Oxford Handbook of Islamic Law The Class PDF

4/5/2017 Classical PeriodScripture, Origins, and Early Development - Oxford Handbooks
Oxford Handbooks Online
The Classical Period: Scripture, Origins, and Early Development

Mariam Sheibani, Amir Toft, and Ahmed El Shamsy
The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Law
Edited by Anver M. Emon and Rumee Ahmed
Subject: Law, History of Law, Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law Online Publication Date: Apr 2017
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199679010.013.13
Abstract and Keywords
This article examines whether the Quran served as a source for the early jurists during the classical period;
whether Hadith reports contain authentic information regarding Muhammads sayings and actions (and if they do
not, when and how they became attributed to him); whether and how the regional legal traditions were transformed
into legal schools centered around particular individuals; and how the nature of legal reasoning changed within
this period. The article rst revisits the debates regarding the role of the Quran and Hadith, respectively, in the
formulation of Islamic law. It then reviews scholarship on the phases of Islamic laws development, beginning
with the emergence of geographically dened legal traditions and culminating in the formation of the legal schools
and their distinctive theoretical principles and substantive doctrines. It concludes by suggesting directions for
future research.
Keywords: Quran, Hadith, Muhammad, legal schools, legal reasoning, Islamic law, legal traditions
Much of the historiography of Islamic law in the period between the seventh and eleventh centuries is rooted in
positions taken on one central question: is the traditional Muslim account of the genesis of Islamic law reliable?
This traditional account, in a nutshell, says that Islamic law originated in the rules and instructions propounded by
Muhammad, and that after the exodus to Medina and the establishment of a Muslim polity these rules grew into an
extensive body of laws rooted in the Quran. After Muhammads death, his successors continued to implement the
Quranic laws as well as others based on the Prophets precedent. In addition, they solved issues that were not
explicitly covered by the former two sources by employing individual reasoning (ray). Some of Muhammads
companions who were recognized for their legal acumen settled in the newly founded garrison towns, establishing
regional traditions of legal learning in these locations. Between the second quarter of the second Islamic century
and the middle of the third (roughly 740860 CE), a handful of prominent jurists systematized earlier legal thought
and laid the foundations for enduring legal schools with their own legal literatures. Within this traditional
narrative, the aspects that have prompted extensive debate concern the following questions: whether the Quran
actually served as a source for the early jurists; whether Hadith reports contain authentic information regarding
Muhammads sayings and actions (and if they do not, when and how they became attributed to him); whether and
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how the regional legal traditions were transformed into legal schools centered around particular individuals; and
how the nature of legal reasoning changed within this period.
This chapter is divided into six sections. The rst two address debates regarding the role of the Quran and Hadith,
respectively, in the formulation of Islamic law. The remaining four sections engage with scholarship on the phases
of Islamic laws development, beginning with the emergence of geographically dened legal traditions and
culminating in the formation of the legal schools and their distinctive theoretical principles and substantive
doctrines.
I. Law in the Quran

Classical works of Sunni legal theory (usul al-qh) take as axiomatic that the Quran is the foundation of Islamic
law, complemented by the precedent, or Sunna, of the prophet Muhammad. Western scholars writing in the second
half of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries drew heavily on the narrative provided by these
works for their understanding of legal developments in the rst two centuries AH (roughly the seventh and eighth
centuries CE).1 But shortly into the twentieth century, and in earnest after about 1950, scholars started questioning
whether this narrative reliably represented the historical reality of the rst two centuries of Islamic law.
Building on his nineteenth-century predecessors, Ignaz Goldziher (18501921) put forward a highly inuential
challenge to the classical narrative, and his critical engagement with the earliest legal sources set a benchmark for
succeeding scholarship. His most cutting critique, elaborated in the next section, was of the authenticity of Hadith,
the body of reports of the statements and deeds of the Prophet, his Companions, and other early gures whom later
jurists regarded as legal authorities. Goldziher asserted that the Quran and Hadith (which over time came to serve
as the textual substance of the prophetic Sunna) were accorded legal authority only at a secondary stage of Islamic
legal formation.2 Since Goldziher, scholars who have cast doubt on the Qurans legal content have approached the
matter from two broad but complementary angles.
The rst, and by far the more inuential, is a historiographical approach that focuses, as Goldziher did, on the
appearance of early scriptural texts and their reception by the rst generations of Muslims. It asks whether those
early generations took the Qurans black-letter imperatives as a basis for legislation and, if so, when they began to
do this. The most prominent proponent of this approach is Joseph Schacht (19021969). It is scarcely possible to
overstate the inuence of Schachts work on the modern study of Islamic law. Since the publication of his Origins
of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (1950), Schacht has without question become the most frequently cited authority
in western studies in the elds of legal origins and Islamic law, and his work has elicited paeans of acclaim as well
as sweeping rebuttals. Despite its waning inuence under the force of increasingly successful critiques, to a large
extent Schachts conclusions still frame the debate for both his admirers and his detractors.
Did Schacht view the Quran as a source of early Islamic law? With respect to its content, Schacht saw the Quran
as providing a moral take on legal matters.3 This perspective, likely inuenced by Goldziher, is rooted in a vision
of Near Eastern cultural continuity that informed Arabian custom both before and during Muhammads prophetic
mission and is reected in the language of the Quran. Where the Quran speaks of the Prophets judicial
functions, therefore, it speaks of his role in settling disputes (hukm)which Schacht saw as a continuation of the
pre-Islamic Arabian custom of the wise arbiter (hakam)and augments it with a new rudimentary notion of
administering justice (qada).4 For Schacht, the Prophet was only marginally elevated to the status of lawgiver
by virtue of his political and military leadership at Medina. His primary role was to rectify societys fallen
standards, and the Quran implicitly registers this mission through its prescriptions and prohibitions regarding
commercial dealings, family relations, and public conduct. The Qurans verses in favor of women and orphans
and against usury, blood feuds, and lax sexual mores were therefore declarations of right and wrong, not instances
of legislation.
Schacht argued that the Qurans incorporation into Islamic law proper was a much later development. He
complemented his impressions about the Qurans language with a critical analysis of early Hadith collections and
legal works, dating the beginning of a truly Islamic articulation of law about twenty years into the second/eighth
century. Preceding it was what he called the customary (e.g. marriage and divorce) and administrative (e.g. scal
and military) law of the Umayyad Caliphate (41132/661750). These doctrines he regarded as the starting point
for what later developed into Islamic law: later jurists either afrmed doctrines they deemed theologically and
rationally acceptable and clothed them in legitimizing scriptural authority or, alternatively, discarded unacceptable
ones in favor of other doctrines which they equally clothed in the same scriptural authority.5 To Schacht, this
scriptural clothing was woven of Hadith reports, which he, like Goldziher before him, considered almost entirely
fabricated (for Schachts Hadith critique, see the next two sections). With regard to the Quran, what is important
to note is that Schacht viewed Islamic law-making as essentially the invention of early Hadith masters who
systematically islamized existing legal doctrines by fabricating reports that linked them to the authority of the
Prophet and the early Muslim community. According to this narrative, Quranic injunctions became important
only after the process of islamization began and were used to pad the new religious law at a decidedly secondary
stage. Schacht thus dispatched the Quranic element of Islamic law in a precious few pages toward the end of
his study, further emphasizing his view of the Qurans marginal role in the formation of a functional legal
system.6
Schacht sharpened Goldzihers skeptical view of the classical narrative by grounding it in a more thoroughgoing
analysis of a broader range of Arabic primary texts, some of which had not been available to scholars before him.
But not all were convinced by Schachts demotion of the Quran. An alternative but complementary approach is
exemplied by the work of Noel Coulson (19281986). Coulson too characterized the Quran as essentially moral,
but it was precisely because of its moral imperative that he argued that it must have provided the ethical seeds for
later Islamic legal doctrine. On this view, Islamic law developed alongside Umayyad regulatory law.7 Still,
Coulson seemed to view Islamic lawthough not islamized lawas emerging when jurists cloth[ed Quranic]
norms of behavior with legal consequences.8
Shortly after Coulson, S. D. Goitein (19001985), best known for his magisterial studies on the Cairo geniza,9
disputed the notion that the Quran is bereft of legal material.10 He was unconvinced by the quantitative argument
namely, that because the Quran has no more than 500 verses of legal import (out of over 6,000), it cannot be
considered to have signicant legal weight.11 Goitein pointed out that verses with legal import are often long and
detailed, and that in any case quantity does not outweigh substance and thus can tell us nothing of how the early
community viewed the role of scripture in their lives. Paralleling the old Israelite conception and in keeping with
Near Eastern tradition, Muhammads followers, Goitein argued, viewed law not as a contingent human institution
but as an eternal and ontologically independent expression of truth accessible only through divinely conferred
wisdom or revelation. Like Schacht, Goitein afrmed the Prophets status as wise arbiter (hakam), but unlike
Schacht, he took this broadened scope of the Prophets ofcefrom preacher to arbiteras evidence that religious
law existed as an instrument of social governance during the Prophets lifetime. Goitein identied a particular
Quranic passage (5:4251) as anointing the Prophet as arbiter and, using the chronology of the Quranic text
12
proposed by earlier scholars, he pinpointed the birth-hour of Islamic law at around the year 5 AH (637 CE).12 But
Goitein seemed unprepared to take on Schacht in so short an article, sidestepping the latters main contention that
law lay outside of religion in the rst century. Instead, he drew a distinction between (sacred) law and (formal)
jurisprudence, which somewhat diluted his argument into a variation on Schachts thesis.
After a period of dormancy, studies on the origins of Islam and its law acquired fresh vigor beginning around
1980, and the doubts Schacht raised about the early sources were taken to new heights. Patricia Crone (1945
2015) stands out as promoting the most sweepingly skeptical position. Crone viewed the Quran as a confounding
hodgepodge of statements whose disorganization and amorphous origins severely compromised its usefulness as a
source of historical information. Later exegetical works, which she contended were heavily inltrated by the tales
of nameless storytellers, offer no help; and early jurists, she argued, chronically misunderstood the true import of
legal verses.13 What she identied as severe discontinuities between the real meanings of the Quran and the
provisions of Islamic law bolstered her conclusion, prevalent in much of her work, that the Quran coalesced into
its canonical form at a period substantially later than that claimed in the traditional Muslim narrative.14 An
authoritative Quranic canon was either non-existent in the Hejaz at an early period or, if it existed, was considered
irrelevant for the purpose of deriving law.15 In a separate study on the foreign borrowings in Islamic law, Crone
took the Qurans irrelevance for granted, and the Qurans complete absence in this work stands out even more
than the passing treatment it receives in Schachts Origins.16 Crone earned considerable praise from some scholars
for her daring, while others attacked her for what they described as a polemical, high-handed tone and an
inadequate, even arbitrary handling of the Quran and exegetical sources.17
Since then, several studies that focus on specic areas of the legal corpus have in great measure disproved the
sweeping claim that the Quran was absent in early Islamic law. David S. Powerss 1986 study on inheritance law,
while partially in agreement with Schacht, was reserved about marginalizing the Qurans early importance, which
would leave an unaccountable space of about a century before the Hadith masters got to work.18 Not long after,
Harald Motzki and Yasin Dutton, each studying an early Hadith collection, noted that gures from the rst/seventh
century are observed routinely employing both direct and indirect references to the Quran as evidence for legal
doctrine.19 Finally, in her study on Islamic purity law, Marion Holmes Katz made the sensible observation that the
basic rules governing ritual washing for daily acts of worship are all articulated in the Quran, which makes it
implausible that the Quran had no legal relevance for early Muslims whatever.20
A more resounding recent critique, however, belongs to Wael B. Hallaq. Hallaqs views on the subject appear to
have undergone a slight evolution, or else perhaps a shift in emphasis. His 2005 synoptic study of legal origins
described a view of the Quran as eminently concerned with carving out a unique Muslim moral identity that
absorbed acceptable pre-Islamic customs while rejecting immoral pagan practices as well as correcting the errant
ways of previous monotheistic communities (i.e. Jews and Christians).21 This Islamic legal ethic, his narrative
suggested, grew organically after the Prophets death. But in a 2009 article, he re-centered the debate explicitly on
the philosophical question of morality and the law.22 Drawing on the writings of modern moral and legal
philosophers, Hallaq upbraided scholars for what he deemed their misguided habit of exporting a modern
European dichotomy between the moral and legal spheres across time and space into seventh-century Arabia. To
him, the Qurans juxtaposition of faith (iman) and practice (amal) comports with the premodern conviction
that the moral and the legal were identical concepts. Therefore, the Quran, by virtue of being a moral text,
cannot but have been seen by its rst recipients as an expression of law as well.
Other studies have sought to combine the respective historical values of the Quran and Hadith to see whether a
coherent and continuous historical picture emerges.23 These studies use the Quranic reception as a springboard to
explain what happened in the rst century after the Prophets death. But because so much of this story is bound up
in the reliability of Hadith reports, they tend to focus considerably on this source, to which we, too, now turn.
II. Law in the Hadith

As we have seen, historians reconstructing Islamic legal history in the rst two Islamic centuries are faced with the
challenge of doing so on the basis of limited and incomplete sources. The majority of legal material available to
historians is contained in the vast corpus of Hadith reports (also referred to by many as traditions). Each Hadith
report is composed of a narrated text (matn), which recounts an event from the prophetic age, appended to a chain
of transmitters (isnad), which traces the text back to its putative source. Given that the earliest extant Hadith
collection was compiled around the middle of the second/eighth century, historians of early Islam have applied the
critical tools of modern historical inquiry, particularly source criticism, to evaluate the historicity of Hadith reports
and to accurately date when specic reports rst appeared and to which authorities they may be correctly ascribed.
Nineteenth-century scholars such as D. S. Margoliouth (18581940) drew heavily on the classical narrative for
their understanding of the Hadith (just as they did for their understanding of the Quran), taking the canonical
works24 as more or less reliable.25 On this account, during the rst/seventh century, the Companions of the Prophet
and their Successors derived Islamic law on the basis of (in hierarchical order) the Quran, the Sunna, and the
consensus of the Companions. The second/eighth century saw the emergence of ray, the exercise of a jurists
individual reasoning to resolve legal questions, which was later systematized as legal analogy (qiyas) and
constituted the fourth source of law.26 Despite the relative emphasis placed on Hadith in Medina and ray in Iraq,
by the middle of the second/eighth century the foundations of a coherent legal system were discernible and served
as the basis for the later schools of law.
Goldzihers source-critical approach and his rejection of this classical account, as already noted, altered the course
of all subsequent research on the formation and early development of Islamic law. First in his study of the Zahiri
school and later in his Muslim Studies, Goldziher posited the reverse trajectory: in the rst/seventh century, Islamic
legal doctrine was developed primarily from ray, and only later were Hadith reports fabricated to justify existing
ray-based jurisprudence.27 Goldziher characterized the jurisprudence of the rst/seventh century as
underdeveloped and attributed the evolution of legal doctrine in the following century to the religious policies of
the early Abbasids, who sought to ground religious and social life in prophetic precedents, which in turn gave rise
to the mass forgery of Hadith reports. Goldziher adduced as evidence the fact that legal works preceded Hadith
collections; the latter, he argued, did not appear until the third/ninth century. This claim turns on Goldzihers own
classication of second/eighth-century workssuch as Ibn Jurayjs (d. 150/767) collection and Malik b. Anass (d.
179/796) Muwattaas legal manuals. He also categorized older collections (suhuf and kutub) as mere scripta, or
rough notes of individual sayings intended for private use.28
Schacht furthered Goldzihers ideas by developing methods for dating Hadith reports, or at least establishing a
terminus post quem for various categories of reports, and integrating his ndings into a comprehensive master
narrative of the development of Islamic law. In his Origins, Schacht maintained that legal traditions from the
rst/seventh centurythose ascribed to the Prophet and the Companionsshould be assumed ctitious unless
proven otherwise, and that the reports of Successors are likewise largely inauthentic. Schacht proposed several
methods for dating reports. One was based on an argument e silentio. He assumed that a legal report would have
been adduced as evidence immediately after it came into circulation, and from there he concluded that reports that
were not mentioned in a legal discussion to which they would have pertained did not yet exist at that historic
moment.29 Schacht further proposed that a reports initial circulation could be dated based on when it rst
appeared in legal or Hadith literature, or when the earliest common transmitter in the isnadwhom Schacht
termed a common linkappeared in a chain.30
Schacht related his dating of Hadith to his broader interest in the origins of Islamic law. In his studies of the
earliest extant legal works, Schacht observed a generational frequency in the Hadith reports adduced by early Iraqi
jurists. They ascribed more reports to Successors than to Companions and cited the former more frequently than
the latter, and these in turn more frequently than reports that extended all the way back to the Prophet. Schacht also
noted that the quantity of Hadith reports in circulation grew considerably between 150/767 and 250/864, and that
the quantity of prophetic reports in particular expanded during the rst half of the third/ninth century, which
coincided with the period after the death of al-Shai (d. 204/820). These observations led Schacht to posit the
backward growth of isnads: legal doctrines were rst ascribed to the Successors, then later to the Companions,
and nally to the Prophet. In this schema, isnads were gradually improved through the steady projection of
teachings back to earlier and higher authorities, culminating in the unbroken isnads found in the Hadith collections
of the third/ninth centuries. For Schacht, the most complete isnads were forged most recently, and therefore, the
more perfect the isnad, the later the tradition.31
Schachts contemporaries generally received his work with approbation,32 and its signicance has been so
enduring in the eld of Hadith studies that it has provided the starting point and the dominant paradigm for
virtually every subsequent study in the eld. While several scholars, such as Johann Fck (18941974), Fuat
Sezgin, and Muhammad Mustafa Azami,33 have disputed Schachts methods and conclusions, among western
scholars the most signicant challenge to Schachts legacy has been posed by the so-called isnad-cum-matn
method, most extensively developed by Harald Motzki.
Motzki criticized Schachts conclusions as circular, overly generalized, and arbitrary. He proposed an alternative
and, in his view, more rigorous and robust way of judging the historicity of Hadith reports, one that accounts for
both the isnad and the matn. First, all available narrations are compiled, diagrammed, and compared to identify
any variant transmissions in both the isnad and the matn. Then, groups of matn variants and groups of isnad
variants are compared to identify any correlations.34 By applying this method to Hadith collections from the rst
two centuries, including previously unexamined ones such as the Musannaf of Abd al-Razzaq (d. 211/827),
Motzki challenged Schachts categorical conclusions of fabrication and back projection. Against Goldzihers and
Schachts ndings, Motzki argued that the growth of reports does not necessarily entail forgery and that common
links should not be assumed to be forgers. Further, he asserted that the age and provenance of early Hadith reports
can be determined through careful study and comparison of chains of transmission with the earliest collections
available to us. His own study of the Musannaf led him to conclude that Islamic law began at the end of the
rst/seventh century and was the result of systematic collecting, not merely forging, of Hadith reports.35 Motzkis
results also called into question Schachts argument from silence. The complexity of the process of gathering and
evaluating Hadith reports means that the absence of a particular report from the legal discussion of one scholar
cannot be taken as evidence that it was not known to other scholars at the time.
Motzkis novel research agenda has inaugurated a new era in the study of early Islam, and his method is now being
employed by a new generation of scholars.36 While Motzkis work has been misinterpreted as incorporating an a
priori assumption of authenticity for Hadith reports,37 he has emphatically repudiated this claim, maintaining that
he has intended only to judiciously retrace the transmission history of individual textswhich may very well
contain forgerieswith a view to dating individual reports or groups of reports.38
III. The Debate on Origins, First/Seventh Century

Having evaluated how scholars have engaged with the historical sources of Islamic law, we now turn to
contending visions of its early development. The rst century of Islam played a formative role in determining the
course of the subsequent development of Islamic law. Already in the rst three generations after the Prophet,
foundational legal institutions were established and the characteristic features of Islamic law became discernible.
Regrettably, the paucity of contemporaneous sources from this period also makes it the one about which the least
is known with certainty. We have already described the traditional narrative of development elaborated in classical
Sunni sources from the fourth/tenth century onward, to which many early European historians generally adhered.
Some nineteenth-century scholars, however, postulated unacknowledged borrowings from other legal systems in
the Near East. Abraham Geiger (18101874) wrote an inuential study that argued for a strong Jewish inuence
on Islamic thought, particularly in the area of law.39 Alfred von Kremer (18281889) was one of the rst to
consider the inuence of Roman law on the formation of Islamic legal doctrines and to hypothesize an indirect
transfer through the medium of Jewish law.40 Goldziher not only saw Islamic law as primarily derived from the
practical ray accommodations of rst-century jurists but also considered it deeply indebted to Roman law.41
As on so many other questions in Islamic legal history, Schacht furthered Goldzihers theories concerning Islamic
legal origins. According to Schacht, during the greater part of the rst century Islamic law, in the technical
meaning of the term, did not yet exist.42 Instead, he argued, apart perhaps from the narrow scope of worship and
ritual law, early Muslims were generally indifferent to legal matters and largely retained the practice and
institutions of the territories they conquered. During the rst/seventh century, legal maxims and customs
originating from Roman law, canon law of the Eastern Churches, Jewish law, and Sassanian law inltrated
Umayyad popular and administrative practices and appeared later in legal doctrines of the second/eight century.
Schacht identied cultured non-Arab converts, whose education in Hellenistic rhetoric had comprised the study of
Roman law at a rudimentary level, as the chief conduit of this transfer.43 On Schachts account, these borrowings,
alongside the ray-based judgments of Umayyad judges and the remnants of pre-Islamic customary law, combined
to form the living tradition of the ancient schools, which was subsequently islamized and buttressed with
fabricated post-prophetic and then prophetic reports starting in the early second/eighth century.
In her study on foreign elements in Islamic law, Crone held to the basic outlines of Schachts paradigm, but she
described his ndings (as well as Goldzihers) on extra-Islamic legal sources as far-fetched.44 She disputed his
work on two specic fronts. First, she argued that since the early Islamic community took shape in the Roman
Fertile Crescent, borrowings must have taken place through this geographical area, not through Iraq as Schacht
had supposed.45 While she accepted borrowings from Jewish law as self-evident,46 Crone maintained that the
principal source of classical and Umayyad institutions was neither Arab custom nor ancient Roman law but
Roman provincial law, that is, Roman law that incorporated foreign elements and was applied in the provinces
of the Roman Empire, especially in the east.47 Second, Crone argued that the list of supposed borrowings given by
Goldziher and Schacht was unconvincing, going so far as to state that not a single item of Goldzihers and
Schachts list of Roman elements in Islamic law has been proved, and several are demonstrably wrong.48
Paralleling her critique of earlier studies of foreign inuences on Islamic law, Crones own ndings have attracted
both substantive and methodological criticism. Kevin Reinhart argued that Crones evidence in fact contradicts her
conclusions. He contended that the eastern Mediterranean world of the rst/seventh century, in which Islam
emerged, was not a cultural vacuum, but a heterogeneous region with shared cultural institutions. It should,
therefore, be no surprise if Muslims inherited some of these institutions.49 Accordingly, Reinhart interpreted
Crones evidence as a carefully documented history of the creativity of an Islamic culture that felt free to borrow
but also to discard and that both integrated itself into and distinguished itself from its predecessors.50
Hallaq criticized Crone for misreading legal texts; for leaving unanswered important questions, such as what
exactly the sources of provincial law were and who was applying it; for not taking into account important ndings
in the elds of Roman and Byzantine studies; and, above all, for a deprecating assumption of Arabian cultural
inferiority which, he argued, colored her interpretation of the evidence51 and prompted her to search for the true
origins of legal norms, which she believed could not possibly have been an indigenous Arab development.52 In his
own study on legal origins, Hallaq emphasized that the genuine sources of Islamic law are to be found in the
Hejaz, not in cultural borrowings from the Fertile Crescent or elsewhere in the wake of the Muslim conquests.
Much like Reinhart, Hallaq held that Islam emerged within an indigenous Arabian legal tradition, and to the extent
that pre-Islamic Arabs absorbed Greco-Roman and Semitic laws and Near Eastern legal institutions, these could be
unproblematically incorporated into Islamic law.53
Motzkis studies on early legal developments in Mecca, which used the method of Hadith analysis outlined above,
concluded that Schachts date for the beginnings of a properly Islamic law was at least half to three-quarters of a
century too late.54 Motzki identied reliable and precise examples of legal reasoning that drew on the Quran and
prophetic Hadith reports as early as the second half of the rst/seventh century.55 He also argued that during the
Umayyad period, the rulings of judges and governors played a very marginal role in the formation of the opinions
of the early [jurists], at least in the issues of private law (e.g. marriage and divorce) with which Motzkis study
was concerned. El Shamsy has likewise argued for an early inauguration of a properly Islamic law, noting that the
founding document of the Islamic polity in Medina shows that the early Muslims saw their community as
religiously constituted, and that the laws of this community could therefore be legitimately considered Islamic.56
Consequently, Muslim jurists in the formative period did not enjoy the luxury of a tabula rasa in their law-making:
they had to operate within the framework of an existing Islamic legal tradition that must have possessed
considerable authority.
One possible way of shedding light on the transition from early, preliterary Islamic legal thought to the law as
articulated in second/eighth-century legal literature is offered by the systematic study of the opinions of the earliest
jurists, which were transmitted orally or in note form. Such a study was undertaken on a limited scale by Motzki,57
but a comprehensive survey has yet to be attempted, even though extensive lists of the early jurists are available in
the works of Ibn Hazm (d. 456/1064) and Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 751/1350).58 Muhammad Rawas Qalaji has compiled
the legal opinions of many of these early jurists into individual volumes, ordering all of their known legal views
alphabetically and carefully referencing the various Hadith collections in which their transmissions appear.
Qalajis more than a dozen volumes draw together the legal reports attributed to Companions such as Umar b. al-
Khattab, Abdullah b. Umar, Ali b. Abi Talib, Ibn Abbas, and Aisha, as well as Successors such as Ibrahim al-
Nakhai and al-Layth b. Sad. These volumes could serve as a propitious beginning for a historical and analytical
study on this topic.
IV. Master Jurists and the Emergence of a Legal Literature,

Second/Eighth Century
Many scholars mark the middle of the second/eighth century as the beginning of a formal Islamic law. The rst
surviving books on Islamic law properthat is, works that were deliberately composed and disseminated
originate from around the middle of the second Islamic century. The emergence of a written discourse at this time
is not limited to Islamic law. Owing primarily to the adoption of paper and the advantages this medium offered
over parchment and papyrus, the same shift can be observed across the landscape of Islamic learning.59 These
surviving works do not appear to have been preceded by similar ones that were later lost; they seem in fact to have
been the rst. Schacht accordingly called the stretch of time roughly from 150 to 250 AH the literary period.60
Still, the works of this period represent a legal system that was still taking shape, and scholars studying these
works have reached varying conclusions about the nature of early law and its sources of authority.
The new urban centers in the vast Islamic Empire were far enough apart to develop separate characters but close
enough to maintain strong commercial and cultural exchange, which included religious knowledge. The main
regions of learning in the second century were the Hejaz, represented by Medina, less so by Mecca; Iraq,61
represented by Kufa, the southern port city of Basra, and the emerging metropolis of Baghdad; and Syria,
represented by Damascus. After the Abbasid revolution in 132/750, Damascus ceased to be the capital of the
caliphate, and Syrias importance faded. By contrast, over the course of the second/eighth century and in the
beginning of the third/ninth, Egypt, with its center at Fustat (Old Cairo), grew in importance, and its inuence
eventually extended across the Muslim domains in North Africa and Iberia.
An important scholarly discussion on this period concerns the space in which early legal thinking took place. At
what point did early jurists begin to view themselves as part of an increasingly dened juristic community, and
what was the nature of juristic thought before that point? Schacht regarded the rst half of the second/third century
as the period of the ancient schools of Medina and Iraq.62 These schools, he suggested, were not homogeneous,
but they were characterized by common patterns of legal thinking expressed in regional terms. The scholars of
Medina determined normativity through reliance on the communal practice (amal) of the citys leading jurists,
while Iraqi scholarship was known for its rigorous application of ray as a way of generating legal decisions out of
a set of well-attested normative principles. Toward the end of the second century, these regional styles of legal
thinking were reworked into personal schools named after the inuential masters who were thought to represent
them best. Abu Hanifa (d. 150/767), whose disciples were the Hanas, represented the Iraqi school; Malik (d.
179/796) and his disciples, the Malikis, represented the Medinan. Hallaq, however, vehemently contested this
geographical partitioning of the early intellectual landscape, arguing that known legal disputes among jurists
within each region clearly indicate that there was no such thing as uniform schools delimited by regional
boundaries.63 Some scholars have supported Hallaqs stance against Schachts notion of regional schools, while
others have pointed out that Hallaq may have misread Schachts intended meaning for regional and personal.64
This disagreement extends to views on the schools subsequent development in the third/ninth century, discussed
in the next section.
Another central debate on the second/eighth century relates to the question of who had the authority to formulate
and apply the law. It has become something of a commonplace in legal scholarship, particularly on Sunnism,65 to
describe Islamic law as a jurists law66that is, a law whose binding authority derives not from judicial rulings
or government legislation but from the collective efforts of private jurists who issued opinions on legal questions.
Because of the generally private nature of their occupationin the sense that the government did not actively
regulate itearly Muslim jurists possessed signicant independent social and religious authority. This was based
on their claim to represent the heirs and guardians of the normative practice of the sacred past, from the Prophet
and his Companions down to their own time. This autonomous status, coupled with such regional variation as may
have existed, created a legal diversity that could prove disruptive to the new Abbasid dynastys efforts to bring
unity and centralized control to the sprawling empire.
That the new administration saw both decentralization and diversity in the law as a problem is brought out in
Joseph Lowrys study of a well-known letter written by the courtier Ibn al-Muqaffa (d. c. 139/756) to the caliph
al-Mansur (r. 13658/75475). In this letter, Ibn al-Muqaffa advises the caliph to assume nal discretion in
selecting and promulgating legal doctrine out of what he saw as a hash of conicting opinions from regional
judges and jurists. Beyond its pragmatic plea to mitigate legal indeterminacy, Lowry argued, the letter contains an
early typology of the religious law that pregured later legal theory, which divided the law into spheres of
interpretation: a non-interpretable sphere, which covered such fundamental obligations as prayer, and an
interpretable one, which included nearly everything else.67 Ibn al-Muqaffa suggests placing legal interpretation
within the caliphal domain, thereby linking obedience to sacred law with obedience to the caliph.
Examining the thought of this one courtier largely in the abstract, Lowry made no clear historical judgment about
the political relationship of jurists and rulers. This was done much earlier in an inuential but highly controversial
book by Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds (19411988).68 Crone and Hinds argued that religious authority was
initially invested in the caliph, who was seen as Gods representative on earth rather than as a temporal and non-
inspired successor of Muhammad. This framework pitted the caliphate from the outset against the increasingly
inuential class of scholars (ulama), which included jurists and theologians. The conict swelled into the
Abbasid period and culminated in the Quranic Inquisition (21834/83349), or Mihna, wherein the caliphs
attempted to determine ofcial theology against the scholars protestations. The scholars triumphed, successfully
wresting legal and theological authority from the caliphs, and, in Crone and Hindss account, they proceeded to
erase the past by systematically linking normative religion to the prophetic age. Unlike Schacht, Crone and Hinds
held that caliphal law was seen ipso facto as religious law; like him, they argued that the victorious scholars
rewrote history.
Crone and Hindss thesis is emblematic of a trend in Islamic legal historiography that depicts early tensions as a
erce, sometimes violent dialectic between two irreconcilable enemies, with one winner who proceeds to
obliterate the legacy of the loser. Such zero-sum terms often exaggerate the conicts intensity and obscure the
exchange of ideas between scholars and rulers. In rebuttal to Crone and Hinds, Muhammad Qasim Zaman has
argued that the caliphs, particularly the Abbasids, sought to legitimize their rule not by sidelining religious
scholars but by enlisting them in their centralizing project through patronage and other means.69 Whether this
strategy is better called inclusion or cooptation, according to Zaman, is a triing point. Similarly, El Shamsy has
proposed that the major shift in the late Umayyad and early Abbasid period was from a communitarian vision of
Islamic law, one based on regional practice that amalgamated caliphal and judicial decisions and scholarly
opinions, to a regularized system of legal interpretation. This system produced an inuential class of jurists to
which rulers increasingly turned for legal opinions and on which, in turn, they exercised signicant inuence
through judicial appointments and patronage of scholars.70
What unies all of the studies we have surveyed, despite their often radically different emphases and conclusions,
is a quest to determine how legal thought evolved and spread, a process that took on new dimensions in the
following century.
V. The Early Schools, Third/Ninth Century

In the third/ninth century, as well as in the decades leading up to it, we see the emergence and establishment of the
four madhhabs, the classical schools of Sunni Islamic law.71 Until the modern period, these four schools
constituted the preeminent formal institution through which Sunni legal doctrine in Muslim lands was interpreted
and debated and legal cases involving Muslims adjudicated.72 And even though the secular nation-state has now
long been the operative political order in most of the historical Muslim lands, the madhhab continues to guide
many Muslims in ritual and civil matters (and increasingly commercial ones) and to serve as the framework for
teaching Islamic law in many traditional colleges and schools.73 The label classical here denotes that in this
period each schools discursive repertoire (e.g. a legal vocabulary) and general institutional contours (e.g. a distinct
body of legal opinion and methodology) more or less assumed the forms that would carry legal thought for the
following millennium.74
The traditional Muslim account of the emergence of the legal schools can be summarized as follows. In the rst
two centuries, the development of Islamic law was to a large extent driven by practical needs and expressed in
legal responsa (fatawa, sg. fatwa) from jurists and judicial rulings (ahkam, sg. hukm) from judges and rulers.75
These legal authoritiesmany of them either students of the Companions or students of these studentsdrew rst
and foremost on the recent memory of the Prophets community in issuing their opinions and rulings. Jurists in the
generations thereafter cultivated these opinions and rulings into a body of substantive doctrine, applying a set of
largely implicit principles of legal interpretation (ijtihad) to address emergent issues. These jurists legal acumen
and social standing attracted followings of disciples, creating masterdisciple associations that were often
numerous and not necessarily exclusive, with students typically attending the learning circles of more than one
master. But these associations gradually contracted and formalized over the course of the third/ninth century (and
to some extent the following century as well), until Sunni law came to be dominated by the four institutionalized
schools, each named after its principal founder: Hana, Maliki, Shai, and Hanbali.76 Of the early Sunni schools
that did not survive, the most notable is the Zahiri school, named after the literalist scholar Dawud al-Zahiri (d.
270/884).
By the end of the third/ninth century, the Hana, Maliki, and Shai schools were rmly established, with the
Hanbali school soon to follow. Each had a body of law and a legal methodology, as well as an extensive literature
produced by a robust community of dedicated students. In order to guarantee the (relative) predictability of judicial
rulings, the ruling authorities patronized the legal schools and began to appoint judges on the explicit condition
that they adhere to a specic school in their judgments. But how and when the schools changed from loose
associations to formal institutions remain among the more vexing questions for historians of Islamic law today.
Apart from the dearth of sources already mentioned, two aspects of the early schools make their history hard to pin
down. First, religious law was not decreed by sovereign power, which precludes nding a reliable narrative in the
historical chronicles alone. Second, the early networks of jurists were diffused across place and time, which means
that a robust narrative must account for considerably more than fty or a hundred years. Because school formation
was uid and gradual, scholars have attempted to impose order by highlighting a particular conceptual category of
historical agents that they believe propelled the process. For the sake of simplicity, one could characterize the
various approaches as focused on individuals, institutions, or ideas.77
The rst approach focuses on prominent gures and is represented by Schacht, who, as seen earlier, propounded a
two-stage narrative. In the rst stage, the early, ancient schools, expressed in terms of regional normative
traditions, emerged in Iraq, Medina, Syria, and later on in Egypt. In the second stage, before and after the turn of
the third/ninth century, these transitioned into personal schools dened by exclusive adherence to the doctrine of
an eponymous imam.78 Schachts thesis gave prominent credit to al-Shai, whose distinct synthesis of textual and
rational interpretation enabled legal doctrine to be packaged, transported, and systematically applied without
reliance on local tradition.79 Schachts narrative is largely based on al-Shais writings and ends with his death in
204/820, but the implication is that he set the schools on their new trajectory. The novel legal theory formulated by
al-Shai became the new way of articulating law, but it was al-Shais personal authority, and that of the other
eponymous imams, that served as the new organizing principle for the legal schools.
The second approach emphasizes the importance of social and political institutions for the development and spread
of the classical schools. George Makdisi (19202002), and after him his student Christopher Melchert, took up
Schachts early periodization and extended the narrative into the third/ninth century (and beyond). Makdisi saw in
this period the evolution of the personal schools into de facto guilds that featured a hierarchical structure of
leadership and were dedicated to the education of students and the reproduction of knowledge, a mission that
eventually came to be performed within the space of the law college (madrasa).80 Melchert considered the
regularization of legal education to be the dening moment for a schools birth. He proposed precise dates of
formationeither in the late third/ninth century or in the early fourth/tenthfor each school based on the lives of
particular teachers who established regular systems for transmitting legal doctrines.81
Both Makdisi and Melchert accorded tremendous (in Melcherts case, nearly exclusive) weight to biographical
works in the construction of their narratives.82 This source preference generated a certain historiographical bias in
favor of scholarly activity in Iraq in general and of Hadith scholarship in Baghdad in particular.83 Makdisis
emphasis on Baghdad seems in great measure a function of his interest in the citys Hadith-minded jurists and
theologians (whom he termed traditionalists in opposition to the rationalists) and in the emergence of
Hanbalism. He saw the Quranic Inquisition in Baghdad as the decisive showdown between the rationalists and the
traditionalists84 in a conict that had been put into motion by al-Shai and was brought to a conclusion by Ahmad
b. Hanbal, whose unyielding stance on the textual primacy of the Quran and Hadith carried the day for the
traditionalists.85 This is another example of the tendency, mentioned earlier, to depict intellectual conicts in
overtly martial terms. In the end, the victorious Hanbalis forced the hand of the rationalist jurists, who by the
fourth/tenth century had largely begun to reframe their legal thought to square with the compulsions of Hadith
reports. In more certain terms, Melchert saw this rapprochement between traditionalists and rationalists as the
decisive moment in which the law acquired its classical framework.86
Other scholars have linked the schools growth and spread to the relative levels of state patronage they enjoyed.
Using later biographical dictionaries, Nurit Tsafrir constructed chronological charts of judicial tenure in the
various regions in the second/eighth and third/ninth centuries and correlated the spread of the Hana school with
the increasing number of Hana jurists taking up posts in the empires expanding judiciary.87 Her work supported
the general thesis that the Hana school ourished chiey thanks to the backing of the Abbasid center. She
conceded, however, that in so early a period school identities were still ill dened, and she coined the term semi-
Hana to describe jurists of ambiguous afliation.
The third approach to school formation shifts the emphasis from the personages of the imams and the formal
institutions of learning and patronage to the idea of doctrinal authority. It has been articulated most extensively by
Hallaq, who, as described earlier, contested Schachts progression from regional to personal schools. Rejecting the
notion of regional schools altogether, Hallaq argued that the rst schools of the second/eighth century were
personal, marked by the dominance of individual master jurists and consisting of their positive legal opinions. In
the third/ninth century these schools then acquired a doctrinal framework that dened the classical schools from
then on. The doctrinal schools, Hallaq maintained, were composite systems, comprising the cumulative legal
rulings of successive generations of jurists (e.g. Abu Hanifa and his two leading students, Abu Yusuf and al-
Shaybani) as well as a clear methodology for addressing legal problems. Each of the schools was also dened by
the loyalty of its adherents, who abandoned its doctrines on pain of rejection from the school. The eponymous
imams, by this view, were not founders of their schools but were accorded this status ctitiously by later jurists in
order to provide the schools with an axis of authority.88 This authority was preserved by the widely accepted
principle of legal conformism (taqlid), discussed further in the next section.
More recent studies, wary of the pitfalls of singling out historical causes, forgo the impulse to date and attempt
instead to unpack the socio-political contexts and gradual intellectual processes that underpinned the formation of
the classical schools. This scholarship revises the preceding theses by combining and complicating their
categories. For example, Umar Faruq Abd-Allah studied the life and works of Malik, parsing his legal terminology
and contending that his rulings embody an interpretive process that was far more systematic and sophisticated than
the nebulous living tradition that Schacht and others had made it out to be. Though not concerned with the
schools formalization and spread beyond the second/eighth century, Abd-Allah maintained that a richer
understanding of Maliks thought could change how we understand the formation of the schools.89 El Shamsy
returned to Schachts historical scheme of regional schools followed by personal ones but further theorized
personal schools as communities of jurists centered on a discursive paradigm founded by the eponym. This
paradigm allowed successive jurists, through the development of a secondary literature, to extend and even
disagree with the founders opinions while remaining faithful to his methods of interpretation.90 Saud Al-Sarhan
pursued a similar approach in an article-length study of the Hanbali school. By reviewing the legal responsa
collected by eight of Ibn Hanbals students, Al-Sarhan offered examples of how these students tried to extract the
imams legal-theoretical principles from his rulings.91
Put together, the ndings of these recent studies suggest that an integrated examination of the ideas expressed in
early legal texts alongside the narratives in historical and biographical works produces more fruitful results than
impressionistic interpretations of a limited and often arbitrary selection of sources. Such a holistic approach allows
for a clearer understanding of how legal thought developed over the course of the third/ninth century, which
facilitates a better understanding of the trajectory it took in the two centuries that followed.
VI. Legal Developments in the Fourth/Tenth and

Fifth/Eleventh Centuries
This section addresses three of the most signicant developments in the evolution of Islamic law in the
fourth/tenth and fth/eleventh centuries. The rst is the putative closing of the gate of ijtihad; the second, the
development of legal theory following al-Shai; and the third, the emergence of a distinctive Shii jurisprudence.
A. Closing the Gate of Ijtihad

When Snouck Hurgronje rst put forward the ideaadopted from indigenous Muslim historiography92that the
exercise of ijtihad, or independent legal reasoning, had ceased around the turn of the third/ninth century, he could
not have anticipated the controversy that would ensue.93 Indeed, few controversies in the eld of Islamic legal
history have gained as much traction as the debate concerning the closing of the gate of ijtihad. Schacht, who
studied under Snouck Hurgronje, popularized his teachers view, and his authority lent the topic weight. In his
clearest statement on the subject, Schacht wrote:
[B]y the beginning of the fourth/tenth century the point had been reached when the scholars of all
schools felt that all essential questions had been thoroughly discussed and nally settled, and a
consensus gradually established itself to the effect that from that time onwards no one could be deemed
to have the necessary qualications for independent reasoning in religious law, and that all future
activity would have to be conned to the explanation, application, and, at the most, interpretation of the
doctrine as it had been laid down once and for all. This closing of the gate of ijtihad, as it was called,
amounted to the demand for taklid which now came to mean the unquestioning acceptance of the
doctrines of established schools and authorities.94
This thesis t within Schachts broader account of the decline of intellectual sophistication in the later tradition.
While Schacht acknowledged that the work of later jurists was no less creative than that of their predecessors
and noted the ongoing dispute regarding ijtihad among them, the fact that he never elaborated on the character of
their innovative contribution led his successors to view as conclusive his emphatic remarks about the stagnation of
the later tradition.95
The thesis of the closure of the gate of ijtihad remained largely unchallenged for several decades, and its inuence
is evident in every major work written on Islamic law in the twentieth century.96 Hallaq reignited the debate and
advanced the most sustained challenge to Schachts work in a series of articles written in the 1980s and 1990s. His
essay Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed? in many ways reset the course of inquiry on the topic. In it, he argued that
the gates of ijtihad were never closed in either theory or practice. As evidence, Hallaq characterized the
requirements for reaching the rank of mujtahid as relatively easy; typied ijtihad as indispensable for the
derivation of rulings through legal theory; documented the exclusion from Sunnism of groups who opposed
ijtihad; listed jurists who lived after the fourth/tenth century and were labeled mujtahids or practiced ijtihad; and
traced the persistence of the controversy regarding ijtihad in classical works.97 In a follow-up article, Hallaq
addressed the question of why the controversy concerning the existence of mujtahids existed when ijtihad never
ceased. He located the answer beyond the connes of the law, in the theological doctrine of the end of religion
and the coming of the Day of Judgment.98
Hallaqs studies generated renewed interest in the question. Norman Calder steered a middle course between
Schacht and Hallaq. He followed Schacht by upholding the Islamic legal traditions distinction between ijtihad as
direct confrontation with revelation, which generally ceased after al-Shai, and ijtihad as innovative responses to
new cases and creative legal thinking within the constraints of taqlid, which was ongoing. He conceded Hallaqs
central thesis: that creative legal reasoning did not cease or even necessarily decline after the third/ninth century.
Beyond this point, however, Calder thoroughly critiqued Hallaqs study, particularly for failing to make systematic
distinctions between various types of ijtihad and for not qualifying the depiction of ijtihad as a sustained
phenomenon.99 Importantly, Calder differed on the role of legal theory. He saw this discipline only as an ex post
facto justication of law, while Hallaq conceived of the process of ijtihad as it is described in works of legal
theory, namely, as a coherent system of principles through which a qualied jurist could extract rulings for novel
cases.100
Despite their sharply divergent accounts, Schachts and Hallaqs theses share one major premise: they both typify
ijtihad as creative legal thought while associating taqlid with blind imitation, lack of originality, and a qualitative
decline in legal scholarship. Several scholars have challenged this negative depiction of taqlid and the concomitant
depiction of ijtihad as the natural telos of Islamic law. They have argued that taqlid is in fact a more advanced
stage of legal development with its own social logic as the mainstay of a mature legal system. Sherman Jackson
maintained that taqlid was not motivated by any real or perceived inability on the part of post-formative jurists to
come up with novel interpretations.101 Rather, he characterized post-formative taqlid as a dynamic institution
whose primary function was to appropriate the established authority of the earlier tradition and thereby to
legitimize the interpretations of later jurists by virtue of their afliation to the mujtahid imams.102 In a similar vein,
Mohammad Fadel drew on the sociology of law and an analysis of legal process to highlight the crucial social
logic of taqlid: not only was it essential to guaranteeing a stable and determinate legal system that ensured uniform
rules, but it also limited the discretionary power of legal ofcials, especially those at the bottom of the legal
hierarchy.103 Beyond the taqlidijtihad dichotomy, El Shamsy identied a discourse that theorized precedent as a
distinct locus of normativity in discussions of the qibla (direction of prayer) in Shai legal works.104 This
justication of precedent enabled later jurists to bypass al-Shais explicit prohibition of taqlid and to assign his
legal views a privileged status as binding interpretations that were distinct from but consistently bolstered by
revelatory evidence.
B. Legal Theory After al-Shai

Conventional accounts of the history of legal theory see al-Shais Risala as the work that gave birth to the
discipline and formed the basis of subsequent contributions. However, the development of legal theory in the
century and a half that followed al-Shais death has been difcult to reconstruct. The second extant treatise
dedicated to legal theory is al-Fusul al-usul by al-Jassas (d. 370/981). This work was closely followed by a
proliferation of writings on legal theory in all four Sunni schools, as well as among the Mutazila and the Zahiris
in North Africa, by such illustrious scholars as al-Baqillani (d. 403/1013), al-Dabbusi (d. 430/1039), Abu Yala b.
al-Farra (d. 458/1065), al-Juwayni (d. 478/1085), Abu al-Husayn al-Basri (d. 436/1044), and Ibn Hazm (d.
456/1064).
The apparent gap in the extant record between al-Shai and al-Jassas led Hallaq to argue, against Schacht, that al-
Shais centrality in the inauguration of legal theory has been greatly overstated and that his allegedly
foundational work in fact had little resonance until Ibn Surayj (d. 306/918) and his students popularized it in the
fourth/tenth century.105 By contrast, other scholars have argued that the formative inuence of al-Shai on
subsequent legal theory is evident in the signicant body of fragmentary and indirect evidence available from the
third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries. In the past few decades, several studies have successfully demonstrated how
intellectual history can be reconstructed in the absence of contemporaneous sources. They have shown that the
period after al-Shai was a dynamic one: al-Shais ideas were continuously discussed and reworked in the form
of abridgments, commentaries, and refutations, and a technical vocabulary was developed, debated, and rened.106
For example, Murteza Bedir has used al-Jassass work to establish the views and signicance of Isa b. Aban (d.
221/836), a much earlier jurist, and to trace his engagement with al-Shais ideas.107 Using a similar
methodology, Devin Stewart has reconstructed a lost treatise on legal theory by Dawud al-Zahiri (d. 271/884) from
the copious quotations of it in al-Qadi Numans (d. 363/974) Ikhtilaf usul al-madhahib.108 And El Shamsy has
found al-Shais theoretical discussions reproduced and expanded by Ibn Surayj in the late third/ninth century and
by Abu Bakr al-Khaffaf in the early fourth/tenth century.109
When compared with al-Shais Risala, works of legal theory written after the second half of the fourth/tenth
century exhibit certain literary features that reveal the disciplines course of development in the intervening
century and a half. First and foremost, mature legal theory demonstrates how thoroughly the Shai paradigm won
out over contending approaches. There is considerable evidence that as early as the rst half of the third/ninth
century, scholars from other schools had already assimilated the central feature of the Shai paradigmnamely,
the prioritization of textual evidence rooted in the canonized revelatory sources, especially the Hadithand that
they adopted some of al- Shais conceptual tools and hermeneutic techniques.110 David Vishanoff has carefully
documented the debates surrounding legal hermeneutics in the period after al-Shai, showing that while Sunni
theorists were initially torn between four different hermeneutical visions representing distinctive conceptual
models of how language reveals the law (the literalist Zahiri, the Basran Mutazili, the Ashari theological, and the
law-oriented paradigms), in the fth/eleventh century the law-oriented paradigm championed by Abu Yala b. al-
Farra triumphed, assisted by the resurgence of traditionalism and the rise of the legal schools.111
A second feature of developed legal theory is its incorporation of the theological concerns of rationalist theology
and the sharply deductive theoretical and dialectical methods it employed. This feature was rst noted by Makdisi,
who placed the development in its historical context and highlighted its departure from the legal theory articulated
by al-Shai, which contained a pronounced antirationalist dimension.112 In his study of legal theory after al-
Shai, El Shamsy showed that Shais in the early fourth/tenth century were undeterred by their masters
condemnation of rationalist theology. They embedded legal theory both substantively and methodologically within
a rationalist ethical framework: reason and revelation were assigned complementary roles; the securing of human
interest (maslaha) was posited as the structuring principle of the law; and the formalistic method of dialectics
(jadal) formed the basis of analogical reasoning. With the advent of Asharism, however, law was extracted from
the realm of theology, while a detheologized variety of maslaha was integrated into a rmly legal methodology
of reasoning.113 The most detailed examination of a theological controversy developed in legal theory is Reinharts
comprehensive study of legality in the absence of revelation, a controversial problem that was debated vigorously
in classical works of legal theory. Reinhart analyzed the underlying epistemological and moral issues that this
debate indexes, including the limits of human intellect, the signicance of revelation, and moral categorization and
its relation to ontology.114
C. Emergence of a Distinct Shii Law

Early Shii legal history remains an understudied eld, as Shiism in general and early Shiism in particular have
been seen primarily as subjects of theological and political, not legal, interest.115 Consequently, most accounts of
early Twelver Shii (or Imami) law have adopted a theological periodization. This framework describes the period
before the occultation (ghayba) of the twelfth imam in 260/874 as one in which Shii law remained relatively
underdeveloped, owing to the accessibility of the imam, who presided over the community as the exclusive source
of infallible judgment. The sudden absence of the imam then necessitated the development of a more systematic
approach to law. In the most comprehensive work to date on Shii (in particular, Imami) legal history written in a
European language, Hossein Modarressi disputed this picture as overly simplistic, arguing that the earliest sources
depict a dynamic and heterogeneous circle of followers, who were encouraged by the imams to exercise their
individual reason and who expressed a variety of legal opinions even in the presence of the imams.116
After the twelfth imams occultation, the fourth/tenth and fth/eleventh centuries represented a period of crucial
intellectual ferment and doctrinal crystallization for the nascent Imami Shii community. The rst Imami Hadith
collections were compiled in the last decades of the third/ninth century and in the early fourth/tenth, and the rst
works of legal theory were written in the century that followed.117 Sunni Hadith collections and jurisprudence thus
predate their Shii counterparts by more than a century, and the former exercised a signicant formative inuence
on the latter, both in terms of structure and substantively in the incorporation of select elements of legal theory and
positive law. This fact has shaped an important debate in the eld of Shii legal studies, namely, how to
characterize the historical interaction between the Sunni and Shii legal systems. In his terse treatment of Shii
legal history, Schacht maintained that in the rst three centuries, Shii law was closely identied with Sunni law,
and that modications introduced to orthodox legal doctrines were only supercial concessions necessitated
by political exigencies or essential Shii doctrines.118 It was only after the occultation, Schacht argues, that Shii
legal doctrine gradually distinguished itself as a separate legal system.119
Several scholars after Schacht have likewise supported the thesis of extensive Shii borrowing of legal thought
from the Sunni schools.120 Devin Stewarts study has been the most comprehensive to date. He examined
structural features adopted by Shii jurists from Sunni law, especially consensus, which he argued became the
hallmark of orthodoxy in the fourth/tenth and fth/eleventh centuries.121 Stewart created a typology of three
responses to Sunni orthodoxy among Shii jurists: rst, outward conformity with the Sunni consensus and
adherence to the Shai school among the four Sunni schools; second, adoption of a modied version of consensus
and a parallel legal school for Twelver Shiis; and third, outright rejection of the Sunni legal system on the grounds
that it violates fundamental Shii principles. Stewart posited a trajectory that was diametrically opposed to that
outlined by Schacht. On the level of legal theory, he contended, early Shii law was originally quite different from
Sunni law and only gradually came to conform to the more dominant Sunni legal system.122 Furthermore, although
the dominant view continues to be that the institution of the Shii madhhab and the development of Shii legal
theory were engendered by the urgent need to ll the vacuum in religious authority after the disappearance of the
imam,123 Stewart has argued that a more decisive factor was the formation of the Sunni schools, which created a
desire among Shii legal scholars to be included within the wider community of jurists.124
VII. Conclusion: Directions for Future Research

We conclude this survey of modern debates regarding the origins and early development of Islamic law by
pointing to a few of the many promising avenues for further inquiry in this eld.
There is still much room to improve our understanding of the origins of Islamic law by comparing the emerging
Islamic norms with preexisting legal systems. However, such studies ought to be carried out holistically. Narrow
and formalistic comparisons between legal systems are of limited use, since parallels between individual laws are
often coincidental and cannot provide concrete evidence of a genetic relationship.125 A good example of a holistic
study is Motzkis examination of how pre-Islamic Arabian norms on the treatment of defaulting debtors were
transformed into classical Islamic rules.126 Motzkis legal-historical analysis is preceded and supported by
painstaking authentication of the relevant source material, which brings us to a second area of fruitful future
concern.
While the revisionist trend succeeded in pressing home the need for a more rigorous approach to the sources for
early Islamic history, it impoverished the study of early Islamic law by dismissing the bulk of the available
material on the subjectnamely, Hadith and reports on the early generations of Muslims. The isnad-cum-matn
analysis represents a methodological offensive to reclaim these sources and to use them critically for the study of
early Islam, including Islamic law. But it is neither the only nor the most obvious way to bring out new sources.
Another is to examine the enormous body of surviving early Islamic papyri, which remain largely unmined for
insights into early Islamic law.127 As historical artifacts, papyri are not subject to the authenticity questions that
afict other types of sources. There are also important manuscripts from the early literary period of Islamic law
that have not been edited or studied, including manuscripts held in well-known and accessible libraries.128
Moreover, even many key works that have been published remain curiously understudied. Such works include the
foundational opus of the Hana school, al-Shaybanis Kitab al-Asl, which was fully edited and published only in
2012.129 The problem of understudied sources is closely related to our nal point, namely, how to study them to
begin with.
The big questions that animate the eld of early Islamic legal history have been debated since the nineteenth
century, but this interest has not, by and large, been accompanied by the kind of foundational research that is
necessary to provide a reliable basis for answering these larger questions. Until the end of the twentieth century,
the dearth of such research could be traced to the small number of scholars working on Islamic law. The expansion
of the eld since then has created new opportunities, but the present academic ecosystem in the humanities does
not reward the unglamorous and laborious spadework of reading manuscripts and compiling documents.
Collaborative projects, such as the European Research Council project Islamic Law Materialized, led by
Christian Mller, should be commended for the service they render to the eld.130 The corpus of early Arabic legal
documents assembled by this project is an important contribution toward the vertical integration of sources, from
documents such as wills and contracts up through the most abstract discussions of theory. Such integration of
sources can reveal the connections between private ritual observance, everyday contracts between individuals,
adversarial encounters in court, debates among jurists on ne points of law, and theories of the relationship of law
to reason and revelation. It is thus a precondition for writing a truly comprehensive history of Islamic law in the
classical period.
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Notes:
(1) See e.g. Sachau, Zur ltesten Geschichte; von Kremer, Culturgeschichte, 1:470504; Hurgronje, Nieuwe
bijdragen; Sprenger, Skizze der Entwicklungsgeschichte; MacDonald, Development of Muslim Theology, 65
117.
(2) Goldziher, Muslim Studies.
(3) Schacht, Introduction, 1014; cf. Coulson, Conicts and Tensions, 8182.
Schacht, Introduction, 80. Though published about fteen years after Origins, Schachts introductory book is a
good entry into his scholarship. It provides a synopsis of major elements and themes in Islamic law (e.g. origins,
theory and practice, modern iterations) and summaries of the substantive content areas of law (e.g. property,
family, penal, procedural). It is informed by the same premises guiding Schachts more ambitious work.
(4) Schacht cites Q 4:65.
(5) Schacht, Origins, 190 ff.
(6) Ibid., 224227.
(7) Coulson, History, 34.
(8) Coulson, Conicts and Tensions, 8182.
(9) Goitein, Mediterranean Society.
(10) Ibid., Birth-Hour.
(11) Coulson, too, observed that this quantity is not great by any standards; see Coulson, History, 12.
(12) Goitein, Birth-Hour, 2628.
(13) On Quranic exegesis and history, see Crone, Meccan Trade. On the Quran in law, see Crone, Two Legal
Problems.
(14) Dating the Quranic text was never one of Schachts main concerns. Crone was part of a wave of skeptical
scholarship in Quranic studies that included John Wansbrough, who argued in Quranic Studies (1977) and
Sectarian Milieu (1978) that the Quran came to its nal form in Syria (not the Hejaz) around 800 CE and therefore
had nothing originally to do with the Prophet Muhammad. Crone expressed ambivalence about dating the Quran
quite this late and disagreed with Wansbroughs claim that it originated outside of Arabia. See Crone, Two Legal
Problems, 1619. On the skeptical school, see Donner, Narratives, 2025 (overview), 3540 (dating the Quranic
text). Following the groundbreaking work of Behnam Sadeghi and Uwe Bergmann on dating early Quran
manuscripts (see Sadeghi and Bergmann, Codex), Crone eventually came to afrm the view that the Quranic
text does indeed originate in the seventh century (see Crone, Quranic Pagans, xiii).
(15) Crone, Two Legal Problems, 1921.
(16) Crone, Roman, Provincial and Islamic Law, ch. 2.
(17) In praise of Crones Meccan Trade, see reviews by Wansbrough and by Paxton. For a thoroughgoing and
particularly acid assessment of the same book, see review article by Serjeant, as well as Crones long and equally
acid response.
(18) Powers, Studies.
(19) Motzki, Origins, 108117, 152157; Dutton, Origins, 6177, 157161.
(20) Katz, Body of Text, 33.
(21) Hallaq, Origins and Evolution, 1925.
(22) Hallaq, Groundwork.
(23) See e.g. Maghen, Virtues; Lowry, Reading the Quran; Stodolsky, New Model.
(24) In particular the two Sahih collections of al-Bukhari (d. 256/870) and Muslim (d. 261/875). For the history and
status of these and other canonical Hadith collections, see Brown, Canonization.
(25) See above, n. 1. D. S. Margoliouth also largely followed in the line of scholarship before Goldziher, but he
asserted that initially the term sunna denoted the normative practice of the general community and only later
acquired the restricted sense of prophetic precedent; see Margoliouth, Development, 6598. Schacht cites
Margoliouth and incorporates similar ndings into his thesis; see Schacht, Origins, 5881.
26
(26) These comprise the four sources (which is the literal translation of usul) commonly referred to in classical
jurisprudence.
(27) Goldziher, Zahiris; Goldziher, Muslim Studies, 2:73.
(28) Goldziher, Muslim Studies, 2:182, 211.
(29) Schacht, Origins, 140151.
(30) Ibid., 171175.
(31) Schacht, Revaluation, 147.
(32) See e.g. separate reviews by Watt, Gibb, and Anderson.
(33) For a critical assessment, see review by Fck. For more extended criticism, see review by Sezgin; see also
Sezgin, Bukharinin kaynaklari. And for a more direct rebuttal, see Azami, Studies; Azami, Schachts Origins.
(34) Motzki, Dating Traditions.
(35) Motzki, Origins, 295297.
(36) Motzki, Boekhoff-van der Voort, and Anthony, Analysing Muslim Traditions.
(37) Berg, Competing Paradigms, 260. For Motzkis response to Berg, see Motzki, Question of Authenticity.
(38) Motzki et al., Analysing Muslim Traditions, 234235.
(39) Geiger, Was hat Mohammed aufgenommen?
(40) Von Kremer, Culturgeschichte, 1:5321:547.
(41) Goldziher, Muslim Studies, vol. 2, appendix 2. For a survey of the scholarship on this topic, see Crone, Roman,
Provincial and Islamic Law, ch. 1.
(42) Schacht, Introduction, 19.
(43) Ibid., 21.
(44) Crone, Islamic Roman, Provincial and Islamic Law, 3, 9.
(45) Ibid., 78.
(46) Ibid., 23; Crone and Cook, Hagarism.
(47) Crone, Roman, Provincial and Islamic Law, 1.
(48) Ibid., 11.
(49) Reinhart, review of Roman, Provincial, and Islamic Law.
(50) Ibid., 216.
51
(51) Hallaq, Use and Abuse. Hallaq also presented a broader critique of Crones work in Origins or Doctrine.
(52) Hallaq, Use and Abuse, 80.
(53) Hallaq, Origins and Evolution, 1819, 2428, 197198.
(54) Motzki, Origins, 297.
(55) Ibid., 131.
(56) El Shamsy, Canonization, 21. To what extent these laws match those in the legal literature of the
second/eighth century onward is a separate question.
(57) Motzki, Origins.
(58) Ibn Hazm, al-Ihkam, 5:895:105; Ibn al-Qayyim, Ilam, 2:172:49.
(59) The importance of writing as a tool of knowledge transmission cannot be overstated. For a review of its
growth and interaction with oral transmission, see Schoeler, Genesis, 115.
(61) Iraq here denotes the historical region of Iraq, which roughly coincides with but does not extend as far north
as the modern state of Iraq.
(62) Schacht, Origins, 210 and passim.
(63) Hallaq, Regional to Personal. See also Hallaq, Origins and Evolution, 153167.
(64) In support of Hallaqs critique, see e.g. Powers, Schools of Law; Wymann-Landgraf, Malik and Medina, 21.
Against Hallaq, see El Shamsy, Canonization, 42; Christopher Melchert, Basra and Kufa, 174.
(65) Because of the role of the infallible imam, legal authority was, at least in theory, less ambiguous for most
branches of Shiism. For an overview of the bases of Shii law, see Modarressi, Introduction, 26.
(66) For the foundational statement of this view, see Schacht, Introduction, 5, 209.
(67) Lowry, First Islamic Legal Theory, 2540. Lowry was careful to point out that later legal theory is likely not
genetically related to the courtiers typology despite their similarities.
(68) Crone and Hinds, Gods Caliph.
(69) Zaman, Religion and Politics. For a short version of one of his central arguments, see Zaman, The Caliphs,
the Ulama, and the Law.
(70) El Shamsy, Canonization, 8487.
(71) School, like most translations, is not a perfect one, and scholars have rightly taken the time to explore the
semantic shades of madhhab; see e.g. Hallaq, Origins and Evolution, 150153.
72
(72) The following section discusses the emergence of a distinctly Shii law, whose history and theoretical
underpinnings distinguish it qualitatively from Sunni law.
(73) See Hefner and Zaman, Schooling Islam, for a rich set of essays by leading experts on the various regions of
the Muslim world.
(74) Both the endurance and the elasticity of the legal school as an institution is brought out in the essay collection
by Bearman, Peters, and Vogel, The Islamic School of Law.
(75) Many jurists (fuqaha, sg. faqih) were called upon to issue opinions in response to inquiries put to them either
by private individuals or, in more formal settings, by judges. The responsum was known as a fatwa, the issuer a
mufti (often translated as a jurisconsult for the role he historically played as an authority to a judge). Note, then,
that the jurist did not necessarily serve formally as a mufti, nor did the functions of fatwa and mufti remain the
same over time. For an excellent overview of the muftis developing roles, see Masud, Messick, and Powers,
Muftis, Fatwas, and Islamic Legal Interpretation.
(76) For general information on these four gures, see their entries in the Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd edn, Abu
Hanifa al-Numan (J. Schacht); al-Shai (E. Chaumont); Malik b. Anas (J. Schacht); Ahmad b. Hanbal
(H. Laoust). For short but more informative biographies on al-Shai and Ibn Hanbal, see Ali, Imam Shai;
Melchert, Ahmad ibn Hanbal.
(77) These are, of course, not rigidly dened categories, but notional centers of gravity for the respective scholars
analysis.
(79) Subsequent debates regarding al-Shais importance and impact are discussed in section VI.
(80) Makdisi, Rise of Colleges.
(81) Melchert, Formation of the Sunni Schools, xxvii.
(82) Makdisi, Tabaqat-Biography; Melchert, Formation of the Sunni Schools, xxviixxviii. For an overview of
the genre of Muslim intellectual biography, see Kadi, Biographical Dictionaries.
(83) The bias may have been directly or indirectly inuenced by a subtle but similar bias in Schachts work.
According to Schacht, Medina shared Iraqs ancient doctrine, but where cross-inuences existed, they nearly
always moved from Iraq to Medina. See Schacht, Origins, 220.
(84) He thus viewed it differently from Crone and Hinds, who, as seen earlier, interpreted the inquisition as a
political struggle for religious authority.
(85) Makdisi, Rise of Colleges, 69.
(86) Melchert, Traditionist-Jurisprudents.
(87) Tsafrir, History of an Islamic School of Law.
(88) Hallaq, Origins and Evolution, 155167; Hallaq, Authority, Continuity, and Change.
89
(89) Abd-Allah, Malik and Medina; cf. Dutton, Origins of Islamic Law.
(90) El Shamsy, Canonization, ch. 7.
(91) Al-Sarhan, Responsa of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal.
(92) See e.g. El Shamsy, Hashiya in Islamic Law.
(93) Hurgronje, review of Muhammedanisches Recht by Sachau. The idea acquired particular salience in the
context of the Orientalist view of the Islamic worlds historical decline.
(94) Schacht, Introduction, 7071.
(95) Schacht, Introduction, 73; Schacht, Taklid.
(96) See e.g. Coulson, History of Islamic Law, 80; Gibb, Whither Islam?, 67.
(97) Hallaq, Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?
(98) Hallaq, On the Origins of the Controversy, 134.
(99) Calder, Al-Nawawis Typology.
(100) Ibid., 158; Hallaq, Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?, 5. Sadeghi largely agreed with Calder on this issue in
The Logic of Law Making in Islam.
(101) Jackson, Taqlid, Legal Scaffolding and the Scope of Legal Injunctions, 172.
(102) Ibid., 169, 172.
(103) Fadel, Social Logic of Taqlid.
(104) El Shamsy, Rethinking Taqlid.
(105) Hallaq, Was al-Shai the Master Architect?
(106) In addition to the references in the following notes, see El Shamsy and Zysow, Al-Buwaytis Abridgment;
El Shamsy, Wisdom of Gods Law; Stewart, Al-Tabaris al-Bayan; Temel, Missing Link.
(107) Bedir, Early Response to Shai.
(108) Stewart, Muhammad b. Dawud al-Zahiris Manual of Jurisprudence.
(109) El Shamsy, Bridging the Gap.
(110) See e.g. Dutton, Amal v Hadith; Jackson, Setting the Record Straight; El Shamsy, Canonization, ch. 8.
(111) Vishanoff, Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics.
(112) Makdisi, Juridical Theology of Shai.
(113) El Shamsy, Wisdom of Gods Law.

114
(114) Reinhart, Before Revelation.
(115) Haider, Prayer, Mosque, and Pilgrimage, 152.
(116) Modarressi, Introduction, 2425.
(117) However, Shii thinkers were clearly engaging with questions of legal theory already earlier; see Gleave,
Early Shiite Hermeneutics.
(118) Schacht, Fikh; Schacht, Introduction, 16.
(119) Schacht, Origins, 54, 99, 262.
(120) Muzaffar, Usul al-qh, 3:97; Cole, Imami Jurisprudence, 35; Modarressi, Introduction, 44, 48; Madelung,
Authority in Twelver Shiism, 168; Moussavi, Religious Authority in Shiite Islam, 26, 30, 85, 164 n. 47, 170.
(121) Stewart, Islamic Legal Orthodoxy.
(122) Ibid., 17.
(123) In the case of Ismailism, however, these developments took place in the presence of the imam; see al-Qadi
al-Numan, Disagreements of the Jurists; Qutbuddin, Fatimid Legal Exegesis of the Quran.
(124) Stewart, Islamic Legal Orthodoxy.
(125) A study that illustrates the perils of the latter approach is Jokisch, Islamic Imperial Law; see esp. 627650.
(126) Motzki et al., Analysing Muslim Traditions, ch. 3, esp. 194204.
(127) Sijpesteijn, Hadith Fragment on Papyrus, is a relatively rare exception; but see also El Shamsy, Debates
on Prayer.
(128) As but one example, a manuscript copy of Abu Ishaq al-Marwazis (d. 340/951) important work al-Tawassut
bayn al-Shai wa-l-Muzani languishes unstudied in Yales Beinecke Library, misattributed to Ibn al-Qass in the
catalog.
(129) A partial edition by Abu al-Wafa al-Afghani was published in 19661973.
(130) See the projects database at http://cald.irht.cnrs.fr/php/ilm.php.
Mariam Sheibani
Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, The University of Chicago
Amir Toft
Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, The University of Chicago
Ahmed El Shamsy
Associate Professor, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, The University of Chicago
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4/5/2017 Classical PeriodScripture, Origins, and Early Development - Oxford Handbooks

Oxford Handbooks Online

The Classical Period: Scripture, Origins, and Early Development

Abstract and Keywords

I. Law in the Quran

II. Law in the Hadith

III. The Debate on Origins, First/Seventh Century

IV. Master Jurists and the Emergence of a Legal Literature,

V. The Early Schools, Third/Ninth Century

VI. Legal Developments in the Fourth/Tenth and

A. Closing the Gate of Ijtihad

B. Legal Theory After al-Shai

C. Emergence of a Distinct Shii Law

VII. Conclusion: Directions for Future Research

Chaumont, E. EOI2 s.v. Al-Shai.

El Shamsy, Ahmed. Debates on Prayer in Second/Eighth-Century Islam: Some Remarks on Sijpesteijns

Gibb, H. A. R. Review of Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, by Joseph Schacht. Journal of Comparative

Laoust, H. Ahmad b. Hanbal. In Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd edn.

Find this resource:

Melchert, Christopher. Ahmad ibn Hanbal. Oxford: Oneworld, 2006.

Find this resource:

Schacht, Joseph. Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950.

Schacht, Joseph. An Introduction to Islamic Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964.

Schacht, Joseph. EOI1 s.v. Taklid.

Schacht, Joseph. Abu Hanifa al-Numan. In Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd edn.

Schacht, Joseph. EOI2, s.v. Fikh.

Schacht, Joseph. EOI2, s.v. Malik b. Anas.

(2) Goldziher, Muslim Studies.

(4) Schacht cites Q 4:65.

(5) Schacht, Origins, 190 ff.

(6) Ibid., 224227.

(7) Coulson, History, 34.

(8) Coulson, Conicts and Tensions, 8182.

(9) Goitein, Mediterranean Society.

(10) Ibid., Birth-Hour.

(12) Goitein, Birth-Hour, 2628.

(15) Crone, Two Legal Problems, 1921.

(16) Crone, Roman, Provincial and Islamic Law, ch. 2.

(18) Powers, Studies.

(19) Motzki, Origins, 108117, 152157; Dutton, Origins, 6177, 157161.

(20) Katz, Body of Text, 33.

(21) Hallaq, Origins and Evolution, 1925.

(22) Hallaq, Groundwork.

(27) Goldziher, Zahiris; Goldziher, Muslim Studies, 2:73.

(28) Goldziher, Muslim Studies, 2:182, 211.

(29) Schacht, Origins, 140151.

(30) Ibid., 171175.

(31) Schacht, Revaluation, 147.

(32) See e.g. separate reviews by Watt, Gibb, and Anderson.

(34) Motzki, Dating Traditions.

(35) Motzki, Origins, 295297.

(38) Motzki et al., Analysing Muslim Traditions, 234235.

(39) Geiger, Was hat Mohammed aufgenommen?

(40) Von Kremer, Culturgeschichte, 1:5321:547.

(42) Schacht, Introduction, 19.

(43) Ibid., 21.

(44) Crone, Islamic Roman, Provincial and Islamic Law, 3, 9.

(45) Ibid., 78.

(46) Ibid., 23; Crone and Cook, Hagarism.