Stuff
Stuff
Stuff
Augustine's Press
Sumrna Philosophica
Socrates 'Students
The Platonic Tradition
Socratic Logic
Edition 3.1
by Peter Kreeft
Edited by Trent Dougherty
S T AUGUSTINE'S PRESS
South Bend, Indiana
Copyright 2004, 2005, 2008, 2010, 2014 by Peter Kreeft
3 4 5 6 20 19 18 17 16 15 14
PREFACE ix
INTRODUCTION 1
1. W h a t g o o d is logic? 1
2. S e v e n t e e n w a y s this b o o k is different 9
3. T h e t w o logics (P) # 15
4. All of logic in two pages: an overview (B)* 26
5. T h e three acts o f the m i n d (B) 28
I. T H E F I R S T A C T O F T H E M I N D : U N D E R S T A N D I N G 35
1. Understanding: the thing that distinguishes man from
both beast and c o m p u t e r (P) 35
2. Concepts, t e r m s and w o r d s (P) 40
3. T h e " p r o b l e m of universals" (P) 41
4. T h e extension and comprehension of terms 43
II. T E R M S 47
1. Classifying terms 47
2. Categories (B) 54
3. Predicables (B) 56
4. Division and Outlining (B) 62
III. M A T E R I A L FALLACIES 68
1. Fallacies of language 71
2. Fallacies of diversion 80
3. Fallacies of oversimplification 86
4. Fallacies of argumentation 92
VII. C O N T R A D I C T I O N 173
1. What is contradiction? (B) 173
2. The Square of Opposition (B) 174
3. Existential import (P) 179
4. Tricky propositions on the Square 181
5. Some practical uses of the Square of Opposition 183
IX. D I F F E R E N T K I N D S O F A R G U M E N T S 200
1. T h r e e m e a n i n g s o f " b e c a u s e " 200
2. T h e four c a u s e s (P) 202
3. A classification o f arguments 205
4. S i m p l e argument m a p s (B) 206
5. Deductive and inductive reasoning (B) 210
6. C o m b i n i n g induction and deduction: Socratic method (P) 211
X. S Y L L O G I S M S 215
1. T h e structure and strategy of the syllogism (B) 215
2. T h e skeptic's objection to the syllogism (P) 219
3. T h e empiricist's objection to the syllogism (P) 222
4. Demonstrative syllogisms 230
5. H o w to construct convincing syllogisms (B) 232
XII. M O R E D I F F I C U L T S Y L L O G I S M S 264
1. Enthymemes: abbreviated syllogisms (B) 264
2. Sorites: chain syllogisms 275
3. Epicheiremas: multiple syllogisms (B) 279
4. Complex argument maps 282
XIII. C O M P O U N D S Y L L O G I S M S 289
1. Hypothetical syllogisms (B) 289
2. "Reductio ad absurdum " arguments 294
3. T h e practical syllogism: arguing about means and ends 296
4. Disjunctive syllogisms (B) 301
5. Conjunctive syllogisms (B) 303
6. Dilemmas (B) 306
XIV. I N D U C T I O N 313
1. What is induction? 313
2. Generalization 315
3. Causal arguments: Mill's methods 319
viii SOCRATIC LOG1C
XV. S O M E P R A C T I C A L A P P L I C A T I O N S O F L O G I C 342
1. How to write a logical essay 342
2. How to write a Socratic dialogue 344
3. How to have a Socratic debate 348
4. H o w to use Socratic m e t h o d on difficult people 350
5. How to read a book Somatically 355
XVI. S O M E P H I L O S O P H I C A L A P P L I C A T I O N S O F L O G I C 358
1. Logic and theology (P) 358
2. Logic and metaphysics (P) 359
3. Logic and cosmology (P) 360
4. Logic and philosophical anthropology (P) 361
5. Logic and epistemology (P) 362
6. Logic and ethics (P) 362
APPENDIX: P R O B L E M S W I T H M A T H E M A T I C A L L O G I C 364
1. Basic modern logic 364
2. The paradoxes of material implication 366
3. Responses to the paradoxes of material implication 367
ANSWERS T O E V E N - N U M B E R E D E X E R C I S E S 370
(1) No other logic text explicitly sets out to train little Socrateses.
(2) No other logic text in print is so explicitly philosophical in a classical,
Platonic way.
(3) And only two or three other, shorter, formal logic texts bypass mathe-
matical and symbolic logic for the "Aristotelian" logic of real people.
X SOCRATIC LOGIC
real inquiry, and real conversations. (The only other alternative to sym-
bolic logic available today is "informal logic" or "rhetoric." This is use-
ful, but less exact and less philosophical.)
Introduction
Section 1. What good is logic?
This section will give you 13 good reasons why you should study logic.1
1. Order. You may be wondering, "What can I do with logic?" The answer
is that logic can do something with you. Logic builds the mental habit of
thinking in an orderly way. A course in logic will do this for you even if you
forget every detail in it (which you won't, by the way), just as learning Latin will
make you more habitually aware of the structure of language even if you forget
every particular Latin word and rule.
No course is more practical than logic, for no matter what you are thinking
about, you are thinking, and logic orders and clarifies your thinking. No matter
what your thought's content, it will be clearer when it has a more logical form.
The principles of thinking logically can be applied to all thinking and to every
field.
Logic studies the forms or structures of thought. Thought has form and
structure too, just as the material universe does. Thought is not like a blank
screen, that receives its form only from the world that appears on it, as a movie
screen receives a movie. This book will show you the basic forms (structures)
and the basic laws (rules) of thought, just as a course in physics or chemistry
shows you the basic forms and laws of matter.
2. Power. Logic has power: the power of proof and thus persuasion. Any
power can be either rightly used or abused. This power of logic is rightly used to
win the truth and defeat error; it is wrongly used to win the argument and defeat
1 Making numbered lists like this is the first and simplest way we learn to order "the
buzzing, blooming confusion" that is our world. Children, "primitive" peoples, and
David Letterman love to make lists. Thus we find "twelve-step programs," "the Ten
Commandments," "the Seven Wonders of the World" "the Five Pillars of Islam," "the
Four Noble Truths," and "the Three Things More Miserable Than a Wet Chicken." To
make a list is to classify many things under one general category, and at the same time to
distinguish these things by assigning them different numbers.
2 INTRODUCTION
3. Reading. Logic will help you with all your other courses, for logic will
help you to read any book more clearly and effectively. And you are always
going to be reading books; books arc the single most effective technological
invention in the history of education. On the basis of over 40 years of full time
college teaching of almost 20,000 students at 20 different schools, I am con-
vinced that one of the reasons for the steep decline in students' reading ability is
the decline in the teaching of traditional logic.
Mortimer Adler's classic How to Read a Book is based on the traditional
common-sense logic of the "three acts of the mind" that you will learn in this
book. If I were a college president, I would require every incoming freshman to
read Adler's book and pass a test on it before taking other courses. (The most
important points of that book are summarized in this book on p. 355.)
4. Writing. Logic will also help you to write more clearly and effective-
ly, for clear writing and clear thinking are a "package deal": the presence or
absence of either one brings the presence or absence of the other. Muddled writ-
ing fosters muddled thinking, and muddled thinking fosters muddled writing.
Clear writing fosters clear thinking, and clear thinking fosters clear writing.
Common sense expects this, and scientific studies confirm it. Writing skills
have declined dramatically in the 40 years or so since symbolic logic has
replaced Aristotelian logic, and I am convinced this is no coincidence.
There is nothing more effective than traditional logic in training you to be a
clear, effective, and careful writer. It is simply impossible to communicate clear-
ly and effectively without thinking clearly and effectively. And that means logic.
5. Happiness. In a small but significant way, logic can even help you
attain happiness.
We all seek happiness all the time because no matter what else we seek, we
seek it because we think it will be a means to happiness, or a part of happiness,
cither for ourselves or for those we love. And no one seeks happiness for any
other end; no one says he wants to be happy in order to be rich, or wise, or
healthy. But we seek riches, or wisdom, or health, in order to be happier.
How can logic help us to attain happiness? Here is a very logical answer to
that question:
(1) When we attain what we desire, we are happy.
(2) And whatever we desire, whether Heaven or a hamburger, it is more like-
ly that we will attain it if we think more clearly.
(3) And logic helps us to think more clearly.
(4) Therefore logic helps us to be happy.
No other things that make us happy are contradicted or threatened by logic,
though many people think they are:
Beauty, for instance. There is nothing illogical about the beauty of a sunset,
or a storm, or a baby.
Take heroism, or even holiness. What's illogical about being very, very
good?
Even fantasy is not illogical. In fact, according to the greatest master of this
art, J.R.R. Tolkien, "Fantasy is a rational, not an irrational, activity . . . creative
fantasy is founded upon the hard recognition that things are so in the world as it
appears under the sun; on a recognition of fact, but not a slavery to it. So upon
logic was founded the nonsense that displays itself in the tales and rhymes of
Lewis Carroll. If men really could not distinguish between frogs and men, fairy-
stories about frog-kings would not have arisen." ("On Fairy-Stories") The refer-
ence to Lewis Carroll (the author of Alice in Wonderland) is particularly telling.
Lewis Carroll was a pseudonym or pen name for Rev. Charles Lutwidge
Dodgson, an Oxford mathematician who wrote a textbook on logic. In fact, he
was working on volume two when he died.
6. Religious faith. All religions require faith. Is logic the ally or enemy of
faith?
Even religion, though it goes beyond logic, cannot go against it; if it did, it
4 INTRODUCTION
would literally be unbelievable. Some wit defined "faith" as "believing what you
know isn't true." But we simply cannot believe an idea to be true that we know
has been proved to be false by a valid logical proof.
It is true that faith goes beyond what can be proved by logical reasoning
alone. That is why believing in any religion is a free personal choice, and some
make that choice while others do not, while logical reasoning is equally com-
pelling for all. However, logic can aid faith in at least three ways. (And thus, if
faith significantly increases human happiness, as most psychologists believe, it
logically follows that logic can significantly increase happiness.)
First, logic can often clarify what is believed, and define it.
Second, logic can deduce the necessary consequences of the belief, and
apply it to difficult situations. For instance, it can show that if it is true, as the
Bible says, that "God works all things together for good for those who love
Him" (Romans 8:28), then it must also be true that even seemingly terrible
things like pain, death, and martyrdom will work together for good; and this
can put these terrible things in a new light and give us a motive for enduring
them with hope.
Third, even if logical arguments cannot prove all that faith believes, they can
give firmer reasons for faith than feeling, desire, mood, fashion, family or social
pressure, conformity, or inertia. For instance, if you believe the idea mentioned
above, that "all things work together for good for those who love God," simply
because you feel good today, you will probably stop believing it tomorrow when
you feel miserable; or if you believe it only because your friends or family do,
you will probably stop believing it when you are away from your friends or fam-
ily. But if you have logical grounds for believing this, even though those grounds
are not a compelling proof, they can keep your faith more firmly anchored dur-
ing storms of changing feelings, fashions, friends, etc.
How could there be logical grounds for such a belief as this (that "all things
work together for good") that seems to contradict common sense and experi-
ence? Some logical grounds might be the following: this conclusion can be log-
ically deduced from four premises which are much easier to believe: (1) that
God exists, (2) that God is the Creator of the universe and thus all-powerful, (3)
that God is the source of all goodness and thus all-good, and (4) that God is the
source of all design and order in the universe and thus all-wise. A God who is
all-powerful is in control of everything He created; a God who is all-good wills
only good to everything He created; and a God who is all-wise knows what is
ultimately for the best for everyone and everything He created. So to deny that
all things are foreseen and allowed by God for the ultimate good of those He
loves, i.e. wills goodness to, is to deny either God's existence, power, goodness,
or wisdom. In a logical argument, you cannot deny the conclusion without deny-
ing a premise, and you cannot admit the premises without admitting the conclu-
sion. The logical chains of argument can thus bind our minds, and through them
also even our feelings (to a certain degree), to God and to hope and to happiness.
What good is logic? 5
And if these four more basic premises of God's existence, power, goodness,
and wisdom are questioned, logic may also help to establish them by further rea-
sonable arguments (e.g. the traditional arguments for the existence of God); and
perhaps logic can give good grounds for the premises of those arguments too.
The point is not that logic can prove religious beliefs - that would dispense
with the need for faith - but that it can strengthen them (and thus also the hap-
piness that goes with them). And if it does not - if clear, honest, logical think-
ing leads you to tftsbelieve something you used to believe, like Santa Claus
then that is progress too, for truth should trump even happiness. If we are hon-
est and sane, we want not just any happiness, but true happiness.
8. Democracy. There are even crucial social and political reasons for
studying logic. As a best-selling modern logic text says, "the success of democ-
racy depends, in the end, on the reliability of the judgments we citizens make,
and hence upon our capacity and determination to weigh arguments and evi-
dence rationally." As Thomas Jefferson said, "In a republican nation, whose cit-
izens are to be led by reason and persuasion and not by force, the art of reason-
ing becomes of the first importance." (Copi & Cohen, Logic, 10th edition,
Prentice-Hall, 1998).
9. Defining logic's limits. Does logic have limits? Yes, but we need logic to
recognize and define logic's limits.
Logic has severe limits. We need much more than logic even in our think-
ing. For instance, we need intuition too. But logic helps us to recognize this dis-
tinction.
In our lives, logical arguments are always embedded in a human context that
is interpersonal, emotional, intuitive, and assumed rather than proved; and this
colors the proper interpretation of a logical argument. For instance, in 1637
Dcscartes said "I think, therefore I am"; 370 years later, a bumper sticker says
"I bitch, therefore I am." The logical form of both arguments is the same, but the
contexts are radically different. Descartes was seriously trying to refute skepti-
cism (the belief that we cannot be certain of anything) by a purely theoretical
argument, while the bumper sticker was making a joke. We laugh at it because
we intuitively understand that it means "Don't complain at my bitching; bitch-
ing makes me feel more 'real,' more alive." Logical thinking alone cannot know
this, but it can know what its limits are: it can distinguish what it can understand
from what it can't (non-logical factors such as humor and feeling and intuition).
6 INTRODUCTION
11. Recognizing contradictions. One of the things you will learn in this
course is exactly what contradiction means, how to recognize it, and what to do
with it. Logic teaches us which ideas contradict each other. If we are confused
about that, we will be either too exclusive (that is, we will think beliefs logical-
ly exclude each other when they do not) or too inclusive (that is, we will believe
two things that cannot both be true).
When we consider two different ideas which seem to contradict each other,
we need to know three things:
(1) First of all, we need to know exactly what each one means. Only then
can we know whether they really contradict each other or not.
(2) And if they do, we need to know which one is true and which is false.
(3) And we do this by finding reasons why one idea is true and another is
false.
These are the "three acts of the mind": understanding a meaning, judging
what is true, and reasoning. These are the three parts of logic which you will
learn in this course.
12. Certainty. Logic has "outer limits"; there are many things it can't give
you. But logic has no "inner limits": like math, it never breaks down. Just as 2
plus 2 are unfailingly 4, so if A is B and B is C, then A is unfailingly C. Logic
is timeless and unchangeable. It is certain. It is not certain that the sun will rise
tomorrow (it is only very, very probable). But it is certain that it either will or
won't. And it is certain that if it's true that it will, then it's false that it won't.
In our fast-moving world, much of what we learn goes quickly out of date. "He
who weds the spirit of the times quickly becomes a widower," says G.K. Chesterton.
But logic never becomes obsolete. The principles of logic are timelessly true.
Our discovery of these principles, of course, changes and progresses
through history. Aristotle knew more logic than Homer and we know more than
Aristotle, as Einstein knew more physics than Newton and Newton knew more
than Aristotle.
What good is logic?
13. Truth. Our last reason for studying logic is the simplest and most impor-
tant of all. It is that logic helps us to find truth, and truth is its own end: it is
worth knowing for its own sake.
Logic helps us to find truth, though it is not sufficient of itself to find truth.
It helps us especially (1) by demanding that we define our terms so that we
understand what we mean, and (2) by demanding that we give good reasons,
arguments, proofs.
These are the two main roads to truth, as you will see more clearly when
you read Chapter II, on the three "acts of the mind": understanding, judging, and
reasoning. Truth is found only in "the second act of the mind," judging - e.g. the
judgment that "all men are mortal." But two paths to truth are "the first act of
the mind" (e.g. understanding the meaning of the terms "men" and "mortal")
and "the third act of the mind" (e.g. reasoning that "since all men have animal
bodies, and whatever has an animal body is mortal, therefore all men are mor-
tal"). These are the two main ways logic helps us to find truth.
Truth is worth knowing just for the sake of knowing it because truth fulfills
and perfects our minds, which are part of our very essence, our deep, distinctive-
ly human core, our very selves. Truth is to our minds what food is to our bodies.
Aristotle pointed out, twenty-four centuries ago, that there are three reasons
for pursuing truth and three corresponding kinds of "sciences" (in the older,
broader sense of the word "sciences," namely "rational explanations through
causes"). He called the three kinds of sciences (1) "productive sciences," (2)
"practical sciences," and (3) "theoretical sciences." Each pursues truth for a dif-
ferent end:
(I) We want to know about the world so that we can change it, improve it,
and make things out of it (like rubber, or roads, or rockcts, or robots).
8 INTRODUCTION
This is what Aristotle called "productive science? since its end is to pro-
duce things. We call it "technology" after the Greek word techne, which
means approximately "know-how" knowing how to make or fix or
improve some material thing in the world. "Productive scicnces"
include things as diverse as engineering, surgery, auto repair, cooking,
and cosmetics.
(2) We also want to know about ourselves so that we can change and
improve our own lives, our behavior, our activities. Aristotle called this
"practical science," knowledge in practice, in action. "Practical sci-
ences" include ethics and politics as well as knowing how to do things
as diverse as economics, singing, and surfing.
(3) But most of all, we want to know simply in order to know, i.e. to become
larger on the inside, as it were, to "expand our consciousness." Sciences
that pursue this end Aristotle called "theoretical sciences," from the
Greek word theoria, which means "looking" or "contemplating."
("Theoretical" does not necessarily mean "uncertain" or "merely hypo-
thetical") Theoretical sciences include such diverse things as physics,
biology, theology, mathematics, astronomy, and philosophy. These all
have practical applications and uses, but they are first of all aimed at
simply knowing and understanding the truth, even if there is no practi-
cal application of it.
Many people today think that theoretical sciences are the least important
because they are not practical. But Aristotle argued that the theoretical sciences
were the most important for the same reason that practical sciences were more
important than productive scienccs: because their " p a y o f f " is more intimate,
their reward closer to home. For they improve our very selves, while practical
sciences improve our actions and lives, and productive sciences improve our
world. All three are important, but just as our lives are more intimate to us than
our external world, so our very selves are even more intimate to us than our lives,
our deeds, and certainly more intimate and more important to us than the mate-
rial things in our world. As a very famous and very practical philosopher argued
twenty centuries ago, "What does it profit a man to gain the whole world but
lose his own self?" (Mark 8:36)
The original meaning of a "liberal arts" education was this: the study of the
truth for its own sake, not only for the sake of what you can do with it or what
you can make with it. The term "liberal arts" comes from Aristotle: he said that
just as a man is called "free" when he exists for his own sake and a "slave" when
he exists for the sake of another man, so these studies are called "free" ("liber-
al" or liberating) because they exist for their own sake and not for the sake of
anything else.
Logic will prove very useful to you in many ways, but its most important
use is simply to help you to sec more clearly what is true and what is false.
Logic alone will not tell you what is true. It will only aid you in discovering
Seventeen ways this book is different 9
truth. You also need experience, to get your premises; logic can then draw your
conclusions. Logic will tell you that if all leprechauns are elves and all hobbits
arc leprechauns, then it necessarily follows that all hobbits are elves; but logic
will not tell you whether all leprechauns are elves, or even whether there are any
leprechauns. (I once asked my very Irish neighbor whether she believes in lep-
rechauns and she answered, "Of course not But they exist all the same, mind
you." Perhaps the Irish should write their own logic textbook.)
To have logical clarity and consistency is admirable. But to have only logi-
cal clarity and consistency is pitiful. In fact, it is a mark of insanity, as G.K.
Chesterton pointed out:
"If you argue with a madman, it is extremely probable that you will get
the worst of it; for in many ways his mind moves all the quicker for not
being delayed by the things that go with good judgment. He is not ham-
pered by a sense of humour or charity, or by the dumb certainties of
experience. . . . Indeed, the common phrase for insanity is in this
respect a misleading one. The madman is not the man who has lost his
reason. The madman is the man who has lost everything except his rea-
son . . . if a man says that he is the rightful King of England, it is no
complete answer to say that the existing authorities call him mad; for if
he were King of England that might be the wisest thing for the existing
authorities to do. Or if a man says that he is Jesus Christ, it is no answer
to tell him that the world denies his divinity; for the world denied
Christ's . . . his mind moves in a perfect but narrow circle. A small cir-
cle is quite as infinite as a large circle; but, though it is quite as infi-
nite, it is not so large. In the same way the insane explanation is quite
as complete as the sane one, but it is not so large.... 'So you are the
Creator and Redeemer of the world: but what a small world it must be!
What a little heaven you must inhabit, with angels no bigger than but-
terflies! How sad it must be to be God; and an inadequate God! Is there
really no life fuller and no love more marvelous than yours? . . . How
much happier you would be, how much more of you there would be, if
the hammer of a higher God could smash your small cosmos, scatter-
ing the stars like spangles, and leave you in the open, free like other
men to look up as well as down!'... Curing a madman is not arguing
with a philosopher; it is casting out a devil." (Orthodoxy)
1. It's simple. It's better for most students because it's not the best, i.e. the
10 INTRODUCTION
Newtonian physics, with its basic laws of motion and its principles of simple
machines. Though Einstein is theoretically superior. Newton is still much more
practical for beginners. I think I have never found anyone except a professional
philosopher who actually used symbolic logic in actual conversation or debate.
5. It's readable. Its linguistic style is popular, personal, informal, light, and
sometimes even humorous.
3 Interestingly, Christian apologist C.S. Lewis was once confused with C.I. Lewis, who
went on to be an important developer of symbolic logic. When CS. Lewis saw a review
of The Principles of Symbolic Logic which attributed the work to him, he wrote to his
father "1 am writing back to tell them that they have got rather muddled. Symbolic Logic
forsooth!" (Letters, 25 May 1919).
Se\'enteen w ays this book is different 13
11. It's flexible. The division into so many sections gives the teacher the
option to select a "mix and match" of sections in many different ways, depend-
ing on the emphasis desired.
There are four kinds of sections: basic logic, advanced logic, practical appli-
cations, and philosophical logic. The Table of Contents marks the basic sections
"(B)", marks the philosophical sections "(P)", and puts the practical application
14 INTRODUCTION
sections in Chapter 15. This allows the book to be used in at least ten different
ways, ranging from the very short to the very long:
(1) the bare basics only
(2) the basic sections plus the philosophical sections
(3) the basic sections plus the more advanced sections in logic
(4) the basic sections plus the practical application sections
(5) the basic sections plus any two of these three additions
(6) all of the book
(7) all or some of it supplemented by a text in symbolic logic
(8) all or some of it supplemented by a text in inductive logic
(9) all or some of it supplemented by a text in rhetoric or informal logic
(10) all or some of it supplemented by readings in and applications to the
great philosophers
The first option should take about half a semester, (2) through (6) a whole
semester, and (7) through (10) up to two semesters. In a one-semester, 14-week,
one-class-a-week course, you can combine any or all of the following chapters
into single-class lessons: (1) the Introduction and chapter 1; (2) chapters 6 and
7; (3) chapters 8 and 9; (4) chapters 10 and 11; (5) chapters 15 and 16.
12. It's short. The first few options above give you a short, basic, no-frills,
no-fat logic text.
13. It's selective. It emphasizes a relatively small number of "big ideas"
that the student will always need and use and remember, rather than the usual
logic text's many "bells and whistles" that students will rarely use.
14. It's innovative where it needs to be. It includes some specific things
most other logic texts do not, such as:
15. It's interactive. It includes many exercises, because this is how a logic
course "takes" in students' minds and lives. It is more effective to master a few
important principles, by much practice, than to be exposed to so many principles
and so little practice that you cannot remember and apply the principles after the
course is over. We remember general principles only by particular experiences
in applying them. (This "practical empiricism" is part of the Aristotelian her-
itage behind the book.)
A suggestion for teachers: Instead of lecturing on the text, which would
probably be only rehashing it, let it teach itself, but leave plenty of time for stu-
dent questions on it.
A suggested class format: (1) first, discuss all student questions about the
pages that were assigned, including exercises; (2) then, a short quiz (weekly or
even daily); (3) then go over the correct answers to the quiz, so students can
immediately learn from their mistakes; (4) then introduce the next assignment.
One more suggestion: If there are not enough questions, and only a small
number of students, require at least two written questions from each student at the
very beginning of each class, for you to answer (or have other students answer).
16. It's holistic. It emphasizes the whole, the "big picture," the structure
and outline of the whole of logic. It repeatedly situates each topic within the
"three acts of the mind" overview of the course, so that the student has a sense
of where everything fits, and does not feel lost. (Teachers tend to underestimate
this need for a continual orientation check, and how much confidence it gives
the confused student.)
mathematics seems. Its forte is quantity, not quality. Mathematics is the only
totally clear, utterly unambiguous language in the world; yet it cannot say any-
thing very interesting about anything very important Compare the exercises in
a symbolic logic text with those in this text How many are taken from the Great
Books? How many are from conversations you could have had in real life?
(2) A second reason for the popularity of symbolic logic is probably its
more scientific and exact form. The very artificiality of its language is a plus for
its defenders. But it is a minus for ordinary people. In fact, Ludwig Wittgenstein,
probably the most influential philosophical logician of the 20th century, admit-
ted, in Philosophical Investigations, that "because of the basic differences
between natural and artificial languages, often such translations [between natu-
ral-language sentences and artificial symbolic language] are not even possible
in principle." "Many logicians now agree that the methods of symbolic logic are
of little practical usefulness in dealing with much reasoning encountered in real-
life situations" (Stephen N. Thomas, Practical Reasoning in Natural Language,
Prentice-Hall, 1973).
- And in philosophy! "However helpful symbolic logic may be as a tool of
t h e . . . sciences, it is [relatively] useless as a tool of philosophy. Philosophy aims
at insight into principles and into the relationship of conclusions to the princi-
ples from which they are derived. Symbolic logic, however, does not aim at giv-
ing such insight" (Andrew Bachhuber, Introduction to Logic (New York:
Appleton-Century Crofts, 1957), p. 318).
(3) But there is a third reason for the popularity of symbolic logic among
philosophers, which is more substantial, for it involves a very important differ-
ence in philosophical belief. The old, Aristotelian logic was often scorned by
20th-century philosophers because it rests on two commonsensical but unfash-
ionable philosophical presuppositions. The technical names for them arc "epis-
temological realism" and "metaphysical realism." These two positions were held
by the vast majority of all philosophers for over 2000 years (roughly, from
Socrates to the 18th century) and are still held by most ordinary people today,
since they seem so commonsensical, but they were not held by many of the
influential philosophers of the past three centuries.
(The following summary should not scare off beginners; it is much more
abstract and theoretical than most of the rest of this book.)
The first of these two presuppositions, "epistemological realism," is the
belief that the object of human reason, when reason is working naturally and
rightly, is objective reality as it really is; that human reason can know objective
reality, and can sometimes know it with certainty; that when we say "two apples
plus two apples must always be four apples," or that "apples grow on trees," we
are saying something true about the universe, not just about how we think or
about how we choose to use symbols and words. Today many philosophers arc
18 INTRODUCTION
skeptical of this belief, and call it naive, largely because of two 18th-century
"Enlightenment" philosophers, Hume and Kant.
Hume inherited from his predecessor Locke the fatal assumption that the
immediate object of human knowledge is our own ideas rather than objective
reality. Locke naively assumed that we could know that these ideas "corre-
sponded" to objective reality, somewhat like photographs; but it is difficult to
see how we can be sure any photograph accurately corresponds to the real object
of which it is a photograph if the only things we can ever know directly are pho-
tographs and not real objects. Hume drew the logical conclusion of skepticism
from Locke s premise.
Once he limited the objects of knowledge to our own ideas, Hume then dis-
tinguished two kinds of propositions expressing these ideas: what he called
"matters of fact" and "relations of ideas."
What Hume called "relations of ideas" are essentially what Kant later called
"analytic propositions" and what logicians now call "tautologies": propositions
that are true by definition, true only because their predicate merely repeats all or
part of their subject (e.g. "Trees are trees" or "Unicorns are not non-unicorns"
or "Unmarried men are men").
What Hume called "matters of fact" are essentially what Kant called "syn-
thetic propositions," propositions whose predicate adds some new information
to the subject (like "No Englishman is 25 feet tall" or "Some trees never shed
their leaves"); and these "matters of fact," according to Hume, could be known
only by sense observation. Thus they were always particular (e.g. "These two
men are bald") rather than universal (e.g. "All men are mortal"), for we do not
sense universals (like "all men"), only particulars (like "these two men").
Common sense says that we can be certain of some universal truths, e.g.
that all men are mortal, and therefore that Socrates is mortal because he is a
man. But according to Hume we cannot be certain of universal truths like "all
men are mortal" because the only way we can come to know them is by gener-
alizing from particular sense experiences (this man is mortal, and that man is
mortal, etc.); and we cannot sense all men, only some, so our generalization can
only be probable. Hume argued that particular facts deduced from these only-
probable general principles could never be known or predicted with certainty. If
it is only probably true that all men are mortal, then it is only probably true that
Socrates is mortal. The fact that we have seen the sun rise millions of times does
not prove that it will necessarily rise tomorrow.
Hume's "bottom line" conclusion from this analysis is skepticism: there is
no certain knowledge of objective reality ("matters of fact"), only of our own
ideas ("relations of ideas"). We have only probable knowledge of objective real-
ity. Even scientific knowledge, Hume thought, was only probable, not certain,
because science assumes the principle of causality, and this principle, according
to Hume, is only a subjective association of ideas in our minds. Because we have
seen a "constant conjunction" of birds and eggs, because we have seen eggs
The two logics 19
follow birds so often, we naturally assume that the bird is the cause of the egg.
But we do not see causality itself, the causal relation itself between the bird and
the egg. And we certainly do not see (with our eyes) the universal "principle of
causality." So Hume concluded that we do not really have the knowledge of
objective reality that we naturally think we have. We must be skeptics, if we are
only Humean beings.
Kant accepted most of Hume's analysis but said, in effect, "I Kant accept
your skeptical conclusion." He avoided this conclusion by claiming that human
knowledge does not fail to do its job because its job is not to conform to objec-
tive reality (or "things-in-themselves," as he called it), i.e. to correspond to it or
copy it. Rather, knowledge constructs or forms reality as an artist constructs or
forms a work of art. The knowing subject determines the known object rather
than vice versa. Human knowledge does its job very well, but its job is not to
learn what is, but to make what is, to form it and structure it and impose mean-
ings on it. (Kant distinguished three such levels of imposed meanings: the two
"forms of apperception": time and space; twelve abstract logical "categories"
such as causality, necessity, and relation; and the three "ideas of pure reason":
God, self, and world.) Thus the world of experience is formed by our knowing it
rather than our knowledge being formed by the world. Kant called this idea his
"Copernican Revolution in philosophy." It is sometimes called "epistemological
idealism" or "Kantian idealism," to distinguish it from epistemological realism.
("Epistemology" is that division of philosophy which studies human know-
ing. The term "epistemological idealism" is sometimes is used in a different way,
to mean the belief that ideas rather than objective reality are the objects of our
knowledge; in that sense, Locke and Hume are epistemological idealists too. But
if we use "epistemological idealism" to mean the belief that the human idea (or
knowing, or consciousness) determines its object rather than being determined
by it, then Kant is the first epistemological idealist.)
The "bottom line" for logic is that if you agree with either Hume or Kant,
logic becomes the mere manipulation of our symbols, not the principles for a
true orderly knowledge of an ordered world. For instance, according to episte-
mological idealism, general "categories" like "relation" or "quality" or "cause"
or "time" are only mental classifications we make, not real features of the world
that we discover.
In such a logic, "genus" and "species" mean something very different than
in Aristotelian logic: they mean only any larger class and smaller sub-class that
we mentally construct. But for Aristotle a "genus" is the general or common part
of a thing's real essential nature (e.g. "animal" is man's genus), and a "species"
is the whole essence (e.g. "rational animal" is man's species). (See Chapter III,
Sections 2 and 3.)
Another place where modern symbolic logic merely manipulates mental
symbols while traditional Aristotelian logic expresses insight into objective real-
ity is the interpretation of a conditional (or "hypothetical") proposition such as
20 INTRODUCTION
"If it rains, I will get wet." Aristotelian logic, like common sense, interprets this
proposition as an insight into real causality: the rain causes me to get wet. I am
predicting the effect from the cause. But symbolic logic does not allow this com-
monsensical, realistic interpretation. It is skeptical of the "naive" assumption of
epistemological realism, that we can know real things like real causality; and
this produces the radically anti-commonsensical (or, as they say so euphemisti-
cally, "counter-intuitive") "problem of material implication" (see page 23).
Besides epistemological realism, Aristotelian logic also implicitly assumes
metaphysical realism. (Metaphysics is that division of philosophy which inves-
tigates what reality is; epistemology is that division of philosophy which inves-
tigates what knowing is.) Epistemological realism contends that the object of
intelligence is reality. Metaphysical realism contends that reality is intelligible;
that it includes a real order; that when we say "man is a rational animal," e.g. we
are not imposing an order on a reality that is really random or chaotic or
unknowable; that we are expressing our discovery of order, not our creation of
order; that "categories" like "man" or "animal" or "thing" or "attribute" are
taken from reality into our language and thought, not imposed on reality from
our language and thought.
Metaphysical realism naturally goes with epistemological realism.
Technically, metaphysical realism is the belief that universal concepts corre-
spond to reality; that things really have common natures; that "universals" such
as "human nature" are real and that we can know them.
There are two forms of metaphysical realism: Plato thought that these uni-
versals were real things in themselves, while Aristotle thought, more common-
sensically, that they were real aspects of things which we mentally abstracted
from things. (See Chapter II, Section 3, "The Problem of Universals")
The opposite of realism is "nominalism " the belief that universals are only
man-made nomini (names). William of Ockham (1285-1349) is the philosopher
who is usually credited (or debited) with being the founder of nominalism.
Aristotelian logic assumes both epistemological realism and metaphysical
realism because it begins with the "first act of the mind," the act of understand-
ing a universal, or a nature, or an essence (such as the nature of "apple" or
"man"). These universals, or essences, are known by concepts and expressed by
what logic calls "terms." Then two of these universal terms are related as sub-
jects and predicates of propositions (e.g. "Apples are fruits," or "Man is mor-
tal").
"Aristotle never intended his logic to be a merely formal calculus [like
mathematics]. He tied logic to his ontology [metaphysics]: thinking in concepts
presupposes that the world is formed of stable species" (J. Lenoble, La notion de
/'experience, Paris, 1930, p. 35).
Symbolic logic is a set of symbols and rules for manipulating them, with-
out needing to know their meaning and content, or their relationship to the real
world, their "truth" in the traditional, commonsensical sense of "truth." A
The two logics 21
Logic is deeply related to moral and ethical changes in both thought and
practice. All previous societies had a strong, nearly universal, and rarely ques-
tioned consensus about at least some basic aspects of a "natural moral law,"
about what was "natural" and what was "unnatural." There may not have been a
greater obedience to this law, but there was a much greater knowledge of it, or
agreement about it. Today, especially in the realm of sex (by far the most radi-
cally changed area of human life in both belief and practice), our more
"advanced" minds find the old language about "unnatural acts" not only "polit-
ically incorrect" but literally incomprehensible, because they no longer accept
the legitimacy of the very question of the "nature" of a thing. Issues like homo-
sexuality, contraception, masturbation, pedophilia, incest, divorce, adultery,
abortion, and even bestiality are increasingly debated in other terms than the
"nature" of sexuality, or the "nature" of femininity and masculinity. It is not an
unthinkable suspicion that one of the most powerful forces driving the new logic
is more social than philosophical, and more sexual than logical.
Symbolic logic naturally fosters utilitarian ethics, which is essentially an
ethic of consequences. The fundamental principle of utilitarianism is that an act
is good if its probable consequences result in "the greatest happiness for the
greatest number" of people. It is an " i f . . . then . . ." ethics of calculating con-
sequences - essentially, "the end justifies the means" (though that formula is
somewhat ambiguous). Symbolic logic fits this perfectly because it is essential-
ly an " i f . . . then . . . " logic, a calculation of logical consequences. Its basic unit
is the proposition (p or q) and its basic judgment is "if p then q." In contrast,
Aristotelian logic naturally fosters a "natural law ethic," an ethic of universal
principles, based on the nature of things, especially the nature of man. For its
basic unit is the term, a subject (S) or a predicate (P) within a proposition (p);
and its basic judgment is "all S is P" - a statement of universal truth about the
nature of S and P.
The very nature of reason itself is understood differently by the new sym-
bolic logic than it was by the traditional Aristotelian logic. "Reason" used to
mean essentially "all that distinguishes man from the beasts," including intu-
ition, understanding, wisdom, moral conscience, and aesthetic appreciation, as
well as calculation. "Reason" now usually means only the last of those powers.
That is why many thinkers today who seem at first quite sane in other ways actu-
ally believe that there is no fundamental difference between "natural intelli-
gence" and "artificial intelligence" - in other words, you are nothing but a com-
puter plus an ape. (Having met some of these people at MIT, I must admit that
their self-description sometimes seems quite accurate.)
Aristotelian logic is not exact enough for the nominalistic mathematical logi-
cian, and it is too exact for the pop psychology subjectivist or New Age mystic.
Out at sea there between Scylla and Charybdis, it reveals by contrast the double
tragedy of modern thought in its alienation between form and matter, structure
The two logics 23
and content, validity and meaning. This alienated mind was described memo-
rably by C.S. Lewis: "the two hemispheres of my brain stood in sharpest con-
trast. On the one hand, a glib and shallow rationalism. On the other, a many-
islanded sea of myth and poetry. Nearly all that I loved, I believed subjective.
Nearly all that was real, I thought grim and meaningless" (Surprised by Joy).
Neither mathematical logic nor "experience" can heal this gap; but Aristotelian
logic can. It is thought's soul and body together, yet not confused. Mathematical
logic alone is abstract and "angelistic," and sense experience and feeling alone
is concrete and "animalistic," but Aristotelian logic is a human instrument for
human beings.
Aristotelian logic is also easier, simpler, and therefore time-saving. For
example, in a logic text book misleadingly entitled Practical Reasoning in
Natural Language, the author takes six full pages of symbolic logic to analyze a
simple syllogism from Plato's Republic that proves that justice is not rightly
defined as "telling the truth and paying back what is owed" because returning a
weapon to a madman is not justice but it is telling the truth and paying back what
is owed. (pp. 224-30). Another single syllogism of Hume's takes eight pages to
analyze (pp. 278-86).
I have found that students who are well trained in Aristotelian logic are
much better at arguing, and at understanding arguments, than students who are
trained only in symbolic logic. For Aristotelian logic is the logic of the four most
basic verbal communication arts: reading, writing, listening, and speaking. It is
the logic of Socrates. If you want to be a Socrates, this is the logic you should
begin with.
The old logic is like the old classic movies: strong on substance rather than
sophistication. The new logic is like typically modern movies: strong on "spe-
cial effects" but weak on substance (theme, character, plot); strong on the tech-
nological "bells and whistles" but weak on the human side. But logic should be
a human instrument; logic was made for man, not man for logic.
true conclusion. But we can also use false propositions in good reasoning. Since
a false conclusion cannot be logically proved from true premises, we can know
that if the conclusion is false then one of the premises must also be false, in a
logically valid argument.
A logically valid argument is one in which the conclusion necessarily fol-
lows from its premises. In a logically valid argument, if the premises are true,
then the conclusion must be true. In an invalid argument this is not so. "All men
are mortal, and Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal" is a valid argu-
ment. "Dogs have four legs, and Lassie has four legs, therefore Lassie is a dog"
is not a valid argument. The conclusion ("Lassie is a dog") may be true, but it
has not been proved by this argument. It does not "follow" from the premises.
Now in Aristotelian logic, a true conclusion logically follows from, or is
proved by, or is "implied" by, or is validly inferred from, only some premises and
not others. The above argument about Lassie is not a valid argument according
to Aristotelian logic. Its premises do not prove its conclusion. And common
sense, or our innate logical sense, agrees. However, modern symbolic logic dis-
agrees. One of its principles is that "if a statement is true, then that statement is
implied by any statement whatever." Since it is true that Lassie is a dog, "dogs
have four legs" implies that Lassie is a dog. In fact, "dogs do not have four legs"
also implies that Lassie is a dog! Even false statements, even statements that are
self-contradictory, like "Grass is not grass," validly imply any true conclusion in
symbolic logic. And a second strange principle is that "if a statement is false,
then it implies any statement whatever." "Dogs do not have four legs" implies
that Lassie is a dog, and also that Lassie is not a dog, and that 2 plus 2 are 4, and
that 2 plus 2 are not 4.
This principle is often called "the paradox of material implication."
Ironically, "material implication" means exactly the opposite of what it seems to
mean. It means that the matter, or content, of a statement is totally irrelevant to
its logically implying or being implied by other statements. Common sense says
that Lassie being a dog or not being a dog has nothing to do with 2+2 being 4 or
not being 4, but that Lassie being a collie and collies being dogs does have
something to do with Lassie being a dog. But not in the new logic, which departs
from common sense here by totally sundering the rules for logical implication
from the matter, or content, of the propositions involved. Thus, the paradox
ought to be called "the paradox of wort-material implication."
The paradox can be seen in the following imaginary conversation:
Logician: So, class, you see, if you begin with a false premise, anything fol-
lows.
Student: I just can't understand that.
Logician: Are you sure you don't understand that?
Student: If I understand that, I'm a monkey's uncle.
Logician: My point exactly. (Snickers.)
Student: Whats so funny?
The two logics 25
(1) If the premise or premises (let's just say "the premise" for short) are true
and the conclusion is true, then the " i f . . . then" proposition summariz-
ing the implication is true. If p is true and q is true, then "if p then q" is
true. So "if grass is green, then Mars is red" is true.
(2) If the premise is true and the conclusion is false, then the " i f . . . then"
proposition summarizing the implication is false. If p is true and q is
false, then "if p then q" is false. So "if grass is green, then Mars is not
red" is false.
(3) If the premise is false and the conclusion is true, then the " i f . . . then"
proposition summarizing the implication is true. If p is false and q is
true, then "if p then q" is true. So "if grass is purple, then Mars is red"
is true.
(4) If the premise is false and the conclusion is false, then the " i f . . . then"
proposition summarizing the implication is true. If p is false and q is
false, then "if p then q" is true. So "if grass is purple, then Mars is pur-
ple" is also true!
In this logic, if the premise and the conclusion are both false, the premise
implies the conclusion (this is #4), and if the premise is false and the conclusion
is true, the premise also implies the conclusion (this is #3). So if the moon is
blue, then the moon is red (#4); and if the moon is blue, then the moon is not
blue (#3)! This may make some defensible sense mathematically, but it certain-
ly does not make sense commonsensically, for it does not seem to make sense in
the real world.
Logicians have an answer to the above charge, and the answer is perfectly
tight and logically consistent. That is part of the problem! Consistency is not
enough. Logic should be not just a mathematically consistent system but a
human instrument for understanding reality, for dealing with real people and
things and real arguments about the real world. That is the basic assumption of
the old logic. If that assumption is naive and uncritical, unfashionable and unin-
telligent - well, welcome to Logic for Dummies.
26 INTRODUCTION
This is one of the shortest and simplest sections in this book, but it is also one
of the most important, for it is the foundation for everything else in logic. If you
do not understand it clearly, you will be hopelessly confused later on. (It is
explained in more detail in the next section, Section 5.)
(1) First, all the terms must be clear and unambiguous. If a term is
ambiguous, it should be defined, to make it clear. Otherwise, the two parties to
the argument may think they are talking about the same thing when they are
not.
(2) Second, all the premises must be true. You can (seem to) "prove" any-
thing from false premises: e.g. "All Martians are infallible, and I am a Martian,
therefore I am infallible."
(3) Third, the argument must be logically valid. That is, the conclusion
must necessarily follow from the premises, so that if the premises are true, then
the conclusion must be true.
All of logic in two pages: an overview 27
For instance, in the classic example "All men are mortal, and I am a man,
therefore I am mortal," the argument is everything inside the quotation marks.
The two premises are (a) "All men are mortar' and (b) "I am a man." The con-
clusion is "I am mortal." The subject of the first premise is "men" and the pred-
icate is "mortal"; the subject of the second premise is "I" and the predicate is "a
man"; and the subject of the conclusion is "I" and the predicate is "mortal."
Structural parts of a term: none
Structural parts of a proposition: subject term & predicate term
Structural parts of an argument: premises & conclusion
We can think of the subject and predicate terms as two rooms which togeth-
er make up one floor of a building (say, a town house). Each floor is a proposi-
tion. A syllogism is a building with three floors. The rooms are the parts of the
floors, and the floors are the parts of the building.
You will be hopelessly confused for the rest of this book if you do not clear-
ly understand this.
Terms are never true or false in themselves; the propositions they are in arc
true or false.
Terms are never valid or invalid. Only arguments are valid or invalid.
Terms are only either clear or unclear.
Propositions are never clear or unclear; the terms in them are clear or
unclear.
Propositions are never valid or invalid in themselves; the arguments they are
parts of are either valid or invalid.
Propositions are only either true or false.
Arguments are never clear or unclear; each of the terms in an argument is
clear or unclear.
Arguments are never true or false. Each of the propositions in an argument
is true or false.
Arguments are only either valid or invalid.
Most (but not all) of logic consists of deciding when arguments are valid.
"Valid" is a technical term in logic. It does not mean just "acceptable." An argu-
ment is logically valid when its conclusion necessarily follows from its premis-
es. That is, "if the premises are all true, then the conclusion must be true" - that
is the definition of a valid argument. An invalid argument is one in which the
conclusion does not necessarily follow even if the premises are true.
For instance, this argument is valid:
All men are mortal.
And I am a man.
Therefore I am mortal.
But this argument is not valid:
All men are mortal.
And all pigs are mortal.
Therefore all pigs are men.
It is invalid not just because the conclusion is false but because the conclu-
sion does not follow from the premises. The following argument is also invalid,
even though the conclusion (and also each premise) is true:
All men are mortal.
And Socrates is mortal.
Therefore Socrates is a man.
For this argument has the same logical form as the one above it; it merely
replaces "pigs" with "Socrates."
An argument may have nothing but true propositions in it, yet be invalid. E.g.:
32 INTRODUCTION
I exist.
And grass is green.
Therefore Antarctica is cold.
An argument may have false propositions in it and yet be logically valid. E.g.:
I am a cat.
And all cats are gods.
Therefore I am a god.
For if both those premises were true (that I am a cat and that all cats are
gods) it would necessarily follow that I was a god.
An argument that has nothing but true propositions and also is logically
valid is the only kind of argument that is worth anything, the only kind that con-
vinces us that its conclusion is true, and the only kind that we can use to con-
vince others that its conclusion is true.
If an argument has nothing but clear terms, true premises, and valid logic,
its conclusion must be true. If any one or more of these three things is lacking,
we do not know whether the conclusion is true or false. It is uncertain.
If the terms arc and (he premises arc a n d the logic is t h e n the conclusion is
Clear true valid true
Clear true invalid uncertain
Clear false valid uncertain
Clear false invalid uncertain
Unclear true valid uncertain
Unclear true invalid uncertain
Unclear false valid uncertain
Exercises
A. (easy) Identify each of the following as a term, a proposition, an argu-
ment, or none of the above.
1. Everyone
2. Everyone in America
3. Everyone in America and in the rest of the world as well
4. I think, therefore I am.
5. Are you mad?
6. You won't pass.
7. You won't pass because you haven't studied.
8. Don't take this logic course.
9. Please be quiet.
10. A falsity so obvious that it couldn't fool a child
11. God exists.
12. It ain't broke, so it don't gotta be fixed.
13. You're weird.
14. Everything in the kitchen sink except the sink itself
15. Ouch!
B. (harder) Use the chart on page 32 to tell whether the following statements
are true or false. Assuming all terms are clear and unambiguous,
1. If an argument is logically valid, its conclusion must be true.
2. If an argument's conclusion is true, it must be logically valid.
3. If an argument's conclusion is not true, it cannot be logically valid.
4. If an argument's conclusion is not true, its premises cannot be true.
5. If an argument's premises arc true and it is invalid, its conclusion must be
false.
6. If an argument's premises are true and its conclusion is true, it must be
valid.
7. If an argument's premises are true and its conclusion is false, it must be
invalid.
8. If an argument's premises are true and it is valid, its conclusion must be
true.
I: The First Act of the Mind:
Understanding
ask arc: What, Whether, and Why, i.e. What is it? Is it? and Why is it? These are
dealt with in the three parts of logic.
The part that most clearly distinguishes humans from computers is the first:
understanding a "what," an "essence," the nature of a thing. Computers under-
stand nothing; they merely store, process, relate, and regurgitate data. You don't
really think there is a little spirit somewhere inside your hand-held calculator, do
you? But the world's most complex computer has nothing qualitatively more in
it than that, only quantitatively more. An amoeba is closer to understanding than
a computer, for it has some rudimentary sensation of feeling (e.g. it detects
food).
A baby often goes around pointing to everything he 1 sees, asking "What's
that?" The baby is a philosopher. "What's that?" is philosophy's first question.
(Look at any Socratic dialogue to see that.)
1 The use of the traditional inclusive generic pronoun " h e " is a decision of language, not
of gender justice. There are only six alternatives. (1) We could use the grammatically mis-
leading and numerically incorrect "they." But when we say " o n e baby was healthier than
the others because they didn't drink that milk," we do not know whether the antecedent
of "they" is "one" or "others," so we don't know whether to give or take away the milk.
Such language codes could be dangerous to baby's health. (2) Another alternative is the
politically intrusive "in-your-face" generic "she," which I would probably use if I were
an angry, politically intrusive, in-your-face woman, but I a m not any of those things. (3)
Changing "he" to "he or she" refutes itself in such comically c l u m s y and ugly revisions
as the following: "What does it profit a man or woman if h e or she gains the w h o l e world
but loses his or her own soul? Or what shall a man or w o m a n give in exchange for his or
her soul?" The answer is: he or she will give up his or her linguistic sanity. (4) We could
also be both intrusive and clumsy by saying " s h e or he." (5) O r we could use the neuter
"it," which is both dehumanizing and inaccurate. (6) O r w e could c o m b i n e all the lin-
guistic garbage together and use "she or he or it," which, a b b r e v i a t e d would sound like
" s h . . . it."
I believe in the equal intelligence and value of w o m e n , but not in the intelligence or
value of "political correctness," linguistic ugliness, grammatical inaccuracy, conceptual
confusion, or dehumanizing pronouns.
Understanding
at the same time, but a concept can. Suppose someone asks you whether you
think San Francisco or Boston is the more beautiful city. You understand the
question, and you answer it. Your mind compared (and therefore was present to)
two cities 3000 miles apart - at once! Your concepts did what your body cannot
do.
Though your body is unimaginably tiny compared with the universe, your
concept of the universe is greater than the universe! For if you understood the
word "universe," your thought 'surrounded' the universe - the same universe
that surrounds your body. You did that by having a concept of the universe.
Concepts have at least five characteristics that material things do not have.
They are spiritual (or immaterial), abstract, universal, necessary, and unchanging.
1. Concepts are spiritual (immaterial, non-material). Compare the con-
cept of an apple with an apple. The apple has size, weight, mass, color, kinetic
energy, molecules, shape, and takes up space. The concept does not. It is "in"
your mind, not your body. It is not in your brain, for your brain is part of your
body. It has no size, so it cannot fit there. (If you say that it does have size, the
size of an apple, then you must say that your brain must get as big as an elephant
when you think of an elephant.) It has no weight, for when you stand on a scale
and suddenly think the concept "tree," you do not gain the slightest amount of
weight.
In contrast to the concept "apple," the word "apple" is just as physical as an
apple. It takes up space on the page, and it is made of molecules. The spoken
word also is made of molecules: wave-vibrations of sound of a certain size and
shape. But between these two material things - the apple and the word "apple"
- there is the concept. That is the only reason why we can use the word "apple"
to mean the physical apple we eat. We use one physical thing (the word "apple")
as a symbol of another physical thing (the apple we eat), and that mental act, or
mental relation, that we set up is not a third physical thing. It is a concept, and
its meaning is the real apple even though its being is not the being of an apple.
(It is not in space, has no molecules, etc.) The concept's meaning is "a physical
fruit that grows on apple trees, has red or green skin, etc.," but the concept's
being is not physical (material), but spiritual (immaterial).
Our having the concept of an apple is dependent on our having a physical
body, of course: it is dependent both on the eye, which perceives the apple, and
on the brain, which works whenever we have a concept. If we had never seen
an apple, we would never have a concept of one, and if we had no brain we
could not think the concept of an apple. But the concept is not just the physical
apple or the visible word or even the sense image, which is somewhere between
a physical and a spiritual thing. (We will see the difference between a concept
and a sense image more clearly in the next few paragraphs.) The sense image
is like a scouting report sent out by the intellect. The intellect is like a king who
stays in a soul-castle and sends out scouts (the senses) to report to him what^s
going on in his kingdom. Or, to change the image, the intellect is like a para-
38 I. THE FIRST ACT O F THE MIND: UNDERSTANDING
lytic in a wheelchair who directs a blind man where to push him. (In this image,
the intellect is symbolized paradoxically, by the physically sighted paralytic and
the senses by the blind pusher.) The two are interdependent.
When a thing is known, it acquires a second existence, a mental existence;
the thing becomes a thought. If familiarity did not dull us, we would find this
utterly remarkable, unparalleled in all the universe. No galaxy, no physical ener-
gy, no cell, no animal can do this; only a mind can give a thing a second life.
Every language speaks of the human mind or intellect, as doing something
more than the (animal) senses do: as going "deeper" or "below the surface" or
"penetrating" what is sensed like an X-ray; as going beyond appearances to
reality, beyond seeing to understanding. (Thus the irony in a blind poet or "seer"
like Homer, John Milton, or Helen Keller "seeing" more than sighted people.)
Only because we distinguish between appearance and reality do we ask ques-
tions. There would be no philosophy and no science without this distinction.
2. Concepts are abstract. The English word "abstract" comes from the
Latin abstraho, "to draw (traho) from (ab(s))" or "to drag out of." Our mind
extricates, or separates, something from something else. What is this something?
When we form a concept, we abstract one aspect of a concrete thing from
all its other aspects - e.g. the size of a flower (when we measure it), or its color
(when we paint it). No one can physically or chemically separate the size from
the color, or either one from the whole flower; but anyone can do it mentally.
We can abstract, or mentally separate, adjectives from nouns. Animals sim-
ply perceive "green-grass," but even the most primitive men mentally distin-
guished the green from the grass; and this enabled them to imagine green skin,
or red grass, even though they had never seen it. And once they imagined these
things, they set about making them, e.g. by dying their skin green from the juice
of grasses, or painting pictures of red grass with dye made from beet juice.
(When he was two, my son made the thrilling discovery that he could make "pur-
ple doo-doo" by mixing up blue and red Play-Doh R in the shape of a hot dog.)
Technology and art both flow from this human power of abstraction.
The most important act of abstraction is the one by which we abstract the
essential from the accidental. By having a concept we can focus on the essence
and abstract from the accidents. Some people are reluctant to do this. Their con-
versation is utterly concrete - and utterly boring. You want to scream at them,
"Come to the point!" These people have few friends, for to have friends you
must learn to abstract, i.e. select, set apart, or pick out, the things that interest
both them and you. Abstraction fosters friendship - a concrete payoff!
Abstractions have received bad press in the modern world. Too bad. The
next time you hear someone say "I'm a concrete, practical person, and I hate
abstractions," remind them that babies are very concrete - and uncivilized.
Abstract ideas do not move us as much as concrete things do. Intellectuals,
who live with abstractions, are often practically ineffective dreamers and rarely
"movers and shakers" of men, because men will not usually live and die for
Understanding 39
abstractions that move only our mind - even stirring abstractions like "liberty,
equality, fraternity" or "democracy" or "freedom" - but for concrete things that
move their loves, like their families or their buddies next to them in the trenches.
3. Concepts are universal. Ask a child what he wants and he may answer,
"Everything!" He has formed a universal concept. (Most concepts are only rel-
atively universal, not absolutely universal like "everything" or "something" or
"being")
E.g. "tree" is a universal concept because it is a concept of not only that one
tree in your yard, but of all trees. "Beauty" is a universal concept, and when we
judge whether San Francisco or Boston is more beautiful, we judge both cities
by the universal concept "beauty" (or "beautiful city").
The literal meaning of "universal" is "one with respect to many" (unum ver-
sus alia). This means that a concept, while remaining one - one essence, one
meaning - nevertheless is true of many things, predicable (sayable) of many
things, applicable to many things. This oak and that oak and that maple are all
"trees." We can truly apply the concept "tree" to any and every possible and
actual tree that ever was, is, or will be.
The concept signifies something common to many different things. This
oak and that oak are different in size, and oaks and maples are different in shape
of leaves and taste of sap, but all are trees. All share the same common essence,
or essential nature. That is what we are seeking to know when we ask "What is
that?"
Only the concept gets at this one-in-many, this common essence in many
different things. It is not in sense perception that we see this universal. We per-
ceive only individual men and women, who are either tall or short, either old or
young, but "human being" is neither male nor female, neither tall nor short, nei-
ther old nor young. "Human nature" does not look male or female, tall or short,
old or young. It does not "look" at all; it "means." Appearances are particular; but
essences, or meanings, or the natures of things, are universal. You cannot touch
them or feel them; you can only understand them. They are known by concepts.
4. Relations between concepts are necessary. Every tree necessarily has
leaves; every triangle necessarily has three sides. A tree may or may not have
many leaves, but it must have leaves. A triangle has to have three sides; that is
dictated by its essence, which is grasped in the concept.
Thus we can be certain of relations between concepts, as we cannot be cer-
tain of material things. We can be certain that a triangle will have 180 degrees
in its three angles, but we cannot be certain how tall a tree will be.
5. Concepts are unchanging. Two plus two can never become other than
four, but two bunnies plus two bunnies can become more than four bunnies. The
concept "blue" can never become not-blue, but the blue sky can become not-
blue. The nature of a thing, which is known by a concept, is unchanging; but
things, which are known by sense experience, are changing. Humans change;
essential human nature does not.
40 I.THERRST ACT O F T H E M I N D : U N D E 1 1
translate between different languages: because the same stable term, or unit of
meaning, anchors many different words in many different languages. E.g.
"love" "carit as" "agape," "lieb," "amor," and "amour" are the same term in six
different words.
A word is physical and sensible (to the eyes or the ears, or to the touch, in
Braille). A concept is not. A term mediates between a concept and a word: inso-
far as it is a unit of meaning, it is not something made of matter or perceivable
with the senses; insofar as it is expressed by a word, in any language, it is per-
ceivable by the senses, like the word "word" in this sentence.
The difference between a term and a concept, and the difference between a
term and a word, may be difficult to grasp, and it is not crucially important from
a practical point of view for the logic student to understand it; but it is crucially
important to understand the difference between a concept, a judgment, and an
argument; or between a term, a proposition, and a syllogism; or between a word,
a sentence, and a paragraph.
A term is the most simple and basic unit of meaning. A term is simply any
word or group of words that denotes an object of thought. The English word
"term" comes from the Latin "terminus," which means "end" A term is one of
the two "ends" of a proposition, as the first and last points on a line are the two
ends of the line; for a term is either the subject (the beginning) or the predicate
(the end) of a proposition, when it is in a proposition. Whether a term is inside
a proposition or not. a term is whatever can be used as the subject or the predi-
cate of a proposition. "Apples" has the same meaning whether it is in the propo-
sition "Apples are fruits" or whether it is outside the proposition and merely
"apples." A term is simply any word or group of words that denotes one object
of thought.
Terms are never either true or false. Only propositions are true or false.
"Apple" is neither true nor false. The proposition "Apples are fruits" is true, and
the propositions "Apples are vegetables" is false. Instead of being true or false,
terms are unambiguous or ambiguous, clear or unclear. Propositions are
ambiguous or unambiguous only insofar as their terms are ambiguous or unam-
biguous. You will learn how to change ambiguous terms into unambiguous
terms in the chapter on defining terms.
concrete individual entities that exist in a particular space and time; but where
and when do we find beauty or humanity, as distinct from this beautiful thing or
that human being?
We have said that terms express concepts, that concepts arc universal, and
that concepts refer to the essences or natures of things. Are these essences uni-
versal, like the concepts we have of them?
If they are not, then it seems that our concepts of them are not accurate, for
they do not correspond to their objects. And in that case, our concepts would dis-
tort rather than reveal the true nature of things.
But are universals then real things? Is beauty real as well as beautiful
things? Does humanity or human nature or the human species really exist in
addition to the 6+ billion human beings that have the same essential human
nature?
Plato thought they did. He called these universals "Forms" or "Ideas" - not
ideas in minds but Ideas outside minds, objective Truths; not thoughts but the
objects of thoughts. He believed there were two kinds of reality, two "worlds":
a world of concrete, material individual things in space and time that we know
by our bodily senses, and another world of immaterial universal Forms that we
know with our minds through concepts.
The "two worlds theory" seems fantastic to common sense and an example
of what one philosopher (Alfred North Whitehead) calls "the fallacy of mis-
placed concreteness," treating an abstracted aspect of a thing (its essential
nature) as if it were another concrete thing. This theory of Plato's is sometimes
called "Extreme Realism" because it claims that universals are "extremely real,"
so to speak - just as real as individual things, in fact more real since they arc
timeless and immortal and unchangeable. A beautiful face changes with age, but
beauty does not.
The theory most totally opposed to Plato's is called Nominalism. The 14th-
century medieval philosopher William of Ockham is usually credited for invent-
ing the theory, and modern philosophies such as Empiricism, Pragmatism,
Marxism, and Positivism have embraced it and made it popular. Nominalism
claims that universals are only names (nomini) that we use as a kind of short-
hand. Instead of giving each individual tree a separate proper name, we group
together, for our own convenience, under the one vague name "tree," all those
things that resemble each other in certain ways (e.g. having trunks and branch-
es and leaves). But in reality, all trees are different, not the same; not one-in-
many ("uni-versal"), but only many.
Nominalism seems logically self-contradictory, for if all trees are different,
how can it be true to call them all "trees"? The very sentence that says all trees
are not really the same presupposes that they are! If universals are only our
names for individuals that resemble each other in certain ways, those "certain
ways" must be really universal (e.g. all have trunks, branches, and leaves); so we
have eliminated one universal ("tree") only by appealing to three others ("trunk,"
The extension and comprehension of terms 43
"branches," and "leaves"). Something in trees must justify our use of a universal
term "tree." What is this? Is it their "resemblance" or "similarity"? But they
must resemble each other in something. What could this be but their nature, their
essence, their treeness, what-trees-really-are?
Aristotle, as usual, takes a middle position between these two extremes,
and his view accords best with common sense. His position was developed by
the Arabic philosopher Avicenna and by St. Thomas Aquinas in the Middle
Ages. It is called "Moderate Realism," and it holds that essences are objec-
tively real (contrary to Nominalism) but not real things (contrary to Extreme
Realism). They are the essential "forms" or natures of things. Forms exist in
the world only in individual material things, but they exist in our minds as uni-
versal concepts when our minds abstract them from things. It is the very same
nature (e.g. humanness) that exists in both states; otherwise our concept of it
would not be accurate, would not be a concept of it, of what really is in the
things. A universal form such as humanness exists in the world only individu-
ally, but the same form or nature exists in the mind universally, by "abstrac-
tion" from individuals.
So according to Aristotle the Nominalist is right to say that universality is
only in the mind, not in things, but wrong to say that there is nothing in reality
that is the object of universal concepts. And the Extreme Realist is right to
affirm that universals are objectively real and not just names, but wrong to think
they are "substances." (Aristotle s technical term for concrete individual things
was "substances") They are the "forms" of substances (e.g. the treeness of trees,
the humanness of humans, the beauty of beautiful things, the redness of red
things). Some are essential forms (like "humanness") which a thing must have
in order to be what it is, others are accidental forms (like "redness") which a
thing can gain or lose and still remain what it is, as when a tomato changes from
green to red.
This apparently very technical, abstract, logical dispute has great practical
consequences. If universals are more real than individuals, then individuals, and
human individuals too, are not primarily important - a convenient philosophy
for totalitarians! And if individual things are less real than universals, then the
senses do not reveal anything very important, and only the few "brains" who can
think very abstractly are wise. On the other hand, if universals are not real at all,
then we have the even more radical consequence of skepticism: reality is an
unknowable chaos, and all so-called universal truths arc merely subjective and
man-made, including all principles of science and ethics.
QUALITATIVE QUANTITATIVE
Comprehension Extension
Intension Extension
Connotation Denotation
Meaning Reference
(2) Terms are either clear or unclear. Clarity is not quite the same as unam-
biguousness. A term is clear in the way light is clear: it "comes through" to the
mind. Unambiguousness means a lack of confusion between two meanings.
Unless a term is first of all clear, it cannot be either ambiguous or unambiguous.
Until there is light, it cannot be either one color or two colors.
Whether a term is clear or not depends not only on the term but also on the
mind that tries to think it. The term "quasar" is clear to those who know modem
astronomy but not to those who do not.
Rene Descartes, often called "the father of modern philosophy," said that we
could not be sure any proposition was true or false unless its terms were "clear
and distinct (unambiguous)." "Clear and distinct ideas" was his criterion for cer-
titude that any proposition is true. It is not a criterion of truth, for a proposition
with ambiguous terms can still be true (e.g. "Life is good"). It is not even a suf-
ficient criterion for certitude, for many uncertain and even false propositions can
have clear and distinct terms. But it seems to be a necessary criterion for certi-
tude, a minimum, a beginning.
(3) Terms are either vague or exact. Vague terms are not necessarily
ambiguous or unclear. "Tall" is a vague term ("six feet tall" is an exact term) but
"tall" is neither ambiguous nor unclear.
There is nothing necessarily wrong with a vague term. We often need vague
terms rather than exact terms; they are very useful. For much of our knowledge
is not exact, so the terms that express that knowledge rightly cannot be exact
either. We often need a "fuzzy logic" in our terms.
But although there is room for "fuzzy logic" in terms, there is no room for
"fuzzy logic" in propositions or arguments. Propositions are either true or false
and arguments are either valid or invalid; and there is no third possibility and no
fuzziness or sliding scale or matter of degree between true and false, or between
valid and invalid.
However, we often cannot be certain whether a given proposition is true or
false; and that dimension (namely, probability) can sometimes be "fuzzy." At
other times, that dimension can be exact, as in statistics. In statistics, even inex-
actness can be exact: e.g. a "5% margin of error."
(4) Terms are either univocal, equivocal, or analogical. A univocal term has
one and only one meaning. An equivocal term has two or more quite different
and unrelated meanings. An analogical term has two or more meanings that are
(a) partly the same and partly different, and (b) related to each other.
When I say "I ate two apples" and "You ate two hamburgers," I use "ate"
and "two" univocally. When I say "The river has two banks" and "The town has
two banks," I use "banks" equivocally, for there is no connection between a river
bank and a money bank. When I say "The good man gave his good dog a good
meal," I use "good" analogically, for there is at the same time a similarity and a
Classifying terms 49
difference between a good man, a good dog, and a good meal. All three are desir-
able, but a good man is wise and moral, a good dog is tame and affectionate, and
a good meal is tasty and nourishing. But a good man is not tasty and nourishing,
except to a cannibal; a good dog is not wise and moral, except in cartoons, and
a good meal is not tame and affectionate, unless it% alive as you cat i t
Strictly speaking, a term is never univocal, equivocal, or analogical in itself;
it is only used univocally, equivocally, or analogically. The phrases "bark of a
dog" and "bark of a tree" use "bark" equivocally; the phrases "bark of an oak"
and "bark of a maple" use "bark" univocally. (So do "bark of a hound" and "bark
of a poodle.") "Healthy food" and "healthy exercise" use "healthy" univocally
(for both mean something that causes health in a human body), but "a healthy
climate," "a healthy body" and "a healthy sweat" use "healthy" analogically, for
a healthy climate is a cause of a healthy body, while a healthy sweat is an effect
of a healthy body. 'Exercise* is an action, 'sweat' is a substance, 'climate' is nei-
ther.
One of the things computers cannot do is understand and use analogies. One
of the things philosophers and poets do especially well is to understand and use
analogies. See also "arguments by analogy," p. 329.
14. "Christians believe God is three persons." "Then he must be triplets. Three
persons make triplets."
15. "Buddhists seek Enlightenment. Only a few attain it." "Oh, 'the
Enlightenment' - we Westerners went through that once, back in the 18th
century." "What are you two talking about? Enlightenment happens every
morning when the sun rises."
16. "I have to change the change I gave you for your dollar; 1 made a mistake."
(5) Terms are either literal or metaphorical. A metaphor is not the same as
an analogy. When I call my dog an "affectionate" dog, I am using an analogy;
for the dog shows some but not all of the signs of the kind of human love we call
"affection," and we think the dog feels some but not all of the same emotions we
feel when we are affectionate to other human beings. But even though I am using
the term "affectionate" analogically rather than univocally, I am using it literal-
ly, not metaphorically. But when Jesus calls wily King Herod a "fox" or St. Peter
a "rock" or God a "good shepherd," he is using metaphors. The word "good" in
"good shepherd" is not metaphorical but analogical (for "good God," "good
man," "good dog," "good meal," and "good shepherd" are all good in different
ways). But the word "shepherd" is metaphorical, for God is not literally a man
with sheep at all. A metaphor is literally false; an analogy is not.
(6) Terms are positive or negative. It is usually easy to tell the difference
between a positive term and a negative term simply by looking for a negative
syllable at the beginning, like "un-" or "non-" or "in-." But this is not always so.
Some terms that begin with these syllables are not negative, like "underwear" or
"interference." And some terms have an essentially negative meaning without a
negative syllable, like "absence" or "blindness" or "evil." Some words are both
positive and negative at the same time, like "inconvenience," which means a
(negative) absence of convenience but also a (positive) presence of trouble.
(7) Terms are simple or complex. A single object of thought, like "apple," is
a simple term; two or more objects of thought which could be either together or
apart, like "green apple," constitute a complex term. No matter how long or
complex it is, if it is not a complete sentence, it is only a term. "Everything in
the kitchen sink except the kitchen sink itself, including all the garbage from last
night's steak dinner for four and all the dirty forks, knives, and spoons" is still
only one complex term. As a term, the whole complex phrase in quotes can be
the subject of a proposition with a predicate such as "can be thrown away."
Exercise: Tell whether the subject of each of the following propositions is uni-
versal, particular, or singular.
(10) Terms designating groups of things are used either collectively or divi-
sively. When I use a term collectively, I mean the group as a whole; when I use
a term divisively, I mean each individual member of the group. A collective term
refers to a number of individuals looked at as a single group, like the soldiers in
an army or the crew of a ship.
Only terms designating groups can be either collective or divisive. Which
of the two it is, is determined by use, by how the term is used in a sentence. For
instance, "library" is used collectively in the sentence "This library is composed
of ten thousand books," but the same term is used divisively in the sentence
"This town has three libraries." When I say "this class is the smartest logic class
I've ever taught," I use "class" collectively, because I don't mean that every sin-
gle member of the class is smart, only that the class as a whole is. But when I
say "all men are mortal," I use "men" divisively because I mean that every sin-
gle man is mortal, not just that the species homo sapiens, or humanity, is mortal
as a species.
(11) Terms are concrete or abstract. "Concrete" does not necessarily mean
something you can touch or see, and "abstract" does not necessarily mean some-
thing you cannot touch or see. Terms that mean physical things can be either
concrete or abstract: "red" and "hard" are concrete, while "redness" and "hard-
ness" are abstract. Terms that mean nonphysical things can also be either con-
crete or abstract: "equal" and "spirit" are concrete, while "equality" and "spiri-
tuality" are abstract. An abstract term is the expression of a mental act of
"abstracting," in which we have "abstracted" or mentally "taken out" some
aspect or quality from a real thing and placed that quality itself before the mind.
Whenever we make an adjective into a noun, it becomes abstract: "hot" becomes
"heat" and "true" becomes "truth." Whenever we add "ness" to an adjective, it
becomes abstract: "dry" becomes "dryness" and "kind" becomes "kindness."
Exercises: Explain and resolve the ambiguities in the following (see also pp.
71-73):
1. The end of a thing is its purpose and perfection, and death is the end of
life, therefore death is lifes purpose and perfection.
2. Cancer is made of human cells, and whatever is made of human cells is
human, and what is human should not be killed, so cancer should not be
killed.
3. Innuendo is an Italian suppository.
4. Condemned prisoner to judge: "But I don't feel guilty."
5. Condemned prisoner to judge: "You're a bad man, judge; you're terribly
judgmental."
6. Condemned prisoner to judge: "You're supposed to do justice, judge. But
you've just done a bad thing, and a bad thing can't be just, because justice
is a good thing, not a bad thing." "What bad thing have I done?" "You've
lowered my self-esteem in declaring me guilty. Self-esteem is good, and
you've taken away something good, so you're bad. You should be punished
instead of me."
7. There shouldn't be laws against drugs, because the people who use drugs
don't believe there should be laws against them, and that means the coun-
try doesn't have consensus about it, and laws should reflect the people's
consensus.
8. Philosophy is a kind of love - the love of wisdom. Therefore philosophy
teachers who accept salaries are mercenary lovers. They're intellectual
prostitutes; they sell their love for money.
9. Antigravity should be easy. We disobey all kinds of laws, even the law of
non-contradiction, so we should be able to disobey the law of gravity.
54 II. T E R M S
10. How can we claim to define ambiguity? It can't be done, because to define
anything is to take its ambiguity away. But if you take the ambiguity away
from ambiguity, it won't be ambiguity any more.
"For there is (1) substance, in the common understanding of the term, such
as man or horse; (2) how much, e.g. as being of two or three cubits; (3) of what
kind, e.g. as being white or being grammatical; (4) being related to something,
e.g. as double, half, or greater; (5) where, e.g. as being in the grove or market
place; (6) when, e.g. as tomorrow or the day before yesterday; (7) having a pos-
ture, e.g. as one is reclining or standing; (8) to be equipped, e.g. as one is shod
or armed; (9) to act, e.g. as a thing cuts or burns; (10) to receive, e.g. as a thing
is cut or burned."
The traditional terms for the ten categories are;
1. substance (an individual thing or entity, not a kind of matter, like "salt")
2. quantity
3. quality
4. relation
5. place
6. time
7. posture (the internal order of a thing's parts)
8. possession
9. action
10. passion (being acted upon)
"Relation" seems to be more fundamental than Aristotle thought, and "pos-
ture" and "possession" less fundamental, but the rest of the list seems as fixed
as the structure of language itself. For the parts of speech in language corre-
spond to this list of categories; nouns and pronouns usually express substances,
adjectives express qualities or quantities, prepositions and conjunctions express
relations, verbs express actions or passions, and adverbs express times or places
(or, more often, qualities or quantities of actions or passions).
Exercises: Identify the category of each categoregmatic term (see p. 50) in the
following sentences:
1. In the square sat seven skinny soldiers stuck in the stocks at six o'clock.
2. Near the blasted heath at midnight, the three Weird Sisters stood, gleeful-
ly stirring the round, black witches' pot filled with three tiny broken frogs.
3. Politically proper Professor Pete, painted partly pink, proffered puzzling
paradoxes of pop psychology, ponderously pontificating.
4. Pooping on pieces of pork in the park is proper performance for perky pel-
icans.
5. Sam was struck Saturday by scads of silver saliva spat by six scraggly
singers sitting stupidly on solid seats simultaneously singing scary seven-
syllable songs.
6. Categories are used to classify things.
56 11. TERMS
simply, or in themselves, (c) whether they are in a proposition or not. But the
five predicates are a classification of (a) only predicate terms, (b) relatively, in
relation to their subjects, (c) in a proposition.
Symbolic logic has no room for the predicables because the predicables pre-
suppose the forbidden idea of nature, or essence, or whatness. The five predica-
bles are a classification of predicates based on the standard of how close the
predicate comes to stating the essence of the subject:
(1) The species (not a biological species) states the whole essence of the
subject. In the proposition "Man is a rational animal," "rational animal" is the
species of "man." In the proposition "A triangle is a three-sided plane figure,"
"three-sided plane figure" is the species of "triangle." In the proposition
"Democracy is government by the people," "government by the people" is the
species of "democracy."
(2) The genus states the generic or general or common aspect of the essence
of the subject. (This is to define "genus" in terms of comprehension; to define
it in terms of extension, a genus is a more general class to which the subject
essentially belongs.) "Animal" is a genus of "man." "Plane figure" is a genus of
"triangle." "Government" is a genus of "democracy." Note that the genus is part
of the species, i.e. part of the species' comprehension. (In modern logic we usu-
ally say a species is part of a genus because modem logic thinks in terms of
extension rather than comprehension.)
(3) The specific difference states the specific, or differentiating, or proper
aspect of the essence of the subject, the aspect of its essence that differentiates
it from other members of the same genus. "Rational" is the specific difference
of "man." "Three-sided" is the specific difference of "triangle." "By the people"
is the specific difference of "democracy."
(4) A property or "proper accident" is any characteristic that is not the
essence itself but "flows from" the essence, is caused by the essence, and there-
fore is always present in the subject because the essence is always present. A
property is necessarily connected with the essence and therefore inseparable from
it. "Able to speak," "able to laugh," and "mortal" are properties of "a man."
"Having its three interior angles equal to two right angles" is a property of "tri-
angle." "Able to change laws by popular consent" is a property of "democracy."
(5) An accident is any characteristic of the subject that is not essential (nei-
ther the essence nor necessarily present as "flowing from" or caused by the
essence), and therefore can come and go, is sometimes present and sometimes
not. "Bald" and "Athenian" are accidents of "man." "Equilateral" and "tiny" are
accidents of "triangle." "Modern" and "bicameral" are accidents of "democra-
cy." In ordinary language any attribute, essential or accidental, is often called a
"property," but in logic "accidents" are distinguished from "properties."
running around the house pointing to each object and demanding, "Wot d a t ? W o t
dat?"
We have an intuitive, commonsensical knowledge of essences w h i c h is u s e -
ful enough for everyday conversation, but not clear enough for s c i e n t i f i c p u r -
poses. Because science cannot usefully deal with this implicit, e v e r y d a y , i n t u -
itive, commonsense knowledge of essences, science has rightly put a s i d e t h e
notion and demanded more empirically verifiable and "operational" d e f i n i t i o n s
of things. Things are defined by scientists in terms of what we can see t h e m d o ,
rather than in terms of what they are. Medieval science did not clearly t a k e t h i s
useful step.
However, the mistake typically made by medieval science, in c o n f u s i n g
common sense (which knows essences), with science (which d o e s n o t ) , is s t i l l
with us, but in its opposite form: where the medievals reduced s c i e n c e t o c o m -
mon sense, we reduce common sense to science if we reject the n o t i o n o f
essences entirely. And since logic and philosophy (at least any logic a n d p h i l o s -
ophy applicable to the humanities) are based on co m mon sense r a t h e r t h a n o n
the scientific method, it is a mistake to drop the c o m m o n s e n s e n o t i o n o f
essences - and to drop from logic the doctrine of the predicables, w h i c h is b u i l t
on it.
Because it has dropped the notion of essence and therefore has n o d o c t r i n e
of the predicables, modern logic has difficulty answering the q u e s t i o n o f t h e
ancient skeptic Antisthenes, who claimed that every proposition w a s a s e l f - c o n -
tradiction because it asserts that one thing, the subject, is another thing, t h e
predicate. He argued that on the basis of the law of non-contradiction, w e s h o u l d
only say that S is S, not that S is P. In terms of modern logic, A n t i s t h e n e s ' a r g u -
ment is a dilemma: either the proposition is a mere tautology (if P is i d e n t i c a l
with S), or it will be self-contradictory (if P is not identical w i t h S ) . E . g .
Antisthenes argued, "How can you say a cloud is white? A cloud is o n e t h i n g a n d
whiteness another. To say that a cloud is white is saying a cloud is n o t a c l o u d .
That is a contradiction." If you have understood the doctrine of the p r e d i c a b l e s
above, you will be able to answer Antisthenes easily. But not by the l a w o f n o n -
contradiction alone, not by "computer logic" alone.
The "Tree of Porphyry": The ancient Greek logician Porphyry a r r a n g e d t h e
basic genera and species in the universe into a kind of upside d o w n t r e e , a s s e e n
on page 61.
The Tree is useful for a number of things. For one thing, it h e l p s u s t o s e e
the inverse relationship between extension and comprehension. A s y o u m o v e
down the tree, each successive branch has more comprehension ( m o r e p r o p e r -
ties) but less extension (fewer members). It also helps us to see the c a t e g o r i e s a s
the "summa genera," highest genera, most general classes. It gives u s a m e t a -
physical road map, a basic map of being. With this map, we at least k n o w w h a t
continent we are on; without it, we are lost: we do not know w he re o r e v e n w h a t
we are.
Predicables 61
Being
Substance Accidents
(that which (that which
exists in exists only
itself) in a substance)
Immaterial Material
(pure spirits)
Inorganic Organic
Non-sentient Sentient
(plants) (animals)
Non-rational Rational
("brutes") (man)
Dividing terms
When we divide a term, we divide the extension of the term. When we d e f i n e a
term, we define the comprehension of the term (see page 43). There are t h r e e
rules: the division must be exclusive, exhaustive, and use only one standard.
1. The division must be exclusive; i.e. the things divided must be really
distinct, and not overlap.
Dividing political systems into monarchical, constitutional, and democratic
violates this rule because a regime could be both monarchical and constitution-
al, as well as both democratic and constitutional.
Dividing regimes into totalitarian and democratic also violates this rule, f o r
Division and outlining 63
the two could overlap. You could have a totalitarian democracy. For totalitarianism
and democracy are not two mutually exclusive answers to the same question, but
answers to two different questions. Democracy is an answer to the question of
sovereignty: who ultimately holds the power? Its answer is: the demos, the peo-
ple at large, or the majority. Totalitarianism is an answer to the question of quan-
tity: how much power, or power over how much of human life, especially private
life, is there? Its answer is: total, unlimited power. Brave New World is a totali-
tarian democracy; so is Rousseau's idea of "the general will" as infallible (vox
populi, vox dei: "The voice of the people is the voice of God").
Dividing attitudes into loving, hating, and indifferent also violates this rule
because although love and hate both exclude indifference, they do not exclude
each other. Though an attitude cannot be loving and indifferent at the same time,
it can be loving and hating at the same time.
Dividing attitudes into amoral, moral, and hateful also violates this rule
because an attitude of hatred toward evil - evil that harms persons - is quite
moral. The division should be between the amoral, the moral, and the immoral.
One simple way of obeying this f rst rule is to divide in an "either/or" way,
into only two subclasses, one of which negates the other. For instance, "loving
and non-loving" are exclusive, while "loving and hating" are not. "Democratic
and non-democratic" are exclusive, while "democratic and totalitarian" are not.
Such a division is called dichotomous (literally, "cut in two").
2. The division must be exhaustive; i.e. the divided parts should add up to
a whole.
This rule must always be obeyed in dividing terms, but not always in out-
lining. Dividing the term "meat" into beef and lamb violates this rule because it
omits pork. But we can divide "examples of healthy meats" in an outline into
beef and lamb if we wish, omitting pork.
Dividing tools into hand tools and electrical tools is a non-exhaustive divi-
sion, thus violates this rule because it omits tools that use power sources such as
gas or steam. Such non-exhaustive divisions are sometimes useful, though,
because they often do exhaustively divide a part of the class, the part we are con-
cerned with. For instance, in the above division, "tools" may be shorthand for
"the tools at hand" or "the tools in my house" or "the tools I can afford," and
electrical and hand tools may be the only two kinds of those tools.
Dividing the parts or aspects of a person into head and body violates this
rule because it omits the soul or mind. Even dividing a person into body and soul
might be said to omit the spirit, if spirit is distinguished from soul, as it some-
times (but not usually) is. But "head and body" do exhaustively divide a person's
body, in the narrower sense of "body" as "what's below the head."
3. The division should have only one basis or standard. We should not
divide people simultaneously by their race and by their intelligence, e.g. or
books by their objective truth and their subjective appeal. One of the things we
64 II. TERMS
should clearly divide and distinguish is the basis or standard by which we divide
and distinguish.
Exercise: Evaluate the following divisions of terms and tell which, if any, of the
three rules they violate:
1. women into blondes, brunettes, and redheads
2. men into bald and hirsute
3. parts of speech into nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs
4. cats into tailless and those with tails
5. animals into reptiles, mammals, amphibians, marsupials, birds, and fish
6. regimes into popular and totalitarian
7. human acts into those that are morally good and those that cause pain
8. human beings into male and female
9. animals into rational animals ("men") and irrational animals ("brutes")
10. organisms into plants and animals
11. things ("substances") into physical things and spiritual things
12. reality into that which is real in itself and that which is real only relative
to something else
13. beings into mental beings and objectively real beings
14. musical keys into major and minor
15. (H) "All Gaul is divided into three parts. The Belgians inhabit one part, the
Aquitanians another, and those who call themselves Celts - in our lan-
guage, Gauls - inhabit the third." (Julius Caesar)
16. (H) "Democracy has therefore two excesses to avoid: the spirit of inequal-
ity, which leads to aristocracy or monarchy, and the spirit of extreme
equality, which leads to despotic power, as the latter is completed by con-
quest." (Montesquieu)
17. (H) "Let me ask you now: How would you arrange goods? Are there not
some which we welcome for their own sakes, and independently of their
consequences, as for example harmless pleasures and enjoyments, which
delight us at the time though nothing follows from them?"
"I agree in thinking that there is such a class," I replied.
"Is there not also a second class of goods, such as knowledge, sight,
health, which are desirable not only in themselves but also for their
results?"
"Certainly," I said
"And would you not recognize a third class, such as gymnastic and the
care of the sick, and the physician's art; also the various ways of money-
making? These do us good but we regard them as disagreeable, and no one
would choose them for their own sakes." (Plato, Republic, Book II)
18. (H) "Now order can be compared to reason in four ways. There is a cer-
tain order which reason docs not make but only considers, such as the
Division and outlining 65
Outlining
The principles of outlining are like the principles of morality in that they are
usually simple and easy to understand but hard to obey. They are not hard in
themselves; we are just lazy! But their practice has a big payoff. Few things clar-
ify and improve writing and thinking more. By far the most important rule about
outlining is: JUST DO IT!
The basic rules are these:
1. Titles and subtitles are not parts of the outline but placed above it.
2. Use Roman numerals for main topics, capital letters for main subtopics,
then Arabic numerals for sub-subtopics, then small letters, then Arabic numer-
als in parentheses, then small letters in parentheses.
3. For each number or letter there must be a topic. Each must stand on a line
by itself. E.g. never write "AI" or "IA."
4. There must always be more than one subtopic under any topic. (No A
without a B, no 1 without a 2.)
5. A subtopic must be placed under the main topic which it qualifies. This
is the rule that gives many students the most trouble: distinguishing the relative
rank of each point, deciding which are coordinate with which, and which are
subordinate to which. This is an ability that is more intuitive than teachable; but
it can be greatly improved by practice, and cannot be greatly improved without
practice.
6. Subtopics are indented, so that all numbers or letters of the same kind
comc directly under each other vertically.
Division and outlining 67
7. Begin each topic with a capital letter, even if they are not complete sen-
tences.
8. Do not include Introduction or Conclusion as points within the outline.
Outlining is not simply putting numbers and letters in order before sen-
tences or before headings. They must be in logical order and logical subordina-
tion.
Students usually dislike outlining because they find it mechanical and
inflexible. But when we construct any work of art with a complex structure,
whether a garage or a symphony, there is simply no comparison between having
a plan or outline and not having one.
Ill: Material Fallacies
First, we must distinguish material fallacies, which are covered in this chapter,
from formal fallacies, which are covered later. Formal fallacies are mistakes in
reasoning, errors in the operation of the third act of the mind. For instance,
"Some men are mortal, and some mortals are fish, therefore some men are fish"
commits a formal fallacy. "Some men are fish" does not logically follow from
the two premises that "some men are mortar' and "some mortals are fish," even
though both the premises are true. There is no ambiguity or wrong use of terms
in this argument, only bad reasoning. We will learn the rules of good logical rea-
soning in the third section of this book, which covers the third act of the mind.
Material fallacies, on the other hand, are treated here, in the section of the
book which covers the first act of the mind, because they are mistakes in under-
standing the meaning or use of terms, errors in the operation of the first act of
the mind. These material fallacies are found in the course of an argument, so
they are called "fallacies," or mistakes in reasoning; but they are not mistakes in
the logical form but mistakes in the content or matter or meaning.
Most of the errors and misunderstandings that plague our conversation and
argumentation come from a loose use of language rather than from formal fal-
lacies. Formally fallacious arguments don't deceive us as often as materially fal-
lacious arguments do. Therefore we have made this section, on material falla-
cies, longer than it is in most logic texts. Most logic texts do not do this because
they specialize in what they do best: the clear, black-or-white formal fallacies,
as distinct from the more messy and intuitive material fallacies. But the topics
in a practical text should be determined not by the topic's clarity but by its prac-
ticality, i.e. by human need and use.
How many material fallacies are there? There is an exact number of formal
fallacies, but no exact number of material fallacies, because they often overlap,
because the list can always be added to, and because they can be classified in
different ways. Most logic texts list only a dozen or two; we list 49, because the
more we know, the more we can avoid. Like sins, fallacies are easier to avoid if
they are labeled. "It would be a very good thing if every trick could receive some
short and obviously appropriate name, so that when a man used this or that par-
ticular trick, he could at once be reproved for it" (Arthur Schopenhauer, The Art
of Controversy).
Material fallacies 69
Students have more legitimate arguments about the right answers to test
questions on the material fallacies than on any other topic in logic, since the fal-
lacies often overlap and in some cases more than one fallacy is present. It is less
important to distinguish them from each other than to distinguish them from
good reasoning, less important to "get the answer right" to the question "Which
fallacy is present here?" than simply to be aware of them and on the watch for
them. This is why we do not include a set of exercises after this section.
For each of the 49 fallacies, we will give (1) a definition, (2) an explana-
tion, and (3) some typical examples of it.
Here is a systematic outline of the 49 fallacies, grouped under seven differ-
ent kinds, each of which happens to have seven major fallacies under it; and in
each of the seven kinds, the most important and most common fallacy is
placcd first.
Many have Latin names. This is not a reason for panic or attacks on histo-
ry or Western civilization. Knowing a few Latin terms does not make you a snob
or a showoff.
1. Fallacies of language
A. Equivocation 71
B. Amphiboly 74
C. Accent 75
D. Slanting 76
E. Slogans 78
F. Hyperbole 78
G. "Straw M a n " 79
2. Fallacies of Diversion
A. Ad hominem (The Appeal to the Person), including 80
"Poisoning the Well,"
Tu quoque ("You Too"), and
"The Genetic Fallacy"
B. Ad verecundiam (The Appeal to [Illegitimate] Authority) 82
C. Ad baculum (The Appeal to Force) 83
D. Ad misericordiam (The Appeal to Pity) 84
E. Ad ignominiam (The Appeal to Shame) 84
F. Adpopulum (The Appeal to the Masses), including 85
Flattery (or "The Appeal to the Gallery"),
Identification ("I'm one of you!"),
"Everybody Docs It,"
"The Polls Say,"
The Appeal to Prejudice,
"Snob Appeal," and
"The Big Lie"
G. Ad ignorantiam (The Appeal to Ignorance) 86
70 lit. MATERIAL FALLACIES
3. Fallacies of Oversimplification
A. Die to simp liciter 86
B. "Special Case" 87
C. Composition 87
D. Division 88
E. " T h e Black-and-White Fallacy" 89
F. Quoting out of Context 90
G. Stereotyping 91
4. Fallacies of Argumentation
A. Non sequitur ("It Does Not Follow") 92
B. Ignoratio Elenchi (Irrelevant Conclusion, or "Ignorance
of the Chain" connecting premises and conclusion) 94
C. Petitio principii ("Begging the Question") 94
D. "Complex Q u e s t i o n " 95
E. Arguing in a Circle 95
F. Contradictory Premises 97
G. False Assumption 99
5. Fallacies of Induction
A. Hasty Generalization 100
B. Post hoc, ergo propter hoc ("After this, therefore caused by this") 100
C. Hypothesis C o n t r a r y to Fact 101
D. False Analogy 102
E. Argument from Silence 103
F. Selective Evidence 103
G. Slanting the Question 104
6. Procedural Fallacies
A. " R e f u t i n g " an A r g u m e n t by R e f u t i n g its Conclusion 104
B. Assuming that Refuting an A r g u m e n t Disproves Its
Conclusion 105
C. Ignoring an A r g u m e n t 106
D. Substituting Explanations for Proof 106
E. Answering A n o t h e r A r g u m e n t than the O n e Given 107
F. Shifting the Burden of Proof 108
G. W inning the A r g u m e n t but Losing the Arguer, o r Vice Versa 108
7. Metaphysical Fallacies
A. Reductionism o r " N o t h i n g B u t t e r y " (especially, Confusing
Form with Matter) 109
B. T h e Fallacy of Accident (Confusing the Accidental
with the Essential) 110
C. Confusing Q u a n t i t y with Quality 111
Fallacies of language 71
in the library all night. You arc someone. Therefore you have not been in
the library all night." And he walked away.
8. G.K. Chesterton, visiting New York City for the first time, saw two women
screaming at each other from the windows of their 4th floor apartments,
which were directly across a narrow alley from each other. He comment-
ed, "Those women will never agree because they are arguing from differ-
ent premises."
9. (E) "What is the highest form of animal life?" "The giraffe."
10. (E) "Your argument is sound. In fact, it's nothing but sound."
11. A Russian-English language translator computer was tested by being
given this sentence, "The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak," to trans-
late into Russian, and then back into English. It came out: "The vodka is
agreeable but the meat is too tender."
12. Foreign language teacher informing a student that he had failed a test on
pronunciation: "I will now pronounce your sentence."
13. "Oh, I am very fond of children," said the Giant to Jack.
14. "He cares for her."
15. (E) "I couldn't work for NASA because safety regulations demand that
some missions be aborted, and I don't believe in abortion."
16. (E) "The English don't drive on the right side of the road. Therefore they
drive on the wrong side."
17. The 9th-century philosopher John the Scot Eriugena was sitting at dinner
with the rude, racist, and very drunken king Charles the Bald, who said to
him, in a feeble attempt at humor, "Tell me, John, what separates a Scot
from a sot?" The philosopher answered, "Only the width of the table.
Sire." (What word's ambiguity is the point of John's riposte?)
18. "Why do you love violence?" "Because I am pious." "That's ridiculous."
"No, that's logical. To be like what God is, is to be Godlike, and what God
is, is love, therefore to love is Godlike. To be Godlike is to be pious, there-
fore he who loves is pious. He who loves violence, loves, therefore he who
loves violence is pious. I love violence. Therefore I am pious."
19. (H) "If you move, you're dead. If you're dead, you can't move. Therefore
if you move, you can't move." (Which word is equivocal here? Hint:
unpack the contractions.)
20. (H) President Clinton, responding to a question from a prosecutor who
was investigating whether he had engaged in illegal activities: "That
depends on what you mean by 'is.'" Could this be a reasonable, intelligent,
and honest answer? Can "is" be equivocal?
21. (H) "Evil makes you think; thinking makes you wise; being wise is good;
therefore evil makes you good."
22. (H) "Nothing is more expensive than diamonds. But paper is more expen-
sive than nothing. Therefore paper is more expensive than diamonds."
74 ill. MATERIAL FALLACIES
IB, Amphiboly
An "amphiboly" is not an ambiguous word (or phrase) but ambiguous syntax
(word order or grammatical structure). Simple puns are based on equivocation;
slightly longer "language jokes" are usually based on amphiboly, e.g.; What
word is pronounced incorrectly by nearly all English people? Answer: the word
"incorrectly."
Here is an example of amphiboly that is not a joke, just an ambiguity:
"Aristotle the peripatetic (i.e. the 'walker') taught his students walking." There
are two ambiguities here. First, who was walking, Aristotle or his students?
Second, did he teach them the art of walking or did he teach them something else
while he was walking?
The 18th-century philosopher Berkeley was trying to prove his conclusion
that esse est percipi, "to be is to be perceived," i.e. that there is no "material
world," no objective reality independent of perception or awareness, whether
mental or sensory. He used this argument: "Is it not a great contradiction to think
a thing exists when you do not think it?" The ambiguity here comes from the fact
that the adverbial phrase "when you do not think it" can modify either the verb
"think" or the verb "exists." Only the first interpretation is "a great contradic-
tion," for it means "to think . . . when you do not think." But the second is no
contradiction, for it means "to believe the following idea: that a thing will not
stop existing when I stop thinking about it."
Most of Jay Leno's "headlines" are examples of amphiboly. The New Yorker
magazine used to collect humorous amphibolies, or (as they used to be called)
malapropisms (after Mrs. Malaprop, a character in an old comedy). E.g.:
(1) "WENCH FOR SALE, complete with rope. For further information call
3081." (advertisement in the Fairmont West Virginian, reprinted in The New
Yorker 3/6/54, p. 104)
(2) "SUMMER RENTAL: 5-room house with wood paneling plus small
guest and garage in rear." (advertisement in Princeton Town Topics, reprinted in
The New Yorker 6/12/54)
(3) "It won't be a real New England clam chowder unless you put your heart
into it." (New England Homestead, reprinted in The New Yorker 6/12/54)
(4) "Although slightly hazy around the city this afternoon, weather bureau
officials claimed that no fog was imminent." (Hartford Times, reprinted in The
New Yorker 5/15/54)
(5) "GUEST FOR LUNCH ONE WAY TO SOLVE EATING PROBLEM"
(headline in the Providence Bulletin, reprinted in The New Yorker 5/8/54)
(6) "I shall lose no time in reading your manuscript." (Samuel Johnson)
(7) "Sir: I have your manuscript before me. 1 am sitting in the smallest room
in my house. Soon I shall have your manuscript behind me." (Samuel Johnson)
(If you don't get it, ask yourself what is the smallest room in your house.)
(8) Alice: "Would you - be very good enough - to stop a minute - just to
get - one's breath again?" White King: "I'm good enough, only I'm not strong
Fallacies of language 75
enough. You sec, a minute goes by so fearfully quick. You might as well try to
stop a Bandersnatch." (Lewis Carroll)
(9) "The duke yet lives that Henry shall depose." (Shakespeare, Henry VI,
Part II, Act I, scene 4)
(10) "Would you rather a cannibal ate you or a shark?"
(11) (title of article in student newspaper): "How To Cook Yourself"
(12) (TV commercial): "Drive this 4x4 fully loaded."
(13) (Advertisement): "Dogs bathed, fleas removed and returned to your
house for $40."
(14) "And the skies are not cloudy all day" ("Home on the Range")
(15) "Most men love cigars more than their wives."
(16) (newspaper advertisement): "For Sale: Antique desk suitable for lady
with curved legs and large drawers, also mahogany chest" (reprinted in the
Journal of the American Medical Association, 9/19/53)
(17) "The cook opened the oven stuffed with sausages."
(18) "George, you are being selfish and rude to your sister in calling her stu-
pid. Tell her you're sorry." "O.K., Mom. Hey, Sis, I'm sorry you're stupid."
(19) "I'm not myself today." "I see you have revoked the Law of Non-con-
tradiction."
Exercise: Expose the ambiguity in each of the above examples by the two steps
on p. 71.
1C, Accent
Here the ambiguity comes from voice inflection, ironic or sarcastic tone, or even
facial expression, or innuendo. (If you don't know what "innuendo" means, look
it up. Every literate person should have - and more importantly, use - a dic-
tionary.) Accent and amphiboly are the two fallacies that are almost always
humorous, usually ironic, and often sarcastic.
Notice, in the following two examples, how the same sentence can have
many significantly different meanings by implication if different words are
emphasized:
"/ do not choose to run at this time." (But perhaps he will.)
"I do not choose to run at this time." (no ambiguity)
"I do not choose to run at this time." (But I can be forced.)
"I do not choose to run at this time." (But I can be drafted.)
"I do not choose to run at this time." (But I may do it tomorrow.)
Another, similar example:
" We don't have to tell the whole truth, you know." (But others do.)
"We don't have to tell the whole truth, you know." (You only think we do.)
"We don't have to tell the whole truth, you know." (It's optional.)
76 III. MATERIAL FALLACIES
"We don't have to tell the whole truth, you know." (But we should know it.)
"We don't have to tell the whole truth, you know." (Half truths are OK.)
"We don't have to tell the whole truth, you know." (Tell myths or evasions
instead.)
"We don't have to tell the whole truth, you know." (But no one else does.)
ID, Slanting
Slanting is sometimes called the fallacy of the "question-begging epithet"
because it is really a form of "begging the question" (fallacy 4C, below) in a sin-
gle word. "Begging the question" means assuming what you're supposed to
prove, and the use of "slanted" language "begs the question" by telling you
whether to like or dislike the thing the word describes. Instead of proving that
the thing it describes is good or bad, it assumes its value or disvalue in the very
Fallacies of language 77
IE, Slogans
There is no fallacy in a slogan as such, but in its use as a substitute for argument,
e.g. "I'm pro-life." "Why?" "Because of that bumper sticker: 4A Child, Not a
Choice."' "Well, I'm pro-choice." "Why?" "Because of that bumper sticker:
'Every Woman's Right To Choose.'"
Or: "Why are you voting for the incumbent?" "You know the saying: 'Don't
change horses in the middle of the stream.' And 'If it ain't broke, don't fix it.'"
"Why are you voting for his opponent?" "Because I believe in Progress. I'm pro-
gressive."
Almost any expression can become a slogan when it is used to produce a
thoughtless knee-jerk reaction of agreement or disagreement simply on the basis
of the familiarity of the words rather than on the basis of reason. The words
function like the logo of the local football team.
IF, Hyperbole
"Hyperbole" means "exaggeration." This is routinely done by "media hype." For
instance, note every occurrence of the word "crisis" in your daily newspaper.
How may are really crises and how many are only "a tempest in a teapot"? Do
Fallacies of language 79
the same with the word "shocking." Surely it is highly ironic that this word is
used more and more as Americans find less and less to be shocked at.
Another form of hyperbole is the "absurd extension" of the other speaker's
claim. Children often do this:
"You need to clean up your room." "Oh, so you want me to be your slave."
"You shouldn't drink so much." "You're always harping on that." (A wimpy
once-a-month reminder becomes "harping.")
"You can't stay out all night. You're only sixteen." "My life is ruined. I'm a
prisoner in my own home forever."
"Oh, so you're against pornography. You must be against freedom of
speech."
"Absurd extension" must be distinguished from the legitimate form of argu-
ment called "reduction to absurdity," or reductio adabsurdum, which consists in
proving that if you accept a certain proposition as a premise, that premise nec-
essarily leads to a conclusion which is "absurd," i.e. one which everybody knows
is false, and therefore the premise cannot be accepted. It is not fallacious to
argue that "If p were true, then q would be true. But q is not true, for it is absurd.
Therefore p is not true." One of the two premises of this argument may be false
- it may be false that q follows p, or that q is absurd - but there is no formal or
material fallacy in the argument.
2 A, Ad horninem
The most common of these fallacies of diversion is the argumentum ad hominem
(or simply "ad hominem" for short), which means an "argument addressed to the
person" (or the personality) instead of to the issue. In other words, a personal
attack, attacking the person instead of attacking the issue.
"Poisoning the Well" is the direct attack on the trustworthiness of the per-
son making a statement instead of addressing the statement, e.g.: "How can you
believe anything he says? He . . " T h e fallacy does not consist in criticizing the
person's character or reliability; that is certainly a relevant consideration, and it
would be a fallacy to suppress it, or any other relevant evidence. The fallacy con-
sists in substituting the personal attack for facing the person's argument or truth-
claim, using it as a "reason" for not looking at the facts or reasons.
"Poisoning the Well" usually (but not always) involves another fallacy also,
viz. slanting or name-calling within the attack on the person's character, the use
of "question-begging epithets" or insulting labels instead of facts and reasons
for doubting his reliability. If you believe your opponent's character or reliabili-
ty is questionable, it is legitimate to say so, but reasons must be given for that
belief too. not just insults.
"Tu quoque" (literally, "you too") consists of accusing your critic of the
same thing your critic accuses you of, rather than defending yourself against the
criticism. "I've just proved that you're a liar. Refute my argument." "Well, you're
just as much a liar as I am." Perhaps he is, but that does not refute his argument.
The most common form of ad hominem today is "the genetic fallacy,"
which consists in "refuting" an idea by showing some suspicious psychological
Fallacies of diversion 81
origin of it. There is nothing wrong with looking at an idea's psychological ori-
gin, but this is the task of the psychologist, not the logician. The "genetic falla-
cy" is a fallacy not because it is psychological but because it is a confusion, and
an extremely common one, between logic and psychology. It is a confusion
between the two fundamental meanings of the word "because." "Because" can
mean (1) a cause of an effect, or it can mean (2) a reason or premise or evidence
for a conclusion. If it means (I) a cause, then in turn that cause can be either (la)
an external, objective, physical cause of a physical effect, like heavy objects
falling down because of gravity, or paper towels absorbing water because of their
capillary action; or (lb) an internal, subjective, psychological cause of a belief,
like believing in Santa Claus because it makes you happy, or fearing large black
dogs because one bit you once when you were a child. "The genetic fallacy"
consists in substituting (lb) for (2), substituting a personal motive for a logical
reason - e.g. "you believe that only because you've never grown up" or "you just
can't admit I'm right because you're jealous of my intelligence" or "Your con-
clusion is false because you don't understand my feelings."
The Freudian emphasis on the subconscious has made this fallacy popular
today. E.g. it is often thought that monarchists believed in God because they sub-
consciously wanted the universe to be hierarchical in order to justify their hier-
archical society. But it is just as "reasonable" to argue that egalitarians opt for
atheism for the same "reason" in reverse.
Arguments about gender issues frequently use this fallacy: "You say that
just because you're a man." "And you deny it just because you're a woman." The
two suspicions cancel each other out, and the real argument, the argumentum ad
rem, can then begin. (But it rarely does.)
No matter how egregious the psychological origins of a belief may be, the
logic of the argument for it is independent of the psychology. If Einstein had
been a vicious Nazi and had discovered the Theory of Relativity only in order to
give Hitler the atom bomb to kill his enemies and conquer the world, that would
not prove that E does not equal MC 2 .
If the genetic fallacy were not a fallacy, we would have to reject our model
for the benzene molecule because it came from its founder's dream of a snake
eating its own tail.
Examples of ad hominem:
(1) (Tu Quoque): Judge: "You have just been convicted of petty larceny."
Prisoner: "Your honor, I just looked up your salary; you get $200,000 a year. If
I'm a thief, you're a bigger one."
(2) (Tu Quoque): "St. Augustine led a wild life himself as a youth, so what
right does he have to tell us we should be saints?"
(3) "Your preaching is worthless." "Why?" "Because you don't you practice
what you prcach."
(4) Modern version of the above: "Papa, don't preach." ("Madonna") (Note
that this is also self-contradictory: preaching against preaching.)
82 III. MATERIAL FALLACIES
(5) "O.J. Simpson was innocent because Mark Fuhrman, the cop who gath-
ered the evidence, was proved to be a racist, which means that we cannot believe
his claim that the DNA evidence proves O.J.'s guilt."
(6) "How could you possibly counsel married couples? You've never been
married."
(7) "What do you know? You're only a teenager."
(8) "What do you know? You're not a teenager."
2B, Ad verecundiam
"Ad verecundiam" means "the appeal to reverence," i.e. reverence for authority.
The fallacy is the illegitimate appeal to authority, or the appeal to illegitimate
authority. Appeal to authority is not in itself fallacious. For "authority" does not
mean "might" but "right." In fact, most of what we know, we have learned by
trusting authorities: First of all our parents, then our teachers and textbooks. No
one can learn everything first-hand; most of what we know comes to us second-
hand, with many other human links in the chain.
G.K. Chesterton satirizes the uncritical refusal to accept anything on
authority in the first sentence of his autobiography: "Bowing down in blind
credulity, as is my custom, before mere authority, and the tradition of the elders,
superstitiously swallowing a story 1 could not test at the time by experiment or
private judgment, 1 am firmly of the opinion that I was born on the 29th of May,
1874, on Campden Hill, Kensington, and baptized according to the formularies
of the Church of England in the little church of St. George opposite the large
Waterworks that dominated that ridge."
However, humans are fallible, and therefore, according to the medieval
maxim, "the argument from (human) authority is the weakest of all arguments."
As we grow, we question our authorities and test them by reason and try to learn
more and more on our own (though no one ever gets to the point where he no
longer needs to rely on any authorities at all).
The appeal to authority becomes fallacious when the authority is (1) irrel-
evant (e.g. when a movie star is taken as an authority on science, or a priest on
how to make a lot of money); or (2) unreliable (e.g. the "National Enquirer" or
"Pravda"); or (3) unnecessary, since there is an argument from reason instead
that is easy, clear, and readily available; or (4) when the appeal is dogmatic, i.e.
closed rather than open, claiming certainty rather than probability; when men
are treated as gods; or (5) when the appeal is uncritical, when there is no good
reason why this authority should be trusted. This latter form includes such forms
as the "snow job," the "appeal to the expert" and the "appeal to Big Names."
Examples: (Which, if any, of the five errors above does each of the follow-
ing commit?)
(1) "The doctrine of Aristotle is the supreme truth, because his intellect was
the limit of the human intellect. It is therefore rightly said that he was created
Fallacies of diversion 83
and given to us by divine providence so that we might know all that can be
known" (Muslim philosopher Averroes, quoted by Etienne Gilson in History of
Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, p. 220). (This was not the typical
medieval attitude toward Aristotle!)
(2) "There must be something to astrology; my mother swears by it"
(3) "Ho Chi Minh was not a tyrant." "How do you know that?" "Jane Fonda
said so."
(4) "According to 75% of all convicted felons, the American justice system
is unjust."
(5) "Euclid said that the square of the hypotenuse of a right triangle is equal
in area to the sum of the squares on the other two sides, so it must be tme."
(6) "It must be true; I got it right from my philosophy professor."
(7) "Don't touch that!" "Why not?" "It's hot It burns. It hurts." "How do you
know? Did you try it? Did you get a boo-boo on it?" "No, but Mommy said so."
(8) "Evolution is probably true because nearly all scientists believe it."
(9) "Mary was assumed into Heaven." "How do you know?" "The Church
says so."
(10) "Allah hates the aggressor." "How do you know what Allah thinks?"
"It's in the Qur 'an."
(11) "There probably are billions and billions of extraterrestrial life forms.
Carl Sagan says so."
2C, Ad baculum
This is the appeal to force ("baculum" means "stick"), i.e. to fear (the fear of
force) instead of reason.
The "other side of the coin," or correlative, of the appeal to fear is the appeal
to desire. This has not yet received a separate technical name; yet the thought
that "It's true because I want it to be true" is perhaps the commonest fallacy of
all. Freud would certainly say so. (Is that an argumenturn ad verecundiaml)
Examples:
(1) "Of course there's a real Santa Claus, but he doesn't bring presents to
children who don't believe in him."
(2) "Before you answer, remember who pays your salary."
(3) Chairman of the Board: "All those in favor of my proposal, say i agree';
all those opposed, say *1 resign.'"
(4) "Thomas, if you could only see your way clear to agree with King
Henry's theology, you would be Chancellor of England for life."
(5) "If you just can't agree with the reasonableness of company policy on
this issue, you can start looking for another job."
(6) "It is reasonable to believe in God because if you believe in God, you
have your best chance to be rewarded with Heaven. If you do not, you have a
good chance to be punished with Hell." (Is "Pascal's Wager" a fallacy?)
84 III. MATERIAL FALLACIES
(7) "If you adopted the belief that everywhere is Heaven, even here, and
everyone is God, even you, you would be blissfully happy and free from fear. For
what is there to fear in Heaven, and what does God have to be afraid of?"
(8) (Advisors to their campaigning politician): "The best argument we know
for changing your mind on this controversial issue is the polls, which tell us that
your constituents will not re-elect you unless you agree with them about it."
2D, Ad misericordiam
The fallacy of "ad misericordiam" or "appeal to pity" is the perversion of some-
thing that is perfectly legitimate in itself, just as is the "appeal to authority." Pity
is usually a good thing, often appropriate and sometimes ncccssary; but it can-
not be a substitute for argument.
The commonest form of this fallacy in teachers' experience is students'
attempt to "buy" higher grades or more time to complete late assignments,
because of the supposed suffering that they experienced either before the test or
assignment ("Give me an A even though I scored a 70% on your test because I
studied terribly hard all night") or afterwards ("If you flunk me, my parents will
be devastated. They sacrificed all their savings on my tuition.").
Examples:
(1) "I do not think that when you have to look at the painful, lingering death
of someone you love, you will still believe that euthanasia is morally wrong."
(But the moral question is not whether such a death is painful and pitiable but
whether it is man or God who has authority over man's life. In the words of the
title of a pro-euthanasia movie, "Whose Life Is It, Anyway?" Pity no more
refutes the traditional religious answer to that question than it proves it.)
(2) "If you don't commit adultery with me, I will despair and kill myself"
(3) "If you have tears, prepare to shed them now." (Mark Antony, in
Shakespeare's "Julius Caesar")
(4) "Officer, I don't deserve a speeding ticket: my dog just died, my moth-
er-in-law moved in, and my tax return is being audited!"
2E, Ad ignontiniam
This is the "appeal to shame." Shame, like fear and pity, is another emotion that
is often appropriate but never a valid substitute for a reason. To believe or dis-
believe an idea, or to choose to do or not do a deed, only because you do not
want to experience shame, is to substitute emotion for reason, and that is clear-
ly just as unreasonable as substituting reason for emotion.
Shame itself is not a fallacy; but deciding what to do or say by appealing
only to shame is a logical fallacy because it is a diversion from objective truth,
facts, and evidence. For shame is subjective, or intcrsubjective; it is dependent
on other people's minds: we feel shame only when others see or know us. E.g.
Fallacies of diversion 85
we are not ashamed to be naked in the shower, but in the street. Shame is essen-
tially social and relative to social expectations, which change with time, place,
and culture. What is shameful in one society is not shameful in another. Guilt,
by contrast, we can feel when we are alone, and it is relative not to other peo-
ple's feelings but to our own beliefs about moral rightness, or what we think we
truly ought to do. So an appeal to guilt can be quite rational. It can also be irra-
tional, of course, if the guilt is pathological, overdone, or inappropriate.
Examples of the "appeal to shame":
(1) "You're going to talk to teenagers about chastity? You'll be a laughing
stock. They'll call you a Puritan behind your back, and a weirdo. Prepare for a
big blush."
(2) "What? You're going to be a lawyer^ Is it because you want people to
tell jokes on you?"
(3) "There is nothing to feel guilt for except guilt feelings."
(4) St. Augustine said he stole some pears with some friends at the age of
16 because "Someone said, "Let's do it,' and I was ashamed to be ashamed."
(5) "What! You still have heroes? In this day and age? You're the only per-
son I know who will admit that. Don't you feel like a naive little kid?"
2F, Adpopulum
This fallacy is especially popular today, in what some sociologists call an "other-
directed" age, when the need for acceptance by others is felt so strongly; it is the
fallacy of believing or doing something only because it is popular, or getting
someone else to believe or do something only because other people do. It is
called the "appeal to the populace," or the "appeal to the masses," but sometimes
the appeal is only to a select group of people, by implying "I'm one of your kind;
trust me." This is sometimes called "snob appeal," and usually is negative rather
than positive, e.g. ""Can anything good come out of Nazareth?" (John 1:46)
As with the other fallacies in this group, the fallacy consists not in the feel-
ing itself (the desire to be accepted), but in appealing to it instead of to reason,
as a diversion from facts and evidence.
Examples:
(1) "I am no orator, as Brutus is; but as you know me all, a plain blunt man.
. . . For I have neither wit, nor words, nor worthy Action, nor utterance, nor the
power of speech,/ To stir men's blood; I only speak right on." (Mark Antony in
Shakespeare, "Julius Caesar" III, 2)
(2) ('"The Big Lie") "The magnitude of a lie always contains a certain fac-
tor of credibility, since the great mass of the people . . . , in view of the primi-
tive simplicity of their minds, more easily fall a victim to a big lie than a little
one, since they themselves lie in little things, but would be ashamed of lies that
were too big. Such a falsehood will never enter their heads." (Adolf Hitler, Mein
KampJ) ""The Big Lie" appeals to this process of unconscious reasoning: "If
86 111. MATERIAL FALLACIES
most of 'my kind of people' believe an idea that seems absurd the idea must be
true, for people like me would never fall for that big a lie."
(3) "Capital punishment can't be wrong; 75% of the people support it."
(4) "If you let this man go, you are no friend of Caesar's" (John 19:12)
(This is a good example of a fallacy that can be classified in more than one way;
it is also an argumentum ad baculum.)
(5) "Forty million Frenchmen can't be wrong."
(6) "In Philadelphia, nearly everybody reads the Bulletin(Philadelphia
Bulletin ad)
(7) "Evil spirits? Who believes in that today?"
(8) "The notion of timeless truth is based on an outmoded Greek meta-
physics that we moderns have rejected."
2G. Ad Ignorantiam
The "appeal to ignorance" consists in arguing that an idea must be true because
we do not know that it is not. It is a fallacy because ignorance can never be a
premise or reason. Premises must express knowledge-claims. Nothing logically
follows from nothing, i.e. from no-knowledge.
Examples:
(1) "He can't prove he earned that money, so he must have stolen it."
(2) "Aristotle? Never heard of him. So he can't be important."
(3) "We know of no natural cause that could have produced that effect. So
it must have been a miracle."
(4) "How could there be a war going on? I haven't seen any evidence of it."
(5) "God must exist because I've never seen any proof that he doesn't."
3 A, Dicta Simpliciter
We now move to seven fallacies of oversimplification. The most obvious and
direct of these is called "dicto simpliciter ," which means saying something too
simply, absolutely, or unqualifiedly; that is, applying a general principle to a spe-
cial case without the needed qualification. It consists in ignoring the facts about
the special case that requires the principle to be qualified.
Examples:
(1) Man is a rational animal. Therefore even an idiot can pass a logic course.
(2) "According to the Greek saying, water is best (ariston to hudor). So I'll
swap you some water for those diamonds and you'll come out ahead."
(3) "Dicto simpliciter is a fallacy. Therefore don't read this logic textbook;
it's too simple. It gives you only basics."
Fallacies of oversimplification 87
(4) "Man has been progressively more lenient, first to citizens, then to
slaves, then to animals, and then (presumably) to plants. 1 think it wrong to sit
on a man; soon, I shall think it wrong to sit on a horse; eventually (I suppose) I
shall think it wrong to sit on a chair" (G.K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy)
3C, Composition
This fallacy consists in arguing from the part to the whole, ignoring the fact that
what is true of the part is not necessarily true of the whole.
88 111. MATERIAL FALLACIES
It can be done with either groups or single things. "This member of the
Professor's logic class is smart, therefore that must be a smart class" docs it for
a group. "That chapter was fascinating. The whole book must be fascinating
too" does it for a thing.
Examples:
(1) Mark Twain said to his minister, "I enjoyed your service this morning. I
welcomed it like an old friend. I have, you know, a book at home containing
every word of it."
"You have not," the minister protested.
"I have so."
"Well, you send that book to me. I'd like to see it."
"I'll send i t " promised Twain. The next day, he sent the minister an
unabridged dictionary.
(2) Texas has more millionaires than any other state, therefore Texas is the
richest state.
(3) Every one of the actors in this movie is great, so it must be a great movie.
(4) "An arrow that appears to be in flight must really be at rest, for when a
thing occupies a space equal to itself, it is at rest. Since the arrow never occu-
pies a space greater or smaller than itself, it is always at rest. Since the arrow is
at rest at each moment of flight, it can never move." (Zeno the Eleatic) (Math
majors should explain how the infinitesimal calculus answers Zeno's puzzle.)
(5) "There's a bug on this blade of grass." "My goodness, you certainly have
a buggy lawn."
3D, Division
This is the reverse of Composition; it consists in arguing from whole to part,
ignoring the fact that what is true of the whole is not always true of the part.
It too can be done either with single things ("That book is fascinating, there-
fore each chapter must be") or with groups ("That class is smart, and he's a
member of it, therefore he must be smart").
Examples:
(1) If ten glasses of wine per meal is harmful to health, then one glass of
wine per meal must also be harmful to health, for it cannot be that many good
things make one bad thing.
(2) Irishmen are scattered all over the world. Pat is an Irishman. Therefore
Pat is scattered all over the world.
(3) "A frugal shepherd will buy only black sheep, not white sheep" "I did
not know that. Why is that so?" "Because white sheep eat more than black
sheep." "I did not know that either. Why is that so?" "Why, it's obvious. White
sheep eat more than black sheep because there are more white sheep than black
sheep "
Fallacies of oversimplification 89
set of teeth ready to chew and destroy." "Thanks," interrupted God, "Don't call
me, I'll call you." Then he interviewed Abraham, and asked the same question,
and Abraham replied, "Oh, God, don't ask me. I don't know what man is. I look
into myself and sometimes I see light and sometimes darkness, sometimes an
angel and sometimes an animal. In fact I seem to be a whole zoo of animals,
some tame and some wild." "You shall be my prophet," said God. (God docs not
commit the black or white fallacy.)
Some of the most egregious examples of quoting out of context consist sim-
ply in dropping the quotation marks or a phrase like "he said," thus making it
seem as if the writer approves a quotation he really disapproves. For instance,
Thomas Aquinas begins each "article" of the Summa Theologica by summariz-
ing objections to the thesis he will defend; and students (and sometimes even
scholars) sometimes quote these objections as if they were Aquinas's own posi-
tion.
Some other examples of the fallacy of quoting out of context:
(1) "Kennedy said, 'Ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you
can do for your country/ Therefore he must have been against federal public
health care."
(2) "I am the Great Truth-Teller. No one can make me tell a lie." "I can.
Watch me. Tell me, is it bad to lie?" "Yes." "So I should avoid it?" "Yes." "In
order to avoid it, I must know what it is, right?" "Of course." "But I am confused
about what it is to tell a lie. Please teach me." "How?" "I learn best by examples.
So give me an example." "All right. I am a Martian." "Aha! The Great Truth-
Teller has told a lie."
(3) "Milton wrote, 'Better to reign in Hell than serve in Heaven.' So he must
have agreed with the Devil."
(4) "The manager is a thief. He told his baserunner to steal whenever he
could."
(5) "Shakespeare was a nihilist. He wrote, 'Life's but a walking shadow, a
poor player that struts and frets his hour upon the stage and then is heard no
more. It is a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.'"
I hate courthouses.
Therefore you will lose your case in court today.
is a /ion sequitur.
school with straight A*s, and learned everything that anyone else learned there,
tell me this: Do dead men bleed?" "No," he answered. "Are you sure?" "Yes."
"Good. Now watch - " and he took a pin and pricked the boy's hand. "What do
you see?" "I'm bleeding" said the boy. "Yes. So what is your logical conclu-
sion?" "Doctor, you are a genius! You have taught me that I was wrong all my
life! Dead men do bleed after all."
(5) "Good sense is, of all things among men, the most equally distributed;
for everyone thinks himself so abundantly provided with it that even those who
are the most difficult to satisfy in everything else do not usually desire a larger
measure of this quality than they already possess. Since it is unlikely that all men
should err in such a matter, we may take it as assured . . (Rene Descartes,
Discourse on Method)
(6) "You can't help believing in free will; you're predestined to think that
way."
4E, A r g u i n g in a Circle
This fallacy consists in using a conclusion to justify a premise after having used
that premise to justify that conclusion. Thus it is really another version of beg-
ging the question, assuming what you arc supposed to prove (namely, the con-
clusion) - but this time not just assuming it but also using it as a premise to
prove your other proposition.
Examples:
(1) "All the precepts of the Qur'an are true."
"Why?"
"Because they are the word of Allah."
96 III. MATERIAL FALLACIES
way. The believers in miracles accept them (rightly or wrongly) because they
have evidence for them. The disbelievers in miracles deny them (rightly or
wrongly) because they have a doctrine against them. The open, obvious, demo-
cratic thing is to believe an old apple-woman when she bears testimony to a mir-
acle, just as you believe an old apple-woman when she bears testimony to a mur-
der. The plain, popular course is to trust the peasant's word about the ghost
exactly as far as you trust the peasant's word about the landlord. . . . If I say, 4a
peasant saw a ghost,' I am told, 4But peasants are so credulous.' If I ask, 4 Why
credulous?' the only answer is - that they see ghosts." (G.K. Chesterton)
(14)"There are only two kinds of people in the world: those who say there
are only two kinds of people in the world and those who don't. And I'm in the
second class." (Robert Benchley)
(15)"The trouble with people like you is that you're always stereotyping
people like us."
(16)"One thing only do I know for certain and that is that man's judgments
of value follow directly his wishes for happiness - that, accordingly, they are an
attempt to support his illusions with arguments." (Sigmund Freud, Civilization
and Its Discontents)
(17)"Why have you come to me, O seeker?"
"To hear your wisdom, O Enlightened One."
"What wisdom?"
"The wisdom of life. Tell me, what is life? What is the meaning of
life?"
"Life is suffering. To live is to suffer."
"This is true wisdom, O Enlightened One. But can you also teach me
how to escape suffering?"
"I can. If you desire to escape suffering, you must know its cause and
cure."
"I await your wisdom, O Enlightened One. What is the cause of suffer-
ing?"
"The cause of suffering is desire."
"And what is its cure?"
"Its cure is the extinguishing of desire. For to take away the cause is to
take away the effect."
"This is truly wisdom, O Enlightened One. And how can I attain this
extinguishing?"
"Only by the Noble Eightfold Path."
"And is this path an easy one?"
"No, it is a very demanding one."
"And what will bring me success on this path, O Enlightened One?"
"What do you think?"
"I know not. Is it family connections, or fame, or money, or intelli-
gence?"
"None of these will bring you success, O seeker."
"What will bring me success, then?"
"Only perseverance will bring you success on this path."
"But what is perseverance? Is it not great desire?"
(18) "Even if a fetus is a person, I still believe in abortion because I believe
in every person's right to control her own body." (Do you see the self-contradic-
tion there? If not, why not?)
(19)"It is useless to argue at all if all our conclusions are warped by our
conditions. Nobody can correct anybody's bias if all mind is all bias. . . . The
Fallacies of argumentation 99
dark; yet my light switch is 20 feet away from my bed." "How do you do that?"
"I wait till it's daytime."
(5) "When you sold me this parrot you told me it could repeat every word
it heard." "That's right." "Well, I've been talking to it all day and it hasn't said a
word yet. That's false advertising." "No it isn't. The parrot's deaf."
(6) The starship Enterprise has a crew of 300 humans, one non-human
Klingon, and one half-human, half-Vulcan, Mr. Spock. If we call the Klingon
human, how many humans do we have on the Enterprise? Answer: 300. Calling
a Klingon human doesn't make it human.
5A, Hasty G e n e r a l i z a t i o n
This is the commonest and simplest fallacy of induction, and it occurs in the
commonest and simplest form of induction, the inference from some specific
examples to a general principle. Mere examples never conclusively prove a gen-
eral principle, of course; they only render it more probable as the examples are
more numerous, more diverse, and more representative. So whether or not an
inductive generalization is "hasty," and thus fallacious, is a matter of degree and
a common-sense "judgment call."
Some examples of hasty generalization:
(1) "We went to three ball games this year and the home team lost each one.
They're losers."
(2) "We went to three ball games this year and the home team lost each one.
We're their jinx." (Here we have not a hasty generalization but a hasty causal
induction.)
(3) "All the swans we've ever seen were white, so all swans must be white."
("All swans are white" was a classic logic textbook example of a universal
proposition - until a species of black swan was discovered.)
(4) "Modern philosophers are all atheists. Look at Machiavelli and Hobbes
and Hume and Mill and Russell and Marx and Nietzsche and Sartre."
occur before the second thing. The fact that A is observed to occur before B may
be a clue, and it is reasonable to follow this clue further to determine whether A
is the cause of B; but the mere temporal proximity is not a sufficient reason by
itself for concluding that A is the cause of B. It may be, or it may not. It may be
a mere coincidence, or it may be that A and B are both caused by a third thing,
C, or it may be that B causes A.
Examples of post hoc:
(1) The rooster thinks his crowing brings up the sun each morning because
each morning the sun rises shortly after he crows.
(2) "I ain't niver had a axydent cuz I alius cairy mah lucky rabbit's foot"
(3) "My doctor asked me whether I drank two hot scotches every night, and
I answered him that I did, but only as a preventative of toothaches. I have never
had a toothache." (Mark Twain)
(4) "Why are you putting all those little pieces of lemon around your yard?"
"To keep the alligators away" "But there are no alligators within a thousand
miles of here." "See? It works."
(5) "And the sailors said to one another, 4 Come, let us cast lots, that we may
know on whose account this evil (storm) has come upon us.' So they cast lots,
and the lot fell upon Jonah." (Jonah 1:7)
have ruled the world. If he had ruled the world, we would all have been brought
up under Nazi propaganda and would have been Nazis. So the only reason we
are not Nazis is because the Italians did not believe in clocks.
woman's faith, and he was pleased when she detected and refuted his fallacy by
extending his analogy:
"And Jesus went away from there and withdrew to the district
of Tyre and Sidon. And behold, a Canaanite woman from that region
came out and cried, 'Have mercy on me, O Lord, Son of David; my
daughter is severely possessed by a demon.' But he did not answer
her a word. And his disciples came and begged him, saying, 'Send
her away, for she is crying after us.* He answered, 4 1 was sent only to
the lost sheep of the house of Israel.' But she came and knelt before
him, saying, "Lord, help me.' And he answered, "It is not fair to take
the children's bread and throw it to the dogs.' She said, 'Yes, Lord,
yet even the dogs eat the crumbs that fall from their master's table.'
Then Jesus answered her, "O woman, great is your faith! Be it done
for you as you desire.' And her daughter was healed instantly."
(Matthew 15:21-28)
5E, T h e A r g u m e n t f r o m Silence
When a speaker or writer is silent about x, we cannot conclude that he does not
believe in x, or that there is no x. The fallacy called the '"argument from silence"
does just that. E.g.: ""Notice that this author never once refers to her husband.
And there is no evidence whatever of any reference to her husband in any doc-
uments of her time or later, by her friends or by her enemies. Therefore she must
have been unmarried."
Western legal systems recognize this fallacy in the principle that ""silence
betokeneth nothing" (used by Thomas More in his trial: see A Man For All
Seasons) and in the Fifth Amendment (the accused is allowed to refuse to answer
a question, and this cannot be used as positive evidence against him).
Historical textual scholars often commit this fallacy, arguing from a text's
silence. From the fact that Descartes does not mention anything about the
Masons or the Rosicrucians, some conclude that he could not have belonged to
these societies, as some claim he did. Others argue that his silence is evidence
that he did belong to them, since they are secret societies and silence is exactly
what we would expect to find in their members! (This is arguing in a circle, a
form of begging the question.) Both arguments, of course, are fallacious and
prove nothing.
refute it. Pessimists will point to many ways in which life is getting worse:
increased rates of suicide, divorce, depression, new diseases, teenage crime,
domestic violence, etc.; while optimists will point to many ways life is getting
better: increased wealth, medical discoveries, treatment of the handicapped,
technological efficiency, communications, etc. The fallacy is so common and so
simple that it is pointless to multiply examples. It is perhaps the most basic of
all mistakes for a scientist: letting his hypothesis control his data rather than vice
versa.
paralyze the mind of a rational and objective listener, for the listener now finds
himself suspended between two arguments, and two conclusions, that seem
equally convincing.
The 18th-century philosopher Immanuel Kant thought this was all that
could ever be done with regard to metaphysical questions. He thought that "pure
reason," i.e. the use of reason beyond sense experience, always resulted in logi-
cal standoffs or "antinomies" where equally good and equally irrefutable argu-
ments for two contradictory propositions could be found. He called these "antin-
omies of pure reason." For instance, that space and time are infinite and that they
are finite; or that the human will is free rather than necessitated or determined,
and that it is necessitated or determined rather than free. Kant thought this situ-
ation showed that we should be skeptical of the possibility of metaphysics.
But this conclusion need not follow. First, even if metaphysical arguments
did lead to antinomies, that would not prove the questions are somehow wrong:
that is a non sequitur. Second, the antinomies might be psychological rather than
logical, subjective rather than objective. Third, the antinomies can be answered;
mistakes can be found in at least one of the arguments on each side in any
"antinomy," usually an ambiguous term. Fourth, they must be answerable, in
principle. For two contradictory conclusions cannot both be true, therefore they
cannot both be proved by perfectly good arguments.
But when you leave an argument "hanging" instead of showing its weak-
ness, and then go off and create another one, you neglect half your work. That is
like sending good batters to the plate but no fielders to the field, hoping that you
score more runs than your opponent even without any defense. That might pos-
sibly win a baseball game but not a logical debate, for you do not win a logical
debate by simply scoring the most runs, so to speak, i.e. inventing the largest
number of arguments.
explanations claim less than proofs, they are less controversial, less threatening,
less confrontational; so it is tempting to use them instead of proofs. This is not
a fallacy, if we know what we are doing; but it is a fallacy when we confuse the
two and think that our explanation amounts to a proof.
E.g. Darwinian Natural Selection explains the fossil record, and does so
more scientifically than any other hypothesis. However, Natural Selection is an
explanation, not a proof. First of all, it is not put forward as a proof of the fossil
record (for no one questions that record; it is not controversial; it is not a con-
clusion of an argument, but it is data). It is put forward as a hypothesis that
explains the fossil rccord. Second, the Darwinian argument for Natural
Selection, including the evidence of the fossil record, amounts to a probable
argument, but not a "door-shutting" proof - at least so far. Copernicus's helio-
centric hypothesis too was only an explanation, not a proof, until subsequent
observations refuted the alternative Ptolemaic geocentric hypothesis.
Similarly, the Freudian explanation of religion as fear-induced father-fig-
ure-fantasy does not prove religion is an illusion, any more than the religious
explanation of Freud's atheism as his own Oedipus complex proves that Freud
was wrong about God.
The more common mistake today is probably the opposite of this fallacy:
using tactics of personal appeal such as friendliness to substitute for good rea-
sons, using the subjective element as a substitute for the objective element in
dialogue. There is a brilliant example in "A Man for All Seasons," where the
Duke of Norfolk is trying to persuade Thomas More to approve King Henry
VIII's divorce, as the Duke and all his friends have, even in violation of
Thomas's own conscience: "Couldn't you see your way clear to come with me,
Thomas - for friendship's sake?" And Thomas replies, "And when you go to
Heaven for obeying your conscience, and I go to Hell for disobeying mine, will
you come with me - for friendship's sake?"
Both the personal and the impersonal dimensions are necessary as two parts
of all interpersonal argument, and neither one can make up for the lack of the
other.
1 Though both are controversial, and some would defend these two examples as not falla-
cious at all.
112 III. MATERIAL FALLACIES
substituting concern for faraway groups like "the p o o f ' and abstractions like
"justice in the Near East" for concrete human beings and problems in our own
families and lives. As Linus says in a "Peanuts" comic strip, "I have no problem
with Humanity. It's people I can't stand." Or as G.K. Chesterton put it,
There are no exercises at the end of this long chapter on the 49 fallacies.
Examples have been integrated into the text instead. Why? Because it is the
hardest topic in logic for fair and useful quizzes and tests, since there is almost
always some overlapping among the fallacies, especially if there are a large
number of them to learn. (And 49 is a large number!) Very often, when one pri-
mary fallacy is committed, another, secondary fallacy is too, at least in an
implicit way. Often there are three or four good answers to the question "identi-
fy the fallacy." So the correct answer is often a matter of interpretation, with
some reasonable doubt as to which is the best. "Name the fallacy" exercises
often resemble the game "Pin the Tail on the Donkey." This stands in striking
contrast to the rest of logic, where the correct answers are almost always "black
and white" and unarguable.
So, instead of the pain of exercises, we have included the pleasure of an old.
charmingly out-of-date, satirical short story entitled "Love Is a Fallacy." It will
stick with you, as a "big picture," longer than many little flea-like exercises.
114 111. MATERIAL FALLACIES
"Love Is a Fallacy"
by Max Schulman (from The Many Loves of Dobie Gillis)
Cool was I and logical. Keen, calculating, perspicacious, acute and astute-
I was all of these. My brain was as powerful as a dynamo, as precise as a
chemist's scales, as penetrating as a scalpel. And - think of it! - I was only eight-
een.
It is not often that one so young has such a giant intellect. Take, for exam-
ple, Petey Bellows, my roommate at the university. Same age, same background,
but dumb as an ox. A nice enough fellow, you understand, but nothing upstairs.
Emotional type. Unstable. Impressionable. Worst of all, a faddist. Fads, I submit,
are the very negation of reason. To be swept up in every new craze that comes
along, to surrender yourself to idiocy just because everybody else is doing it -
this, to me, is the acme of mindlessncss. Not, however, to Petey.
One afternoon I found Petey lying on his bed with an expression of such
distress on his face that I immediately diagnosed appendicitis. "Don't move," I
said. "Don't take a laxative. I'll get a doctor."
"Raccoon," he mumbled thickly.
"Raccoon?" I said, pausing in my flight.
"I want a raccoon coat," he wailed.
I perceived that his trouble was not physical, but mental. "Why do you want
a raccoon coat?"
"I should have known it," he cried, pounding his temples. "I should have
known they'd come back when the Charleston came back. Like a fool I spent all
my money for textbooks, and now I can't get a raccoon coat."
"Can you mean," I said incredulously, "that people are actually wearing rac-
coon coats again?"
"All the Big Men on Campus are wearing them. Where've you been?"
"In the library," 1 said, naming a place not frequented by Big Men on
Campus.
He leaped from the bed and paced the room. "I've got to have a raccoon
coat," he said passionately. "I've got to!"
"Peter, why? Look at it rationally. Raccoon coats are unsanitary. They shed.
They smell bad. They weigh too much. They're unsightly. They - 44
"You don't understand," he interrupted impatiently. "It's the thing to do.
Don't you want to be in the swim?"
"No," I said truthfully.
"Well, I do," he declared. "I'd give anything for a raccoon coat. Anything!*'
My brain, that precision instrument, slipped into high gear. "Anything?" I
asked, looking at him narrowly.
"Anything," he affirmed in ringing tones.
I stroked my chin thoughtfully. It so happened that I knew where to get my
hands on a raccoon coat. My father had had one in his undergraduate days; it lay
"Love Is a Fallacy" 115
now in a trunk in the attic back home. It also happened that Petey had something
I wanted. He didn't have it exactly, but at least he had first rights on it. I refer to
his girl, Polly Espy.
I had long coveted Polly Espy. Let me emphasize that my desire for this
young woman was not emotional in nature. She was, to be sure, a girl who excit-
ed the emotions, but I was not one to let my heart rule my head. I wanted Polly
for a shrewdly calculated, entirely cerebral reason.
I was a freshman in law school. In a few years I would be out in practice. I
was well aware of the importance of the right kind of wife in furthering a
lawyers career. The successful lawyers I had observed were, almost without
exception, married to beautiful, gracious, intelligent women. With one omission,
Polly fitted these specifications perfectly.
Beautiful she was. She was not yet of pin-up proportions, but I felt sure that
time would supply the lack. She already had the makings.
Gracious she was. By gracious I mean full of graces. She had an erectness
of carriage, an ease of bearing, a poise that clearly indicated the best of breed-
ing. At table her manners were exquisite. I had seen her at the Kozy Kampus
Korner eating the specialty of the house - a sandwich that contained scraps of
pot roast, gravy, chopped nuts, and a dipper of sauerkraut - without even getting
her fingers moist.
Intelligent she was not. In fact, she veered in the opposite direction. But I
believed that under my guidance she would smarten up. At any rate, it was worth
a try. It is, after all, easier to make a beautiful dumb girl smart than to make an
ugly smart girl beautiful.
"Petey," I said, "are you in love with Polly Espy?"
"I think she's a keen kid," he replied, "but I don't know if you'd call it love.
Why?"
"Do you," I asked, "have any kind of formal arrangement with her? I mean
are you going steady or anything like that?"
"No. We see each other quite a bit, but we both have other dates. Why?"
"Is there," I asked, "any other man for whom she has a particular fondness?"
"Not that I know of. Why?"
I nodded with satisfaction. "In other words, if you were out of the picture,
the field would be open. Is that right?"
"I guess so. What arc you getting at?"
"Nothing, nothing," I said innocently, and took my suitcase out of the closet.
"Where you going?" asked Petey.
"Home for the weekend." I threw a few things into the bag.
"Listen," he said, clutching my arm eagerly, "while you're home, you could-
n't get some money from your old man, could you, and lend it to me so I can
buy a raccoon coat?"
"I may do better than that," I said with a mysterious wink and closed my bag
and left.
116 III. MATERIAL FALLACIES
"Look," I said to Petey when I got back Monday morning. I threw open the
suitcase and revealed the huge, hairy, gamy object that my father had worn in his
Stutz Bearcat in 1925.
"Holy Toledo!" said Petey reverently. He plunged his hands into the raccoon
coat and then his face. "Holy Toledo!" he repeated fifteen or twenty times.
"Would you like it?" I asked.
"Oh yes!" he cried, clutching the greasy pelt to him. Then a canny look
came into his eyes. "What do you want for it?"
"Your girl," I said, mincing no words.
"Polly?" he said in a horrified whisper. "You want Polly?"
"That's right."
He flung the coat from him. "Never," he said stoutly.
I shrugged. "Okay. If you don't want to be in the swim, I guess its your
business."
I sat down in a chair and pretended to read a book, but out of the corner of
my eye I kept watching Petey. He was a torn man. First he looked at the coat with
an expression of a waif at a bakery window. Then he turned away and set his jaw
resolutely. Then he looked back at the coat, with even more longing in his face.
Then he turned away, but with not so much resolution this time. Back and forth
his head swiveled, desire waxing, resolution waning. Finally he didn't turn away
at all; he just stood and stared with mad lust at the coat.
"It isn't as though I was in love with Polly," he said thickly. "Or going steady
or anything like that."
"That's right," I murmured.
"What's Polly to me, or me to Polly?"
"Not a thing," said I.
"It's just been a casual kick - just a few laughs, that's all."
"Try on the coat," said I.
He complied. The coat bunchcd high over his ears and dropped all the way
down to his shoe tops. He looked like a mound of dead raccoons. "Fits fine," he
said happily.
I rose from my chair. "Is it a deal?" I asked, extending my hand.
He swallowed. "It's a deal," he said and shook my hand.
I had my first date with Polly the following evening. This was in the nature
of a survey; I wanted to find out just how much work I had to do to get her mind
up to the standard I required. I took her first to dinner. "Gee, that was a delish
dinner," she said as we left the restaurant. Then I took her to a movie. "Gee, that
was a marvy movie," she said as we left the theater. And then I took her home.
"Gee, I had a sensaysh time," she said as she bade me good night.
I went back to my room with a heavy heart. I had gravely underestimated the
size of my task. This girl's lack of information was terrifying. Nor would it be
enough merely to supply her with information. First she had to be taught to think.
This loomed as a project of no small dimensions, and at first I was tempted to
"Love Is a Fallacy" 117
give her back to Petey. But then I got to thinking about her abundant physical
charms and about the way she entered a room and the way she handled a knife
and fork, and I decided to make an effort.
I went about it, as in all things, systematically. I gave her a course in logic.
It happened that I, as a law student, was taking a course in logic myself, so I had
all the facts at my finger tips. "Polly," I said to her when I picked her up on our
next date, "tonight we are going over to the Knoll and talk/*
"Oo, terrif," she replied. One thing I will say for this girl: you would go far
to find another so agreeable.
We went to the Knoll, the campus trysting place, and we sat down under an
old oak, and she looked at m e expectantly. "What are we going to talk about?"
she asked.
"Logic."
She thought this over for a minute and decided she liked it. "Magnif," she
said.
"Logic," I said, clearing my throat, "is the science of thinking. Before we
can think correctly, we must first learn to recognize the common fallacies of
logic. These we will take up tonight."
"Wow-dow!" she cried, clapping her hands delightedly.
I winced, but went bravely on. "First let us examine the fallacy called Dicto
Simpliciter."
"By all means," she urged, batting her lashes eagerly.
"Dicto Simpliciter means an argument based on an unqualified generaliza-
tion. For example: Exercise is good. Therefore everybody should exercise."
"I agree," said Polly earnestly. "I mean exercise is wonderful. I mean it
builds the body and everything."
"Polly," I said gently, "the argument is a fallacy. Exercise is good is an
unqualified generalization. For instance, if you have heart disease, exercise is
bad, not good. Many people are ordered by their doctors not to exercise. You
must qualify the generalization. You must say exercise is usually good, or exer-
cise is good for most people. Otherwise you have committed a Dicto Simpliciter.
Do you see?"
"No," she confessed. "But this is marvy. Do more! Do more!"
"It will be better if you stop tugging at my sleeve," I told her, and when she
desisted, I continued. "Next we take up a fallacy called Hasty Generalization.
Listen carefully: You can't speak French. I can't speak French. Petey Bellows
can't speak French. I must therefore conclude that nobody at the University of
Minnesota can speak French."
"Really?" said Polly, amazed. "Nobody?"
I hid my exasperation. "Polly, it's a fallacy. The generalization is reached too
hastily. These are too few instances to support such a conclusion."
"Know any more fallacies?" she asked breathlessly. "This is more fun than
dancing even."
118 III. MATERIAL FALLACIES
I fought off a wave of despair. I was getting nowhere with this girl, absolute-
ly nowhere. Still, I am nothing if not persistent. I continued, "Next comes Post
Hoc. Listen to this: Let's not take Bill on our picnic. Every time we take him out
with us, it rains."
"I know somebody just like that," she exclaimed." A girl back home - Eula
Becker, her name is. It never fails. Every single time we take her on a picnic
"Polly," I said sharply, "it's a fallacy. Eula Becker doesn't cause the rain. She
has no conncction with the rain. You are guilty of Post Hoc if you blame Eula
Becker."
"I'll never do it again," she promised contritely. "Are you mad at me?"
I sighed. "No, Polly, I'm not mad."
"Then tell me some more fallacies."
"All right. Let's try Contradictory Premises."
"Yes. let's," she chirped, blinking her eyes happily.
I frowned, but plunged ahead. "Here's an example of Contradictory
Premises: If God can do anything, can He make a stone so heavy that He won't
be able to lift it?"
"Of course," she replied promptly.
"But if He can do anything. He can lift the stone," I pointed out.
"Yeah," she said thoughtfully. "Well, then I guess He can't make the stone."
"But He can do anything," I reminded her.
She scratched her pretty, empty head. "I'm all confused," she admitted.
"Of course you are. Because when the premises of an argument contradict
each other, there can be no argument. If there is an irresistible force, there can
be no immovable object. If there is an immovable object, there can be no irre-
sistible force. Get it?"
"Tell me some more of this keen stuff," she said eagerly.
I consulted my watch. "I think we'd better call it a night. I'll take you home
now, and you go over all the things you've learned. We'll have another session
tomorrow night"
1 deposited her at the girls' dormitory, where she assured me that she had
had a perfectly terrif evening, and I went glumly home to my room. Petey lay
snoring in his bed, the raccoon coat huddled like a great hairy beast at his feet.
For a moment I considered waking him and telling him that he could have his
girl back. It seemed clcar that my project was doomed to failure. The girl sim-
ply had a logic-proof head.
But then I reconsidered. I had wasted one evening: I might as well waste
another. Who knew? Maybe somewhere in the extinct crater of her mind a few
embers still smoldered. Maybe somehow I could fan them into flame.
Admittedly it was not a prospect fraught with hope, but I decided to give it one
more try.
Seated under the oak the next evening I said, "Our first fallacy tonight is
called Ad Misericordiam."
"Love Is a Fallacy" 119
"My dear," I said, patting her hand in a tolerant manner, "five dates is plenty.
After all, you don't have to eat a whole cake to know that it's good."
"False Analogy," said Polly promptly. "I'm not a cake. I'm a girl."
I chuckled with somewhat less amusement. The dear child had learned her
lessons perhaps too well. I decided to change tactics. Obviously the best
approach was a simple, strong, direct declaration of love. I paused for a moment
while my massive brain chose the proper words. Then I began:
"Polly, I love you. You are the whole world to me, and the moon and the
stars and the constellations of outer space. Please, my darling, say that you will
go steady with me, for if you will not, life will be meaningless. I will languish.
I will refuse my meals. I will wander the face of the earth, a shambling, hollow-
eyed hulk."
There, I thought, folding my arms, that ought to do it.
"Ad Misericordiam," said Polly.
I ground my teeth. I was not Pygmalion; I was Frankenstein, and my mon-
ster had me by the throat. Frantically I fought back the tide of panic surging
through me. At all costs I had to keep cool.
"Well, Polly," I said, forcing a smile, "you certainly have learned your fal-
lacies."
"You're darn right," she said with a vigorous nod.
"And who taught them to you, Polly?"
"You did."
"That's right. So you do owe me something, don't you, my dear? If I hadn't
come along you never would have learned about fallacies."
"Hypothesis Contrary to Fact," she said instantly.
I dashed perspiration from my brow. "Polly," I croaked, "you mustn't take
all these things so literally. I mean this is just classroom stuff. You know that the
things you learn in school don't have anything to do with life."
"Dicto Simpliciter," she said, wagging her finger at me playfully.
That did it. I leaped to my feet, bellowing like a bull. "Will you or will you
not go steady with m e ? "
"I will not," she replied.
"Why not?" I demanded.
"Because this afternoon I promised Petey Bellows that I would go steady
with him."
I reeled back, overcome with the infamy of it. After he promised after he
made a deal, after he shook my hand! "The rat!" I shrieked kicking up great
chunks of turf. You can't go with him, Polly. He's a liar. He's a cheat. He's a rat."
"Poisoning the Well," said Polly, "and stop shouting. I think shouting must
be a fallacy too."
With an immense effort of will, I modulated my voice. "All right," I said.
"You're a logician. Let's look at thing logically. How could you choose Petey
122 111. MATERIAL FALLACIES
we will not confuse it with other things. The maximum, or perfect, idea of a
thing is both clear and distinct; but if we cannot have perfect clarity, we should
at least have perfect distinctness. If we cannot know exactly what a thing is, we
should at least know what it isn't, that is, know its limits. "Definition" comes
from de-finio, which means to set limits around a thing.
The importance of definition can hardly be overestimated. It perfects the
first act of the mind in telling us what a thing is. If we do not know what a thing
is, we simply do not know what we are talking about.
This is the most basic reason why symbolic logic alone is radically inade-
quate for philosophy: it cannot deal with what a thing is. It is at least implicitly
Nominalist (sec Chapter I, Section 3, pages 41-43): it excludes the very notion
of essences.
b. by final cause
c. by material cause
4. by effects
Most arguments about definitions are about whether or not the definition is
too broad or too narrow. This is one of the most important first steps in any
philosophical argument, as can be seen by reading the dialogues of Plato. Such
arguments arc not only about words but about reality, since definitions, like any
propositions, are either true or false. However, one cannot argue about nominal
definitions except in terms of usage: is this how the term is in fact usually used?
Nominal definitions, like languages, are man-made, socially constructed con-
ventions rather than universal objective truths; they are invented rather than dis-
covered. Especially, one cannot argue about stipulative definitions, for they are
neither true nor false, not acts of intellect that claim to discover objective truths,
but proposals of will ("Let us use the term X to designate Y and Z"). Stipulative
definitions simply create new nominal definitions. And one can argue about
nominal definitions only in terms of practicality of usage.
Socrates always preferred ordinary language definitions to technical or stip-
ulative ones. Most subsequent philosophers (and "experts" in every field) have
tended to prefer what a populist might call "witch doctor languages," technical
terminologies understood only by the elite, the inner circle in power. It is a very
good exercise to translate "witch doctor languages" into ordinary language. This
is both useful for others, who do not understand the terminology, and useful for
ourselves, since translating is a test as to whether we understand the concept or
only the words. Great philosophers like Aristotle can define difficult terms by
one-syllable words. (See Aristotle's definition of truth on page 144.)
The following chart provides examples of each kind of definition for three
simple concepts.
I. Give a good definition for each of the following. Label what kind of defini-
tion you are giving. Try to give an essential definition if possible. If possi-
ble. have others evaluate and argue about your definitions.
1. logic
2. science
3. induction
4. deduction
5. reasoning
6. proposition
7. term
8. (H) abstraction (noun)
9. (H) concrete (adjective)
10. accident
11. property
12. definition
The limits of definition 131
II. First classify, then evaluate, each of the following definitions. If it is too
broad or too narrow, say why: what is there in the subject that is not in the
predicate if the predicate is too narrow, and what is there in the predicate that
is not in the subject if the predicate is too broad? The definitions quoted
from literary sources (section B) especially are designed to stimulate fruit-
ful philosophical arguments.
A. Shorter, easier exercises:
1. Life is the most vivid of all dreams.
2. Marriage is a voluntary, lifelong, monogamous covenant relationship
between a man and a woman.
3. "A man's religion is what he does with his solitude."
4. A bishop is a clergyman who exercises episcopal functions.
5 Trade is the interchange of goods.
6. (E) Love is "a something we know not what."
7. Life is the sum of vital forces.
8. Life is the opposite of death.
9. (E) Life is a bowl of cherries.
10. (E) Life is when you Ye breathing.
11. Life is what happens between birth and death.
12. Memory is the storehouse of the mind.
13. A university is a placc for acquiring a great deal of knowledge on a great
deal of subjects.
14. Security means contentment.
15. (E) A separation is not a divorce.
16. "Personality is the ability to say Yes; character is the ability to say No."
(Ann Landers)
17. (E) Personality is the quality of being a person.
132 IV. DEFINITION
B. Q u o t a t i o n s
1. "Philosophy is unintelligible answers to insoluble problems." (Henry
Adams)
The limits of definition
2. (E) "A philosopher is a blind man in a dark room looking for a black cat
that isn't there." (Lord Bowen)
3. (E) "A philosopher is one who contradicts other philosophers." (William
James)
4. (E) "Philosophy is common sense in a dress suit." (Oliver S. Braston)
5. (E) "Religion is the opiate of the people." (Marx)
6. "Love is nothing else but an insatiate thirst of enjoying a greedily desired
object." (Montaigne)
7. (E) "Law is whatever is boldly asserted and plausibly maintained." (Aaron
Burr)
8. "Law is . . . an ordinance of reason for the common good, promulgated by
him who has care of the community." (Thomas Aquinas)
9. "A figure is that which is enclosed by one or more boundaries." (Euclid)
10. "Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not
seen." (Hebrews 11:1)
11. "Faith is when you believe something that you know ain't true." (attributed
to a schoolboy by William James in "The Will to Believe")
12. (E) "Economics is the science which treats of the phenomena arising out
of the economic activities of men in society." (John Maynard Keynes.
Scope and Methods of Political Economy)
13. "Justice is health of soul." (Plato)
14. "Justice, for each part of the soul or the state, is doing one's own proper
work." (Plato)
15. (E) "We see that all men mean by justice that kind of state of character
which makes people disposed to do what is just and makes them act just-
ly and wish for what is just." (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics)
16. '"The true,' to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our
thinking, just as 'the right' is only the expedient in the way of our behav-
ing." (William James, "Pragmatism's Conception of Truth")
17. (E) "By good, I understand that which we certainly know is useful to us."
(Spinoza, Ethics)
18. "Happiness is the satisfaction of all our desires." (Kant, Critique of Pure
Reason)
19. (E) "The word happiness indicates the extent to which the innate and
acquired components of sensory-motor function approach an optimum
relationship between the antagonistic processes of individualization and
socialization so that the movements of the individual are contributing
directly or indirectly to larger and more complex electron-proton aggre-
gates or larger and more complex social organizations." (A.P. Weiss, A
Theoretical Basis of Behavior)
20. (E) "Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indetermi-
nate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions
and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a uni-
fied whole." (John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry)
134 IV. DEFINITION
21. "Grief for the calamity of another is pity, and ariseth from the imagination
that the like calamity may befall himself." (Hobbes, Leviathan)
22. "Conscience is an inner voice that warns us somebody is looking." (H.L.
Mencken)
23. (E) "Religion is a complete system of human communication (or a 'form
of life') showing in primarily 'commissive,' 'behabitive,' and 'exercitive'
modes how a community comports itself when it encounters an 'untran-
scendable negation of possibilities."' (Gerald James Larson, "Prolego-
mena to a Theory of Religion," Journal of the American Academy of
Religion)
24. "When we talk of any particular sum of money, we sometimes mean noth-
ing but the metal pieces of which it is composed; and sometimes we
include in our meaning some obscure reference to the goods which can be
had in exchange for it, or to the power of purchasing which the possession
of it conveys." (Adam Smith)
25. "But in practice a citizen is defined to be one of whom both the parents
are citizens; others insist on going further back, say to two or three more
ancestors. This is a short and practical definition; but there are some who
raise the further question how this third or fourth ancestor came to be a
citizen. Gorgias of Lcontini, partly because he was in a difficulty, partly in
irony, said: 'Mortars are what is made by mortar-makers, and the citizens
of Larissa are those who are made by magistrates; for it is their trade to
make Larissaeans.'Yet the question is really simple, for, if according to the
definition just given they shared in the government, they were citizens.
This is a better definition than the other. For the words 'born of a father
and a mother who is a citizen'cannot possibly apply to the first inhabitants
or founders of a state." (Aristotle)
26. "By liberty is understood, according to the proper signification of the
word, the absence of external impediments." (Thomas Hobbes)
27. (E) "We are willing to treat the term 'religious sentiment' as a collective
name for the many sentiments which religious objects may arouse."
(William James)
28. (E) "It is almost a definition of a gentleman to say that he is one who never
inflicts pain." (Newman)
29. "Man is a thinking reed." (Pascal)
30. "Knowledge is true opinion." (Plato, Theaetetiis)
31. "The Master said 4Yu, shall I teach you what know ledge is? When you
know a thing, to recognize that you know it, and when you do not know a
thing, to recognizc that you do not know it: that is knowledge."' (Confu-
cius, Analects)
32. "The word body, in the most general acceptation, signifieth that which fil-
leth, or occupieth some certain room, or imagined place, and dependeth
The limits of definition 135
not on the imagination, but is a real part of that we call the universe."
(Hobbes, Leviathan)
33. "War . . . is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill
our will." (Von Clausewitz, On War)
34. (E) "Political power, properly so called, is merely the organized power of
one class for oppressing another." (Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The
Communist Manifesto)
35. "To sneeze is to emit wind audibly by the nose." (Samuel Johnson,
Dictionary)
36. "I would define 'political correctness* as a form of dogmatic relativism,
intolerant of those, such as believers in 'traditional values,' whose posi-
tions are thought to depend on belief in objective truth." (Philip Devine,
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association June, 1992)
37. (E) "The word 'reality* has whatever significance we choose to give it."
(Reuben L. Goodstein, "Language and Experience")
38. (E) "Truth is whatever my colleagues in my department let me get away
with saying." (Stanley Fish)
39. "The meaning of a statement is the method of its verification." (Friedrich
Waismann, Erkenntnis I)
40. "Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of
motion, during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent
homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, and during which the
retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation." (Herbert Spencer,
Principles of Biology)
41. "A friend is a person with whom I may be sincere." (Emerson)
meant to be doubtful about himself, but undoubting about the truth; this
has been exactly reversed
7. "The false theory of progress . . . maintains that we alter the test instead
of trying to pass the test. . . . If the standard changes, how can there be
improvement, which implies a standard? . . . Progress itself cannot
progress.... Progress should mean that we are always changing the world
to suit the vision. Progress does mean (just now) that we are always chang-
ing the vision."
8. "Art is limitation.... If, in your bold creative way, you hold yourself free
to draw a giraffe with a short neck, you will really find that you are not
free to draw a g i r a f f e . . . . You can free things from alien or accidental laws
but not from the laws of their own nature. You may, if you like, free a tiger
from his bars, but do not free him from his stripes. . . . Do not go about as
a demagogue encouraging triangles to break out of the prison of their three
sides."
9. "Tradition is only democracy extended through time. It is trusting to a
consensus of common human voices. . . . Tradition may be defined as an
extension of the franchise. Tradition means giving votes to the most
obscure of all classes, our ancestors. It is the democracy of the dead.
Tradition refuses to submit to the small and arrogant oligarchy of those
who merely happen to be walking about."
10. "Obviously a suicide is the opposite of a martyr. A martyr is a man who
cares so much for something outside him that he forgets his own personal
life. A suicide is a man who cares so little for anything outside him that he
wants to see the last of everything."
11. "They have invented a phrase that is a black-and-white contradiction in
two words - 'free-love,' as if a lover ever had been, or ever could be, free.
It is the nature of love to bind itself, and the institution of marriage mere-
ly paid the average man the compliment of taking him at his word."
12. "Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a . . . . Peasant. Indeed the type
can only exist in community.... One must not think primarily of a French
Peasant, any more than of a German Mcasle. The plural of the word is the
proper form; you cannot have a Peasant till you have a peasantry The
essence of the Peasant ideal is equality; and you cannot be equal all by
yourself."
of its senses, looser or stricter. But to fairies it can hardly be applied For
it is man who is, in contrast to fairies, supernatural (and often of diminutive
stature); whereas they are natural, far more natural than he. Such is their
doom." (J.R.R. Tolkien, "On Fairy Stories")
G. Plato having defined man as a featherless biped, Diogenes ran to the mar-
ketplace, bought a chicken, plucked out all its feathers, ran back into Plato's
classroom, threw the plucked chicken at Plato's feet, and said to the class,
"Behold Plato's man!" On which account Plato added to the definition:
"with broad, flat nails." (Diogenes Laertius)
V. The Second Act of the Mind:
Judgment
Section 1. Judgments, propositions, and sentences
It is very useful at various points in this book, especially at the beginning of a
new section such as this one, to go back and review the Introduction, Section 4
(all of logic in two pages, pp. 26-27) or Section 5 (the Three Acts of the Mind,
pp. 28-34). For that is like a road map that tells you where you are, how every-
thing in the landscape is related to everything else, where it all fits. Without this
sense of place, without this outline, you may feel lost and confused, and this
feeling will permeate every new detail you learn.
We now begin exploring the second act of the mind, judgment, and its log-
ical product, the proposition, which is expressed linguistically in a declarative
sentence. The distinction, within the second act of the mind, between judgments,
propositions, and sentences is not absolutely crucial, but what is absolutely cru-
cial for all subsequent progress in logic is the distinction between judgment and
the other two acts of the mind: the distinction between judgments and concepts
and the distinction between judgments and arguments - or, in terms of the prod-
ucts of these three acts of the mind, the distinction between propositions and
terms and the distinction between propositions and syllogisms. These two dis-
tinctions are expressed in language, respectively, in the distinction between sen-
tences and words and in the distinction between sentences and paragraphs. If this
paragraph was at all confusing to you, please reread pp. 28-34.
Propositions are most clearly and sharply distinguished from both terms
and arguments by the fact that only propositions can be either true or false.
Terms are only clear or unclear, whether these terms stand by themselves or
form parts of propositions. Propositions arc either true or false, whether they
stand by themselves or form parts of arguments. Arguments as a whole are nei-
ther true nor false; each proposition within an argument is either true or false.
Arguments as a whole are either logically valid or logically invalid, depending
on whether or not the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises.
Judgments, propositions, and sentences 139
This is the simple and obvious core of the art of reading, and this is one of
the most useful parts of logic. For the complaints that students can no longer
read seem to be increasing every generation. After a century of universal public
education, Americans do not know how to read or write as well today as they did
a hundred years ago. If you doubt this, compare newspapers or elementary read-
ing textbooks for any grade a century ago with those today.
One of the best remedies for bad reading and writing is good logic, espe-
cially the analysis of propositions. For thinking clearly, expressing your thoughts
clearly (in writing or speaking), and interpreting another's expressions (written
or spoken) clearly are three arts that are very closely allied; no one of them can
be done well without doing the other two. And the part of logic that is most
directly related to this is the part that studies propositions.
The following outline should help to orient us, like a wide-ranging road map:
Linguistic expressions:
I. Less than sentences (terms)
II. Sentences
A. Declarative sentences (propositions)
1. Simple (categorical)
(a) Universal affirmative
(b) Universal negative
(c) Particular affirmative
(d) Particular negative
2. Compound
(a) Hypothetical
(b) Disjunctive
(c) Conjunctive
B. Non-declarative sentences
1. imperative
2. interrogative
3. exclamatory
4. performative
III. More than sentences (arguments)
There arc other possible divisions of propositions. The most important divi-
sion of all is the division into true and false. Each kind of proposition above can
be either true or false. We may not know whether a given proposition is true or
false, but every proposition must be either true or false. Either there are cxactly
91,199 craters on the moon larger than Meteor Crater in Arizona, or not. Either
the Chicago Cubs are under a curse, and will never win a World Scries until the
end of the world, or not.
Because we sometimes do and sometimes do not know whether a proposi-
tion is true or false, we can also divide propositions into three kinds, (a) true (i.e.
known to be true), (b) false (i.e. known to be false), and (c) unknown. This divi-
sion violates one of the rules of logical division, since it simultaneously uses two
standards: true vs. false and known vs. unknown. (See p. 64, rule 3.) However,
in dealing with the Square of Opposition (Chapter VII, Section 2) the classifi-
cation of propositions into true, false, and unknown, which results from doing
two different divisions at once, is very useful and time-saving.
predicate) of another (the subject). It asserts that all or some of the subject is or
is not the predicate.
There are two ways to look at this. Modern logic texts look at it in terms of
extension, and of class inclusion. This is why they call simple propositions "cat-
egorical" propositions: because they relate two "categories" to each other. In
modern logic, "categories" is meant in the broad sense of any classes or sets of
things. But in traditional, Aristotelian logic, "categories" is meant in the more
restricted sense explained above in Chapter II, Section 2 (page 54). In Aristo-
telian logic, categories are objectively real kinds, not man-made sets; natural
rather than artificial.
They are not just any classes but only the ten highest genera (substance,
quality, quantity, relation, time, place, action, passion, posture, possession).
But in modern logic, any things in the world can simply be classified at will
into mental boxes, and then those boxes are compared as to population (exten-
sion, not comprehension). Thus in modern logic "all men are mortal" means
"the set of beings that we classify as men is included in the larger set of beings
that wc classify as mortals." This is a perfectly legitimate thing to do, but in
Aristotelian logic a proposition does more than that. It deals also with the real
natures of things, our knowledge of these natures, and the expression of that
knowledge and those natures in the meanings (comprehension) of terms. Thus
"all men are mortal" means that all beings that have the essence of humanity
have the property of mortality as part of that essence, or a consequence of that
essence.
The two significant differences here are (1) that modern logic deals with
extension, not comprehension; class inclusion, not essences or natures of things;
because it tends to be nominalistic and skeptical of "essences" or "natures" (see
pages 19-23 and 43-46); and (2) that in modern logic these "classes" of things
that are related in a proposition as subject and predicate are thought to be con-
structed rather than discovered. They arc created by our act of classifying, for
whatever purposes we may have. Modern logic manipulates class concepts; tra-
ditional logic explores the natures of things.
or false. The words "ideas" and "thoughts" are rather vague and generic, and
from a logical point of view we must distinguish three different kinds of "ideas"
or "thoughts." namely the three acts of the mind (conceiving, judging, and rea-
soning), their three mental products (concepts, judgments, and arguments), their
three logical expressions (terms, propositions, and syllogisms), and their three
linguistic expressions (words or phrases, declarative sentences, and paragraphs).
Truth and falsity reside only in the second of each of these sets of three things.
As we have already seen, truth does not reside in concepts or in arguments
but only in judgments. The terms that express concepts are either unambiguous
or ambiguous, but never true or false. Only when two terms are combined in a
proposition can there be truth or falsity. The syllogisms that express arguments
are either logically valid or invalid, but never true or false. Each proposition in
a syllogism is either true or false, but the syllogism as a whole is not.
Modern logic obscures this distinction because it reduces validity to truth.
It interprets a syllogism like "all A is B and all B is C, therefore all A is C " as
simply the claim that the following proposition is true: "All cases of proposition
p (that all A is B) being true together with proposition q (that all B is C) being
true are also cases of proposition c (that all A is C) being true."
Truth does not reside in any other logical entities than propositions, but it
does reside elsewhere than in propositions. For example, we use the word "true"
to refer to a quality that resides in some things, insofar as they conform to a stan-
dard by which the mind judges them. We say "This is true money, but that is
counterfeit." "This is a true (original) Van Gogh, but that a copy." "The publican
had true piety, but the Pharisee had false piety." "He is true to his promises."
"What the prophet says will come true." This kind of truth the truth in things,
ontological truth - is the conformity of the thing to the mind, to an idea or design
or standard in a mind, human or divine; whereas logical truth, i.e. propositional
truth, as we shall sec, is the conformity of the mind to the thing.
According to religious Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, the ultimate "house
of truth" is the mind of God. God invents the truth of the universe, as His art;
man discovers it, as his scicnce. Human science is the indirect reading of the
divine mind.
We also use the word "true" to refer to a quality that resides in persons,
insofar as they are authentic, reliable, and honest. "He's a true man; she's a true
woman." "True" here means "true to his word, trustable, faithful." (There is a
distinctive Hebrew word for this: emeth.) God is called "faithful and true"
(emeth) in the Hebrew scripturcs.
Once we have our answer to where truth is, it becomes easier to answer our
second question, what truth is, especially if we confine our answer to logical
truth. Aristotle defined truth, and what everyone does in fact mean by truth, in
the most simple and commonsensical possible way when he said, "If a man says
of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, he speaks the truth, but if he
says of what is not that it is, or of what is that it is not, he does not speak the
The four kinds of categorical propositions 145
truth." There you have it: the answer to "What is truth?" in one 48-word sen-
tence, and not one word of more than one syllable! The ability to speak advanced
wisdom in words of one syllable is a true test of a philosopher, or at least a good
philosophy teacher. As G.K. Chesterton says, "Most of the machinery of mod-
ern language is labour-saving machinery; and it saves mental labour very much
more than it o u g h t . . . . Long words go rattling by us like long railway trains
It is a good exercise to try for once to express any opinion one holds in words of
one syllable. If you say, 'The social utility of the indeterminate sentence is rec-
ognized by all criminologists as a part of our sociological evolution towards a
more humane and scientific view of punishment,' you can go on talking like that
for hours with hardly a movement of the gray matter inside your skull. But if you
begin 'I wish Jones to go to gaol [jail] and Brown to say when Jones shall come
out,' you will discover, with a thrill of horror, that you are obliged to think."
(Orthodoxy)
Telling the truth means "telling it like it is," and knowing the truth means
"knowing what is." Truth is the conformity of thought to thing, mind to reality,
thought's subject to thought's object. And we express what-is in true proposi-
tions (and what-is-not in false propositions).
Even if you say (as some philosophers do) that truth is what works
(Pragmatism), or that truth is the ontological size of an idea (Monism), or that
truth is the coherence of an idea with other ideas (Idealism), you are still always
presupposing Aristotle's commonsensical definition (often called "the corre-
spondence theory of truth") by saying that this (your definition) is in fact what
truth really is; you are trying to "tell it like it is": that truth really is what works,
or ontological size, or coherence.
(A technical point, but an important one: to speak accurately, Aristotle's the-
ory is more sophisticated than the one modern philosophers often call the "cor-
respondence theory" [usually associated with Locke]. Locke's is a "picture the-
ory" while Aristotle's is a "formal identity theory." Locke believed that our ideas
are copies of reality and that what we know immediately and first of all is our
own ideas. This logically leads to skepticism [though Locke did not draw this
consequence], for if we never know reality directly and immediately, we can
never be sure which pictures of it truly correspond to it and which do not. In con-
trast, Aristotle taught that the very same identical "form" or essence [e.g. apple-
ness] that exists in reality [in the apple] materially and individually and con-
cretely, is abstracted by the mind and exists in the mind immaterially and uni-
versally and abstractly.)
Singular Propositions
There are really six kinds of propositions rather than four because there are
really three kinds of quantity: universal, particular, and singular. Singular
propositions do not talk about cither all of a class or some of a class because
they do not talk about a class at all, but about an individual. E.g. "Socrates was
bald," or "The next sound you hear will be the hyena." Since we cannot divide
the extension of a concrete individual thing or person, as we can divide the
extension of a class, there can never be a singular proposition that begins with
"some." That is. singular propositions are not particular propositions. The ter-
minology of logic at this point can be misleading, since in ordinary language
"particular" has two meanings: "some members of this class" and "this one con-
cretc individual." In logic we use "particular" only in the first sense.
Instead of treating singular propositions as a third kind of quantity, neither
universal nor particular, wc can treat them all as universal propositions, since
they always refer to all of the individual they refer to. An individual cannot be
divided. "Socrates is mortal" means "Socrates as a whole is mortal, all Socrates
Logical form 147
is mortal." (You might think that only part of Socrates is mortal since his body
can die but his soul cannot. But even so, the concrete individual person Socrates,
who has both a body and a soul, is mortal, i.e. can die, because his body and soul
can be divided from each other.) So we will not need six forms of propositions
(universal affirmative, universal negative, particular affirmative, particular neg-
ative, singular affirmative, and singular negative) but only four, since we can
treat singular propositions as universal propositions.
All propositions must fit into one of the four following molds:
(1) Universal affirmative (A) proposition: All | S | is | P |
(2) Universal negative (E) proposition: No |S) is |P)
(3) Particular affirmative (I) proposition: Some |S] is | P |
(4) Particular negative (O) proposition: Some | S | is not |P]
Here are a few examples of the difference between ordinary language and
logical form.
Ordinary language: "Birds fly."
Logical form: All [birds] arc [things that fly]
is so that each term can be independent, and shift positions if necessary, from
subject to predicate or from predicate to subject. (And this will be necessary
later, when dealing with arguments.) But a verb or an adjective cannot be a sub-
ject. Only a noun (or a noun phrase or a pronoun) can be a subject. Since every
predicate must be able to be used also as a subject, it must be changed into a
noun. So "corrupts the whole barrel" is changed into "that which corrupts the
whole barrel."
We will be using "that which" so often in this way that it is convenient to
use the abbreviation "tw" for it. We need to add **that which" before a verb,
when the predicate is a verb, and "that which is," or " t w i " before an adjective,
when the predicate is an adjective. But we do not need to use "twi" before a term
that is already a noun.
IF PREDICATE IS . . . USE.. .
a verb tw (that which)
e.g. "X grows y " All [X] is [tw grows y]
When translating from ordinary language to logical form, the basic and uni-
versal rule is that we may change the wording if necessary but never the mean-
ing. When we change "A few apples corrupt the whole barrel" to "Some [apples]
are [that which corrupt the whole barrel]" we have changed the wording (in two
places) to get the proposition into logical form, but we have not changed the
meaning.
So the four (and only four) strict logical forms for all simple propositions
arc:
A: All [S] is [P]
E: No [S] is [P]
I: Some [S ] is [P]
O: Some [S] is not [P]
Logical form 151
The logical form for an O proposition is "some S is not P," and this can also
be ambiguous if we accent the word "some," thereby implying that "some and
only some S is not P." We do not use acccnts, or anything ambiguous, in logical
form. In logical form, "some " does not mean "only some," or "some but not all"
152 V. THE SECOND ACT OF THE MIND: JUDGMENT
(we could call this the strong meaning of "some ") but "at least some " (wc could
call this the weak meaning of "some").
A:
could be classified under the "fallacy of accent.** (See above, page 75.) The only
way to reveal the negative aspect is to add a second proposition, an O, So the
sentence "Some lawyers are honest" with accent is really equivalent to "Some
lawyers are honest (I) and Some lawyers are not honest (O).**
The Euler diagram for an I proposition puts part of the S circle, or S class,
into P, and leaves the rest of it in dotted lines outside P. The dotted lines signify
the unknown. When we know only that "some S is P," we know only that some
S is within P, we do not know whether or not some S is also outside P. But we
make room for that possibility by the dotted lines.
0
The Euler diagram for an O puts part of the class (or circle) of S outside P
(i.e. in "not-P"), but leaves the other part dotted or unknown. If we know only
that "some S is not P" (i.e. that some S is outside P), we do not know whether
or not it is also true that some S is P (i.e. that some S is also inside P).
O:
men are allowed into the men's room," in the form of an E proposition; (2) or we
can translate it into an A proposition as follows: "Only men are allowed into the
men's room" becomes "All who are allowed into the m e n s room arc men."
"Only S is P" can be reworded as "All P is S." The rule is always that we may
change the wording but never the meaning.
Another, different kind of exclusive proposition begins not with "only" but
with "the only." These are easy to reword. "The only S is P" means simply "All
S is P." ("The only" = "all") E.g. "The only good Yankee is a dead Yankee"
means that "All good Yankees are dead Yankees." "The only ones allowed into the
men's room are men" means "All who are allowed into the men s room are men."
Exceptive propositions begin with "all e x c e p t . . . . " These propositions real-
ly say two things and should be translated into two propositions. "All humans
except the first humans had human parents" means both that "All humans who
were not the first humans had human parents" and that "The first humans did
not have human parents." "Every animal exccpt man lacks reason" means both
that "All non-human animals lack reason" and that "Man does not lack reason."
Indesignate propositions. Some propositions have no words to indicate
quantity, and we have to intuit whether they are meant as universal or particular.
E.g. "people are fickle," or "cliffs arc dangerous." or "fans swarmed the field."
Clearly, "cliffs are dangerous" is an A and "fans swarmed the field" is an I, but
"people are fickle" might be meant either universally ("All people are fickle")
or particularly ("Some people are fickle"); it is hard to tell which. One helpful
rule here is that if the predicate belongs to the subject by nature (or essentially),
the proposition is universal; if only by accident, the proposition is particular.
Thus cliffs are by nature dangerous, and since all cliffs have the nature of cliffs,
all cliffs are dangerous. But fans do not swarm the field by nature, just bccause
they are fans, so that proposition is particular. As to "People are fickle," if "fick-
le" means "somewhat fickle" or "capable of being fickle," this belongs to man
by nature and thus to all men, so the proposition is universal; but if "fickle"
means "very fickle" or "surprisingly fickle" or "unusually fickle," this is acci-
dental and the proposition is particular.
So to dccidc whether indesignate propositions are universal or particular,
we must look at the comprehension. If the predicate belongs to the subject nec-
essarily, bccause of the nature of the subject as such, it is universal; if not, it is
particular. Thus the meaning of maxims like "Great books deserve to be taught"
is universal, while the meaning of rough generalizations like "White men can't
dance" is not.
Note that we are only speaking of meaning here, not truth. Do not try to
determine the meaning of someone else's proposition by imposing what you
believe is true onto it. That would be confusing interpretation (of what the
proposition means) with beliefs what you think is true). (See page 355, point A.)
More specific quantifiers: Sometimes, we cannot fit all the quantitative
meaning into our strict logical form. "A few," "many," "most," "a small quantity
Tricky propositions 155
of" and "a fairly large percentage o f " all have to bccome "some" What do wc
do with cxacl numbers, e.g. "Three ships took Columbus to America"? "Three"
cannot become "all"; and we cannot have more than two quantities, "all" and
"some," or else wc would multiply our logical forms so much that wc could not
make simple rules about them, as we will be doing for the rest of the book. We
could just say "Some" instead of "three," but that would lose an important part
of the meaning. So it is best to put exact numbers into the matter or contcnt of
the term, with an "all" added: e.g. "Three ships took Columbus to America"
becomes: "All [three ships] are [tw took Columbus to America].**
"Few " vs. "A fewPropositions beginning with "a few" are straightforward
I propositions, but propositions beginning with "few" are usually O proposi-
tions, bccause their main intent is negative. "Few Hittites could read" means to
say something about Hittite illiteracy more than Hittite literacy, so it is best to
translate it as "some Hittites are those who could not read." Yet it seems to imply
that some Hittites could read, so it also implies an I. It is really two propositions.
Other quantifiers: sentences beginning with "every," "each," "everyone,"
"anyone,'* "whoever," "any," "everything," "one who," "that which," "anything,"
and the like are obviously universal. Sentences beginning with "a few," "few,"
"many," "most," "a group of," and the like are particular.
Temporal quantifiers. Sometimes time words do the job of quantifiers,
"never" indicating an E. "always" an A. and "sometimes" or "occasionally" an I
or an O. E.g. "Hyenas never really laugh" becomes "No [hyena] is [tw really
laughs]" and "Water is always H 2 0 " becomes "All [water] is [H 2 0]." But some-
times the temporal word is part of the meaning of a term. e.g. "Socrates is the
philosopher I always teach first to beginners."
Compound propositions. We do not have strict logical forms for compound
propositions yet, and the forms we will use for them are more symbolic and
quasi-mathematical than those for simple propositions. (In fact, symbolic logic
is much more useful there than Aristotelian logic.) But even at this point we
should be able to rccognize them, their distinction from simple propositions, and
the three kinds of them: hypothetical ( " i f . . . then . . . " ) propositions, disjunctive
("either . . . or . . .") propositions, and conjunctive ("both . . . and . . ." or "not
both . . . and . . .**) propositions.
When a single compound sentence contains more than one simple proposi-
tion without being either hypothetical or disjunctive, it is usually conjunctive:
e.g. "To be a philosopher is not merely to have subtle thoughts, nor even to
found a school, but so to love wisdom as to live according to its dictates."
(Thoreau, Walden)
Exercises: Identify each of the following as (a) not a proposition at all. (b) a sim-
ple (categorical) proposition, or (c) a compound proposition. If it is a simple
proposition, put it into strict logical form.
156 V. THE SECOND ACT OF THE MIND: J U D G M E N T
14. "Work is the curse of the drinking class." (George Bernard Shaw)
15. "Man is neither angel nor brute, and the unfortunate thing is that he who
would act the angel acts the brute." (Pascal)
16. "Some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be
chewed and digested." (Francis Bacon)
17. "Abandon all hope, ye who enter here." (Dante)
18. "Cleopatra's nose: if it had been shorter, the whole history of the world
would have been changed." (Pascal)
19. "The mass of men lead lives of quiet desperation." (Thoreau)
20. "All happy families resemble one another; every unhappy family is unhap-
py in its own fashion." (Tolstoy)
21. "For all have not the gift of martyrdom." (John Dryden)
22. "What is the use of running when you are on the wrong road?" (John Ray)
23. "Nothing is demonstrable unless the contrary implies a contradiction."
(Hume)
24. "Either death is a state of nothingness and utter unconsciousness, o r . . . there
is a change and migration of the soul from this world to another." (Plato)
25. "The moving finger writes; and, having writ, moves on; not all your piety
nor wit shall lure it back to cancel half a line, nor all your tears wash out
a word of it." (Edward Fitzgerald) (There are 4 propositions here!)
26. "Twas brillig, and the slithy toves did gyre and gimble in the wabe; AH
mimsy were the borogoves, and the mome raths outgrabe." (Lewis Carroll)
27. "If thy Superior drawl or hesitate in his words, pretend not to help him out
or prompt him." (The School of Manners, or Rules for Children's
Behaviour, 1701)
28. "The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do
nothing." (Edmund Burke)
29. "Industrious and intelligent boys who live in the country arc mostly well
up in the cunning art of catching small birds at odd times during the win-
ter months." (A Plain Cookery Book for the Working Classes by Charles
Elme Francatelli, 1861)
30. "Fear God. Honour the King. Reverence thy Parents. Submit to thy
Superiors. Despise not thy inferiors. Be courteous with thy Equals. Pray
daily and devoutly. Converse with the Good. Imitate not the wicked.
Hearken to Instruction. Be desirous of Learning. Love the School. Be
always cleanly. Study Vertue. Provoke no Body. Love thy Schoolfellows.
Please thy Master. Let not play entice thee. Restrain thy Tongue. Covet
future Honour, which only Vcrtuc and Wisdom can procure. ( T h e School
of Manners, 1701)
31. " ' B a h ! ' said Scrooge, 'Humbug!'" (Dickens)
32. "The silken, sad, uncertain rustling of each purple curtain thrilled me."
(Edgar Allen Poe)
Tricky propositions 159
30. "The serpent that did sting thy father's life now wears his crown." (Hamlet
1. 5)
31. "If this be error and upon me proved, I never writ, nor no man ever loved."
(Sonnet 116)
32. "For sweetest things turn sourest by their deeds; lilies that fester smell far
worse than weeds." (Sonnet 94)
33. "Had I but served my God with half the zeal I served my King, He would
not in mine age have left me naked to mine enemies." (King Henry VI11
111,2)
34. "For God's sake, let us sit upon the ground and tell sad stories of the death
of kings." (King Richard II III, 2)
35. "Poor and content is rich, and rich enough." (Othello III, 3)
36. "If it be now, 'tis not to come; if it be not to come, it will be now; if it be
not now, yet it will come." (Hamlet V, 2)
37. "A great while ago the world begun, with hey, ho! the wind and the rain."
(Twelfth Night V, 1)
38. "To gild refined gold, to paint the lily . . . is wasteful and ridiculous
excess." (King John IV ,2)
39. "All that glisters is not gold." (The Merchant of Venice II, 7)
40. "Not all the water in the rough, rude sea can wash the balm off from an
anointed king." (King Richard II III, 2)
41. "That man that hath a tongue, I say, is no man if with his tongue he can-
not win a woman." (Two Gentlemen of Verona III, 1)
42. "Now the hungry lion roars, and the wolf behowls the moon." (A
Midsummer Nights Dream V, 1)
43. "O all you host of heaven! O earth! What else? And shall I couple hell? O,
fie! Hold, hold, my heart; and you, my sinews, grow not instant old, but
bear me stiffly up." (Hamlet I, 5)
44. "To be or not to be: that is the question." (Hamlet III, 1)
45. "My words fly up, my thoughts remain below; words without thoughts
never to heaven go." (Hamlet III, 3)
46. "Alas, poor Yorick!" (Hamlet V, 1)
47. "To err is human; to forgive, divine." (though sometimes attributed to
Shakespeare, this is really from Alexander Pope, Essay on Criticism)
48. "Horatio, I am dead." (Hamlet V, 2)
49. "Good night, sweet prince, and flights of angels sing thee to thy rest."
(Hamlet V, 2)
F. From G.K. Chesterton:
1. "As long as you have mystery, you have health; when you destroy mystery
you create morbidity." (Orthodoxy)
2. "Thoroughly worldly people never understand the world." (Orthodoxy)
3. "If a thing is worth doing, it's worth doing badly."
162 V. THE SECOND ACT OF THE MIND: JUDGMENT
4. "Men did not love Rome because she was great. She was great bccause
they had loved her." (Orthodoxy)
5. "The man who makes a vow makes an appointment with himself at some
distant time and place." ("A Defense of Rash Vows")
6. "A great classic means a book which one can praise without having read."
("Tom Jones and Morality")
7. "The only two things that can satisfy the soul are a person and a story; and
even a story must be about a person " ("The Priest of Spring")
8. "Logic is a machine of the mind, and if it is used honestly it ought to bring
out an honest conclusion." (Varied Types)
9. "There is a very real thing which may be called the love of humanity; in
our time it exists almost entirely among what are called uncducatcd peo-
ple, and it does not exist at all among the people who talk about it."
(Tremendous Trifles)
16. "O that his left hand were under my head and his right hand embracing
me!" (Song of Songs 8:3)
17. "Some boast of chariots, some of horses, but wc boast of the name of the
Lord our God " (Psalm 20:7)
18. "All things work together for good for those who love God." (Romans
8:28)
19. "Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I fear no
evil." (Psalm 23:4)
SUBJECT PREDICATE
A: All S d is P u
E: No S d is P d
I: Some S u is P u
O: Some S u is not P d
When we know that no apes are angels, we already know that no angels are
apes. An E proposition mutually excludes its subject and predicate. We see
immediately that if the subject is excluded from the predicate, that means that
Immediate inference / Conversion 167
the predicate is excluded from the subject We do not really infer a new conclu-
sion; we only express the knowledge we already had - that S and P are exclud-
ed from each other - in different words.
But in the second example we might know both of the premises without
ever bringing them together in our mind and drawing the conclusion. We might
have thought that angels are confined by space, that only a certain finite num-
ber of angels could dance on the head of a pin, because we never noticed that
the two premises necessarily prove the conclusion that angels are not confined
by space. We may have known that angels are pure spirits rather than things with
material bodies, and also that pure spirits without bodies are not confined by
space, since space is an aspect of bodies only - we may have known both of
these premises to be true without knowing the conclusion to be true until this
argument was presented to us. Quite often we do not realize the logical implica-
tions of what we already know or believe. In fact, argumentation usually consists
in trying to convince someone of a conclusion he does not yet accept on the
basis of premises that he already does accept. If he already accepted the con-
clusion, you would not need to prove it to him; and if he did not accept the prem-
ises, you could not prove it to him.
But what "immediate inference" really is, is merely changing a single
proposition in form. There are two ways of doing this: conversion and obver-
sion.
"Some birds are not robins" does not mean that "Some robins are not birds."
When we argue "Some S is not P, therefore Some P is not S," we violate the rule
of distribution, for S was undistributed in the premise ("Some S") but distributed
in the conclusion. For in the conclusion "Some P is not S " S is the predicate of
a negative proposition. This gives us a second fairly common fallacy, the illicit
conversion of an O proposition.
In the premise "Some S is not P" (above) the lines around S are partly dot-
ted lines, symbolizing what is unknown. There are three possibilities about S: we
don't know whether it (1) stops outside the border of P, (2) extends into part of
P, or (3) extends into all of P. If the third possibility is true, then it is not true that
some P is not S.
E-> E
I I
A> I
E O
A> E
E> A
I ->o
0-> I
Obversion / Contraposition
Exercises:
A. Convert each of the following if possible. First, translate into logical form.
1. "God helps those who help themselves."
/ 72 VI. CHANGING PROPOSITIONS
Exercises: Put each proposition into logical form and write its contradictory also
in logical form.
1. "No man is a hero to his valet."
2. "Full many a flower is born to bloom unseen."
3. "Nobody doesn't like Sara Lee."
4. "A thing of beauty is a joy forever."
5. "It's a dirty bird that fouls its own nest."
6. "A fair face may be a foul bargain."
7. "Red sky in the morning, sailors take warning; red sky at night, sailor's
delight."
8. "There's many a slip 4twixt the cup and the lip."
9. "A good conscience is your best pillow."
10. "None but the brave deserve the fair."
11. "Sometimes a man's gotta do what a man's gotta do."
12. "Not all mistakes arc stupid ones."
I O
The Square of Opposition 175
j SUBCONTRARIEIY Q
The most important kind of opposition is contradiction, the relation
between opposed A and O propositions, or between opposed E and I proposi-
tions. (The relation is called "contradiction" and the two propositions are called
"contradictories") This is the relation diagrammed by the two diagonal lines
across the center of the Square. Of two contradictories, if one is true the other
is false and if one is false the other is true. If "all lawyers are crooks" is true,
"some lawyers are not crooks" is false, and if "all lawyers are crooks" is false,
"some lawyers arc non-crooks" is true. (Apologies to lawyers, but stock exam-
ples stick in memory.)
There are also three other kinds of opposition besides contradiction. The
most important of these is contrariety. The only two propositions that arc con-
traries are an A and an E in opposition (i.e. with the same subject and predi-
cate). "All S is P" and "No S is P" are contraries.
Contraries cannot both be true, but they can both be false. If "All lawyers
are crooks" is true, then "No lawyers are crooks" must be false, and if "No
lawyers are crooks" is true, then "All lawyers arc crooks" must be false. However,
both propositions can be false, if some lawyers are crooks and some are not.
The practical application of the distinction between contraries and contra-
dictories is this: To refute an A or E proposition, you do not need to prove its
contrary, only its contradictory. You need to show only some counter exam-
ples, in fact only one, to refute a universal. An A proposition is an affirmative
universal, and an O is sufficient to refute it. If someone says "All lawyers are
crooks," you have refuted him if you show that "some lawyers arc not crooks."
You do not need to show that "No lawyers are crooks." Similarly, an I proposi-
tion is sufficient to refute an E. If someone says "No lawyers are crooks," you
176 VII. CONTRADICTION
have refuted him if you show that "some lawyers are crooks." You do not need
to show that "All lawyers are crooks"
The relation between two opposed particular propositions. I and O, is callcd
subcontrariety, and the propositions are called subcontraries. Subcontraries
can both be true. This is why proverbs that seem to contradict each other often
do not: because their meaning is often particular rather than universal. Two par-
ticulars do not contradict each other.
Subcontraries can both be true, but subcontraries cannot both be false. If
"Some lawyers are crooks" is true, it may be that "some lawyers are not crooks"
is also true, and vice versa. But if "some lawyers are crooks" is false, then "some
lawyers are not crooks" cannot also be false. For if "some lawyers are crooks"
is false, this can be only because no lawyers are crooks. If an I is false (e.g.
"Some lawyers are crooks"), then its contradictory E must be true: "No lawyers
are crooks." The only thing that would make it false that even some lawyers are
crooks is that no lawyers at all are crooks. So if an I is false, its opposed E (its
contradictory) must be true. (Remember, with contradictories, if one is false, the
other must be true, and if one is true, the other must be false.) But if the E is true
- if it is true that "No lawyers arc crooks" - then it is certainly true that at least
some lawyers are not crooks, and that is the O.
The relation between opposed A and I propositions, and between opposed
E and O propositions, is called subalternation. and the propositions are called
subalternates.
Among subalternates, if the universal proposition is true, then the particu-
lar that comcs under it (i.e. its subalternatc) must also be true. And if the partic-
ular is not true, then the universal cannot be true.
If "All lawyers are crooks" is true, then "Some lawyers are crooks" must be
true. (Remember, in logic "some" docs not mean anything more than it says; it
does not mean "only some" but "at least some") And if "No lawyers are crooks"
is true, then certainly "Some lawyers arc not crooks" must be true.
Also, among subalternates, if the particular proposition is false, the univer-
sal must be false. If it is false that even some lawyers are crooks, it must be false
that all lawyers are crooks. And if it is false that even some lawyers are not
crooks, it must be false that no lawyers are crooks.
All of this works only for propositions in opposition, not for any other
propositions. The Square of Opposition is a very productive "machine " but its
products arc limited.
Instead of memorizing all four of these technical terms (contradiction, con-
trariety, subcontrariety, and subalternation) and their definitions, and then apply-
ing them, it is quicker and easier to memorize the following version of the
Square of Opposition, which includes everything you will need to know for
practical purposes:
The Square of Opposition 177
The Square is a very effective machine, but it runs only on the proper fuel:
two propositions in opposition and in logical form. There are three ways the
Square of Opposition is useful:
(1) The cross lines tell you what proposition contradicts any given proposi-
tion. So if you need to refute any proposition (i.e. prove it to be false), you can look
at the square to see what proposition you need to prove to be true. E.g. to refute
"all lawyers are crooks" you need to prove that "some lawyers are not crooks."
178 VII. CONTRADICTION
(2) The arrows tell you which inferences are valid (but only between two
opposed propositions). All inferences (between two opposed propositions) that
are on this square are valid; all inferences (between two opposed propositions)
that are not on this square are invalid. If someone has made an inference from
one opposed proposition to another, you can instantly see whether it is a valid
inference or not.
(3) The arrows also tell you how to complete a valid inference yourself from
one opposed proposition to another. Just follow any of the arrows on the square.
Thus there arc three kinds of questions, or exercises, for the Square:
(1) "Tell what proposition needs to be proved in order to disprove the fol-
lowing proposition." That is, "give the contradictory of the following proposi-
tion." The answer to this question is a proposition.
(2) "Tell whether the following completed inference is valid or invalid." The
answer to this question is "valid" or "invalid."
(3) "If you know that the following proposition is true, or false, as given,
what do you know about the following second proposition: is it true, false, or
unknown?" The answer to this question is "true," "false," or "unknown" because
you are here completing the inference and declaring the proposition which is the
conclusion of your inference to be true, false, or unknown. (If unknown, this
means you do not claim you can make an inference at all.)
Exercises:
A. To disprove each of the following propositions, what proposition must be
proved? In other words, give the contradictory of each of the following
propositions.
1. "Man was born free and is everywhere in chains." (Rousseau)
2. "There is nothing new under the sun." (Ecclesiastes)
3. "I alone have escapcd to tell you." (Job, quoted in Moby Dick)
4. "Some hate by morning what they love by night."
5. "All evil is not rooted in the love of money."
B. Evaluate the following inferences:
1. Since it's true that some banks are not safe, it must be true that some banks
are.
2. It's false to say that no man ever lost money underestimating the intelli-
gence of consumers. Therefore it must be true that some men did lose
money underestimating consumer intelligence.
3. It must be true that not all truths are true, because it's false that every truth
is true.
4. If love never fails, then it can't be true that some love fails.
5. If it's false that some philosophers are insane, it must be false that all
philosophers are insane.
6. Since some students are good debaters, some students are not good
debaters.
Existential import 179
C. If you know that the proposition in column I is true or false as indicated, what
do you know about the corresponding proposition in column II? Is it true,
false, or unknown?
Column I Column II
1. All snarks are boojums: false. 1. Some snarks are boojums.
2. Some snarks are boojums: false. 2. All snarks are boojums.
3. No snarks are boojums: false. 3. All snarks are boojums.
4. Some snarks are not boojums: false. 4. Some snarks are boojums.
5. Some snarks are not boojums: true. 5. No snarks are boojums.
6. Some snarks are boojums: true. 6. No snarks are boojums.
7. No snarks are boojums: true. 7. Some snarks are not boojums.
8. All snarks are boojums: true. 8. All boojums are snarks.
Everyone knows fish exist, and everyone knows leprechauns don't, but
some people think witches exist and some think they don't. But we cannot
decide whether or not a proposition in itself has existential import (meaning) by
taking polls to see how many people believe that the subject of that proposition
exists. The objective meaning of a proposition is one thing; whether someone
subjectively believes it to be true or false is another thing.
So how do we decide whether propositions that are not explicitly existential
propositions have existential import or not? All modern logic texts solve this
problem by claiming that all universal propositions lack existential import and
all particular propositions have it. This is not what traditional Aristotelian logic
ISO VII. CONTRADICTION
assumes, and it seems (to this writer, anyway) a wholly unnecessary, arbitrary,
and confusing assumption. For how could the proposition "all witches are dan-
gerous" lack existential import and "some witches are dangerous" have it?
Either witches exist, or not. In either case, it might be that none are dangerous,
or that all are, or that some are and some are not - whether we are talking about
real beings or only fictional beings. Exactly the same thing is true of lep-
rechauns, which all of us believe are fictional, and of fish, which all of us
believe are real. This is the simplest way of dealing with existential import for
ordinary propositions: that none of them have it, that only explicitly existential
propositions have it, that only explicitly existential propositions mean to assert
the existence of the subject.
Modern logic texts always assume that particular propositions have existen-
tial import. But if I say "Some unicorns are fierce and some are gentle," I do not
mean to assert the existence of unicorns. I only mean to distinguish, among
these unicorns (all of whom have the essence of unicorns but no existence),
between those that have the accident "fierce" and those that have the accident
"gentle." Modern logicians could not have missed such a simple point unless
they had abandoned or forgotten the elementary metaphysical distinctions
between essence and existence, and between esscnce and accidcnt.
Every modern logic text I can find simply asserts, without proof, that par-
ticular propositions have existential import and universal propositions do not.
For instance, the latest edition (the tenth) of the world's best-selling logic text,
by Copi, brings up a "difficulty" with the standard Square of Opposition: "The
difficulty can be appreciated by reflecting upon I and O propositions, which
surely (s/'c!) do have existential import. Thus the I proposition 'Some soldiers
are heroes' says that there exists at least one soldier who is a hero. . . . But if this
is so . . . we are forced to confront some very awkward consequences. [So why
not question your assumption then?]
"(1) Earlier we said that an I proposition follows validly from its corre-
sponding (opposed) A proposition by subalternation. . . . But if I and O propo-
sitions have existential import, and they follow validly from their corresponding
A and E propositions, then A and E propositions must also have existential
import." And the idea that universal propositions have existential import has
already been denied.
"(2) Furthermore, if both universal and particular propositions have exis-
tential import, then we could never formulate a negative existential proposition.
"(3) Finally, the inference from a true A to a true I would be invalid if par-
ticulars have existential import and universals do not, for it is fallacious to derive
more from less, to deduce an existential conclusion from a non-existential prem-
ise." The modern interpretation makes the Square of Opposition invalid. And yet
wc know commonsensically that the Square is correct, and the greatest minds
since Aristotle have never thought otherwise until the advent of symbolic logic.
Tricky propositions on the Square 181
But no modern logic text considers denying its presupposition that I and O
propositions always have existential import and A and E propositions never do,
since all symbolic logic texts follow the interpretation of George Boole, the
English mathematician who is one of the founders of modern symbolic logic:
"In the Boolean interpretation, universal propositions are interpreted as having
no existential import, while particular propositions are not interpreted in this
way." (Copi, op. cit., p. 201)
Yet clearly, in ordinary language, particular propositions sometimes do and
sometimes do not have existential import. Just as "some" sometimes, in some
contexts and tones of voice, implies "some but not all," while at other times it
does not, so the initial word "some" in an I or O proposition sometimes, in some
contexts, implies "some of these really existing things" while at other times it
does not. "Some of our ballplayers are sick" does imply that our ballplayers
exist, but "Some elves are heroic" does not imply that elves exist.
The same is true for universal propositions: sometimes there is an implica-
tion of existential import, sometimes not, and sometimes there is neither impli-
cation. Whoever says "All of our ballplayers are sick" implies real ballplayers,
but whoever says "All fictions are subjective" implies that fictions are fictional!
And there is a third case, which makes neither of the above implications: "All
nuclear terrorists who hold the whole world hostage will be instantly executed"
does not imply that there are or ever will be any such beings - nor does it imply
that there are not.
By the simple and commonsensical device of not making the gratuitous
assumption that all A and E propositions must lack existential import and all I
and O propositions must have it, we preserve the traditional commonsensical
Square. Common sense comes to the aid of common sense.
Tricky Exercise: Where is the fallacy in the following nine-step inference? Each
step is either an obversion, a conversion, or an opposition, and each single step
seems valid. Yet the first premise is obviously true and the final conclusion is
obviously false. We cannot validly prove a false conclusion from premises that
arc not false, so where is the erroneous step? (Hint: page 170, last paragraph.)
same thing as "some immortal beings are not unwise men," by obversion.
So if 5 is false, 6 is false also.
7. But if it is false that some immortal beings are not unwise men, then it
must be true that all immortal beings are unwise men, by contradiction on
the Square of Opposition.
8. And i f it is true that all immortal beings are unwise men, then it is true that
some unwise men are immortal beings, by conversion.
9. Thus we have proved that some unwise men are immortal beings, i.e. that
some students who flunk logic will never die.
ness, the two absolute desires of everyone. But we cannot be sure which of these
two propositions is true: that God exists or that He does not. We gain the truth
in two of the four cases: (I) and (4), for our belief matches reality in both cases.
We lose the truth in the other two cases, (2) and (3), since our belief fails to
match reality in those cases. But if we believe that we cannot know which is
more likely, we cannot decide whether or not to believe on this basis. We have a
50-50 chance of winning the truth no matter whether we choose Yes or No. So
far we have no clear reason for "betting" for God or against Him. But if wc turn
to our other goal, happiness, we have good reason for "wagering" that God
exists rather than not. For if God does not exist, there is no meeting Him after
death, no Heaven or Hell, no infinite and eternal gain or loss; thus there is little
difference between believing and not believing, since there is in the end nothing
to gain or to lose. But if God does exist and I must believe in Him and accept
His gift of Heaven in order to attain Heaven, then believing in Him (possibility
#1) gives me infinite gain but little or no loss; while not believing in Him (pos-
sibility #2) gives me little or no gain but infinite loss. Thus my only chance of
winning is the combination (I) and my only chance of losing is the combination
(2). So belief is a very reasonable "wager."
Here is an example of the other kind of "square," with gradual or relative
answers, "more affirmative" vs. "more negative." Avery Dulles has proposed a
classification of four ideological attitudes toward Church and State in contem-
porary America. "Traditionalism" is more positive toward the Church and more
negative toward the current State; "Neo-conservatism" is more positive toward
both; "Liberalism" is more positive toward the State and negative toward the
Church and "Radicalism" is more negative toward both.
Toward the Church
Positive Negative
Positive Nco-conscrvat ism Liberalism
Toward the State
Negative Traditionalism Radicalism
to life (and therefore all abortions are wrong), (I) that at least some persons have
the right to life (and therefore that at least some abortions are wrong), (E) that
no persons have the right to life (and therefore that no abortions are wrong), and
(0) that at least some persons do not have the right to life (and therefore that at
least some abortions are not wrong).
Those who debate important and divisive moral issues like abortion often
do not clearly distinguish what propositions they claim are true, or claim to
know arc true. It is often assumed that there are only two possible positions
when there arc in fact four because there are two variables, not one. A "square"
can reveal this. Sometimes the variables are the same as they are on the real
Square, viz. universal vs. particular and affirmative vs. negative. At other times,
the two variables are different (as in the Avery Dulles example).
I This is simply the definition of an angel, whether or not angels are real, whether or not
there is good reason for believing they arc real, and whether or not those reasons amount
What Joes "reason " mean?/The ultimate foundations of the syllogism 187
On the other hand, the human mind has a remarkable power compared with
even the highest animal intelligence. Human reason surpasses animal intelli-
gence in at least three ways:
First, though all human knowledge begins in experience, we can acquire
knowledge beyond experience, and even with certainty, through deductive rea-
soning. For instance,
If we know that everything that has atoms must be able to reflect light,
And if we know that all little green men on Mars have atoms (i.e. if there
are little green men on Mars, they must have atoms),
Then wc know with certainty that all little green men on Mars (if there are
any) must be able to reflect light, even though we have never seen little
green men on Mars, and even though we do not know whether or not there
are little green men on Mars. This is quite remarkable.
Second, we can know not only particular truths beyond our immediate expe-
rience, but also universal truths, such as "2+2=4" or "all men are mortal." This
power presupposes the first power, the power to know beyond experience, for
experience never presents universals, only particulars. We can know universals
by abstracting them from the particulars that we experience, e.g. "human nature"
from human beings or "life" from living things.
Third, we can know necessary and unchangeable truths; we can know not
only that such and such happens to be the case, but also that it must necessarily
and always be the case. If A is B and B is C, then A must necessarily be C. This
is even more than the power to know universal truths. Not all universal truths are
necessary. "All human babies come from human mothers" is a universal truth
(so far) but not a necessary truth, and it will cease to be true when someone
clones a human being. "All my ties are four-in-hand" is true but not necessarily
true, since I could have had some bow ties too, and probably will have some in
the future. But "all men are mortal" or "all triangles have 180 degrees in the sum
of their three interior angles" are not only universal truths (true of all men or all
triangles) but also necessary truths, truths that must be so and cannot ever cease
to be so.
to proofs. Wc are not assuming the existence of angels, or of God, but using the concept
of an angel to understand the nature of human reason by contrast.
2 1 And* often indicates a relation between two premises.
188 VIII. THE THIRD ACT OF THE MIND: REASONING
3 This is why modern logicians, who arc usually nominalists, do not think much of syllo-
gism. Nominalism is the denial of any real universals. See also the next chapter for more
historical and logical detail on this controversy (pages 219-30).
The ultimate foundations of the syllogism 189
Tautologies
A "tautology" is a proposition that does not need to be proved because it is
logically self-evident. It "proves itself," so to speak, because if you deny it, you
must contradict yourself. Examples are: "Frogs are frogs," "Whatever animal
has teeth and claws, has claws," "If I exist, I exist," and "Nothing that is divisi-
ble is indivisible at the same time." A tautology can be defined in three ways: (a)
a proposition that is true because of its logical form, whatever its content, (b) a
proposition whose contradictory is self-contradictory, or (c) a proposition whose
predicate is necessarily contained in its subject.
Though a proposition may be self-evident objectively, in itself, it may not
be self-evident subjectively, to a given human mind. For instance, "angels are
not confined to space" and "whatever has color must have size" are both self-
evident in themselves, but not to a person who does not understand the nature of
angels and space, color and size well enough to know that these connections are
necessary.
Sometimes the term "tautology" is used for any objectively self-evident
proposition, but more usually it is used in a narrower sense, only for propositions
that are explicitly self-evident, verbally self-evident, independent of the meaning
of the terms. If we use this narrower sense, "All red ties are red," "All red X's are
X's," and "All red gloms are gloms" are tautologies, but "no angels have bodies"
and "All men have bodies" are not.
What about a proposition like "You will pass this course if you work hard
enough"? This is a tautology if "hard enough" means "hard enough to pass"; for
then the proposition means "If you work hard enough to pass, you will pass," or
"If you pass because you work hard enough, then you will pass." And that is
clearly a tautology. However, if "hard enough" means "hard enough to satisfy
the teacher," then it is not a tautology.
A tautology tells us no new information. "This candidate will be elected if
there is sufficient support" is a tautology, like "you will pass if you work hard
enough," though it sounds as if it is saying something informative. It says only
that if there is sufficient support for him to be elected, then there will be suffi-
cient support for him to be elected. If you contradict the proposition, you con-
tradict yourself: it cannot be true that the candidate will be elected even if there
is not sufficient support for him to be elected.
Tautologies are necessarily true. Their contradictories are necessarily false,
logically impossible. Other propositions are true (or false) only because of some
other things being true; that is, they are contingently true (or false). "Water runs
downhill" is contingently true, true only because of gravity. In a universe where
matter repels instead of attracts, it would not be true. Necessary truths are truths
that arc true in all possible worlds.
We cannot imagine or conceive the opposite of a necessary truth. For
instance, we cannot imagine, or conceive, or tell a story about, a world in which
2+2=5. We can, however, imagine the opposite of any contingent truth if we have
190 VIII. THE THIRD ACT O F THE MIND: REASONING
a lively enough imagination - like a world without gravity. "Dead bodies decay
(when there is normal heat and air) and do not come back to life" is a truth about
all dead bodies; but it is a contingent truth, and we can imagine (and even
believe) a miracle happening, in which a dead body does not decay but comes
back to life. That would be a violation of physical law, but physical laws arc only
contingent truths, true only because something else is true in this particular
world, which might not be true in some other possible world. But we cannot even
conceive, and therefore we literally cannot believe, any violation of a logical law,
since logical laws are necessary truths, true of all possible worlds, so that a
proposition that violates a logical law is strictly meaningless.
For instance, "A man walked on water" may be a miracle, but it is not a self-
contradiction. "A man walked on water and didn't walk on water at the same
time" is a self-contradiction, if there is no ambiguity in the terms. (Of course,
surfers walk on water in a sense. But though that may be almost as wonderful as
what Jesus did, it's not quite the same.) "God can give man free choice, so that
man is free to choose between good and evil, and at the same time withhold free
will from man, so that man never chooses evil" is a self-contradictory and thus
strictly meaningless proposition. It does not become meaningful because it is
predicated of God. God, if He exists and created the physical universe, can over-
ride its physical laws; but even God cannot violate logical laws, because these
laws are not dependent on the temporal nature of the creation but on the eternal
nature of the Creator.
If, of course, God exists. It is not clear what reality these laws are depend-
ent on if there is no God; but in any case they are eternal, unchangeable, neces-
sary truths. If God exists, these laws are descriptions of the nature of God. This
is a useful explanation of the distinction between necessary and contingent
truths even for atheists, for it is the meaning of "God," or the concept of God,
that is relevant here. The distinction holds conceptually whether there is a real
God or not.
(2) be clear about what the argument is saying, and we do this by putting it into
logical form, especially the form of a syllogism. That corresponds to the net.
(Advanced fishermen might do without a net, and advanced logicians can
bypass the step of putting ordinary-language arguments into logical form, but
beginners in logic definitely need to put an argument into logical form before
they can see whether it is valid or not, just as beginning crabbers need to get the
crab in the net before they can see whether it is edible or not.) But even before
we can do this (2), we must first (1) detect the presence of an argument, as wc
detect the presence of a crab. If we wave our net of syllogism randomly, we will
probably not find an argument in it. For there is much more in human linguistic
communication than arguments, just as there is much more in the sea than crabs.
Detecting the presence of an argument is not something that can be taught
mechanically. It is intuitive "seeing." There are mechanical principles for testing
the validity of an argument, and we will learn these shortly; but there are no
mechanical principles for testing for the presence of an argument.
However, there are indicators. One is the presence of the essential structure
of an argument, and another is certain key words.
(1) The essential structure of every argument consists of a relationship
between its two parts: premises and conclusion. The conclusion is what you are
trying to prove; the premises are your reasons, your evidence, your proof. The
relationship between them can be put in different ways: we can say that the con-
clusion "follows from" the premises, or that the premises "entail" the conclu-
sion, or "prove" the conclusion, or that the premises are the "reasons" for the
conclusion, or that the conclusion is true because the premises are true, or that
(in a deductive argument but not an inductive one) if the premises are true, then
the conclusion must be true.
In "All men arc mortal and Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal"
the conclusion is "Socrates is mortal" because that is what you are trying to
prove; and the premises are "All men are mortal" and "Socrates is a man"
because that is your reason for believing that Socrates is mortal, that is your
proof that Socrates is mortal, that is your evidence that Socrates is mortal. The
word "therefore" asserts your claim that the premises have this logical relation
to the conclusion, that they prove the conclusion to be true.
(2) There is usually a key word indicating this premise-to-conclusion rela-
tion. "Therefore" is the formal, proper word, but there are many others. The fol-
lowing is a list of "conclusion indicators." The proposition that follows these
words is usually the conclusion of an argument; and the proposition that pre-
cedes these words is usually a premise (thus argument-indicator words usually
indicate both the conclusion and a premise):
"therefore"
"hence"
"it follows that"
192 VIII. THE THIRD ACT O F THE MIND: REASONING
"consequently"
"in consequence"
"which shows that"
"so"
"then" (after "if")
"indicates that"
"implies that"
"entails that"
"so you can see that"
"we can conclude that"
4
Sve can infer that"
"we may deduce that"
"points to the conclusion that"
"which means that"
"which shows that"
"leads one to believe that"
"bears out the point that"
"proves that"
"thus"
"as a result"
"accordingly"
"for this reason" (followed by a comma)
The following words arc premise-indicators. The proposition which follows
any one of them is usually a premise of an argument; and the proposition which
precedes them is usually the conclusion:
"because"
"since"
"for"
"as"
"on the assumption that"
"if"
"if we assume that"
"if we suppose that"
"in view of the fact that"
"let us assume that"
"may be inferred from"
"may be deduced from"
"follows from"
"as shown by"
"inasmuch as"
"as indicated by"
Arguments vs. explanations 193
It is a weak argument because the first premise, which was implied rather
than stated, is pretty obviously not true. But if instead we use the true premise
that"Some who have shifty eyes are guilty," the resulting syllogism is formally
invalid or fallacious:
194 VIII. THE THIRD ACT OF THE MIND: REASONING
Only in the first case can we know that the conclusion is true. In the other
three cases, we do not know whether the conclusion is true or false.
LOGIC
VALID INVALID
We can also know that an argument whose conclusion is false and whose
logic is valid must have at least one false premise.
LOGIC
VALID INVALID
TRUE Premises unknown Premises unknown
CONCLUSION
FALSE At least one premise Premises unknown
must be false
This is equally important for practical purposes, since we often argue "back-
wards," so to speak, proving that a premise must be false from the fact that the
conclusion is false (if the logic is valid), instead of "forwards " proving that a con-
clusion must be true from the fact that the premises are all true (if the logic is
valid). These are the two most usual strategies in arguing: reasoning backwards, or
"upstream" from pollution downstream (a false conclusion) to pollution upstream
(a false premise); or reasoning forwards, or "downstream" from unpolluted (true)
premises to an unpolluted (true) conclusion. And both strategies depend on this
principle about the relationship between truth and validity in an argument.
We cannot validly argue in any other way. e.g. we cannot validly argue that
if the premises of a valid argument are false, then the conclusion must be false
too; that pollution upstream proves pollution downstream, so to speak; that if the
argument is consistent, false premises must lead to a false conclusion just as
surely as true premises lead to a true conclusion. That mistake comes from
thinking of an argument as a sort of mathematical equation, with the premises
on one side and the conclusion on the other. But a mathematical equation is
reversible, while an argument is not. (Neither is a proposition simply reversible,
as we have seen previously (page 140): the subject and the predicate are not
interchangeable, but perform different functions.) In a valid argument, true
premises entail a true conclusion (arguing "downstream"), but a true conclusion
does not necessarily entail true premises. And a false conclusion entails false
premises (arguing "upstream") but a false premise does not necessarily entail a
false conclusion. The conclusion might be true by accident.
So only the two following inferences arc corrcct:
Truth and validity 197
1. If the argument is valid and the premises are true, then the conclusion
must be true. (This is one mode of correct argument; we could call it
"arguing forward?)
2. If the argument is valid and the conclusion is false, then at least one
premise must be false. (This is the other mode of correct argument; we
could call it 44 arguing backward?)
Here arc two examples of valid arguments with false premises but a true
conclusion:
All evil spirits are birds. The earth is a star.
And all sparrows are evil spirits. And no stars are fish.
Therefore all sparrows are birds. Therefore the earth is not a fish.
In both cases above, the premises are false, and the argument is valid, yet the
conclusion happens to be true (by accident).
The practical point of this is that you do not refute a conclusion by showing
that it follows from false premises.
Suppose someone has just given a logically valid argument for a conclusion
you disagree with, but this argument has one or more false premises in it. You
point out these false premises. What have you accomplished? Something, but
not everything. You have refuted his argument but not his conclusion. You have
only shown that your opponent's argument has not proved his conclusion, as he
claimed. His argument is inconclusive because it has a false premise. The con-
clusion is still in doubt. It is neither proved to be true, as your opponent has
claimed nor is it proved to be false.
And just because a valid argument has a true conclusion, that does not mean
it has true premises. We must be careful not to think of an argument as a
reversible equation. Like a river, an argument carries us in one direction, down-
stream: wc can move from true premises to a true conclusion - we can know that
if the premises are true, then the conclusion be true - but we cannot reverse this
and know that if the conclusion is true the premises must be true. (We can, how-
ever, deduce that if the conclusion is false, at least one of the premises must have
been false, just as wc can deduce that if garbage is flowing down the river, some-
one must have unloaded it upstream.)
The practical point in strategy of arguing here can be summed up as the fol-
lowing:
(1) You do not prove that a premise is true by showing that from it a true con-
clusion logically follows.
(2) You do not prove that a conclusion is false by showing that it logically fol-
lows from a false premise.
(3) You do prove that a premise is false by showing that from it a false con-
clusion logically follows.
(4) You do prove that a conclusion is true by showing that it logically follows
from true premises.
/ 98 VIII. THE THIRD ACT OF THE MIND: REASONING
These situations all concern valid arguments. Here are some other situations
with invalid arguments. When you have an invalid argument, you know nothing
about truth and falsity:
(5) You do not prove that a conclusion is false by showing that the argument
is invalid An invalid argument can have a true conclusion:
The sky is blue
And grass is green
Therefore man is mortal
(6) You do not prove that an argument is invalid by showing that its conclu-
sion is false. A false conclusion can emerge from a valid argument if it has
false premises:
All pigs are purple
And all purple things are immortal
Therefore all pigs are immortal
(7) You do not prove a conclusion is true by showing that the argument is
valid. The premises must also be true. The example above (6) is a valid
argument but has a false conclusion.
(8) You do not prove an argument valid by showing that its conclusion is true.
Example (5) above has a true conclusion but it is an invalid argument.
Arguing "Forward"
If P r e m i s e s A r e . . . A n d A r g u m e n t Is . . . T h e n C o n c l u s i o n Is . . .
TRUE VALID TRUE
TRUE INVALID UNKNOWN
FALSE VALID UNKNOWN
FALSE INVALID UNKNOWN
Arguing "Backward"
If C o n c l u s i o n Is . . . A n d A r g u m e n t Is . . . Then Premises Are . . .
TRUE VALID UNKNOWN
FALSE VALID ONE FALSE 4
TRUE INVALID UNKNOWN
FALSE INVALID UNKNOWN
Imagine a spy trying to get out of East Berlin into West Berlin. In order to
succeed in getting to West Berlin, he has to pass three checkpoints: Able, Baker,
and Charlie. If he fails at any of one or more of the checkpoints, he fails to get
out. The spy symbolizes an argument, and escape to West Berlin symbolizes
proving its conclusion to be true. The three checkpoints arc the three questions
of logic, one for each of the "three acts of the mind" (see the charts on pages
32-33). Checkpoint Able checks for ambiguous terms. Checkpoint Baker
checks for false premises. Checkpoint Charlie checks for logical fallacies.
4 At least one, possibly more.
Truth and validity 199
We can know (1) that if the spy passes all three checkpoints, he succeeds
(this is arguing "forward"); and that (2) if he does not succecd, he has failed at
least one chcckpoint (this is arguing "backward"). (3) We also know that if he
has passed two of the three checkpoints and yet has not succeeded in getting to
West Berlin, he must have failed the remaining checkpoint.
Thus wc know (1) that if an argument has no ambiguous terms, false prem-
ises, or logical fallacies, its conclusion must be true; and that (2) if the conclu-
sion is not true, it must have failed at least one of the three checkpoints. (3) We
also know that if the argument with the false conclusion has passed any two of
the three checkpoints, it must have failed the remaining one.
(1) The relation between cause and effect is easily understood. When we say
"I will die because of cancer" wc point to death as the effcct and canccr as the
cause. When we say "The Red Sox did not win a World Series for 86 years
because of the Curse of the Bambino " we point to their 86-year drought as the
effect and the Curse as the cause. (More prosaic minds can substitute weak
pitching as the cause.)
(2) The relation between premise and conclusion is different. It is a logical
relation, not a physical (#1) or psychological (#3) relation. When we say "I will
die bccausc all men die and I am a man," I point to the truth of "I will die" as the
conclusion that is proved, and I point to "all men die and I am a man" as the two
premises which together prove that conclusion. When we say "Since the Red Sox
finally defeated the Yankees in the playoffs, God must have converted and is not
a Yankee fan any more," we point to God's conversion as our conclusion and the
Red Sox victory as our reason for believing that conclusion. When we say "He
believes in Heaven bccausc there has to be perfect justice in the end," we point
to his conclusion that Heaven exists and to the fact (or claim) that there must be
pcrfect justice in the end as his premise or logical reason for believing it.
(3) "Because" can also indicate a psychological motive for a mental or
physical act. When I say "I think I will die today because I am feeling despair,"
Three meanings of "because " 201
I point to my belief that I will die today as my mental act and to my feeling of
despair as my motive, or moving force leading me to this belief. It is not a phys-
ical cause, nor is it a logical reason. I am giving the subjective cause for my
believing it rather than the objective cause of its really happening. I am giving a
motive for the subjective, psychological act rather than cither a logical reason
proving the conclusion or a physical cause causing the event. When I say "I
always expect the Red Sox to blow a lead because I'm a New England pes-
simist," I'm pointing to my pessimism as the psychological motive or moving
cause for my belief. When 1 say "He believes in Heaven because he's afraid to
die," I'm pointing to his fear of death as the subjective, psychological moving
cause of his belief in Heaven. I'm not saying his fear of death is a logical proof
of Heaven, nor that it is the physical cause or creator of Heaven.
The difference between motives ("because" #3) and reasons ("bccausc" #2)
is that motives are psychological "efficient causes" of beliefs while reasons arc
"formal causes." To see what this means, we need to look at one of the most use-
ful ideas ever discovered, Aristotle's notion of the "four causes." It is an idea that
is so basic that it is a criterion of being educated, a condition for being civilized.
The final cause is the end goal, or purpose of something, whether this pur-
pose is conscious or not. and whether the thing is artificial or natural. The final
cause of an acorn is to grow into an oak tree. The final cause of an operation is
to heal a disease. The final cause of this book is to teach logic. The final cause
of a river is to How to the lowest possible point The final cause of "butterflies
in the stomach" is to warn the body to act differently somehow, e.g. to avoid
foods that cause indigestion.
A historical sidebar on final causes: Modern philosophy tends to be very
suspicious of final causcs or "teleology" (from telos, the Greek word for pur-
pose) anywhere except in consciously purposive human activity. (Some philoso-
phers even deny it there and say man is just a complex machine.) But it is rea-
sonable and commonsensical to believe that "there is a purpose for everything,"
even though that purpose is not always known or present to human minds (as
distinct from the mind of God). The reason for thinking that everything must
have a final cause is that just as the efficient cause of any thing is the reason why
its matter is now determined to have this form rather than another, so the final
cause is the reason why the efficient cause acts as it does, toward this determi-
nate end and not randomly. E.g. the words in this book (its content, raw materi-
al, or "matter") are formed into a logic text (its "form" or essence) because of
the purpose of this text: to teach logic. It has seemed reasonable and "common-
sensical" to almost all people in all times, places, and cultures to believe in real
teleology even for mindless things in nature; for these things, after all, move in
regular and predictable ways, like arrows directed to targets: dogs have puppies
and puppies become dogs. The fact that we do not know the purposes of natural
things nearly as well as we know the purposes of the artificial things we
designed does not mean that there are no such natural purposes. (Unless every-
thing we don't know can't be!)
There were two main reasons why belief in final causes declined in the
modern West. The first was the confusion of science with scient/sm. Early mod-
ern physical scientists discovered that when we use the scientific method final
causality was useless for its explanatory purposes (naturally, since these final
causes or natural purposes are not clearly known by the human mind since we
did not design nature). But scientism was the philosophical (not scientific) belief
that only science provided objectively reliable knowledge.
The second reason for the declinc of belief in final causes was a decline of
belief in religion. Obviously, natural design and a cosmic Designer of nature nat-
urally (but not necessarily) go together.
So the four causes, (1) formal, (2) material, (3) efficient, and (4) final, tell
us a thing's (1) identity, (2) contents, (3) origin, and (4) destiny; or (1) what it is,
(2) what it's made of, (3) where it came from, and (4) where it's going.
Obviously, the most important application of these four questions is to our-
selves. If we were to fulfill Socrates' (and Apollo's) first law, "know thyself," we
would have to know the answers to these four questions about ourselves and our
204 IX. DIFFERENT KINDS OF ARGUMENTS
life. And of the four questions, the fourth is the most important, for the question
of the final cause of human life is the question of the "meaning of life" or the
"purpose of life" or the summum bonum (greatest good, ultimate end).
The four questions are obviously connected: if our origin is merely dust and
chance, our essence is also merely dust and chance, and so is our destiny. If our
origin is more heavenly, so is our essence and our destiny.
All four causes arc always connected, since they are not merely artifices,
humanly-invented methods for explaining things, but real aspects of real things.
The final cause is the reason why the efficient cause imposes the formal cause
on the material cause. To shelter a family is the reason why a carpenter shapes
wood into a house. To teach logic is the reason why an author forms words into
a logic textbook.
Exercises: Identify which of the four causes is used in each of the following
explanations or arguments; and tell whether it is an explanation or an argu-
ment:
two terms; mediate inference contains at least two premises and at least three
terms.
Immediate inference includes opposition, obversion. conversion, and con-
traposition.
Within mediate inference, arguments may be cither deductive or inductive.
Deductive arguments begin with a general, or universal, premise and usually
apply it to a particular case in the conclusion. Inductive arguments begin with
particular, individual, specific cases and usually generalize to a more universal
conclusion. Deductive arguments claim certainty; inductive arguments claim
only probability. We will deal with induction in Chapter XIV.
Deductive arguments are usually syllogisms, either simple syllogisms, com-
posed only of simple (categorical) propositions, or compound syllogisms,
which contain at least one compound proposition. There are different rules for
each kind of syllogism. We will deal with syllogisms in Chapters X, XI, and XII.
Within compound syllogisms, there arc three basic types: hypothetical, dis-
junctive, and conjunctive. We will deal with them in Chapter XIII.
(2) By causality: Any kind of deductive argument may also be divided into
arguments from cause to effect, or arguments from effect to cause. Both of
these in turn can be divided into four kinds depending on which of the four caus-
es is used: formal, material, efficient, or final.
(3) By direction of movement: We may move from an argument's premise
to its conclusion, or we may move from a conclusion back to its premise. The
objective logical structure of the argument is the same in each case, but our sub-
jective psychological process is different. Sometimes we deduce a new conclu-
sion from a given premise, and sometimes we trace a given conclusion back to
its not-given but implicit premise, arguing that in order to reach a given conclu-
sion you need to assume such and such a premise.
(4) By length: Any of the above kinds of arguments may also be divided into
one-step arguments and multiple arguments. Multiple arguments are simply
chains of simple arguments, where the conclusion of the first step becomes a
premise for the second step.
(5) By strategy: Multi-step arguments can be put together cither linearly or
cumulatively. A linear argument is like a river that begins at one place, with
one premise, and takes a number of turns, adding other premises, like tributar-
ies. usually using multiple arguments in a chain, and finally reaching one desti-
nation, the conclusion. Socrates' arguments are usually of this nature and usual-
ly contain many steps. A cumulative argument is like a number of rivers all
running into the same lake. It uses different premises, and different, independ-
ent arguments, often of different types, all to establish the same conclusion. This
is the kind of argument most often used in debate or in informal conversation.
The horizontal line between the two premises is like a marriage: only when con-
joined together do these two premises produce the legitimate child, their con-
clusion.
At some point in the future it may be useful to save time by the abbreviation
of using symbols for whole propositions instead of writing them out; but at this
point, to avoid any possibility of confusion, you should take the time to patient-
ly write out the whole proposition in each box when using argument maps.
Take the following linear argument:
Now take the following cumulative argument: "There must be a life after
death, becausc life would be unendurable otherwise, and because nearly every
culture in history teaches it, and because there has to be a final judgment, and
also because we're not just bodies but spirits too."
Here, four different premises all are brought up to prove the same conclu-
sion. The argument map for this argument would be:
Life would not be Nearly every culture There has to be We're not just
endurable otherwise in history teaches it a final judgment bodies but spirits
"If there were a God, the world would be perfect, and this world is
far from perfect. Besides, science can explain everything real with-
out God. And psychology can explain all our subjective fantasies
and fallacies and faiths without God, bccause it can trace them all
back to fear or ignorance - for instance, ignorance of the forces of
nature led the Greeks to believe that a god made thunder. So it seems
more rational to me to be an atheist."
deductive, simple syllogism or something else), and then (3) evaluate (as logi-
cally valid or invalid). Argument maps help you to do the first of these three
steps. You identify each separate argument, and its relation to the other separate
arguments, as well as its place in the overall argument, by such argument maps.
Only then are you ready to classify and evaluate each of these separate argu-
ments without confusing one with another. You will learn the rules to use in eval-
uating each kind of argument (the third step) in the following chapters. You will
also learn the forms and structures of each kind of argument (the second step),
so that you can identify which kind of argument you have. You cannot apply the
rules for inductive arguments to arguments that are deductive, for instance, or
vice versa. You cannot apply the rules that distinguish valid from invalid simple
syllogisms if you have a compound syllogism. Each kind of argument has a dif-
ferent set of rules, so you must (1) first identify each distinct argument, then (2)
classify it (determine what kind of argument it is), and then (3) evaluate it by its
appropriate set of rules. More complex arguments maps arc presented on page
282. You might be able to do a few of the exercises on these more complex argu-
ments, on page 285. Try them.
The clearest difference between deduction and induction is that the premis-
es of induction come from sense observation, which is always of individual
cases; while at least one of the premises of deduction comes from intellectual
understanding, which always includes something universal.
Just as deduction does not always move from the universal to the more par-
ticular, induction does not always move from the more particular to the more
universal. Some kinds of inductive argument do not end in a general conclusion:
e.g. many arguments from analogy and causal arguments.
Here is another kind of inductive argument with a singular conclusion:
I am a professor and I am absent-minded.
And she is a professor and she is absent-minded.
And they are professors and they are absent-minded.
And he is a professor.
Therefore he is probably absent-minded.
A second difference between induction and deduction is that deduction
always claims certainty for its conclusion, while inductive reasoning claims only
probability. Obviously, if all A is B, then this A is B too (deductive); while if this
A is B, it does not follow with certainty that all A is B (inductive). An inductive
argument claims to give good reasons for its conclusion, but they are not good
enough for certainty, only some degree of probability. Thus deductive arguments
are either simply valid or simply invalid, while inductive arguments are better or
worse, more or less probable.
An inductive argument can claim certainty only if it is a "complete induc-
tion," that is, covers all cases. If I know there are only ten people in my class,
and if I have examined each one and determined that he is over 18,1 can con-
clude with certainty that all the people in my class are over 18.
Deductive and inductive arguments have totally different sets of rules. The
rules for deductive arguments are "tight," certain, and infallible. (Obviously, the
people who use the rules are not!) A computer can determine whether any
deductive argument is formally valid or invalid. But the rules for inductive argu-
ments are not "tight" but "loose." An inductive argument is like a plane that is
flown "by the scat of your pants" while a deductive argument is like a plane
flown by instruments.
4.
Sense
XXXX X
Observation Examples Further Example(s)
1. Questioning
Step 4 is crucial bccause inductive reasoning alone cannot prove its gener-
al conclusion with certainty. So if the general principle that has been arrived at
by induction is not known with any more certainty than the inductive argument
Combining induction and deduction: Socratic method 213
gives it (in step 3), then when we use it as the premise of a deductive argument
(in step 5), that premise will still only be probably true, and the conclusion of
the deductive argument will also be only probably true, even though its connec-
tion with its premises is certain. It is certain that if all swans are white and this
is a swan, this is white; but if it is not certain that all swans are white, then it is
not certain that this swan is white.
The step in Socratic method between the inductive reasoning and the deduc-
tive reasoning is not a step of reasoning but understanding; a first-act-of-the-
mind insight into the universal that has been discovered by inductive reasoning.
And only when this insight understands the necessity of this universal principle
can that principle be known with certainty and not only with probability, which
is all that induction gives. Only then can that principle yield certainty in the con-
clusion that follows from it by deductive reasoning. For instance:
(1) We wonder whether we are going to die.
(2) We look around for relevant evidence and we observe in experience that
each individual human being that we know of who has lived in the past has died.
We know a few of these deaths from direct experience, and we know most of
them through authorities like obituary columns and history books. We also know
that each individual living in the present believes himself to be mortal.
(3) From this data base, we arrive by induction at the principle that "all men
are mortal." So far this is only probable, its probability increasing as the data
base increases.
(4) Then we come to understand that mortality is a property, and not just an
accident, of man; that man is mortal by nature, since man by his nature has an
animal body, which is an organic, interdependent system of material organs all
of which are needed in order for it to live, and any one of which can be destroyed
simply by separating some of its material parts from others by a rock or a knife
or a fire.
(5) Having understood that "all men are mortal" by necessity, our deduction
that "all men are mortal, and I am a man, therefore I am mortal," can give us a
conclusion we can be certain is true, for it not only validly follows from its true
premises but validly follows from its certainly true premises.
This is the overall epistemological pattern of the logic of the Socratic
Method. What is more famous, and more typically associated with Socrates, is
the methodological format within step five, the famous art of cross-examination
(probably imitated from Athenian court cases) in which Socrates (a) does not
lecture but asks his opponent questions, eliciting "yes" or "no" answers, (b) does
so in a "dialectical" way, that is, in the form of "either-or" dilemmas, and (c) uses
long, multi-step reductio ad absurdum arguments to refute one horn of the
dilemma, thus proving the other. These are the "signature" details of Socratic
method, and the larger context of the five steps is usually forgotten; but that larg-
er context is Socrates' even more fundamental contribution to the art of philo-
sophical argument. Aristotle, who disagrees with much of Socrates' (or Plato's)
2 / 4 IX. DIFFERENT KINDS OF ARGUMENTS
(4) Finally, identify the middle term as the term that is left, the term that is not
in the conclusion but is in each premise.
From now on we will use the following standard abbreviations:
S = the minor term
P = the m a j o r term
M = the middle term
We use S for the minor term because it is always the subjcct (S) of the con-
clusion. It is not always the subject of the minor premise, however. Sometimes
it is and sometimes it is not. But even when it is the predicate of the minor prem-
ise. we will use the symbol S for it, since it is always the subject of the conclu-
sion.
We use P for the major term because it is always the predicate (P) of the
conclusion. It is not always the predicate of the major premise, however.
Sometimes it is and sometimes it is not.
We use M for the middle term no matter where it appears in the premises.
It may be the subject of both premises, or the predicate of both, or the subject of
one and the predicate of the other.
(All this technical terminology is necessary if we want to analyze arguments
clearly and judge them as valid or invalid.)
It is conventional to place the major premise first, then the minor premise,
and last the conclusion, when putting a syllogism into logical form. But in ordi-
nary language, the three propositions in a syllogism can occur in any order what-
soever. In fact, one of them is often omitted, and implied or "kept in mind." (This
kind of syllogism is called an "enthymeme," from the Greek word for "kept in
mind." It is the commonest form of all in ordinary language.) The order of the
premises is not important. When you put in a syllogism in logical form, the only
rule about the order of the three propositions is that the conclusion is always put
last. The major premise does not have to be put first, unless your instructor is
very picky. (But there are often good reasons for being picky.)
Using this terminology, we can now understand the strategy of the syllo-
gism. It can be summarized in the following diagram:
negative). To do this, we relate both S and P to the same common third term, M.
The middle term is the touchstone; we test whether or not S and P belong togeth-
er by touching both to M, as we would test whether two magnets have the same
polarity by touching them both to the same third magnet to see whether they
react to it in the same way or in opposite ways.
Imagine a bridge over a river. The middle term is the middle of the bridge.
S and P are the two ends of the bridge, where it touches the land. The major and
minor premises are the two halves of the bridge: the major premise connects M
(the middle of the bridge) with P (one end of the bridge) and the minor premise
connects M with S (the other end of the bridge). It is M that either holds the
bridge together or makes it fall apart. The middle term is the center and key of
the syllogism, the hinge on which it turns.
Let us look at two different cases: a syllogism with an affirmative conclu-
sion and a syllogism with a negative conclusion.
Case #1: an affirmative conclusion. If both S and P are related affirmative-
ly to M in the premises, then S and P must be related affirmatively to each other
in the conclusion. It is an axiom in algebra that two quantities equal to a com-
mon third quantity are equal to each other. Although S and P are not quantities,
and the copula ("is") is not the same as the equal sign in mathematics, yet the
axiom is applicable here too: if S and M agree, and if M and P agree, then S and
P agree.
(2B) And if S and M do not agree, but M and P do, then S and P do not:
(3) What if S and P are both related to M negatively? Then we know noth-
ing about how they are related to each other. We cannot prove a negative con-
clusion from two negative premises. For instance,
No men are insects.
And no insects write logic books.
Therefore no men write logic books.
is obviously an invalid argument. Its premises are both true, but its conclusion
is false.
Imagine S, M, and P as warring nations, which can be cither allies or ene-
mies. (In affirmative propositions the two terms are like allies; in negative
propositions they are like enemies.) Let us look at three possible cases: (1) no
negative premises, (2) one negative premise, and (3) two negative premises.
(1) If S and M are allies, and M and P are allies, then S and P must be allies.
(E.g. if France and England are allies, and England and America are allies, then
Francc and America must be allies.)
(2A) If S and M arc enemies, and M and P are allies, then S and P must be
enemies. (E.g. if America and Germany arc enemies, and Germany and Italy are
allies, then America and Italy must be enemies.)
(2B) If S and M are allies, and M and P are enemies, then S and P must be
enemies. (E.g. if England and America are allies, and America and Japan are
enemies, then England and Japan must be enemies.)
(3) If S and M are enemies, and M and P are enemies, then S and P may be
allies or enemies. (E.g. if America and Germany are enemies, and Germany and
Russia arc enemies, then America and Russia may be either allies or enemies.)
The saying is not always true that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." But
the ally of my enemy must be my enemy.
The skeptic s objection to the sy llogism 219
We do not deduce the rest of our knowledge from tautologies; they are not
the starting points of our learning. Sense experience is. Tautologies are the final
court of appeal, so to speak: if any argument violates a tautology, a self-evident
logical law, that fact alone shows that the argument is invalid. This is how we
ultimately prove that a given argument is valid or invalid if challenged.
For instance, suppose someone challenges the syllogism "All men are mor-
tal, and Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal." Suppose someone says,
"Why can't the premises be true and the conclusion false?" Our reply is that if
you say this is so, you are contradicting yourself, for you arc saying both that
Socrates is mortal and that he is not. If Socrates is not mortal - if the conclusion
is false - then at least this one man is not mortal. (For you have already admit-
ted that Socrates is a man.) But the admission that at least one man is not mor-
tal contradicts the other premise you admitted namely that all men are mortal.
So you are contradicting yourself. The law of non-contradiction is the ultimate
tautology in logic, the ultimate court of appeal.
The puzzling question then arises: How do we know these four principles,
the heart of reason itself? By reason? Or by "faith"? Or by something else?
From the time of Descartes, philosophers for two centuries have tried to
prove them, to rationally validate reason itself. Most philosophers today believe
the attempt is intrinsically impossible, and begs the question, for it would have
to use reason to prove reason, thus assuming the validity of the reason it uses.
Is the alternative faith? Aldous Huxley wrote: "All science is based on an
act of faith - faith in the validity of the mind's logical processes, faith in the
explicability of the world, faith that the laws of thought are laws of things."
Pascal put the puzzle in a theological context: our minds are like comput-
ers, and their innate hardware, including these Laws of Thought, have been pro-
grammed into us either by a wise and unstable intellect (God), or by an unwise
and/or untrustworthy intellect (anything from a brilliant but fallible extraterres-
trial to the Devil), or by no intellect at all but by blind chance. If either of the
two latter possibilities is the true one, then our intellect is not to be totally trust-
ed. Therefore the rationalist, who wants to trust reason above all else, must begin
not with reason and proof but with an act of faith.
Perhaps what Huxley and Pascal call "faith" is not the opposite of reason
but the heart of reason: a direct insight into the necessary truth of the self-evi-
dent. If "reason" means only calculation and proof, as it does for Descartes and
his successors, including symbolic logicians, this insight is not "reason." But if
"reason" means what it did to Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, then this is the most
rational knowledge possible.
Philosophers of a Kantian type maintain that this not an insight into truth at
all but simply a psychological fact about how our minds have to work. But is it
then a limitation that we cannot believe in mcaninglcssness, irrationality, and
self-contradiction? "Romanticists" like Walt Whitman and Nietzsche seem to
have believed just that. Whitman wrote, in "Song of Myself," "Do I contradict
myself? Very well, then, I contradict myself. I am large. I contain multitudes."
And Nietzsche encouraged potential "overmen" to "have chaos in yourselves."
But surely this is self-defeating, for if the laws of non-contradiction and identi-
ty are not true, then "I contradict myself" means "I do not contradict myself,"
and "Have chaos" means "Do not have chaos."
The objection is that the syllogism is a fake, to put it bluntly; that it claims
to yield new knowledge but does not and cannot; that deduction never proves
anything at all. For either the conclusion merely repeats in different words what
has already been stated in the premises, or not. If it does merely repeat the prem-
ises, then it is like immediate inference, in which the original proposition or
premise is merely reworded or changed around; no new knowledge is gained-
There is no more in the conclusion than in the premises. If it does not merely
repeat the premises, it commits the fallacy of non sequitur, "it does not follow"
for there is more in the conclusion than in the premises.
So if there is not more in the conclusion than in the premises, the syllogism
is a tautology; and if there is, then it is a non sequitur. Thus the syllogism is
either a trivial tautology or an invalid non sequitur.
Take the classic case, "all men are mortal, and Socrates is a man, therefore
Socrates is mortal." Mill argues that we could never know the premise that all
men are mortal unless we already knew that Socrates was mortal. For (assuming
that Socrates is a man) if Socrates is not mortal, then not all men are mortal. So
instead of the universal premise being evidence or reason for the particular con-
clusion, it is the other way round: the universal premise actually presupposes the
truth of the particular conclusion. The conclusion is the premise, and the prem-
ise is the conclusion. Syllogisms really work backwards. That is Mill's objection.
Here is our answer to Mill's objection. It comes from experience, from data,
from the way we all actually do in fact reason. Let's look at a very ordinary, typ-
ical case of reasoning by syllogism. Suppose you the student now say, "I hate
logic." I ask you why. You say, "Because it's confusing, and I hate confusing sub-
jects." You are giving me a syllogism to justify not thinking about the problem
of the syllogism. Your syllogism is:
John Stuart Mill would not accept your argument. He would say, How can
you know that every confusing subject is one you hate (your major premise)
unless you had first experienced every single confusing subject in the world
including logic?
The answer, of course, is that we learn not only by experiencing particulars
but also by understanding universals. Once we have experienced some confus-
ing subjects, we can abstract the universal principle from the particular case. We
understand that every confusing subject will be unattractive precisely because it
is confusing. This is not an accident, it is a property.
The same is true regarding the "all men are mortal" syllogism. We under-
stand that all men must be mortal because they must have organic bodies,
although not all men must be white or between three and seven feet tall. We
224 X. SYLLOGISMS
sequitur. How could science generalize from a few observations of a few falling
bodies to the universal rule that"all freely falling bodies accelerate at the rate of
32.2 feet per second per second" without committing a non sequitur? And it is
impossible to observe all freely falling bodies in the world. The larger the num-
ber of instances observed, the more probable is the universal conclusion, of
course; but it is merely probable. What makes it more than probable? It is only
probable that a coin will come up heads half the time; but it is more than prob-
able that falling bodies will accelerate at 32.2 feet per second per second. What
is only probably true is also possibly false. The truth of an A proposition is ren-
dered probable if its opposed I proposition is true (and this is induction); but the
truth of an O is also compatible with the I being true; and if the O is true then
the A is not true, since the A and the O are contradictory.
It is a common misunderstanding that modern science relies on induction
rather than deduction and therefore is impervious to Mill's critique of deduction.
It is true that modern science is vastly superior to pre-modem science partly
because it relies on experience and observation rather than authority, tradition,
and speculation. But science is not identical with induction. It depends on
deduction as well as induction. For science is predictive, and all prediction is
deductive and syllogistic.
Prediction is syllogistic because it is like mathematics. When the scientist
predicts, he is using his equations and formulas as a major premise, and the spe-
cific material and natural forces that he observes as a minor premise, i.e. an
instance or example of the formulas. To take a very simple example, "2+2=4"
could be a major premise, and then it could be applied to apples as follows:
Any two things, if added to two things of the same kind, will be four things of
that kind.
Two apples added to two apples are two things added to two things of the same
kind.
Therefore two apples added to two apples will be four apples.
Mill's critique of the syllogism applies just as much to this syllogism as to
any other. Modern science, with its emphasis on mathematics, induction and
concrete experience, is no more exempt from Mill's critique than ancient phi-
losophy, with its emphasis on syllogism, deduction, and abstraction.
To understand this, we must understand the analogy between inductive rea-
soning and abstraction. Induction, like deduction, is reasoning, and therefore
comes under the third act of the mind, not the first; while abstraction comes
under the first act of the mind, not the third; yet there is an analogy between the
two.
Abstraction is the process by which we form a universal concept on the
basis of experiencing a number of particular instances of it - for instance, under-
standing "man" or "human nature" from having experienced some individuals
of this species. Aristotle gives this famous image for it: "It is like a rout in bat-
226 X. SYLLOGISMS
tie stopped by first one man making a stand and then another, until the original
formation has been restored. When one of a number of logically indiscriminable
[identical in essence] particulars has made a stand [in the mind], the earliest uni-
versal is present in the soul" (Posterior Analytics 100a). Abstraction mentally
separates this universal, common essence from the individuating accidents such
as gender, race, height, age, clothing, etc. Intelligent minds do it quickly, after
only a few examples; slower minds take longer and need more examples, more
experience.
Induction: Just as abstraction is the power of the mind to move from sensed
particulars to an understood universal (e.g. from men to Man) in the first act of
the mind (understanding), so induction is the power in the third act of the mind
(reasoning) to move from a number of singular propositions, which are the
reports of sense observations, to a universal proposition - e.g. from "these men
are mortal" to "all men are mortal."
How is this done? Let us look at a specific instance. There are two peasants
on a medieval feudal manor. Neither has ever been away from his little bit of
land; neither has ever seen more than 500 different human beings; but one (let's
call him Odo) has a bright and quick mind while the other (Bozo) has a dim and
slow one. One day both see something they never saw before: slave traders with
black men on chains, coming to the manor to sell the black men as slaves. Odo
says: "What a terrible thing to do: treating those humans like animals!" Bozo
replies, "What do you mean, human beings? They have black skin. They can't
be human beings. They must be animals. And it's perfectly all right to chain ani-
mals and sell them, so it's not a terrible thing at all."
Note that both Odo and Bozo use the same logical principles of the syllo-
gism. Odo is implicitly arguing:
Bozo agrees with Odo's first syllogism, but not with the second premise of
his second syllogism, because he does not recognize that these black men are
human beings. Why not? Because he did not abstract as well as Odo. All Bozo
did was to abstract the sensed constants from the sensed variables. All humans
he ever saw had two legs, two eyes, hair, white skin, the power of speech, and a
Frankish accent. Some were male, some female; some old, some young, some
tall, some short. So he knew that not all humans were male, or old, or tall. But
he did not know that not all humans were white, or Frankish. Odo, however, not
only abstracted the sensed constants from the sensed variables, like Bozo, but
The empiricist s objection to the syllogism 227
also abstracted the essence from the accidents among the sensed constants. He
understood that the power of speech was part of the human essence but the color
of skin was not.
Odo
\ /
/\
The materialist and empiricist and nominalist ignores this distinctively
human power, the power not shared by animals, cameras, or computers: the
power to abstract and understand essences. In other words, the modern nomi-
nalist logician has no doctrine of the predicables; he cannot distinguish an acci-
dent from an essential property.
Finally, let us answer Mill logically, in his own terms, about the syllogism.
He claims that all syllogisms really beg the question, and work backward, from
conclusion to premise. Let us look at two kinds of syllogisms. In the first kind
all the predicates are accidents. In the second some are properties.
Mill is right about the first kind of syllogism but wrong about the second.
There is no way to know that all the books on your bookcase are paperbacks
without first looking at each one, including this one. So the conclusion ("this
book is a paperback") must be known to be true before the premise ("all the
books in my bookcase are paperbacks") can be known to be true. For all of the
predicates in this syllogism are accidents of their subjects. It is accidcntal to a
book to be a paperback or a hardcover. It is accidcntal to a book to be on my
bookcase or not. If a proposition has an accident as its predicate, the only way
to be sure it is true is by experience, by observation. The mind cannot tell, just
by understanding the essence of a book, whether it is a paperback or not and
whether it is on my bookcase or not. We know this not a priori, prior to sense
experience, but only a posteriori, posterior to experience.
But the opposite is true of the second syllogism. We have a priori knowl-
edge that all men are mortal; we can know that all men are mortal before we
experience all men, i.e. every single man. (We can never experience every sin-
gle man, of course; there are over 6 billion of them alive, and many dead, and
many not yet born.) We can know that all men are mortal by understanding the
essence of the subject "man." Man is a rational animal, with a rational soul and
an animal body. This is his essence. Wc can understand the animal part of his
cssence well enough to understand why everything with an animal body must be
mortal. We know that all men are mortal not by examining every individual man
with our senses but by examining the universal essence of man with our mind.
Until modern times, the word "reason" meant that power of understanding (the
first act of the mind) as well as the power of computer-like deduction (the third
act of the mind).
The source of Mills error is his Nominalism. It is only through the univer-
sal - specifically, through the middle term - that syllogism works. And in every
syllogism the middle term must be universal ("distributed") at least once; other-
wise we have the fallacy of Undistributed Middle. (Sec pages 246-48.)
Nominalism denies universals; no wonder it denies syllogism.
Nominalism also undermines induction, for nominalism reduces universals
to man-made groupings of individuals into artificial classes set up for acciden-
tal purposes. According to Nominalism there is no objectively right or wrong
way of grouping many individuals into a class, since there is no common nature
or essence in the individuals that really and objectively constitutes that class. All
we can do is whatever we desire to do: e.g. we can classify men and trees togeth-
er as "tall" or "handsome" or "things that make me smile"; or we can classify
men and mud and marshmallows together as "soft" or "things that begin with the
letter 4 m / " Reason is a servant of desire - and this is another, connected, doc-
trine of this philosophical school that includes Hobbes, Hume, Mill, Freud,
Darwin, and Marx. Aristotle offers us the alternative in the famous formula that
"one can know a universal without knowing all its particulars" (Posterior
Analytics 71a, 2 6 f f ) .
The empiricist s objection to the syllogism 229
Nominalism amounts to denying that we can know what an apple is. All
human thought and speech use universal concepts. The only exceptions are prop-
er names; all other names are "common," and Aristotelian realism (the alterna-
tive to Nominalism) is "common sense." The denial of this common sense has
permeated modern philosophy. Especially in the 20th century, the dominant phi-
losophy in all English speaking countries has been some form of Positivism.
This is a word with many meanings, but essentially it designates the constella-
tion of six "isms" already enumerated: nominalism in metaphysics, atheism in
theology, determinism in cosmology, materialism in anthropology, empiricism
in epistemology, and utilitarianism in ethics.
Its logical form was first called "Logical Positivism" in its landmark mani-
festo Language, Truth and Logic by A.J Ayer (1926); then "analytic philosophy,"
when it was softened and modified a bit, since the fundamental claim of this
manifesto was not only mistaken but self-refuting, self-contradictory. The basic
claim was that the only two kinds of meaningful propositions were tautologies
and empirically verifiable or falsifiable propositions (essentially, what Kant
called "analytic a priori judgments" and "synthetic a posteriori judgments").
This claim is immediately self-contradictory, for it itself is neither a tautology
nor empirically verifiable, therefore meaningless by its own criteria.
What is relevant here is to see that nominalism naturally results in such a
narrow either/or. If there are no real universals, then all knowledge of objective
reality is of concrete individuals, knd this comes only by sense observation. Man
is essentially reduced to an animal plus a computer in his powers of knowing.
The distinctively human dimensions of reason have been abolished - by human
reason! This is not intellectual humility; it is intellectual suicide.
A popular argument of the modern Nominalist against the old notion of rea-
son is that it was arrogant and aprioristic, that it ignored experience and held
back the progress of science, and that the modern concept of reason is more
humble and scientific. The history of science, the Nominalist argues, is a
garbage can full of abstract "essences" which have been discarded. For instance,
Aristotle thought that fire rose because it was the essence of fire to move toward
the heavens.
It is true that the knowledge of universal essences by abstraction is by its
very nature (i.e. its essence!) subject to error, and history is full of errors that
came from its misuse. But "the misuse of a thing does not take away its proper
use." {Abusus non tollit usum.) All human knowledge is subject to error, and its
history is full of examples of them. But at least metaphysical realism explains
why abstraction can be valid; Nominalism cannot explain even that. Realism is
embarrassed by reason's errors, but Nominalism is embarrassed by reason's suc-
cess!
Much of the progress of science consists in a better understanding of the
nature of things. For instance, modern physicists no longer claim that it is fire's
essence to move toward the heavens, because they claim to know more about the
230 X. SYLLOGISMS
nature of fire, and other bodies, than Aristotle did - and this claim itself cannot
be made by a Nominalist.
But even when both premises are known to be certainly true, our mind (and
not just our feelings) is more totally satisfied by one kind of syllogism than by
another. For one syllogism may give the real reason why the conclusion is true
(this reason resides in the middle term), while another may not. Both kinds of
syllogism can be logically valid, but only the first kind is called a "perfect
demonstration," or an argument propter quid ("because of this"), since it gives
the real causc of the conclusion being true.
To see this distinction, contrast the following two syllogisms:
Both syllogisms are logically valid, and both have true premises, but (1) is
more convincing than (2). Why?
Demonstrative syllogisms 231
Because in (1), the middle term is the real reason or cause for the conclu-
sion being true, while in (2) it is not. Matter is in reality destructible because it
is composed of parts; its parts actually make it destructible, decomposable, split-
table. But consciousness is not immaterial because it cannot reflect light waves.
The inability to reflect light waves does not actually cause the immateriality of
consciousness. Rather, it is an effect of it.
Take another example:
It is not the absence of being able to be moved from one place to another
that makes numbers immaterial. The middle term does not give the real reason
for the conclusion.
When the middle term does give the real reason or cause for the conclusion
being true, we have what is classically called a "demonstrative syllogism." It is
also sometimes called a "perfect demonstration" - perfect because our mind is
satisfied, since we know not only the fact (the conclusion) but also the reason
for it (the middle term). In a non-demonstrative syllogism, we have indeed
proved the fact (the conclusion), and we can be certain that it is true if we are
certain that the premises are true; but not why. we do not yet know the real rea-
son or cause why it is true. So our mind is not totally satisfied.
A classic example of the difference between a valid non-demonstrative
argument and a valid demonstrative argument is the difference we have already
referred to (page 214) between Book 1 of Plato's Republic and Books 2 through
10. Socrates is dissatisfied at the end of Book 1 because although he has proved
that justice is more profitable than injustice, he does not yet know why, since he
does not yet know the essence of justice, what justice is. He has not yet deduced
justice's "profitability" from its essence. Only after finding the essence of jus-
tice (a long process in the Republic) can he know that this essence of justice is
the real reason why justice must always be more profitable than injustice. This
essence, expressed in his definition of justice, is the middle term of his basic syl-
logism. (It is basically that justice is that virtue in a soul or in a state by which
each part performs its natural function with its proper particular virtue, in har-
mony with the other parts. Justice is to the soul or the state what health is to the
body.)
The most practical application of this distinction between demonstrative
and nondemonstrative syllogisms comes when we arc trying to construct syllo-
gisms. To make a syllogism, you must find an appropriate middle term. To make
a demonstrative syllogism, you must find a middle term that tells us the real rea-
son for the conclusion. For instance, suppose you wanted to prove to someone
who admired Hitler that Hitler was not a great man. You could argue this way:
232 X. SYLLOGISMS
But the middle term here is not the cause of Hitler's lack of greatness, so
you have not constructed a demonstrative syllogism, though it is a valid one. It
would be better to use instead a syllogism whose middle term gives the actual
cause, e.g.:
Still another reason why some syllogisms are more convincing than others
- this time a purely psychological reason - is bccause their arrangement of terms
is clearer and stronger. Affirmative propositions are clearer and stronger than
negative ones, and universal propositions are clearer and stronger than particu-
lar ones, so the most convincing and simple form of syllogism is one with three
A propositions, arranged in perfect order like the circles on a dart board. It could
be called a "bull's eye syllogism." E.g.:
All men are mortal.
All sages are men.
Therefore all sages are mortal.
Pit bull owners will still disagree with you, but at least you have something
to argue about. Your conclusion is now based on two premises, not just feeling
or prejudice. And the premises are a bit harder to refute than the conclusion. At
least, more people agree with the premises than with the conclusion. That's the
whole strategy of the syllogism: to lead people from premises they already
believe to a conclusion they do not.
Or suppose you want to prove that Utopianism is an illusion, that a perfect
society can never exist on earth. First, formulate your conclusion: "No perfect
society is something that can exist on earth." Then ask yourself "Why?" What is
there about a perfect society that makes it impossible, or what is there about
things on earth that make them all imperfect? Formulating the question in the
first way might give you a syllogism like
Or if you formulate the question in the second way, you might come up with a
syllogism like
All things on earth are infected with weakness, ignorance, and death.
Nothing infected with weakness, ignorance, and death is a perfect society.
Therefore nothing on earth is a perfect society.
The more you do it, the more easy and natural it becomes. Appropriate middle
terms begin to leap out at you; and this clarifies your own reasons as well as fur-
nishing you with arguments to persuade others.
Exercises
A. Test your intuitive sense of valid and invalid arguments by telling whether
you think each of the following syllogisms is valid or invalid.
1. Courage is a virtue.
2. Not all great men are patriotic.
3. Giving makes you happy.
4. Somebody farted.
5. Slavery is morally wrong.
6. Whatever has color, has size.
7. Power is not happiness.
8. All men by nature desire to know.
9. Some valid syllogisms do not convince anyone to believe their conclusion.
C. The following exercises are more difficult because they require you to see
both sides of a controversial issue. Construct convincing syllogisms to prove
both of each pair of contradictory conclusions. This is a good exercise not
only in logic but also in practical psychology, "getting into" other minds.
just diagram both premises by Euler diagrams, superimposing one on the other.
This is possible because there is always a common term to any two propositions
in a syllogism. A syllogism has only three terms, remember; if there are more
than three, we have either no syllogism at all, or a syllogism with "the Fallacy of
Four Terms," or perhaps two syllogisms in a chain. (We will soon learn how to
detect these patterns.)
Take the easiest case first, our old friend "All men are mortal, and Socrates
is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal We first diagram "all men are mortal" in
Euler circles:
the diagram of the premises. For the conclusion does not add any new data to
the premises. The premises by themselves supply all the data, or information;
and the conclusion only reveals the truth that is already implicit in the premises.
So if a syllogism is logically valid, we can see the conclusion in the premises
simply by looking at the Euler diagram of the two premises superimposed on
each other. In this case, we sec that "Socrates is mortal" necessarily follows.
Now let's take an example of a syllogism with a negative premise and a neg-
ative conclusion:
No creatures are perfect.
And all angels are creatures.
Therefore no angels are perfect.
Euler's Circles 239
The dotted line signifies that we do not know whether or not some fish do
not have teeth. (Remember, "some" must be interpreted to mean "at least some,"
that is, "some and perhaps all" rather than "only some, some and not all" -
unless there is some clear indication, in the words that we are given, that it is
meant in the second, stronger sense. We must not "read between the lines" or
"read into" the data we are given.)
Euler's Circles show that this conclusion necessarily follows.
However, suppose we have the syllogism:
Some fish have teeth.
And all fish have gills.
Therefore some things that have teeth have gills.
These two premises are more difficult to diagram together, because the rela-
tion between the terms "things that have teeth" and "things that have gills" is not
clear. (Try it.) You probably cannot tell just from your attempt to diagram these
two premises together that the conclusion does indeed necessarily follow.
Sometimes we can handle syllogisms with I or O propositions in Euler's cir-
cles if we draw not just one but a number of dotted lines to show that there are
a number of possibilities. For instance, take the syllogism
Some good generals are not good politicians.
This man is a good politician.
Therefore this man is not a good general.
First, diagram the universal premise, the second one:
Then, superimpose the other premise, the first one It is an O, and can be
drawn with just one dotted line, as follows:
But it can also be drawn with as many as three other dotted lines, because
we do not know what part of P ("good politicians") the rest of S ("good gener-
als") takes up:
Euler's Circles 241
It may be (1) that there are no good generals that are good politicians; or it
may be (2) that the line goes somewhere partially through "good politicians," so
that there are some good generals outside good politicians, some good generals
inside good politicians, and some good politicians outside good generals; or it
may be (3) that S ("good generals") totally surrounds P ("good politicians"), so
that all of "good politicians" is inside "good generals." We do not know which
of these three possibilities is the case just from knowing that "Some S is not P."
So wc do not know the relation between "this man" and "good generals." The
syllogism is invalid.
(I)
(2)
0) good politicians
Now we superimpose the I premise. But where does the dotted line go, the
line that contains the persons that are not handicapped? It might go (1) nowhere
at all outside the class of the handicapped and thus overlap no part of the class
"Greek gods." In other words, it might be true that there are no non-handicapped
persons. (In fact this is true if we do not limit "handicapped" to overt physical
disabilities; and we can all learn this important lesson about ourselves from
more obviously handicapped people!) Or (2) the dotted line might overlap part
of the class "Greek gods"; it might be that there are some non-handicapped per-
sons who are Greek gods and some who are not. Finally, (3) it might be that
"non-handicapped persons" totally encompass the class "Greek gods."
(1)
(2)
(3)
Since we do not know, just from the I proposition, which of these three pos-
sibilities is the case, we should diagram all three of them and then see whether
the conclusion necessarily follows in all three cases - which it does not here, and
so the syllogism is invalid.
syllogisms. They were discovered by the same genius who first clearly discov-
ered the theory of the syllogism itself.
To be valid, any syllogism must obey all six of these rules. If it disobeys any
one, it is invalid.
You need not memorize the numbers of the rules, or even the exact words
of the rules themselves; for you will quite quickly remember them just by using
them over and over again in doing many exercises. By the way, one of the ways
logic (and philosophy) is unlike languages is that deliberate memorization is
almost never useful. For you either understand what you are memorizing, or not
If you do, then you need not try to memorize it because you will remember it
naturally and spontaneously by the mere fact of understanding i t If you do not
understand it, then it will be very difficult for you to remember it So it is almost
always more time-efficient, as well as more pleasant, to spend your time trying
to understand rather than trying to memorize.
The Rules
Rule 1: A syllogism must have three and only three terms. The usual vio-
lation of this rule is called The Fallacy of Four Terms.
Rule 2: A syllogism must have three and only three propositions. There
is no named fallacy for the violation of this rule.
Rule 3: The middle term must be distributed at least once. The violation
of this rule is called The Fallacy of Undistributed Middle.
Rule 4: No term that is undistributed in the premise may be distributed
in the conclusion. The violation of this rule is called The Fallacy of Illicit
Minor or The Fallacy of Illicit Major, depending on whether it is the minor
term or the major term that contains the fallacy.
Rule 5: No syllogism can have two negative premises. The fallacy here is
called simply the fallacy of Two Negative Premises.
Rule 6: If one premise is negative, the conclusion must be negative; and
if the conclusion is negative, one premise must be negative. (No name for this
fallacy; just the rule.)
In addition to these six rules, there are two corollaries, which are not nec-
essary to know but are very helpful. They are not necessary to know because
every syllogism which violates one of the two corollaries also violates one of the
six rules. They are very helpful because sometimes the violation of one of the
two corollaries is more obvious and quickly detectable than the violation of one
of the six rules.
Corollary One: No syllogism may have two particular premises.
Corollary Two: If a syllogism has a particular premise, it must have a
particular conclusion.
The first two rules concern the essential structure of the syllogism.
The next two rules concern the distribution of terms.
The last two rules concern negative propositions.
And the two corollaries concern particular propositions.
244 XL CHECKING SYLLOGISMS FOR VALIDITY
Arguments with only two propositions stated but with three terms arc usu-
ally "enthymemes," abbreviated syllogisms. One of the three propositions of the
syllogism is "kept in mind" (the meaning of "enthymeme"), or implied rather
than expressed. These are genuine syllogisms, and they are in fact the common-
est of all forms of argument in ordinary language. The next chapter will explore
them in depth.
Enthymemes do not violate rule 2 even though they contain only two
expressed propositions, for the third proposition is implied. It is really there and
operating on an unconscious level, just as many things do in your life. For
instance, "Man is mortal because he is material" is an enthymeme, an abbrevi-
ated form of
All that is material is mortal, (implied premise)
Man is material, (expressed premise)
Therefore man is mortal, (expressed conclusion)
And "No mere man can know everything, so you can't either" is an enthymeme,
an abbreviated form of
No mere man can know everything, (expressed premise)
You are a mere man. (implied premise)
Therefore you can't know everything, (expressed conclusion)
When we study how to find the implied, missing premise in any given
enthymeme, you will come to recognize the structure of an enthymeme very
clearly, so that you will not confuse it with a violation of Rule 2. When you see
two propositions with a premise indicator or a conclusion indicator, and a total
of three terms in the two propositions, you probably have an enthymeme.
(At this point, if you arc not sure you understand what it means for a term
to be "distributed" or undistributed," or how to recognize in any given case
whether any particular term is distributed or undistributed, review pages 163-65
before going on with this chapter.)
Rule 3 concerns the hinge and center of the syllogism, the middle term.
The reason the middle term must be distributed at least once is this: if it is
not, then the minor term and the major term may be related to two totally dif-
ferent parts of the extension of the middle term, thus giving us the equivalent of
the fallacy of four terms. It is the relationship which the major and minor terms
bear to the middle term (in the major and minor premises) that justifies the rela-
tionship they bear to each other in the conclusion. If they are related to different
middle terms (the Fallacy of Four Terms explicitly), or if they are related to a
middle term with two different meanings (the Fallacy of Four Terms implicitly),
or if they are related to different parts of (the extension of) the middle term (the
Fallacy of Undistributed Middle), we have essentially the same fallacy: the mid-
dle term is not functioning as it must.
Let us begin with an example of a syllogism whose middle term functions
correctly:
The first premise excludes babies from the whole extension of sages. Then
the second premise includes all saints in some part of the class of sages. It does
not matter how large or small that part is; all saints are in it. And no babies are.
Therefore no babies can be saints. The Euler diagram shows this:
No one would be fooled by this argument, because everyone knows the conclu-
sion is false, though both premises are true. But people might be fooled by an
argument with the same logical form but a different content, such as:
All Communists insist on the abolition of private property.
This candidate insists on the abolition of private property.
Therefore this candidate must be a Communist.
No, he might be against private property for other reasons. He might be an anar-
chist, or a spiritualist who wants to deny all material property because he
believes matter is an illusion; or a monk who wants the whole world to live in a
global monastery, or a tyrant who wants to possess all property himself.
But the form of this deceptive argument is exactly the same as the form of
the first one (about cats and dogs), which is not deceptive because of its clearer
content. The common form is:
All P is M
And all S is M
248 XI. CHECKING SYLLOGISMS FOR VALIDITY
P and S are not necessarily compared with, or related to, the same part of
the extension of M here. Perhaps S is one kind of M and P is another. Or per-
haps they arc the same. We do not know from this syllogism, because neither
premise has a distributed (universal) middle term.
This pattern will be found very frequently. Undistributed Middle is proba-
bly the most common violation of the rules of the syllogism, and this pattern
(two A premises with the same predicate) is the most common pattern for it.
Rule 4 could be called the No Trespassing rule. Think of the line between
the premises and the conclusion as a property line. Only those who belong on
the property may enter it; only those terms which have produced their creden-
tials can cross over into the conclusion. If a term is so weak, so to speak, that it
is undistributed in the premise, it cannot suddenly become strong and distributed
in the conclusion. If all we know about a term in the premise is a partial knowl-
edge, a knowledge of some of its extension (and that is what "undistributed"
means), then that is all we are justified in claiming to know in the conclusion
when that term reappears. To go from undistributed to distributed would be like
a magician pulling a live rabbit out of a dead hat. It would be a trick. And there
are no tricks in logic.
For instance, take the following syllogism:
Compassion is a virtue.
Justice is not compassion.
Therefore justice is not a virtue.
Let's first test this syllogism by Euler circles, and then by the six rules. The
Euler diagram shows how both premises can be true without the conclusion
being true, for there are two possibilities:
And Euler circlcs must be drawn for all possibilities to sec whether there is any
possibility that the premises can be true without the conclusion being true. (For
this reason, it is sometimes easier to use the six rules than to use Euler circles.)
The six rules reveal the fallacy here as "illicit major": the major term,
"virtue," moves from being undistributed in the major premise to being distrib-
uted in the conclusion. The predicate of the conclusion is the major term. This
Aristotle s six rules 249
is "a virtue." This same term occurs also in one of the premises, which makes
that premise the major premise. The premise is: "Compassion is a virtue." This
is an A proposition. The predicate of an A proposition is undistributed. But this
same term ("a virtue") is distributed in the conclusion. The syllogism thus vio-
lates Rule 4: no term undistributed in the premises may be distributed in the con-
clusion. The syllogism is fallacious: Illicit Major.
Another example of the same fallacy (Illicit Major) shows how Euler's
Circles can be more difficult to use than the six rules:
A healthy life is worth living.
Some lives are not healthy.
Therefore some lives are not worth living.
Here is one possible diagram for the premises, which seems to show that the syl-
logism is valid:
But here is another possible diagram of the premises, which shows that it is
invalid:
For if there is any possibility of the premises being true without the conclusion
being true, the argument is invalid.
Consider the following syllogism:
No violence is just.
All violence is aggression.
Therefore no aggression is just.
Perhaps all three propositions are true, but the syllogism is invalid because the
minor term, "aggression," moves from being undistributed in the minor premise
250 XI. CHECKJNG SYLLOGISMS FOR VALIDITY
to being distributed in the conclusion. The Euler diagram here again also shows
the fallacy, but only if we draw both possible diagrams for the premises:
When it crosses the line from premises to conclusion, a term may move
from distributed to undistributed, or it may remain undistributed or it may
remain distributed but it may not move from undistributed to distributed. From
distributed to distributed from undistributed to undistributed and from distrib-
uted to undistributed are all OK, but not from undistributed to distributed. From
distributed to undistributed is OK - a term may move from being distributed in
the premise to being undistributed in the conclusion - bccausc if we know about
all of the term in the premise (which is what "distributed" means), we arc justi-
fied in claiming to know about some of that term (undistributed) in the conclu-
sion; from "all" we can infer "some." But from "some" we cannot infer "all."
OK OK OK invalid
Rule 5 forbids two negative premises, and the reason is again the middle
term. When both the major and minor terms are related negatively to the middle
term, we do not know how they are related to each other. Remember, it is not
necessarily true that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" or (analogously) it
is not necessarily true that two things that do not "match" a common third thing
do not "match" each other. They may, or they may not.
For instance, take the following two syllogisms, both having the same logi-
cal form:
Odd numbers are not even numbers. Birds are not fish.
Three is not an even number. Humans are not fish.
Therefore three is not an odd number. Therefore humans are not birds.
The conclusion of the second happens to be true, but its premises do not
Aristotle's six rules 251
prove it. The conclusion of the first is obviously false, and it is easier to see why
its premises do not prove it. But the first syllogism is in exactly the same logi-
cal situation. They have the same logical form:
No P is M
No S is M
Therefore no S is P
Rule 6 is similar to Rule 4 in that it is a kind of "No Trespassing" rule. Rule
4 state that if a term is undistributed in the premise, it must also be undistributed
in the conclusion. Rule 6 states that if the premises contain a negative proposi-
tion, the conclusion must also be negative, and vice versa. (There is no "vice
versa" clause in Rule 4.) There will also be a third "No Trespassing" rule,
Corollary 2, which states that if one premise is particular, the conclusion must
also be particular.
Consider these two syllogisms, which violate Rule 6 as well as Rule 5:
No dogs arc angels. No philosophers are angels.
And no mammals are angels. And no lawyers are angels.
Therefore all dogs are mammals. Therefore all philosophers are lawyers.
The first conclusion happens to be true, and the second false, but exactly
the same logical form is used:
No S is M
And no P is M
Therefore All S is P
That this syllogistic form is invalid, can be seen by the Euler Circle dia-
gram:
(1) (2)
Remember, if there is any way we can diagram the premises without having the
conclusion, the argument is invalid. Both of the two diagrams above have faith-
fully diagrammed the two premises, but the second one does not yield the con-
clusion.
252 XI. CHECKING SYLLOGISMS FOR VALIDITY
Corollary I forbids any syllogism to have two particular premises. Any syl-
logism that violates this rule will also violate Rule 3 or 4. For example:
Some swans are white. Some jewels are green.
And some white things are beautiful. And some green things are alive.
Therefore some swans are beautiful. Therefore some jewels are alive.
Here again we have the same logical form, and both syllogisms contain two true
premises, but only the first has a true conclusion. The conclusion is true "by
accident," so to speak; it does not necessarily follow from the premises. The fal-
lacy is Undistributed Middle. Or consider the following:
Some onions are not smelly. Some sheep are not black.
And some smelly things taste good. And some black things are animals.
Therefore some onions do not taste good. Therefore some sheep are not animals.
Here again in both cases we have true premises but only in the first case do
we have a true conclusion, by accident. It does not follow from the premises. The
two syllogisms have the same logical form and both commit the fallacy of Illicit
Major:
Some S is not M
And some M is P
Therefore some S is not P
The corollary is a useful time-saver bccausc the fallacy of two particular
premises can be detected at a glance, while you have to mark each term with a
"d" or a "u" before you can tell whether a syllogism commits the fallacies of
Undistributed Middle, Illicit Major, or Illicit Minor.
Exercise A: Test each of the following syllogisms and the ones on page 234 by
the six rules:
3. Peace is good.
War is not peace.
Therefore war is not good.
1. No one philosophizes who can not wonder, and computers cannot wonder,
therefore no computer philosophizes.
2. "Objection 1: ft seems that mercy cannot be attributed to God, for mercy is
a kind of sorrow, as Damascene says, but there is no sorrow in God; and
therefore there is no mercy in Him." (St. Thomas Aquinas, ST 1,21,3)
3. Not all syllogisms are silly, for only persons are silly, and nothing but non-
persons are syllogisms. (Hint: reword the more complex proposition, which
is more flexible and changeable, to conform to the terms of the more simple
propositions, which are less flexible and changeable. Remember that you
may never change the meaning of a proposition, only the wording.)
4. Most subjects that tend to withdraw the mind from pursuits of a low nature
are useful. But classical learning does not do this, and therefore it is not use-
ful.
5. Bacon was a great statesman. He was also a philosopher. We may infer from
this that any philosopher can be a great statesman.
6. Happiness is always desired for its own sake and never as a means to any-
thing else. Pleasure is always desired for its own sake and never as a means
to anything else. Therefore happiness is identical with pleasure.
7. All immoral companions should be avoided, and some immoral companions
are intelligent persons, therefore some intelligent persons should be avoid-
ed.
8. Apes are never angels, and philosophers are never apes, therefore philoso-
phers are never angels.
9. Mathematics improves the reasoning powers. But logic is not mathematics.
Therefore logic does not improve the reasoning powers.
10. "Is a stone a body? Yes. Then is not an animal a body? Yes. Are you an ani-
mal? I think so. Therefore you are a stone, being a body." (Lucian) (There
are two syllogisms here.)
11. "His imbecility of character might have been inferred from his proneness to
favorites, for all weak princes have this failing." (De Morgan)
12. Rational beings arc responsible for their actions. Brute animals are not
responsible. Therefore they are not rational.
13. Any honest man admits his rival's virtues. Not every scholar does this.
Therefore some scholars are not honest.
14. "Since all knowledge comes from sensory impressions, and since there's no
sensory impression of substance itself, it follows logically that there is no
knowledge of substance." (Robert Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle
Maintenance, paraphrasing Hume.)
15. "Because intense heat is nothing else but a particular kind of painful sensa-
tion; and pain cannot exist but in a perceiving being; it follows that no
intense heat can really exist in an unperceiving corporeal substance."
(George Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hvlas and Philonous)
16. "Since fighting against neighbors is an evil, and fighting against the
256 XI. CHECKING SYLLOGISMS FOR VALIDITY
major premise first. But when using "Barbara Celarent" it is, for the mood of a
syllogism is always expressed in a three-letter summary that is in this order: first
the major premise, then the minor premise, then the conclusion.
The figure of a syllogism is the placement of the middle term. There are
four possibilities: the middle term can be
(1) the subjcct of the major premise and the predicate of the minor premise
(= the "first figure")
(2) the predicate of both premises (= the "second figure")
(3) the subject of both premises (= the "third figure")
(4) the predicate of the major premise and the subject of the minor premise
(= the "fourth figure")
MP P M M P P M
S M S M M S M S
First Second Third Fourth
Figure Figure Figure Figure
"Barbara Celarent" is a mnemonic device to remember the valid moods for
each figure. The vowels of the names make up the mood (e.g. "Barbara" =
AAA) and there are four lines of names for the four figures:
Barbara, Celarent, Darn, Ferio (AAA, EAE, A l l , EIO)
Camestres, Cesare, Baroko, Festino (AEE, EAE, AOO, EIO)
Darapti, Disamis, Datisi, Felapton, Bokardo, Ferison (AAI, IAI, A l l , EAO,
OAO, EIO)
Bramantip, Camenes, Dimaris, Fesapo, Fresison (AAI, AEE, IAI, EAO,
EIO)
The medievals loved these lines, for they were a key (though a slow one)
that opened up all valid syllogisms and locked away all invalid ones. They also
knew and used Aristotle's six rules, but the Latin verses seemed more elegant,
almost a magical formula or incantation. Tastes change; the laws of logic do not.
The list of names includes other devices as well. E.g. the letter "s" after the
vowels "E" or "I" indicates that when the E proposition can be converted sim-
ply ("s"), the syllogism is transformed, or "reduced" into one of the first figure,
the figure which Aristotle and the medievals regarded as the most clear, simple,
natural, and direct. There are also other details in the scheme, e.g. using the same
initial consonant for syllogisms that can be "reduced" to each other. All this
elaborate logical dancing was done naturally, easily, and without reference to a
text by medieval debaters.
"Barbara Celarent" they are not necessary to learn, for they are superfluous;
they do not do anything that Aristotle's six rules do not do.
Furthermore, they presuppose and use Boole's rather than Aristotle's inter-
pretation of all universal propositions: as lacking existential import and all par-
ticular propositions as having it. This Boolean interpretation, used in all sym-
bolic logic, invalidated the Square of Opposition (see pages 179-81), and we
gave reasons there why it is quite natural and proper to reject it.
However, sincc Venn diagrams have become as fashionable today as
"Barbara Celarent" was in the middle ages, we should briefly summarize them,
as a present historical curiosity.
First, we must learn how to symbolize A, E, I and O propositions in a total-
ly new way. As with Euler's circles, each term is diagrammed by a circle.
However, instead of relating the terms by including or excluding the S and P cir-
cles, these circles always overlap, giving us 4 possible classes: S, P, both S and
P, and neither S nor P.
Shaded lines are used to designate which of the areas is not "occupied."
Thus an A proposition, "All S is P" is interpreted to mean that there are no real
beings that are S and not P - i.e. "No S is not P":
Note that the universal proposition is interpreted as not implying that any
260 XI. CHECKING SYLLOGISMS FOR VALIDITY
S's exist (all it does is to deny that there are any S's that are not P), while the par-
ticular proposition is interpreted as implying that some S's exist (thus the aster-
isk). This is the assumption we have questioned above.
The E proposition, "No S is P," shades out the overlapping part, to show that
there are no S's that are also P's:
And the O proposition has an asterisk in the part of S that is nor P (also
implying that such S's exist):
Now when we test a syllogism by Venn diagrams, we use one of the same
principles as we used in Euler's circles: superimpose diagrams of the two prem-
ises on each other, and then look to see whether the conclusion necessarily fol-
lows. We do this by constructing a three-c\xc\c diagram for each syllogism (one
circle for each term), as follows:
Let us now diagram an AAA syllogism such as "All men are mortal, and
Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal" - or any syllogism of the form
"All M is P, all S is M, therefore all S is P."
We first shade out M s that are not P, to diagram the major premise "all M
r>
is P :
Venn Diagrams 26 J
Then we add the minor premise "all S is NT by shading out all S's that arc
not M:
Then we look to see whether the conclusion follows, that "all S is P." All S's
that are not P have been shaded out, so this does follow. It is valid.
Take an EIO syllogism (a common form, the only mood which is valid in
all four figures).
No M is P
Some S is M
Therefore some S is not P
First we write down the three rings, empty:
Then, diagram the major premise "No M is P" by shading out all M's that
are P:
Then add the minor premise "Some S is M" by inserting the asterisk in S's
M-overlapping area:
262 XI CHECKING SYLLOGISMS FOR VALIDITY
Then diagram the major premise, "All P is M" by shading out all P that is
not M:
But when we come to diagram "Some S is M," we are still uncertain where
to put the asterisk for S. So we have to insert two of them, since there are two
possibilities. We connect them with a dotted line to show this Oust as we use a
dotted line for what is uncertain in Euler's circles):
We can sec that this syllogism is not valid because we can see a possibility
for both premises being true yet the conclusion false.
Sometimes there is a discrepancy between Aristotle's six rules and Venn
diagrams about whether the same syllogism is valid or invalid, because Venn
diagrams use the Boolean interpretation of all particular propositions as
Venn Diagrams 263
stand his own argument better, by exposing its necessary assumption. Then,
though A and B may still disagree, their disagreement has moved to a more basic
level, the level of the assumption. The dialogue can then focus on arguments for
and against that assumption. In other words, deductive arguments in lived con-
versation often move "backward" from conclusion to premise rather than "for-
ward."
Here is a seven step method for finding the missing premise. After a little
practice, you will recognize familiar patterns and instinctively go through all
seven steps quickly, almost simultaneously.
(1) Be sure you have an enthymeme. Look for (a) an argument indicator
word (premise indicator or conclusion indicator) and (b) two propositions, with
one common term between them. In our example the argument indicator is
"because," and the common term is "teenagers."
(2) Identify the conclusion first. (It is usually stated. Third order
enthymemes are fairly rare, and usually obvious.) In our example, the conclu-
sion is: "Teenagers can't buy beer in this state."
(3) Put it into logical form'. "No [teenagers] are [those who can buy beer in
this state]."
(4) Identify the expressed premise'. "They arc minors."
(5) Put it into logical form: "All [teenagers] arc [minors]." (Translating the
pronoun "they" into its noun, "teenagers")
(6) If you already have a common term, proceed to step (7). If you do not
have an explicit common term (i.e. a word or phrase used once in each of the
two propositions without any word change), and yet you sense that there is an
argument here (i.e. a connection between the premise and the conclusion such
that the premise is some sort of reason for the conclusion), then try rewording
one of the propositions to conform to the other one, thus getting an explicit com-
mon term. The basic rule is that you may change the wording but not the mean-
ing. Here are some of the most common wording changes:
(6a) All pronouns should be changed to the nouns they refer to.
(6b) If you have two words or phrases that mean exactly the same thing,
they are synonyms. Synonyms should be changed into each other. E.g. in "Holy
people aren't gloomy; that's why Stoics aren't saints," "saints" and "holy people"
are synonyms.
(6c) Word order can be changed, e.g. passive voice and active voice can be
interchanged. E.g. "I love you, therefore you cannot die" can be changed to "You
are loved by me, therefore you cannot die," thus giving us the common term
"you."
(6d) Possessives can be reworded as independent nouns. E.g. "Since he's a
doctor, his bag probably contains drugs" can be changed to "He is a doctor,
therefore he is one whose bag probably contains drugs."
(6e) If a short term appears alone as a complete term in one proposition and
reappears as part of a longer term in another proposition, change the wording of
Enthymemes: abbreviated syllogisms 267
that other proposition as follows: extract the short term from the longer term,
make it the subject, and without changing its meaning, reword the rest of the
proposition to fit into the predicate. (Predicates are flexible; subjects arc not.)
E.g. "The man who killed Kennedy must have been a sharpshooter because
Kennedy was moving fast" can be changed to "Kennedy must have been killed
by a sharpshooter bccause Kennedy was moving fast." Or "Mothers who have
more than one child in China are forced to kill their second child by abortion or
infanticide; therefore China is a tyrannical regime" can be changed into "China
is a place where mothers who have more than one child are forced to kill their
second child by abortion or infanticide, therefore China is a tyrannical regime."
(7) Once you have a common term, and the two expressed propositions are
written out in logical form, it is fairly simple to find the missing premise:
(7a) First, write down the mood (A, E, I, or O) of each of the two expressed
propositions, e.g. AA or IO.
(7b) From the mood of the two propositions that are already expressed, you
can tell what must be the mood of the implied but unexpressed proposition has
to be if the syllogism is not to violate rule 5 or 6 or one of the two corollaries.
For instance, if the expressed premise is an E and the conclusion is an E, the
implied premise must be an A. For if it were an E or an O, the syllogism would
violate rule 5 (two negative premises), and if it were an I, the syllogism would
violate Corollary 2 (a particular premise with a universal conclusion).
If the expressed premise is an A and the conclusion is an A, the implied
premise must be an A. This is the most common form of all, the "bull's eye syl-
logism."
In our example above, the premise is an A ("all teenagers are minors") and
the conclusion is an E ("no teenagers can legally buy beer in this state"), so the
kept-in-mind premise must be an E. An A or an I would give us a negative con-
clusion without a negative premise (violating rule 6); an O would give us a par-
ticular premise without a particular conclusion (violating corollary 2).
We express the mood of a syllogism by writing the mood of each proposi-
tion in order, with the conclusion last. (It is conventional to write the major
premise first, but not necessary in practice; reversing the order of the two prem-
ises does not change anything.)
The following list is a streamlined version of the clumsy old "Barbara
Celarent" list of valid moods. (See page 257.) Unlike the medieval list, this one
does not require you to take the figure of the syllogism into account at all (i.e.
the placement of the middle term). Only the following moods are valid, all oth-
ers are invalid. The list need not be memorized; it is just an application of rules
5 and 6 and two corollaries.)
AAA AEE EIO
AA1 EAE IEO
All AEO AOO
IAI EAO OAO
268 XII. MORE DIFFICULT SYLLOGISMS
And since we can reverse the order of the premises without changing any-
thing, we can omit five of the twelve above, resulting in only seven valid moods:
AAA AEE EIO
AAI AEO AOO
All
For only the following combinations of premises, in either order, can be
valid (by rules 5 and 6):
AA
AE
AI
AO
EI
And the conclusion that must follow each of these five, must be as follows
(by rules 5 and 6):
AAA (or I)
AEE (or O)
All
AOO
EIO
The reason for this limit, the reason all other moods of the syllogism are
invalid, is the "no trespassing" rule: no "weakness" in the premises can cross
over the line into the conclusion without being reflected in the conclusion. There
are two such "weaknesses": negativity and particularity. You cannot have more
in the conclusion (the effect) than you had in the premises (the cause).
(7c) Now that you have the mood of the missing premise, write out the
"empty" logical form for that mood, with brackets around the yet-to-be-supplied
subject and predicate terms. In our example, the missing premise is an E, so the
empty logical form is: No [ ] is [ ].
(7d) Next, find the f u o terms that are to be joined in this missing premise.
They are the two terms that have been used only once. One of them will be the
middle term, which you can identify at a glance by the fact that it is the only
term not in the conclusion. In our example, the two terms to be joined in the
missing premise are "minors" and "those who can legally buy beer in this state."
(7e) Once you have the two terms, the only decision remaining is which of
these two terms will be the subject and which the predicate. Try both arrange-
ments, and if one of them gives you a fallacy, drop it and use the other.
Do not think: I will use whatever order of terms gives me a true premise;
for there can be dispute about what is true, but there is no question about what
is fallacious. You want to supply whatever missing premise will make the syllo-
gism valid. For even if you are arguing against an opponent, you want to be fair
Enthymemes: abbreviated syllogisms 269
to him and not saddle him with a fallacy he did not explicitly commit. Give him
the benefit of the doubt.
If the missing premise is an E or an I, it does not matter which order the
terms come in, since both the E and the I proposition can be converted.
Let's take another example:
"Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth." (Matthew 5:2)
First, we determine that we have an argument. We do this both by intuition,
or common sense, and by observing the presence of an argument indicator, the
word "for."
Next, wc identify the conclusion.
This can be done in two ways: by common sense and by looking at the clue,
the argument indicator.
Common sense tells us that the speaker is trying to get across the conclu-
sion that the meek are blessed, and that his reason for this rather strange and con-
troversial conclusion is that they will inherit the earth. That is what makes them
blessed: that is why they are blessed. If this point does not immediately register
on your logical intuition, go to the argument indicator. (Go to it anyway, to check
your intuition.)
The word "for" is a premise indicator: it points to a premise, introduces a
premise; a premise comes after it. So the conclusion must come before it. So the
conclusion is: "blessed are the meek." The remaining proposition must be a
premise: "they shall inherit the earth."
(Remember, every argument indicator indicates two propositions: a con-
clusion indicator indicates not only a conclusion after it but also a premise
before it, and a premise indicator indicates not only a premise after it but also a
conclusion before it.)
We have, now, an enthymeme with one premise expressed, one premise
implied, and the conclusion expressed.
Now we translate the two expressed propositions into logical form.
Take the conclusion first. "Blessed are the meek." We have here a reversed
word order, with the predicate first. For the subject of a proposition is what you
are talking about and the predicate is what you say about it. The speaker is not
saying: "I am going to tell you something about blessed. That is my sermon
topic. And what I will say about it is that it is, or are, the meek" That simply
makes no sense. Rather, he is talking about the meek and saying that they are
blessed. The meek are blessed: that is the point. He uses reversed word order for
poetic or rhetorical purposes.
Clearly the proposition is affirmative. But is it universal or particular? Is he
saying that some of the meek are blessed or that all are? Neither "some" nor
"all" is used, but "all" is implied. Why? Because it is a general and unqualified
statement. Also, because the statement implies that the meek are blessed simply
by being meek, simply because they are meek. So if the meek are blessed
270 XII. MORE DIFFICULT SYLLOGISMS
bccause they are meek, then all the meek are blessed since all the meek are
meek.
Thus we have our conclusion, in logical form: "All [the meek] are [those
who are blessed]."
"Blessed" is an adjective, and cannot stand alone as a subject, so we add the
words "those who are," changing the wording without changing the meaning.
Remember, in logical form, each term must be able to stand alone as a subject
or a predicate, so each term must be a noun or noun phrase, since only a noun
or noun phrase can be a subject. There will be quite a few occasions where you
will have to take the predicate term and put it into the subject position when you
supply the missing premise; this is the main reason why logical form requires all
noun terms.
Now look at the expressed premise: "They shall inherit the earth."
First, we change the pronoun to its noun, to get a common term. Who are
"they"? The meek, of course, the subjects that the speaker is speaking about.
This proposition is affirmative, obviously, but is it an A or an I? Will all the
meek, will the meek as such, inherit the earth? Will the meek inherit the earth
because they are meek, and thus all of them will inherit the earth? That is clear-
ly what is implied. It is an unqualified alTrmation. So it is an A, just as the con-
clusion is.
Next, we need to change the predicate ("shall inherit the earth") to a noun
phrase ("those who shall inherit the earth")
Now we have the expressed premise in logical form: "All [the meek] are
[those who shall inherit the earth]."
We have a common term between the two expressed propositions. It is "the
meek." So we do not have the problem of finding or making a common term.
The next step is to write down the logical form the missing premise has to
have. Is it A, E. I, or O? Since both of the two expressed premises are A, the
missing premise will have to be A to avoid violating rule 5 or 6. So it will be the
most typical form of syllogism, AAA, a "bull's eye syllogism." So we write out
the logical form for the implied A: "all [ ] are [ ] "
Now wc need to find the two terms. How? Look at the terms in the two
propositions we have already written out in logical form. Remember the struc-
ture of a syllogism: Each term must be used twice. And "the meek" has already
been used twice, while "those who are blessed" and "those who shall inherit the
earth" have both been used only once. So each of these two terms must be used
one more time, by being joined in the missing premise.
Next, we need to find what order to put them in. There are two possibilities:
"All [those who shall inherit the earth] are [those who are blessed]," or "All
[those who are blessed] are [those who shall inherit the earth]." Which is it?
Common sense might click in at this point and tell us the answer; but sup-
pose it docs not. In that case, let us try both possibilities, and see which one
gives us a valid syllogism.
Enthymemes: abbreviated syllogisms 271
If we try as our missing premise "all [those who shall inherit the earth] are
[those who are blessed]," wc have the following syllogism:
All [those who shall inherit the earth] are [those who are blessed]
And all [the meek] are [those who shall inherit the earth]
Therefore all [the meek] arc [those who are blessed].
This is a perfect bull's eye syllogism, and valid. But if we had used the other
possibility for our missing premise, namely "All [those who are blessed] are
[those who shall inherit the earth]," we would have had:
All [those who are blessed] are [those who shall inherit the earth]
All [the meek] are [those who shall inherit the earth]
Therefore all [the meek] are [those who are blessed]
And this gives us Undistributed Middle.
Now there is absolutely no reason to saddle the speaker with this missing
premise ("all the blessed shall inherit the earth"), which would make his argu-
ment fallacious, since he did not commit himself to this premise. Clearly, he is
implying the other premise, the one that would make his argument valid. So that
is the missing premise ("all who shall inherit the earth are blessed").
Remember, if you want to criticize another person's enthymeme, it is not
fair to saddle him with a premise that would make his argument invalid if there
is another premise that would not. Even if you think the premise that makes his
argument invalid is true, and the premise that makes his argument valid is false,
not everyone will agree as to which propositions are true and which are false,
but everyone will agree as to which arguments are valid and which are invalid.
After showing that he needs such-and-such a premise to make his argument
valid, then and only then is it the time to argue that this necessary missing prem-
ise is in fact false.
Exercises on enthymemes: Put each of the following enthymemes into logical
form, including the missing proposition. (It will usually be a missing prem-
ise, but it could be the conclusion that is missing and implied.) Identify the
missing proposition with an arrow, or by enclosing it in an oval, like a car-
toon "balloon" surrounding a character's thoughts. Then check the syllogism
for validity. (NB: There are more exercises on enthymemes than on anything
else in this book because enthymemes are the most frequent form of argu-
ment found in ordinary conversation. In fact, that very sentence was an
enthymeme! Can you put it into logical form?)
1. "Rational beings are accountable for their actions; irrational brutes are
therefore exempt from this responsibility."
2. "Love makes the world go round so that means it doesn't make it go flat."
3. (E) "Love is a virtue, therefore hate is not."
4. (E) "Love is an act of will, therefore it is not an emotion."
272 XII. MORE DIFFICULT SYLLOGISMS
32. "Forbear to judge, for we are sinners all." (Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part II,
111,3)
33. (H) "The criminal law forbids suicide . . . the prohibition is ridiculous, for
what penalty can frighten a person who is not afraid of death itself?"
(Schopenhauer, "On Suicide")
34. "Wisdom is the principal thing; therefore get wisdom." (Proverbs 4:7)
35. "He who disobeys us is, as we maintain, thrice wrong: first because in dis-
obeying us he is disobeying his parents; secondly, because we arc the
authors of his education; thirdly, because he has made an agreement with us
that he will duly obey our commands." (Plato, Crito, imagining the laws of
the state arguing for themselves)
36. (H) "One may be subject to laws made by another, but it is impossible to
bind oneself in any matter which is the subject of one's own free exercise of
will. . . . It follows of necessity that the king cannot be subject to his own
laws." (Jean Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth (1576)) (Hint: take
"matters which are the subject of one's own free exercise of will" as the sub-
ject of a premise and reword the argument accordingly.)
37. (H) "Our ideas reach no farther than our experience. We have no experience
of divine attributes. I need not conclude my syllogism; you can draw the
inference yourself." (David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion)
38. "As a matter of fact, man, like woman, is flesh, therefore passive, the play-
thing of his hormones and of the species, the restless prey of his desires."
(Simone De Beauvoir, The Second Set)
39. (H) "Although these textbooks purport to be a universal guide to learning of
great worth and importance, there is a single clue that points to another
direction. In the six years I taught in city and country schools, no one ever
stole a textbook." (W. Ron Jones, Changing Education)
40. "He would not take the crown. Therefore 'tis certain he was not ambitious."
(Shakespeare, Julius Caesar. 111,2)
41. "We possess some immaterial knowledge. No sense knowledge, however,
can be immaterial. Therefore, etc." (Duns Scotus, Oxford Commentary on
the Sentences)
42. "A nation without a conscience is a nation without a soul. A nation without
a soul is a nation that cannot live." (Winston Churchill)
43. (H) "The man who says that all things comc to pass by necessity cannot crit-
icize one who denies that all things come to pass by necessity, for he admits
that this too happens of necessity." (Epicurus, Fragment 40)
44. (H) "We can explain nothing but what we can reduce to laws whose object
can be given in some possible experience. But freedom is a mere idea, the
objective reality of which can in no way be shown according to natural laws
or in any possible experience." (Kant)
45. (H) "Since no man has a natural authority over his fellow . . . we must con-
clude that conventions form the basis of all legitimate authority among
274 XII. MORE DIFFICULT SYLLOGISMS
human effort belong to no one and are not property. It follows that a thing
can become someone's property only if he works and labors on it to change
its natural state." (Locke, Of Property)
61. "The fact that any individual's scientific activities are socially conditioned
entails that science cannot achieve objectivity." (Richard Rudner,
Philosophy of Social Science)
62. "Be glad of life because it gives you the chance to love and to work and to
play and to look up at the stars." (Henry Van Dyke)
63. "Spinoza argued that since God is the only thing that is ultimately real, the
soul could be nothing else than a mode of God." (S.E. Frost, The Basic
Teachings of the Great Philosophers)
64. (H) "Thou hast made us for Thyself, and [therefore] our hearts are restless
until they rest in Thee." (St. Augustine, Confessions 1, 1)
65. (E) "A machine can handle information. It can calculate, conclude, and
choosc. It can perform reasonable operations with information. A machine,
therefore, can think." (Edmund C. Berkeley)
66. "Man is the only animal that laughs and weeps, for he is the only animal that
is struck by the difference between what things are and what things ought to
be." (William Hazlitt) Also identify what kind of "because" this is: argument
or explanation? Which of the four causes?
67. "The value of any commodity to the person who wants to exchange it for
other commodities is equal to the quantity of labor which it enables him to
purchase or command. Labor, therefore, is the real measure of the exchange-
able value of all commodities." (Adam Smith)
68. "The good is not the same as the pleasant, my friend, nor is the evil the same
as the painful. For we cease from the one pair at the same time, but not from
the other." (Plato, Gorgias) (Hint: make "good and evil" one term and "plea-
sure and pain" a second.)
69. "Only man has dignity; only man, therefore, can be funny." (Ronald Knox)
70. "God must have loved the plain people; He made so many of them."
(Abraham Lincoln)
71. (H) "Whatsoever we imagine is finite. Therefore there is no idea or concep-
tion of anything we call infinite." (Thomas Hobbes)
Sometimes the terms need a little rewording to go into logical form. E.g.:
"Since happiness consists in peace of mind, and since durable peace of mind
depends on the confidence we have in the future, and since that confidence is
based on the science we should have of the nature of God and the soul, it fol-
lows that that science is necessary for true happiness" (Leibniz). Putting the
propositions into more logical form, this becomes:
(1) All happiness is peace of mind
(2) All peace of mind depends on the confidence we have in the future
(3) Whatever depends on the confidence wc have in the future, depends on that
which is based on the science of God and the soul
(4) Therefore all happiness depends on that which is based on the science of
God and the soul.
278 XII. MORE DIFFICULT SYLLOGISMS
When a sorites gets this long, it is a useful and time-saving device to abbre-
viate the terms when drawing the Euler diagram. (However, be sure the terms
are exactly worded first, before using the abbreviations, for most mistakes in
sorites come from the fallacy of four terms during one of the steps, stemming
from sloppy use of terminology.)
(1) All happiness (H) is peace of mind (P)
(2) All peace of mind (P) depends on the confidence we have in the future (DCF)
(3) Whatever depends on the confidence we have in the future (DCF), depends
on that which is based on the science of God and the soul (DBSGS)
(4) Therefore all happiness (H) depends on that which is based on the science of
God and the soul (DBSGS)
Here is another, even longer sorites from Leibniz. To save time and space,
we add abbreviations for the terms as wc go along. "The human soul (A) is a
thing whose activity is thinking (B). A thing whose activity is thinking (B) is one
whose activity is immediately apprehended and without any representation of
parts therein (C). A thing whose activity is immediately apprehended without
any representation of parts therein (C) is a thing whose activity does not contain
parts (D). A thing whose activity does not contain parts (D) is one whose activ-
ity is not motion (E). A thing whose activity is not motion (E) is not a body (F).
What is not a body (F) is not in space (G). What is not in space (G) is insuscep-
tible of motion (H). What is insusceptible of motion (H) is indissoluble (I) (for
dissolution is a movement of parts). What is indissoluble (I) is incorruptible (J).
What is incorruptible (J) is immortal (K). Therefore the human soul (A) is
immortal (K)" (from H.W.B. Joseph's An Introduction to Logic).
Though large, the Euler circle diagram for this is as simple as the last two.
The negative sorites (called the "Goclenian sorites") has only one negative
premise, which is always placed last in the argument, for the sake of clarity.
Socratcs is a man.
And all men are mortal.
Epicheiremas: multiple syllogisms 279
It would not be fallacious to place the negative premise first, but it would
be more confusing and hard to follow, therefore it is rare. One could, however,
argue this way, e.g.: "No gods are mortal, and all men are mortal, and Socrates
is a man, therefore Socrates is not a god" and the Euler diagram would be the
same.
Rarely do we find a fallacious sorites, since they come in only these two
clearly valid forms. This is another reason for not wasting time using the six
rules or Venn diagrams on them. The main difficulty with a sorites is usually
translating it from ordinary language into logical form.
Or:
(When there is a choice like this, it is usually easier to reword the proposi-
tions so that you have negative terms and affirmative propositions rather than
affirmative terms and negative propositions. Most syllogisms can be reworded
into the AAA "bull's eye" format.)
However, the argument is not just a single syllogism but an epicheirema
because it adds another proposition, "they are not composed of particles of any
size," and connects that proposition to the proposition "minds do not take up
space" by a premise indicator, "since." This creates another enthymemc on top
of the first one, and this is called an epicheirema, after the Greek preposition
"epi," "on top of." (Epicheiremas can be made up of either enthymemes or full
syllogisms.)
Minds are not composed of particles of any size (expressed premise of syl-
logism # 1)
Whatever is not composed of particles of any size does not take up space
(implied premise of U\)
Therefore minds do not take up space (conclusion of syllogism U1 and
expressed premise of #2)
What does not take up space cannot be confined in prisons (expressed prem-
ise of #2)
Therefore minds cannot be confined in prisons (conclusion of #2, final con-
clusion)
Sometimes both premises of the last syllogism arc expressed and reasons
are added to both premises, as in the following: "Love is a virtue, because it is
a deliberate choice. But compassion is not a virtue, because it is a spontaneous
feeling. Therefore compassion is not love."
Main syllogism:
Argument maps are often very useful for making clear the "strategy" and
order of the propositions in long epichciremas like this. (See next section.)
Take one more epichcirema, which is more complex because it requires
some rewording to get it into logical form with the proper number of terms:
"Truth must necessarily be stranger than fiction, for fiction is the creature of
the human mind and therefore congenial to it." (G.K. Chesterton)
It should be clcar that the first proposition is the conclusion, since the prem-
ise indicator "for" comes after it.
However, there is a "therefore" near the end of the quotation, which may
lead you to think (mistakenly) that what follows this "therefore" is not just a pre-
liminary conclusion but the final conclusion. We have two conclusions: the one
before "for" (remember, premise indicators always reveal conclusions, which
come before them, as well as premises, which come after them) and the one after
"therefore." How do wc tell which is the final conclusion? By intuitively under-
standing the point and content of the argument, and also by the form: one for-
mal clue is the fact that what follows "for" is another whole syllogism, in the
form of an epichcirema, thus indicating that this syllogism is the reason attached
on top of the premise of the main syllogism.
Thus:
The best way to find your way through the complex jungle of propositions
282 XII. MORE DIFFICULT SYLLOGISMS
Section 4. C o m p l e x a r g u m e n t m a p s
Arguments in practice are often long and complex, consisting of more than one
or two syllogisms. Even the relatively simple, short, and straightforward patterns
of enthymemes, sorites, and epicheiremas that we have just studied do not come
close to exhausting the possible patterns of argument. So we need a kind of log-
ical road map for longer and more complex arguments, to see the overall strate-
gy of the argument, to break it down into those smaller arguments that arc its
parts and to see how those parts are related to each other. Only then will we be
in a position to evaluate each smaller argument one by one.
Here arc the three steps in mapping a long argument.
(1) First, read it through slowly and carefully. This is the step that you will
be tempted to overlook or to take for granted or to do too quickly. But this is the
opportunity to use your strongest logical weapon, your innate logical intuition,
your ability to "see" what the point is, what the final, basic conclusion is, and
what the argument is that supports it, and why it seems strong. Everyone has this
innate, intuitive ability; that is the only reason logic textbooks and courses are
possible - just as the fact that everyone has a moral consciencc is the only rea-
son moral systems, commandments, and ideals are possible.
Complex argument maps 283
When you read over the passage, do it slowly and patiently. This will actu-
ally save you time in the long run.
You are reading the argument for its logic, so you must ignore your feelings
of agreement or disagreement, of interest or boredom, of attraction or repulsion.
You need to find the formal logical structure.
Perhaps the most common cause of misunderstandings and of our inability
to see eye to eye with each other is our hurry to evaluate before we receive, to
talk back before listening. Premature criticism is always unfair criticism; anoth-
er word for it is "prejudice," which means "premature judgment."
(2) Step two is to break the argument down into its steps. To do this, a good
visual method is to mark the original text of the argument as follows:
(a) Identify each proposition that seems to be part of the argument by under-
lining it and putting a number before it.
(b) Circle each premise indicator or conclusion indicator. (Do not worry
about rewording the propositions to get common terms yet. Our first task is to
find the propositions and their logical relation to each other.)
(c) Now copy the propositions (or their numbers) onto a logical map, with
arrows leading from premises to conclusions. Wc now have an overview of the
strategy of the argument, so to speak.
The strategy will be cumulative, linear, or both. A cumulative argument will
have many separate arguments (usually enthymemes) all leading to the same con-
clusion. (E.g. page 208.) A linear argument will be a multi-layered epicheirema
(these will also usually be enthymemes), with premises attached to premises, and
further conclusions following from conclusions. (E.g. page 284.)
(3) Only now are you in a position to evaluate the overall argument by eval-
uating each smaller argument that makes it up. Because you have the logical
map, you may not need to take the time to do a three-step evaluation of every
single argument step, checking for ambiguous terms, false premises, and falla-
cies. Rather, if you doubt the conclusion, the logical map will make it easier and
clearer for you to spot where you think the overall argument's weakness is. It
will usually be a premise that can be disputed; but the premise will often be the
hidden and implied premise of an enthymeme, so you will have to write out each
enthymeme, including the missing (implied) premises.
All arguments can be put into argument maps, no matter what rules apply
in evaluating their validity. There are still three forms of deductive argument
which we have not covered: hypothetical, disjunctive, and conjunctive syllo-
gisms, i.e. syllogisms that begin with an " i f . . . then . . " premise, an "either . .
. o r . . p r e m i s e , or a "both . . . and . . o r "not both . . . and . . . " premise. The
rules for these syllogisms are different from those for simple ("categorical") syl-
logisms; but even without having studied these rules, you can do argument maps
for these syllogisms just as for categorical syllogisms.
Take the following example, from Plato's Republic. (We identify the propo-
sitions by number, as suggested above.)
284 XII. MORE DIFFICULT SYLLOGISMS
(1) "A bad soul must rule badly, but a good soul well."
"Yes, it must be so."
(2) "Now did we not agree that a bad soul is an unjust soul and a good soul a
just soul?"
"We did."
(3) "Then the just soul must rule well and the unjust soul badly."
"So it seems by your reasoning."
(4) "But further, one who rules well is blessed or happy, and one who does not
is miserable."
"Of course."
(5) "Then the just soul is happy and the unjust miserable."
"Let it be so."
(6) "But to be miserable is not profitable, and to be happy is."
"Of course."
(7) "Then, O Thrasymachus, blessed among men, the just is always profitable
and the unjust unprofitable."
Here we have a rather simple, though long, argument. What makes it sim-
ple is two things: it is linear, and it consists in complete syllogisms rather than
enthymemes.
Let's write out the argument map for this argument in full verbal form. It is
two cxactly parallel arguments, one about injustice and the other about justice.
We write out only the half about injustice: you can easily do the other half:
(I) All bad souls rule badly. (2) All bad souls are unjust souls.
(3) All unjust souls rule badly (4) All who rule badly arc miserable.
(5) All unjust souls are miserable. (6) Nothing miserable is profitable
When we put this argument into logical form, the thing that may make it
confusing is that two arguments are going on at once: one about the just being
profitable and the other about the unjust being unprofitable. It is difficult to put
both parts of the argument (the one about justice and the other about injustice)
into each proposition. But it is easy to make two overall arguments out of it, one
about justice and the other about injustice.
Here is a somewhat more difficult long argument to map. It is St. Thomas
Aquinas *s restatement of the most argued-about argument in the entire history of
philosophy, St. Anselm's famous "ontological argument," which attempts to
prove that God must exist, in fact that "God exists" is a self-evident proposition.
Once again, we number the propositions. The logical connector words are our
clues.
Complex argument maps 285
"(1) Those propositions are self-evident which are known to be true as soon
as their terms are understood. (2) But as soon as the terms 'God' and 'exists' are
understood, the proposition 4God exists* is known to be true. For (3) 'God*
means 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived'; and (4) that which
exists only mentally but not actually is not that
than which nothing greater can be conceived,
because (5) that which exists both mentally
and actually is greater than that which exists
only mentally. Therefore (6) God does not
exist only mentally, but actually. Thus (7) the
proposition 'God exists' is known to be true as
soon as its terms are understood. (8) It is there-
fore a self-evident proposition."
Each arrow on the map - that is, each syl-
logism - in this argument still must be put into
logical form. But the argument map aids that
process, for it tells you what propositions
make up the premises and conclusions of each
argument, and whether each syllogism is a
simple syllogism, an epicheirema, or an
enthymeme. For if two connected, "married"
arrows lead to it, it is a simple syllogism rather
than an enthymeme, since the two horizontal arrows symbolize its two premis-
es, showing that it does not have any missing premise. If it has an arrow from
only one premise to a conclusion, it is probably an enthymeme. If it has an arrow
leading to one of its premises from one or more other premises, this shows that
it is an epicheirema.
Exercises: Make argument maps for each of the following. Some of them are
very difficult, especially the first two. Proposition numbers arc supplied for
some of them. Before you focus on the logical form, read each one slowly
and thoughtfully, since understanding the logical form depends on under-
standing the content, the meaning and "point" of the argument.
1. (H) "In a well-ordered republic it should never be necessary to resort to
extra-constitutional measures; for although they may for the time be benefi-
cial, yet the precedent is pernicious, for if the practice is once established of
disregarding the laws for good reasons, the laws will in a little while be
changeable under that pretext for evil reasons. Thus no republic will ever be
perfect if she has not by law provided for everything, having a remedy for
every emergency, and fixed rules for applying it. And therefore I will say in
conclusion that those republics which in time of danger cannot resort to a
dictatorship, or some similar authority, will generally be ruined when grave
occasions occur." (Machiavelli, The Prince)
286 XII MORE DIFFICULT SYLLOGISMS
2. "A question arises: whether it is better to be loved than feared, or feared than
loved? One should wish to be both, but because (I) it is difficult to unite
them in one person, (2) it is much safer to be feared than loved, when of the
two one must be dispensed with. Becausc (3) this is to be asserted in gener-
al of men: that they are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowards, covetous . . . (4)
Men have less scruple in offending one who is beloved than one who is
feared, for (5) love is preserved by the link of obligation, (6) which, (7)
owing to the baseness of men, (6) is broken at every opportunity for their
advantage; but (8) fear preserves you by a dread of punishment which never
fails." (Ibid.)
3. (H) "There are some philosophers who imagine wc are every moment inti-
mately conscious of what we call our self; that we feci its existence and its
continuance in existence, and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demon-
stration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity. . . . Unluckily, all these
positive assertions are contrary to that very experience which is pleaded for
them, nor have we any idea of self after the manner it is here explained. For
from what impression could this idea be derived? This question it is impos-
sible to answer without a manifest contradiction and absurdity; and yet it is
a question which must necessarily be answered if we would have the idea of
self pass for clear and intelligible. It must be some one impression that gives
rise to every real idea. But self or person is not any one impression but that
to which our several impressions and ideas arc supposed to have a reference.
If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must contin-
ue invariably the same, through the whole course of our lives, since self is
supposed to exist after that manner. But there is no impression constant and
invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed
each other and never all exist at the same time. It cannot therefore be from
any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is derived;
consequently there is no such idea." (David Hume, Treatise on Human
Nature)
4. "I know that nothing good dwells within me, that is, in my flesh. I can will
what is right, but I cannot do it. For I do not do the good I want, but the evil
I do not want is what I do. Now if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I
that do it but sin which dwells in me." (St. Paul, Romans 7:18-20)
5. "We observe that rust destroys iron, mildew corn, blindness the eye, but rust
and mildew do not destroy the eye, nor do blindness and rust destroy com,
nor do mildew or blindness destroy iron. Thus we see that it is the natural
evil of each thing that destroys it, and only this; that is, if this natural evil
does not destroy it then nothing can. For what is good cannot destroy it
(since destruction is not the work of goodness), nor can what is neither good
nor evil for it (for destruction is not the work of the neutral either, but only
of the evil), nor can what is evil for something else, as we have seen in the
examples above. If, then, there is something whose own natural evil cannot
Complex argument maps 287
destroy it, it is indestructible. The soul is such a thing, for its natural evils,
vicc and ignorance, do not ever wholly destroy it, but only weaken i t
Nothing, therefore can destroy the soul. If nothing can destroy it, it is inde-
structible and everlasting/' (summary of Plato's argument for immortality in
Book X of the Republic)
6. "Wc cannot define 'religion' narrowly, as 'belief in God f because Buddhism
is a religion but does not believe in God. Nor can we define religion more
broadly, as 'belief in some absolute,' without God, because atheism can
believe in an absolute too, but atheism is not a religion. But religion must be
defined either as the belief in God or as something like an absolute without
reference to God. Therefore religion cannot be defined." (from a student
paper)
7. "We must explain then that Nature belongs to the class of causes which act
for the sake of something. . . . A difficulty presents itself: Why should not
nature work, not for the sake of something, nor because it is better so, but
just as the sky rains, not in order to make the corn grow but of necessity?
What is drawn up must cool, and what has been cooled must become water
and descend, the result of this being that the corn grows. Similarly if a man's
crop is spoiled on the threshing-floor, the rain did not fall for the sake of this
- in order that the crop might be spoiled - but that result just followed. Why
then should it not be the same with the parts in nature, e.g. that our teeth
should come up of necessity - the front teeth sharp, fined for tearing, the
molars broad and useful for grinding down the food - since they did not
arise for this end, but it was merely a coincident result; and so with all other
parts in which we suppose that there is purpose? Wherever, then, all the
parts came about just as they would have been if they had come to be for an
end, such things survived, being organized spontaneously in a fitting way;
whereas those which grew otherwise perished and continue to perish. . . .
Such are the arguments (and others of the kind) which may cause difficulty
on this point. Yet it is impossible that this should be the true view. For teeth
and all other natural things either invariably or normally come about in a
given way; but of not one of the results of chance or spontaneity is this true."
(Aristotle, Physics II, 8)
8. (E) "All men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we
take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are loved for
themselves; and above all others the sense of sight. For not only with a view
to action, but even when we arc not going to do anything, we prefer seeing,
one might say, to everything else. The reason is that this, most of all the sens-
es, makes us know and brings to light many differences between things."
(Aristotle,Metaphysics I, I)
9. (E) "Whoever kills a tyrant kills not a man but a beast disguised as a man.
For, being deprived of all natural love for their fellow creatures, it follows
that tyrants are without human sympathies, and hcnce are not men but wild
288 XII. MORE DIFFICULT SYLLOGISMS
animals. Thus, it is clear that whoever kills a tyrant is not committing homi-
cide, sincc he kills a monster and not a man." (Michelangelo, Great
Conversations, ed. Louis Biancolli (N.Y.: Simon & Schuster, 1948), p. 281)
10. "// seems that God does not exist. For if one of two contraries be infinite, the
other would be altogether destroyed. But the word 4God* means that he is
infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would be no evil discov-
erable. But there is evil in the world. Therefore God docs not exist. (St.
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I, 2, 3, objection 1)
11. "We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for
an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the
same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortu-
itously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intel-
ligence cannot move towards an end unless it be directed by some being
endowed with knowledge and intelligence, as the arrow is shot to the mark
by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural
things are directed to their end; and this being we call God. (St. Thomas
Aquinas, Summa Theologica 1,2,3, the "fifth way")
12. "I answer that: It is impossible for any created good to constitute man's hap-
piness. For happiness is the perfect good, which satisfies the desire alto-
gether; else it would not be the last end, if something yet remained to be
desired. Now the object of the will, i.e. of man's desire, is the universal good,
just as the object of the intellect is the universal true. Hence it is evident that
naught can satisfy man's will save the universal good. And this is to be
found, not in any creature, but in God alone; because every creature has
goodness by participation. Wherefore God alone can satisfy the will of man,
as is said in the words of Psalm 102:5, "Who satisfieth thy desire with
good." Therefore God alone constitutes man's happiness. (St. Thomas
Aquinas, Summa Theologica I-II, 2, 8)
13. "Life is meaningless, since it ends in death, and death is meaningless. Death
is meaningless because it is nothingness, and nothingness is the nothingness
of meaning. But everything is either life or death. Therefore everything is
meaningless. My proof that everything is meaningless is therefore also
meaningless." (student essay)
14. "Happiness is the perfect good. But power is imperfect. For as Boethius
says, 'the power of a man cannot relieve the gnawings of care, nor can it
avoid the thorny path of anxiety'; and, further on, he says, 'Do you think a
man is powerful who is surrounded by attendants whom he may inspire with
fear but whom he fears even more than they fear him?" Therefore, happiness
does not consist in power. Two reasons, in addition, show that this is true.
First, because power has the character of a beginning, but happiness has the
nature of an end. Secondly, because power is open to either good or evil,
while happiness is man's supreme and proper good." (St. Thomas Aquinas,
Summa Theologica I-II, 2, 4)
XIII. Compound Syllogisms
Compound syllogisms begin with a compound proposition.
Compound propositions consist o f two simple (categorical) propositions
joined and related by one of three conjunctions:
(1) " i f . . . t h e n . . ( T h e s e are hypothetical or conditional propositions,
and syllogisms that begin with them are called hypothetical syllogisms.)
(2) " e i t h e r . . . o r . . . " (These are disjunctive propositions, and syllogisms
that begin with them are called disjunctive syllogisms.)
(3) " b o t h . . . and . . . " or "not both . . . and . . ( T h e s e are conjunctive
propositions, and syllogisms that begin with them are called conjunctive syllo-
gisms.)
Compound syllogisms have a wholly different structure and wholly differ-
ent rules from simple syllogisms. We cannot use Euler's circles, Aristotle's sue
rules, Venn diagrams, or "Barbara Celarent" in checking them. They do not have
mood or figure. They do not have major, minor, and middle terms, or major and
minor premises. In fact, they do not necessarily have only three terms. When
they are invalid, they do not commit any of the fallacies already defined by the
six rules. Virtually the only thing common to simple and compound syllogisms
is the basic structure of two premises and one conclusion. To understand and
evaluate them, we must begin afresh.
Note that even a negative proposition ("No man is wise") can be symbol-
ized by a single letter without a tilde. The symbol p or q stands for any proposi-
tion whatever, no matter what its content
(2) "If there is radioactivity here, it appears on this Geiger counter. And it
does not appear on this Geiger counter. Therefore there is no radioactivity here."
(3) "If we are in a tornado, the house is falling apart. And the house is
falling apart. Therefore we are in a tornado "
(4) "If we're lottery winners, we're rich. We're not lottery winners.
Therefore we're not rich."
They are named by what is done in the second premise. The first premise is
identical in all four cases: p z> q. The second premise can say one of four things:
p, ~q, q. or ~p. That is, the second premise can either affirm or deny either the
antecedent (p) or the consequent (q).
"Affirming the Antecedent" and "Denying the Consequent'' are the two
valid forms of hypothetical syllogisms. "Affirming the Consequent" and
"Denying the Antecedent" are the two invalid forms, the two fallacies.
The reason for this rule is simple: more than one cause can produce the
same effect. So the mere fact that the house is falling apart does not prove that
a tornado is causing it (# 3 above). The house might be falling apart due to an
earthquake, or termites. And the mere fact that we're not lottery winners (#4
above) does not prove that we're not rich. Wc might get rich through another
cause, e.g. inheriting money from a dead relative, or working hard.
However, the first two forms are valid:
(1) If p is true and p's truth implies, or entails, q's truth, then q must be true.
If whenever p is true, q is true too, then if p is true now, q is true now.
(2) If p implies q, and q is not true, then p is not true. If we have q whenev-
er we have p, then when we do not have q we do not have p. For if we did have
p, we would have q too.
Let us go through all four forms of a hypothetical syllogism with the same
content. Let us begin with this p D q proposition: "If the wind blows, the paper
falls off the desk." Now let us add the four possible second premises.
(1) Let us begin by adding p ("The wind is blowing") to p z> q; i.e. let us in
the second premise affirm the antecedent of the first premise. What follows?
That the paper falls off the desk, q. For whenever the wind blows, the paper falls.
The argument is valid.
p=>q
P
.*. q
The first premise, the hypothetical proposition, may in fact be false. It
claims that whenever the wind blows, the paper falls; and that is probably not
true, since we could nail the paper down to the desk, so that even if the wind
blows the paper would not fall. But //it is true that whenever the wind blows the
paper falls, and if it is also true that the wind is blowing, then it must follow that
the paper falls. "Affirming the Antecedent" is a valid form of argument.
(2) Now let us add ~q ("The paper does not fall o f f " ) instead as a second
premise to the same first premise ("If the wind blows, the paper falls"). What
logically follows? That the wind is not blowing, - p . For if the wind were blow-
ing, the paper would fall olf. Another valid form: "Denying the Consequent."
p=>q
/ . ~p
Hypothetical syllogisms 293
(3) But suppose wc follow "If the wind blows, the paper falls" with "The
paper falls" in the second premise, and then draw the conclusion that "The wind
blows." This is invalid because the conclusion does not necessarily follow. Just
bccause the paper falls, it docs not mean the wind blows; another cause could
producc the same cfleet, such as a person blowing it off, or flipping it off - or
even an earthquake. "Affirming the Consequent" is an invalid form:
pz>q
q
P
(4) And "Denying the Antecedent" in the second premise is also invalid. "If
the wind blows, the paper falls, and the wind does not blow, therefore the paper
docs not fall" forgets all those other possible causes of the paper falling that
were mentioned above.
p^q
-p
~q
Both fallacies make the same mistake: they begin with p z> q and then pro-
ceed as if it were q 3 p. We can no more "convert" a hypothetical proposition
than we can validly convert a simple A proposition. "Whenever the wind blows,
the paper falls" docs not say the same thing as "Whenever the paper falls, the
wind blows." "All cases of A are cases of B " does not say the same thing as "all
cases of B are cases of A."
A hypothetical syllogism can be an enthymeme, omitting any one of its
three propositions, just as a simple syllogism can. And it can also be an
epicheirema, adding a reason to one or both of its premises.
Thus there are three valid forms of hypothetical syllogisms and two falla-
cious forms. The valid forms are:
(1) the pure hypothetical syllogism:
p=>q
q3r
p z> r
If you like mnemonic devices, you could think of the abbreviations AA and
DC for the two valid forms and DA and AC for the two invalid forms. Alcoholics
Anonymous (AA) and Direct Current (DC) are straight (valid), while District
Attorneys (DA) and Alternating Current (AC) can be crooked (invalid). If this
sounds silly, forget it.
really is absurd). In some eases, however, you might want to deny that q is
absurd and false, and this would be to deny the second premise.
The reductio form can be used satirically. E.g. "The government in its wis-
dom considers ice a 4 food product/ This means that Antarctica is one of the
world's foremost food producers*' (George Will).
The full symbolization of this argument would be:
Key: p = Ice is a food product. Symbolization: p D q
q = Antarctica is one of the world's ~q
foremost food producers. /. ~p
reductio ad absurdum. But the borders between a reductio and any other
Denying the Consequent are not sharp. It depends on how "absurd" q is, and this
is often a matter of opinion. The arguments above are reductios. The following
argument is not: "If Albert De Salvo is not the Boston Strangles then he could
not know such intimate details as these about each murder. But he does know
these details. (And this is not absurd, but only surprising.) Therefore he is the
Boston Strangler." But the following is a borderline case: "It is clear that we
mean something, and something different in each case, by such words (as "sub-
stance," "cause," and "change"). If we did not, we could not use them consis-
tently, and it is obvious that on the whole we do consistently apply and withhold
such names" (C.D. Broad, Scientific Thought). Here the conclusion comes first.
The argument can be symbolized as follows:
Or simply:
The practical syllogism: arguing about means and ends 297
In both forms, there is one factual premise and one moral premise; one "is"
premise and one "ought" premise. It is their combination that makes moral rea-
soning.
For instance, the essential "pro-life" argument against abortion contains a
moral premise and a factual premise; and there are two different "pro-choice"
replies to it depending on which of the two premises is denied:
All innocent human persons have a right to life and may not be killed.
And all unborn human babies are innocent human persons.
Therefore all unborn human babies have a right to life and may not be killed.
It makes a very significant difference whether one denies the first (moral)
premise or the second (factual) premise: it is the difference between a dispute
about a philosophical principle and a dispute about a scientific fact.
Perhaps the most famous pragmatic practical syllogism of all time is
"Pascal's Wager." Pascal argues that it is a most practical " w a g e r " to believe in
God, for: "Let us weigh gain and loss in calling heads that G o d is. Reckon these
two chances: if you win, you win everything; if you lose, you lose nothing. Then
do not hesitate: wager that He is." The argument is essentially this:
If I wager that God is (by believing in God), I can win everything and I can
lose nothing.
I want to win everything and lose nothing.
Therefore I should wager that God is.
Exercises on hypothclical syllogisms: Put into correct symbolic form and test
for validity. If there is a fallacy, name it. Remember, there may be a few
enthymemes or cpicheircmas too. There are no practical syllogisms here.
causcs (second causes). But there are caused causes. Therefore there must
be an Un-caused Cause."
12. "As everyone knows, beauty is in the eye of the beholder. But if beauty were
an objective reality, it would be in the reality of the beheld rather than in the
eye of the beholder. Therefore beauty is not an objective reality." (How
would someone answer this argument?)
13. "If an intelligent Creator existed, we would find design throughout the uni-
verse. We do find design throughout the universe. Therefore an intelligent
Creator exists." (If this argument is invalid how can it be changed to make
it valid?)
14. "If God did not exist, we would feel so alone that we would be unable to
endure a universe without Him. And this feeling can be observed to exist.
Therefore God does not exist."
15. "If Papa comes home today, you will be in big trouble!" "That's true, but
Papa won't come home today, so I won't be in big trouble."
16. "Whenever I cat chocolates, I get migraines. I got migraines today, so I must
have eaten chocolates today."
17. "If Dr. X did not kill the officer, then he didn't kill the deputy either. And
wc proved that the officcr was not killed by Dr. X. Therefore the deputy was
not either."
18. "Confidence in promises is essential to the intercourse of human life, for
without it the greatest part of our conduct would proceed upon chance. But
there could be no confidence in promises if men were not obliged to perform
them. The obligation, therefore, to perform promises is essential." (Stanley
Jevons)
19. "'If anyone knows anything about anything,' said Bear to himself, 'it's Owl
who knows something about something,' he said, 'or my name's not Winnie-
thc-Pooh,' he said. 'Which it is,' he added. 'So there you are.'" (Winnie the
Pooh)
20. "Mankind, judging by their neglect of him, have never, I think, at all under-
stood the power of Love. For if they had understood him they would surely
have built noble temples and altars and offered solemn sacrifices in his
honor; but this is not done." (Plato, Symposium)
21. "If space is finite, it must be bounded. But space cannot have a boundary,
bccause a boundary can only separate one space from another space. What
separates space from non-space is not a spatial boundary; it is a logical
boundary. Therefore space is infinite." (Compare this with US.)
22. "'To be great is to be misunderstood.' I am misunderstood. Therefore I am
great."
23. "Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this island or lose the war. If
we can stand up to him, all Europe may be free, and the life of the world may
move forward into broad, sunlit uplands; but if we fail, then the whole world,
including the United States, and all that we have known and cared for, will
Disjunctive syllogisms
sink into the abyss of a new dark age made more sinister, and perhaps more
prolonged, by the lights of a perverted science. Let us therefore brace our-
selves to our duty and so bear ourselves that if the British Commonwealth
and Europe lasts for a thousand years men will still say: This was their finest
hour." (Winston Churchill, speech to the House of Commons, June 18,
1940)
24. "If men were angels, no government would be necessary." (James Madison)
(Hint: this is an enthymeme with two propositions implied.)
25. "If Christ is not risen, then our preaching is in vain and your faith is in vain.
And we are even found to be misrepresenting God, because we testified of
God that he raised Christ, whom he did not raise if it is true that the dead are
not raised. . . . If Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile and you are
still in your sins. Then those also who have fallen asleep in Christ have per-
ished. If for this life only we have hoped in Christ, we are of all men most
to be pitied." (St. Paul, I Corinthians 15:14-19)
26. "If I had cherished iniquity in my heart, the Lord would not have listened.
But truly God has listened; he has given heed to the voice of my prayer."
(Psalm 66:18-19)
However, there are really only two forms, since p and q are reversible and
interchangeable in a disjunctive proposition, as they are not in a hypothetical
proposition. "Either p or q" says exactly the same thing as "either q or p." But
"if p then q" does not at all say the same thing as "if q then p."
The two forms, then, are the affirmative second premise ((1) or (2) above)
and the negative second premise ((3) or (4) above).
The affirmative form is invalid and the negative form is valid.
Here's why: "Either p or q" does not necessarily imply anything more than
it says. It does not say "either p or q hut not both." "Either p or q but not both"
is called a "strong disjunction." Simply "either p or q" is called a "weak dis-
junction." "Either p or q" means that at least one of these two, p or q, must be
true. At least one, maybe both. So from the affirmative second premise, which
claims that one of the two alternatives is true, we cannot deduce that the other
302 XIII. COMPOUND SYLLOGISMS
alternative could not be true as well. That is why the affirmative form is invalid
(i.e. the form that has an affirmative second premise).
Some examples: Suppose someone has done something very bad. We think:
this must be due to either moral wickedness (villainy) or intellectual wickcdncss
(folly). So we say:
This is a valid argument. If at least one of the two causes, moral or intel-
lectual badness, must have been present to account for what he did, and if one
of those two was not present, then the other must have been. If the first premise
is right in saying that there are only two possible causes, and if the second prem-
ise is right in saying that one of those two causes was not present, then the other
cause must have been present.
But it is fallacious to argue that:
For he could be both a villain and a fool; both causes might be operative;
intellectual defects and moral defects might both have helped account for the
effect.
Only when the first, disjunctive, proposition is a strong disjunction - only
when p and q exclude each other - can we validly argue from an affirmative sec-
ond premise. For instance,
Since no one is both a man and a woman (though there are some confused
people who sincerely believe they are), p and q here are exclusive, and the pres-
ence of one entails the absence of the other just as much as the absence of one
entails the presence of the other. If and only if we know that the first premise is
a strong disjunction, we can affirm in the second premise and validly argue to a
negative conclusion.
Exercises: Symbolize the following disjunctive arguments and test for validity.
Remember, some may be enthymemes.
1. "You must be either a liar or a fool, and you're not a fool, so you must be a
liar."
Conjunctive syllogisms 303
2. "Either the professor's Theory of General Insanity is true, or I'm insane. But
the theory is not true. Therefore I am not insane."
3. "Either the theory is insane, or I am. But I am not insane. Therefore it isn't
either."
4. (H) "Since no man has a natural authority over his fellows . . . we must con-
clude that conventions form the basis of all legitimate authority among
men." (Rousseau) (This is an enthymeme with an implied disjunctive prem-
ise about authority.)
5. "Either God or nature causes disasters. Nature causes disasters. Therefore
God does not."
6. "Why, what's happened to your tail?" he said in surprise.
"What has happened to it?" said Eeyore.
"It isn't there!"
"Are you sure?"
"Well, either a tail is there or it isn't there. You can't make a mistake about
it." (Winnie the Pooh)
And since p and q are here reversible, the following is also valid:
~(P & q)
q
~p
304 XIII. COMPOUND SYLLOGISMS
q
And this is really the same as:
- ( p & q)
If we begin not with a simple syllogism but with a compound one, we get
the same exchange possibilities:
Exercises on Conjunctive Syllogisms: Put into symbolic form, test for validity,
and imagine how you might reply to each of the following. Some may be
enthymemes or epicheiremas, and these may require a more complex sym-
bolization. For an additional exercise, also transform each into disjunctive,
hypothetical, and categorical forms.
1. "You can't be both you and somebody else. That's why you're not somebody
else."
2. "Vampires are 'the undead.' But nothing can be both dead and undead.
Therefore vampires are not dead. And nothing can be both dead and alive.
Therefore vampires arc alive."
3. "You can't both have your cake and eat it too. That's why you can cat your
cake."
4. (A student's critique of Plato's attempt to write a philosophical dialogue on
306 XIII. COMPOUND SYLLOGISMS
love:) "Since the objective and the subjective attitudes are opposites, it is
impossible for us to objectively reason about and subjectively experience the
same thing at the same time. And you, Plato, are now objectively reasoning
about love, since you are philosophizing about it. Therefore you cannot be
experiencing love. But what we do not experience, we have no right to phi-
losophize about. So you have no right to philosophize about love" (How
would you answer this argument?)
5. "There is a disjunction between disjunction and conjunction; no proposition
can be both. But this is a disjunction. Therefore it is not a conjunction."
6. "There is a disjunction between conjunction and disjunction. But disjunction
is exclusive. Therefore conjunction is not." (Hint: this argument comes
clearer when we translate it into a simple syllogism.)
(5) If the consequences of both horns of the dilemma are unacceptable, the stu-
dent realizes that there is probably something wrong with his original assump-
tion, and is led backwards, so to speak, to question this previously unquestioned
assumption. It is a double reductio ad absurdum, which is even more effective
than a single one because the student is given a choice. The dilemma leads the
student to see for himself where his own premises take him. This is more effec-
tive than directly arguing against the student, which might threaten, alienate, or
embitter him and put him in an adversary relationship with his teacher. (See also
pages 211-14 and 350-55 on Socratic method.)
Exercises: Put each of the following dilemmas in symbolic form, then answer
each one.
1. "An unhappy alternative is before you, Elizabeth. From this day you must be
a stranger to one of your parents. Your mother will never see you again if you
do not marry Mr. Collins, and I will never see you again if you do." (Jane
Austen, Pride and Prejudice)
2. "Culture is on the horns of this dilemma: if profound and noble, it must
remain rare; if common, it must become mean." (George Santayana)
3. "Pain is unavoidable, for if we satisfy our desires we feel satiation and
boredom; and if we do not, we feel restlessness and discomfort." (Arthur
Schopcnhauer)
4. (H) "A man cannot inquire either about that which he knows, or about that
which he does not know. For if he knows, he has no need to inquire; and if
not, he cannot inquire, for he does not know the very thing about which he
is to inquire." (Plato, Meno)
5. King Henry VI Fs tax collector collected enormous amounts of taxes from the
people, arguing that "If you have been spending little, you must be rich
through your savings; and if you have been spending much, you must be rich
in order to spend so much."
6. Caliph Omar justified burning the world's greatest library, at Alexandria, by
this dilemma: "These books either agree with the Qur'an or they do not. If
they agree, they are superfluous. If they disagree, they are heretical. In either
case, they should be burned."
7. Socrates argued that evil is only ignorance, that no one could knowingly and
deliberately choose evil. For either he knows that the act he is choosing is
evil, or he does not. If he knows it is evil, he will not choose it, for no one
chooses what is harmful to himself, and evil is always harmful to oneself, in
body or soul. If he does not know the act is evil, then if he chooses it he will
not be choosing it knowingly but unknowingly.
8. "Mortimer Adler wrote a great book on how to read great books, entitled
How to Read a Book. But this book must be worthless, for either the reader
already knows how to read a book before reading How to Read a Book, or
not. If he does already know this, Adler's book is superfluous to him; if not
- that is, if he does not know how to read a book - then he will not be able
to read How to Read a Book, for How to Read a Book is a book."
9. Each religion claims to teach the most important truth in the world, the truth
that is most worthy of belief. If the claim of any religion is true, then all who
do not believe it are fools for not believing the thing most worthy of belief.
If the claim is untrue, then all believers are fools for believing what is not
believable. But each truth claim must be either true or untrue. Therefore in
any case, billions of people are fools: either the believers or the unbelievers.
10. Hume argued against deduction by this dilemma: If the conclusion of a
deduction does not contain anything new that is not already given in the
312 XIII. COMPOUND SYLLOGISMS
premises, the deduction is useless, for it yields no new knowledge; but if the
conclusion does contain something new that is not in the premises, the
deduction is logically invalid, for there can be no more in a conclusion than
in its premises. (How would you answer this argument philosophically?)
11. "All political action aims at either preservation or change. When desiring to
preserve, we wish to prevent a change to the worse; when desiring to change,
we wish to bring about something better. All political action is then guided
by some thought of better and worse." (Leo Strauss, What Is Political
Philosophy?)
12. "If freedom of speech is restricted, we will cease to be a democracy. If it is
not restricted, wc will be at the mercy of demagogues and fanatics."
13. "Death is not to be feared, for if you are dead you cannot fear, and if you are
living you are not dead."
14. "If a thing moves, it must move either in the place where it is or in the placc
where it is not. But it cannot move in the place where it is, for it remains
therein; nor in the place where it is not, for it does not exist therein.
Therefore a thing cannot move." (Scxtus Empiricus, Against the Physicists,
quoting Zeno the Eleatic)
15. "If Socrates died, he died either when he was living or when he was dead.
But he did not die while living, for assuredly he was living, and as living he
had not died. Nor when he died, for then he would be dead twicc. Therefore
Socrates did not die." (Sextus Empiricus, Against the Physicists)
16. If the citizens arc good, laws are unnecessary to prevent evil; and if they arc
bad, laws are impotent to prevent evil. Therefore laws are either unnecessary
or impotent.
17. [Jesus to the Pharisees:] "Whence was the baptism of John? From Heaven
or from men?" [Pharisees among themselves:] "If we say, 'from Heaven,' he
will say to us, 'Why then did you not believe him? [And then we fear that
the people will hate us.] But if wc say, 'from men,' we fear the people, for
all regard John as a prophet."
XIV. Induction
Section 1. What is induction?
Induction is not a single form of argument. There are at least six different kinds
of induction:
(1) generalization from experience
(2) arguments to establish a cause
(3) scientific hypotheses
(4) arguments of statistical probability
(5) arguments from analogy
(6) a fortiori and a minore arguments
What unites them all as "inductive"?
A common but inadequate definition of induction and of its distinction
from deduction is that "deduction is reasoning from the universal to the partic-
ular, while induction is reasoning from the particular to the universal." This is
usually but not always true. There are forms of induction which remain at the
level of the particular, and there are forms of deduction which remain at the level
of the universal (e.g. "All bachelors are unmarried men and no unmarried men
are married men, therefore no bachelors are married men"). Valid deductive
arguments can also begin with a particular premise (though they must always
add at least one universal premise), e.g. "Some men are bald men, and no bald
men shampoo, therefore some men do not shampoo."
There are also inductive arguments that have universal premises as well as
universal conclusions, e.g. "All poodles are dogs and bark; all hounds are dogs
and bark; all spaniels are dogs and bark; therefore it is probable that all dogs
bark." And there are inductive arguments that have particular conclusions as well
as particular premises, e.g. "Thomas was a saint and happy; Francis was a saint
and happy; Theresa was a saint and happy; Catherine was a saint and happy; and
John was a saint; therefore probably John was happy."
A second common definition of an inductive argument is "an argument
whose premises are discovered by sense experience " The premises of deduction,
since they must include at least one universal premise, are not all known by
314 XIV INDUCTION
sense experience, since sense experience knows only particulars, not universals.
For instance, we sense a man or men, not "man" or "all men."
However, this distinction between induction and deduction also does not
always hold true. Many deductive arguments also discover their premises by
sense observation: e.g. "I have observed that all the houses on Main Street are
white, and #24 Main Street is a house on Main Street, therefore #24 Main Street
is white." And induction also can use more than sense observation alone to find
its premises. E.g. "I feel my life is meaningful, and you do too, and so do 90 out
of 100 of the people I know. Therefore it is probable that most people feel their
lives arc meaningful."
The most unexceptionable definition of an inductive argument is one which
does not claim to prove its conclusion with certainty, even if its premises are
true, but only with probability. This is true of all six forms of induction men-
tioned above.
All deductive arguments are either logically valid or logically invalid by
their logical form alone. Valid deductive arguments prove their conclusions with
certainty (assuming the truth of the premises). But all six forms of inductive
arguments fall somewhere between the two extremes of simply valid and simply
invalid, and their strength derives from their matter rather than from their form.
They all offer only probable reasons for their conclusions, ranging from highly
probable to slightly probable.
(reality) to find a tiger (a universal). As the tiger lives in the jungle, the univer-
sal exists in its particulars: justice exists in just persons and acts, redness in red
things, humanity in humans. As the hunter immobilizes and cages the tiger and
takes it out of the jungle into a city zoo, the mind abstracts the unchanging uni-
versal from the changing concrete things and events it is involved in (the jungle),
confines it to a concept (the cage), and places it in the mental realm (the city
zoo, full of caged beasts) where it can be safely and objectively studied and com-
pared with other universals.
Zoos cannot create tigers, only receive them from jungles. Deduction
receives all its data from induction. Deduction presupposes induction because
no syllogism can prove its own premises. If the premises are proved by another
deductive syllogism, rather than by induction, this second syllogism will also
need to prove its premises, and the process will go on ad infinitum with the
result that no premise will be certain, since it depends on prior premises - in
which case no conclusion will be certain either. (This fact was the basis of some
ancient skeptics' objection to the syllogism; see page 219.)
This process of questioning premises and tracing them back to prior prem-
ises stops in two ways. First, it stops at sense experience (and the two processes
that come from it: the first-act-of-the-mind abstraction of a universal form from
particular material instances of it, and the third-act-of-the-mind inductive rea-
soning to a universal conclusion from particular premises which are instances of
it). Second, it also stops at tautologies or self-evident propositions which prove
themselves, so to speak, and need no prior premises. Wc "just see" that 2 + 2 = 4,
or that a whole cannot be smaller than its parts, because we understand what a
whole is and what a part is.
But the fact that such principles are self-evident does not mean that we did
not learn them through experience, inductively. Even the law of non-contradic-
tion itself is gradually discovered, like all universals, in and through experienc-
ing cases of it. But we do not argue to its truth merely from our observations of
some instances of it, inductively. At some point in our experience we understand
that "x non-x," like "2 + 2 = 4" and unlike "The sky is blue," is necessary, not
accidental; it not only is true but must be true and cannot not be true - really,
objectively, in fact, always and everywhere.
Section 2. Generalization
Generalization is the first and simplest of the six forms of induction. Abstraction
(in the first act of the mind) and inductivc generalization (in the third act of the
mind) both reach the universal through the particular. In abstraction, the intel-
lect sees the universal nature (e.g. "redness") in and through a number of par-
ticular examples (e.g. "this red apple" and "that red sunset"). In generalization,
the reason arrives at a conclusion (a proposition, the expression of the second
act of the mind) through a proccss of reasoning (the third act of the mind) which
316 XIV. INDUCTION
begins with a number of particular truths as premises and ends with a universal
truth as a probable conclusion. E.g. "This swan is white, and that swan is white,
and so is that swan and that one, therefore probably all swans are white."
This form of inductive reasoning is also called "induction by simple enu-
meration." It is the simplest form of induction. It obviously can only arrive at a
probable conclusion unless we have a "complete induction," in which we are
sure that we have examined all the cases, i.e. each of the members of the class
which is the subject of our conclusion (e.g. "Rose passed and Tim passed and
Tom passed and Barbara passed and Ruth passed, and these five arc the only
members of the class, therefore all the members of the class passed").
The probability of the conclusion being true increases in proportion to each
of the following factors: (1) How many observations, how many cases or exam-
ples are there? (2) More important, what proportion of the whole class do the
cases observed constitute? If there are only 100 swans but there are 800 ducks,
observing 90 swans yields more probability than observing 400 ducks. (3) How
representative is the sample? Is it a fair cross-section?
There are other factors to be factored in too, such as time: Is there past
precedent? Are there historical data? And will things change in the future?
The probability of a generalization increases when we add other factors to
distinguish coincidences from causal laws. Superstitions often come from the
confusion between coincidences and causal laws; e.g. someone probably
observed 10 people walk under a ladder, observed that all 10 had bad luck short-
ly afterwards, and concluded that walking under a ladder causes bad luck - but
it was just a coincidence. (See page 100 on the post hoc fallacy.)
No inductive argument can be evaluated in the same way as deductive argu-
ments. A deductive argument is either simply valid or simply invalid; it is either-
or, zero-sum, as far as logical validity is concerned. The other two factors in a
deductive arguments do not usually have this zero-sum character: the truth or
falsity of the premises and the meaning of the terms. Unless the premises are
self-evidently true tautologies or sclf-evidently false self-contradictions, they are
usually uncertain and disputable (though in objective fact each proposition is
either true or false). And the clarity and meaning of the terms is always poten-
tially "gray." But in an inductive argument, even the "third-act-of-the-mind"
logic of the argument is "gray." Even if the premises are true, the conclusion fol-
lows only with probability, not certainty.
The strength of an inductive argument is not usually quantifiable (except for
statistical probabilities). However, the argument bccomes stronger, and the prob-
ability of its conclusion being true increases, when we apply standards such as
the three factors mentioned four paragraphs above. Generalizations, like
abstractions, always retain something of the character of "flying by the seat of
your pants." Generalizing is much more subjective, i.e. relative to different indi-
viduals' abilities. Some people seem to have a better intuitive ability than others
to generalize accurately and quickly. And one person will "just see" the truth of
Generalization 317
a generalization from a few instances, while another, slower person will require
more examples. One person will leap to conclusions too quickly (the fallacy of
hasty generalization - see page 100) while another will be more careful and
discriminating. And one person will be good at inductive generalizations in one
field (a field familiar to him) while another will excel in another field. The same
person may be quick and accurate at one time and too slow or hasty at another.
The point here is not to classify people but to avoid the expectation that induc-
tion can be as precise and impersonal as deduction.
Aristotle used the analogy of a formation in battle arising from a number of
individual soldiers making a stand together, to show that the human mind is
capable of this process of seeing the universal (the general principle) in the par-
ticular. "We conclude that these states of knowledge (knowing the universal
from experience) are neither innate . . . nor developed from other states of
knowledge, but from sense perception. It is like a rout in battle being stopped by
first one man making a stand and then another, until the original formation has
been restored. The soul is so constituted as to be capable of this process"
(Posterior A nalytics, 1 OOa-b).
5. Summarize and evaluate the point of the following passage: "I have never
understood why there is supposed to be something crabbed or antique about
a syllogism: still less can I understand what anybody means by talking as if
induction had somehow taken the place of deduction. The whole point of
deduction is that true premises produce a true conclusion. What is called
induction seems simply to mean collecting a large number of true premises,
or perhaps, in some physical matters, taking rather more trouble to see that
they arc true. It may be a fact that a modern man can get more out of a great
many premises, concerning microbes or asteroids, than a medieval man
could get out of a very few premises about salamanders and unicorns. But
the process of deduction from the data is the same for the modern mind as
for the medieval mind. . . . It was the misfortune of medieval culture that
there were not enough true premises, owing to the rather ruder conditions of
travel or experiment. But however perfect were the conditions of travel or
experiment, they could only produce premises; it would still be necessary to
deduce conclusions. But many modern people talk as if what they call
induction were some magic way of reaching a conclusion without using any
of those horrid old syllogisms. But . . . induction leads us only to a deduc-
tion. . . . Thus the great nineteenth century men of science . . . went out and
closely inspected the air and the earth, the chemicals and the gases, doubt-
less more closely than Aristotle or Aquinas, and then came back and embod-
ied their final conclusion in a syllogism: 'All matter is made of microscop-
ic little knobs which are indivisible. My body is made of matter. Therefore
my body is made of microscopic little knobs which arc indivisible.' They
were not wrong in the form of their reasoning, because it is the only way to
reason. In this world there is nothing cxcept a syllogism - and a fallacy. But
of course these modern men knew, as the medieval men knew, that their con-
clusions would not be true unless their premises were true. And that is where
the trouble began. For the men of scicnce, or their sons and nephews, went
out and took another look at the knobby nature of matter, and were surprised
to find that it was not knobby at all. So they came back and completed the
process with their syllogism: 'All matter is made of whirling protons and
electrons. My body is made of matter. Therefore my body is made of
whirling protons and electrons.* And that again is a good syllogism, though
they may have to look at matter once or twice more before we know whether
it is a true premise and a true conclusion. But in the final process of truth
there is nothing else except a good syllogism. The only other thing is a bad
syllogism, as in the familiar fashionable shape: 4A11 matter is made of pro-
tons and electrons. I should very much like to think that mind is much the
same as matter. So I will announce . . . that my mind is made of protons and
electrons.*" (G.K. Chesterton, St. Thomas Aquinas)
6. "Everyone has heard people quarrelling. Sometimes it sounds funny and
sometimes it sounds merely unpleasant; but however it sounds, I believe we
Causal arguments: Mills methods 319
can Icarn something very important from listening to the kind of things they
say. They say things like this: 4How'd you like it if anyone did the same to
you?* - That's my seat, I was there first* - 'Leave him alone, he isn't doing
you any harm' - 4 Why should you shove in first?' - 'Give me a bit of your
orange, I gave you a bit of mine' - 'Come on, you promised.' People say
things like that every day, educated people as well as uneducated, and chil-
dren as well as grown-ups.
"Now what interests me about all these remarks is that the man who
makes them is not merely saying that the other man's behaviour does not
happen to please him. He is appealing to some kind of standard of behav-
iour which he expects the other man to know about. And the other man very
seldom replies: 'To hell with your standard.' Nearly always he tries to make
out that what he has been doing does not really go against the standard, or
that if it does there is some special excuse. He pretends there is some spe-
cial reason in this particular case why the person who took the seat first
should not keep it, or that things were quite different when he was given the
bit of orange, or that something has turned up which lets him off keeping his
promise. It looks, in fact, very much as if both parties had in mind some kind
of Law or Rule of fair play or decent behaviour or morality or whatever you
like to call it, about which they really agreed. And they have. If they had not,
they might, of course, fight like animals, but they could not quarrel in the
human sense of the word. Quarrelling means trying to show that the other
man is in the wrong. And there would be no sense in trying to do that unless
you and he had some sort of agreement as to what Right and Wrong are; just
as there would be no sense in saying that a footballer had committed a foul
unless there was some agreement about the rules of football." (C.S. Lewis,
Mere Christianity) (Find an inductive generalization, a hypothetical syllo-
gism, and an argument from analogy here.)
Science seeks real causes. (Even psychology seeks the real causes of knowing,
feeling, etc.)
(b) We have also distinguished the four causes (page 202). Modern science
seeks efficient causes and material causes, not formal causes or final causes.
This is part of the narrowing of focus (like laser light) that distinguishes mod-
ern science from ancient science and accounts for much of its power and suc-
cess.
(c) We also have distinguished reasoning from cause to effect from rea-
soning from effect to cause (page 204). Science usually reasons from effect to
cause. (However, it also predicts effects from causcs.) We perceive the effect,
and want to find the cause: e.g. Why do 1 get headaches? Why arc there tides?
Why did this plane crash?
(d) We also need to distinguish between necessary cause and sufficient
cause. A necessary cause is a cause without which the effect cannot happen. A
sufficient cause is a cause with which the effect must happen. Remove the nec-
essary cause, and you remove the effect. Produce the sufficient cause, and you
produce the effect.
This distinction (d) is closely related to the one before it (c), for wc can infer
the cause from the effect only with necessary causes, and we can infer the effect
from the cause only with sufficient causes. E.g. when we infer the presence of a
foot from the presence of a footprint, we infer that a foot is a necessary cause
for a footprint. (The inference is only probable, for footprints can also be made
artificially.) And when we infer and predict future beach erosion from a hurri-
cane, we infer that a hurricanc alone is sufficient to cause beach erosion. Science
usually seeks necessary causes, since it usually reasons from cffcct to cause.
(e) Finally, we must also distinguish between ultimate and proximate
causes, or remote and immediate causes, or first and second causes. The ulti-
mate cause of evolution may be (according to thcists) divine providence, but the
proximate cause may be (according to Darwin) Natural Selection. The ultimate
cause of a murder may be the murderer's choice, but the proximate cause was
the poison he put in the victim's food. Science seeks only proximate causes. This
is one of the ways it differs from philosophy.
S e c o n d C a n o n : Method of Difference
If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an
instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save
one, that o n e occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the
two instances differ is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the
cause, of the phenomenon."
Third C a n o n : Joint Method of Agreement and Difference
" I f two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs have only one
circumstance in common, while two or more instances in which it does not occur
have nothing in c o m m o n save the absence of that circumstance, the circum-
stance in which alone the two sets of instances differ is the effect, or the cause,
or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon"
Fourth Canon: Method of Residues
"Subduct [subtract] from any phenomenon such part as is known by previ-
ous inductions to be the effect of certain antecedents, and the residue of the phe-
nomenon is the effect of the remaining antecedents"
Fifth Canon: Method of Concomitant Variations
"Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever anolherphenome-
d,
r t=
non varies in some particular manner, is either a cause or an effect of that phe-
,h, ><
This is translated into scientific languag y observing a nam-
ly observable, namely the constant and the - " t t T o d u c i n g those different
ral phenomenon under different circums ^ s c i e n t i s t ^ 5 to find the
circumstances through a controlle expe > p h e n o m e n o n . The philosopher
common cause of all different occurrences of ^ lhc
caused decreased decay, and to the practice of fluoridating water supplies, with
the result that dental decay was significantly decreased throughout the world.
The Method of Agreement, though its name is affirmative, is really nega-
tive: what it does is to eliminate circumstances present in some but not all cases
of the phenomenon whose cause we are seeking. This can never be done com-
pletely, of course. This is one reason why neither this Method nor the other four,
nor all five together, can yield certainty, as deduction can. Another reason is
because the use of this method presupposes a judgment about which of many
circumstances we should focus on as likely causes of the phenomenon; and this,
in turn, requires an insight into the nature of things, the nature of the supposed
causc and the effect. This is illustrated by a famous example of the misuse of the
Method of Agreement: "When I drank scotch and soda, I got drunk; when I
drank bourbon and soda, I got drunk; when I drank gin and soda, I got drunk. I
gotta stop drinking that soda!"
The Method of Agreement can give more conclusive evidence for what is
not a cause than for what is. For instance, it is constantly assumed that more
money spent on public education causes better results, as measured by SAT
scores; yet this assumption is not borne out by data. For instance, in 1992-1993
the 15 states with the top SAT scores did not includc any one of the five with the
highest teacher salaries, and only one of the states with the highest SAT scores
was one of the ten with the highest expenditures per pupil. Four of the ten states
with the highest SAT scores were among the 10 states with the lowest per-pupil
expenditures. New Jersey had the highest per-pupil expenditures but was 39th in
SAT scores. South Dakota was third in SAT scores and dead last in teacher
salaries. All this data does not prove that being cheap causes SAT scores to
increase, or that putting more money into education is a total waste; but it does
help us to save time by sending us elsewhere to look for the main causes of pupil
achievement.
there would be more air in it. But since, on the contrary, when more air is put in,
the whole becomes heavier, it follows that each part has a weight of its own, and
consequently that the air has weight." (Pascal, Treaties on the Weight of the Mass
of the Air)
trust books, people, sense perception, tradition, etc. until they are proved false,
and wc treat accused people as innocent until proved guilty. But science requires
what Descartes calls "universal [or nearly universal] methodic doubt." We must
assume nothing, question every thing. This opens up the mind to possibilities
we would otherwise not consider. The doubt is universal (or as nearly universal
as possible) but only methodic. That is to say, it is only theoretical, not practical
and lived. (In fact it is unlivable. Imagine a conversation in which everyone
demanded proof for everything!) And it is a beginning, not an end; it is not a
recipe for skepticism but for inquiry.
(3) A preliminary hypothesis is set up, a possible explanation. This pre-
cedes the collection of data (the next step), for we search for data only after we
know where to search, what kind of data to search for, which data are relevant.
Understanding counts more than logic here. If computers performed all the steps
of the scientific method, this would be the hardest one to program them to do.
Hypotheses are only sometimes causal. That is why Mill's methods arc only
one part of the scientific method. Sometimes we want to know what rather than
why. For instance, the hypothesis that light is composed of particles concerns the
matter or content or composition of light rather than the efficient cause of it.
Which hypotheses are worth testing? What makes a hypothesis likely? We
can list a number of factors, all of which are matters of practical and common-
sensical judgment: (a) relevance to the problem, (b) simplicity, (c) testability
by data (verifiability and falsifiability), (d) compatibility with everything else
we know, both proven facts and probable theories, and (e) power to explain or
predict future data.
From the viewpoint of the logic of science, testability is perhaps the most
important factor. If an idea is not in principle verifiable or falsifiable by data
gathered by any of the scienccs, then that idea is not scientifically testable. It
may still be meaningful, it may still be true, and there may still be other ways of
testing it, but it cannot be called a scientific idea. The Freudian theory of id, ego,
and super-ego, e.g. as the structure of the psyche has been criticized as an unsci-
entific hypothesis because it excludes falsifiability in principle. If a Freudian
can explain any possible observed psychic event as caused by id, ego, or super-
ego, then the hypothesis is not testable because no observation can be specified
that could refute it. It is more like a religious faith, which is not in principle fal-
sifiable (disprovable) by any empirical data; e.g. no amount of injustice, or
suffering would disprove God's goodness, for God's ways are by definition
above full human understanding. The believer will not say, e.g. that a Holocaust
of 6 million Jews does, but 600 does not, disprove the existence of the God of
Israel. This may be reasonable, but it is not scientific. It is like trusting a friend,
while science is like fingerprinting a suspect. Friendship and religion use a kind
of methodic faith; science uses methodic doubt. People should be treated as
innocent until proved guilty, but scientific ideas should be treated as guilty
(false) until proved innocent (true).
Scientific hypothesis 327
image would be displaced so many degrees if it passed close to the mass of the
sun. Exactly this amount of displacement was observed during a solar eclipse,
which made the stars along the line of sight near the sun visible during the
eclipse.
(6) And this is step six: the hypothesis is tested by observation of the pre-
dicted consequences. This step can often be done in a much more quick and effi-
cient way by controlled experiment than by simple observation.
Obviously, if the predicted consequences are not observed to occur, the
hypothesis is shown to be inadequate. But even if the predicted consequences
are observed, this does not prove the hypothesis. (To claim that would be to com-
mit the fallacy of Affirming the Consequent.) However, it makes the hypothesis
much more probable.
(7) What increasingly verifies the hypothesis is success in predicting and
controlling what could not otherwise be predicted or controlled. At a certain
point the hypothesis is verified and becomes a scientific law. There is some dis-
agreement about where that "certain point" lies. We usually distinguish a
hypothesis, as possible, a theory, as probable, and a law, as verified (proved).
application to the case we are arguing about. The general principle is that jus-
tice, or righteousness, is the advantage of the weaker, and the application is that
moral and political justice too must be not the advantage of the stronger but of
the weaker. If Socratcs had shortened and simplified this already-abbreviated
argument (minus step 3) to a one-step argument by analogy, it would consist in
arguing from the cases of the doctor, teacher, and horseman to the similar case
of the politician.
Here is another example: I am lost in a jungle, very hungry, and have no
food. I wonder which of the unfamiliar fruits I see is safe to eat. I observe mon-
keys eating a certain fruit that looks a little like a mango, so I eat it too, since
monkeys are more similar to man than any other animal is. Instead of reasoning
in the four steps above, I have taken a short cut and reasoned directly from what
I know of mangoes (that they are safe to eat) to this mango-like fruit (that it is
too), and from monkeys to men, intuiting (or hoping) that they are similar
enough.
3. Understanding the /
universal principle (
as essential and V
J .
necessary jt- \.
^ \
\ particular instance
1. Observation of
concrete parti- X XX X X
cular instances \ ,
4
Four Steps (1. to 4. above) Short cut by analogy
Obviously some arguments from analogy are better than others. Why? To
find the criteria that make arguments from analogy more or less probable, we
need to specify as exactly as possible what are the structural elements of this
argument.
The premises of the argument from analogy are the observed similarities
between two or more things in one or more ways or attributes. The conclusion is
Arguments by analogy 331
that these things will also be similar in another way. Schematically, the argument
from analogy looks like this:
The criteria that make an argument from analogy more probable are:
(1) The number of entities observed in the premises.
(2) The variety of entities observed in the premises.
(3) The number of attributes in which the entities are similar.
(4) The relevance of these known attributes (in which the entities are simi-
lar) to the unknown one (in which we hope they are also similar).
"Relevance" here means "some kind of causal connection "
(5) The number, variety, and importance of dissimilarities between the enti-
ty we are reasoning about in the conclusion and the ones we see as ana-
logical to it in the premises. Dissimilarities weaken analogies.
(6) The boldness of the conclusion s claim, in terms of either exactness or
certainty or both. The bolder the claim, the stronger the premises must
be for a good argument; the weaker the claim, the weaker the premises
may be.
These criteria are not usually applicable in simple, short analogies that do
not distinguish or specify a number of entities (criteria 1 and 2) or attributes (cri-
teria 3 and 5) or the degree of exactness or certainty claimed (criterion 6). In
such cases, the following two criteria suffice:
(1) How similar are the two cases? Is the similarity essential or accidental?
(2) How dissimilar are they? All analogies are similar in some ways and dis-
similar in other ways. The dissimilarities will not usually be specified in the
argument, since they count against the analogy, so you must look for them in the
world. Arc these dissimilarities essential or accidental?
Extending an Analogy
An argument from analogy can often be countered by "extending the anal-
ogy," i.e. showing that the analogy counts against the conclusion it is supposed
to support. Here is a famous example from the Gospels (Matthew 15:21-28):
And Jesus went away from there and withdrew to the district of Tyre
and Sidon. And behold, a Canaanite woman from that region came
out and cried, 'Have mercy on me, O Lord, Son of David; my daugh-
ter is severely possessed by a demon.' But he did not answer her a
word. And his disciples came and begged him, saying, *Send her
332 XIV. INDUCTION
away, for she is crying after us.' He answered 'I was sent only to the
lost sheep of the house of Israel.' But she came and knelt before him,
saying, 4Lord, help me.* And he answered, 4It is not fair to take the
children's bread and throw it to the dogs/ She said, 'Yes, Lord, yet
even the dogs eat the crumbs that fall from their master's table.'Then
Jesus answered her, 4 0 woman, great is your faith! Be it done for
you as you desire.' And her daughter was healed instantly.
Here, Jesus praises the Gentile woman for refuting his analogy by extend-
ing it, for the analogy (the "chosen people" = the children; the Canaanite
Gentiles = the dogs) was designed to test her faith and her humility, by his cal-
culated insult, and she passed the test. It is one of the only two times Jesus ever
lost an argument. See John 2:1-11 for the other. (This same example appears on
page 103 as an example of the fallacy of false analogy.)
A second form of "extending the analogy" consists in extending it to
absurdity. The earliest memory I have is winning an argument with my mother,
who was showing me how to wipe my bum after potty training. She said, "There!
See? Now it's as clean as a pillow case." I replied, "Well, why don't you sleep on
it then?" Even a three-year-old knows some basic logic.
Extending an analogy to absurdity can be either a form of reductio ad
absurdum (page 294) or a form of the fallacy of hyperbole (page 78), depending
on whether the extension reasonably follows from the original analogy or not.
And this is a matter of intuitive common sense, not logical rules.
The refutation of this argument would begin with some phrase like 4iYou
might as well argue that" or 44If you argue that way, you can also argue that," and
then say
All Fascists breathed.
And all the Israeli army breathed.
Therefore the Israeli army were Fascists.
Arguments by analogy 333
For both arguments have the same fallacious form of Undistributed Middle.
The underlying principle of this kind of refutation is that an argument is
valid or invalid by its logical form alone, irrespective of content, and that any
argument with true premises and a false conclusion is invalid.
Refutation by logical analogy may also focus on the content rather than the
form of the argument refuted, by exposing the argument's implied premise (for
most everyday arguments are enthymemes) and showing how false it is by
deducing an obviously false consequence from it in the same field or subject
matter as the original argument. E.g. "Islamic culture was imposed on Africa
from abroad. Therefore it is only a veneer there, and alien." "So whatever cul-
ture is imposed from abroad is only a veneer, and alien? Then Christian culture
is only a veneer and alien to Italy, because it was imposed from abroad." When
the general principle that is the implied premise in the first sentence of the refu-
tation ("So whatever culture . . " ) is omitted, we have then the "short cut" of an
argument by analogy.
Exercises: Evaluate the following analogies. First determine whether they are
meant as arguments or merely as explanations. (Sometimes they can be
interpreted either way.) If they are arguments, evaluate them by the six cri-
teria on page 331 if possible, or at least by the two simpler criteria immedi-
ately after them, as well as by intuition and common sense.
1. "It is true that we don't have a great deal of direct evidence about what hap-
pens to a nation which continues to leave its budget unbalanced over a long
period. But it is imperative for us to know whether we are running into
national disaster by piling up our national debt, instead of cutting it down
and making the budget balance. Without direct evidence, our best method is
to turn to the closest thing we do know about, and that is the family budget.
We know that a family cannot run up its debts forever, it will sooner or later
lose the confidence of tradesmen, it will owe more than it could pay even by
selling all its household goods, and it will go into bankruptcy when the cred-
itors become insistent. This is reason enough for predicting national insol-
vency if we go on the way we have been going."
2. " T m not anti-Semitic, I'm just anti-Zionist* is the equivalent of T m not
anti-American, I just think the United States shouldn't exist.'" (Netanyahu)
3. "Thinking is an experimental dealing with small quantities of energy, just as
a general moves miniature figures over a map before setting his troops in
action." (Sigmund Freud)
4. "Wittgenstein used to compare thinking with swimming: just as in swim-
ming our bodies have a natural tendency to float on the surface so that it
requires great physical exertion to plunge to the bottom, so in thinking it
requires great mental exertion to force our minds away from the superficial,
down into the depth of a philosophical problem." (George Pitcher, The
Philosophy of Wittgenstein)
334 XIV. INDUCTION
19. "As a wall'd town is more worthier than a village, so is the forehead of a
married man more honourable than the bare brow of a bachelor"
(Shakespeare, As You Like It 3,3)
20. Judith Jarvis Thompson, defending abortion, used the analogy between a
woman who is unwillingly pregnant and a woman who is kidnapped, tied to
a hospital bed, and hooked up to a famous violinist, who needs her rare blood
type, by continuous intravenous blood transfusion. If she pulls the plug, the
violinist will die. But this act is morally legitimate. Therefore so is abortion.
1 Tiffany: You know, Fatima, you're a swell person even though you were
brought up in an awfully repressive society. I guess that proves
free will is stronger than social conditioning.
2 Fatima: How dare you insult my people by complimenting me! They are
part of me. They are my family.
3 Tiffany: I'm sorry; I didn't mean to insult your people - I mean the indi-
viduals. I meant your social system.
4 Fatima: What's wrong with our social system?
Tiffany: All the injustices, of course.
5 Fatima: Why do you say that?
Tiffany: Everybody knows your society is full of injustices.
6 Fatima: Well, I don't. And I lived there. Did you?
Tiffany: No. ..
7 Fatima: In fact, I believe my society is one of the most just societies on earth.
8 Tiffany: You sound so certain! Well, I guess that's true for you.
Fatima: How can something be "true for you" unless it's true?
9 Tiffany: Look, let's not argue, OK? You love your society, and that's great;
because love is always great, even though "love is blind."
10 Fatima: No it isn't!
Tiffany: Of course it is: look at you. Look at what it's done to you: it's
made you blind to injustice.
11 Fatima: Either Iraq is one of the most just societies on Earth or I'm as
blind to injustice as a bat is to the sun. And I am not that blind.
12 Tiffany: OK, prove it. Prove Iraq is one of the most just societies on Earth.
Fatima: Iraq is an Islamic society. And Islamic society is formed by
Islamic law. And Islamic law is the most just law on Earth.
An exercise on nearly everything 337
59 Tiffany: All I see is that Fatima here is buying into the old, repressive
stereotypes like "a woman's nature" and "a woman's place" and
"the feminine mind ."
60 Socrates: So you believe there is no such thing as a woman's nature?
Doesn't everything we can speak about meaningfully have some
sort of nature?
61 Tiffany: Yes, but surely you don't believe there is such a thing as "the fem-
inine mind." Obviously there is a biological difference in our
bodies, but "the feminine mind" is a social convention. In fact,
"the feminine mind" is a fiction invented by the masculine mind!
62 Socrates: I think you may have a self-contradiction there . . .
63 Tiffany: I was only kidding, not literal.
64 Socrates: Tell me, Tiffany: do you agree with my disciple Plato that a
human being is essentially a mind? Or with his disciple,
Aristotle, that a human is essentially what psychologists call a
psychosomatic unity, one substance with two dimensions, mate-
rial and mental, rather than two substances?
Tiffany: Aristotle, I think. He sounds much more commonsensical.
65 Socrates: And that "psychosomatic u n i t y " - d o e s it mean that any essential
and innate quality that pervades all of either of these two dimen-
sions must have some natural effect in the other?
Tiffany: That seems true.
66 Socrates: And are masculinity and femininity essential and innate and all-
pervasive qualities of the body? Or docs our biological gender
come from social convention too, as "the feminine mind" docs?
Tiffany: It's by nature. I wouldn't call it "all-pervasive" though. That's sexism.
67 Socrates: I don't know what you mean by "sexism," but our identity as mas-
culine or feminine pervades every cell in our bodies, doesn't it?
Tiffany: Yes.
Socrates: So it seems to follow then that it must have some effect on our
other dimension, according to the principle of the psychosomat-
ic unity that you believe.
Tiffany: I guess that follows.
68 Socrates: Does it not also follow, then, that there is some truth to the old
idea of a "feminine mind" and a "masculine mind"?
69 Fatima: Congratulations, Socrates. So you agree with me in seeing that
women are quite naturally and quite happily inferior.
Socrates: I did not say that, Fatima. Nor do I believe it.
70 Fatima: But you must see that that logically follows, Socrates. You are the
father of logic, after all.
71 Socrates: Yes, and you two are the mothers of the same unquestioned
assumption from which both of your opposite conclusions follow.
Don't you see it? You really should take a logic course some time,
and pay close attention to enthymemes!
An exercise on nearly every thing 341
I. relatively easy
1. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica i-ii, 1, 2, "Those Things In Which
Happiness Consists," in eight articles (all easy syllogisms but good practice
and profoundly practical content)
2. Plato, the part of Apology of Socrates that contains Socrates' dialogue with
Mcletus
3. Peter Kreefl, Between Heaven and Hell, the first half (the dialogue between
C.S. Lewis and J.F. Kennedy)
4. Kreeft, The Unaborted Socrates, the first dialogue
5. Kreeft, Socrates Meets Jesus, any of the dialogues, especially "Candy
Confessions"
6. Kreeft, The Best Things in Life, any of the dialogues, especially #6 or #12
7. Kreeft, Ecumenical Jihad, the Luther-Aquinas-C.S. Lewis trialogue
8. Kreeft, Socrates Meets Machiavelli, any of the chapters
9. Kreeft. Socrates Meets Marx, any of the chapters
10. Kreeft, Socrates Meets Sartre, any of the chapters
11. Kreeft, Socrates Meets Descartes, any of the chapters
12. Kreeft, Socrates Meets Hume, any of the chapters
13. Kreeft, Socrates Meets Kant, any of the chapters
II. Intermediate
1. St. Thomas Aquinas, almost any of the articles in the Summa Theologica
2. Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, Book 4
3. Plato. Republic, Book I, the dialogues between Socrates and Cephalus and
between Socrates and Polymarchus
4. Plato, Meno
5. Plato, Euthvphro
6. Plato, Phaedo, the three arguments for immortality
7. Plato, Crito
8. Plato, Gorgias, the first half, the dialogues between Socrates and Gorgias
and/or between Socrates and Polus
III. Harder
1. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica i, 2, 3, the "five ways"
2. C.S. Lewis, Miracles, chapter 3
3. Plato, Republicy Book 1, last half, the dialogue between Socrates and Thra-
symachus
4. Plato, Gorgias, second half, the dialogue between Socrates and Callicles
5. Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous
XV. Some Practical Applications
of Socratic Logic
Section 1. How to write a logical essay
Students are required to write essays throughout their educational career. This
ability can even determine whether or not you get into a good college or gradu-
ate school, or get good enough grades to stay in. The simple, three-acts-of-the-
mind structure of Socratic-Aristotelian logic gives us an ideal simplified form
for writing an effective, clear, and persuasive essay.
What follows is certainly not the only good way to write a persuasive essay.
But it is a simple and effective way, and many intelligent students today have
never been taught even this simple form. That is why it may seem at first artifi-
cial and confining, or "picky" and over-strict. However, following this seven-
step guideline in each detail can make a tremendous difference: the difference
between a vague, weak, rambling, disordered, confusing, and therefore non-per-
suasive essay and a sharp, strong, economical, orderly, clear, and convincing
one.
It will feel rigid at first, but rigid forms are necessary for beginners in every
field. Aspiring poets should first learn to write sonnets before writing free verse.
Pianists must master scales and chords and Bach's two-part Inventions. Babies
need walkers, and the lame need crutches, and sinners need "organized reli-
gion."
The principles below can apply to argumentative essays of any length but
especially to a medium length essay in the neighborhood of 3 - 6 pages.
1. Choose a good topic. A good topic for a logical essay has all three of the fol-
lowing qualities:
(a) It is controversial, that is, argued-about, not obvious. "War is painful" is
not controversial; "all wars are unjust" is. "Man is mortal" is not contro-
versial; "man can be made immortal" is.
How to write a logical essay 343
3. Give your answer (thesis, conclusion). This is the "point" of your whole
essay. This tends to come at the end in a Socratic dialogue, but it should usu-
ally be "upfront" and come at the beginning in an essay.
5. Prove your thesis. Give one or more reasons (arguments) for it. These rea-
sons will be either inductive (from specific examples) or deductive (from a
general principle) or both.
If they are deductive, your reasons will be either linear (A, therefore B,
therefore C, therefore D) or cumulative (D is true bccause of A, and also
because of B, and also because of C).
Each of your arguments should have
(a) no ambiguous terms,
(b) no false premises, and
(c) no logical fallacies (i.e. the conclusion should follow necessarily from the
premises)
(1) a term used ambiguously (Which term? Distinguish its two meanings.
Show how it has changed its meaning in the course of your opponent's
argument.); or
(2) a false premise (Which premise? Is it stated or implied? If implied,
prove that it is necessarily implied. Whether stated or implied show
that it is false; give reasons for disagreeing with it.); or
(3) a logical fallacy. (Which fallacy? Use the principles in this book to
show that the conclusion does not logically follow from the premises.)
I did it. And the answer is simply that there is no reason why it can't be done.
Furthermore, I think I can even give at least a few pieces of pretty obvious and
commonsensical advice to others now about how to do iL Here they are:
his turn: do not put three or more people into the conversation at once
(except perhaps very briefly). If you do, that will loosen its logical struc-
ture, and argument will turn into conversation.
2. The initial question should arise naturally from an ordinary situation or
conversation. It should not be artificial or imposed, but arise from "O's"
interests.
3. Like Plato, you might want to add the little trick of placing a veiled clue
to the central point of the dialogue in the very first line.
4. Socrates asks the questions rather than giving the answers (except, per-
haps, in response to his dialogue partner's questions). Remember, Socrates
is not a preacher. (This is easy to understand, but surprisingly hard to
obey.)
5. There is always an ironic contrast between Socrates' knowing that he does-
n't know and "O's" not knowing that he doesn't know. The one who seems
to know, doesn't; and the one who seems not to know, does. The one who
seems to be the student (Socrates) is really the teacher, and vice versa.
6. This irony may emerge in the interaction between the characters if " O " is
a bit arrogant - in which case Socrates gets a chancc to use his (always
light and subtle) ironic wit and humor. But " O " should never be unfairly
treated, put down, or preached at; and neither should the reader.
7. The personal, psychological struggle is as much a part of the Socratic dia-
logue as the struggle of ideas. A Socratic dialogue is a form of spiritual
warfare, therapy, or doctoring to the spirit of the student. Yet paradoxical-
ly, it is for this reason that you must avoid direct personal confrontation
and let the argument always be the object of attention. Socrates sees him-
self and "O" not as a winner and a loser but as two scientists mutually
seeking the truth by testing two alternative hypotheses. Whichever one
finds the truth, both are winners.
8. Socrates' goal is always ultimately somehow moral (though this is not
always apparent at first). For he has only one lifetime, and it is too pre-
cious to waste on issues that are not somehow connected to the most
important purpose of human life, becoming more wise and virtuous.
9. Socrates' aim is not to harm but to help "O." Sometimes, this involves
shame, but it never involves a conflict of interests - at least not from
Socrates' point of view. "O" may or may not understand this, but Socrates,
like Jesus, is altruistic in his very offensiveness. He believes, as Aquinas
says, that "there is no greater act of charity one can do to his neighbor than
to lead him to the truth." Socratic dialogue is ultimately missionary work.
until he has first restated that argument, in his own words (to prove that he
understands the meaning, not just the words), to his opponent % satisfaction.
5. The order must always be: first data (what, exactly, was actually said?),
then interpretation of the data (what the speaker meant, not what the hear-
er would have meant), then evaluation and argument (is he right or
wrong?). This might be called "constructionism," for it is in explicit con-
tradiction to the method that calls itself "Deconstructi on ism," perhaps the
most polar opposite to a Socratic debate in the entire history of philosophy.
6. Two formats are possible, (a) In the formal one, each debater is given a set
amount of time to state, and his opponent to try to refute, his argument,
tum by turn. E.g. A summarizes his argument in 5 minutes, then B has 5
minutes to respond, then A has 5 minutes to respond to B, then B gets
another 5 minutes, etc., either for a pre-set amount of time or until the
moderator (or both debaters) decide they are "debated out." (b) In the
informal format, pre-set time structures are not imposed.
7. Whether the time is explicitly counted and monitored or not, in both for-
mats each debater must be given approximately equal time, or at least
enough time to satisfy him and his need to explain himself.
8. The debate will usually work better with an impartial moderator, but it can
sometimes work without one, if both parties adhere conscientiously to all
the rules. Any two people can start a debate club, or a "Saint Socrates
Society." Try it! You might begin a Quiet Revolution
not accept it. I will not tell you why. Instead, this conclusion you have
proved to be objectively true I will label 4your* truth, as I hug 4 my'
truth to myself like an auto-erotic intellectual security blanket."
3. When your opponent finds an ambiguously-used term, you must redefine
it and reword your argument without ambiguity, or else abandon your
argument and find another one. When he claims to find a false premise,
you must prove that it is not false, or else that you do not need to assume
this premise. When he claims to find a logical fallacy, you must show that
he has misunderstood your argument, or else reword your argument to
avoid the fallacy.
4. Do not leave arguments " h a n g i n g D o not respond to his argument prov-
ing x simply by an argument proving non-x.
5. One long, linear, many-step argument is preferable to many cumulative
arguments bccause this "backs up" the discussion onto more and more
fundamental premises, so that even if no one "wins" the debate, both see
more clearly the more basic reasons behind their disagreement.
6. Be honest enough to change your mind if your opponent convinces you.
Remember, no one loses a Socratic debate except ignorance, and no one
wins except truth. If no one finds truth, both lose. If one finds it, both win.
These many points of advice will seem very complex and difficult if you
have no experience of reading Socratic dialogues, but quite simple, easy, and
obvious if you have - which shows that induction, starting with concrete expe-
rience, is a much more effective method of learning than deduction, starting
with abstract principles. The same holds for learning ethics as for learning
Socratic method, by the way. (Saints teach it more effectively than philosophers.)
But a "difficult person" (let us call him DP) is difficult precisely bccause he
or she re/uses this attitude of "let us try to find the truth together" Either DP
does not believe in objective truth at all, and is a principled subjectivism or else
he cannot or will not believe that he lacks this truth and his opponent has it (i.e.
he is an egotist - which is usually a cover-up for a very fragile and threatened
ego, as the bully is the cover-up for the coward). The charm of the Socratic
method is that it seems tailor-made for such people. For (1) it allows the truth to
seep in under their defenses like subterranean water as they are busy erecting
walls against the army of opposing ideas on the surface; and (2) it allows DP to
be his own corrector, thus saving his ego. When you play Socrates you do not
define the truth; you only ask questions and let DP define the truth with his
answers, which then become your teacher which you explore and examine
humbly, on the assumption that it is true, not false. (In the course of your exam-
ination, of course, you discover that this assumption is questionable, and let us
hope that DP discovers this too.)
The art of Socratic dialogue resists being put into a universal and unchange-
able formula, since you as Socrates must be flexible enough to follow DP wher-
ever he takes you. And this is one of the keys to its usefulness with difficult peo-
ple: it is in thus serving DP that you become the master, or rather allow truth to
become the master.
Thus the Socratic method, used with a "difficult person," is an illustration
of the irony of Hegel's famous "master-slave dialectic," in which the master is
really the slave, enslaved to the slave he needs, while the slave is free and thus
is really the master, for he does not need the master while the master needs him.
To say the same thing in a different way and using a different historical ref-
erence, it is an illustration of the Taoist principle that the humble, yielding water-
like attitude is the one that conquers the proud, "difficult," self-assertive, rock-
like one - ultimately because the first attitude corresponds to the nature of ulti-
mate reality, and thus is, ultimately, the most "realistic."
Still another historical reference to the same mysterious principle is the
Christian one: he who would be last becomes first and he who would be first
becomes last. In the Kingdom, the greatest is the servant of all, since this
Kingdom is nothing less than the epiphany or manifestation of the divine King
whose eternal and essential nature is revealed by the King's Son to be self-giv-
ing love. Thus the Socratic method, like the Taoist and Zen arts, is ultimately
rooted in the nature of God, if Christianity is true.
Taoists* favorite symbol for this art is water. By its softness it wears away
hard rock. It seeps in under walls and defenses precisely because it seeks the
lowest, humblest places. Water has no form itself; that is why it can conform to
any form, fill containers of any size and shape.
However, there is an intrinsic structure to water (H 2 0), and to the Socratic
method even when used with "difficult people." As soon as the "Socrates" and
352 XV. SOME PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS O F SOCRATIC LOGIC
the DP are engaged in conversation about whether some idea is true or not, that
conversation must follow certain essential logical principles, even when the topic
of the conversation is charged with "personal particles" as a dynamo is charged
with electricity. And we can analyze the conversational process into steps and
thus prepare its strategy beforehand. Those steps would be the following:
1. From the outset you must establish the Socratic relationship: you are the
listener, not the teacher; the disciple, not the opponent; the one who needs
to be shown the right, not the one who is in the right, or knows the right,
or has the right while DP is the one who is wrong.
The next three steps correspond to the three acts of the mind: first, the
thesis (proposition), then the definition (terms), then the reasons (argument).
2. First, get clear what DP's basic contentious contention is. Find his thesis,
or conclusion, or "bottom line." ("What, then, are you saying?")
3. Next, be sure you understand it as DP does. Ask for DP's definition of his
terms. ("What, exactly, do you mean?")
4. Then, find DP's reasons, or evidence - not in the spirit of the inquisitor
about to pounce on it and refute it, but in the spirit of the apprentice being
led and instructed by the master. Ask "why?" in this spirit, like a good psy-
choanalyst.
5. After DP's thesis, terms, and reasons are clear, be sure to express your
understanding of them, repeating them in your own words, so that it is
clear to DP that there is at least one other person in the world who under-
stands "where he's coming from." Difficult people often feel lonely and
isolated, as if "no one else understands."
6. Once DP sees you are on his "side," you can begin the next step: explo-
ration either "upstream" or "downstream" on the river of DP's original
argument, i.e. the exploration either of DP's premises (and perhaps also
their premises) or of the consequences of DP's conclusion.
You have already taken care of the terms; you have "come to terms"
with DP, so there is no misunderstanding and no ambiguity.
You have also seen and stated DP's argument (though informally) to
determine that there is no logical fallacy. Even difficult people rarely com-
mit logical fallacies. And you should hope that DP has not done so, for it
is rather embarrassing and insulting for anyone to be shown that his argu-
ment is fallacious; and (more to the point practically) being shown that his
argument is fallacious will probably not change or convince DP, for he will
still believe his conclusion. Everyone knows, instinctively, that showing
that a given argument for a certain conclusion is weak or fallacious does
not disprove that argument's conclusion. Everything is still "up for grabs."
However, if there is a fallacy in DP's argument, you may still be able to
How to use Socratic method on difficult people 353
show DP his fallacy in such a way that it disarms his hold on the conclu-
sion. E.g. "Yes, he said this terrible thing to you yesterday. But it docs not
necessarily follow that he still feels the same way today; he may be feel-
ing remorse." Or "Yes, he is a cannibal. But he doesn't want to eat every-
body, so maybe he doesn't want to eat you." Or "Yes, he did a terrible job
at X, and it is natural for you to conclude that he just doesn't care about
X, or about you; but is it not possible that he cares too much about X, and
had performance anxiety? Or that he has a mental block, or even a mental
defect, that we do not know about? Perhaps it is his mind rather than his
will that has the defect. Or perhaps there is some other cause we don't
know about. Maybe his dog just died, or his mother-in-law just came back
to life. Isn't it true that people sometimes do a terrible job at X ev en when
they care?"
7. Suppose you are now convinced that it is not the terms or the logic of the
argument, but the propositions that remain to be investigated. You believe
that DP's thesis or conclusion is false, and you want to serve DP and the
truth by opening up DP's mind to this possibility in a personally non-
threatening way, so that DP sees it for himself. There are two paths, logi-
cally: "upstream" or "downstream": (A) to show DP what questionable
premises are necessary to prove his thesis, or (B) to show DP what ques-
tionable conclusions his thesis necessarily entails when that thesis is taken
as a premise. Both investigations can be undertaken nonthreateningly, for
DP should be personally interested in his thesis, and therefore also in its
premises and in its conclusions, or corollaries.
Although the "upstream" strategy (A) may be logically easier and more
conclusive, the "downstream" strategy (B) is psychologically preferable.
For it is easier to win DP's sympathy and attention with strategy (B), draw-
ing out the further conclusions logically entailed by DP's thesis, because
DP is already attached to his thesis and therefore suspicious of investigat-
ing its possibly-weak foundations (premises), which is what the
"upstream" strategy does. Further, even if you do show DP the falseness
of some of his premises, and thus the weakness of his argument, this may
not wean him from his conclusion if he is attached to it; he can simply find
another argument for it.
The "downstream" strategy is really reductio ad absurdum, for you
show that if DP's thesis is true, it logically entails a conclusion that is so
absurd that even DP must rethink his thesis. If you do this, be sure you do
not give DP the impression that you think he believes this absurd conclu-
sion that you dcduce from his thesis, but rather that he does not. You will
insult him if you seem to assume that he is stupid enough to believe an
absurdity; you will compliment him if you seem to assume that he is intel-
ligent enough to refuse to believe an absurdity. When you show DP that
his wisdom in rejecting the absurd conclusion necessarily entails also
354 XV. S O M E PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS O F SOCRATIC LOGIC
rejecting his original thesis which logically entails that absurd conclusion,
you enable DP to save face by correcting himself by his own wisdom
instead of being corrected by yours.
8. Use options, dialectical (disjunctive) arguments, as much as you can, to
give the difficult person a choice.
Use dilemmas, but constructive rather than destructive dilemmas, so
that DP does not feel "destroyed."
9. As a concrete example, watch how Socrates deals with Cephalus,
Polemarchus, and above all, Thrasymachus, in Book I of the Republic, or
with Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles in the Gorgias. Five or these six (not
Polymarchus) are difficult people in different ways, and Socrates matches
his style to their personalities, instinctively.
10. Reflect on the wisdom of Kierkegaard in The Point of View for my Work as
an Author, in which he reflects upon and interprets all his previous books,
and on the Socratic method he has used in them. He speaks here of "dis-
pelling an illusion." which was Socrates* lifelong task.
help means to endure for the time being the imputation that one
is in the wrong and does not understand what the other under-
stands.
Take the case of a man who is passionately angry, and let us
assume that he is really in the wrong. Unless you can begin with
him by making it seem as if it were he that had to instruct you,
and unless you can do it in such a way that the angry man, who
was too impatient to listen to a word of yours, is glad to discov-
er a complaisant and attentive listener - if you cannot do that, you
cannot help him at all . . . if you cannot humble yourself, you are
not genuinely serious. Be the amazed listener who sits and hears
what the other finds the more delight in telling you because you
listen with amazement. . .
If you can do that, if you can find exactly the place where the
other is and begin there, you may perhaps have the luck to lead
him to the place where you are.
For to be a teacher does not mean simply to affirm that such a
thing is so, or to deliver a lecture, etc. No, to be a teacher in the
right sense is to be a learner. Instruction begins when you, the
teacher, learn from the learner, put yourself in his place so that
you may understand what he understands in the way he under-
stands it.
The point is (1) very simple, (2) very obvious, (3) and very rarely practiced.
Apparently there are more than just intellectual difficulties in the way of prac-
ticing this method, since it is (1) simple to understand and (2) obviously correct.
Why then is it (3) rare?
We learn the answer to this question when we learn the identity of the "dif-
ficult person." And we learn that by looking into a mirror. This is the most
Socratic thing we can do: "know thyself"
C. The questions you ask the book are not random, nor are they personal and
subjective. They have a common structure. Here are the main questions you
should ask about any book:
(1) Classification: What kind of book is it? Classify the book. To interpret a
book correctly, you must know what kind of book it is, and what the
author's intentions were. Interpreting Darwin as religion or Genesis as sci-
ence has caused immense confusion. So has interpreting Plato's Republic
as practical politics or Machiavelli's The Prince as ethical philosophy.
(3) Outline: How do its subordinate themes or points relate to the main one?
Give a basic outline of the book.
How to read a book Socrntically 357
(4) Argument: What are its contents, its main terms, propositions, and argu-
ments?
(5) Evaluation: Is it true or not, and why? Use the principles you have learned
in this book to summarize and then evaluate the book's argument.
(6) Application: What of it? What follows? What difference does it make?
Here we look not just at the book but along it or with it, like a telescope,
at the world, at reality, at ourselves and our lives.
Some examples of Socratic Analysis of Great Books (by the author of this
one, all from Ignatius Press):
Philosophy 101 by Socrates (on the Apology)
Socrates Meets Machiavelli (on The Prince)
Socrates Meets Marx (on The Communist Manifesto)
Socrates Meets Sartre (on Existentialism and Human Emotions)
Socrates Meets Descartes (on Discourse on Method)
Socrates Meets Hume (on An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding)
Socrates Meets Kant (on Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals)
XVI. Some Philosophical
Applications of Logic
Logic is not philosophy, but it is an excellent preparation for it. Logic is to phi-
losophy what a telescope is to astronomy or a cookbook to a meal. It is an instru-
ment. It is no substitute for the real thing, but it makes "the real thing" work
much better.
What follows is the briefest sample of the interface between logic and each
of the basic systematic divisions of philosophy: philosophical theology, meta-
physics, cosmology, philosophical anthropology, epistemology, and ethics.
These divisions correspond to basic questions: about God, or the Ultimate
Reality; about reality as such, universally; about the visible universe; about
human nature; about how we know; and about good and evil, the good life and
the good society. The following is only a sketchy sample of how logic can make
a difference to each of these kinds of questions.
for the existence of God, such as Aquinas's "five ways," try to show that the
answer is yes.
But can any sense data prove or disprove the existence of a God who by def-
inition cannot be sensed? Modern empiricists claim that the answer is no; that
God's existence cannot in principle be proved.
Can formal logic alone disprove atheism - i.e. is atheism logically sclf-con-
tradictory? St. Anselm's famous "ontological argument" answers yes.
Does the existence of evil (which by definition is the opposite of good) dis-
prove an infinitely good God? The most famous argument for atheism answers
yes.
Whatever your answer is, it must answer the arguments of the other side.
The debate over the existence of God is not merely one about faith, it is one
about logic too. It is not just "sharing personal feelings" but a hard look at facts
and arguments. In fact, one argument for God (used by thinkers as diverse as
Pascal, Chesterton, and C.S. Lewis) argues that logic itself would be worthless
if it were not God but mindless chance that caused our minds to be as they are.
A good sample of how contemporary philosophers on both sides argue this
issue can be found in Does God Exist? by J.P. Moreland & Kai Nielson.
laws of all being" are universals. But isn't the very question of Nominalism a
metaphysical question? Aren't you doing metaphysics when you deny meta-
physics?
Kant argued that metaphysics is impossible because it transcended the pos-
sible limits of what we could know, since all we could know was appearances
("phenomena") and not "things-in-themselves" or "noumena" (i.e. objective
reality). But this seems to be logically self-contradictory, for Kant seems to be
saying that he really knows, as an objective fact, that we cannot really know
objective facts. As Wittgenstein put it, "to draw a limit to thought, you must
think both sides of the limit."
If metaphysics is legitimate, all the rest of philosophy depends on it, some-
what as an I proposition falls under an A proposition on the Square of
Opposition. If x is true of all of reality, then it must be true of each part of real-
ity. Take, e.g. the following dispute among three different philosophical posi-
tions. Note how the disagreement in every other field logically follows from the
disagreement in metaphysics:
Platonic Realism Aristotelian Nominalism
(Extreme of excess) Moderate Realism (Extreme of defect)
Metaphysics Universals are the Universals are real (so Universals arc not
supreme realities; arc individuals); they objectively real.
the -Forms" arc arc the forms of
independent entities. individual entities.
Ethics The supreme good The supreme good for The supreme good
for man is know ledge man is happiness, per- for man universally
of the Forms. fection of soul & body is unknowable.
Politics Priority of the com- Balance of the com- Priority of the private
mon (universal) good mon good with the (individual) good
private good
them. E.g. science's presupposition that the fundamental laws of the universe are
the same throughout all time and space (the "uniformity of nature") must be
assumed rather than proved by scicncc; can philosophy prove it? Science
explains things by causes; can philosophy prove that causality is real rather than
merely mental, as is held by some philosophers (like Hume and Kant, in differ-
ent ways)? Arc final causes as real as efficient causes? Is it logically necessary
that the universe had a beginning? These are some of the questions about the
cosmos that philosophers still argue about, and some of the arguments seem to
be able to be settled logically, in principle if not in practice. For instance, take
Kant's notion that our concept of causality comes not from the real world and
our discovery of it, but from the inherent, necessary structure of our conscious-
ness and our unconscious projection of that concept onto our sensations so as to
organize them and make them intelligible - is this not logically self-contradic-
tory? For it claims that on the one hand causality is not real and on the other
hand that our unconscious mind really causes us to think the way we do, causes
our sensations to be orderly.
desires? Does the will command the mind or the mind command the will, or
both? What is the relationship between "I think," "I want," and "I feel"?
Socrates did and take both seriously, subjecting ethical questions to the most
demandingly honest logical reasoning.
His example was meant to continue.
THE BEGINNING
Appendix: Problems with
Mathematical Logic
BY T R E N T D O U G H E R T Y
1 Though important work was pioneered by George Boole, Augustus De Morgan, and
Gottlob Frege.
2 The conception of conditional to be considered was already present in the literature on
the subjcct, but there was no uniform agreement. For an interesting account of some rel-
evant discussions see Lewis Carroll's Symbolic Logic, pp. 444 49.
Basic modern logic 365
P q porq
case 1 T T T
case 2 T F T
case 3 F T T
case 4 F F F
that both are false. Let's represent that last statement in a truth table, building its
parts progressively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
P q ~P ~q -p&-q -(-p & ~q)
case 1 T T F F F T
case 2 T F F T F T
case 3 F T T F F T
case 4 F F T T T F
The expression we are interested in is at the top of column six. It reads, "It is not
the case that p is false and q is false," or in more natural English, "p and q are not
both false." This is obviously equivalent to "either p or q is true," which was rep-
resented in the previous truth table. Note that the two expressions are true in exact-
ly the same cases. They can both be true in every case except number four in
which both p and q are false. Thus we can define 'or' in terms o f ' n o t ' and 'and'. 3
This seems so promising for logical atomism that it leads philosophers to
try to represent 'if...then...' statements in truth tables. As we will see, this cre-
ates problems, problems which seem to us insurmountable for logical atomism.
One fact about any universally true *if...then...' statement is that the pres-
ence of the item following the ' i f ' is always followed by the item following
'then'. The 'if* clause is called the antecedent and the 'then' clause is called the
consequent. In ordinary English, if we say "If it rains, then I'll get wet" we imply
that there's no way, given present circumstances, for it to rain without my get-
ting wet. We can represent this implication, letting ' p ' be "It will rain" and ' q '
be "I will get wet" as ~(p & ~q). So according to modern logic, which presup-
poses logical atomism, the ordinary English conditional can be reduced to the
elements 'not* and 'and'. Here is where the problems begin.
3 To follow the truth table fully, notice that column three is calculated from column one in
accordance with the truth table definition of negation. Likewise for columns four and
two. Then column five is calculated from columns three and four in accordance w ith the
truth table definition of conjunction. Finally, column six is calculated from column five
in accordancc with the truth table definition of negation.
The paradoxes of material implication / Responses to these paradoxes 367
ditional. The problems that result are called the paradoxes of material implica-
tion. They are easy to see once we represent material implication with a truth table
(wc will use 4 - ' to represent the conditional, so p - q reads "If p, then q"). 4
P q p-*q
ease 1 T T T
case 2 T F F
case 3 F T T
case 4 F F T
Notice that the only case in which the material conditional is false is where
the antecedent is true and the consequent false. This case is certainly correct, but
each of the other cases reveals problems with this treatment of conditional state-
ments. 5
In case one, we see that any two true statements can be linked in a condi-
tional. Take any two true statements you want and according to the theory of
material implication they will imply one another. Thus, according to this theory,
"Grass is green" implies that "Snow is white." So the conditional "If grass is
green, then snow is white" comes out true. Again, "Abe Lincoln was the 16th
president" implies that "The Sun is a star." Case four has it the other way: any
two false statements imply one another. So "Fire is cold" implies "The Earth is
flat," and "All rocks are soft" implies "The Moon is made of green cheese."
Similar implications result from case three.
Looking at the cases in pairs we see that cases one and three have the
result that every true statement is implied by any statement at all, regardless of
truth value. So "1+1=3" implies " 1 + 1 = 2 " i.e. according to logical atomism the
statement "If 1 + 1=3, then 1 + 1=2" is true! Similarly, cases three and four have
the result that a false statement implies any statement. Finally, the modern treat-
ment of conditionals has the surprising result that for any two statements, one of
them implies the other. That is, regardless of whether either is true or false, it
will turn out that one of them implies the other. This will hold for a pair of true
statements, a pair of false statements, or a mixed pair. We'll leave it to you to
come up with your own examples in each variety.
4 To sec that this is the truth table for material implication, construct the truth tabic for *~p
& ~q)' using the methods exemplified earlier in the appendix. 1 leave this as homework.
5 One of the very first to express dissatisfaction with the mathematical treatment of con-
ditionals due primarily to Boole was Scottish logician Hugh MacColI. See his
"Symbolical Reasoning," published in the journal Mind volume five, 1880.
368 APPENDIX: PROBLEMS WITH MATHEMATICAL LOGIC
sonable but ambitious approach, has been to try and keep the baby while dump-
ing the bath water.
This strategy involves either strengthening or weakening the basic logical
system. Modal logics pioneered by MacColl in the 19th century and extensively
developed in early to mid 20th century by C.I. Lewis 6 take the problem with the
basic logic to be one of weakness. That is, the connection between statements in
a conditional is stronger than the material conditional implies; the connection
should be necessary. So modal logic adds operators for necessity and possibili-
ty, the two modes a statement can be in. When a necessity operator is attached
to a material conditional, the new conditional is called strict implication. The
good news for modal logic is that the paradoxes of material implication tend to
go away. The bad news is that they reappear in most systems as the paradoxes of
strict implication. For example, an impossible statement implies any statement.
Also, any statement implies a necessary statement. This does not seem to be
much of an improvement. There are replies that interpret strict implication as a
deducibility relation, which some think neutralizes the paradoxes. This debate,
however, is far beyond the scope of this book.
We will end our discussion of modal logic with two observations. First,
whether or not modal logic is burdened by similar paradoxes, it is clearly a depar-
ture from the attempt to have a purely truth functional logic. You cannot neces-
sarily infer the truth value of "p is necessary" from knowing whether p is true or
false. For example, "You are now reading a logic book," is true, but it didn't have
to be. You could have gone on a walk instead (and perhaps should have). 7
Secondly, modal logic turns out to support the basis of traditional logic.
Modal logician Alvin Plantinga, considering W.V.O. Quine's accusation that
modal logic implies "Aristotelian essentialism," the view that things actually
have essences, says that "Quine seems to be right ... [it] clearly does imply the
truth of that ancient doctrine."8
The second way of responding to the paradoxes involves weakening the
standard logic. It removes ccrtain principles from basic modern logic, insisting
that there must be some relevant connection between the antecedent and the con-
sequent. This family of logics are thus callcd relevance logics. Like modal log-
ics, relevance logics are not purely truth functional.
There are many other kinds of systems of intensional logic: temporal logic,
epistemic logic, deontic logic, intuitionist logic et al. It is important to point out
that whenever philosophers use advanced logical techniques to attempt to solve
complex philosophical problems they always use one or more of these inten-
sional systems. For every proposed solution on the basis of a system of inten-
6 That's the C.I. Lewis with whom C.S. Lewis was once confused (see page 12).
7 There is also ineliminable intensionality in the semantics of modal logic.
8 Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), last
page.
Responses to the paradoxes of material implication 369
sional symbolic logic there is a philosophical dispute over its basic principles.
Though making extensive use of symbols and formal procedures, they arc not
truly systems of mathematical logic in that they are not purely truth-functional.
The literature on these logical systems is vast and highly technical. One thing is
sure: the attempts on the part of some modern logicians to remove substantive
metaphysical content from logic has failed. Aristotelian logic not only recog-
nizes the contribution of metaphysics to logic, it is based on it. Once again, mod-
ern man, through his greatest intellectual and "scientific" endeavors, has con-
firmed ancient truth.
Answers to Even-Numbered Exercises
(NB: Teachers seeking answers to odd-numbered exercises should e-mail
St. Augustine's Press at bruce@staugustine.net.)
Page 34
A
2: term
4: argument
6: proposition
8: not a proposition; an imperative sentence
10: term
12: argument ("so" = "therefore")
14: term
B
2: false
4: false
6: false
8: true
Page 49
2: analogical (moral evil vs. physical evil; sin vs. suffering; doing harm vs. suffer-
ing harm)
4: univocal (numbers are the most univocal language there is)
6: analogical
8: analogical
10: analogical
12: univocal (or perhaps analogical, since death is not an accidental change but a
substantial [essential] change)
14: analogical (ask a theologian to explain this)
16. equivocal
Page 51
2: universal
4: singular
6: universal
8: particular
A timers to pages 34-61 371
Page 52
2: collective
4: collective
6: collective
8: ambiguously used: first collective, then divisive
Page 53
2: "Human" is used ambiguously, first as an adjective and then as a noun. Parts or
products of human beings are "human" but they are not humans.
4: Guilt feelings, like all feelings, are subjective. Courts try to judge real guilt,
objective and impersonal truth about whether the accused is guilty in fact of vio-
lating a law. Judges deal with real guilt, by punishment; psychologists deal with
guilt feelings, by therapy.
6: "Good" is used ambiguously. Self-esteem may be psychologically good, in aid-
ing happiness; but a judge's verdict is legally and morally good if it is legally and
morally just. Was it "good" that Hitler had so much self-esteem?
8: "Love" is analogical. Love of wisdom is not the same kind of love as sexual love.
(However, Socrates would probably still press the point that the two have some
principles in common, one of which is that pure love of any kind should not "sell
itself" for money.) He would probably call professional philosophers prostitutes.
10: "Ambiguity" is ambiguous: first it is used nominally, then really; it refers first
to the word 'ambiguity' and then to real ambiguity.
Page 55
2: "Near" = relation; "blasted" = passion; "heath" = substance (or "near the blasted
heath" = place); "midnight" = time; "three" = quantity; "Weird" = quality;
"Sisters" = substance (but in relation); "stood" = posture; "gleefully" = quality;
"stirring" = action; "round" = quality; "black" = quality; "witches"' = possession;
"pot" = substance; "filled" = passion; "three" = quantity; "tiny" = quantity (even
though not mathematically measured); "broken" = passion; "frogs" = substance.
4: "Pooping" = action; "on" = relation; "pieces" = quantity (fraction); "pork" = sub-
stance; "in the park" = place; "is" = no category but a copula (see page 149);
"proper" = quality; "performance" = action; "perky" = quality; "pelicans" =
substance.
6. "Categories" = substance; "are" = a copula (page 149); "used" = passion; "clas-
sify" = action; "things" = substance.
Page 61
2: genus
4: genus
6: property (or accident if "temper" is taken to mean "an unusually hot temper")
8: genus
10: property
12: species
14: accident
16: genus
372 ANSWERS TO EVEN-NUMBERED EXERCISES
Page 64
2: OK (although it is a matter of degree)
4: OK
6: Not exclusive (some totalitarians are very popular); and not exhaustive (it omits
unpopular non-totalitarian regimes); and two different standards (popularity and
power)
8: OK
10: OK (if "man" is included in "animals")
12: OK
14: OK
16: Not exhaustive; not only are there other "excesses" but even if the class to be
divided is taken to be "excesses concerning equality," there could be other
excesses concerning equality.
18: OK
20: Uses two standards at once: how many and how qualified the rulers are; com-
pare n21. Also not exhaustive.
22: OK logically, though some would find it controversial religiously; a good divi-
sion to outline as an exercise.
Page 72
2: "The most hungry" is temporally ambiguous: those who arc the most hungry
before they cat, will usually then eat the most, but those who arc the most hun-
gry after they cat, have usually eaten the least.
4: There are two ambiguities: Sam interprets "bored to death" literally, while his
father means it figuratively, and Sam interprets "the service" as "the church
service" while the minister means "the military service."
6: The question can mean "who's the (offensive) baserunncr on first?" or "who's
the (defensive) first baseman?" And in the Abbot & Costello routine, "Who" is
also the player s last name.
8: "Premises" can mean "logical assumptions" or "living quarters."
10: "Sound" can mean "logical valid" or "physical noise."
12: "Pronounce your sentence" can mean "utter your proposition" or decree your
punishment.
14: "Cares for" can man "physically takes care of" or "is emotionally attached to."
16: "Right" can mean the opposite of "left" or the opposite of "wrong."
18: To "love" violence is to enjoy it, even though it harms persons. To "love" in the
religious sense (charity, agape) is to will good, not harm, to other persons.
20: "Is" can be multiply equivocal: e.g. a copula ("Socrates is mortal"), an equation
("2+2 is 4"), a tautology ("x is not non-x"), a timeless truth ("justice is more
profitable than injustice"), a temporal truth ("Bush is President"), an assertion
of existence ("Though he died, he still is"), a fictional identity ("Hamlet is the
Prince of Denmark"), and many more.
22: The first "nothing" means "There is no thing that is . . ." The second "nothing"
means "nothingness" or "nothing at all." The first "nothing" begins a universal
negative proposition, the second "nothing" is a term.
Answers to pages 64-131
Page 83
2: dogmatic
4: uncritical and unreliable
6: uncritical appeal to the "expert"
8: reasonable if not dogmatic
10: reasonable on Islamic premises
Page 130,1 (These arc not, of course, the only possible good definitions, but samples.)
2: "an ordered body of knowledge through causes"; or "systematic, rational expla-
nation through evidence"
4: "reasoning from a universal premise to a conclusion that necessarily follows"
6: "the logical expression of judgment"; or "a statement with a subject and predi-
cate which can be true or false"
8: "an object of knowledge which in reality is an aspect of things rather than a thing,
but is considered by the mind apart from the real things in which it inheres"
10: as a category, "that which that exists only in a substance (thing) and not in
itself": as a predicable, "any predicate which is not the essence of its subject or
a necessary property of it"
12: "a statement of what a thing is, which distinguishes it from everything else"
14: "the mind's conformity to reality"
16: "the universal nature of a thing"
18: "a created spirit without a body"
20: "a large natural satellite of a star"
22: "part of speech designating a person, place or thing"; or "the subject of predi-
cation"
24: "the cessation of life"
26: "an artificial means of exchange of goods and services"
Page 131, II
A
2: essential, good
4: circular: "episcopal" is simply the adjective formed from "bishop"
6: negative and far too broad
8: negative
10: no genus (never define by "is when") and too narrow (some living things don't
breathe)
12: metaphorical
14: nominal, but too narrow (some people, though really secure, do not feel content)
and too broad (some people feel content without being secure)
16: metaphorical (literally, anyone can pronounce those two words) and too narrow
(is that all personality is? Is that all character is?). Clever, though.
18: too broad
20: circular ("round" means "circular" and "circular" means "round"), no genus (should
be "geometrical figure"), and too broad (wheels are not circles but arc round)
22: nominal; OK
374 ANSWERS TO EVEN-NUMBERED EXERCISES
24: OK; it distinguishes plants from animals, as the lack of reason distinguishes
brutes from humans
26: nominal; OK
28: OK (Is it essential or by final cause? Or both? Is its final cause an artifact's
essence?)
30: nominal; OK
32: metaphorical
34: no genus, negative, and too broad (also too narrow)
36: too broad
38: OK by property, since insanity is a disease of reason, which is proper to man
alone. However, animal psychologists speak of "psychosis" and "insanity" also
in higher animals using these words more broadly; and in this sense the defini-
tion is too broad.
40: too narrow; only one virtue (temperance, self-control, or moderation) does that
42: OK, by material cause
44: too broad (are there no bad laws from bad lawmakers?), too narrow (there are
some goods that bad lawmakers do not find acceptable, and some goods that are
irrelevant to lawmakers), and no genus
46: much too narrow (unless you are God)
48: a joke
50: nominal; OK
B (Page 132)
2: metaphorical
4: metaphorical
6: too narrow, also too broad (is addiction love?)
8: OK (by both efficient and final causc)
10: metaphorical and too broad (but it is probably not meant as a definition)
12: circular
14: within the context already defined in the Republic, OK; out of that context, too
broad
16: too broad and too narrow: the idea that there is a tunnel under the prison may be
true but quite inexpedient to the jailer; the idea that "everything is going to be
all right" may be expedient to a worried man yet untrue
18: too narrow; it excludes partial happiness ("all our desires"?), undesired happi-
ness ("surprised by joy"), and objectively real but not subjectively experienced
blessedness (like the wisdom that comes through suffering)
20: needlessly complex, long, and obscure
22: metaphorical
24: nominal
26: Too narrow, for nothing except God has liberty by this definition. If "impedi-
ment" is taken to mean "harmful impediment," the definition is too broad, for it
applies even to planets, raindrops, and fingernails.
28: Too broad: corpses, wimps, and hermits may also not inflict pain. Also too nar-
row: does it not inflict emotional pain to be told in a discreet and gentlemanly
way, "Excuse me sir, but your fly is open"?
Answers to pages 131-156 375
30: OK; but "knowledge" is also sometimes distinguished from "opinion" by Plato
himself (e.g. in the Meno).
32: Not, as it seems, nominal but real and even essential, if we use Einstcinian rather
than Newtonian physics. If gases and liquids are also "bodies," OK.
34: circular, also too narrow
36: too broad in principle but accurate in practice in America in 1992
38: if serious, too broad and too narrow (unless the colleagues in his department
consist of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit)
40: obscure and complex and also too broad, since evolution applies only to living
matter
C (page 135)
2: The first definition is rightly rejected as too broad (is it bigotry to be ccrtain that
2 + 2 = 4?); the second gives a property of bigotry but is probably too broad,
since it also covers a weak imagination.
4: This is similar to 2 and seems too broad because it also is true of intellectual
weakness, and even is true of certainty about self-evident propositions.
6: If this is a critique of a popular definition of humility, it is on target: humility is
a moral virtue, not an intellectual weakness (skepticism, or doubt about truth).
The popular notion of humility has the wrong genus, and confuses a moral
virtue with the lack of an intellectual virtue. However, "doubt about oneself" is
too broad to be a good definition of humility. Some self-doubt is extreme and
pathological: an emotional disorder at the opposite extreme from bigotry or
arrogance.
8: GKC shows that "limitation" is a property of art, and that "freedom" is ambigu-
ous: freedom from external, alien laws is compatible with art but "freedom"
from intrinsic, essential laws is not. But it is not a definition. No one of the three
concepts discussed (limitation, freedom, art) is a genus or a specific difference
of any other one.
10: In differentiating suicide and martyrdom by motive, this seems accurate.
However, if they are meant as definitions, the second seems too broad; for care
about someone outside himself may motivate a man to suicide, however fool-
ishly: e.g. the desire that his family get rich from his life insurance.
12: A valid critique of the attempt to conceive a "peasant" individualistically, but
this is not usually an error in definition but in sociology.
Pages 156-63
A (Page 156)
2: not a proposition, only one long term (no predicate)
4: All [Socrates] is [tw was a philosopher] We need to add the "tw" ("that which")
only because we need to include the past tense in the predicate; ordinarily we do
not need to add "tw" or a "twi" (that which is") if we already have a noun.
6: AH [I] am [tw itches]
8: All [things which are not the observer of every thing in the universe] are [things
in the universe] and No [observer of every thing in the universe] is [a thing in
the universe]
376 ANSWERS TO EVEN-NUMBERED EXERCISES
10: Sonic [gamblers] arc [tw are just lucky] and Some [gamblers] are not [tw are
lucky]
12: All [Alexander the Great] is [tw was Aristotle's student]
14: All [tw know that everyone is a fraud] are [frauds]
B (Page 156)
2: All [charity] is [tw begins at home]
4: not a proposition; a performative sentence
6: not a proposition: an imperative followed by an interrogative
8: If all [you] are [tw continues to turn the crank of that torture rack], then all [you]
are [tw will in all probability detach all four of my limbs from their sockets]. The
ncxt-to-last words of the Stoic philosopher; his words were "Sec? I told you so."
10: All [he who jest at scars] is [he who never felt a wound]
12: All [men] arc [good judges of their own interests]
14: All [loose lips] arc [tw sink ships]
16: All [tw this country needs] is [a good five cent cigar]
18: No [history] is [tw ever repeats itself]
20: not a proposition; a performative sentence
22: All [tw man has done] is [tw man can do]
24: All [he who laughs last] is [he who laughs best]
26: No [tw is morally wrong] is [tw can be politically right]
C (Page 157)
2: All [a good talker] is [tw implies a good audicncc even more than a good orator
does]
4: If All [we] arc [tw trample our vices underfoot] then All [we] are [tw make a lad-
der of our vices]
6: No [tw do not complain] arc [tw are ever pitied] OR:
All [tw do not complain] are [tw arc never pitied]
8: All [the world] is [a looking glass] and All [the world] is [tw gives back to every
man the reflection of his own face]
10: All [tw can understand the greatness of the past] are [the adventurous] OR:
No [tw are not adventurous] are [tw can understand the greatness of the past]
12: All [they] are [tw were born of the sun] and All [they] are [tw traveled a brief
while toward the sun] and All [they] arc [tw left the vivid air singed with their
honor]
14: All [work] is [the curse of the drinking class]
16: Some [books] are [tw is to be tasted] and Some [books] arc [tw is to be swal-
lowed] and Some [books] arc [tw is to be chewed and digested]
18: If All [Cleopatra's nose] is [tw had been longer] then All [the history of the
world] is [tw would have been changed]
20: All [happy families] arc [tw resemble one another] and All [unhappy families]
are [tw are unhappy in their own fashion]
22: No [running when you are on the wrong road] is [tw is of use] (This is a rhetor-
ical question, which is really a proposition, a declaration, not an interrogative.)
Answers to pages 156-159 377
24: Either All [death] is [a state of nothingness and utter unconsciousness) or All [a
change and migration of the soul from this world to another] is [rwi real].
(Existential proposition; no predicate, unless we add 'real/)
26: All [it] is [tw was brillig] and All [the slithy toves] are [tw did gyre and gimble
in the wabe] and All [the borogoves] are [tw were mimsy] and All [the mome
raths] arc [tw were outgrabe]
28: All [tw is necessary for the triumph of evil] is [for good men to do nothing]
30: No propositions; all imperatives (commands), except the last: All [rw can pro-
cure future Honor] is [Virtue and Wisdom]
32: All [the silken, sad, uncertain rustling of each purple curtain] is [tw thrilled me]
34: All [1] am [tw never had a job] and All [I] am [tw just always played baseball]
36: All [man] is [tw was created a little lower than the angels] and All [man] is [tw
has been getting a little lower ever since]
38: No [time before this time] is [one in which so much has been owed by so many
to so few]
D (Page 159)
2: All [tw speak or act with an impure mind] are [tw are followed by trouble as the
ox that draws the cart is followed by the wheel] and All [tw speak or act with a
pure mind] are [tw are followed by happiness as you are followed by your shad-
ow] OR:
If All [you] are [tw speak or act with an impure mind] then All [you] are [tw
will be followed by trouble as the ox that draw the cart is followed by the
wheel] and if All [you] arc [tw speak or act with a pure mind] then All [you]
are [tw will be followed by happiness as you are followed by your shadow]
4: All [the fool who knows he is a fool] is [tw is that much wiser] and All [the fool
who thinks he is wise] is [a fool indeed]
6: All [tw are slow to do good] are [tw are caught by the mind delighting in mis-
chief] OR:
If All [you] are [twi slow to do good] then AH [the mind, delighting in mischief]
is [tw will catch you] "Be quick to be good" is am imperative.
8: All [hurt] is [tw rebounds]
10: All [ignorant men] are [oxen]; All [ignorant men] are [tw grow in size, not wis-
dom] (This is two propositions connected not by "if" or "either" or "and" but by
an implied "bccause." It is an abbreviated form of argument, called an cnthy-
meme, which you will Icam to evaluate later.)
12: If All [you] are [tw let go of winning and losing] then All [you] are [tw will find
joy] OR:
All [tw let go of winning] are [tw will find joy]
14: No [the way] is [twi in the sky] and All [the way] is [twi in the heart] OR:
All [the way] is [twi not in the sky] and All [the way] is [twi in the heart] OR:
All [the way] is [twi not in the sky but in the heart]
E(Page 159)
2: All [the uses of adversity] arc [twi sweet]
4: All [cowards] are [tw die many times before their deaths] and All [the valiant]
378 ANSWERS TO EVEN-NUMBERED EXERCISES
F (Page 161)
2. No [thoroughly worldly people] are [those who ever understand the world]
4. No [men] are [those who loved Rome because she was great] and All [Rome] is
[tw was great bccausc they had loved her]
6. All [great classics] arc [tw one can praise without having read]
8. All [logic is [a machine of the mind] and if All [logic] is [twi used honestly],
then All [logic] is [tw ought to bring out an honest conclusion]
G (Page 162)
2. All [the poor in spirit] are [tw arc blessed]
4. If All [God] is [tw so clothes the grass of the field . . .]
then All [God] is [tw will much more clothe you]
(The proposition is a "rhetorical question.")
6. All [tw a man sows] is [tw he shall also reap]
8. All [tw are not with me] are [tw are against me]
10. No [good tree] is [tw can bring forth evil fruit]
12. If all [1] am [tw speak with tongues of men and of angels but have not love]
then All [I] am [a noisy gong or a clanging cymbal]
14. This interrogative sentence is not a proposition, but it contains a proposition:
All [she] is [tw lookcth forth as the morning, etc.]
16. not a propositon; a wish
18. All [things] are [tw work together for good for them who love God], OR
All [tw love God] are [those for whom all things work together for good]
Page 164
2: c
4: d
6: b
8: a
Pages 171-72
A
2: Some [tw eat little fish] are [bigger fish]
4: No [hero to his valet] is [a man]
6: You can't validly convert an O.
8: No [tw ends] is [love]
B
2: No [bigger fish] are [tw do not cat little fish]
4: All [men] are [non-heroes to their valets]
6: Some [tw glitters] is [non-gold]
380 ANSWERS TO E VE N- NUMBE RE D EXERCISES
8: All [love] is [tw never ends] OR, if this was your original form. No [love] is [tw
ever ends]
2. Partial contrapositive: No [tw do not eat little fish] arc [bigger fish]; Full contra-
positive: All [tw do not eat little fish] arc [twi not bigger fish]. Partial inverse: Some
[tw cat little fish] are not [twi not bigger Fish]; Full inverse: O does not convert.
4. Partial contrapositive: Some [twi not heroes to their valets] are [men]; Full con-
trapositive: Some [twi not heroes to their valets] are not [non-men]. Partial
inverse: All [heroes to their valets] are [non-men]; Full inverse: Some [non-men]
are [heroes to their valets].
6. Partial contrapositive: Some [non-gold] is [tw glitters]; Full contrapositivc:
Some [non-gold] is not [tw does not glitter]. No inverses; O does not convert.
8. Partial contrapositive: No [tw ever ends] is [love]; Full contrapositive: All [tw
ever ends] is [non-love]. Partial inverse: Some [tw never ends] is not [non-love];
no full inverse; O does not convert.
E
2: valid: first an obversion, then a conversion (thus a partial contraposition)
4: invalid conversion of an O
6: valid conversion of an I
Page 174
2. Some [flowers] are [twi born to bloom unseen] vs. No [flowers] arc [twi bom to
bloom unseen]
4: AH [things of beauty] are [a joy forever] vs. Some [things of beauty] arc not [a
joy forever]
6: Some [fair faces] are [tw may be a foul bargain] vs. No [fair faces] are [tw may
be a foul bargain]
8: Some [slips between the cup and the lip] are [twi real] vs. No [slips between the
cup and the lip] arc [twi real] (Existential propositions can also contradict each
other.)
10: all [tw deserve the fair] are (tw are brave] vs. some [tw are non-brave] are [tw
deserve the fair].
12. All [tw deserve the fair] arc [twi brave] vs. Some [tw deserve the fair] are not
[twi brave].
Pages 178-79
A
2: Some [thing new under the sun] is [twi real] OR: Some [thing under the sun] is
[twi new]
4: No [men] are [those who hate by morning what they love by night]
B
2: valid
4: valid
6: invalid
C
2: false
Answers to pages / 72-235 381
4: true
6: false
8: unknown (not an opposition; an illicit conversion)
Page 199
2: false
4: false
6: false
8: false
10: false
12: false
14: false
16: true (for in a valid argument, true premises necessitate a true conclusion)
18: true
20: false
Page 205
2: formal (argument or explanation)
4: efficient (explanation)
6: material (argument)
8: material (explanation)
10: material or efficient (explanation)
12: final (explanation)
14: final (explanation) [a magnet does not push but pulls, by attraction]
16: formal (argument)
Page 219
2: true
4: false
6: true
8: true
10: false (only 2 terms and 2 propositions)
Page 234
A
2: invalid
4 valid
6: valid
8: invalid
10: invalid
Page 235
B
2: Some great men are political nonconformists.
No political nonconformists are patriotic.
Therefore some great men are not patriotic.
4: Somebody passed wind.
All who passed wind, farted.
Therefore somebody farted.
382 ANSWERS TO E V E N - N U M B E R E D EXERCISES
Page 236
C
2 Whatever can be created by our imag- What is argued about is not subjec-
ination is subjective. tive.
Beauty can be created by our imagi- Beauty is argued about.
nation. Therefore beauty is not subjective.
Therefore beauty is subjective.
4: Whatever is defined differently by What Hows from man's essence does
different societies, changes with time not change with time and place.
and place. Moral rightness flows from man's
Moral rightness is defined differently essence.
by different societies. Therefore moral rightness does not
Therefore moral Tightness changes change with time and placc.
with time and place
6: Man is created by God Man is naturally selfish.
Whatever is created by God is essen- What is naturally selfish is not essen-
tially good tially good.
Therefore man is essentially good Therefore man is not essentially good.
8: Capital punishment is a practice of Capital punishment harms its victims.
justice Whatever harms its victims is not
Whatever is a practice of justice is morally right.
morally right Therefore capital punishment is not
Therefore capital punishment is morally right.
morally right
Page 253
A
2: valid
4: invalid: Illicit Major
6. valid (if you obvert one of the premises to avoid two negative premises)
8: valid
10: valid (translate the second premise as an A, not an E, both to avoid two negative
premises and to get a common term with the first premise)
12: valid
14: invalid: Illicit Minor
16: invalid: Undistributed Middle
18: invalid: four terms (Jill, John, tw loves John, and tw loves Jesus)
Answers to pages 235-254 383
Page 254
B
2: All [mercy] is [sorrow]
No [sorrow] is [twi in God]
Therefore no [mercy] is [twi in God]: valid
"But 'sorrow' is used ambiguously: there is the act of sorrow (a will) in mercy,
but here is no passive sorrow (a passion, or emotion) in God," Aquinas explains.
4: Some [subjects that tend to withdraw the mind from pursuits of a low nature] are
[twi useful]
No [classical learning] is [a subject that tends to withdraw the mind . . . etc.]
Therefore no [classical learning] is [twi useful]: invalid; Illicit Major
6: All [happiness] is [twi desired as an end and never as a means]
All [pleasure] is [twi desired as an end and never as a means]
Therefore all [happiness] is [pleasure] : invalid: Undistnbuted M.ddle
8: No [apes] are [angels]
SSSSBSS-
10: All [animals] are [bodies]
~
All [you] arc [an animal]
Therefore All [you] are [a body]: valid
All [you] are [a body] .x
And all [stones] arc [bodies] (first premise mentioned)
Therefore all [you] are [a stone] : invalid; Undistributed Middle
12: All [rational beings] are [responsible beings]
No [brute animals] are [respons.ble beings]
Therefore no [brute animals] are [rational beings]. valid
14: All [knowledge] is [tw comes from s e n s o r y impression ]
No [sensory impression] is [twi o su s^a ; invalid: four terms ("That
Therefore no [knowledge] is [twi o s "sensory impres-
which comes from sensory impressions is not the sam
ev
16: AnTfighting against neighbors;| is J jns, n c i g h b o r s ]
All Ifi&hting against the ThebansJ is [\ i b
AM [fighting a'gainst the Thebans] is [tw. evil]: valid
18: No [after-image] is [twi in physical space] ^
All [the brain process] is [twi in p y t c s s ] ; valid
Therefore no [the after-image] is I h o f t h c p o c t to their hearers]
Therefore no [morals] are [twi derived from reason] : Invalid: four terms (That
which is derived from reason is not the same as reason alone.)
24: No [metaphysical sentence] is [either a tautology or an empirical hypothesis]
All [significant, meaningful propositions] arc [either tautologies or empirical
hypotheses]
Therefore no [metaphysical sentences] are [significant, meaningful proposi-
tions] : valid
(But this "verification principle" of "Logical Positivism" is self-contradictory,
for it itself is neither a tautology nor an empirical hypothesis, therefore it is by
its own criterion meaningless and insignificant.)
26: All [friendship] is [love]
All [love] is [tw has three objects]
Therefore all [friendship] is [tw is of three kinds] : Invalid, four terms as it
stands.
However, it is an enthymeme with the implied premise "Whatever has three
objects, is of three kinds," and when this is added, we have two valid syllogisms.
28: AH [existence] is [a perfection]
No [perfections] are [twi lacking in God]
Therefore no [existence] is [twi lacking in God] : valid
OR:
All [God] is [tw lacks no perfection]
All [tw lacks no perfection] is [tw docs not lack existence]
Therefore all [God] is [tw does not lack existence] : valid
However, the argument merely proves that if the concept, or nature, or defini-
tion, of God is to lack no perfection, and therefore not to lack existence either,
then we can conclude only that the concept of God cannot lack existence; we
cannot conclude that God in fact exists. If wc begin only with a concept (4God*),
we end only with a concept ('God'); if wc want to end with more than a concept
(God without the quotation marks), we must begin with more than a conccpt
(God without the quotation marks), but that would be begging the question in
assuming a real God. You cannot prove God from 'God' without committing the
fallacy of four terms. You need other facts to prove the fact of God. A second
problem w ith the argument is the confusion of existence with essence: perfec-
tions are qualities of an essence. Existence is not a perfection but the precondi-
tion for or actualization of all perfections.
30: Some [twi south] is [twi west]
And some [twi west] is [twi north]
Therefore some [twi south] is [twi north] : invalid. Undistributed Middle and
two particular premises. ("Can be" means "Some is.")
Page 271
2: All [tw makes the world go round] is [tw does not make it go flat]
All [love] is [tw makes the world go round]
Therefore all [love] is [tw does not make it go flat] : valid
Answers to pages 254-271 385
OR:
No [tw makes the world go round] is [tw makes it go Hat]
All [love] is [tw makes the world go round]
Therefore no [love] is [tw makes it go flat] : valid
4: No [act of will] is [an emotion]
All [love] is [an act of will]
Therefore no [love] is [an emotion] : valid
6: No [tw has no wheels] is [tw can be moved]
All [mountains] are [tw have no wheels]
Therefore no [mountains] are [tw can be moved] : valid
8: All [tw deserve the fair] are [twi brave]
No [you] are [twi brave]
Therefore no [you] are [twi deserve the fair] valid (third order enthymemc)
10: No [tw did not have enough food to fulfill the needs of a warm blooded animal]
is [a warm blooded animal]
All [dinosaurs] are [tw did not have enough food to fulfill the needs of a warm
blooded animal]
Therefore no [dinosaurs] are [warm blooded animals] : valid
12: All [those whose views were always incompatible with those of the existing
societies which they wanted to overthrow] are [those who have always been
social radicals]
All [Marxists] are [those whose views were always incompatible with those of
the existing societies which they wanted to overthrow]
Therefore all [Marxists] are [those who have always been social radicals]: valid
14: All [Bull-friendly sets] are [conclusions of Bulls equation]
No [null sets] are [Bull-friendly sets]
Therefore all [conclusions of Bulls equation] are [null sets] : invalid; affirma-
tive conclusion from negative premise, whichever implied premise we add
16: All [the one to whom the center is hiking the ball] is [the quarterback]
All [Bub] is [the one to whom the center is hiking the ball]
Therefore all [Bub] is [the quarterback] : valid
18: All [I] am [twi loved by God]
No [twi loved by God] is [junk] *<-
No [I] am [junk] : valid
20: All [restrictions on abortion] are [restrictions on a woman's right to control her
own body]
All [restrictions on a woman's right to control her own body] are [twi wTong]
Therefore all [restrictions on abortion] arc [twi wrong] : valid
(NB most of these arguments can be put into valid form; the main practical use
of doing so is not find fallacies, since these are relatively rare, but to smoke out
the logically necessary assumptions. The first premise here implies that abortion
is controlling the mother's body, not the baby's.)
22: No [tw commit suicide] are [twi happy]
Some [twi rich] are [tw commit suicide]
Therefore some [twi rich] are not [twi happy]: valid
386 ANSWERS TO EVEN-NUMBERED EXERCISES
44: All [tw wc can explain] is [tw we can reduce to laws whose object can be given
in some possible experience]
No [freedom] is [tw we can reduce to laws whose object can be given in some
possible experience]
Therefore no [freedom] is [tw we can explain] valid
46: All [tw occurs] is [tw God wills to occur]
All [evil] is [tw occurs]
Therefore all [evil] is [tw God wills to occur]: valid (But which term is ambiguous?)
48: All [those with whom Thou art] are [ones who will fear no evil]
All [I] am [one with whom Thou art]
Therefore all [I] am [one who will fear no evil] : valid
50: All [tw should be invited to international conferences] are [tw have legions]
No [the Pope] is [tw has legions]
Therefore no [the Pope] is [tw should be invited to international conferences] :
valid
Or, more simply (nearly every syllogism can be recast into an AAA syllogism):
All [tw have no legions] are [tw should not be invited to international confer-
ences]
All [the Pope] is [tw has no legions]
Therefore all [the Pope] is [tw should not be invited to international confer-
ences] : valid
52: All [tw copies nothing] is [tw copies life]
All [art] is [tw copies nothing]
Therefore all [art] is [tw copics life] : the main syllogism is valid
It is, however, very difficult to put the rest of the argument into a syllogism.
Clearly, the fact that "life copies nothing" is the reason why "That which copies
nothing, copies life" And the point seems right. But if we put it into a syllogism
it will come out fallacious.
All [life] is [tw copies nothing]
Therefore all [tw copies nothing] is [tw copies life]
We already have an illicit minor. We also need to connect the two terms "life"
and "tw copies life" in the implied premise. But Chesterton's point is that life
does not copy life. It is a clever logical paradox that will apparently not go into
a valid syllogism. Can you make it do so?
54: All [tw are at the head of something with which she can do as she likes] are [tw
arc in the more powerful position]
All [women] arc [tw are at the head of something with which she can do as she
likes]
Therefore ail [women] are [tw are in the more powerful position] : valid
56: All [things that arc never presented otherwise than as a phenomenon] are [things
I know not]
All [things in themselves] are [things that are never presented otherwise than as
a phenomenon]
Therefore all [things in themselves] are [things I know not]: valid
388 ANSWERS TO EVEN-NUMBERED EXERCISES
58: All [tw assert nothing] are [twi neither true nor false]
All [metaphysical propositions] are [tw assert nothing]
Therefore all [metaphysical propositions] are [twi neither true nor false]: valid
(NB in this case it is the expressed premise rather than the implied premise that
is false.)
60: This is not a syllogism but an immediate inference, a contraposition (assuming
that 'belonging to no one' and 'not property' are the same term):
No [twi untouched by human work] is [property]
Therefore all [property] is [twi is touched by human work]
62: All [tw gives you the chance to love, etc.] is [tw you should be glad of]
All [life] is [tw gives you the chance to love, etc.]
Therefore all [life] is [tw you should be glad of]: valid (Literally, the conclusion
is an imperative, not a declarative, sentence. But it is argued for: it is followed
by the premise indicator 'because.')
64: All [tw God has made for Himself] are [those whose hearts are restless until they
rest in God]
All [we] are [tw God has made for Himself]
Therefore all [we] are [those whose hearts are restless until they rest in God] :
valid, but explanation not argument (like #57)
66: All [animals that laugh and weep] are [animals that are struck by the difference
between what things are and what things ought to be]
All [animals that are struck by the difference between what things are and what
things ought to be] are [men]
Therefore all [animals that laugh and weep] arc [men] : valid; explanation by
efficient cause (being struck by this difference moves us to laugh and weep)
68: All [pleasure and pain] are [tw we cease from at the same time]
No [good and evil] are [tw we case from at the same time]
Therefore no [pleasure and pain] are [good and evil] : valid
70: All [tw made many plain people] is [tw loves plain people]
All [God] is [tw made many plain people]
Therefore all [God] is [tw loves plain people] : valid; OR:
All [twi many] is [twi loved by God]
All [plain people] arc [twi many]
Therefore all [plain people] are [twi loved by God] : valid
Page 282
2. Some [lizards] are not [tw bite]
All [lizards are [reptiles]
T h e r e f o r e S o m e f r e p t i l e s ] a r e not [tw b i t e ]
<Cnd All [reptiles] are f s n a k e s Q
T h e r e f o r e S o m e [ s n a k e s ] are not [tw b i t e ]
rh
Valid bill OP'Y " ' T H GILDED PREMISE wh'
4<^irftvvlaugh at my bad puns] are [tw love meT!II>
All [she] is [tw laughed at my bad puns]
T h e r e f o r e all [she] is [ t w loves m e ]
Answers to pages 271-285 389
Page 285
2:
4:
390 ANSWERS TO EVEN-NUMBERED EXERCISES
6:
8:
10:
Answers to pages 285-299 391
12.
14:
Page 299
2: Denying the Consequent; a valid enthymemc, with the implied premise "light
does not possess momentum"
4: An enthymeme with the second premise and the conclusion implied. Valid,
Denying the Consequent:
If [the objective of marriage were contentment then the discontent of either
party would be a sufficient reason for ending it
But it is not true that the discontent of either party is a sufficient reason for end-
ing it
Therefore it is not true that the objective of marriage is contentment
392 ANSWERS TO EVEN-NUMBERED EXERCISES
p 3-q
q
~p valid: Denying the Consequent
14: p = God docs not exist
q = we feel so alone that we arc unable to endure a universe without Him
p=>q
q
p invalid: Affirming the Consequent
16: p = I eat chocolates
q = I get migraines
pz>q
q
p invalid: AfTirming the Consequent
18: p = there is confidence in promises
q = the greatest part of our conduct proceeds upon chance
r = men are obliged to perform their promises
~p=>q
-v z> ~p
~ r D q valid: pure hypothetical syllogism
20: p = mankind understands the power of love
q = man builds noble temples and altars and offers solemn sacrifices in his honor
Answers to pages 299-302. 393
pz>q
~q
~p valid: Denying the Consequent
22: p = I am great
q = I am misunderstood
pz>q
q
/. p invalid: Affirming the Consequent
NB this can also be put into a categorical syllogism as follows:
All [twi great] are (twi misunderstood]
All [I] am [twi misunderstood]
Therefore all [I] am [twi great] invalid: Undistributed Middle
24: p = men are angels
q = no government is necessary
p=>q
~P
~q invalid: Denying the Antecedent (But perhaps it is not meant as an
cnthymeme, i.e. not an argument at all, but as an explanation of why government
is necessary by contrasting the real situation and an ideal situation, in which men
are angels).
26: p = I cherished iniquity in my heart
q = God listened to my prayer
p=>~q
q
- p valid: Denying the Consequent
Page 302
2: p = the professor's Theory of General Insanity is true
q = I am insane
pvq
~P
~q (invalid)
4: p = human authority is natural
q = human authority is conventional
pvq
~P
\ q (valid)
6: p = a tail is there
q = a tail isn't there
pvq
~P
q (valid)
394 ANSWERS TO EVEN-NUMBERED EXERCISES
Page 305
2: p = vampires are undead
q = vampires are dead
r = vampires are alive
-[p & q]
P
^q (valid)
-[q&r]
r (invalid) "Dead" and "alive" may not be the only two possibilities.
4: p = Plato is objectively reasoning about love
q = Plato is subjectively experiencing love
r = Plato has a right to philosophize about love
~[P & q]
p
~q (valid)
^ q D ~ r (You could argue that this is a false premise.)
~q
-T (valid: Affirming the Antecedent)
6: No [disjunction] is [conjunction]
All [disjunction] is [twi exclusive]
No [conjunction] is [twi exclusive] invalid: illicit major
Page 311
2: p = culture is profound and noble
q = culture remains rare
r = culture is common
s = culture becomes mean
(p => q) & (r z> s)
p v r (implied premise of the enthymeme)
q v s (implied conclusion)
Answer: One could take it by the horns and deny that common culture must
become mean. Or one could escape between the horns and embrace a sort of
compromise culture just common enough to escape rarity and just noble enough
to escape meanness.
4: p = a man knows what he is inquiring about
q = a man has need to inquire
r = a man can inquire
(p 3 -q) & (~p 3 ~r)
p v~p
v ~r
Answers to pages 305-311 395
Plato himself escapes between the horns of this dilemma in the Meno by con-
tending that a man can inquire by "remembering" what he has forgotten. We
might call this making implicit knowledge explicit, or raising unconscious
knowledge to the level of consciousness. "Know" is ambiguous.
6: p = these books agree with the Qur'an
q = these books are superfluous
r = these books are heretical
s = these books should be burned
(p => q) & (~p 3 r)
p v-p
.'.q v r
(q => s) & (r 3 s)
qvr
s
One could take it by a horn: a book can "agree with" the Qur'an without being
superfluous: e.g. helpful commentaries on it. One can also escape between the
horns: a book of geography, e.g. neither agrees nor disagrees with the Qur'an.
Finally, one can take the second dilemma by the horns and say that there are bet-
ter things to do with superfluous or heretical books than burning them: e.g.
heretical books can be argued against and refuted. Muhammad would not have
approved Omar's act or his reason for it.
8: p = the reader knows how to read a book before reading How to Read a Book
q = How to Read a Book is superfluous
r = How to Read a Book is unreadable
(p => q) & (~p => r)
Pv-p
qvr
Adler himself would escape between these horns. His book is not for those who
cannot read at all, nor is it for those who can read as well as he can, but for those
in the middle. In other words, the term 'read' is used ambiguously.
10: p = the conclusion of a deduction contains something new that is not in the
premises
q = the deduction is useless
r = the deduction is logically invalid
One could escape between the horns since a conclusion can be validly implied
by the premises but not explicitly known until deduction shows it. It can be psy-
chologically new without being logically new. See also pages 222-30.
396 ANSWERS TO EVEN-NUMBERED EXERCISES
Page 317
2: Descartes s data base for his generalization is extremely tiny: only one example!
4: First, it is not at all clear, or agreed, that these are relevant examples of oppres-
sion. Most individuals in these relationships did not feel oppressed. Second, they
are only professional and economic relationships: there are many other kinds.
6: The inductive generalization can be corroborated by ordinary experience. Its
conclusion is put in the sentence beginning with "It looks, in fact, very much as
i f . . ."The following hypothetical syllogism beginning with "And there would
be no sense . . i s illustrated, in the same sentence, by the analogy of football,
and the analogy specifics the common principle: agreement about the rules. This
too seems corroborated by experience.
Page 333
2: Relevant differences include the following: 1) "Semitic" is a racial adjective;
"American" is not. 2) "Anti-Zionism" does not always seek the abolition of Israel:
sometimes it seeks only equal sovereignty for Palestine. 3) No one makes any
Answers to pages 311-333 397
Pages 336-341
Sample of Logical Analysis of the "Exercise on Nearly Everything"
1. T s conclusion ("I guess that proves . . . " ) is a non sequitur and a hasty general-
ization (look them up).
2. The implied syllogism here is:
All (part of me) is (my people).
All (my people) are (insulted by your complimenting me).
Therefore all (part of me) is (insulted by your complimenting me).
3. T distinguishes individuals from the "system"; and implicitly accuses F of the
fallacy of division (predicating of individuals what is said of a group); but a
"system" is not a group of individuals but a set of laws and customs.
4. This is simply a direct question and a direct answer. It might be accused of beg-
ging the question though.
5. T's "everybody knows" is an argurnentum adpopulam.
6. F's reply is an ad hominem.
7. This is F's thesis, or conclusion, which F and T will argue about.
8. "True for you" is meaningless patronizing, as F shows with her argument:
If something is not true, it cannot be true for you.
And this is not true.
Therefore it cannot be "true for you."
9.T's syllogism is: All love is great;
All your love for your society is love;
Therefore all your love for your society is great.
Perhaps implied is also:
Some love is blind;
All love is great;
Therefore some of what is blind is great.
10. F disagrees with T's "love is blind" premise.
T tries to prove it with the following sylloism:
Whatever makes you blind to injustice, is blind.
Your love of your society makes you blind to injustice.
Therefore your love of your society is blind.
And your love of your society is love.
Therefore some love is blind.
11. F uses a disjunctive syllogism.
p = Iraq is one of the most just societies on Earth.
q = I'm as blind to injustice as a bat is to the sun.
p vq
not q
therefore p
Answers to pages 336-341