Case 105
Case 105
Case 105
Facts:
8. petitioner moved for the lifting of the CDO, which public respondent SEC denied for lack
of merit on February 22, 2001.
Aggrieved, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals imputing grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on public respondent SEC for issuing the order. It
also applied for a temporary restraining order, which the appellate court granted.
On May 23, 2001, the Court of Appeals consolidated petitioners case with CA-G.R. [SP] No.
62890 entitled Prosperity.Com, Incorporated v. Securities and Exchange Commission
(Compliance and Enforcement Department), Cristina T. De La Cruz, et al.
9. petitioner filed in the Court of Appeals a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. On July 6, 2001, the motion was heard. On July 12, 2001, public respondent
SEC filed its opposition. On July 13, 2001, the appellate court granted petitioners
motion,
It behooves us to trace the history of the concept of an investment contract under R.A.
No. 8799. Our definition of an investment contract traces its roots from the 1946 United States
(US) case of SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.[14] In this case, the US Supreme Court was confronted
with the issue of whether the Howey transaction constituted an investment contract under the
Securities Acts definition of security.[15] The US Supreme Court, recognizing that the term
investment contract was not defined by the Act or illumined by any legislative report, [16] held that
Congress was using a term whose meaning had been crystallized [17] under the states blue sky
laws[18] in existence prior to the adoption of the Securities Act.[19] Thus, it ruled that the use of the
catch-all term investment contract indicated a congressional intent to cover a wide range of
investment transactions.[20] It established a test to determine whether a transaction falls within
the scope of an investment contract.[21] Known as the Howey Test, it requires a transaction,
contract, or scheme whereby a person (1) makes an investment of money, (2) in a common
enterprise, (3) with the expectation of profits, (4) to be derived solely from the efforts of others.
[22]
Although the proponents must establish all four elements, the US Supreme Court stressed
that the Howey Test embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of
adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of
the money of others on the promise of profits. [23] Needless to state, any investment contract
covered by the Howey Test must be registered under the Securities Act, regardless of whether
its issuer was engaged in fraudulent practices.
After Howey came the 1973 US case of SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc. et
al.[24] In this case, the 9th Circuit of the US Court of Appeals ruled that the element that profits
must come solely from the efforts of others should not be given a strict interpretation. It held that
a literal reading of the requirement solely would lead to unrealistic results. It reasoned out that
its flexible reading is in accord with the statutory policy of affording broad protection to the
public. Our R.A. No. 8799 appears to follow this flexible concept for it defines an investment
contract as a contract, transaction or scheme (collectively contract) whereby a
person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits not solely but
primarily from the efforts of others. Thus, to be a security subject to regulation by the SEC,
an investment contract in our jurisdiction must be proved to be: (1) an investment of money, (2)
in a common enterprise, (3) with expectation of profits, (4) primarily from efforts of others.
Prescinding from these premises, we affirm the ruling of the public respondent SEC and
the Court of Appeals that the petitioner was engaged in the sale or distribution of an investment
contract.