Safety Culture Assessment
Safety Culture Assessment
Safety Culture Assessment
Abstract: Improving aviation safety has always been a priority for the aviation industry. While in
recent decades the reliability of machinery and computers dramatically improved the reliability
of the people and the organizational aspect of safety did not change much. Many of air accident
investigations have shown that one of the causal factors, which increase the probability and
severity of accidents, is exactly poor safety culture. The purpose of this paper is to present
the concept of safety culture assessment and the overview and review of different methods
of measuring the safety culture in aviation. This research provides the suggestion that by use
of different methods of assessment (evaluation) of the results, more credible insight into the
level of safety culture in the organization can be obtained. It also provides an understanding
of how measurement systems in order to guide future performance can be used proactively.
Keywords: safety culture, safety management system, survey, ICAO, EUROCONTROL, EASA.
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Corresponding author: tadej.kosel@fs.uni-lj.si
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Zohar (1980) did not explicitly identify the if the managers and staff at the operational
safety culture, but merely highlighted the level share the same views about safety and
factors that define the safety climate: behave accordingly, this pattern ref lects
Management commitment to safety; positive safety culture (Eurocontrol, 2008).
General environment control; Positive safety culture is when everyone
Stable workforce and care for older knows their role in regard to safety and all
employees; in the organization are truly committed to
Emphasis on training; safety.
Good communication and frequent
cont ac t bet ween employee s a nd 2.2. The Concept and Stages of the Safety
management; Culture
Safety promotion.
Systematic safety management, covering
2.1. How to Recognize Positive and regulatory, technical, organizational and
Negative Safety Culture managerial aspects is crucial for achieving
and maintaining sufficient level of aviation
The definition of safety culture, given in the safety. W hen trying to find out what is
first chapter, seems quite abstract. In general, the level of safety in the organization two
weakening of the safety culture happens concepts, namely safety culture and safety
when practice is different from theory climate, are described in the literature. The
and policy; when the safety is sacrificed, general consensus is that culture mainly
even though employees claim that safety embodies values, beliefs and underlying
is number one (Eurocontrol, 2008). Some assumptions, and climate is a descriptive
simple examples of the statement above are: m e a s u r e r e f l e c t i n g t he e m plo y e e s
Where staff concerns about safety are perceptions of the organizational atmosphere
not consistently addressed; and defines the current mood (OConnor et
Where staff does not learn from past al., 2011; Flin et al., 2000).
events;
Where safety cases indicate that the Hudson (2001) in his work states that the
system is safe, but operational staff organizations safety culture is the result of
believes that the accident is inevitable an evolutionary process of the steps from
or; dangerous to safe. Only after a certain
Where there is a belief that safety is the defined point in this evolutionary process
responsibility of someone else. it can be considered that the organization
has a mature (serious enough) safety culture.
Discrepancy in the safety culture, where The author defines the development of
managers and employees at the operational safety culture through the five stages of
level do not share the same view about safety, development:
or when the behavior of these groups of Pathological stage: Who cares about
personnel are in contrast, can be found in safety if we are not caught.
many organizations. This pattern reflects the Reactive phase: Safety is important; a
negative safety culture, which means that the lot is done every time a disaster occurs.
safety of the organization is not addressed in Calculative phase: We have systems for
a coordinated and effective way. However, risk management.
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Proactive phase: We are trying to predict questionnaires both at the State level and
safety problems before they happen. at the level of providers of air navigation
Generative phase: Safety is our business services (ANSPs). The foundation for this
mission. assessment is the ICAOs safety management
framework; at the State level the ability
T he sa fet y cu lt ure can on ly tr u ly be to manage State Safety Program (SSP) is
confirmed at the generative level when the measured and at the ANSPs level the ability
beliefs that are associated with safety are to manage an effective SMS is measured
fully internally adopted and when everything (EASA, 2014). To achieve the aim to assess
that the organization does is based on safety. the safety performance the questionnaire
Many attempts to improve the level of safety includes typical SMS elements: safety policy
culture have also failed, the reason mainly and objectives, safety risk management,
being beliefs and practices that characterize safety assurance, promotion of safety and
(define) the organization and its members. safety culture, as a system enabler. The
number of questions for each one of the
3. Current Safety Culture Evaluation five elements varies and for each question
Method the respondents are required to select one
level of maturity (from A to E, see chapter
Measuring the levels of development and 4) that best represent the position of their
safety culture in Europe is to some extent company.
laid down by law, by Performance Scheme
regulations (EU) No. 691/2010 and 390/2013 The evaluation methodology also requires
(European commission, 2010; European verification responses for both performance
commission, 2013) laying down performance indicators. Questionnaires replies at the
scheme for air navigation services and state level are crosschecked with the results
network functions. The regulation applies of standardization inspections done by
to a specific area of air navigation services EASA and/or with requests for additional
by defining key performance areas of safety, clarifications requested by EASA.
environment, capacity and cost effectiveness
and their implementation during defined Questionnaires replies at the level of ANSPs
reference periods. are verified by the Member States (national
supervisory authorities). The purpose of
T he per for mance scheme Reg ulation verification of responses is to some extent
contains binding performance indicators based on trust; if EASA in their cross-
that are monitored at European, national and examination finds out that the Member State
/or FAB level and are used to assess safety has overrated the level of implementation,
(among other areas). For the purpose of this they can reduce it to the lower level of
research, methodology for measurement and i mplementat ion. On t he ot her ha nd,
verification of the effectiveness of safety States are obliged to verify the responses
management (EoSM) is discussed. of individual ANSP. Questionnaires are
addressed at the management level; usually
Measurement of EoSM of air navigation safety/quality managers carry this task, and
services in Europe is carried out through the coordination of all activities between
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Fig. 1.
The Level of Maturity Achieved at the Level of Member States
Source: Performance Review Body (2014)
A similar picture is seen at the level of Per for ma nce of t he SM S def i nes a n
ANSPs (Fig. 2), where the most powerful important element that connects all the main
area in addition to the two mentioned at the phases; that is feedback. The management
national level is also the safety promotion of the organization is, based on feedback,
which suggests that creation of the formal able to determine the performance related
policy and goals is not so much a problem to safety. Feedback will also serve as a guide
as is the implementation and monitoring of to decision-making and resource allocation.
these in practice. To the employees, feedback provides the
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Valenta Grebenek M. et al. Safety Culture Assessment Optimization of Existing Practice
information on the safety achievements. This Phases Do-Check (safety risk management,
helps create the commitment and contributes safety promotion) and flow of the feedback
to the promotion of a safety culture within with a low level of maturity, suggest that
the organization. policies and objectives are not effectively
integrated into daily routine.
From Hudson (2001) generic model of the
SMS, which defines the phases of SMS (Plan- Results also show different levels of maturity
Do-Check and Feedback), can be concluded of safety culture, which coincides with the
that the phase of planning is the strongest, concept of maturity of safety culture where
i.e. policy and strategic objectives, and safety culture is not developing as fast and
assignment of responsibilities are starting in a steady manner in all organizations and
elements for all activities related to safety. in all elements (Fleming, 2000).
Fig. 2.
The Level of Maturity Achieved at the Level of ANSPs
Source: Performance Review Body (2014)
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Bot h f ac tor s st rong ly i n f luence t he The concept of safety culture has been re-
perception of safety culture at all levels of searched internationally by number of academ-
the organization. From the aforementioned ics from different scientific fields (engineering,
reasons, it would make sense to extend the psychology, anthropology...). Guldenmund
survey questionnaires (with customized (2010) defines three different approaches to
questions) to all levels of the organization the safety culture assessment: academic, ana-
thus acquiring a perception of safety culture lytical and pragmatic approach. Each approach
from different points of view; from the staff is based on specific methods and instruments
(ATCOs, technicians) that carries out (or of evaluation. Concise characteristics of each
not) prescribed procedures and practices. approach are shown in Table 1.
Table 1
Characteristic of Each Approach
Properties of specific approach
Main Approach Information aimed to Research Research
Time focus
retrieve Characteristics characteristics
Pragamatic Safety culture maturity Behaviourally Anchored
Future Normative, prescriptive
(experience based) (level) Rating Scales
Quantitative information,
Analitical Present on the safety climate/ Descriptive Questionnaires, survey
culture
Document analysis,
Academic Past Qualitative information Descriptive observations, workshops,
interviews
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The pragmatic approach as mentioned group attitudes towards safety, and the level
above is used to determine the current of safety perceived on the job (Guldenmund,
state of maturity of safety culture in order 2010). This determines the parameters
to assist the management of organizations by which questions are formulated. Data
to identify the actions needed (required) to analysis should show whether all concepts
improve their level of culture. It is not based are present.
on empirical research, but on experience
and professional judgment. In practice, the Last one, the academic approach, on the
pragmatic approach focuses on the structure other hand aims to describe and understand
and processes of the organization, which the safety culture in the organization rather
due to the dynamic interleaving, influence to evaluate it. Primary research methodology
the culture of the organization. Pragmatic of this approach is of qualitative nature
approach is f ut u re-or iented a nd is a (Guldenmund, 2010). Academic approach
normative rather than a descriptive approach explores the history of the organization,
(Guldenmund, 2010). since the current state of the safety culture
in an organization is primarily the result of
On the other hand the analytical approach what has happened in the past. Therefore
is the most popular and dominant approach the academic approach focuses primarily
in the evaluation of the safety culture. It on accident statistics, statements of safety
focuses mainly on the organizational policy, etc. This is a descriptive approach,
aspect of safety climate. The safety culture which means that the pur pose of the
is assessed through questionnaires with research is to describe and understand the
numerical results on all levels of organization safety culture, with the aim to promote
of the establishment. Surveys are based and improve the level of safety culture in
on standardized questionnaires that ask the organization. The techniques of data
employees about their opinion regarding collection include interviews, observation,
specific safety elements. Data obtained from and examination of documents, literature
the survey are processed and analyzed in such re sea rc h, a nd a ny t h i ng el se, w h ic h
a way to provide a snapshot of the current indicates the underlying assumptions of
state of the safety climate in the organization. the organization. Most important in this
The approach with the questionnaires also approach is that the data collected are
provides comparison with the past results meaningful and sufficient to enable accurate
in order to quantify change processes or to interpretation of the results obtained. EASA
assess the effects of interventions. It should methodology does contain some elements
be noted that it is necessary to define groups of the academic approach (verification of
at different but meaningful organizational the responses at Member State level), but
levels that have identifiable ways and means the sample is too small and inconsistent
to interact, for example whole organization, (not involving checks at all levels of the
sector or department, or simply a working organization).
group (Guldenmund, 2010; Zohar, 2010).
W hen using questionnaires, it is first Common to all techniques is that they
necessary to identify the potential concept should be carried out by a person who has
or aspect of the study (these are the most the expertise and the neutrality needed to
commonly company policies towards safety, evaluate and interpret the results.
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