Reliable Moot Court

RELIABLE INSTITUTE OF LAW, MORTA, AFFILATED TO CCS MEERUT UNIVERSITY
st
1 NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2017
IN THE HONBLE ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT

DATED THIS THE 19TH MARCH 2017
BEFORE
THE HONBLE MR. JUSTICE ANUJ GOYAL
(CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION)
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT IN C.C. NO.209 OF 2017

Criminal Petition No.209 of 2017
MR.Y ...PETITIONER
Versus
STATE DEFENDANT
(UNDER SEC 374 OF CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1973)
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

1st NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITON, 2017
RELIABLE INSTITUTE OF LAW, MORTA AFFILATED TO CCS
MEERUT UNIVERSITY
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS4
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.6
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION9
STATEMENT OF FACTS...10
ISSUES RAISED13
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS...14
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED18
1. WHETHER THE PETITION BROUGHT BEFORE THIS COURT IS
MAINTAINABLE OR NOT...18
1.1 JURISDICTION OF SC UNDER ARTICLE 136 CAN ALWAYS BE INVOKED
WHEN A QUESTION OF LAW OF GENERAL PUBLIC IMPORTANCE
ARISES. 18
1.1.1 THAT THE MATTER INVOLVES QUESTION OF LAW OF
GENERAL PUBLIC IMPORTANCE AND HENCE, ENTITLED TO
BE MAINTAINABLE.19
1.1.2 THE MATTER INVOLVES SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW
AND HENCE ENTITLED TO BE MAINTAINABLE..20
2. WHETHER THE SESSIONS COURT JUSTIFIED IN INTERPREATING SEC-34.22
2.1 THE BONE TEST IS A RELIABLE SOURCE24
2.2 THE LOWER COURT IS NOT JUSTIFIED FOR DENYING THE
OSSIFICATION TEST AS A RIGHT TO SHAYAMA...24
Page | 2 MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

1st NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITON, 2016 INSTITUTE
OF LAW, KURUKSHETRA UNIVERSITY, KURUKSHETRA
3. WHETHER THE ACT OF Mr. Y WAS IN FURTHERANCE OF COMMON
INTENTION DEFINED UNDER S.34 OF IPC26
3.1 ABSENCE OF COMMON INTENTION....28
3.2 THE ACT WAS NOT IN FURTHERANCE OF COMMON INTENTION...29
4. WHETHER THE ACT IS IN CONTRAVENTION WITH THE CONSTITUION OF
INDIANA AND INTERNATIONAL NORMS..30
4.1. THE ACT IS IN CONTRAVENTION WITH THE ARTICLE 15(3) OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA...31
4.2. THE ACT IS IN CONTRAVENTION WITH THE UN CONVENTION ON THE
RIGHTS OF CHILD..31
PRAYER35
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AIR All India Reporter
All Allahabad High Court
Bom. LR Bombay Law Reporter
Cal Calcutta High Court
CBI Central Bureau of Investigation
Cri LJ / Cr LJ Criminal Law Journal
Cr.P.C. Code of Criminal Procedure
Del Delhi High Court
Ed. Edition
JJA Juvenile Justice Act
Guj Gujarat High Court
HC High Court
IPC Indian Penal Code
IC Indian Cases
ILR Indian Law Reports
ITR Income Tax Reports
JT Judgment Today
Mad Madras High Court
NCRB National Crime Records Bureau
Ori Orissa High Court
P&H Punjab and Haryana High Court
Pat Patna High Court
Raj Rajasthan High Court

1st NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITON, 2016
INSTITUTE OF LAW, KURUKSHETRA UNIVERSITY, KURUKSHETRA
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCJ Supreme Court Journal
SCR Supreme Court Reporter
Sec. Section
U.O.I Union of India
V. Versus
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

Bachchan Lal v. State AIR 1957 All 184, 1957 Cri LJ 344.

Queen Empress v. Devji Govindji, 29-Jul-1895, (1896) ILR20BOM215.

Sachin Jana V. State of west Bengal 2008 II Cr.L.J.

State of MP V. Deshraj 2004 Cri L.J. 1415 (S.C.).

Balakrishna v. Rmaswami, (1965) AIR 195.

Veeda Menezes V Yusuf Khan 1966 Cr LJ 1489 AIR 1966 SC 1773: 68 Bom LR629.

Dale & Carrington Investment Ltd. v. P.K. Prathapan, (2005) 1 SCC 212.

Sir Chunilal Mehta and Sons. Ltd. v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co.
Ltd., (1962) AIR 1314.

Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra, (1952) AIR 991.

Pritam Singh v. The State, (1950) AIR 169.

Sripur Paper Mills v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, (1970) AIR 1520.

Gopinath Gosh v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1984 SC 237.

Jaya Mala v. Home Secretary, Govt. Of J&K, AIR 1982 SC 1297.

Bhoop Ram v. State of U.P, AIR 1989 SC 1329.

Mepa Dana, (1959) Bom LR 269.

Shaik China Brahmam v. State of A.P., AIR 2008 SC 610.

Garib Singh v. State of Punjab, 1972 Cr LJ 1286.

Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 SC 216.

Oswal Danji v. State, (1960) 1 Guj LR 145.

Bherusingh v. State, 1956 Madh. BLJ 905.

Nandu & Dhaneshwar Naik v. The State, 1976 CriLJ 250.


Ramchander & Ors. v. The State of Rajasthan, 1970 CrLJ 653.

Veer Singh v. State of U.P., 2010 (1) A.C.R. 294 (All.).

State of Bihar v. Lala Mahto A.I.R 1955 pat. 161.

Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana, AIR 1978 SC 1492.

William Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 116.

Surinder Singh vs. State of U.P., AIR 2003 SC 3811.

Subramanian Swamy v. Raju, (2014) 8 SCC 390.
BOOKS
th
Ratanlal & Dhirajlals Law of Crimes The Indian Penal Code, , Lexis Nexis, Delhi, 34
Edn. 2016.

S.N MISHRA Law of Crimes The Indian Penal Code Central Law Publications 2016.
th
K D GAUR Criminal law, Lexis Nexis, 12 Edn. 2016.

Dr. (Sir) Hari Singh Gour, Penal Law of India, Law Publishers (India) Pvt. Ltd., 11th
Edn. 2014.

J C Smith, Smith and Hogan Criminal Law Cases and Materials, LexisNexis
Butterworths, 8th Edn. 2002.

Basus Indian Penal Code (Law of Crimes), Vol I., Ashoka Law House, 11th Edn.
2011.

Criminal Manual, Universal Law Publishing Company, 2015.

Dr. Karunakaran Mathiharan, Modis Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology,
LexisNexis Butterworths, 23rd Edn. 2010.

Maharukh Adenwalla, Child Protection and Juvenile Justice System, ChildLine India
th
Foundation, Mumbai, 10 Edn. 2008.

Ved Kumari, Juvenile Justice System in India, Oxford University Press, New Delhi,
2004.
S.K.A Naqvi & Sharat Tripathi, R. N. Choudhrys Law Relating to Juvenile Justice in
rd
India, Orient Publishing Company, New Delhi, 3 Edn. 2012.
STATUTES

Indian Penal Code, 1860.

The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act. 2015.

The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules. 2007.

The Constitution of India, 1949.
TREATIES

United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1990
LEXICONS

Garner Bryana, Blacks law Dictionary, 7th Edn.1981, West Group.

Collins Gem English Thesaurus, 8th Edn. 2016. Collins.
th
Catherine Soanes, Oxford Dictionary Thesaurus, 40 Edn. 2006, Oxford University
Press.
LEGAL DATABASES

Indian Kanoon

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Petitioners have approached the Honble Supreme Court of Indiana under Article 136 of
the Constitution of Indiana. The leave has been granted by this Honble court in both matters
and both the matters are to be heard by this Honble Supreme Court together. The article 136
of Constitution of Indiana reads as hereunder:
136. SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL BY THE SUPREME COURT.
(1) Notwithstanding Anything In This Chapter, The Supreme Court May, In Its Discretion,
Grant Special Leave To Appeal From Any Judgment, Decree, Determination, Sentence Or
Order In Any Cause Or Matter Passed Or Made By Any Court Or Tribunal In The Territory
Of India.
(2) Nothing In Clause (1) Shall Apply To Any Judgment, Determination, Sentence Or Order
Passed Or Made By Any Court Or Tribunal Constituted By Or Under Any Law Relating To
The Armed Forces.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
For the sake of brevity and convenience of the Hon`ble Court the facts of the present case are
summarized as follows:
BACKGROUND
1. Shyama is a poor boy who used to live in a slum in the outskirts of the city of Brada
in the Republic of Indiana. He studied in a government funded school named, Shanti
Niketan School up to Sixth Standard but then he dropped out of school and since then,
he has been in the employment of Mr. R. Batra. Shyama lives in the quarter provided
by Mr. Batra. It has been 6 years since his employment.
2. Mr. R. Batra had two children, a boy named Ravi, aged 18 years and a girl named
Vanita, aged 16 years. Shekhar Saxena, aged 17 years and 7 months is the Son of Mr.
Saxena. Shekhar is the neighbor of Mr. Batra.
3. Shekhar and Ravi had hatred for each other since childhood. In light of this both had a
heated quarrel. One day Shekhar was playing soccer in the park and Ravi & Vanita
were jogging at the same time. While playing soccer, the football got hit over Vanitas
head and she sustained some minor injuries. As a result, Ravi started verbally abusing
Shekhar and this led to a heated quarrel between the two where Ravi gave a blow to
Shekhar. Soon, the quarrel was resolved by one of the neighbors.
4. Both, Ravi and Vanita, used to insult Shyama in a condescending manner. Shyama
was also abused and tormented in public. One day, Shekhar saw this and talked to
Shyama. Both started sharing the hatred for Ravi and Vanita.
DEATH OF RAVI AND VANITA
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5. Shyama took a leave for 3 days on 7 March, 2015 for going to his village. He had the
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permission of Mr. Batra for the leave. On 8 March, 2015, Mrs. Batra had planned to go
to a painting exhibition with her family but due to Mr. Batras work she decided
to go with her children. Shyama had prior knowledge of the same.
th
6. Mrs. Batra, with her children, reached the exhibition at 7:30 P.M. on 8 March, 2015.
Around 8:30 P.M. Vanita was taken away by four persons. Ravi sensed this and he
started searching for his sister. While searching, Ravi went to the basement and saw
four persons. Two persons were holding her sister and the other two were trying to
outrage her modesty.
7. Ravi tried to save his sister, however, he was suffered one blow on his head and
several blows on his abdomen. As a result, he fell unconscious. His sister Vanita tried
to scream, but her mouth was shut and in sudden haste she was strangulated. She fell
dead and all the four persons fled away. The bodies of the deceased were discovered
around 9:30 P.M by the guard who came down to the basement to switch off the
lights.
JUDICAL PROCEEDINGS
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8. Shekhar was arrested on 10 March, 2015 on the information of Ram Manohar who
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saw him sneaking out the basement on the night of 8 March, 2015. On the 12
March, 2015, Shyama was arrested along with Raju and Ranveer, who were
Shekhars friends.
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9. On 15 May, 2015, the case was admitted to the Juvenile Board (hereinafter asJB) as
all the boys were alleged to be below the age of 18 years. The case of Shekhar and
Shyama was committed to the Sessions Court as the JB found them well aware of the

circumstances and consequences of their acts. Both of them were tried u/s
302,304,326,354 read with S. 34 of the Indiana Penal Code (hereinafter as IPC).
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10. On 12 June, 2015 Shekhars case was remanded back to the JB. However, Shyamas
submissions were rejected due to lack of evidence of age as his Birth Certificate
provided by the Municipality could not be discovered. Shyamas assertion to carry out
a Bone Test or any other allied test for the determination of his age was also rejected
by the court due to inconclusiveness of these kinds of tests.
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11. On 28 July, 2015, Shyama was found guilty u/s 304, 326, 354 read with S.34 of IPC,
1860. He was sentenced to imprisonment of 3 years. Shekhar was found guilty u/s
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304, 326, 354 read with S. 34 of IPC, 1860 on 4 August, 2015 and he was sent to a
special home for a maximum period of 3 years by the JB. Shekhar appealed to the
Session court against the judgement and order passed by the Juvenile Board.
However, the appeal was dismissed as the case had been proved beyond reasonable
doubt before the Juvenile Board.
12. Both Shekhar and Shyama appealed to the High Court. Shyama filed an appeal
against the order of conviction since the Court of Session had no jurisdiction to try the
case as he was a minor. He also raised a question regarding the justification of the
court in rejecting the bone test. Whereas, Shekhar filed an appeal for the quashing of
the order of conviction of the Court. Both the appeals were rejected by the High Court
as both were capax of committing the crime and both had common consensus.
Shyama was sentenced for life imprisonment and Shekhar was sentenced for
imprisonment of 10 years.
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13. On 11 January, 2016, both the accused have petitioned before this Honble Apex
Court against the order of High Court and the Sessions Court. The matter is admitted
and listed for hearing.

ISSUES RAISED
1. WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION BROUGHT BEFORE THIS
COURT IS MAINTAINABLE OR NOT.
2. WHETHER THE SESSIONS & HIGH COURT WERE JUSTIFIED IN
REJECTING THE BONE TEST.
3. WHETHER THE ACT OF SHEKHAR WAS IN FURTHERANCE OF
COMMON INTENTION DEFINED UNDER S.34 OF IPC.
4. WHETHER THE ACT IS IN CONTRAVENTION WITH THE CONSTITUION
OF INDIANA AND INTERNATIONAL NORMS.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
It is humbly submitted before this Honble Court that the Special Leave Petition against
the judgment of the Honble High Court (hereinafter as HC) is maintainable under Article
136 of the Constitution of India. It is contended that the jurisdiction of Supreme Court
(hereinafter as SC) under Article 136 can always be invoked when a question of law of
general public importance arises and even question of fact can also be a subject matter of
judicial review under Art.136.
The jurisdiction conferred under Art. 136 on the SC is a corrective one and not a
restrictive one. A duty is enjoined upon the SC to exercise its power by setting right the
illegality in the judgments is well-settled that illegality must not be allowed to be
perpetrated and failure by the SC to interfere with the same would amount to allowing the
illegality. It has been held by this Honble Court that when a question of law of general
public importance arises, or a decision shocks the conscience of the court, its jurisdiction
can always be invoked. Article 136 is the residuary power of SC to do justice where the
court is satisfied that there is injustice to be perpetuated.
In the present case, the question of law involved in appeal is of recurring nature which
has been raised in plethora of cases. Hence, it is humbly submitted before this Honble
Supreme Court of India that the matter involves substantial question of law and hence
entitled to be maintainable.
REJECTING THE BONE TEST.
It is submitted before this Honorable Court that the bone age of a child indicates his/her
level of biological and structural maturity. In the present case, the plea to conduct a bone
test or any other allied test for the determination of the age of Shyama was rejected by the
Sessions & High Court. The reason for such decision to reject the above mentioned tests
was due to the inconclusiveness of these kinds of tests.
This is an insufficient ground for rejecting to conduct the Age Determination Test. It is a
well-accepted fact in the precedents of our Indian Judiciary that the last resort for age
determination of a juvenile is the Bone Test i.e. Ossification Test. The "Age determination
inquiry" conducted under Section-94(2) of the JJA, 2015 enables the court to seek
evidence and in that process the court can obtain the matriculation or equivalent
certificates, if available. The petitioner asserts that Shyama had time and again submitted
before various lower courts the petition for determination of his age, and time and again it
was denied to him.
3. WHETHER THE ACT OF SHEKHAR WAS IN FURTHERANCE OF COMMON
INTENTION DEFINED UNDER S.34 OF THE IPC.
It is submitted before this honorable Court that in the present case there has been a gross
failure of justice on part of the lower courts. There has been a grave error in convicting
Shekhar solely on the basis of his mere presence at the exhibition. The Section 34 of IPC
is intended to meet cases in which it may be difficult to distinguish between the acts of
the individual members of a party or to prove what part was exactly taken by each of
them in furtherance of the common intention of all. To constitute common intention it is

necessary that the intention of each one of the accused was known to the rest of them and
was shared by them. The test to decide if the intention of one of them is common is to see
whether the intention of one was known to the other and was shared by that other.
It is submitted that the co-accused Shekhar is being dragged into the picture for no
justifiable cause and for no fault, participation or involvement of his in the alleged act in
question. It is submitted that neither the accused had any intention with others nor did he
act in concert with others to commit such act. There was no evidence that prior to the
incident there was any common intention shared by both the accused. The said intention
did not develop at the time of the incident as well.
It is respectfully submitted that the impugned Act seeks to punish the child in conflict
with law for the failure of the society at large in providing the child with adequate care
and protection. It is submitted that the impugned Act seeks to create a fictional
classification between the children belonging to age group of 16-18 years on the basis of
degree of crime "allegedly" committed by them.
It is submitted that under the Indian law a person under the age of 18 is not allowed to
vote, is considered minor for entering into a contract, a girl of age less than 18 cannot
give consent for sexual relationships, a child of age less than 18 cannot marry, yet, by the
amended act, that child can be tried as an adult and after a preliminary assessment, the
child shall be presumed to have the knowledge and understanding of the alleged crime he
has committed. The counsel submits that such a scenario would be travesty of Justice.
The law of juvenile justice stands on the principles of restorative and reformative justice
and any digression from the same would be detrimental to the right of the children and in
contravention with the principle as enunciated under Article 15(3) of the Constitution of
Indiana
The counsel humbly submits that the impugned amendment is against the UN Convention
on the Rights of the Child (hereinafter as UNCRC) which is a comprehensive and
internationally binding agreement on the rights of children. It was adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly in 1989.
The Petitioner submits that our country accepts the international convention of keeping 18
years as the age of the child and the same is reflected in various laws where the age of
child was kept at 18 years such as Contract Act, Motor Vehicles Act, etc.
ARGUMENTS ADVACNED
It is humbly submitted that the Special Leave Petition against the judgment of Honble
High Court is maintainable under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. It is contended
that the jurisdiction of Supreme Court under Article 136 can always be invoked when a
question of law of general public importance arises and even question of fact can also be
a subject matter of judicial review under Art.136.
1.1 JURISDICTION OF SC UNDER ARTICLE 136 CAN ALWAYS BE INVOKED
WHEN A QUESTION OF LAW OF GENERAL PUBLIC IMPORTANCE
ARISES.
The jurisdiction conferred under Art. 136 on the SC are corrective one and not a
1
restrictive one . A duty is enjoined upon the SC to exercise its power by setting right
the illegality in the judgments is well-settled that illegality must not be allowed to be
perpetrated and failure by the SC to interfere with the same would amount to allowing
2
the illegality to be perpetuated .It has been held in plethora of cases that when the
question of law of general public importance arises, the jurisdiction of SC can be
invoked by filing special leave petition. In the present case, the issue involves matter
of General Public Importance and hence, entitled to be maintainable.
1
Haryana State Industrial Corporation. v. Cork Mfg. Co. (2007) 8 SCC 359.
2
Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2003)11 SCC 241.
1.1.1 THE MATTER INVOLVES QUESTION OF LAW OF GENERAL
PUBLIC IMPORTANCE AND HENCE, ENTITLED TO BE
MAINTAINABLE.
It has been held by this Honble Court that when a question of law of general
public importance arises, or a decision shocks the conscience of the court, its
jurisdiction can always be invoked. Article 136 is the residuary power of SC to
3
do justice where the court is satisfied that there is injustice . The principle is
that this court would never do injustice nor allow injustice being perpetrated
4
for the sake of upholding technicalities .In any case, special leave would be
granted from a second appellant decision only where the judgment raises issue
5
of law of general public importance
In the case at hand, requisite and proper inquiries were not conducted
regarding the age of the Shyama and creditworthiness of the witness and the
judgement was passed without conducting proper inquiry and collection of
evidences. Also the juveniles in conflict with law have been punished
arbitrarily. This has disturbed the public. Hence, the matter concerned is of
great public importance and the same was reiterated by the High court.
Hence, considering all the above authorities, it is humbly submitted before this
court that the matters involves question of law of general public importance
and therefore, the appeal is maintainable under article 136 of the Constitution
of Indiana.
3
C.C.E v Standard Motor Products, (1989) AIR 1298.
4
Janshed Hormusji Wadia v Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai (2004)3 SCC 214.
5
Balakrishna v. Rmaswami, (1965) AIR 195.
1.1.2 THE MATTER INVOLVES SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW
AND HENCE ENTITLED TO BE MAINTAINABLE
Where findings are entered without considering relevant materials and without
following proper legal procedure, the interference of the Supreme Court is
6
called for . The expression "substantial question of law" is not defined in any
legislation. Nevertheless, it has acquired a definite connotation through various
judicial pronouncements. A Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, while
explaining the import of the said expression, observed that:
The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case
is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public
importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the
parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not
finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or
7
is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views .
In the present case, the question of law involved in appeal is of recurring nature
which has been raised in plethora of cases. Hence, it is humbly submitted
before this Honble Supreme Court of India that the matter involves substantial
question of law and hence entitled to be maintainable.
The Supreme Court is not precluded from going into the question of facts under
8
article 136, if it considers it necessary to do so . The Article 136 uses the
wording in any cause or matter. This gives widest power to this court to deal
6
Dale & Carrington Investment Ltd. v. P.K. Prathapan (2005) 1 SCC 212.
7
Sir Chunilal Mehta and Sons. Ltd. v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (1962) AIR 1314.
8
Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra (1952) AIR 991.
9
with any cause or matter . It is, plain that when the Supreme Court reaches the
conclusion that a person has been dealt with arbitrarily or that a court or
tribunal has not given a fair deal to a litigant, then no technical hurdles of any
kind like the finality of finding of facts, or otherwise can stand in the way of the
10
exercise of this power
It is submitted that, the present facts in issue satisfy all of the above mentioned
criteria. The case involves the matter of general public importance and it
directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties as the order is
erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the petitioners. Also, in the light of
the facts that huge amount of cases aroused under same facts and
circumstances, it is submitted that the question is indeed an open question.
9
Pritam Singh v. The State, (1950) AIR 169.
10
Sripur Paper Mills v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax (1970) AIR1520.
REJECTING THE BONE TEST
It is submitted before this Honble Court that the bone age of a child indicates his/her level
of biological and structural maturity.By the age of 18 years, bone age cannot be computed
from hand & wrist radiographs, therefore the medial end of the clavicle is used for bone
age calculation in individuals aged 1822 years. In the present case, the plea to conduct a
bone test or any other allied test for the determination of the age of Shyama was rejected
by the Sessions & High Court. The reason for such decision to reject the above mentioned
11
tests was due to the inconclusiveness of these kinds of tests . This is an insufficient
ground for rejecting to conduct the Age Determination Test.
The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015states that,
(2) In case, the Committee or the Board has reasonable grounds for doubt regarding
whether the person brought before it is a child or not, the Committee or the Board, as the
case may be, shall undertake the process of age determination, by seeking evidence by
obtaining
(i) The date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent
certificate from the concerned examination Board, if available; and in the absence
thereof;
(ii) The birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a
panchayat;
11
Fact Sheet, 11, Line 7.
(iii) And only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be determined by an
ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test conducted on the
12
orders of the Committee or the Board
It is a well-accepted fact in the precedents of our Indian Judiciary that the last resort for
age determination of a juvenile is the Bone Test i.e. Ossification Test. The "Age
determination inquiry" conducted under Section-94(2) of the JJA, 2015 enables the court
to seek evidence and in that process the court can obtain the matriculation or equivalent
certificates, if available. If there is an absence of both, matriculation or equivalent
certificate and the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, the court needs to
obtain the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat
(not an affidavit but certificates or documents). The question of obtaining medical opinion
from a duly constituted Medical Board arises only if the abovementioned documents are
unavailable. In case the exact assessment of the age cannot be done, then the court, for
reasons to be recorded, may, if considered necessary, give the benefit to the child or
juvenile by considering his or her age on lower side within the margin of two years.
There have been cases where the criminal justice system has not recognized an accused to
be a juvenile, and the claim of juvenility is raised for the first time before the Supreme
13
Court. In the case of Gopinath Gosh v. State of West Bengal the question to determine the
age of the accused was raised for the first time in the case before the Supreme Court. The
Apex Court instructed the Magistrate to conduct an inquiry about age when it appeared that
the accused was under 21 years of age at the time when he committed the offence. As a
result, the accused was found to be a juvenile at the time of commission of the offence. The
Apex court observed that, If necessary, the Magistrate may refer the accused to the
12
Section 94, Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act. 2015.
13
AIR 1984 SC 237.
Medical Board or the Civil Surgeon, as the case may be, for obtaining credit worthy
14
evidence about age .
2.1 THE BONE TEST IS A RELIABLE SOURCE
The petitioner asserts that Shyama had time and again submitted before various lower
courts the petition for determination of his age, and time and again it was denied to
him. As per experts that there can be error of about two years in the age determined by
the ossification test, but it is still more reliable than ascertaining the age on mere
appearance basis. In case of doctors opinion regarding age of petitioners, benefit of
15
plus/minus two years to be given .
On request of the petitioner the Magistrate had directed the Superintendent of sub-Jail
to send ossification report. On the basis petitioners age was held not below 18 years.
Courts below had wrongly relied on the report without giving margin of 2-3 years. If
two views were possible regarding age of petitioner, one favorable to him should be
accepted. It was obligatory on part of Magistrate to hold enquiry and determine the
16
age after providing opportunity of hearing to the parties .
2.2 THE LOWER COURT IS NOT JUSTIFIED FOR DENYING THE
OSSIFICATION TEST AS A RIGHT TO SHAYAMA
The petitioner asserts that, the order passed by the Session Court on the ground of
17
inconclusiveness of these kinds of tests is an insufficient ground for rejecting to
14
Gopinath Ghosh v. State of Bengal, AIR 1984 SC 237.
15
Shehzad v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2006 (3) JCC 1580.
16
Ummeed Singh v. State of M.P., 2007 (57) AIC 849 (MP) (Gwalior Bench).
17
Fact Sheet, 11, Line 7.
conduct age ascertainment test. The petitioner asserts that, the accused i.e., Shekhar
had time and again submitted before various lower courts the petition for
determination of his age, and time and again it was denied to him.
Ossification test is performed by radiological examination of several main joints, and
18
the opinion of age is based on the extent of fusion of the bones .The foundation of
the Indian criminal justice system is that any doubt or ambiguity should support the
accused. Hence, in borderline cases the accused is to be treated as a juvenile.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the approach of the courts should not be
19
hyper-technical whilst determining juvenility .
20
The judicial trend has more been diverted from Surinder Singhs Case , when the
Supreme Court rejected a plea of juvenility that was for the first time raised before
Apex Court. Legislature intervened by amending JJA 2000 to assure juveniles the
envisaged treatment. Section 7-A was inserted to clarify the courts should entertain at
any stage, even after final disposal of the case, a plea that an accused was below 18
years of age at the time of occurrence of the crime.
It is most respectfully submitted to the Court that, where the declaration as to whether
the accused was juvenile or not has not been given by any competent Court, the
matter was remanded to the concerned Court for determining the age of the petitioner
and for passing order on the point of juvenile and in connection with the pending case
21
against the petitioner .
18
Jaya Mala vs. Home Secretary, Govt. Of J&K, AIR 1982 SC 1297.
19
Bhoop Ram vs. State of U.P. AIR 1989 SC 1329.
20
Surinder Singh vs. State of U.P., AIR 2003 SC3811.
21
Hemal Jain vs. State of Jharkhand, 2004 Cr. LJ. 3830 (Cal).
3. WHETHER THE ACT OF SHEKHAR WAS IN FURTHERANCE OF COMMON
INTENTION DEFINED UNDER S.34 OF IPC.
It is submitted before this honorable Court that in the present case there has been a gross
failure of justice on part of the lower courts. There has been a grave error in convicting
Shekhar solely on the basis of his mere presence at the exhibition. The Section 34 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 states;
When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention
of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by
22
him alone .
This section is intended to meet cases in which it may be difficult to distinguish between
the acts of the individual members of a party or to prove what part was exactly taken by
23
each of them in furtherance of the common intention of all. The reason why all are
deemed guilty in such cases is that the presence of accomplices gives encouragement,
support and protection to the person actually committing an act.
The essential ingredients of Sec. 34 of IPC as stated and restated by law Courts in
plethora of cases are:
(i) Common intention to commit a crime, and
(ii) Participation by all the accused in the act or acts in furtherance of the common
24
intention. These two things establish their joint liability.
This provision is only a rule of evidence and does not create a substantive offence. It lays
down the principle of joint liability. To charge a person under this section, it must be
22
Section 34, Indiana Penal Code.
23
Mepa Dana, (1959) Bom LR 269.
24
Shaik China Brahmam v. State of A.P., AIR 2008 SC 610.
shown that he shared a common intention with another person or persons to commit a
25 26
crime and subsequently the crime was perpetrated .The Apex Court held in a case , that
in the case of Sec. 34 it is well established that a common intention presupposes prior
concert. It requires a pre-arranged plan because before a man can be vicariously convicted
for the criminal act of another, the act must have been done in furtherance of the common
intention of them all.
To constitute common intention it is necessary that the intention of each one of the
accused was known to the rest of them and was shared by them.The test to decide if the
intention of one of them is common is to see whether the intention of one was known to
the other and was shared by that other. In drawing the inference the true rule of law which
is to be applied is the rule which requires that guilt is not to be inferred unless that is the
only inference which follows from the circumstances of the case and no other innocuous
27
inference can be drawn.
In a case where the accused persons on going together to a village attacked a victim and
caused his death and after having achieved the object tried to escape together, they act in
close concert and harbour the common intention of beating the deceased. To such a case
28
Section 34 does apply. Common intention is not the same or similar intention. It
follows that there must be a prior meeting of the minds. Several persons can
simultaneously attack a man. Each can have the same intention, that is, intention to kill.
Each can individually cause a separate fatal blow. Yet, there may not exist a common
25
Garib Singh v. State of Punjab, 1972 Cr LJ 1286.
26
Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 SC 216.
27
Oswal Danji v. State, (1960) 1 Guj LR 145.
28
Bherusingh v. State, 1956 Madh. BLJ 905.
intention if there was no prior meeting of the mind. In such a case, each would be
29
individually liable for the injuries, he causes.
3.1 ABSENCE OF COMMON INTENTION
It is submitted that the co-accused Shekhar is being dragged into the picture for no
justifiable cause and for no fault, participation or involvement of his in the alleged
act in question. It is submitted that neither the accused had any intention with
others nor did he act in concert with others to commit such act.
Common intention implies a pre- concerted plan and acting in concert pursuant
to the plan. Common intention comes into being prior to the commission of the act
30
in point of time, which need not be a long gap. Though establishing common
intention is difficult for the prosecution, yet, however difficult it may be, the
prosecution has to establish by evidence, whether direct or circumstantial that
there was a plan or meeting of mind of all the assailants to commit the offence, be
it pre-arranged or the spur of the moment, but it must necessarily be before the
commission of the crime.
There was no evidence that prior to the incident there was any common intention
shared by both the accused. The said intention did not develop at the time of the
incident as well and therefore, it was held that Sec. 34 of the Indian Penal Code
31
cannot be resorted to hold accused guilty of any crime .
29
Nandu & Dhaneshwar Naik v. The State, 1976 CriLJ 250.
30
Ramchander & Ors. v. The State of Rajasthan, 1970 CrLJ 653.
31
Veer Singh v. State of U.P., 2010 (1) A.C.R. 294 (All.).
Therefore, it is humbly submitted that there was no common intention among
Shekhar and the others accused. Hence, in absence of common intention he must
not be held liable under S.34 of the IPC.
3.2 THE ACT WAS NOT IN FURTHERANCE OF COMMON INTENTION
In view of the phraseology of S. 34 existence of common intention is not enough,
the criminal act impugned to attract S.34 must be committed in furtherance of
common intention. The section operates only when it is found that the criminal act
done by an individual is in furtherance of the common intention and not without
32
it . The words in furtherance of the common intention of all in S.34, IPC do not
require that in order that the section may apply, all participants in the joint acts
must either have common intention of committing the same offence or the
common intention of producing the same result by their joint act be performed.
It is true that no concrete evidence is required to prove a common intention
between two people to commit an act. It is however key here to understand that
such evidence must be such that it does not leave any room for doubt against such
33
an intention. Moreover, to sustain a charge under s. 34, active participation in
the commission of the criminal act is required which is clearly absent in the
present case.34
The petitioner submits that since the aforementioned two essential conditions have
not been met with in the present. It is further submitted that the accused must not
be held liable under S.34 of IPC.
32
State of Bihar v. Lala Mahto A.I.R 1955 pat. 161.
33
Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana, AIR 1978 SC 1492.
34
William Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 116.
It is respectfully submitted that the impugned Act seeks to punish the child in conflict
with law for the failure of the society at large in providing the child with adequate care
and protection. It is submitted that the impugned Act seeks to create a fictional
classification between the children belonging to age group of 16-18 years on the basis of
degree of crime "allegedly" committed by them.
It is submitted that as per the scheme of the amendment act the Juvenile Justice Board
35
under section 15 of the Act will have an arbitrary power to conduct a preliminary inquiry
to determine whether a juvenile offender is to be sent for rehabilitation or be tried as an
adult. It is submitted that such classification does not adhere to or does not have any
nexus with the objective sought to be achieved. It is submitted that the impugned Act has
been brought in place in a knee jerk manner and without keeping in mind the interest of
the children.
The NCRB data relied upon by the Parliament shows a minute increase of 0.9% in
juvenile crime since 2003. It is pertinent to mention herein that the abovementioned data
merely reflects the number of FIR registered and not the conviction. Further, for heinous
offences like rape, the data shows that in year 2013 out of total rape cases registered only
5% of the rape crimes were allegedly committed by children belonging to the age group
36
of 16-18 .
35
Section 15, Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act. 2015 Preliminary assessment into heinous offences
by Board.
36
Crime in India - 2013, National Crime Records Bureau, 2014.
It is submitted that under the Indian law a person under the age of 18 is not allowed to
vote, is considered minor for entering into a contract, a girl of age less than 18 cannot
give consent for sexual relationships, a child of age less than 18 cannot marry, yet, by the
amended act, that child can be tried as an adult and after a preliminary assessment, the
child shall be presumed to have the knowledge and understanding of the alleged crime he
has committed. The counsel submits that such a scenario would be travesty of Justice.
4.1 THE ACT IS IN CONTRAVENTION WITH THE ARTICLE 15(3) OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA
It is submitted that the impugned Act is in violation of Article 15(3) of the
37
Constitution of Indiana . It is submitted that the stated object of the Act is for the
welfare of children, however, the amendment passed makes the legislation draconian
and against the idea of welfare of children. There is no need to subject the children to
different or adult judicial system as it will go against 15(3) of the Constitution of
Indiana.
It is submitted that the idea behind treating a certain age group as children is to protect
the most vulnerable section of the society. In case a crime is committed by the
children, the endeavour of the state should be reformative rather than punitive or
worse retributive. The law of juvenile justice stands on the principles of restorative
and reformative justice and any digression from the same would be detrimental to the
right of the children and in contravention with the principle as enunciated under
Article 15(3) of the Constitution of Indiana.
37
Article 15(3), Constitution of Indiana, 1949 - Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any
special provision for women and children.
4.2 THE ACT IS IN CONTRAVENTION WITH THE UN CONVENTION ON
THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
The counsel humbly submits that the impugned amendment is against the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereinafter as UNCRC) which is a
comprehensive and internationally binding agreement on the rights of children. It was
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1989. The definition of child as
envisaged in Article-1 states:
"For the purposes of the present Convention, a child means every human being
below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child,
majority is attained earlier."
The object clause of the present amendment states thus:
"And whereas, the Government of India has acceded on the 11th December, 1992 to
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by the General Assembly of United
Nationswhich has prescribed a set of standards to be adhered to by all State parties in
securing the best interest of child."
The counsel submits that the mention of UNCRC in the objective of the impugned
amendment is a mere eye wash as the amendment seeks to erode the very definition of
38
child as envisaged in the UNCRC. The counsel further submits that section 16 of the
Act of 2000 had a specific provision to deal with children between 16-18 years who had
committed serious offences which was well within the existing juvenile system and that
there was no need to push juvenile offenders into adult criminal system.
38
Section 16, Juvenile Justice Act. (2000) - Order that may not be passed against juvenile.
The counsel submits that our country accepts the international convention of keeping
18 years as the age of the child and the same is reflected in various laws where the age
of child was kept at 18 years such as Contract Act, Motor Vehicles Act, etc.
In those legal systems recognizing the concept of the age of criminal responsibility for
juveniles, the beginning of that age shall not be fixed at too low an age level, bearing
39
in mind the facts of emotional, mental and intellectual maturity .
The age of eighteen has been fixed on account of the understanding of experts in child
psychology and behavioural patterns that till such an age the children in conflict with
law could still be redeemed and restored to mainstream society, instead of becoming
hardened criminals in future. There are, of course, exceptions where a child in the age
group of sixteen to eighteen may have developed criminal propensities, which would
make it virtually impossible for him/her to be re-integrated into mainstream society,
but such examples are not of such proportions as to warrant any change in thinking,
since it is probably better to try and re-integrate children with criminal propensities
into mainstream society, rather than to allow them to develop into hardened criminals,
40
which does not augur well for the future .
Further, the Child shall be forced to face trial which will have negative effect on the
psychology of the child. Under the previous law, if a child, in conflict with law,
between the ages of 16-18 years was found to have committed an offence by the
Juvenile Justice Board, there was a range of rehabilitative dispositions that could be
passed by the Juvenile Justice Board. These rehabilitative dispositions included
admonition, community service, imposition of a fine, probation, group counselling
and an extreme measure of deprivation of liberty by way of placement of the child in
a special home for three years.

39
Subramanian Swamy v. Raju, (2014) 8 SCC 390.
40
Salil Bali v Union of India, (2013) 7 SCC 705.
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1990 read with the concluding
Resolution of the Committee on Child Rights (constituted under the UN Convention)
of the year 2000 and the General Resolution of the year 2007 clearly contemplate the
MACR as 18 years and mandates member States to act accordingly. The UN Standard
Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (the Beijing Rules) were
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1985. Rule 2.2(a) defines a
juvenile as a child or young person who, under the respective legal system, may be
dealt with for an offence differently than an adult. Rule 4.1 set out below mandates
Member States to refrain from fixing a minimum age of criminal responsibility that is
too low, bearing in mind the facts of emotional, mental and intellectual maturity.
Lastly, the counsel herein submits that the brain of the teenager is not completely
developed and he/she is incapable of fully understanding the consequences of his
actions or omissions. Furthermore, it is submitted before this Honble court that in the
present case the act in question is in contravention with the Constitutional provisions
of the Constitution of Indiana as well as it is also not in consonance with the
principles of the UNCRC.

PRAYER
In the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, may this Honble
Court be pleased to:
1. Set aside the conviction of Shekhar and free him from all the charges framed upon
him.
2. Hold that the case of Shyama be remanded back to the Juvenile Justice Board for his
trial as a minor.
3. Hold that the Ossification Test of Shyama be conducted for the determination of his
age.
4. Hold that the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act. 2015 is in contravention with
Constitution of Indiana and the International Conventions.
AND/OR
Pass any other order that it deems fit in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience.
And for this, the Petitioner as in duty bound, shall humbly pray.
COUNSELS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER


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RELIABLE INSTITUTE OF LAW, MORTA, AFFILATED TO CCS MEERUT UNIVERSITY

IN THE HONBLE ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT

THE HONBLE MR. JUSTICE ANUJ GOYAL

(CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION)

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT IN C.C. NO.209 OF 2017

(UNDER SEC 374 OF CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1973)

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

1. WHETHER THE PETITION BROUGHT BEFORE THIS COURT IS

1.1 JURISDICTION OF SC UNDER ARTICLE 136 CAN ALWAYS BE INVOKED

WHEN A QUESTION OF LAW OF GENERAL PUBLIC IMPORTANCE

1.1.1 THAT THE MATTER INVOLVES QUESTION OF LAW OF

GENERAL PUBLIC IMPORTANCE AND HENCE, ENTITLED TO

1.1.2 THE MATTER INVOLVES SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW

AND HENCE ENTITLED TO BE MAINTAINABLE..20

2. WHETHER THE SESSIONS COURT JUSTIFIED IN INTERPREATING SEC-34.22

2.1 THE BONE TEST IS A RELIABLE SOURCE24

2.2 THE LOWER COURT IS NOT JUSTIFIED FOR DENYING THE

OSSIFICATION TEST AS A RIGHT TO SHAYAMA...24

Page | 2 MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

3. WHETHER THE ACT OF Mr. Y WAS IN FURTHERANCE OF COMMON

INTENTION DEFINED UNDER S.34 OF IPC26

3.1 ABSENCE OF COMMON INTENTION....28

3.2 THE ACT WAS NOT IN FURTHERANCE OF COMMON INTENTION...29

4. WHETHER THE ACT IS IN CONTRAVENTION WITH THE CONSTITUION OF

INDIANA AND INTERNATIONAL NORMS..30

4.1. THE ACT IS IN CONTRAVENTION WITH THE ARTICLE 15(3) OF THE

4.2. THE ACT IS IN CONTRAVENTION WITH THE UN CONVENTION ON THE

AIR All India Reporter

All Allahabad High Court

Bom. LR Bombay Law Reporter

Cal Calcutta High Court

CBI Central Bureau of Investigation

Cri LJ / Cr LJ Criminal Law Journal

Cr.P.C. Code of Criminal Procedure

Del Delhi High Court

JJA Juvenile Justice Act

Guj Gujarat High Court

IPC Indian Penal Code

ILR Indian Law Reports

ITR Income Tax Reports

Mad Madras High Court

NCRB National Crime Records Bureau

Ori Orissa High Court

P&H Punjab and Haryana High Court

Pat Patna High Court

Raj Rajasthan High Court

SCC Supreme Court Cases

SCJ Supreme Court Journal

SCR Supreme Court Reporter

U.O.I Union of India

Page | 6 MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

Page | 7 MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

Page | 8 MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

of Constitution of Indiana reads as hereunder:

136. SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL BY THE SUPREME COURT.

The Armed Forces.

in the Republic of Indiana. He studied in a government funded school named, Shanti

by Mr. Batra. It has been 6 years since his employment.

Saxena. Shekhar is the neighbor of Mr. Batra.