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The Local Role in Homeland Security: Committee On Governmental Affairs United States Senate

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S. Hrg.

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THE LOCAL ROLE IN HOMELAND SECURITY

HEARING
BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

DECEMBER 11, 2001

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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TED STEVENS, Alaska
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MAX CLELAND, Georgia PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
JOYCE A. RECHTSCHAFFEN, Staff Director and Counsel
KATHRYN SEDDON, Counsel
MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Professional Staff Member
HANNAH S. SISTARE, Minority Staff Director and Counsel
WILLIAM M. OUTHIER, Minority Investigative Counsel
DARLA D. CASSELL, Chief Clerk

(II)
CONTENTS

Opening statements: Page


Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 1
Senator Thompson ............................................................................................ 3
Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 4
Senator Levin .................................................................................................... 18
Senator Domenici ............................................................................................. 29
Senator Cleland ................................................................................................ 34
Prepared statement:
Senator Bunning ............................................................................................... 57

WITNESSES

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 11, 2001


Hon. Marc H. Morial, Mayor, City of New Orleans, Louisiana and President,
U.S. Conference of Mayors .................................................................................. 6
Hon. Javier Gonzales, Commissioner, Santa Fe County, New Mexico and
President, National Association of Counties (NACo) ........................................ 8
Jay Fisette, Chairman, Arlington County Board, Virginia .................................. 11
Richard J. Sheirer, Director, Office of Emergency Management, New York
City Mayors Office ............................................................................................... 13
John D. White, Jr., Director, Tennessee Emergency Management Agency ........ 16
Chief William B. Berger, President, International Association of Chiefs of
Police ..................................................................................................................... 36
Michael C. Caldwell, M.D., M.P.H., Commissioner of Health, Dutchess County
Department of Health, New York, on behalf of the National Association
of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO) ............................................... 39
Michael J. Crouse, Chief of Staff for the General President, International
Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) .................................................................... 42
Major General Joseph E. Tinkham, II, Adjutant General of Maine and Com-
missioner of the Maine Department of Defense, Veterans and Emergency
Management ......................................................................................................... 44

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES


Berger, Chief William B.:
Testimony .......................................................................................................... 36
Prepared statement with an attachment ....................................................... 118
Caldwell, Michael C. M.D., M.P.H.:
Testimony .......................................................................................................... 39
Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 129
Crouse, Michael J.:
Testimony .......................................................................................................... 42
Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 144
Fisette, Jay:
Testimony .......................................................................................................... 11
Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 93
Gonzales, Hon. Javier:
Testimony .......................................................................................................... 8
Prepared statement with an attachment ....................................................... 83
Morial, Hon. Marc H.:
Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6
Prepared statement with an attachment ....................................................... 58
Sheirer, Richard J.:
Testimony .......................................................................................................... 13
Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 96
(III)
IV
Page
Tinkham, Major General Joseph E., II:
Testimony .......................................................................................................... 44
Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 150
White, John D., Jr.:
Testimony .......................................................................................................... 16
Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 109

APPENDIX
Ellen M. Gordon, Administrator/Homeland Security Advisor, Iowa Emergency
Management Division, prepared statement ....................................................... 155
The National Association of Regional Councils, prepared statement ................. 162
The United Jewish Communities and The Jewish Federations of North Amer-
ica, prepared statement ....................................................................................... 165
THE LOCAL ROLE IN HOMELAND SECURITY

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 11, 2001

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ONGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:06 a.m., in room
SD342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieber-
man, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lieberman, Cleland, Carper, Levin, Thompson,
Collins, and Domenici.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN
Chairman LIEBERMAN. The hearing will come to order. Good
morning to everyone. Thanks for being here and being here a bit
early. I apologize that Washington traffic made me a few minutes
late.
It is a pleasure to welcome everyone to todays hearing on the
local role in homeland security, which is part of an ongoing series
of hearings by the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee in-
tended to both oversee and, hopefully, improve the Federal Govern-
ments response to the urgent set of terrorist threats our country
and our people now face.
On September 11, as we watched the attacks with horror and
disbelief, we also, fortunately, were able to watch with increasing
appreciation and admiration as local and State governments rose
to this extraordinary occasion to protect and serve their people.
That response, I think, dramatically demonstrated what is true no
matter the nature of the emergency or the size of the locality. In
Americas war against terrorism, it is city, county, and State gov-
ernments and their workers who will bear the primary responsi-
bility for providing our citizens the safety and services that they
need.
The local role, of course, is much deeper and broader than emer-
gency response. State, county, and city agencies are the primary
providers of public health, transportation, and social support serv-
ices, and as the daily law enforcement presence in our commu-
nities, they play a lead role in helping to prevent terrorist acts
from happening in the first place.
After September 11, all of this means that in order to fight ter-
rorism effectively, counties, cities, and States need not only new
technology, training, and talent, they need new funding. This
morning, the U.S. Conference of Mayors is releasing a detailed in-
ventory of the needs it has identified. The National Governors As-
sociation and the National Association of Counties have recently
(1)
2

issued similar reports. The governors, in fact, estimate that the


cost to our States of guarding against threats to the public health
and critical infrastructure will be approximately $4 billion in the
coming fiscal year, and county officials have suggested the need for
a new $3 billion Federal block grant for localities to meet these
challenges.
This morning, we want to talk as much about improving methods
and relationships as about providing money. This Committee wants
to learn what Federal policies, practices, and procedures should be
put in place to help States and localities do their job better, and
in what ways can we, all branches of government, work together
to meet and defeat the terrorist threat. Our goal is to leverage the
strengths of each branch and level of government so that we are
doing everything in our power to protect our people against ter-
rorism, and if the terrorists do strike again, that we will be able
to count on a swift, sure, and seamless response.
From recent events, we have reason to be proud of the role that
has been played, but also reason to acknowledge that we have some
way to go in the coordination of government responses to terrorism
at the various levels. Too often in responding to the homeland secu-
rity threats we have faced so far, the Federal and local govern-
ments have not worked hand-in-hand but have tripped over each
others feet.
A number of local officials, for instance, have expressed great
frustration with what they perceive as a lack of information shar-
ing by the FBI, although I am pleased to note and I will be inter-
ested to hear from the local officials today that FBI Director
Mueller has convened an advisory group of State and local law en-
forcement officials and indicated a willingness to speed up security
clearances for local officials and to establish more joint terrorism
task forces.
Similar gaps and communication breaches were revealed during
the response to the anthrax attack. The CDC and other Federal
agencies, including the Office of Homeland Security, the Secretary
of HHS, and the Post Office seemed to send inconsistent, certainly
confusing messages to States, counties, and cities, and, I might
add, even to Members of Congress.
There was a very interesting article in yesterdays New York
Times about what we are holding the hearing on this morning, and
I quote this sentence from it: For all the calls to vigilance in a do-
mestic defense drive like no other, many State and local govern-
ments are starting to balk because of the costs and the frustration
over what they see as the Federal Governments confusing stream
of intelligence information and security alerts. Whether or not this
feeling remains on the front page, the fact is that all levels of our
government need to get on the same page and to do so without
delay.
The challenge is exacerbated, I think, by the approach to
counterterrorism that is being taken at the Federal level, an ap-
proach that I believe would be greatly improved by the creation of
a full-fledged cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security with
clear lines of authority and the power to get things done.
Until that happens, the Office of Homeland Security under Gov-
ernor Ridge, as it is constituted now, has the primary responsi-
3

bility, and I certainly hope and believe that Governor Ridge, be-
cause of his experience at the State level, will act in a way that
makes clear that he knows that State and local governments have
to sit as equals at the table of anti-terrorist planning with the Fed-
eral Government. Encouragingly, Governor Ridge, in fact, has an-
nounced his intention to form a State and local government com-
mittee to advise the Office of Homeland Security, and that, I think,
is the first good step.
I hope we on this Committee across party lines can be advocates
here in Congress for local government efforts, so that from the
grassroots to the top of the Federal organizational tree, we are all
working together to make the ground on which Americans live and
work as safe and secure as possible.
I will just say a final word in a historical context. Our founders
understood that the Federal Government would be better at some
things and that State and local governments, which are closer to
the people, would be much better at other governmental functions.
Because this is the first modern war that is being fought simulta-
neously both abroad and on our homefront, the war against ter-
rorism really represents in a new way the intersection of one tradi-
tional national Federal responsibility, which is waging war and
securing the Nation, and one traditional local government responsi-
bility, which is providing for the health and safety of our commu-
nities. As a result, this war on terrorism challenges us to rethink
and, if necessary, revise some traditional Federal and local rela-
tionships even while we reaffirm others, with the overriding goal
of leveraging our strengths to make us a more secure society.
But in any case, on the front lines of that preparedness will be
the State, county, and local officials, including those we are pleased
to have with us today. Senator Thompson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR THOMPSON
Senator THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We
have held a number of hearings on homeland security and bioter-
rorism and one theme that keeps coming up is the importance of
local officials in responding to a terrorist attack.
We have been reminded repeatedly throughout our recent hear-
ings that local fire fighters, law enforcement officers, emergency
management officials, public health officials, and health care pro-
viders will be the first to respond to a terrorist attack. Unfortu-
nately, we have also heard that our focus at the Federal level has
been primarily on programs, some of which overlap and are spread
over 40 different agencies.
One of our witnesses at the bioterrorism hearing, Dr. Amy
Smithson, made an observation in a report that I think bears re-
peating and which reflects what we will be hearing from our wit-
nesses today. Dr. Smithson noted that only $315 million of the
total of the $8.4 billion counterterrorism budget in 2000 went to
the front lines in the form of training, equipment grants, and plan-
ning assistance. That is a remarkably small piece of the pie.
I am glad that we will have the opportunity today to hear from
John White, the Director of Emergency Management in Tennessee.
Mr. White has worked in emergency management for 35 years and
certainly has an excellent perspective on this issue.
4

One point that Director White makes in his written statement


and that I think is very important and insightful is that local and
State emergency officials have, in effect, been preparing for ter-
rorist attacks for years. For example, many have expressed concern
about the safety of our nuclear plants in the wake of the events of
September 11. But as Director White points out, his office has been
conducting exercises to prepare for accidents at nuclear plants for
years. People are now becoming more concerned about chemical at-
tacks, but his Emergency Management Agency was conducting
training and response exercises to deal with hazardous waste mate-
rial spills and accidents well before recent attacks.
So we have infrastructures in place at the State and local levels
already, at least somewhat prepared to respond to attacks. Perhaps
rather than pouring more money into more Federal programs and
response teams, the first priority should be to determine how we
can best coordinate and support training and exercises with local
officials to take advantage of the programs that are already in ex-
istence.
As we have heard previously, and I believe that Dr. Caldwell will
testify today, the same point can be made about our public health
systems. Clearly, we need to take steps to improve the detection,
surveillance, and response capabilities of our public health depart-
ments and our private health care providers. We can build on sys-
tems already in place and reap the additional benefit of strength-
ening our preparedness in the health care arena overall.
Finally, I believe we will also hear today about the need for bet-
ter communications in the law enforcement area. We have all read
about some confrontations between the FBI and local law enforce-
ment. Both Director Mueller and Attorney General Ashcroft have
announced efforts to try to facilitate communications between local
and Federal officials, as well as to share more information when
necessary. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on
this subject, as well.
Again, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to our discussion today
about how best to support our very valuable local resources. Thank
you.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Thompson. Senator Col-
lins.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS


Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
convening this hearing and for inviting a witness from Maine,
Commissioner Joseph Tinkham, to participate.
Our purpose to examine the local role in homeland security is of
utmost importance, for one of the lessons of September 11 is those
first on the scene are local officialspolice officers, fire fighters,
EMS and other medical personnel. They are the ones who are the
first responders.
We are here today to learn about the efforts of State, county, and
local officials to prepare for and respond to acts of terrorism. We
need to assess the effectiveness of communication and coordination
among Federal, State, and local agencies, and also to evaluate the
extent of assistance that is needed from the Federal Government.
5

Critical to the homeland defense of our Nation as a whole is the


security of individual States, and securing a State presents signifi-
cant financial and logistical challenges. Let me illustrate these
challenges using my home State of Maine as an example.
As Commissioner Tinkham of Maines Department of Defense,
Veterans, and Emergency Management has noted in his written
testimony, Maine has more than 3,000 miles of coastline. It has the
longest international border with Canada in the continental United
States. The State has more than 250 air strips, military bases, and
two major shipyards, more than 800 dams, a deactivated nuclear
power plant with spent fuel rods on site, and the second largest pe-
troleum tank farm on the East Coast, located in the very heart of
the States largest population center. According to Commissioner
Tinkham, the State of Maine has identified 25 vulnerabilities that
could result in a large loss of life or environmental catastrophe.
To meet these challenges and those facing other States, we must
improve coordination among Federal, State, and local governments
as well as the private sector. We must avoid wasteful duplication.
We must have realistic plans and conduct effective training and ex-
ercises. We also must ensure that appropriate information about
the presence of terrorists and potential threats is shared by Fed-
eral law enforcement agencies with their State and local counter-
parts.
Portland, Maine, Police Chief Michael Chibwood has expressed
many times his frustration at not being told of the presence of indi-
viduals on the FBIs watch list. As he put it, if there is something
that impacts the public safety of a community, the police chief
ought to know.
Finally, we must have adequate funding for homeland defense.
While the responsibility for homeland security is not the Federal
Governments alone and must be shared by local and State govern-
ments, I fully support additional Federal financial assistance for
States and communities.
For example, I recently joined with Senators Frist, Kennedy, and
several others in introducing the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act,
which not only strengthens our Federal response, but also author-
izes substantial new funding for States, local governments, and
hospitals, the people who are, indeed, on the front lines and would
be called upon first in the event of any new bioterrorist attack. Our
legislation authorizes $1.5 billion to improve State and local pre-
paredness capabilities and also authorizes an additional $60 mil-
lion to improve the public health laboratory network through the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
It is important that we allow Governor Ridge the opportunity to
assess needs and priorities carefully. After that assessment, how-
ever, I fully expect that the President will propose billions of dol-
lars in his next budget, which we expect to be released in early
February. In that regard, this hearing and the testimony of Com-
missioner Tinkham and the other witnesses today will be very
helpful in identifying the gaps in the system and the priorities for
this additional funding.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We clearly have a lot of work to do
together.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Collins.
6

I am delighted with the witnesses we have here this morning. It


is really a first-rate and very representative group and I thank you
for being here.
First is the Hon. Marc Morial, who is here this morning as Presi-
dent of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, Mayor of New Orleans, ob-
viously, first elected in 1994 at the extraordinarily young age of 35,
now in his second term, and, therefore, still very young. [Laughter.]
Mayor Morial, thanks for being here. I look forward to your testi-
mony.
TESTIMONY OF HON. MARC H. MORIAL,1 MAYOR, CITY OF NEW
ORLEANS, LOUISIANA AND PRESIDENT, U.S. CONFERENCE
OF MAYORS
Mr. MORIAL. Thank you. Good morning. I am Marc Morial,
Mayor of New Orleans and President of the Conference of Mayors.
I want to thank Chairman Lieberman as well as Senator Thomp-
son and the entire Committee.
I am also very pleased to be here with fellow local leaders, espe-
cially our NACo President, Javier Gonzales. Mayors have always
attached a high priority to preparing our cities for the possibility
of disasters.
In the wake of September 11 and the anthrax mailings, efforts
to strengthen emergency management plans have been redoubled
and there have been significant additional deployments of local
public safety resources. As I stated in a recent meeting with Gov-
ernor Ridge, we are the domestic troops, and today, I am here rep-
resenting not only mayors, but police officers, fire fighters, public
health workers who are on the front line on the domestic side of
this war against terrorism.
In October, the Conference of Mayors sponsored an unprece-
dented safety and security summit which brought together more
than 200 mayors, police chiefs, fire chiefs, emergency managers,
and public health officials. Today, I am proud to release this na-
tional action plan which emerged from the summit which I want
to briefly summarize.
First, in the area of homeland security, we have been concerned,
as each of you has mentioned, about the multiplicity of Federal
agencies which have responsibility for helping cities, counties, and
States prepare for and respond to a possible attack, and we are ex-
tremely encouraged by our conversations with Governor Ridge, who
we think understands the importance of intergovernmental part-
nership and the need for better coordination.
To strengthen his efforts, we strongly endorse the idea that the
Office of Homeland Security be given cabinet-level status, should
be fully authorized and given budgetary authority over Federal pro-
grams related to homeland protection. Without this, the Office of
Homeland Security will be unable to fulfill, we believe, the mission
that President Bush has so aptly placed under the responsibility of
Governor Ridge, and I understand that you, Senator Lieberman,
have introduced legislation on this.
Second, and this is important, right now, of the approximately
$10 billion which is in the Federal budget related to terrorism, and
1 The prepared statement of Mr. Morial appears in the Appendix on page 58.
7

that has recently been identified by OMBonly 4.9 percent is allo-


cated for State and local first response activities. And of this lim-
ited amount, most is provided to States.
To ensure that heightened security can be maintained and that
traditional public safety needs do not suffer, we have called, and
our national action plan includes, a new flexible homeland security
block grant to be used for additional deployment expenses, train-
ing, communications, rescue equipment, and the protection of pub-
lic infrastructure. We are very pleased that such legislation, S.
1737, was introduced by Senator Clinton, along with Senators
Feinstein, Mikulski, Durbin, and Schumer, to authorize $3 billion
for a targeted block grant, and I want to urge the Senate to pass
this bill.
Unfortunately, Congress took a major step backwards recently
when it approved a $122 million cut in the local law enforcement
block grant. This 24 percent cut in funding provided directly to
local governments and which we use in most instances for police
overtime comes at the very time when our police departments are
facing extraordinary and unbudgeted costs as a result of moving to
a heightened state of alert as requested by the Federal Government
and as demanded by the people we represent. I want to strongly
urge the Members of this Committee to work with us to help re-
store this cut in the local law enforcement block grant, which pro-
gram helps cities big and small around the country.
Third, it is acknowledged that the Nation has failed to invest
adequately in local public health infrastructure. Resources are
needed for 24/7 disease surveillance, on-the-scene investigations,
local bioterrorism preparedness, planning, increased interagency
communications and surge capacity. There must also be adequate
regional stockpiles of vaccines and a rapid response testing net-
work must be deployed.
Let me talk a little about transportation security. Our own task
force on airport security, chaired by L.A. Mayor Jim Hahn, has
drafted detailed recommendations which are included in our na-
tional action plan. We want to compliment the Senate and the Con-
gress and President Bush for embracing our recommendations that
airport screening security personnel be federalized. We think this
was an important step in the right direction and we want to work
very closely with the executive and legislative branches to make
sure that the time lines in the legislation are met.
It is very important that baggage screening not be delayed. It is
very important that the creation of the new Federal agency which
is going to oversee aviation security not be delayed. We continue
to work very closely with Secretary Mineta and we want to urge
you to provide him with all of the resources necessary to fully im-
plement this legislation on time.
Several other areas, very quickly. Transit security, passenger
and freight rail security, and port security are also areas of great
concern. My city is a major port city, as are many coastal cities
around the Nation. We must pay close attention to port security
and develop initiatives in that regard.
Finally, I want to talk a little bit about Federal-local law enforce-
ment cooperation. We represent 650,000 local police officers, a pow-
erful force in this war against terrorism, and I think our plea is
8

that these local forces be fully integrated into our national home-
land defense planning. We must create a new communications sys-
tem between Federal and local public safety officials with a 24/7
threat assessment capability.
In many meetings and discussions held on this subject since Sep-
tember 11, it has become clear that many barriers still exist at the
Federal level. The Attorney General, we think, should be com-
plimented on initiating a number of important steps to strengthen
and alleviate these barriers through the anti-terrorism task forces,
and our discussions with Director Ridge, Attorney General
Ashcroft, and Director Mueller have been constructive. We strongly
believe that any institutional barriers to greater intelligence shar-
ing should be addressed.
Senators Schumer, Clinton, Leahy, and Hatch have introduced a
Federal-Local Information Sharing Partnership Act which we be-
lieve would allow the Federal Government to increase intelligence
sharing with local and State governments and we urge its passage.
Finally, in addition to these issues, there are many other areas
that are covered in our national action plan, including border secu-
rity, water and wastewater security, communications interoper-
ability, and highway security, and I want to thank the Committee
for the opportunity to testify today and I look forward to continued
discussions as together we work to strengthen this Nations home-
land defense. Thank you.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Mayor, for an excel-
lent statement and for the report that you have issued today,
which we look forward to reading. I look forward to the questions
and answers, too.
The Hon. Javier Gonzales is the President of the National Asso-
ciation of Counties and a County Commissioner in Santa Fe Coun-
ty, New Mexico. He was elected to the Board of Commissioners in
November 1994 and then reelected to serve a second term in 1998.
I, being personal and not partisan in mentioning the great honor
and adventure that I had last year running for national office. One
of my favorite stops was in Santa Fe, where we had a wonderful
rally. Probably my favorite sign of the campaign was a woman in
the front row who held up a big hand-lettered sign that in three
words said it all for me, Viva la chutzpah. [Laughter.]
So it is in that spirit that I welcome you this morning.

TESTIMONY OF HON. JAVIER GONZALES,1 COMMISSIONER,


SANTA FE COUNTY, NEW MEXICO AND PRESIDENT, NA-
TIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES (NACo)
Mr. GONZALES. Thank you, Senator Lieberman and Members of
the Committee, and we certainly enjoyed having you in Santa Fe
last year, as well. Thank you for inviting me to testify on an issue
of paramount importance to counties across the country, securing
our homeland against the threat of terrorism.
My name is Javier Gonzales and I am an elected County Com-
missioner from Santa Fe County, New Mexico. I currently serve as
President of the National Association of Counties.
1 The prepared statement of Mr. Gonzales appears in the Appendix on page 83.
9

As you stated in your opening comments, counties are the first


responders to terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and other major
emergencies. County public health, law enforcement, fire, and other
public safety personnel are responsible for on-the-ground response
and recovery action. Counties also own, operate, and secure key
aspects of the Nations infrastructure, such as airports, transit sys-
tems, water supplies, schools, and hospitals. Elected county offi-
cials like myself, along with emergency managers, provide the es-
sential regional leadership, planning, and coordination function in
preventing, preparing for, and managing our communitys response
to emergency events.
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 3 months
ago today, I appointed a NACo task force on homeland security.
The task force, comprised of 45 top county officials from across the
country, was formed to provide a forum for county officials to
advise the Federal Government about the roles and concerns of
counties regarding homeland security and to identify model county
programs for our colleagues as we increase security measures and
preparedness in our communities. The task force has met twice this
fall and I would like to share a few relevant outcomes from those
meetings with you.
First, the importance of coordination has been a recurring theme.
County officials believe it is critically important that emergency
preparedness plans be coordinated and rehearsed among local,
State, and Federal levels, as well as across the various agencies
with a role in emergency response.
In the event of an emergency, county officials strongly believe
that the local first responder should maintain control of the scene
at the ground level. In the case of involvement and support at the
scene by multiple Federal agencies, we believe that the Federal
Government should quickly identify the agency that speaks for the
Federal Government and that all Federal agencies should diligently
follow the lead of that controlling Federal authority.
NACo, along with its sister State and local government organiza-
tions, has formally requested that Homeland Security Director Tom
Ridge create a State and Local Advisory Committee to the Office
of Homeland Security. The committee, comprised of elected officials
from State, county, and city governments, would provide input and
assistance to Federal homeland security activities and facilitate co-
ordination among levels of government, and we have received a
commitment from Governor Ridge that he will form such a com-
mittee and we look forward to the committee being established as
soon as possible.
NACo also has some specific recommendations in the areas of
law enforcement, public health, communications, and emergency
planning and preparedness. On law enforcement, it has been the
longstanding concern of counties that intelligence information ob-
tained by the Federal Government is not shared with appropriate
local officials in a timely manner. Ultimately, this hampers our
ability to track suspicious persons and prevent crimes from being
committed.
NACo has made a specific request to the Department of Justice
that the composition of its anti-terrorism task forces specifically in-
clude elected representatives of county governments and that secu-
10

rity clearances be provided to county officials for intelligence infor-


mation commensurate with their responsibilities.
We have seen some progress on this front. In a letter dated No-
vember 13, Attorney General Ashcroft informed county officials
that he is setting up a system to share information with State and
local officials through each U.S. Attorneys Office, and as I under-
stand it, this system will provide a mechanism for Federal intel-
ligence to reach appropriate officials at the local level and for infor-
mation collected locally to be communicated to Federal law enforce-
ment.
In the public health area, there are two major points. First, coun-
ty officials are calling on the Congress to provide adequate funding
for the Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act. NACo believes
that an appropriation of a minimum of $1.8 billion is needed to im-
plement the law fully and effectively with at least $835 million
dedicated to building and maintaining local and State public health
infrastructure.
The second point relates to information dissemination via the
Health Alert Network. NACo believes that the Centers for Disease
Control Public Health Practice Program, the CDC office that best
understands local dynamics, should continue to coordinate and
communicate with county health departments and that there
should be a focus on improving the Health Alert Network and on
assistance with technological upgrades for county health depart-
ments.
To enhance coordination among local jurisdictions, communica-
tions interoperability, the ability of one jurisdiction to talk to its
neighbor during crisis must be increased. In this regard, NACo is
requesting that the Federal Government help improve interoper-
ability by releasing additional spectrum in the 700 megahertz band
for public safety and emergency management use.
Finally, as I mentioned toward the beginning of my remarks,
counties as regional governments are in the unique position to pro-
vide the leadership, planning, and coordination function needed to
prevent, prepare for, and manage the response to emergency
events. While the survey we conducted in late September found
that 95 percent of counties have emergency response plans, and
100 percent of large urban counties have both plans and mutual
aid agreements with surrounding jurisdictions, there are still im-
provements to be made.
Since October, NACo has been calling for the authorization of a
local anti-terrorism block grant at a minimum of $3 billion. NACo
believes that these funds should flow directly from the Federal
Government to local governments and that funding decisions under
the block grants should be made county-wide as an outgrowth of
an existing all hazards emergency management planning process.
Senator Lieberman and Members of the Committee, thank you
for the opportunity to testify. Counties have a significant role to
play in our new national strategy for homeland security. We are
the publics first defense, but we do have limited resources and will
need additional support and cooperation from the Federal Govern-
ment in order to succeed. I would be pleased to answer any ques-
tions that you might have.
11

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Commissioner Gon-


zales, for your very thoughtful testimony.
The next two witnesses in some measure represent the heroes of
September 11, coming as they do from Arlington County and em-
bracing the attack on the Pentagon, responding to it, and from New
York City. So we thank you both for being here and look forward
to your testimony.
First is the Hon. Jay Fisette, Chairman of the Arlington County
Board. Mr. Fisette was elected to the Board in 1997 and became
chairman in 2001. Good morning, Mr. Fisette.
TESTIMONY OF JAY FISETTE,1 CHAIRMAN, ARLINGTON
COUNTY BOARD, VIRGINIA
Mr. FISETTE. Good morning, Senator Lieberman, Members of the
Committee. You just stated why I am here, because Arlington
County and New York City were the two targets, and as you all
know, I was not one on the front lines. I was the chief elected offi-
cial.
In the case of the Pentagon, the local government was Arlington.
This meant that our mutual aid partners came together with us
throughout the region to respond. Our fire department was, in fact,
in charge and coordinated the fire rescue and recovery for the first
full 10 days of the incident and thereafter, and the reality is they
did their work. They are professionals. They did an outstanding
job.
Over the course of the event, staff from literally every county
agency came together to respond, and I look at it as three attacks,
in fact. We had the Pentagon, we had Reagan National Airport,
and then we had the anthrax issues thereafter. We learned many
lessons from this and we have been spending a lot of time hashing
that out, and what became extremely clear to us was the important
partnership between local government and the Federal Govern-
ment and the increased emphasis that needs to be put on that, so
I would like to share with you four recommendations that we have
to put forward to you.
One is there must be clear articulation of roles and responsibil-
ities among Federal, State, and local agencies in emergencies, espe-
cially on Federal installations, such as the Pentagon, or Congress.
This includes roles for FEMA, CDC, local fire and health depart-
ments, and others that you have already heard about.
Arlington fought a fire at the Pentagon several weeks before Sep-
tember 11 and we have also responded to two fires since. In cal-
endar year 2000, Arlington responded to 251 fire and EMS calls at
the Pentagon. That created a history of respect and cooperation
that was very instrumental in our response on September 11.
We recommend, however, that the Federal Government work to
establish formal memorandum of understanding with local and
State officials for emergency responses at all major Federal instal-
lations, an MOU. We do not have one in place now.
The second suggestion, as part of the development of these
MOUs, an assessment should be made of local capacity to respond
to different events in support of the Federal Government and to
1 The prepared statement of Mr. Fisette appears in the Appendix on page 93.
12

provide financial support to fulfill that capacity. As noted earlier,


we have responded to the Pentagon continuously over time. How-
ever, we have never received any financial support, capital or oper-
ating, to meet those needs that go beyond the normal needs of our
community.
We are proud to serve the Pentagon and other Federal installa-
tions in the community, as are other communities. However, given
the new reality and the new threats we face, we feel it is appro-
priate for the Federal Government to accept some role and respon-
sibility in this, as well, and I support the recommendation I just
heard from Mr. Gonzales, that those funds be made directly to the
local governments.
The third issue is really one that focuses here in the Washington
region and that is an issue of indemnification. In the case of the
greater Washington area, Congressional action is especially needed
to approve legislation to eliminate issues of local liability in pro-
viding mutual aid. During the inauguration and other pre-planned
events, local police are deputized as Federal marshals in order to
avoid such local liability concerns.
In an emergency, there is no time for such action, nor has there
ever been an ability to address issues in the case of fire mutual aid.
Congress needs to put this issue to rest by passing legislation that
has since been drafted by the Washington Council of Governments.
And finally, and, of course, the largest challenge before all of you,
is the development of a national strategy for terrorism prepared-
ness. As the Nation pulled together at all levels, and I believe we
responded very well to September 11 and afterwards, that may not
always be the case. A major reason we did, however, is because we
did not have more casualties. Despite the horrific nature of the at-
tacks here in Arlington, we did not have mass casualties flooding
our limited hospital capacity, and you have heard Senator Thomp-
son and others refer to this.
We would like to put some increased emphasis and believe it
needs to be placed on the hospital systems capacity and the public
health sector capacity, as well. It was a wake-up call to the Federal
Government about the limited capacity of our hospitals that health
care competition and cost containment may have contributed to. At
the same time, with the development of antibiotics in the last cen-
tury, there has been a steady erosion of our public health capacity,
those who are on the front lines of a biological attack. These are
the disease police.
So a national strategy or standards for preparing or responding
to biological and chemical attacks needs to be put in place. Now
that we know that they are not theoretical, we need to be able to
do better. We need to address protocols for the National Pharma-
ceutical Stockpile. We need to train and practice in deployment.
And we must have a way to get consistent, accurate, and authori-
tative information, I think a theme you have already heard.
So in closing, I think there is a window of opportunity we have
not had before. Peoples awareness is high. At the local level, we
know that we will always be the first responders and we are work-
ing hard on our own planning and development capacity, but no
local government will be able to respond to a major event alone, es-
pecially on Federal installations, and the Federal Government
13

needs to be fully engaged in the preparedness, assessment, and


planning, and in providing the resources necessary to make that
happen. Thank you.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Fisette, for your leader-
ship and also for very interesting testimony. I had not thought
about the problem of liability and it is an important one.
I regret to say that we are in the middle of a vote on the Senate
floor, so we are going to have to recess the hearing. This is one of
three votes. We will see if we can work it out so that we come back
in the middle for a little bit more, hear the two witnesses, and then
go back for the last one. In any case, the Committee will stand in
recess for a few moments. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Senator LIEBERMAN. The Committee will reconvene. Thanks very
much for your patience. We caught a break that the Senate decided
to voice vote the second two judicial nominations, so we were able
to come back a bit earlier than we might have been.
Our next witness is Richard Sheirer, who is the Director of the
Office of Emergency Management for the City of New York. We
have all watched with tremendous admiration the citys response
to these attacks. If Mayor Giuliani has been the Commander in
Chief, maybe perhaps it is appropriate to say that Richard Sheirer
is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this particular re-
sponse and they have had great help from the fire commissioner
and police commissioner and others, as well. Mr. Sheirer continues
to be involved in the response right to this day, so we appreciate
the time you have taken to come down and share your experiences
with us. I know they are going to be helpful to us in the future of
planning responses to what we hope will not happen again, but we
have got to plan in case they do.
Mr. Sheirer, thanks. We look forward to your testimony now.
TESTIMONY OF RICHARD J. SHEIRER,1 DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, NEW YORK CITY MAYORS OF-
FICE
Mr. SHEIRER. Thank you, Senator. Good morning, Chairman
Lieberman, Senator Thompson, and Members of the Committee. I
am Richard Sheirer. I am the Director of the Mayors Office of
Emergency Management and I come with a unique background.
I spent 28 years in the New York City Fire Department, followed
by 4 years as Chief of Staff at the New York City Police Depart-
ment, and in February 2000, I was appointed the citys Director of
Emergency Management. I think that background gave me the op-
portunity to handle the situation we faced from September 11 on
with a full hand, and I think it is important that we talk about the
things that we did and how they impact homeland security and
how OEM in particular impacts the local role of homeland security.
In 1996, recognizing the need to enhance interagency and inter-
governmental coordination for planning, preparing, and responding
during any emergency, Mayor Giuliani established the Mayors Of-
fice of Emergency Management through an executive order. OEM
in New York City is a multi-jurisdictional agency comprised of per-
1 The prepared statement of Mr. Sheirer appears in the Appendix on page 96.
14

sonnel drawn from city agencies, including fire, police, health, envi-
ronmental protection, emergency medical services, and other agen-
cies. OEM was recently described by the Mayor as New York Citys
Office of Homeland Security and has been crucial in managing and
coordinating the citys response to the World Trade Center attack,
the anthrax incidents that occurred, the ongoing recovery efforts at
the World Trade Center, and the November 12 crash of Flight 587.
OEM is responsible for monitoring and responding to all poten-
tial emergency conditions and potential incidents, whether they be
emergencies or not, where there is a multi-agency response. We op-
erate the citys Emergency Operations Center, the EOC, which en-
ables the Mayor and the city to manage any multi-agency emer-
gency condition and any potential incident. It is used for weather.
It is used for good events, like the new millennium. And it was crit-
ical to our ability to address the incidents of September 11.
We research, we compile and evaluate the contingency plans of
every agency of the city. We have drills on every type of emergency
we can possibly have and we prepare and organize and conduct
those drills with the help of every agency of the city. And we co-
ordinate special interagency and intergovernmental responses.
As I said, the backbone of OEM is its Emergency Operations
Center. We activate it in times of any multi-agency incident or the
anticipation of it. Anything that affects the lives and safety of peo-
ple who live, work, or visit New York City, it is our job to make
sure that we respond to it.
During and after the World Trade Center attack, the EOC oper-
ated on a 24-hour, 7-day-a-week basis, with representatives of 110
local, State, and Federal agencies, the voluntary organizations such
as the Red Cross, Salvation Army, and the public utilities which
provide gas, electric, steam, and telephone communications. These
110 agencies were represented by anywhere from 300 to 1,000 peo-
ple in the EOC at any given time. We had to feed them. We had
to provide them with rest areas. We provided medical and mental
health services. In short, the EOC became a small town. In fact,
the Mayor even performed the marriage of a Marine who was
working in the EOC during his time there.
On September 11, after the first airplane flew into the north
tower of the World Trade Center, OEM immediately activated its
Emergency Operations Center at Seven World Trade Center and
began to coordinate the emergency operations in conjunction with
the fire department, the police department, Port Authority police,
numerous other emergency agencies, the health department, our
mutual aid plan from the surrounding areas, and others. Despite
the loss of OEMs EOC in Seven World Trade Center at the very
moment when we needed it most, we were able to quickly reestab-
lish an Emergency Operations Center and continue to coordinate
the emergency response to the World Trade Center attack.
The importance of a fully equipped, technologically advanced
Emergency Operations Center to coordinate Federal, State, and
local responses to the September 11 attack was immeasurable. It
was possible to immediately share and gather information among
the various Federal, State, and local agencies to address the issues
and needs of the emergency workers and of our citizens as they
arose. It made it possible to coordinate the various multi-agency re-
15

sponses. It was possible to coordinate and assist the utilities and


the various agencies to rebuild the damaged infrastructure, while
at the same time providing resources for the rescue efforts.
The effort was critical to reestablishing the world financial mar-
kets of the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Ex-
change, the Mercantile Exchange, the NASDAQ as quickly as pos-
sible to make sure that the world knew our resolve to get back to
normal as much as we could, no matter what happened.
OEM is responsible for preparing for the unexpected. We have a
very significant medical surveillance system which monitors emer-
gency responses by ambulances based on systems. That system al-
lows us to identify trends and abnormalities very quickly and have
Department of Health epidemiologists start to work to find out
what is causing it.
We also monitor purchases of over-the-counter drugs from var-
ious pharmaceutical chains to see if there is any unusual usage of
flu medications, diarrhea medications, those medications that could
possibly indicate that the public has been faced with an attack like
we did during this time with anthrax. We use that and we compare
everything to the historical data we have collected to see where
there is an abnormality.
From October 12 to November 9, we faced the additional incident
of the anthrax letters sent to various media locations and outlets.
We coordinated Points of Dispensing. On September 12, we were
scheduled to have a drill called the TriPOD. It is a point of dis-
pensing to test our bio plan, our ability to distribute medication to
the public as needed. Ironically, the location of that drill is where
we now have our EOC. We took it from one thing to another. But
our plan worked. We used it at NBC and ABC. CDC is looking at
it as the model to use across the country.
It all boils down to one thing, planning and preparation. The old
adage, how do you get to Carnegie Hall? Practice, practice, practice.
It could not hold truer for what we do. There are times when peo-
ple say, why are we having another drill? Why are we having an-
other planning meeting? Why are we having another exercise? I
think those questions will not be asked again. We have learned
very significantly how important those items are, and there are a
number of lessons we have learned from the citys ability to re-
spond to the attack.
Before September 11, as I said, the city was amongst the best
prepared in the country, with plans and exercises and drills on
every imaginable emergency. We used all those preparations to ad-
dress the issues we faced from September 11 on. We took a little
piece of our coastal storm plan, a little piece of our all hazards
plan, and we were able to address the issues as they arose.
The preparation of enhanced degree of communication that has
been spoken of before, it is critical that we communicated with our
State and Federal partners. The State Emergency Management
Agency of New York and FEMA have been our partners from day
one. They have walked with us hand in hand. They have been sup-
portive. They knew that New York City was one of the major cities
in this country that could handle this on a local level and they pro-
vided the backbone of support in terms of logistics and advice, but
they have not gotten in our way, which is very important.
16

Many of the officials who visited New York City before Sep-
tember 11 would come to our operations center and they would
comment on how they wished they could afford to have such a facil-
ity. If there is one thing we have all learned is that the reality is
they cannot afford not to.
I believe that you have heard this before and you will hear it
again. Mayor Giuliani and the police commissioner have said, and
I believe critically, that one of the most essential elements in effec-
tively protecting not only our city but every locality from terrorist
attacks is the communication of information sharing between the
Federal, State, and local law enforcement.
In New York City, we have created a multi-agency intelligence
sharing network of the New York City Police, the Port Authority
Police, the New Jersey State Police, the New York State Police, to
share information as much as we can. But it still is not the sharing
we need and we need more of it with the Federal agencies and we
are all working towards that.
After September 11, we have increased the number of New York
City police officers in the Joint Terrorist Task Force, the New York
FBI Task Force. Those task forces are our first line of defense in
terms of terrorism, and having worked with them in a past life in
the police department, the value for every jurisdiction that has a
Joint Terrorist Task Force is exceptional. They provide you the best
information of the best and the brightest that the Federal agents
that are available and your people become critical. We are expand-
ing our participation to agencies beyond the police department.
In closing, I thank you for the opportunity to speak to you about
the citys role in national and local homeland security and that role
in response to the World Trade Center attacks and to again empha-
size the crucial need of sharing intelligence among the Federal,
State, and local law enforcement authorities. An open flow of intel-
ligence information is vital for us to be prepared for whatever may
happen. Also, the need for localities to have a full-functioning
emergency operations center cannot be overstated. If they have to
combine resources, they should make them multi-jurisdictional, but
they need that resource when something strikes.
And finally, I want to thank you for holding this hearing to see
what we can do to make sure that the lives of our citizens on a
daily basis are protected from the evil people that struck New York
City and Arlington and Pittsburgh on September 11. Thank you.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Sheirer, thanks for all you have done
and for very thoughtful testimony today. I look forward to the ques-
tions.
Our final witness on this panel is John White, Director of the
Tennessee Emergency Management Agency, a real professional in
this field. He has been with TEMA since 1967 and director since
1994. Mr. White, thanks for being here.
TESTIMONY OF JOHN D. WHITE, JR.,1 DIRECTOR, TENNESSEE
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
Mr. WHITE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Thompson, and
other Members of the Committee. I sat here and listened to the
1 The prepared statement of Mr. White appears in the Appendix on page 109.
17

other members of this panel and determined that my reading of


this speech will probably not do any good. They have echoed every-
thing that I feel that you should know.
I think that one of the things that we all wonder about, and I
was listening to different members here, is where we are at and
where we are going to and how we are going to get a little further
along.
Since September 11, I think that you have seen the things that
have come together, that have been practiced across the United
States for a long period of time. Since 1968, we have had Emer-
gency Operations Centers. We have had other types of emergency
plans and exercises. I think that Richard said testing and exer-
cising is so important. The funding of that is tremendously impor-
tant and there is not enough of that simply because the funding
is not available.
Since September 11, I think that the State and local govern-
ments have just absolutely been overwhelmed by studies. I brought
a copy of just one study. This was the study that the Department
of Justice requested. That is one study. I reduced it where it was
a little bit manageable. The FBI requested another one that we did
that is actually 12 notebooks thick. We have had the same type of
studies from FEMA, which I brought a copy, DOJ, FBI, National
Guard Bureau, the Fire Association, DOT, CDC, DOE, and NSF,
every one of them different, every one of them since September 11,
and none of them asks the same questions. None of them have the
same criteria.
I am in a unique position that I got to see all the different ones,
but I doubt that anyone on this panel has ever seen this from their
locale. I do not know why we cannot do one for everybody. I do not
know why we cannot set a standard that is there. We have done
in the past all kinds of assessments on sensitive facilities, emer-
gency facilities, medical facilities, evacuation shelters, but yet we
redo them again. It is another requirement.
We were talking about information going up and then intel-
ligence coming up and no information coming down. I hold a se-
cret clearance. I hold a top secret clearance. I hold a top secret
departmental clearance, a Q clearance, yet I do not hold a clear-
ance to know anything about terrorism. FEMAs clearances are not
good with DOE. DOEs clearance is not good with NSF. NSF is not
good with the military. The military is not good with anybody. And
then DOJ is not good for any of those.
I asked the other dayI just got through redoing my Q clear-
ancewhat does it cost to do a clearance? Initial step, $5,000 per
person. How many clearances do we have and how many different
types? Did they spend $5,000 on me on each security clearance I
have got? And nobody knowsI can give you all kinds of things
like that. I doubt there is a security clearance you can get to see
the information.
I think that you find if you do not work for the FBI, the informa-
tion is not passed down. You pass it up when you get information.
If you are lucky, when it happens, then they are there.
You look at exercising. FEMA is really good about exercising and
the Federal Government is really good about exercising, but they
never play. You never know exactly what you are going to get. We
18

have two nuclear plants within the State. We have to, every year,
exercise in the nuclear plant where they would be relicensed. That
is some approximately 3,000 people play in that exercise. That is
State and local government. There has never been a Federal agen-
cy play in the exercise. They grade it. Do we know what we would
see from the Federal Government if we had a nuclear accident? We
guess at it.
When you are looking at exercising at that level and the exer-
cising that is required, you must put some type of funding for local
government and for State Government to be able to do it. They can-
not afford it, to pay the overtime, to pay the other people that are
required in there just to do it. Tabletops cost a tremendous amount
of money, but the real exercise costs a lot.
I look forward to answering some of your questions. I look for-
ward to helping out in this problem. Thank you.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. White. You actually posed
the questions, and I think you did them very well from your experi-
ence.
Senator LEVIN. Would you yield for 30 seconds, Mr. Chairman,
just to put my statement in the record?
Chairman LIEBERMAN. You are asking a lot of me this morning.
[Laughter.]
Yes, of course, I will.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN
Senator LEVIN. Thank you. If I could just put this statement in
the record, and I hope to get back before the end of the hearing.
If I could take 10 seconds, one part of my statement has to do with
this intelligence sharing between Federal and State, which I just
heard these last two witnesses talk about.
A former assistant district attorney told my office he would rath-
er have needles poked in his eyes than to have to work with the
FBI on an investigation. [Laughter.]
I will put the balance of my statement in the record.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is pretty graphic. Thanks, Senator
Levin.
[The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN
In the minutes, hours and days after the terrorist attacks on September 11, the
people we saw on the front lines at the World Trade Center in New York and at
the Pentagon here in Washingtonthe first responders everyone was watching
around the globewere local firefighters, police officers, and other emergency per-
sonnel. They were the ones charged with the responsibility of responding to the inju-
ries, the developing threats, and the public reaction. Nothing tells us more clearly
how important state and local governments are in our fight against terrorism than
our experience of September 11. We owe our local personnel a great deal of thanks
and respect.
But we also owe them the commitment to try to make our intergovernmental sys-
tems work better in the future. I imagine all of our offices have heard concerns ex-
pressed by our state and local governments back home of communication and infor-
mation problems. Local police officials in Michigan have told my office, for example,
that they are not receiving the information they need. Our witness today, the Presi-
dent of the International Association of Chiefs of Police expresses a similar concern,
particularly with respect to classified information, and has identified several areas
where state and local police officers could greatly benefit from training, in such
areas as responding to biological, chemical and nuclear incidents. We need to ad-
dress these requests with meaningful action.
19
I also want to add that most importantly, our Federal agencies have to see state
and local governments as equal partners, people with whom we are working to-
gether and collaborating to make progress against terrorism. I have heard too many
stories in the past about the arrogance of agencies like the FBI when they interface
with local police. A former assistant district attorney recently told my office that
hed rather have needles poked in his eyes than have to work with the FBI on an
investigation. Instead of sharing information, they apparently often hide it. Instead
of working as a team, they work as competitors. To the extent that is still hap-
pening, and I hope it is a thing of the past, we have to stop it. In these new times,
old practices like that have no role to play.
Communicating within a state is also key. My own state of Michigan completed
and submitted its three-year Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy report to
the Department of Justice in October. States were required in 1998 to prepare a
statewide assessment that shows the needs and vulnerability assessments of the
state. Each states study will then be used to channel future Federal assistance
through state governments to enhance state and local emergency preparedness.
Every state is either working on their own self evaluating report or has submitted
such a report. These reports will hopefully be helpful, not only to the state, but also
to Governor Ridge and his Office of Homeland Security.
No one has more responsibility for the inter-governmental relationships around
terrorism than Governor Ridge. Governor Ridge has done a good job so far. He re-
sponded positively when I asked that National Guardsmen remain in place at the
international border crossings in Michigan when their funding was set to expire. I
am hopeful that he will continue to seek input, not only from Congress, but from
local entities, both private and public, in creating an organizational structure to
fight terrorism.
Although todays hearing is focusing on the role of public officials, it is crucial that
private companies are also consulted. My staff recently met with an association
based in Detroit that represents independent pollution spill response companies
across the U.S. They offered to provide their expertise and help to train local offi-
cials in remediation including chemical and biological hazards. Yet, they were un-
sure where to go to offer their assistance. My staff directed them to Governor
Ridges office and they are attempting to meet with his staff. The point is: we have
private resources here that should not be overlooked. Many citizens tell me that
they desperately want to help their country in some way besides spending money,
and private companies may offer a way for citizens to help in what they may see
as a more tangible way.
It is a terrible force that we are up againsthatred always is. But we have a lot
of good people willing to help and a lot of hard work to do. I look forward to hearing
from the witnesses who can teach us a great deal from their own real life experi-
ences.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let us talk about that one a little bit, be-
cause we have heard that. I have heard it a lot, and probably all
the Members of the Committee have. There are real concerns na-
tionally, particularly from mayors and people in local law enforce-
ment, about the difficulty in getting information from the FBI, and
I presume here we are talking about intelligence information that
might lead you to know about whether your local area is maybe
vulnerable or subject to attack. Even though we have heard every
time Attorney General or Governor Ridge has put out one of these
national alerts that they have notified the 18,000 law enforcement
officials around the country.
So my question is, and maybe I will start with you, Mayor
Morial, have you had that problem? Is it as widespread as the an-
ecdotal evidence that I have had? I did mention in my opening
statement that Director Mueller of the FBI has formed a committee
or a task force of some kind. Are you hopeful that can solve this
problem?
Mr. MORIAL. It is a concern by mayors and police chiefs around
the country. I think the experience is if there is a working relation-
ship between local government and the special agent in charge in
that jurisdiction, then based on those relationships, those working
20

relationships, the information may flow. If there is no working rela-


tionship, then the information does not flow
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right.
Mr. MORIAL [continuing]. And I think it calls out for there to be
a protocol established in terms of how and what information is
going to flow and to whom.
For example, 2 weeks ago when Governor Ridge announced his
non-specified threat, the first thingthe thing he did before an-
nouncing the threat publicly by way of a press conference was to
convene a conference call with the Nations 50 governors, and those
governors, I take it, were not in turn advised as to what they
should do with the information.
In my own view, the appropriate thing for the governors to do
would have been to hold a follow-up conference call with the chief
law enforcement officers of every county, or in the case of Lou-
isiana, the parish in their State to provide the information to them
and then they could, in turn, transfer it to local police, chief elected
officials in those areas.
I found out, because when the threatwhen I saw Director Ridge
on television, I called my chief of police and asked him if he had
received the information. Lo and behold, I found out only after ask-
ing him that the information was being communicated to local law
enforcement through their NCIC computer hookup, which is not
commonly monitored for this kind of information by local law en-
forcement.
So, Senator, what it calls out for is there needs to be a protocol
established by administrative rule, by administrative regulation, by
statute, if necessary, as to what information should flow and how
it should flow and the time frame in which it should flow.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is a good recommendation. I wonder
if any of the rest of you want to comment on that, and if you do,
help us understand what the problem is. Is it that the FBI is not
sharing information in advance or is it that once there is a crime,
there is a joust for jurisdiction or cooperation? Commissioner
Gonzales.
Mr. GONZALES. I would just say, Senator Lieberman, there is no
doubt that the thousands of public law enforcement officials around
the country, public safety officials, are gathering information. Part
of the frustration we are hearing from our sheriffs around the
country is that the information is moving up but it is not coming
down, that the information becomes very fragmented. They are
gathering information. The city police officers are gathering infor-
mation. They are sending it somewhere. Someone is making a deci-
sion as to whether there are threats that are being accumulated
and then nothing is coming back.
And so I think it comes down to the simple relationships, as
Mayor Morial indicated, that the local FBI has with the local law
enforcement. If you have an established relationship, you are going
to share information. I was told by our own local law enforcement
officials that the FBI has indicated there is some information that
they do not know and that they cannot pass down
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes.
21

Mr. GONZALES [continuing]. And so there are different classifica-


tions that exist, and so what they are receiving may not be the en-
tire picture.
So it is very difficult for our local law enforcement community to
operate on fragmented information. They are doing the best they
can, but it is almost a wait and see type of deal. And so as Mayor
Morial indicated, I think it begins first with the local relationships,
but it has got to start from the top. They need to know that there
is going to be some type of uniform effort to assure that level of
communication is occurring all across the board.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you.
I wonder if, Mr. Sheirer, if you care to remark on how working
relationships were with Federal law enforcement during the crisis
that both of your governments responded to so well.
Mr. SHEIRER. We had a very good working relationship with the
New York office. Barry Mawn and the Assistant Deputy Director,
and prior to him, Jimmy Kallstrom and Lou Schlero have had an
exceptional relationship with the Police Commissioner and the
Chief of the New York City Police Department, and the Joint Ter-
rorist Task Force works very closely. It is very well mixed with po-
lice officers and FBI agents.
Our experience in this incident was that there was a lot of infor-
mation coming from a lot of different sources that was not filtering
down to us what we felt was quickly enough, and I think you expe-
rience that in any crisis. But particularly when it comes to law en-
forcement information, probably one of your biggest sources is the
street cop, whether it be a street cop in L.A. or a street cop in
Brooklyn. That information that gets to the FBI has to bethey
have to find a way to disseminate that to the right jurisdiction.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right.
Mr. SHEIRER. It is an enormous undertaking, but it has got to be
done. It is critical that we have the information that they know as
quickly as they can possibly share it with us. It is not something
that can sit on someones desk or someone should be evaluating it
without talking to the jurisdiction for whom a threat is pointed at,
because there are local issues that that person in the city, in the
jurisdiction, in the county would understand maybe better than an
FBI agent who is not from that area. There are a lot of individual
things and that sharing has to improve, and I think everybody ac-
knowledges it. It is just the way to get it done.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well said. Mr. Fisette.
Mr. FISETTE. I would only agree, I think, with Mr. Sheirer that
our police department has a quite good relationship with the FBI.
On the other hand, I think the suggestion of a protocol where you
find that balance between providing sufficient information so that
we at the local level can, in fact, fulfill our responsibilities, yet not
compromise the FBI in a way that in the long term would be detri-
mental.
So having that discussion, creating the protocol seems to be
there will always be tension in any emergency situation. I think
that is inevitable. However, it can be made better.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you.
Mr. White, let me take you to another question that you raised
that I wanted to ask you is with your example of the reports. I just
22

have a minute or so left on my time. Obviously, in the existing


framework, you have the Department of Justice, HHS, FEMA, a
whole range of Federal agencies that deal with the terrorism prob-
lem now that are interacting with State and county and local gov-
ernments, and your example of the various reports that are quite
similar being asked by the different agencies is very graphic and
illustrative.
What is the way, from your perspective as a State official, to
make this work better? I mean, should we be creating an overall
block grant of some kind? Should there be more coordination in the
relations on this subject of anti-terrorism through the Department
of Homeland Security? What ideas do you have about how to make
this part of it better, because it sure seems like a waste.
Mr. WHITE. It would seem to me that there has been an agency
established, be it Homeland Security or FEMA. FEMA is more
than the Department of Justice, more than any of the other agen-
cies that I know of, dealing with State and local government every
day. They have a conduit by which money can flow to local govern-
ment to produce, to abstain, to train people, for equipment, for ex-
ercising, and other things.
Also, I think that we have done all these different types of stud-
ies, and for some reason, they are not shared at the Federal level.
In other words, I doubt that DOJ has asked FEMA for anything.
I sure know that NGB has not asked any of them for anything.
They just do not talk.
That is alarming in that when you get to comparing the ques-
tions, you get to looking at the answers, and remember, the an-
swers are kind of arbitrary, so you can make it look as bad as you
want to or as good as you want to with a number.
I kind of wish they had come to one agency in the State and said,
coordinatethis is what we want to know, coordinate this for us,
and let one group help them through it and set a standard. But
that is not the way it is happening.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Those are some good ideas, Mr. White,
and I thank you for them.
Senator Cleland just arrived. It reminds me that at an earlier
hearing after September 11, we had, if I am not mistaken, your
counterpart in Georgia, who is the head of emergency management.
As his illustrationno jokeof the problems that the Federal
agencies have in not communicating or in sharing jurisdiction, ap-
parently at the scene of the bombing in Atlanta during the Olym-
pics, this gentleman witnessed the beginning of a fistfight between
two representatives of two different Federal agencies who were
jousting for control over the site, so we have got some work to do.
Senator Thompson.
Senator THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. White, thank you very much for your insight. I think you
have really put your finger on the crux of the problem that we are
facing here.
Following up on Senator Liebermans last couple of questions,
what is your feeling as you look at the Office of Homeland Security
as it is being set up now? It is awfully early in the game. Governor
Ridge has just really had an opportunity to get into it. He has all
these agencies to deal with, all these problems, duplication, over-
23

lap, and he is hearing, I am sure, from all over the country some
of the same things that you have been saying.
Would you have any suggestions to him? Should the problem be
given to FEMA within his jurisdiction, under his umbrella? Do you
see anything that they are doing or not doing that you would com-
ment on as to whether or not you feel they are going in the right
direction with regard to some of these problems you have just been
talking about?
Mr. WHITE. I think Governor Ridge has not been there long
enough to really get a handle on the different areas that are going
to come up by anyone new in that type of position. In reading his
charge, its certainly an astronomical task that he has to do. It is
going to be remarkable to see him do it.
Senator THOMPSON. It would seem like that would be the place
where all of this has to come together, would it not, and resolved?
Mr. WHITE. I would probably say yes, but I do not think it can
happen, the reason being is that one State, right here, what hap-
pens is what I call smoke and mirrors. Who is in charge today? So
we give him 50 States this thick and say, OK, now when you get
through, when you know what this means, come talk to me, well,
guess what? It will never happen. We multiply the amount of paper
and the other agencies do what they normally do, will get another
survey.
The next thing is that there are no requirements that he can lay
out for things to happen. I am exercisingfor a fixed nuclear facil-
ity plant, I am exercising all the local PDs. If something happens,
what is the difference in a release at a nuclear plant, be it because
of a failure of a piece of equipment or because of terrorism? There
is not. But that is not impacted into what we are doing. The money
that we need to do that for the other locations are not there.
When you look at the City of Memphis, which is a wonderful, a
very robust city, we have got the urban search and rescue task
force there that came to the Pentagon. We have got probably more
resources than the entire State. But to exercise it, there is no
money. There is no criteria there except for FEMA.
I am not sure Governor Ridge can ever get to that, and I am not
sure that the other Federal agencies will let him have that kind
of jurisdiction anyway. You are talking about turf now. That is im-
portant.
Senator THOMPSON. You are addressing the same things that we
have been talking about here for a long time now. Clearly, the
President is going to have to make it clear that he has the author-
ity and he is going to have to exercise that authority.
Mr. WHITE. I think FEMA has done one thing. FEMA is an agen-
cy that is not in charge of anything when you really think about
it. What they are is a very good turf walker. We coordinate and
emergency management coordinates a lot of agencies that have
legal responsibility to do something. We coordinate them together.
We do not want what they do. I do not want to be a fire fighter.
I do not want to be a policeman. I do not want to be a lot of things.
But I coordinate what they do in one direction.
It is a very unique thing to walk on somebody elses area and get
their help. FEMA does that well. Now we have got to train some-
one else how to do that.
24

Senator THOMPSON. I am going to make sure that the people in


the Office of Homeland Security get the benefit of your thoughts on
all of this. Is this one reportdid you say you had to send several
reports like that in?
Mr. WHITE. Yes.
Senator THOMPSON. To all the various agencies?
Mr. WHITE. These reports, you know, it is not only us, but local
government. There are some 10,000 questions in here. Even once
you read it, and I have read through it twice, you really have noth-
ing because there is no thread through it that makes it seamless
to mean anything. This was with the Department of Justice, an-
other one with FEMA.
Senator THOMPSON. And they accumulate?
Mr. WHITE. And they accumulate and they neverI cannot let
some of my people see the National Guard Bureaus report. Some
of them cannot read this. Some of my planners cannot look at the
DOE reports. And they are dealing with
Senator THOMPSON. Well, do not feel too bad. We have had, for
a decade now or more, we have accumulated reports here in Con-
gress, GAO reports and Inspector General reports and in some
cases intelligence community reports, laying out for us the ter-
rorism threat and the threat of weapons of mass destruction and
all the things that can happen and how vulnerable we are, time
and time and time again.
So something finally happens and we are still trying to figure out
how to get anthrax out of one of our buildings here because we can-
not agree on the nature of the matter. It is all up and down the
Federal Government. The FBI is now scrambling and trying to, I
think, get its arms around all this, but the FBI is used to solving
crimes after the fact. They are not used to having to deal with
threat assessments, risk assessments, training, exercising, all these
issues now that we have to deal with. So it is a whole new culture
for them. We are having to learn how to walk again in a lot of
these areas.
You mentioned these nuclear plants. Are you getting any assist-
ance? Are you having any communication? Are they requiring you,
for example, to make your threat and risk assessments with regard
to those plants in your reports, and if so, are you getting any feed-
back? Are you getting any help or assistance in terms of planning
in case we had a disaster of that kind with regard to those nuclear
plants?
Mr. WHITE. Not from the Federal Government. It comes from the
plant site specific to the State. That is done by the utility. It just
so happens in Tennessee it is TVA. That is non-Federal money
comes from the generation of power.
Senator THOMPSON. Do you need that kind of additional assist-
ance?
Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir. When you look at the money that the State
and local governments around that area put in for that plant to op-
erate, it requires more assistance than what is there. You do what
you do with what you have. We were very fortunate in the licens-
ing of those plants, the first to license after Three Mile Island, then
the last plant to get a license of that type in the United States,
which was very fortunate. But that is the type of planning that is
25

there also that you use for homeland security. That is what you are
looking at.
There are other things. I think that the individual counties, we
handle in the State some 3,000 to 3,600 missions and incidents a
year, in 1 years period. That is stuff that we respond to with the
local governments. We handled 3,000 hoaxes of anthrax. Where
does that come from? We had to treat everywhere does the
money for that come from? There has been no talk of any kind of
help for that.
What we are looking at we have upped the security in the air-
ports, yet the Governor and mayors and chief executives have had
to up the security around courthouses, overtime. We have had to
put National Guardsmen around the Capitol. This is another secu-
rity threat. Yet, there is no money there for that. Does the State
try to pay for it? I do not know. We are paying $10 million since
September 11 for extra security and for things like this right here
that we did not program, and I know that you all did not, either.
Senator THOMPSON. Mr. Chairman, I think we are just beginning
to get a slight feel for what the financial impact of all of this is
going to be on the Federal Government and on the State and local
governments. We have got training and threat and risk assessment
and exercises that need to be done, and nobody really can tell what
all this is going to cost. We have a few bills around, each one of
them has a few billion here and a few billion there, but it is going
to affect our fiscal picture here in tremendous ways that we are
just beginning to have an appreciation for.
Mr. WHITE. I do not pretend to know, Senator, the challenges
that you all have on a day-to-day basis. Also, I was looking at some
of the bills coming out, you know, and you said it, that we are put-
ting a little bit of money here, a little bit of money there. I would
say to you, out of each one of those little bit of monies, there are
a lot of people that take it off the top. And when you look at what
comes off the top to get to the bottom, by the time it gets to the
bottom, there is not any.
Senator THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Thompson. I could not
agree with you more. Hopefully, the Committee can play some role
in creating more clarity and better organization and more efficiency
in the use of Federal resources. But the reality is, we did enter a
new chapter of our history on September 11 and we have a require-
ment to focus on homeland security which is greater than we have
ever had before, a whole new dimension.
And you all representyou have said it over and over again
the front-line troops. We do not have to create a domestic security
force, or as other countries have, an interior department with inter-
nal security. We have got it. You are out there. Now the question
isand you are performing a national function and the question is
how we can come to some appropriate level of support for what the
Nation is asking you each to do and how we can better coordinate
the relationship between the various levels of government, and that
is the challenge we all have together. There is no question we can
do it, because we have got to do it.
Senator Cleland, thank you for being here.
26

Senator CLELAND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank


you for holding the hearing. Before I get into my opening state-
ment, which I understand I can do before the next panel
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Or if you want to do it now, go right
ahead.
Senator CLELAND. Actually, I would just like to follow up with
Mr. Whites observations. Mr. White, you have such a clear and an
unvarnished understanding of how things work, I wondered where
you are from. I know that you are from New Georgia, so I think
that [Laughter.]
Mr. WHITE. Senator, I am from Tennessee.
Senator CLELAND. I know. [Laughter.]
I was just sitting here absorbing your insight. We have an out-
standing emergency management operation in Georgia. Gary
McConnell, your counterpart there, he is the kind of person who,
when the popcorn hits the fan, or as Jeff Copeland says, the head
of CDC, when the anthrax hits the fan, he is the kind of person
you want in the foxhole with you. He has a great sense of where
things are and what ought to be done and anticipating the com-
mand, all those things, and I have seen him perform in the wake
of tornadoes, in the wake of floods, in, shall we say, natural disas-
ters, natural attacks, so to speak, on our State.
Now, in the wake of September 11, I guess we have all been
searching for a formula with which to, or a key to unlock the secret
of how we defend our homeland. We have been struggling, quite
frankly, with the things that you have already articulated. It does
seem to me that the big bugaboos here in terms of homeland de-
fense are not uncommon to other areas of our defense, that is, co-
ordination, cooperation, and communication, none of which is rock-
et science.
But it does seem that, particularly at the Federal level, there is
a great inability to go outside ones turf, to share information, to
coordinate operations, to communicate, and so forth. We see this,
and I am painfully aware of it because the CDC is located right
there in Atlanta, we see this with the whole anthrax threat here,
where once the FBI gets on the scene, they declare it a crime scene
and, in effect, confiscate the evidence, shut it down. They send
their anthrax samples to Fort Detrick, Maryland, not to the CDC,
and that has put us in several binds from time to time.
There are two cultures. Just for instance, CDC is designed to,
shall we say, communicate openly to the public all the time, to local
and State health departments, and share every bit of information
they have got and tap the great resources there of the 8,000 people
that they have and say, Professor so-and-so or Dr. so-and-so is the
expert on this and talk to him, whereas the FBI does not share any
information with anybody, ever. I mean, there are two cultures.
Both are right in their own setting, but to try to get them both to
attack the same problem is like oil and water, and we have seen
that.
Your point about turf walkers, I have never thought about FEMA
in that regard but maybe that is what we are talking about here
in terms of homeland defense. Maybe we already have an agency
with budgetary authority, with troops in the field, with some back-
ground and training in response to emergencies and maybe we al-
27

ready have basically a homeland defense agency. It is called


FEMA, expert in doing the very kind of things, coordination, co-
operation, communication, that we are so lacking in and have
struggled to bring about by other means.
I do not really want to put you on the spot, but do you think we
ought to seriously look here in Washington, all of us, at maybe ei-
ther using the FEMA model or using FEMA in some way as an an-
chor or using this wonderful agency that works, and our mayors
and our governors out there all, I think, would swear pretty much
by it.
They have got a central command post. I have been down to the
central command post when a hurricane was moving onto the
Southeast coast of Georgia. I mean, I went in there and it was like,
in effect, a Pentagon war room. I mean, they had it. They had it
nailed. They were on top of it and they were coordinating and they
were cooperating and they were communicating.
Anyway, do you think we have the kernel of a homeland defense
agency in FEMA and maybe just maybe build on that?
Mr. WHITE. I would suggest to you that is where they came from.
It was called civil defense, and that is what that was.
Senator CLELAND. Yes.
Mr. WHITE. It was just a different time. It was just a different,
smaller threat. I just do not, and maybe it is from being a Southern
boy and just kind of being in Tennessee all the time, I just do not
see the difference between an Oklahoma City and a New York. I
do not see a difference between a hurricane that wipes out all of
Florida and New York. It is done by somebody else. It is done by
something different. But the consequences are the same. The recov-
ery is the same.
You still have to provide the people with funding. You have to
provide the local government the capability to do it. You have to
assist them, stand back and let them work as far as they can. Then
the State comes in and helps them. If I cannot do it, then FEMA
comes in and helps me. Then that is the way we get things done.
It would seem to me that Governor Ridge would be very well
served by looking at some of the things that FEMA has done. I
have been around a long time with FEMAFEMA has not always
been what it is today. But I would say to you that today is a model
of something that will work, a model of how to get money to local
governments and get it to them fast, a model of how to respond to
a disaster and how to get information to governors, to the people
on the front lines.
Do I think that you will ever solve the security problem? No, sir.
It will not happen because they are not going to tell you.
Senator DOMENICI. Could you repeat that, please?
Mr. WHITE. I said, do I think that you will ever solve the security
problems between the CIA, the FBI, or NSF? No, because they do
not talk to each other now and are not going to talk to you. If they
talk to you, then you know as much as they know and you have
got to have it for the funding. In other words, there is always going
to be a black program. That is the way they get their money.
But you have to have a turf walker, someone that is not going
to offend or not try to take over somebody elses job and to get the
money out there, and also gently hold them accountable. That is
28

very important, too, because OMB is going to send an auditor 26


years from today and want to know where that piece of equipment
is, and you say, I do not know where it is at. Well, guess what,
you are going to pay for it 17 times. [Laughter.]
So you have got to have also, then, accountability. The Depart-
ment of Justice has learned their lesson. Out of the $1 million that
they gave out in Tennessee, they cannot find one piece of equip-
ment. They did not bother to know that it was disposable equip-
ment. Once you used it, you had to throw it away. We had not fig-
ured that out yet. But they will when OMB gets through with
them.
Senator CLELAND. Before we go to Mayor Morial, who wants to
say something, is it not true that in terms of this emergency pre-
paredness, we will call it, the old civil defense operation, that there
is an established protocol already, that when the popcorn hits the
fan, all the players of the team know exactly what their responsi-
bility is.
For instance, something hits the State of Tennessee or Georgia.
There is a protocol there. Ultimately, the governor asks the Presi-
dent, I guess, to declare X area a disaster area. The moment the
President does that, there is an established protocol for money, for
small business loans, for emergency assistance. I mean, people are
on the plane. Things are happening right then, and I have seen it
happen.
The problem with, say, this bioterrorist attack we just went
through, we found that there was no real established protocol. The
Postmaster General testified he did not understand the protocol
about what happened when he got hit with an anthrax scare, so
I think that is something we could look at. Mayor Morial.
Mr. MORIAL. Thank you, Senator Cleland. I could not agree with
Mr. White more. FEMA does an excellent job. We have had great
experiences with FEMA in connection with weather emergencies,
but I wanted to make this point. FEMA is a response agency.
Homeland defense includes prevention, working to prevent future
attacks, developing intelligence and coordination.
FEMAs role and the role of most successors to the old civil de-
fense systems that exist are setting up the appropriate response
once you have an emergency situation, and I think in your con-
versations, in your considerations, and in your deliberations, we
would ask you to also keep in mind the need for a system of pre-
vention, resources for prevention. I think that is where I hope Gov-
ernor Ridge, the Office of Homeland Defense, will focus and will go.
Let me give you an illustration. We are preparing right now for
the Super Bowl, and in our preparations, we have, in effect, divided
our preparations into two components. One is prevention. What do
we do with traffic, with people, with security, with special events,
with deployment of police, fire, and EMS officials? The other is,
what are the protocols to respond in the event there is X type of
problem over here or Y type of problem over there?
Both components have to be adequately addressed, and I would
think that the FEMA model, because they are an excellent coordi-
nator, they work with State and local government, they try to mar-
shal resources, might be a model that could be employed on the
prevention side, too. Whether it could be carried out by FEMA, I
29

do not know. Whether it needs to be carried out by the Office of


Homeland Defense with the appropriate staffing and personnel,
that would be a consideration. But I think that local government
is acutely aware of both components of the challenge we face.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mayor Morial, for a very good
statement. I would say, for the record, you were kind enough to
refer to the bill that Senator Specter and I have put in to create
the Homeland Security Agency, give it budget authority, cabinet
status. We are building here on a lot of work that has been done,
particularly by the commission headed by Senators Rudman and
Hart.
But in our bill, we have actually three directorates under the
Secretary of Homeland Security and it follows your model. Preven-
tion, in our case, we had one called protection, which was the ongo-
ing business of protecting critical infrastructure, and then re-
sponse, and the vision we had in the response, FEMA is really the
heart of it because it does such a great job, as Mr. White said.
Senator Domenici, thanks for being here.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DOMENICI


Senator DOMENICI. Thanks very much. First, Mr. Chairman, I
really do compliment you for holding this hearing.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you.
Senator DOMENICI. I am not quite sure how we are going to go
beyond the hearings into changing things that are desperately in
need of change, but we have got to start somewhere, and it seems
to me that as we talk up here, it becomes quite obvious that one
of the reasons we are going to have a hard time getting ourselves
into a different management mode on all the fronts we have been
discussing is that there are great conflicts of interest. There is no
committee with jurisdiction to solve it and come up with a bill. In
a subtle way, all the committees are going to want to keep some
of their jurisdiction even if they are not quite sure what it does for
the country.
If it is something that they are charged with doing, you are going
to have difficultyif you perceive in this Committee under your
leadership and our good friend who used to be Chairman, what you
ought to do. I am not sure that you will not have to go to so many
committees that it is going to be hard to get the job done. I can
tell you that at every level that has to do with security, our country
is in a big muddle and we did not do much about it before this ter-
rorist attack.
Will we be able to do something about it? I think the President
wants to, and that is the starter. I think he put in a governor who
has obviously managed some big things. Now the question is, what
is his authority? Frankly, if we try to draw something to set out
his authority, I am very concerned that it would take us forever to
get the legislation done and the claims on jurisdiction would be
three or four committees.
But nonetheless, the President has started out right by saying
we need a new level of defense and it is homeland defense. We
should all remember that if homeland defense is important, we
ought to know how much we spent on the defense of our Nation
30

without due consideration to homeland. We spend over $325 billion


to defend ourselves in this world we live in.
I believe we are going to have a very large budget for homeland
defense. It may not be very large now, but we will be spending a
lot of money on homeland defense once it gets coordinated right. I
hope that the precursor is that we have got to find out how to orga-
nize it. But we have got to spend some money, there is no question
about it.
I want to say to all of these witnesses: I very much appreciate,
as one Senator, your coming and the excellent understanding of the
problem from the local level. Sometimes we just keep talking to
ourselves. It is really good that that stops and somebody that is out
there experiencing it gets into the loop. You all have been in that
loop today and you are going to stay in it in trying to help us get
our job done.
I want to personally thank Javier Gonzales, the County Commis-
sioner who came up here and has a national role. I thank you very
much for the time, the effort, and what you have said.
I have a statement that is in the record, but I would like to just
talk for a minute to the Committee about some things. In 1996,
quite a while ago in terms of reference to the towers being bombed,
almost an eon before, we passed a piece of legislation up here. Its
nickname is Nunn-Lugar-Domenici. It included a domestic home-
land initiative where the U.S. Government attempts to help first
responders.
Last year, we completed 120 cities, Mr. Chairman, 120 American
cities, and some of you are aware of this. Those cities came to-
gether under Nunn-Lugar-Domenici and prepared to communicate
among themselves and organize for the eventuality of a mass acci-
dent, either nuclear or a huge accident that occurs because of na-
ture. Now I think we have to decide to take a look at that legisla-
tion and see, in light of terrorism, does it do the right thing?
I think we did a pretty good job, considering it was so many
years ahead of things to set up a first responder organization and
communication. It just about does your three Cs. It does not do it
for everything, but in a limited way. Frankly, Mr. Chairman, it suf-
fered after it was passed from the typical difficulties that anything
in America that is different and that is preventative and that is
ahead of the time suffers.
We could not get the administration to decide who ought to run
it, so we put the Department of Defense in the first time through.
That caused all kinds of flaps, with concerns that the Department
of Defense was going to come into cities and help them prepare
their first responders. It took 112 or 2 years and we finally said,
let the Department of Justice do it. The Department of Justice does
not like to do it, but they do it. Now, it is getting pretty healthy
because we spent $667 million on that legislation in the year we
are in now, a pretty healthy chunk of money to help cities and in-
stitutions prepare themselves for communication, and for first re-
sponder efficiency, then firemen will know what their job is and the
police will know theirs.
As a matter of fact, fellow Senators, I am not sure that we know
the impact of that program on New York City, but it is commonly
thought that they were much better prepared because they had for
31

2 or 3 years been annually preparing their responder organizations


under the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act and had trained them, got
them ready, with much better communication capacity and skills.
It might indeed be wise for our staff, bipartisan here, to take a
look at that legislation. They should see if maybe you can build on
it in a way that would expand what it does so that it will do more
of the things that Mr. White (and I greatly appreciate your obser-
vations) and Mr. Sheirer and all of you have given us.
Let me close by saying that Tom Ridge has one of the toughest
jobs anybody could have. How we are going to be able to shake
these organizations that have been complacent and, when we give
them money, for them to do the right thing with it and get it spent
on the right things is not going to be easy. But I also think that
this Committee under your leadership has a rare opportunity to let
people know what we do and what you can do. You have very broad
jurisdiction in this area.
I close by telling you that we were not capable in this country,
prior to this big accident of clearing Federal employees for jobs in
secret establishments. Sometimes it took 2 years. I can tell you, for
the record, that in my State, for jobs at Los Alamos National Lab-
oratory, there are many great scientists hired and, in a sense, put
in a bullpen.
In other words, they are hired but they are not hired in that they
cannot work in secure areas of the laboratory because they are
awaiting their clearance. And sometimes, they meet me on an air-
plane and they say, Well, I sure would like to be working at the
job I was hired to do. I am so-and-so. Here is my expertise. But
just so you will know, I am not working at that job. I draw a pay-
check, but it has already been 12 months and they have not cleared
me. Is that not pathetic?
Now we have reason to do a lot of these things better, just to ask
the administration, how do you fix that? What is a reasonable
time? Do you think it is 6 months? Surely if you have machinery
and equipment, you ought to find out in 6 months whether a Ph.D.
that came from Georgia Tech in research in nuclear this, that, or
the other, can be cleared as an American to work on nuclear weap-
ons? Why 2 years?
And this is the problem everywhere you go. All the things we are
going to try to solve are going to run into these kinds of adminis-
trative nightmares. But now, it is life or death, so it may very well
be that we will change. If we do not change, we are going to have
another one of these events and everybody is going to say, Why
were we not informed? And somebody is going to say, Well, we
should have been. Why did so many people die? Well, if we had just
been able to do this, they would not have. And somebody will say,
Well, we know how to do that. Why did we not do it?
So I urge that you and the Ranking Member decide what your
role is going to be. I, for one, do not have a lot of time, but I will
pledge to you that I will join you if you undertake in a major way
how to put this together and challenge these other committees who
want to continue to say they have the power and the jurisdiction.
We want somebody to do something. Is that not what you want?
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Amen.
32

Senator DOMENICI. I do not think you want to sit around and


have hearings that people have rave reviews on because we got the
facts. I think you want a result, and we are not getting results. In
fact, it is terrible. Some would have to say, we may get results be-
cause we were bombed in our homeland and we will never have the
same America because nobody can any longer kid anyone. We could
havein your hometown, or in your State, Senatora major ter-
rorist event within the next couple of weeks. Who knows.
We did not think of that 2 years ago. If you brought up a bill
to spend money to prevent that, people around here would have
said we were crazy. Nobody is going to do anything to America.
Well, that is over with, is it not? I mean, they can do anything. In
fact, I am worried about just which is their next target. I cannot
believe they are not going to do anything, except we have taught
a few of them a lesson. They do know we will fight.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is right.
Senator DOMENICI. So I thank you, and again, I will read your
testimony and I will just close by telling you, there is a piece of
equipment manned by scientists. It is called NISAC, National In-
frastructure Simulation and Analysis Center. I must tell you, it is
the most phenomenal production in terms of the infrastructure of
America that you would ever think we would do.
The scientists at two nuclear laboratories took their big com-
puters, the ones that have more capacity than anybody ever
thought. They have put a little bit of the time into NISAC. They
now are trying to put together a center where they can apply this
equipment in a way you would not believe, Mr. Chairman, to all
of the infrastructure of America of any significance. The NISAC
computers will permit you to relate one piece of infrastructure to
another, so that if a big dam is blown up here, what is the con-
sequence to the country? It will tell you now. And now it needs to
be continued year by year to be a predominant fixture for informa-
tion dissemination or prevention by doing things that this software
will tell you.
I know you will wonder, where has this been, this wonderful
equipment? I would tell you, it has been rather difficult to get it
funded. Now, somebody in the administration has agreed that it is
a whopping great, great thing. Still, I am not sure that the $20 mil-
lion is going to be appropriated for it to become part of the civilian
network of America, but I think it will. Anybody that will listen
and see it will know that the greatest scientists in the world have
pulled something out of a hat again for us. With it, we will know
so much about the relationships of one piece of infrastructure to
another that it is almost unimaginable. I am very grateful that
some Senators helped me do this and I did not come to all of you
because it was moving along.
You will know, all of you and Mr. White, when this is all set up.
If we can then establish who is entitled to the information, it will
be an incredible thing for the counties and cities and States to be
able to look at their infrastructure and see what are the risks,
which things are really dangerous, what is the consequence if they
get this, to our State on this? I think it will be exciting for every-
body. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Domenici follows:]
33
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR DOMENICI
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this hearing as your Committee
continues to explore issues associated with Homeland Security. The focus of this
hearing, on local roles, highlights the critical contribution from the first responders
and local jurisdictions who represent our first line of defense against terrorist ac-
tions.
Id like to add my welcome to Javier Gonzales, Commissioner from Santa Fe
County. Thank you for traveling here for this important hearing.
In 1996, the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation focused on two key issues, stopping
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and on domestic preparedness in case
these weapons are used. That bill charged the Department of Defense with responsi-
bility for training First Responders for potential attacks. Later the responsibility
for that program moved to the Department of Justice.
Im pleased that 120 cities have received this training. Im told that the training
in New York City contributed to their ability to respond to the events of September
11.
That 1996 legislation was a good foundation, but we in Congress need to build
upon it. In fact, the exercisesboth practice ones and unfortunately in response to
real attackshave highlighted areas that need additional legislative focus.
For example, it is clear that better coordination is required for all domestic pre-
paredness efforts. I anticipate that Governor Ridge will provide that coordination.
Im pleased to note in the testimony of Javier Gonzales that the National Associa-
tion of Counties has been working directly with Governor Ridge toward creation of
a State and Local Advisory Committee within his Office. I support that proposal.
It is also clear that follow-up training is needed after the initial exercises for the
first responders. Certainly those exercises are important. But, there has not been
a mechanism or program for further training and ensuring the sustainability of first
responders capabilities.
And finally, it is abundantly clear that our public health infrastructure needs sig-
nificant enhancement to respond to the range of risks presented by terrorism.
On a local note in New Mexico, Im proud of the role played by New Mexico Insti-
tute of Mining and Technology with their first responder training program.
Mr. Chairman, the original Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation provided the founda-
tion for training of first responders for incidents involving weapons of mass destruc-
tion. I stand ready to work with you and this Committee as legislation is crafted
to build on that vital foundation.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Domenici. Thanks for
your offer of help. I think we have got a job to do here and it is
an important one. The program you mentioned at the end is exactly
what we should be doing, bringing technology to bear on this new
problem.
Thanks also for the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici law, because after
September 11 when people said, why did the Federal Government
not do anything, in fact, we had done some things, thanks to lead-
ership like that. We did not do enough. We did not expect the at-
tacks in exactly that way, but it helped.
We do have to move on to the next panel, but while you were
talking, I saw Mr. Sheirer looking for recognition. I assume that
you wanted to talk about your experience under the Nunn-Lugar-
Domenici law.
Mr. SHEIRER. Under Nunn-Lugar-Domenici, in May of this past
year, we had a tabletop exercise called Red X, which was a bioter-
rorist incident in New York City where we had about 75 different
agencies and hundreds of observers up at the EOC. The mayor
came and participated, and 5 minutes into this exercise, you forgot
it was an exercise with our mayor. We virtually quarantined Man-
hattan and we went through this step by step what we would do.
What was interesting in the critique of it right afterwards, some
people criticized us for closing the city, Manhattan, so quickly. It
was interesting to try and reach out to them after what happened
34

with both the bombing on September 11 and the anthrax to see if


they had changed their critique in any way.
But the second part of that same drill was the TriPOD exercise,
the point of dispensing, which had a direct impact on our ability
to deal with the anthrax situation and how we handled those peo-
ple that were exposed. Thank you very much. That bill has done
exactly what it was intended to do.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is great. Go ahead, Mr. Sheirer.
Mr. SHEIRER. One other observation, a very quick one. I had fully
expected that we were going to run into the turf problems some-
where along the line as we got further and further away from Sep-
tember 11 and I am happy to say, to this point, with the help of
FEMA, with the help of the State Emergency Management Office,
and with every agency, we have had a few bumps in the road, but
nothing, absolutely nothing that would deter us from getting our
job done in terms of the September 11 incident, funding all the
local ones we can and recovery from that, the anthrax incident, and
Flight 587. It has just been a tremendous cooperative effort from
the agencies, and where you had expected some problems, they
have not come up.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks for that good report, Mr. Sheirer.
You know, one of the things that I think we might most readily
do in this Committee is to lead an effort to expand Nunn-Lugar
Domenici. If we continue the military analogy, and it is not far-
fetched at all in this case, it is training exercises that make our
military what it is and helped us to perform as successfully as we
have thus far in Afghanistan. The truth is, every State, county, and
metropolitan area in the country today ought to have the support
that you got under Nunn-Lugar-Domenici to carry out training ex-
ercises.
Mr. SHEIRER. Exactly.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you all very much. You have been
an excellent panel, very helpful. I really want to ask that you stick
with us and continue to be engaged with us. We are going to share
whatever products we have of this set of hearings and we are really
going to welcome your response because we want it to work from
your level of government.
Thanks very much. Have a good day.
I will call the second panel now. I want to indicate that I have
to go off to a meeting of the Education Conference Committee and
I am very grateful that Senator Cleland has agreed to Chair the
hearing in my absence. I hope to return as soon as I possibly can,
certainly before the hearing is over.
Senator Cleland, thank you very much.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CLELAND


Senator CLELAND [presiding]. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair-
man.
As our second panel is taking their seats, I would just like to pro-
vide an opening statement. This hearing is, I believe, one of the
most critical hearings we can have on the subject of homeland se-
curity because it gets at an issue that resonates from almost every
major era of our Nations history, the issue of integrating the role
35

of the Federal Government with that of State and local govern-


ment.
Philosophically, I think it is fair to say that the roots of America
lie in the ideal of giving back some autonomy to State and local
governments, consistent with the efficiency, coherence, and equity
necessary to ensure a successful response to the challenge at hand.
The issue we are here to discuss today of securing our homeland
against a diverse range of potential challenges is as complex as any
I am aware of in our Nations history. The scope of the attacks that
are possible and that we have already witnessed cries out for
standardization and economies of scale that are the hallmark of a
strong Federal response. At the same time, the diversity of geog-
raphy, of population density, and of infrastructure that exists in
our Nation at the present time makes it impossible to envision a
one-size-fits-all solution.
For these reasons, it is critical that we accurately survey and
monitor the capabilities available at State and local levels and tai-
lor Federal resources to provide complementary capabilities that
ensure every region of our Nation has the supplies, personnel, and
infrastructure needed to meet an acceptable benchmark of care for
the entire population.
To this end, I am extremely proud that my home county, DeKalb
County in the State of Georgia, was the very first county in the
country to establish an independent Office of Homeland Security.
I note that several witnesses have cited the need for additional
funding to assist first responders in their efforts to prepare for inci-
dents involving hazardous materials. Your testimony could not
come at a better time.
I will introduce this week the Heroic Emergency Response Oper-
ations, or HERO Act of 2001. This legislation will allow the Depart-
ment of Transportation to access $15 million in surplus funds that
have accumulated in the emergency preparedness grants program
due to appropriations restrictions. The purpose of the bill is to dis-
burse the surplus funds to State and local governments for haz-
ardous material training of the men and women who are at ground
zero during emergencies involving hazardous materials.
The HERO Act would also authorize $1 million of the surplus to
go to the International Association of Fire Fighters to help fund the
specialized training that the IAFF provides free of charge to local
fire departments. According to the IAFF, this will quadruple the
number of fire fighters who receive this HAZMAT training.
I call on my colleagues in this Committee and in the Senate to
cosponsor the HERO Act of 2001.
I have introduced several other measures to enhance the coordi-
nation and integration of our response to likely attacks and I have
attempted to prioritize resources to those entities, areas, and infra-
structures that have the potential to provide the greatest enhance-
ments against the most likely threats.
The Public Health Emergencies Accountability Act, introduced
just last month, puts in place a procedure that allows clear assign-
ment of responsibility in cases where the public health is threat-
ened. It further mandates the exchange of information between
Federal entities primarily responsible for public health, such as the
CDC, and those primarily responsible for countering criminal and
36

terrorist activities. I have and will continue to advocate for in-


creased funding for the CDC, an organization absolutely critical to
our national capability to sustain the integrity of our society in the
event of a significant biological attack.
I suspect this hearing will highlight once again the need for
greater coordination. Local officials in my own State have told me
that they need a better understanding of what resources they can
expect from the Federal Government in a given situation. They
have also identified the need to be buffered from the unintentional
secondary effects of Federal actions, such as the loss of key per-
sonnel from local public health, police, and fire organizations
caused by the call-up of the National Guard.
To provide clarity on these issues, I will solicit the views of our
witnesses, either directly or for the record, regarding what is need-
ed to provide an adequate level of response capability.
I would like to thank the Chairman and Members of the Com-
mittee for their attention today, and now I would like to introduce
our witnesses here.
Chief William Berger is President of the International Associa-
tion of Chiefs of Police. Chief Berger was named the Chief of Police
in North Miami Beach, Florida, in 1989. His previous experience
includes 15 years with the City of Miami Police Department. He
joined the board of the International Association of Police Chiefs in
1995.
Joseph Tinkham, II, is Commissioner, Maine Department of De-
fense, Veterans, and Emergency Management. General Tinkham
serves as both the Adjutant General of Maine, commanding the
Maine Army and Air National Guard, and is the Commissioner of
the Maine Department of Defense, Veterans, and Emergency Man-
agement.
Dr. Michael Caldwell is Dutchess County Commissioner of
Health, here on behalf of the National Association of County and
City Health Officials. Dr. Caldwell became Commissioner of the
Dutchess County, New York, Department of Health in 1994.
Michael Crouse is Chief of Staff for the General President of the
International Association of Fire Fighters. Mr. Crouse is a veteran
fire fighter and former District Vice President for the International.
He is here on behalf of IAFF General President Harold Schait-
berger.
Senator Collins asked that Mr. Tinkhams introductory state-
ment go last so she has time to return from another hearing, so
we will go to Chief Berger now, if you will. We are glad to have
you.
TESTIMONY OF CHIEF WILLIAM B. BERGER,1 PRESIDENT,
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE
Mr. BERGER. Good morning, Senator Cleland. How are you, sir?
As you know, the IACP is the worlds oldest and largest organi-
zation of police executives, with more than 19,000 members, over
100 countries being represented. Our mission throughout the his-
tory of our association has always been to address urgent law en-
forcement issues, develop policies, programs, and training, tech-
1 The prepared statement of Mr. Berger appears in the Appendix on page 118.
37

nical assistance, and to help with whatever problem may be con-


temporary.
As I appear before you today, combating terrorism looms as our
most urgent issue facing the membership and, of course, all our
communities. The initial response of law enforcement and other
public safety agencies in New York, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and
throughout the United States to the terrible incidents and events
of September 11 was outstanding, and I can assure you that the
actions of the brave men and women of the New York City area
police departments would be duplicated by any of the more than
16,000 law enforcement agencies in the United States today be-
cause that is what we do.
After September 11, Federal, State, and local law enforcement
agencies immediately began working together in a massive effort to
respond to the attack and to prevent additional attacks. However,
in the weeks and months that have followed, it has become appar-
ent that the critical partnership between Federal, State, and local
law enforcement is being hindered by difficulties in cooperation, co-
ordination, and information sharing. This, of course, is unaccept-
able.
Now at a time when communities across the United States are
turning to their law enforcement agencies for guidance and protec-
tion, we must all do what we can to ensure that law enforcement
agencies work together and overcome those artificial walls that
sometimes divide us. The IACP is certainly not alone in this belief.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation and other Federal law enforce-
ment agencies have also realized how critical working with State
and local law enforcement is to the success of their efforts and they
have taken several positive actions to make this happen.
In addition to addressing this critical information sharing issue,
there are other steps that the Federal Government can take to en-
sure that State and local governments and law enforcement agen-
cies are active and effective partners in homeland security. Al-
though the primary mission of law enforcement agencies has been
to ensure public safety, the events of September 11 have dramati-
cally and significantly changed the focus of law enforcement oper-
ations.
Suddenly, agencies and officers who have been trained and
equipped to deal with traditional crimes are now focused on appre-
hending individuals operating with different motives, who have dif-
ferent objectives and who use much deadlier weapons than tradi-
tional criminals. As a result, law enforcement agencies and officers
will need new training, new equipment to meet this new threat.
For example, State and local officers would be greatly benefited
from training on certain topics, which are, one, recognizing possible
threats to public safety and terrorist tactics; two, field interrogation
techniques to better enable them to recognize and respond to ter-
rorist attacks; three, Federal immigration law, sources, and docu-
mentation; four, to respond to biological, chemical, nuclear inci-
dents; and five, detecting false identification documents, such as
drivers licenses, passports, and visas.
As for the equipment needs, it has become clear that law enforce-
ment agencies will need to obtain protective clothing and isolation
equipment for those critical first responders.
38

Radio spectrum, I know it has been commented about here but


it is a top priority. As demonstrated on September 11 and during
the numerous other large-scale incidents that have occurred in the
last several yearsHurricane Andrew, which I was involved in in
South Florida, Hurricane Hugothere has been a critical need to
address communications problems caused by limited radio spec-
trum available for public safety use. Because the spectrum is cur-
rently in use by public safety agencies, it is both fragmented and
limited. Agencies from different and even neighboring jurisdictions
are many times unable to communicate with each other. This com-
munications failure obviously complicates the ability of law enforce-
ment and other public safety agencies to coordinate an effective re-
sponse in emergency situations.
The IACP urges the Congress and FCC to take immediate steps
to ensure that public safety agencies receive additional radio spec-
trum allocations that is sufficient to provide for interference-free
and interoperable communications between emergency service per-
sonnel.
Threat alert protocols need to be established. Finally, a last area
of concern I would like to address before I conclude this matter in
which the Federal Government issues terrorist threat alerts. After
having conversations with Governor Ridge this Saturday and FBI
Director Robert Mueller, it has become apparent that the establish-
ment of an effective notification system is imperative. While State
and local law enforcement agencies appreciate receiving threat
advisories from the Federal Government, the vague nature of the
information and the lack of clear response protocols often leave
State and local law enforcement executives uncertain as to what,
if any, action should be taken. This uncertainty is especially trou-
blesome at a time when communities across the Nation are turning
to their law enforcement agencies for both guidance and protection.
Therefore, the IACP believes that the Office of Homeland Secu-
rity, in conjunction with the FBI, the Department of Justice, and
representatives of both State and local law enforcement, should im-
mediately address this area and develop clear and concise protocols
for issuing threat alerts and providing guidance for law enforce-
ment responses.
At our recently concluded annual conference in Toronto, the
IACP leadership addressed this critical issue and discussed the cre-
ation of a national threat level and law enforcement response pro-
tocol. This protocol concept, modeled after the U.S. military threat
alert system, calls for the development of graduated alert systems
that would categorize the threat level confronting the United
States and provide guidance as to what law enforcement actions
would be appropriate for each threat level.
In order to facilitate the discussion of this concept, a chart out-
lining the protocol framework is attached to the record of this dis-
cussion. It is the belief of IACP that such a system would provide
State and local law enforcement executives with a clear under-
standing of the threat confronting their communities and the ac-
tions required that their agencies must take in this response.
The events of September 11 have opened a new chapter on ter-
rorism for all governments and their law enforcement agencies
throughout the entire world. If we are to be successful in our ef-
39

forts to combat terrorism, we must work together, efficiently and


effectively. We can no longer let affiliations or jurisdictional squab-
bles interfere with our mission of protecting our most sacred com-
munities, the citizens we serve who expect in no other fashion and
actually demand it from us.
I thank you on behalf of the IACP for the opportunity to appear
here this morning, and, of course, later on be glad to answer any
questions.
Senator CLELAND. Thank you very much, Chief Berger. We will
wait for questions until everybody finishes, but I cannot help but
articulate that I would like to hear you expound a little bit more
on the spectrum problem. As an old Army signal officer, one radio
not talking to another, I cannot raise you, and the problem is al-
ways on the other end. I think probably in metropolitan Atlanta,
what have we got, 68 police departments? I would be surprised if
they were all on one frequency at any given moment.
Mr. BERGER. They are not.
Senator CLELAND. That is just an example, but thank you for
that and we will get into that a little bit more. Also, I am fas-
cinated by the, shall we say, adopting the military model, threat
condition alpha or threat condition beta or 321 or whatever. You
are right. When a Federal official just says, Now you all watch out
there, now, you hear. Good luck. I mean, what are you supposed
to do with that? You are right, so we can get into that.
Mr. Tinkham, we are going to wait on Senator Collins, if you do
not mind.
Dr. Caldwell, welcome.

TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL C. CALDWELL,1 M.D., M.P.H., COMMIS-


SIONER OF HEALTH, DUTCHESS COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, NEW YORK, ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL ASSO-
CIATION OF COUNTY AND CITY HEALTH OFFICIALS
(NACCHO)
Dr. CALDWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Cleland, and
Members of the Committee. I am Dr. Michael Caldwell. I am the
Commissioner of Health for Dutchess County in New York, the
home of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Thank you for inviting me to
speak here today on behalf of the National Association of County
and City Health Officials, which represents the 3,000 local public
health departments across our country.
Are we prepared for bioterrorism as a Nation? Not nearly
enough. Though we have made progress and learned important les-
sons in the last few years, we have a long way to go to be able to
detect and respond to an act of bioterrorism quickly, prevent the
spread of disease, and save as many lives as possible. Bioterrorism
preparedness requires a combination of the resources and skills of
public health with those of other public safety and emergency pre-
paredness disciplines.
While public health preparedness is a shared joint responsibility
between the Federal, State, and local governments, we believe the
planning must focus at the local level and on the local level.
1 The prepared statement of Dr. Caldwell appears in the Appendix on page 129.
40

We have identified four core capacities for public health pre-


paredness for bioterrorism. We need to increase surveillance and
epidemiologic investigation capacity. We need to increase our lab-
oratory capacity. We need to increase our communications capac-
ities. We need to increase our planning and response capacities.
I can tell you, as a local Commissioner of Health in New York
State, that I typically get disease reports that are 2 and 3 years
old. That does very little to help me in my planning for today or
the future. We need to develop new data systems that give us real
time data of emerging diseases, not just the diseases but the sur-
veillance of symptoms which might uncover patterns of disease or
types of diseases. Rather than just giving me a report with the
name already, I want to know what the symptoms are, because if
we see patterns across the community, that may indicate an out-
break.
I can tell you, a couple of years ago, we dealt with the problem
of West Nile virus in crows. We had so many crows across New
York State, we just did not know what to do with them all, and
certainly when we sent them to our State lab, they did not quite
know what to do with them all, either. They had to develop quickly
a prioritization system. There was not a reserve capacity.
We saw that again with the anthrax problem. We were quickly
overwhelmed in New York State and across the country with envi-
ronmental samples being sent, from a new pair of blue jeans to
some kitty litter to other things that you would think are maybe
not so suspicious, but yet the lab did not have a priority process
set up. They did not have capacity.
You have heard of the Health Alert Network. Well, it is in its in-
fancy. Only 13 States have all local jurisdictions connected. We
need to have 3,000 local Health Alert Networks so that we can
then take this Federal information and give it to our localities.
Now, do we need one in every health department? Maybe not. We
need to look at regionalization. But every local jurisdiction must be
covered.
What about our planning and response capacity? We need to per-
form routine drills. We have heard this over and over again. And
once again, they need to be done from a regional standpoint.
Local public health departments and their communities are
learning that local partnerships between agencies can be built and
are essential for further progress. But first, these agencies must
know each other and have planned together well in advance. They
should not be exchanging business cards of introduction during a
real crisis, and let me tell you, Senator, this, unfortunately, has
happened.
Local surveillance and response systems will not work unless we
have thoroughly trained professionals to use them and those people
knowing exactly what to do and knowing what the other people do
and do not do and have sufficient practice doing it in advance. Cer-
tain agencies will say, oh, well that department does that, and that
department says, well, I think that department does it, and so you
have gaps, and then others times you have duplication, where
agencies say, no, I do that, and the other agency will say, oh, no,
I do that, too. So we need to work through all of this.
41

In Dutchess County, we have been quite busy recently. Yes, we


were devastated by September 11. The spouse of our mayor,
Collette LaFuente in Poughkeepsie, was lost in the financial dis-
trict that day. But also, we have been very busy with anthrax.
Whether it was the worker at NBC Studios who lives in Dutchess
County that presented to a local doctor and the doctor called us up
and said, What do I do? or the father of the Eagle Scout who just
received a congratulatory letter from Senator Daschle and said,
This letter was dated on October 15, 2001, the day all the news
broke. What do I do with this letter? We are the natural first re-
sponders in a case of suspected bioterrorism.
Your local public health department is on the front line with the
professionals of this distinguished panel. The local public health
system finally has emerged as a core component of our national se-
curity. We are looked to for leadership. We coordinate response and
communication. We provide information to the community and all
involved parties. People expect us to have action. Get that sample
to the lab. What are the tests for the lab? They want follow-up.
They want to know things are complete and accurate.
You asked me to come here today to tell you what actions could
be taken by the Federal Government to support our efforts of local
public health agencies, and I have two answers. One, the National
Association of County and City Health Officials already recognizes
that the Senate voted to provide $1 billion for State and local pub-
lic health capacity building and we applaud you for that. Thank
you. So, yes, we do need financial resources.
But my county executive, William Steinhaus, wanted me to send
you a message. He said, We do not expect the Federal Government
to pay for everything. There is a fair local share and a State share
and we are willing to ante up. But let me tell you that, to date,
Dutchess County has not received one penny of Federal assistance,
nor have 55 of our 58 counties, not one penny of bioterrorism or
Health Alert Network assistance.
But finally, we need technical assistance and consultation. We do
not just need a manual with money. We need someone to help us,
walk us through it. We want the planners from the Federal Gov-
ernment to come sit with us at our planning meetings and make
sure that we are doing it right.
Overall, we need to strive for a seamless and coordinated effort
from local to Federal, across agencies at the Federal, State, and
local levels, and we want to make sure that everyone is informed
on a continuous basis.
Finally, my colleagues at local public health agencies across the
country know that you appreciate the funds that you will appro-
priate for bioterrorism preparedness will be used to strengthen our
collective local public health infrastructure in many other valuable
ways, as well. So thank you for helping to build a safer and
healthier local community.
Senator CLELAND. Thank you, Dr. Caldwell. Several images you
gave me there, that when an emergency happens, people in the
business of responding should not be just introducing themselves at
that point with, Here is my card. Call me when you need me,
that kind of thing. This protocol needs to be established before-
42

hand. That is a powerful point here in all this and we want to go


back to that. Thank you very much for your testimony.
I am reading Doris Kearne Goodwins great Pulitzer Prize win-
ning book, No Ordinary Time, and in so many aspects, the book
is like reading yesterday or todays headlines. In terms of Dutchess
County, New York, apparently the only paying job Eleanor Roo-
sevelt ever had was working for the Office of Civil Defense in New
York.
Mr. Crouse, welcome very much. Thank you.
TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL J. CROUSE,1 CHIEF OF STAFF FOR
THE GENERAL PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF FIRE FIGHTERS (IAFF)
Mr. CROUSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the op-
portunity to appear before this Committee today. My name is Mi-
chael Crouse and I am the Chief of Staff of the International Asso-
ciation of Fire Fighters. I am here today representing the interest
and views of our General President, Harold Schaitberger, and the
245,000 men and women professional fire fighters, EMTs, and
paramedics who are members of the IAFF.
I spent 17 years as a fire fighter employed by the Federal Gov-
ernment protecting U.S. military installations. For 10 years, I was
an IAFF District Vice President representing the interests of those
Federal fire fighters. Mr. Chairman, exactly 3 months ago today,
our Nation lost 344 of its bravest. For fire fighters, it is still Sep-
tember 11. Every time the alarm goes off, we steel ourselves to the
possibility that we are responding to the latest act of terrorism. In
the first war of the 21st Century, the battle lines are drawn in our
communities.
Senator, your home State of Georgia has already suffered from
terrorism, and unfortunately, there are still many high-profile tar-
gets vulnerable. In this war, we must not only support our troops
abroad, but also with equal zeal and financial resources support
our fire fighters who are our Nations domestic defenders.
The first thing the Federal Government must do to shore up our
homeland security is to assist local communities with the hiring of
additional fire fighters and providing all fire fighters with special-
ized HAZMAT and weapons of mass destruction training.
Second, establishing a single point of contact to help localities ac-
cess the various Federal programs can have a positive effect on ter-
rorism response.
The first and foremost need of the fire service is adequate per-
sonnel. Today, two-thirds of our fire departments operate with in-
adequate staffing. In your own State, Senator, jurisdictions such as
the City of Augusta and Richmond County operate with only three
fire fighters per apparatus. Responding to a fire with only three
people makes it impossible for first responding units to comply
with OSHAs two in and two out standard for safe fire ground op-
erations and places the lives of those fire fighters in jeopardy. Con-
gress would never allow our Army to engage in war with two-thirds
of its divisions understaffed. Incredibly, this is exactly what we are
asking our local fire departments to do every day.
1 The prepared statement of Mr. Crouse appears in the Appendix on page 144.
43

That is why the IAFF, along with the International Association


of Fire Chiefs and several members of Congress have strongly en-
dorsed the Safer Fire Fighters Act, S. 1617 and H.R. 3185. The
Safer Fire Fighters Act uses the procedures established by the
highly successful universal hiring program for police officers to
place 75,000 additional fire fighters in our communities.
The second most pressing need is specialized training in weapons
of mass destruction and HAZMAT mitigation response. From the
vantage point of front-line emergency responders, the two crucial
components of any WMD or HAZMAT training program are that
training is conducted in a local jurisdiction incorporating the
unique aspects of the communities and that it uses trainers who
are both certified instructors and professional fire fighters.
Training for a terrorism event in your own community allows
first responders to not only learn the tactics and methods of effec-
tive response, but it also applies these theoretical concepts to con-
centrated targets in their jurisdictions. The value of qualified fire
fighters teaching other fire fighters is in the benefit gained by
shared experiences. The bond of common experiences allows fire
fighter instructors to more effectively communicate the lessons of
a training course than, say, a person from academia or the mili-
tary.
I am proud to note that the IAFF offers training programs to fire
departments free of charge in terrorism and HAZMAT response
that have all the elements of a successful training program. Our
training utilizes skilled instructors who are both HAZMAT techni-
cians and certified instructors to train fire departments to safely
and effectively respond to weapons of mass destruction terrorist at-
tacks. Additionally, our program conducts the training in the com-
munity and incorporates the unique aspects of the localities.
The IAFFs programs were developed in partnership with the De-
partment of Justice, Department of Energy, the Department of
Transportation, the Environmental Protection Agency, and Health
and Human Services. We have trained tens of thousands of fire
fighters, both professionally and volunteer fire fighters, union and
unorganized departments. Especially since September 11, the de-
mand for our training program far outpaces our funding to deliver
it. The IAFF can dramatically increase the number of fire depart-
ments trained if our grants from these various Federal agencies are
increased.
We agree that a single point of contact will help localities. How-
ever, clarifying the lead agencys mission is more important than
determining which agency should serve as the point of contact.
While there is unquestionably a need for a Federal agency to co-
ordinate the various counterterrorism programs that exist through-
out the government, we do not believe that this lead agency should
subsume the functions of those other agencies. There is value in
several agencies being involved in terrorism response.
For instance, in the area of training, many of the so-called dupli-
cative programs are, in fact, specialized training to address specific
needs. EAP, DOT, and DOE all offer hazardous material training.
However, the EAP program focuses on responding to HAZMAT
incidents at Superfund sites. Likewise, the Department of Trans-
44

portations program focuses on the unique challenges posed by the


release of hazardous materials while in transport.
Last, the Department of Energys program is specific to HAZMAT
issues at nuclear facilities. Each setting presents distinct chal-
lenges and needs to be addressed in separate training programs.
Too often, the fire service has been neglected when it comes to
planning for and devoting resources to respond to terrorism. Our
ranks are thin and reinforcements are needed quickly. Congress
must take the lead by providing the fire service with the resources
to ensure adequate staffing so that we can operate safely and effec-
tively and providing fire fighters the necessary training so that we
will be able to play our role in fighting the war on terrorism.
Thank you for the time to present our views of the IAFF and I
will be available for questions.
Senator CLELAND. Thank you very much, and thank you to the
fire fighters around America.
You may have heard me a little bit earlier today. I am intro-
ducing legislation, I think, that might be of some interest to you
and maybe respond to some of the things you just pointed out. It
is called the HERO Act of 2001, which will allow DOT, the Depart-
ment of Transportation, to access $15 million in surplus funds that
have accumulated in something called the emergency preparedness
grants program, accumulated due to appropriations restrictions.
The purpose of my legislation is to disburse the surplus, the $15
million, to State and local governments for hazardous material
training of men and women who are at ground zero during emer-
gencies involving hazardous materials. The HERO Act would also
authorize $1 million of the surplus to go to your organization, the
International Association of Fire Fighters, to help fund the very
specialized training programs you just mentioned that you provide
free of charge, and that now those programs, in terms of training,
are so much in demand you cannot really afford the demand on
you. But this would provide you $1 million to provide this kind of
training free of charge to local fire departments.
This apparently, according to your statistics, will quadruple the
number of fire fighters who actually receive this hazardous mate-
rial training, is that correct?
Mr. CROUSE. Yes, sir, that is.
Senator CLELAND. Thank you very much.
Senator Collins is wrapped around an axle in a conference meet-
ing on education and she apologizes for not being able to return
right now for your statement, Mr. Tinkham. Why do we not pro-
ceed with your statement and know that Senator Collins would
love to be here if she could and she will make it when she can.
TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPH E. TINKHAM, II,1 AD-
JUTANT GENERAL OF MAINE AND COMMISSIONER OF THE
MAINE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, VETERANS AND EMER-
GENCY MANAGEMENT
Mr. TINKHAM. Very well. Thank you, Senator Cleland. I am Jo-
seph E. Tinkham, II, here from the great State of Maine, and I am
honored to have been called to testify before the Committee today.
1 The prepared statement of Mr. Tinkham appears in the Appendix on page 150.
45

In my professional life, I serve as both the Adjutant General of


Maine, commanding the Army and Air National Guards, and also
as the Commissioner for the Department of Defense, Veterans, and
Emergency Management. Additionally, since the events of Sep-
tember 11, I have been tasked by Governor Angus King to coordi-
nate Maines governmental plans and procedures to protect our citi-
zens from terrorist attack.
I appear before you here today in my civilian commissioner ca-
pacity. I would like to thank this Committee, and particularly Sen-
ator Collins, for the opportunity to appear here today.
The State of Maine presents those who would wish to attack us
both a variety of options for illegal entry into our Nation and a sig-
nificant number of vulnerable targets upon which to wreak their
evil intentions. Maine is virtually an open door to the United
States. She has, with her rugged, jagged shores, over 3,000 miles
of Atlantic coastline and is the State with the longest international
border with Canada after Alaska. We have 86 Canadian-American
points of entry, most of which are unmanned and uncontrolled,
save for a sign instructing the visitor where to report for Customs
processing.
Our vulnerabilities are many and diverse. Maine has several
international and domestic airports, including 250 uncontrolled air-
strips just moments from Canada. We have military bases, to in-
clude unprotected radar and communications installations. There
are two major shipyards serving the U.S. Navy and other national
defense industry facilities in Maine. We have over 800 dams, 49 of
which are large enough to produce electricity. There are gas and
oil pipelines criss-crossing the State. We have a deactivated nuclear
power plant on our unprotected shore with its spent fuel rods
stored on site, and the second largest petroleum tank farm on the
East Coast is on the shores of our most important commercial har-
bor in the very heart of our largest urban population center. The
current situation in Maine lends the phrase, rich in diversity, a
whole new meaning.
On the evening of September 11, in the Emergency Operations
Center of the Maine Emergency Management Agency, Governor
King and I participated in a brainstorming session with our emer-
gency response team to identify possible threats from terrorist at-
tack. We listed literally hundreds of vulnerabilities to terrorism
within our borders.
Over the course of the next few days, I scrubbed this list, with
the concurrence of the governor, to identify just those targets that
would result in either a large loss of life or environmental catas-
trophe. We have some 25 vulnerabilities in Maine fitting that cat-
egory.
We then formed a joint National Guard-Maine State Police secu-
rity team to visit these 25 sites, and in coordination with local law
enforcement, assess their specific weaknesses to terrorist attack.
We found that security measures, while probably sufficient for any
perceived threat as we understood them on September 10, were not
adequate after September 12.
We found one site, Senator, that takes some rather nasty chemi-
cals and stores them. They transfer them from rail cars into a stor-
age facility, and then when the paper industry needs these chemi-
46

cals, they call for them. The fence was downtrodden. There was no
security guard. Our security team asked the manager, What do
you do in an emergency, and he pointed to this button on the wall.
He said, We ring that siren. The employees are instructed to run
outside, look at the windsock, and then run in the opposite direc-
tion.
On many of these sites, we wish desperately to put in place an
armed security force, and while we had the manpower and the
equipment, we lacked the financial resources. We had to satisfy
ourselves with developing plans to guard these sites, were we to re-
ceive the intelligence to do so, and regretfully, plans to respond, to
pick up the pieces and to put out the fires, if you will, were the
sites attacked without warning.
I am convinced that lack of monetary resources greatly impedes
our ability to address real security concerns in Maine. On Sep-
tember 11, there was no line in the State or in the county or in
the local budgets reading national defense.
And while we in the States take great pains to protect our citi-
zens from the natural perils which may befall us, protection from
attack by a foreign enemy upon our people in their homes and in
their places of business has for almost two centuries been within
the purview of the Federal Government. Most of us with experience
in emergency management were convinced, wrongly thus far, as it
turns out, that the Federal Government through FEMA or through
some other vehicle would come to our assistance.
Large special appropriations were being passed, it appeared to
us, for that very purpose. The U.S. Capitol complex was being se-
cured, as was the Kennedy Space Center and Federal courthouses.
The airports and the airline industries and even the conces-
sionaires at Reagan National Airport were receiving assistance.
Surely, help for the States must be, and I hope is, forthcoming.
What do we require? We need financial assistance, for the most
part, and the flexibility to tailor its expenditure to our unique
needs in Maine. We do not need a lot of money in the larger
scheme of things, something approximating $25 million which we
would share with local governments to strengthen our
vulnerabilities.
In conclusion, I would just like to say that, arguably, the best
American contemporary artist of the mid-20th Century was Nor-
man Rockwell. During the dark days of World War II, he painted
a series of works he called the Four Freedoms. Perhaps you know
them. As I recall, the first three depicted freedom of religion, free-
dom of speech, and freedom from want. The last painting has an
American mother and father gazing lovingly down upon their sleep-
ing children tucked safely into their beds. The father holds a folded
newspaper with a headline from the war. The children sleep bliss-
fully, safe and unaware of the terrors ravishing much of the world.
Rockwell titled this painting, Freedom from Fear, and that, ladies
and gentlemen, is the most basic responsibility of government on
every level, the responsibility of ensuring that our citizens, our
children, can live peacefully in their homes, free from fear.
To that end, we must strive, setting all else aside until we have
done so, and to that end, we in Maine, and I am sure other States,
as well, are striving mightily. We have the will and the ability to
47

counter most of these terrorist threats to our citizens and we are


in the best position to do so, but we lack the financial resources
and the means to gather the intelligence on threats from outside
our borders. For that help, we turn to the solemn and enduring
contract we signed in Philadelphia in 1787, which was, in great
measure, to provide for the common defense. It is time we dust off
that most honorable pledge.
Again, my thanks to you, Senator Cleland, and to the Committee
for affording me this opportunity to share my thoughts.
Senator CLELAND. Thank you very much, Mr. Tinkham, and we
thank you for those eloquent words. I cannot help but feel that
there is a powerful connection between you and Dr. Caldwell. It
was Franklin Roosevelt right out of Dutchess County that had the
famous four freedoms speech in 19401941 that so impressed Mr.
Rockwell that he did those four freedoms for the Saturday Evening
Post, and I have a copy of those in my office, so I thank you for
reiterating that.
I have often thought in the wake of September 11 about Franklin
Roosevelts comment in 1933 that the only thing we have to fear
is fear itself, blind, unreasonable fear, and, of course, that is what
the terrorist deals in, fear, not knowing where the next strike or
incoming round or whatever might occur. That is part of the psy-
chology of dealing with all this, but thank you for bringing that up.
We have Senator Levin with us today. I am glad you could join
us. We have a distinguished group of panelists here. They have all
issued opening statements, and if you would like to issue an open-
ing statement or make a comment, we would be glad to recognize
you. Senator Levin.
Senator LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I made a
very brief comment before, which was relative to the lack of co-
operation between the FBI and local law enforcement. I hear a lot
of it. It was a very pungent comment, the one that I heard before
which had to do with a local law enforcement guy saying he would
rather get sticks in his eye than to work with the FBI in an inves-
tigation, and I have heard that, I am afraid, from many local law
enforcement people.
I would like to talk to Chief Berger, perhaps, to start with. I
have a New York Times article here from November. I do not know
if you have been asked about this or not, Chief, but you were
quoted as saying this, that there is real frustration relative to the
cooperation level between local law enforcement and the FBI. You
said that even after September 11, you were still hearing com-
plaints from fellow chiefs. I do not think that we can afford to
have these impediments to information any longer. Some of these
terrorists were living in our communities.
And there are a lot of other quotes in this article, as a matter
of fact. The chief of Portland, Maine, I understand what the FBI
is about. It is all about culture and elitism, and on and on. It is
really quite an extraordinary series of quotations from people who
are frustrated in working with the FBI, and one of them happens
now to be the police chief in Ann Arbor, Chief Oates, who I have
talked to, who used to be with the New York Police Department,
who had a lot of work assignments with the FBI and just was to-
tally frustrated in terms of working out joint cooperative ventures,
48

getting information, getting intelligence, which is important, to


local police. This is simply not shared.
Now, this may be a matter of culture. It may be a matter of pro-
cedures being different. It may be bureaucracy. It may beI am
not sure what all the reasons for it are, but it obviously has been
going on a long time. Again, according to this article, it is, Since
the days of J. Edgar Hoover, State and local officials have com-
plained that the Bureau is high-handed with its local counterparts
and that the FBI looks for any excuse not to share even the most
innocuous intelligence information.
So, Chief, if you have not already been asked about this, let me
ask you, is it still true? Are there any improvements you see? Is
there anything we can do to change that culture or whatever it is?
Mr. BERGER. I have seen drastic improvements in the area that
the director himself, Director Mueller, has been very open. He
came to Toronto for our international conference and was very
genuinely, not only embarrassed, but open to any suggestions that
we, the International, or any law enforcement had.
As you know, he has empaneled a committee of local law enforce-
ment, State, Federal people to basically advise him on a one-to-one
basis. I think that is very, very important. I believe his heart is
open. I do not believe this is just mirrors. I truly believe that he
wants to improve this. I know there are some pending changes to
actually put a liaison person specifically there. He or she would
communicate with law enforcement on a need-be basis.
Let me just say, I have been in law enforcement 28 years. I was
the commander of the Miami homicide unit for years. And I can tell
you, there has always been this culture in law enforcement, a need
to know. Homicide did not talk to robbery. Robbery did not talk to
burglary. It is not just a Federal problem. It has been a law en-
forcement problem, and I wish I could say where we could trace it
back to, but there has always been this need to know. Certainly
with national security, this ups the stakes. We certainly do not
want to put critical information for distribution.
What we talked about with the Bureau that we were very frus-
trated with was the fact that, initially after September 11, there
was a tremendous surgence of FBI agents going to the commu-
nities, securing evidenceas you know, the residents were, many
of them in Florida and throughout the country. And in this urgency
to get the job done, what was happening is news media would see
the Bureau at certain locations and then mayors and citizens
would talk to their police chief and say, Wait a second, why is the
FBI in my neighborhood, in my building, in my condominium?
And, of course, the response is, I have no idea, and that is very
frustrating.
That is what we told our special agent in charge of the Miami
office, our U.S. Attorney down in the greater Florida area. That is
what my members told their special agents in charge of the various
offices. Just give us the courtesy of telling us that we are going to
be in your community and we are effecting, whether it is a search
warrant, whether an arrest, just so that we know. We do not need
to know in many cases the particulars for that arrest. Certainly,
they have the people power to take care of that particular incident
or search warrant or whatever that needs.
49

But that is that frustration, and I saw the frustration from the
local special agent in charge, Hector Fitzgeros, because, basically,
after September 11, he was doing truly a million things, trying to
get the job done as quickly as he could and the people that work
for him, and many times, those things occur where you just do not
talk to people and it is wrong. It is wrong because of the pressures
that each one of us have in our individual communities, who we
have to report to, and it is just basic information.
I think there is going to beI know there is going to be a tre-
mendous change in that attitude to at least share initial informa-
tion, and then later on, as we have talked about these security
clearances, maybe more specific information regarding operatives
in individual communities.
Senator LEVIN. By the way, I have talked to Director Mueller
about this issue shortly after he was sworn in, because I was so
bothered by it, and even talked to local law enforcement and they
feel so strongly about this disconnect that I felt that I just had to
really meet with him on this subject, which I did. And he, again,
as you pointed out, I think, indicated a determination to change
that culture and to improve those relationships and it is very im-
portant that happen.
I do not know how many tips came into the FBI following the
attack on the Trade Center and the Pentagon, but it is a huge
number. I think it was over 100,000, although I
Mr. BERGER. Over 100,000.
Senator LEVIN. There is no way, I do not think, that the FBI can
possibly even screen these. I do not think they are large enough.
I think they have to rely on local law enforcement to do it. Are they
relying on local law enforcement to screen, in some preliminary
way, at least, the 100,000 or so tips which have come in since the
September 11 attacks, do you know?
Mr. BERGER. The answer to that is yes, but I cannot speak na-
tionwide. I know in Florida, that has already started. We have de-
veloped regions, regions based on county boundaries. Those regions
are actually effecting the following up of many of these leads that
are occurring.
The one thing we do not want, though, is to be given tasks that
are just not important, just this is a preliminary task, and I have
echoed that to powers to be. It would be insulting to use local law
enforcement just to go ahead and follow up these non-important
things.
Senator LEVIN. Does the same problem exist in terms of lack of
sharing of information with other Federal agencies, or has it been
true with the Border Patrol, DEA, Customs, U.S. Attorneys, or
Coast Guard? Is this true generally or has it been sort of something
which is more identified with the FBI?
Mr. BERGER. I certainly do not feel qualified, only because all my
experience has been at the local level. But having dealt with task
forces, having dealt with the HIDA programs down in South Flor-
ida, certainly, there are communications problems even between
Federal agencies that work with themselves on a regular basis,
again, this kind of concept of need to know.
50

We need to work harder. I think that is something, as you men-


tioned, that is a culture. It is ingrained. It is ego. A lot of it is ego,
and that is at all levels.
Senator LEVIN. On these task forces, these joint task forces, are
they always chaired by a Federal official?
Mr. BERGER. The answer to that is no.
Senator LEVIN. Are they rotating chairs? Sometimes it is a State
or local official that chairs it?
Mr. BERGER. Down in South Florida, there happens to be a Sher-
iff of Broward County, but there are two co-chairs, a State officer
and a U.S. Attorney is the other co-chair.
Senator LEVIN. I am glad to hear that. I think it is useful. I do
not know that has been true, generally, until recently, but if it has
not, I am glad to see the change and I hope that is true across the
board, because the local contribution here is major and we have got
to find a way to coordinate better and that is what Governor
Ridges challenge is, in part.
Just one other question. I do not know if any of you might have
information on this, and that has to do with the fact that we have,
in the private sector, companies that specialize in responses to dis-
asters, including pollution, biological problems, and spills. Are any
of you in a position to know whether or not we have got good co-
ordination between our local, Federal agencies and the private sec-
tor which has been focused on these issues? We talk about biologi-
cal or chemical attacks. There are spill pollution problems which
have been focused on for a long time which have a lot of similar-
ities. They are not exactly the same, but a lot of similarities. Would
any of you be in a position to know that or have you commented
on that?
[No response.]
Senator LEVIN. OK. That is something, then, that, Mr. Chair-
man, I will take up with the member of our first panel that I was
not able to come here to attend, and I want to thank you, Mr.
Chairman, and to thank our panel.
Senator CLELAND. Thank you very much.
Chief Berger, I would like to follow up here. Mayor Morial just
sat right there in that seat less than an hour ago
Mr. BERGER. It is still warm. [Laughter.]
Senator CLELAND. He said, we must not only think about re-
sponse, and we had been talking about FEMA, and I think Senator
Lieberman and Senator Specter have legislation, which I think I
am actually a cosponsor of, to maybe create an Agency of Home-
land Defense with a budget and people and so forth and part of the
core of that is the response aspect of FEMA.
And the mayor said, we must not only think about response, we
must think about prevention, and I was just sitting here thinking,
he has got the Super Bowl, a big target, all the things that terror-
ists like, one particular place where a lot of people are going to be.
How do you work on prevention? It seems to me it was the same
challenge of September 11, not only response, but intelligence to
pick up the threat or threats that might come your way.
In other words, if you are the Chief of Police in New Orleans, it
seems to me that one would love to have any credible intelligence
the FBI or any other agency of the Federal Government might have
51

certainly passed on to him so he can evaluate it and take some ac-


tion.
I do not see how we can prevent a terrorist attack unless we
have better intelligence. If you do not have better communication,
State and local to Federal, particularly in the FBIs case, they are
the Nations CIA. Outside the borders of the United States, it is the
CIA, and that is a whole other kettle of fish, whether the CIA and
the FBI properly coordinate. But if you are chief of police anywhere
in America and you have got a target, or if you are the General
here and you are sitting on miles of untended border and nuclear
installations and so forth, you have got to be looking for all the bat-
tlefield intelligence that the FBI, particularly, could provide you so
you can put your people on alert and check out some things.
So in terms of prevention, I think the key to that is intelligence,
but if you are not sharing information, I do not know how we can
help our chiefs of police prevent things. Is that a view that you
support?
Mr. BERGER. I have a lot of experience in that. When Pope John
Paul, remember, he came to Americahe has come a couple of
times, but the one he came down to South Florida, I was respon-
sible for his security when he had his very large mass. I have been
involved with Super Bowls of the past when they were held at the
Orange Bowl. That is how long ago it was.
I can tell you, in specific events, I think pre-planning, we do a
very good job. I have never seen Secret Service nor the Bureau or
anyone that may have intelligence information ever share it. Of
course, I would not know if it was not there, but on those specific
events, I have even run Grand Prix, those, we have many pre-
meetings before. Many things are worked out. Escape routes are
worked out. We can isolate the event and plan specifically for it.
I was just in Salt Lake City. As you know, the Winter Olympics
will be there. The pre-planning started 2 years ago. Those things,
I think we do a very good job in coordinating that. Certainly the
World Trade Center was something that probably, without intel-
ligence to talk about, we could have really never planned for some-
thing to that effect.
But I assure you that security at this upcoming Super Bowl or
any major event, as the Olympics will follow that, shortly after,
will be premium. I am convinced of that, that it will be a very safe
place for Americans to visit and a very peaceful venue during those
situations. But that is because, like I said, we know we have the
purpose, the intent has been designed, and that is our mission, and
we do very good at creating security for missions.
Senator CLELAND. Thank you. That is good to know. Mr.
Tinkham, thank you very much for being here.
Mr. TINKHAM. Yes, sir.
Senator CLELAND. Your description of your security situation is
quite challenging, shall we say.
Mr. TINKHAM. Well, we here with a military background, Sen-
ator, as you know, would note that when you try to guard every-
thing, you guard nothing, and so we must rely on intelligence. In-
telligence is one of those things that we can gather perhaps bits
and pieces of what is going on inside our border, but we need to
52

turn to the Federal Government for anything outside the border


and put the pieces together.
I know that while, as far as we know, there has been no specific
intelligence threats in Maine, it would be very comforting to hear
that every day. In Vietnam when we put patrols out or we put out
outposts, they would report back periodically that things were neg-
ative. It was heartening to know that at least they were still out
there watching. That would be helpful, if our intelligence gathering
agencies could at least on a daily basis say, hello, and by the way,
we have not forgotten you up there. We have checked and there is
currently no specific threat to Maine. I think our people would ap-
preciate that, more to counter that fear in their homes.
But as far as law enforcement is concerned, I have seen barriers
fall in the last 3 months that I thought would never fall. I mean,
the cooperation between many departments in both State and Fed-
eral Government and between the various levels of government has
been much greater than it has ever been in my experience since
the events of September 11.
Senator CLELAND. Thank you. That is good to know.
Dr. Caldwell, talk to me a little bit about the CDC. You are there
at the bottom of the threat, in effect.
Dr. CALDWELL. Or the top.
Senator CLELAND. That is right. That is one way to look at it.
You are closest to the problem and the CDC is, in effect, the B
52s on call up there.
Dr. CALDWELL. See, we look at the CDC as the foundation and
we look at ourselves as the eyes and the ears. It is the patients
who walk into doctors offices or present to school clinic and school
nurses. There may be some unusual symptoms or questions or anx-
iety or fears, and then they call the local health department. The
local health department then, if they are lucky, can quickly go to
their Internet site and look at the Health Alert Network and imme-
diately transmit some information, answer a question, call some-
body up from the CDC to ask some advice.
So I think we are, in some ways, an extension of the CDC, so
we get frustrated at the local level when we see the CDC having
struggles with sister Federal agencies, because at the local level,
we try not to replicate those problems. And I think that you will
find a diverse number of good and not-so-good relationships at the
local level.
In Dutchess County, I could say we are very fortunate with the
leadership of my county executive. He has been able to put in place
a position of an epidemiologist in Dutchess County, New York, pop-
ulation of 280,000. There are a number of States that do not have
an epidemiologist. So on January 1, I will have a bioterrorism coor-
dinator.
But even luckier than that was 2 years ago, my county executive
recognized with West Nile virus we needed a biostatistician. We
never had one before. We used that person on September 11. We
reassigned her with this capacity and said, you are now our bioter-
rorism coordinator. When this other position opens, you can go into
that.
So what we need to do is try to replicate that, maybe not at all
3,000 local health departments, but at enough of them so that they
53

are all covered, and we need that at the local level because if you
just, as I say, give us money or give us guidelines and dont provide
us with the staff capacity to be able to know what to do with them,
that become a real problem.
One more example. Let us say there is a problem in Dutchess
County or in New York City, since we have about 5,000 or more
commuters to and from New York City each day. Somebody comes
in with some unexplained symptoms and suddenly it turns out to
be smallpox or something horrible like that. Well, I have confidence
that the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile, these pushpacks will
be activated. They will get there in 7 hours. But we are going to
have to know what to do with them. Dr. Caldwell, the pushpacks
are here. Where do we put them?
And it is not just me. It is departments of emergency planning
fire and police. But I think for now, we have really emerged as
equals and I want to thank you for putting us on this panel be-
cause I think, before, people did not recognize the value of local
public health. So the CDC has the beginnings of a foundation. We
are not starting from scratch.
Let me tell you one final comment about Health Alert Network
funding in the State of New York. We got a few hundred thousand
dollars, the State of New York, and in the law, it was crafted that
some of it must go to the local level. Well, I just told you 55 out
of 58 counties got nothing. But I can understand the States predic-
ament. They need this much money and they got this much.
So they said, if we take this much and give it to all of the coun-
ties, you will basically have enough to print pamphlets. So let us
take this amount and try to create a model in one or two counties.
Let us get the State up to speed, and that is what they have done.
But now we need to replicate that across all of New York State and
across the country so that we do not leave any jurisdiction behind.
So we have a lot of work to do, and one more quote from Frank-
lin Roosevelt, he said, Never before have we had so little time to
do so much, and that is, I think, the way we all feel. We all feel
a little behind in public health, but we know we are on the right
course, and with your assistance and help, we know we are going
to get there, not in a 5- or 10-year plan, but in a 5-month plan.
Senator CLELAND. It is interesting that you just said that, be-
cause 3 years ago, a private group that supports the CDC in At-
lanta came to me and they said, We have got a 10-year plan. This
is 3 years ago. And they said, But we really need to make it a 5-
year plan because the CDC is vulnerable to a terrorist attack, it
is spread out in 22 different offices, some of them date back to
World War II, we have got rain coming through the roof on million-
dollar computers and on world class scientists. This is an untenable
situation.
So I went to work on the problem and we got money each year.
But then all of a sudden comes September 11. The point is, we can-
not wait 10 years to upgrade the CDC. We cannot wait 5 years. So
I have called for a Manhattan Project to, in 36 months, dramati-
cally upgrade the CDC in every sense of the wordfacilities, labs,
communication capability, and security.
So I think we are on the right track here. You are right. I do not
think we have a whole lot of time to wait.
54

Dr. CALDWELL. And strengthening the CDC will strengthen the


local public health department, but you cannot leave us out com-
pletely, out of the funding stream. What we have seen with pre-
vious Health Alert Network funding, so much has been siphoned
off at the Federal and State level, just a trickle has gotten to us.
But that, as I said, is just because of the amount that was given.
I think they made the best choices that they had available, but now
they need to do it all.
Senator CLELAND. Mr. Crouse, any final comment as we wrap up
the hearing here?
Mr. CROUSE. No, sir. Thank you.
Senator CLELAND. Dr. Caldwell, Senator Lieberman has asked
me to ask a question. You identified the need to integrate public
health experts and their activities with that of other emergency re-
sponders. How can that best be done, and is there an appropriate
Federal role?
Dr. CALDWELL. We have planning going on at the local level all
the time. I think that if local public health agencies are not being
included in those plannings, that they need to hear the message
that they should be included. I believe that they are, and if they
were not before, they are being included now.
But more importantly, I mentioned to you that we need technical
support, not just money but technical support. I find it valuable as
we go through our planning committees to have somebody from the
FBI and the CDC sitting at those planning committees with us
from time to time to help ensure that we have a standardization,
this protocol development, I think, that Mayor Morial was speaking
of earlier, so that every community will respond in a similar way
based upon its population. But I think that we need to hear redun-
dant messages going back and forth from the local up to the Feds
and then from the Feds down to the locals.
Set a good example. Let us see the Federal Government have
interagency collaboration, and just like kids who see their parents
do bad things tend to follow those behaviors, maybe if we see them
do good things, it will trickle down to us. But let us see, set by ex-
ample, have some of those Federal agencies get together, sitting at
our local table helping us plan locally.
So for the Dutchess County Governments comprehensive emer-
gency response plan, we can have representatives from the Depart-
ment of Justice, the CDC, etc., with us, and I say not at every
meeting, but at least to have a presence so we are not handing
those business cards out the day that that disaster is there.
Part of the problem, as well, is people do rotate over time, posi-
tions. These personal relationships, if they are there, as I think
that Mayor Morial said before, they work. If they are not there,
they do not work. We should not have to rely solely on personal re-
lationships for our Nations defense. I need as Commissioner of
Health of Dutchess County to have a list of all the positions I need
to know and who is in those positions and make sure they have my
business card, the local FBI director, the regional Health and
Human Services director, etc.
And I think that is a beginning for us to know who we should
get to know. Then it is my responsibility if I do not. But if we all
have that list, I am not just sort of sitting around saying, gee, I
55

think that would be a good person to know, or maybe I will call


up my colleague in Orange, County, New York, see if they know
their person, etc.
So we need guidelines, and I think they are coming around, but
we need to hear them over and over again. It has to become a nat-
ural way of doing business and we are a long way from that.
Senator CLELAND. Thank you very much. That is one of the rea-
sons we are having these series of hearings about coordination, co-
operation, and communication of Federal agencies along with our
local entities.
We thank you all very much for your patience and for coming
today to testify. The record will remain open for a week after the
close of the hearing.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:32 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR BUNNING


Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am pleased to be here today as we discuss the role of state and local govern-
ments in homeland security.
The events of the past 3 months have illustrated how important it is for Federal,
state and local governments to work together in responding to terrorist attacks.
On September 11, our country responded to one of the worst terrorist attacks in
our nations history. Within a month, we were attacked againthis time by someone
sending anthrax through the mail.
Since that time, this Committee has held several hearings on security, including
improving the security of our ports and airports, combating bioterrorism, and pro-
tecting our mail.
Today we are looking at the local role in homeland security. State and local gov-
ernments have tremendous responsibility in protecting their citizens.
Many times, their employeesthe police officers, firemen and women, and other
emergency personnelare the first to respond to a disaster.
In light of recent events, many of our state and local governments, along with the
Federal Government, are now taking a second look at the disaster plans currently
in place to handle a terrorist attack or disaster.
Many communities and states will need to make some changes so they can ade-
quately protect their citizens. The Federal Government will also be making some
changes, particularly through the new office of homeland security.
Several of the witnesses we will hear from today will discuss ways the govern-
ment can better respond to attacks, including hiring more personnel, providing bet-
ter communications and coordination, and providing more funding for various pro-
grams.
As we all work to strengthen our security, it is important to remember that each
level of government has an important role to play, and that we do need to work to-
gether to make sure we get the job done.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, and I thank them for being
here today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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