule or an emergency Executive order No. 53."
measure, or how long such temporary rules or We are clearly of the opinion and hold
emergency measures shall remain in force and that Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to
effect, or when they shall take effect. That is to authorized the Governor-General in his discretion
say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice,
specified or defined any basis for the order, but and to make the sale of rice in violation of the
has left it to the sole judgment and discretion of price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in
the Governor-General to say what is or what is
violation of the proclamation a crime, is the private respondent, the Center for
unconstitutional and void. Educational Measurement (CEM).
The petitioners sought to enjoin the
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the
DELEGATION OF POWERS Board of Medical Education and the Center for
YNOT VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE Educational Measurement from enforcing Section
COURT 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as
148 SCRA 659, NO. L- 74457, MARCH 20, 1987 amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of
1985 and from requiring the taking and passing
CRUZ, J: of the NMAT as a condition for securing
FACTS: certificates of eligibility for admission and from
Executive Order 626-A prohibited the administering the NMAT.
transport of the carabaos or carabao meat across The trial court denied said petition. The
the provincial boundaries without government NMAT was conducted and administered as
clearance, for the purpose of preventing the previously scheduled.
indiscriminate slaughter of those animals. Republic Act 2382, as amended by
The Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the
petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump "Medical Act of 1959" with one of its basic
boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they were objectives was to provide for the standardization
confiscated by the police station commander for and regulation of medical education.
violation of EO 626-A. The executive order The statute, among other things,
defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner created a Board of Medical Education with the
and immediately imposed punishment, which was functions specified in Section 5 of the statute
carried out forthright. The petitioner claimed that include the following:
the penalty is invalid because it is imposed (a) To determine and prescribe requirements for
without according the owner a right to be heard admission into a recognized college of medicine;
before a competent and impartial cout as (f) To accept applications for certification for
guaranteed by due process. The petitioner admission to a medical school and keep a
challenges the constitutionality of the said order register of those issued said certificate; and to
and the improper exercise of the legislative collect from said applicants the amount of twenty-
power by the former President under Amendment five pesos each which shall accrue to the
No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. operating fund of the Board of Medical Education;
(h) To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid delegation necessary rules and regulations for the proper
of legislative power in relation to the disposal of implementation of the foregoing functions.
the confiscated properties (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum

requirements for applicants to medical schools
HELD: and one of these is a certificate of eligibility for
No. We also mark, on top of all this, the entrance to a medical school from the Board of
questionable manner of the disposition of the Medical Education.
confiscated property as prescribed in the MECS Order No. 52, issued by the then Minister
questioned executive order. It is there authorized of Education, Culture and Sports established a
that the seized property shall be distributed to uniform admission test called the National
charitable institutions and other similar Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional
institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat requirement for issuance of a certificate of
Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of eligibility for admission into medical schools of
carabeef, and to deserving farmers through the Philippines, beginning with the school year
dispersal ad the Director of the Animal Industry 1986-1987.
may see fit, in the case of carabaos. The phrase Private respondent Center conducted
may see fit is an extremely generous and NMATs for entrance to medical colleges during
dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden the school year 1986-1987 and the year
with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse 1987.1988.
and even corruption, One searches in vain for the The fundamental issue is of course the
usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or constitutionality of the statute or order assailed.
better still, the limitations that the said officers Petitioners had made the argument that Section
must observe when they make their distribution. 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as
There is none. Their options are apparently amended, offend against the constitutional
boundless. Who shall be the fortunate principle which forbids the undue delegation of
beneficiaries of their generosity and by what legislative power, by failing to establish the
criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers necessary standard to be followed by the
named can supply the answer, they and they delegate, the Board of Medical Education.
alone may choose the grantee as they see fit,
and in their own exclusive discretion. ISSUE: Whether or not there exists a sufficient
standard to be followed by the Board
DELEGATION OF POWER HELD:

SECTION 1, ARTICLE VI, 1987 CONSTITUTION Yes. The standards set for subordinate
TABLARIN vs. GUTIERREZ legislation in the exercise of rule making authority
G.R. No. 78164 July 31, 1987 by an administrative agency like the Board of
Medical Education are necessarily broad and
FELICIANO, J .: highly abstract. As explained by then Mr. Justice

FACTS: Fernando in Edu v. Ericta
The petitioners sought admission into The standard may be either expressed
colleges or schools of medicine for the school or implied. If the former, the non-delegation
year 1987-1988. However, the petitioners either objection is easily met. The standard though
did not take or did not successfully take the does not have to be spelled out specifically. It
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) could be implied from the policy and purpose of
required by the Board of Medical Education, one the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector
of the public respondents, and administered by Law, clearly the legislative objective is public
safety. What is sought to be attained as in It is apparent, however, from the

Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the language of this clause that the phrase "as the
roads . public welfare may require" qualified, not the
We believe and so hold that the clauses preceding the one just quoted, but only
necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the place to which the seat of the government
the 1959 Medical Act: "the standardization and may be transferred.
regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 Again, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our
(a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the statute fundamental law ordains:
itself, and that these considered together are The President shall have control of all
sufficient compliance with the requirements of the the executive departments, bureaus, or
non-delegation principle. offices, exercise general supervision
over all local governments as may be
provided by law, and take care that the
DELEGATION OF POWERS laws be faithfully executed.
SEC. 1, ARTICLE VI & SEC. 10 (1) OF
ARTICLE VII, 1987 CONSTITUTION The power of control under this
EMMANUEL PELAEZ VS. AUDITOR provision implies the right of the President to
GENERAL interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may
G.R. NO. L-23825, DECEMBER 24, 1965 be vested by law in the officers of the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices of the national
CONCEPCION, J.: government, as well as to act in lieu of such
FACTS: officers. This power is denied by the Constitution
The President of the Philippines, to the Executive, insofar as local governments
pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised are concerned. With respect to the latter, the
Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders fundamental law permits him to wield no more
Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating authority than that of checking whether said local
thirty-three (33) municipalities. Petitioner governments or the officers thereof perform their
Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the duties as provided by statutory enactments.
Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted a special Upon the other hand if the President
civil action, for a writ of prohibition with could create a municipality, he could, in effect,
preliminary injunction, against the Auditor remove any of its officials, by creating a new
General, to restrain him and his representatives municipality and including therein the barrio in
and agents, from passing in audit any which the official concerned resides, for his office
expenditure of public funds in implementation of would thereby become vacant. Thus, by merely
said executive orders. brandishing the power to create a new
Petitioner alleges that said executive municipality (if he had it), without actually
orders are null and void, on the ground that creating it, he could compel local officials to
Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect,
Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue exercising over them the power of control denied
delegation of legislative power. to him by the Constitution.
Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Then, also, the power of control of the
Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios President over executive departments, bureaus
may "not be created or their boundaries altered or offices implies no more than the authority to
nor their names changed" except by Act of assume directly the functions thereof or to
Congress or of the corresponding provincial interfere in the exercise of discretion by its
board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in officials. Manifestly, such control does not include
the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the authority either to abolish an executive
the council of the municipality or municipalities in department or bureau, or to create a new one. As
which the proposed barrio is situated." a consequence, the alleged power of the
President to create municipal corporations would
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue necessarily connote the exercise by him of an
delegation of legislative power upon the chief authority even greater than that of control, which
executive he has over the executive departments, bureaus
or offices. In other words, Section 68 of the
HELD: Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail
Although Congress may delegate to to comply with the constitutional mandate above
another branch of the Government the power to quoted. Instead of giving the President less
fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or power over local governments than that vested in
administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall him over the executive departments, bureaus or
a violation of the principle of separation of offices, it reverses the process and does the
powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself exact opposite, by conferring upon him more
it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, power over municipal corporations than that
carried out or implemented by the delegate which he has over said executive departments,
and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are bureaus or offices.
sufficiently determinate or determinable to In short, even if it did entail an undue
which the delegate must conform in the delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly
performance of his functions. does, said Section 68, as part of the Revised
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Administrative Code, approved on March 10,
Code does not meet these well-settled 1917, must be deemed repealed by the
requirements for a valid delegation of the power subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935,
to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent
does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or with said statutory enactment.
implemented by the President. Neither does it The Executive Orders in question are
give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the hereby declared null and void ab initio.
evil effects above referred to. In this connection, We believe and so hold that the
we do not overlook the fact that, under the last necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of
clause of the first sentence of Section 68, the the 1959 Medical Act: "the standardization and
President: regulation of medical education" and in Section 5
... may change the seat of the government within (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the statute
any subdivision to such place therein as the itself, and that these considered together are
public welfare may require.
sufficient compliance with the requirements of the district is represented by at least three per
non-delegation principle. centum (3%) of the registered voters thereof,
shall sign a petition for the purpose and register
the same with the Commission.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735 (b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987
Constitution must have at least twelve per
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF centum (12%) of the total number of registered
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AND voters as signatories, of which every legislative
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR. district must be represented by at least three per
centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.
I Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised
General Provisions only after five (5) years from the ratification of the
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5)
"The Initiative and Referendum Act." years thereafter.
Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. The power of the (c) The petition shall state the following:
people under a system of initiative and c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought
referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, repealed, as the case may be;
ordinances, or resolutions passed by any c.2. the proposition;
legislative body upon compliance with the c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;
requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided
recognized and guaranteed. herein;
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered
this Act, the following terms shall mean: voters; and
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one
propose amendments to the Constitution or to hundred (100) words which shall be legibly
propose and enact legislations through an written or printed at the top of every page of the
election called for the purpose. petition.
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely: (d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law,
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a resolution or ordinance passed by the legislative
petition proposing amendments to the assembly of an autonomous region, province or
Constitution; city is deemed validly initiated if the petition
a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition thereof is signed by at least ten per centum
proposing to enact a national legislation; and (10%) of the registered voters in the province or
a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a city, of which every legislative district must be
petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, represented by at least three per centum (3%) of
city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or the registered voters therein; Provided, however,
ordinance. That if the province or city is composed only of
(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by one (1) legislative district, then at least each
the people through a proposition sent to municipality in a province or each barangay in a
Congress or the local legislative body for action. city should be represented by at least three per
(c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.
approve or reject a legislation through an election (e) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance
called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, passed in a municipality shall be deemed validly
namely: initiated if the petition therefor is signed by at
c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a least tenper centum (10%) of the registered
petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part voters in the municipality, of which every
thereof, passed by Congress; and barangay is represented by at least three per
c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.
petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or (f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay
ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and resolution or ordinance is deemed validly initiated
local legislative bodies. if signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the
(d) "Proposition" is the measure proposed by the registered voters in said barangay.
voters. Sec. 6. Special Registration. The Commission
(e) "Plebiscite" is the electoral process by which on Election shall set a special registration day at
an initiative on the Constitution is approved or least three (3) weeks before a scheduled initiative
rejected by the people. or referendum.
(f) "Petition" is the written instrument containing Sec. 7. Verification of Signatures. The
the proposition and the required number of Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on
signatories. It shall be in a form to be determined the basis of the registry list of voters, voters'
by and submitted to the Commission on affidavits and voters identification cards used in
Elections, hereinafter referred to as the the immediately preceding election.
Commission. II
(g) "Local government units" refers to provinces , National Initiative and Referendum
cities, municipalities and barangays. Sec. 8. Conduct and Date of Initiative or
(h) "Local legislative bodies" refers to the Referendum. The Commission shall call and
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang supervise the conduct of initiative or
Panlungsod, Sangguniang Bayan, and referendum. Within a period of thirty (30) days
Sangguniang Nayon. from receipt of the petition, the Commission shall,
(i) "Local executives" refers to the Provincial upon determining the sufficiency of the petition,
Governors, City or Municipal Mayors and Punong publish the same in Filipino and English at least
Barangay, as the case may be. twice in newspapers of general and local
Sec. 4. Who may exercise. The power of circulation and set the date of the initiative or
initiative and referendum may be exercised by all referendum which shall not be earlier than forty-
registered voters of the country, autonomous five (45) days but not later than ninety (90) days
regions, provinces, cities, municipalities and from the determination by the Commission of the
barangays. sufficiency of the petition.
Sec. 5. Requirements. (a) To exercise the Sec. 9. Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum
power of initiative or referendum, at least ten per Proposition. (a) The Proposition of the
centum (10%) of the total number of the enactment, approval, amendment or rejection of
registered voters, of which every legislative a national law shall be submitted to and approved
by a majority of the votes cast by all the shall extend assistance in the formulation of the
registered voters of the Philippines. proposition.
If, as certified to by the Commission, the (d) Two or more propositions may be submitted
proposition is approved by a majority of the votes in an initiative.
cast, the national law proposed for enactment, (e) Proponents shall have one hundred twenty
approval, or amendment shall become effective (120) days in case of autonomous regions, ninety
fifteen (15) days following completion of its (90) days in case of provinces and cities, sixty
publication in the Official Gazette or in a (60) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30)
newspaper of general circulation in the days in case of barangays, from notice
Philippines. If, as certified by the Commission, mentioned in subsection (b) hereof to collect the
the proposition to reject a national law is required number of signatures.
approved by a majority of the votes cast, the said (f) The petition shall be signed before the
national law shall be deemed repealed and the Election Registrar, or his designated
repeal shall become effective fifteen (15) days representative, in the presence of a
following the completion of publication of the representative of the proponent, and a
proposition and the certification by the representative of the regional assemblies and
Commission in the Official Gazette or in a local legislative bodies concerned in a public
newspaper of general circulation in the place in the autonomous region or local
Philippines. government unit, as the case may be. Signature
However, if the majority vote is not obtained, the stations may be established in as many places as
national law sought to be rejected or amended may be warranted.
shall remain in full force and effect. (g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided,
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the the Commission on Elections, through its office in
Constitution approved by a majority of the votes the local government unit concerned shall certify
cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to as to whether or not the required number of
the day of the plebiscite. signatures has been obtained. Failure to obtain
(c) A national or local initiative proposition the required number is a defeat of the
approved by majority of the votes cast in an proposition.
election called for the purpose shall become (h) If the required number of the signatures is
effective fifteen (15) days after certification and obtained, the Commission shall then set a date
proclamation by the Commission. for the initiative at which the proposition shall be
Sec. 10. Prohibited Measures. The following submitted to the registered voters in the local
cannot be the subject of an initiative or government unit concerned for their approval
referendum petition: within ninety (90) days from the date of
(a) No petition embracing more than one (1) certification by the Commission, as provided in
subject shall be submitted to the electorate; and subsection (g) hereof, in case of autonomous
(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the regions, sixty (60) days in case of the provinces
enactment of which are specifically vested in and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of
Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of
to referendum until ninety (90) days after its barangays. The initiative shall then be held on
effectivity. the date set, after which the results thereof shall
Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. Any duly be certified and proclaimed by the Commission
accredited people's organization, as defined by on Elections.
law, may file a petition for indirect initiative with Sec. 14. Effectivity of Local Propositions. If
the House of Representatives, and other the proposition is approved by a majority of the
legislative bodies. The petition shall contain a votes cast, it shall take effect fifteen (15) days
summary of the chief purposes and contents of after certification by the Commission as if
the bill that the organization proposes to be affirmative action thereon had been made by the
enacted into law by the legislature. local legislative body and local executive
The procedure to be followed on the initiative bill concerned. If it fails to obtain said number of
shall be the same as the enactment of any votes, the proposition is considered defeated.
legislative measure before the House of Sec. 15. Limitations on Local Initiatives. (a)
Representatives except that the said initiative bill The power of local initiative shall not be
shall have precedence over the pending exercised more than once a year.
legislative measures on the committee. (b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or
Sec. 12. Appeal. The decision of the matters which are within the legal powers of the
Commission on the findings of the sufficiency or local legislative bodies to enact.
insufficiency of the petition for initiative or (c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the
referendum may be appealed to the Supreme local legislative body shall adopt in toto the
Court within thirty (30) days from notice thereof. proposition presented, the initiative shall be
III cancelled. However, those against such action
Local Initiative and Referendum may, if they so desire, apply for initiative in the
Sec. 13. Procedure in Local Initiative. (a) Not manner herein provided.
less than two thousand (2,000) registered voters Sec. 16. Limitations Upon Local Legislative
in case of autonomous regions, one thousand Bodies. Any proposition or ordinance or
(1,000) in case of provinces and cities, one resolution approved through the system of
hundred (100) in case of municipalities, and fifty initiative and referendum as herein provided shall
(50) in case of barangays, may file a petition with not be repealed, modified or amended, by the
the Regional Assembly or local legislative body, local legislative body concerned within six (6)
respectively, proposing the adoption, enactment, months from the date therefrom, and may be
repeal, or amendment, of any law, ordinance or amended, modified or repealed by the local
resolution. legislative body within three (3) years thereafter
(b) If no favorable action thereon is made by local by a vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all its members:
legislative body within (30) days from its Provided, however, that in case of barangays, the
presentation, the proponents through their duly period shall be one (1) year after the expiration of
authorized and registered representative may the first six (6) months.
invoke their power of initiative, giving notice Sec. 17. Local Referendum. Notwithstanding
thereof to the local legislative body concerned. the provisions of Section 4 hereof, any local
(c) The proposition shall be numbered serially legislative body may submit to the registered
starting from one (1). The Secretary of Local voters of autonomous region, provinces, cities,
Government or his designated representative municipalities and barangays for the approval or
rejection, any ordinance or resolution duly ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

enacted or approved. MARIANO, JR. VS. COMELEC
Said referendum shall be held under the control 242 SCRA 211, 1995
and direction of the Commission within sixty (60)
days in case of provinces and cities, forty-five FACTS:
(45) days in case of municipalities and thirty (30) R.A. 7854, which aims to convert Makati
days in case of barangays. into a city, is assailed as being unconstitutional
The Commission shall certify and proclaim the on the grounds that R.A. 7854 aims to increase
results of the said referendum. membership of the House which the Constitution
Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. Nothing in this fixes and that R.A. 7854 being a special law
Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts cannot change members of the Houses.
from declaring null and void any proposition
approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the ISSUE: Whether or not the conversion of Makati
Constitution or want of capacity of the local into a city is constitutional.
legislative body to enact the said measure.
IV HELD:
Final Provisions Yes. The Supreme Court held that as
Sec. 19. Applicability of the Omnibus Election was already decided by the Supreme Court in
Code. The Omnibus Election Code and other Tobias vs. Abalos, the Constitution provides that
election laws, not inconsistent with the provisions the compositions of the House should not be
of this Act, shall apply to all initiatives and more than 250 members, UNLESS otherwise
referenda. provided by law. The natural result in the
Sec. 20. Rules and Regulations. The creation of a new legislative from a special law
Commission is hereby empowered to promulgate whose purpose is to convert a municipality into a
such rules and regulations as may be necessary city is sanctioned by the Constitution.
to carry out the purposes of this Act.
Sec. 21. Appropriations. The amount
necessary to defray the cost of the initial ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
implementation of this Act shall be charged MONTEJO VS. COMELEC
against the Contingent Fund in the General 242 SCRA 45
Appropriations Act of the current year.
Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for FACTS:
the full implementation of this Act shall be Biliran, a sub-province of Leyte was
included in the annual General Appropriations made into a province which caused the reduction
rd
Act. of the Municipalities under the 3 district of Leyte.
Sec. 22. Separability Clause. If any part or Because of this inequality the COMELEC
provision of this Act is held invalid or reapportioned some of the Municipalities from
unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions one district to another. Montejo now wants to
thereof shall remain valid and effective. transfer a municipality (Tolosa) from his district to
rd
Sec. 23. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect another district (3 ) allegedly because of some
fifteen (15) days after its publication in a inequality in the number of registered voters.
newspaper of general circulation. COMELEC through resolution 2736 permitted the
transfer.
Approved: August 4, 1989
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC have the
power to reapportion districts.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the
COMELEC does not have the power to
reapportion districts but only to make minor
adjustments. The Court added that the creation
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT of a new province though results in an imbalance
TOBIAS VS. ABALOS and devalue a citizens vote in violation of the
239 SCRA 106 equal protection clause of the Constitution the
only remedy is for Congress, to make a
FACTS: reapportionment of the legislative districts.
The municipality of Mandaluyong and
San Juan belonged to only one legislative district.
R.A. 7675 aims to make Mandaluyong into a city. REPUBLIC ACT No. 7941
The petitioner contends that the said law aims to
increase the membership of the House as the AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF
conversion of Mandaluyong into a city will result PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH
in the creation of a separate congressional THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM, AND
district for Mandaluyong. APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
ISSUE: Whether or not the conversion of Makati Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the
into a city is constitutional. "Party-List System Act."
Section 2. Declaration of part y. The State shall
HELD: promote proportional representation in the
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the election of representatives to the House of
creation of a new congressional district for Representatives through a party-list system of
Mandaluyong was but a natural consequence of registered national, regional and sectoral parties
Mandaluyongs conversion into a city. The or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will
Constitution provides that a city should have a enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
population of at least 250,000 and having met and under-represented sectors, organizations
this requirement Mandaluyong is qualified to be and parties, and who lack well-defined political
converted into a city and as provided in the constituencies but who could contribute to the
Constitution entitled to at least 1 representative. formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole,
to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State but in no case not later than sixty (60) days
shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open before election.
party system in order to attain the broadcast Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of
possible representation of party, sectoral or Registration. The COMELEC may, motu propio
group interests in the House of Representatives or upon verified complaint of any interested party,
by enhancing their chances to compete for and refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing,
win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the the registration of any national, regional or
simplest scheme possible. sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of
Section 3. Definition of Terms. the following grounds:
(a) The party-list system is a mechanism of (1) It is a religious sect or denomination,
proportional representation in the election of organization or association, organized
representatives to the House of Representatives for religious purposes;
from national, regional and sectoral parties or (2) It advocates violence or unlawful
organizations or coalitions thereof registered with means to seek its goal;
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). (3) It is a foreign party or organization;
Component parties or organizations of a coalition (4) It is receiving support from any
may participate independently provided the foreign government, foreign political
coalition of which they form part does not party, foundation, organization, whether
participate in the party-list system. directly or through any of its officers or
(b) A party means either a political party or a members or indirectly through third
sectoral party or a coalition of parties. parties for partisan election purposes;
(c) A political party refers to an organized group (5) It violates or fails to comply with
of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, laws, rules or regulations relating to
principles and policies for the general conduct of elections;
government and which, as the most immediate (6) It declares untruthful statements in
means of securing their adoption, regularly its petition;
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and (7) It has ceased to exist for at least one
members as candidates for public office. It is a (1) year; or
national party when its constituency is spread (8) It fails to participate in the last two
over the geographical territory of at least a (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain
majority of the regions. It is a regional party when at least two per centum (2%) of the
its constituency is spread over the geographical votes cast under the party-list system in
territory of at least a majority of the cities and the two (2) preceding elections for the
provinces comprising the region. constituency in which it has registered.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group Section 7. Certified List of Registered Parties.
of citizens belonging to any of the sectors The COMELEC shall, not later than sixty (60)
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal days before election, prepare a certified list of
advocacy pertains to the special interest and national, regional, or sectoral parties,
concerns of their sector, organizations or coalitions which have applied or
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of who have manifested their desire to participate
citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who under the party-list system and distribute copies
share similar physical attributes or thereof to all precincts for posting in the polling
characteristics, employment, interests or places on election day. The names of the part y-
concerns. list nominees shall not be shown on the certified
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly list.
registered national, regional, sectoral parties or Section 8. Nomination of Party-List
organizations for political and/or election Representatives. Each registered party,
purposes. organization or coalition shall submit to the
Section 4. Manifestation to Participate in the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days
Party-List System. Any party, organization, or before the election a list of names, not less than
coalition already registered with the Commission five (5), from which party-list representatives shall
need not register anew. However, such party, be chosen in case it obtains the required number
organization, or coalition shall file with the of votes.
Commission, not later than ninety (90) days A person may be nominated in one (1) list only.
before the election, a manifestation of its desire Only persons who have given their consent in
to participate in the party-list system. writing may be named in the list. The list shall not
Section 5. Registration. Any organized group of include any candidate for any elective office or a
persons may register as a party, organization or person who has lost his bid for an elective office
coalition for purposes of the party-list system by in the immediately preceding election. No change
filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety of names or alteration of the order of nominees
(90) days before the election a petition verified by shall be allowed after the same shall have been
its president or secretary stating its desire to submitted to the COMELEC except in cases
participate in the party-list system as a national, where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing
regional or sectoral party or organization or a his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which
coalition of such parties or organizations, case the name of the substitute nominee shall be
attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral
platform or program of government, list of representatives in the House of Representatives
officers, coalition agreement and other relevant who are nominated in the party-list system shall
information as the COMELEC may require: not be considered resigned.
Provided, That the sectors shall include labor, Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees.
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous No person shall be nominated as party-list
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, representative unless he is a natural-born citizen
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident
professionals. of the Philippines for a period of not less than one
The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at (1)year immediately preceding the day of the
least two (2) national newspapers of general election, able to read and write, a bona fide
circulation. member of the party or organization which he
The COMELEC shall, after due notice and seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
hearing, resolve the petition within fifteen (15) preceding the day of the election, and is at least
days from the date it was submitted for decision twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any
at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than elected party-list representative who changes his
thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. political party or sectoral affiliation during his term
Any youth sectoral representative who attains the of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he
age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed changes his political party or sectoral affiliation
to continue in office until the expiration of his within six (6) months before an election, he shall
term. not be eligible for nomination as party-list
Section 10. Manner of Voting. Every voter shall representative under his new party or
be entitled to two (2) votes: the first is a vote for organization.
candidate for member of the House of Section 16. Vacancy. In case of vacancy in the
Representatives in his legislative district, and the seats reserved for party-list representatives, the
second, a vote for the party, organizations, or vacancy shall be automatically filled by the next
coalition he wants represented in the house of representative from the list of nominees in the
Representatives: Provided, That a vote cast for a order submitted to the COMELEC by the same
party, sectoral organization, or coalition not party, organization, or coalition, who shall serve
entitled to be voted for shall not be counted: for the unexpired term. If the list is exhausted, the
Provided, finally, That the first election under the party, organization coalition concerned shall
party-list system shall be held in May 1998. submit additional nominees.
The COMELEC shall undertake the necessary Section 17. Rights of Party-List Representatives.
information campaign for purposes of educating Party-List Representatives shall be entitled to the
the electorate on the matter of the party-list same salaries and emoluments as regular
system. members of the House of Representatives.
Section 11. Number of Party-List Section 18. Rules and Regulations. The
Representatives. The party-list representatives COMELEC shall promulgate the necessary rules
shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
total number of the members of the House of the purposes of this Act.
Representatives including those under the party- Section 19. Appropriations. The amount
list. necessary for the implementation of this Act shall
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first be provided in the regular appropriations for the
five (5) major political parties on the basis of Commission on Elections starting fiscal year
party representation in the House of 1996 under the General Appropriations Act.
Representatives at the start of the Tenth Starting 1995, the COMELEC is hereby
Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled authorized to utilize savings and other available
to participate in the party-list system. funds for purposes of its information campaign on
In determining the allocation of seats for the the party-list system.
second vote, the following procedure shall be Section 20. Separability Clause. If any part of this
observed: Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other
(a) The parties, organizations, and parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid and
coalitions shall be ranked from the effective.
highest to the lowest based on the Section 21. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees,
number of votes they garnered during executive orders, rules and regulations, or parts
the elections. thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this
(b) The parties, organizations, and Act are hereby repealed.
coalitions receiving at least two percent Section 22. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect
(2%) of the total votes cast for the party- fifteen (15) days after its publication in a
list system shall be entitled to one seat newspaper of general circulation.
each: Provided, That those garnering
more than two percent (2%) of the votes Approved, March 3, 1995.
shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes
: Provided, finally, That each party, ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
organization, or coalition shall be ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS. COMELEC
entitled to not more than three (3) seats. 248 SCRA 300, 1995
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for
Party-List Representatives. The COMELEC shall FACTS:
tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or Montejo then incumbent congressman
coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them of the first district of Leyte petitions for the
according to the number of votes received and disqualification of Imelda Marcos as a candidate
allocate party-list representatives proportionately for the same position because the latter
according to the percentage of votes obtained by supposedly lacks the residency requirement of
each party, organization, or coalition as against one-year. Marcos had only lived in Tolosa
the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list recently and have yet to reside in the first
system. district for the required 1 year. The petitioner is
Section 13. How Party-List Representatives are contending that Imelda had set up residency in
Chosen. Party-list representatives shall be various places throughout her lifetime from
proclaimed by the COMELEC based on the list of teaching in Tacloban up to the time she married
names submitted by the respective parties, where she stayed for years in San Juan, Metro
organizations, or coalitions to the COMELEC Manila.
according to their ranking in said list.
Section 14. Term of Office. Party-list ISSUE: Whether or not Imelda Marcos lacks the
representatives shall be elected for a term of residency requirement in her candidacy.
three (3) years which shall begin, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the HELD:
thirtieth day of June next following their election. No. The SC held that Tolosa remains as
No party-list representatives shall serve for more his domicile of origin. Residence is to be
than three (3) consecutive terms. Voluntary synonymous with domicile particularly in election
renunciation of the office for any length of time law. Marcos domicile of origin was established in
shall not be considered as an interruption in the Tolosa because she followed the domicile of her
continuity his service for the full term for which he parents. This domicile of origin was not lost
was elected. because she got married as residence and
domicile have different meanings under civil law.
The SC even added that considering Petitioner Mohammad Ali Dimaporo was
that her husband died and she went free to elected Representative for the Second
choose her domicile, her intentions were manifest Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during the
in her actions that Tolosa was to be her domicile. 1987 congressional elections and took his oath of
office on January 9, 1987. On January 15, 1990,
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Certificate of
AQUINO VS. COMELEC Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor
248 SCRA 400, 1995 of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
The election was scheduled for February 17,
FACTS: 1990.
Butz Aquinos residence requirement is Upon being informed of this
being contended as he intends to run for development by the COMELEC, respondents
congress in the newly created legislative district Speaker and Secretary of the House of
of Makati. Butz Aquino was contending that his Representatives excluded petitioners name from
lease of a condo unit in Makati is indicative of the the Roll of Members of the House of
fact that he has chosen Makati to be his domicile Representatives pursuant to sec.67, Art.IX of the
and not just residence. Omnibus Election Code, which states: Any
elective official whether national or local running
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of Aquino in for any office other than the one which he is
leasing a condo unit in Makati is indicative of his holding in a permanent capacity except for
desire to make it his domicile. President and Vice President shall be considered
ipso facto (by the mere act) resigned from his
HELD: office upon filing of his certificate of candidacy.
No. The Court ruled against Aquino Petitioner contends that he did not
because his leasing of a condo unit is by no thereby lose his seat as congressman because
means indicative of his desire to make Makati his Sec.67, Art.IX of the B.P. Blg.881 is not operative
permanent home or domicile, considering that he under the present Constitution, being contrary
was still a known resident of Concepcion, Tarlac thereto, and therefore not applicable to the
for the past 52 years of which happens to be his present members of the Congress.
birthplace.
The Supreme Court reiterated how to ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner forfeited his
successfully effect a chage of domicile: seat, upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy
Actual removal/actual change of for another office.
domicile
Intention to abandon former domicile HELD:
and establish a new one Yes. Forfeiture is automatic and
Definite act which correspond with the permanently effective upon the filing of the
purpose certificate of candidacy for another office. Once
the certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited
and nothing save a new election or appointment
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT can restore the ousted official. The wording of the
CO VS. HRET law plainly indicates that only the date of filing of
199 SCRA 293, 1991 the certificate of candidacy should be taken into
account. The law does not make the forfeiture
FACTS: dependent upon the future contingencies,
Ong, a candidate for congressional unforeseen and unforeseeable, since the
elections in his local district is being assailed as vacating is expressly made as of the moment of
to his qualifications that his being a natural-born the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
citizen is questionable along with not having
complied with the residency requirement.
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
ISSUE: Whether or not Ong met the JIMENEZ V. CABANGBANG
qualifications and the residency requirement. G.R. NO. L-15905, AUGUST 3, 1966
HELD: FACTS:
Yes. As to the matter of citizenship the Court This is an ordinary civil action, originally
ruled in Ongs favor citing the following reasons: instituted in the Court of First instance of Rizal,
Ongs father was already naturalized for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jiminez,
while he was just 9 years old Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several
Ongs mother was a Filipina plus the sums of money, by way of damages for the
fact that a lot of instances transpired publication of an allegedly libelous letter of the
after he reached the age of majority defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. Upon being
than reinforces the fact that he elected summoned, the letter moved to dismiss the
Filipino citizenship. complaint upon the ground that the letter in
That the fact that his brothers question is not libelous, and that, even if were,
citizenship was in fact already answered said letter is a privileged communication. This
favorably by the Constitutional motion having been granted by the lower court,
Commission itself. plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the
As to the issue of residence, again the corresponding order of dismissal.
court ruled in Ongs favor holding that he never
had any intention to abandon his domicile of ISSUES:
origin despite having stayed in Manila to study or a. Whether or not the publication in
pursue his personal career. question is a privileged communication?
b. Whether or not it is libelous?
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT HELD:

DIMAPORO VS. MITRA a. No. The aforementioned publication
202 SCRA 779, 1991 does not fall within the purview of the phrase
speech and debate therein that is to say in
FACTS: Congress used in Art.VI, sec.15 of the
Constitution. Said expression refers to utterances
made by Congressmen in the performance of against the President. The House is the judge of
their official functions, such as speeches what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only
delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the because the Constitution has conferred
halls of Congress, while the same is in session jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter
as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether depends mainly on factual circumstances of
the same is in session or not, and other acts which the House knows best but which can not
performed by Congressmen, either in Congress be depicted in black and white for presentation
or outside the premises housing its offices, in the to, and adjudication by the Courts. The house
official discharge of their duties as members of has exclusive power; the courts have no
Congress and of Congressional Committees duly jurisdiction to interfere. The theory of separation
authorized to perform its functions as such at the of powers fastidiously observed by this Court,
time of the performance of the acts in question. demands in such situation a prudent refusal to
The publication involved in this case interfere.
does not belong to this category. According to the
complaint herein, it was an open letter to the b. No. The resolution does not violate the
President of the Philippines, dated November 14, constitutional parliamentary immunity for
1958, when Congress presumably was not in speeches delivered in the House. Our
session, and defendant caused said letter to be Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity
published in several newspapers of general which is a fundamental privilege in every
circulation in the Philippines, on or about said legislative assembly of the democratic world. But
date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the it does not protect him from responsibility before
communication to be so published, he was not the legislative body itself whenever his words and
performing his official duty, either as a member of conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or
Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof. unbecoming of a member thereof. For
Hence, the said communication is not absolutely unparliamentary conduct, members of the
privileged. parliament or of Congress have bee, or could be
b. No. The letter in question is not censured, committed to prison, suspended, even
sufficient to support plaintiffs action for damages. expelled by the votes of their colleagues.
It is true that the complaint alleges that an open
letter in question was written by the defendant,
knowing that is false and with the intent to ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
impeach plaintiffs reputation, to expose them to ZANDUETA VS. DELA COSTA
public hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule, G.R. NO. L-46267, NOVEMBER 28, 1938
and to alienate them from their associates, but
these allegations are mere conclusions which are FACTS:
inconsistent with the contents of said letter and While petitioner Francis Zandueta was
th
cannot prevail over the same, it being the very presiding over the 5 Branch of Courts of First
basis of the complaint. The very document upon Instance of Manila, he received a new ad interim
which plaintiffs action is based explicitly indicates appointment, issued in accordance with
that they might be absolutely unaware of the Commonwealth Act No. 145, to discharge the
alleged operational plans, and that they may be Office of Judge in the Court of First Instance of
th
merely unwitting tools of the planners. This the 4 Judicial District with authority to preside
statement is not derogatory to the plaintiffs to the over the CFI of Manila and Palawan. The
point of entitling them to recover damages. National Assembly adjourned without its
Commission on Appointments having acted on
said ad interim appointment.
The Commission on Appointments of
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT the National Assembly disapproved the ad
OSMENA V. PENDATUN interim appointment of petitioner. Subsequently,
G.R. NO. L-17144 OCTOBER 28, 1960 the President of the Philippines appointed
respondent Sixto de la Costa, judge of first
th
FACTS: instance of the 4 Judicial District, with authority
Congressman Sergio Osmena, Jr., in a to preside over the CFI of Manila and Palawan,
privilege speech delivered before the House, and his appointment was approved by the
made the serious imputations of bribery against Commission on Appointments of the National
the President which are quoted in Resolution No. Assembly.
59. Petitioner instituted quo warranto
Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun proceedings against respondent and also
and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity questioned the validity of the appointment
as members of the Special Committee created by alleging that C.A. No. 145 is unconstitutional.
House Resolution No. 59 found said
congressman guilty of serious disorderly ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner may
behavior; and acting on such report, the House proceed to question the constitutionality of C.A.
approved on the same day-before closing its No. 145 by virtue of which the new ad interim
th
session-House Resolution No. 175, declaring him appointment of judge of first instance of the 4
guilty as recommended and suspending him from Judicial District, to preside over the CFI of Manila
office for fifteen months. and Palawan, was issued in his favor?
ISSUES: HELD:
a. Whether or not delivery of speeches No. Petitioner is estopped by his own
attacking the Chief Executive constitutes act form proceeding to question the
disorderly conduct for which Osmena may constitutionality of C.A. No. 145. He likewise
be disciplined? knew, or at least he should know, that his ad
b. Whether or not the resolution violated his interim appointment was subject to the approval
constitutional absolute parliamentary of the Commission on Appointments of the
immunity for speeches delivered in the National Assembly and that if said Commission
House? were to disapprove the same, it would become
ineffective and he would cease discharging the
HELD: office. The petitioner was free to accept or not the
a. Yes. There is no question that Congressman ad interim appointment issued by the President of
Osmena made a serious imputation of bribery the Commonwealth in his favor, in accordance
with said C.A. No. 145. Nothing or nobody acquired them "after the fact" that is, on May 30,
compelled him to do so. When a public official 1979, after the contested election of Directors on
voluntarily accepts an appointment to an office May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit had
newly created or reorganized by law which new been filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC and one
office is incompatible with the one formerly day before the scheduled hearing of the case
occupied by him qualifies for the discharge of before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is
the functions thereof by taking the necessary more, before he moved to intervene, he had
oath, and enters in the performance of his duties signified his intention to appear as counsel for
by executing acts respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, but which was
inherent in said newly created or reorganized objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the
office and receiving the corresponding salary, he validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to
will be considered to have abandoned the office "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the
he was occupying by virtue of his former matter under litigation. And it maybe noted that in
appointment, and he cannot question the the case filed before the Rizal Court of First
constitutionality of the law by which he was last Instance (L-51928), he appeared as counsel for
appointed. He was estopped form questioning defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent
the validity of said appointment by alleging that Acero therein.
the law, by virtue of which his appointment was Under those facts and circumstances,
issued, is unconstitutional. He is exempted from there has been an indirect circumvention of the
said rule only when his non-acceptance of the constitutional prohibition. An assemblyman
new appointment may affect public interest or cannot indirectly follow the constitutional
when he is compelled to accept it by reason of prohibition not to appear as counsel before an
legal exigencies. administrative tribunal like the SEC by buying
nominal amount of share of one of the
stockholders after his appearance as counsel
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT therein was contested. A ruling upholding the
SECTION 14 ARTICLE VI 1987 CONSTITUTION intervention would make the constitutional
PUYAT VS. DE GUZMAN, JR. provision ineffective. All an Assemblymen need
(G.R. NO. L-51122, MARCH 25, 1982) to do, if he wants to influence an administrative
body is to acquire a minimal participation in the
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: interest of the client and then intervene in the
FACTS: proceedings. That which the Constitution
This suit for certiorari and Prohibition prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a
with Preliminary Injunction is poised against the general legislative act which is intended to
Order of respondent Associate Commissioner of accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly
the SEC granting Assemblyman Estanislao A. prohibited.
Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case No.
1747.
Before he moved to intervene he had ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
signified his intention to appear as counsel for the SECTION 16 ARTICLE VI 1987 CONSTITUTION
respondent T.C. Acero, but which was objected SANTIAGO VS. GUINGONA, JR.
to by petitioners. Acero instituted at the SEC quo (G.R. NO. 134577, NOVEMBER 18, 1998)
warranto proceedings, questioning the election
for the 11 Directors of the International Pipe PANGANIBAN, J.:
Industries Corporation, a private corporation. FACTS:
Acero claimed that the stockholders votes were The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen.
not properly counted. Justice Estanislao A. John Henry R. Osmea as presiding officer,
Fernandez, then member of the Interim Batasang convened on July 27, 1998 the first regular
Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as session of the eleventh Congress. Senator Tatad
counsel for respondent Acero to which petitioner thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of
Eugenio Puyat objected on Constitutional Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other
grounds Sec.11, Art.VIII, of the 1973 member of the minority, he was assuming the
Constitution, then in force, provided that no position of minority leader. He explained that
Assemblyman could appear as counsel before those who had voted for Senator Fernan, as
any administrative body, and SEC was an Senate President, comprised the "majority," while
administrative body. The cited constitutional only those who had voted for him, the losing
prohibition being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez nominee, belonged to the "minority."
did not continue his appearance for respondent During the discussion on who should
Acero. constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M.
Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to
ISSUE: Whether or not, in intervening in the SEC the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering
Case, Assemblyman Fernandez is, in effect, seven (7) and, thus, also a minority had
appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader.
administrative body in contravention of the No consensus on the matter was arrived at. The
Constitutional provision. following session day, the debate on the question
continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad
HELD: delivering privilege speeches.
Yes. Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion Miriam Defensor Santiago and
for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot Francisco S. Tatad later instituted an original
be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section
he is not appearing on behalf of another, 5, Rules of Court, seeking the ouster of Senator
although he is joining the cause of the private Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader of the
respondents. His appearance could theoretically Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as
be for the protection of his ownership of ten (10) the rightful minority leader.
shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation
and not for the protection of the petitioners nor ISSUES:
respondents who have their respective capable 1. Does the Court have jurisdiction to settle the
and respected counsel. controversy?
However, he later had acquired a mere 2. In recognizing Respondent Guingona as the
P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing ten Senate minority leader, did the Senate or its
shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He
officials, particularly Senate President Suddenly, the petitioner banged the

Fernan, violate the Constitution or the laws? gavel and abandoning the Chair hurriedly walked
out of the session hall followed by Senator David,
HELD: Tirona, Francisco, Torres, Magalona and Clarin,
1. Yes. This Court has jurisdiction over the while the rest of the senators remained.
petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction Whereupon Senator Melencio Arranz, Senate
of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate President Pro-tempore, urged by those senators
or its officials committed a violation of the present took the Chair and proceeded with the
Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in session.
the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. Senator Cabili stood up, and asked that
2. No. While the Constitution mandates it be made of record it was so made that
that the President of the Senate must be elected the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the
by a number constituting more than one half of all petitioner, made it incumbent upon Senate
the members thereof, it does not provide that the President Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining
members who will not vote for him shall ipso members of the Senate to continue the session in
facto constitute the "minority," who could thereby order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate.
elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then
regulation states that the defeated candidate suggested that respondent be designated to
shall automatically become the minority leader. preside over the session which suggestion was
While the Constitution is explicit on the carried unanimously. The respondent thereupon
manner of electing a Senate President and a took the Chair.
House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the Upon motion of Senator Arranz which
manner of selecting the other officers in both was approved, Gregorio Abad was appointed
chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says Acting Secretary. Senator Taada, after being
is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to
officers as it may deem necessary." The method deliver his privilege speech. Thereafter Senator
of choosing who will be such other officers is Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said
merely a derivative of the exercise of the Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his motion for
prerogative conferred by the aforequoted approval thereof and the same was unanimously
constitutional provision. Therefore, such method approved.
must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by With Senate President Pro-tempore
this Court. Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the
respondent had yielded it to him, Senator
Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT "Resolution declaring vacant the position of the
SECTION 16 ARTICLE VI 1987 CONSTITUTION President of the Senate and designated the
AVELINO VS. CUENCO Honorable Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting
(G.R. NO. L-2821, MARCH 4, 1949) President of the Senate." Put to a vote, the said
resolution was unanimously approved.
FACTS: Senator Cuenco took the oath.
Senator Prospero Sanidad filed with the The next day the President of the
Secretary of the Senate a resolution enumerating Philippines recognized the respondent as acting
charges against the then Senate President and president of the Philippines Senate.
ordering the investigation thereof. When the By his petition in this quo warranto
meeting was called to order, Senator Sanidad proceeding petitioners asked the Court to declare
moved that the roll call be dispensed with but him the rightful President of the Philippines
Senator Tirona opposed said motion. The roll senate and oust respondent.
was called.
Senator Sanidad next moved to ISSUE: Does the Court have jurisdiction over the
dispense with the reading of the minutes, but this petition?
motion was likewise opposed by Senator Tirona
and David. HELD:
Before and after the roll call and before None. The constitutional grant to the
and after the reading of the minutes, Senator Senate of the power to elect its own president,
Taada repeatedly stood up to claim his right to which power should not be interfered with, nor
deliver his one-hour privilege speech but the taken over, by the judiciary.
petitioner, then presiding, continuously ignored The Court will not sally into the
him; and when after the reading of the minutes, legitimate domain of the Senate on the plea that
Senator Taada instead on being recognized by our refusal to intercede might lead into a crisis,
the Chair, the petitioner announced that he would even a resolution. No state of things has been
order the arrest of any senator who would speak proved that might change the temper of the
without being previously recognized by him, but Filipino people as a peaceful and law-abiding
all the while, tolerating the actions of his follower, citizens. And we should not allow ourselves to be
Senator Tirona, who was continuously shouting stampeded into a rash action inconsistent with
at Senator Sanidad "Out of order!" everytime the the calm that should characterized judicial
latter would ask for recognition of Senator deliberations.
Taada. Supposing that the Court has
At this juncture, some disorderly jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the
conduct broke out in the Senate gallery. Senator session under Senator Arranz was a continuation
Pablo Angeles David, one of the petitioner's of the morning session and that a minority of ten
followers, moved for adjournment of session. senators may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the
Senator Sanidad registered his opposition to the other twelve senators from passing a resolution
adjournment of the session and this opposition that met with their unanimous endorsement. The
was seconded by herein respondent who moved answer might be different had the resolution been
that the motion of adjournment be submitted to a approved only by ten or less.
vote. Another commotion ensued.
Senator David reiterated his motion for
adjournment and herein respondent also ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
reiterated his opposition to the adjournment and SECTION 16 ARTICLE VI 1987 CONSTITUTION
again moved that the motion of Senator David be OSMEA VS. PENDATUN
submitted to a vote. (G.R. NO. L-17144, OCTOBER 28, 1960)
district's representation can not be more weightly

BENGZON, J.: in the matter of suspension than in the case of
FACTS: imprisonment of a legislator; yet deliberative
Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., bodies have the power in proper cases, to
submitted to this Court a verified petition for commit one of their members to jail.
"declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction" against Congressman ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other PAREDES, JR. VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
congressmen in their capacity as members of the GR NO. 118364. JANUARY 28, 1997
Special Committee created by House Resolution
No. 59. He asked for annulment of such FACTS:
Resolution on the ground of infringement of his While Congressman was still Provincial
parliamentary immunity. He also asked, Governor, charges of violations of the Anti-Graft
principally, that said members of the special Law were filed against him before the
committee be enjoined from proceeding in Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, he was elected to
accordance with it, particularly the portion Congress. During his second term in Congress,
authorizing them to require him to substantiate the Sandiganbayan imposed a preventive
his charges of bribery against then President suspension on him pursuant to the Anti-Graft
Garcia with the admonition that if he failed to do Law. Paredes challenged the authority of the
so, he must show cause why the House should Sandiganbayan to suspend a district
not punish him. representative.
Congressman Osmea alleged; first, the
Resolution violated his constitutional absolute ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can be
parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in suspended.
the House; second, his words constituted no
actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly HELD:
objectionable speech and words, the House took YES. Petitioners invocation of Section
up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the 16(3), Article VI of the Constitution which deals
Rules of House provides that if other business with the power of each House of Congress inter
has intervened after the member had uttered alias to punish its members of Congress for
obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held disorderly behavior and suspend or expel a
to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by member by a vote of two0thirds of the members
the House. subject to the qualification that the penalty of the
The Special Committee during the suspension spoken of in Sec. 13 of RA 3019
pendency of his petition, found said congressman which is not penalty by a preliminary preventive
guilty of serious disorderly behavior. The House measure presenting from the fact that the latter is
approved House Resolution No. 175 declaring not being imposed on the petitioner for
him suspended from office for 15 months. misbehavior as a Member of the House of
Representative.
ISSUE: Can the House of Representatives
discipline its members as in the case at bar?
HELD: US VS. PONS
Yes. The House is the judge of what 34 PHIL 729. 1916
constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only
because the Constitution has conferred FACTS:
jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter The respondent, together with Beliso
depends mainly on factual circumstances of and Lasarte were charged with illegal importation
which the House knows best but which can not of opium. Pons and Beliso were tried separately
be depicted in black and white for presentation on motion of counsel. Lasarte had not yet been
to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, arrested. Each was found guilty of the crime,
if this Court assumed the power to determine charged and sentenced accordingly. Both
whether Osmea conduct constituted disorderly appealed. Beliso later withdrew his appeal and
behaviour, it would thereby have assumed the judgment as to him has become final.
appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution Respondents motion alleged to prove that the
never intended to confer upon a coordinate last day of the special session of the Philippine
th
branch of the Government. The theory of Legislature for 1914 was the 28 day of
separation of powers fastidiously observed by February, that Act No.2381 under which Pons
this Court, demands in such situation a prudent must be punished if found guilty, was not passed
th
refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been nor approved on the 28 of February but on
said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within March 1 of that year. Also, counsel for Pons
its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own alleged that the Assemblys clock was stopped
sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 on February 18, 1914 at midnight and left so until
Phil., 139.) the determination of the discussion of all pending
Under our form of government, the matters among which was Act NO. 2381. to
judicial department has no power to revise even prove aid allegations, counsel argued the court to
the most arbitrary and unfair action of the go beyond the proceedings of the Legislature as
legislative department, or of either house thereof, recorded in the journals.
taking in pursuance of the power committed
exclusively to that department by the ISSUE: Whether or not the court may go beyond
Constitution. It has been held by high authority the recitals of legislature journals or just take
that, even in the absence of an express provision judicial notice of said journals for the purpose of
conferring the power, every legislative body in determining the date of adjournment when such
which is vested the general legislative power of journal are clear and explicitly.
the state has the implied power to expel a
member for any cause which it may deem HELD:
sufficient. YES. From their very nature and object
The Congress has the inherent the records of the Legislature are as important as
legislative prerogative of suspension which the those of the judiciary. And to inquire into the
Constitution did not impair. In any event, veracity of the journals of the Philippine
petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the Legislature when they are, as we have said, clear
and explicit, would be to violate both the letter measure on the ground inter alia that it is
and the spirit of the organic laws by which the discriminatory and encroached on the
Philippine government was brought into independence of the judiciary.
existence, to invade and coordinate and
independent department of the Government and ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of the
to interfere with the legitimate powers and petitioner is tenable.
functions of the Legislature.
HELD:
YES. Under the doctrine of separation of
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the
CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., VS. certification of the approval of a bill from the
GIMENEZ presiding officers of Congress. The
7 SCRA 347 (1963) aforementioned measure is declared
unconstitutional insofar as it withdraws the
FACTS: franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTC and
Pursuant to the provisions of RA 7609 MTC and other government offices.
known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee It is alleged that RA No. 7354 is
Law, the Central Bank issued Circular NO. 95 discriminatory because while withdrawing the
fixing a unified margin fee of 25% on foreign franking privilege of the Judiciary, it retains the
exchange transaction and a memorandum same for the President of the Philippines, the
establishing the procedure for application for Vice-President of the Philippines, Senators and
exemption from payment of said fee. In members of the House of Representatives, the
November and December 1959, and in May Commission on Elections, former president of he
1960, Casco Philippine Chemical Co. Inc., Philippines, widows of former presidents of the
brought foreign exchange for the importation of Philippines, the national census and statistics
urea and formaldehyde and paid for the margin Office and the general public in the filing of
fee therefore. Then as petitioner, the Central complaints against public offices or officers.
Bank declaring that separate importation of urea The equal protection of the laws is
and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. When embraced in the concept of the due process, as
the back issue corresponding margin fee unfair discrimination offends the requirement of
vouchers for the refund, the auditor of the back justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been
issue the said vouchers upon the ground that the embodied in a separate clause in Article III,
exemption granted by the Monetary Board is in Section I of the Constitution to provide for a more
violation of Sec. 2(18_ of RA 2609, according to specific guaranty against any form of undue
the pertinent portion of the Act, urea favoritism or hostility from the government.
formaldehyde is exempted from the margin fee. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on
The National Institute of Science and Technology the basis of the due process clause .but if the
further affirms that urea formaldehyde is particular act assailed partakes of an
different from urea and formaldehyde. Hence, the unwarranted partiality or prejudice the sharper
separate importations of these two raw materials weapon to cut it down is the equal protection
are not excluded from margin fee. clause.
ISSUE: Whether or not the phrase urea

formaldehyde as used in the statute should be SEPARATION OF POWERS; ENROLLED BILL
read as urea and formaldehyde. DOCTRINE
ARROYO VS. DE VENECIA
HELD: (G.R. NO. 127255. AUGUST 14, 1997)
NO. Hence, urea formaldehyde is
clearly a finished product which is patently MENDOZA, J.
distinct and different from urea and FACTS:
formaldehyde as used in the manufacture of the Petitioners are members of the House of
synthetic resin known as urea formaldehyde. Representatives. They brought this suit against
Petitioner contends, however, that the bill the respondents charging them violation of the
approved in Congress contained the copulative rules of the House which petitioners claim are
conjunction and between the term urea and "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation
formaldehyde, not the latter as a finished is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
product, citing in support of this view the The present petition also challenges the validity
statements made on the floor of Senate, during of RA No. 8240, which amends certain provisions
the consideration of the bill before said House, by of the National Internal Revenue Code by
members thereof. imposing so-called *sin taxes (actually specific
Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and
which uses the term urea formaldehyde is a cigarettes.
conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor The law originated in the House of
of the measure passed by the Congress and Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was
approved by the President. approved on third reading on September 12,
1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to
the Senate which approved it with certain
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT amendments on third reading on November 17,
PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS. 1996. A bicameral conference committee was
PRADO formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of
227 SCRA 703. 1993 the House and Senate versions of the bill.
The bicameral conference committee
FACTS: submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on
The Philippine Postal Corporation November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a
implemented RA 7534, a measure withdrawing recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier proceeded to
the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTC and deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he
MTC along with certain other government offices. was interpellate. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was
The petitioners are members of the lower courts first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep.
who feel that their official functions as judges will Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep.
be prejudiced by the aforementioned measure. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and
The petitioners assail the constitutionality of the asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair
(Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the

presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo appealed the JURISDICTION; JUDICIAL REVIEW OF HRET
ruling of the Chair, but his motion was defeated DECISIONS
when put to a vote. The interpellation of the ROBLES vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
sponsor thereafter proceeded. Petitioner Rep. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET)
Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was (G.R. NO. 86647. FEBRUARY 5, 1990)
fourth in the order. In the course of his
interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he MEDIALDEA, J.
was going to raise a question on the quorum, FACTS:
although until the end of his interpellation he Petitioner Virgilio Robles and private
never did. respondent Romeo Santos were candidates for
st
On the same day, the bill was signed by the position of Congressman of the 1 district of
the Speaker of the House of Representatives and Caloocan City in the May 1987 elections.
the President of the Senate and certified by the Petitioner Robles was proclaimed the winner.
respective secretaries of both Houses of Santos filed an election protest with respondent
Congress as having been finally passed by the HRET, alleging that the elections were
House of Representatives and by the Senate on characterized by the commission of electoral
November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed frauds and irregularities. He likewise prayed for
into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on the recounting of the genuine ballots in all the
November 22, 1996. 320 contested precincts. Petitioner alleged the
late filing of the protest.
ISSUE: Whether or not the passage of RA No. The HRET issued an order setting the
8240 is in violation of the rules of the House, commencement of the revision of contested
hence making it null and void. ballots on September 1, 1988 and directed
protestant Santos to identify 25% of the total
HELD: contested precincts which he desires to be
NO. First, it is clear from the foregoing revised first in accordance with Section 18 of the
facts that what is alleged to have been violated in Rules of the HRET. On September 7, 1988, the
the enactment of R.A. No 8240 are merely revision of the ballots for 75 precincts,
internal rules of procedure of the House rather representing the initial 25% of all the contested
than constitutional requirements for the precincts, was terminated.
enactment of a law, i.e. Article VI, Secs. 26-27. Robles filed an Urgent Motion to
The Constitution provides that each House may Suspend Revision while Santos filed a Motion to
determine the rules of its proceedings. The Withdraw Protest on the unrevised precincts. But
prevailing view is that they are subject to the HRET did not act on the said motions. Santos
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure then filed an Urgent Motion to Recall and
of the body adopting them as they are primarily Disregard Withdrawal of Protest which was
procedural. Courts ordinary have no concern with granted by the HRET. Hence the resumption of
their observance. They may be waived or the revision of the ballots was ordered.
disregarded by the legislative body. Robles filed a Motion for
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them Reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, the
does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken instant petition. Petitioner contends in the present
if the requisite number of members have agreed petition that when private respondent filed the
to a particular measure. The above principle is Motion to Withdraw Protest on Unrevised
subject, however, to this qualification. We have Precincts and Motion to Set Case for Hearing,
no more power to look into the internal respondent HRET lost its jurisdiction over the
proceedings of a House than members of that case, hence when respondent HRET
House have to look over our shoulders, as long subsequently ordered the revision of the
as no violation of constitutional provisions is unrevised protested ballots, notwithstanding the
shown. withdrawal of the protest, it acted without
Second, under the enrolled bill doctrine, jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the
House and the President of the Senate and the ISSUE: Whether or not respondent HRET has
certification by the secretaries of both Houses of lost its jurisdiction over the case.
Congress that it was passed on November 21,
1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. Where HELD:
there is no evidence to the contrary, the Court will NO. It is noted that upon Santos filing of
respect the certification of the presiding officers his Motion to Withdraw on Unrevised Precincts
of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed. on September 12, 1988, no action thereon was
Under this rule, this Court has refused to taken by respondent HRET. The mere filing of
determine claims that the three-fourths vote the motion to withdraw protest on the remaining
needed to pass a proposed amendment to the uncontested precincts, without any action on the
Constitution had not been obtained, because "a part of respondent tribunal, does not by itself
duly authenticated bill or resolution imports divest the tribunal of its jurisdiction over the case.
absolute verify and is binding on the courts." Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the
Moreover, as already noted, the due instance of the parties but continues until the
enactment of the law in question is confirmed by case is terminated.
the Journal of the House of November 21, 1996 The Court agrees with the HRET when it
which shows that the conference committee held that the Tribunal retains the authority to
report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A. No. grant or deny the Motion, and the withdrawal
8740, was approved on that day. The keeping of becomes effective only when the motion is
the Journal is required by the Constitution, Art. granted. To hold otherwise would permit a party
VI, 16(4). The Journal is regarded as conclusive to deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction already
with respect to matters that are required by the acquired. The Court therefore holds that this
Constitution to be recorded therein. As already Tribunal retains the power and the authority to
noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is grant or deny Protestants Motion to Withdraw, if
shown in the Journal. Hence its due enactment only to insure that the Tribunal retains sufficient
has been duly proven. authority to see to it that the will of the electorate
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is ascertained.
and prohibition is DISMISSED. Since Protestant's "Motion to Withdraw
Protest on the Unrevised Precincts" had not been
acted upon by this Tribunal before it was recalled protest filed the election of the herein petitioner
by the Protestant, it did not have the effect of notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such
removing the precincts covered thereby from the election by resolution of the National Assembly.
protest. If these precincts were not withdrawn
from the protest, then the granting of Protestant's HELD:
"Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard (1) YES. The separation of powers is a
Withdrawal of Protest" did not amount to allowing fundamental principle in our system of
the refiling of protest beyond the reglementary government. It obtains not through express
period. provision but by actual division in our
In the absence of any clear showing of Constitution. Each department of the government
abuse of discretion on the part of respondent has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
tribunal in promulgating the assailed resolutions, jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.
a writ of certiorari will not issue. Where the court In the case at bar, here then is
has jurisdiction over the subject matter, its orders presented an actual controversy involving as it
upon all questions pertaining to the cause are does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature
orders within its jurisdiction, and however between the National Assembly on the one hand,
erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected and the Electoral Commission on the other. The
by certiorari. This rule more appropriately applies Electoral Commission is a constitutional organ
to respondent HRET whose independence as a created for a specific purpose, namely to
constitutional body has time and again been determine all contests relating to the election,
upheld by the Court in many cases. Thus, returns and qualifications of the members of the
judicial review of decisions or final resolutions of National Assembly. Although the Electoral
the HRET is (thus) possible only in the exercise Commission may not be interfered with, when
of this Courts so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, and while acting within the limits of its authority, it
upon a determination that the tribunals decision does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the
or resolution was rendered without or in excess constitutional mechanism adopted by the people
of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of and that it is not subject to constitutional
discretion. restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a
ACCORDINGLY, finding no grave separate department of the government, and
abuse of discretion on the part of respondent even if it were, conflicting claims of authority
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in under the fundamental law between department
issuing the assailed resolutions, the instant powers and agencies of the government are
petition is DISMISSED. necessarily determined by the judiciary in
justifiable and appropriate cases. Upon principle,
reason and authority, we are clearly of the
SEPARATION OF POWERS; LEGISLATURE opinion that upon the admitted facts of the
ELECTORAL COMMISSION present case, this court has jurisdiction over the
ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION Electoral Commission and the subject mater of
(G.R. NO. L-45081. JULY 15, 1936) the present controversy for the purpose of
determining the character, scope and extent of
LAUREL, J. the constitutional grant to the Electoral
FACTS: Commission as "the sole judge of all contests
Petitioner Jose Angara and the relating to the election, returns and qualifications
respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and of the members of the National Assembly."
Dionisio Mayor, were candidates for the position (2) NO. The issue hinges on the
of member of the National Assembly for the first interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the
district of the Province of Tayabas in the Constitution which provides:
September 17, 1935 elections. Petitioner was "SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission
proclaimed winner. composed of three Justice of the Supreme Court
The National Assembly passed designated by the Chief Justice, and of six
Resolution No. 8 which effectively confirmed the Members chosen by the National Assembly,
election of petitioner to the said body. Ynsua filed three of whom shall be nominated by the party
before the Electoral Commission a Motion of having the largest number of votes, and three by
Protest against the election of petitioner. the party having the second largest number of
Meanwhile, on December 9, 1935, the National votes therein. The senior Justice in the
Assembly, in a resolution, fixed said date as the Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral
last day for the filing of protests against the Commission shall be the sole judge of all
election, returns and qualifications of members of contests relating to the election, returns and
the National Assembly, notwithstanding the qualifications of the members of the National
previous confirmation made by them. Assembly." It is imperative, therefore, that we
Angara then filed a petition praying for delve into the origin and history of this
the dismissal of Ynsuas protest. He alleged that constitutional provision and inquire into the
Resolution no. 8 was passed by the National intention of its framers and the people who
Assembly in the exercise of its constitutional adopted it so that we may properly appreciate its
prerogative to prescribe the period during which full meaning, import and significance.
protests against the election of its members The Electoral Commission is a
should be presented. But said Motion to Dismiss constitutional creation, invested with the
was denied by the Electoral Commission. Hence necessary authority in the performance and
the present petition filed by petitioner seeking to execution of the limited and specific function
restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission assigned to it by the Constitution. The grant of
from taking further cognizance of the protest power to the Electoral Commission to judge all
made by Ynsua against the election of said contests relating to the election, returns and
petitioner. qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, is intended to be as complete and
ISSUES: unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
(1) Whether or not the Court has legislature. The express lodging of that power in
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of
the subject matter of the controversy. the exercise of that power by the National
(2) Whether or not the Electoral Assembly.
Commission acted without or in excess of its Resolution No. 8 of the National
jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of the Assembly confirming the election of members
against whom no protests had been filed at the over the protest filed by private respondent. To
time of its passage on December 3, 1935, cannot support his contention, he cited Section 250 of
be construed as a limitation upon the time for the the Omnibus Election Code which provides:
initiation of election contests. While there might Sec. 250. Election contests for Batasang
have been good reason for the legislative Pambansa, regional, provincial and city offices .
practice of confirmation of the election of A sworn petition contesting the election of any
members of the legislature at the time when the Member of the Batasang Pambansa or any
power to decide election contests was still lodged regional, provincial or city official shall be filed
in the legislature, confirmation alone by the with the Commission by any candidate who has
legislature cannot be construed as depriving the duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been
Electoral Commission of the authority incidental voted for the same office, within ten days after
to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of the proclamation of the results of the election.
all contest relating to the election, returns, and On the other hand, in finding that the
qualifications of the members of the National protest was flied on time, the HRET relied on
Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said Sec. 9 of its Rules, to wit:
election protests. Confirmation by the National Election contests arising from the 1987
Assembly of the returns of its members against Congressional elections shall be filed with the
whose election no protests have been filed is, to Office of the Secretary of the Tribunal or mailed
all legal purposes, unnecessary. As contended at the post office as registered matter addressed
by the Electoral Commission in its resolution of to the Secretary of the Tribunal, together with
January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the twelve (12) legible copies thereof plus one (1)
herein petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by copy for each protestee, within fifteen (15) days
the respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the from the effectivity of these Rules on November
election of any member is not required by the 22, 1987 where the proclamation has been made
Constitution before he can discharge his duties prior to the effectivity of these Rules, otherwise,
as such member. the same may be filed within fifteen (15) days
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral from the date of the proclamation . Election
Commission was acting within the legitimate contests arising from the 1987 Congressional
exercise of its constitutional prerogative in elections filed with the Secretary of the House of
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed Representatives and transmitted by him to the
by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the Chairman of the Tribunal shall be deemed filed
election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, with the tribunal as of the date of effectivity of
and that the resolution of the National Assembly these Rules, subject to payment of filing fees as
of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll prescribed in Section 15 hereof.
the time for filing protests against the elections,
returns and qualifications of members of the ISSUES:
National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a 1. Whether or not the HRET has
protest within such time as the rules of the jurisdiction over the protest filed by private
Electoral Commission might prescribe. respondent.
The petition for a writ of prohibition 2. What provision of law governs the
against the Electoral Commission is hereby period for filing protests in the HRET.
denied. 3. Whether or not private respondents
protest had been seasonably filed.
HRET HELD:
LAZATIN V. HRET The Court is of the view that the protest
(G.R. NO. 84297. DECEMBER 8, 1988) had been filed on time and, hence, the HRET
acquired jurisdiction over it. Protestant filed his
CORTES, J. protest on February 8, 1988, or eleven (11) days
FACTS: after January 28. The protest, therefore, was filed
Petitioner Carmelo Lazatin and private well within the reglementary period provided by
respondent Lorenzo Timbol were candidates for the Rules of the HRET.
Representative of the first district of Pampanga Petitioner's reliance on Sec. 250 of the
during the May 11, 1987 elections. During the Omnibus Election Code is misplaced. Sec. 250 is
canvassing of the votes, Timbol objected to the couched in unambiguous terms and needs no
inclusion of certain election returns. Since the interpretation. It applies only to petitions filed
Municipal Board of Canvassers did not rule on before the COMELEC contesting the election of
his objections, Timbol brought the matter to the any Member of the Batasang Pambansa , or any
COMELEC, which initially ruled the suspension of regional, provincial or city official. Furthermore,
the proclamation of the winning candidate. It later Sec. 250 should be read together with Sec. 249
ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to of the same code which provides that the
proceed with the canvassing of votes and to COMELEC "shall be the sole judge of all contests
proclaim the winner. relating to the elections, returns and qualifications
Petitioner was proclaimed as of all Members of the Batasang Pambansa,
Congressman-elect. Private respondent thus filed elective regional, provincial and city officials,"
in the COMELEC a petition to declare petitioners reiterating Art. XII-C, Sec. 2(2) of the 1973
proclamation void ab initio and another petition to Constitution. It must be emphasized that under
prohibit petitioner from assuming office. The the 1973 Constitution there was no provision for
COMELEC failed to act on the second petition so an Electoral Tribunal, the jurisdiction over
petitioner was able to assume office. Later, the election contests involving Members of the
COMELEC declared petitioners proclamation Batasang Pambansa having been vested in the
void ab initio. Petitioner challenged this resolution COMELEC.
before the Court, which sustained the petitioner. That Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election
Thus, private respondent filed in the HRET an Code, as far as contests regarding the election,
election protest against petitioner. returns and qualifications of Members of the
Petitioner moved to dismiss the protest Batasang Pambansa is concerned, had ceased
on the ground that it had been filed late. to be effective under the 1987 Constitution is
However, the HRET ruled that the protest had readily apparent. The Constitution now vests
been filed on time. Petitioners motion for exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to
reconsideration was also denied. Hence, this the election, returns and qualifications of the
petition challenging the jurisdiction of the HRET Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in the respective Electoral deciding all contests relating to the election,
Tribunals [Art. VI, Sec. 171. The exclusive returns and qualifications of Senators.
original jurisdiction of the COMELEC is limited by Every member of the tribunal may, as
constitutional fiat to election contests pertaining his conscience dictates, refrain from participating
to election regional, provincial and city offices in the resolution of a case where he sincerely
and its appellate jurisdiction to those involving feels that his personal interests or biases would
municipal and barangay offices [Art. IX-C, Sec. stand in the way of an objective and impartial
2(2)]. judgment. What we are merely saying is that in
The power of the HRET, as the sole the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral
judge of all contests relating to the election, Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent
returns and qualifications of the Members of the its entire membership of Senators and that no
House of Representatives, to promulgate rules amendment of its rules can confer on the 3
and regulations relative to matters within its Justice-Members along the power of valid
jurisdiction, including the period for filing election adjudication of a senatorial election protest.
protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-
making power necessarily flows from the general
power granted it by the Constitution. ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
The inescapable conclusion from the BONDOC VS. PINEDA
foregoing is that it is well within the power of the 201 SCRA 792. 1991
HRET to prescribe the period within which
protests may be filed before it. Consequently, GRIO-AQUINO, J:
private respondent's election protest having been FACTS:
filed within the period prescribed by the HRET, Marciano Pineda of LDP won against
the latter cannot be charged with lack of his rival Dr. Emigdio Bondoc of NP causing the
jurisdiction to hear the case. The alleged latter to file a protest in the HRET. A decision had
invalidity of the proclamation (which had been been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda
previously ordered by the COMELEC itself) by a margin of 23 votes. Hence, the LDP
despite alleged irregularities in connection members in the tribunal insisterd on a re-
therewith, and despite the pendency of the appreciation and recount of the ballots cast in
protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that is some precincts resulting to the increase of
also addressed, considering the premises, to the Bondocs lead over Pineda to 107 votes.
sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal. Congressman Camasura coted with the SC
But then again, so long as the Justices and Congressman Cerilles to proclaim
Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the Bondoc as the winner of the contest. Camasura
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, later on revealed to his chief, notified the
returns and qualifications of Members of the Chairman of the Tribunal to withdraw the
House of Representatives, any final action taken nomination and to rescind the election of
by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction Camasura to the HRET and seeks to cancel the
shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court. promulgation of the tribunals decision in Bondoc
Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion v. Pineda.
is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the
HRET's judgment. In the instant case, there is no ISSUE: Whether or not the House of
occasion for the exercise of the Court's collective Representatives could change its representatives
power, since no grave abuse of discretion that in the HRET at the request of the dominant party.
would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and would warrant the issuance of the writs HELD:
prayed for has been clearly shown. NO. If the HRET would reserve the
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is interest of the party in power, the independence
hereby DISMISSED. Private respondent's of the Electoral Tribunal, as embodied in the
Counter/Cross Petition is likewise DISMISSED. Constitution, will no longer be protected. The
resolution of the House of Representatives
removing Congressman Camasura from the
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT HRET for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast
ABBAS VS. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL his vote in the favor of NPs candidate, is a clear
166 SCRA 651. 1988 impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the
HRET to the sole judge of the election contest
GANCAYCO, J: between Pineda and Bondoc.
FACTS: To sanction such interference by the
On October 1987, the petitioners filed House of Representatives in the work of the
before the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal HRET would reduce the Tribunal to a mere tool
an election protest against 22 candidates of the for the aggrandizement of the party in power
LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators- (LDP) which the 3 Justices of the SC and the
elect. Subsequently, the petitioners filed with the lone NP member would be powerless to stop. A
respondent Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification minority party candidate may as well abandon all
or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof hope at the threshold of the tribunal.
from the hearing and resolution of the As judges, the members of the Tribunal
aforementioned case, as respondents therein. must be nonpartisan. They must discharge their
The petitioners urged the contest to be decided functions with complete detachment, impartiality
by only 3 members of the Tribunal. and independence even independence from
the political party to which they belong. Hence,
ISSUE: Whether or not the Senators-Members of disloyalty to a party and breach of party
the Electoral Tribunal may be compelled to inhibit discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion
themselves from hearing the contest. of a member of the Tribunal. In expelling
Congressman Camasura from the HRET for
HELD: having cast a conscience vote in favor of
NO. It seems quite clear to us that in Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the
thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both examination and appreciation of the ballots and
Justices of the SC and Members of the Senate, the recount of the votes by the Tribunal, the
the Constitution intended that both those House of Representatives committed a grave
Judicial and Legislative components abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a
commonly share the duty and authority of
violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of 2. Whether or not the LDP is not
expulsion against Congressman Camasura is entitled to a seat in the Commission on
therefore null and void. Appointments because it does not suffice the
qualification of being a political party.
HELD:
1. No. It is because what is involved in the case
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT at bar is the legality, not the wisdom of the act of
CHAVEZ V. COMELEC (211 SCRA 315 [1992]) the House of Representative in removing the
G.R. NO. 105323 JULY 3, 1992 petitioner from the CA. Even if the question were
political in nature, it would still come within the
FACTS: Courts power of review under the expanded
Petitioner Francisco Chavez prays in to jurisdiction conferred by Article VIII, Section 1 of
this Court for the issuance of a temporary the Constitution which includes the authority to
restraining order enjoining respondent determine whether grave abuse of discretion
th
COMELEC from proclaiming the 24 highest amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has
senatorial candidate. And he also prays that been committed by any branch or instrumentality
judgment be rendered requiring the COMELEC to of the government.
re-open the ballot boxes in 80,348 precincts in 13 2. No. In the first place, the Commission on
provinces therein enumerated including Metro Election has already approved the petition of the
Manila, scan the ballots for Chavez votes which LDP for registration as political party.
were invalidated or declared stray and credit said Furthermore, the petitioners contention that LDP
scanned Chavez votes in favor of petitioner. must prove its permanence and must exist in a
longer period of time in not tenable. It is because
ISSUE: Whether or not, in the case at bar, this even the Liberal Party in 1946 election is only
Court has jurisdiction to resolve issue regarding four (4) months old, yet no question was raised
the instant regular election protest? as to its right to be represented in the
Commission.
HELD:
No. The petitioners proper recourse is
to file a regular election protest which under the ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, COSETENG VS. MITRA
exclusively pertains to the Senate Electoral 187 SCRA 377. 1990
Tribunal. Thus, sec.17, Art.VI of the Constitution
provides that the Senate and the House of FACTS:
th
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Ablan was elected as the 12 member
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all of the Commission on Appointments on
contests relating to their respective Members. September 22, 1987. A year later, the LDP was
The word sole underscores the exclusivity of organized as a political party. The House
the Tribunals jurisdiction over the election Committee, including the House representation in
contests relating to their respective Members. the Commission on Appointments had to be
This Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the reorganized because 158 out of 202 members of
instant petition. It is the Senate Electoral Tribunal the House of Representatives are affiliated with
which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the the LDP. Petitioner Coseteng of KAIBA then
complaint of petitioner involving as it does, wrote a letter to Speaker Mitra requesting that
contest relating to the election of a member of the she be appointed as a member of the
Senate. As aforesaid, petitioners proper Commission and the House Electoral Tribunal.
recourse is to file a regular election protest before On December 1988, the House of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal after the winning Representatives on motion of the Majority Floor
senatorial candidates have been proclaimed. The Leader and over the objection of Congressman
proper recourse is for petitioner to ask not this Daza, LP, revised the House Majority
Court but the Legislature to enact remedial membership in the Commission on Appointments
measures. to conform with the new political alignments. On
February 1989, Coseteng filed a petition for quo
warranto and injunction praying the Court to
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT declare as null and void the election of the
DAZA V. SINGSON respondent as members of the Commission on
180 SCRA 497, DECEMBER 21, 1989 Appointments.
CRUZ, J: ISSUE: Whether or not the election of the

FACTS: respondents as members of the Commission on
Herein petitioner Raul A. Daza was Appointments should be enjoined for having
chosen and listed as representative of the Liberal violated the constitutional mandate of
Party in the Commission on Appointments (CA). proportional representation.
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized. HELD:
Twenty four (24) members of the Liberal Party NO. After deliberating on the petition
resigned and joined the LDP. Based on this, the and the comments of the respondents, we hold
House of Representative revised its that the petition should be dismissed not because
representation in the CA by withdrawing the seat it raises a political question which does not, but
occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the because the revision of the House representation
LDP member Luis C. Singson. in the Commission on Appointments is based on
The petitioner argued that he cannot be proportional representation of the political parties
removed from CA because his election thereto is therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the
permanent. He further contended that LDP is not 1987 Constitution.
a duly registered political party and has not yet The composition of the House
attained political stability because it was just membership in the Commission on Appointments
established recently. was based on a proportional representation of
the political parties in the House. There are 160
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the question raised by members of the LDP in the House. They
the petitioner is political in nature. represent 79% of the House membership. 88% of
12 members in the Commission would equal to 9 1. In the Senate, a political party or

members, which may be rounded off to 10 coalition must have at least 2 duly
members from the LDP. Even if KAIBA were to elected senators for every seat in
be considered as an opposition party, its lone the Senate.
member represents only 4% of less than 1% of 2. Where there are more than 2
the House membership. Hence she is not entitled political parties represent in the
to one of the 12 House seats in the Commission Senate, a political party or coalition
on Appointments. with a single senator in the Senate
cannot constitutionally claim a seat
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT in the commission.
GUINGONA VS. GONZALES
214 SCRA 789. 1992 Furthermore, the SC said it is not
mandatory to elect 12 senators and 12 members
FACTS: of the House of Representatives to the
As a result of the national elections held Commission on Appointments. What the
last May 1992, the Senate is composed of the Constitution requires is that there be at least a
following members representing the political majority of the entire membership.
affiliation: LDP 15 Senators, NPC -5 senators,
LAKAS-NUCD 3 senators, LP-PDP-LABAN 1
senator. ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
The resulting composition of the Senate BENGZON VS. SENATE BLUE RIBBON
based on the rule of proportional representation COMMITTEE
of each party is as follows. 203 SCRA 767, 1991
POLITICAL PARTY
MEMBERSHIP PROPORTION FACTS:
MEMBERSHIP The PCGG filed with the
LDP Sandiganbayan a civil case against Kokoy
15 7.5 members Romualdez, et al., in connection with ill-gotten
NPC wealth. During the pendency of the case, there
5 2.5 members were rumors that the properties involve in the
LAKAS case were already being disposed of by
3 1.5 members Romualdez. Senator Enrile in his privilege
LP-PDP-LABAN 1 speech before the Senate called the attention of
.5 members the Senate regarding the matter.
On motion of Senator Mecado, the
On September 23, 1992, Senator matter was referred to the Committee on
Guingona filed a petition to prohibit respondents Acountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon
Alberto Romulo and Wigberto Tanada from sitting Committee). The committee subpoenaed
and assuming the position of members of the petitioner who was also one of the defendants in
Commission on Appointments and to prohibit said case. Petitioner declined to testify on the
Senator Neptali Gonzales from allowing ground that his testimony might unduly prejudice
respondents to sit as members thereof on the the defendants. The committee continued in its
ground that the inquiry, thus the present petition for prohibition to
proposed compromise of Senator Tolentino was restrain respondent from investigating.
violative of the rule of proportional representation The committee commented that the
as enunciated in Sec. 18, Art. VI of the 1987 Court cannot properly inquire into the motives of
Constitution. the lawmakers in conducting legislative
investigations in aid of legislation under this
ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate acted with or doctrine of separation of power. Petitioners
in excess of jurisdiction when it designated contend that the Senate Blue Ribbon
th
Senator Romulo as the 8 member of the CA Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative
upon nomination by the LDP and respondent purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation
Senator Tanada as LP nominee even if LDP and
LP are entitled only to half a member. ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction to
HELD: inquire into the motives of the lawmakers in
The problem is what to do with the conducting legislative investigations in aid of
fraction of .5 or to which each of the parties is legislation under the doctrine of separation of
entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate power.
converted fractional half membership into a 2. Whether or not such inquiry is within the
whole membership of one senator by adding one- power of the Congress to conduct
th
half to be able to elect Senator Romulo as the 8 investigation.
member. In so doing, the election of Senator
Romulo gave more representation to the LDP HELD:
and reduced the representation of one political 1. YES, the Court has jurisdiction over the
party either the LAKAS-NUCD or the NPC. This present controversy for the purpose of
is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is determining the scope and extent of the
no longer in compliance with the proportional power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
representation of the political parties. This to conduct inquiries into private affairs in
provision of Section 18 on proportional purported aid of legislation.
representation is mandatory in character and The separation of powers is a
does not leave any discretion to the majority fundamental principle in our system of
party in the Senate to disobey the rule on government. Each department of the government
proportional representation. Otherwise, the party has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
with a majority representation in the Senate or jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.
House of Representatives can be sheen force of But it does not follow from the fact that the three
members impose its will on the hapless minority. powers are to be kept separate and distinct that
the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
The SC laid down the following unrestrained and independent of each other. The
guidelines accordingly: Constitution has provided for an elaborate
system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various The committee sought to determine who
departments of the government. were responsible for and who benefited from the
The overlapping and interlacing of transaction at the expense of the government.
functions and duties between the several The special committee called and
departments, however, sometimes makes it hard examined among other witness, Jean Arnault.
to say just where the one leaves off and the other However, for the latters refusal to answer some
begins. In cases of conflict, the judicial of the questions propounded on him, the name of
department is the only constitutional organ which the person to whom he gave the money as well
can be called upon to determine the proper as answer to other pertinent questions in
allocation of powers between the several connection therewith, the Senate resolved to
departments and among the integral or imprison him until such time as he decided to
constituent units thereof. answer relevant questions put to him in
When the judiciary mediates to allocate connection with the investigation of a government
constitutional boundaries; it does not assert any transaction.
superiority over the other departments; it does
not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate has authority
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and to punish petitioner for contempt.
sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of HELD:
authority under the Constitution and to establish The Supreme Court said yes
for the parties in an actual controversy the rights considering that he questions were pertinent to
which that instrument secures and guarantees to the pursuance of the Senate Resolution.
them. The Supreme Court also held that the
2. NO, the 1987 Constitution expressly offender could be imprisoned indefinitely by the
recognizes the power of both houses of State, it being a continuing body, provided that
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of the punishment did not become so long as to
legislation; but in the present case, no violate due process.
legislation was apparently being
contemplated in connection with the said
investigation. SECTION 24 SHALL ORIGINATE
The contemplated inquiry by respondent EXCLUSIVELY IN HOR
Committee is not really "in aid of legislation" TOLENTINO VS. SECRETARY OF FINANCE
because it is not related to a purpose within the 235 SCRA 630, 1994
jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the
investigation is to find out whether or not the FACTS:
relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on
had violated the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices the sale, barter or exchange of goods and
Act", a matter that appears more within the properties as well as on the sale or exchange of
province of the courts rather than of the services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross
legislature. selling price or gross value in money of goods or
The Court ruled that petitioners may not properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the
be compelled by the respondent Committee to gross receipts from the sale or exchange of
appear, testify and produce evidence before it, it services.
is only because SC hold that the questioned Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen
inquiry is not in aid of legislation and, if pursued, the tax base of the existing VAT system and
would be violative of the principle of separation of enhance its administration by amending the
powers between the legislative and the judicial National Internal Revenue Code.
departments of government, ordained by the It was challenged for alleged
Constitution. constitutional infirmities (defects), among others:
Law did not originate exclusively in the
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUSTICE CRUZ: House of Representative as required by Section
The inquiry deals with alleged 24, Article VI they contended that to be
manipulations of public funds and illicit considered as having originated in the HOR, it
acquisitions of properties now being claimed by should retain the essence of the House Bill.
the PCGG for the Republic of the Philippines.
The purpose of the Committee is to ascertain if ISSUE: Whether or not there are constitutional
and how such anomalies have been committed. defects in RA 7716, since it did not originate
It is settled that the legislature has a exclusively in the House of Representative as
right to investigate the disposition of the public required by Sec. 24, Article VI.
funds it has appropriated; indeed, "an inquiry into
the expenditure of all public money is an HELD:
indispensable duty of the legislature." No. The Supreme Court held that the
Moreover, an investigation of a possible Senate is empowered by the Constitution to
violation of a law may be useful in the drafting of concur with amendments and propose
amendatory legislation to correct or strengthen amendments, even substitute the entire bill as a
that law. whole.
A bill originating in the HOR may
undergo such extensive changes in the Senate
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT that the result maybe rewriting of the whole; As a
ARNAULT VS. NAZARENO result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be
87 PHIL. 29, 1950 produced AND to insist that a revenue statute
must substantially be the same as the House bill
FACTS: would be to deny the Senates power not only to
On February 27, 1950, the Senate concur with amendments but also to propose
adopted a resolution creating a special amendments.
committee to investigate on the purchase by the
government of the Buenavista and Tambobong
Estates owned by Ernest Burt as represented by ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Jean Arnault. ALVAREZ, ET AL. VS. GUINGONA, ET AL.
252 SCRA 695, 1996

FACTS: fundamental governmental policy matters of the

Law converting municipality of Santiago, calling to active duty and the reversion to inactive
Isabela into a city is being assailed that the Bill status of reserve officers in the AFP. It clearly
did not originate exclusively from HOR as shows that the paragraph in question does not
mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 relate to the appropriation.
Constitution since it had a counterpart in the
Senate.
ISSUE: Whether or not, considering that the DEMETRIA VS. ALBA
Senate passed SB No. 1243, its own version of 148 SCRA 208, 1987
HB No. 8817, Republic Act No. 7720 can be said
to have originated in the House of FACTS:
Representatives. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD No.
1177 states that the President shall have the
HELD: authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for
A bill of local application, such as one the different departments, bureaus, offices and
asking for the conversion of a municipality into a agencies of the Executive department, which are
city, is deemed to have originated from the included in the General Appropriations Act, to
House provided that the bill of the House was any program, project or activity of any
filed prior to the filing of the bill in the Senate department, bureau or office in the General
even if, in the end, the Senate approved its own Appropriations Act or approved after its
version. enactment.
The filing in the Senate of a substitute
bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the ISSUE: Is the provision valid?
House, does not contravene the constitutional
requirement that a bill of local application should HELD:
originate in the House of Representatives, for as No. The court said that such was
long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it unconstitutional as it empowers the President to
receives the House bill. indiscriminately transfer funds from one
department to any program, project, or activity of
any departments without regard as to whether or
SECTION 25 APPROPRIATIONS not the funds to be transferred are actually
GARCIA VS. MATA savings in the item from which the same are to
65 SCRA 517, 1975 be taken.
FACTS: PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
Petitioner was a reserve officer on VS. ENRIQUEZ
active duty with the AFP until his reversion to 235 SCRA 506. 1994
inactive status pursuant to the provisions of RA
No. 2332. Petitioner filed a complaint for QUIASON, J.:
mandamus and recovery of a sum of money, to FACTS:
compel the former to reinstate him in the active The General Appropriation Bill of 1994
commissioned service of the AFP, to readjust his was passed and approved by both Houses of
rank, and to pay all the emoluments and Congress. It presented the bill to the president for
allowances due to him from the time of his the exercise of his veto power.
reversion to inactive status. One of the special provisions vetoed by
Petitioner anchored his claim to the President is with respect to the realignment of
reinstatement at paragraph 11 of the Special operating expenses. Whereas each member of
Provisions for the AFP in RA 1600 which was the Congress is allotted for his own operating
Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 1956-57 as expenditures, a proportionate share of the
reads: appropriation for the house which he belongs. If
THAT RESERVE OFFICERS WITH AT he does not spend for one item of expense, the
LEAST 10 YEARS OF ACCUMULATED questioned provision allows him to transfer his
COMMISSIONED SERVICE WHO ARE STILL allocation in said item of expense. Petitioners
ON ACTIVE DUTY AT THE TIME OF THE assail the special provision allowing a member of
APPROVAL OF THIS ACT SHALL NOT BE Congress to realign his allocations for operational
REVERTED TO INACTIVE STATUS EXCEPT expenses to any other expense categorically
FOR CAUSE AFTER PROPER COURT- claiming that this practice is prohibited by Section
MARTIAL PROCEEDINGS OR UPON THEIR 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution. They argue
REQUEST. that the Senate President and Speaker of the
Respondent, Judge Mata, declared House, not the individual member of Congress,
paragraph 11 of the Special Provisions for the are the ones authorized to realign the savings as
AFP in RA No. 1600 which was the Appropriation appropriated.
Act for the fiscal year 1956-57 unconstitutional Another special provision vetoed by the
and therefore invalid and inoperative. President is on the appropriation for debt service.
Hence, this petition for certiorari to It provides Use of funds. The appropriation
review the decision of the CFI. authorized therein shall be used for payment of
principal and interest of foregoing and domestic
ISSUE: Is the provision valid? indebtedness; provided, that any payment in
excess of the amount therein appropriated shall
HELD: be subject to the approval of the President with
The SC held that the said provision the concurrence of the Congress of the
used by the petitioner as a basis was a RIDER Philippines; provided further, that in no case shall
because the Constitution provides that no this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the
provision or enactment shall be embraced in the Central Bank of Liquidators.
general appropriations bill UNLESS it relates Petitioners claim that the President
specifically to some particular appropriation cannot veto the special provision on the
therein (Art. VI, Section 25(2)). appropriations for debt service without vetoing
RA 1600 appropriated money for the the entire amount of P86B for said purpose.
operation of the Government for the fiscal year In the appropriation for the AFP Pension
1956-1957, the said paragraph 11 refers to the and Gratuity Fund, the President vetoed the new
provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use The SC is sustaining the veto of the
savings in the AFP to augment pension and Special Provision of the item on debt service can
gratuity funds. According to the President, the only be with respect to the proviso therein
grant retirement and separation benefits should requiring that any payment in excess of the
be covered by direct appropriation specially amount therein, appropriated shall be the subject
approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29 to the approval of the President of the Philippines
(1) of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he with the concurrence of the Congress of the
stated that the authority to use savings is lodged Philippines.
in the officials enumerated in Section 25 of Article The special provision which allows the
VI of the Constitution. On the contrary, petitioners Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the
claim that said provision is a condition or pension fund for the AFP being managed by the
limitation, which is intertwined with the item of AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System
appropriation that it could not be separated is violative of Section 25 and Section 29 of Article
therefrom. VI of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners

contentions are tenable. SECTION 26 PASSING OF A BILL
PHILCONSA VS. GIMENEZ
HELD: 15 SCRA 489, 1965
Petitioners contentions are without
merit. Under the special provisions applicable to FACTS:
the Congress of the Philippines, the members of The Supreme Court was called upon in
the Congress only determine the necessity of the to decide the grave and fundamental problem of
realignment of the savings in the allotment for the constitutionality of RA 3836 insofar as the
their operating expenses. They are in the best same allows retirement gratuity and commutation
position to do so because they are the one who of vacation and sick leave to Senators and
know whether there are savings available in Representatives and to the elective officials of
some items and whether there are deficiencies in both houses (of Congress).
other items of their operating expenses that need The constitutionality of the law is
augmentation. However, it is the Senate assailed on the ground that the provision for the
President and the Speaker of the House as the retirement of the members and certain officers of
case may be who shall approve the realignment. Congress is not expressed in the title of the bill,
Before giving their stamp of approval, those two in violation of the Constitution.
officials will have to see to it that: (1) the funds to
be aligned or transferred are actually savings in ISSUE: W/N RA 3836 violates the Constitutional
the items of expenditures from which the same provision that every bill passed by the Congress
are to be taken and to the transfer on realignment shall embrace only one subject which shall be
is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expressed in the title thereof.
expenditure to which said transfer or realignment
is to be made. HELD:
It is readily apparent that the special YES. Under RA 3836, amending CA
provision applicable to the appropriation for debt 186, as amended by RA Nos. 660 and 3096, the
service in so far as it refers to funds in excess of retirement benefits are granted to members of
the appropriation for debt service in so far as it the GSIS who have rendered at least twenty
refers to funds in excess of the amount years of service regardless of age. This
appropriated in the bill, is an inappropriate provision is related and germane to the subject of
provision referring to the funds other than P68B CA 186. On the other hand, the succeeding
appropriated in the GAAA of 1994. paragraph of RA 3836 refers to members of
The veto power while exercised by the Congress and to elective officers thereof who are
President is actually a part of the legislative not members of the GSIS. To provide retirement
process. Hence, found in Article VI rather than benefits, therefore, for these officials would relate
Article VII. to subject matter, not germane to CA 186.
As the constitution is explicit that the
provision with the Congress can include in an
appropriate to which it relates, it follows that any ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
provision which does not relate to any particular TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD
item or which it extends in its operation beyond 151 SCRA 204, 1987
an item of appropriation is considered an
inappropriate provision which be vetoed FACTS:
separately from an item. Also to be included in PD NO 1987 is entitled An Act Creating
the category of inappropriate provision are the Videogram Regulatory Board. Section 10
unconstitutional provisions and provisions which thereof imposes a 30% tax on gross receipts on
are intended to amend other laws because video transactions. The petitioner argued that
clearly those kinds of laws have no place in an such tax impose is a RIDER and the same is not
appropriation bill. germane to the subject matter thereof.
The President vetoed the entire
paragraph, one of the special provision of the ISSUE: Is section 10 a RIDER?
item on debt services including the provisos that
the appropriation authorized in said item shall be HELD:
used for the payment of one principal and interest NO. The requirement that every bill
of foreign and domestic indebtedness and that in must only have one subject expressed in the title
no case shall this fund be used to pay for the is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough to
liabilities of the Central Bank Board of include subjects related to the general purpose
Liquidators. These provisos are germane to and which the statute seeks to achieve. Such is the
have direct connection with the item of debt case here. Taxation is sufficiently related to the
service. Inherent in the power of the regulation of the video industry.
appropriation is the power to specify how the The provision is allied and germane to,
money shall be spent. Said provisos are and is reasonably necessary for the
appropriate provisions hence, cannot be vetoed accomplishment of, the general object of the
separately. DECREE, which is the regulation of the video

industry through the Videogram Regulatory title would not only be unreasonable but would
Board as expressed in its title. actually render legislation impossible.
The Supreme Court thus provided the
following standards whether or not a provision is
embraced in the title: SECTION 27 METHODS BY WHICH A BILL
Title be comprehensive enough to MAY BECOME A LAW
include the general purpose which a TOLENTINO VS. SECRETARY OF FINANCE
statute seeks to achieve. 235 SCRA 630, 1994
If all the parts of the statute are related
and germane to the subject matter FACTS:
expressed in the title. The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on
So long as they are not inconsistent or the sale, barter or exchange of goods and
foreign to the general subject to the title. properties as well as on the sale or exchange of
Regardless of how diverse it is so long services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross
as it maybe considered in furtherance of selling price or gross value in money of goods or
such subject by providing for the method properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the
and means of carrying out the general gross receipts from the sale or exchange of
object. services.
Should not be construed as to cripple Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen
legislative power the tax base of the existing VAT system and
Given a PRACTICAL rather than a enhance its administration by amending the
technical construction National Internal Revenue Code.
It was challenged for alleged
constitutional infirmities (defects), among others:
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT It is claimed that the conference
PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS. committee included provisions not found in either
PRADO the House Bill or the Senate Bill that these
227 SCRA 703, 1993 provisions were stealthily inserted by the
conference committee.
FACTS:
The main target of this petition is ISSUE: Whether or not there are constitutional
Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by defects in RA 7716, since the conference
the Philippine Postal Corporation through its committee included provisions not found in either
Circular No. 9228. These measures withdraw the the House Bill or the Senate Bill.
franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the HELD:
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial A third version of the bill may result from
Courts, and the Land Registration Commission the conference committee, which is considered
and its Register of Deeds, along with certain may result from the conference committee, which
other government offices. is considered an amendment in the nature of a
The petitioners are members of the substitute the only requirement being that the
lower courts who feel that their official functions third version be germane to the subject of the
as judges will be prejudiced by the above-named House and Senate bills.
measures. The National Land Registration As to the possibility of an entirely new
Authority has taken common cause with them bill emergency out of a Conference Committee, it
insofar as its own activities, such as the sending has been explained:
of requisite notices in registration cases, affect Under congressional rules of procedure,
judicial proceedings. On its motion, it has been conference committees are not expected to make
allowed to intervene. any material change in the measure at issue,
The petition assails the constitutionality either by deleting provisions to which both
of R.A. No. 7354 on the ground that its title houses have already agreed or by inserting new
embraces more than one subject and does not provisions. But this is a difficult provision to
express its purposes. enforce. Note the problem when one house
amends a proposal originating in either house by
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7354 violates the striking out everything following the enacting
Constitution for it was alleged to embraces more clause and substituting provisions which make it
than one subject and does not express its an entirely new bill. The versions are now
purpose. altogether different, permitting a conference
committee to draft essentially a new bill.
HELD: The result is a third version, which is
NO. The franking privilege from some considered an "amendment in the nature of a
agencies is germane to the accomplishment of substitute," the only requirement for which being
the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is that the third version be germane to the subject
the creation of a more efficient and effective of the House and Senate bills.
postal service system. Court ruled that, by virtue
of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did
not have to be expressly included in the title of ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
the said law. TAN VS. DEL ROSARIO
The title of the bill is not required to be (237 SCRA 324 [1994])
an index to the body of the act, or to be as
comprehensive as to cover every single detail of FACTS:
the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly Petitioner contends that Republic Act
indicates the general subject, and reasonably No. 7496 is a misnomer or, at least deficient f0r
covers all the provisions of the act, and is not being merely entitled "Simplified Net Income
calculated to mislead the legislature or the Taxation Scheme For Self Employed and
people, there is sufficient compliance with the Professionals Engaged in the practice of their
constitutional requirement. Profession". It is the petitioner's view that the
To require every end and means said law should be considered as having now
necessary for the accomplishment of the general adopted a gross income scheme, instead of
objectives of the statute to be expressed in its having still deductions from gross income of
single proprietorships and professionals in the
computation of their, taxable net income, provided in the statute. The turnout at the
petitioner argued that this violated the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting
requirement for uniformity in taxation and due population where 18,621 voted "yes" whereas
process because single proprietorship and 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A.
professional were taxed differently from No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.
corporations and partnerships. Petitioners now come before this Court,
contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article
ISSUE: VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for
WON RA No. 7496 is in violation of Art. VI Sec. being violative of three specific provisions of the
26 and 28 of the 1987 Constitution. Constitution. First, that it contravenes the "one
subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI,
HELD: Section 26(1) of the Constitution, to wit:
On the basis of the language of the said Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the
questioned law, it would be difficult to accept the Congress shall embrace only one subject which
petitioner's view that the amendatory should be shall be expressed in the title thereof.
considered as now having adopted a gross Petitioners allege that the inclusion of
income, instead of as having still retained the net the assailed Section 49 in the subject law
income, taxation scheme. The allowance of resulted in the latter embracing two principal
deductible items may have been significantly subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of
reduced by the questioned law in comparison Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2)
with that which has prevailed prior to the the division of the congressional district of San
amendment, limiting, however, allowable Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
deductions from gross income is neither Petitioners' second and third objections
discordant with nor opposed to, the net income involve Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) of the
tax concept. Constitution. Petitioners argue that the division of
Art. VI Sec. 26 (I) of the Constitution San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate
has been envisioned so as (a) to prevent congressional districts under Section 49 of the
logrolling legislation intended to unite the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the
members of the legislature who favor anyone of composition of the House of Representatives
the unrelated subjects in support of the whole beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of
act; (b) to avoid surprise or even fraud upon the the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners
legislature and (c) to fairly apprise the people, contend that said division was not made pursuant
through such publications of its proceedings are to any census showing that the subject
as usually made, of the subjects of legislations. municipalities have attained the minimum
The above objective of the fundamental law population requirements. And finally, petitioners
appears to have sufficiently met. Anything else assert that Section 49 has the effect of
would be to require a virtual compendium of the preempting the right of Congress to reapportion
law which could have been the intendment of the legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) as
constitutional mandate. aforecited.
The contention of the petitioner that RA
No. 7496 desecrates the constitutional ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 7675 is
requirement that taxation shall be uniform and unconstitutional.
equitable is of no merit. The contention clearly
forgets that such a system of taxation has long HELD:
been the prevailing rule even prior to RA 7496. No.Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the
Uniformity of Taxation merely requires creation of a separate congressional district for
that all subjects or objects of taxation similarly Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and
situated are to be treated both in privileges and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a
liabilities. Uniform does nor forefend classification highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical
as long as 1.) The standards that are used consequence of its conversion into a highly
therefore are substantial and not arbitrary. 2.) urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675,
The categorization is germane to achieve "An Act Converting the Municipality of
legislative purpose. 3.) The law applies all things Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of
being equal, to both present and future Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and
conditions, and 4.) The classification applies contemplates the subject treated under Section
equally well to all those belonging to the same 49 regarding the creation of a separate
class. Shifting the income taxation of individuals congressional district for Mandaluyong.
to the schedules system, this makes the income Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-
tax depend on the kind of taxable income, and one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by
maintaining for corporations the global treatment this court so as not to cripple or impede
which treats in common all kinds of taxable legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73
income of the taxpayer. Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the constitutional
requirement as now expressed in Article VI,
Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT than a technical construction. It should be
TOBIAS VS. ABALOS sufficient compliance with such requirement if the
(G.R. NO. L-114783 DECEMBER 8, 1994) title expresses the general subject and all the
provisions are germane to that general subject."
BIDIN, J.; The liberal construction of the "one title-
FACTS: one subject" rule had been further elucidated in
Prior to the enactment of the assailed Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to
statute Republic Act No. 7675, the municipalities wit:
of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only Of course, the Constitution does not
one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the require Congress to employ in the title of an
incumbent congressional representative of this enactment, language of such precision as to
legislative district, sponsored the bill which mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents
eventually became R.A. No. 7675. Pursuant to and the minute details therein. It suffices if the
the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite title should serve the purpose of the constitutional
was held to asked the people whether they demand that it inform the legislators, the persons
approved of the conversion of the Municipality of interested in the subject of the bill and the public,
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation" (emphasis As to the possibility of an entirely new
supplied). bill emergency out of a Conference Committee, it
Proceeding now to the other has been explained:
constitutional issues, alleging that there is no Under congressional rules of procedure,
mention in the assailed law of any census to conference committees are not expected to make
show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each any material change in the measure at issue,
attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 either by deleting provisions to which both
inhabitants to justify their separation into two houses have already agreed or by inserting new
legislative districts, the same does not suffice to provisions. But this is a difficult provision to
strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The enforce. Note the problem when one house
said Act enjoys the presumption of having amends a proposal originating in either house by
passed through the regular congressional striking out everything following the enacting
processes, including due consideration by the clause and substituting provisions which make it
members of Congress of the minimum an entirely new bill. The versions are now
requirements for the establishment of separate altogether different, permitting a conference
legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required committee to draft essentially a new bill.
that all laws emanating from the legislature must The result is a third version, which is
contain all relevant data considered by Congress considered an "amendment in the nature of a
in the enactment of said laws. substitute," the only requirement for which being
As to the contention that the assailed that the third version be germane to the subject
law violates the present limit on the number of of the House and Senate bills.
representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a
reading of the applicable provision, Article VI,
Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The GONZALES VS. MACARAIG
Constitution clearly provides that the House of 191 SCRA 452
Representatives shall be composed of not more
than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided FACTS:
by law." The inescapable import of the latter The veto of a particular section in the
clause is that the present composition of 1989 appropriations act was assailed for being
Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so unconstitutional on grounds that the president
mandates through a legislative enactment. may not veto provisions with regard to
As to the contention that Section 49 of appropriation bills and if the president vetoes a
R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of provision in an appropriation bill that the entire bill
Congress to reapportion legislative districts, the should be vetoed. Further, item-veto power does
said argument borders on the absurd since not carry with it the power to strike out conditions.
petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was
Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon ISSUE: Whether or not the President has the
and enacted the assailed law, including Section power to veto provisions with regard to
49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt appropriation bills.
itself on a right which pertains to itself.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court held the
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT following:
TOLENTINO VS. SECRETARY OF FINANCE The President can veto an item or items
235 SCRA 630, 1994 in an appropriations bill BUT nothing less than an
item or items.
FACTS: o Item an indivisible sum of money dedicated
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on to a stated purpose that a distinct and
the sale, barter or exchange of goods and severable part of a bill maybe subject to a
properties as well as on the sale or exchange of different veto.
services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross Therefore, regard to the petitioners
selling price or gross value in money of goods or contention that if a provision in an appropriations
properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the bill is vetoed the entire bill must be vetoed cannot
gross receipts from the sale or exchange of be sustained. The said power to veto provisions
services. has been carried over the previous constitutions
Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen and has now been understood as broadened to
the tax base of the existing VAT system and include the item or items to which the provision
enhance its administration by amending the relates.
National Internal Revenue Code. In relation still to veto of provisions, the
It was challenged for alleged principle that distinct and severable parts of a bill
constitutional infirmities (defects), among others: maybe the subject to a different veto is founded
It is claimed that the conference on Art. 6, Section 25(2) wherein provisions are
committee included provisions not found in either limited to its operation to the appropriation to
the House Bill or the Senate Bill that these which it relatesa distinct and severable part
provisions were stealthily inserted by the subject to a different veto. Therefore it doesnt
conference committee. mean that if the president vetoes a provision in
an appropriations bill hell need to veto the entire
ISSUE: Whether or not there are constitutional bill.
defects in RA 7716, since the conference Besides, the said provisions are
committee included provisions not found in either inappropriate in the first place because the
the House Bill or the Senate Bill. provisions should relate to a particular
appropriation in the general appropriations bill.
HELD: That said sections of the appropriation
A third version of the bill may result from bill cannot be subject to veto if such are made to
the conference committee, which is considered be conditions on the expenditure of funds cannot
may result from the conference committee, which be sustained because such conditions
is considered an amendment in the nature of a inappropriate. Restrictions or conditions in an
substitute the only requirement being that the appropriation bill must exhibit a connection with
third version be germane to the subject of the money items in a budgetary sense in the
House and Senate bills. schedule of expenditures. Said sections were in
fact general law measures, there was no power is merely to execute the laws passed by
necessary connection with the schedule of Congress.
expenditures.
That in any case, the sections
mentioned contravene the Constitution as it takes ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
away the power of the President to augment any SECTION 1 ARTICLE 8, 1987 CONSTITUTION
item in the appropriations law of their respective PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
offices from savings in other items of their VS. ENRIQUEZ
respective appropriations, since a statute has 235 SCRA 506. 1994
already authorized such power.
QUIASON, J.:
FACTS:
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT The General Appropriation Bill of 1994
BENGZON VS. DRILON was passed and approved by both Houses of
208 SCRA 133, 1992 Congress. It presented the bill to the president for
the exercise of his veto power.
FACTS: One of the special provisions vetoed by
The case involved the General the President is with respect to the realignment of
Appropriations Act of 1992. The law operating expenses. Whereas each member of
appropriated 500M Pesos For general fund Congress is allotted for his own operating
adjustment for operational and special expenditures, a proportionate share of the
requirements as indicated hereunder. Among appropriation for the house which he belongs. If
the several authorized uses of the fund was the he does not spend for one item of expense, the
adjustment of pension of justices as authorized questioned provision allows him to transfer his
by an earlier law. The President vetoed the use allocation in said item of expense. Petitioners
of such fund for the adjustment of the pension of assail the special provision allowing a member of
justices. Congress to realign his allocations for operational
The funds pertaining to the payment of expenses to any other expense categorically
the adjusted pensions of Retired Justices of the claiming that this practice is prohibited by Section
Supreme Court and CA was vetoed and assailed 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution. They argue
as being unconstitutional. that the Senate President and Speaker of the
RA 1797 was the law granted these House, not the individual member of Congress,
benefits in 1957. are the ones authorized to realign the savings as
Section 3-A of RA 1797 was repealed appropriated.
by PD 644. Another special provision vetoed by the
Congress thought to revive RA 1797 President is on the appropriation for debt service.
through HB No.16297. It provides Use of funds. The appropriation
But PD 644 never became a law! (not authorized therein shall be used for payment of
published) principal and interest of foregoing and domestic
President vetoed HB No. 16297. indebtedness; provided, that any payment in
excess of the amount therein appropriated shall
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto act of the be subject to the approval of the President with
President the use of such fund for the adjustment the concurrence of the Congress of the
of the pension of justices is valid. Philippines; provided further, that in no case shall
this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the
HELD: Central Bank of Liquidators.
The Supreme Court ruled: Petitioners claim that the President
In declaring the veto invalid, the Court cannot veto the special provision on the
said that it was not the veto of an item. appropriations for debt service without vetoing
The item was the entire 500M peso the entire amount of P86B for said purpose.
allocation out of which unavoidable In the appropriation for the AFP Pension
obligations not adequately funded in and Gratuity Fund, the President vetoed the new
separate items could be met. What the provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use
President had vetoed was the method of savings in the AFP to augment pension and
meeting unavoidable obligations or the gratuity funds. According to the President, the
manner of using the 500M Pesos. grant retirement and separation benefits should
When the President vetoed certain be covered by direct appropriation specially
provisions of the 1992 General approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29
Appropriations Act, she was actually (1) of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he
vetoing RA 1797 since PD 644 never stated that the authority to use savings is lodged
took effect which is beyond the power to in the officials enumerated in Section 25 of Article
accomplish. VI of the Constitution. On the contrary, petitioners
claim that said provision is a condition or
The Congress included in the General
limitation, which is intertwined with the item of
Appropriations Act of 1992, provisions
appropriation that it could not be separated
identifying funds and savings which may
therefrom.
be used to pay the adjusted pensions
pursuant to the Supreme Court
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners
Resolution. As long as retirement laws
contentions are tenable.
remain in the statute book, there is an
existing obligation on the part of the
HELD:
government to pay the adjusted pension
Petitioners contentions are without
rate pursuant to RA 1797 and AM-91-8-
merit. Under the special provisions applicable to
225-CA.
the Congress of the Philippines, the members of
Neither may the veto power of the
the Congress only determine the necessity of the
President be exercised as a means of repealing
realignment of the savings in the allotment for
RA 1797. This is arrogating unto the Presidency
their operating expenses. They are in the best
legislative powers which are beyond its authority.
position to do so because they are the one who
The President has no power to enact or amend
know whether there are savings available in
statutes promulgated by her predecessors much
some items and whether there are deficiencies in
less to repeal existing laws. The Presidents
other items of their operating expenses that need
augmentation. However, it is the Senate goods or services by persons engaged in

President and the Speaker of the House as the business with an aggregate gross annual sale
case may be who shall approve the realignment. exceeding 200,000.
Before giving their stamp of approval, those two
officials will have to see to it that: (1) the funds to
be aligned or transferred are actually savings in ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
the items of expenditures from which the same ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE VS. AQUINO
are to be taken and to the transfer on realignment 162 SCRA 106, 1988
is for the purpose of augmenting the items of
expenditure to which said transfer or realignment FACTS:
is to be made. Petitioner filed suit to annul and declare
It is readily apparent that the special void the "Notice of Seizure" and the "Notice of
provision applicable to the appropriation for debt Sale" of its lot and building for non-payment of
service in so far as it refers to funds in excess of real state taxes and penalties.
the appropriation for debt service in so far as it Petitioner contends that the primary use
refers to funds in excess of the amount of the lot and building for educational purposes,
appropriated in the bill, is an inappropriate and not the incidental use thereof, determines
provision referring to the funds other than P68B and exemption from property taxes under
appropriated in the GAAA of 1994. Section 22 (3), Article VI of the 1935
The veto power while exercised by the Constitution. Hence, the seizure and sale of
President is actually a part of the legislative subject college lot and building, which are
process. Hence, found in Article VI rather than contrary
Article VII. Private respondents counter that the
As the constitution is explicit that the college lot and building in question which were
provision with the Congress can include in an subjected to seizure and sale to answer for the
appropriate to which it relates, it follows that any unpaid tax are used: (I) for the educational
provision which does not relate to any particular purposes of the r college; (2) permanent
item or which it extends in its operation beyond residence of the President and Director thereof,
an item of appropriation is considered an and his family including the in-laws and
inappropriate provision which be vetoed grandchildren; and (3) for commercial purposes
separately from an item. Also to be included in because the ground floor of the college building
the category of inappropriate provision are is being used and rented by a commercial
unconstitutional provisions and provisions which establishment, the Northern Marketing
are intended to amend other laws because Corporation
clearly those kinds of laws have no place in an
appropriation bill. ISSUE: Whether or not the lot and building is
The President vetoed the entire question are used exclusively for educational
paragraph, one of the special provision of the purposes thereby exempting petitioner from
item on debt services including the provisos that property taxes.
the appropriation authorized in said item shall be
used for the payment of one principal and interest HELD:
of foreign and domestic indebtedness and that in NO. The lot and building are not used
no case shall this fund be used to pay for the exclusively for educational purposes. It must be
liabilities of the Central Bank Board of stressed however, that while this Court allows a
Liquidators. These provisos are germane to and more liberal and non-restrictive interpretation of
have direct connection with the item of debt the phrase "exclusively used for educational
service. Inherent in the power of the purposes" as provided for in Article VI, Section
appropriation is the power to specify how the 22, paragraph 3 of the 1935 Philippine
money shall be spent. Said provisos are Constitution, reasonable emphasis has always
appropriate provisions hence, cannot be vetoed been made that exemptions extends to facilities
separately. which are incidental to and reasonably necessary
The SC is sustaining the veto of the for the accomplishment of the main purposes.
Special Provision of the item on debt service can Otherwise stated, the use of the school building
only be with respect to the proviso therein or lot for commercial purposes is neither
requiring that any payment in excess of the contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. Thus,
amount therein, appropriated shall be the subject while the use of the second floor of the main
to the approval of the President of the Philippines building in the case at the bar for residential
with the concurrence of the Congress of the purposes of the Director and his family, may find
Philippines. justification under the concept of incidental use,
The special provision which allows the which is complimentary to the main or primary
Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the purpose - educational, the lease of the first floor
pension fund for the AFP being managed by the thereof to the Northern Marketing Corporation
AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System cannot by any stretch of the imagination be
is violative of Section 25 and Section 29 of Article considered incidental to the purpose of
VI of the Constitution. education.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial
court correctly arrived at the conclusion that the
SECTION 28 RULE ON TAXATION, TARIFF school building as well as the lot where it is built,
POWERS, EXEMPTIONS should be taxed, not because the, second floor of
KAPATIRAN VS. TAN the same is being used by the Director and his
163 SCRA 371, 1988 family for residential purposes, but because the
first floor thereof is being used for commercial
CASE: purposes. However, since only a portion is used
The VAT law or EO 273 is being for purposes of commerce, it is only fair that half
assailed on grounds among others that taxation of the assessed tax be returned to the school
shall be uniform and equitable. involved.
The Court overruled the contention
holding that such was uniform because it
operates with the same effect and force in every ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
place where the subject may be found. It is also SECTION 29 RULES ON PUBLIC MONEY
equitable since it is imposed only on sales of
PASCUAL VS. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC OSMENA VS. ORBOS

WORKS 220 SCRA 703, 1993
110 PHIL. 331, 1960
FACTS:
FACTS: The Oil Price Stabilzation Fund (OPSF)
The sum of 85,000 pesos was was created to minimize the frequent price
appropriated by Congress for the construction of changes brought about by exchange rate
a feeder road running through a private adjustments and/or changes brought about by
subdivision and over a property owned by a changes in world market prices of crude oil and
private individual. Subsequently, the feeder road imported petroleum products. A Terminal Fund
is donated to the government. Balance deficit now aims to resolve the deficit by
increasing petroleum prices, contravening
ISSUE: Is the appropriation valid? Section 29(3), Article VI where such fund shall be
paid only for the purpose for which it was
HELD: created.
The Supreme Court annulled this item,
observing that the property sought to be ISSUE: Whether or not the increase of petroleum
improved with public funds was private in nature prices to resolve the Terminal Fund Balance
at the time the appropriation was made. The deficit is valid.
circumstance that the roads were later donated to
the government did not cure the basic defect of HELD:
the appropriation as it was null and void ab initio. Yes. The Court held that it was a valid
exercise of police power.
AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ
64 PHIL. 201, 1937 ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
FACTS: VS. ENRIQUEZ
The Philippine government authorized a 235 SCRA 506. 1994
special stamp issue on occasion of the
rd
observance in Manila of the 33 International QUIASON, J.:
Eucharistic Congress under the sponsorship of FACTS:
the Catholic Church. The petitioner, as head of The General Appropriation Bill of 1994
the Philippine Independent Church, assailed the was passed and approved by both Houses of
measure and contended that it violated the Congress. It presented the bill to the president for
Constitution inasmuch as it benefited a particular the exercise of his veto power.
region. The Supreme Court, on examining the One of the special provisions vetoed by
facts, discovered that the original design of the the President is with respect to the realignment of
stamp featured a picture of a Catholic chalice, but operating expenses. Whereas each member of
this was later rejected in favor of a map of the Congress is allotted for his own operating
Philippines under which appeared the caption expenditures, a proportionate share of the
rd
Seat, 33 International Eucharistic Congress, appropriation for the house which he belongs. If
Feb. 3-7, 1937. he does not spend for one item of expense, the
questioned provision allows him to transfer his
ISSUE: Whether or not the stamp issue was allocation in said item of expense. Petitioners
valid. assail the special provision allowing a member of
Congress to realign his allocations for operational
HELD: expenses to any other expense categorically
Yes. As the purpose of the stamp issue claiming that this practice is prohibited by Section
were not for the benefit of the Roman Catholic 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution. They argue
Church, nor money was derived from the sale of that the Senate President and Speaker of the
the stamps given to that church but was evidently House, not the individual member of Congress,
to focus attention not on the Eucharistic are the ones authorized to realign the savings as
Congress but on its site, the idea being to attract appropriated.
tourists to our country and not primarily the Another special provision vetoed by the
religious event, it was held that the stamp issue President is on the appropriation for debt service.
was not invalid. It provides Use of funds. The appropriation
authorized therein shall be used for payment of
principal and interest of foregoing and domestic
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT indebtedness; provided, that any payment in
GUINGONA VS. CARAGUE excess of the amount therein appropriated shall
196 SCRA 221, 1991 be subject to the approval of the President with
the concurrence of the Congress of the
FACTS: Philippines; provided further, that in no case shall
PD 1177 is being assailed on its this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the
constitutionality. It is argued that the automatic Central Bank of Liquidators.
reappropriation law for servicing foreign debts is Petitioners claim that the President
invalid because it does not appropriate a fixed cannot veto the special provision on the
amount and is therefore an undue delegation of appropriations for debt service without vetoing
legislative power the entire amount of P86B for said purpose.
In the appropriation for the AFP Pension
ISSUE: Whether or not PD 1177 is constitutional. and Gratuity Fund, the President vetoed the new
provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use
HELD: savings in the AFP to augment pension and
Yes. The amount is fixed by the gratuity funds. According to the President, the
parameters of the law itself which requires the grant retirement and separation benefits should
simple act of looking into the books of the be covered by direct appropriation specially
Treasure. approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29
(1) of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he
stated that the authority to use savings is lodged
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT in the officials enumerated in Section 25 of Article
VI of the Constitution. On the contrary, petitioners pension fund for the AFP being managed by the
claim that said provision is a condition or AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System
limitation, which is intertwined with the item of is violative of Section 25 and Section 29 of Article
appropriation that it could not be separated VI of the Constitution.
therefrom.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

contentions are tenable. DIAZ VS.COURT OF APPEALS
(G.R. NO. L-109698 DECEMBER 5, 1994)
HELD: BELLOSILLO, J.:
Petitioners contentions are without FACTS:
merit. Under the special provisions applicable to On 23 January 1991, Davao Light and
the Congress of the Philippines, the members of Power Company, Inc. (DLPC) filed with the
the Congress only determine the necessity of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) an application
realignment of the savings in the allotment for for the approval of the sound value appraisal of
their operating expenses. They are in the best its property in service. The Asian Appraisal
position to do so because they are the one who Company valued the property and equipment of
know whether there are savings available in DLPC at One Billion One Hundred Forty One
some items and whether there are deficiencies in Million Seven Hundred Seventy Four Thousand
other items of their operating expenses that need Pesos (P1,141,774,000.00).
augmentation. However, it is the Senate On 6 December 1992, ERB approved
President and the Speaker of the House as the the application of DLPC after deducting Fourteen
case may be who shall approve the realignment. Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos
Before giving their stamp of approval, those two (P14,800,000.00) worth of property and
officials will have to see to it that: (1) the funds to equipment which were not used by DLPC in its
be aligned or transferred are actually savings in operation. Petitioners filed a petition for review on
the items of expenditures from which the same certiorari before this Court assailing the decision
are to be taken and to the transfer on realignment of ERB on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
is for the purpose of augmenting the items of and/or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
expenditure to which said transfer or realignment lack of jurisdiction.
is to be made. In Supreme Courts resolution of 8
It is readily apparent that the special September 1992, it referred the case for proper
provision applicable to the appropriation for debt disposition to the Court of Appeals which
service in so far as it refers to funds in excess of subsequently dismissed the petition. Among the
the appropriation for debt service in so far as it grounds given was that the filing of the petition
refers to funds in excess of the amount for review with the Supreme Court was a wrong
appropriated in the bill, is an inappropriate mode of appeal.
provision referring to the funds other than P68B Petitioners filed a motion for
appropriated in the GAAA of 1994. reconsideration contending that the resolution of
The veto power while exercised by the 8 September 1992 was a directive for the Court
President is actually a part of the legislative of Appeals to disregard the above circular. They
process. Hence, found in Article VI rather than further claimed that E.O. No. 172 creating the
Article VII. Energy Regulatory Board to replace the Board of
As the constitution is explicit that the Energy provides under Sec. 10 thereof that "[a]
provision with the Congress can include in an party adversely affected by a decision, order or
appropriate to which it relates, it follows that any ruling of the Board . . . may file a petition to be
provision which does not relate to any particular known as petition for review with the Supreme
item or which it extends in its operation beyond Court."
an item of appropriation is considered an
inappropriate provision which be vetoed ISSUE: Whether or not, Sec. 10 of E.O. No.172
separately from an item. Also to be included in is constitutional.
the category of inappropriate provision are
unconstitutional provisions and provisions which HELD:
are intended to amend other laws because No. The predecessor of the Energy
clearly those kinds of laws have no place in an Regulatory Board was the Board of Energy
appropriation bill. created under P.D. No. 1206. There under,
The President vetoed the entire appeals from the decisions of the Board of
paragraph, one of the special provision of the Energy were appealable to the Office of the
item on debt services including the provisos that President. However, under the Interim Rules
the appropriation authorized in said item shall be Implementing the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
used for the payment of one principal and interest 1980, final decisions, orders, awards or
of foreign and domestic indebtedness and that in resolutions of the Board of Energy were made
no case shall this fund be used to pay for the appealable to the Intermediate Appellate Court
liabilities of the Central Bank Board of (Sec. 9).
Liquidators. These provisos are germane to and Furthermore, the 1987 Constitution,
have direct connection with the item of debt Sec. 30, Art VI provides: "No law shall be passed
service. Inherent in the power of the increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
appropriation is the power to specify how the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution
money shall be spent. Said provisos are without its advice and concurrence."
appropriate provisions hence, cannot be vetoed It is very patent that since Sec. 10 of
separately. E.O. No. 172 was enacted without the advice and
The SC is sustaining the veto of the concurrence of this Court, this provision never
Special Provision of the item on debt service can became effective, with the result that it cannot be
only be with respect to the proviso therein deemed to have amended the Judiciary
requiring that any payment in excess of the Reorganization Act of 1980. Consequently, the
amount therein, appropriated shall be the subject authority of the Court of Appeals to decide cases
to the approval of the President of the Philippines from the Board of Energy, now ERB, remains (Cf.
with the concurrence of the Congress of the First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
Philippines. G.R. No. 110571, 7 October 1994).
The special provision which allows the On 27 February 1991, the Supreme
Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the Court promulgated Circular No.1-91, par. (1) of
which specifically provides that the proper mode

of appeal from any quasi-judicial agency, ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC
including ERB, is by way of a petition for review committed grave abuse of discretion in
with the Court of Appeals. If the appeal is brought promulgating and implementing its Resolution
to either Court (Supreme Court or Court of No. 2848 which govern the conduct of the
Appeals) by the wrong procedure, the only referendum proposing to annul or repeal
course of action open to it is to dismiss the Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the
appeal. There is no longer any justification for Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan?
allowing transfers of erroneous appeals from one
court to another (Quesada v. Court of Appeals, HELD:
G.R. No. 93869, 12 November 1990). Yes. COMELEC commit grave abuse of
Prior to Circular No. 1-91, the Supreme discretion in promulgating and implementing
Court promulgated Circular No. 2-90 dated 9 Resolution No. 2848. The process started by
March 1990, Item No. 4 of which states that "[a]n private respondents was an INITIATIVE but
appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the respondent COMELEC made preparations for a
Court of Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate REFERENDUM only.
mode shall be dismissed". Also, paragraph (d) of Based on the definitions given by the
said Circular No. 2-90 also provides that "[n]o Local Government Code (R.A. 7160): Local
transfer of appeals erroneously taken to the Initiative is the legal process whereby the
Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals to registered voters of a local government unit may
whichever of these Tribunals has appropriate directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance;
appellate jurisdiction will be allowed; continued while Local Referendum is the legal process
ignorance or willful disregard of the law on whereby the registered voters of the local
appeals will not be tolerated." government units may approve, amend or reject
Consequently, the Court of Appeals was correct any ordinance enacted by the Sanggunian.
when it held In other words, while initiative is entirely
Contrary to petitioners' stand, the Supreme the work of the electorate, referendum is begun
Court's Resolution dated September 8, 1992, and consented to by the law-making body.
referring "this case to the Court of Appeals for Initiative is a process of law-making by the
further disposition" was not a directive for this people themselves without the participation and
court to disregard the above circulars and against the wishes of their elected
precedents. Rather the said SC resolution could representatives, while referendum consists
mean only that this court should dispose of the merely of the electorate approving or rejecting
subject petition in conformity with, and not in what has been drawn up or enacted by a
violation of, those circulars and precedents legislative body. Hence, the process and the
(Rollo, p. 26). voting in an initiative are understandably more
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is complex than in a referendum where expectedly
DISMISSED. the voters will simply answer yes or no in the
ballot.
In the case at bar, the exercise
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT conducted is unquestionably an Initiative.
SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS.
COMMISION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. NO. 125416 SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS
FACTS: (177 SCRA 668)
The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong,
Bataan (Sangguniang Bayan) passed FACTS:
Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, In February 1986, Ferdinand Marcos
expressing therein its absolute concurrence to was deposed from the presidency via the non-
join the Subic Special Economic Zone. violent people power revolution and forced into
Respondents Garcia, et al. filed a exile. Corazon C. Aquino was declared
petition with the Sangguniang Bayan to annul President of the Philippines under a revolutionary
Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993. government.
The Sangguniang Bayan promulgated After three years, Mr. Marcos, in his
Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 18, Serye 1993, deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the
requesting Congress to amend certain provisions Philippines to die. But President Aquino has
of R.A. No.7227, particularly those concerning stood firmly in the decision to bar the return of
the matters cited in items of private respondents Mr. Marcos and his family - considering the dire
petition. consequences to the nation of his return at a time
Not satisfied, private respondents when the stability of the government is
resorted to their power of initiative. Respondent threatened from various directions and the
COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative economy is just beginning to rise and move
on the ground that the subject thereof was merely forward.
a resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not
an ordinance. Thereafter, COMELEC issued a ISSUE: Whether or not in the exercise of the
Resolution directing its Provincial Election powers granted by the Constitution, the President
Supervisor to hold action on authentication of may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the
signatures being solicited by private respondent. Philippines.
COMELEC also issued Resolution No.
2845, adopting a Calendar of Activities for local HELD:
referendum on certain municipal ordinance Yes, the President has the Power under
passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from
Bataan. It then promulgated said Resolution, returning to our country.
providing for the rules and guidelines to govern The Constitution says that the executive
the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul power shall be vested in the President. It also
or repeal Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the enumerates certain specific powers. The
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan. enumeration, however, does not exhaust the
Contesting the validity of Resolution No. totality of executive powers. Tradition recognizes
2428, petitioner instituted a petition for certiorari that the powers of the President are more than
and prohibition. the sum of enumerated executive powers. The
duty of the government to serve and protect the more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of
people as well as to see to the maintenance of Representatives. On November 20, the Senate
peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, formally opened the impeachment trial of the
and property, and the promotion of the general petitioner. Twenty-one (21) senators took their
welfare argue towards the existence of residual oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice
instated powers. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding. The political
tension rose during the impeachment trial
particularly during the December hearings when
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of
MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS Equitable-PCI Bank testified on the existence of
(178 SCRA 760) the Jose Velarde account. The impeachment trial
reached its turning point when on the fateful day
FACTS: of January 16, by a vote of 11-10 the senator-
On October 1989, motion for judges ruled against the opening of the second
reconsideration was filed by petitioners raising envelope which allegedly contained evidence
the following major arguments among others: showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a
1. The President has no power to bar a secret bank account under the name "Jose
Filipino from his own country. Velarde." The non-opening of the second
2. There is no basis for barring the return envelope led to the resignation of the public and
of the family of former President private prosecutors and the spontaneous
Marcos. outburst of anger by the people in EDSA which is
now referred to as the EDSA dos.
ISSUE: Petitioners fall from power became
W/N the President has the power to bar the more apparent starting January 19 when key
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. officials from the armed forces, the PNP and his
other cabinet members withdrew support. At
HELD: about 12:00 noon of January 20 Chief Justice
YES. The Supreme Court held that it Davide administered the oath to respondent
cannot be denied that the President, upon whom Arroyo as President of the Philippines. At 2:30
executive power is vested, has unstated residual p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left
powers which are implied from the grant of Malacaang Palace while leaving a press
executive power and which are necessary for her statement indicating his strong and serious
to comply with her duties under the Constitution. doubts about the legality and constitutionality of
The powers of the President are not limited to the proclamation of the respondent as President
what are expressly enumerated in the article on and that he is leaving the Palace as he does not
the Executive Department and in scattered wish to prevent the restoration of unity and order
provisions of the Constitution. This is so, in our civil society.
notwithstanding the avowed intent of the
members of the Constitutional Commission of ISSUES:
1986 to limit the powers of the President as a 1. Whether or not the case at bar is a political
reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. question and hence, are beyond the jurisdiction
Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific of this Court to decide
powers of the President, particularly those 2. Whether or not petitioner Estrada is a President
relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting
a diminution of the general grant of executive President.
power.
HELD:
1.)No the case at bar is not a political question.
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT Accordingly, it is within the jurisdiction of the
SECTION 8 ARTICLE 7, 1987 CONSTITUTION Court to decide. In the case of Tanada v.
ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO Cuenco, the Court, through former Chief Justice
(G.R. NO. 146710-15, MARCH 2, 2001) Roberto Concepcion, held that political questions
refer "to those questions which, under the
PUNO, J.: Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
FACTS: their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President legislative or executive branch of the
while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was government. It is concerned with issues
elected Vice-President. Both petitioner and the dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
respondent were to serve a six-year term particular measure." To a great degree, the 1987
commencing on June 30, 1998.During his term, Constitution has narrowed the reach of the
the petitioner experienced a sharp descent from political question doctrine when it expanded the
power started on October 4, 2000 when Ilocos power of judicial review of this court not only to
Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime settle actual controversies involving rights which
friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused are legally demandable and enforceable but also
the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving to determine whether or not there has been a
millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expos grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
immediately ignited reactions of rage. Numerous excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
investigations commenced both from the Senate instrumentality of government.
and the House of Representatives. Calls for the Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on
resignation of the petitioner filled the air that on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed
October 11, Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the
issued a pastoral letter asking the petitioner to new provision, however, courts are given a
step down from the presidency as he had lost the greater prerogative to determine what it can do to
moral authority to govern. prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to
Political tensions continued to heat up lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
as key economic advisers and members of the branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly,
cabinet defected. On November 13, in a the new provision did not just grant the Court
tumultuous session, the house of representatives power of doing nothing. In fine, the legal
finally transmitted the articles of impeachment to distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA
the senate signed by 115 represenatatives or People Power II is clear. EDSA I involves the
exercise of the people power of revolution which the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving
overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expos
exercise of people power of freedom of speech immediately ignited reactions of rage.
and freedom of assembly to petition the On November 13, in a tumultuous
government for redress of grievances which only session, the house of representatives transmitted
affected the office of the President. EDSA I is the articles of impeachment to the senate. On
extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new November 20, the Senate formally opened the
government that resulted from it cannot be the impeachment trial of the petitioner. The
subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra impeachment trial reached its turning point when
constitutional and the resignation of the sitting on the fateful day of January 16, by a vote of 11-
President that it caused and the succession of 10 the senator-judges ruled against the opening
the Vice President as President are subject to of the second envelope which allegedly
judicial review. EDSA I presented a political contained evidence showing that petitioner held
question; EDSA II involves legal questions. P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the
name "Jose Velarde." The non-opening of the
2. ) No. President Estrada is not on leave, he second envelope led to the resignation of the
resigned from office. Resignation is not a high public and private prosecutors and the
level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and spontaneous outburst of anger by the people in
its elements are beyond quibble: there must be EDSA which is now referred to as the EDSA dos.
an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled On January 20, 2001, petitioner sent a
by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a letter to the Senate and the House of
resignation is not governed by any formal Representatives claiming his inability to perform
requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be his functions as a president. Unaware of the
written. It can be express. It can be implied. As letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office
long as the resignation is clear, it must be given as President on January 20, 2001 at about 12:30
legal effect. p.m. Despite receipt of the letter, the House of
In the cases at bar, the facts show that Representatives as well as the Senate issued
petitioner did not write any formal letter of House Resolution Nos. 175, 176 and 178 as well
resignation before he evacuated Malacaang as Senate Resolution nos. 82, 83 and 84
Palace. Consequently, whether or not petitioner recognizing and confirming the assumption of the
resigned has to be determined from his act and respondent of the presidency.
omissions before, during and after January 20, After respondent has taken her oath of
2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous office, petitioner postulated that respondent
and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence Arroyo as Vice President has no power to
bearing a material relevance on the issue. Using adjudge the inability of the petitioner to discharge
this totality test, the Court holds that petitioner the powers and duties of the presidency. His
resigned as President. The petitioners significant submittal is that "Congress has the
resignation is shown in the following instances: ultimate authority under the Constitution to
a. he left Malacaang determine whether the President is incapable of
b. he acknowledged the oath-taking of the performing his functions in the manner provided
respondent as President of the Republic albeit for in section 11 of article VII."This contention is
with reservation about its legality the centerpiece of petitioner's stance that he is a
c. he emphasized he was leaving the President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only
Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of an Acting President.
peace and in order to begin the healing process
of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the ISSUES:
Palace due to any kind inability and that he was 1. Whether or not the petitioner Is only temporarily
going to re-assume the presidency as soon as unable to Act as President
the disability disappears 2. Whether conviction in the impeachment
d. he expressed his gratitude to the proceedings is a condition precedent for the
people for the opportunity to serve them. criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada
e. he assured that he will not shirk from 3. Whether or not the petitioner is immune from the
any future challenge that may come ahead in the charges filed against
same service of our country. Petitioner's
reference is to a future challenge after occupying HELD:
the office of the president which he has given up; 1. No, petitioner is not only temporarily unable to
f. he called on his supporters to join him in act as president. House Resolution Nos.
the promotion of a constructive national spirit of 175,176, and 178, as well as Senate
reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the Resolutions No. 82, 83 and 84 show that both
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could houses of Congress have recognized respondent
not be attained if he did not give up the Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that
presidency. recognition is the premise that the inability of
petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary.
Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT inability.
SECTION 11 ARTICLE 7, 1987 CONSTITUTION
ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO 2.) No. Conviction in the impeachment
(G.R. NO. 146710-15, MARCH 2, 2001) proceedings is not a condition precedent for the
criminal prosecution of the petitioner. The
PUNO, J.: impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was
FACTS: aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner the events that led to his loss of the presidency.
Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President Since, the Impeachment Court is now functus
while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand
elected Vice-President. Both petitioner and the that he should first be impeached and then
respondent were to serve a six-year term convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea
commencing on June 30, 1998.During his term, if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his
the petitioner experienced a sharp descent from prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to
power started on October 4, 2000 when Ilocos commend itself for it will place him in a better
Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime situation than a non-sitting President who has not
friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused been subjected to impeachment proceedings and
yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. an accused has not signed any document of any
To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional bid of the family corporation of which he is
Commission make it clear that when member, submitted to any government
impeachment proceedings have become moot departments.
due to the resignation of the President, the
proper criminal and civil cases may already be HELD:
filed against him No, the provision shall still apply
because the DITC remained a family corporation
3.) No. The petitioner is not immuned from the in which Doromal has at least an indirect interest.
cases filed against him by virtue of him being an Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
unsitting president. The cases filed against Constitution provides that "the President, Vice-
petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They President, the members of the Cabinet and their
involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. deputies or assistants shall not . . . during (their)
By no stretch of the imagination can these tenure, . . . directly or indirectly . . . participate in
crimes, especially plunder which carries the any business." The constitutional ban is similar to
death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle the prohibition in the Civil Service Law that
of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner "pursuit of private business . . . without the
cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing permission required by Civil Service Rules and
the President to commit criminal acts and Regulations" shall be a ground for disciplinary
wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from action against any officer or employee in the civil
liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity service.
is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts
and conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts of
public officials are not acts of the State and the ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS. EXECUTIVE
stands in the same footing as any SECRETARY
trespasser. (194 SCRA 317)
FACTS:
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT President Aquino issued EO No. 284,
DOROMAL VS. SANDIGANBAYAN which allows members of the Cabinet, their
(177 SCRA 354) undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to
hold other government offices or positions in
FACTS: addition to their primary positions. It was
The special prosecutor officer filed in the assailed for it violates the Constitution.
Sandiganbayan an information against petitioner Petitioners challenge the
Doromal, alleging: constitutionality of EO No. 284 on the principal
"That the above-named accused, a submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13,
public officer, being then Commissioner of the Article VII other than those provided in the
Presidential Commission on Good Government, Constitution. According to petitioners, by virtue of
did then and there wilfully and unlawfully have the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
direct or indirect financial interest in the Doromal Constitution," the only exceptions against holding
International Trading Corporation, an entity which any other office or employment in Government
transacted or entered into a business transaction are those provided in the Constitution, namely:
or contract with the Department of Education, (1) The Vice-President may be appointed as a
Culture and Sports and the National Manpower Member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2),
and Youth Council, both agencies of the Article VII thereof; and (2) the Secretary of
government which business, contracts or Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial
transactions he is prohibited by law and the and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article
constitution from having any interest." VIII.
The information was initially annulled for
the reason that the TanodBayan has no right to ISSUE: Whether or not an executive order
file information without the approval of the allowing members of the Cabinet, their
Ombudsman. The Special Prosecutor sought undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to
clearance from the Ombudsman to refile it. The hold other government offices in addition to their
Ombudsman granted clearance but advised that primary positions is valid.
"some changes be made in the information." A
new information, duly approved by the HELD:
Ombudsman, was filed, alleging that: Invalid. In the light of the construction
". . . , the above-named accused given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to
(Doromal), a public officer, being then a Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987
Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July
Good Government, did then and there willfully 23, 1987 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting
and unlawfully, participate in a business through the number of positions that Cabinet members,
the Doromal International Trading Corporation, a undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may
family corporation of which he is the President, hold in addition to their primary position to not
and which company participated in the biddings more than two (2) positions in the government
conducted by the Department of Education, and government corporations, Executive Order
Culture and Sports and the National Manpower & No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple
Youth Council, which act or participation is offices or employment in direct contravention of
prohibited by law and the constitution." the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of
Petitioner moved to quash the the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing
information on the ground that he, a PCGG so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Commissioner, has not signed any document, bid Constitution itself.
of the family corporation of which he is member,
submitted to DECS.
Sandiganbayn denied the motion to ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
quash, hence this petition. IN RE APPOINTMENTS DATED MARCH
30,1998 OF
ISSUE: W/N the prohibition under Section 13 of HON. M. A. VALENZUELA AND HON. P. B.
Article VII of the Constitution should not apply if VILLARTA AS RTC JUDGES
(298 SCRA 408 [NOVEMBER 9, 1998]) HELD:

NO. The Court's view is that during the
NARVASA, C.J.: period stated in Section 15. Article VII of the
FACTS: Constitution "(t)wo months immediatey before
Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. the next presidential elections and up to the end
Placido B. Vallarta were appointed by the then his term" the President is neither required to
President on March 30, 1998 as Judges of the make appointments to the courts nor allowed to
RTC, Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, do so; and that Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII
Cabanatuan City, respectively. On May 12, 1998, simply mean that the President is required to fill
the Chief Justice received from Malacanang the vacancies in the courts within the time frames
appointments of two (2) Judge of the RTC provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15
mentioned above. The appointments were of Article VII. It is not noteworthy that the
questioned on the view that they were made prohibition on appointments comes into effect
during the period of the ban on appointments only once every six years.
imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the In this connection, it may be pointed out
Constitution. that that instruction that any "vacany shall be
The issue was already ventilated at the filled within ninety days" (in the last sentence of
meeting of the Judicial and Bar Council on March Section 4 (1) of Article VIII) contrasts with the
9, 1998 regarding the constitutionality of prohibition Section 15, Article VII, which is
appointments of eight (8) Associate Justices to couched in stronger negative language that "a
the Court of Appeals, specifically, in light of the President or Acting President shall not make
forthcoming presidential elections. Attention was appointments. . ."
drawn to Section 15, Article VII of the Now, it appears that Section 15, Article
Constitution reading as follows: VI is directed against two types of appointments:
Sec. 15. Two months immediately (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those
before the next presidential elections and up to made for partisan considerations. The first refers
the end of his, term, a President or Acting to those appointments made within the two
President shall not make appointments, except months preceding a Presidential election and are
temporary appointments to executive positions similar to those which are declared elections
when continued vacancies therein will prejudice offenses in the Omnibus Election Code. The
public service or endanger public safety. second type of appointments prohibited by
On the other hand, appointments to fill Section 15, Article VII consist of the so-called
vacancies in the Supreme Court during the "midnight" appointments.
period mentioned in the provision just quoted Considering the respective reasons for
could be justified by Section 4(1) of Article VII of the time frames for filling vacancies in the courts
the Constitution which states: and the restriction on the President's power of
Sec. 4 (1) The Supreme Court shall be appointments, it is this Court's view that, as a
composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen general proposition, in case of conflict, the former
Associate Justices. ** **. Any vacancy shall be should yield to the latter. Surely, the prevention of
filled within ninety days from the occurrence vote-buying and similar evils outweighs the need
thereof. for avoiding delays in filling up of court vacancies
Also pertinent although not specifically or the disposition of some cases. Temporary
discussed is Section 9 of the same Article VIII vacancies can abide the period of the ban which,
which provides that for the lower courts, the incidentally and as earlier pointed out, comes to
President shall issue the appointments from a exist only once in every six years. Moreover,
list of at least three nominees prepared by the those occurring in the lower courts can be filled
Council for every vacancy within ninety days temporarily by designation. But prohibited
from the submission of the list. appointments are long-lasting and permanent in
The Court issued a Resolution which their effects. They may, as earlier pointed out,
states that pending the foregoing proceedings their making is considered an election offense.
and the deliberation by the Court on the mater, To be sure, instances may be conceived
and until further orders, no action be taken on the of the imperative need for an appointment, during
appointments of Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. the period of the ban, not only in the executive
Vallarta which in the meantime shall be held in but also in the Supreme Court. This may be the
abeyance. case should the membership of the Court be so
In compliance with the foregoing reduced that it will have no quorum, or should the
Resolution, Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta voting on a particularly important question
filed before the Court the required pleadings and requiring expeditious resolution be evenly
other documents. It is noted that Hon. Valenzuela divided. Such a case, however, is covered by
had already taken his Oath of Office a Judge on neither Section 15 of Article VII nor Sections 4 (1)
May 14, 1998 and explained that he did so and 9 of Article VIII.
because on May 7, 1998, he received from Concerning Valenzuelas oath-taking
Malacanang copy of his appointment *** which and reporting for duty as Presiding Judge of
contained the following direction By virtue RTC Branch 62, Bago City, on May 14, 1998, it
hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the must be noted that it is a standing practice on the
performance of the duties of the office. appointments to the Judiciary from the highest
The Court then deliberated on the to the lowest court to be sent by the Office of
pleadings and documents above mentioned, in the President to the Office of the Chief Justice,
relation to the facts and circumstances on record the appointments being addressed to the
and thereafter resolved to promulgate the appointees. It is the Clerk of Court of the
following opinion. Supreme Court in the Chiefs Justice behalf, who
thereafter advises the individual appointees of
ISSUE: Whether, during the period of the ban on their appointments and also the date
appointments imposed by Section 15, Article VII commencement of the pre-requisite orientation
of the Constitution, the President is nonetheless seminar to be conducted by the Philippine
required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view Judicial Academy for new Judges. The procedure
of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII. ensures the authenticity of the appointments,
Whether the President can make enables the Court, particularly the Office of the
appointments to the judiciary during the period of Court Administrator, to enter in the appropriate
the ban in the interest of public service. records all appointments to the Judiciary a well
as other relevant data such as the dates of
qualification, the completion by the appointees of pleasure, as in fact it was (albeit for a different
their pre-requisite orientation seminars, their reason).
assumption of duty, etc. The procedure also
precludes the possibility, however remote of 2. Designation may also be loosely defined as an
Judges acting on spurious or otherwise defective appointment because it likewise involves the
appointments. naming of a particular person to a specified
The appointments of Messrs. public office.
Valenzuela and Vallarta on March 30, 1998 That is the common understanding of
(transmitted to the Office of the Chief Justice on the term. However, where the person is merely
May 14, 998) were unquestionably made during designated and not appointed, the implication is
the period of the ban. Consequently, they come that he shall hold the office only in a temporary
within the operation of the first prohibition relating capacity and may be replaced at will by the
to appointments which are considered to be for appointing authority. In this sense, the
the purpose of buying votes or influencing the designation is considered only an acting or
election. While the filling of vacancies in the temporary appointment, which does not confer
judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, security of tenure on the person named.
there is no showing in this case of any compelling
reason to justify the making of the appointments
during the period of the ban. On the other hand, ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
as already discussed, there is a strong public SARMIENTO VS. MISON
policy for the prohibition against appointments (156 SCRA 154, 1987)
made within the period of the ban.
In view of the foregoing considerations, FACTS:
the Court Resolved to DECLARE VOID the The petitioners, who are taxpayers,
appointments signed by His Excellency the lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the
President under date of March 30, 1998 of Hon. Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law,
Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison
Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of from performing the functions of the Office of
Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the
Cabanatuan City, respectively and to order them, respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of
forthwith on being served with notice of this the Department of Budget, from effecting
decision, to forthwith CEASE AND DESIST from disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries
discharging the office of Judge of the Courts to and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's
which they were respectively appointed on March appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of
30, 1998. Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not
having been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. The respondents, on the other
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT hand, maintain the constitutionality of respondent
BINAMIRA VS. GARRUCHO Mison's appointment without the confirmation of
(188 SCRA 154 [1990]) the Commission on Appointments.
FACTS: ISSUES:
The petitioner, Binamira, was the former 1. What are the groups of officers whom
General Manager of the Philippine Tourism the President shall appoint?
Authority by virtue of the designation of the 2. W/N confirmation of the appointments of
Minister of Tourism with the approval of President Commissioners of the Bureau of
Aquino. Subsequently, Garrucho was delegated Customs by the Commission on
by the President as the new Secretary of the Appointments required.
Ministry. Garucho then had taken over the
position of Binamira as the General Manager of HELD:
Philippine Tourism Authority. Hence, this 1. Under the provisions of the 1987
petition. Constitution, just quoted, there are four (4)
groups of officers whom the President shall
ISSUES: appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will
1. W/N a person designated to a position hereafter refer from time to time, are:
by a member of the cabinet should step First, the heads of the executive
down to a person newly designated by departments, ambassadors, other public
the President to that same position. ministers and consuls, officers of the armed
2. Distinguished designation from forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
appointment and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution;
HELD: Second, all other officers of the
1. YES. The designation of the petitioner Government whose appointments are not
cannot sustain his claim that he has been illegally otherwise provided for by law;
removed. The reason is that the decree clearly Third, those whom the President may be
provides that the appointment of the General authorized by law to appoint;
Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority shall Fourth, officers lower in rank whose
be made by the President of the Philippines, not appointments the Congress may by law vest in
by any other officer. Appointment involves the the President alone.
exercise of discretion, which because of its The first group of officers is clearly
nature cannot be delegated. Legally speaking, it appointed with the consent of the Commission on
was not possible for Minister Gonzales to Appointments. Appointments of such officers are
assume the exercise of that discretion as an alter initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is
ego of the President. confirmed by the Commission on Appointments,
His designation being an unlawful the President appoints.
encroachment on a presidential prerogative, he Those belonging to second, third and
did not acquire valid title thereunder to the fourth groups may be appointed by the President
position in question. Even if it be assumed that it without such confirmation with COA.
could be and was authorized, the designation
signified merely a temporary or acting 2. NO. It is evident that the position of
appointment that could be legally withdrawn at Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a
bureau head) is not one of those within the first appointed by the President for a term of seven
group of appointments where the consent of the years without re-appointment. Appointment to
Commission on Appointments is required. As a any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term
matter of fact, as already pointed out, while the of the predecessor."
1935 Constitution includes "heads of bureaus"
among those officers whose appointments need ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
the consent of the Commission on Appointments, QUINTOS-DELES VS. COMMISSION ON
the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, APPOINTMENTS
deliberately excluded the position of "heads of (177 SCRA 259, 1989)
bureaus" from appointments that need the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on FACTS:
Appointments. Petitioner and three others were
appointed Sectoral Representatives by the
President pursuant to Article VII, Section 16,
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the
BAUTISTA VS. SALONGA Constitution. However, the appointees were not
(172 SCRA 160, 1989) able to take their oaths and discharge their duties
as members of Congress due to the opposition of
FACTS: some congressmen-members of the Commission
President Aquino designated Mary on Appointments, who insisted that sectoral
Bautista as Acting Chairman of the CHR. Later representatives must first be confirmed by the
on, the President extended to Bautista a respondent Commission before they could take
permanent appointment as Chairman of the their oaths and/or assume office as members of
Commission. She took her oath of office by virtue the House of Representatives.
of her appointment as Chairman of the CHR.
Bautista received letters from the COA ISSUE: W/N appointment of Sectoral
Secretary requesting her to submit certain Representatives requires confirmation by the
information and documents and to be present at Commission on Appointments.
a meeting of the COA Committee on Justice and
Judicial and Bar Council and Human Rights, in HELD:
connection with her confirmation as Chairman of YES. Since the seats reserved for
CHR. However, she refused to submit herself to sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section
the COA arguing that the latter has no jurisdiction 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the
to review her appointment as CHR Chairman. President by express provision of Section 7, Art.
The COA's secretary sent a letter to the XVIII of the Constitution, it is undubitable that
executive secretary informing the latter that COA sectoral representatives to the House of
disapproved Bautista's "ad interim appointment" Representatives are among the "other officers
as Chairman of the CHR, in view of her refusal to whose appointments are vested in the President
submit to the jurisdiction of the COA. It is the in this Constitution," referred to in the first
COA's submission that the President decides to sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose
the extent another appointment to Bautista, this appointments are-subject to confirmation by the
time, submitting such appointment/nomination to Commission on Appointments.
the COA for confirmation. There are appointments vested in the
President in the Constitution which, by express
ISSUE: Whether or not confirmation of the mandate of the Constitution, require no
appointments of the Chairman of the Commission confirmation such as appointments of members
on Human Rights requires the consent of the of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts
COA. (Sec. 9, Art. VIII) and the Ombudsman and his
deputies (Sec. 9, Art. XI). No such exemption
HELD: from confirmation had been extended to
No, since the office is not one of those appointments of sectoral representatives in the
mentioned in the first sentence of Article VII, Constitution.
Section 16, nor is it specified elsewhere that such
appointments needs consent of the Commission,
it follows that the appointment by the President of ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
the Chairman of the CHR is to be made without CALDERON VS. CARALE
the review or participation of the Commission on (208 SCRA 254, 1992)
Appointments.
To be more precise, the appointment of FACTS:
the Chairman and Members of the Commission Sometime in March 1989, RA 6715
on Human Rights is not specifically provided for amending the Labor Code was approved. Sec 13
in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and thereof provides that the Chairman, the Division
Members of the Civil Service Commission, the Presiding Commissioners and other
Commission on Elections and the Commission Commissioners shall all be appointed by the
on Audit, whose appointments are expressly President subject to the confirmation by the
vested by the Constitution in the President with Commission on Appointment.
the consent of the Commission on Appointment. Pursuant to said law, President Aquino
The President appoints the Chairman appointed the Chairman and Commissioners of
and Members of the Commission on Human the NLRC representing the public workers and
Rights pursuant to the second sentence in employees sectors. The appointment stated that
Section 16, Art. VII, that is, without the the appointees may qualify and enter upon the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments performance of the duties of the office.
because they are among the officers of This petition for prohibition questions the
government "whom he (the President) may be constitutionality of the permanent appointment
authorized by law to appoint." And Section 2(c), extended by the President without submitting the
Executive Order No. 163, 5 May 1987, authorizes same to the Commission on Appointment for
the President to appoint the Chairman and confirmation pursuant to RA 6715.
Members of the Commission on Human Rights. It The Solicitor General contends that RA
provides: 6715 transgresses Sec 16 Art VII by expanding
"(c) The Chairman and the Members of the confirmation power of the Commission on
the Commission on Human Rights shall be Appointments without Constitutional basis.
"Sec. 6. Composition of the Monetary

ISSUES: Board. The powers and functions of the Bangko
1. May the Congress expand the list of Sentral shall be exercised by the Bangko Sentral
those whose appointment needs Monetary Board, hereafter referred to as the
confirmation by the Commission on Monetary Board, composed of seven (7)
Appointments? members appointed by the President of the
2. When is confirmation by COA can be Philippines for a term of six (6) years.
said to be required and not? The seven (7) members are:
(a) The Governor of the Bangko Sentral, who
HELD: shall be the Chairman of the Monetary Board.
1. NO, the Court held that the Congress The Governor of the Bangko Sentral shall be
may not expand the list of appointments needing head of a department and his appointment shall
confirmation. be subject to confirmation by the Commission on
The NLRC Chairman and Appointments. Whenever the Governor is unable
Commissioners fall within the second sentence of to attend a meeting of the Board, he shall
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, more designate a Deputy Governor to act as his
specifically under the "third groups" of appointees alternate: Provided, That in such event, the
referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom the Monetary Board shall designate one of its
President may be authorized by law to appoint. members as acting Chairman . . ." (Underlining
Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the supplied).
NLRC are not among the officers mentioned in In their comment, respondents claim
the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose that Congress exceeded its legislative powers in
appointments requires confirmation by the requiring the confirmation by the Commission on
Commission on Appointments. To the extent that Appointments of the appointment of the Governor
RA 6715 requires confirmation by the of the Bangko Sentral. They contend that an
Commission on Appointments of the appointment to the said position is not among the
appointments of respondents Chairman and appointments which have to be confirmed by the
Members of the National Labor Relations Commission on Appointments, citing Section 16
Commission, it is unconstitutional because: of Article VII of the Constitution.
a. it amends by legislation, the first
sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the ISSUE: May the Congress expand the
Constitution by adding thereto confirmation powers of the Commission on
appointments requiring confirmation Appointments and require appointment of other
by the Commission on government officials not expressly mentioned in
Appointments; and the first sentence of Sec. 16 of Article 7 of the
b. it amends by legislation the second Constitution?
sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution, by imposing the HELD:
confirmation of the Commission on NO. In this case the Court used the
Appointments on appointments same ruling as what was held in the case of
which are otherwise entrusted only Calderon vs. Corale, where the ruled was that
with the President Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation
2. Confirmation by the Commission on powers of the COA and require confirmation of
Appointments is required only for presidential appointments of other government officials not
appointees mentioned in the first sentence of expressly mentioned in the first sentence of
Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution.
whose appointments are expressly vested by the
Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral
representatives to Congress and members of the
constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service
and Election).
Confirmation is not required when the
President appoints other government officers ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
whose appointments are not otherwise provided FLORES VS. DRILON
for by law or those officers whom he may be (223 SCRA 568, 1993)
authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman
and Members of the Commission on Human FACTS:
Rights). Also, as observed in Mison, when Mayor Gordon of Olongapo City was
Congress creates inferior offices but omits to appointed Chairman of SBMA on account of RA
provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an 7227. Under said law, for the first year of its
unconstitutional manner for such appointments, effectiveness, the mayor of Olongapo shall be
the officers are considered as among those appointed as chairman of the SBMA.
whose appointments are not otherwise provided It was argued that said provision
for by law. violates Sec. 7 Art IX:-B which provides: that no
elective official shall be eligible for appointment in
any capacity to any public officer or position
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT during his tenure.
TARROSA VS. SINGSON It was contended that the prohibition
(232 SCRA 553, 1994) cannot be applied due to the presence of a law
authorizing the appointment. The Local
FACTS: Government Code permits the appointment of
President Ramos appointed respondent local elective official to another position or post.
Singson as Governor of the Bangko Sentral.
Petitioner argues that this appointment is null and ISSUE: Whether the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d),
void since it was not submitted for confirmation to of R.A. 7227 which states, "Provided, however,
the COA. The petition is anchored on the That for the first year of its operations from the
provisions of Section 6 of R.A. No. 7653, which effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of
established the Bangko Sentral as the Central Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman
Monetary Authority of the Philippines. Section 6, and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority,"
Article II of R.A. No. 7653 provides: violates the constitutional proscription against

appointment or designation of elective officials to POBRE VS. MENDIETA

other government posts. (224 SCRA 738, 1993)
HELD: FACTS:
YES. In the case before us, the subject This controversy began when the term
proviso directs the President to appoint an of office of Honorable Francia as PRC
elective official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, Commissioner/Chairman expired. At that time,
to other government posts (as Chairman of the Mendieta was the senior associate
Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). Commissioner and Pobre was the second
Since this is precisely what the constitutional associate Commissioner of the PRC.
proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no Then the executive secretary sought the
stretching of the imagination to conclude that the opinion of acting secretary of justice on whether
proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first part., Art. IX-B, the President may appoint as
of the Constitution. Here, the fact that the Commissioner/Chairman of the PRC any person
expertise of an elective official may be most other than the Senior Associate Commissioner.
beneficial to the higher interest of the body politic Acting secretary of justice answered that Sec. 2
is of no moment. of PD 223 does not limit or restrict the appointing
It is argued that Sec. 94 of the Local power of the President.
Government Code (LGC) permits the President Aquino then appointed the
appointment of a local elective official to another petitioner, then an Associate Commissioner, as
post if so allowed by law or by the primary the PRC Commissioner/Chairman.
functions of his office. 8 But, the contention is Mendieta filed a petition for declaratory
fallacious. Section 94 of the LGC is not relief contesting Pobres appointment as
determinative of the constitutionality of Sec. 13, Chairman of the PRC because he allegedly
par. (d), of R.A. 7227, for no legislative act can succeeded Francia as PRC Chairman by
prevail over the fundamental law of the land. operation of law. The trial court ruled in favor of
Mendieta. Hence, this petition.
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT ISSUE:

LUEGO VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION W/N the vacancy in the commission shall be filled
(143 SCRA 327, 1986) by succession or operation of law.
FACTS: HELD:
The petitioner was appointed NO. The Court finds unacceptable the
Administrative Officer II by the city mayor, Mayor view that every vacancy in the Commission
Solon. The appointment was described as (except the position of "junior" Associate
permanent but the Civil Service Service Commissioner) shall be filled by "succession" or
Commission approved it as temporary subject by "operation of law" for that would deprive the
to the outcome of the protest of the respondent. President of his power to appoint a new PRC
The Civil Service Commission decided Commissioner and Associate Commissioners --
that respondent was better qualified, revoked the "all to be appointed by the President" under P.D.
appointment of petitioner and ordered the No. 223. The absurd result would be that the only
appointment of respondent in his place. The occasion for the President to exercise his
private responded was so appointed by the new appointing power would be when the position of
mayor, Mayor Duterte. junior (or second) Associate Commissioner
The petitioner, invoking his earlier becomes vacant. We may not presume that when
permanent appointment, is now before the the President issued P.D. No. 223, he
Court to question that order and the private deliberately clipped his prerogative to choose and
respondents title. appoint the head of the PRC and limited himself
to the selection and appointment of only the
ISSUES: associate commissioner occupying the lowest
1. Is the Civil Service Commission authorized rung of the ladder in that agency.
to disapprove a permanent appointment on
the ground that another person is better
qualified than the appointee and, on the ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
basis of this finding, order his replacement DRILON VS. LIM
by the latter? (235 SCRA 135, 1994)
2. W/N the Civil Service Commission has the
power to make a permanent appointment FACTS:
into a temporary one. Pursuant to section 187 of the Local
Government Code (Procedure for approval and
HELD: effectivity of Tax Ordianance and Revenue
1. NO. The Civil Service Commission is without Measures), the Secretary of Justice had, on
authority to revoke an appointment because appeal to him of four oil companies and taxpayer,
of its belief that another person was better declared Manila Revenue Code null and void for
qualified, which is an encroachment on the non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in
discretion vested solely in the city mayor. the enactment of tax ordianance (there were no
2. NO. While the principle is correct, and we written notices of public hearings nor were copies
have applied it many times, it is not correctly of the proposed ordinance published).
applied in this case. The argument begs the In a petition for certiorari, RTC revoked
question. The appointment of the petitioner Secretarys resolution and sustained ordinance
was not temporary but permanent and was holding that all the procedural requirements had
therefore protected by Constitution. The been observed in the enactment of the Manila
appointing authority indicated that it was Revenue Code and that the City of Manila had
permanent, as he had the right to do so, and not been able to prove such compliance before
it was not for the respondent Civil Service the Secretary only because he had given it only
Commission to reverse him and call it five days within which to gather and present to
temporary. him all the evidence later submitted to the trial
court. More importantly, it declared Section 187
of the LGC as unconstitutional insofar as it
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT empowered the Secretary of Justice to review tax
ordinance and inferentially to annul them. His authorized under Section 1 hereof [are hereby
conclusion was that the challenged section gave directed] to immediately cause the return/refund
the Secretary the power of control and not of of the excess within a period of six months to
supervision only. The 1987 Constitution provides commence fifteen (15) days after the issuance of
that President shall exercise general supervision this Order." In compliance therewith, the heads of
over local governments. the departments or agencies of the government
concerned, who are the herein respondents,
ISSUES: caused the deduction from petitioners' salaries or
1. Distinguish control from supervision. allowances of the amounts needed to cover the
2. W/N Section 187 of the LGC gave the alleged overpayments. Thus, petitioners seek
Secretary the power of control and not relief from this.
supervision only. Petitioners theorize that AO 29 and AO
268 violate EO 292 and since the latter is a law, it
HELD: prevails over executive issuances. Petitioners
1. An officer in control lays down the rules in likewise assert that AO 29 and AO 268 encroach
the doing of an act. It they are not followed, upon the constitutional authority of the Civil
he may, in his discretion, order the act Service Commission to adopt measures to
undone or re-done by his subordinate or he strengthen the merit and rewards system and to
may even decide to do it himself. promulgate rules, regulations and standards
Supervision does not cover such authority. governing the incentive awards system of the civil
The supervisor or superintendent merely service.
sees to it that the rules are followed, but he
himself does not lay down such rules, nor ISSUE: Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268 were
does he have the discretion to modify or issued in the valid exercise of presidential control
replace them. If the rules are not observed, over the executive departments?
he may order the work done or re-done but
only to conform to the prescribed rules. He HELD:
may not prescribe his own manner for the Yes. AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in
doing of the act. He has no judgment on this the valid exercise of presidential control over the
matter except to see to it that the rules are executive departments. The President is the
followed. head of the government. Governmental power
and authority are exercised and implemented
2. NO. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary through him. His power includes the control
Drilon did precisely this (See No.1), and no executive departments. Control means "the
more nor less than this, and so performed an power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside
act not of control but of mere supervision. what a subordinate officer had done in the
Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila performance of his duties and to substitute the
Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with judgment of the former for that of the latter." It
his own version of what the Code should be. has been held that "the President can, by virtue
He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise of his power of control, review, modify, alter or
or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. nullify any action, or decision, of his subordinate
He did not say that in his judgment it was a in the executive departments, bureaus, or offices
bad law. What he found only was that it was under him. He can exercise this power motu
illegal. All he did in reviewing the said proprio without need of any appeal from any
measure was determine if the petitioners party."
were performing their functions is When the President issued AO 29
accordance with law, that is, with the limiting the amount of incentive benefits,
prescribed procedure for the enactment of enjoining heads of government agencies from
tax ordinances and the grant of powers to granting incentive benefits without prior approval
the city government under the Local from him, and directing the refund of the excess
Government Code. As we see it, that was an over the prescribed amount, the President was
act not of control but of mere supervision just exercising his power of control over
executive departments. The President issued
WHEREFORE, the judgment is hereby subject Administrative Orders to regulate the
rendered REVERSING the challenged decision grant of productivity incentive benefits and to
of the Regional Trial Court insofar as it declared prevent discontentment, dissatisfaction and
Section 187 of the Local Government Code demoralization among government personnel by
unconstitutional but AFFIRMING its finding that committing limited resources of government for
the procedural requirements in the enactment of the equal payment of incentives and awards. The
the Manila Revenue Code have been observed. President was only exercising his power of
control by modifying the acts of the respondents
who granted incentive benefits to their employees
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT without appropriate clearance from the Office of
REMEDIOS T. BLAQUERA, ET AL. VS. ANGEL the President, thereby resulting in the uneven
C. ALCALA, ET AL. distribution of government resources. In the view
G.R. NO. 109406, SEPTEMBER 11, 1998 of the President, respondents did a mistake
which had to be corrected.
FACTS:
Petitioners were paid incentive benefits
for the year 1992, pursuant to E.O. 292 and the ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292. VILLENA VS. SECRETARY OF INTERIOR
President Ramos issued A.O. 29, authorizing the (67 PHIL 451)
grant of productivity incentive benefits for the
year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 FACTS:
and reiterating the prohibition 4 under Section 7 5 It appears that the Division of
of A.O. 268, enjoining the grant of productivity Investigation of the Department of Justice, upon
incentive benefits without the Presidents prior the request of the Secretary of the Interior,
approval. Section 4 of AO 29 directed "all conducted an inquiry into the conduct of the
departments, offices and agencies which petitioner, as a result of which the latter was
authorized payment of CY 1992 Productivity found to have committed bribery, extortion,
Incentive Bonus in excess of the amount malicious abuse of authority and unauthorized
practice of the law profession. The respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
recommended to the President of the Philippines dismissed the same.
the suspension of the petitioner to prevent When the case was elevated to the
possible coercion of witnesses, which President of the Philippines, Executive Secretary
recommendation was granted. The Secretary of Juan Pajo, by authority of the President, modified
the Interior suspended the petitioner from office, the decision of the Director of Lands as affirmed
and then and thereafter wired the Provincial by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Governor of Rizal with instruction that the Resources.
petitioner be advised accordingly. The Plaintiff corporation took this decision to
respondent wrote the petitioner a letter, the trial court, praying that judgment be rendered
specifying the many charges against him and declaring that the decision of the Secretary of
notifying him of the designation of a special Agriculture and Natural Resources has full force
investigator to investigate the charges. The and effect. Plaintiff's mainstay is Section 4 of
special investigator forthwith notified the Commonwealth Act 141. The precept there is
petitioner that the formal investigation would be that decisions of the Director of Lands "as to
commenced on March 28, 1939. Hence, the questions of fact shall be conclusive when
petition for preliminary injunction against the approved" by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Secretary of Interior to restrain him and his Natural Resources. Plaintiff's trenchant claim is
agents from preceding with the investigation of that this statute is controlling not only upon courts
petitioner which was scheduled to take place on but also upon the President.
March 28, 1939.
ISSUE: May the President through his executive
ISSUES: secretary undo an act of the Director of Lands,
1. W/N the Secretary of Interior has the which a law provides that such act will be
power to order an investigation. conclusive when affirmed by the Secretary of
2. W/N the Secretary of Interior has the Agriculture and Natural Resources OR W/N the
power to suspend. administrative decision could still be appealed to
the President?
HELD:
1. YES. Supervision is not a meaningless HELD:
thing. It is an active power. It is certainly not YES. The President's duty to execute
without limitation, but it at least implies the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his
authority to inquire into facts and conditions control of all executive departments. Thus it is,
in order to render the power real and that department heads are men of his
effective. If supervision is to be confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his,
conscientious and rational, and not too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure.
automatic and brutal, it must be founded Naturally, he controls and directs their acts.
upon knowledge of actual facts and Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm,
conditions disclosed after careful study and modify or reverse the action taken by his
investigation. The principle there enunciated department secretaries. In this context, it may not
is applicable with equal force to the present be said that the President cannot rule on the
case. correctness of a decision of a department
The Secretary of the Interior is invested secretary.
with authority to order the investigation of the It may be stated that the right to appeal
charges against the petitioner and to appoint to the President reposes upon the President's
a special investigator for that purpose. power of control over the executive departments.
2. YES. The Secretary of Interior is And control simply means the power of an officer
empowered to investigate the charges to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
against the pwtitioner and to appoint a subordinate officer had done in the performance
special investigator for that purpose, of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
preventive suspension may be a means by former for that of the latter.
which to carry into effect a fair and impartial
investigation.
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC. VS. PANO CITY OF ILIGAN V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
(21 SCRA 395, 1967) (158 SCRA 158 [1988])
FACTS: FACTS:
Jose Magallanes, a permittee and actual Proclamation No. 335 was issued,
occupant of a 1,103-hectare pasture land, ceded withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserved
his rights and interests to a portion thereof to for the use of the NPC certain parcels of the
plaintiff. Subsequently, the portion Magallanes public domain.
ceded to plaintiff was officially released from the Meanwhile, the NPC constructed Maria
forest zone as pasture land and declared Cristina Fertilizer Plant, which was sold, ceded,
agricultural land. transferred and conveyed to Marcelo Tire and
Jose Pao and nineteen other claimants Rubber Corporation, including the right of
applied for the purchase of 90 hectares of the occupancy and use of the land described in
released area. Plaintiff corporation in turn filed its Proclamation 335, Series of 1952.
own sales application covering the entire Proclamation No. 20, Series of 1962,
released area. This was protested by Pao and and Proclamation 198, Series of 1964, were
his companions, claiming that they are actual subsequently issued, excluding from the
occupants of the part thereof covered by their operation of Proclamation No. 335, Series of
own sales application. 1952, certain areas occupied by the Maria
The Director of Lands rendered Cristina Fertilizer Plant, and declaring the same
judgment, giving due course to the application of open to disposition under the provisions of Public
plaintiff corporation, and dismissing the claim of Land.
Jose Pao and his companions. A move to The Marcelo Steel Corporation and/or
reconsider failed. An appeal was made but the the Maria Cristina Fertilizer Plant, through the
President, Jose P. Marcelo filed in the Bureau of
Lands a Miscellaneous Sales Application for etc., 15 the President of the Philippines has
tracts of lands for industrial purposes. Director of therefore the same authority to dispose of
Lands advised the public that the Bureau of portions of the public domain as his subordinates,
Lands will sell to the highest qualified bidder the the Director of Lands, and his alter ego the
tract of land covered by Miscellaneous Sales Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
application.
Proclamation No. 469 was later issued,
which exclude from the reservation made in favor ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
of the NPC, existing under Proclamation No. 335, GASCON VS. ARROYO
Series of 1952, and Proclamation No. 20, Series (178 SCRA 582, 1989)
of 1962, certain parcels of land embraced
therein." Lots 1,1-a, 3 and 4, containing FACTS:
approximately an area of 29,681 square meters The Lopez family is the owner of two
are described therein. The Proclamation further television stations, namely: Channels 2 and 4
stated "that upon the recommendation of the which they have operated through the ABS-CBN
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Broadcasting Corporation.
and pursuant to Section 60 of C.A. No. 141, I do When martial law was declared, TV
hereby grant, donate and transfer the Channel 4 was closed by the military; thereafter,
aforementioned parcels of land including the its facilities were taken over by the Kanlaon
foreshores thereof, in favor of Iligan City." Broadcasting System which operated it as a
The Mayor of Iligan City wrote the commercial TV station.
Director of Lands to inform him that the City of In 1978, the said TV station and its
Iligan is the owner in fee simple of Lots 1, 1-a, 3 facilities were taken over by the National Media
and 4 including the foreshores thereof by virtue of Production Center (NMPC), which operated it as
Proclamation No. 469, Series of 1965, and the Maharlika Broadcasting System TV 4 (MBS-
requesting that the said property be excluded 4).
from the proposed auction sale." No action was After the 1986 EDSA revolution, the
taken on this request for exclusion. PCGG sequestered the aforementioned TV
Hence, the City of Iligan filed a Stations, and, thereafter, the Office of Media
complaint for injunction with preliminary injunction Affairs took over the operation of TV Channel 4.
against the Director of Lands, District Land The Lopez family, through counsel,
Officer of Lanao del Norte and the Marcelo Steel requested President Aquino to order the return to
Corporation to enjoin and stop the sale and/or the Lopez family of TV Stations 2 and 4. They
disposition of the afore described parcels of land. made a written request to the PCGG for the
President Marcos issued Proclamation return of TV Station Channel 2. The PCGG
No. 94 excluding from the operation of approved the return of TV Station Channel 2 to
Proclamation No. 469 certain portions of the land the Lopez family. The return was made on 18
embraced therein, situated in Iligan City and October 1986.
declaring the same open to disposition. Said Thereafter, the Lopez family requested
portions of land, as described therein are Lots 1- for the return of TV Station Channel 4. Acting
a, 2-a and 3 of the parcels of land in question. upon the request, respondent Executive
After the trial on the merits, the court Secretary, by authority of the President, entered
dismissed the complaint and dissolved the writ of into with the ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation,
preliminary injunction. On appeal, the records of represented by its President, Eugenio Lopez, Jr.,
the case were certified to this Court as the issue an "Agreement to Arbitrate", 3 pursuant to which
of the validity of any executive order and the an Arbitration Committee was created, composed
errors or the questions of Atty. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., for the Republic of
of the law raised are within the exclusive the Philippines, Atty. Pastor del Rosario, for ABS-
jurisdiction of this Court. CBN, and retired Justice Vicente Abad Santos,
as Chairman.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President has the Thereupon, petitioners, as taxpayers,
power to grant portions of public domain to any filed the instant petition.
government entity like the city of Iligan.
ISSUE: W/N the Executive Secretary has the
power and authority to enter into an Agreement
to Arbitrate.
HELD: HELD:
YES. the Secretary of Agriculture and YES. Respondent Executive Secretary
Natural Resources is the executive officer-in- has the power and authority to enter into the
charged with the duty of carrying out the Agreement to arbitrate with the ABS-CBN
provision of the Public Land Act thru the Director Broadcasting Corporation as he acted for and in
of Lands who acts under his immediate control. behalf of the President when he signed it.
Section 4 thereof, also provides: Under the Provisional Constitution of the
"Sec. 4. Subject to said control, the Republic of the Philippines (also known as the
Director of Lands shall have direct executive Freedom Constitution), which was in force and
control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or effect when the "Agreement to Arbitrate" was
any other form of concession or disposition and signed by the parties thereto on 6 January 1987,
management of the lands of the public domain, the President exercised both the legislative and
and his decisions as to questions of fact shall be executive powers of the Government. As Chief
conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Executive, the President was (and even now)
Agriculture and Natural Resources." "assisted by a Cabinet" composed of Ministers
Since it is the Director of Lands who has (now Secretaries), who were appointed by and
direct executive control among others in the accountable to the President. In other words, the
lease, sale or any form of concession or Members of the cabinet, as heads of the various
disposition of the land of the public domain departments, are the assistants and agents of the
subject to the immediate control of the Secretary Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or
considering that under the Constitution the the law to act in person, or where the exigencies
President of the Philippines has control over all of the situation demand that he act personally,
executive departments, bureaus, and offices, the multifarious executive and administrative
functions of the Chief Executive are performed by An administrative officer has only such
and through the executive departments, and the powers as are expressly granted to him and
acts of the heads of such departments, those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.
performed in the regular course of business, are, These powers should not be extended by
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief implication beyond what may be necessary for
Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief their just and reasonable execution.
Executive. Supervision and control include only the
Respondent Executive Secretary had, authority to: (a) act directly whenever a specific
therefore, the power and authority to enter into function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
the "Agreement to Arbitrate" with the ABS-CBN subordinate; (b) direct the performance of duty;
Broadcasting Corporation, as he acted for and in restrain the commission of acts; (c) review,
behalf of the President when he signed it; hence, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of
the aforesaid agreement is valid and binding subordinate officials or units; (d) determine
upon the Republic of the Philippines, as a party priorities in the execution of plans and programs;
thereto. and (e) prescribe standards, guidelines, plans
and programs. Specifically, administrative
supervision is limited to the authority of the
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT department or its equivalent to: (1) generally
KILUSANG BAYAN VS. DOMINGUEZ oversee the operations of such agencies and
(205 SCRA 92, 1992) insure that they are managed effectively,
efficiently and economically but without
FACTS: interference with day-to-day activities; (2) require
The Municipal Government of the submission of reports and cause the conduct
Muntinlupa entered into a contract with the of management audit, performance evaluation
Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga and inspection to determine compliance with
Nagtitinda sa Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng policies, standards and guidelines of the
Muntinlupa (kilusan) for the latter's management department; (3) take such action as may be
and operation of the Muntinlupa Public Market. necessary for the proper performance of official
When Ignacio Bunye (petitioner in GR 91927) functions, including rectification of violations,
became Mayor of Muntinlupa, he directed a abuses and other forms of mal-administration; (4)
review of such contract, claiming that the virtual, review and pass upon budget proposals of such
50-year term agreement was contrary to Sec. agencies but may not increase or add to them.
143 (3) of BP 337. He sought opinions from the
COA and the Metro Manila Commission after
which the latter granted the Municipality the ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
authority to take the necessary legal steps for the ANG-ANGCO VS. CASTILLO
cancellation of the above contract. 9 SCRA 619 [1963]
Consequently, upon the presentation
made by Bunye with the Municipal Council, the FACTS:
latter approved Resolution No. 45 abrogating the The Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade
contract. Bunye, together with men from the PC, requested for special permit to withdraw Pepsi
proceeded to the public market and announced Cola concentrates from the customs house.
to the general public that the Municipality was Petitioner Collector of Customs Isidro Ang-angco
taking over the management and operation of the advised the counsel for Pepsi-Cola to try to
facility therein. The officers of the Kilusan filed secure the necessary release certificate from the
suit for breach of contract and damages, and No-dollar Import Office. Aquiles Lopez of said
continued holding office in the KB Building under office wrote petitioner, stating that it could not
their respective official capacities. take action on the request, as the same is not
Bunye, together with some heavily within the jurisdiction of the Office. Following
armed men, forcibly opened the doors of the Secretary of Finance Hernandezs approval of
offices of petitioners purportedly to serve them the release, petitioner authorized release of the
the Order of then Sec. of Agriculture Carlos concentrates.
Dominguez, ordering 1) the take over by the When Customs Commissioner Manahan
Department of Agriculture of the management learned of said release, he ordered the seizure of
over the public market pursuant to the the goods but only a portion thereof remained in
Department Regulatory and Supervisory Power the warehouse. Thus, he filed an administrative
under Sec. 8 of PD 175 and Sec. 4 of EO No.3; suit against petitioner.
2) the creation of a Management Committee After an investigation, respondent
which shall assume the management of Kilusan; Executive Secretary Natalio Castillo found
and 3) the disband, of the Board of Directors and petitioner guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best
4) the turn over of all assets, properties and interest of the service and considering him
records to the Management Committee. resigned, with prejudice to reinstatement in the
Petitioners filed this petition praying that the Bureau of Customs. Petitioner wrote Pres.
Order to be declared null and void as the Garcia, asserting that the action taken by
respondent Secretary acted without or in excess respondent had the effect of depriving him of his
of jurisdiction in issuing the order. statutory right to have his case originally decided
by the CSC, as well as of his right or appeal to
ISSUE: W/N 28 October 1988 Order of the Civil Service Board of Appeals, whose
respondent Secretary of Agriculture is without or decision under RA 2260 is final. By authority of
in excess of jurisdiction? the President, respondent denied
reconsideration, as well as the appeal. Hence,
HELD: this present petition.
YES. P.D. No. 175 and the by-laws of
the KBMBPM explicitly mandate the manner by ISSUE: Whether the President has the power to
which directors and officers are to be removed. make direct action on the case of petitioner even
The Secretary should have known better than to if he belongs to the classified service in spite of
disregard these procedures and rely on a mere the provision now in the Civil Service Act of 1959.
petition by the general membership of the
KBMBPM and an on-going audit by Department HELD:
of Agriculture auditors in exercising a power The action taken by respondent
which he does not have, expressly or impliedly. executive Secretary, even with the authority of
the President in taking direct action on the After due hearing, the investigating
administrative case, petitioner, without submitting committee found Arive guilty of charges and he
the same to the Commission of Civil Service is was dismissed. Arive appealed from the decision
contrary to law and should be set aside. The of the NAMARCO to the President. The
following are the reasons: NAMARCO was advised by the Office of the
1. Under sec 16 of the Civil Service Act President of the appeal, and was asked to
of 1959, it is the Commissioner of Civil Service forward the records of the Administrative case.
who has original and exclusive jurisdiction to The Executive Secretary, presumably acting for
decide administrative cases of all officers and the President, handed down a decision setting
employees in the classified service. The only aside the resolution of the board of directors and
limitation to this power is the decision of the reinstating Arive.
Commissioner may be appealed to the Civil NAMARCO, through its General
service Board of Appeals, in which case said Manager, sought reconsideration, contended that
Board shall decide the appeal within a period of the Office of the President had no jurisdiction to
90 days after the same has been submitted for review any decision of the NAMARCO Board of
decision, whose decision in such cases shall be Directors removing suspending or otherwise
final. It is therefore clear that under the present disciplining any of its subordinate employees,
provision of the Civil Service act of 1959, the because RA 1345 (the NAMARCO Charter),
case of petitioner comes under the exclusive which grants that power to the General Manager
jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service, and to the Board of Directors, does not provide
and having been deprived of the procedure and for an appeal to any governmental body. This
down therein in connection with the investigation motion for reconsideration was denied twice by
and disposition of this case, it may be said that the Executive Secretary on the ground that the
he has been deprived of due process guaranteed President had jurisdiction under his constitutional
by said law. power of control over all executive departments,
2. Let us now take up the power of bureaus and offices.
control given to the President by the Constitution The Office of the President, acting on
over all offices and employees in the executive complaints of Arive that he had not been
department which is not invoked by respondents reinstated in spite of the denial of the
as justification to override the specific provision of NAMARCO's two motions for reconsideration,
the Civil Service Act. The power merely applies sent a telegram to the General Manager
to the exercise of control over the acts of the requesting him to act on the case and to
subordinate and not over the actor or agent comment within forty-eight hours; but the said
himself of the act. It only means that the General Manager neither acted on the case nor
President may set aside the judgment of action commented.
taken by the subordinate in the performance of Respondent Juan T. Arive filed against
duties. the NAMARCO and the members of its Board of
3. Not the strongest argument against Directors an action for reinstatement. Judge Arca
the theory of respondents is that it would entirely ruled in his favor, ordering NAMARCO to
nullify and set aside at naught the beneficent reinstate Arive. Defendants motion for
purpose of the whole Civil Service system as reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present
implanted in this jurisdiction which is to give petition.
stability to the tenure of office of those who
belong to the classified service, in derogation of ISSUE: WETHER OR NOT the preident has the
the provision of our Constitution which provides power to review and reverse decisions of
the No officer or employee in the civil service government corporations.
shall be removed or suspended except for cause
as provided by law. The power of control of the HELD:
President may extend to the power to investigate, YES. The Court hold that the President
suspend or remove officers and employees who of the Philippines' authority to review and reverse
belong to the executive department if they are the decision of the NAMARCO Board of Directors
presidential appointee or do not belong to the dismissing Juan T. Arive from his position in the
classified service for to them that inherent power NAMARCO and to order his reinstatement falls
cannot be exercised. This is in line with the within the constitutional power of the President
provision of our constitutional which says; The over all executive departments, bureaus and
Congress may by law vest the appointment of the offices. Under our governmental setup,
inferior officers in the President alone corporations owned or controlled by the
in the courts or in the heads of department and government, such as the NAMARCO, partake of
with regards to these officers provided by law for the nature of government bureaus or offices,
a procedure for their removal precisely in view of which are administratively supervised by the
this constitutional authority. One such law is the Administrator of the Office of Economic
Civil Service Act of 159. Coordination, "whose compensation and rank
shall be that of a head of an Executive
Department" and who "shall be responsible to the
President of the Philippines under whose control
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT his functions . . . shall be exercised."
NATIONAL MARKET CORP. (NAMARCO) VS.
ARCA
(29 SCRA 648 [SEPTEMBER 30, 1969]) ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
GUAZON VS. DE VILLA
FACTS: (181 SCRA 623, 1990)
Respodent Arive was the Manager of
the Traffic-Storage Department of the FACTS:
NAMARCO. Pursuant to the General Managers This is a petition for prohibition with
Administrative Order, he was investigated by a preliminary injunction to prohibit the military and
committee for violating Management police officers represented by public respondents
Memorandum Order declaring that the from conducting "Areal Target Zonings" or
allocation and deliveries of merchansdise "Saturation Drives" in Metro Manila.
imported to its designated beneficiaries be The petitioners complains that police
stopped and causing the improper release of and military units without any search warrant or
shipments intended for delivery. warrant of arrest goes to an area of more than
one residence and sometimes whole barangay or deprive the Supreme Court of its original
areas of barangay in Metro Manila to search for jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the
evidence of offenses that may have been penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment.
committed. The petitioners claim that the
saturation drives follow a common pattern of ISSUE: Whether or not the 93rd of Article of War
human rights abuses. unconstitutional?
Solicitor General argues just the
contrary, that it had been conducted with due HELD:
regard to human rights. NO. The petitioners are in error. This
error arose from failure to perceive the nature of
ISSUE: W/N the President has the power to courts martial and the sources of the authority for
order saturation drives. their creation. Court Martial are agencies of
executive character and one of the authorities for
HELD: ordering of court martial has been held to be
YES. There is, of course, nothing in the attached to the constitutional functions of the
Constitution which denies the authority of the President as Commander in Chief, independently
Chief Executive, invoked by the Solicitor General, of legislation.
to order police actions to stop unabated Unlike court of law, they are not a
criminality, rising lawlessness, and alarming portion of judiciary. They are in fact simply
communist activities. The Constitution grants to instrumentalities of the executive power, provided
Government the power to seek and cripple by Congress for the President as Commander in
subversive movements which would bring down chief to aid him in properly commanding the army
constituted authority and substitute a regime and navy and enforcing discipline therein and
where individual liberties are suppressed as a utilized under his order Or those of his authorized
matter of policy in the name of security of the military representatives.
State. However, all police actions are governed The petition is therefore has no merit
by the limitations of the Bill of Rights. and that it should be dismissed with costs.
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT OLAGUER VS. MILITARY COMMISSION NO.
RAMON RUFFY VS. THE CHIEF OF STAFF, 34
PHILIPPINE ARMY (150 SCRA 144, 1987)
(G.R. NO. L-533, AUGUST 20, 1946)
FACTS:
TUASON J. The petitioners were charged for
FACTS: subversion.
It appears that at the outbreak of war in The respondent Chief of Staff of the
1941, Ramon Ruffy was the Provincial AFP created the respondent Military Commission
Commander, Prudente M. Francisco, a junior No. 34 to try the criminal case filed against the
officer, and Andres Fortus, a corporal, all of the petitioners. An amended charge sheet was filed
Philippine Constabulary garrison stationed in for seven offenses, namely: (1) unlawful
Mindoro. When the Japanese forces landed in possession of explosives and incendiary devices;
Mindoro, Major Ruffy retreated to the mountains (2) conspiracy to assassinate President and Mrs.
instead of surrendering to the enemy, disbanded Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate cabinet
his company, and organized and led a guerrilla members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad
outfit known as Bolo Combat team of Bolo Area. and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to
During the occupation of the Philippines assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roo
by the Japanese forces, the Bolo Area in Mindoro and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings;
was a contingent of the 6th Military District, which (6) attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez,
had been recognized by and placed under the Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino
operational control of the US Army in the and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and proposal
Southwest Pacific. to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion.
A change in the command in the Bolo Sometime thereafter, trial ensued.
Area was effected by Col. Jurado, the then In the course of the proceedings the
Commanding Officer of the Bolo Combat Team in petitioners went to this Court and filed the instant
Mindoro. Major Ruffy was relieved of his Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus. They
assignment as Commanding Officer of the Bolo sought to enjoin the respondent Military
Area. Col. Jurado was slain allegedly by the Commission No. 34 from proceeding with the trial
petitioners. After the commission of this crime, it of their case. They likewise sought their release
is alleged that the petitioners seceded from the from detention by way of a writ of habeas corpus.
6th Military District. It was this murder which gave The thrust of their arguments is that military
rise to petitioner's trial, the legality of which is commissions have no jurisdiction to try civilians
now being contested. for offenses alleged to have been committed
A trial by the General Court Martial during the period of martial law.
ensued and which resulted to the acquittal of
Ramon Ruffy and dismissal of the case as to ISSUE: W/N military commissions have no
Victoriano Dinglasan and the conviction of Jose jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses alleged to
Garcia, Prudente Francisco, Dominador Adeva have been committed during the period of martial
and Andres Fortus. law.
The petitioners who were convicted filed
suit before this Court, assailing the HELD:
constitutionality of 93rd Article of War. It ordains Military commission has no jurisdiction
"that any person subject to military law who to try civilians when the civil courts are open.
commits murder in time of war should suffer Due process of law demands that in all
death or imprisonment for life, as the court criminal prosecutions (where the accused stands
martial may direct" It is argued that since "no to lose either his life or his liberty), the accused
review is provided by that law to be made by the shall be entitled to, among others, a trial. The
Supreme Court, irrespective of whether the trial contemplated by the due process clause of
punishment is for life imprisonment or death" it the Constitution, in relation to the Charter as a
violated Art. VIII See 2 par 4 of the Constitution. It whole, is a trial by judicial process, not by
provides that "the National Assembly may not executive or military process. Military
commissions or tribunals, by whatever name they (152 SCRA 272, 1987)

are called, are not courts within the Philippine
judicial system. FACTS:
Petitioner was convicted by the trial
court of the crime of estafa and was sentenced to
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT prison term. Petitioner was later granted a
QUILONA VS. GENERAL COURT MARTIAL conditional pardon on condition that petitioner
(206 SCRA 821, 1992) would "not again violate any of the penal laws of
the Philippines. Should this condition be violated,
FACTS: he will be proceeded against in the manner
The petitioner is a policemen assigned prescribed by law." Petitioner accepted the
at the WPD. He was charged with murder before conditional pardon and was consequently
the respondent general court martial. released from confinement.
At the scheduled arraignment on The Board of Pardons and Parole (the
December 15, 1990, petitioner's counsel "Board") resolved to recommend to the President
manifested to the General I Court Martial his the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted
client's desire to be arraigned and to be tried to the petitioner. The evidence before the Board
instead by a civilian court. Arraignment was showed that on 22 March 1982 and 24 June
reset. 1982, petitioner had been charged with twenty
At the next arraignment on December counts of estafa, which cases were then pending
21, 1990, petitioner filed a motion asking that the trial before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal. The
court mal1ial inhibit itself front pursuing the record also showed that petitioner had been
arraignment of the accused and to have his case convicted by the trial court of the crime of
investigated by the civilian prosecutor or at least sedition: this conviction was then pending appeal
tried by a civilian court. before the Intermediate Appellate Court.
Although set or oral argument of Respondent Minister of Justice wrote to
January 3, 1991, respondent court decided to the President of the Philippines informing her of
have the motion argued on the day it was filed. the Resolution of the Board recommending
The motion was denied, the same with the cancellation of the conditional pardon previously
motion for reconsideration. granted to petitioner. Thereafter, the President
Petitioner refused to enter a plea and cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner.
said that he would elevate the case to the SC. Respondent Minister issued "by
Nevertheless, a plea of not guilty was entered authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and
upon court order. Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner
Hence, this petition for certiorari and was accordingly arrested and confined in
prohibition. Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his
sentence.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent court martial Petitioner now impugns the validity of
acted with grave abuse of discretion. the Order of Arrest and Recommitment. He
claims that he did not violate his conditional
HELD: pardon since he has not been convicted by final
YES the respondent court martial acted judgment of the estafa nor of the crime of
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack sedition.
or excess of jurisdiction in proceeding with the
arraignment of the petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by
Republic Act No. 6975, 10 creating the final judgment of a court is necessary before the
Philippine National Police (PNP), which took petitioner can be validly rearrested and
effect on 1 January 1991, provides: "SEC. 46. recommitted for violation of the terms of his
Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. Any provision of conditional pardon.
law to the contrary notwithstanding, criminal
cases involving PNP members shall be within the HELD:
exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts: x x x. It depends.
Provided, further, that criminal cases against PC- The determination of the occurrence of
INP members who may have not yet been a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the
arraigned upon the effectivity of this it shall be proper consequences of such breach, may be
transferred to the proper city or provincial either a purely executive act, not subject to
prosecutor or municipal trial court judge." judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the
Although Republic Act No. 6975 was not Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a
yet in effect when petitioner was arraigned on 28 judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of
December 1990, nevertheless, respondent court violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159
martial knew or should have known that the said of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President
Act had already been signed or approved by the opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the
President on 13 December 1990 and that the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial
same was published in two (2) national pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is
newspapers of general circulation on 17 necessary, much less conviction therefor by final
December 1990 and that it would take effect on 1 judgment of a court, in order that a convict may
January 1991. It is precisely for this reason that be recommended for the violation of his
respondent court martial decided to have the conditional pardon.
petitioner's motion to inhibit argued on 28 Here, the President has chosen to
December 1990 and thereafter arraigned the proceed against the petitioner under Section 64
petitioner on the same day despite his vehement (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That
refusal to enter a plea. choice is an exercise of the President's executive
Clearly, under the circumstances prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.
obtaining in the present case, respondent court
martial acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
proceeding with the arraignment of the petitioner. MONSANTO VS. FACTORAN, JR.
(170 SCRA 190, 1989)
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT FACTS:

TORRES VS. GONZALES
The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner (250 SCRA 581, 1995)

Monsanto and three accused of the complex
crime of estafa thru falsification of public FACTS:
documents. Accused-appellants Francisco Salle, Jr.
Petitioner Monsanto appealed her and Rickey Mengote were found guilty beyond
conviction to this Court which subsequently reasonable, doubt as co-principals of the
affirmed the same. She then filed a motion for compound crime of murder and destructive
reconsideration but while said motion was arson. Appellants seasonably filed their notice of
pending, she was extended by then Presiden appeal. However, Salle filed an urgent motion to
Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted. withdraw his appeal in view of his acceptance of
By reason of said pardon, petitioner the grant of conditional pardon by the President.
wrote the Calbayog City Treasurer requesting Mengote was also granted a conditional pardon
that she be restored to her former post as and was released from confinement, but the latter
assistant city treasurer since the same was still did not file a motion to withdraw his appeal.
vacant. The court granted Salle's motion to
Petitioners letter-request was referred withdraw his appeal and his case is considered
to the Ministry of Finance for resolution. The closed and terminated, insofar as he is
Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be concerned. Mengote, on the other hand, has not
reinstated to her position without the necessity of filed any motion to withdraw his appeal.
a new appointment not earlier than the date she
was extended the absolute pardon. It also ISSUE:
directed the city treasurer to see to it that the W/N appeal of the case must be withdrawn for
amount of P4,892.50 which the Sandiganbayan the effectivity of a pardon granted.
had required to be indemnified in favor of the
government. HELD:
Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing YES. The "conviction by final judgment"
ruling, petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that limitation under Section 19 of Art.VII of the
the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped put present constitution prohibits the grant of pardon,
the crime which implies that her service in the whether full or conditional, to an accused during
government has never been interrupted and the pending of his appeal from his conviction by
therefore the date of reinstatement should the trial court. Any application therefore, if one is
correspond to the date of her preventive made, should no be acted upon or the process
suspension; that she is entitled to backpay for the towards its grant should no begun unless the
entire period of her suspension; and that she appeal is withdrawn or the conviction is final.
should not be required to pay the proportionate A judgment of conviction become final
share of the amount of P4892.50. (a) when no appeal is seasonably perfected" (b)
The Ministry of Finance referred when the accuse commences to serve the
petitioners letter to the Office of the President for sentence, (c) when the right to appeal is
further review and action. expressly waived in writing, except where the
The respondent Deputy Executive death penalty was imposed by the trial court, and
Secretary Factoran denied the petitioners (d) then the accused applies for probation,
request and holds that Monsanto is not entitled to thereby waiving his right to appeal. Thus, where
an automatic reinstatement on the basis of the the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal
absolute pardon granted her, but must secure an and has not yet therefore attained finality as in
appointment to her former position and that she the case of Mengote, executive clemency may
is liable for the civil liability to her previous not be granted to appellant
conviction. The reason is that, the doctrine of
Petitioner filed a motion for separation of powers of demands that such
reconsideration which was denied, hence this exclusive authority of the appellate court be fully
petition. respected and kept unimpaired.
ISSUE: W/N a public officer who had been

granted an absolute pardon by the Chief ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Executive is entitled to reinstatement to her GARCIA VS. COA
former position without need of a new (226 SCRA 356, 1993)
appointment.
FACTS:
HELD: Petitioner Vicente Garcia was a
NO. Having accepted the pardon, supervising lineman of the Bureau of
petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her Telecommunication in Lucena City before he was
appeal and her conviction by the Sandiganbayan summarily dismissed on April I, 1975 on the
and has assumed the character of finality. ground of dishonesty in accordance with the
The essence of pardon is the remission decision of the Ministry of Public Works in
of guilt. Thus pardon implies guilt. Pardon does Administrative Case No. 975 for the loss of
not ipso facto reinstate a convicted felon to public several telegraphs poles. Petitioner did not
office which was forfeited by reason of the appeal the decision.
conviction. It should be noted that public office is Based on the same facts, a criminal
intended primarily for collective protection, safety case for qualified theft was filed against
and benefit of the common good. Thus, it cannot petitioner, which was resolved acquitting
be compromised to favor private interests. A petitioner. In view of his acquittal Garcia sought
pardon does not virtually acquit the accused of reinstatement to his former position which was
the offense charged. denied by the Bureau of Telecommunications.
But the pardon restores the petitioner Petitioner pleaded to the President of the
eligibility for appointment to the said office. Thus, Philippines for executive clemency which was
to regain her former post, she must reapply and granted.
undergo the usual procedure required for a new Thereafter, Garcia filed with the
appointment. respondent COA a claim for payment of back
salaries effective April 1975. This was denied by
COA on the ground that the executive clemency
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT granted to him did not provide for the payment of
PEOPLE VS. SALLE back salaries and that he had not been reinstated
in the service. Petitioner then appealed the COA Petitioner now prays to this Court for the
decision to the Office of the President. Based on following relief:
the recommendation of the Deputy Secretary 1. (that he be) Reinstated to his former
Factoran, petitioner filed this petition for review position as Elementary School Principal I;
on certiorari. 2. His government services be made
continuous since September 10, 1948 which is
ISSUE: W/N petitioner is entitled to payment of his original appointment until the present time;
back wages after having been reinstated 3. (that he be) Given his back salaries
pursuant to the grant of executive clemency. corresponding to the period from September 1,
1971 to November 23,1982;
HELD: 4. That all his service credits duly
YES. Petitioner's automatic earned be restored;
reinstatement to the government service entitles 5. And, that all other rights and
him to back wages. This is meant to afford relief privileges not mentioned herein shall also be
to petitioner who is innocent from the start and to granted.
make reparation for what he has suffered as a The Solicitor General comments that
result of his unjust dismissal from the service. To there is no justiciable controversy in this case
rule otherwise would defeat the very intention of because the issue involved is whether or not
the executive clemency, i.e., to give justice to petitioner merits reappointment to the position he
petitioner. Moreover, the right to back wages is held prior to his conviction.
afforded to those who have been illegally
dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to ISSUE: Is there a justifiable controversy in this
those otherwise acquitted of the charges against case where the petitioner sought his
them. There is no doubt that petitioner's case reinstatement to his former position after given a
falls within the situations aforementioned to pardon by the President?
entitle him to back wages.
The bestowal of executive clemency on HELD:
petitioner in effect completely obliterated the Yes. There is here a justiciable
adverse effects of the administrative decision controversy. Petitioner claims he must be
which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered restored to the same position he was in before he
his separation from the service. This can be was convicted on a mere technical error and for
inferred from the executive clemency itself which he was given an absolute pardon.
exculpating petitioner from the administrative This is not a hypothetical or abstract
charge and thereby directing his reinstatement, dispute. It is not academic or moot for, to our
which is rendered automatic by the grant of the mind, there is a definite and concrete controversy
pardon. This signifies that petitioner need no touching the legal relations of parties having
longer apply to be reinstated to his former adverse legal relations. This is a real and
employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto substantial controversy admitting of specific relief
upon the issuance of the clemency. through a court decree that is conclusive in
character. The case does not call for a mere
opinion or advise, but for affirmative relief.
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT This Court held that the absolute
ISABELO T. SABELLO, VS. DECS disqualification from office or ineligibility from
(G.R. NO. 87687, DECEMBER 26, 1989) public office forms part of the punishment
prescribed under the penal code and that pardon
GANCAYCO, J. frees the individual from all the penalties and
FACTS: legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil
Petitioner, was the Elementary School rights. Although such pardon restores his
Principal of Talisay and also the Assistant eligibility to a public office it does not entitle him
Principal of the Talisay Barangay High School of to automatic reinstatement. He should apply for
the Division of Gingoog City. The barangay high reappointment to said office.
school was in deficit at that time. Since at that However, the Court cannot grant his
time also, the President of the Philippines who prayer for backwages from September 1, 1971 to
was earnestly campaigning was giving aid in the November 23, 1982 for he is not entitled to
amount of P2,000.00 for each barrio, the barrio automatic reinstatement. Petitioner was lawfully
council through proper resolutions allotted the separated from the government service upon his
amount of P840.00 to cover up for the salaries of conviction for an offense. Thus, although his
the high school teachers, with the honest thought reinstatement had been duly authorized, it did not
in mind that the barrio high school was a barrio thereby entitle him to backwages. Such right is
project and as such therefore, was entitled to its afforded only to those who have been illegally
share of the RICD fund in question. The only part dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to
that the petitioner played was his being those otherwise acquitted of the charge against
authorized by the said barrio council to withdraw them.
the above amount and which was subsequently In the same light, the Court cannot
deposited in the City Treasurer's Office in the decree that his government service be made
name of the Talisay Barrio High School. continuous from September 10, 1948 to the
Thus, petitioner, together with the barrio present when it is not. At any rate when he
captain, were charged with the violation of RA reaches the compulsory age of retirement, he
3019, and both were convicted. On appeal, the shall get the appropriate retirement benefits as
appellate court modified the decision by an Elementary School Principal I and not as a
eliminating the subsidiary imprisonment in case mere classroom teacher.
of insolvency in the payment of one-half of the
amount being involved.
Finally, petitioner was granted an ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
ABSOLUTE PARDON by the President, restoring LLAMAS VS. ORBOS
him to 'full civil and political rights.' With this (202 SCRA 844, 1991)
instrument on hand, petitioner applied for
reinstatement to the government service, only to FACTS:
be reinstated to the wrong position of a mere Petitioner Rodolfo Llamas is the
classroom teacher and not to his former position incumbent Vice Governor of the Province of
as Elementary School Principal I. Tarlac. He assumed the position by virtue of a
decision of the office of the President, the HELD:

governorship. Private respondent Mariano YES. The concurrence of the House of
Ocampo III is the incumbent Governor of the Congress is required by our fundamental law in
Province of Tarlac and was suspended from the making of treaties which are however distinct
office for a period of 90 days due to a verified and different from executive agreements which
complaint filed by petitioner against respondent may validly entered into without such occurrence.
Governor before the Department of Local The validity of the executive agreement
Government charging him with the alleged in question is thus present. In fact, the so-called
violation of the Local Government Code and the parity right provided for in the ordinance
Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Law. Public appended to our Constitution were prior thereto,
respondent Oscar Orbos was the Executive the subject of an executive agreement, made
Secretary at the time of the filing of this petition without the concurrence of2/3s of the Senate of
and is being impleaded herein in that official the United States.
capacity for having issued, by authority of the
President, the assailed Resolution granting
executive clemency to respondent governor. ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Petitioner's main argument is that the DAZA VS. SINGSON
President may grant executive clemency only in (G.R. NO. 86344, DECEMBER 21, 1989)
criminal cases based on Art. VII, Sec. 19 of the
Constitution. According to the petitioner, the CRUZ, J.:
qualifying phrase "after conviction by final FACTS:
judgment applies solely to criminal cases and no After the May 11, 1987 congressional
other law allows the grant of executive clemency elections, the House of Representatives
or pardon to anyone who has been convicted in proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the
an administrative case." COA among the several political parties
represented in that chamber. Petitioner Raul A.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President of the Daza was among those chosen and was listed as
Philippines has the power to grant executive a representative of the Liberal Party.
clemency in administrative cases. The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
was reorganized, resulting in a political
HELD: realignment in the House of Representatives.
YES. The President has the power to Twenty four members of the Liberal Party
grant executive clemency in administrative case formally resigned and joined the LDP, thereby
because the Constitution does not distinguish swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly
between which cases executive clemency may reducing their former party to only 17 members.
be exercised by the President, with the sole On the basis of this development, the
exclusion of impeachment cases. SC also held House of Representatives revised its
that there are no valid and convincing reasons representation in the COA by withdrawing the
why the President cannot grant executive seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to
clemency in administrative cases, which are the newly-formed LDP. The chamber elected a
clearly less serious than criminal offense. new set of representatives consisting of the
original members except the petitioner and
including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT the additional member from the LDP.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VS. EASTERN Petitioner came to this Court to
SEA TRADING challenge his removal from the COA and the
3 SCRA 351[1961] assumption of his seat by the respondent.
Respondent counters that the question raised by
FACTS: the petitioner is political in nature and so beyond
The respondent was the consignee of the jurisdiction of this Court.
several shipments of onion and garlic. Since
none of the shipments had the required certificate ISSUE: Does the instant case fall on the
by the Central Bank Circular Nos. 44 and 45 for jurisdiction of the Court?
the release of goods thus imported were seized
and subjected to forfeiture proceedings. The HELD:
Collector of Customs of Manila having been in Yes. Contrary to the respondent's
the meantime released to the consignees on assertion, the Court has the competence to act
surety bonds directed the same and its surety on the matter at bar. What is before us is not a
that the amount of the bonds be paid, jointly and discretionary act of the House of Representatives
severally to the Bureau of Customs. The that may not be reviewed by the Court because it
Consignee thereafter sought a review with the is political in nature. What is involved here is the
Court of Tax Appeal which reversed the decision legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that
and ordered that the bond be withdrawn and chamber in removing the petitioner from the
cancelled. Hence, the present petition. Commission on Appointments. That is not a
The petition is based upon the facts that political question because, as Chief Justice
insofar as the license and a certificate authorizing Concepcion explained in Tanada v. Cuenco.
the importation release of the goods under the ... the term "political question" connotes,
consideration are required by the Central Bank in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
Circulars Nos. 44 and 45, the latter are null and parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other
void and the seizure and the forfeiture of the words, ... it refers "to those questions which,
goods imported from Japan cannot implement an under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
executive agreement-extending the effectivity of people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
our Trade and Financial agreement with Japan- which full discretionary authority has been
which is dubious validity, because there is no delegated to the Legislature or executive branch
government agency authorized to issue the of the Government." It is concerned with issues
import license required by the aforementioned dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
executive order. particular measure.
In the case now before us, the
ISSUE: Whether the executive agreement is valid jurisdictional objection becomes even less
even without the 2/3 concurrence of the Senate. tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if
we were to assume that the issue presented
before us was political in nature, we would still only to the determination of "whether or not there
not be precluded from resolving it under the has been a grave abuse of discretion (by them)
expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" in the
covers, in proper cases, even the political exercise of their authority and in the performance
question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution of their assigned tasks (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987
clearly provides: Constitution).
Section 1. The judicial power shall be Courts may not substitute their
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower judgment for that of the APT, nor block, by any
courts as may be established by law. injunction, the discharge of its function and the
Judicial power includes the duty of the implementation of its decision in connection with
courts of justice to settle actual controversies the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets
involving rights which are legally demandable transferred to it. There can be no justification for
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not judicial interference in the business of an
there has been a grave abuse of discretion administrative agency except when it violated a
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the citizen's rights, or commit a grave abuse of
part of any branch or instrumentality of the discretion, or acts in excess of, or without
Government. jurisdiction.
Lastly, we resolve that issue in favor of
the authority of the House of Representatives to
change its representation in the Commission on ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Appointments to reflect at any time the changes PACU VS. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
that may transpire in the political alignments of its 97 PH1LS 806 [1955]
membership. It is understood that such changes
must be permanent and do not include the FACTS:
temporary alliances or factional divisions not The petitioning colleges and universities
involving severance of political loyalties or formal request that Act No. 2706 as amended, be
disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance declared unconstitutional. This act is entitled "An
from one political party to another. Act Making the Inspection and Recognition of
The instant petition is therefore Private Schools and Colleges Obligatory for the
dismissed. Secretary of Public Instruction."
Petitioners contend that the right of a
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL citizen to own and operate a school is
DEPARTMENT guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law
MANTRUSTE SYSTEMS, INC. VS. COURT OF requiring to own and operate a school is
APPEALS guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law
(G.R. NOS. 86540-41, NOVEMBER 6, 1989) requiring previous governmental approval or
permit before such person could exercise said
GRIO-AQUINO, J.: right, amounts to censorship, a practice
FACTS: abhorrent to our system of laws and government.
The President in the exercise of her Petitioners, obviously refer Sec. 3e of the Act
legislative power under the Freedom Constitution which provides that before a private school
issued Proclamation No. 5O-A prohibiting the maybe opened to the public it must first obtain a
courts from issuing restraining orders and writ of permit from the Secretary of Education.
injunction against Asset Privatization Trust (APT) The Solicitor General on the other hand
and the purchases of any assets sold by it, to pints out that none of petitioners has caused to
prevent courts from interfering in the discharge, present this issue because all of them have
by this instrumentality of the executive branch of permits to operate and are actually operating by
government, of its task of carrying out the virtue of their permits. And they do not assert the
expeditious dispositions and privatization of Secretary has threatened to revoke their permits.
certain government corporations and or the
assets thereof. The enforcement of such ISSUE: Whether there exists an actual case or
Proclamation was questioned by the petitioner controversy.
arguing that the Court was deprived of its
jurisdiction to hear the cases involved therein. HELD:
There is no actual case or controversy.
ISSUE: Whether Proclamation No. 50-A impair Mere apprehension that the Secretary of
the inherent power of courts as defined in See I Education might under the law withdraw permit of
Art VIII of the Constitution. one the petitioners does not constitute a judicial
controversy.
HELD: "Courts will not pass upon the
No. Section 31 of Proclamation No. 50- constitutionality of a law upon the complaint of
A does not infringe any provision of the one who fails to show that he is injured by its
Constitution. It does not impair the inherent operation."
power of courts "to settle actual controversies "The power of the courts to declare a
which are legally demandable and enforceable law unconstitutional arises only when the interest
and to determine whether or not there has been a of litigants the use of that judicial authority for
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or their protection against actual interference, a
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or hypothetical threat being insufficient".
instrumentality of the government" (Sec. 1, Art. An action, like this, is brought for a
VIII, 1987 Constitution). The power to define, positive purpose, nay, to obtain actual and
prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the positive relief. Courts do not sit to adjudicate
various courts belongs to the legislature, except mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly
that it may not deprive the Supreme Court of its interest therein, however, intellectually solid the
jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5, problem maybe. This is
Article VIII of the Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, especially true when the issues reach
1987 Constitution). constitutional dimensions, for them comes into
While the judicial power may appear to play regard for the courts duty to avoid decision
be pervasive, the truth is that under the system of of constitutional issues unless avoidance
separation of powers set up in the Constitution, becomes evasion.
the power of the courts over the other branches
and instrumentalities of the Government is limited ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
JOYA VS. PCGG as registered voters since this case does not
225 SCRA 586, 1993 concern their right of suffrage. Their interest in
92 of B.P. Blg. 881 should be precisely in
FACTS: upholding its validity. Much less do they have an
The Presidential Commission on Good interest as taxpayers since this case does not
Government (PCGG) ordered the sale at public involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing or
auction of paintings by old masters and spending power. A party suing as a taxpayer
silverware alleged to be ill-gotten wealth of must specifically show that he has a sufficient
President Marcos, his relatives and cronies. interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of
Petitioners, as citizens and taxpayers, filed a money raised by taxation and that he will sustain
petition to stop the auction from proceeding. a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of
the questioned statute.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are the The other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc.,
proper party to file the instant case. appears to have the requisite standing to bring
this constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates
HELD: radio and television broadcast stations in the
No. Petitioners failed to show ownership Philippines affected by the enforcement of 92 of
of the artworks, they are not proper parties to B.P. Blg. 881 requiring radio and television
enjoin the PCGG form proceeding with the broadcast companies to provide free air time to
auction sale. They do not stand to be injured by the COMELEC for the use of candidates for
the action of the PCGG. campaign and other political purposes. Petitioner
The Court will exercise its power of claims that it suffered losses running to several
judicial review only if the case is brought before it million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in
by a prty who has the legal standing to raise the connection with the 1992 presidential election
constitutional or legal question. Legal standing and the 1995 senatorial election and that it
means a personal and substantial interest in the stands to suffer even more should it be required
case such that the party has sustained or will to do so again this year. Petitioner's
sustain direct injury as a result of the allegation that it will suffer losses again because
governmental act that is being challenged. it is required to provide free air time is sufficient
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT to give it standing to question the validity of 92.
TELEBAP VS. COMELEC
289 SCRA 337, 1998
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
FACTS: LEGASPI V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Petitioner Telecommunications and G.R. NO. L-72119. MAY 29, 1987
Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. is an
organization of lawyers of radio and television CORTES, J.
broadcasting companies. They are suing as FACTS:
citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters. The The fundamental right of the people to
other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., operates information on matters of public concern is
radio and television broadcasting stations invoked in this special civil action for mandamus
throughout the Philippines under a franchise instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi
granted by Congress. Petitioners assail the against the Civil Service Commission. The
validity of Section 92 of B.P. Blg. No. 881 against respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request
claims that the requirement that radio and for information on the civil service eligibilities of
television time be given free takes property certain persons employed as sanitarians in the
without due process of law; that it violates the Health Department of Cebu City. These
eminent domain clause of the Constitution which government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and
provides for the payment of just compensation; Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented
that it denies broadcast media the equal themselves as civil service eligibles who passed
protection of the laws; and that, in any event, it the civil service examinations for sanitarians.
violates the terms of the franchise of petitioner Solicitor General challenges the
GMA Network, Inc. petitioner's standing to sue upon the ground that
the latter does not possess any clear legal right
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have legal to be informed of the civil service eligibilities of
standing. the government employees concerned. He calls
attention to the alleged failure of the petitioner to
HELD: show his actual interest in securing this
Petitioner TELEBAP is without legal particular information. He further argues that
standing. In cases in which citizens were there is no ministerial duty on the part of the
authorized to sue, this Court upheld their Commission to furnish the petitioner with the
standing in view of the "transcendental information he seeks.
importance" of the constitutional question raised
which justified the granting of relief. In contrast, in
the case at bar, as will presently be shown, ISSUES:
petitioners' substantive claim is without merit. To 1. Whether or not petitioner possesses the legal
the extent, therefore, that a party's standing is standing to bring the present suit.
determined by the substantive merit of his case 2. Whether or not the information sought by the
or a preliminary estimate thereof, petitioner petitioner is within the ambit of the constitutional
TELEBAP must be held to be without standing. guarantee of the right of the people to information
Indeed, a citizen will be allowed to raise a on matters of public concern.
constitutional question only when he can show
that he has personally suffered some actual or HELD:
threatened injury as a result of the allegedly 1. YES. When a mandamus proceeding involves
illegal conduct of the government; the injury is the assertion of a public right, the requirement of
fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that
injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of
action. Members of petitioner have not shown the general "public" which possesses the right.
that they have suffered harm as a result of the
operation of 92 of B.P. Blg. 881. Nor do The petitioner, being a citizen who, as
members of petitioner TELEBAP have an interest such is clothed with personality to seek redress
for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the

public right. We find no cogent reason to deny his ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the first paragraph of
standing to bring the present suit. Section 4, BP Blg. 52 is valid.
2. Whether or not the second
2. YES. Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution paragraph of Section 4, BP Blg. 52 is valid.
reads: The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized. HELD:
Access to official records, and to documents, and 1. YES. Retirement from government service
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or may or may not be a reasonable disqualification
decisions, as well as to government research for elective local officials. For one thing, there can
data used as basis. for policy development, shall also be retirees from government service at ages,
be afforded the citizen, subject to such stations say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to
as may be provided by law. disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65 year old
But the constitutional guarantee to retiree could be a good local official just like one,
information on matters of public concern is not aged 65, who is not a retiree.
absolute. It does not open every door to any and But, in the case of a 65-year old elective
all information. Under the Constitution, access to local official, who has retired from a provincial,
official records, papers, etc., are "subject to city or municipal office, there is reason to
limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, disqualify him from running for the same office
Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore from which he had retired, as provided for in the
exempt certain types of information from public challenged provision. The need for new blood
scrutiny, such as those affecting national assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree
security. The threshold question is, therefore, for government work is present, and what is
whether or not the information sought is of public emphatically significant is that the retired
interest or public concern. But then, it is not employee has already declared himself tired and
enough that the information sought is of public unavailable for the same government work, but,
interest. For mandamus to lie in a given case, the which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would
information must not be among the species like to assume again. It is for this very reason that
exempted by law from the operation of the inequality will neither result from the application
constitutional guarantee. of the challenged provision. Just as that provision
The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian does not deny equal protection neither does it
being of public concern, and in the absence of permit of such denial (see People vs. Vera, 65
express limitations under the law upon access to Phil. 56 [1933]). Persons similarly situated are
the register of civil service eligibles for said similarly treated.
position, the duty of the respondent Commission In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal
to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of protection clause does not forbid all legal
any person occupying the position becomes classification. What is proscribes is a
imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies. classification which is arbitrary and
WHEREFORE, the Civil Service unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is
Commission is ordered to open its register of not violated by a reasonable classification based
eligibles for the position of sanitarian, and to upon substantial distinctions, where the
confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of classification is germane to the purpose of the
Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, for said law and applies to all Chose belonging to the
position in the Health Department of Cebu City, same class (Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30
as requested by the petitioner Valentin L. [1978] citing Felwa vs. Salas, 18 SCRA 606
Legaspi. [1966]; Rafael v. Embroidery and Apparel Control
and Inspection Board, 21 SCRA 336 [1967];
Inchong etc., et al. vs. Hernandez 101 Phil. 1155
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT [1957]). The purpose of the law is to allow the
DUMLAO VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS emergence of younger blood in local
G.R. NO. L-52245. JANUARY 22, 1980 governments. The classification in question being
pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J: invalid "even it at times, it may be susceptible to
FACTS: the objection that it is marred by theoretical
Petitioners question the constitutionality inconsistencies" (Chief Justice Fernando, The
of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as Constitution of the Philippines, 1977 ed., p. 547).
discriminatory and contrary to the equal
protection and due process guarantees of the 2. NO. Explicit is the constitutional provision that,
Constitution. Said Section 4 provides: in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
SEC. 4. Special presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
disqualification. In addition to and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
violation of Section 10 of Article XII(C) of and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973
the Constitution and disqualifications Constitution). An accusation, according to the
mentioned in existing laws which are fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt.
hereby declared as disqualification for The challenged proviso contravenes the
any of the elective officials enumerated constitutional presumption of innocence, as a
in Section 1 hereof, any retired elective candidate is disqualified from running for public
provincial, city or municipal official, who office on the ground alone that charges have
has received payment of the retirement been filed against him before a civil or military
benefits to which he is entitled under the tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In
law and who shall have been 65 years ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof,
of age at the commencement of the no distinction is made between a person
term of office to which he seeks to be convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against
elected, shall not be qualified to run for whom charges have been filed for such acts, as
the same elective local office from which both of them would be ineligible to run for public
he has retired. office. A person disqualified to run for public
2) "... the filing of charges for the office on the ground that charges have been filed
commission of such crimes before a civil against him is virtually placed in the same
court or military tribunal after preliminary category as a person already convicted of a
investigation shall be prima facie crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries
evidence of such fact". with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the
right to hold office during the term of the EIGHT of its Articles of Incorporation," it cannot
sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code). lawfully enter into the contract in question
And although the filing of charges is because all forms of gambling and lottery is
considered as but prima facie evidence, and one of them are included in the so-called
therefore, may be rebutted, yet. there is "clear foreign investments negative list under the
and present danger" that because of the Foreign Investments Act (R.A. No. 7042) where
proximity of the elections, time constraints will only up to 40% foreign capital is allowed.
prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from
offering contrary proof to overcome the prima ISSUES:
facie evidence against him. 1. Whether or not petitioners have the Locus
Additionally, it is best that evidence pro standi to file the petition at bench. 2.
and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Whether or not the challenged Contract of Lease
Courts rather than before an administrative body violates or contravenes the exception in Section
such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42,
of findings between two government bodies, to which prohibits the PCSO from holding and
the extreme detriment of a person charged, will conducting lotteries "in collaboration, association
thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a or joint venture with" another.
legislative/administrative determination of guilt
should not be allowed to be substituted for a HELD:
judicial determination. 1. YES. In line with the liberal policy of this Court
Wherefore, paragraph 1 being on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, members of
consistent with the equal protection clause is Congress, and even association of planters, and
declared valid; while paragraph 2 is declared null non-profit civic organizations were allowed to
and void for being violative of the constitutional initiate and prosecute actions before this Court to
presumption of innocence guaranteed to an question the constitutionality or validity of laws,
accused. acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various
government agencies or instrumentalities.
We find the instant petition to be of
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT transcendental importance to the public. The
KILOSBAYAN VS. GUINGONA, JR. issues it raised are of paramount public interest
G.R. NO. 113375, 5 MAY 1994 and of a category even higher than those
involved in many of the aforecited cases.
DAVIDE, JR., J.
FACTS: 2.YES. A careful analysis and evaluation of the
This is a special civil action for provisions of the contract and a consideration of
prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a the contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and
temporary restraining order and preliminary PGMC indubitably disclose that the contract is
injunction, which seeks to prohibit and restrain not in reality a contract of lease under which the
the implementation of the "Contract of Lease" PGMC is merely an independent contractor for a
executed by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes piece of work, but one where the statutorily
Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming proscribed collaboration or association , in the
Management Corporation (PGMC) in connection least, or joint venture , at the most, exists
with the on- line lottery system, also known as between the contracting parties.
"lotto." The only contribution the PCSO would
Pursuant to Section 1 of its charter, the have is its franchise or authority to operate the
PCSO decided to establish an on- line lottery on-line lottery system; with the rest, including the
system for the purpose of increasing its revenue risks of the business, being borne by the
base and diversifying its sources of funds. The proponent or bidder PGMC (which represents
Office of the President approved the award of the and warrants that it has access to all managerial
contract to, and entered into the so-called and technical expertise to promptly and
"Contract Of Lease" with, respondent PGMC for effectively carry out the terms of the contract..
the installation, establishment and operation of Certain provisions of the contract
the on-line lottery and telecommunication confirm the indispensable role of the PGMC in
systems required and/or authorized under the the pursuit, operation, conduct, and management
said contract. of the On-Line Lottery System. They exhibit and
Petitioners, question the legality and demonstrate the parties' indivisible community of
validity of the Contract of Lease in the light of interest in the conception, birth and growth of the
Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. on-line lottery, and, above all, in its profits, with
Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding each having a right in the formulation and
and conducting lotteries "in collaboration, implementation of policies related to the business
association or joint venture with any person, and sharing, as well, in the losses with the
association, company or entity, whether domestic PGMC bearing the greatest burden because of
or foreign." its assumption of expenses and risks, and the
The petitioners also point out that PCSO the least, because of its confessed
paragraph 10 of the Contract of Lease requires or unwillingness to bear expenses and risks. In a
authorizes PGMC to establish a manner of speaking, each is wed to the other for
telecommunications network that will connect all better or for worse. In the final analysis, however,
the municipalities and cities in the territory. in the light of the PCSO's RFP and the above
However, PGMC cannot do that because it has highlighted provisions, as well as the "Hold
no franchise from Congress to construct, install, Harmless Clause" of the Contract of Lease, it is
establish, or operate the network pursuant to even safe to conclude that the actual lessor in
Section 1 of Act No. 3846, as amended. this case is the PCSO and the subject matter
Moreover, PGMC is a 75% foreign-owned or thereof is its franchise to hold and conduct
controlled corporation and cannot, therefore, be lotteries since it is, in reality, the PGMC which
granted a franchise for that purpose because of operates and manages the on-line lottery system
Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, for a period of eight years. (In effect, the PCSO
which requires that for a corporation to operate a leased out its franchise to PGMC which actually
public utility, at least 60% of its capital must be operated and managed the same.)
owned by Filipino citizens. Furthermore, since WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
"the subscribed foreign capital" of the PGMC hereby GRANTED and the challenged Contract
"comes to about 75%, as shown by paragraph
of Lease is hereby DECLARED contrary to law

and invalid.
ISSUE: Do petitioner-senators have legal
Note: The separate opinions of Justices focused standing to assail the constitutionality of
on the issue of Locus standi of herein petitioners, conditions imposed by the President in the items
in relation to the four (4) requirements that must of the GAA of 1994?
be satisfied before one can come to court to
litigate a constitutional issue, namely: (1) there HELD:
must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the YES a member of the Senate, and of
question of constitutionality must be raised by the the House of Representatives for that matter, has
proper party; (3) the constitutional question must the legal standing to question the validity of a
be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and presidential veto or a condition imposed on an
(4) the decision of the constitutional question item in an appropriation bill. Where the veto is
must be necessary to the determination of the claimed to have been made without or in excess
case itself. of the authority vested on the President by the
The Court did not resolve the issue on Constitution, the issue of an impermissible
whether or not the Contract of Lease is in intrusion of the Executive into the domain of the
violation of section 11, Article XII of the Legislature arises. To the extent the power of
Constitution. However, in the dissenting opinion Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
penned by Justice Puno, he explained that: For member thereof, since his office confers a right to
even assuming arguendo that PGMC is a public participate in the exercise of the powers of that
utility, still, the records do not at the moment bear institution
out the claim of petitioners that PGMC is a An act of the Executive which injures the
foreign owned and controlled corporation. This institution of Congress causes a derivative but
factual issue remains unsettled and is still the nonetheless substantial injury, which can be
subject of litigation by the parties in the Securities questioned by a member of Congress. In such a
and Exchange Commission. case, any member of Congress can have a resort
to the courts.
Former Chief Justice Enrique M.
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT Fernando, as Amicus Curiae, noted:
PHILCONSA VS. ENRIQUEZ This is, then, the clearest case of the
(GR. NO. 113105 AUGUST 19, 1994) Senate as a whole or individual Senators as such
having a substantial interest in the question at
QUIASON, J.: issue. It could likewise be said that there was the
FACTS: requisite injury to their rights as Senators. It
House Bill No. 10900, the General would then be futile to raise any locus standi
Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was issue. Any intrusion into the domain appertaining
passed and approved by both houses of to the Senate is to be resisted. Similarly, if the
Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it situation were reversed, and it is the Executive
imposed conditions and limitations on certain Branch that could allege a transgression, its
items of appropriations in the proposed budget officials could likewise file the corresponding
previously submitted by the President. It also action. What cannot be denied is that a Senator
authorized members of Congress to propose and has standing to maintain inviolate the
identify projects in the "pork barrels" allotted to prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the
them and to realign their respective operating Constitution in his office
budgets. It is true that the Constitution provides a
Pursuant to the procedure on the mechanism for overriding a veto (Art. VI, Sec. 27
passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by [1]). Said remedy, however, is available only
the Constitution, Congress presented the said bill when the presidential veto is based on policy or
to the President for consideration and approval. political considerations but not when the veto is
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the claimed to be ultra vires. In the latter case, it
bill into law, and declared the same to have becomes the duty of the Court to draw the
become Republic Act No. 7663. On the same dividing line where the exercise of executive
day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto power ends and the bounds of legislative
Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he jurisdiction begin.
vetoed and on which he imposed certain
conditions. ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Sixteen members of the Senate led by TATAD VS GARCIA, JR
Senate President Edgardo J. Angara, Senator (GR NO. 114222, APRIL 6,1995)
Neptali A. Gonzales, the Chairman of the
Committee on Finance, and Senator Raul S. QUIASON, J.
Roco, sought the issuance of the writs of FACTS:
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the The DOTC planned to construct the
Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the EDSA LRT III. RA 6957 was enacted, providing
Department of Budget and Management, and the for two schemes for the financing, construction
National Treasurer. Suing as members of the and operation of government projects through
Senate and taxpayers, petitioners question: (1) private initiative and investment: Build-Operate-
the constitutionality of the conditions imposed by Transfer (BOT) or Build-Transfer (BT).
the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) The notice, advertising the
for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit prequalification of bidders, was thereafter
(COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on published. Five groups responded to the
Human Rights (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces invitation namely, ABB Trazione of Italy,
Geographical Units (CAFGU'S) and (f) State Hopewell Holdings Ltd. of Hongkong, Mansteel
Universities and Colleges (SUC's); and (2) the International of Mandaue, Cebu, Mitsui & Co.,
constitutionality of the veto of the special Ltd. of Japan, and EDSA LRT Consortium.
provision in the appropriation for debt service. After evaluating the prequalification
The Solicitor General claimed that the bids, the PBAC declared that only the EDSA LRT
remedy of the Senators is political (i.e., to Consortium "met the requirements of garnering at
override the vetoes) in effect saying that they do least 21 points per criteria, except for Legal
not have the requisite legal standing to bring the Aspects, and obtaining an over-all passing mark
suits. of at least 82 points".
The EDSA LRT Consortium submitted paid by the DOTC which, in turn, shall come from
its bid proposal to DOTC. Finding this proposal to the earnings of the EDSA LRT III. After 25 years
be in compliance with the bid requirements, and DOTC shall have completed payment of the
DOTC and respondent EDSA LRT Corporation, rentals, ownership of the project shall be
Ltd., in substitution of the EDSA LRT Consortium, transferred to the latter for a consideration of only
entered into an "Agreement to Build, Lease and U.S. $1.00.
Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA" R.A. No. 7718, an "Act Amending
under the terms of the BOT Law. Secretary Certain Sections of Republic Act No. 6957,
Prado, thereafter, requested presidential Entitled "An Act Authorizing the Financing,
approval of the contract. Construction, Operation and Maintenance of
Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon, Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector, and
Orbos replacement, informed Secretary Prado for Other Purposes" was signed into law by the
that the President could not grant the requested President. The law expressly recognizes BLT
approval for the following reasons: (1) that DOTC scheme and allows direct negotiation of BLT
failed to conduct actual public bidding in contracts.
compliance with Section 5 of the BOT Law; (2)
that the law authorized public bidding as the only ISSUES:
mode to award BOT projects, and the (1) Whether or not petitioners as taxpayers have
prequalification proceedings was not the public the legal standing to institute the action.
bidding contemplated under the law; (3) that Item (2) Whether or not EDSA LRT Corp, a foreign
14 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of corporation own EDSA LRT III, a public utility.
the BOT Law which authorized negotiated award
of contract in addition to public bidding was of HELD:
doubtful legality; and (4) that congressional (1) YES. The petitioners have the legal standing
approval of the list of priority projects under the to institute the action.
BOT or BT Scheme provided in the law had not Respondents claimed that petitioners
yet been granted at the time the contract was had no legal standing to initiate the instant action.
awarded. In view of the comments of Executive Petitioners, however, countered that the action
Secretary Drilon, the DOTC and private was filed by them in their capacity as Senators
respondents re-negotiated the agreement. and as taxpayers.
The parties entered into a "Revised and The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer's
Restated Agreement to Build, Lease and suits are to allow taxpayers to question contracts
Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA" entered into by the national government or
inasmuch as "the parties [are] cognizant of the government-owned or controlled corporations
fact the DOTC has full authority to sign the allegedly in contravention of the law (Kilosbayan,
Agreement without need of approval by the Inc. v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 [1994]) and to
President pursuant to the provisions of Executive disallow the same when only municipal contracts
Order No. 380 and that certain events [had] are involved (Bugnay Construction and
supervened since November 7, 1991 which Development Corporation v. Laron, 176 SCRA.
necessitate[d] the revision of the Agreement". 240 [1989]).
The DOTC, represented by Secretary Jesus For as long as the ruling in Kilosbayan
Garcia vice Secretary Prado, and private on locus standi is not reversed, we have no
respondent entered into a "Supplemental choice but to follow it and uphold the legal
Agreement to the 22 April 1992 Revised and standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute
Restated Agreement to Build, Lease and the present action.
Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA"
so as to "clarify their respective rights and (2) The Constitution, in no uncertain terms,
responsibilities" and to submit [the] Supplemental requires a franchise for the operation of a public
Agreement to the President, of the Philippines for utility. However, it does not require a franchise
his approval". Secretary Garcia submitted to before one can own the facilities needed to
President Ramos the two agreements, which operate a public utility so long as it does not
were approved. According to the agreements, the operate them to serve the public.
EDSA LRT III will use light rail vehicles from the The right to operate a public utility may
Czech and Slovak Federal Republics and will exist independently and separately from the
have a maximum carrying capacity of 450,000 ownership of the facilities thereof. One can own
passengers a day, or 150M a year to be said facilities without operating them as a public
achieved-through 54 such vehicles operating utility, or conversely, one may operate a public
simultaneously. The EDSA LRT III will run at utility without owning the facilities used to serve
grade, or street level, on the mid-section of EDSA the public. The devotion of property to serve the
for a distance of 17.8 kilometers from F.B. public may be done by the owner or by the
Harrison, Pasay City to North Avenue, Quezon person in control thereof who may not
City. The system will have its own power facility. necessarily be the owner thereof.
It will also have 13 passenger stations and one While private respondent is the owner of
depot in 16-hectare government property at North the facilities necessary to operate the EDSA. LRT
Avenue. Private respondents shall undertake and III, it admits that it is not enfranchised to operate
finance the entire project required for a complete a public utility.
operational light rail transit system. Target In sum, private respondent will not run
completion date is 1,080 days or approximately the light rail vehicles and collect fees from the
three years from the implementation date of the riding public. It will have no dealings with the
contract inclusive of mobilization, site works, public and the public will have no right to demand
initial and final testing of the system. Upon full or any services from it.
partial completion and viability thereof, private
respondent shall deliver the use and possession
of the completed portion to DOTC which shall ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
operate the same. DOTC shall pay private OPOSA VS FACTORAN, JR
respondent rentals on a monthly basis through an (GR NO 101083, JULY 30,1993)
Irrevocable Letter of Credit. The rentals shall be
determined by an independent and internationally DAVIDE, JR., J.
accredited inspection firm to be appointed by the FACTS:
parties. As agreed upon, private respondent's Petitioners instituted a taxpayers class
capital shall be recovered from the rentals to be suit against the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran,
Jr., then DENR Secretary, alleging that as cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is
citizens and taxpayers of the Republic of the the need to implead, as party defendants, the
Philippines, they are entitled to the full benefit, grantees thereof for they are indispensable
use and enjoyment of the natural resource parties. The foregoing considered, Civil Case No.
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy
forests." formulation or determination by the executive or
The complaint starts off with the general legislative branches of Government is not
averments that the Philippine archipelago of squarely put in issue. What is principally involved
7,100 islands has a land area of 30M hectares is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies
and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant already formulated and expressed in legislation.
rainforests in which varied, rare and unique It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the
species of flora and fauna may be found; these political question doctrine is no longer, the
rainforests contain a genetic, biological and insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of
chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are judicial power or the impenetrable shield that
also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures protects executive and legislative actions from
which have existed, endured and flourished since judicial inquiry or review.
time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that
in order to maintain a balanced and healthful
ecology, the country's land area should be
utilized on the basis of a ratio of 54% for forest ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
cover and 46% for agricultural, residential, KILOSBAYAN, INC VS MORATO
industrial, commercial and other uses; the (GR NO 118910, JULY 17,1995)
distortion and disturbance of this balance as a
consequence of deforestation have resulted in a MENDOZA,J.
host of environmental tragedies. FACTS:
Factoran moved to Dismiss the As a result of our decision in G.R. No.
complaint based on two grounds, namely: (1) the 113375 (Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona,
plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and 232 SCRA 110 (1994)) invalidating the Contract
(2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political of Lease between the PCSO and the Philippine
question which properly pertains to the legislative Gaming Management Corp. (PGMC) on the
or executive branches of Government. ground that it had been made in violation of
Respondent granted the motion. Hence, PSCOs charter, the parties entered into
the instant petition. negotiations for a new agreement.
The parties signed an Equipment Lease
ISSUES: Agreement (ELA) whereby the PGMC leased on-
(1) Whether or not the petitioners have a cause line lottery equipment and accessories to the
of action against the respondent; and PCSO in consideration of a rental equivalent to
(2) Whether or not the issue raised is a political 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket sales derived
question which properly pertains to the legislative by the PCSO from the operation of the lottery
or executive branches of Government. which in no case shall be less than an annual
rental computed at P35,000.00 per terminal in
HELD: commercial operation. The rental is to be
(1) Petitioners minors assert that they represent computed and paid bi-weekly. In the event the bi-
their generation as well as generations yet weekly rentals in any year fall short of the annual
unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they minimum fixed rental thus computed, the PCSO
can, for themselves, for others of their generation agrees to pay the deficiency out of the proceeds
and for the succeeding generations, file a class of its current ticket sales.
suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the Under the law, 30% of the net receipts
succeeding generations can only be based on from the sale of tickets is allotted to charity. The
the concept of intergenerational responsibility term of the lease is 8 years, commencing from
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful the start of commercial operation of the lottery
ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter equipment first delivered to the lessee pursuant
expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony to the agreed schedule.
of nature." Nature means the created world in its In the operation of the lottery, the PCSO
entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably is to employ its own personnel. It is responsible
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, for the loss of, or damage to, the equipment
utilization, management, renewal and arising from any cause and for the cost of their
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, maintenance and repair. Upon the expiration of
land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas the lease, the PCSO has the option to purchase
and other natural resources to the end that their the equipment for the sum of P25M. A copy of
exploration, development and utilization be the ELA was submitted to the Court by the
equitably accessible to the present as well as PGMC in accordance with its manifestation in the
future generations. Needless to say, every prior case.
generation has a responsibility to the next to This suit was filed seeking to declare the
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in the
Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of first case.
their right to a sound environment constitutes, at
the same time, the performance of their ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a legal
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for right which has been violated.
the generations to come.
HELD:
(2) After careful examination of the petitioners' In actions for the annulment of
complaint, We find the statements under the contracts, such as this action, the real parties are
introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the those who are parties to the agreement or are
specific averments under the sub-heading bound either principally or subsidiarily or are
CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of
show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their the contracting parties and can show the
rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be detriment which would positively result to them
granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It from the contract even though they did not
bears stressing, however, that insofar as the intervene in it, or who claim a right to take part in
a public bidding but have been illegally excluded that of the retired Justices of the Supreme Court
from it. and Court of Appeals who are only a handful and
These are parties with "a present fairly advanced in years, was not.
substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere Realizing the unfairness of the
expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or discrimination against the members of the
consequential interest. . . . The phrase 'present Judiciary and the Constitutional Commissions,
substantial interest' more concretely is meant Congress approved in 1990 a bill for the
such interest of a party in the subject matter of reenactment of the repealed provisions of RA
action as will entitle him, under the substantive 1797 and RA 3595. Congress was under the
law, to recover if the evidence is sufficient, or that impression that PD 644 became law after it was
he has the legal title to demand and the published in the Official Gazette on April 7, 1977.
defendant will be protected in a payment to or In the explanatory note of House Bill No. 16297
recovery by him. and Senate Bill No. 740, the legislature saw the
But petitioners do not have such present need to reenact RA 1797 and 3595 to restore
substantial interest in the ELA as would entitle said retirement pensions and privileges of the
them to bring this suit. Denying to them the right retired Justices and members of the
to intervene will not leave without remedy any Constitutional Commissions, in order to assure
perceived illegality in the execution of those serving in the Supreme Court, Court of
government contracts. Questions as to the nature Appeals and Constitutional Commissions
or validity of public contracts or the necessity for adequate old age pensions even during the time
a public bidding before they may be made can be when the purchasing power of the peso has been
raised in an appropriate case before the diminished substantially by worldwide recession
Commission on Audit or before the Ombudsman. or inflation. President Aquino, however vetoed
The Constitution requires that the Ombudsman House Bill No. 16297 on July 11, 1990 on the
and his deputies, "as protectors of the people ground that according to her "it would erode the
shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form very foundation of the Government's collective
or manner against public officials or employees of effort to adhere faithfully to and enforce strictly
the government, or any subdivision, agency or the policy on standardization of compensation as
instrumentality thereof including government- articulated in RA 6758 known as Compensation
owned or controlled corporations." (Art. XI, 12) and Position Classification Act of 1989." She
In addition, the Solicitor General is authorized to further said that "the Government should not
bring an action for quo warranto if it should be grant distinct privileges to select group of officials
thought that a government corporation, like the whose retirement benefits under existing laws
PCSO, has offended against its corporate charter already enjoy preferential treatment over those of
or misused its franchise. the vast majority of our civil service servants."
Prior to the instant petition, however,
Retired Court of Appeals Justices Manuel P.
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT Barcelona, Juan P. Enriquez, Juan O. Reyes, Jr.
BENGZON VS DRILON and Guardson R. Lood filed a letter/petition
(GR NO 103524, APRIL 15,1992) asking this Court far a readjustment of their
monthly pensions in accordance with RA. 1797.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J. They reasoned out that PD 644 repealing
FACTS: Republic Act No. 1797 did not become law as
RA 910 was enacted to provide the there was no valid publication. PD 644 appeared
retirement pensions of Justices of the Supreme for the first time only in the supplemental issue of
Court and of the Court of Appeals who have the Official Gazette, (Vol. 74, No. 14) purportedly
rendered at least 20 years service either in the dated April 4, 1977 but published only on
Judiciary or in any other branch of the September 5, 1983. Since PD 644 has no binding
Government or in both, having attained the age force and effect of law, it therefore did not repeal
of 70 years or who resign by reason of incapacity RA 1797.
to discharge the duties of the office. The retired The Court acted favorably on the
Justice shall receive during the residue of his request. Pursuant to the above resolution,
natural life the salary which he was receiving at Congress included in the General Appropriations
the time of his retirement or resignation. Bill for Fiscal Year 1992 certain appropriations for
Identical retirement benefits were also the Judiciary intended for the payment of the
given to the members of the Constitutional adjusted pension rates due the retired Justices of
Commissions under RA. 1568, as amended by the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals.
RA 3595. Subsequently, President Marcos
signed PD 578 which extended similar retirement ISSUE: Whether or not the attempt of the
benefits to the members of the Armed Forces President to use the veto power to set aside a
giving them also the automatic readjustment Resolution of this Court and to deprive retirees of
features of RA 1797 and RA 3595. However, PD benefits given them by Rep. Act No. 1797
644 was issued, repealing Section 3-A of RA trenches upon the constitutional grant of fiscal
1797 and RA 3595 (amending RA 1568 and PD autonomy to the Judiciary.
578) which authorized the adjustment of the
pension of the retired Justices of the Supreme HELD:
Court, Court of Appeals, Chairman and members YES. The Judiciary, the Constitutional
of the Constitutional Commissions and the Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have
officers and enlisted members of the Armed the independence end flexibility needed in the
Forces to the prevailing rates of salaries. discharge of their constitutional duties. The
Significantly, under PD 1638 the imposition of restrictions and constraints on the
automatic readjustment of the retirement pension manner the independent constitutional offices
of officers and enlisted men was subsequently allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for
restored by President Marcos. A later decree PD their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy
1909 was also issued providing for the automatic and violative not only of the express mandate of
readjustment of the pensions of members of the the Constitution but especially as regards the
Armed Forces who have retired prior to Supreme Court, of the independence and
September 10, 1979. separation of powers upon which the entire fabric
While the adjustment of the retirement of our constitutional system is based. In the
pensions for members of the Armed Forces who interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme
number in the tens of thousands was restored, Court, Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman have so far limited their objections Justices Justices Narvasa and Melencio-
to constant reminders. We now agree with the Herrera, respectively.
petitioners that this grant of autonomy should Suffice it to say that the Court with its
cease to be a meaningless provision. new membership is not obliged to follow blindly a
In the case at bar, the veto of these decision upholding a party's case when, after its
specific provisions in the General Appropriations re-examination, the same calls for a rectification.
Act is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how "Indeed", said the Court in Kilosbayan, Inc. vs.
its funds should be utilized, which is clearly Morato, et al., 250 SCRA 130, 136, "a change in
repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of the the composition of the Court could prove the
Chief Justice to make adjustments in the means of undoing an erroneous decision".
utilization of the funds appropriated for the
expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of
any savings from any particular item to cover ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
deficits or shortages in other items of the DRILON VS. LIM
Judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to the (GR. NO. 112497 AUGUST 4, 1994)
Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy
freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated CRUZ, J.:
to it in the appropriations law. It knows its FACTS:
priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The principal issue in this case is the
The Chief Justice must be given a free hand on constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local
how to augment appropriations where Government Code reading as follows:
augmentation is needed.
Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax
Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT Public Hearings. The procedure for approval
LIMKETKAI SONS MILLING, INC. vs. COURT of local tax ordinances and revenue measures
OF APPEALS shall be in accordance with the provisions of this
(GR. NO. 118509 September 5, 1996) Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be
FRANCISCO, J.: conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment
FACTS: thereof; Provided, further, That any question on
Involved in the instant case is the the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances
Motion of petitioner Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc., or revenue measures may be raised on appeal
for reconsideration of the Court's resolution of within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof
March 29, 1996, which set aside the Court's to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a
December 1, 1995 decision and affirmed in toto decision within sixty (60) days from the date of
the Court of Appeals' decision dated August 12, receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That
1994. such appeal shall not have the effect of
It is argued, albeit erroneously, that the suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and
case should be referred to the Court En Banc as the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or
the doctrines laid down in Abrenica v. Gonda and charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That
De Garcia, 34 Phil. 739, Talosig v. Vda. de within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision
Nieba, 43 SCRA 473, and Villonco Realty Co. v. or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the
Bormaheco, Inc., et al., 65 SCRA 352, have been Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the
modified or reversed. A more circumspect aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings
analysis of these cases vis-a-vis the case at with a court of competent jurisdiction.
bench would inevitably lead petitioner to the Pursuant thereto, the Secretary of
conclusion that there was neither reversal nor Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil
modification of the doctrines laid down in the companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance
Abrenica, Talosig and Villonco cases. No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila
What petitioner bewails the most is the Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance
present composition of the Third Division which with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of
deliberated on private respondents' motions for tax ordinances and for containing certain
reconsideration and by a majority vote reversed provisions contrary to law and public policy.
the unanimous decision of December 1, 1995. In a petition for certiorari filed by the City
More specifically, petitioner questions the of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila
assumption of Chief Justice Narvasa of the revoked the Secretary's resolution and sustained
chairmanship of the Third Division and arrogantly the ordinance, holding inter alia that the
rams its idea on how each Division should be procedural requirements had been observed.
chaired, i.e., the First Division should have been More importantly, it declared Section 187 of the
chaired by Chief Justice Narvasa, the Second Local Government Code as unconstitutional
Division by Mr. Justice Padilla, the next senior because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice
Justice, and the Third Division by Mr. Justice of the power of control over local governments in
Regalado, the third in line. violation of the policy of local autonomy
mandated in the Constitution and of the specific
ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of provision therein conferring on the President of
petitioner as to the composition of the third the Philippines only the power of supervision over
division meritorious. local governments. The Secretary argues that the
annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that
HELD: the procedural requirements for the enactment of
NO. We need only to stress that the tax ordinances as specified in the Local
change in the membership of the three divisions Government Code had indeed not been
of the Court was inevitable by reason of Mr. observed.
Justice Feliciano's retirement. Such Parenthetically, this petition was
reorganization is purely an internal matter of the originally dismissed by the Court for non-
Court to which petitioner certainly has no compliance with Circular 1-88, the Solicitor
business at all. In fact, the current "staggered" General having failed to submit a certified true
set-up in the chairmanships of the Divisions is copy of the challenged decision. However, on
similar to that adopted in 1988. In that year, the motion for reconsideration with the required
Court's Third Division was likewise chaired by certified true copy of the decision attached, the
then Chief Justice Fernan, while the First and petition was reinstated in view of the importance
Second Divisions were headed by the next senior of the issues raised therein.
justice of the peace forwarded the case to the

ISSUES: trial court.
(1) Whether or not the RTC of Manila has The Supreme Court upheld the assailed
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of denial, saying that respondent judge did not act
Section 187 of the Local Government Code. in excess of his jurisdiction or in abuse of
(2) Whether or not the Supreme Court has discretion in refusing to grant the accused's
appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and motion to return the record for the purpose set
orders of lower courts. out therein. Hence, the motion for
reconsideration.
HELD:
Yes to both. We stress at the outset that ISSUES: Whether or not Section 11 of Rule 108
the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the of the Rules of Court infringes section 13, Article
constitutionality of Section 187, this authority VIII of the 1935 Constitution. ( now Section 5(5),
being embraced in the general definition of the Article 8, 1987 Constitution)
judicial power to determine what are the valid and
binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to HELD:
the fundamental law. Specifically, BP 129 vests No. The Supreme Court, in its
in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil Resolution dated March 8, 1949 opined that
cases in which the subject of the litigation is Section 11 of Rule 108, like its predecessors, is
incapable of pecuniary estimation, even as the an adjective law and not a substantive law or
accused in a criminal action has the right to substantive right. Substantive law creates
question in his defense the constitutionality of a substantive rights and the two terms in this
law he is charged with violating and of the respect may be said to be synonymous.
proceedings taken against him, particularly as Substantive rights is a term which includes those
they contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover, rights which one enjoys under the legal system
Article VIII, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests prior to the disturbance of normal relations. (60
in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over C.J., 980.) Substantive law is that part of the law
final judgments and orders of lower courts in all which creates, defines and regulates rights, or
cases in which the constitutionality or validity of which regulates the rights and duties which give
any treaty, international or executive agreement, rise to a cause of action; that part of the law
law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, which courts are established to administer; as
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in opposed to adjective or remedial law, which
question. prescribes the method of enforcing rights or
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower obtains redress for their invasion. (36 C. J., 27;
courts are advised to act with the utmost 52 C. J. S., 1026.)
circumspection, bearing in mind the While section 11 of Rule 108 denies to
consequences of a declaration of the defendant the right to cross-examine
unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no witnesses in a preliminary investigation, his right
less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. to present his witnesses remains unaffected, and
As the questioned act is usually the handiwork of his constitutional right to be informed of the
the legislative or the executive departments, or charges against him both at such investigation
both, it will be prudent for such courts, if only out and at the trial is unchanged. In the latter stage of
of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher the proceedings, the only stage where the
judgment of this Court in the consideration of its guaranty of due process comes into play, he still
validity, which is better determined after a enjoys to the full extent the right to be confronted
thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and by and to cross-examine the witnesses against
with the concurrence of the majority of those who him. The degree of importance of a preliminary
participated in its discussion. investigation to an accused may be gauged by
the fact that this formality is frequently waived.
The distinction between "remedy" and
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT "substantive right" is incapable of exact definition.
BUSTOS VS. LUCERO The difference is somewhat a question of degree.
(GR. NO. L-2068, March 8, 1949) (Dexter vs. Edmands, 89 F., 467; Beazell vs.
Ohio, supra.) It is difficult to draw a line in any
TUASON, J.: particular case beyond which legislative power
FACTS: over remedy and procedure can pass without
Petitioner, an accused in a criminal touching upon the substantive rights of parties
case, filed a motion with trial court, praying that affected, as it is impossible to fix that boundary
the record of the case be remanded to the justice by general condition. (State vs. Pavelick, 279 P.,
of the peace court of Masantol, the court of 1102.) This being so, it is inevitable that the
origin, in order that he might cross-examine the Supreme Court in making rules should step on
complainant and her witnesses in connection with substantive rights, and the Constitution must be
their testimony, on the strength of which warrant presumed to tolerate if not to expect such
was issued for the arrest of the accused. The incursion as does not affect the accused in a
motion was denied. harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive him of a
According to the memorandum defense, but operates only in a limited and
submitted by the petitioner's counsel in support of unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage. For
his motion, the accused, assisted by counsel, the Court's power is not merely to compile, revise
appeared at the preliminary investigation. The or codify the rules of procedure existing at the
justice of the peace informed him of the charges time of the Constitution's approval. This power is
and asked him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
upon which he entered the plea of not guilty. practice, and procedure in all courts," which is a
"Then his counsel moved that the complainant power to adopt a general, complete and
present her evidence so that she and her comprehensive system of procedure, adding new
witnesses could be examined and cross- and different rules without regard to their source
examined in the manner and form provided by and discarding old ones.
law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor
objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the
objection was sustained. "In view thereof, the
accused's counsel announced his intention to ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
renounce his right to present evidence," and the
BP 129 (SECTION 9(3)), EO226 (ART. 82), of cases, this Court quoted the ratiocination of
AND SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR 1-91 the Investigating Judge, brushing aside the
FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC. VS. COURT contention of respondent judge that assigning
OF APPEALS cases instead of raffling is a common practice
(GR. NO. 110571 MARCH 10, 1994) and holding that respondent could not go against
the circular of this Court until it is repealed or
NOCON, J.: otherwise modified, as "Laws are repealed only
FACTS: by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-
BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto observance shall not be excused by disuse, or
Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI customs or practice to the contrary."
certificate of registration by changing the scope The argument that Article 82 of E.O. 226
of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" cannot be validly repealed by Circular 1-91
to "ceramic tiles." Opositor Mariwasa moved for because the former grants a substantive right
reconsideration of said BOI decision. This motion which, under the Constitution cannot be modified,
having been denied, Mariwasa filed a petition for diminished or increased by this Court in the
review with respondent court. exercise of its rule-making powers is not entirely
The CA temporarily restrained the BOI defensible as it seems. Respondent correctly
from implementing its decision. This TRO lapsed argued that Article 82 of E.O. 226 grants the right
by its own terms 20 days after its issuance, of appeal from decisions or final orders of the
without respondent court issuing any preliminary BOI and in granting such right, it also provided
injunction. Petitioner filed a "Motion to Dismiss where and in what manner such appeal can be
Petition and to Lift Restraining Order" on the brought. These latter portions simply deal with
ground that the CA has no appellate jurisdiction procedural aspects which this Court has the
over BOI Case No. 92-005, the same being power to regulate by virtue of its constitutional
exclusively vested with the Supreme Court rule-making powers.
pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Clearly, Circular 1-91 effectively
Investments Code of 1987. The appellate court repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226
denied the motion to dismiss. Thus, a petition for insofar as the manner and method of enforcing
certiorari and prohibition was filed before this the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are
Court. concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI,
Petitioner claims that the CA acted which by statute was previously allowed to be
without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now
the questioned resolution. Petitioner argues that be brought to the Court of Appeal.
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129 and Circular 1-91,
"Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the
Court of Appeals from a Final Order or Decision
of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial
Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's
appeal to respondent court because the
procedure for appeal laid down therein runs ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides ARUELO VS. CA
that appeals from decisions or orders of the BOI GR NO. 107852. OCTOBER 20, 1993
shall be filed directly with this Court.
Mariwasa counters that whatever FACTS:
"obvious inconsistency" or "irreconcilable Aruelo and Gatchalian were Vice-
repugnancy" there may have been between B.P. Mayoralty candidates in Balagtas, Bulacan in the
129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question of May 1992 elections. Gatchalian was proclaimed
venue for appeal has already been resolved by as the duly elected vice-mayor. Aruelo filed with
Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which was the COMELEC a petition seeking to annul
promulgated four years after E.O. 226 was Gatchalian's proclamation on the ground of
enacted. "fraudulent alteration and tampering" of votes.
Aruelo also filed with the RTC a petition
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has protesting the same election.
the power to prescribe rules to eliminate Gatchalian moved to dismiss, claiming
unnecessary contradictions and confusing rules that: (a) the petition was filed out of time; (b)
of procedure. there was a pending protest case before the
COMELEC; and (b) Aruelo failed to pay the
HELD: prescribed filing fees and cash deposit on the
Yes. The Supreme Court, pursuant to its petition.
Constitutional power under Section 5(5), Article The COMELEC denied Aruelo's petition.
VIII of the 1987 Constitution to promulgate rules However, the trial court denied Gatchalian's
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in Motion to Dismiss and ordered him to file his
all courts, and by way of implementation of B.P. answer to the petition.
129, issued Circular 1-91 prescribing the rules Aruelo prayed before the CA for the
governing appeals to the Court of Appeals from issuance of a temporary restraining order or a
final orders or decisions of the Court of Tax writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the trial
Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies to eliminate court from implementing the Order of August 11
unnecessary contradictions and confusing rules 1992, regarding the revision of ballots. The CA
of procedure. belatedly issued a temporary restraining order.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, Meanwhile, Gatchalian filed with the CA another
although a circular is not strictly a statute or law, petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 28977),
it has, however, the force and effect of law again alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
according to settled jurisprudence. In Inciong v. part of the trial court in issuing the Order, which
de Guia, a circular of this Court was treated as denied his Motion for Bill of Particulars. The CA
law. In adopting the recommendation of the dismissed this petition for lack of merit.
Investigating Judge to impose a sanction on a The CA rendered judgment, denying
judge who violated Circular No. 7 of this Court Gatchalian's petition, but declaring, at the same
dated September 23, 1974, as amended by time, that Gatchalian's Answer With Counter-
Circular No. 3 dated April 24, 1975 and Circular Protest and Counterclaim was timely filed. The
No. 20 dated October 4, 1979, requiring raffling appellate court also lifted the temporary
restraining order and ordered the trial court to ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
"proceed with dispatch in the proceedings below. JAVELLANA VS. DILG
Hence this petition. GRN 102549, AUGUST 10, 1992
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of motions to FACTS:

dismiss and motions for bill of particulars is Petitioner Atty. Erwin B. Javellana was
prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the an elected City Councilor of Bago City, Negros
COMELEC Rules of Procedure; hence, the filing Occidental. In 1989, City Engineer Ernesto C.
of said pleadings did not suspend the running of Divinagracia sued Javellana for: (1) violation of
the five-day period, or give Gatchalian a new five- Department of Local Government (DLG)
day period to file his answer. Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 in relation to
DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 and of
HELD: Section 7, paragraph b, No. 2 of Republic Act No.
NO. Petitioner filed the election protest 6713," and (2) for oppression, misconduct and
(Civil Case No. 343-M-92) with the RTC, whose abuse of authority.
proceedings are governed by the Revised Rules Divinagracia's complaint alleged that
of Court. Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the Javellana has continuously engaged in the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable practice of law without securing authority for that
to proceedings before the regular courts. As purpose, as required; that petitioner, as counsel
expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I for Antonio Javiero and Rolando Catapang, sued
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the filing of Divinagracia for "Illegal Dismissal and
motions to dismiss and bill of Particulars, shall Reinstatement with Damages" putting him in
apply only to proceedings brought before the public ridicule; and that Javellana also appeared
COMELEC. Section 2, Rule 1, Part I provides: as counsel in several cases without prior
authority of the DLG Regional Director.
"SEC. 2. Applicability. These rules, except Part Petitioner filed this petition for certiorari
VI, shall apply to all actions and proceedings praying that DLG Memoramdum Circulars Nos.
brought before the Commission. Part VI shall 80-38 and 90-81 and Section 90 of the new Local
apply to election contests and quo warranto Government Code (RA 7160) be declared
cases cognizable by courts of general or limited unconstitutional and null and void because:
jurisdiction It must be noted that nowhere in Part (1) they violate Article VIII, Section 5 of
VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it the 1987 Constitution and (2) They constitute
provided that motions to dismiss and bill of class legislation, being discriminatory against the
particulars are not allowed in election protest or legal and medical professions for only
quo warranto cases pending before the regular sanggunian members who are lawyers and
courts. doctors are restricted in the exercise of their
profession while dentists, engineers, architects,
Constitutionally speaking, the teachers, opticians, morticians and others are not
COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the so restricted (RA 7160, Sec. 90 (b-l]).
filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts.
The power to promulgate rules concerning ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned
pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is memorandum circulars and Section 90 of the
vested on the Supreme Court (Constitution, Art Local Government Code unconstitutional.
VIII, Sec. 6 [5]).
Private respondent received a copy of
the order of the RTC denying his motion for a bill
of particulars on August 6, 1992. Under Section HELD:
l(b), Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, a NO. As a matter of policy, this Court
party has at least five days to file his answer after accords great respect to the decisions and/or
receipt of the order denying his motion for a bill of actions of administrative authorities not only
particulars. Private respondent, therefore, had because of the doctrine of separation of powers
until August 11, 1992 within which to file his but also for their presumed knowledgeability and
answer. The Answer with Counter-Protest and expertise in the enforcement of laws and
Counterclaim filed by him on August 11, 1992 regulations entrusted to their jurisdiction With
was filed timely. respect to the present case, we find no grave
The instant case is different from a pre- abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent,
proclamation controversy which the law expressly Department of Interior and Local Government
mandates to be resolved in a summary (DILG), in issuing the questioned DLG Circulars
proceeding (B.P. Blg. 881, Art. XX, Sec. 246; Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 and in denying
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Part V, Rule 27, petitioner's motion to dismiss the administrative
Sec. 2). Pre-proclamation controversies should charge against him.
be summarily decided, consistent with the In the first place, complaints against
legislators' desire that the canvass of the votes public officers and employees relating or
and the proclamation of the winning candidate be incidental to the performance of their duties are
done with dispatch and without unnecessary necessarily impressed with public interest for by
delay. An election protest does not merely express constitutional mandate, a public office is
concern the personal interests of rival candidates a public trust. The complaint for illegal dismissal
for an office. Over and, above the desire of the filed by Javiero and Catapang against City
candidate to win, is the deep public interest to Engineer Divinagracia is in effect a complaint
determine the true choice of he people. For this against the City Government of Bago City, their
reason, it is a well-established principle that laws real employer, of which petitioner Javellana is a
governing election protests must be liberally councilman. Hence, judgment against City
construed to the end that the popular will Engineer Divinagracia would actually be a
expressed in the election or public officers, will judgment against the City Government. By
not, by purely technical reasons, be defeated serving as counsel for the complaining
We find no grave abuse of discretion on employees and assisting them to prosecute their
the part of the Court of Appeals. claims against City Engineer Divinagracia, the
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby petitioner violated Memorandum Circular No. 74-
DISMISSED. 58 (in relation to Election 7[b-2) of RA 6713)
prohibiting a government official from engaging in
the private practice of his profession, if such
practice would represent interests adverse to the the state under the revised Penal Code for his
government. felonious Act.
Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of However, we agree with petitioner that
the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG in the absence of any administrative action taken
Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article against him by this Court with regard to his
VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is completely certificate of service, the investigation being
off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular conducted by the Ombudsman over all courts
trenches upon the Supreme Court's power and and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of
authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. separation of powers.
The Local Government Code and DLG Articles VIII, Sec. 6 of the 1987
Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply Constitution exclusively vests in the SC
prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to administrative supervision over all courts and
avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge court personnel, from the presiding Justice of the
of their public duties and the private practice of CA that can oversee the judge's and court
their profession, in those instances where the law personnel's compliance commit any violation
allows it. thereof. No other branch of government may
Section 90 of the Local Government intrude into this power, without running afoul of
Code does not discriminate against lawyers and the doctrine separation of power.
doctors. It applies to all provincial and municipal The Ombudsman cannot justify it's
officials in the professions or engaged in any investigation of petitioner on the powers granted
occupation. Section 90 explicitly provides that to it by Constitution, for such a justification not
sanggunian members .may practice their only runs counter to the specific mandate of the
professions, engage in any occupation, or teach constitution grating supervisory powers to SC
in schools except during session hours. " If there overall courts and their personnel, but likewise
are some prohibitions that apply particularly to undermines the independence of the judiciary.
lawyers, it is because of all the professions, the Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer
practice of law is more likely than others to relate the matter of petitioner's certificate of service to
to, or affect, the area of public service. this court for determination of whether said
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED certificate reflected the true status of his pending
for lack of merit. case load, as the Court has the necessary
records to make such determination. The
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT Ombudsman cannot compel this court, as one of
MACEDA VS. VASQUEZ the three branches of government, to submit its
221 SCRA 464 [1993] records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this
matter, as suggested by public respondent
FACTS: Abiera in his affidavit-complaint.
Petitioner Judge Bonifacio Sanz The rationale for the foregoing
Maceda seeks the review of the following orders pronouncement is evident in this case.
of the office of the Ombudsman: Administratively, the question before us is this,
1.) The order dated September 18, 1991 denying should a judge, having been granted by this court
ex parte motion refer to the SC filed by the an extension of time to decide before him, report
Petitioner and these cases in his certificate of service. As this
2.) The order dated November 22, 1951 denying question had not yet been raised these cases
the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and less resolved by, this Court how could be the
directing petitioners to file his counter affidavit Ombudsman resolve the present criminal
and other controverting evidences. complaint that requires the resolution of this
In his affidavit-complaint, respondent question.
Napoleon Abiera asserts that petitioner falsely In fine, where the criminal complaint
certified that all civil and criminal cases which against a judge or other court employees arises
have been submitted for decision or from their administrative duties, the ombudsman
determination for a period of 90 days have been must defer action on said complaints and refer
determined and decided on or before January 31, the same to this Court for determination whether
1998 where in truth and in fact, petitioner knew said judge or court employee had acted within
that no decision had been rendered in the cases the scope of their administrative duties.
that have been submitted for decision. Wherefore, the instant petition is hereby
Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner granted. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to
similarly falsified his certificate of service. dismiss the complaint filed by the public
Petitioner counters that he had been respondent Atty. Napoleon Abiera and to refer
granted by this court an extension of 90 days to the same to this court for appropriate action.
decide said cases, and that the Ombudsman has
no jurisdiction over the case since the offense
charged arose from the judge's performance of ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
his official duties, which is under control of this NITAFAN VS. COMMISSION OF INTERNAL
Court. REVENUE
152 SCRA 284 [1987]
ISSUE: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman
could entertain criminal complaints for the alleged FACTS:
falsification of a judge's certification submitted to Petitioners David Nitafan Wenceslao
the supreme court to the SC, and assuming that Polo and Maximo Savellano are duly appointed
it can, whether a referral should be made first to and qualified Judges of the RTC, NCR Manila.
the SC. They sought to prohibit and/or
perpetually enjoin respondent Commission of
HELD: Internal Revenue and Finance Office of the SC
The Court disagrees with the first part if from making any deductions of withholding taxes
the petitioners basic argument, there is nothing in from their salaries. They submit that a tax
the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to withheld from their compensation as judicial
offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his officers constitute a decrease or diminution of
official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate their salaries contrary to the provision of Sec.10
is administratively liable to the SC for serious of Art.VIII of the Constitution mandating that
misconduct and inefficiency under Sec. 1 Rule "during their continuance in office, their salary
140 of the rules of Court and criminally liable to shall not be decreased.
shown. It held that the enactment thereof was in

ISSUE: Is the deduction in the said salaries in answer to a pressing and urgent need for a major
violation of Sec.10 of Art.VIII? reorganization of the judiciary; that the attendant
abolition of the inferior courts which shall cause
HELD: their incumbents to cease from holding office
YES. The draft proposal of Sec 10 Art does not impair the independence of the judiciary
VIII reads as "their salary shall not be decreased" and the security of tenure guarantee as
and the words "not subjected to income tax" was incumbent justices and judges with good
deleted so as to give substance to equality performance and clean records can be named
among the three branches of government. anew in legal contemplation without interruption
Thus, the clear intent of the in the continuity of their service; that the provision
Constitutional Commission was to delete the granting the President authority to fix the
proposed express grant of exemption from compensation and allowances of the Justices
payment of income tax to members of the and judges survives the test of undue delegation
Judiciary. In the course of deliberations, it was of legislative power, a standard having been
made clear that the salaries of members of the clearly adopted therefor; that the reorganization
Judiciary would be subject to general income tax provided by the challenged Act will be carried out
does not fall within their continuance in office. in accordance with the President's constitutional
The court disregarded the ruling in duty to take care that the laws be faithfully
Perfecto vs. Meer that declared the salaries of executed, and the judiciary's commitment to
members of the Judiciary exempt from payment guard constitutional rights.
of income tax and considered such payment as
diminution of their salaries during their
continuance in office. ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Furthermore, in constructing Sec 10 Art PEOPLE VS. HON. ESTAQUIO GACOTT
VIII of the 1987 Constitution, it is plain that the (G.R. No. 116049 March 20, 1995)
Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law
fixing another rate of compensation of Justice BIDIN, J.:
and Judges but such rate must be higher than FACTS:
that which they are receiving at the time of the Respondents Strom and Reyes were
enactment, of if lower, it would be applicable only charged with violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.
to the appointed after its approval. It would be The accused filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss,
strained construction to read into the provision an arguing that since the power to prosecute is
exemption from taxation when the true intent of vested exclusively in the Anti-Dummy Board
the framers was to make the salaries of the under RA 1130, the City Prosecutor of Puerto
Judiciary taxable. Princesa has no power or authority to file the
same. The prosecution filed an opposition
pointing out that the Anti-Dummy Board has
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT already been abolished by Letter of
DE LA LLANA vs. ALBA Implementation No. 2, Series of 1972.
(G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982) Respondent judge granted the motion.
The prosecution moved for reconsideration but
FERNANDO, C.J.: respondent judge denied the same in an order,
FACTS: the pertinent portions of which are quoted
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality hereunder:
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 entitled "An Act . . . . It may be ignorance of the law to
Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds insist that the law, Republic Act 1130 was
Therefore and for other Purposes," the same repealed or amended by Letter of Instruction (sic)
being contrary to the security of tenure provision No. 2, Series of 1972 as what the City Prosecutor
of the Constitution as it separates from the has harped all along. A Letter of Instruction (sic)
judiciary Justices and judges of inferior courts is not law by any standard and neither has it the
from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit force and effect of law. A contrary contention
courts except the occupants of the would be violative of Article 7 of the New Civil
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, Code which provides that laws are repealed only
unless appointed to the inferior courts by subsequent ones and of the Rules of Statutory
established by such Act. They likewise impute Construction.
lack of good faith in its enactment and Besides, penal statutes are strictly
characterize as undue delegation of legislative construed against the State and liberally in favor
power to the President his authority to fix the of the accused. The rules in all criminal
compensation and allowances of the Justices prosecutions is that all counts are resolved in
and judges thereafter appointed and the favor of the accused. In the case at bar, the court
determination of the date when the seriously doubts that the City Prosecutor has the
reorganization shall be deemed completed. The power or the authority to investigate violations of
Solicitor General maintains that there is no valid the Anti-Dummy Law and to file and to prosecute
justification for the attack on the constitutionality cases of this kind before our courts, as that is
of the statute, it being a legitimate exercise of the lodged with the Anti-Dummy Board under R. A.
power vested in the Batasang Pambansa to 1130.
reorganize the judiciary, the allegations of
absence of good faith as well as the attack on the ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge in
independence of the judiciary being unwarranted granting the Motion to Quash gravely abused his
and devoid of any support in law. discretion as to warrant the issuance of a writ of
certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not BP Blg. 129 is
unconstitutional. HELD:
Obviously, respondent judge did not
HELD: even bother to read the text of the cited LOI;
Yes. It is constitutional. After an otherwise, he would have readily acknowledged
intensive and rigorous study of all the legal the validity of the argument advanced by the
aspects of the case, the Supreme Court prosecution. As correctly observed by the
dismissed the petition, the unconstitutionality of Solicitor General, Presidential Decrees, such as
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been P.D No. 1, issued by the former President
Marcos under his martial law powers have the your ready reference, I am enclosing herewith
same force and effect as the laws enacted by machine copies of Executive Order RF6-04 and
Congress. As held by the Supreme Court in the the appointment.
case of Aquino vs. Comelec, (62 SCRA 275 Before I may accept the appointment
[1975]), all proclamations, orders, decrees, and enter in the discharge of the powers and
instructions and acts promulgated, issued, or duties of the position as member of the Ilocos
done by the former President are part of the law (Norte) Provincial Committee on Justice, may I
of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, have the honor to request for the issuance by the
and effective, unless modified, revoked or Honorable Supreme Court of a Resolution, as
superseded by subsequent proclamations, follows:
orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the (1) Authorizing me to accept the
President. LOI No. 2 is one such legal order appointment and to assume and discharge the
issued by former President Marcos in the powers and duties attached to the said position;
exercise of his martial law powers to implement (2) Considering my membership in the
P.D. No. 1. Inasmuch as neither P.D. No. 1 nor Committee as neither violative of the
LOI No. 2 has been expressly impliedly revised, Independence of the Judiciary nor a violation of
revoked, or repealed, both continue to have the Section 12, Article VIII, or of the second
force and effect of law. (Rollo, pp. 7-8). paragraph of Section 7, Article IX (B), both of the
Indeed, Section 3, Article XVII of the Constitution, and will not in any way amount to an
Constitution explicitly ordains: abandonment of my present position as
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, Executive Judge of Branch XIX, Regional Trial
executive orders, proclamations, letters of Court, First Judicial Region, and as a member of
instructions, and other executive issuances not the Judiciary; x x x
inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain
operative until amended, repealed, or revoked. ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of Judge
But even more glaring than respondent Manzano as member of the Provincial
judge's utter inexcusable neglect to check the Committeee on Justice violates the Constitution.
citations of the prosecution is the mistaken belief
that the duty to inform the court on the applicable HELD:
law to a particular case devolves solely upon the Yes. Under the Constitution, the
Prosecution or whoever may be the advocate members of the Supreme Court and other courts
before the court. Respondent judge should be established by law shall not be designated to any
reminded that courts are duty bound to take agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
judicial notice of all the laws of the 1 and (Sec. 1, functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).
Rule 129 Rules of Court). Being the trier of facts, Considering that membership of Judge
judges are presumed to be well-informed of the Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial
existing laws, recent enactments and Committee on Justice, which discharges
jurisprudence, in keeping with their sworn duty as administrative functions, will be in violation of the
members of the bar (and bench) to keep abreast Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his
of legal developments request.
The Court is fully aware that not every Former Chief Justice Enrique M.
error or mistake of a judge in the performance of Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of
his duties is subject to censure. But where, as in Garcia vs. Macaraig (39 SCRA 106) ably sets
the present case, the error could have been forth:
entirely avoided were it not for public While the doctrine of separation of
respondent's irresponsibility in the performance powers is a relative theory not to be enforced
of his duties, it is but proper that respondent with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of
judge be reprimanded and his order of dismissal government precluding its doctrinaire application,
set aside for grave ignorance of the law. For, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being
respondent judge's error is not a simple error in required to assume a position or perform a duty
judgment but one amounting to gross ignorance non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the
of the law which could easily undermine the principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure
public's perception of the court's competence. from its command. The essence of the trust
reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court,
as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass
on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an
executive or legislative official, however eminent.
It is indispensable that there be no exception to
the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to
be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT his sworn responsibility no leas than the
IN RE: MANZANO maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be
[A.M. NO. 88-7-1861-RTC. OCTOBER 5, 1988.] satisfied with nothing less."
This declaration does not mean that
PADILLA, J: RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic
FACTS: insensibility or unbecoming indifference to
On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Province/City Committee on Justice. As
Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the
Norte, Branch 19, sent this Court a letter which structure of government. Their integrity and
reads: performance in the adjudication of cases
By Executive Order RF6-04 issued on June 21, contribute to the solidity of such structure. As
1988 by the Honorable Provincial Governor of public officials, they are trustees of an orderly
Ilocos Norte, Hon. Rodolfo C. Farias, I was society. Even as non-members of Provincial/City
designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte Committees on Justice, RTC judges should
Provincial Committee on Justice created render assistance to said Committees to help
pursuant to Presidential Executive Order No. 856 promote the landable purposes for which they
of 12 December 1986, as amended by Executive exist, but only when such assistance may be
Order No. 326 of June 1, 1988. In consonance reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their
with Executive Order RF6-04, the Honorable judicial duties.
Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte issued my ACCORDINGLY, the aforesaid request of Judge
appointment as a member of the Committee. For Rodolfo U. Manzano is DENIED.
violates the aforementioned constitutional

requirement. The petitioners claim that it is not a
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT reasoned decision and does not clearly and
NICOS INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION VS. distinctly explain how it was reached by the trial
COURT OF APPEALS court.
(G.R. NO. 88709, FEBRUARY 11, 1992)
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a failure to state
CRUZ, J.: clearly and distinctly the facts and the law in
FACTS: which the order of dismissal is based.
In its complaint, petitioners alleged that
on January 24, 1980, NICOS Industrial HELD:
Corporation obtained a P2M loan from private Yes.The questioned order is an over-
respondent United Coconut Planters Bank simplification of the issues, and violates both the
(UCPB) and to secure payment thereof, executed letter and spirit of Article VIII, Section 14, of the
a real estate mortgage on two parcels of land. Constitution.It is a requirement of due process
The mortgage was foreclosed for alleged non- that the parties to a litigation be informed of how
payment of the loan, and the sheriff's sale was it was decided, with an explanation of the factual
held without re-publication of the required notices and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of
after the original date for the auction was the court. The court cannot simply say that
changed without the knowledge or consent of the judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y
mortgagor. UCPB was the highest and lone and just leave it at that without any justification
bidder and the mortgaged lands were sold to it. whatsoever for its action. The losing party is
UCPB sold all its rights to the properties entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to
to private respondent Manuel Co, who a higher court, if permitted, should he believe that
transferred them to Golden Star Industrial the decision should be reversed. A decision that
Corporation, another private respondent, upon does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and
whose petition a writ of possession was issued to the law on which it is based leaves the parties in
it. NICOS and the other petitioners filed suit for the dark as to how it was reached and is
"annulment of sheriff's sale, recovery of especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is
possession, and damages, with prayer for the unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court
issuance of a preliminary prohibitory and for review by a higher tribunal.
mandatory injunction." It is important to observe at this point that the
Golden Star and Evangelista filed a 7- constitutional provision does not apply to
page demurrer to the evidence where they interlocutory orders, such as one granting a
argued that the action was a derivative suit that motion for postponement or quashing a
came under the jurisdiction of the Securities and subpoena, because it "refers only to decisions on
Exchange Commission; that the mortgage had the merits and not to orders of the trial court
been validly foreclosed; that the sheriff's sale had resolving incidental matters."
been held in accordance with Act 3135; that the As for the minute resolutions of this
notices had been duly published in a newspaper Court, we have already observed in Borromeo v.
of general circulation; and that the opposition to Court of Appeals that
the writ of possession had not been filed on time. The Supreme Court disposes of the bulk
No opposition to the demurrer having been of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees
submitted despite notice thereof to the parties, them as final and executory, as where a case is
Judge Nestor F. Dantes considered it submitted patently without merit, where the issues raised
for resolution and on June 6, 1986, issued the are factual in nature, where the decision
following appealed from is supported by substantial
ORDER evidence and is in accord with the facts of the
Acting on the "Demurrer to Evidence" case and the applicable laws, where it is clear
dated April 30, 1986 filed by defendants Victorino from the records that the petitions were filed
P. Evangelista and Golden Star Industrial merely to forestall the early execution of
Corporation to which plaintiff and other judgment and for non-compliance with the rules.
defendants did not file their comment/opposition The resolution denying due course or dismissing
and it appearing from the very evidence adduced a petition always gives the legal basis.
by the plaintiff that the Sheriff's Auction Sale xxx xxx xxx
conducted on July 11, 1983 was in complete The Court is not duty bound to render
accord with the requirements of Section 3, Act signed decisions all the time. It has ample
3135 under which the auction sale was discretion to formulate decisions and/or minute
appropriately held and conducted and it resolutions, provided a legal basis is given,
appearing from the allegations in paragraph 13 of depending on its evaluation of a case.
the plaintiff's pleading and likewise from plaintiff The order in the case at bar does not
Carlos Coquinco's own testimony that his cause come under either of the above exceptions. As it
is actually-against the other officers and is settled that an order dismissing a case for
stockholders of the plaintiff Nicos Industrial insufficient evidence is a judgment on the merits,
Corporation ". . . for the purpose of protecting the it is imperative that it be a reasoned decision
corporation and its stockholders, as well as their clearly and distinctly stating therein the facts and
own rights and interests in the corporation, and the law on which it is based.
the corporate assets, against the fraudulent ants
and devices of the responsible officials of the
corporation, in breach of the trust reposed upon
them by the stockholders . . ." a subject matter
not within the competent jurisdiction of the Court,
the court finds the same to be impressed with ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
merit. MENDOZA VS. CFI
WHEREFORE, plaintiff's complaint is G.R. NO. L-35612-14 JUNE 27, 1973
hereby dismissed. The Defendants' respective
counterclaims are likewise dismissed. FERNANDO, J.
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction FACTS:
heretofore issued is dissolved and set aside. Petitioner filed a petition for habeas
It is this order that is now assailed by corpus, certiorari and mandamus. Said petitions
the petitioners on the principal ground that it were dismissed by the court for lack of merit due
to the fact that petitioner failed to sustain the likelihood is, rather than await the outcome of the
burden of showing that his confinement was proceeding against him with a death sentence,
marked by illegality or that the order cancelling an ever-present threat, temptation to flee the
the bail previously issued was tainted with grave jurisdiction would be too great to be resisted.
abuse of discretion. Hence, this petition for The precise question however, is whether once
reconsideration. the provisional liberty has been thus obtained, it
could be terminated by the cancellation of the
ISSUES: bail. The two basic objections are:
WON the petitioner can invoke the habeas One was that petitioner, when the bail
corpus rule. was granted, was still at large. The municipal
Granted that petitioner may not be released court, therefore, could not have granted bail in
on a habeas corpus proceeding, is he, accordance with our ruling in Feliciano v.
however, entitled to bail? Pasicolan. Thus: "'The constitutional mandate
that all persons shall before conviction be
HELD: bailable except those charged with capital
1. NO. Habeas corpus could be invoked by offenses when evidence of guilt is strong, is
petitioner if he were able to show the illegality of subject to the limitation that the person applying
his detention. There is aptness and accuracy in for bail should be in custody of the law, or
the characterization of the writ of habeas corpus otherwise deprived of his liberty. The purpose of
as the writ of liberty. Rightfully it is latitudinarian bail is to secure one's release and it would be
in scope. It is wide-ranging and all embracing in incongruous as to grant bail to one who is free.'"
its reach. It can dig deep into the facts to assure Secondly, and what is worse, the
that there be no toleration of illegal restraint. prosecution was never given a chance to present
Detention must be for a cause recognized by law. its evidence. The authoritative doctrine in People
The writ imposes on the judiciary the grave v. San Diego is thus squarely in point: "Whether
responsibility of ascertaining whether a the motion for bail of a defendant who is in
deprivation of physical freedom is warranted. custody for a capital offense be resolved in
This it has to discharge without loss of time. The summary proceeding or in the course of a regular
party who is keeping a person in custody has to trial, the prosecution must be given an
produce him in court as soon as possible. What opportunity to present, within a reasonable time,
is more, he must justify the action taken. Only if it all the evidence that it may desire to introduce
can be demonstrated that there has been no before the Court should resolve the motion for
violation of one's right to liberty will he be bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the
absolved from responsibility. Unless there be instant special civil action, the prosecution should
such a showing, the confinement must thereby be denied such an opportunity, there would be a
cease. violation of procedural due process, and order of
The above formulation of what is settled the Court granting bail should be considered
law finds no application to the present situation. void."
Petitioner's deprivation of liberty is in accordance No grave abuse of discretion to justify the grant
with a warrant of arrest properly issued after a of the writ certiorari prayed for has been shown.
determination by the judge in compliance with the That is why our resolution sought to be
constitutional provision requiring the examination reconsidered should stand.
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses produced. No allegation to the
contrary may be entertained. There was no ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
question, however, as to the legality of the BORROMEO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
warrants of arrest previously issued to petitioner. (G.R. NO. L-82273, JUNE 1, 1990)
Habeas corpus, under the circumstances, would
not therefore lie. PER CURIAM
FACTS:
2. NO. BAIL is the remedy by which, Petitioner Joaquin T. Borromeo charges
notwithstanding the absence of any flaw in one's Attys. Julieta Y. Carreon and Alfredo P.
confinement, provisional liberty may still be had. Marasigan, Division Clerk of Court and Asst.
Such a remedy, as a matter of fact, was granted Division Clerk of Court, respectively, of the Third
him in accordance with an order of the municipal Division, and Atty. Jose I. Ilustre, Chief of the
court of Mulanay. Thereafter, however, the bail Judicial Records Office of this Court, with
was revoked by the Court of First Instance in the usurpation of judicial functions, for allegedly
order now challenged. Such actuation he would "maliciously and deviously issuing biased, fake,
now condemn as a grave abuse of discretion. baseless and unconstitutional 'Resolution' and
Before conviction, every person is 'Entry of Judgment' in G.R. No. 82273.
bailable except if charged with capital offense This is not the first time that Mr.
when the evidence of guilt is strong. Such a right Borromeo has filed charges/complaints against
flows from the presumption of innocence in favor officials of the Court. In several letter-complaints
of every accused who should not be subjected to filed with the courts and the Ombudsman
the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be Borromeo had repeatedly alleged that he
entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved "suffered injustices," because of the disposition of
beyond reasonable doubt. Thereby a regime of the four (4) cases he separately appealed to this
liberty is honored in the observance and not in Court which were resolved by minute resolutions,
the breach. It is not beyond the realm of allegedly in violation of Sections 4 (3),13 and 14
probability, however, that a person charged with of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. His
a crime, especially so where his defense is weak, invariable complaint is that the resolutions which
would just simply make himself scarce and thus disposed of his cases do not bear the signatures
frustrate the hearing of his cage. A bail is of the Justices who participated in the
intended as a guarantee that such an intent deliberations and resolutions and do not show
would be thwarted. It is, in the language of that they voted therein. He likewise complained
Cooley, a mode short of confinement which that the resolutions bear no certification of the
would, with reasonable certainty, insure the Chief Justice and that they did not state the facts
attendance of the accused for the subsequent and the law on which they were based and were
trial. Nor is there anything unreasonable in signed only by the Clerks of Court and therefore
denying this right to one charged with a capital "unconstitutional, null and void."
offense when evidence of guilt is strong, as the
The Supreme Court through its Third

Division disposed of Borromeo's petition in a four- ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
page resolution which more than adequately KOMATSU INDUSTRIES (PHILS.) INC., VS.
complies with the constitutional requirements COURT OF APPEALS
governing resolutions refusing to give due course (G.R. NO. 127682, APRIL 4, 1998)
to petitions for review. The petition and its
incidents were discussed and deliberated upon REGALADO, J.
by the Justices of the Third Division. The Court FACTS:
reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants NIDC granted petitioner KIPI a direct
that it disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute loan of P8M and a P2M guarantee to secure
resolutions and decrees them as final and PNB. As security thereof, KIPI executed in favor
executory, as where a case is patently without of NIDC a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage,
merits where the issues raised are factual in covering, among others, a parcel of land with all
nature, where the decision appealed from is its improvements. Upon full payment of KIPI's
supported by: substantial evidence and, is in account with NIDC and the P2.0 M Credit Line
accord with the facts of the case and the with Respondent PNB, NIDC executed a Deed of
applicable laws, where it is clear from the records Release and Cancellation of Mortgage, which
that the petition is filed merely to forestall the provided that: "Whereas, the credit
early execution of judgment and for non- accommodations had been fully paid by the
compliance with the rules. Borrower to the Philippine National Bank (PNB)
and NIDC which subsequently returned the
ISSUES: owner's copy of the TCT No. 469737 of the
1. WON the certification of the Chief petitioner and accordingly the Deed of Release
Justice is imperative in minute resolutions. and Cancellation of Mortgage was registered with
2. WON the resolution in question the Registry of Deed. However, it appeared that
lacked necessary facts and law on which they are there were some accounts chargeable to KIPI on
based. deferred letters of credit opened which came to
the knowledge of PNB only in 1981 and 1982.
HELD: Hence, PNB requested for the return of the
1. NO. Minute resolutions need not be signed by owner's copy of TCT No. 469737 and the said
the members of the Court who took part in the title was returned to PNB.
deliberations of a case nor do they require the PNB filed a "Petition for Correction of
certification of the Chief Justice. For to require Entry and Adverse Claim" with the office of the
members of the court to sign all resolutions Registry of Deeds of Makati, and was able to
issued would not only unduly delay the issuance have the same annotated. It then filed a Petition
of its resolutions but a great amount of their time of Sale to extra-judicially foreclose various
would be spent on functions more properly properties belonging to KIPI. KIPI received an
performed by the Clerk of court and which time undated Notice of Sheriff's Sale to the effect that
could be more profitably used in the analysis of the land covered by TCT No. 469737 would be
cases and the formulation of decisions and foreclosed extra-judicially on December 19, 1983
orders of important nature and character. Even at 9:00 a.m.
with the use of this procedure, the Court is still Petitioner challenged the foreclosure
struggling to wipe out the backlogs accumulated sale saying that it was null and void because the
over the years and meet the ever increasing Deed of Release necessarily includes the
number of cases coming to it. Remedial- mortgage to the PNB. The Court did not agree
legislation to meet this problem is also pending in that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage
Congress. on the whole property is null and void. And due to
In discharging its constitutional duties, the unfavorable decision Petitioner filed a
the Court needs the fun time and attention of its pleading denominated as a Motion for Leave to
Clerks of Court and other key officials. Its officers file Incorporated Second Motion for
do not have the time to answer frivolous Reconsideration of the Resolution sayibg that the
complaints filed by disgruntled litigants "minute resolutions" it assails are supposedly in
questioning decisions and resolutions of the violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the present
Court and involving cases deliberated upon and Constitution. It insinuates that such procedure
resolved by the Court itself. As earlier stated, all adopted by this Court is a culpable constitutional
resolutions and decisions are actions of the violation and can be subject of impeachment
Court, not its subordinate personnel. The Court proceedings.
assumes full responsibility: for all its acts. Its
personnel cannot answer and should not be ISSUE: WON the minute resolutions of the court
made to answer for acts of the Court. are in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
2. NO. In Macario Tayamura, et al. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. (May 21, HELD:
1987), the Court clarified the constitutional NO. It has been stressed that these
requirement that a decision must express clearly "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above
and distinctly the facts and law on which it is constitutional requirements; they merely hold that
based as referring only to decisions. Resolutions the petition for review should not be entertained
disposing of petitions fall under the constitutional and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so
provision which states that, "No petition for understood it; and the petition to review the
review ... shall be refused due course ...without decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of
stating the legal basis therefor" (Section 14, right but of sound judicial discretion, hence there
Article VIII, Constitution). When the Court, after is no need to fully explain the Court's denial
deliberating on a petition and any subsequent since, for one thing, the facts and the law are
pleadings, manifestations, comments, or motions already mentioned in the Court of Appeals'
decides to deny due course to the petition and decision.
states that the questions raised are factual or no The constitutional mandate is applicable
reversible error in the respondent court's decision only in cases "submitted for decision," i.e., given
is shown or for some other legal basis stated in due course and after the filing of briefs or
the resolution, there is sufficient compliance with memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not
the constitutional requirement. where the petition is refused due course, with the
resolution therefor stating the legal basis thereof.
Thus, when the Court, after deliberating on a ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
petition and subsequent pleadings, decides to OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION vs.
deny due course to the petition and states that COURT OF APPEALS
the questions raised are factual or there is no G.R. No. 114323. July 23, 1998
reversible error in the respondent court's
decision, there is sufficient compliance with the MARTINEZ, J.:
constitutional requirement. FACTS:
The Court reminds all lower courts, The dispute between the parties had its
lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of the bulk origin in the non-delivery of the 4,300 metric tons
of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees of oil well cement to the petitioner. The petitioner
them as final and executory, as where a case is is a foreign corporation owned and controlled by
patently without merit, where the issues raised the Government of India while the private
are factual in nature, where the decision respondent is a private corporation duly
appealed from is supported by substantial organized and existing under the laws of the
evidence and is in accord with the facts of the Philippines. A contract was entered into between
case and the applicable laws, where it is clear the two parties whereby the private respondent
from the records that the petition is filed merely to undertook to supply the petitioner 4,300 metric
forestall the early execution of judgment and for tons of oil well cement for a consideration of
non-compliance with the rules. The resolution US$477,300.00. Notwithstanding the fact that the
denying due course or dismissing the petition private respondent had already received payment
always gives the legal basis. and despite several demands made by the
petitioner, the private respondent failed to deliver
the oil well cement. Thereafter, negotiations
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT ensued between the parties and they agreed that
PRUDENTIAL BANK VS. CASTRO the private respondent will replace the entire
(A.M. NO. 2756, MARCH 15, 1988) 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement with Class
"G" cement cost free at the petitioner's
PER CURIAM designated port. However, upon inspection, the
FACTS: Class "G" cement did not conform to the
Respondent Grecia filed a "Petition for petitioner's specifications. The petitioner then
Redress and Exoneration and for Voluntary informed the private respondent that it was
Inhibition", praying that the decision of November referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to
12,1987, and the resolution of the denial of the Clause 16 of their contract.
motion for reconsideration of the said decision be The chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N.
set aside and a new one entered by this Court Malhotra, resolved the dispute in petitioner's
dismissing the administrative complaint and favor. To enable the petitioner to execute the
exonerating the respondent. Respondents ire award in its favor, it filed a Petition before the
results from an administrative case filed against Court of the Civil Judge in Dehra Dun. India
him and the subsequent collective decision of the (foreign court), praying that the decision of the
Court to disbar him. arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court" in India.
Respondent questions the validity of The foreign court refused to admit the private
Courts decision due to the fact that the said respondents objections for failure to pay the
decision is violative of the 1987 Constitution due required filing fees. Thus, an order was issued
to lack of certification by the Chief Justice and ordering privare respondent to pay petitioner.
that the conclusions of the Court were reached in Despite notice sent to the private
consultation before the case was assigned to a respondent of the foregoing order and several
member for the writing of the opinion of the demands by the petitioner for compliance
Court. therewith, the private respondent refused to pay
the amount adjudged by the foreign court as
ISSUE: WON the certification of the Chief Justice owing to the petitioner. Accordingly, the petitioner
is required for the validity of the assailed filed a complaint with Branch 30 of the Regional
decision. Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City for the
enforcement of the aforementioned judgment of
HELD: the foreign court. The private respondent moved
NO. The certification requirement refers to dismiss the complaint on the following
to decisions in judicial, not administrative cases. grounds: (1) plaintiffs lack of legal capacity to
From the very beginning, resolutions/decisions of sue; (2) lack of cause of action; and (3) plaintiffs
the Court in administrative cases have not been claim or demand has been waived, abandoned,
accompanied by any formal certification. In fact, or otherwise extinguished. The RTC dismissed
such a certification would be a superfluity in private respondents complaint for lack of a valid
administrative cases, which by their very nature, cause of action. Anent the issue of the sufficiency
have to be deliberated upon considering the of the petitioner's cause of action, however, the
collegiate composition of this Court. RTC found the referral of the dispute between the
But even if such a certification were parties to the arbitrator under Clause 16 of their
required, it is beyond doubt that the conclusions contract erroneous. The RTC characterized the
of the Court in its decision were arrived at after erroneous submission of the dispute to the
consultation and deliberation. The signatures of arbitrator as a mistake of law or fact amounting
the members who actually took part in the to want of jurisdiction. Consequently, the
deliberations and voted attest to that. Besides, proceedings had before the arbitrator were null
being a per curiam decision, or an opinion of the and void and the foreign court had therefore,
Court as a whole, there is no ponente although adopted no legal award which could be the
any member of the Court may be assigned to source of an enforceable right.
write the draft. In such cases, a formal The petitioner then appealed to the
certification is obviously not required. respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the
dismissal of the complaint. In its decision, the
appellate court concurred with the RTC's ruling
that the arbitrator did not have jurisdiction over
the dispute between the parties, thus, the foreign
court could not validly adopt the arbitrator's
award. In addition, the appellate court observed
that the full text of the judgment of the foreign
court contains the dispositive portion only and The constitutional mandate that no
indicates no findings of fact and law as basis for decision shall be rendered by any court without
the award. Hence, the said judgment cannot be expressing therein dearly and distinctly the facts
enforced by any Philippine court as it would and the law on which it is based does not
violate the constitutional provision that no preclude the validity of "memorandum decisions"
decision shall be rendered by any court without which adopt by reference the findings of fact and
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts conclusions of law contained in the decisions of
and the law on which it is based. Upon denial of inferior tribunals. Hence, even in this jurisdiction,
the motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed the incorporation by reference is allowed if only to
present petition. avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the
decision of the lower courts, or portions thereof,
ISSUES: in the decision of the higher court. This is
(1) Whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction particularly true when the decision sought to be
over the dispute between the petitioner and the incorporated is a lengthy and thorough
private respondent under Clause 16 of the discussion of the facts and conclusions arrived
contract. at, as in this case, where Award Paper No. 3/B-1
(2) Whether or not the judgment of the foreign consists of eighteen (18) single spaced pages.
court is enforceable in this jurisdiction in view of Furthermore, the recognition to be
the private respondent's allegation that it is bereft accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily
of any statement of facts and law upon which the affected by the fact that the procedure in the
award in favor of the petitioner was based. courts of the country in which such judgment was
rendered differs from that of the courts of the
HELD: country in which the judgment is relied on. Thus,
1. It is noted that the non-delivery of the oil well if under the procedural rules of the Civil Court of
cement is not in the nature of a dispute arising Dehra Dun, India, a valid judgment may be
from the failure to execute the supply rendered by adopting the arbitrator's findings,
order/contract design, drawing, instructions, then the same must be accorded respect. In the
specifications or quality of the materials as same vein, if the procedure in the foreign court
provided for in the Clause 16 of their Contract. mandates that an Order of the Court becomes
That Clause 16 should pertain only to matters final and executory upon failure to pay the
involving the technical aspects of the contract is necessary docket fees, then the courts in this
but a logical inference considering that the jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the
underlying purpose of a referral to arbitration is foreign court simply because our rules provide
for such technical matters to be deliberated upon otherwise.
by a person possessed with the required skill and The foreign judgment being valid, there
expertise which may be otherwise absent in the is nothing else left to be done than to order its
regular courts. enforcement, despite the fact that the petitioner
This Court agrees with the appellate merely prays for the remand of the case to the
court in its ruling that the non-delivery of the oil RTC for further proceedings. As this Court has
well cement is a matter properly cognizable by ruled on the validity and enforceability of the said
the regular courts as stipulated by the parties in foreign judgment in this jurisdiction, further
Clause 15 of their contract: proceedings in the RTC for the reception of
All questions, disputes and differences, evidence to prove otherwise are no longer
arising under out of or in connection with this necessary.
supply order, shall be subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the court, within the local limits of
whose jurisdiction and the place from which this
supply order is situated. ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL
We believe that the correct COMMISSIONS
interpretation to give effect to both stipulations in A. COMMON PROVISIONS
the contract is for Clause 16 to be confined to all ARULEO VS. CA
claims or disputes arising from or relating to the 227 SCRA 311 [1993]
design, drawing, instructions, specifications or
quality of the materials of the supply FACTS:
order/contract, and for Clause 15 to cover all Aruelo and Gatchalian were Vice-
other claims or disputes. Mayoralty candidates in Batangas, Bulaean.
But the Court finds merit on the Gatchalian was declared the winner. Thereupon,
contention that the failure of the replacement Aruelo filed with the RTC a civil case protest in
cement to conform to the specifications of the the same elections. Aruelo claims that in
contract is a matter clearly falling within the ambit elections contests, the COMELEC Rules give the
of Clause 16. Undoubtedly, what was referred to respondent only 5 days from summons to file his
arbitration was no longer the mere non-delivery answer and that this 5-day period has lapsed.
of the cargo at the first instance but also the According to him, the tiling of Motions to Dismiss
failure of the replacement cargo to conform to the and Motion to Bill of particulars is prohibited by
specifications of the contract, a matter clearly Sec. 1 Rule 13 of COMELEC. Rules of
within the coverage of Clause 16. Procedures, hence, the filling by Gatchalian of
said pleadings did not suspend the running of the
2. As specified in the order of the Civil Judge of 5-day period.
Dehra Dun, "Award Paper No. 3/B-1 shall be a
part of the decree". This is a categorical ISSUE: Is Aruelos contention correct?
declaration that the foreign court adopted the
findings of facts and law of the arbitrator as HELD:
contained in the latter's Award Paper. Award NO. Part VI of the Come lee Rules does
Paper No. 3/B-1, contains an exhaustive not provide that MTDE and Bill of particulars are
discussion of the respective claims and defenses not allowed in election contest pending before the
of the parties, and the arbitrator's evaluation of regular courts constitutionally speaking. Comelec
the same. Inasmuch as the foregoing is deemed cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain
to have been incorporated into the foreign court's pleadings in the regular courts. The power to
judgment the appellate court was in error when it promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice
described the latter to be a "simplistic decision and procedure in all courts is vested on the SC.
containing literally, only the dispositive portion".
Gatchalian received a copy of the RTC Dr. Estolas and Salvador (the one to
order denying his motion for Bill of Particulars on replace Acena) filed a petition for review with the
August 6, 1992. Under Sec.1 (b) Rule 12 of the Office of the President, which refered said
Revised Rules of Court, a party has at least five petition to the CSC. The CSC ruled in favor of Sr.
days to file his answer I after receipt of the order Estolas and Salvador. Hence, this petition.
denying his motion for a bill of particulars. His
answer was filed right on time. ISSUE: Whether or not esc acted without in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion when it set the order of MSPB.
HELD:
It is settled rule, that a respondent
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL tribunal exercising judicial function acts without
COMMISSIONS jurisdiction if does not have the authority by law
A. COMMON PROVISIONS to hear and decide the case. There is excess of
CUA VS. COMELEC jurisdiction where the respondent has the legal
156 SCRA 582 [1987] power to decide the case but oversteps his
authority. And there is gave abuse of discretion
FACTS: where the respondent acts in capricious,
The COMELEC First Division rendered whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the
a 2:7 decision on August 10, 1987 favoring Cua exercise of his judgment amounting to lack of
as winner in the lone Congressional scat of jurisdiction.
Quirino but his proclamation was suspended due Under PD 1409 the CSC has the
to lack of unanimous vote required by the jurisdiction to review the decision of the MAPB.
procedural rules in Comelec Resolution No.1669 However, said the authority to review can only be
regarding transaction of official business of a exercised if the party adversely affected by the
Division. decision of the M APB had filed an appeal with
Pursuant to said rule, private the Commission within the I5-day reglementary
respondent Puzon filed a motion for period. Here, it is admitted by CSC and not
reconsideration with the Comelec en banc. On disputed by the private respondent Estolas that
October 28, 1987, three members voted to the petitioner for review was filed outside the
sustain the First Decision, with 2 dissenting and reglementary period. This being so, the public
one abstaining (one died earlier). But respondent respondents exceeded its jurisdiction when it
insists that no valid decision was reached by the entertained the petition that was erroneously filed
COMELEC en banc because only three votes with the Office of the President. Having exceeded
were reached in favor of Cua and theses did not its jurisdiction the CSC committed a reversible
constitute a majority of the body. error when it set aside the order the MSPB which
had long become (final and executory. Final
ISSUE: Is the Cuas contention correct? decision or order can no longer be subject to
review.
HELD: Moreover, Estolas has not even
Yes. The 2-1 decision rendered by the bothered to offer an explanation why she incurred
First Division was valid decision under Art.IX-A delay and why she filed a petition with the Office
Sec.7 of the Constitution. of the President. Such being the case, the public
Furthermore, the three members who respondent CSC cannot legally invoke and justify
voted to affirm the First division constituted a the assumption of jurisdiction on grounds of
majority of the five members who deliberated and equality and substantial justice.
voted thereon en bane. Their decision is also
valid under the aforesaid Constitutional provision.
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSIONS
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL A. COMMON PROVISIONS
COMMISSIONS VITAL-GOZON VS. COURT OF APPEALS
A. COMMON PROVISIONS G.R. NO. 101428, AUGUST 5, 1992
ACENA VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
193 SCRA 623 [1991] NARVASA, C.J.:
FACTS:
FACTS: President Aquino reorganized the
Petitioner Acena was appointed as an various offices of the Ministry of Health. Dr. de la
Administrative Officer of Rizal Technological Fuente was demoted but the CSC declared the
Colleges (RTC), a state college. He was transfer from Chief of Clinics to Medical
approved as permanent by the CSC. Dr. Profets Specialists II as illegal.
later extended to Acena a promotional Three months elapsed without any word
appointment as Associate Professor and at the from Dr. Vital-Gozon or anyone in her behalf, or
same time designated the latter as Acting any indication whatever that the CSC Resolution
Administrative Officer, despite the promotional would be obeyed. Dr. de la Fuente, apprehensive
appointment. that the funds to cover the salaries and
Dr. Estolas replaced Dr. Profets as RTC allowances otherwise due him would revert to the
OTC. In a memorandum Dr. Estolas revoked the General Fund, asked the CSC to enforce its
designation of Acena as Acting Administrative judgment. He was however "told to file in court a
Officer. petition for mandamus because of the belief that
Subsequently, petitioner Acena filed suit the Commission had no coercive powers
with the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) unlike a court to enforce its final
against Ds. Estolas for illegal termination. MSPB decisions/resolutions.
initially dismissed the complaint, but it Respondent court denied it on the
subsequently reversed itself after having been ground that the "petitions (for mandamus) are not
informed of the opinion of the CSC Chairman the vehicle nor is the Court the forum for . . .
Gotdalera to the effect that Acena is still (said) claim of damages."
Administrative Officer of the RTC because his De la Fuente sought reconsideration,
appointment as Associate Professor had been contending that the Appellate Court had
withdrawn. competence to award damages in a mandamus
action. He argued that while such a claim for

damages might not have been proper in a ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL
mandamus proceeding in the Appellate Court COMMISSIONS
"before the enactment of B.P. Blg. 129 because A. COMMON PROVISIONS
the CA had authority to issue such writs only 'in FILIPINAS ENGINEERING AND MACHINE
aid of its appellate jurisdiction,'" the situation was SHOP VS. JAIME N. FERRER
changed by said BP 129 in virtue of which three G.R. NO. L-31455, FEBRUARY 28, 1985
levels of courts the Supreme Court, the
Regional Trial Court, and the Court of Appeals CUEVAS, J.:
were conferred concurrent original jurisdiction to FACTS:
issue said writs, and the CA was given power to In a bid for the manufacture and delivery
conduct hearings and receive evidence to resolve of voting booths for COMELEC, respondent
factual issues. To require him to separately COMELEC Bidding Committee Chairman and
litigate the matter of damages he continued, Members rejected Acme Companys bid and
would lead to that multiplicity of suits which is instead awarded it to petitioner Filipinas. After an
abhorred by the law. ocular inspection of all the samples submitted
On the other hand, in an attempt to was conducted and after the Commissioners
nullify the adverse dispositions of the Court of noted that Acme submitted the lowest bid, the
Appeals and obtain "the ultimate and corollary COMELEC issued a Resolution awarding the
relief of dismissing respondent de la Fuente's contract (for voting booths) to Acme.
claim for damages" the Solicitor General's Filipinas filed an Injunction suit with the
Office had instituted the special civil action of then CFI of Manila against herein public
certiorari at bar. It contends that the CA is not respondents COMELEC Commissioners,
legally competent to take cognizance of and chairman and members of the Comelec Bidding
decide the question of damages in a mandamus Committee, and private respondent Acme.
suit. Filipinas also applied for a writ of preliminary
injunction. After hearing petitioner's said
ISSUES: application, the respondent Judge denied the writ
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals has prayed for.
jurisdiction, in a special civil action of mandamus Thereafter the public respondents filed a
against a public officer, to take cognizance of the motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the lower
matter of damages sought to be recovered from court has no jurisdiction over the nature of suit,
the defendant officer. and that the complaint states no cause of action.
2. Whether or not the Solicitor General may Acting on the motion (to dismiss), the
represent the defendant public officer in the respondent Judge issued the questioned Order
mandamus suit, in so far as the claim for dismissing Civil Case No. 77972. Filipinas'
damages is concerned. motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of
merit.
HELD: Hence, the instant appeal.
1. No. The Solicitor General's Office correctly
identifies Section 9, B.P. 129 as the legal ISSUES:
provision specifying the original and appellate 1. Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. The section to take cognizance of a suit involving an order of
pertinently declares that the "Intermediate the COMELEC dealing with an award of contract
Appellate Court (now the Court of Appeals) shall arising from its invitation to bid;
exercise . .," among others: Original jurisdiction to 2. Whether or not Filipinas, the losing bidder, has
issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, a cause of action under the premises against the
habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary COMELEC and Acme, the winning bidder, to
writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its enjoin them from complying with their contract.
appellate jurisdiction .
Section 19, governing the exclusive HELD:
original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in 1. Yes. The Commission on Elections shall have
civil cases, contains no reference whatever to exclusive charge of the enforcement and
claims "for moral and exemplary damages," and administration of all laws relative to the conduct
indeed does not use the word "damages" at all; of elections and shall exercise all other functions
yet it is indisputable that said courts have power which may be conferred upon it by law. It shall
to try and decide claims for moral, exemplary and decide, save those involving the right to vote, all
other classes of damages accompanying any of administrative questions affecting elections,
the types or kinds of cases falling within their including the determination of the number of
specified jurisdiction. location of Polling places, and the appointment of
election inspectors and of other election officials.
2. No. As laid down in the Urbano and Co cases: ... The decisions, orders and rulings of the
(T)he Office of the Solicitor General is not Commission shall be subject to review by the
authorized to represent a public official at any Supreme Court. (Section 2, Article X, 1935
stage of a criminal case. Philippine Constitution, which was then in force)
This observation should apply as well to It has been consistently held that it is
a public official who is haled to court on a civil the Supreme Court, not the Court of First
suit for damages arising from a felony allegedly Instance, which has exclusive jurisdiction to
committed by him (Article 100, Revised Penal review on certiorari final decisions, orders or
Code). Any pecuniary liability he may be held to rulings of the COMELEC relative to the conduct
account for on the occasion of such civil suit is for of elections and enforcement of election laws.
his own account. The State is not liable for the We are however, far from convince that
same. A fortiori, the Office of the Solicitor an order of the COMELEC awarding a contract to
General likewise has no authority to represent a private party, as a result of its choice among
him in such a civil suit for damages. various proposals submitted in response to its
It being quite evident that Dr. Vital- invitation to bid comes within the purview of a
Gozon is not here charged with a crime, or civilly "final order" which is exclusively and directly
prosecuted for damages arising from a crime, appealable to this court on certiorari. What is
there is no legal obstacle to her being contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General. and decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable by
certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by
law are those rendered in actions or proceedings (G.R. No. 113219. August 14, 1995)
before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of
by the said body in the exercise of its PUNO, J.:
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. FACTS:
It cannot be gainsaid that the powers Upon complaint of some Morong Water
vested by the Constitution and the law on the District (MWD) employees, petitioners MWD
Commission on Elections may either be classified Board Members conducted an investigation on
as those pertaining to its adjudicatory or quasi- private respondent Edgar Sta. Maria, then Gen.
judicial functions, or those which are inherently Manager. He was placed under preventive
administrative and sometimes ministerial in suspension and Maximo San Diego was
character. designated in his place as Acting Gen. Manager.
We agree with petitioner's contention He was later dismissed.
that the order of the Commission granting the Challenging his dismissal, private
award to a bidder is not an order rendered in a respondent filed for Quo Warranto and
legal controversy before it wherein the parties Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction before the
filed their respective pleadings and presented trial court. Petitioners moved to dismiss on the
evidence after which the questioned order was ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the
issued; and that this order of the commission was disciplinary actions of government employees
issued pursuant to its authority to enter into which is vested exclusively in the CSC.
contracts in relation to election purposes. Respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss
In short, the COMELEC resolution and the motion for reconsideration.
awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but before this court, which referred the case to
merely as an incident of its inherent respondent court. The CA dismissed the petition
administrative functions over the conduct of and denied the motion for reconsideration.
elections, and hence, the said resolution may not Hence, the petition.
be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by
certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non- ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court has
judicial in character, no contempt may be jurisdiction over a case involving dismissal of an
imposed by the COMELEC from said order, and employee of quasi-public corporation?
no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this
Tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising HELD:
from said order may be well taken in an ordinary No. There is no question that MWD is a
civil action before the trial courts. quasi-public corporation. Indeed, the established
rule is that the hiring and firing of employees of
2. No. Filipinas, the losing bidder, has no cause government-owned and controlled corporations
of action under the premises to enjoin the are governed by the provisions of the Civil
COMELEC from pursuing its contract with Acme, Service Law and Rules and Regulations.
the winning bidder. So We held in Mancita v. Barcinas, no
While it may be true that the lower court has the appeal lies from the decision of the Service
jurisdiction over controversies dealing with the Commission, and that parties aggrieved thereby
COMELEC's award of contracts, the same being may proceed to this Court alone on certiorari
purely administrative and civil in nature, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, within 30
nevertheless, herein petitioner has no cause of days from receipt of a copy thereof, pursuant to
action on the basis of the allegations of its section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution.
complaint. Mancita, however, no longer governs for
Indeed, while the law requires the under the present rules, Revised Circular No. 1-
exercise of sound discretion on the part of 91 as amended by Revised Administrative
procurement authorities, and that the reservation Circular No. 1-95 which took effect on June 1,
to reject any or all bids may not be used as a 1995, final resolutions of the Civil Service
shield to a fraudulent award, petitioner has Commission shall be appealable to the Court of
miserably failed to prove or substantiate the Appeals. In any event, whether under the old rule
existence of malice or fraud on the part of the or present rule, RTCs have no jurisdiction to
public respondents in the challenged award. entertain cases involving dismissal of officers and
Pursuant to COMELEC's Invitation to employees covered by the Civil Service Law.
Bid No. 127, a bidder may have the right to Petition granted. Decision and resolution
demand damages, or unrealized or expected annulled and set aside.
profits, only when his bid was accepted by
resolution of the COMELEC. Filipinas' bid,
although recommended for award of contract by REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 1-
the bidding committee, was not the winning bid. 95 May 16, 1995
No resolution to that effect appeared to have (REVISED CIRCULAR NO. 1-91)
been issued by the COMELEC. Decidedly then,
Filipinas has no cause of action. TO: COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX
In issuing the resolution awarding the APPEALS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, THE
contract for voting booths in Acme's favor, the GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, ALL
Commissioners of the COMELEC had taken into MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT
account that Acme's bid was the lowest; that PROSECUTION SERVICE, AND ALL
Acme was a responsible manufacturer; and that MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF
upon an ocular inspection of the samples THE PHILIPPINES.
submitted by the bidders, Acme's sample was
favorable chosen subject to certain conditions SUBJECT: Rules Governing appeals to the Court
cited in the resolution. In fine, the public of Appeals from Judgment or Final Orders of the
respondents properly exercised its sound Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial
discretion in making the award. Agencies.
1. SCOPE. These rules shall apply to appeals

ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax
COMMISSIONS Appeals and from awards, judgments, final
A. COMMON PROVISIONS orders or resolutions of or authorized by any
MATEO VS. COURT OF APPEALS quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial functions. Among these agencies are the 7. EFFECT OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
Civil Service Commission, Central Board of REQUIREMENTS. The failure of the petitioner
Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange to comply with the foregoing requirements
Commission, Land Registration Authority, Social regarding the payment of the docket and other
Security Commission, Office of the President, lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service
Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, of the petition, and the contents of and the
Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National documents which should accompany the petition
Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory shall be sufficient grounds for the dismissal
Board, National Telecommunications thereof.
Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform 8. ACTION ON THE PETITION. The Court of
under Republic Act 6657, Government Service Appeals may require the respondent to file a
Insurance System, Employees Compensation comment on the petition, not a motion to dismiss,
Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, within ten (10) days from notice. The Court,
Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy however, may dismiss the petition if it finds the
Commission, Board of Investments, and same to be patently without merit, prosecuted
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission. manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised
2. CASES NOT COVERED. These rules shall therein are too unsubstantial to require
not apply to judgments or final orders issued consideration.
under the Labor Code of the Philippines. 9. CONTENTS OF COMMENT. The comment
3. WHERE TO APPEAL. An appeal under shall be filed within ten (10) days from notice in
these rules may be taken to the Court of Appeals seven (7) legible copies and accompanied by
within the period and in the manner herein clearly legible certified true copies of such
provided, whether the appeal involves questions material portions of the record referred to therein
of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. together with other supporting papers. It shall
4. PERIOD OF APPEAL. The appeal shall be point out insufficiencies or inaccuracies in
taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petitioner's statement of facts and issues, and
award, judgment, final order or resolution or from state the reasons why the petition should be
the date of its last publication, if publication is denied or dismissed. A copy thereof shall be
required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial served on the petitioner, and proof of such
of petitioner's motion for new trial or service shall be filed with the Court of Appeals.
reconsideration filed in accordance with the 10. DUE COURSE. If upon the filing of the
governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only comment or such other pleadings or documents
one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be as may be required or allowed by the Court of
allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of Appeals or upon the expiration of period for the
the full a mount of the docket fee before the filing thereof, and on the bases of the petition or
expiration of the reglementary period, the Court the record the Court of Appeals finds prima facie
of Appeals may grant an additional period of that the court or agencies concerned has
fifteen (15) days only within which to file the committed errors of fact or law that would warrant
petition for review. No further extension shall be reversal or modification of the award, judgment,
granted except for the most compelling reason final order or resolution sought to be reviewed, it
and in no case to exceed another period of fifteen may give due course to the petition; otherwise, it
(15) days. shall dismiss the same. The findings of fact of the
5. HOW APPEAL TAKEN. Appeal shall be court or agency concerned, when supported by
taken by filing a verified petition for review in substantial evidence, shall be binding on the
seven (7) legible copies with the Court of Court of Appeals.
Appeals, with proof of service of a copy thereof 11. TRANSMITTAL OF RECORD. Within
on the adverse party and on the court or agency fifteen (15) days from notice that the petition has
a quo. The original copy of the petition intended been given due course, the Court of Appeals may
for the Court of Appeals shall be indicated as re-quire the court or agency concerned to
such by the petitioner. transmit the original or a legible certified true
Upon filing the petition for review, the petitioner copy of the entire record of the proceeding under
shall pay to the Clerk of Court of the Court of review. The record to be transmitted may be
Appeals the docketing and other lawful fees and abridged by agreement of all parties to the
deposit the sum of P500.00 for costs. Exemption proceeding. The Court of Appeals may require or
from payment of docketing and other lawful fees permit subsequent correction of or addition to the
and the deposit for costs may be granted by the record.
Court of Appeals upon verified motion setting 12. EFFECT OF APPEAL. The appeal shall
forth the grounds relied upon. If the Court of not stay the award, judgment, final order or
Appeals denies the motion, the petitioner shall resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court
pay the docketing and other lawful fees and of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such
deposit for costs within fifteen (15) days from terms as it may deem just.
notice of the denial. 13. SUBMISSION FOR DECISION. If the
6. CONTENTS OF THE PETITION. The petition is given due course, the Court of Appeals
petition for review shall (a) state the full names of may set the case for oral argument or require the
the parties to the case, without impleading the parties to submit memoranda within a period of
courts or agencies either as petitioners or fifteen (15) days from notice. The case shall be
respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of deemed submitted for decision upon the filing of
the facts and issues involved and the grounds the last pleading or memorandum required by
relied upon for the review; (c) be accompanied by these rules or by the Court itself.
a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true 14. TRANSITORY PROVISIONS. All petitions
copy of the award, judgment, final order or for certiorari against the Civil Service
resolution appealed from, together with certified Commission and The Central Board of
true copies of such material portions of the record Assessment Appeals filed and pending in the
as are referred to therein and other supporting Supreme Court prior to the effectivity of this
papers; and (d) state all the specific material Revised Administrative Circular shall be treated
dates showing that it was filed within the as petitions for review hereunder and shall be
reglementary period provided herein; and (e) transferred to the Court of Appeals for
contain a sworn certification against forum appropriate disposition. Petitions for certiorari
shopping as required in Revised Circular No. 28- against the aforesaid agencies which may be
91. filed after the effectivity hereof and up to June 30,
1995 shall likewise be considered as petitions for
review and shall be referred to the Court of

Appeals for the same purpose.
In both instances, for purposes of the period of ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL
appeal contemplated in Section 4 hereof, the COMMISSIONS
date of receipt by the Court of Appeals of the B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
petitions thus transferred or referred to it shall be DE LOS SANTOS VS. MALLARE
considered as the date of the filing thereof as 97 PHIL 289 [1950]
petitions for review, and the Court of Appeals
may require the filing of amended or FACTS:
supplemental pleadings and the submission of Eduardo de los Santos, the petitioner
such further documents or records as it may was appointed City Engineer of Baguio on July
deem necessary in view of and consequent to the 16, 1946 by the President, appointment which
change in the mode of appellate review. was confirmed by the CA on August 6. On June I,
15. REPEALING CLAUSE. Rules 43 and 44 of 1050, Gil Mallure was extended an "ad interim"
the Rules of Court are hereby appointment by the President to the same
position, after which, on June 3, the
repealed and superseded by this Circular. undersecretary of the Department of the Public
16. EFFECTIVITY. This Circular shall be works directed Santos to report to the Bureau of
published in two (2) newspapers of general Public Works for another assignment. Santos
circulation and shall take effect on June 1, 1995. refused to vacate the office. The petitioner rests
his case on the Constitution which reads, ''No
May 16, 1995. officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
(Sgd.) ANDRES R. NARVASA removed or suspend except for cause as
Chief Justice provided by law."
ISSUE: Whether or not the removal of the

ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL petitioner was constitutional.
COMMISSIONS
B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION HELD:
TUPAS V. NATIONAL HOUSING NO. There are three classes of
CORPORATION positions-policy-determining, primarily
(G.R. NO. 49677, MAY 4, 1989) confidential and highly technical - as excluded
from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure
REGALADO, J.: of officers and employees appointed herein is
FACTS: allowed by the Constitution. These positions
Petitioner TUPAS filed a petition for the involve the highest degree of confidence, or are,
conduct of a certification election in order to closely bound with the dependent 011 other
determine the exclusive bargaining positions to which they are subordinates or are
representative of the workers in NHC. The temporary in nature. However, the office of the
petition was dismissed. On appeal to the Bureau City Engineer is neither primarily confidential,
of Labor Relations, the order of dismissal was policy determining nor highly technical. Thus, the
reversed and the holding of the election was constitutional provision is very much applicable in
ordered. Upon a motion for reconsideration, this his case wherein he is protected from removal
order was set aside. Hence, the instant petition without cause.
for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON petitioner organization can be ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL

allowed to hold a certification election. COMMISSIONS
B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
HELD: SALAZAR VS. MATHAY
Yes. The civil service now covers only 73 SCRA 285 [1976]
government owned or controlled corporations
with original or legislative charters, that is those FACTS:
created by an act of Congress or by special law, Petitioner Salazar was appointed by the
and not those incorporated under and pursuant to Auditor General Confidential agent in the Office
a general legislation. of the Auditor General, GSIS. Her appointment
The workers or employees of NHC was noted by the Commission of Civil Service.
undoubtedly have the right to form unions or After six years, petitioner received a
employees organizations. The right to unionize notice from the Auditor General that her service
or to form organizations is now explicitly as confidential in the office of the Auditor OSIS
recognized and granted to employees in both the has been terminated.
governmental and the private sectors. Thereafter, the Auditor General issued
There is, therefore, no impediment to an appointment to the petition as Junior
the holding of a certification election among the Examiner receiving a lower compensation. On
workers of NHC for it is clear that they are the day of the appointment petitioner assumed
covered by the Labor Code, the NHC being a the position.
government-owned and/or controlled corporation Petitioner wrote the Commission of Civil
without an original charter. Service that she be reinstated to her former
It is meet, however, to also call attention position as confidential agent in the office of the
to the fact that, insofar as certification elections auditor, GSIS. However, no action was taken.
are concerned, subsequent statutory
developments have rendered academic even the ISSUE: Whether or not the service of petitioner
distinction between the two types of government- as confidential agent was validly terminated on
owned or controlled corporations and the laws the alleged ground of loss of confidence, and if
governing employment relations therein, as not, whether or not she could still be reinstated to
hereinbefore discussed. For, whether the said position after accepting the position of Junior
employees of NHC are covered by the Labor Examiner in the same office.
Code or by the civil service laws, a certification
election may be conducted. HELD:
Resolution annulled and set aside. The tenure of officials holding primarily
Conduct of a certification election granted. confidential ends upon loss of confidence
because their term of office lasts only as long as ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL

confidence in them endures. COMMISSIONS
B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
LUEGO VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL (G.R. NO. L-69137. AUGUST 5, 1986)
COMMISSIONS
B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION CRUZ, J.:
CORPUZ VS. CUADERNO FACTS:
13 SCRA 591 [1965] Petitioner Felimon Luego was appointed
Administrative Officer 11, Office of the City
FACTS: Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Florentino Solon on
Petitioner Corpuz, then holding the February 18, 1983. The appointment was
position of Special Assistant to the Governor in described as permanent" but the Civil Service
charge of the Export Department in the Central Commission (CSC) approved it as "temporary,"
Bank, a position declared by the President as subject to the final action taken in the protest filed
highly technical in nature, was administratively by the private respondent and another employee,
charged by several co - employees in the export and provided "there (was) no pending
department with dishonesty, incompetence, administrative case against the appointee, no
neglect of duty and abuse of authority, pending protest against the appointment nor any
oppression, conduct unbecoming of a public decision by competent authority that will
official and of violation of the internal regulations adversely affect the approval of the appointment."
of the Central Bank. The CSC then found the private respondent
The Monetary Board suspended the better qualified than the petitioner for the
petitioner. After which he filed an action for contested position, and accordingly, appointed
certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto and Tuozo as administrative officer and revoked the
damages with preliminary injunction with the CFI appointment of Luego. The private respondent
of the Manila. The CFI declared the Board was so appointed on June 28, 1984, by the new
Resolution null and void and ordered the mayor, Mayor Ronald Duterte. The petitioner, in
reinstatement of the petitioner. As aforesaid, both the present petition questions the order and the
the petitioner and respondent appealed the private respondents title.
judgment.
The appeal of the Central Band and ISSUE: Is the CSC authorized to disapprove a
Monetary Board is planted on the proposition that permanent appointment on the ground that
officers holding highly technical positions may at another person is better qualified than the
anytime for lack of confidence by the appointing appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order
power be removed. It argued that for the three his replacement by the latter?
classes of positions (policy-determining. primarily
confidential and highly technical) lack of HELD:
confidence of the one making the appointment NO. It is noted that the appointment of
constitute sufficient and legitimate cause of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent
removal. and was therefore protected by Constitution. The
appointing authority indicated that it was
ISSUE: Whether or not highly technical permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it
employees may be removed by reason of lack of was not for the respondent CSC to reverse him
confidence by the one making the appointment. and call it temporary.
The stamping of the words "APPROVED
HELD: as TEMPORARY" did not change the character
The tenure of official holding primarily of the appointment, which was clearly described
confidential positions ends upon 19s5 of as "Permanent" in the space provided for in Civil
confidence, because their terms of office lasts Service Form No. 33, dated February 18, 1983.
only as long as confidence in them endures; and What was temporary was the approval of the
thus their cessation involves no removal. But the appointment, not the appointment itself and what
situation is different for those holding technical made the approval temporary was the fact that it
posts, requiring special skills and qualifications. was made to depend on the condition specified
The Constitution clearly distinguished the therein and on the verification of the qualifications
primarily confidential from highly technical, and to of the appointee to the position.
apply the loss of confidence to the latter The Civil Service Commission is not
incumbents is to ignore and erase the empowered to determine the kind or nature of the
differentiation expressly made by our appointment extended by the appointing officer,
fundamental charter. Moreover, it is illogical that its authority being limited to approving or
while an ordinary technician, say clerk, reviewing the appointment in the light of the
stenographer, enjoys security of tenure and may requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the
not be removed at any pleasure, a highly appointee is qualified and authorizing the other
technical officers such as an economist or a legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission
scientist of a avowed time, without right to a has no choice but to attest to the appointment in
hearing or chance to defend himself. No technical accordance with the Civil Service Laws. Indeed,
men worthy would be willing to accept work the approval is more appropriately called an
under such condition. Ultimately, the rule' attestation, that is, of the fact that the appointee
advocated by the bank would demand that highly is qualified for the position to which he has been
technical positions be filed by persons who must named.
labor always with an eye cocked at the humor of Appointment is an essentially
the superiors. It would signify that the so-called discretionary power and must be performed by
highly technical positions will have to be filed with the officer in which it is vested according to his
incompetents and yes-men. Who must rely not best lights, the only condition being that the
on their own qualifications and skill but on their appointee should possess the qualifications
ability to carry favor with the powerful. The entire required by law. If he does, then the appointment
objective of the constitution in establishing and cannot be faulted on the ground that there are
dignifying the civil service on the basis on merit others better qualified who should have been
should be thus negated. preferred. It is different where the Constitution or
the law subjects the appointment to the approval
of another officer or body, like the Commission
on Appointments under 1935 Constitution. on is of no moment as his having passed the

Appointments made by the President of the supervising security guard examination, did not
Philippines had to be confirmed by that body and ipso facto convert his temporary appointment into
could not be issued or were invalidated without a permanent one. In cases such as the one at
such confirmation. In fact, confirmation by the bench, what is required is a new appointment
Commission on Appointments was then since a permanent appointment is not a
considered part of the appointing process, which continuation of the temporary appointment
was held complete only after such confirmation. these are two distinct acts of the appointing
Significantly, the CSC acknowledged authority.
that both the petitioner and the private It is worthy to note that private
respondent were qualified for the position in respondent rests his case entirely on the letter
controversy. That recognition alone rendered it dated March 19, 1976 communicated by Mr.
functus officio in the case and prevented it from Rama to the Governor of Camarines Sur. The
acting further thereon except to affirm the validity foregoing is a clear arrogation of power properly
of the petitioner's appointment. To be sure, it had belonging to the appointing authority. It was
no authority to revoke the said appointment already held before (Luego v. CSC) that the CSC
simply because it believed that the private has the power to approve or disapprove an
respondent was better qualified for that would appointment set before it. It does not have the
have constituted an encroachment on the power to make the appointment itself or to direct
discretion vested solely in the city mayor. the appointing authority to change the
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the employment status of an employee. The CSC
respondent Commission on Civil Service dated can only inquire into the eligibility of the person
March 22, 1984, is set aside, and the petitioner is chosen to fill a position and if it finds the person
hereby declared to be entitled to the office in qualified it must attest. If not, the appointment
dispute by virtue of his permanent appointment must be disapproved. The duty of the CSC is to
thereto dated February 18, 1983. No costs. attest appointments and after that function is
discharged, its participation in the appointment
process ceases. In the case at bench, CSC
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL should have ended its participation in the
COMMISSIONS appointment of private respondent on January 1,
B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 1974 when it confirmed the temporary status of
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR VS. CA the latter who lacked the proper civil service
GR NO. 104639. JULY 14, 1995 eligibility.
Moreover, the Court is not prepared to
FACTS: accord said letter any probative value the same
Private respondent Tito Dato was being merely a purported photocopy of the
appointed Assistant Provincial Warden by then alleged letter, initialed and not even signed by the
Gov. Felix Alfelor, Sr. Since he had no civil proper officer of the CSC. Based on the
service eligibility for the position he was foregoing, private respondent Tito Dato, being
appointed to, what was extended to him was a merely a temporary employee, is not entitled to
temporary appointment which was renewed the relief he seeks, including his claim for
annually. backwages for the entire period of his
Gov. Alfelor approved the change in suspension.
Datos employment status from temporary to Wherefore, premises considered, the
permanent upon the latters representation that appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and the
he passed the necessary civil service exam. petition for mandamus instituted by herein private
However, the CSC did not favorably act upon this respondent Tito Dato is hereby DISMISSED.
change of status.
After criminal charges were filed against
him and a prison guard, Dato was indefinitely ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL
suspended. Lope Rama, head of the Camarines COMMISSIONS
Sur Unit of the CSC, wrote the Governor of B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Camarines Sur, informing him that the status of DE LOS SANTOS V. YATCO
Dato has been changed from temporary to GR NO. L-13932. DECEMBER 24, 1959
permanent, the latter having passed the required
examination. The change of status was to be FACTS:
made retroactive to June 11, 1974, the date of A compromise agreement was
release of said examination. submitted referring to the sale by installment of a
Dato was acquitted of the charges. parcel of land made by plaintiffs therein Pacita de
Thus, he asked for reinstatement and los Santos and Jose de los Santos to Franicsco
backwages. When his request was not heeded, Mendonez. The agreement was subsequently
Dato sued for mandamus before the RTC which approved.
ruled in his favor. On appeal, the CA affirmed the Plaintiffs moved for execution because
assailed decision. Hence this present petition. defendant had allegedly neglected to pay
monthly installments since January 1958.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent Tito Defendant sought postponement of the hearing
Dato was a permanent employee of petitioner for the motion which was granted by respondent
Province of Camarines Sur at the time he was Judge. Respondent then issued a motion for
suspended. execution but the defendant moved to quash the
writ of execution. The parties were heard and in
HELD: view of a possible amicable settlement, the
NO. Private respondent does not motion to quash was held in abeyance for two
dispute the fact that at the time he was appointed weeks during which period they can settle the
Assistant Provincial Wasrden in 1974, he had not case.
qualified in an appropriate examination for the After the pre-trial conferences,
aforementioned position. Such lack of a civil respondent quashed the writ of execution. Hence
service eligibility made his appointment this petition for certiorari.
temporary and without a fixed and definite term
and is dependent entirely upon the pleasure of ISSUE: Whether or not there was grave abuse of
the appointing power. The fact that private discretion on the part of the respondent Judge.
respondent obtained civil service eligibility later
HELD: provided that "the Civil Service law and Rules

NO. In the first place, there being governing concerted activities and strikes in the
opposition on the part of the defendant, who government services shall be observed, subject
alleged and proved a subsequent verbal to many legislation that may be enacted by
agreement amending the compromise, execution congress by Congress." The President was
could not validly be decreed without a hearing. apparently referring to Memorandum Circular No.
In the second place, the allegations 6 of the Civil Service Commission which "prior to
proved by Mendonez about their verbal the enactment by Congress of applicable laws
agreement, his having secured a loan from the concerning strike by government employees
GSIS and his consequent ability to discharge his enjoying under pain of administrative sanctions
obligation seemingly justified the courts refusal all government demonstration, mass leaves,
to eject defendant from the premises (on walkouts and other forms of mass action which
execution) with the consequent forfeiture in favor will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of
of the plaintiffs of more than 12,000 already paid public service" the air was thus cleared 'of the
by defendant as previous installments of the confusion. At present, in the absence of any
purchase price not to mention the loss of legislation allowing government employees to
defendants use of the house and theater erected strike recognize their right to do so, or regulating
on that parcel of land. Upon the other hand, the the exercise of the right, they are prohibited from
respondent judges action caused no irreparable striking. This being the case, the strike staged by
or undue harm to plaintiffs, because the latter still employees of the SSS was illegal.
have the judgment that may be enforced upon
any further default of defendant Mendonez.
Wherefore, as the court had jurisdiction
and has committed no grave abuse of discretion,
the writ of certiorari may not be issued.
Petition denied, with costs against
petitioners.
COMMISSIONS
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
COMMISSIONS CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS. EXECUTIVE
B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION SECRETARY
SSS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION VS. CA 194 SCRA 317 [1991]
175 SCRA 686 [1989]
FACTS:
FACTS: Petitioner contends that Section 13 run
When the SSS failed to act on the counter to See 13 Art. VII of the 1987
SSEA's demands, the latter went to strike. The Constitution -The President, Vice-m President
SSS filed with the RTC complaint for damages and the members of the Cabinet and their
and asked for a writ of preliminary injunctions to deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
stop the strike. The trial Court issued a TRO provided in this constitution, hold any office of
while the Union filed a Motion of Dismiss alleging employment during their tenure.
the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject By virtue of the opinion rendered by
matter. then Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordonez,
The position of the union is that the RTC construing Section 13 Art. VII in relation to
had no jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by Section 7, par.2 Art.IX-B that cabinet members,
the SSS and to issue the restraining order and their deputies and assistants may hold other
the writ of preliminary injunction, as jurisdiction office including membership in the board of
lay with the DOLE of the NLRC, since the case GOCC's when a) directly provided by the
involves a labor dispute constitution as in case of Sec of Justice which is
made an ex-officio member of the Judicial and
ISSUE: Whether or not the SSS Employees have Bar Council; b) if allowed by law; c) if allowed by
the right to strike the primary functions of their respective positions,
the President of the Philippines issued EO 284
HELD: two days before Congress convened.
There is no question that the Petitioners argue that the exception to
constitution recognizes the right of government the prohibition in See 7 Par 2 Art IX applies to the
employees to organize as shown in the following officers and employees of the Civil Service
articles: XIII Sec. 3, Art.XI (B) Sec. 2 (1) and (5) Commission in general and do not or cannot be
Art. III Sec. 8. extended to Sec.13 Art.VII which applies
However, those articles are silent as to specifically to President, Vice- Presiednt and
whether such recognition also includes the right members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
to strike. Resort of the intent of the framers of the assistants. The difference in the contention of the
organic law becomes helpful in understanding the parties therefore lies in the interpretation of the
meaning of these provisions. A reading of the phrase 'unless otherwise provided in the
proceedings of the Constitution Commission that Constitution' used in Sec.13 of Art.VII which has
drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in petitioner claims to refer only to those expressly
recognizing the right government employees to provided by the Constitution such as the Vice
organize, the associations only, without including President being allowed to become member of
the right to strike. the Cabinet or Secretary of Justice to become an
The Labor Code is silent as to whether ex-officio member of the Judiciary and Bar
or not government employees may strike, for Council, while respondents insists it make
such are excluded from its coverage, but then the reference to Sec 7 of Art IX-B in so far as the
Civil Service Decree is equally silent on the appointive official mentioned therein is
matter. concerned.
On July 1, 1987, to implement the
constitution guarantee of the rights of ISSUE: Does the prohibition in Sec.13 Art.VII
government employees to organize, the insofar as cabinet members, their deputies and
President issued EO No. t 80 which provides assistants are concerned admit of the broad
guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize exceptions made for appointive officials in
government employees. In Sec. 4 thereof, it is general under Sec 7 par 2 Art IXB unless
otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions this original petition with prayer for prohibition,
of his position, no appointive officials shall hold preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
any other office or employment in the order "to prevent useless and unnecessary
government. expenditures of public funds by way of salaries
and other operational expenses attached to the
HELD: office . . . ."
We rule in the negative. In construing Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers,
the Constitution, it should be borne in mind the employees of the U.S. Facility at the Subic,
objects it sought to accomplish by its adoption, Zambales, and officers and members of the
and the evils if any, it sought to prevent or Filipino Civilian Employees Association in U.S.
remedy. Facilities in the Philippines, maintain that the
The practice of holding multiple offices proviso in par. (d) of Sec. 13 of the said law
or positions in the government led to abuses by infringes the constitutional provision set forth in
unscrupulous public officials who took advantage Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution,
of this scheme for the purposes of self- which states that "[n]o elective official shall be
enrichment. The blatant betrayal of public trust eligible for appointment or designation in any
evolved into one of the serious causes of capacity to any public officer or position during
discontent with the Marcos regime. his tenure," because the City Mayor of Olongapo
A comparison of Sec 13 Art VII with City is an elective official and the subject posts
other provisions of the Constitution on the are public offices.
disqualification of the public official such as Sec.
13 Art VI on members of Congress, Sec 5 par 4 ISSUE: Does the proviso in Sec.13, par. (d) of
Art XVI on members of the Armed Forces and R.A. 7227 which states, "Provided, however, That
even Sec '7 provisions on disqualification for the first year of its operations from the
pertains to an office or position in the government effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of
and GOCC's. Unlike Sec 13 Art. VI the prohibition Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman
is all-embracing and covers both public and and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority,"
private office and position in the government. violate the constitutional proscription against
Thus, while all the other appointive appointment or designation of elective officials to
officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other government posts?
other office or employment in the government
during their tenure when such is allowed by law
and the primary function of their office, members
of the cabinet, their deputies and assistants may HELD:
do so only when expressly authorized by the YES. The subject proviso directs the
Constitution itself. In other words, Sec., Art IX- B President to appoint an elective official, i.e., the
is meant to officials while sec 13 Art VII is meant Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government
to the exception applicable only to the President, posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief
Vice-President, members of the cabinet and their Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this is
deputies and assistants. precisely what the constitutional proscription
This being the case, the qualifying seeks to prevent, it needs no stretching of the
phrase 'unless otherwise provided in this imagination to conclude that the proviso
Constitution' in see 13 Art VII cannot possibly contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the
refers to the broad exceptions provided under Constitution. Here, the fact that the expertise of
Sec.7 Art.IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. The an elective official may be most beneficial to the
position under See 13 Art VII is not to be higher interest of the body politic is of no
interpreted as covering positions held without moment.
compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided It is argued that Sec. 94 of the Local
by law or as requires by the primary functions of Government Code (LGC) permits the
their office. appointment of a local elective official to another
Mandating additional duties and post if so allowed by law or by the primary
functions of the President, Vice-President, functions of his office. 8 But, the contention is
Cabinet members and their deputies and fallacious. Section 94 of the LGC is not
assistants which are not inconsistent with those determinative of the constitutionality of Sec. 13,
already prescribed by their offices or employment par. (d), of R.A. 7227, for no legislative act can
by virtue of their special knowledge, expertise prevail over the fundamental law of the land.
and skill in their respective offices is a practice Moreover, since the constitutionality of Sec. 94 of
long-recognized in many jurisdictions. It bears LGC is not the issue here nor is that section
repeating through that such additional duties or sought to be declared unconstitutional, we need
functions may not transgress the prohibition must not rule on its validity. Neither can we invoke a
be required by the primary functions of the official practice otherwise unconstitutional as authority
covered, who is to perform the same in an ex for its validity.
officio capacity as provided by law, without In any case, the view that an elective
receiving any additional compensation therefore. official may be appointed to another post if
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
office, ignores the clear-cut difference in the
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art.
COMMISSIONS IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second
B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices
FLORES VS. DRILON by an appointive official when allowed by law or
(G.R. NO. 104732, JUNE 22, 1993) by the primary functions of his position, the first
paragraph appears to be more stringent by not
BELLOSILLO, J.: providing any exception to the rule against
FACTS: appointment or designation of an elective official
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), to the government post, except as are particularly
of R.A. 7227, 1 otherwise known as the "Bases recognized in the Constitution itself, e.g., the
Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under President as head of the economic and planning
which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of agency; the Vice-President, who may be
Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and appointed Member of the Cabinet; and, a
Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay member of Congress who may be designated ex
Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged in officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.
The distinction being clear, the ISSUE: Whether or not Christian Monsod has
exemption allowed to appointive officials in the been engaged in the practice of law for at least
second paragraph cannot be extended to elective ten years as required by the Constitution?
officials who are governed by the first paragraph.
WHEREFORE, the proviso in par. (d), HELD:
Sec. 13, of R.A. 7227, which states: ". . . YES. Practice of law means any
Provided, however, That for the first year of its activity, in or out of court, which requires the
operations from the effectivity of this Act, the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
Mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed training and experience. To engage in the
as the chairman and chief executive officer of the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
Subic Authority," is declared unconstitutional; characteristics of the profession. Generally, to
consequently, the appointment pursuant thereto practice law is to give notice or render any kind of
of the Mayor of Olongapo City, respondent service which device or service requires the use
Richard J. Gordon, is INVALID, hence NULL and in any degree of legal knowledge or skill (III ALR
VOID. 23).
Interpreted in the light of the various
definitions of the term practice of law,"
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL particularly the modern concept of law practice,
COMMISSIONS and taking into consideration the liberal
B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION construction intended by the framers of the
QUINTOS VS. OZAETA Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work
98 PHIL 705 [1956] experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
FACTS: lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
Appellants Braulio Quimson was a legislator of both the rich and the poor verily
deputy Provincial Treasurer and Municipal more than satisfy the constitutional requirement
Treasurer of Caloocan, Rizal. In addition from that he has been engaged in the practice of
being treasurer, he was appointed as Agent law for at least ten years.
Collector of Rural Progress Administration, a The Commission on the basis of
public corporation. He assumed the office without evidence submitted doling the public hearings on
waiting for the approval of the President. Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that
he possessed the necessary qualifications as
ISSUE: Whether the appointment as agent is required by law. The judgment rendered by the
constitutional and if it is, whether he is entitled to Commission in the exercise of such an
additional compensation. acknowledged power is beyond judicial
interference except only upon a clear showing of
HELD: a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
YES. The employment of appellant as excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1
agent collector is not in itself unlawful because Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse
there is no incompatibility between said of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court
appointment and his employment as Deputy interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the
Provincial Treasurer and Municipal Treasurer. instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise
There is no legal objection to government official of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse,
occupying two government offices and much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would
performing functions to both as long as there is amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and
no incompatibility. The Constitutional prohibition would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed,
refers to double appointments and performance for has been clearly shown.
of functions of more than one office.
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
COMMISSIONS C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS BRILLANTES VS. YORAC
CAYETANO VS. MONSOD 192 SCRA 358[1990]
(G.R. NO. 100113 SEPTEMBER 3, 1991)
FACTS:
PARAS, J.: President Aquino designated Associate
FACTS: Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac as Acting
Respondent Christian Monsod was Chairman of the COMELEC, in place of
nominated by President Aquino to the position of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been
Chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed named chairman of the fact-finding commission
the nomination because allegedly Monsod does to investigate the December 1989 coup d'etat
not possess the required qualification of having attempt.
been engaged in the practice of law for at least Petitioner challenged the designation
ten years pursuant to Article IX-C, Section 1 (1) contending that the President has no power to
of the 1987 Constitution. make such designation in view of the following
The Commission on Appointments reasons:
confirmed the nomination. Subsequently, 1. The status of the Commission on
respondent took his oath and assumed office as Elections as an independent
Chairman of the COMELEC. constitutional body, and;
Challenging the validity of the 2. The specific provision of Art IX-C
confirmation by the Commission on Section 1(2) of the Constitution that (1)
Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner, no case shall any member of the
as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition COMELEC be appointed or designated
for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said in a temporary or acting capacity.
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Petitioner invokes Nacionalista Party v.
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Bautista, where President Quirino designated the
Elections be declared null and void. Solicitor General as acting member of the
COMELEC and the Court revoked the
designation as contrary to the Constitution. It is
also alleged that the respondent is not even the
senior member of the COMELEC, being the implementation of the Order and writ of
outranked by Associate Commissioner Alfredo E. execution.
Abueg, Jr. COMELEC denied the petition for
The Solicitor General counters that the certiorari and lifted the preliminary injunction. It
designation should be sustained for reasons of ruled that the trial court did not commit grave
'administratively expediency,' to prevent abuse of discretion in granting the motion for
disruption of the functions of the COMELEC in execution pending appeal since on the basis
the absence of legal provisions for temporary alone of the physical count of ballots, private
succession similar to the Supreme Court's (Sec respondent would still be ahead of petitioner by
12 Judiciary Act of 1948) as well as the CA (Sec 90 votes. It also held that the examination of
5 BP 129). original ballots shall be made at the appeal
proper to dispose of all the issues relative to the
ISSUE: Does the President of the Philippines merits of the case.
have the power to make designation of a Hence, the petition for certiorari and
COMELEC Chairman in an acting Capacity? prohibition.
HELD: ISSUE: Is the petition proper?

No. President has no such authority and
expediency is a dubious justification. Art IX-A. HELD:
Sec.1 of the Constitution expressly describes all NO. COMELEC's statement that fake
the Constitutional Commissions as 'independent.' and spurious ballots may have been introduced
Although essentially executive in nature, they are to increase the votes of protestant was taken out
not under the control of the President in the of context. Thus, it cannot be made as basis for
discharge of their respective functions. Each of denying the execution pending appeal. To be
these Commissions conducts in own proceedings precise, the COMELEC merely said that there is
under the applicable laws and its own rules and a possibility that fake spurious ballots were
the exercise of its discretion. The choice of a placed in the ballot box to increase private
temporary chairman in the absence of the regular respondent's votes, but the COMELEC correctly
chairman comes under that discretion. That ruled that an examination of the ballots to resolve
discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its that petition for certiorari is not proper at said
consent, by the President of the Philippines. time for the only issue it resolved was whether
A designation as Acting Chairman is by there was a grave abuse of discretion in granting
its very terms essentially temporary and therefore the execution pending appeal.
revocable at will. No cause need be established In his petition for certiorari before the
to justify its revocation. Assuming its validity, the COMELEC, petitioner mainly anchored his
designation of the respondent as Acting opposition to the order of execution pending
Chairman of the Commission on Elections may appeal on his allegation that the trial judge did
be withdrawn by the President at any time and for not examine the original ballots, but relied only on
whatever reason she sees fit and the respondent, the xerox copy of the ballots in deciding the
having accepted such designation, will be protest case. However, this contention raises a
stopped from challenging its withdrawal. (Note: factual issue and its determination in best left in
This illustrates how the independence pf the the appeal pending before the COMELEC. Its
Constitutional Commissions may be resolution will involve the merit of the case. We
undermined.) are only concerned with the issue of whether
The lack of a statutory rule covering the grave abuse of discretion was committed in
situation at bar is no justification for the President ordering execution pending appeal. And there
of the Philippines to fill the void by extending the was a good reason for ordering execution
temporary designation in favor of the respondent. pending appeal.
The members of the COMELEC could have Thus, petitioner's recourse would be to
handled the situation themselves without the pursue his appeal with the COMELEC, where the
participation of the President, however well- opening of the ballot boxes and the examination
meaning. of original ballots may be made so that the true
In the choice of the Acting Chairman, will of the electorate can be finally ascertained.
the members of the Commission on Elections It also bears emphasis that Rule 143 of
would most likely have been guided by the the Rules of Court allows execution pending
seniority rule as they themselves would have appeal in election cases upon good reasons
appreciated it. In any event, that choice and the stated in the special order.In its Order of
basis thereof were for them and not the President execution, respondent RTC Judge Dilag cited two
to make. reasons to justify execution of his decision
pending appeal, viz: (1) the grant of execution
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL would give substance and meaning to the
COMMISSIONS people's mandate, especially since the RTC has
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS established private respondent's right to office,
LINDO VS COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and; (2) barely 18 months is left on the tenure of
G.R. NO. 127311 JUNE 19, 1997 the Ternate mayor and the people have the right
to be governed by their chosen official. In the
PUNO, J. recent case of Gutierrez v. COMELEC, the same
FACTS: grounds for execution pending appeal of the
Petitioner Conrado Lindo and private decision in the protest case were relied upon by
respondent Rosario Velasco (incumbent mayor of the trial court and we found them to be valid
Ternate, Cavite) were mayoralty candidates. reasons for execution.
When petitioner was declared as the winner,
Velasco filed an election protest with the trial
court. ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL
Respondent Judge Napoleon Dilag took COMMISSIONS
over the protest case. Velasco moved for C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
execution pending appeal, which motion was GALLARDO V. JUDGE TABAMO
granted. Dilag thus issued the writ of execution. (G.R. NO. 104848, JANUARY 29, 1993)
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the COMELEC, with prayer for DAVIDE, JR., J.
the issuance of a preliminary injunction to prevent FACTS:
Petitioners seek to prohibit the (1) Enforce and administer all laws and
enforcement of the TRO issued by respondent regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
Judge on 10 April 1992, on the ground that the plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
latter acted whimsically, capriciously and without (Emphasis supplied).
jurisdiction when he took cognizance of the case The word regulations is not found in either the
and issued the said order. It is the petitioners' 1935 or 1973 Constitutions. It is thus clear that its
thesis that the said casethe hiring of hundreds incorporation into the present Constitution took
of laborers in the different projects continues into account the Commission's power under the
unabated in flagrant violation of paragraphs (a), Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg.
(b), (v) and (w), Section 261 of the Omnibus 881), which was already in force when the said
Election Code, among othersprincipally Constitution was drafted and ratified, to:
involves an alleged violation of the provisions of xxx xxx xxx
the Omnibus Election Code the jurisdiction over Promulgate rules and regulations
which is exclusively vested in the COMELEC. implementing the provisions of this Code or other
laws which the Commission is required to enforce
16
ISSUE: Does respondent judge have jurisdiction and administer, . . . .
to take cognizance of the complaint or petition Needless to say, the acts sought to be
based on election offenses prior to the conduct of restrained in Special Civil Action No. 465 before
preliminary investigation by the Commission on the court a quo are matters falling within the
Elections. exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission. It is not
true that, as contended by the petitioners, the
HELD: jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court under the
No. The material operative facts alleged election laws is limited to criminal actions for
in the petition therein inexorably link the private violations of the Omnibus Election Code. The
respondent's principal grievance to alleged Constitution itself grants to it exclusive original
violations of paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and (w), jurisdiction over contests involving elective
27
Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code municipal officials. Neither it is tenable that the
(Batas Pambansa Blg. 881). There is particular petitioners' assertion that the Special Civil Action
emphasis on the last two (2) paragraphs which filed in the court below involves the prosecution
read: of election offenses; the said action seeks some
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. The reliefs incident to or in connection with alleged
following shall be guilty of an election offense: election offenses; specifically, what is sought is
(v) Prohibition against release, disbursement or the prevention of the further commission of these
expenditure of public funds. Any public official or offenses which, by their alleged nature, are
employee including barangay officials and those continuing.
of government-owned or controlled corporations The petition is granted.
and their subsidiaries, who, during forty-five days
before a regular election and thirty days before a
special election, releases, disburses or expends ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL
any public funds for: COMMISSIONS
(1) Any and all kinds of public works, except the C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
following: RELAMPAGOS V. CUMBA
xxx xxx xxx (G.R. NO. 118861, APRIL 27, 1995)
(w) Prohibition against construction of public
works, delivery of materials for public works and DAVIDE, JR., J.
issuance of treasury warrants and similar FACTS:
devices. During the period of forty-five days Petitioner and private respondent Rosita
preceding a regular election and thirty days Cumba were candidates for the position of Mayor
before a special election, any person who (a) in the municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del
undertakes the construction of any public works, Norte. When Cumba was proclaimed the winner,
except for projects or works exempted in the petitioner filed an election protest with the trial
preceding paragraph; or (b) issues, uses or avails court, which found the latter to have won with a
of treasury warrants or any device undertaking margin of six votes over the private respondent.
future delivery of money, goods or other things of Cumba appealed to the COMELEC. The
value chargeable against public funds. trial court gave due course to the appeal.
Essentially, therefore, Civil Case No. Petitioner moved for execution pending appeal,
465 before the trial court is for the enforcement of which was granted. The corresponding writ of
laws involving the conduct of elections the execution was thus issued. Since her motion for
present Constitution upgraded to a constitutional reconsideration was denied, Cumba filed with the
status the aforesaid statutory authority to grant COMELEC a petition for certiorari to annul the
the Commission broader and more flexible assailed order of the trial court.
powers to effectively perform its duties and to COMELEC promulgated its resolution,
insulate it further from legislative intrusions. declaring null and void the order and the writ of
Doubtless, if its rule-making power is made to execution issued by the lower court. Accordingly,
depend on statutes, Congress may withdraw the petitioner was ordered restored to her position as
same at any time. Indeed, the present Municipality Mayor.
Constitution envisions a truly independent Respondents contend that Sec. 50 of
Commission on Elections committed to ensure BP Blg. 697 was repealed by the Omnibus
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible Election Code (BP Blg. 881), citing jurisprudent
elections, and to serve as the guardian of the where it was declared that, indeed, the
people's sacred right of suffrage the citizenry's COMELEC has no jurisdiction to issue special
vital weapon in effecting a peaceful change of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in
government and in achieving and promoting aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
political stability.
The present Constitution, however, ISSUE: Whether the Commission has the
implicitly grants the Commission the power to authority to hear and decide petitions for
promulgate such rules and regulations. The certiorari in election cases.
pertinent portion of Section 2 of Article IX-C
thereof reads as follows: HELD:
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall Yes. Since the COMELEC, in
exercise the following powers and functions: discharging its appellate jurisdiction pursuant to
Sec. 2 (2), Art. IX-C, acts as a court of justice decision. Bernardo opposed Edding's motion,
performing judicial power and said power claiming that the RTC has no jurisdiction to order
includes the determination of whether or not execution pending appeal, and invoked Section
there has been grave abuse of discretion 17 of Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, it Procedure which allows execution only if the
necessarily follows that the Comelec, by judgment has become final.
constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction The RTC approved Bernardo's Notice of
to issue writs of certiorari in aid of its appellate Appeal but later granted Edding's Motion, and
jurisdiction. ordered the records of the case to be forwarded
In abandoning the ruling in the Garcia to the COMELEC. Thereafter, Edding replaced
and Uy and Veloria cases, the Court held that the Bernardo and assumed office. Bernardo filed
last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 with the COMELEC a Petition for Certiorari with
providing as follows: The Commission is hereby Application for Preliminary Injunction and for
vested with exclusive authority to hear and Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order,
decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and seeking to enjoin the Order of the RTC granting
mandamus involving election cases, remains in execution pending appeal. The COMELEC gave
full force and effect but only in such cases where, due course to the petition, and issued a
under paragraph (2), Section 1, Article IX-C of temporary restraining order. Finally, the
the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate COMELEC issued the assailed Order, ordering
jurisdiction. Simply put, the COMELEC has the respondent Judge to cease and desist from
authority to issue the extraordinary writs of enforcing the assailed Resolution.
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only in aid Petitioner argues that the COMELEC
of its appellate jurisdiction. lacks jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari; and
That the trial court acted with palpable that the power of the RTC to grant execution
and whimsical abuse of discretion in granting the pending appeal in election cases has already
petitioner's motion for execution pending appeal been confirmed in the case of Tobon-Uy vs.
and in issuing the writ of execution is all too COMELEC where it was held that "the
obvious. Since both the petitioner and the private COMELEC is bereft of authority to deprive
respondent received copies of the decision on 1 Regional Trial Courts of the competence to order
July 1994, an appeal therefrom may be filed execution pending appeal."
within five days from 1 July 1994, or on or before Respondents counter that the
6 July 1994. Any motion for execution pending COMELEC has the power to issue writs of
appeal must be filed before the period for the certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, invoking
perfection of the appeal. Pursuant to Section 23 Sections 2(2) and 3 of Article IX of the 1987
of the Interim Rules Implementing B.P. Blg. 129, Constitution, which provides in part:
which is deemed to have supplementary effect to Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections
the COMELEC Rules of Procedures pursuant to shall exercise the following powers and functions:
Rule 43 of the latter, an appeal would be deemed (2) Appellate jurisdiction over all contests
perfected on the last day for any of the parties to involving elective municipal officials decided by
appeal, or on 6 July 1994. trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving
On 4 July 1994, the private respondent elective barangay officials decided by trial courts
filed her notice of appeal and paid the appeal fee. of limited jurisdiction.
On 8 July 1994, the trial court gave due course to Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections
the appeal and ordered the elevation of the may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
records of the case to the COMELEC. Upon the promulgate its rule of procedure in order to
perfection of the appeal, the trial court was expedite disposition of election case, including
divested of its jurisdiction over the case. Since pre-proclamation controversies
the motion for execution pending appeal was filed
only on 12 July 1994, or after the perfection of ISSUE: Whether the Commission on Elections
the appeal, the trial court could no longer validly (COMELEC) has jurisdiction to issue Writs of
act thereon. It could have been otherwise if the Certiorari against the interlocutory order of the
motion was filed before the perfection of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in election cases.
appeal.
Accordingly, since the respondent HELD:
COMELEC has the jurisdiction to issue the None. The court decided to abandon
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and the rule laid down in the aforecited cases. In
mandamus, then it correctly set aside the Relampagos vs. Cumba and the COMELEC, the
challenged order granting the motion for Court upheld the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to
execution pending appeal and writ of execution issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and
issued by the trial court. mandamus over election cases where it has
appellate jurisdiction by virtue of Section 50 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 697, which provides as
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL follows:
COMMISSIONS Sec. 50. Definition.
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS The commission is hereby vested with
EDDING V. COMELEC the exclusive authority to hear and decide
(G.R. NO. 112060 JULY 17, 1995) petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
involving election cases.
FRANCISCO, J. But notwithstanding the decision in
FACTS: Relampagos vs. Cumba, the COMELEC
During the May 1992 elections, committed grave abuse of discretion in the
petitioner Norbi H. Edding and respondent Pablo instant case when it enjoined the order of the
S. Bernardo were among the candidates for the RTC, dated July 13, 1993, granting petitioner's
office of the municipal mayor of Sibuco motion for immediate execution. Private
Zamboanga del Norte. When respondent was respondent's petition for certiorari with application
declared the winner, petitioner filed an election for a writ of preliminary injunction before the
protest with the trial court, which proclaimed the COMELEC is anchored on the former's claim that
latter as the winner and declared null and void the trial court acted without or in excess of
the election of respondent. jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in
Respondent appealed while petitioner granting execution despite the filling of a notice of
moved for the immediate execution of the appeal by private respondent within the
reglementary period. It appears however that on evidence (ballots) which is beyond the
July 8, 1993, the same day when private power of review of this Court. The
respondent filed his notice of appeal with the COMELEC found that the writing of the
RTC, petitioner in turn filed his motion for letter "C" after the word "Galido" in the
immediate execution. Both actions were therefore fifteen (15) ballots of Precinct 14 is a
seasonably filed within the five-day reglementary clear and convincing proof of a pattern
period for filling an appeal since the decision of or design to identify the ballots and/or
the RTC was promulgated in open court on July voters. This finding should by conclusive
8, 1993. on the Court.
The settled rule is that the mere filing of Petitioner, on the other hand, cites
a notice of appeal does not divest the trial court Article IX (A), Section 7 of the Constitution, to
of its jurisdiction over a case and resolve pending support his petition. It states: "Unless otherwise
incidents. Where the motion for execution provided by this Constitution or by law, any
pending appeal was filed within the reglementary decision, order, or ruling of each (Constitutional)
period for perfecting an appeal, as in the case at Commission may be brought to the Supreme
bench, the filing of a notice of appeal by the Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
opposing party is of no moment and does not thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
divest the trial court of its jurisdiction to resolve
the motion for immediate execution of the ISSUE: May the decision by the COMELEC in
judgment pending appeal because the court must election contest involving municipal officials be
hear and resolve it for it would become part of the brought to the Supreme Court by a petition for
records to be elevated on appeal. Since the court certiorari by the petitioner?
has jurisdiction to act on the motion at the time it
was filed, that jurisdiction continued until the HELD:
matter was resolved and was not lost by the YES. The fact that decision, final orders
subsequent action of the opposing party. or ruling of the Commission on Elections in
Considering however that the term of contests involving elective municipal and
office for the disputed mayoralty seat will already barangay offices are final, executory and not
expire on June 30, 1995, in addition to the fact appealable, does not preclude a recourse to this
that the election for the next term of office for the Court by way of a special civil action of certiorari.
contested post has recently been concluded, the The proceedings in the Constitutional
instant petition has therefore become moot. Commission on this matter are enlightening.
Thus-
"MR. REGALADO: It is understood,
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL however, that while these decisions
COMMISSIONS with respect to barangay and
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS municipal officials are final and
GAUDO VS COMELEC immediately executory and therefore
193 SCRA 78 [1991] not appealable, that does not rule out
the possibility of an original special
FACTS: civil action for certiorari, prohibition, or
Petitioner and private respondent were mandamus, as the case may be,
candidates for the position of mayor in the Garcia under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court"
Herna.ndez, Bohol. Petitioner was proclaimed
duly-elected Mayor. We do not, however, believe that the
In an election protest by private respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse
respondent before the RTC, the court upheld the of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
proclamation of petitioner as the duly-elected jurisdiction in rendering the questioned decision.
Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez, by a majority of It is settled that the function f a writ of certiorari is
eleven (11) votes. toe keep an inferior court or tribunal within the
Private respondent appealed the RTC bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from
decision to the COMELEC. Through its First committing a grave abuse of discretion
Division, affirmed by COMELEC en bane, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
reversed the trial court's decision and declared COMELEC has the inherent power to
private respondent the duly-ejected mayor by a decide an election contest on physical evidence,
plurality of five (5) votes. The COMELEC held equity, law and justice, and apply established
that the fifteen (15) ballots in the same precinct jurisprudence in support of its findings and
containing the initial "C" after the name "Galido" conclusion; and that the extent to which such
(petitioner herein) were marked ballots and, precedents apply rests on its discretion, the
therefore invalid. exercise of which should not be controlled unless
Petitioner filed before the Supreme court such discretion has been abused to the prejudice
a petition for certiorari and injunction. Private of either party. Petition is therefore dismissed.
respondent moves for the dismissal of the
petition contending the following: [Note: A short lesson in Remedial Law. You must
1. Final decisions, orders or ruling of the distinguish the nature of the special civil action of
COMELEC in election contests involving certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
elective municipal offices are final and which is not a mode of appeal, but rather an
executory and not appealable citing original action.]
Artkle IX (C), Section 2 (2), paragraph 2
of the 1987 Constitution, which is
implemented in the Rules of Procedure ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL
promulgated by the COMELEC , COMMISSIONS
particularly Part VII, Rule 39, Section 2 C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
thereof, which reads: PEOPLE VS JUDGE INTING
"Section 2 Non-reviewable decisions- 187 SCRA 788 [1990]
Decisions in appeals from courts of general or
limited jurisdiction in election cases relating to the FACTS:
ejections, returns, and qualifications of municipal Mrs. Editha Barba filed letter-complaint
and barangay officials are not appealable." against OIC Mayor Dominador Regalado of
2. The petition involves pure questions of Tanjay, Negros Oriental with the COMELEC, for
fat as they relate to appreciation of allegedly transferring her, a permanent Nursing
Attendant, Grade I, in the office of the Municipal PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BASILLA
Mayor to a very remote barangay and without (G.R. NOS. 83938-40, NOVEMBER 6, 1989)
obtaining prior pennission or clearance from
COMELEC as required by law. FELICIANO, J.:
Acting on the complaint, COMELEC FACTS:
directed Atty. Gerardo Lituanas, Provincial As an aftermath of the May 1987
Election Supervision of Dumaguete City to congressional elections in Masbate, complaints
conduct the preliminary investigation of the case for violations of Section 261, par.a-1 (vote
to file the necessary information in court and buying) and par. p (carrying of deadly weapon) of
prosecute, if warranted. the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881) were
After a preliminary investigation, Atty. filed with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Lituanas filed a criminal case with the respondent Masbate against the private respondents. After
trial court which in turn issued a warrant of arrest preliminary investigation of the foregoing
against the Ole-Mayor. complaints, the Provincial Fiscal of Masbate filed
Subsequently, however, the trial court in the Regional Trial Court of Masbate the said
set aside its order of arrest on the ground that criminal complaints. In three (3) separate orders,
Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to determine accused respondent Judge Henry Basilla motu
probable cause pursuant to Sec 2, Art. III of the proprio dismissed the three (3) informations
1987 Constitution and further required Atty. giving the following justification: .. The record
Lituanas to secure the written approval of the shows that the complainant filed the complaint
provincial Fiscal after which the prosecution of with the fiscal and not with the COMELEC. The
the case shall be under the supervision and COMELEC did not investigate the case.
control of the latter. Atty. Lituanas failed to The Petition argues principally that the
comply so the case was dismissed. Commission on Elections ("Comelec") has
authority to deputize the chief state prosecutors,
ISSUE: Does a preliminary investigation provincial and city fiscals and their assistants,
conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor under Sections 2 (4) and (8), Article IX-C of the
involving election offenses have to be coursed 1987 Constitution, and that the Comelec did
through the Provincial Fiscal, before the Regional deputize such prosecution officers to conduct
Trial Court may take cognizance of the preliminary investigation of complaints for alleged
investigation and determine whether or not violation of election laws and to institute criminal
probable cause exists? information therefore. The respondent judge
therefore committed grave abuse of discretion
HELD: amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the
NO. The Provincial Fiscal, as such, case.
assumes no role in the prosecution of election
offenses. If ever the Fiscal or Prosecutor files ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge
information charging an election offense or erred in deciding that COMELEC in the case at
prosecutes a violation or election law, it is bar failed to perform its function as provided in
because he has been deputized by the the 1987 Constitution.
COMELEC. He does not do so under the sole
authority of his office (People vs. Basilla, et al HELD:
G.R. Nos. 83938-40, November 6, ] 989). In the Yes. There is no dispute that the
instant case, there is no averment or allegation Comelec is vested with power and authority to
that the respondent Judge is bringing in the conduct preliminary investigation of all election
Provincial Fiscal as a deputy of COMELEC. He offenses punishable under the Omnibus Election
wants the Fiscal to "approve" the COMELEC's Code and to prosecute such offenses in court.
preliminary investigation, which is not proper. Sec. 2(6) of Art. IX (C) of 1987 Constitution
providesinvestigate and, when appropriate
Article IX C Section 2 of the Constitution prosecute cases of violation of election laws,
provides: including acts or omissions, constituting election
"Sec. 2 The Commission on Election frauds offenses, malpractices."
shall exercise the following powers and functions: It must be noted that while Section 265
1. Enforce and administer all laws and of the Omnibus Election Code vests "exclusive
regulations relative to the conduct of an power" to conduct preliminary investigation of
election, plebiscite, initiative. referendum, election offenses and to prosecute the same
and recall. upon the Comelec, it at the same time authorizes
xxx xxx the Comelec to avail itself of the assistance of
xxx other prosecuting arms of the Government.
2. File upon a verified complaint, or on its own Section 2 of Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution
initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or clearly envisage that the Comelec would not be
exclusion of votes, investigate and, where compelled to carry out all its functions directly
appropriate, prosecute cases of violation of and by itself alone:
election laws, including acts or omission Section 2. The Commission on Elections
constituting election frauds. offenses, and shall exercise the following powers and functions:
malpractices" (Emphasis supplied) (1) Enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
In effect, the 1987 Constitution plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
mandates the COMELEC not only to investigate xxx xxx xxx
but also to prosecute cases of violation of (4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the
election laws. This means that the COMELEC is President, law enforcementi agencies and
empowered to conduct preliminary investigations instrumantalities of the Government, including the
in cases involving election offenses for the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive
purpose of helping the Judge determine probable purpose of ensuring free orderly, honest,
cause and for filing information in court. This peaceful, and credible elections.
power is exclusive with COMELEC. xxx xxx xxx
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own
initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL exclusion of voters; investigate and, where
COMMISSIONS appropriate, prosecute cases of violation of
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and Director of Region VII or its Law Department to
malpractices. conduct a reinvestigation
xxx xxx xxx
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of HELD:
any officer or employee it has deputized, or the YES. The refusal of the COMELEC or
imposition of any other disciplinary action, for its agents to comply with the order of the trial
violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its court requiring them to conduct a reinvestigation
directive, order, or decision. in this case and to submit to the court the record
xxx xxx xxx of the preliminary investigation on the ground that
The contention of private respondents only this Court may review its actions is certainly
that the deputation by the Comelec of the untenable.
prosecuting arms of the Government would be It is clear that aside from the
warranted only before the elections and only to adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power of the
ensure tree, honest, orderly, peaceful and COMELEC to decide election contests and
credible elections, that is, to perform the peace- administrative questions, it is also vested the
keeping functions of policemen, lack substance. power of a public prosecutor with the exclusive
There is nothing in Section 2 (4) of Article IX-C of authority to conduct the preliminary investigation
the Constitution which requires such a pinched and the prosecution of election offenses
niggardly interpretation of the authority of the punishable under the Code before the competent
Comelec to appoint as its deputies, officials or court. Thus, when the COMELEC, through its
employees of other agencies and duly authorized law officer, conducts the
instrumentalities of the government. The prompt preliminary investigation of an election offense
investigation and prosecution and disposition of and upon a prima facie finding of a probable
election offenses constitute an indispensable part cause, files the information in the proper court,
of the task of securing free, orderly, honest, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the
peaceful and credible elections. The investigation case. Consequently, all the subsequent
and prosecution of election offenses are, in an disposition of said case must be subject to the
important sense, more important than the approval of the court. The COMELEC cannot
maintenance of physical order in election conduct a reinvestigation of the case without the
precinct. ' authority of the court or unless so ordered by the
All this the respondent Judge disregarded when court.
he motu proprio dismissed the criminal The records of the preliminary
informations filed in this case. The cases he cited investigation required to be produced by the court
in his identical orders can offer him no comfort at must be submitted by the COMELEC. The trial
all; for these cases do not relate to the authority court may rely on the resolution of the COMELEC
of the Comelec to deputize the regular to file the information, by the same token that it
prosecution arms of the Government for the may rely on the certification made by the
investigation and prosecution of election offenses prosecutor who conducted the preliminary
and those cases are not in conflict with our ruling investigation, in the issuance of the warrant of
here. arrest. Nevertheless the court may require that
the record of the preliminary investigation be
submitted to it to satisfy itself that there is
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL probable cause which will warrant the issuance of
COMMISSIONS a warrant of arrest.
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS . The petition is brought in the name of
PEOPLE VS. DELGADO the People of the Philippines. Only the Solicitor
(GR. NO. 93419-32, SEPTEMBER 18, 1990) General can represent the People of the
Philippines in this proceeding. In the least, the
GANCAYCO, J.: consent of the Office of the Solicitor General
FACTS: should have been secured by the COMELEC
Comelec filed an information against before the filing of this petition. On this account
each of the private respondents for violation of alone, the petition should be dismissed.
Section 261 (y) (2) and (5) of the Omnibus
Election Code. In three separate manifestations,
the Regional Election Director of Region VII was ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL
designated by the COMELEC to handle the COMMISSIONS
prosecution with the authority to assign another C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
COMELEC prosecutor. Private respondents, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS VS. SILVA, JR
through counsels, then filed motions for (GR. NO. 129417 FEBRUARY 10, 1998)
reconsiderations and the suspension of the
warrant of arrest with the respondent court on the MENDOZA, J.:
ground that no preliminary investigation was FACTS:
conducted. An order was then issued by The COMELEC charged private
respondent court directing the COMELEC respondents Erasto Tanciongco and Norma
through the Regional Election Director of Region Castillo with violations of 27 of R.A. No. 6646,
VII to conduct a reinvestigation of said cases and together with Zenon Uy, in twelve separate
to submit his report within ten (10) days after informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of
termination thereof. Bataan. Tanciongco and Castillo then filed a joint
In its petition, the COMELEC contends "Omnibus Motion for Examination of Evidence to
that as an independent constitutional body, its Determine the Existence of Probable Cause;
actions on election matters may be reviewed only Suspension of Issuance of Warrant of Arrest; and
on certiorari by the Supreme Court. On the other Dismissal of the Cases." Chief State Prosecutor
hand, the respondents contend that since the Jovencito Zuo, who had been designated by the
cases were filed in court by the COMELEC as a Commission on Elections to prosecute the cases,
public prosecutor, and not in the exercise of its filed a comment joining in private respondents'
power to decide election contests, the trial court request. In view thereof, respondent judges Silva
has authority to order a reinvestigation. and Vianzon summarily dismissed the cases
against private respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Court has The COMELEC sought to appeal the
the power or authority to order the Commission dismissal of the cases to the Court of Appeals,
on Elections through its Regional Election but the respondent judges denied due course to
its appeal. The sole basis for the denial was the
fact that the prosecutor, whom the COMELEC ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL
had deputized to prosecute the cases, had earlier COMMISSIONS
taken a contrary stand against the COMELEC. C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Said prosecutor stated that he cannot give his ARUELO VS. CA
conformity to the Notice of Appeal filed by the GR NO. 107852. OCTOBER 20, 1993
Comelec as it would not be consistent with his
position that he would abide by whatever finding FACTS:
the court may come up with on the existence of Aruelo and Gatchalian were Vice-
probable cause as against the accused Erasto Mayoralty candidates in Balagtas, Bulacan in the
Tanciongco and Norma Castillo. May 1992 elections. Gatchalian was proclaimed
as the duly elected vice-mayor. Aruelo filed with
ISSUES: the COMELEC a petition seeking to annul
(1) Is the order denying due course to the Notice Gatchalian's proclamation on the ground of
of Appeal of the COMELEC correct? "fraudulent alteration and tampering" of votes.
(2) Who has authority to decide whether or not to Aruelo also filed with the RTC a petition
appeal from the orders of dismissal the protesting the same election.
COMELEC or its designated prosecutor? Gatchalian moved to dismiss, claiming
that: (a) the petition was filed out of time; (b)
HELD: there was a pending protest case before the
NO. Ther order of the respondent COMELEC; and (b) Aruelo failed to pay the
judges denying due course to the Notice of prescribed filing fees and cash deposit on the
Appeal of the COMELEC is not correct. . The petition.
authority to decide whether or not to appeal the The COMELEC denied Aruelo's petition.
dismissal belongs to the COMELEC. Art. IX-C, However, the trial court denied Gatchalian's
2(6) of the Constitution expressly vests in it the Motion to Dismiss and ordered him to file his
power and function to "investigate and, where answer to the petition.
appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of Aruelo prayed before the CA for the
election laws, including acts or omissions issuance of a temporary restraining order or a
constituting election frauds, offenses, and writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the trial
malpractices." As this Court has held: court from implementing the Order of August 11
In effect the 1987 Constitution mandates 1992, regarding the revision of ballots. The CA
the COMELEC not only to investigate but also to belatedly issued a temporary restraining order.
prosecute cases of violation of election laws. This Meanwhile, Gatchalian filed with the CA another
means that the COMELEC is empowered to petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 28977),
conduct preliminary investigations in cases again alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
involving election offenses for the purpose of part of the trial court in issuing the Order, which
helping the Judge determine probable cause and denied his Motion for Bill of Particulars. The CA
for filing an information in court. This power is dismissed this petition for lack of merit.
exclusive with COMELEC. The CA rendered judgment, denying
Indeed, even before the present Gatchalian's petition, but declaring, at the same
Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. time, that Gatchalian's Answer With Counter-
Blg. 881) and, before it, the 1971 Election Code Protest and Counterclaim was timely filed. The
(R.A. No. 6388) and the 1978 Election Code appellate court also lifted the temporary
(P.D. No. 1296) already gave the COMELEC the restraining order and ordered the trial court to
exclusive power to conduct preliminary "proceed with dispatch in the proceedings below.
investigation of all election offenses and to Hence this petition.
prosecute them in court. The purpose is to place
in the hands of an independent prosecutor the ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of motions to
investigation and prosecution of election dismiss and motions for bill of particulars is
offenses. prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the
Prosecutors designated by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; hence, the filing
COMELEC to prosecute the cases act as its of said pleadings did not suspend the running of
deputies. They derive their authority from it and the five-day period, or give Gatchalian a new five-
not from their offices. Consequently, it was day period to file his answer.
beyond the power of Chief State Prosecutor Zuo
to oppose the appeal of the COMELEC. For that HELD:
matter, it was beyond his power, as COMELEC- NO. Petitioner filed the election protest
designated prosecutor, to leave to the trial courts (Civil Case No. 343-M-92) with the RTC, whose
the determination of whether there was probable proceedings are governed by the Revised Rules
cause for the filing of the cases and, if it found of Court. Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the
none, whether the cases should be dismissed. COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable
Those cases were filed by the COMELEC after to proceedings before the regular courts. As
appropriate preliminary investigation. If the Chief expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I
State Prosecutor thought there was no probable of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the filing of
cause for proceeding against private motions to dismiss and bill of Particulars, shall
respondents, he should have discussed the apply only to proceedings brought before the
matter with the COMELEC and awaited its COMELEC. Section 2, Rule 1, Part I provides:
instruction. If he disagreed with the COMELEC's "SEC. 2. Applicability. These rules,
findings, he should have sought permission to except Part VI, shall apply to all actions and
withdraw from the cases. But he could not leave proceedings brought before the Commission.
the determination of probable cause to the courts Part VI shall apply to election contests and quo
and agree in advance to the dismissal of the warranto cases cognizable by courts of general
cases should the courts find no probable cause or limited jurisdiction It must be noted that
for proceeding with the trial of the accused. It nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of
was, therefore, grave abuse of discretion on the Procedure is it provided that motions to dismiss
part of the respondent judges to rely on the and bill of particulars are not allowed in election
manifestation of Chief State Prosecutor Zuo as protest or quo warranto cases pending before the
basis for denying due course to the notices of regular courts.
appeal filed by the COMELEC. Constitutionally speaking, the
COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the
filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts. In dismissing the appeal, the COMELEC
The power to promulgate rules concerning relied on Section 21, Rule 35 of the COMELEC
pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is Rules of Procedure which reads:
vested on the Supreme Court (Constitution, Art "SEC. 21. Appeal -
VIII, Sec. 6 [5]). From any decision rendered by
Private respondent received a copy of the court, the aggrieved party
the order of the RTC denying his motion for a bill may appeal to the Commission
of particulars on August 6, 1992. Under Section on Elections within five (5)
l(b), Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, a days after the promulgation of
party has at least five days to file his answer after the decision."
receipt of the order denying his motion for a bill of On the other hand, petitioner contends
particulars. Private respondent, therefore, had that the period of appeal from decisions of the
until August 11, 1992 within which to file his Municipal Trial Courts or Metropolitan Trial
answer. The Answer with Counter-Protest and Courts involving barangay officials is governed by
Counterclaim filed by him on August 11, 1992 Section 9 of Republic Act 6679 and Section 252
was filed timely. of the Omnibus Election Code. Section 9 of
The instant case is different from a pre- Republic Act 6679 reads:
proclamation controversy which the law expressly "SEC. 9. A sworn petition contesting the
mandates to be resolved in a summary election of a barangay official may be filed with
proceeding (B.P. Blg. 881, Art. XX, Sec. 246; the proper municipal or metropolitan trial court by
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Part V, Rule 27, any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of
Sec. 2). Pre-proclamation controversies should candidacy and has been voted for a barangay
be summarily decided, consistent with the office within ten (10) days after the proclamation
legislators' desire that the canvass of the votes of the results of the election. The trial court shall
and the proclamation of the winning candidate be decide the election protest within thirty (30) days
done with dispatch and without unnecessary after the filing thereof. The decision of the
delay. An election protest does not merely municipal or metropolitan trial court may be
concern the personal interests of rival candidates appealed within ten (10) days from receipt of a
for an office. Over and, above the desire of the copy thereof by the aggrieved party to the
candidate to win, is the deep public interest to regional trial court which shall decide the issue
determine the true choice of he people. For this within thirty (30) days from receipt of the appeal
reason, it is a well-established principle that laws and whose decision on questions of fact shall be
governing election protests must be liberally final and non-appealable. For purposes of the
construed to the end that the popular will barangay elections, no pre-proclamation cases
expressed in the election or public officers, will shall be allowed."
not, by purely technical reasons, be defeated Similarly, Section 252 of the Omnibus
We find no grave abuse of discretion on Election Code provides:
the part of the Court of Appeals. "SEC. 252. Election contest for
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby barangay offices. - A sworn petition contesting
DISMISSED. the election of a barangay officer shall be filed
with the proper municipal or metropolitan trial
court by any candidate who has duly filed a
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL certificate of candidacy and has been voted for
COMMISSIONS the same office within ten days after the
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS proclamation of the results of the election. The
ANTONIO VS. COMELEC trial court shall decide the election protest within
GR NO. 135869, SEPTEMBER 22, 1999 fifteen days after the filing thereof. The decision
of the municipal or metropolitan trial court may be
FACTS: appealed within ten days from receipt of a copy
The parties in this case were rival thereof by the aggrieved party to the regional trial
candidates for the Punong Barangay of Barangay court which shall decide the case within thirty
Ilaya, Las Pias City, Metro Manila. Protestee days from its submission, and whose decisions
Rustico Antonio was proclaimed as the winner. shall be final."
Protestant Vicente Miranda, Jr. then filed an No less than the 1987 Constitution
election protest before the Las Pias MeTC, (Article IX-A, Section 6 and Article IX-C, Section
which declared Miranda as the duly elected 3) grants and authorizes this Commission to
Barangay Chairman. promulgate its own rules of procedure as long as
Antonio appealed from this judgment. such rules concerning pleadings and practice do
Meanwhile, Miranda moved to execute the court's not diminish, increase or modify substantive
decision but such was denied and records were rights. Hence, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
forwarded to the COMELEC Second Division. promulgated in 1993 as amended in 1994 is no
The COMELEC dismissed the appeal ordinary interpretative or administrative ruling. It
for lack of jurisdiction. It was stated therein that is promulgated by this Commission pursuant to a
petitioner failed to perfect his appeal within the constitutionally mandated authority which no
prescribed period. The Period aforestated is legislative enactment can amend, revise or
jurisdictional and failure of the protestee to repeal.
perfect his appeal within the said period deprives The COMELEC Rules of Procedure
the Commission of its appellate jurisdiction. (Rule 37 Section 21) provides that from the
Hence, this motion for reconsideration. decision rendered by the court, the aggrieved
party may appeal to the Commission on Elections
ISSUE: Is the period to appeal a decision of a within five (5) days after the promulgation of the
municipal trial court to the COMELEC in an decision. Rule 22 Section 9 (d) of Our Rules of
election protest involving a barangay position five Procedure further provides that an appeal from
(5) days per COMELEC Rules of decisions of courts in election protest cases may
Procedure or ten (10) days as provided be dismissed at the instance of the Commission
for in Republic Act 66791 and the Omnibus for failure to file the required notice of appeal
Election Code? within the prescribed period.
In case at bar, Antonio filed his notice of
HELD: appeal before the trial court on the ninth (9) day
from receipt of the decision appealed from or four
(4) days after the five-day prescribed period to
appeal lapsed. Therefore, the present appeal Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is
must be dismissed. For it is axiomatic that the not in conflict with any existing law. To adopt a
perfection of an appeal in the manner and within contrary view would defeat the laudable objective
the period laid down by the COMELEC Rules of of providing a uniform period of appeal and defy
Procedure is not only mandatory but also the COMELEC's constitutional mandate to enact
jurisdictional. As a consequence, the failure to rules of procedure to expedite disposition of
perfect an appeal within the prescribed period as election cases.
required by the Rules has the effect of defeating The COMELEC, therefore, did not
the right of appeal of a party and precluding the commit an abuse of discretion in dismissing the
appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over appeal.
the case.
Petitioner's argument raises the
presumption that the period to appeal can be ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL
severed from the remedy or the appeal itself COMMISSIONS
which is provided in Section 9, Republic Act 6679 C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and survive on its own. The presumption cannot SARMIENTO VS. COMELEC
be sustained because the period to appeal is an 212 SCRA [1992]
essential characteristic and wholly dependent on
the remedy. Petitioner also cites the case of FACTS:
Flores v. COMELEC. However, when this Court Petitioner impugn the resolution of the
stated in the aforementioned case that "Section 9 Comelec as having been issued with grave
of Rep. Act No. 6679 is declared unconstitutional abuse of discretion in the, inter alias, the
insofar as it provides that barangay election Commission sitting en bane, took cognizance
contests decided by the municipal or metropolitan and decided the appeals without first referring
trial court shall be appealable to the regional trial them to any of its division.
court", it meant to preserve the first two
sentences on the original jurisdiction of municipal ISSUE:
and metropolitan trial courts to try barangay Whether or not the Comelec en banc has the
election protests cases but not, as advanced by jurisdiction over the said resolution.
the petitioner, the ten-day period to appeal to the
Regional Trial Court. This is the logical and HELD:
sound interpretation of subject portion of the Sec. 3 Art IX-C of the 1987 Constitution
Flores case. expressly provides: 'The Comelec may sit en
We cannot indulge in the assumption banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its
that Congress still intended, by the said laws, to rule of procedure in order to expedite disposition
maintain the ten (10) day period to appeal of election cases, including pre proclamation
despite the declaration of unconstitutionality of controversies. All such election cases shall be
the appellate jurisdiction of the regional trial heard and decided in division, provided that the
court, Republic Act No. 7166 amending the motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
Omnibus Election Code, evinces the intent of our decided by the Commission en bane.'
lawmakers to expedite the remedial aspect of It is clear that election cases include pre
election controversies. The law was approved on proclamation controversies and all. such cases
November 26, 1991, after the Flores case which must first be heard and decided by a Division of
was promulgated on April 20,1990, and the Commission. The Commission sitting en
presumably, the legislature in enacting the same bane does not have the authority to hear and
was cognizant of the ruling in Flores. Said law decide the same at the first instance. In the
provides the same five (5) day period to appeal Comelec Rules of Procedures, pre proclamations
decisions of the trial court in election contests for are classified as special cases and in compliance
municipal officers to the COMELEC. Section 22 with the provision of the constitution, the two
thereof reads: divisions of the Commissions are vested with the
"Sec. 22. Election Contests for authority to hear and decide these special cases.
Municipal Officers. -All election contests involving Rule 127 thereof governs special cases,
municipal offices filed with the Regional Trial especially See 9 of the said Rule provides that
Court shall be decided expeditiously. The appeals from ruling of the assigned and not by
decision may be appealed to the Commission the Commission en bane.
within five (5) days from promulgation or receipt Indisputably then, the Comelec en banc
of a copy thereof by the aggrieved party. The acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
Commission shall decide the appeal within sixty discretion, when it resolved the appeals of
(60) days after it is submitted for decision, but not petitioners ion the special cases without first
later than six (6) months after the filing of the referring them to any of its divisions.
appeal, which decision shall be final, Accordingly, the instant petitions are
unappealable and executory." dismissed without prejudice to the filing by
There would be no logic nor reason in petitioners of regular election protests.
ruling that a longer period to appeal to the
COMELEC should apply to election contests for
barangay officials. ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL
And since the whole remedy was COMMISSIONS
invalidated, a void was created. Thus, the C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
COMELEC had to come in and provide for a new REYES VS. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
appeal in accordance with the mandate of the ORIENTAL MINDORO
Constitution. As correctly pointed out by the (G.R. NO. 108886, MAY 5, 1995)
COMELEC, Section 6, Article IX-A14 of the 1987
Constitution grants and authorizes the MENDOZA, J.:
COMELEC to promulgate its own rules of FACTS:
procedure. The 1993 COMELEC Rules of Petitioner Aquiles Reyes and private
Procedure have provided a uniform five (5) day respondent Adolfo Comia were candidates for the
period for taking an appeal consistent with the position of member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
expeditious resolution of election-related cases. It Naujan, Oriental Mindoro in the May 11, 1992
would be absurd and therefore not clearly synchronized elections. On May 13, 1992, during
intended, to maintain the 10-day period for the proceedings of the Municipal Board of
barangay election contests. Hence, Section 3, Canvassers, private respondent moved for the
exclusion of certain election returns, on the Since a basic condition for bringing such action is
ground of serious irregularity in counting in favor that the petitioner first file a motion for
of petitioner Aquiles Reyes votes cast for "Reyes" reconsideration, it follows that petitioner's failure
only, considering that there was another to file a motion for reconsideration of the decision
candidate (Epitacio Reyes) bearing the same of the First Division of the COMELEC is fatal to
surname. However, without resolving his petition, his present action.
the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Petitioner argues that this requirement
on the same day petitioner as the eighth winning may be dispensed with because the only
candidate with 7,205 votes. On May 25, 1992 question raised in his petition is a question of law.
petitioner took his oath of office. Private This is not correct. The questions raised by
respondent later filed an election protest before petitioner involve the interpretation of
the trial court. He alleged that "a vital mistake constitutional and statutory provisions in light of
[had been] committed by the Board of the facts of this case. The questions tendered
Canvassers in the mathematical computation of are, therefore, not pure questions of law.
the total number of votes garnered by petitioner Moreover, that a motion for
[now private respondent]. Petitioner filed a motion reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc is
to dismiss private respondent's petition on the required for the filing of a petition for certiorari is
ground that it was filed beyond the reglementary clear from Article 9C pars. 2 & 3 of the
period of ten days from proclamation, which Constitution:
petition was denied by the trial court. Conformably to these provisions of the
On June 23, 1992, the trial court Constitution all election cases, including pre-
rendered its decision annuling the proclamation proclamation controversies, must be decided by
of petitioner and declaring private respondent as the COMELEC in division. Should a party be
the eighth winning candidate for the position of dissatisfied with the decision, he may file a
councilor of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC
Oriental Mindoro. A copy of the decision was en banc. It is, therefore, the decision, order or
served on petitioner on June 26, 1992. ruling of the COMELEC en banc that, in
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the accordance with Art. IX, A, 7, "may be brought
COMELEC. In addition, he filed a petition for to the Supreme Court on certiorari."
mandamus and prohibition in the Court of
Appeals, to compel the Sangguniang Bayan to
recognize him as the duly proclaimed member of ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL
that body and prohibit it from further recognizing COMMISSIONS
private respondent. The Court of Appeals C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
dismissed the petition because of petitioner's NATIONAL PRESS CLUB VS. COMMISSION
pending appeal in the COMELEC. The appellate ON ELECTIONS
court cited Supreme Court Circular 28-91 which (G.R. NO. 102925 MARCH 5, 1992)
prohibits the filing of multiple petitions involving
the same issues. Petitioner filed a motion for FELICIANO, J.:
reconsideration but his motion was denied. The FACTS:
appellate court's decision became final and This is a consolidation of three cases
executory on December 10, 1992. filed before the Supreme Court which involves
Meanwhile, the Sangguniang Bayan met the same issue. Petitioners in these cases
in inaugural session on July 3, 1992, during consist of representatives of the mass media
which private respondent was recognized as the which are prevented from selling or donating
eighth member of the body and thereafter space and time for political advertisements; two
allowed to assume office and discharge its (2) individuals who are candidates for office (one
functions. for national and the other for provincial office) in
On the other hand, the COMELEC's the May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and
First Division dismissed on January 22, 1993 voters who claim that their right to be informed of
petitioner's appeal on the ground that he had election issues and of credentials of the
failed to pay the appeal fee within the prescribed candidates is being curtailed. It is principally
period. argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of
Petitioner then brought the present Republic Act No. 6646 invades and violates the
action. Petitioner contends that both the trial constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of
court and the COMELEC's First Division expression. Petitioners maintain that the
committed a grave abuse of discretion, the first, prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to
by assuming jurisdiction over the election contest censorship, because it selects and singles out for
filed by private respondent despite the fact that suppression and repression with criminal
the case was filed more than ten days after sanctions, only publications of a particular
petitioner's proclamation, and the second i.e., the content, namely, media-based election or political
COMELEC's First Division, by dismissing propaganda during the election period of 1992. It
petitioner's appeal from the decision of the trial is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of
court for late payment of the appeal fee. media's role, function and duty to provide
adequate channels of public information and
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner violated public opinion relevant to election issues. Further,
Article IX A of the Constitution. petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges
the freedom of speech of candidates, and that
HELD: the suppression of media-based campaign or
Yes, petitioner violated Article IX A of political propaganda except those appearing in
the Constitution which provides that only the Comelec space of the newspapers and on
decisions of the COMELEC en banc may be Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts,
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. In the would bring about a substantial reduction in the
present case, he filed the present petition without quantity or volume of information concerning
first filing a motion for reconsideration before the candidates and issues in the election thereby
COMELEC en banc. curtailing and limiting the right of voters to
It is now settled that in providing that the information and opinion.
decisions, orders and rulings of COMELEC "may
be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari" ISSUE: Whether or not Section 11(b) of Republic
the Constitution in its Art. IX, A, 7 means the Act No. 6646 runs contradictory to Articles III [4]
special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, 1. and IX (C) (4) of the Constitution.
"Comelec space," much the same considerations

HELD: should be borne in mind. As earlier noted, the
The objective which animates Section Comelec is commanded by statute to buy or
11 (b) is the equalizing, as far as practicable, the "procure" "Comelec time" and "Comelec space"
situations of rich and poor candidates by in mass media, and it must be presumed that
preventing the former from enjoying the undue Comelec will carry out that statutory duty in this
advantage offered by huge campaign "war connection, and if it does fail to do so, once
chests." Section 11 (b) prohibits the sale or again, the candidate or candidates who feel
donation of print space and air time "for aggrieved have judicial remedies at their
campaign or other political purposes" except to disposal.
the Commission on Elections ("Comelec"). Upon The technical effect of Article IX (C) (4)
the other hand, Sections 90 and 92 of the of the Constitution may be seen to be that no
Omnibus Election Code require the Comelec to presumption of invalidity arises in respect of
procure "Comelec space" in newspapers of exercises of supervisory or regulatory authority
general circulation in every province or city and on the part of the Comelec for the purpose of
"Comelec time" on radio and television stations. securing equal opportunity among candidates for
Further, the Comelec is statutorily commanded to political office, although such supervision or
allocate "Comelec space" and "Comelec time" on regulation may result in some limitation of the
a free of charge, equal and impartial basis among rights of free speech and free press. For
all candidates within the area served by the supervision or regulation of the operations of
newspaper or radio and television station media enterprises is scarcely conceivable without
involved. such accompanying limitation. Thus, the
It seems a modest proposition that the applicable rule is the general, time-honored one
provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines that a statute is presumed to be constitutional
freedom of speech, freedom of expression and and that the party asserting its unconstitutionality
freedom of the press (Article III [4], Constitution) must discharge the burden of clearly and
has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX (C) convincingly proving that assertion. Petition
(4) which may be seen to be a special provision denied for lack of merit.
applicable during a specific limited period i.e.,
"during the election period."
It is important to note that the restrictive
impact upon freedom of speech and freedom of
the press of Section 11 (b) is circumscribed by
certain important limitations: [1] Section 11 (b) is ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL
limited in the duration of its applicability and COMMISSIONS
enforceability. By virtue of the operation of Article C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST
limited in its applicability in time to election ATTORNEYS
periods. By its Resolution No. 2328 dated 2 OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.. VS. COMELEC
January 1992, the Comelec, acting under another (G.R. NO. 132922. APRIL 21, 1998)
specific grant of authority by the Constitution
(Article IX [C] [9]), has defined the period from 12 MENDOZA, J.:
January 1992 until 10 June 1992 as the relevant FACTS:
election period; [2] Section 11 (b) is limited in its Petitioner Telecommunications and
scope of application. Analysis of Section 11 (b) Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc.
shows that it purports to apply only to the (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio
purchase and sale, including purchase and sale and television broadcasting companies. They
4
disguised as a donation, of print space and air are suing as citizens, taxpayers, and registered
time for "campaign or other political purposes." voters. The other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc.,
Section 11 (b) does not purport in any way to operates radio and television broadcasting
restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or stations throughout the Philippines under a
television stations of news or news-worthy events franchise granted by Congress. The Supreme
relating to candidates, their qualifications, political Court explained that TELEBAP has no legal
parties and programs of government; [3] Section standing to file the case. A citizen will be allowed
11 (b) exempts from its prohibition the purchase to raise a constitutional question only when he
by or donation to the Comelec of print space or can show that he has personally suffered some
air time, which space and time Comelec is then actual or threatened injury as a result of the
affirmatively required to allocate on a fair and allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the
equal basis, free of charge, among the individual injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action;
candidates for elective public offices in the and the injury is likely to be redressed by a
province or city served by the newspaper or radio favorable action. Members of petitioner have not
or television station. Some of the petitioners are shown that they have suffered harm as a result of
apparently apprehensive that Comelec might not the operation of 92 of B.P. Blg. 881. The High
allocate "Comelec time" or "Comelec space" on a Court, however, recognized the legal standing of
fair and equal basis among the several Petitioner GMA to bring the constitutional
candidates. Should such apprehensions challenge. GMA claims that it suffered losses
materialize, candidates who are in fact prejudiced running to several million pesos in providing
by unequal or unfair allocations effected by COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992
Comelec will have appropriate judicial remedies presidential election and the 1995 senatorial
available, so long at least as this Court sits. Until election and that it stands to suffer even more
such time, however, the Comelec is entitled to should it be required to do so. Petitioners
the benefit of the presumption that official duty allegation that it will suffer losses again because
will be or is being regularly carried out. It seems it is required to provide free air time is sufficient
appropriate here to recall what Justice Laurel to give it standing to question the validity of 92
7
taught in Angara v. Electoral Commission that of BP 881 (Omnibus Election Code).
the possibility of abuse is no argument against As pointed out in Osmea v.
the concession of the power or authority involved, COMELEC, 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 and 90 and
for there is no power or authority in human 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 are part and parcel of a
society that is not susceptible of being abused. regulatory scheme designed to equalize the
Should it be objected that the Comelec might opportunity of candidates in an election in regard
refrain from procuring "Comelec time" and
to the use of mass media for political campaigns. present case was brought, such provisions had
These statutory provisions state in relevant parts: not been thought of as taking property without
B.P. Blg. 881, (Omnibus Election Code) just compensation. Art. XII, 11 of the
SEC. 90. Comelec space. - The Constitution authorizes the amendment of
Commission shall procure space in at franchises for the common good.
least one newspaper of general circulation In truth, radio and television
in every province or city: Provided, broadcasting companies, which are given
however, That in the absence of said franchises, do not own the airwaves and
newspaper, publication shall be done in frequencies through which they transmit
any other magazine or periodical in said broadcast signals and images. They are merely
province or city, which shall be known as given the temporary privilege of using them.
Comelec Space wherein candidates can Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the
announce their candidacy. Said space exercise of the privilege may reasonably be
shall be allocated, free of charge, equally burdened with the performance by the grantee of
and impartially by the Commission among some form of public service. Thus, in De Villata
all candidates within the area in which the v. Stanley, a regulation requiring interisland
newspaper is circulated. (Sec. 45, 1978 vessels licensed to engage in the interisland
EC). trade to carry mail and, for this purpose, to give
SEC. 92. Comelec time. - The advance notice to postal authorities of date and
Commission shall procure radio and hour of sailings of vessels and of changes of
television time to be known as Comelec sailing hours to enable them to tender mail for
Time which shall be allocated equally and transportation at the last practicable hour prior to
impartially among the candidates within the vessels departure, was held to be a
the area of coverage of all radio and reasonable condition for the state grant of
television stations. For this purpose, the license. Although the question of compensation
franchise of all radio broadcasting and for the carriage of mail was not in issue, the
television stations are hereby amended so Court strongly implied that such service could be
as to provide radio or television time, free without compensation, as in fact under Spanish
of charge, during the period of the sovereignty the mail was carried free.
campaign. (Sec. 46, 1978 EC) In the granting of the privilege to operate
Thus, the law prohibits mass media from broadcast stations and thereafter supervising
selling or donating print space and air time to the radio and television stations, the state spends
candidates and requires the COMELEC instead considerable public funds in licensing and
to procure print space and air time for allocation supervising such stations. It would be strange if it
to the candidates. It will be noted that while 90 cannot even require the licensees to render
of B.P. Blg. 881 requires the COMELEC to public service by giving free air time.
procure print space which, as we have held, Petitioners claim that 92 is an invalid
should be paid for, 92 states that air time shall amendment of R.A. No. 7252 which granted
be procured by the COMELEC free of charge. GMA Network, Inc. a franchise for the operation
Petitioners contend that 92 of BP Blg. of radio and television broadcasting stations.
881 violates the due process clause and the They argue that although 5 of R.A. No. 7252
eminent domain provision of the Constitution by gives the government the power to temporarily
taking air time from radio and television use and operate the stations of petitioner GMA
broadcasting stations without payment of just Network or to authorize such use and operation,
compensation. Petitioners claim that the primary the exercise of this right must be
source of revenue of the radio and television compensated. The basic flaw in petitioners
stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and argument is that it assumes that the provision for
that to require these stations to provide free air COMELEC Time constitutes the use and
time is to authorize a taking which is not a de operation of the stations of the GMA Network,
minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the Inc. This is not so. Under 92 of B.P. Blg. 881,
use of private property. According to petitioners, the COMELEC does not take over the operation
in 1992, the GMA Network, Inc. lost of radio and television stations but only the
P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time of one allocation of air time to the candidates for the
(1) hour every morning from Mondays to Fridays purpose of ensuring, among other things, equal
and one (1) hour on Tuesdays and Thursdays opportunity, time, and the right to reply as
from 7:00 to 8:00 p.m. (prime time) and, further, it mandated by the Constitution. Indeed, it is wrong
stands to lose in the 1998 Elections, to claim an amendment of petitioners franchise
P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELECs for the reason that B.P. Blg. 881, which is said to
requirement that radio and television stations have amended R.A. No. 7252, actually antedated
provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for it. The provision of 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 must be
the COMELEC Time. deemed instead to be incorporated in R.A. No.
7252. And, indeed, 4 of the latter statute does.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 92 of the For the fact is that the duty imposed on the GMA
Omnibus Election Code is valid. Network, Inc. by its franchise to render adequate
public service time implements 92 of B.P. Blg.
HELD: 881. Undoubtedly, its purpose is to enable the
Yes, Section 92 of BP 881 is valid. government to communicate with the people on
All broadcasting, whether by radio or by matters of public interest.
television stations, is licensed by the government. Petitioners complain that B.P. Blg. 881,
Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as 92 singles out radio and television stations to
there are more individuals who want to broadcast provide free air time. They contend that
than there are frequencies to assign. A franchise newspapers and magazines are not similarly
is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to required as, in fact, in Philippine Press Institute v.
amendment by Congress in accordance with the COMELEC we upheld their right to the payment
constitutional provision that any such franchise of just compensation for the print space they may
or right granted . . . shall be subject to provide under 90. In the allocation of limited
amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress resources, relevant conditions may validly be
when the common good so requires. Indeed, imposed on the grantees or licensees. The
provisions for COMELEC Time have been made reason for this is that, as already noted, the
by amendment of the franchises of radio and government spends public funds for the
television broadcast stations and, until the allocation and regulation of the broadcast
industry, which it does not do in the case of the other moving vehicles would be his last medium
print media. To require the radio and television to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial
broadcast industry to provide free air time for the candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections. Finally,
COMELEC Time is a fair exchange for what the the petitioner states that as of February 22, 1992
industry gets. From another point of view, this (the date of the petition) he has not received any
Court has also held that because of the unique notice from any of the Election Registrars in the
and pervasive influence of the broadcast media, entire country as to the location of the supposed
[n]ecessarily . . . the freedom of television and "Comelec Poster Areas."
radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope
than the freedom accorded to newspaper and ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission on
print media. Elections (COMELEC) may prohibit the posting of
To affirm the validity of 92 of B.P. Blg. decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or
881 is to hold public broadcasters to their private, and limit their location or publication to
obligation to see to it that the variety and vigor of the authorized posting areas that it fixes.
public debate on issues in an election is
maintained. For while broadcast media are not HELD:
mere common carriers but entities with free No. The COMELEC's prohibition on
speech rights, they are also public trustees posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places
charged with the duty of ensuring that the people whether public or private except in designated
have access to the diversity of views on political areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null
issues. This right of the people is paramount to and void on constitutional grounds.
the autonomy of broadcast media. To affirm the The constitutional objective to give a
validity of 92, therefore, is likewise to uphold the rich candidate and a poor candidate equal
peoples right to information on matters of public opportunity to inform the electorate as regards
concern. The use of property bears a social their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section
function and is subject to the states duty to 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article
intervene for the common good. Broadcast media IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not
can find their just and highest reward in the fact impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars
that whatever altruistic service they may render in and other private vehicles. Compared to the
connection with the holding of elections is for that paramount interest of the State in guaranteeing
common good. freedom of expression, any financial
considerations behind the regulation are of
marginal significance. It is to be reiterated that
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL the posting of decals and stickers on cars,
COMMISSIONS calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the
BLO UMPAR ADIONG VS. COMMISSION ON vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen
ELECTIONS becomes crucial in this kind of election
(G.R. NO. 103956 MARCH 31, 1992) propaganda not the financial resources of the
candidate. Whether the candidate is rich and,
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: therefore, can afford to doleout more decals and
FACTS: stickers or poor and without the means to spread
On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC out the same number of decals and stickers is
promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its not as important as the right of the owner to
powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus freely express his choice and exercise his right of
Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and free speech. The owner can even prepare his
7166 and other election laws. Section 15 of the own decals or stickers for posting on his personal
said Resolution provides for lawful election property. To strike down this right and enjoin it is
propaganda while Section 21(f) thereof provides impermissible encroachment of his liberties.
for what is unlawful. It states: In sum, the prohibition on posting of
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether
or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any public or private except in the authorized areas
place, whether public or private, mobile or designated by the COMELEC becomes
stationary, except in the COMELEC common censorship which cannot be justified by the
posted areas and/or billboards, at the campaign Constitution:
headquarters of the candidate or political party, . . . The concept of the Constitution as
organization or coalition, or at the candidate's the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for
own residential house or one of his residential the validity of any public act whether proceeding
houses, if he has more than one: Provided, that from the highest official or the lowest functionary,
such posters or election propaganda shall not is a postulate of our system of government. That
exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in size. is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority
(Emphasis supplied) accorded to that which occupies the topmost
The statutory provisions sought to be rung in the legal hierarchy. The three
enforced by COMELEC are Section 82 of the departments of government in the discharge of
Omnibus Election Code on lawful election the functions with which it is entrusted have no
propaganda and Section 11(a) of Republic Act choice but to yield obedience to its commands.
No. 6646 on prohibited forms of election Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.
propaganda. Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever
Petitioner Adiong, a senatorial candidate be on guard lest the restrictions on its authority,
in the 1992 elections assails the COMELEC's either substantive or formal, be transcended. The
Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot
decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars ignore or disregard what it ordains. In its task of
and other moving vehicles. According to him applying the law to the facts as found in deciding
such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the cases, the judiciary is called upon to maintain
Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law.
Republic Act No. 6646. In addition, the petitioner Even its power of judicial review to pass upon the
believes that with the ban on radio, television and validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in
print political advertisements, he, being a the course of adjudication is a logical. corollary of
neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer this basic principle that the Constitution is
grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition. paramount. It overrides any governmental
The posting of decals and stickers on cars and measure that fails to live up to its mandates.
Thereby there is a recognition of its being the However, neither Article IX-C of the
supreme law. (Mutuc v. Commission on Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A.
Elections, supra) 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec
Petition is granted. The portion of has also been granted the right to supervise and
Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the regulate the exercise by media practitioners
Commission on Elections providing that "decals themselves of their right to expression during
and stickers may be posted only in any of the plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising
authorized posting areas provided in paragraph their freedom of expression during plebiscite
(f) of Section 21 hereof" is DECLARED NULL periods are neither the franchise holders nor the
and VOID. candidates. In fact, there are no candidates
involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of
Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL basis.
COMMISSIONS While the limitation does not absolutely
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS bar petitioner's freedom of expression, it is still a
SANIDAD VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS restriction on his choice of the forum where he
(G.R. NO. 90878 JANUARY 29, 1990) may express his view.
Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern
MEDIALDEA, J.: and importance. The people's right to be
FACTS: informed and to be able to freely and intelligently
RA 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING make a decision would be better served by
FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE access to an unabridged discussion of the
CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was issues, including the forum. The people affected
enacted into law, pursuant to which provinces by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not
included therein shall take part in a plebiscite for be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum
the ratification of said Organic Act. The where the right to expression may be exercised.
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may
govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said provide a forum for expression but they do not
Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous guarantee full dissemination of information to the
Region. public concerned because they are limited to
Petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, a either specific portions in newspapers or to
newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the specific radio or television times.
BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, assailed the
constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec
Resolution No. 2167, which provides: ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL
Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, COMMISSIONS
commentators or announcers. During the D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
plebiscite campaign period, on the day before GUEVARA VS. GIMENEZ
and on the plebiscite day, no mass media (G.R. NO. L-17115, NOVEMBER 30, 1962)
columnist, commentator, announcer or
personality shall use his column or radio or CONCEPCION, J.:
television time to campaign for or against the FACTS:
plebiscite issues. Miguel Cuaderno, the then Governor of
Petitioner maintains that if media the Central Bank of the Philippines, acting for and
practitioners were to express their views, beliefs in behalf thereof, asked petitioner to cooperate
and opinions on the issue submitted to a with the legal counsel of the Central Bank in
plebiscite, it would in fact help in the government defending the same and its Monetary Board in a
drive and desire to disseminate information, and civil case. Accordingly petitioner entered his
hear, as well as ventilate, all sides of the issue. appearance as counsel for the respondents in
COMELEC counters that the Resoultion said case and argued therein, verbally and in
is not violative of the constitution and it is a valid writing.
implementation of its power to supervise and The Governor presented to the Board
regulate media during election or plebiscite and the latter approved by unanimous vote, the
periods as enunciated in the Constitution. It designation of Judge Guillermo Guevara as
stated that it does not absolutely bar petitioner counsel to collaborate with the Legal Counsel of
from expressing his views and/or from the Central Bank. The Board also authorized the
campaigning for or against the Organic Act. He Governor to arrange with Judge Guevera the
may still express his views or campaign for or amount of fee which the latter will charge the
against the act through the Comelec space and Central Bank for handling the said cases. Prior
airtime. thereto the latter had sent to the Central Bank his
bill for the retainer's fee of P10, 000. The Bank
ISSUE: The constitutionality of Section 19 of Auditor sought advice thereon from the Auditor
Comelec Resolution No. 2167 on the ground that General, who stated that he would not object to
it violates the constitutional guarantees of the the retainer's fees, provided that its payment was
freedom of expression and of the press during made in installments.
the conduct of a plebiscite. With the understanding that, "in case
there is no appeal from the CFI decision, the
HELD: balance will be paid in full", once, presumably,
Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. the decision has become final. As regards the
2167 is declared null and void and P300 per diem, the Auditor General express
unconstitutional. however, the belief that it is "excessive and may
It is clear in the Constitution that what be allowed in audit". Hence, the present action
was granted to the Comelec was the power to for mandamus to compel respondent to approve
supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of payment of petitioner's retainer fee and his per
franchises, permits or other grants issued for the diem aggregating P3,300, for the 11 hearings
operation of transportation or other public utilities, attended by him.
media of communication or information to the end
that equal opportunity, time and space, and the ISSUE: Whether or not the Auditor General has
right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates the authority to disapprove the expenditures he
therefore, for public information campaigns and deemed unwise or that the amount stipulated
forums among candidates are ensured. thereon is unreasonable?
A Debit Memorandum was issued in

HELD: petitioner's name debiting his account with the
The Auditor General has no mandate to NPC for the amount of the hospitalization
disapprove expenditures which in his opinion expenses. Petitioner claims that he prepared the
excessive and extravagant. questioned legal opinion in the performance of
Under our Constitution, the authority of his official functions as mandated by law. At the
the Auditor General, in connection with time he rendered it, he was the officer-in-charge
expenditures of the Government is limited to the of the NPC's Office of the General Counsel.
auditing of expenditures of funds or property Section 15-A of its charter provides that all legal
pertaining to, or held in trust by the Government matters shall be handled by the General Counsel
or the provinces or municipalities thereof (Article of the Corporation. As such, he provides legal
XI, section 2, of the Constitution). Such function advice and/or renders legal opinions on legal
is limited to a determination of whether there is a matters involving the NPC. Since this function is
law appropriating funds for a given purpose; quasi-judicial in nature, the discretion exercised
whether a contract, made by the proper officer, in the discharge thereof is not subject to re-
has been entered into in conformity with said examination or controversion by the respondents;
appropriation law; whether the goods or services when the latter did what was proscribed, they in
covered by said contract have been delivered or effect usurped the statutory function of the
rendered in pursuance of the provisions thereof, General Counsel of the NPC. There is no law
as attested to by the proper officer; and whether which expressly authorizes the respondents to
payment therefore has been authorized by the re-examine or controvert the General Counsel's
officials of the corresponding department or opinion. Petitioner additionally stresses that he is
bureau. If these requirements have been fulfilled, not personally liable for the amount disallowed as
it is the ministerial duty of the Auditor General to he was merely performing his official functions.
approve and pass in audit the voucher and Besides, his questioned opinion is not alleged to
treasury warrant for said payment. He has no have been rendered with malice and bad faith.
discretion or authority to disapprove said
payment upon the ground that the ISSUES:
aforementioned contract was unwise or that the (1) Does the legal opinion of petitioner, which
amount stipulated thereon is unreasonable. If he was relied upon for the disbursement in question,
entertains such belief, he may do so more than preclude or bar the COA from disallowing in post-
discharge the duty imposed upon him by the audit such disbursement?
Constitution (Article XI, section 2), "to bring to the (2) Has the General Counsel of the COA the
attention of the proper administrative officer authority to decide a motion to reconsider the
expenditures of funds or Property which, in his disallowance in question?
opinion, are irregular, unnecessary, excessive or (3) Is the petitioner personally liable for the
extravagant". This duty implies a negation of the disallowance on the theory that the disbursement
power to refuse and disapprove payment of such was made on the basis thereof?
expenditures, for its disapproval, if he had
authority therefore, would bring to the attention of HELD:
the aforementioned administrative officer the 1. Both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions
reasons for the adverse action thus taken by the conferred upon the COA a more active role and
General Auditing office, and, hence, render the invested it with broader and more extensive
imposition of said duty unnecessary. powers. These were not meant to make it a
toothless tiger, but a dynamic, effective, efficient
and independent watchdog of the Government.
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL In determining whether an expenditure of a
COMMISSIONS Government agency or instrumentality such as
D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT the NPC is irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
OROCIO VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT extravagant or unconscionable, the COA should
(G.R. NO. 75959 AUGUST 31, 1992) not be bound by the opinion of the legal counsel
of said agency or instrumentality which may have
FACTS: been the basis for the questioned disbursement;
An accident occurred at the Malaya otherwise, it would indeed become a toothless
Thermal Plant of the National Power Corporation tiger and its auditing function would be a
(NPC), when the plug from the leaking tube gave meaningless and futile exercise. Its beacon lights
way, thereby releasing steam and hot water then should be nothing more than the pertinent
which hit two of the employees working on the laws and its rules and regulations.
tube leak. 2. No. The General Counsel of the COA does not
The NPC initially advanced this amount have the authority to decide a motion to
by setting it up as an account receivable from reconsider the disallowance in question The
OPLGS (employees agency) and deducted on a COA, both under the 1973 and 1987 Constitution,
staggered basis from the latter's billings against is a collegial body. It must resolve cases
NPC until the same was fully satisfied. OPLGS presented to it as such. Its General Counsel
requested for a refund of the total amount cannot act for the Commission for he is not even
deducted from their billings representing payment a Commissioner thereof. He can only offer legal
of the advances made by the NPC. Petitioner, as advice or render an opinion in order to aid the
officer-in-charge, recommended favorable action COA in the resolution of a case or a legal
on OPLGS' request. question.
Thus, the amount for the hospitalization 3. Even if we assume that the disallowance was
expenses was refunded to the contractor proper, there would still be no basis for directly
OPLGS. In Certificate of Settlement and holding petitioner liable.
Balances (CSB) No. 01-04-83 prepared by If he rendered the opinion in the just performance
respondent Jose M. Agustin, Unit Auditor of the of his official duties and within the scope of his
COA assigned to the NPC-MRRC, the refund of assigned tasks, he would not be personally liable
the hospitalization expenses was disallowed for for any injury that may result therefrom.
"[u]nder the NPC-O.P. Landrito contract, there is Compromise Agreement between the
no employer-employee relationship between the City of Cebu and Spouses de la Cerna which
Corporation and the latter's employees." Hence, involves monetary consideration was upheld
the NPC is not answerable for such expenses. constitutional.

G.R. NO. 92279 JUNE 18, 1992

COMMISSIONS FACTS:
D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT An agreement was entered into by and
OSMEA VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT between the Province of Isabela and ECS
(G.R. NO. 110045 NOVEMBER 29, 1994) Enterprises for the purchase of 300 units of
wheelbarrows, 837 pieces of shovels and 1 set of
FACTS: radio communication equipment. Out of the items
Reynaldo de la Cerna, the son of the de delivered, a partial delivery was made. The
la Cerna Spouses was stabbed by an unknown Provincial Auditor allowed the payment of only
assailant. He was rushed to the Cebu City 50% pending receipt of reply to the query to
Medical Center but later died due to severe loss Price Evaluation Division of COA.
of blood. His parents claimed that Reynaldo A second delivery was made and
would not have died were it not for the payment of 50% was allowed by the Provincial
"ineptitude, gross negligence, irresponsibility, Auditor. Based on the findings of the Price
stupidity and incompetence of the medical staff" Evaluation Division of COA, there has been an
of the hospital. overpricing. The President/GM of ECS
The Spouses thus filed suit for damages Enterprises made no comment on the overpricing
against the city of Cebu, the Sangguniang but instead proposed a 10% deduction on the
Panlungsod, and five physicians of the Cebu City unpaid balance. The Provincial Auditor forwarded
Medical Center. the matter to the COA Regional Director who
The parties entered into a compromise formally endorsed the stand of the Provincial
agreement, which included a provision for the Auditor.
payment of the sum of P30, 000.00 to the ECS Enterprises appealed to COA,
plaintiffs by defendant City of Cebu. The which denied the appeal. Hence the present
agreement was submitted to the Sangguniang petition.
Panlungsod of the City, which ratified the same.
The sanggunian authorized "the City Budget ISSUE: Did the COA commit grave abuse of
Officer, Cebu City, to include in Supplemental discretion in affirming the decision of the
Budget No. IV of the City . . . for the year 1989 Provincial Auditor and the Regional Director?
the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,
000.00) PESOS for financial assistance to the HELD:
parents of the late Reynaldo de la Cerna, all of No. In the exercise of its regulatory power
Cebu City. vested upon it by the Constitution, COA adheres
Respondent COA disallowed the to the policy that government funds and property
"financial assistance" thus granted to the should be full protected and conserved and that
Spouses, averring that it is not within the powers irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu to expenditures or uses of funds owned by, or
provide, either under the general welfare clause pertaining to, the Government or any of its
or even on humanitarian grounds, monetary subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities
assistance that would promote the economic (Article IX (D-1) Section 2(1), 1987 Constitution) .
condition and private interests of certain That authority extends to the accounts of all
individuals only. persons respecting funds or properties received
or held by them in any accountable capacity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Compromise (Section 26, P.D. No. 1445). In the exercise of its
Agreement between the City of Cebu and jurisdiction, it determines whether or not the fiscal
Spouses de la Cerna which involves monetary responsibility that rests directly with the head and
consideration constitutional? whether or not there has been loss or wastage of
government resources.
HELD: Wherefore, for lack of merit, the petition
Yes. The Compromise Agreement is dismissed.
entered between the City of Cebu and Sps. De la
Cerna was constitutional.
The participation by the City in ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL
negotiations for an amicable settlement of a COMMISSIONS
pending litigation and its eventual execution of a D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
compromise relative thereto, are indubitably BUSTAMANTE VS. COMMISSIONER ON
within its authority and capacity as a public AUDIT
corporation; and a compromise of a civil suit in (G.R. NO. 103309, NOVEMBER 27, 1992)
which it is involved as a party, is a perfectly
legitimate transaction, not only recognized but CAMPOS, JR. J.:
even encouraged by law. FACTS:
That the City of Cebu complied with the Petitioner is the Regional Legal Counsel
relevant formalities contemplated by law can of the National Power Corporation (NPC) for the
hardly be doubted. The compromise agreement Northern Luzon Regional Center covering the
was submitted to its legislative council, the provinces of Rizal up to Batanes. As such he was
Sangguniang Panlungsod, which approved it issued a government vehicle. Pursuant to NPC
conformably with its established rules and policy as reflected in the Board Resolution No.
procedure, particularly the stipulation for the 81-95 authorizing the monthly disbursement of
payment of P30, 000.00 to the de la Cerna transportation allowance, the petitioner, in
family. Neither may it be disputed that since, as a addition to the use of government vehicle,
municipal corporation, Cebu City has the power claimed his transportation allowance for the
to sue and be sued, it has the authority to settle month of January 1989. Ppetitioner received an
or compromise suits, as well as the obligation to Auditor's Notice to Person Liable from
pay just and valid claims against it. respondent Regional Auditor Martha Roxana
Caburian disallowing P1,250.00 representing
aforesaid transportation allowance.
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL Petitioner moved for reconsideration,
COMMISSIONS which the Regional Auditor denied. Petitioner
D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT appealed to COA, which denied the appeal.
SAMBELI V. PROVINCE OF ISABELA Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Can the Supreme Court review COA

ISSUE: Did the COA grave abuse of discretion in decisions on administrative matters?
its denial to give due course to the petitioners
appeal? Did the COA, in the exercise of its HELD:
constitutional powers, usurp the statutory No. The petition has to be dismissed for
functions of the NPC Board of Directors? the following reasons:
1. Our power to review COA decisions refers to
HELD: money matters and not to administrative cases
No. It is beyond dispute that the discretion involving the discipline of its personnel.
exercised in the denial of the appeal is within the 2. Even assuming that We have jurisdiction to
power of the Commission on Audit as it is review decisions on administrative matters as
provided in the Constitution: mentioned above, We can not do so on factual
Sec. 2. The Commission on Audit shall have the issues; Our power to review is limited to legal
following powers and functions: issues.
(1) Examine, audit, and settle, in accordance with
law and regulations, and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property,
owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL
Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, COMMISSIONS
or instrumentalities, including government-owned D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
or controlled corporations; keep the general PHILIPPINE AIRLINESVS. COMMISSION ON
accounts of the Government and, for such period AUDIT
vouchers pertaining thereto; and promulgate (G.R. NO. 91890 JUNE 9, 1995)
accounting and auditing rules and regulations
including those for the prevention of irregular, ROMERO, J.:
unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant FACTS:
expenditures or uses of funds and property. . . . At the time of the filing of the petition,
(Article XII-D, 1973 Constitution) majority of PALs shares of stock was owned by
We likewise cannot sustain petitioner's the GSIS. To assure itself of continuous, reliable
contention that the Commission, in the exercise and cost-efficient supply of fuel, PAL adopted a
of its power granted by the Constitution, usurped system of bidding out its fuel requirements under
the statutory functions of the NPC Board of a multiple supplier set-up whereby PAL awarded
Directors for its leads to the absurd conclusion to the lowest bidder 60% of its fuel requirements
that a mere Board of Directors of a government- and to the second lowest bidder the remaining
owned and controlled corporation, by issuing a 40%, provided it matched the price of the lowest
resolution, can put to naught a constitutional bidder.
provision which has been ratified by the majority COA wrote PAL a letter stating:
of the Filipino people. If We will not sustain the It has come to our attention that PAL
Commission's power and duty to examine, audit international fuel supply contracts are expiring
and settle accounts pertaining to this particular this August 31, 1989. In this connection, you are
expenditures or use of funds and property, advised to desist from bidding the company's fuel
owned or held in trust by this government-owned supply contracts, considering that existing
and controlled corporation, the NPC, We will be regulations require government-owned or
rendering inutile this Constitutional Body which controlled corporations and other agencies of
has been tasked to be vigilant and conscientious government to procure their petroleum product
in safeguarding the proper use of the requirements from PETRON Corporation.
government's, and ultimately, the people's PAL sought reconsideration but was
property. denied by COA. A final appeal for reconsideration
WHEREOF, the instant petition is was also denied in the now assailed COA
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Decision No. 1127.
ISSUE: Did respondent commit grave abuse of

ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL discretion amounting to lack or excess of
COMMISSIONS jurisdiction in ordering PAL to desist from bidding
D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT the companys fuel supply contracts?
SALIGUMBA
VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT HELD:
(G.R. NO. L-61676, OCTOBER 18, 1982) No. The COA is clothed under Section
2(2), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution with the
ABAD SANTOS, J.: "exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in
FACTS: this Article, to define the scope of its audit and
On the basis of the sworn complaint of examination, establish the techniques and
Editha Saligumba, the COA instituted the methods required therefor, and promulgate
administrative case against Leonardo Estella, accounting and auditing rules, and regulations
Auditing Examiner III, in the Auditor's Office of including those for the prevention and
Misamis Occidental. The charge was that the disallowance of irregular, unnecessary,
respondent raped Editha Saligumba on several excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
occasions. expenditures, or uses of government funds and
On April 12, 1982, the COA rendered a properties." The authority granted under this
decision with the following judgment: constitutional provision, being broad and
Wherefore, for insufficiency of evidence, comprehensive enough, enables COA to adopt
the instant charge is hereby dropped. as its own, simply by reiteration or by reference,
Respondent is, however, warned to comport without the necessity of repromulgation, already
himself henceforth in such a manner as would existing rules and regulations. It may also expand
forestall the filing of similar complaints in the the coverage thereof to agencies or
future. instrumentalities under its audit jurisdiction. It is in
Editha Saligumba now wants The Court this light that we view COA Memorandum No. 88-
to review the COA decision. She insists that the 565 issued on August 1, 1988.
decision of the COA is contrary to the evidence. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED for being moot and academic.

FACTS:
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr.
COMMISSIONS was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January
D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. In
BAGATSING VS. COMMITTEE ON 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law,
PRIVATIZATION upon the death of the incumbent. In 1992, he ran
(G.R. NO. 112399 JULY 14, 1995) and was elected mayor for a 3-year term. On
May 8, 1995, he was reelected mayor for another
QUIASON, J.: term.
FACTS: Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for
Petron is a government acquired mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998
company aimed to provide for a buffer against elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja Jr., also a
the vagaries of oil prices in the international mayoralty candidate, sought Capco's
market by serving as a counterfoil against price disqualification, arguing that the latter would have
manipulation that may go uncheck if all oil already served as mayor for three consecutive
companies were foreign-owned. It owns the terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be
largest, most modern complex refinery in the ineligible to serve for another term after that.
Philippines and is also the country's biggest The COMELEC ruled petitioners favor
combined retail and wholesale market of refined and declared Capcos disqualification. However,
petroleum products. Following President on motion of private respondent, the COMELEC
Corazon Aquinos desire to raise revenue for the reversed the decision and declared Capco
government and the ideal of leaving business to eligible to run for mayor.
private sector, the privatization of Petron was
initiated. This privatization was subsequently ISSUE: Whether or not a vice-mayor who
approved by President Fidel V. Ramos as succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of
recommended by PNOC and the Committee on law and serves the remainder of the term is
Privatization. 40 % was to be sold to a strategic considered to have served a term in that office for
partner, 40% was to be retained by the the purpose of the three-term limit?
government and the remaining 20% was to be
offered to the public. The floor bid price was HELD:
finally set at us$440 million No. Article X, 8 of the Constitution
The bidding for the 40% block share provides, that the term of office of elective local
was participated by PETRONAS, ARAMCO and officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
WESTMONT. WESTMONTs proposal was determined by law, shall be three years and no
rejected for not having met the pre-qualification such official shall serve for more than three
criteria of financial capability and lack of technical consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
and management expertise. The bid of office for any length of time shall not be
ARAMCO was for US$502 million while the bid of considered as an interruption in the continuity of
PETRONAS was for US$421 million. ARAMCO his service for the full term for which he was
was declared the winning bidder. elected.
Petitioner argues that there was a failed The term limit for elective local officials
bidding as provided for in COA circular No. 89- must be taken to refer to the right to be elected
296. It provides that there is a failure of public as well as the right to serve in the same elective
auction when: 1) there is only one offeror; or (2) position. Consequently, it is not enough that an
when all the offers are non-complying or individual has served three consecutive terms in
unacceptable. an elective local office, he must also have been
elected to the same position for the same number
ISSUE: Whether or not the public bidding was of times before the disqualification can apply.
tainted with haste and arbitrariness because This point can be made clearer by considering
there was a failed bidding for having only one the following cases or situations:
offeror? Case No. 1. Suppose A is a vice-mayor
who becomes mayor by reason of the death of
HELD: the incumbent. Six months before the next
No. While two offerors were election, he resigns and is twice elected
disqualified, PETRONAS for submitting a bid thereafter. Can he run again for mayor in the next
below the floor price and WESTMONT for election?
technical reasons, not all the offerors were Yes, because although he has already
disqualified. To constitute a failed bidding under first served as mayor by succession and
the COA Circular, all the offerors must be subsequently resigned from office before the full
disqualified. term expired, he has not actually served three full
Petitioners urge that in effect there was terms in all for the purpose of applying the term
only one bidder and that it can not be said that limit. Under Art. X, 8, voluntary renunciation of
there was a competition on "an equal footing. But the office is not considered as an interruption in
the COA Circular does not speak of accepted the continuity of his service for the full term only if
bids but of offerors, without distinction as to the term is one "for which he was elected." Since
whether they were disqualified. A is only completing the service of the term for
The COA itself, the agency that adopted which the deceased and not he was elected, A
the rules on bidding procedure to be followed by cannot be considered to have completed one
government offices and corporations, had upheld term. His resignation constitutes an interruption
the validity and legality of the questioned bidding. of the full term.
The interpretation of an agency of its own rules Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected
should be given more weight than the mayor and, during his first term, he is twice
interpretation by that agency of the law it is suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If
merely tasked to administer. he is twice reelected after that, can he run for one
more term in the next election?
Yes, because he has served only two
ARTICLE X - LOCAL GOVERNMENT full terms successively.
BORJA VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS In both cases, the mayor is entitled to
(G.R. NO. 133495 SEPTEMBER 3, 1998) run for reelection because the two conditions for
the application of the disqualification provisions
MENDOZA, J. have not concurred, namely, that the local official
concerned has been elected three consecutive TINIO of ACT, FERDINAND GAITE of
times and that he has fully served three COURAGE, GIOVANNI A. TAPANG of AGHAM,
consecutive terms. In the first case, even if the WILFREDO MARBELLA of KMP, LANA
local official is considered to have served three LINABAN of GABRIELA, AMADO GAT
full terms notwithstanding his resignation before INCIONG, RENATO CONSTANTINO, JR.,
the end of the first term, the fact remains that he DEAN PACIFICO H. AGABIN, SHARON R.
has not been elected three times. In the second DUREMDES of the NATIONAL COUNCIL OF
case, the local official has been elected three CHURCHES IN THE PHILIPPINES, and BRO.
consecutive times, but he has not fully served EDMUNDO L. FERNANDEZ (FSC) of the
three consecutive terms. ASSOCIATION OF MAJOR RELIGIOUS
Case No. 3. The case of vice-mayor C SUPERIORS OF THE PHILIPPINES (AMRSP),
who becomes mayor by succession involves a petitioners, vs. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his
total failure of the two conditions to concur for the capacity as Executive Secretary, ROMULO
purpose of applying Art. X, 8. Suppose he is NERI, in his capacity as Director-General of
twice elected after that term, is he qualified to run the NATIONAL ECONOMIC and
again in the next election? DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (NEDA) and the
Yes, because he was not elected to the Administrator of the NATIONAL STATISTICS
office of mayor in the first term but simply found OFFICE (NSO), respondents.
himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither
had he served the full term because he only FACTS:
continued the service, interrupted by the death, of This case involves two consolidated
the deceased mayor. petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
To consider C in the third case to have under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the
served the first term in full and therefore ineligible nullification of Executive Order No. 420 (EO 420)
to run a third time for reelection would be not only on the ground that it is unconstitutional. EO 420,
to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on
of the people to choose whom they wish to 13 April 2005, reads:
govern them. If the vice-mayor turns out to be a REQUIRING ALL GOVERNMENT
bad mayor, the people can remedy the situation AGENCIES AND GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND
by simply not reelecting him for another term. But CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS TO
if, on the other hand, he proves to be a good STREAMLINE AND HARMONIZE THEIR
mayor, there will be no way the people can return IDENTIFICATION (ID) SYSTEMS, AND
him to office (even if it is just the third time he is AUTHORIZING FOR SUCH PURPOSE THE
standing for reelection) if his service of the first DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC
term is counted as one for the purpose of AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY TO
applying the term limit. IMPLEMENT THE SAME, AND FOR OTHER
To consider C as eligible for reelection PURPOSES
would be in accord with the understanding of the Under EO 420, the President directs all
Constitutional Commission that while the people government agencies and government-owned
should be protected from the evils that a and controlled corporations to adopt a uniform
monopoly of political power may bring about, data collection and format for their existing
care should be taken that their freedom of choice identification (ID) systems. The purposes of the
is not unduly curtailed. uniform ID data collection and ID format are to
Further, resort to historical examination reduce costs, achieve efficiency and reliability,
would show adherence to the fundamental tenet insure compatibility, and provide convenience to
of representative democracy wherein the people the people served by government entities.
should be allowed to choose those whom they Section 3 of EO 420 limits the data to be
please to govern them. To bar the election of a collected and recorded under the uniform ID
local official because he has already served three system to only 14 specific items, namely: (1)
terms, although the first as a result of succession Name; (2) Home Address; (3) Sex; (4) Picture;
by operation of law rather than election, would (5) Signature; (6) Date of Birth; (7) Place of Birth;
therefore be to violate this principle. (8) Marital Status; (9) Name of Parents; (10)
Height; (11) Weight; (12) Two index fingers and
two thumbmarks; (13) Any prominent
2006 CASES distinguishing features like moles or others; and
(14) Tax Identification Number. Section 5 of EO
[G.R. NO. 167798. APRIL 19, 2006.] 420 prescribes the safeguards on the collection,
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, NATIONAL recording, and disclosure of personal
FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG identification data to protect the right to privacy.
MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), JOSELITO V. The following safeguards are instituted:
USTAREZ, EMILIA P. DAPULANG, a. The data to be recorded and stored,
SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, MARTIN T. which shall be used only for purposes of
CUSTODIO, JR. and ROQUE M. TAN, establishing the identity of a person, shall be
petitioners, vs. THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, limited to those specified in Section 3 of this
NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT executive order; aEAIDH
AUTHORITY, and THE SECRETARY, b. In no case shall the collection or
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and compilation of other data in violation of a person's
MANAGEMENT, respondents. right to privacy be allowed or tolerated under this
order;
[G.R. NO. 167930. APRIL 19, 2006.] c. Stringent systems of access control to
BAYAN MUNA Representatives SATUR C. data in the identification system shall be
OCAMPO, TEODORO A. CASIO, and JOEL instituted;
G. VIRADOR, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY d. Data collected and stored for this
Representative LIZA L. MAZA, ANAKPAWIS purpose shall be kept and treated as strictly
Representatives RAFAEL V. MARIANO and confidential and a personal or written
CRISPIN B. BELTRAN, Rep. FRANCIS G. authorization of the Owner shall be required for
ESCUDERO, Rep. EDUARDO C. ZIALCITA, access and disclosure of data;
Rep. LORENZO R. TAADA III, DR. CAROL e. The identification card to be issued shall
PAGADUAN-ARAULLO and RENATO M. be protected by advanced security features and
REYES, JR. of BAYAN, MARIE HILAO- cryptographic technology;
ENRIQUEZ of KARAPATAN, ANTONIO L.
f. A written request by the Owner of the Place of Birth; (8) Marital Status; (9) Name of
identification card shall be required for any Parents; (10) Height; (11) Weight; (12) Two index
correction or revision of relevant data, or under fingers and two thumbmarks; (13) Any prominent
such conditions as the participating agency distinguishing features like moles or others; and
issuing the identification card shall prescribe. (14) Tax Identification Number.
These limited and specific data are the
ISSUES: usual data required for personal identification by
(1) Whether or not EO 420 is a usurpation of government entities, and even by the private
legislative power by the President. sector. Any one who applies for or renews a
(2) Whether or not EO 420 infringes on the driver's license provides to the LTO all these 14
citizen's right to privacy. specific data.
The data collected and stored for the
HELD: unified ID system under EO 420 will be limited to
(1) No, EO 420 is not a usurpation of legislative only 14 specific data, and the ID card itself will
power by the President. Section 2 of EO 420 show only eight specific data. The data collection,
provides, "Coverage. All government agencies recording and ID card system under EO 420 will
and government-owned and controlled even require less data collected, stored and
corporations issuing ID cards to their members or revealed than under the disparate systems prior
constituents shall be covered by this executive to EO 420.
order." EO 420 applies only to government Prior to EO 420, government entities
entities that issue ID cards as part of their had a free hand in determining the kind, nature
functions under existing laws. These government and extent of data to be collected and stored for
entities have already been issuing ID cards even their ID systems. Under EO 420, government
prior to EO 420. Examples of these government entities can collect and record only the 14
entities are the GSIS, SSS, Philhealth, Mayor's specific data mentioned in Section 3 of EO 420.
Office, LTO, PRC and similar government In addition, government entities can show in their
entities. Section 1 of EO 420 directs these ID cards only eight of these specific data, seven
government entities to "adopt a unified multi- less data than what the Supreme Court's ID
purpose ID system." Thus, all government shows.
entities that issue IDs as part of their functions Also, prior to EO 420, there was no
under existing laws are required to adopt a executive issuance to government entities
uniform data collection and format for their IDs. prescribing safeguards on the collection,
Second, the President may by executive recording, and disclosure of personal
or administrative order direct the government identification data to protect the right to privacy.
entities under the Executive department to adopt Now, under Section 5 of EO 420, the following
a uniform ID data collection and format. Section safeguards are instituted:
17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides a. The data to be recorded and stored,
that the "President shall have control of all which shall be used only for purposes of
executive departments, bureaus and offices." The establishing the identity of a person, shall be
same Section also mandates the President to limited to those specified in Section 3 of this
"ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." executive order;
Certainly, under this constitutional b. In no case shall the collection or
power of control the President can direct all compilation of other data in violation of a person's
government entities, in the exercise of their right to privacy be allowed or tolerated under this
functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform order;
ID data collection and ID format to achieve c. Stringent systems of access control to
savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and data in the identification system shall be
convenience to the public. The President's instituted;
constitutional power of control is self-executing d. Data collected and stored for this
and does not need any implementing legislation. purpose shall be kept and treated as strictly
Of course, the President's power of confidential and a personal or written
control is limited to the Executive branch of authorization of the Owner shall be required for
government and does not extend to the Judiciary access and disclosure of data;
or to the independent constitutional commissions. e. The identification card to be issued shall
Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the Judiciary, or be protected by advanced security features and
to the COMELEC which under existing laws is cryptographic technology;
also authorized to issue voter's ID cards. This f. A written request by the Owner of the
only shows that EO 420 does not establish a identification card shall be required for any
national ID system because legislation is needed correction or revision of relevant data, or under
to establish a single ID system that is compulsory such conditions as the participating agency
for all branches of government. issuing the identification card shall prescribe.
Constitution also mandates the In the present case, EO 420 does not
President to ensure that the laws are faithfully establish a national ID system but makes the
executed. There are several laws mandating existing sectoral card systems of government
government entities to reduce costs, increase entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and LTO less
efficiency, and in general, improve public costly, more efficient, reliable and user-friendly to
services. the public. Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of
The adoption of a uniform ID data executive issuance under the President's
collection and format under EO 420 is designed constitutional power of control over government
to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in entities in the Executive department, as well as
general, improve public services. Thus, in issuing under the President's constitutional duty to
EO 420, the President is simply performing the ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are WHEREFORE, the petitions are
faithfully executed. DISMISSED. Executive Order No. 420 is
declared VALID.
(2) No, EO 420 does not infringe on the citizens
right to privacy. Section 3 of EO 420 limits the
data to be collected and recorded under the [G.R. NO. 142362. MAY 3, 2006.]
uniform ID system to only 14 specific items, PHILIPPINE AGILA SATELLITE INC. and
namely: (1) Name; (2) Home Address; (3) Sex; MICHAEL C. U. DE GUZMAN, complainants,
(4) Picture; (5) Signature; (6) Date of Birth; (7) vs. JOSEFINA TRINIDAD-LICHAUCO
Undersecretary for Communications, Appeals, which subsequently nullified the RTC

Department of Transportation and order.
Communication (DOTC), respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suit against Lichauco,
FACTS: the undersecretary of DOTC, is a suit against the
Petitioner Philippine Agila Satellite Inc. State.
(PASI) is a duly organized corporation, whose
President and Chief Executive Officer is co- HELD:
petitioner Michael C.U. De Guzman. PASI was As was clearly set forth by Justice
established by a consortium of private Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of
telecommunications carriers which in 1994 had Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al.
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding 'Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts
(MOU) with the DOTC, through its then Secretary by its officers, unauthorized acts of government
Jesus Garcia, concerning the planned launch of a officials or officers are not acts of the State, and
Philippine-owned satellite into outer space. Under an action against the officials or officers by one
the MOU, the launch of the satellite was to be an whose rights have been invaded or violated by
endeavor of the private sector, and the satellite such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a
itself to be owned by the Filipino-owned suit against the State within the rule of immunity
consortium (subsequently organized as PASI). of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has
The consortium was to grant the Philippine been said that an action at law or suit in equity
government one (1) transponder free of charge against a State officer or the director of a State
for the government's exclusive use for non- department on the ground that, while claiming to
commercial purpose, as well as the right of first act for the State, he violates or invades the
refusal to another one (1) transponder in the personal and property rights or the plaintiff, under
Philippine satellite, if available. 4 The Philippine an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of
government, through the DOTC, was tasked authority which he does not have, is not a suit
under the MOU to secure from the against the State within the constitutional
InternationalTelecommunication Union the provision that the State may not be sued without
required orbital slot(s) and frequency its consent.' The rationale for this ruling is that the
assignment(s) for the Philippine satellite. doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an
PASI itself was organized by the instrument for perpetrating an injustice. Thus,
consortium in 1996. The government, together Lichauco, in alleging in her Motion to Dismiss that
with PASI, coordinated through the International she is shielded by the State's immunity from suit,
Telecommunication Union two (2) orbital slots, to hypothetically admitted the truth of the
designated as 161 East Longitude and 153 allegations in the complaint. Such hypothetical
East Longitude, for Philippine satellites. On 28 admission has to be deemed a concession on
June 1996, PASI wrote then DOTC Secretary her part that she had performed the tortious or
Amado S. Lagdameo, Jr., seeking for official damaging acts against the petitioners, which if
Philippine government confirmation on the true, would hold her liable for damages.
assignment of the two aforementioned Philippine The decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside
orbital slots to PASI for its satellites, which PASI and the RTC is ordered to try the case on its
had designated as the Agila satellites. Secretary merits.
Lagdameo, Jr. replied in a letter dated 3 July
1996, confirming "the Philippine Government's
assignment of Philippine orbital slots 161E and [G.R. NO. 171396. MAY 3, 2006.]
153E to [PASI] for its [Agila] satellites." PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO
PASI avers that after having secured the TAADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L.
confirmation from the Philippine government, it ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER
proceeded with preparations for the launching, R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL
operation and management of its satellites, REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C.
including the availment of loans, the increase in BOLASTIG, petitioners, vs. GLORIA
its capital, negotiation with business partners, MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND
and an initial payment of US$3.5 Million to the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE
French satellite manufacturer. However, SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON.
respondent Lichauco, then DOTC AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF
Undersecretary for Communications, allegedly NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO
"embarked on a crusade to malign the name of SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES
Michael de Guzman and sabotage the business OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL
of PASI." Lichauco's purported efforts against ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
PASI culminated allegedly in her offering orbital NATIONAL POLICE, respondents.
slot 153 East Longitude for bidding to other
parties sometime in December 1997, despite the [G.R. NO. 171409. MAY 3, 2006.]
prior assignment to PASI of the said slot. It was NIEZ CACHO-OLIVARES AND TRIBUNE
later claimed by PASI that Lichauco subsequently PUBLISHING CO., INC., petitioners, vs.
awarded the orbital slot to an entity whose HONORABLE SECRETARY EDUARDO
indentity was unknown to PASI. ERMITA AND HONORABLE DIRECTOR
Thus, a complaint was filed against GENERAL ARTURO C. LOMIBAO,
Lichauco for damages. A Motion to Dismiss was respondents.
then filed by Lichauco. She rooted her prayer for
the dismissal of the complaint primarily on the [G.R. NO. 171485. MAY 3, 2006.]
grounds that the suit is a suit against the State FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO, JOSEPH A.
which may not be sued without its consent; that SANTIAGO, TEODORO A. CASINO, AGAPITO
the complaint stated no cause of action; and that A. AQUINO, MARIO J. AGUJA, SATUR C.
the petitioners had failed to exhaust OCAMPO, MUJIV S. HATAMAN, JUAN
administrative remedies by failing to seek EDGARDO ANGARA, TEOFISTO DL.
recourse with the Office of the President. GUINGONA III, EMMANUEL JOSEL J.
In an order 13 dated 14 August 1998, VILLANUEVA, LIZA L. MAZA, IMEE R.
the RTC denied the motion to dismiss. Lichauco MARCOS, RENATO B. MAGTUBO, JUSTIN
assailed the RTC order through a Petition for MARC SB. CHIPECO, ROILO GOLEZ,
Certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of DARLENE ANTONINO-CUSTODIO, LORETTA
ANN P. ROSALES, JOSEL G. VIRADOR,
RAFAEL V. MARIANO, GILBERT C. REMULLA, whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out
FLORENCIO G. NOEL, ANA THERESIA (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress . . .
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, IMELDA C. rebellion. . . ," and in my capacity as their
NICOLAS, MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN, NERI Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the
JAVIER COLMENARES, MOVEMENT OF Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law
CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CIVIL and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or
LIBERTIES REPRESENTED BY AMADO GAT suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as
INCIONG, petitioners, vs. EDUARDO R. any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce
ERMITA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AVELINO obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
J. CRUZ, JR., SECRETARY, DND RONALDO orders and regulations promulgated by me
V. PUNO, SECRETARY, DILG, GENEROSO personally or upon my direction; and as provided
SENGA, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, ARTURO in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do
LOMIBAO, CHIEF PNP, respondents. hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
Thereafter, the President issued G.O.
[G.R. NO. 171483. MAY 3, 2006.] No. 5 implementing PP1017. It called upon the
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the
ITS CHAIRPERSON ELMER C. LABOG AND PNP, as well as the officers and men of the AFP
SECRETARY GENERAL JOEL MAGLUNSOD, and PNP, to immediately carry out the necessary
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS- and appropriate actions and measures to
KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and
REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL lawless violence.
PRESIDENT, JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, Immediately after the issuance of
ANTONIO C. PASCUAL, SALVADOR T. PP1017 and G.O. No. 5, the Office of the
CARRANZA, EMILIA P. DAPULANG, MARTIN President announced the cancellation of all
CUSTODIO, JR., AND ROQUE M. TAN, programs and activities related to the 20th
petitioners, vs. HER EXCELLENCY, anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I;
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, earlier by the local governments. Justice
EDUARDO ERMITA, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, Secretary Raul Gonzales stated that political
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, rallies, which to the President's mind were
GENEROSO SENGA, AND THE PNP organized for purposes of destabilization, are
DIRECTOR GENERAL, ARTURO LOMIBAO, cancelled. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael
respondents. Defensor announced that "warrantless arrests
and take-over of facilities, including media, can
[G.R. NO. 171400. MAY 3, 2006.] already be implemented.
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG), Those who staged rallies and public
petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY assemblies were violently dispersed by huge
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, LT. GEN. GENEROSO clusters of anti-riot police. The well-trained
SENGA, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO policemen used truncheons, big fiber glass
LOMIBAO, respondents. shields, water cannons, and tear gas to stop and
break up the marching groups, and scatter the
[G.R. NO. 171489. MAY 3, 2006.] massed participants.
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M. On the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No.
BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. RIVERA, JOSE AMOR 5, operatives of the CIDG and PNP raided the
M. AMORADO, ALICIA A. RISOS-VIDAL, Daily Tribune offices in Manila. The raiding team
FELIMON C. ABELITA III, MANUEL P. confiscated news stories by reporters,
LEGASPI, J.B. JOVY C. BERNABE, BERNARD documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the
L. DAGCUTA, ROGELIO V. GARCIA AND Saturday issue. Policemen from Camp Crame in
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES Quezon City were stationed inside the editorial
(IBP), petitioners, vs. HON. EXECUTIVE and business offices of the newspaper; while
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, GENERAL policemen from the Manila Police District were
GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS stationed outside the building.
AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, AND DIRECTOR A few minutes after the search and
GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, IN HIS seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the police
CAPACITY AS PNP CHIEF, respondents. surrounded the premises of another pro-
opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister
[G.R. NO. 171424. MAY 3, 2006.] publication, the tabloid Abante.
LOREN B. LEGARDA, petitioner, vs. GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, IN HER CAPACITY ISSUE: Whether or not PP1017 and G.O. 5 are
AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF; constitutional.
ARTURO LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE HELD:
NATIONAL POLICE (PNP); GENEROSO The Court finds and so holds that PP
SENGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a
STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE call by the President for the AFP to prevent or
PHILIPPINES (AFP); AND EDUARDO ERMITA, suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is
IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the
SECRETARY, respondents. Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence
discussed earlier. However, PP 1017's
FACTS: extraneous provisions giving the President
On February 24, 2006, as the nation express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2)
celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws
People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP even those not related to lawless violence as well
1017 declaring a state of national emergency, as decrees promulgated by the President; and (3)
thus: to impose standards on media or any form of
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and
President of the Republic of the Philippines and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot
me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine take over privately-owned public utility and
Constitution which states that: "The President. . . private business affected with public interest.
In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 President Arroyo has no authority to
valid. It is an Order issued by the President enact decrees. It follows that these decrees are
acting as Commander-in-Chief addressed to void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With
subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions respect to "laws," she cannot call the military to
of PP 1017. Significantly, it also provides a valid enforce or implement certain laws, such as
standard that the military and the police should customs laws, laws governing family and
take only the "necessary and appropriate actions property relations, laws on obligations and
and measures to suppress and prevent acts of contracts and the like. She can only order the
lawless violence." But the words "acts of military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent
terrorism" found in G.O. No. 5 have not been to its duty to suppress lawless violence.
legally defined and made punishable by 2) A distinction must be drawn between
Congress and should thus be deemed deleted the President's authority to declare "a state of
from the said G.O. While "terrorism" has been national emergency" and to exercise emergency
denounced generally in media, no law has been powers. To the first, as elucidated by the Court,
enacted to guide the military, and eventually the Section 18, Article VII grants the President such
courts, to determine the limits of the AFP's power, hence, no legitimate constitutional
authority in carrying out this portion of G.O. No. objection can be raised. But to the second,
5. manifold constitutional issues arise.
Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:
REASONS FOR THE RULING (IMPORTANT SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of
POINTS TO REMEMBER): two-thirds of both Houses in joint session
1) The President is granted an assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole
Ordinance Power under Chapter 2, Book III of power to declare the existence of a state of war.
Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of (2) In times of war or other national
1987). She may issue any of the following: emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize
Sec. 2. Executive Orders. Acts of the the President, for a limited period and subject to
President providing for rules of a general or such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise
permanent character in implementation or powers necessary and proper to carry out a
execution of constitutional or statutory powers declared national policy. Unless sooner
shall be promulgated in executive orders. withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the powers shall cease upon the next adjournment
President which relate to particular aspect of thereof.
governmental operations in pursuance of his It may be pointed out that the second paragraph
duties as administrative head shall be of the above provision refers not only to war but
promulgated in administrative orders. also to "other national emergency." If the
Sec. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President intention of the Framers of our Constitution was
fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of to withhold from the President the authority to
public moment or interest, upon the existence of declare a "state of national emergency" pursuant
which the operation of a specific law or regulation to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and
is made to depend, shall be promulgated in grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the
proclamations which shall have the force of an existence of a state of war), then the Framers
executive order. could have provided so. Clearly, they did not
Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. Acts of the intend that Congress should first authorize the
President on matters of administrative detail or of President before he can declare a "state of
subordinate or temporary interest which only national emergency." The logical conclusion then
concern a particular officer or office of the is that President Arroyo could validly declare the
Government shall be embodied in memorandum existence of a state of national emergency even
orders. in the absence of a Congressional enactment.
Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. Acts of the But the exercise of emergency powers,
President on matters relating to internal such as the taking over of privately owned public
administration, which the President desires to utility or business affected with public interest, is
bring to the attention of all or some of the a different matter. This requires a delegation from
departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the Congress.
Government, for information or compliance, shall Courts have often said that
be embodied in memorandum circulars. constitutional provisions in pari materia are to be
Sec. 7. General or Special Orders. Acts and construed together. Otherwise stated, different
commands of the President in his capacity as clauses, sections, and provisions of a constitution
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the which relate to the same subject matter will be
Philippines shall be issued as general or special construed together and considered in the light of
orders. each other. Considering that Section 17 of
President Arroyo's ordinance power is limited to Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI, previously
the foregoing issuances. She cannot issue quoted, relate to national emergencies, they must
decrees similar to those issued by Former be read together to determine the limitation of the
President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential exercise of emergency powers.
Decrees are laws which are of the same category Generally, Congress is the repository of
and binding force as statutes because they were emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of
issued by the President in the exercise of his Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate
legislative power during the period of Martial Law such powers to the President. Certainly, a body
under the 1973 Constitution. cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is However, knowing that during grave
unconstitutional insofar as it grants President emergencies, it may not be possible or
Arroyo the authority to promulgate "decrees." practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its
Legislative power is peculiarly within the province powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed
of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency
categorically states that "[t]he legislative power powers to the President, subject to certain
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines conditions, thus:
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of (1) There must be a war or other
Representatives." To be sure, neither Martial Law emergency.
nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency (2) The delegation must be for a limited
can justify President Arroyo's exercise of period only.
legislative power by issuing decrees.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such was bequeathed to Kyle Guersey. His will was
restrictions as the Congress may prescribe. also probated in the U.S.A and in the Philippines.
(4) The emergency powers must be The ancilliary administrator in the
exercised to carry out a national policy declared probate of the will of Richard here in the
by Congress. 124 Philippines filed a project of partition with the
Section 17, Article XII must be probate court wherein 2/5 of Richard's 3/4
understood as an aspect of the emergency undivided interest in the Makati property was
powers clause. The taking over of private allocated to respondent, while 3/5 thereof were
business affected with public interest is just allocated to Richard's three children. This was
another facet of the emergency powers generally opposed by respondent on the ground that under
reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 the law of the State of Maryland, "a legacy
states that the "the State may, during the passes to the legatee the entire interest of the
emergency and under reasonable terms testator in the property subject of the legacy."
prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct Since Richard left his entire estate to respondent,
the operation of any privately owned public utility except for his rights and interests over the A/G
or business affected with public interest," it refers Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire 3/4
to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or undivided interest in the Makati property should
not the President may exercise such power is be given to respondent. The respondents
dependent on whether Congress may delegate it opposition was sustained by the probate court.
to him pursuant to a law prescribing the The respondent also filed with the Court
reasonable terms thereof. of Appeals a petition for the annulment of the
It is clear that if the President had judgment of the probate court with regards to the
authority to issue the order he did, it must be probate of the will of Audrey here in the
found in some provision of the Constitution. And Philippines. Respondent contended that
it is not claimed that express constitutional petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty
language grants this power to the President. The when he disregarded the laws of the State of
contention is that presidential power should be Maryland on the distribution of Audrey's estate in
implied from the aggregate of his powers under accordance with her will. Respondent argued that
the Constitution. Particular reliance is placed on since Audrey devised her entire estate to
provisions in Article II which say that "The Richard, then the Makati property should be
executive Power shall be vested in a President . . wholly adjudicated to him, and not merely 3/4
. . ;" that "he shall take Care that the Laws be thereof, and since Richard left his entire estate,
faithfully executed;" and that he "shall be except for his rights and interests over the A/G
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire
United States. Makati property should now pertain to
3) Since there is no law defining "acts of respondent. The Court of Appeals sustained the
terrorism," it is President Arroyo alone, under respondent and ordered the annulment of the
G.O. No. 5, who has the discretion to determine decisions of the probate court.
what acts constitute terrorism. Her judgment on
this aspect is absolute, without restrictions. ISSUE: Whether or not the passing of the land to
Consequently, there can be indiscriminate arrest respondent is valid despite the fact that records
without warrants, breaking into offices and do not show when and how the Guerseys
residences, taking over the media enterprises, acquired the Makati property.
prohibition and dispersal of all assemblies and
gatherings unfriendly to the administration. All HELD:
these can be effected in the name of G.O. No. 5. Yes, the passing of the land to
These acts go far beyond the calling-out power of respondent is valid. The Court notes the fact that
the President. Certainly, they violate the due Audrey and Richard Guersey were American
process clause of the Constitution. Thus, this citizens who owned real property in the
Court declares that the "acts of terrorism" portion Philippines, although records do not show when
of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional. and how the Guerseys acquired the Makati
Significantly, there is nothing in G.O. property.
No. 5 authorizing the military or police to commit Under Article XIII, Sections 1 and 4 of
acts beyond what are necessary and appropriate the 1935 Constitution, the privilege to acquire
to suppress and prevent lawless violence, the and exploit lands of the public domain, and other
limitation of their authority in pursuing the Order. natural resources of the Philippines, and to
Otherwise, such acts are considered illegal. operate public utilities, were reserved to Filipinos
and entities owned or controlled by them. In
Republic v. Quasha, the Court clarified that the
[G.R. NO. 139868. JUNE 8, 2006.] Parity Rights Amendment of 1946, which re-
ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, petitioner, vs. opened to American citizens and business
CANDELARIA GUERSEY-DALAYGON, enterprises the right in the acquisition of lands of
respondent. the public domain, the disposition, exploitation,
development and utilization of natural resources
FACTS: of the Philippines, does not include the
Spouses Audrey ONeill and W. Richard acquisition or exploitation of private agricultural
Guersey were American citizens. They resided lands. The prohibition against acquisition of
in the Philippines for thirty years. They adopted private lands by aliens was carried on to the 1973
Kyle Guersey. When Audrey died she left a will. Constitution under Article XIV, Section 14, with
Her estate consisted of a real estate property in the exception of private lands acquired by
Makati City, a bank account and shares of stocks hereditary succession and when the transfer was
in A/G Interiors. She left her entire estate to made to a former natural-born citizen, as
Richard. Her will was admitted to probate in provided in Section 15, Article XIV. As it now
Maryland, U.S.A and in the Philippines. stands, Article XII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 1986
Thereafter, Richard married the Constitution explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from
respondent, Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon, a acquiring or holding title to private lands or to
Filipino citizen. They had two children Kimberly lands of the public domain, except only by way of
and Kevin. He died with a will. He left his entire legal succession or if the acquisition was made
estate to his second wife, Candelaria, except his by a former natural-born citizen.
shares of stocks with A/G Interiors. The latter In any case, the Court has also ruled
that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who
subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to 28, 1978, the trial court dismissed the petition to
a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is reopen Civil Reservation Case No. 1, G.L.R.O.
considered cured and the title of the transferee is 211 insofar as Lot 76-B was concerned, and the
rendered valid. In this case, since the Makati certificate of title issued pursuant to the partial
property had already passed on to respondent decision involving Lot 76-A was invalidated. The
who is a Filipino, then whatever flaw, if any, that trial court stated that the remedy for those who
attended the acquisition by the Guerseys of the were issued titles was to file a petition for
Makati property is now inconsequential, as the revalidation under Presidential Decree No. 1271,
objective of the constitutional provision to keep as amended by Presidential Decrees No. 1311
our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved. and 2034.
After the dismissal of the case, Guzman
Cario was left undisturbed in his possession of
[G.R. NO. 146459. JUNE 8, 2006.] the subject property until his death on August 19,
HEIRS OF DICMAN, namely: ERNESTO 1982.
DICMAN, PAUL DICMAN, FLORENCE DICMAN On April 20, 1983, petitioners, suing as
FELICIANO TORRES, EMILY TORRES, compulsory heirs of Ting-el Dicman, revived the
TOMASITO TORRES and HEIRS OF CRISTINA foregoing case by filing a complaint for recovery
ALAWAS and BABING COSIL, petitioners, vs. of possession with damages involving the subject
JOSE CARIO and COURT OF APPEALS, property with the RTC, docketed as Civil Case
respondents. No. 59-R. The RTC rendered a decision in favor
of the private respondent. The RTCs decision
FACTS: was appealed to the CA. The latter affirmed in
On advice of his lawyer and because toto the RTCs decision.
there were already many parcels of land
recorded in his name, Sioco Cario caused the ISSUE: Whether or not the Dicmans as
survey of the land in controversy in the name of indigenous people are entitled to the land in
Ting-el Dicman. The latter executed a public controversy.
instrument entitled Deed of Conveyance of Part
Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land with HELD:
Sioco Cario. It stated that he is an applicant for No, the Dicmans as indigenous people
a patent over a parcel of land. That Mr. Sioco are entitled to the land in controversy. Petitioners
Cario has advanced all expenses for said argue that Proclamation No. 628 issued by then
survey for me and in my name, and also all other President Carlos P. Garcia on January 8, 1960
expenses for the improvement of said land, to had the effect of "segregating" and "reserving"
date; that for and in consideration of said certain Igorot claims identified therein, including
advance expenses, to me made and delivered by one purportedly belonging to the "Heirs of
said Mr. Sioco Cario, I hereby pledge and Dicman," and prohibiting any encumbrance or
promise to convey, deliver and transfer unto said alienation of these claims for a period of 15 years
Sioco Cario, of legal age, married to Guilata from acquisition of patent. But by the time the
Acop, and resident of Baguio, P.I., his heirs and Proclamation had been issued, all rights over the
assigns, one half (1/2) of my title, rights, and property in question had already been vested in
interest to and in the aforesaid parcel of land; private respondent. The executive issuance can
same to be delivered, conveyed and transferred only go so far as to classify public land, but it
in a final form, according to law, to him, his heirs cannot be construed as to prejudice vested
and assigns, by me, my heirs, and assigns, as rights. Moreover, property rights may not be
soon as title for the same is issued to me by altered or deprived by executive fiat alone without
proper authorities. contravening the due process guarantees of the
Thereafter, Sico Cario sold the said Constitution and may amount to unlawful taking
land to his son Guzman Cario through an of private property to be redistributed for public
Absolute Deed of Sale. Thereafter, Guzman use without just compensation.
performed all acts of ownership over the land. The recognition, respect, and protection
He filed an opposition to the petition of the heirs of the rights of indigenous peoples to preserve
of Ting-el Dicman establishing ownership over and develop their cultures, traditions, and
the questioned land. It was found by the court institutions are vital concerns of the State and
that Lot 76-A belongs to the Dicmans. But there constitute important public policies which bear
are still adverse claims over Lot 76-B. Thus, upon this case. To give life and meaning unto
hearings should still be held. these policies the legislature saw it fit to enact
Meanwhile, on January 8, 1960, while Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as The
the foregoing petition was pending in the trial Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997, as a
court, President Carlos P. Garcia issued culminating measure to affirm the views and
Proclamation No. 628 "excluding from the opinions of indigenous peoples and ethnic
operation of the Baguio Townsite Reservation minorities on matters that affect their life and
certain parcels of public land known as 'Igorot culture. The provisions of that law unify an
Claims' situated in the City of Baguio and otherwise fragmented account of constitutional,
declaring the same open to disposition under the jurisprudential and statutory doctrine which
provisions of Chapter VII of the Public Land Act." enjoins the organs of government to be vigilant
The Proclamation further provided that the "Igorot for the protection of indigenous cultural
Claims" enumerated therein shall be "subject to communities as a marginalized sector, to protect
the condition that except in favor of the their ancestral domain and ancestral lands and
government or any of its branches, units, or ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-
institutions, lands acquired by virtue of this being, and to guard their patrimony from those
proclamation shall not be encumbered or inclined to prey upon their ignorance or ductility.
alienated within a period of fifteen years from and As the final arbiter of disputes and the last
after the date of issuance of patent." One such bulwark of the Rule of Law this Court has always
claim pertained to the "Heirs of Dicman," been mindful of the highest edicts of social justice
Before the trial court could dispose of especially where doubts arise in the interpretation
the case, the Supreme Court promulgated and application of the law. But when in the
Republic v. Marcos which held that Courts of pursuit of the loftiest ends ordained by the
First Instance of Baguio have no jurisdiction to Constitution this Court finds that the law is clear
reopen judicial proceedings on the basis of and leaves no room for doubt, it shall decide
Republic Act No. 931. As a consequence, on July according to the principles of right and justice as
all people conceive them to be, and with due

appreciation of the rights of all persons
concerned.


Case Digests in Polirev

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Case Digests in Polirev

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Case Digests in Polirev

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Alliance for Alternative Action

THE ADONIS CASES 2014-2015

The act of ratification is the act of voting

FACTS: MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS

San Beda College of Law 1

business of respondent GSIS being a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is

HELD: held that the Court in construing a Constitution

IMBONG VS. COMELEC

San Beda College of Law 4

FERNANDO, C.J.: President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E.

proposing these amendments. These three

CONCEPT OF THE STATE PER CURIAM:

San Beda College of Law 14

In a letter addressed to petitioner Secondly, whatever acts or utterances

The Sandiganbayan denied private Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.

ISSUE: Is the PCGG immune from suit? ISSUE:

FACTS: THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY

As held in United States of America v. ISSUE:

PNB VS. PABALAN

ISSUE: Whether the CAA, being an agency of

In such a case, the monetary judgment may be AND STATE POLICIES

ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES The promulgation of said executive order is an

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents, in ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

HELD: ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

However, in February, 1989, A.T. Chong,

The expropriation before us affects all private

ISSUE: Moreover, the provision as written leaves

everybody equally without discrimination, Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by

HELD: Except, perhaps when it is clear that the

official records," the Constitution does not GRP.

The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern

two-thirds consists of currency in circulation. province to another for the purpose of

San Beda College of Law 49

Issue: Whether or not the Bureau of

Held: NO. To compel print media companies to Sumulong v. Guerrero

San Beda College of Law 55

POWER OF TAXATION prohibiting members of Congress from being

Issue: Is this ordinance and the law authorizing it

San Beda College of Law 57

San Beda College of Law 60

The minimum requirements of due process

voluntariness and validity of the affidavit of The respondent Judge committed

Issue: Whether the NTC is required to provide

of the death of Leonardo Villa, petitioner Cynthia

legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is

intervenors with their own motion for

San Beda College of Law 73

constitutional rights, be invoked against the

PEOPLE vs. MARTI Facts: Upon application of the officers of the

persons, houses, papers and

Held: YES. Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III

San Beda College of Law 81

warrant is not a sweeping authority purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court

Facts: Pat. Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalados

San Beda College of Law 83

insurgency movement, so clearly whose object is either to determine the identity of

CHUCHI Eh, di sana individual and the constitutional protection is ever

'Public policy, the welfare of