Case 3:14-cr-00004-CWR-LRA Document 1 Filed 01/09/14 Page 1 of 1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2012-CA-01480-COA

JASON ZEBERT APPELLANT

v.

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF APPELLEE

THOMAS E. BAKER

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/18/2012

TRIAL JUDGE: HON. DAN H. FAIRLY
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: RANKIN COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: WAYNE MILNER
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: HARRY JONES ROSENTHAL
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - OTHER
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: APPELLANT FOUND IN CONTEMPT AND
ORDERED INCARCERATED UNTIL HE
PURGES HIMSELF OF CONTEMPT
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE LEE, C.J., BARNES, AND FAIR, JJ.

BARNES, J., FOR THE COURT:

1. In 2000, the Rankin County Chancery Court appointed attorney Jason Zebert guardian

over the person and estate of Thomas E. Baker. Zebert posted a bond for $35,000. From

2000 to 2008, Zebert provided the chancery court with required yearly accountings, which

the court approved. However, in early 2009, Zebert failed to provide the chancery court with

the eighth accounting (for the period beginning October 1, 2007, and ending September 30,

2008). An order to show cause for the past-due accounting was issued by Chancellor John

Grant III on April 8, 2009. The order required Zebert to appear before the court on June 1,
2009. Several continuances (in response to Zeberts motions) were granted throughout the

next year. In one of the motions for a continuance, Zebert asked to be replaced as guardian.

Harry Rosenthal was appointed guardian over Baker and his estate on September 2, 2009.

2. On October 4, 2010, two years after the accounting was due, Zebert filed a Petition

Exhibiting Eighth Accounting of Estate. However, the petition only covered the period

from October 1, 2007, to December 31, 2007. For the next several months, three more

continuances for the show cause hearing were entered. On June 27, 2011, Judge Grant

issued another show-cause order, requiring Zebert to appear for a hearing on July 26, 2011.

After the hearing, Judge Grant found that the proper annual accounting had not been filed

and approved. In his order dated July 26, 2011, Judge Grant found Zebert in contempt and

ordered him to be incarcerated; the chancellor suspended the incarceration, however, until

August 4, 2011, to allow Zebert time to fil[e] and hav[e] approved all annual accounting(s)

that are past due in this cause[.]

3. Zebert subsequently filed a motion for the recusal of Judge Grant. On August 4, 2011,

Judge Grant once again stayed Zeberts incarceration, this time until September 8, 2011, to

allow Zebert and his counsel additional time in which to prepare and present to the Court

past due annual accountings that have not been properly filed or approved. A few days

later, on August 8, Judge Grant recused himself, appointing the Honorable Dan Fairly to hear

the matter. The order also sealed the prior orders of contempt (July 26, 2011; August 4,

2011) and the current August 8, 2011 order from public viewing until further order of the

chancery court.

2
4. On September 8, 2011, Zebert filed another accounting for the period beginning

October 1, 2007, and ending July 27, 2011. It was in this accounting that Zebert noted that

he had made disbursements of $44,468.83 and $133,749.92 in loans extended on behalf of

the Estate. It was also noted that at the beginning of the accounting period, Bakers account

at First Commercial Bank held $164,909.93; at the end of the accounting period, the account

only held $6,555.50. Attached as exhibits to the petition for accounting were spreadsheets

of the accounts income/expenses for this period. A short hearing was held before Judge

Fairly, who ordered Zebert to provide all outstanding bank statements for Bakers account.

Zebert told the chancellor that all remaining documentation would be available by September

19.

5. Yet, on that date, Zebert still had not provided bank statements, but merely copies of

the checks for the vouchers. Consequently, Judge Fairly found Zebert in contempt for failure

to present an acceptable accounting and fined him $1,500. The chancellor also continued all

other matters in this cause, including but not limited to the other findings of contempt and

incarceration until the next hearing on October 3, 2011, at which time the chancery court

expect[ed] Zebert to produce bank statements and copies of cancelled checks. In a

supplement to the accounting, filed that same day, Zebert explained that without obtaining

the chancery courts approval, he had disbursed funds totaling $133,749.92 from Bakers

estate for three different loans, all at five percent interest: (1) $75,000 to Sherri Baggett and

3
Jimmie Susan Fowler from January 2008 to January 15, 2012;1 (2) $37,000 to Fowler,

payable January 15, 2012; and (3) $21,749.92 made/advanced to Fowler, payable January

15, 2012. Fowler was Zeberts employee; Baggett was a female acquaintance of Zeberts.

As already noted, these disbursed funds reduced the assets of the estate from approximately

$165,000 to $6,555.50. 2 The supplement also stated that the loans were secured by an

interest in land located in Rankin County, Mississippi, with a value in excess of $350,000.

However, although a description of the property was attached, there was no deed of trust for

the property provided with the supplemental accounting.

6. Another show-cause hearing was held on July 18, 2012. At that hearing, Zebert was

questioned about the unapproved disbursements from the estate, which he claimed involved

loans to an employee and a female acquaintance. Zebert confessed he had not obtained

approval from the court to make the disbursements. He also claimed that documentation

regarding the disbursements had been inadvertently destroyed by water damage to his office

during a storm.3

1
The record also reflects that check number 1432, dated January 11, 2008, was a
disbursement payable to Zebert for $75,000 the memo line read Transfer For C[ertificate
of Deposit]. It is unclear whether this disbursement corresponds to the loan amount
mentioned. There is no record of a certificate of deposit in Zeberts name.
2
A memo from First Commercial bank dated September 14, 2011, confirmed the
account balance as of July 27, 2011, was $6,554.95. However, the account number listed
in the memo is different than the account number for Bakers guardianship account.
3
In July 2008, Zebert wrote two checks payable to himself from the guardianship
account, totaling approximately $8,000, for roofing and miscellaneous repair.

4
7. Judge Fairly found Zebert in civil contempt. He ordered Zebert to jail until he purges

himself of such contempt. Zebert, who is still incarcerated, appeals the order, claiming that

the order of contempt was criminal in nature, rather than civil, and must be reversed since

it is impossible for him to comply with the chancery courts order.4 Finding no error, we

affirm.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

8. A chancellors finding of contempt is reviewed for manifest error. Jones v. Mayo, 53

So. 3d 832, 838 (21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).

The decision to hold a person or entity in criminal or civil contempt . . . is a

discretionary function of the [chancery] court. Issues of contempt are
questions of law to be decided on a case-by-case basis. Regarding a
determination of contempt, a [chancery] court due to its temporal and physical
proximity to the parties is infinitely more competent to decide the matter.

4
The only issue on appeal concerns the nature of the chancellors order of contempt.
Zebert admits in his brief that he did not obtain approval from the chancery court for the
aforementioned expenditures. Zebert also notes that he has since received a target letter
from the United States Department of Justice concerning his mismanagement of Bakers
estate. Moreover, counsel for Zebert stated during oral argument before this Court that
federal charges were pending against Zebert and that he anticipated Zebert will be
convicted by pleading guilty to misappropriation of funds. Counsel also submitted that
Zebert acknowledges that these funds were misappropriated and is willing to face up to it
and admits his guilt.

On October 8, 2013, a letter was sent to this Court by the Federal Public Defenders
Office of the Northern and Southern Districts of Mississippi, requesting that this Court take
into account evidence of the anticipated federal charges against Zebert for the
misappropriation of Bakers funds and vacate Zeberts contempt order. The Appellee has
filed a motion to suppress the letter, which this Court has granted as the letter concerns facts
that are not only outside the record, but also occurred after the chancery courts ruling in the
matter.

5
Corporate Mgmt. Inc. v. Greene Cnty., 23 So. 3d 454, 466 (32) (Miss. 2009) (internal

citations and quotations omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. Whether the order of contempt issued by the chancellor was civil

or criminal in nature.

9. At the hearing on July 18, 2012, Judge Fairly found Zebert to be in civil contempt by

clear and convincing evidence. The chancellor summarized:

You have woefully failed to properly account to this court, Mr. Zebert. This
court has been abundantly patient with you. I cant imagine why . . . Judge
Grant didnt put you in jail [a] long time ago, because thats where you are
going today. Until you properly account to this court for every penny of this
mans money, youre going to sit over there in the Rankin County jail.

I adjudicate you to be in willful and contumacious contempt. Im reinstating

Judge Grants Order incarcerating you; and youre going to jail, sir, until you
account for every penny.

Zebert responded, I understand what a proper accounting is, and I certainly can put that

together; however, he later questioned the chancery court as to how he could accomplish

that task while incarcerated. The chancellor said that was Zeberts problem to solve. The

corresponding Order of Contempt and Incarceration stated that Zebert was to present and

have approved an accounting in this cause. (Emphasis added).

10. The purpose of civil contempt is to compel compliance with the courts orders,

admonitions, and instructions, while the purpose of criminal contempt is to punish. In re

McDonald, 98 So. 3d 1040, 1043 (5) (Miss. 2012) (quoting Graves v. State, 66 So. 3d 148,

151 (11) (Miss. 2011)).

6
 The order of contempt is entered by the court for the private benefit of the
offended party. Such orders, although imposing a jail sentence, classically
provide for termination of the contemnors sentence upon purging himself of
the contempt. The sentence is usually indefinite and not for a fixed term.
Consequently, it is said that the contemnor carries the key to his cell in his
own pocket.

On the other hand, a criminal contempt proceeding is maintained solely and

simply to vindicate the authority of the court or to punish otherwise for
conduct offensive to the public in violation of an order of the court.

Jones v. Hargrove, 516 So. 2d 1354, 1357 (Miss. 1987) (citation omitted). A criminal-

contempt penalty [is] designed to punish the contemnor for disobedience of a court order;

punishment is for past offenses and does not terminate upon compliance with the court

order. C.K.B. v. Harrison Cnty. Youth Court, 36 So. 3d 1267, 1273 (16) (Miss. 2010)

(quoting Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. McGill, 890 So. 2d 859, 868 (35) (Miss. 2004)).

11. On appeal, Zebert claims that it is factually and legally impossible for him to

present an approved accounting since he admittedly misappropriated funds from the estate

and perpetuated a fraud on the court. He also says compliance with the chancery courts

order is physically impossible since, from jail, he has no access to the necessary

documentation. Zebert therefore contends that since it is impossible for him to comply with

the chancellors directive, he was subjected to constructive criminal contempt, which

requires the chancery court to provide him with procedural due process safeguards. See

Davis v. Davis, 17 So. 3d 114, 120 (23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009). Zebert also argues that

Judge Fairly should recuse himself since the record reflects that Judge Fairly had a personal

bias against him.

7
12. Judge Fairlys reasoning for remanding Zebert into custody was to compel compliance

with his order to present a proper accounting of funds. Judge Fairly never stated during the

hearing that Zebert had to have an approvable accounting; he said that Zebert needed to

provide a proper accounting. However, as already noted, the order for contempt and

incarceration did state that Zebert was required to present and have approved an accounting

in this matter[.] The footnote in the order further stated:

While accountings have been presented, none have been approved by the
Court. All of the presented accountings and supplements fall woefully short
of the statutorily required information necessary for the Court to approve
same. Vouchers, presented by Mr. Zebert after being previously ordered by
the Court, showed unauthorized and unapproved expenditures made by Jason
T. Zebert.

This is the basis for Zeberts assertion that he cannot provide an accounting that would be

approved, due to the misuse of funds.

13. We find no merit to Zeberts claims that the order was criminal in nature and that he

is unable to comply with the order.5 This is not a situation where Zebert owes money that

5
The dissent notes Zeberts argument that the contempt order should be set aside
because he failed to receive proper notice of the show cause hearing through a Rule 81
summons. M.R.C.P. 81 He claims that the lack of a Rule 81 summons violated his due-
process rights. Criminal-contempt defendants are entitled to notice under Mississippi Rule
of Civil Procedure 81(d), which requires service of process. Corr v. State, 97 So. 3d 1211,
1216 (12) (Miss. 2012) (citing M.R.C.P. 81(d)(2)).

As will be addressed more fully in section II of this opinion, the fundamental

requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner. Pearson v. Browning, 106 So. 3d 845, 851 (32) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012)
(quoting Vincent v. Griffin, 872 So. 2d 676, 678 (6) (Miss. 2004)). In Dennis v. Dennis,
824 So. 2d 604, 610 (16) (Miss. 2002), the supreme court held that the appellant, who was
given a meaningful opportunity to explain his actions which were the subject of the motion

8
he is not able to pay; he is merely being required to provide a statement of all income and

disbursements to and from Bakers trust account, together with all his paperwork related to

his management of Bakers funds from October 2007 to September 2008. Zebert even stated

at the July 18, 2012 hearing that he would be glad to provide whatever information,

documentation, or accounting the court wishes to be presented. Yet, over one year later, the

record is still devoid of any documentation as to where the misappropriated funds have gone.

Despite the chancery courts language in the order, it is apparent from the record that Judge

Fairly knew there were unapproved expenditures; he merely wanted Zebert to provide the

documentation that would evidence where the funds went. Although Zebert claims nothing

further could be gained by another accounting, we observe that appellate counsel for Zebert

could not state with certainty that Zebert has provided all the documentation that he has. The

fact remains that the only accounting for the period at issue in this case is incomplete and

contains evidence of fraud. Zebert admits to being solely responsible for the missing funds;

appellate counsel emphatically stated to the Court that Zebert was the person who took the

for contempt and who failed to show that he was prejudiced in any way by the lack of
proper notice, had waived any claim of defective service and violation of due process.
(Emphasis added).

At the hearing, Zebert mentioned that his attorney did not get notice, but he never
denied that he received notice of the hearing. Zeberts Rule 81 argument is a matter of form
over substance. Zebert had been dealing with the issue of the defectiveness of the
accounting for two years. He had already been held in contempt and ordered incarcerated
(twice), although his incarceration had been stayed in the hope that he would satisfy the
chancery courts requirements. Moreover, Zebert entered an appearance at the hearing; he
took advantage of the opportunity to explain and defend his actions to the chancellor.

9
money and had it at his disposal. 6

14. The dissent notes Zebert has a Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself by

admitting to the embezzlement of funds. However, Zebert has invoked no such privilege and

has not raised as an issue on appeal any deprivation of his constitutional rights. Furthermore,

had he wished to invoke this privilege, Zebert should have done so starting with the first

order by Judge Grant requesting the overdue accounting. It is generally held that any

invocation of the privilege must be made at the outset. The privilege [against self-

incrimination] is not ordinarily self-executing[;] it must be affirmatively claimed when self-

incrimination is threatened, and a defendant may lose its benefit inadvertently, without

making a knowing and intelligent waiver, simply by failing to invoke it. State v. Richard,

697 A.2d 410, 415 (Me. 1997) (emphasis added) (citing Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420,

427-28 (1984)).7

6
According to counsel during oral argument, one of the women who allegedly
received the loans was investigated and testified that she did not receive the money.
Counsel for Zebert stated it was apparent that the chancery court determined that the money
did not go to anyone but Zebert. The latest accounting to the chancery court, however,
represents that secured loans were made to the two women.
7
In Richard, the defendant was sued for selling unregistered securities. The State
sought a complete accounting. Richard, 697 A.2d at 412. Paul Richard objected to the
accounting only on the ground that it was an inappropriate remedy, without mentioning his
Fifth Amendment right. Id. at 412-13. He failed to provide the appropriate accounting, and
the State filed two separate motions for contempt over a six-month period. Id. at 413. After
the State filed its second contempt motion, Richard asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege
and declined to provide the accounting. Id. After a hearing, the lower court found him
to be in contempt and ordered him incarcerated. Richard appealed, claiming that prior to the
second motion for contempt, he had no reasonable apprehension of criminal prosecution.
Id. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held:

10
15. This Court also finds it a bit disingenuous for Zebert to assert that his incarceration

makes it physically impossible to comply. Zebert had hired an attorney, Melissa Gardner

Warren, to represent him at his initial show cause hearings. Judge Grant entered a

continuance, staying Zeberts incarceration, on August 4, 2011, based on Warrens request

that she be allowed to assist Zebert with preparing the accounting. Yet no explanation has

been provided why the accounting was not completed at that time with Warrens assistance.

Rosenthal, counsel for the Appellee and successor guardian to the estate, contends that the

request by the chancellor can be simply done, and would require less than three (3) days to

prepare and present the same . . . for the Court[s] review[.] He also reported during oral

argument before this Court, without objection, that he even visited the jail and offered to help

Zebert, but was refused.

16. Although Zebert argues it is necessary that he be released from incarceration to

address the pending federal charges against him, we are obliged to respect the chancery

Given the facts as set forth by the court, we treat this as a finding that Richard
first waived his Fifth Amendment rights when he failed to invoke them in
response to the States requests for an order to provide an accounting, made
in its simultaneous motions for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary
injunction filed in March 1996. Richards argument that he could not have
invoked the privilege because he had no reasonable apprehension at that
juncture that his submission of an accounting could lead to a criminal
prosecution is not persuasive.

Id. at 415 (emphasis added). The Richard court also noted that Richard was notified from
early on that he had violated the statute prohibiting the sale of unregistered securities. In this
case, Zebert was apparently aware from the outset that a full and proper accounting would
make him subject to prosecution.

11
courts role to act as the superior guardian to those suffering from disability who are unable

to act for themselves. In re Wilhite, 121 So. 3d 301, 305 (11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013)

(quoting Carpenter v. Berry, 58 So. 3d 1158, 1163 (19) (Miss. 2011)).

The court will take nothing as confessed against them; will make for them
every valuable election; will rescue them from faithless guardians, designing
strangers, and even from unnatural parents[;] and in general[,] will and must
take all necessary steps to conserve and protect the best interest of these wards
of the court.

Id. at 306 (11) (emphasis added) (quoting Carpenter, 58 So. 3d at 1163 (19)).

17. Judge Fairly has aptly summarized Zeberts continuing unwillingness to provide what

the chancery court has requested. At the hearing on September 19, 2011, when Zebert only

provided copies of the checks to the court, instead of the requested bank statements, Judge

Fairly said:

It is just positively clear youve been playing games with the court, Mr. Zebert.
And, you know, you are purposely I made I couldnt have said bank
statements I bet I said it ten times when we were last here in court [on
September 8, 2011], because theres no way I can do a reconciliation of that
without the bank statements.

Subsequently, on November 14, 2012, Judge Fairly submitted a response to a motion for writ

of habeas corpus filed by Zebert, concluding:

The Court had before it an abundance of evidence to find Zebert in willful and
contumacious contempt of Court and ordered him jailed. Zebert committed a
fraud upon the Court. He stole Bakers money. But that is not why he remains
in jail. He remains in jail and, to the extent this Court has the power, will
remain in jail until he gives the Court a full and complete accounting of all the
funds which he wrongfully expended and, since he has failed to account for the
money, presumably stolen. He offered no explanation as to where the money
went that he transferred electronically to one of his personal accounts. This
Court wants to know: Where did the money go? An accounting will reveal

12
 that. . . . Zeberts incarceration here dealt with his willful disobedience to
account for the missing money.

....

In conclusion, this Court is strongly persuaded and continues to conclude that

unless and until Zebert purges himself of his contempt, which he can do from
the confines of the Rankin County jail by presenting a full and complete
accounting of all funds he removed from the Baker account, he should remain
in the Rankin County jail.

(Emphasis added).8

18. Consequently, we find nothing to support Zeberts contention that Judge Fairlys order

of contempt was criminal in nature. [A] valid order of civil contempt does not become

punitive simply because the contemnor persists in punishing himself. United States v.

Harris, 582 F.3d 512, 520 (3d Cir. 2009). At some point, Zeberts incarceration for civil

contempt may become unhelpful and punitive in nature; however, there is no indication that

this stage has yet been reached. See Commodity Futures Trading Commn v. Armstrong, 269

F.3d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 2001) (A confinement of more than eighteen months for contempt

d[id] not automatically mean that [the] confinement ha[d] lost all realistic possibility of

having a coercive effect, but it might well affect the degree of deference to be accorded a trial

judges determination.); United States ex rel. Thom v. Jenkins, 760 F.2d 736, 740 (7th Cir.

1985) (The contemnor was imprisoned for fifteen months. If after months, or perhaps even

years, the contemnor steadfastly refuse[s] to yield to the coercion of incarceration, the judge

8
Zebert filed a motion for writ of habeas corpus on August 28, 2012, requesting
release from custody. The Mississippi Supreme Court denied Zeberts motion on November
19, 2012.

13
would be obligated to release [him] since incarceration would no longer serve the purpose

of the civil contempt order[.]); Anyanwu v. Anyanwu, 771 A.2d 672, 679-81 (N.J. Super. Ct.

App. Div. 2001) (Since there was no evidence to support the hearing judges determination

that there was no substantial likelihood of compliance, the appellate court reversed the

judges ruling that contemnor should be released from incarceration after four years. No

hard and fast rule or fixed period of time defines when coercive commitment becomes

punitive, but refusal to comply is in itself insufficient for a finding that the commitment has

lost its coercive power.).

19. Regarding any personal bias, the chancellor noted that Zebert was actually ordered

to be incarcerated by Judge Grant. It was only due to the mercy shown by Judge Grant on

July 26, 2011, and August 4, 2011, that he was not incarcerated at that time. The chancery

court, as superior guardian of Bakers estate, has not only the authority, but also the

responsibility, to rescue Baker from the fraudulent actions of his faithless guardian here,

by requiring that guardian, Zebert, to provide all information regarding his management of

the estate.

20. We find this issue is without merit.

II. Whether the failure to issue Zebert a summons under Mississippi

Rule of Civil Procedure 81 for the July 18, 2012 show-cause
hearing was a violation of Zeberts due-process rights.

21. Although Zebert was mailed the order to show cause and notice of the hearing on July

18, 2012, the dissent notes Zeberts argument that the contempt order should be set aside

because he failed to receive notice of the show-cause hearing through a Rule 81 summons.

14
Zebert claims that this was a violation of his due-process rights. However, as we have

concluded that the contempt was civil in nature, this issue is moot. The Mississippi Supreme

Court has held that [c]riminal-contempt defendants are entitled to notice under Mississippi

Rule of Civil Procedure 81(d), which requires service of process. Corr v. State, 97 So. 3d

1211, 1216 (12) (Miss. 2012) (emphasis added) (citing M.R.C.P. 81(d)(2)).

22. We find Zeberts Rule 81 argument unpersuasive. Zebert had been dealing with the

issue of the defectiveness of his accounting for more than two years. The initial order to

show cause was filed on April 8, 2009; the hearing was set for June 1, 2009. Ten

continuances were granted at the request of Zebert over the next two years, delaying the

show-cause hearing until July 26, 2011. At that hearing, Judge Grant found Zebert in

contempt and ordered him incarcerated, but the incarceration was stayed in the hope that

Zebert would satisfy the chancery courts requirements. Judge Grant recused himself shortly

thereafter, and a short hearing was held before the new chancellor, Judge Fairly, on

September 8, 2011. Zebert assured Judge Fairly that he would provide all remaining

documentation on September 19, 2011. However, he failed to do so, and the matter of the

accounting and his contempt was continued until the hearing on July 18, 2012. Zebert was

well aware of the basis for the hearing; Judge Fairly observed at the hearing: Mr. Zebert

fully knows why were here today. Zebert had already been found in contempt on July 26,

2011. The July 18 order of contempt simply reinstated Judge Grants prior order of

contempt and lifted the suspension of Zeberts incarceration.

23. Additionally, Zebert never objected to service of process at the July 18, 2012 hearing.

15
At the show-cause hearing, Zebert casually mentioned that his attorney, Warren, did not get

notice, but he never denied that he received notice of the hearing.9 Zebert also entered an

appearance at the hearing; he took advantage of the opportunity to explain and defend his

actions to the chancellor. With regard to a contempt proceeding, the fundamental

requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a

meaningful manner. Pearson v. Browning, 106 So. 3d 845, 851 (32) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012)

(quoting Vincent v. Griffin, 872 So. 2d 676, 678 (6) (Miss. 2004)). In Dennis v. Dennis, 824

So. 2d 604, 610 (16) (Miss. 2002), the supreme court held that the appellant, who was

given a meaningful opportunity to explain his actions which were the subject of the motion

for contempt and who failed to show that he was prejudiced in any way by the lack of

proper notice, had waived any claim of defective service and violation of due process.

(Emphasis added); see also Chasez v. Chasez, 957 So. 2d 1031, 1037 (15) (Miss. Ct. App.

2007) (Any objections to service of process may be waived if a defendant appears in an

action without raising the objection in the initial pleadings or attached motions.) (citation

omitted). Consequently, we find no merit to Zeberts issue of notice under Rule 81.

III. Whether the order of July 19, 2012, rescinded the order of
contempt and incarceration at issue on appeal.

24. Zebert also claims that Judge Fairlys July 19, 2012 order rescinded the prior order

of contempt and incarceration filed the previous day. Thus, he claims that he should be

9
We also note that the majority of the motions for continuances were filed by Zebert
on his own behalf, not by Warren. He was listed in the court filings as fiduciary and
attorney.

16
released from incarceration.

25. The July 19, 2012 order states in part: ORDERED THAT the prior Order of August

8, 2011, to the extent that it is sealed the order of that date and any prior orders be and the

same is hereby rescinded. We find that this language merely serves to unseal the chancery

courts August 8 order and rescinds all orders prior to that date. The chancery court, in its

response to the motion for habeas corpus, confirms our finding, noting: To argue that the

Order of July 19, 2012, rescinded the Order of Contempt and Incarceration entered the day

before stretches credulity to its utmost. The Order simply unsealed those Orders previously

sealed by Judge Grant. Accordingly, we find this issue to be without merit.

26. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF RANKIN COUNTY IS

AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLANT.

LEE, C.J., IRVING, P.J., CARLTON, MAXWELL AND FAIR, JJ., CONCUR.
GRIFFIS, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY
ISHEE AND ROBERTS, JJ. JAMES, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

GRIFFIS, P.J., DISSENTING:

27. Is Zebert in jail because he failed to file a proper guardianship accounting,10 or is he

in jail because he failed to tell the chancellor what he did with the money he stole or

misappropriated? The answer decides this case.

28. If Zebert is in jail because his accounting is insufficient, he is guilty of civil contempt.

If Zebert is in jail because he will not say what he did with the money he took from the

10
See Uniform Chancery Court Rules 6.01 through 6.17.

17
guardianship without approval, he may be guilty of constructive criminal contempt. The

difference matters to the due process required.

29. I agree with the majority that there is sufficient evidence in the record to conclude that

Zebert misappropriated, stole, or embezzled almost $200,000 from the guardianship. Zebert

has been incarcerated for almost eighteen months now. The chancellor has said that he can

get out of jail when he purges the contempt; said differently by the chancellor, [u]ntil you

properly account to this court for every penny of this mans money, youre going to sit over

there in the Rankin County jail.

30. What does Zebert need to do to get out of jail, i.e., purge the contempt? Certainly, if

he is able to return the money that he disbursed without court authority, the contempt would

be purged. If he tells the court that he squandered the money on wine, women, and song,

would that be a proper account of the money? I do not think so. It is my analysis of the

chancellors contempt order that Zebert must return the money to get out of jail.

31. Hence, my opinion is that Zebert was found not in civil contempt but in constructive

criminal contempt. Although I agree that, ultimately, incarceration is the proper remedy for

Zeberts actions, I find that his actions are criminal, and he is subject to the due-process

protections of the criminal-justice system before he is incarcerated. For these reasons, I

respectfully dissent. I would reverse and vacate the chancellors order of contempt and

incarceration.

I. Whether the order of contempt issued by the chancellor was civil or

criminal in nature.

18
32. The distinctions between civil and criminal contempt are confusing, difficult, and

often blurred. In Hinds County Board of Supervisors v. Common Cause, 551 So. 2d 107,

120-21 (Miss. 1989), the supreme court ruled:

The landmark case which distinguishes civil and criminal contempt is

Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911), which states the
following:

Contempts are neither wholly civil nor altogether criminal. And

it may not always be easy to classify a particular act as
belonging to either one of these two classes. It may partake of
the characteristics of both. It is not the fact of punishment but
rather its character and purpose that often serve to distinguish
between the two classes of cases. If it is for civil contempt the
punishment is remedial, and for the benefit of the complainant.
But if it is for criminal contempt the sentence is punitive, to
vindicate the authority of the court. Imprisonment for civil
contempt is ordered where the defendant has refused to do an
affirmative act required by the provisions of an order which,
either in form or substance, was mandatory in its character.
Imprisonment in such cases is not inflicted as a punishment, but
is intended to be remedial by coercing the defendant to do what
he had refused to do. The decree in such cases is that the
defendant stand committed unless and until he performs the
affirmative act required by the court's order. On the other hand,
if the defendant does that which [he] has been commanded not
to do, the disobedience is a thing accomplished. Imprisonment
cannot undo or remedy what has been done nor afford any
compensation for the pecuniary injury caused by the
disobedience. If the sentence is limited to imprisonment for a
definite period, the defendant is furnished no key, and he cannot
shorten the term by promising not to repeat the offense. Such
imprisonment operates, not as a remedy coercive in its nature,
but solely as punishment for the completed act of disobedience.

(Emphasis added).

33. Recently, in Corr v. State, 97 So. 3d 1211 (Miss. 2012), the supreme court considered

19
a contempt order that is similar to the one in this case. There, the chancellor found that

process servers were in direct criminal contempt and were sentenced to a term of

incarceration. Id. at 1213 (3). The court considered the due-process protections that were

afforded. The court held:

[I]n classifying a finding of contempt as civil or criminal, this Court focuses

on the purpose for which the power was exercised. On appeal, the trial court's
classification is not conclusive. Thus, the determination should focus on the
character of the sanction itself and not the intent of the court imposing the
sanction.

Id. at 1214 (7) (citation omitted).

34. The majority is satisfied that Zeberts contempt was civil. The purpose of civil

contempt is to compel compliance with the courts orders, admonitions, and instructions,

while the purpose of criminal contempt is to punish. In re McDonald, 98 So. 3d 1040, 1043

(5) (Miss. 2012) (quoting Graves v. State, 66 So. 3d 148, 151 (11) (Miss. 2011)). To

determine the type of contempt, we must focus on the character of the sanction itself and

not the intent of the court imposing the sanction. Corr, 97 So. 3d at 1214 (7) (citations

omitted).

A. Proceedings before the previous chancellor

35. This guardianship began in 2000. For approximately seven years, Zebert filed and

presented annual accountings. The assigned chancellor approved each one of the

accountings. In fact, by order dated February 14, 2008, the chancellor held that Zeberts

Petition Exhibiting Seventh Annual Accounting filed herein be, and the same hereby is

approved and allowed as such. Zebert was current on the required guardianship accountings

20
through September 30, 2007. The guardianship bank account had a balance of $164,909.93.

36. From October 2008 through October 2010, the clerk and the assigned chancellor

issued a number of reminders, orders to show cause, and orders continuing hearings. Each

of these asked Zebert to file the annual accountings required by Uniform Chancery Court

Rules 6.01 through 6.17.

37. On October 4, 2010, Zebert filed a Petition Exhibiting Eight[h] Accounting of

Estate. The chancellor did not approve this accounting. Instead, by order dated July 26,

2011, Zebert was found in contempt and ordered to be incarcerated until he complies with

the Uniform Chancery Court Rules by filing and having approved all annual accountings past

due. Nevertheless, the order suspended Zeberts incarceration until August 4, 2011.

38. Zebert then filed a motion for recusal. The chancellor executed another order, dated

August 4, 2011, that found Zebert in contempt and ordered his incarceration. Again, the

order suspended his incarceration order until September 8, 2011.

39. On August 8, 2011, the chancellor entered an order that stayed indefinitely the

previous contempt and incarceration order. The chancellor also recused himself from

presiding over this case. The case was transferred to Chancellor Dan Fairly.

B. Proceedings before the current chancellor

40. On September 8, 2011, Zebert filed a Petition Exhibiting Eight[h] Accounting of

Estate. Attached to the petition was a schedule of income and expenses, in a form similar

to the earlier accountings. On the same day, the chancellor entered an order of continuance

until September 19, 2011.

21
41. On September 19, 2011, Zebert filed a Supplement to Eighth Accounting of Estate.

Zebert noted that disbursements, in the form of loans, had made from the guardianship

account. These loans were not authorized. Attached were letters from First Commercial

Bank that stated the balance in the guardianship account was $6,555.50. Also attached were

approximately fifty-five pages of canceled checks (i.e., vouchers) written on the guardianship

account.

42. A hearing was held on September 19, 2011, but there is no transcript in the record.

The chancellor entered an order that provided:

Jason T. Zebert is found in willful and contumacious contempt of this Courts

prior oral order to present to this Court bank statements in this cause.

....

[A]ll other matters in this cause, including but not limited to other findings of
contempt and incarceration, are hereby continued to October 3, 2011 at 9:00
a.m. at which time the Court expects Jason T. Zebert to present to the Court
bank statements and copies of canceled checks for the Courts review.

(Emphasis added). There is no record of a hearing held on October 3, 2011.

43. In January 2012, the chancery clerk served Zebert with yet another notice of a past-

due accounting. On July 5, 2012, the chancellor issued an order to show cause for a past

due-accounting. The order directed Zebert to appear on July 18, 2012, to show cause, if any

they have, why they should not be sanctioned and/or removed. 11

11
Zebert argues that he was not served with proper process. Zebert was served notice
under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 5. He was not served with a M.R.C.P. 81
summons. As the attorney of the guardianship, Zebert was ordered to appear and to show
cause, if any they have, why they should not be sanctioned and/or removed. At the hearing,

22
44. On July 18, 2012, Zebert filed the Petition Exhibiting Ninth Accounting of Estate.

Attached was a schedule of income and expenses, in a form similar to the earlier accountings.

The petition indicated that the guardianship account had a balance of $564.41. Also, on July

18, 2012, Zebert filed an Accounting Supplement that stated: Attached hereto are the

listings of the electronic loan disbursements in the above referenced Estate Account. There

were two pages attached that itemize, by date, loan disbursements in the sum of $48,745.

45. A hearing was held on July 18, 2012. The transcript is in the record. The chancellor

identified each pleading filed in the court file and interrogated Zebert. The chancellor was

not satisfied with Zeberts accountings or Zeberts inability to testify about where the

guardianship funds had been spent. Also, the chancellor was concerned that Zebert had

misappropriated a substantial sum of the guardianships assets. At the conclusion of the

hearing, the chancellor held Zebert in contempt and incarcerated him. In the order, the

chancellor held:

THIS CAUSE came on for hearing on the Order to Show Cause for failure of
the Fiduciary, Jason T. Zebert, to present and have approved an accounting in
this matter[,] and the Court after finding that it has jurisdiction over the parties
and subject matter herein, further finds that Jason T. Zebert has failed to
present and have approved the accounting in this cause.

Zebert was not removed. Zebert complained at the hearing that he did not have proper notice
of the hearing. Zebert was held in contempt and jailed. A court order that sets a hearing of
contempt, which could result in incarceration, requires that a summons be served on the
defendant under M.R.C.P. 81. Here the defendant is Zebert, the attorney, serving in a
fiduciary capacity in relation to the guardianship. The chancellors failure to ensure proper
service of process, under M.R.C.P. 81, is a violation of Zeberts due-process rights and
requires reversal. See Powell v. Powell, 644 So. 2d 269, 274 (Miss. 1994).

23
 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Jason T.
Zebert be and is hereby found in willful and contumacious civil contempt of
this Court's prior orders to present and have approved an accounting in this
cause.

[Footnote 1] While accountings have been presented, none have

been approved by the Court. All of the presented accountings
and supplements fall woefully short of the statutorily required
information necessary for the Court to approve same. V
ouchers, presented by Mr. Zebert after being
previously ordered by the Court, showed unauthorized and
unapproved expenditures made by Jason T. Zebert.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the Sheriff

of Rankin County, Mississippi, is authorized and empowered to seize and
confine Jason T. Zebert and incarcerate him in the Rankin County Jail until he
purges himself of such contempt.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the prior

Order of Contempt and Incarceration entered in this cause by the Chancellor
for Place 2 of the Chancery Court of Rankin County, Mississippi, that
suspended the incarceration of Jason T. Zebert, be and is hereby lifted and
reinstated.

This is the order from which Zebert appeals.

46. Harry Rosenthal appeared at the July 18, 2012 hearing as the custodian-in-fact of

Mr. Baker. Rosenthal provided the chancellor with several documents and bank statements.

These documents were included in record. The docket identifies these documents as

Accounting Exhibits filed by D.F, and the table of contents of the record identifies these

as Accounting Exhibits filed by Judge Fairly. The record contains approximately 200

pages of documents, which may be identified as follows:

A. Correspondence between the Veterans Administration and Rosenthal.

B. The guardianships monthly bank statement, at Regions Bank, for the

24
 period of September 15, 2011 through October 13, 2011, including
canceled checks.

C. A document, dated November 15, 2011, signed by Rosenthal, titled

Amended Custodians Second Annual Accounting of the Estate of
Thomas E. Baker for the period 10/10/10 through 10/1/11, and filed
with the Veterans Administration. This accounting provided the
following information:

Beginning balance $154,100.01

Funds received 44,519.40
Less expenditures -6,164.76
Ending balance $192,454.65

Attached were copies of bank statements, including deposit slips and

canceled checks, for the period of October 14, 2010 through October
13, 2011.

D. A document, dated October 29, 2010, signed by Rosenthal, titled

Guardians First Annual Accounting of the Estate of Thomas E.
Baker, September 9, 2009[,] to October 30, 2010, and filed with the
Veterans Administration. In this accounting, Rosenthal indicated that
he was requested to serve as Mr. Bakers guardian on September 2,
2009. Rosenthal was approved as the [Veterans Administrations]
guardian-in-fact. This accounting provided the following information:

Beginning balance $ 0.00

Funds received 154,119.01
Less expenditures - 19.00
Ending balance $ 154,100.01

E. The guardianships monthly bank statements, from an account with

Regions Bank, with Rosenthal as signatory, for the period of April 19,
2012 through June 19, 2012, including canceled checks.

F. The guardianships monthly bank statements, from an account with

First Commercial Bank, with Zebert as signatory, for the period from
October 16, 2007 through June 16, 2011, including canceled checks.

47. On July 19, 2012, Judge Fairly executed another order that states: Ordered that the

25
prior Order of August 8, 2011, to the extent that it sealed the order of that date and any prior

orders be and the same is hereby rescinded.

C. Character of Sanction Civil or Criminal Contempt

48. As stated earlier, the type of contempt is based on the character of the sanction itself

and not the intent of the court imposing the sanction. Corr, 97 So. 3d at 1214 (7).

49. The chancellor has determined, and record evidences, the fact that Zebert made

unauthorized disbursements from the guardianship account for his personal benefit. The

majority recognizes, and I agree, that Zebert faces criminal charges.12

50. My examination of the record finds: (1) several petitions to approve accountings filed

by Zebert;13 (2) the guardianships monthly bank statements that show Zeberts unauthorized

disbursements (these were presented to the chancellor at the July 18, 2012 hearing by

12
Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-23-19 (Supp. 2013), titled,
Embezzlement; by agents, bailees, trustees, servants and persons generally, provides:

If any person shall embezzle or fraudulently secrete, conceal, or convert to his

own use, or make way with, or secrete with intent to embezzle or convert to
his own use, any . . . money, or other valuable security, effects, or property of
any kind or description which shall have come or been entrusted to his care or
possession by virtue of his office, position, place, or employment, either in
mass or otherwise, with a value of Five Hundred Dollars ($ 500.00) or more,
he shall be guilty of felony embezzlement, and, upon conviction thereof, shall
be imprisoned in the custody of the Department of Corrections not more than
ten (10) years, or fined not more than Twenty-five Thousand Dollars
($25,000.00), or both.
13
The petitions do not fully comply with Uniform Chancery Court Rules 6.03 and
6.05. Nevertheless, Zebert did file petitions showing each disbursement of the guardianship
funds, albeit some disbursements were neither authorized nor for the benefit of the ward.

26
Rosenthal and were in the record before the chancellor entered the July 18, 2012 order);14 (3)

all of the guardianship accounts canceled checks (i.e. vouchers) (also filed by Rosenthal).15

The record before this Court contains sufficient evidence of how the guardianship funds were

spent. This evidence does not show where Zebert spent the money after it was transferred

to his personal accounts or for his personal use.

51. The majority determines that Zebert is merely being required to provide a statement

of all income and disbursements to and from Bakers trust account, together with all his

paperwork related to his management of Bakers funds from October 2007 to September

2008. Maj. Op. at (13). If that is all that is required, such information is in the record

before this Court and was in evidence before the chancellor on July 18, 2012. Yet, I do not

believe this was the reason why Zebert was held in contempt and incarcerated.

52. The majority then concludes:

Yet, over one year later, the record is still devoid of any documentation as to
where the misappropriated funds have gone. Despite the chancery courts
language in the order, it is apparent from the record that Judge Fairly knew
there were unapproved expenditures; he merely wanted Zebert to provide the

14
The bank statements, albeit copies, provide the information required by Uniform
Chancery Court Rule 6.03. The presentation of these bank statements appear, in my opinion,
to purge Zeberts contempt finding in the September 19, 2011 order, which found Zebert in
willful and contumacious contempt of this Courts prior oral order to present to this Court
bank statements. Based upon the presentation of these bank statements, Zebert was no
longer in contempt of the September 19, 2011 order.
15
Based on Uniform Chancery Court Rule 6.04, the vouchers must consist of a
receipt or canceled bank check showing to whom and for what purpose the money was
paid. The checks included in the record certainly show to whom the money was paid, there
are a number of checks written to Zebert and the bank statements show electronic transfers.

27
 documentation that would evidence where the funds went. Although Zebert
claims nothing further could be gained by another accounting, we observe that
appellate counsel for Zebert could not state with certainty that Zebert has
provided all the documentation that he has. The fact remains that the only
accounting for the period at issue in this case is incomplete and contains
evidence of fraud. Zebert admits to being solely responsible for the missing
funds; appellate counsel emphatically stated to the Court that Zebert was the
person who took the money and had it at his disposal.

Id. (emphasis added). This finding makes it clear that both the majority and the chancellor

do not expect Zebert to purge the contempt by filing documents in the nature of the

accounting. Instead, the contempt can only be purged if Zebert confesses to taking the

money and tells the chancellor where the money has gone. This information will assist in the

recovery of the funds that were illegally removed.16 Thus, in my opinion, when the

16
I rely on the majoritys reference to the chancellors words in response to Zeberts
motion for writ of habeas corpus:

The Court had before it an abundance of evidence to find Zebert in willful and
contumacious contempt of Court and ordered him jailed. Zebert committed a
fraud upon the Court. He stole Bakers money. But that is not why he remains
in jail. He remains in jail and, to the extent this Court has the power, will
remain in jail until he gives the Court a full and complete accounting of all the
funds which he wrongfully expended and, since he has failed to account for
the money, presumably stolen. He offered no explanation as to where the
money went that he transferred electronically to one of his personal accounts.
This Court wants to know: Where did the money go? An accounting will
reveal that . . . .

In conclusion, this Court is strongly persuaded and continues to conclude that

unless and until Zebert purges himself of his contempt, which he can do . . .
by presenting a full and complete accounting of all funds he removed from the
Baker account, he should remain in the Rankin County jail.

(Emphasis added).

28
chancellor held that Zebert is to be incarcerated until he can account for every penny, this

is a criminal contempt.17

53. I cannot find the wrongful conduct here is Zeberts failure to account. Instead, it

appears that the chancellor seeks restitution for the guardianship. The record contains the

information necessary to comply with the accounting requirements of the Uniform Chancery

Court Rules. Instead, it appears to me that the wrongful conduct is the fact that Zebert

misappropriated, stole, or embezzled the guardianships assets. I interpret the chancellors

contempt order as an effort to find and recover the money unlawfully taken.

54. In Corr, the court held:

The proceedings were for constructive (indirect) criminal contempt, that is,
for acts thatin whole or in partoccurred outside the presence of the judge
not for direct criminal contempt, and, therefore, Appellants were entitled to
due-process protections. A direct criminal contempt is one which takes place
in the very presence of the judge making all the elements of the offense
personal knowledge. This Court has provided that:

[D]irect criminal contempt involves words spoken or actions

committed in the presence of the court that are calculated to
embarrass or prevent the orderly administration of justice.
Punishment for direct contempt may be meted out instantly by
the judge in whose presence the offensive conduct was

17
I note that the chancellor was correct to order a forensic audit of the guardianship
accounts. Indeed, a claim should be filed against Zebert that would allow the exercise of
subpoena power to follow the funds and seize any and all documents from Zeberts office,
his home, or from others who may have knowledge or information about the monies
wrongfully taken from this guardianship. The record before this Court, however, does not
indicate that Zebert has been discharged as the guardian, a new guardian appointed, or any
efforts made to recover on the surety bond, from Zebert or others who may have received
these monies. If such claim has not been filed, the limitations period may soon preclude
such action or otherwise limit recovery.

29
 committed[.]

Unlike direct contempt, constructive contempt involves actions

which are committed outside the presence of the court. In the
case of constructive criminal contempt, we have held that
defendants must be provided with procedural due process
safeguards, including a specification of charges, notice, and a
hearing.

Corr, 97 So. 3d at 1214 (8). Here, the wrongful conduct did not occur within the presence

of the chancellor. Instead, the wrongful conduct was the unauthorized expenditures of

guardianship funds. As such, I conclude that the contempt proceedings were for constructive

criminal contempt despite the majoritys and the chancellors characterization of the

contempt as being civil.

55. When the chancellor learns that a fiduciary has misappropriated, stolen, or embezzled

guardianship assets, as the case here, there comes a point that it becomes a criminal matter

and the wrongdoer is entitled to certain inalienable rights protected by the Constitution. In

criminal cases as in criminal-contempt matters, even Zebert is entitled to the presumption of

innocence and basic constitutional protections.18 For example, Zebert may assert his

18
These constitutional protections include, but are not limited to, the Fifth
Amendment right not to be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law, and the Sixth Amendment
right[s] to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . ., to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence. With a criminal charge against him, Zebert would also be entitled
to a reasonable bail. Zebert has been afforded none of these protections here, and he has
been incarcerated for approximately eighteen months.

30
constitutional right to remain silent.19 The Fifth Amendment of the United States

Constitution provides that [n]o person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a

witness against himself. In this action, it appears to me that Zeberts choice is to either

testify against himself and get out of jail on the chancellors contempt and incarceration

order, or assert his constitutional right and remain in jail without the possibility of bond.

56. I commend the chancellor for his efforts in the handling of this matter, and I note the

difficulty presented by current legal precedent on contempt. Nevertheless, I am compelled

to conclude that the chancellors finding was one of constructive criminal contempt and not

civil contempt.

57. In Corr, the supreme court held:

The Mississippi Constitution provides that, in all criminal prosecutions the

accused shall have a right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation.
Miss. Const. art. 3, 26 (1890). For indirect criminal contempt, this Court
requires notice of the charges and the specific conduct alleged to be
contemptuous and a hearing. See Purvis, 657 So. 2d at 798 (constructive
contempt requires a specification of charges, notice and a hearing.) (citing
Wood v. State, 227 So. 2d 288, 290 (Miss. 1969)); Moulds v. Bradley, 791 So.
2d 220, 225 (Miss. 2001) (Without notice of constructive criminal contempt
sanctions, the accused's due process rights were violated.); Premeaux, 569
So.2d at 684 (defendant must be afforded minimum due process rights and

19
The majority responds that Zebert has waived his right to assert his constitutional
rights because he should have asserted these rights when the previous chancellor requested
an overdue accounting. To support this contention, the majority cites a 1997 Maine criminal
court decision. There, at least, the issue of the defendants constitutional rights were
submitted to a court of criminal jurisdiction. State v. Richard, 697 A.2d 410 (Maine 1997).
I do not believe this case supports the majoritys argument. Instead, I used this as an
example to establish that Zeberts actions were recognized by the chancellor to be criminal
in nature, it should have been turned over to the district attorney, and Zeberts incarceration
based on the criminal laws of this State.

31
 [d]ue process includes notice to the alleged contemnor that she was being
considered for criminal contempt.) (citing Mabry v. Howington, 569 So. 2d
1165, 1167 (Miss. 1990), and Cook v. State, 483 So. 2d 371, 375 (Miss.
1986)). The chancellor issued orders in the underlying DHS cases notifying
Appellants of show-cause hearings and instructing them to be prepared to
present evidence as to why they should not be found in contempt of court and
sanctions, including incarceration and/or a fine, should be entered. Thus,
Appellants received a modicum of actual notice of the contempt proceedings.

However, the chancellor did not issue summonses to the proceedings.

Criminal-contempt defendants are entitled to notice under Mississippi Rule of
Civil Procedure 81(d), which requires service of process. [M.R.C.P.] 81(d)(2).
This Court has explained that, although contempt proceedings often are filed
in the same cause number and proceed with the underlying case, they are held
to be separate actions, requiring new and special summons under Mississippi
Rules of Civil Procedure 81. Shavers v. Shavers, 982 So. 2d 397, 402 (Miss.
2008) (citation omitted); see Hanshaw v. Hanshaw, 55 So. 3d 143, 146 (Miss.
2011) (Because contempt proceedings are distinct actions, they require notice
consistent with Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 81(d).). In contempt
proceedings, complete absence of service of process offends due process and
cannot be waived. Dennis v. Dennis, 824 So. 2d 604, 609 (Miss. 2002) . . .
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). Thus, notice by the issuance of
summonses under Rule 81 must occur before contempt proceedings are
conducted. The failure to issue Appellants summonses for the contempt
proceedings violated Appellants' due-process rights and likewise warrants
reversal.

Corr, 97 So. 3d at 1216 (11-12).

58. Based on Corr, I conclude that the contempt proceedings here were for constructive

(indirect) criminal contempt. I also find that the chancellor was required to issue process that

would give Zebert notice of the criminal charges against him. The chancellor failed to do

so and violated Zeberts due-process rights. I would vacate the contempt judgments and

vacate the order of incarceration.

II. Whether the chancellor was required to recuse.

32
59. Because the majority has affirmed this case, I see no reason to address this issue other

than to say that the court in Corr held that recusal is mandatory in a constructive criminal

contempt proceeding. Id. at 1215 (10).

60. It is for these reasons that I respectfully dissent.

ISHEE AND ROBERTS, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION.

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