A Natural History of Human Thinking, by Michael Tomasello

A Natural History
of Human Thinking
A Natural History
of Human Thinking
Michael Tomasello
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England
2014
Copyright 2014 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Tomasello, Michael.
A natural history of human thinking / Michael Tomasello.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-674-72477-8 (hardcover : alk. paper)
1. Cognition Social aspects. 2. Evolutionary psychology.
3. Psychology, Comparative. I. Title.
BF311.T6473 2014
153dc23 2013020185
For Rita, Anya, Leo, and Chiara
Contents
Preface ix
1.
The Shared Intentionality Hypothesis 1
2.
Individual Intentionality 7
Evolution of Cognition 7
Thinking like an Ape 15
Cognition for Competition 26
3.
Joint Intentionality 32
A New Form of Collaboration 33
A New Form of Cooperative Communication 49
Second-Personal Thinking 68
Perspectivity: The View from Here and There 76
viii Contents
4.
Collective Intentionality 80
The Emergence of Culture 81
The Emergence of Conventional Communication 93
Agent-Neutral Thinking 113
Objectivity: The View from Nowhere 120
5.
Human Thinking as Cooperation 124
Theories of Human Cognitive Evolution 125
Sociality and Thinking 133
The Role of Ontogeny 144
6.
Conclusion 149
Notes 155
References 159
Index 173
Preface
This book is a sequel or, better, a prequelto The Cultural Origins of Human
Cognition (Harvard University Press, 1999). But it also has a slightly different
focus. In the 1999 book the question was what makes human cognition unique,
and the answer was culture. Individual human beings develop uniquely pow-
erful cognitive skills because they grow to maturity in the midst of all kinds
of cultural artifacts and practices, including a conventional language, and of
course they have the cultural learning skills necessary to master them. Indi-
viduals internalize the artifacts and practices they encounter, and these then
serve to mediate all of their cognitive interactions with the world.
In the current book, the question is similar: what makes human thinking
unique? And the answer is similar as well: human thinking is fundamentally
cooperative. But this slightly different question and slightly different answer
lead to a very different book. The 1999 book was clean and simple because the
data we had comparing apes and humans were so sparse. We could thus say
things like Only humans understand others as intentional agents, and this
enables human culture. But we now know that the picture is more complex
than this. Great apes appear to know much more about others as intentional
agents than previously believed, and still they do not have human-like culture
x Pr eface
or cognition. Based on much research reported here, the critical difference

now seems to be that humans not only understand others as intentional agents
but also put their heads together with others in acts of shared intentionality,
including everything from concrete acts of collaborative problem solving to
complex cultural institutions. The focus now is thus less on culture as a pro-
cess of transmission and more on culture as a process of social coordination
and indeed, we argue here that modern human cultures were made possible
by an earlier evolutionary step in which individuals made a living by coordi-
nating with others in relatively simple acts of collaborative foraging.
The specific focus on thinking means that this book does not simply doc-
ument that humans participate in shared intentionality in a way that their
nearest primate relatives do not, which has been done elsewhere. Rather, in
addition, it examines the underlying thinking processes involved. To describe
the nature of these thinking processesin particular, to distinguish human
thinking from that of other apeswe must characterize its component pro-
cesses of cognitive representation, inference, and self-monitoring. The shared
intentionality hypothesis claims that all three of these components were trans-
formed in two key steps during human evolution. In both cases, the transfor-
mation was part of a larger change of social interaction and organization in
which humans were forced to adopt more cooperative lifeways. In order to
survive and thrive, humans were forced, twice, to find new ways to coordinate
their behavior with others in collaborative (and then cultural) activities and
to coordinate their intentional states with others in cooperative (and then
conventional) communication. And this transformed, twice, the way that
humans think.
The writing of this book, as most others, was made possible by the support
of many institutions and people. I would like to thank the University of Pitts-
burgh Center for Philosophy of Science (John Norton, director and seminar
leader extraordinaire) for hosting me for one peaceful semester of concen-
trated writing in the spring of 2012. I especially benefited during this stay
from Bob Brandoms generosity with his time and thoughts on many topics
central to the current enterprise. I thank Celia Brownell at the Pitt Depart-
ment of Psychology and Andy Norman at Carnegie Mellon for many useful
discussions during this semester as well. The ensuing summer I benefited
greatly from presenting the themes of the book to the SIAS Summer Institute
titled The Second Person: Comparative Perspectives, organized in Berlin by Jim
Conant and Sebastian Rdl. The book is better for all of these encounters.
Pr eface xi
With regard to the manuscript itself, I would like to thank Larry Barsa-
lou, Mattia Galloti, Henrike Moll, and Marco Schmidt for reading various
chapters and providing very useful feedback. Of special importance, Richard
Moore and Hannes Rakoczy each read the entire manuscript at a fairly early
stage and provided a number of trenchant comments and suggestions, re-
garding both content and presentation. Thanks also to Elizabeth Knoll and
three anonymous reviewers at Harvard University Press for a number of help-
ful comments and criticisms on the penultimate draft.
Last and most important, I thank my wife, Rita Svetlova, for providing con-
stant and detailed critical commentary and suggestions throughout. Many
ideas were made clearer through discussion with her, and confusing passages
were made clear, or at least clearer, by her literate eye.
A Natural History
of Human Thinking
1
The Shared Intentionality Hypothesis
Only cooperation constitutes a process that can produce reason.

jean piaget, So cio log i cal Studies
Thinking would seem to be a completely solitary activity. And so it is for other

animal species. But for humans, thinking is like a jazz musician improvising
a novel riff in the privacy of his own room. It is a solitary activity all right,
but on an instrument made by others for that general purpose, after years of
playing with and learning from other practitioners, in a musical genre with a
rich history of legendary riffs, for an imagined audience of jazz aficionados.
Human thinking is individual improvisation enmeshed in a sociocultural
matrix.
How did this novel form of socially infused thinking come to be, and how
does it work? One set of classic theorists has emphasized the role of culture
and its artifacts in making possible certain types of individual thinking. For
example, Hegel (1807) argued that the social practices, institutions, and ideolo-
gies of a particular culture at a particular historical epoch constitute a necessary
conceptual framework for individual human reason (see also Collingwood,
1946). Peirce (19311935) claimed more specifically that virtually all of humans
most sophisticated types of thinking, including most especially mathematics
and formal logic, are possible only because individuals have available to them
culturally created symbolic artifacts such as Arabic numerals and logical nota-
tion. Vygotsky (1978) emphasized that human children grow up in the midst
of the tools and symbols of their culture, including especially the linguistic
symbols that preorganize their worlds for them, and during ontogeny they
internalize the use of these artifacts, leading to the kind of internal dialogue
that is one prototype of human thinking (see also Bakhtin, 1981).
The other set of classic theorists has focused on the fundamental processes
of social coordination that make human culture and language possible in the
2 A Nat ur a l History of Hu m a n T hink ing
first place. Mead (1934) pointed out that when humans interact with one an-
other, especially in communication, they are able to imagine themselves in the
role of the other and to take the others perspective on themselves. Piaget
(1928) argued further that these role-taking and perspective-taking abilities
along with a cooperative attitudenot only make culture and language pos-
sible but also make possible reasoning in which individuals subordinate their
own point of view to the normative standards of the group. And Wittgen-
stein (1955) explicated several different ways in which the appropriate use of a
linguistic convention or cultural rule depends on a preexisting set of shared
social practices and judgments (forms of life), which constitute the prag-
matic infrastructure from which all uses of language and rules gain their
interpersonal significance. These social infrastructure theorists, as we may
call them, all share the belief that language and culture are only the icing on
the cake of humans ultrasocial ways of relating to the world cognitively.
Insightful as they were, all of these classic theorists were operating with-
out several new pieces of the puzzle, both empirical and theoretical, that have
emerged only in recent years. Empirically, one new finding is the surprisingly
sophisticated cognitive abilities of nonhuman primates, which have been
discovered mostly in the last few decades (for reviews, see Tomasello and Call,
1997; Call and Tomasello, 2008). Thus, great apes, as the closest living rela-
tives of humans, already understand in human-like ways many aspects of
their physical and social worlds, including the causal and intentional rela-
tions that structure those worlds. This means that many important aspects of
human thinking derive not from humans unique forms of sociality, culture,
and language but, rather, from something like the individual problem-solving
abilities of great apes in general.
Another new set of findings concern prelinguistic (or just linguistic) human
infants, who have yet to partake fully of the culture and language around
them. These still fledgling human beings nevertheless operate with some cog-
nitive processes that great apes do not, enabling them to engage with others
socially in some ways that great apes cannot, for example, via joint attention
and cooperative communication (Tomasello et al., 2005). The fact that these
precultural and prelinguistic creatures are already cognitively unique provides
empirical support for the social infrastructure theorists claim that important
aspects of human thinking emanate not from culture and language per se but,
rather, from some deeper and more primitive forms of uniquely human social
engagement.
T he Sh a r ed Intent iona lit y H y pot hesis 3
Theoretically, recent advances in the philosophy of action have provided

powerful new ways of thinking about these deeper and more primitive forms
of uniquely human social engagement. A small group of philosophers of
action (e.g., Bratman, 1992; Searle, 1995; Gilbert, 1989; Tuomela, 2007) have
investigated how humans put their heads together with others in acts of
so-called shared intentionality, or we intentionality. When individuals par-
ticipate with others in collaborative activities, together they form joint goals
and joint attention, which then create individual roles and individual perspec-
tives that must be coordinated within them (Moll and Tomasello, 2007). More-
over, there is a deep continuity between such concrete manifestations of joint
action and attention and more abstract cultural practices and products such
as cultural institutions, which are structuredindeed, createdby agreed-
upon social conventions and norms (Tomasello, 2009). In general, humans
are able to coordinate with others, in a way that other primates seemingly are
not, to form a we that acts as a kind of plural agent to create everything
from a collaborative hunting party to a cultural institution.
Further in this theoretical direction, as a specific form of human collabora-
tive activity and shared intentionality, human cooperative communication
involves a set of special intentional and inferential processesfirst identified
by Grice (1957, 1975) and since elaborated and amended by Sperber and Wilson
(1996), Clark (1996), Levinson (2000), and Tomasello (2008). Human com-
municators conceptualize situations and entities via external communicative
vehicles for other persons; these other persons then attempt to determine why
the communicator thinks that these situations and entities will be relevant
for them. This dialogic process involves not only skills and motivations for
shared intentionality but also a number of complex and recursive inferences
about others intentions toward my intentional states. Th is unique form of
communication characteristic not just of mature language use but also of
the prelinguistic gestural communication of human infantspresupposes
both a shared conceptual framework between communicative partners (a.k.a.
common conceptual ground) and an appreciation of those partners individual
intentions and perspectives within it.
These new empirical and theoretical advances enable us to construct a much
more detailed account than was previously possible of the social dimensions
of human cognition in general. Our focus in this book is on the social di-
mensions of human thinking in particular. Although humans and other ani-
mals solve many problems and make many decisions based on evolved intuitive
heuristics (so-called system 1 processes), humans and at least some other ani-
mals also solve some problems and make some decisions by thinking (system
2 processes; e.g., Kahneman, 2011). A specific focus on thinking is useful be-
cause it restricts our topic to a single cognitive process, but one that involves
several key components, especially (1) the ability to cognitively represent expe-
riences to oneself off-line; (2) the ability to simulate or make inferences trans-
forming these representations causally, intentionally, and/or logically; and
(3) the ability to self-monitor and evaluate how these simulated experiences
might lead to specific behavioral outcomes and so to make a thoughtful
behavioral decision.
It seems obvious that, compared with other animal species, humans think
in special ways. But this difference is hard to characterize using traditional
theories of human thinking since they presuppose key aspects of the process
that are actually evolutionary achievements. These are precisely the social
aspects of human thinking that are our primary focus here. Thus, although
many animal species can cognitively represent situations and entities at least
somewhat abstractly, only humans can conceptualize one and the same situ-
ation or entity under differing, even conflicting, social perspectives (leading
ultimately to a sense of objectivity). Further, although many animals also
make simple causal and intentional inferences about external events, only
humans make socially recursive and self-reflective inferences about others or
their own intentional states. And, finally, although many animals monitor
and evaluate their own actions with respect to instrumental success, only
humans self-monitor and evaluate their own thinking with respect to the
normative perspectives and standards (reasons) of others or the group. These
fundamentally social differences lead to an identifiably different type of think-
ing, what we may call, for the sake of brevity, objective-reflective-normative
thinking.
In this book we attempt to reconstruct the evolutionary origins of this
uniquely human objective-reflective-normative thinking. The shared intentiona-
lity hypothesis is that what created this unique type of thinkingits processes
of representation, inference, and self-monitoringwere adaptations for dealing
with problems of social coordination, specifically, problems presented by indi-
viduals attempts to collaborate and communicate with others (to co-operate
with others). Although humans great ape ancestors were social beings, they
lived mostly individualistic and competitive lives, and so their thinking was
geared toward achieving individual goals. But early humans were at some
T he Sh a r ed Intent iona lit y H y pot hesis 5
point forced by ecological circumstances into more cooperative lifeways, and

so their thinking became more directed toward figuring out ways to coordinate
with others to achieve joint goals or even collective group goals. And this
changed everything.
There were two key evolutionary steps. The first step, reflecting the focus
of social infrastructure theorists such as Mead and Wittgenstein, involved the
creation of a novel type of small-scale collaboration in human foraging. Par-
ticipants in this collaborative foraging created socially shared joint goals and
joint attention (common ground), which created the possibility of individual
roles and perspectives within that ad hoc shared world or form of life. To
coordinate these newly created roles and perspectives, individuals evolved
anew type of cooperative communication based on the natural gestures of
pointing and pantomiming: one partner directed the attention or imagina-
tion of the other perspectivally and/or symbolically about something rele-
vant to their joint activity, and then that partner made cooperative (recur-
sive) inferences about what was intended. To self-monitor this process the
communicator had to simulate ahead of time the recipients likely inferences.
Because the collaboration and communication at this point were between ad
hoc pairs of individuals in the momentbased on purely second-personal
social engagement between I and youwe may refer to all of this as joint
intentionality. When put to use in thinking, joint intentionality comprises
perspectival and symbolic representations, socially recursive inferences, and
second-personal self-monitoring.
The second step, reflecting the focus of culture theorists such as Vygotsky
and Bakhtin, came as human populations began growing in size and com-
peting with one another. This competition meant that group life as a whole
became one big collaborative activity, creating a much larger and more per-
manent shared world, that is to say, a culture. The resulting group-mindedness
among all members of the cultural group (including in-group strangers) was
based on a new ability to construct common cultural ground via collectively
known cultural conventions, norms, and institutions. As part of this process,
cooperative communication became conventionalized linguistic communi-
cation. In the context of cooperative argumentation in group decision mak-
ing, linguistic conventions could be used to justify and make explicit ones
reasons for an assertion within the framework of the groups norms of ratio-
nality. This meant that individuals now could reason objectively from the
groups agent-neutral point of view (from nowhere). Because the collaboration
and communication at this point were conventional, institutional, and nor-

mative, we may refer to all of this as collective intentionality. When put to use
in thinking, collective intentionality comprises not just symbolic and perspec-
tival representations but conventional and objective representations; not
just recursive inferences but self-reflective and reasoned inferences; and not just
second-personal self-monitoring but normative self-governance based on the
cultures norms of rationality.
Importantly, this evolutionary scenario does not mean that humans today
are hardwired to think in these new ways. A modern child raised on a desert
island would not automatically construct fully human processes of thinking
on its own. Quite the contrary. Children are born with adaptations for collabo-
rating and communicating and learning from others in particular ways
evolution selects for adaptive actions. But it is only in actually exercising these
skills in social interaction with others during ontogeny that children create
new representational formats and new inferential reasoning possibilities as
they internalize, in Vygotskian fashion, their coordinative interactions with
others into thinking for the self. The result is a kind of cooperative cognition
and thinking, not so much creating new skills as cooperativizing and collec-
tivizing those of great apes in general.
And so let us tell a story, a natural history, of how human thinking came
to be, beginning with our great ape ancestors, proceeding through some early
humans who collaborated and communicated in species-unique ways, and end-
ing with modern humans and their fundamentally cultural and linguistic ways
of being.
2
Individual Intentionality
Understanding consists in imagining the fact.

ludwig wittgenstein, The Big Typescript
Cognitive processes are a product of natural selection, but they are not its tar-
get. Indeed, natural selection cannot even see cognition; it can only see the
effects of cognition in organizing and regulating overt actions (Piaget, 1971). In
evolution, being smart counts for nothing if it does not lead to acting smart.
The two classic theories of animal behavior, behaviorism and ethology, both
focused on overt actions, but they somehow forgot the cognition. Classical
ethology had little or no interest in animal cognition, and classical behavior-
ism was downright hostile to the idea. Although contemporary instantiations of
ethology and behaviorism take some account of cognitive processes, they pro-
vide no systematic theoretical accounts. Nor are any other modern approaches
to the evolution of cognition sufficient for current purposes.
And so to begin this account of the evolutionary emergence of uniquely
human thinking, we must first formulate, in broad outline, a theory of the
evolution of cognition more generally. We may then begin our natural history
proper by using this theoretical framework to characterize processes of cogni-
tion and thinking in modern-day great apes, as representative of humans
evolutionary starting point before they separated from other primates some
six million years ago.
Evolution of Cognition
All organisms possess some reflexive reactions that are organized linearly as
stimulus-response linkages. Behaviorists think that all behavior is organized
in this way, though in complex organisms the linkages may be learned and
become associated with others in various ways. The alternative is to recognize
that complex organisms also possess some adaptive specializations that are
organized circularly, as feedback control systems, with built-in goal states and
action possibilities. Starting from this foundation, cognition evolves not from
a complexifying of stimulus-response linkages but, rather, from the individ-
ual organism gaining (1) powers of flexible decision-making and behavioral
control in its various adaptive specializations, and (2) capacities for cognitively
representing and making inferences from the casual and intentional relations
structuring relevant events.
Adaptive specializations are orga nized as self-regulating systems, as are
many physiological processes such as the homeostatic regulation of blood
sugar and body temperature in mammals. These specializations go beyond
reflexes in their capacity to produce adaptive behavior in a much wider range
of circumstances, and indeed, they may be quite complex, for example, spi-
ders spinning webs. There is no way that a spider can spin a web using only
stimulus-response linkages. The process is too dynamic and dependent on
local context. Instead, the spider must have goal states that it is motivated to
bring about, and the ability to perceive and act so as to bring them about in a
self-regulated manner. But adaptive specializations are still not cognitive (or
only weakly cognitive) because they are unknowing and inflexible by definition:
perceived situations and behavioral possibilities for goal attainment are mostly
connected in an inflexible manner. The individual organism does not have the
kind of causal or intentional understanding of the situation that would enable it
to deal flexibly with novel situations. Natural selection has designed these
adaptive specializations to work invariantly in the same situations as those
encountered in the past, and so cleverness from the individual is not needed.
Cognition and thinking enter the picture when organisms live in less pre-
dictable worlds and natural selection crafts cognitive and decision making
processes that empower the individual to recognize novel situations and to
deal flexibly, on its own, with unpredictable exigencies. What enables effec-
tive handling of a novel situation is some understanding of the causal and/or
intentional relations involved, which then suggests an appropriate and poten-
tially novel behavioral response. For example, a chimpanzee might recognize
that the only tool available to her in a given situation demands, based on the
physical causality involved, manipulations she has never before performed
toward this goal. A cognitively competent organism, then, operates as a con-
trol system with reference values or goals, capacities for attending to situations
causally or intentionally relevant to these reference values or goals, and
capacities for choosing actions that lead to the fulfillment of these reference
values or goals (given the causal and/or intentional structure of the situation).
Indi v idua l In ten t iona l it y 9
This description in control system terms is basically identical to the classic

belief-desire model of rational action in philosophy: a goal or desire coupled
with an epistemic connection to the world (e.g., a belief based on an under-
standing of the causal or intentional structure of the situation) creates an
intention to act in a particular way.1
We will refer to this flexible, individually self-regulated, cognitive way of
doing things as individual intentionality. Within this self-regulation model
of individual intentionality, we may then say that thinking occurs when an
organism attempts, on some particular occasion, to solve a problem, and so to
meet its goal not by behaving overtly but, rather, by imagining what would
happen if it tried different actions in a situation or if different external forces
entered the situationbefore actually acting. This imagining is nothing more
or less than the off-line simulation of potential perceptual experiences. To
be able to think before acting in this way, then, the organism must possess the
three prerequisites outlined above: (1) the ability to cognitively represent experi-
ences to oneself off-line, (2) the ability to simulate or make inferences trans-
forming these representations causally, intentionally, and/or logically, and (3)
the ability to self-monitor and evaluate how these simulated experiences might
lead to specific behavioral outcomesand so to make a thoughtful behavioral
decision. The success or failure of a particular behavioral decision exposes the
underlying processes of representation, simulation, and self-monitoringindi-
rectly, as it wereto the unrelenting sieve of natural selection.
Cognitive Representation
Cognitive representation in a self-regulating, intentional system may be char-
acterized both in terms of its content and in terms of its format. In terms of
content, the claim here is that both the organisms internal goals and its ex-
ternally directed attention (NB: not just perception but attention) have as
content not punctate stimuli or sense data, but rather whole situations. Goals,
values, and other reference values (pro-attitudes) are cognitive representa-
tions of situations that the organism is motivated to bring about or maintain.
Although we sometimes speak of an object or location as someones goal, this
is really only a shorthand way of speaking; the goal is the situation of having
the object or reaching the location. The philosopher Davidson (2001) writes,
Wants and desires are directed to propositional contents. What one wants
is . . . that one has the apple in hand. . . . Similarly . . . someone who intends
to go to the opera intends to make it the case that he is at the opera (p.126).
In this same manner, modern decision theory often speaks of the desire or
preference that a particular state of affairs be realized.
If goals and values are represented as desired situations, then what the or-
ganism must attend to in its perceived environment is situations relevant to
those goals and values. Desired situations and attended-to environmental situ-
ations are thus perforce in the same perceptually based, fact-like representa-
tional format, which enables their cognitive comparison. Of course, complex
organisms also perceive less complex things, such as objects, properties, and
eventsand can attend to them for specific purposesbut in the current
analysis they always do so as components of situations relevant to behavioral
decision making.
To illustrate the point, let us suppose that the image in Figure 2.1 is what
a chimpanzee sees as she approaches a tree while foraging.
Figur e 2.1 What a chimpanzee sees

The chimpanzee perceives the scene in the same basic way that we would;
our visual systems are similar enough that we see the same basic objects and
their spatial relationships. But what situations does the chimpanzee attend
to? Although she could potentially focus her attention on any of the poten-
tially infinite situations that this image presents, at the current moment she
must make a foraging decision, and so she attends to the situations or facts
relevant to this behavioral decision, to wit (as described in English):
that many bananas are in the tree

that the bananas are ripe
that no competitor chimpanzees are already in the tree
that the bananas are reachable by climbing
that no predators are nearby
that escaping quickly from this tree will be difficult
etc., etc.
For a foraging chimpanzee with the goal of obtaining food, given all of its
perceptual and behavioral capacities and its knowledge of the local ecology,
all of these are relevant situations for deciding what to do all present in a
single visual image and, of course, nonverbally. (NB: Even the absence of
something expected, such as food not in its usual location, may be a relevant
situation.)
Relevance is one of those occasion-sensitive judgments that cannot be
given a general definition. But in broad strokes, organisms attend to situations
as either (1) opportunities or (2) obstacles to the pursuit and maintenance of
their goals and values (or as information relevant to predicting possible future
opportunities or obstacles). Different species have different ways of life, of
course, which means that they perceive or attend to different situations (and
components of situations). Thus, for a leopard, the situation of bananas in a
tree would not represent an opportunity to eat, but the presence of a chim-
panzee would. For the chimpanzee, in contrast, the leopards presence now
presents an obstacle to its value of avoiding predators, and so it should look
for a situation providing opportunities for escape, such as a tree to climb with-
out low-hanging limbsgiven its knowledge that leopards cannot climb such
trees and its familiarity with its own tree-climbing prowess. If we now throw
into the mix a worm resting on the bananas surface, the relevant situations
for the three different speciesthe obstacles and opportunities for their re-
spective goalswould overlap even less, if at all. Relevant situations are thus
determined jointly by the organisms goals and values, its perceptual abili-
ties and knowledge, and its behavioral capacities, that is to say, by its overall
functioning as a self-regulating system. Identifying situations relevant for
a behavioral decision thus involves an organisms whole way of life (von
Uexkll, 1921).2
In terms of representational format, the key is that to make creative infer-
ences that go beyond particular experiences, the organism must represent its
experiences as types, that is to say, in some generalized, schematized, or abstract
form. One plausible hypothesis is a kind of exemplar model in which the indi-
vidual in some sense saves the particular situations and components to
which it has attended (many models of knowledge representation have atten-
tion as the gateway). There is then generalization or abstraction across these in
a process that we might call schematization. (Langackers [1987] metaphor is of
a stack of transparencies, each depicting a single situation or entity, and sche-
matization is the process of looking down through them for overlap.) We
might think of the result of this process of schematization as cognitive models
of various types of situations and entities, for example, categories of objects,
schemas of events, and models of situations. Recognizing a situation or entity
as a token of a known typeas an exemplar of a cognitive category, schema,
or model enables novel inferences about the token appropriate to the type.
Categories, schemas, and models as cognitive types are nothing more or less
than imagistic or iconic schematizations of the organisms (or, in some cases, its
species) previous experience (Barsalou, 1999, 2008). As such, they do not suffer
from the indeterminacy of interpretation that some theorists attribute to iconic
representations considered as mental pictures, that is, the indeterminacy of
whether this image is of a banana, a fruit, an object, and so forth (Crane, 2003).
They do not because they are composed of individual experiences in which the
organism was attending to a relevant (already interpreted) situation. Thus,
the organism interprets, or understands, particular situations and entities in
the context of its goals as it assimilates them to known (cognitively represented)
types: This is another one of those.
Simulation and Inference

Thinking in an organism with individual intentionality involves simulations
or inferences that connect cognitive representations of situations and their
components in various ways. First are those instrumental inferences that occur
in behavioral decision making of the what would happen if . . . variety. For

example, in a concrete problem-solving situation such as a rock preventing
the movement of a stick beneath it some organisms might go through the
kind of inferential simulation that Piaget (1952) called mental trial and error:
the organism imagines a potential action and its consequences. Thus, a chim-
panzee might simulate imaginatively what would happen if she forcefully
tugged at the stick, without actually doing it. If she judged that this would be
futile given the size and weight of the rock, she might decide to push the rock
aside before pulling the stick.
Also possible are inferences about causal and intentional relations created by
outside forces and how these might affect the attainment of goals and values.
For example, a chimpanzee might see a monkey feeding in the banana tree
and infer that there are no leopards nearby (because if there were, the mon-
key would be fleeing). Or, upon finding a fig on the ground, a bonobo might
infer that it will have a sweet taste and that there is a seed insidebased on a
categorization of the encountered fig as another one of those and the natural
inference that this one will have the same properties as others in the category.
Or an orangutan might recognize a conspecific climbing a tree as an intentional
event of a particular type, and then infer something about goals and attention
as intentional causes and so predict the climbers impending actions. Schema-
tizing over such experiences (again aided, perhaps, by the experience of the
species), individuals may potentially build cognitive models of general patterns
of causality and intentionality.
The best way to conceptualize such processes is in terms of off-line, image-
based simulations, including novel combinations of represented events and
entities that the individual herself has never before directly experienced as
such, for example, an ape imagining what the monkey would do if a leopard
entered the scene (see Barsalou, 1999, 2008, for relevant data on humans; Bar-
salou, 2005, extends the analysis to nonhuman primates). Importantly, the
combinatorial processes themselves will include causal and intentional rela-
tions that connect different real and imagined situations, and also logical
operations such as the conditional, negation, exclusion, and the like. These
logical operations are not themselves imagistic cognitive representations
but, rather, cognitive procedures (enactive, in Bruners terms, or operative, in
Piagets terms) that the organism accesses only through actual use. Concrete
examples of how this works will be given when we look more closely at great
ape thinking in the section that follows.
Behavioral Self-Monitoring
To think effectively, an organism with individual intentionality must be able
to observe the outcome of its actions in a given situation and evaluate whether
they match the desired goal state or outcome. Engaging in some such pro-
cesses of behavioral self-monitoring and evaluation is what enables learning
from experience over time.
A cognitive version of such self-monitoring enables the agent, as noted above,
to inferentially simulate a potential action-outcome sequence ahead of time
and observe itas if it were an actual action-outcome sequenceand then
evaluate the imagined outcome. This process creates more thoughtful decision
making through the precorrection of errors. (Dennett [1995] calls it Pop-
perian learning because failure means that my hypothesis dies, not me.) For
example, consider a squirrel on one tree branch gearing up to jump to another.
One can see the muscles preparing, but in some cases the squirrel decides the
leap is too far and so, after feigning some jumps, climbs down the trunk and
then back up the other branch. The most straightforward description of this
event is that the squirrel is observing and evaluating a simulation of what it
would experience if it leaped; for example, it would experience missing the
branch and fallinga decidedly negative outcome. The squirrel must then
use that simulation to make a decision about whether to actually leap. Okrent
(2007) holds that imagining the possible outcomes of different behavioral
choices ahead of time, and then evaluating and deciding for the one with the
best imagined outcome, is the essence of instrumental rationality.
This kind of self-monitoring, requiring what some call executive function-
ing, is cognitive because the individual, in some sense, observes not just its ac-
tions and their results in the environment but also its own internal simulations.
It is also possible for the organism to assess things like the information it has
available for making a decision in order to predict the likelihood that it will
make a successful choice (before it actually chooses). Humans even use the
imagined evaluations of other persons or the imagined comprehension of
others in the case of communicationto evaluate potential behavioral deci-
sions. Whatever its specific form, internal self-monitoring of some kind is
critical to anything we would want to call thinking, as it constitutes, in some
sense, the individual knowing what it is doing.
Thinking like an Ape

We begin our natural history of the evolutionary emergence of uniquely
human thinking with a focus on the last common ancestor of humans and
other extant primates. Our best living models for this creature are humans
closest primate relatives, the nonhuman great apes (hereafter, great apes), com-
prising chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas, and orangutans especially chim-
panzees and bonobos, who diverged from humans most recently, around 6
million years ago. When cognitive abilities are similar among the four species
of great ape but different in humans, we presume that the apes have con-
served their skills from the last common ancestor (or before) whereas humans
have evolved something new.
Our characterizations of the cognitive skills of this last common ancestor
will derive from empirical research with great apes, cast in the theoretical frame-
work of individual intentionality just elaborated: behavioral self-regulation
involving cognitive models and instrumental inferences, along with some form
of behavioral self-monitoring. Because humans share with other apes such a
recent evolutionary historyalong with the same basic bodies, sense organs,
emotions, and brain organizationin the absence of evidence our default
assumption will be evolutionary continuity (de Waal, 1999). That is to say,
when great apes behave identically with humans, especially in carefully con-
trolled experiments, we will assume continuity in the underlying cognitive
processes involved. The onus of explanation is thus on those who posit evolu-
tionary discontinuities, a challenge we embrace in later chapters.
Great Apes Think about the Physical World

Processes of great ape cognition and thinking may be usefully divided into those
concerning the physical world, structured by an understanding of physical
causality, and those concerning the social world, structured by an under-
standing of agentive causality, or intentionality. Primate cognition of the
physical world evolved mainly in the context of foraging for food (see Toma-
sello and Call, 1997, for this theoretical claim and supporting evidence); this
is thus its proper function (in Millikans [1987] sense). In order to procure
their daily sustenance, primates (as mammals in general) evolved the proximate
goals, representations, and inferences for (1) finding food (requiring skills of
spatial navigation and object tracking), (2) recognizing and categorizing food
(requiring skills of feature recognition and categorization), (3) quantifying

food (requiring skills of quantification), and (4) procuring or extracting food
(requiring skills of causal understanding). In these most basic skills of physical
cognition, all nonhuman primates would seem to be generally similar (Toma-
sello and Call, 1997; Schmitt et al., 2012).
What great apes are especially skillful at, compared with other primates, is
tool usewhich one might characterize as not just understanding causes but
actually manipulating them. Other primates are mostly not skilled tool users
at all, and when they are it is typically in only one fairly narrow context (e.g.,
Fragaszy et al., 2004). In contrast, all four species of great ape are highly skilled
at using a variety of tools quite flexibly, including using two tools in succession
in a task, using one tool to rake in another (which is then needed to procure
food), and so forth (Herrmann et al., 2008). Classically, tool use is thought to
require the individual to assess the causal effect of its tool manipulations on the
goal object or event (Piaget, 1952), and so the flexibility and alacrity with which
great apes succeed in using novel tools suggest that they have one or more
general cognitive models of causality guiding their use of these novel tools.
Great apes skills with manipulating causal relations via tools may be
combined in interesting ways with processes of cognitive representation and
inference. For example, Marn Manrique et al. (2010) presented chimpanzees
with a food extraction problem that they had never before seen. Its solution
required a tool with particular properties (e.g., it had to be rigid and of a
certain length). The trick was that the potential tools they could use were in
a different room, out of sight of the problem. To solve this task, individuals
had to first comprehend the causal structure of the novel problem, and then
keep that structure cognitively represented while approaching and choosing a
tool in the other room. Many individuals did this, often from the first trial
onward, suggesting that they assimilated the novel problem to a known cog-
nitive model having a certain causal structure, which they then kept with
them as they entered the adjoining room. They then simulated the use of at
least some of the available tools and the likely outcome in each case through
the medium of this cognitive modelbefore actually choosing a tool overtly.
In the study of Mulcahy and Call (2006), bonobos even saved a tool for
future use, presumably imagining the future situation in which they would
need it.
The simulations or inferences involved here have logical structure. This is
not the structure of formal logic but, rather, a structure based on causal infer-
ences. The idea is that causal inferences have a basic if-then logic and so lead
to necessary conclusions: if A happens, then B happens (because A caused B).

Bermudez (2003) calls inferences of this type protoconditional because the
necessity is not a formal one but a causal one. In the experiment of Marn
Manrique et al. (2010), as an ape simulates using the different tools, she infers
if a tool with property A is used, then B must happen. One thus gets a kind
of proto-modus ponens by then actually using the tool with property A in the
expectation that B will indeed happen as a causal result (if A happens, then B
happens; A happens; therefore B will happen). This is basically a forward-
facing inference, from premise or cause to conclusion or effect.
In another set of recent experiments, we can see backward-facing infer-
ences, that is, from effect to cause. Call (2004) showed chimpanzees a piece of
food, which was then hidden in one of two cups (they did not know which).
Then, depending on condition, the experimenter shook one of the cups. The
relevant background knowledge for success in this experiment is as follows:
(1) the food is in one of the two cups (learned in pretraining), and (2) shaking
the cup with food will result in noise, whereas shaking the cup without food
will result in silence (causal knowledge brought to the experiment). The two
conditions are shown in Figure 2.2, using iconic representations to depict some-
thing of the way the apes understand the situation.
(The iconic diagrams modeling great ape cognitive representations in
Figure 2.2 are not uninterpreted pictures but symbols in a theoretical meta-
language that mean what we agree that they mean. So they are meant to de-
pict the apes interpreted experience when she has seen the cup as a cup and
the noise as coming from the cup, and so on. Importantly, these diagrams are
created within the confines of a restrictive theory of the possibilities of great
ape cognition. Following Tomasellos (1992) depictions for one-year-old hu-
man children, we make the diagrams out of concrete spatial-temporal-causal
elements that may be posited to be a part of the apes cognitive abilities based
on empirical research. Then, the logical structurebased on the protocondi-
tional and protonegationis posited to be necessary to explain apes actions
in specific experimental situations. The logical operations are depicted in
English words, since the ape does not have perception-based representations
of them, but only procedural competence with them.)
In condition 1, an experimenter shook the cup with food. In this case the
chimpanzee observed a noise being made and had to infer backward in
thecausal chain to what might have caused it, specifically, the food hitting the
inside of the cup. This is a kind of abduction (not logically valid, but an in-
ference to best explanation). That is, (1) the shaking cup is making noise;
Figur e 2.2 Ape inferences in finding hidden food (Call, 2004)
(2) if the food were inside the shaking cup, then it would make noise;
(3) therefore, the food is inside the cup. In condition 2, the experimenter
shook the empty cup. In this case the chimpanzee observed only silence and
had to infer backward in the causal chain to why that might be, specifically,
that there was no food in the cup. This is a kind of proto-modus tollens: (1) the
shaking cup is silent; (2) if the food were inside the shaking cup, then it
would make noise; (3) therefore, the food must not be in the cup (the shaken
cup must be empty). The chimpanzees made this inference, but they also made
an additional one. They combined their understanding of the causality of
noise making in this context with their preexisting knowledge that the food
was in one of the two cups to locate the food in the other, nonshaken cup (if
the food is not in this one, then it must be in that one; see bottom row in
Figure 2.2). This inferential paradigm thus involves the kind of exclusion in-
ference characteristic of a disjunctive syllogism.
Negation is a very complex cognitive operation, and one could easily
object to the use of negation in these proposed accounts of great ape logical
inferences. But Bermudez (2003) makes a novel theoretical proposal about some
possible evolutionary precursors to formal negation that make these accounts
much more plausible. The proposal is to think of a kind of protonegation
assimply comprising exclusionary opposites on a scale (contraries), such as
presence-absence, noise-silence, safety-danger, success-failure, and available-
not available. If we assume that great apes understand polar opposites such as
these as indeed mutually exclusivefor example, if something is absent, it
cannot be present, or if it makes noise it cannot be silentthen this could be
a much simpler basis for the negation operation. All of the current descrip-
tions assume protonegation of this type.
When taken together, the conditional (if-then) and negation operations
structure all of the most basic paradigms of human logical reasoning. The
claim is thus that great apes can solve complex and novel physical problems
by assimilating key aspects of the problem situation to already known cognitive
models with causal structure and then use those models to simulate or make
inferences about what has happened previously or what might happen next
employing both a kind of protoconditional and a kind of protonegation in
both forward-facing and backward-facing paradigms. Our general conclusion
is thus that since the great apes in these studies are using cognitive models con-
taining general principles of causality, and they are also simulating or making
inferences in various kinds of protological paradigms, with various kinds of
self-monitoring along the way, what the great apes are doing in these studies
is thinking.
Great Apes Think about the Social World

Primate cognition of the social world evolved mainly in the context of compe-
tition within the social group for food, mates, and other valued resources (see
Tomasello and Call, 1997); competitive social interactions are thus its proper
function. In order to outcompete groupmates, individual primates evolved
the proximate goals, representations, and inferences for (1) recognizing indi-
viduals in their social group and forming dominance and affiliative relation-
ships with them and (2) recognizing third parties social relationships with
one another, such as parent or dominant or friend, and taking these into
account. These abilities enable individuals to better predict the behavior of
others in a complex social field (Kummer, 1972). Despite important species
differences of social structure and interaction, in these most basic of skills of
social cognition all primates would appear to be generally similar (e.g., see
Tomasello and Call, 1997; see also the chapters in Mitani et al., 2012).
Beyond recognizing social relationships based on observed social interac-
tions, great apes also understand that other individuals have goal-situations
that they are pursuing and perceived-situations in the environment that they
are attending toso that together the individuals goals and perceptions (and
her assessment of any relevant obstacles and opportunities for goal achieve-
ment in the environment) determine her behavior. This means that nonhu-
man great apes not only are intentional agents themselves but also understand
others as intentional agents (i.e., as possessing individual intentionality; Call
and Tomasello, 2008).
Consider the following experiment. Hare et al. (2000) had a dominant
and subordinate chimpanzee compete for food in a novel situation in which
one piece of food was out in the open and one piece of food was on the sub-
ordinates side of a barrier where only she could see it. In this situation the
subordinate knew that the dominant could see the piece out in the open and
so he would go for it as soon as he could, whereas he could not see the other
piece (i.e., he saw the barrier only) and so would not go for that piece (i.e., he
would stay on his side). When her door was opened (slightly before the domi-
nants), the subordinate chose to pursue the food on her side of the barrier;
she knew what the dominant could and could not see. In an important varia-
tion, subordinate chimpanzees avoided going for food that a dominant could
not see now but had seen hidden in one of the locations some moments be-
fore; they knew that he knew where the hidden food was located (Hare et al.,
2001; Kaminski et al., 2008). In still another variation, in a back-and-forth
foraging game, chimpanzees knew that if their competitor chose first, he would
choose a board that was lying slanted on the table (as if something were under-
neath) rather than a flat board (under which there could be nothing); they
knew what kind of inference he would make in the situation (Schmelz et al.,
2011). Chimpanzees thus know that others see things, know things, and
make inferences about things.
But beyond exploiting their understanding of what others do and do not
experience and how this affects their behavior, great apes sometimes even at-
tempt to manipulate what others experience. In a series of experiments, Hare
et al. (2006) and Melis et al. (2006a) had chimpanzees compete with a human
(sitting in a booth-like apparatus) for two pieces of food. In some conditions,
the human could see the ape equally well if it approached either piece of food;
in these cases, the apes had no preference for either piece. But in the key con-
dition, a barrier was in place so that the apes could approach one piece of food
without being seenwhich is exactly what they did. They even did this when
they themselves could not see the human in either case. (They had to choose
to reach for food from behind a barrier in both cases, but through a clear tun-
nel in one case and an opaque one in the other.) Perhaps most impressive, the
same individuals also preferentially chose to pursue food that they could ap-
proach silentlyso that the distracted human competitor did not know they
were doing soas opposed to food that required them to make noise en
route. This generalization to a completely different perceptual modality speaks
to the power and flexibility of the cognitive models and inferences involved.
Importantly analogous to the domain of physical cognition, the chimpan-
zees in these studies not only made productive inferences based on a general
understanding of intentionality but also connected their inferences into para-
digms to both predict and even manipulate what others would do (see Figure
2.3). The background knowledge required in all of these food competition
experiments is that a competitor will go for a piece of food if and only if (1) he
has the goal of having it and (2) he perceives its location (e.g., at location A).
The protoconditional inferences in the Hare et al. (2000) experiment follow
straightforwardly from this: if the dominant wants the banana and sees it at
location A, then she will go to location A. Also analogous to the domain of
physical cognition, in these food competition experiments chimpanzees make

use of protonegation. Thus, conceptualizing protonegation in terms of polar
opposites, in the Hare et al. experiments chimpanzees know that if the com-
petitor sees only the barrier, then she will stay in place (i.e., if she does not see
the food she will not go for it; see Figure 2.3, condition C). In the Melis et al.
(2006a) concealment experiments, chimpanzees also understand that if the
human sees only the barrier, or hears only silence, she will remain sitting
peacefully (i.e., if she does not see or hear my approach, she will not reach for
the food), and so they approach such that the other sees only barrier or hears
only silence.3
And so, just as in the domain of physical cognition, in the domain of
social cognition what great apes are especially good at is manipulation. This
special facility for social manipulation also comes out clearly in their gestural
communication. (Their vocal communication is mostly hardwired, and simi-
lar to that of monkeys, so not of great interest for the question of thinking.) All
four species of great apes communicate with others gesturally in ways that
nonape primates mostly do not. They ritualize from their social interactions
with others certain intention-movementssuch as raising the arm to begin
play-hitting as an instigation to playthat they then use flexibly to manipulate
the behavior of others. Perhaps even more important, they also use a number
of attention-getting gesturesfor example, slapping the ground to get others
to look at themin order to manipulate the attention of others. And they
even adopt with humans something like a ritualized reaching or pointing
gesture, one that is not in their natural repertoire with conspecifics, demon-
strating especially clearly the flexibility of great apes skills for manipulating
the behavior and attention of others (see Call and Tomasello, 2007, for a re-
view). Great apes gestural communication thus shows again their special
skills at manipulating causes.
A final experiment demonstrates something like backward-facing infer-
ences in the social domain. Buttelmann et al. (2007) tested six human-raised
chimpanzees in the so-called rational imitation paradigm of Gergely et al.
(2002). Individuals saw a human perform an unusual action on an apparatus
to produce an interesting result. The idea was that in one condition the physi-
cal constraints of the situation forced the human to use an unusual action;
for example, he had to turn on a light with his head because his hands were
occupied holding a blanket, or he had to activate a music box with his foot
because his hands were occupied with a stack of books. When given their
turn with the apparatus and no constraints in effect, the chimpanzees dis-
Figur e 2.3 Ape inferences in competing for food (Hare et al., 2000)
counted the unusual action and used their hands as they normally would.
However, when they saw the human use the unusual action when there was
no physical constraint dictating thishe just turned on the light with his
head for no discernable reasonthey quite often copied the unusual behavior
themselves. The most natural interpretation of this differentiated pattern of
response would be that the apes employed a kind of proto-modus tollens, from
effect to cause with protonegation, similar to that in the Call (2004) shaking
cups study: (1) he is not using his hands; (2) if he had a free choice, he would
be using his hands; (3) therefore he must not have a free choice (in one case
for obvious reasons; in the other not).
These studies demonstrate that great apes can solve complex social problems,
just as they solve complex physical problems, by assimilating key aspects of the
problem situation to a cognitive modelwhich in this case embodies a gen-
eral understanding of intentionalityand then using that model to simulate or
make inferences about what has happened or what might happen next. Great
apes employ both a kind of protoconditional and a kind of protonegation
in both forward-facing and backward-facing modesin the context of
protological paradigms of social inferring. Our conclusion is thus that in the
social domain, as well as the physical domain, what the great apes in these
studies are doing is thinking.
Cognitive Self-Monitoring
Great apes in these studies are clearly not just automatically flipping through
behavioral alternatives and reacting to a goal match; they monitor, and so in
some sense know, what they are doing in order to make more effective deci-
sions. On the level of action (recall the hesitant squirrel), recent studies of
great apes have shown that they can (1) delay taking a smaller reward so as to
get a larger reward later, (2) inhibit a previously successful response in favor
of a new one demanded by a changed situation, (3) make themselves do some-
thing unpleasant for a desired reward at the end, (4) persist through failures, and
(5) concentrate through distractions. Specifically, in a comprehensive com-
parative study, chimpanzees ability to do these things was roughly comparable
to that of three-year-old human children (Herrmann et al., submitted). These
are all skills referred to variously as impulse control, attentional control, emo-
tion regulation, and executive functionthough we prefer to use the terms
behavioral self-monitoring, for more action-based self-regulation, and cognitive
self-monitoring (and in some cases, self-reflection), for more cognitive versions

of the process.
Evidence that apes go beyond just behavioral self-monitoring and engage
in cognitive self-monitoring comes from several experimental paradigms
used with nonhuman primates (sometimes referred to as studies of metacog-
nition). In the best-known paradigm, employed mostly with rhesus monkeys,
individuals must make a discrimination (or remember something) to get a
highly desirable reward. But if they fail to make the discrimination or re-
member correctly, they get nothing and must take a time-out before the next
trial. The trick is that on each trial individuals have the possibility of opting
out of the problem and going for a lesser reward with 100% certainty, which
also means no time-out before the next trial. Many individuals thus develop
a strategy of opting out of only those discrimination or memory tasks that
they are especially likely to fail (Hampton, 2001). They seem to know that they
do not know or that they do not remember.
In another paradigm involving chimpanzees, individuals either do or do
not see the process of food being hidden in one of several tubes. When they
see the hiding process, they choose a tube directly. When they do not see the
hiding process, they go to some trouble to look into the tubes and discover
where the food is located before choosing. Again, the apes seem to know when
they do not know, or at least when they are uncertain, and seek to do some-
thing about it. Interesting for interpretation, variables that affect this process
in apes are the same as those that affect it in humans: they are more likely to
seek extra information if the reward is highly valuable or if it has been longer
since they acquired the information (Call, 2010). Thus, as they are assessing
situations and deciding what to do, if apes self-monitor and find that they
have insufficient information to make an effective decision, this prompts them
to gather information as prerequisite to their choice.
The interpretation of these experiments is not totally straightforward, but
the apes clearly are doing some kind of self-monitoring and evaluation, just as
they do in all of their intelligent decision making. What is new here is that they
seem to be monitoring not just imagined actions and their imagined results, or
imagined causes and their imagined outcomes, but also their own knowledge
or memorywhich they then use to make inferences about their likelihood of
behavioral success. Great apes and other primates thus have some kind of ac-
cess, at least in instrumental contexts, to their own psychological states. And
even if this is not the fully human version of self-reflection (as we will argue
later that it is notbecause it lacks a social/perspectival dimension), this ability

adds further to the conclusion that great apes are skillful with all three of the
key componentsabstract cognitive representations (models), protological in-
ferential paradigms, and psychological self-monitoring and evaluationthat
constitute what can only be called thinking.
Cognition for Competition

Many theorists continue to maintain a kind of Cartesian picture of the dif-
ference between humans and other animals: humans have rational thinking,
whereas other animals, including great apes, are simply stimulus-response
machines with no ratiocination whatever. This view is held not only by behav-
iorist psychologists but also by many otherwise very thoughtful philosophers
and cognitive scientists. But it is a factually incorrect view, in our opinion,
and one that is grounded in an erroneous theory of the evolution of cognition
(Darwin, 1859, 1871). Cognitive evolution does not proceed from simple asso-
ciations to complex cognition, but rather from inflexible adaptive specializa-
tions of varying complexities to flexible, individually self-regulated intentional
actions underlain by cognitive representations, inferences, and self-monitoring.
The empirical research reviewed here (there is much more) clearly demon-
strates, in our view, that great apes operate in this flexible, intelligent, self-
regulated wayand they do so without language, culture, or any other forms
of human-like sociality.
This is not to say, of course, that the interpretations of the studies cited
here are the only possible ones. Thus, some theorists would contest the con-
clusion that great apes understand causal and intentional relations (e.g., Povi-
nelli, 2000; Penn et al., 2008), proposing instead that they operate with some
kind of noncognitive behavioral rules. Others would propose that instead
of causal, intentional, and logical inferences, great apesjust like rats and
pigeons operate only with associations (e.g., Heyes, 2005). And skepticism
about cognitive self-monitoring in apes and other animals abounds (e.g.,
Carruthers and Ritchie, 2012). But behavioral rules (whose nature and origins
have never been specified) cannot account for the flexibility with which great
apes solve novel physical and social problems (Tomasello and Call, 2006),
and association learning takes many dozens of trials to be effective, and this
does not accord with the speed and flexibility with which great apes solve
novel physical and social problems in experiments (Call, 2006). Although the
empirical data are less clear-cut in the case of cognitive self-monitoring, Calls
(2010) finding that the same factors affect the process in humans and great
apes is highly suggestive thatin concrete situations, at leastthe apes are
genuinely self-monitoring the decision-making process.
In any case, our natural history of human thinking begins with this pos-
sibly somewhat generous account of great ape thinking. To summarize, think-
ing comprises three key components, and great apes operate in cognitively
sophisticated ways with each of them.
Schematic Cognitive Representations

First is the ability to work with some kind of abstract cognitive representa-
tions, to which the individual assimilates particular experiences. According
to the best available evidence, great ape abstract cognitive representations
categories, schemas, and modelshave three main features.
I m ag i s t i c . Great ape cognitive representations are iconic or imagistic in

format, based on processes of perceptual and motor experience (for the pro-
posal that human infant cognitive representations are also iconic in format, see
Carey, 2009; Mandler, 2012). It is difficult to imagine what else they could be.
S c h e m at i c . Great apes imagistic representations are generalized or ab-

stract: schematizations of the organisms perceptual experience of exemplar
situations or entities (i.e., they have type-token structure). Importantly, iconic
or imagistic schematizations are not uninterpreted pictures but, rather,
amalgams of already understood (made relevant to existing cognitive models)
exemplars. Thus, when Wittgenstein is searching for what could underlie our
most basic processes of understanding, he speculates imagining the fact:
representing to ourselves the more general and already meaningful cognitive
model to which the current situation is best assimilated as exemplar. Suchcog-
nitive models are already meaningful because a schematized and generalized
understanding of causality and/or intentionality is part and parcel of many of
apes cognitive models of situations.
S i t uat i o n a l c o n t e n t. Great ape cognitive representations have as

their most basic content situations, specifically, situations that are relevant to
the individuals goals and values (e.g., that food is present or that a predator
is absent). Obviously, representational content structured as whole situations

prefigures, in some important sense, human propositional content (though it
is not there yet). Apes can also, for specific purposes, schematize their experi-
ence with components of situations such as objects and events (e.g., a category
of figs).
Causal and Intentional Inferences

The second key component is the ability to make inferences from cognitive
representations. Great apes use their cognitive categories, schemas, and models
productively to imagine or infer nonactual situations. These inferences have
two main characteristics.
C au s a l ly a n d i n t e n t i o n a l ly l o g i c a l . Great ape inferences are

based on their general understanding of causality and intentionality; they
are causal and intentional inferences. But importantly, they still have logical
structurethey form paradigmsbased on facility with a kind of protocon-
ditional (inferences between cause and effect in both the physical world and
social world) and a kind of protonegation (based on mutually exclusive polar
opposite or contraries, such as presence-absence). Apes thus possess proto-
versions of everything from modus tollens to disjunctive syllogism.
P ro d u c t i v e . Great apes cognitive representations and inferences are pro-

ductive or generative in that they can support off-line simulations in which
the subject infers or imagines nonactual situations (Barsalou, 1999, 2008).
Nevertheless, some theorists might still doubt whether great ape thinking
meets Evanss (1982) generality constraint. In this linguistically inspired ac-
count, each potential subject of a thought (or sentence) may be combined with
multiple predicates, and each potential predicate may have multiple subjects.
To do this nonlinguistically, an individual must be able not only to relate rep-
resented situations to one another but also to extract their components and
use them in productive combinations to imagine novel situations.
With respect to a particular agent doing multiple things, great apes know,
for example, that this leopard does lots of things like climb trees, eat chimpan-
zees, drink water, and so on. Indirect evidence for this is the fact that great
apes pass object permanence tasks in which they must understand that the
same object is going different places and doing different things (Call, 2001),
and also that they can predict what particular individuals will do in situations
based on their past experience with them (Hare et al., 2001). Further evidence
is the fact that in experiments great apes individuate objects, so that if they
see a particular object go behind a screen, they expect to find that particular
object there, and if they see it leave and another replace it, they do not expect
to find it there anymore and if two identical objects go behind the screen
they expect to find two objects. They are not feature placing, but rather, they
are tracking the self-same object or objects engaging in different actions across
time (Mendes et al., 2008).
With respect to different individuals doing the same thing, great apes
know such individual things as leopards climb trees, snakes climb trees,
monkeys climb trees each in their own way. Here things are a bit more
difficult evidentially because there are few if any nonverbal methods for inves-
tigating event schemas like climbing. But one hypothesis is that a nonverbal
way of establishing an event schema is imitation. That is, an individual who
imitates another knows at the very least that a demonstrator is doing X and
then they themselves can do Xthe same thing as well (and perhaps
other actors also). Although imitation is not their frontline strategy for social
learning, great apes (at least those raised by humans) are nevertheless capable
of reproducing the actions of others with some facility in some contexts (e.g.,
Tomasello et al., 1993; Custance et al., 1995; Buttelmann et al., 2007). Some
apes also know when another individual is imitating them, again suggesting
at least a rudimentary understanding of self-other equivalence (Haun and
Call, 2008). But imitation involves just self and other. Since apes understand
the goals of all agents, an alternative hypothesis might be that apes schematize
acts of climbing based not on movements but on an understanding that the
actor has the goal of getting up the tree and that goal (not actions per se)
provides the basis for an event schema across all individuals, with or without
the self.
Great ape cognition thus goes at least some way toward meeting the gen-
erality constraint, although productivity may be limited. The claim would be
that great ape productive thinking enables an individual to imagine, for ex-
ample, that if I chase this novel animal it might climb a tree, even if I have
never before seen this animal climb a tree. On the other hand, it may be that
an ape could not imagine something contrary to fact (i.e., contrary to its causal
understanding), such as a leopard flying, as humans are able to do with the
aid of external communicative vehicles. Apes sense of self-other equivalence
may also be limited by the fact that imitation takes place sequentially, whereas
much better for establishing self-other equivalence are situations in which
the equivalence manifest in a single social interaction simultaneously (e.g.,
role reversal in the collaborative activities of humans).
Behavioral Self-Monitoring
The third key component of great ape thinking is the ability to self-monitor the
decision-making process. Many animal species self-monitor, and even antici-
pate, the outcomes of their behavioral decisions in the world. But great apes
do more than this simple behavioral self-monitoring.
C o g n i t i v e s e l f - m o n i to r i n g . Great apes (and some other primate

species) also know when they have insufficient information to make an in-
formed behavioral decision. As noted, monitoring outcomes is a basic pre-
requisite of a self-regulating system, and monitoring simulated outcomes is
acharacteristic of a cognitive system capable of thinking before it chooses.
But monitoring the elements of the decision-making process itself ones
memory or powers of discrimination or the environmental information
availableis a still further enrichment. Self-monitoring of this type implies
some kind of executive oversight of the decision-making process itself.
And so we may imagine a common ancestor to humans and other great apes.
Its daily life was like that of extant nonhuman apes: most waking hours spent
in small bands foraging individually for fruit and other vegetation, with
various kinds of social interactions, mostly competitive, interspersed. Our
hypothesis is that this creature and also probably australopithecines for the
ensuing 4 million years of the human lineagewas individually intentional
and instrumentally rational. It cognitively represented its physical and social
experience categorically and schematically, and it made all kinds of produc-
tive and hypothetical inferences and chains of inferences about its experience
as wellall with a modicum of cognitive self-monitoring. And so, the crucial
point is that well before the emergence of uniquely human sociality, much
less culture, language, and institutions, the foundations for human thinking
were securely in place in humans last common ancestor with other apes.
Individual intentionality is what is needed for creatures whose social inter-

actions are mainly competitive, that is, creatures that act on their own or, at
most, join in with others to choose sides when there is a good fight going
on. In virtually all theoretical accounts, great apes skills of social cognition
evolved mainly for competing with others in the social group: being better or
quicker than groupmates at anticipating what potential competitors might do,
based on a kind of Machiavellian intelligence (Whiten and Byrne, 1988). And
indeed a number of recent studies have found that great apes utilize their most
sophisticated skills of social cognition in contexts involving competition or
exploitation of others as opposed to contexts involving cooperation or com-
munication with others (e.g., Hare and Tomasello, 2004; see Hare, 2001).
Great apes are all about cognition for competition.
Human beings, in contrast, are all about (or mostly about) cooperation.
Human social life is much more cooperatively organized than that of other
primates, and so, in the current hypothesis, it was these more complex forms
of cooperative sociality that acted as the selective pressures that transformed
great ape individual intentionality and thinking into human shared inten-
tionality and thinking. Our task now is thus to provide a plausible evolution-
ary narrative that can take us from humans great ape ancestors all the way to
modern humans. The shared intentionality hypothesis is that this story comprises
a two-step evolutionary sequence: joint intentionality followed by collective
intentionality. At both of these transitions the overall process was, at a very
general level, the same: a change of ecology led to some new forms of collabo-
ration, which required for their coordination some new forms of cooperative
communication, and then together these created the possibility that, dur-
ing ontogeny, individuals could construct through their social interactions
with others some new forms of cognitive representation, inference, and self-
monitoring for use in their thinking.
3
Joint Intentionality
Conceptual contents are essentially expressively perspectival.

robert brandom, Making It Explicit
In their magisterial survey of life on planet earth, Maynard-Smith and Szath-

mary (1995) identified eight major transitions in the evolution of complexity
of living things, for example, the emergence of chromosomes, the emergence
of multicellular organisms, and the emergence of sexual reproduction. Astound-
ingly, in each case the transition was characterized by the same two fundamen-
tal processes. First, in each case there emerged some new form of cooperation
with interdependence: Entities that were capable of independent replication
before the transition can replicate only as part of a larger whole after it
(p.6). Second, in each case this new form of cooperation was made possible by
a concomitant new form of communication: change in the method of infor-
mation transmission (p.6).
The most recent major transition, in this account, was the emergence of hu-
man cooperative societies (cultures) structured by linguistic communication.
Our ultimate goal is to give an account of this emergence, with a specific focus
on the new forms of thinking that it engendered. But we cannot go directly
from competitive great ape societies to cooperative human cultures in one giant
leap. The problem is that there are thousands of human cultures, and each of
them has conventionalized, normativized, and institutionalized a particular set
of cultural and communicative practices. But anything may be conventional-
ized, normativized, or institutionalized; these processes are totally blind to
content. And so to get to cooperatively organized human cultures, there must
have been in existence in all human populations alreadyas raw material for
these group-level processes of cultural creationmany and varied kinds of co-
operative social interactions of a type not possessed by other great apes. Assum-
ing again that great apes are representative of humans last common ancestor
Joi n t I n t e n t iona l i t y 33
with other primates, then, it would seem that we need an intermediate step
inour natural history. We need some early humans who were not yet living in
cultures and using conventional languages, but who were nevertheless much
more cooperatively inclined than the last common ancestor.
And so we will posit in this chapter, as an initial step, some early humans
who created new forms of social coordination, perhaps in the context of col-
laborative foraging. Early humans new form of collaborative activity was
unique among primates because it was structured by joint goals and joint
attention into a kind of second-personal joint intentionality of the moment, a
we intentionality with a particular other, within which each participant
had an individual role and an individual perspective. Early humans new
form of cooperative communicationthe natural gestures of pointing and
pantomiming enabled them to coordinate their roles and perspectives on
external situations with a collaborative partner toward various kinds of joint
objectives. The result was that these early humans cooperativized great ape
individual intentionality into human joint intentionality involving new forms
of cognitive representation (perspectival, symbolic), inference (socially recur-
sive), and self-monitoring (regulating ones actions from the perspective of a
cooperative partner), which, when put to use in solving concrete problems of
social coordination, constituted a radically new form of thinking.
So let us look, first, at the new form of collaboration that emerged with
early humans, then at the new form of cooperative communication that early
humans used to coordinate their collaborative activities, and then at the result-
ing new form of thinking that all of this collaborating and communicating
required as substrate.
A New Form of Collaboration

Cooperation by itself does not create complex cognitive skillswitness the
complex cooperation of the cognitively simple eusocial insects and the coop-
erative child care and food sharing of the not-so-cognitively-complex New
World monkeys, marmosets and tamarins. The case of humans is unique, from
a cognitive point of view, because the common ancestor to humans and other
great apes had already evolved highly sophisticated skills of social cognition
and social manipulation for purposes of competition (as well as highly so-
phisticated skills of physical cognition for purposes of manipulating causality
in the context of tool use) as documented in chapter 2.
Then, out of the elements of these sophisticated processes of individual

intentionality built for competitionunderstanding how the particular goals
and perceptions of others generate particular actionshumans evolved, in
addition, even more sophisticated processes of joint intentionality, involving
joint goals and joint attention, built for social coordination. And social coor-
dination creates unique challenges for cognition and thinking. Whereas the
social dilemmas of game theory (e.g., prisoners dilemma) occur when inter-
actants goals and preferences mostly conflict, coordination dilemmas occur
when individuals goals and preferences mostly align. The challenge in these
cases is not to resolve some conflict, but rather to find a way, perhaps by think-
ing, to coordinate with a social partner to a common goal.
The Cooperative Turn

Chimpanzees and other great apes live in highly competitive societies in
which individuals vie with others for valued resources all day every day, and,
as argued above, this is what shapes their cognition most profoundly. But
chimpanzees and other apes also engage regularly in a number of important
activities that are cooperative in a very general sense. For example, chimpan-
zees travel together and forage in small groups, allies support one another
in fights within the group, and males engage in group defense against out-
siders and predators (Muller and Mitani, 2005). These group behaviors for
traveling, fighting, and defending the group are also common in many other
mammalian species.
To illustrate the difference with human cooperation, let us focus on for-
aging, clearly one of the fundamental activities of all primates. The typical
scene for chimpanzees, for instance, is that a small traveling party comes
upon a fruit tree. Each individual then scrambles up on its own, finds a good
place to procure some fruit on its own, grabs one or several pieces on its own,
and then separates from the others by a few meters to eat. In one recent
experiment, when given a choice of acquiring food cooperatively or alone,
chimpanzees preferred to acquire it alone (Bullinger et al., 2011a). In another
recent experiment, when given a choice of eating together with a groupmate
or eating alone, both chimpanzees and bonobos preferred to eat alone (Bull-
inger et al., 2013). If there is ever a conflict over a piece of food, the dominant
individual (depending, ultimately, on fighting ability) gets it. In general, the
acquisition of food via individual scrambling and contests of dominance
characterizes virtually all of the foraging activities of the four great ape
species.
The main exception to this general great ape pattern is chimpanzees group
hunting of monkeyssystematically observed only in chimpanzees, and only
in some groups (Boesch and Boesch, 1989; Watts and Mitani 2002). What
happens prototypically is that a small party of male chimpanzees spies a red
colobus monkey somewhat separated from its group, which they then proceed
to surround and capture. Normally, one individual begins the chase, and
others scramble to the monkeys possible escape routes, including the ground.
One individual actually captures the monkey, and he ends up getting the
most and best meat. But because he cannot dominate the carcass on his own,
all participants (and many bystanders) usually get at least some meat, depend-
ing on their dominance and the vigor with which they beg and harass the
captor (Gilby, 2006).
The social and cognitive processes involved in chimpanzee group hunting
could potentially be complex, but they could also be fairly simple. The rich
reading is a human-like reading, namely, that chimpanzees have the joint goal
of capturing the monkey together and that they coordinate their individual
roles in doing so (Boesch, 2005). But more likely, in our opinion, is a leaner
interpretation (Tomasello et al., 2005). In this interpretation, each individual
is attempting to capture the monkey on its own (since captors get the most
meat), and they take into account the behavior, and perhaps intentions, of
the other chimpanzees as these affect their chances of capture. Adding some
complexity, individuals prefer that one of the other hunters capture the mon-
key (in which case they will get a small amount of meat through begging and
harassing) to the possibility of the monkey escaping totally (in which case
they get no meat). In this view, chimpanzees in a group hunt are engaged in
a kind of co-action in which each individual is pursuing his own individ-
ual goal of capturing the monkey (what Tuomela, 2007 calls group behavior
in I-mode). In general, it is not clear that chimpanzees group hunting of
monkeys is so different cognitively from the group hunting of other social
mammals, such as lions and wolves.
In stark contrast, human foraging is collaborative in much more fundamen-
tal ways. In modern forager societies, individuals produce the vast majority
of their daily sustenance collaboratively with others, either immediately
through collaborative efforts or via procurers who bring the food back to some
central location for sharing (Hill and Hurtado, 1996; Hill, 2002; Alvard,
2012).1 Human foragers also collaborate in many other domains of activity in

ways that great apes do not. Tomasello (2011) systematically compares the
social structures of great ape and human forager societies and concludes that
in every domain, whereas apes behave mostly individualistically, humans
behave mostly cooperatively. For example, humans but not apes engage in
cooperative childcare in which all adults do all kinds of things to support
developing children (so-called cooperative breeding; Hrdy, 2009). Humans
but not apes engage in cooperative communication in which they provide
one another with information that they judge to be useful for the recipient.
Humans but not apes actively teach one another things helpfully, again for
the benefit of the recipient. Humans but not apes make group decisions about
group-relevant matters. And humans but not apes create and maintain all
kinds of formal social structures such as social norms and institutions and
even conventional languages (using agreed-upon means of expression). In all,
cooperation is simply a defining feature of human societies in a way that it is
not for the societies of the other great apes.2
Exactly when and how this cooperative turn took place in human evolu-
tion are not critical for current purposes. But for whatever it is worth, Tomasello
et al. (2012) hypothesize that it began happening in an initial, preparatory
step soon after the emergence of the genus Homo, around 2 million years ago.
During this period there was a great expansion of terrestrial monkeys, like
baboons, that might have outcompeted humans for their normal fruits and
other vegetation. Humans then needed a new foraging niche. A beginning
might have been scavenging meat, which would probably have required a
kind of coalition of individuals to frighten off the animals that made the ini-
tial kill. But at some point there began more active collaborative hunting of
large game and gathering of plant foods, typically in a mutualistic stag hunt
type situation in which both individuals could expect to benefit from the
collaborationif they could somehow manage to coordinate their efforts. This
is the collaborative creature we are imagining here, and for the most clarity
we may focus on its culmination in hominins of about 400,000 years ago:
the common ancestor to Neanderthals and modern humans, the ever myste-
rious Homo heidelbergensis. Paleoanthropological evidence suggests that this
was the first hominin to engage systematically in the collaborative hunting of
large game, using weapons that almost certainly would not enable a single
individual to be successful on its own, and sometimes bringing prey back to
a home base (Stiner et al., 2009). This is also a time when brain size and
population size were both expanding rapidly (Gowlett et al., 2012). We may
hypothesize that these collaborative foragers lived as more or less loose bands
comprising a kind of pool of potential collaborators.
But more important than when is how. In the hypothesis of Tomasello et
al. (2012), obligate collaborative foraging became an evolutionarily stable strat-
egy for early humans because of two interrelated processes: interdependence
and social selection. The first and most basic point is that humans began a
lifestyle in which individuals could not procure their daily sustenance alone
but instead were interdependent with others in their foraging activities
which meant that individuals needed to develop the skills and motivations to
forage collaboratively or else starve. There was thus direct and immediate se-
lective pressure for skills and motivations for joint collaborative activity ( joint
intentionality). The second point is that as a natural outcome of this interde-
pendence, individuals began to make evaluative judgments about others as
potential collaborative partners: they began to be socially selective, since choos-
ing a poor partner meant less food. Cheaters and laggards were thus selected
against, and bullies lost their power to bully. Importantly, this now meant that
early human individuals had to worry, in a way that other great apes do not,
both about evaluating others and about how others were evaluating them as
potential collaborative partners (i.e., a concern for self-image).
The situation these early humans faced is perhaps best modeled by the stag
hunt scenario from game theory (Skyrms, 2004). Two individuals have easy
access to low-payoff hares (e.g., low-calorie vegetation), and then there ap-
pears on the horizon a high-payoff but difficult-to-obtain stag (e.g., large
game) that can be acquired only if individuals abandon their hares and col-
laborate. Their motivations thus align, because it is in both their interests to
work together. The dilemma is thus purely cognitive: since collaboration is
mandatory and I am risking my hare, I want to go for the stag only if you do,
too. But you only want to go for the stag if I do, too. How do we coordinate
this potential standoff ? There are some cognitively simple ways out of the
dilemma (see Bullinger et al., 2011b, for the leader-follower strategy that chim-
panzees use), but they always involve one individual incurring disproportion-
ate risk, and so they are unstable in certain circumstances. For example, if there
were very few hares, so that each was highly valued, and hunting stags was
only rarely successful, then the cost/benefit analysis would require that each
individual attempt to make certain that their potential partner was also going
for the stag before they relinquished their hare.
In the original analyses of Schelling (1960) and Lewis (1969), coordinating

in this way required some kind of mutual knowledge or recursive mind reading:
for me to go, I have to expect you to expect me to expect you. . . . For both
Schelling and Lewis, this process, while remarkable, did not cause alarm. Later
commentators problematized the analysis, pointing out that an infinite back-
and-forth of us thinking about one anothers thinking could not actually be
happening, or no decision could ever be made. Clark (1996) proposed, as a more
realistic account, that humans simply recognize the common ground they
have with others (e.g., we both know that we both want to go for the stag) and
that this is sufficient for making joint decisions toward joint goals. Tomasello
(2008) suggested that something like common ground is how people actually
operate, but when perturbations occur they often explain them by reasoning
that he thinks that I think he thinks . . . (typically only a few iterations deep),
suggesting an underlying recursive structure. Our position is thus that human
individuals are attuned to the common ground they share with others, and
this does not always involve recursive mind reading, but still, if necessary, they
may decompose their common ground a few recursive layers deep to ask such
things as what he thinks I think about his thinking.
In any case, we may imagine that individuals who were attuned to their
common ground with others, and who could engage in some level of recur-
sive mind reading, had a huge advantage in strategically deciding when to
stay with their hare and when to join with others to go for the more profitable
stag. And those who could develop more sophisticated forms of cooperative
communication would have had an even larger advantage. And so, the first
step in our natural history of uniquely human thinking is the cognitive
mechanisms of joint intentionality that evolved to coordinate humans ear-
liest species-unique forms of small-scale collaboration and, later, cooperative
communication.
Joint Goals and Individual Roles

We may characterize the formation of a joint goal (or joint intention) in more
detail as follows (see Bratman, 1992). For you and me to form a joint goal (or
joint intention) to pursue a stag together, (1) I must have the goal to capture
the stag together with you; (2) you must have the goal to capture the stag to-
gether with me; and, critically, (3) we must have mutual knowledge, or com-
mon ground, that we both know each others goal.
It is important here that each of our goals is not just to capture the stag
but, rather, to capture it together with the other. Each of us wanting sepa-
rately to capture the stag (even if this was mutual knowledge; see Searle, 1995)
would constitute two individuals hunting in parallel, not jointly. It is also
important that we have mutual knowledge of one anothers goal, that is, that
our respective goals are part of our common conceptual ground. Each of us
may want to capture the stag together with the other, but if neither of us
knows that this is the case, we very likely will not succeed in coordinating
(for all of the reasons outlined by Lewis and Schelling, among others). Thus,
joint intentionality is operative both in the action content of each of our goals
or intentionsthat we act together and in our mutual knowledge, or com-
mon ground, that we both know that we both intend this.
Young children begin engaging with others in ways that suggest some form
of joint goal from around fourteen to eighteen months of age, when they are
still mostly prelinguistic. Thus, Warneken et al. (2006, 2007) had infants of
this age engage in a joint activity with an adult, such as obtaining a toy by
each operating one side of an apparatus. Then, the adult simply stopped play-
ing her role for no reason. The children were not happy about this and did
various things to attempt to reengage their partner. (They did not do this if
her stopping was for a good reason; e.g., she had to attend to something else
[Warneken et al., 2012].) Interesting, when this same situation was arranged
for human-raised chimpanzees, they simply ignored the recalcitrant partner
and tried to find ways to achieve the goal on their own. Although infants
reengagement attempts do not suggest necessarily that they have a fully adult-
like joint goal in common ground with their partner, at the very least they
reflect an expectation that, barring obstacles, my partner in this joint activity
is committed enough to reengage after a stoppage an expectation that, ap-
parently, chimpanzees in similar activities do not have.
By the time they are three years of age, children provide much more con-
vincing evidence for joint goals because they themselves display commitment
to the joint activity in the face of distractions and temptations. For example,
Hamann et al. (2012) had pairs of three-year-old children work together to
bring rewards to the top of a step-like structure. The problem was that for
one child the reward, surprisingly, became available midway through. Never-
theless, when this happened, the lucky child delayed consumption of her own
reward and persevered until the other got hers (i.e., more than they helped
the partner in a similar situation in which they were acting individually,
without collaboration). Such commitment to the partner suggests that the chil-
dren constructed a joint goal at the beginning that we get the prizes together,
and they made whatever adjustments were necessary to realize that joint goal.
Again, great apes do not behave in this same way. In a similar experiment with
chimpanzees, Greenberg et al. (2010) found no signs of a human-like com-
mitment to follow through on the joint action until both partners received
their reward. (And Hamann et al. [2011] found that at the end of the collab-
orative activity, three-year-old children, but not chimpanzees, were committed
to dividing the spoils equally among participants as well.)
Importantly, when children of this same age have it in their common ground
with a collaborative partner that each is counting on the other to come through
(we are interdependent), they both feel obligated to the other (see Gilbert,
1989, 1990). Thus, Grfenhain et al. (2009) had preschoolers explicitly agree
to play a game with one adult, and then another adult attempted to lure them
away to a more exciting game. Although two-year-old children mostly just
bolted to the new game straightaway, from three years of age children paused
before departing and took leave, either verbally or by handing the adult the
tool they had been using together. The children seemed to recognize that joint
goals involve joint commitments, the breaking of which requires some kind
of acknowledgment or even apology. No study of this type has ever been
done with chimpanzees, but there are no published reports of one chimpanzee
taking leave from, making excuses to, or apologizing to another for breaking
a joint commitment.
In addition to joint goals, collaborative activities also demand a division of
labor and so individual roles. Bratman (1992) specifies that in joint coopera-
tive activities individuals must mesh their subplans together toward the
joint goal, and even help one another in their individual roles as necessary. In
the Hamann et al. (2012) study cited above, young children stopped to help
their partner as needed. This demonstrates that the partners are attending to
one another and their respective subgoals, and perhaps even attending to the
partner attending to them, and so forth. Indeed, other studies have found
that young children, but not chimpanzees, learn important new things about
the partners role as they are collaborating. For example, Carpenter et al. (2005)
found that after young children played one role in a collaboration, they could
quickly switch to the other, whereas chimpanzees could not do this (Toma-
sello and Carpenter, 2005). Most important, Fletcher et al. (2012) found that
three-year-olds who had fi rst participated in a collaboration playing role
Athen knew much better how to play role B than if they had not previously
collaborated, whereas this was not true of chimpanzees.
Young children are thus beginning to understand that the roles in a collab-
orative activity are in most cases interchangeable among individuals, which
suggests a birds eye view of the collaboration in which the various roles,
including ones own, are all conceptualized in the same representational for-
mat (see Hobson, 2004). This species-unique understanding may support an
especially deep appreciation of self-other equivalence, as individuals imagine
different subjects/agents engaging in similar or complementary activities
simultaneously in the same collaborative activity. As suggested in our discus-
sion of great ape thinking, the understanding of self-other equivalence is a
key component enabling various kinds of combinatorial flexibility in think-
ing. (It also sets the stage for a full-blooded appreciation of agent neutrality
encompassing not just self and other but all possible agents, which is a key
feature of cultural norms and institutions, and objectivity more generally,
as we shall see in chapter 4.)
Preschool children are not good models for the early humans we are pic-
turing here because they are modern humans and they are bathed in culture
and language from the beginning. But from soon after their first birthdays,
and continuing up to their third birthdays, they come to engage with others
in collaborative activities that have a species-unique structure and that do
not, in any obvious way, depend on cultural conventions or language. These
young children coordinate a joint goal, commit themselves to that joint goal
until all get their reward, expect others to be similarly committed to the joint
goal, divide the common spoils of a collaboration equally, take leave when
breaking a commitment, understand their own and the partners role in the
joint activity, and even help the partner in her role when necessary. When
tested in highly similar circumstances, humans nearest primate relatives, great
apes, do not show any of these capacities for collaborative activities underlain
by joint intentionality. Importantly, young children also seem to have a species-
unique motivation for collaboration, as shown in recent studies in which
children and chimpanzees had to choose between pulling in a certain amount
of food collaboratively with a conspecific or pulling in that same amount of
food (or more or less) in a solo activity. Children very much preferred the col-
laborative option, whereas chimpanzees went wherever there was most food
regardless of opportunities for collaboration (Rekers et al., 2011; Bullinger
et al., 2011a).
box 1. Relational Thinking
Penn et al. (2008) have proposed that what makes human cognition
different from that of other primates is thinking in terms of relations,
especially higher-order relations. To support their claim, they review
evidence from many different domains of cognition: judgments of relational
similarity, judgments of same-difference, analogy, transitive inference,
hierarchical relations, and so forth.
Their evaluation of the literature is decidedly one-sided, as they dismiss

findings suggesting that nonhuman primates have some skills of this type.
For example, nonhuman primates clearly understand some relations
(consistently choosing the larger of two objects, for example, despite
absolute size), and some individuals make same-difference judgments again
based on relational not absolute characteristics (Thompson et al., 1997).
Some chimpanzees also do something like analogical inference in using a
scale model (Kuhlmeier et al., 1999), and many primates make transitive
inferences (see Tomasello and Call, 1997, for a review).
But at the same time, it is true that humans are particularly skilled at
relational thinking (Gentner, 2003). One hypothesis that might explain the
data is that there are actually two kinds of relational thinking. One
concerns the concrete physical world of space and quantities, in which we
may compare various characteristics or magnitudes such as bigger-smaller,
brighter-darker, fewer-greater, higher-lower, and even same-different.
Nonhuman primates have some skills with these kinds of physical relations
and relational magnitudes. What they may not comprehend at allthough
there are few direct testsis a second type of relation. Specifically, they
may not comprehend functional categories of things defined by their role in
some larger activity. Humans are exceptional in creating categories such as
pet, husband, pedestrian, referee, customer, guest, tenant, and so forth,
what Markman and Stillwell (2001) call role-based categories. They are
relational not in the sense of comparing two physical entities but, rather, in
assessing the relation between an entity and some larger event or process in
which it plays a role.
The obvious hypothesis here is that this second type of relational thinking
comes from humans unique understanding of collaborative activities with
joint goals and individual roles (perhaps later generalized to all kinds of
social activities even if they are not collaborative per se). As humans
constructed these kinds of activities, they were creating more or less abstract
slots or roles that anyone could play. These abstract slots formed role-
based categories, such as things that one uses to kill game (viz., weapons;
Barsalou, 1983), as well as more abstract narrative categories such as
protagonist, victim, avenger, and so on. A further speculation might be that
these abstract slots at some point enabled humans to even put relational
material in the slots; for example, a married couple can play a role in a
cultural activity. This would be the basis for the kinds of higher-order
relational thinking that Penn et al. (2008) emphasize as especially important
in differentiating human thinking.
In any case, the proposal here is that, at the very least, constructing the
kinds of dual-level cognitive models needed to support collaborative
activities enhanced, if not enabled, human engagement in much broader
and more flexible relational thinking involving roles in larger social realities,
and possibly in higher-order relational thinking as well.
The main point for now is that early humans seem to have created a new
cognitive model. Collaborating toward a joint goal created a new kind of so-
cial engagement, a joint intentionality in which we are hunting antelopes
together (or whatever), with each partner playing her own interdependent
role. This dual-level structure of simultaneous sharedness and individuality
a joint goal but with individual rolesis a uniquely human form of second-
personal joint engagement requiring species-unique cognitive skills and
motivational propensities. It also has a number of perhaps surprising ramifi-
cations for many different aspects of human cognition that go beyond our
primary focus here (see box 1 for one example).
Joint Attention and Individual Perspectives

Organisms attend to situations that are relevant to their goals. And so, when
two humans act together jointly, they naturally attend together jointly to situ-
ations that are relevant to their joint goals. Said another way, as humans
coordinate their actions, they also, to do this effectively, coordinate their
attention. Underlying this coordination is, once again, some notion of com-
mon ground, in which each individual at least potentially can attend to
his partners attention, his partners attention to his attention, and so forth
(Tomasello, 1995). Joint actions, joint goals, and joint attention are thus of a
piece, and so they must have coevolved together.
The current proposal is that the phylogenetic origins of the ability to par-
ticipate with others in joint attentionthe first and most concrete way in
which young children create common conceptual ground and so shared reali-
ties with otherslie in collaborative activities. Th is is what Tomasello (2008)
calls the top-down version of joint attention because it is directed by joint
goals. (The alternative is bottom-up joint attention, such as when a loud noise
attracts both of our attention, and we both know it must have attracted the
others attention as well.) Ontogenetically, young children begin to structure
their joint actions with others via joint visual attention at around nine to
twelve months of age, often called joint attentional activities. These are such
activities as giving and taking objects, rolling a ball back and forth, building
a block tower together, putting away toys together, and reading books to-
gether. Despite specific attempts to identify and solicit such joint attentional
activities with human-raised chimpanzees, Tomasello and Carpenter (2005)
were unable to find any (nor are there any other reliable reports of joint atten-
tion in nonhuman primates).
Just as each partner in a joint collaborative activity has her own individual
role, each partner in joint attentional engagement has her own individual
perspective and knows that the other has her own individual perspective as
well. The crucial point, which will be foundational for all that follows, is that
the notion of perspective assumes a single target of joint attention on which we
have diff ering perspectives (Moll and Tomasello, 2007, in press). If you are
looking out one window of the house and I am looking out another in the
opposite direction, we do not have different perspectiveswe are just seeing
completely different things. We can thus operate with the notion of individu-
ally distinct perspectives only if (1) we are both considering the same thing,
and (2) we both know the other is attending to it differently. If I see some-
thing in one way, and then round the corner to see it in another, this does not
give me two perspectives on the same thing, because I do not have multiple
perspectives available to me simultaneously for comparison. But when two
people are attending to the same thing simultaneously and it is in their
common ground that they are both doing sothen space is created (to use
Davidsons [2001] metaphor) for an understanding of different perspectives to

arise.3
Young children begin showing an appreciation that others have perspectives
that differ from their own from soon after their first birthdays, in conjunction
with their earliest joint attentional activities. For example, in one experiment
an adult and child played together jointly with three different objects for a
short time each (Tomasello and Haberl, 2003). Then, while the adult was out of
the room, the child and a research assistant played with a fourth object. After
that the adult returned, looked at an array containing all four objects, and
exclaimed excitedly Wow! Cool! Look at that! Under the assumption that
people only get excited about new things, not old things, children as young as
twelve months of age identified which of the objects was the new one causing
the adults excitement even though they were all equally old for her. The new
one is the one we have not attended to together before.
This is what some researchers have called level 1 perspective taking, because
it concerns only whether the other person does or does not see something, not
how she sees it. In level 2 perspective taking, children understand that some-
one sees the same thing differently than they do. For example, Moll et al. (2013)
found that three-year-old children understood which object an adult intended
to indicate by calling it blue, even though the object did not appear blue to
the child only to the adult due to her looking through a color filter. Children
could thus take the perspective of the other person when it differed from
their own. However, these same children could not answer correctly when
asked if they and the adult saw the object differently at the same time. Indeed,
children struggle with several versions of such simultaneously conflicting
perspectives on a jointly attended-to situation until they are four or five years
of age (Moll and Tomasello, in press). Thus, children before four or five years
have difficulty with dual naming tasks (it is simultaneously a horse and a
pony), appearance-reality tasks (it is simultaneously a rock and a sponge;
Moll and Tomasello, 2012), and false belief tasks (it is in the cabinet or in
the box). Resolving the conflict between perspectives that confront one an-
other on a jointly attended-to entity especially when both purport to depict
realitytakes some additional skills for dealing with an objective reality
and how different perspectives relate to it, which again will await the next
step in our evolutionary story (and see note 6).
And so we have come to a tipping point. Based on their capacity to coor-
dinate actions and attention with others toward joint goals, early humans
came to understand that different individuals can have different perspectives

on one and the same situation or entity. In contrast, great apes (including the
last common ancestor with humans) do not coordinate their actions and at-
tention with others in this same way, and so they do not understand the no-
tion of simultaneously different perspectives on the same situation or entity
at all. We thus encounter once again the dual-level structure of simultaneous
jointness and individuality. Just as collaborative activities have the dual-level
structure of joint goal and individual roles, joint attentional activities have
the dual-level structure of joint attention and individual perspectives. Joint
attention thus begin the process by which human beings construct an inter-
subjective world with others shared but with differing perspectiveswhich
will also be fundamental to human cooperative communication. We may thus
posit that joint attention in joint collaborative activity, as manifest even in
very young children, was the most basic form of socially shared cognition in
human evolution characteristic already of early humansand that this pri-
mal version of socially shared cognition spawned an equally primal version of
perspectivally constructed cognitive representations.
Social Self-Monitoring
Early humans living as obligate collaborative foragers would have become
more deeply social in still another way. Although skills of joint intentionality
are necessary for human-like collaborative foraging, they are not sufficient.
One also has to find a good partner. This may not always be overly difficult,
as even chimpanzees, after some experience, learn which partners are good
(i.e., lead to success) and which are not (Melis et al., 2006b). But in addition,
in situations in which there is meaningful partner choice, one must be or at
least appear to be a good collaborative partner oneself. To be an attractive
partner for others, and so not be excluded from collaborative opportunities,
one must not only have good collaborative skills, but also do ones share of
the work, help ones partner when necessary, share the spoils at the end of the
collaboration, and so forth.
And so early humans had to develop a concern for how other individuals
in their group were evaluating them as potential collaborative partners, and
then regulate their actions so as to affect these external social judgments in
positive wayswhat we may call social self-monitoring. Other great apes do
not appear to engage in such social self-monitoring. Thus, when Engelmann

et al. (2012) gave apes the opportunity to either share or steal food from a
groupmate, their behavior was totally unaffected by the presence or absence
of other group members observing the process. In contrast, in the same situ-
ations, young human children shared more with others and stole less from
others when another child was watching.
Motivationally, a concern for social evaluation derives from the interde-
pendence of collaborative partners: my survival depends on how you judge
me. Cognitively, a concern for social evaluation involves still another form of
recursive thinking: I am concerned about how you are thinking about my
intentional states. Social self-monitoring is thus the first step in humans ten-
dency to regulate their behavior not just by its instrumental success, as apes
do in their goal-directed activities, but also by the anticipated social evalua-
tions of important others. Because these concerns are about the evaluations
of specific other individuals, we may think of them as second-personal phe-
nomena. They thus represent an initial sense of social normativity a con-
cern for what others think I should and should not be doing and thinking
and so a first step toward the kind of normative self-governance, so as to fit in
with group expectations, that will characterize modern humans in the next
step of our story (see chapter 4).
Summary: Second-Personal Social Engagement

Great apes have a multitude of social-cognitive skills for understanding the
intentional actions of others, but they do not engage with them in any form
of joint intentionality. Thus, great apes understand that others have goals,
and they sometimes even help others attain their goals (Warneken and To-
masello, 2009), but they do not collaborate with others by means of a joint
goal. Similarly, great apes understand that others see things and so can follow
the gaze direction of others to see what they see (Call and Tomasello, 2005),
but they do not engage with others in joint attention. And great apes make
individual decisions that they self-monitor, but they do not make joint deci-
sions with others or monitor themselves via the social evaluations of others.
What emerges for the first time with early humans, in the current account, is
a we intentionality in which two individuals engage with the intentional
states of one another both jointly and recursively.
This new form of joint engagement is second-personal: an engagement of

I and you. Second-personal engagement has two minimal characteristics:
(1) the individual is directly participating in, not observing from outside, the
social interaction; and (2) the interaction is with a specific other individual
with whom there is a dyadic relationship, not with something more general
like a group (if there are multiple persons present, there are many dyadic rela-
tionships but no sense of group). There is less consensus about other possible
features of second-personal engagement, but Darwall (2006) proposes, in addi-
tion, that (3) the essence of this kind of engagement is mutual recognition
in which each partner gives the other, and expects from the other, a certain
amount of respect as an equal individuala fundamentally cooperative atti-
tude among partners.
And so, the evolutionary proposal is that early humansperhaps Homo
heidelbergensis some 400,000 years ago evolved skills and motivations for
joint intentionality that transformed great apes parallel group activities (e.g.,
you and I are each chasing the monkey in parallel) into truly joint collabora-
tive activities (e.g., we are chasing the monkey together, each with our own
role). And they also transformed great apes parallel looking behavior (e.g.,
you and I are each looking at the banana) into true joint attention (e.g., we
are looking at the banana together, each with our own perspective). But early
humans were not doing this in the manner of contemporary human beings,
that is, as manifest in relatively permanent cultural conventions and institu-
tions. Rather, their earliest collaborative activities were ad hoc collaborations
for particular goals on a particular occasion with a particular person, with their
joint attention similarly structured in this second-personal way. There would
thus be second-personal joint engagement with the partner, but when the
collaboration was over the we intentionality would be over as well.
The cognitive model schematized from repeated experiences of this kind
was thus a dual-level structure of simultaneous sharing and individuality while
in direct social interaction with other particular partners, underlain and sup-
ported by some kind of common ground and recursive mind reading (see
Figure 3.1). The cognitive model of this second-personal, dual-level social
engagement laid the foundation for almost everything that was uniquely
human. It provided the joint intentionality infrastructure for uniquely human
forms of cooperative communication involving intentions and inferences about
perspectives as we shall see in the section that follows and, ultimately, it
provided the foundation for the cultural conventions, norms, and institutions
Figur e 3.1 The dual-level structure of joint collaborative activity
that brought the human species into the modern human world as we shall
see in the next chapter.
A New Form of Cooperative Communication

Early humans coordinated their actions and attention based on common
ground. But coordinating in more complex waysfor example, in planning
our specific roles in a collaboration under various contingencies, or in planning
a series of joint actionsrequired a new type of cooperative communication.
The gestures and vocalizations of ancient great apes could not have done this
coordinating work. They could not have, first, because they were geared
totally toward self-serving ends, and this simply does not mesh with mutual-
istic collaboration toward a joint goal. They could not have, second, because
they were used exclusively in attempts to regulate the behavior of others
directly, and this does not mesh with the need to coordinate actions and
attention referentially on external situations and entities, as in collaborative
foraging for food.
Tomasello (2008) argued and presented evidence that the first forms of
uniquely human cooperative communication were the natural gestures of
pointing and pantomiming used to inform others helpfully of situations rel-
evant to them. Pointing and pantomiming are human universals that even
people who share no conventional language can use to communicate effectively

in contexts with at least some common ground. But to do this requires an
extremely rich and deep set of interpersonal intentions and inferences in the
context of this common ground. If I point for you in the direction of a tree,
or pantomime for you a tree, without any common ground, you have nothing
to guide your inferences about what I am intending to communicate to you
or why. Pointing and pantomiming thus created for early humans new prob-
lems of social coordinationnot just in coordinating actions with others but
also in coordinating intentional states and solving these new coordination
problems required new ways of thinking.
A New Motive for Communicating

In joint collaborative activities in which the partners are interdependent, it is
in the interest of each partner to help the other play her role. This is the basis
for a new motive in human communication, not available to other apes (but
see Crockford et al., 2011, for one possible exception), namely, the motive to
help the other by informing her of situations relevant to her. The emergence
of this motive was aided by the fact that in the context of a joint collaborative
activity, directive communication and informative communication are not
clearly distinctbecause the partners individual motives are so closely inter-
twined. Thus, if we are gathering honey together and you are struggling with
your role, I can point to a stick, which I intend as a directive to you to use it,
or, alternatively, I can point to the stick intending only to inform you of its
presencebecause I know that if you see it you will most likely want to use
it. When we are working together toward a joint goal, both of these work
because our interests are so closely aligned.
The evolutionary proposal is thus that early humans first acts of coopera-
tive communication were pointing gestures in joint collaborative activities,
and these were underlain by a communicative motive not yet differentiated
between requestive and informative. But at some point early humans began
to understand their interdependence with others not just while the collaboration
was ongoing but also more generally: if my best partner is hungry tonight, I
should help her so that she will be in good shape for tomorrows foraging.
And outside of collaborative activities, the difference between me requesting
help from you, for my benefit, and me informing you of things helpfully, for
your benefit, becomes crystal clear. And so there arose for early humans two
distinct motives for their deictic communication, requestive and informative,

which everyone both comprehended and produced.
When great apes work together in experiments, there is an almost total
absence of intentional communication of any kind (e.g., Melis et al., 2009;
Hirata, 2007; Povinelli and ONeill, 2000). When apes communicate with
one another in other contexts, it is always directive (Call and Tomasello, 2007;
Bullinger et al., 2011c). In stark contrast, from as soon as they can collaborate
meaningfully with others, at around fourteen to eighteen months of age,
young children use the pointing gesture to coordinate their joint activity
(e.g., Brownell and Carriger, 1990; Warneken et al., 2006, 2007)with, again,
a telling ambiguity about whether their motive is requestive or informative.
But also, outside of collaborative activities, even twelve-month-old infants
sometimes point simply to inform others of such things as the location of a
sought-for object. For example, Liszkowski et al. (2006, 2008) placed twelve-
month-olds in various situations in which they observed an adult misplace an
object or lose track of it in some way, and then start searching. In these situ-
ations infants pointed to the sought-for object (more often than to distractor
objects that were misplaced in the same way but were not needed by the adult),
and in doing this they showed no signs of wanting the object for themselves
(no whining, reaching, etc.). The infants simply wanted to help the adult by
informing her of the location of the sought-for object.
The emergence of the informative communicative motive, alongside the
general great ape directive motive, had three important consequences for the
evolution of uniquely human thinking. First, the informative motive led com-
municators to make a commitment to informing others of things honestly
and accurately, that is, truthfully. Initially during collaborative activities, but
then more generally (as humans interdependence extended outside of collab-
orative activities), if individuals wanted to be seen as cooperative, they would
commit themselves to always communicating with others honestly. Of course,
you may still lie: you point to where you want me to search for my spear even
though it is not really there, for some selfish motive. But lying only works if
there is first a mutual assumption of cooperation and trust: you only lie because
you know that I will trust your information as truthful and act accordingly.
And so, while there is still some way to go to get to truth as an objective
feature of linguistic utterances (see chapter 4), if we want to explain the origins
of humans commitment to characterize the world accurately independent
of any selfish purpose, then being committed to informing others of things
honestly, for their not our benefit, is the starting point. The notion of truth
thus entered the human psyche not with the advent of individual intentionality
and its focus on accuracy in information acquisition but, rather, with the
advent of joint intentionality and its focus on communicating cooperatively
with others.4
The second important consequence of this new cooperative way of com-
municating was that it created a new kind of inference, namely, a relevance
inference. The recipient of a cooperative communicative act asks herself: given
that we know together that he is trying to help me, why does he think that I
will find the situation he is pointing out to me relevant to my concerns. Con-
sider great apes. If a human points and looks at some food on the ground, apes
will follow the pointing/looking to the food and so take itno inferences
required. But if food is hidden in one of two buckets (and the ape knows it is
in only one of them) and a human then points to a bucket, apes are clueless
(see Tomasello, 2006, for a review). Apes follow the humans pointing and
looking to the bucket, but then they do not make the seemingly straightfor-
ward inference that the human is directing their attention there because he
thinks it is somehow relevant to their current search for the food. They do not
make this relevance inference because it does not occur to them that the hu-
man is trying to inform them helpfully since ape communication is always
directive and this means that they are totally uninterested in why the hu-
man is pointing to one of the boring buckets. Importantly, it is not that apes
cannot make inferences from human behavior at all. When a human first sets
up with them a competitive situation and then reaches desperately toward one
of the buckets, great apes know immediately that the food must be in that one
(Hare and Tomasello, 2004). They make the competitive inference, He wants
in that bucket; therefore the food must be in there, but they do not make the
cooperative inference, He wants me to know that the food is in that bucket.
This pattern of behavior contrasts markedly with that of human infants.
In the same situation, prelinguistic infants of only twelve months of age trust
that the adult is pointing out to them something relevant to their current
searchthey comprehend the informative motiveand so they know imme-
diately that the pointed-to bucket is the one containing the reward (Behne
etal., 2005, 2012). The mutual assumption of cooperativeness in such situations
is so natural for humans that they have developed a special set of signals
ostensive signals such as eye contact and addressing the other vocallyby
means of which the communicator highlights for the recipient that he has
some relevant information for her. Thus, as evolutionary example, suppose
that while we are collaboratively foraging I point to berries on a bush for you,
with eye contact and an excited vocalization. You look and see the bush but,
at first, no berries. So you ask yourself: why does he think that this bush is rel-
evant for me and this makes you look harder for something that is indeed
relevant and thus you discover the berries. As communicator, I know that
you, as recipient, are going to be engaging in this process if and only if you see
me as directing your attention cooperatively, and so I want to make sure that
you know that I am doing this. Therefore, I not only want you to know that
there are berries here but also want you to know that I want you to know
this so that you will follow through the inferential process to its conclusion
(Grice, 1957; Moore, in press). By addressing you ostensively, and based on
our mutual expectation of cooperation, I am in effect saying, You are going
to want to know this and you do want to know it because you trust that
Ihave your interests in mind.
The third and final consequence of this newly cooperative way of com-
municating was that there now emerged, at least in nascent form, a distinc-
tion between communicative force as overtly expressed in requestive and
informative intonationsand situational or propositional content as indicated
by the pointing gesture. (NB: Th is means that by this time early humans
would have had to control their vocal expressions of emotions voluntarily in
a way that apes do not.) Early humans could now point toward berries in a
bush, with one of two different motives, expressed intonationally: either an
insistent requestive intonation, in the hopes that the recipient would fetch
some berries for her, or a neutral intonation to just inform the recipient of the
berries location so that she might get some for herself. We thus now have a
clear distinction between something like communicative force and commu-
nicative content: the communicative content is the presence of the berries,
and the communicative force is either requestive or informative. All of this is
implicit, of course, and so we still have some way to go to reach the convention-
alized and so explicit distinction between communicative force and content
that is so important in conventional linguistic communication (see chapter 4).
But the breakthrough here is the relative independence of referential (situa-
tional, propositional) content from the communicators motives or intentions
for referring attention to it.
And so, early humans joint collaborative activities created a new motiva-
tional infrastructure for their communication, a cooperative motivation to
inform one another of things helpfully and honestly. Th is then motivated
recipients to do significant inferential work to find out why the communicator
thought that looking in a certain direction would be relevant for their con-
cerns, which then motivated communicators to advertise when they had some-
thing relevant for a recipient. And the fact that there were now two different
communicative motives possiblerequestive and informativemeant that
the situational (propositional) content of the communicative act was starting
to be conceptualized as independent of the particular intentional states of the
communicator.
New Ways of Thinking for Communicating

The motive to be helpful and cooperative in communication meant that, from
the cognitive point of view, communicators had to be able to determine which
situations were relevant to a recipient on a particular occasion. Conversely,
recipients had to be able to identify the intended situation and its relevance for
them, in essence by determining which situation in the direction of his point-
ing gesture the communicator thinks is relevant or interesting for them on this
occasionand why. The basic problem is that what the communicator wishes
to point out to the recipienthis communicative intention5is a whole fact-
like situation, for example, that there are bananas in the tree, or that there are
no predators in the tree. But the act of pointingthe protruding fingeris
the same in all cases. The puzzle is how does one point out for a recipient dif-
ferent situations in the same perceptual scene?
The key to this puzzle is that the participants in a communicative interac-
tion mutually assume the relevance of the communicative act for the recipient
(Sperber and Wilson, 1996), and this relevance is always in relation to some-
thing that is in our common ground (Tomasello, 2008). Independent of com-
munication, a situation is relevant to you for your own individual reasons. But
for me to direct your attention to that situation successfully in communica-
tion, you must know that I know it is relevant for you; indeed, we must know
together in our common ground that it is relevant for you. The simplest situa-
tion is thus when we are in a collaborative activity with the immediate com-
mon ground created by our joint goal. For example, if we have been searching
unsuccessfully for bananas all day, you will naturally assume that my pointing
gesture toward the banana tree is intended to indicate for you the fact that
there are bananas in that tree. On the other hand, if we spied the bananas to-
gether some minutes ago but there was a predator in the tree and so we waited,
and now the predator seems to have left, you will naturally assume that I am
indicating for you the fact that there is now no predator in the tree. Common
ground and a mutual assumption of relevancenot possible for apes because
they simply do not engage in this kind of cooperative communication
enable a meeting of minds in the direction of the protruding finger.
Following the analysis in chapter 2, relevant situations are those that present
individuals with opportunities and/or obstacles for reaching their goals and
maintaining their values. Thus, if during our search for fruit I point toward a
distant banana tree, it would never occur to you that I might be pointing out
the presence of the leaves, even if leaves is all that you see at the moment, since
the presence of leaves is in no way relevant to what we are doing. Instead, you
will continue looking until you see, for example, some bananas behind the
leaves, whose presence is highly relevant to what we are doing. Another dimen-
sion of this process is that only new situations are communicatively relevant,
since currently shared situations need not be pointed out. And so, in the
example from above, after the predator left the banana tree I pointed to
the banana tree with the intention to indicate the situation of the predators
absence, which you readily discerned. How could I intend and you infer preda-
tor absence when the presence of the bananas is also highly relevant? Because
the presence of the bananas was already in our current common ground, and
so me pointing out this situation to you would be superfluous. If I am going to
be helpful, I must point out situations that are new for you, or else why bother.
And so, in human cooperative communication, both communicators and
recipients mutually assume in their common ground that communicators
point out for recipients situations that are both relevant and new.
Perhaps surprising, even young infants are skillful at keeping track of the
common ground they have with specific other individuals and using that to
determine relevance in both the comprehension and production of pointing
gestures. For example, Liebal et al. (2009) had a one-year-old infant and an
adult clean up together by picking up toys and putting them in a basket. At
one point the adult stopped and pointed to a target toy, which the infant then
cleaned up into the basket. However, when the infant and adult were clean-
ing up in exactly this same way, and a second adult who had not shared this
context entered the room and pointed toward the target toy in exactly the
same way, infants did not put the toy away into the basket; they mostly just
handed it to him, presumably because the second adult had not shared the
cleaning up game with them as common ground. Infants interpretations
thus did not depend on their own current egocentric activities and interests,
which were the same in both cases, but rather on their shared experience with
each of the pointing adults. (In another study, Liebal et al. [2010] found that
infants of this same age also produced points differently depending on their
common ground with the recipient.)
Infants in this same age range also use a mutual assumption of newness to
determine what a pointing adult thinks is relevant for them. Thus, Moll et al.
(2006) had eighteen-month-old infants play with an adult and a toy drum.
If a new adult now entered the room and indicated the drum excitedly, the
child assumed he was talking about the cool drum. But if the adult with
whom the child had just been sharing enjoyment of the drum pointed to the
drum excitedly in exactly the same manner, the child did not assume that she
was excited about the drum: how could she be, since it is old news for us?
Rather, children assumed that the adults excitement must be due to some-
thing new about the drum that they had not previously noticed, and so they
attended to some new aspect, for example, on the adults side of the drum. In
their production of pointing, infants also use this distinction between shared
and new information. For example, when a fourteen-month-old infant wanted
his mother to put his high chair up to the dining room table: on one occasion
he pointed to the chair (because he and his mother had already shared atten-
tion to the empty space at the table), whereas on another occasion he pointed
to the empty space at the table (because he and his mother had already shared
attention to the chair) (Tomasello et al., 2007a). In both cases the infant wants
the exact same thinghis chair placed at the tablebut to communicate
effectively he assumes that the object he and his mother are focused on is al-
ready part of their common ground, and so he points out the aspect of the
situation that she may not have noticed, the new part.6
Engaging in cooperative (ostensive-inferential) communication of this type
requires some new types of thinking. In effect, all three components of the
thinking processrepresentation, inference, and self-monitoringmust
become socialized.
With respect to representation, the key novelty is that both participants in
the communicative interaction must represent one anothers perspective
on the situation and its elements. Thus, the communicator attempts to focus
the recipients attention on one of the many possible situationsfact-like
representationsimmanent in the current perceptual scene (e.g., there are
bananas in the tree versus there is no predator in the tree). The communica-
tive act thus perspectivizes the scene for the recipient. It also perspectivizes
the elements. For example, if we are building a fire, me pointing out to you the
presence of a log construes that log as firewood. But if we are tidying up the
cave, me pointing out to you the presence of that very same log construes it as
trash. In the object choice task, the communicator is not pointing to the bucket
qua physical object or qua vessel for carrying water, but rather qua location:
Iam informing you that the reward is located in there. Cooperative pointing
thus creates different conceptualizations or construals of things. These presage
the ability of linguistic creatures to place one and the same entity under alter-
native different descriptions or aspectual shapes, which is one of the hall-
marks of human conceptual thinking; but it does this without the use of any
conventional or symbolic vehicles with articulate semantic content.
With respect to inference, the key point is that the inferences used in co-
operative communication are socially recursive. Thus, implicit in all of the
foregoing is a kind of backing-and-forthing of individuals making inferences
about the partners intentions toward my intentional states. In the object choice
task, for example, the recipient infers that the communicator intends that she
know that the food is in that bucket a socially recursive inference that great
apes apparently do not make. This inference requires in all cases an abductive
leap, something like: his pointing in the direction of that otherwise boring
bucket would make sense (i.e., would be consistent with common ground,
relevance, and newness) if it is the case that he intends that I know where the
reward is. The communicator, for his part, is attempting to help the recipient
to make that abductive leap appropriately. To do this, at least in many situa-
tions, the communicator must engage in some kind of simulation, or think-
ing, in which he imagines how pointing in a particular direction will lead the
recipient to make a particular abductive inference: if I point in this direction,
what inferences will he make about my intentions toward his intentional states?
And then, when making his abductive inference, the recipient can potentially
take into account the communicators taking into account of what kind of
inference she is likely to make about his communicative intentions. And so
forth.
Finally, with respect to self-monitoring, the key is that being able to oper-
ate in this way communicatively requires individuals to self-monitor in
anew way. As opposed to apes cognitive self-monitoring, this new way was
social. Specifically, as an individual was communicating with another, he
was simultaneously imagining himself in the role of the recipient attempting
to comprehend him (Mead, 1934). And so was born a new kind of self-monitoring
in which communicators simulated the perspective of the recipient as a kind

of check on whether the communicative act was well formulated and so was
likely to be understood. This is not totally unlike the concern for self-image
characteristic of early humans (noted earlier in the discussion of collabora-
tion) in which individuals simulate how they are being judged by others for
their cooperativenessit is just that in this case what is being evaluated is
comprehensibility. Importantly, both of these kinds of self-monitoring are
normative in a second-personal way: the agent is evaluating his or her own
behavior from the perspective of how other social agents will evaluate it. Of
this process, Levinson (1995, p.411) says, There is an extraordinary shift in
our thinking when we start to act intending that our actions should be coordi-
nated withthen we have to design our actions so that they are self-evidently
perspicuous.7 This social self-monitoring for intelligibility in cooperative
communication lays the foundation for modern human norms of social ratio-
nality, where social rationality means making communicative sense to ones
partner.
These new processes of thinking involved in cooperative communication
are well illustrated by two studies with young children. First, from the point
of view of the communicator, is a study by Liszkowski et al. (2009) with twelve-
month-old infants. In this study, an adult played a game with an infant in
which the infant repeatedly needed a particular kind of object, always found
in the same location on a plate. At some point, the infant needed one of those
objects, but none was around. To get one, many infants alighted upon the
strategy of pointing for the adult to the empty plate, that is, to the location
where they both knew in common ground that those kind of objects usually
are found. To perform this communicative act, the infant had to simulate the
adults process of comprehension: what abductive inference (about my inten-
tions toward her intentional states) will she make if I point to the plate? That
this is not just a simple association is suggested by the fact that chimpanzees,
who are perfectly capable of associative learning, in this same setup made no
attempts to direct the humans attention to the empty plate (even though
they did make pointing attempts in other contexts in this same study). The
children simulated the adult making inferences about their intentions toward
her intentional states.
To illustrate the process even more dramatically, and from the point of view
of comprehension, we may consider the phenomenon of markedness. On
some occasions, a communicator may mark (e.g., with intonational stress)
something in her communicative act as out of the ordinary, so that the recipient
will not make the normal inference but rather a different one. For example,
Liebal et al. (2011) had an adult and a two-year-old child again tidying up
toys into a large basket. In the normal course of events, when the adult pointed
to a medium-sized box on the floor, the child took this to suggest that she
should tidy up this box into the basket as well. But in some cases the adult
pointed to the box with flashing eyes and a kind of insistent pointing directed
at the child, obviously not the normal way of doing it. The adult clearly intended
something different from the norm. In this case, many children looked at the
adult puzzled but then proceeded to open the box and look at what was in-
side (and tidy it up). The most straightforward interpretation of this behavior
is that the child understood that the adult was anticipating how she would
construe a normal point, which he did not want, and so he was marking his
pointing gesture so that she would be motivated to search for a different in-
terpretation. This is the child thinking about the adult thinking about her
thinking about his thinking.
And so, the kind of thinking that goes on in human cooperative commu-
nication is evolutionarily new in that it is perspectival and socially recur-
sive. Individuals must think (simulate, imagine, make inferences) about their
communicative partner thinking (simulating, imagining, making inferences)
about their thinkingat the very least. Great apes show no signs of making
such inferences, and their failure to comprehend even the simplest acts of
cooperative pointing, for example, in the object choice task (while making non-
recursive inferences in the same task setting), provides positive evidence that
they do not. Human thinking in cooperative communication also involves a
new kind of social self-monitoring, in which the communicator imagines
what perspective the recipient is taking, or will take, on his intentions toward
her intentionsand so imagines how she will comprehend it. In all, what we
have at this point in our evolutionary story of human communication is indi-
viduals attempting to coordinate their intentional states, and so their actions,
by pointing out new and relevant situations to one another. This relies on their
having a certain amount and type of common ground, and it requires, further,
that the interactants make a series of interlocking and socially recursive infer-
ences about one anothers perspectives and intentional states.
Symbolizing in Pantomime
Beyond the pointing gesture, the second form of natural communication that
humans employ is spontaneously generated, nonconventional iconic gestures,
or pantomime. These gestures are used to direct the imagination of others to

nonpresent entities, actions, or situations. Iconic gestures go beyond simply
directing attention to situations deictically, as in pointing, by actually sym-
bolizing an entity, action, or situation in an external icon. Iconic gestures are
natural because they employ normally effective intentional actions, just in
a special way. The recipient can, on the basis of observing them, imagine the
real actions or objects the communicator is pantomiming, and then, in the
context of their common ground, make the appropriate inference to his com-
municative intention. Examples of informative uses of iconic gestures would
be things like warning of a nearby snake by moving ones hand in a slithering
motion, telling of a deer at the waterhole by miming antlers on ones own
head (or the sound of his vocalization), or identifying the whereabouts of a
friend by pantomiming him swimming. With the appropriate common ground,
such gestures communicate very effectively about all kinds of nonpresent
situations.
No nonhuman primates use iconic gestures or vocalizations. Great apes
could easily gesture with their hands the way that humans do to mime eating
or drinking, but they do not.8 Indeed, great apes do not even understand
iconic signs. In a modified object choice experiment, a human held up a rep-
lica of the object under which food was hidden. Two-year-old children knew
that this meant to search in the similar-appearing object, while chimpanzees
and orangutans did not (Tomasello et al., 1997; Herrmann et al., 2006). In
ongoing research we have been trying to elicit iconic gesturing from apes in
situations in which it would benefit them to do so (e.g., showing a human
how to extract food for them from an apparatus that only they know how to
operate), but so far with no success. Presumably, great apes do not understand
iconic gestures because they do not understand communication marked
ostensively as for you (cooperatively). If an ape views someone hammering
a nut, they know perfectly well what he is doing, but if they view him making
a hammering motion in the absence of any stone or any nuts, they are simply
perplexed. To comprehend iconic gestures, one must be able to see inten-
tional actions performed outside of their normal instrumental contexts as
communicationbecause they are marked as such by the communicator via
various kinds of ostensive signals (e.g., eye contact). Extending an analogy
from Leslie (1987) on pretense, the bizarre action must be quarantined from
straightforward interpretation as an instrumental action by marking it as
for communication only.
Another prerequisite for an individual to produce an iconic gesture is that

he is able to produce with his body an action that resembles a real action (or
object). Presumably the ability to do this derives from the ability to imitate, at
which humans are especially skillful compared with other apes (Tennie et al.,
2009). Somehow early humans came to understand that imitating an action
not for real but with an ostensive communicative intention (simulating it in
action) could lead a recipient to imagine all kinds of referential situations not
in the current perceptual scene. One potentially important social context in
this connection is teaching, which has the evolutionary advantage that the
primal scene is one of an adult instructing its offspring. Csibra and Gergely
(2009) explicate what they call natural pedagogy and note its close connec-
tion to cooperative communication. The most basic form of natural pedagogy
is demonstrating: showing someone how to do something by either doing it
directly or pantomiming it in some way. And like communication, the action
is being done not for its own sake but for the benefit of the observer/learner.
Communicating with iconic gestures thus requires both an understanding of
ostensive communication and some ability to imitate actions.
Importantly, iconic gestures may depict the referential object or action
quite faithfully, but then it can still be, as in pointing, a large inferential leap
to the underlying communicative intention. Thus, to bridge the gap, just as in
the case of pointing, common ground and mutual assumptions of cooperation
and relevance are needed. If I mime for you a snakes motion as we approach
a cave, if you do not know that snakes are often found in caves, you might
wonder why I am waving my hand in that way. In the contemporary world,
we recently observed a young child going through airport security. The guard
scanning her with his wand moved his hand in a circular motion to tell her to
turn around so he can scan her backside. Staring at him, she slowly began
moving her hand in a circular motion back at him she did not understand
that his hand was meant to represent her body. Apparently, they did not have
in their common ground airport security procedures.
Whereas there is only one basic pointing gesture,9 there are myriad possi-
ble iconic gestures a discrete infinity, perhaps. With iconic gestures there
is, or at least can be, a more or less one-to-one correspondence of gestures and
the intended referent (though typically only one aspect of an intended refer-
ential situation is mimed). This means that iconic gestures, even though not
conventional, have a kind of semantic content. With pointing, I can in prin-
ciple indicate for you the shape, size, or material of a piece of paper, within
the appropriate common ground, but the unique perspective in each case is
not in any way contained in the protruding finger itself (see Wittgensteins
[1955] incisive, if cryptic, discussion of this issue). But with iconic gestures,
I would indicate for you the shape, size, or material of a piece of paper or
whether I want you to write on the paper or throw it awayby depicting each
of these different aspects or actions with different icons. The momentous new
feature of iconic gestures is thus that the different perspectives of things and
situations only implicit in pointing are now expressed overtly in external sym-
bolic vehicles with semantic content.
Relatedly, the vast majority of communicative conventions in a natural
language are category terms. That is, common nouns and most verbs are con-
ventionalized for reference to categories of entities such as dog and bite, which
means that to make reference to a specific dog or instance of biting, we must
do some kind of pragmatic grounding (such as with the or my dog, or the dog
who lives next door in the case of nouns; or tense and aspect markers, as in is
biting or bit, in the case of verbs). Iconic gestures are already category terms,
because they implore the recipient to imagine something like this. (It is pos-
sible that one could iconically gesture an individual as wellfor example, by
mimicking her idiosyncratic mannerismsand so the distinction between
common and proper nouns is at least in principle possible in this modality.)
The categorical dimension is bound up with perspective in the sense that call-
ing someone either Bill or Mr. Smith is not perspectival because these are not
category terms, but calling him a father or a man or a policeman is perspectival
because it puts him under a description, that is, it perspectivizes him differ-
ently on different occasions for different communicative purposes.
Iconic gestures are thus an important step on the road to linguistic conven-
tions in that they are symbolic, with semantic content, and are at least poten-
tially categorical. An interesting fact that reinforces this point is that although
young children produce some iconic gestures from early in development,
they actually go down in frequency over the second year of life as children
begin learning language, whereas pointing increases in frequency during the
same period. One hypothesis is that pointing increases because it does not
compete with language but complements it by performing a different func-
tion. As symbolic vehicles with semantic content, iconic gestures compete with
linguistic conventions, and they lose the competitionfor many obvious
reasonswhich usurps the need to create spontaneous gestures on the spot,
except in a few exceptional circumstances. If one imagines an evolutionary
box 2. Pantomime as Imagining in Space
Communicating with iconic gestures and pantomime might plausibly have

had two large and important cognitive consequences. The first stems from
its intimate involvement with and therefore stimulation ofimagination
and pretense. Iconic gestures enable reference to things ever farther removed
in space and time than does pointing, and at the moment of communica-
tion these must be imagined. When I gesture to inform you that there is an
antelope out of sight over the hill, or to warn you that there are snakes in
this cave we are about to enter, or to relate what happened to us on our
just-finished hunting trip, I have to act out whole scenarios in which some
of the key players are not even present and the actions are either long past or
only predicted.
The proposal, then, is that iconic gesturing both depends on preexisting

skills of imagination and also takes these skills to new places. Whereas a
chimpanzee might imagine what awaits her at the waterhole, we are now
talking about depicting for another person in some kind of playacting such
imagined scenestailored for the recipients knowledge and interests, given
our common ground, so that she will be capable and motivated to compre-
hend. It is not unreasonable to suppose, then, that humans evolved ever
more powerful forms of imagination to be able to act out scenes for
othersin a kind of joint imagining. Indeed, we see this behavior in very
young children on a daily basis as they pretend with a parent or peer that
this stick is a horse or that they are Superman. The evolutionary origins of
pretend playwhich would seem to be a bit mysterious because its function
is not so obvious are thus, in the current account, to be found in panto-
miming as a serious communicative activity. In modern humans, panto-
miming for communication has been supplanted by conventional language.
As children learn a conventional language, their tendency to communicate
to others by creating pretend scenarios in gesture has no place to go, so to
speak. They thus play with this ability and create pretend scenarios together
with others, as a pretense activity with no other motivation. A number of
scholars have argued as well that engaging in pretense is one source for the
distinction between appearance and reality (e.g., Perner, 1991), as I act out
Xfictively in order to represent the real X, as well as for counterfactual
thinking in general (Harris, 1991).
(continued )
box 2 (continued )
And so the first surprising effect of iconic gestures is that their emergence in
human evolution led to skills of acting out pretend scenarios with and for
others, which may be the basis for humans creation of all of the imagi-
nary situations and institutions within which they reside. In addition, to
anticipate our story a bit, it is also reasonable to suppose that the creation of
what Searle (1995) calls cultural status functions such as being a president
or a husband and pieces of paper standing for (indeed, constituting)
moneyhas its phylogenetic and ontogenetic roots in pretend play in which
children together anoint a stick as a horse, which gives the stick special
powers, in a manner very similar to anointing a person as a president
(Rakoczy and Tomasello, 2007). If thinking is at base a form of imagining,
then one can hardly overestimate the importance of imagining things for
other people, as embodied in iconic gestures, for the evolution and develop-
ment of uniquely human thinking (Donald, 1991).
The second cognitive effect of iconic gestures and pantomiming is even

more speculative. Almost everyone who studies human cognition recognizes
the crucially important role of spatial conceptualizations. There are
undoubtedly multiple reasons for this, some of them having simply to do
with the importance of space in primate cognition in general. It is well
known, for example, that episodic memory has intimate connections to
spatial cognition.
But more recently, some theorists have dug more deeply into this connec-
tion. Beginning with the pioneering work of Lakoff and Johnson (1979), it is
well known that humans quite often talk about abstract situations or
entities metaphorically or analogically in terms of concrete spatial relation-
ships. As just a few examples, we talk about putting things into and taking
them out of our lectures, we fall into love, we are on our way to success, or
we are going nowhere in our career, or I am out of my mind, or she is
coming to her senses, and on and on. We are not talking about just surface
metaphors here, but very basic ways of conceptualizing complicated and
abstract situations. Thus, in his follow-up work, Johnson (1987) identified a
number of so-called image schemas that seem to permeate our thinking,
such as containment (in and out of a lecture), part-whole (the foundation of
our relationship), link (we are connected), obstacle (my lack of education gets
in the way of my social life), and path (we are on our way to marriage).
Even in the grammars of languages, a number of scholars have noted the

inordinate prominence of space, with some even creating such things as
space grammars. Some of the early work on syntactic case relationships
also emphasized that many case markers emerged first historically from
words for spatial relationships (adpositions of various kinds). Talmy (2003)
has posited a human imaging system that structures grammar via a very
strong spatial component. Thus, one of his central schemas is the force
dynamic schema in which actors cause effects in other entities (e.g.,
investors anxieties crashed the stock market), and another is various kinds
of fictive motion along paths. He has also noted that many complex
relationships are expressed spatially, with topological relationships predomi-
nating. Even more strongly, conventional signed languages use space to
depict all kinds of grammatical relationships, from anaphoric reference to
case role (e.g., Liddel, 2003)which is important if humans earliest
linguistic conventions were, as hypothesized here, in the gestural modality.
In terms of ontogeny, Mandler (2012) has argued and presented evidence

that childrens earliest language is made possible by a set of mainly spatial
image schemas such as animate motion, caused motion, the path of motion,
obstacles to motion, containment, and so forth. These form the conceptual
foundation for childrens early talk about agents doing things (Slobins [1985]
manipulative activity scene) and objects going places (Slobins [1985]
figure-ground scene, in which objects move along paths). These are the
things children first talk about, and fundamental spatial relationships in
motion along paths play a prominent role at all stages.
The speculation is thus that in addition to numerous other reasons for space
being important in human cognition, a critically important reason is that at
an early stage in their evolution humans conceptualized many things for
others in their gestural communication in a fictive space with fictive actors
and actions. Basically, the only way to depict many things in spontaneous,
nonconventionalized gestures is by acting out in space the referent objects
and events. And so if we believe that human thinking is intimately tied to
communicationhow we have come to conceptualize things for others
then the fact that we did this for some time in our history by pantomiming
in space may go a long way toward explaining the inordinately important
role of space in human cognition.
analog, the story would be one of conventional forms of communication

mainly taking over from iconic gestures, whereas pointing would persist. In
both evolution and ontogeny, then, the ability to act out nonactual situations
could then potentially emerge again in other functions, for example, pretense
and other forms of fiction (see box 2).
Iconic gestures thus represent a kind of middle stage in human communi-
cation and thinking that bridges from pointing for others informatively and
perspectivally in the context of common conceptual ground to conventional
linguistic communication. This bridging step involves external forms of sym-
bolic representation that have semantic content categorized. Nevertheless, iconic
gestures almost always have a potentially problematic ambiguity of perspective.
If I mime the throwing of a spear, who is supposed to be throwing itme,
you, or someone else? Of course, this typically is determined through our
common ground context; it is normally clear if I am requesting you to do it,
expressing my desire to do it, or reporting on our friends activity. But in some
situationsfor example, depicting the mornings hunting eventsit might
not be clear who is throwing the spear. The only way to resolve this ambiguity
is with further communicative acts, either deictic or iconic. And this leads us
to the most complex way in which early humans communicated with natural
gestures before conventional languages: combining their gestures in multiunit
expressions.
Combining Gestures
Great apes do not create new communicative functions by combining their
gestures, their vocalizations, or their gestures and vocalizations together (Liebal
et al., 2004; Tomasello, 2008). But humans do, including young children
from the earliest stages of their communicative development, and including
even children exposed to no conventional language, vocal or signed, at all
(Goldin-Meadow, 2003).
While there is no principled reason why someone could not string together
various pointing gesturesand individuals may do this on occasionthis is
not commonly observed. Beginning language learners combine their earliest
linguistic conventions with pointing or other conventions, and beginning sign
language learners produce iconic or conventional signs in combination with
pointing (as do, again, children exposed to no conventional language at all;
Goldin-Meadow, 2003). As originating context in evolution, one can easily
imagine situations in which an individual pantomimed somethingsuch as

eatingand then immediately afterward, in a second thought, pointed to
some particular piece of foodfor instance, the fruit over there (this process
is thus analogous to the successive single word utterances in early child lan-
guage, or the broken utterances in pidgin languages). But then, through a
process of mental combination (Piaget, 1952), these successive thoughts or
intentions came to be integrated into a single thought or intention and so ex-
pressed as a single utterance within a single intonation contour. With some
minimal skills of categorization, individuals could form a schema comprising,
for example, an iconic gesture for eating followed by indexical indication of
anything edible either by oneself or by others. Productivity in thinking would
be thus scaffolded and enhanced by this overt communicative schema.
It is important to emphasize that just as in child language, in early human
communication there would have been functional continuity between differ-
ent expressions of the same referential intention, no matter their internal com-
plexity. For example, one could communicate that there are snakes in the cave
either with a snake motion as we approach the cave or by combining a snake
motion with a pointing gesture to the cave (e.g., if we are not approaching it)
both with the same communicative intention or function. Combining symbolic
and deictic vehicles is not the creation of new communicative intentions, pri-
marily, but rather the parsing of existing ones into their component parts.
This means that in combinations a single gesture is typically indicating only
one aspect of a situation. Thus, whereas the snake motion while approaching
the cave is intended to communicate that there are snakes in the cave, in com-
bination with pointing to the cave (or iconically depicting the cave) this snake
motion now only indicates the snakes themselves, as the rest of the situation is
indicated through other communicative devices. This focus on function and
the parsing of situations into components with different subfunctions are re-
sponsible for the hierarchical organization of human communication.
With gesture combinations we now also have the possibility of beginning
down the path to the subject-predicate organization characteristic of full
propositions.10 Two ingredients are involved, both of which are already present,
in nascent form, in pointing inside collaborative activities. The first ingredi-
ent is the specific cognitive distinction between events and participants. Even
apes learning human-like forms of communication distinguish events and
participants in their sign combinations (see Tomasello, 2008, for evidence).
The second ingredient is the distinction between shared (or given) and new
information. As noted above, even in pointing there is an implicit distinction

between the shared common ground, which typically is not indicated spe-
cifically by the pointing gesture, and the new and noteworthy situation,
which is indicated deictically. But this is all implicit. With gesture combina-
tions, what often happens is that one or more signs are used to make contact
with the common groundtypically to use it as a perspective or topicand
then to indicate with another sign the new and interesting information. In
many situations, one can imagine that one points to a perceptually present
referentto make sure that it is sharedand then iconically signs about some
aspect of it that one thinks is new and noteworthy for the recipient.
The overall picture is thus that early humans used their pointing and
iconic gestures, both singly and in combination, to communicate much more
richly and powerfully than did their primate cousins. This new form of com-
munication took place initially inside of collaborative activities, which sup-
plied the interactants with both the necessary common conceptual ground
and the necessary opportunities for interchanging roles and perspectives with
their partner. Early humans cooperative communication with natural gestures
thus required both levels in our dual-level conception of joint collaborative
activities: joint goals and attention, as the shared aspect, and individual roles
and perspectives, as the individual aspect. And none of this required language.
Communicators conceptualizing or perspectivizing things in different ways
for different communicative partners (depending on judgments of common
ground, relevance, and newness), and then recipients comprehending the
intended perspectives through socially recursive inferences, is not the result
of becoming a language user, but rather its prerequisite.
Second-Personal Thinking
We are trying to get to the full flowering of modern human objective-reflective-
normative thinking in the context of culture and language. We are halfway
there. With the reconstructed early humans we are picturing here, we have
creatures who are not just strategizing how to obtain food or mates in bigger,
better, and faster ways than others, as are great apes, but rather who are attempt-
ing to coordinate their actions and intentional states with others via evolution-
arily new forms of collaborative activity and cooperative communication. They
are not just organizing their actions via individual intentionality; they are also
organizing them via joint intentionality. And this changed the way they imag-
ined the world so as to manipulate it in acts of thinking.
Perspectival, Symbolic Representations

Great apes schematize cognitive models for the various types of situations
that are recurrent and important in their lives. And so when early humans
began engaging in obligate collaborative foraging, they schematized a cogni-
tive model of the dual-level collaborative structure comprising a joint goal
with individual roles and joint attention with individual perspectives. With
cooperative communication, early human individuals began overtly indicat-
ing or symbolizing for a partner situations that were relevant to her, given her
individual role and perspective in the joint activity. To do this, they created
evolutionarily new forms of natural gesturespointing and pantomiming
whose use resulted in cognitive representations that had three new and trans-
formative characteristics.
P e r s pe c t i va l . Conceptualizing things from different perspectives comes

so naturally to humans that we consider it as almost inevitable; it is just the
way cognition works. Typically in cognitive science, concepts are character-
ized in English words, such as car, vehicle, and anniversary present, that can be
applied as needed, even to the same entity sitting in the driveway. But this way
of doing things is not inevitable; indeed, it is not even possible for creatures
that cannot triangulate with another individual simultaneously on the same
entity. Great apes may sometimes apply different schematic representations to
one and the same entity: on one occasion a particular tree is an escape route,
whereas on another occasion it is a sleeping place. But each of these different
conceptualizations is tied to the individuals current goal state; she may know
many things about the tree, but she does not entertain them as alternative pos-
sible construals simultaneously, and so they are not interrelated perspectives in
the way we have defined them here (and this is true even if the ape is solving a
problem by imagining nonactual entities or situations, because even here she
is doing this aimed only at her current problem situation).
In contrast, when early humans began to communicate cooperatively with
others, they were constantly taking the others perspective on a situation or
entity to which they themselves were already attending (they were triangulat-
ing with the other). Indeed, each time they communicated, they had to make
their communicative act relevant and new for the recipient in the context of
her goals and values, their common ground, and her existing knowledge and
expectations. As they were thus thinking how their communicative act
might fit into the life of the recipient, communicators had to consider several
alternative perspectives simultaneously, and only then choose a communica-

tive act to instantiate one of them. For example, in order to warn of danger,
they might pantomime for a recipient as they approached a cave either a snake,
or a snake bite on the leg, or just a general danger sign (which the recipient
would know, in the context of their common ground about caves, meant
snakes).
The key point from the perspective of cognitive representation is that com-
municators were not tied to their own goals and perspectives, but rather they
were considering alternative perspectives for another person, whose conative
and epistemic states they could only imagine. For her part, the recipient, in
order to make the abductive leap necessary to grasp the communicators com-
municative intentions, had to then simulate his perspective on her perspective
(at least). This transacting in perspectives meant that early human individuals
did not just experience the world directly for themselves, in the manner of all
apes but, in addition, at least in some aspects, experienced the exact same
world viewed simultaneously from different social perspectives. This triangu-
lating process inserted for the first time a small but powerful wedge between
what we might now call the subjective and the objective.
S y m b o l i c . Iconic gestures, or pantomime, also seem mundane to humans,

who have the ability to imitate one anothers actions, and to even imitate or
simulate their own past actions outside of their normal instrumental context.
But they are anything but mundane, as they represent the first acts by any pri-
mate (arguably any animal species) that attempt to re-present for a recipient, in
overt action, some event or entity, so that she will imagine it. Iconic gestures also
require that the recipient comprehend communicative intentions (in our story,
already in the comprehension of pointing) so that she can quarantine these
gestures as not actual instrumental acts but rather acts of communication.
Producing communicative acts that resemble their intended referents (e.g.,
miming a monkey climbing) creates a symbolic relationship in which the act
is meant to evoke in imagination the intended referent (e.g., a monkey or an
act of climbing or a monkey climbing), which is hoped to lead the recipient to
infer the communicators communicative intention (e.g., that they go hunting
for monkeys now). Like pointing, iconic gestures perspectivize a situation, but
unlike pointing, they do this articulately in the symbolic vehicle itself. For
example, with iconic gestures one would have different icons for monkey and
food even if, on different occasions, they were used for the exact same animal,
whereas in pointing, the act (protruding finger) would be the same in both
cases, with the common ground of the collaborative activity (whether we are
admiring the local fauna or seeking sustenance) carrying the semantic weight.
Another important feature of iconic gestures is that they are mostly categori-
cal in nature, that is, used to conceptualize or perspectivize things, events, or
situations like this. In choosing what to act out for others in pantomime,
then, communicators construe the situation from a particular perspective cat-
egorically, as opposed to other possible categorical perspectives.
Q ua s i - P ro p o s i t i o n a l . Combining gestures into a single communicative

act parses the referent situation into something like event-participant struc-
ture, which limits the semantic scope of each gesture. Thus, pantomiming a
monkey in combination with pointing to a spear now suggests even more
articulately the desired hunting trip, but the gesture for monkey is now con-
fined to symbolizing the monkey only, not the hunting trip as a whole. In
combination with the already established tendency to background knowledge
in common ground (topic) and to explicitly communicate about new infor-
mation (focus), this parsing creates a nascent subject-predicate organization
in the communicative actresulting in something on the way to full propo-
sitions. (Interestingly, great apes raised by humans with a human-like com-
munication system typically make the event-participant distinction, but not
the topic-focus distinction [because they do not have any notion of a shared
focus of attention or topic], and so they do not have subject-predicate organi-
zation in their multiunit communicative acts [see Tomasello, 2008].) The
addition of a new cooperative communicative motive made for two distinctly
marked motives (requestive and informative), which created a first nascent
distinction between communicative force and content.
With the advent of early human collaboration and cooperative communi-
cation, then, the cognitive representation of experience in type-token format, as
in great apes, was cooperativized. Individuals interacting in joint attention
and common conceptual ground could conceptualize the same event, entity,
or situation simultaneously from multiple perspectives. The symbolization of
these perspectives in categorical iconic gestures and in gesture combinations
with topic-focus organization, with some indication of a force-content dis-
tinction, made them at least incipiently propositional as well. This process
might be seen to effectively decontextualize (cooperativize or make less ego-
centric) the individuals experience of the world, as he decides under which
symbolic description to represent a situation for a communicative partner.

With this perspectival crack in the experiential egg, we are on our way to think-
ing that is in some sense objective.
Socially Recursive Inferences

Socially recursive inferences, once again, seem so natural for humans as to be
barely noticeable: I wonder what she thinks Im thinking. Great apes make
inferences about experiencethey simulate the causes and outcomes of physi-
cal and social situationsbut they do not make inferences about what the
other is thinking about their thinking. Such inferences begin with early
humans attempting to coordinate their actions and attention with others in
collaborative activities with joint goals and attention, but they come into full
flower with early humans attempting to coordinate their intentional states
and perspectives with others in cooperative communication.
In the context of a joint collaborative activity, early human communica-
tors began thinking about (i.e., simulating) how best to formulate their com-
municative act for a recipient, with the goal of both honesty (engendered by
a concern with being cooperative in general) and communicative efficacy. The
concern with honesty especially given that recipients were now becoming
epistemically vigilant (Sperber et al., 2010)puts us on the road to a com-
mitment to the truth of our communicative acts. The concern with commu-
nicative efficacy required that both communicator and recipient anticipate
the perspective of their partner, which required socially recursive inferences
that embedded the intentional states of one partner within those of the other.
In addition, the production of overt combinations of gestures for others, once
they were schematized, created unprecedented new possibilities for produc-
tive inferences about nonactual or even counterfactual states of affairs. Early
human inferences thus display two new and transformative properties.
S o c i a l ly R e c u r s i v e . We may reasonably ask why early human com-

municators began making socially recursive inferences in the first place. The
short answer is that they assumed together in common ground that the com-
municator had cooperative motives, and so they were collaborating toward the
joint goal of recipient comprehension. In this context, they were each trying
to help the other as in all joint collaborative activities and this meant
simulating what the other was thinking about their thinking. And since
pointing and pantomiming on their own are quite weak communicative vehi-
cles, inferential leaps of at least some distance are always required to recon-
struct the communicators communicative intention so that at least some
help is almost always needed.
And so developed a form of communication in which a communicator
intended that a recipient know something, for her benefit. The recipient un-
derstood this and so, for example, understood that he intends for me to know
that the banana is in that bucket. The communicator, for his part, knew that
the recipient would make such an inference if he helped her to do so by alert-
ing her to the fact that he had such an intention (the Gricean communicative
intention that the recipient notice that the communicator wants her to know
something). This may not be one multiply embedded communicative inten-
tion, as in the Gricean analysis, but rather, as argued by Moore (in press) two
singly embedded intentions: I intend that you notice that this communicative
act is for you, plus I intend that you know that the banana is in that bucket.
Nevertheless, the single embedding in this second intention is already more
than great apes can do, and so it represents a new form of recursive inference
(the production version occurring when the communicator simulated the re-
cipients intentional states in order to formulate communicative acts that
would be readily comprehensible for hernot throwing the ball at her, but
rather to her).
C o m b i n ato r i a l . Communicating with others using overt gestures, and

especially being able to combine gestures to communicate with others in more
complex ways, enabled new processes of productive thinking. In their natural
communication with one another, great apes do not combine gestures with
one another (nor vocalizations) to communicate something new. Their think-
ing is thus confined to imagining novel situations using their past individual
experiences reconfigured in new ways. But once early humans began imagin-
ing situations from the perspective of the other in order to communicate with
combinations of gestures, and then schematized these combinations, they had
the possibility to go beyond their own experience to think about something
that others might experience, or even something impossible. For example, I
might produce an iconic gesture for traveling followed by pointing to a loca-
tion, which I generalize to any location. I might then imagine or communi-
cate, via this schema, our child traveling to the sun something I consider
causally impossible. When humans began schematizing communicative
constructions with abstract slots in this way, they created for themselves
almost unlimited combinatorial freedom. Schema formation in communi-
cative acts and the parsing of communicative intentions into discrete overt
components represent a significant step in the direction of the kind of in-
ferential promiscuity characteristic of modern human thinking in a con-
ventional language.
Beyond the new possibilities for creating novel, even counterfactual thoughts
via external communicative vehicles, a number of theorists have emphasized
the necessary role of such external vehicles for individuals to reflect on their
own thinking (e.g., Bermudez, 2003). When individuals formulate an overt
communicative act and then perceive and comprehend it as they produce it,
they are, in effect, reflecting on their own thinking (a process that may become
internalized so that we may think about things that we could potentially com-
municate overtly). Because the gesture combinations at this point have only
limited semantic content (e.g., no logical vocabulary and no propositional atti-
tude vocabulary), early humans could reflect only in a highly limited way on
their own thinking.
With the advent of early human collaboration and cooperative communi-
cation, then, the causal inferences of great apes were, like their cognitive repre-
sentations, cooperativized. This meant that the communicators inferences
were about what was the situation from the perspective of the recipient, and
the recipients inferences were about the communicators simulations of her
simulating his perspective. Overt combinations of symbols, especially if sche-
matized, led to the possibility of thinking various new and even counterfac-
tual thoughts, as well as to the first, rather modest, reflections on ones own
thinking. With all of these new inferential possibilities, then, we are now well
on our way to thinking processes that are truly reflectively reasoned.
Second-Personal Self-Monitoring
Great apes self-monitor their goal-directed behavior, including its psychologi-
cal underpinnings with respect to such things as memory and decision making.
But great apes are not normative creatures. They experience instrumental
pressure, for example, when they have a goal to eat food and they know that
food is available at location X; this implies that they must go to location X.
But this is just the way control systems with individual intentionality work: a
mismatch between goal and perceived reality motivates action. In contrast,
early humans began to self-monitor from the perspective of others and, indeed,
self-regulated their behavioral decisions with others evaluations in mind. Now
we may talk of something that is socially regulated, that is, socially norma-
tive, albeit only in second-personal (as opposed to agent-neutral) form. There
were two manifestations.
C o o pe r at i v e S e l f - M o n i to r i n g . First, because the collaborative ac-

tivities of early humans were interdependent and operated with partner choice,
each individual, even the most dominant, had to respect the power of other
individuals, even the most subordinate, to exclude them from collaborative
opportunities. Early humans thus developed not only an ability to make evalu-
ative judgments about others cooperative proclivities but also an ability to
simulate, and so to anticipate, the evaluative judgments that others were mak-
ing about them. Young human children are concerned with the social evalua-
tions of others from the preschool years on as they attempt to actively manage
the impression they are making on them (Haun and Tomasello, 2011), but
chimpanzees seem to be not so concerned (Engelmann et al., 2012).
Early humans concerns for how their collaborative partners viewed them
and their active attempts to manage this impressionprovided a new motive
for actions, namely, to coordinate with the evaluative expectations of potential
partners. Individuals thus began to cede power over themselves to the second-
personal evaluations of others because these evaluations determined their fu-
ture collaborative opportunities. From the point of view of normativity, this
meant that in making their behavioral decisions, humans not only experienced
individual instrumental pressure but also experienced second-personal social
pressure from their partners in social engagements. This constitutes, in the cur-
rent account, one origin of what will later become social norms of morality.
C o m m u n i c at i v e S e l f - M o n i to r i n g . Second, because early human

communicators wanted to facilitate the recipients comprehension, they had
to actively self-monitor their potential communicative acts in anticipation of
how they might be comprehended and/or interpreted by the recipient. They
thus engaged in a self-monitoring of the communicative process, from the
perspective of the recipient, especially for intelligibility.
Mead (1934) pointed out the key role of overtness here. As they communi-
cated with others in overt acts either deictic or symbolic early humans
saw or heard themselves performing those acts, in which case they then
comprehended them (as perspectivized for another) as the recipient. Commu-

nicators thus adjusted their communicative act so as to maximize the com-
prehension of the recipient, as part of their commitment to the collaborative
act of cooperative communication. Making such adjustments required self-
monitoring and evaluating communicative acts for comprehensibility from
the perspective of specific communicative partners, each with her own indi-
vidual knowledge and motives and common ground with the communicator.
This constitutes, in the current account, one origin of what will later become
social norms of rationality.
The early humans we are picturing here would thus have been able to en-
gage in two kinds of cooperative and communicative self-monitoring that
great apes cannotbecause great apes do not engage in the kind of joint col-
laborative activities and cooperative communication that engenders such so-
cial self-monitoring. Early humans simulated the evaluative judgments that
others made of them with regard to their cooperative proclivitiesprecursors
to norms of moralityand also with regard to the intelligibility of their com-
municative actsprecursors to norms of rationality. Importantly, the evalua-
tions we are talking about here come from particular individuals, and so we
are still a way from the kind of agent-neutral, objective norms by which
modern humans evaluate others and themselves. But we have begun the pro-
cess of socially normativizing individual thinking.
Perspectivity: The View from Here and There

It is now widely accepted that what most clearly distinguishes nonhuman
primates from other mammalian species cognitively is their complex skills of
social cognition. Dunbar (1998), for example, documented that primate brain
size correlates most strongly not with primates physical ecology but, rather,
with their social group size (as a proxy for social complexity). But primates
special skills of social cognition are aimed mainly at competition (i.e., their
intelligence is Machiavellian), in which they keep track of all of the various
dominance relationships in the group, as well as all of the various affiliative
relationships in the group as these might affect the competition for food and
mates.
The question thus arises whether the uniquely human skills of cognition
and thinking that we have identified here might instead have arisen for com-
petition. On the level of evolutionary function (ultimate causation), this is
true almost by definition, since evolutionary success is defined as having

more offspring than others. But on the level of proximate mechanism, we do
not think it likely that perspectival cognitive representations, socially recur-
sive inferences, and social self-monitoring could have arisen directly out of
competitive contexts. It is true that, in theory, one could get a kind of arms
race in mind reading to deal with competitive situations. In competition,
individuals could come to realize that both me and my competitor are focused
on the same resource at the same time ( joint attention?) and then to try to out-
compete her for that resource by thinking about what she is thinking about
my thinking. But what we for sure cannot get strictly from competition are
the unique forms of cooperative communication in which humans engage.
Unlike other primates, humans use their communicative acts to actually en-
courage others to discern their thinking. Thus, human communicators take
the perspective of others in order to determine their goals and interests so
that they can then inform them of something helpful to them. Those others
want this helpful information, and so they do their best to help the commu-
nicator discern their goals and interests, and also to discern their knowledge
and expectations so that he may formulate his communicative act in a com-
prehensible manner. Humans, but not other primates, thus collaborate in
their communication to make it easier for the other to take their perspective
and even to manipulate it if they so desire.
An especially enlightening example of a similar cooperative process con-
cerns a unique physical characteristic of humans. Of the more than two
hundred species of primates, only humans have highly visible eye direction
(because of especially visible white sclera; Kobayashi and Koshima, 2001).
And only humans use this information. Thus, when tested in various condi-
tions contrasting head and eye direction, twelve-month-old human infants
tended to follow the eye direction over the head direction of others, whereas
great apes tended to follow the head direction of others only (Tomasello et al.,
2007b). For humans to have evolved conspicuous cues of gaze direction, there
must have been some advantage to the individual to advertise her eye direc-
tion for others. This suggests predominantly cooperative situations in which
the individual may rely on others using this information collaboratively or
helpfully, not competitively or exploitively. The point is that human commu-
nicative acts serve to advertise the internal states of individuals in this same
way, and so it also suggests cooperation of this same type (e.g., cooperative re-
quests such as Id like some fruit are advertisements of my internal state of
desire, and informative utterances such as There is some fruit over there are
public offers of helpful information). Communication of this type could
never be adaptively stable in contexts that were not fundamentally coopera-
tive, and so fully human-like skills of joint intentionality could never evolve
solely in the context of competition.
There can be no doubt that the last common ancestor to humans and other
primates engaged in individual thinking in pursuit of individual goals, mostly
in order to compete with groupmates for valued resources. Along the way, they
attended to situations relevant to those goals. Early human individualsin
response to a changing feeding ecologythen began to join together with
other individuals dyadically in pursuit of joint goals, and they jointly attended
to situations relevant to that joint goal. Each participant in the collaboration
had her own individual role and her own individual perspective on the situa-
tion as part of the interactive unit. This dual-level structuresimultaneous
jointness and individualityis the defining structure of what we are calling
joint intentionality, and it is foundational for all subsequent manifestations of
human shared intentionality.
The problem was how to coordinate these collaborative activities as they
became ever more complex, both to negotiate a joint goal and to coordinate
the two different roles. The solution was cooperative communication. Early
humans directed the attention of their collaborative partner to relevant situa-
tions by pointing, which required taking her perspective and simulating her
thinking (i.e., in terms of the abductive leap she might be expected to make
given different possible communicative acts). To comprehend, the recipient
had to take the perspective of the communicator taking her perspective
which constituted to a new form of socially recursive inferring. Early humans
concern that their partner comprehend them led to social self-monitoring via
the anticipated evaluations of the partner with respect to the comprehensibil-
ity of the communicative act.
The basic cognitive challenge in all of this was to coordinate ones own per-
spective with the perspective of ones collaborative partner. And so, as early
humans engaged in the truck and barter of making a living collaboratively,
they began to truck and barter in perspectives with their interactive partners
communicativelyand in their own perspectives reflectively to some degree
and this gave human cognitive representation and inference a new kind of flex-
ibility and power. Now, instead of just their own view on the world, early hu-
mans could also view the world at the same time from the perspective of the
other, which might also include her perspective on my perspective. Early hu-
mans had not just a great ape view from here, but rather a view simultaneously
from here and there.
We do not know precisely who these early humans were, but we may spec-
ulate Homo heidelbergensis some 400,000 years ago, living as loosely struc-
tured bands or pools of recurrently collaborating partners. Of course Homo
heidelbergensis did not engage in modern human forms of fully objective-
reflective-normative thinking. Their thinking was not objective but rather
was still tied to the two second-personal perspectives of I and you. Their
thinking was only weakly reflective because they could express very few of
their intentional states or cognitive operations externally in communicative
vehicles (and so they could act as both producers and comprehenders of only
some limited semantic content). And their thinking was socially normative
only in the sense that they were concerned with how their partner evaluated
their cooperative behavior and comprehended their communicative acts, not
with the groups normative standards. There is thus no question that we are
still some way from modern human collective intentionality and its objective-
reflective-normative thinking. But, we would argue, the in-between step of
early human joint intentionality and its perspectival-recursive-socially moni-
tored thinking was necessary for getting there. It was necessary because the
transition to modern humans was all about creating cultural conventions, and
if these were to be in a cooperative directionas they almost invariably were
then some very strong cooperative tendencies had to be already present in the
individuals doing the conventionalizing.
Together, then, early human collaborative activities and cooperative com-
munication represent a kind of second-personal cooperativization of great
ape lifeways and thinking. But these evolutionarily new forms of second-
person social interaction involved joint engagement with specific other per-
sons on specific occasions only, and they did not retain their special character-
istics very far outside of the collaborative activities themselves. And so, despite
the great leap forward represented by this new joint intentional way of living,
communicating, and thinking, the next leap forward will have to take this
cooperativized cognition and thinking and collectivize it by conventional-
izing and institutionalizingand so normativizing and objectifyingalmost
everything.
4
Collective Intentionality
There is no thinking apart from common standards

of correctness and relevance, which relate what I do think
to what anyone ought to think. The contrast between
I and anyone is essential to rational thought.
wilfrid sellars, Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man
A modern human society may be characterized in two dimensions. The first

is its synchronic social organization: the coordinated social interactions that
make it a society in the first place. Early human individuals, as we have seen,
coordinated in acts of collaborative foraging with specific others from a
loosely structured pool of collaborators. But now with modern humans we
need to scale up to much larger social groups with much more complex social
organization, that is to say, to fully cultural organization. Modern humans
became cultural beings by identifying with their specific cultural group and
creating with groupmates various kinds of cultural conventions, norms, and
institutions built not on personal but on cultural common ground. They thus
became thoroughly group-minded individuals.
The second dimension of a modern human society is its diachronic trans-
mission of skills and knowledge across generations. Social transmission of one
sort or another was almost certainly important in the lives of early humans (as
it is in some apes lives), as difficult-to-invent, tool-based, subsistence activities
became ever more complex and important for survival. But now with modern
humans we need to scale up to full-fledged cultural transmission supporting
cumulative cultural evolution. This required that modern humans not just
acquire instrumental actions by observing others, as did early humans, but
actively conform to the behavior and norms of the group, and even enforce
conformity on others through teaching and social norm enforcement.
Col l ec t i v e In t en t iona l i t y 81
The combination of these changes in the two dimensions of human social-

ity created some totally new cultural realities. The transformative process was
conventionalization, which has both a coordinative component, as individuals
implicitly agree to do something in a consistent way (everyone wants to do
it this way as long as everyone else does, too), and a transmitive component,
as this way of doing things sets a precedent to be copied by others who want
to coordinate as well. The result is what we may call cultural practices, in
which individuals, in effect, coordinate with the entire cultural group via
collectively known cultural conventions, norms, and institutions. In commu-
nication this means, of course, linguistic conventions, which serve their coor-
dinative function because, and only because, they exist as agreements in
the groups cultural common ground.
In terms of thinking, early humans imagined the world in order to ma-
nipulate it in thought via perspectival cognitive representations, socially recur-
sive inferences, and social self-monitoringwhich prepared them to coordinate
with other specific individuals. But group-minded and linguistically compe-
tent modern humans had to be prepared to coordinate with anyone from the
group, with some kind of generic other. This meant that modern human in-
dividuals came to imagine the world in order to manipulate it in thought via
objective representations (anyones perspective), reflective inferences con-
nected by reasons (compelling to anyone), and normative self-governance so as
to coordinate with the groups (anyones) normative expectations. And these
group-minded ways of operating and thinking were not present just in specific
ad hoc collaborative interactions of the moment; rather, because of the way
that modern humans became competent members of a cultural group during
ontogeny, they created a permanent imprint in the human mind-set.
So once more let us look, first, at the new forms of collaboration evident in
human cultural organization, then at the new forms of conventional linguis-
tic communication for coordinating cultural life, and then at the resulting
new forms of agent-neutral, normatively governed thinking that cultural life
demanded.
The Emergence of Culture

A number of animal species, from whales to capuchin monkeys, engage in one
or another form of social transmission, requiring some form of social learning.
The most cultural of nonhuman animals are undoubtedly the great apes, espe-
cially chimpanzees and orangutans. Observations in the wild have documented
for these two species a relatively large number of population-specific behaviors
that persist in the group over time and that very likely involve social learning
(Whiten et al., 1999; van Schaik et al., 2003). Experimental studies have also
demonstrated some skills of social learning in these two species, for example,
in learning to use novel tools, that very likely are at work in generating their
cultural patterns in the wild (see Whiten, 2010, for a review).
But great ape culture is not human culture. Tomasello (2011) characterizes
great ape culture as mainly exploitive, as individuals socially learn from others
who may not even know they are being watched. Modern human culture, in
contrast, is fundamentally cooperative, as adults actively teach children, altru-
istically, and children actively conform to adults, as a way of fitting in coopera-
tively with the cultural group. The hypothesis is that this cooperative form of
culture was made possible by the intermediate step of early humans highly
cooperative lifeways and how this transformed great ape social learning into
truly cultural learning. Teaching borrows its basic structure from cooperative
communication in which we inform others of things helpfully, and conformity
is imitation fortified by the desire to coordinate with the normative expectations
of the group. Modern humans did not start from scratch but started from early
human cooperation. Human culture is early human cooperation writ large.
Group Identification
The small-scale, ad hoc collaborative foraging characteristic of early humans
was a stable adaptive strategyfor a while. In the hypothesis of Tomasello
etal. (2012), it was destabilized by two, essentially demographic, factors.
The first factor was competition with other humans. This meant that a
loose pool of collaborators had to turn into a proper social group in order to
protect their way of life from invaders. A loose social grouping of early humans
was under pressure to transform into a coherent collaborative group with
joint goals aimed at group survival (each group member needing the others as
collaborative partners for both foraging and fighting) and division-of-labor
roles toward this end. As with early humans smaller-scale collaborations,
this meant that group members were motivated to help one another, as they
were all now clearly interdependent with one another at all times: we must
together compete with and protect ourselves from them. Individuals thus
began to understand themselves as members of a particular social group with

a particular group identity a culturebased on a we-intentionality encom-
passing the entire group.
The second factor was increasing population size. As human populations
grew, they tended to split into smaller groupings, leading to so-called tribal
organization in which a number of different social groupings were still a single
supergroup or culture. This meant that recognizing others from our own
cultural group became far from trivialand of course we needed to ensure
that they could recognize us as well. Such recognition in both directions was
important because only members of our cultural group can be counted on to
share our skills and values and so be good and trustworthy collaborative part-
ners. Contemporary humans have many diverse ways of marking group iden-
tity, but one can imagine that the original ways were mainly behavioral: people
who talk like us, prepare food like us, and net fish in the conventional way
that is, those who share our cultural practicesare very likely members of our
cultural group.
And so early humans skills of imitation became modern humans active
conformity, both to coordinate activities more effectively with in-group strang-
ers and to display group identity so that others will choose me as a knowledge-
able and trustworthy partner. Teaching others to do things, perhaps especially
ones children, became a good way to assist their functioning in the group
and to ensure even more conformity in the process. Teaching and conformity
then led to cumulative cultural evolution characterized by the ratchet effect
(Tomasello et al., 1993; Tennie et al., 2009; Dean et al., 2012) in which modi-
fications of a cultural practice stayed in the population rather faithfully until
some individual invented some new and improved technique, which was then
taught and conformed to until some still newer innovation ratcheted things
up again. Tomasello (2011) argues that great ape societies do not display the
ratchet effect or cumulative cultural evolution because their social learning is
fundamentally exploitative and not cooperatively structured in the human
way via teaching and conformity, which constitute the ratchet that prevents
individuals from slipping backward.
The new sense of group identity characteristic of modern humans was
thus extended not just in space to in-group strangers but also in time to
ancestors and descendants in the group: this is the way we have always done
things; it is part of who we are. As cultural practices were handed down
across generations cooperativelyadults altruistically teaching and youngsters
trusting and even conformingthe resulting cumulative effect was that the
we became an enduring culture to which we (past, present, and future) are
all committed ( just as early humans were committed to their ongoing, small-
scale collaborations). Human populations thus became more than a loosely
structured pool of collaborators; they become self-identified cultures with
their own histories. Once again, precisely when this all happened is not
crucial to our story, but the first clear signs of distinct human cultures appear
with Homo sapiens sapiens, that is, modern humans, beginning at the earliest
some 200,000 years ago.
That humans do indeed think of their group as a we of interdependent
individualsthat humans identify with their groupis a well-established
psychological fact. Most fundamentally, humans have a marked in-group/out-
group psychology that is, in all likelihood, unique to the species. Much re-
search shows that humans favor their in-group in all kinds of ways, and they
care about their reputation more in their in-group than in any out-groups as
well (Engelmann et al., in press). Moreover, they think of others from other
groups not just as strangers, as do apes and as did early humans, but as mem-
bers of specific out-groups with alien, often despised ways. Perhaps the most
striking phenomenon of group identity is collective guilt, shame, and pride.
Individuals feel guilty, ashamed, and/or proud when an individual of their
group does something noteworthy in basically the same way that they would
if they themselves had done the deed (Bennett and Sani, 2008). In the con-
temporary world, one sees such group identity and collective guilt, shame, and
pride quite clearly in struggles over ethnic identity, linguistic identity, collec-
tive responsibility, and so forthand even in such frivolous phenomena as fan
support of sports teams. As far as we know, great apes do not have, and early
humans did not have, this sense of group identity at all.
The proposal is thus that with increasing population sizes and competition
among humans, the members of human groups began to think of themselves
and their groupmates (known and unknown, present and past) as participants
in one big, interdependent, collaborative activity aimed at surviving and thriv-
ing in competition with other human groups. Group members were identified
most readily by specific cultural practices, and so teaching and conformity to
the groups lifeways became a critical part of the process. These new forms of
group-mindedness led to what we may call the collectivization of human social
life, as embodied in group-wide cultural conventions, norms, and institutions
which transformed, one more time, the way that humans think.
Conventional Cultural Practices

Group identification means that human groups each have their own set of
conventional cultural practices. Conventional cultural practices are things
that we do, that we all know in cultural common ground that we do, and
that we all expect one another in cultural common ground to do in appropri-
ate circumstances. Thus, in an open barter food market in which a conven-
tionalized set of measurements for coordination is in place, if I show up with
my honey in unconventional containers, no other traders will know what to
do with me and my undetermined quantities of honey. With conventional
cultural practices, deviations are not punished per se; they are simply left on
the outside looking in. And there are some conventions that one cannot opt
out of: one can wear this clothing, or that clothing, or nothing at all, but
whatever one wears, it is a cultural choice that will either conform to or vio-
late the expectations of others in the group.
Unlike the second-personal common ground that early human individu-
als created with one another as they engaged in collaborative activities, the
common ground at this point is what Clark (1996) calls cultural common
ground: things that we all in the group know that we all know even if we did
not experience them together as individuals. Indeed, Chwe (2003) argues
that the main function of the public events of a culture is to make sure that
such things as the chief s coronation or his daughters marriage ceremony
become public knowledge: a part of the cultural common ground that every-
one can count on everyone else knowing, which no one can plausibly deny
knowing, and knowledge of which serves as a shibboleth of group member-
ship. Interestingly, children as young as two years of age are already tuned
into cultural common ground. Thus, Liebal et al. (2013) had two- and three-
year-old children meet a novel adult (clearly from their group). This in-group
stranger then asked them sincerely, Who is that? while they looked together
at a Santa Claus toy and a toy the child had just made before the adult entered.
Children answered by naming the newly created toy, as even children this
young know that no one in the culture, not even someone they have never
before met, needs to ask who is Santa Claus. (In a second condition they named
Santa Claus if the stranger asked for the name of a toy she seemed to recog-
nize.) Children in this same age range also expect that in-group strangers will
know the conventional name of an object but not a novel, arbitrary fact about
that same object (Diesendruck et al., 2010).
Some conventional cultural practices are the product of explicit agreement.

But this is not how things got started; a social contract theory of the origins
of social conventions would presuppose many of the things it needed to ex-
plain, such as advanced communication skills in which to make the agree-
ment. Lewis (1969) thus proposed another way to get started. We begin with
a coordination problem, say, what time to show up to go group fishing every
day at our new camp. Let us say that by chance we depart on the first day at
midday ( just because that is when enough people for the task have congre-
gated). Assuming no advanced communication skills, what do we do the next
day? Following Schelling (1960), Lewis (1969) proposes that we search for
anything to single out one time from all the others on this second day, and a
natural way of doing that for humans seems to be precedentwe do what
we did before (what worked for us before) and show up at midday again. And
so we habituate, and new participants just imitate and conform to us. Anyone
who does not conform simply does not participate.
But with the possibility of communication, we may also teach the conven-
tion to others and encourage them to conform and so to participate in the
cultural practice. Importantly for our understanding of collective intention-
ality, when adults teach children how to perform cultural practices, the children
take it not as communication about the current episodic event but, rather, as
something general about the world, applying to things and/or events like
these in general (i.e., Fishing takes place at midday). Thus, an adult might
communicate to a child, without teaching, that there is a fish right there in
the water. But when he goes into teaching mode the message is something
more like, These kind of fish are found in places like this, to facilitate the
childs fishing skills in general (Csibra and Gergely, 2009). The implication of
this pedagogical mode of cooperative communication is that there is a kind
of objective reality that works on general principles (these kinds of fish in
general, and these kinds of places in general), and the current situation is
merely one instance of this objective reality. Teaching is implicitly backed by
the collective and objective perspective on things developed by our cultural
group.
Modern human children are thus learning from adults that there are
certain ways that things should work. This should implicitly undergirding
adult teaching prompts children, in ways that we do not fully understand, to
objectify and reify the generic facts they are being taught into an objective
realitya generic perspective that is the ultimate adjudicator among differing
perspectives on the world. This process has many implications for human think-
ing, but a prominent one is the understanding of false beliefs (which great
apes clearly do not do; see Tomasello and Moll, in press, for a review). Thus,
we previously invoked something like Davidsons notion of social triangula-
tion to explain how it is that early humans came to understand that others
have perspectives that differ from their own. But to get to an understanding
of beliefs, including false beliefs, we must have some notion of a generalized
perspective on an objective reality that is independent of any particular per-
spective. Something like this is needed to make the judgment not just that
a belief is different from mine, but that it is wrong since objective reality is
the final arbiter. It is likely that young children begin to think in terms
ofmultiple different perspectives on things from as soon as they participate
in joint attention with its two perspectives during late infancy (Onishi and
Baillargeon, 2005; Buttelmann et al., 2009), and we may hypothesize that this
was the case for early humans as well. But it is not for several more years that
children come to a full-blown understanding of beliefs, including false beliefs,
because they (and so presumably all humans before modern humans) do not
yet understand objective reality.1
Social Norms and Normative Self-Monitoring

In the small-scale collaborative interactions of early humans, individuals ac-
tively chose some collaborative partners and shunned others, and in some
cases even rewarded and punished partners. But this was all done in second-
personal mode, that is, as one individual evaluating another individual. What
happened with modern group-minded humans was that these evaluations
became conventionalized and so applied in agent-neutral, transpersonal mode,
that is, applied by all to all (even by and to those not directly involved in an
interaction) and with respect to objective, transpersonal standards. Although
great apes retaliate for harm done to them, they do not punish other individu-
als for acts toward third parties (Riedl et al., 2012). In contrast, three-year-old
children enforce social norms on others even when they are not personally
involved or affected in any way, often using normative language about what
one should or should not do in general (Rakoczy et al., 2008; see Schmidt and
Tomasello, 2012, for a review).
Social norms are thus mutual expectations in the cultural common ground
of the group that people behave in certain ways, where the mutual expectations
are not just statistical but, rather, socially normative, as in you are expected to
do your part (or else!). The force of the expectations derives from the fact that
individuals who do not conform to our groups way of doing things often create
disruptions, which should not be tolerated, and indeed, if individuals behave
too differently it signals that they are not one of us (or do not want to be one of
us) and so cannot be trusted. Group-minded individuals thus view nonconfor-
mity in general as potentially harmful to group life in general. The result is that
humans conform to social norms for instrumental reasons (to coordinate suc-
cessfully), for prudential reasons (to avoid the groups opprobrium), and in order
to benefit of the groups functioning since nonconformity potentially disrupts
this functioning (a group-minded reason).
Like conventions in general, social norms operate not in second-personal
mode but rather in agent-neutral, transpersonal, generic mode. First, and most
basic, social norms are generic in that they imply an objective standard against
which an individuals behavior is evaluated and judged. In early humans so-
cial evaluations, individuals only knew who did things ineffectively or nonco-
operatively, but now the roles have specific agent-neutral standards (that can
be taught as such). These objective standards come from the mutual under-
standing of how the different functions in particular conventionalized cultural
practices are effected if everyone is to reap the anticipated benefit. Thus, if it is
cultural common ground in the group that when collecting honey the person
smoking out the bees must do so in this particular way, and that if she does
not do it in this way we will all go home empty-handed, then her behavior
may be evaluated relative to this objective standard for job performance.
Social norms are also generic in terms of their source. Social norms emanate
not from an individuals personal preferences and evaluations but, rather, from
the groups agreed-upon evaluations for these kinds of things. Thus, when an
individual enforces a social norm, she is doing so, in effect, as an emissary of
the group as a wholeknowing that the group will back her up. Group-
minded individuals thus enforce social norms because their collective com-
mitment to a social norm means that they commit not only to following
it themselves but also to seeing that others do, toofor the benefit both of
ourselves and of other group members with whom we are interdependent
(Gilbert, 1983). The typical formulation of individuals enforcing social norms
would be something like, One cannot do it like that; one must do it like
this, which is of course very similar to the generic mode used in teaching.
(Indeed, norm enforcement and teaching may be two versions of the same
phenomenon: enculturating individuals to our groups ways of doing and

thinking about things.) The presupposition of norm enforcement is that this
is the groups collective perspective and evaluation, or possibly even something
generalized beyond that to some deity or some external normative facts of the
universe: it is just the case in our world that this is the right way and that is
the wrong way to do it.
And finally, social norms are also generic in their target: group disapproval
is aimed in an agent-neutral way at in principle anyone, that is, anyone who
identifies with our groups lifeways and so mutually knows and accepts in
cultural common ground our social norms. (The common ground assump-
tion exempts from the force of our social norms individuals from another
social group, young children, and mentally incompetent persons [Schmidt
et al., 2012].) This agent neutrality in application is nowhere more evident than
in the fact that people apply social norms to themselves in acts of guilt and
shame. Thus, if I take some honey that is needed by others, I will feel guilty
under the force of the norm against stealing (perhaps undergirded by sympathy
for the victim). More telling, if some illicit avocation of mine is made public,
I will feel ashamed under the eyes of the group norm, even though I may not
feel that it is wrong at all. Guilt and shame thus demonstrate with special
clarity that the judgment being made is not my personal feeling about things
(Iwanted the honey and that avocation), but rather, it is the groupswhich is
especially clear in the case of shame, in which I may not even agree with the
group. Nevertheless, I, as an emissary of the group, am sanctioning myself.
Guilt and shame may thus have some second-personal bases in me feeling
bad that I harmed another individual or that I did not conform to the expec-
tations of valued others, but the full versions require in addition that I know
I violated a collective norm. It is not just that my victim feels bad, or that I
offended others sense of decency but, more important, that the groupwhich
includes me disapproves.
Because I know that things work in this way, I self-monitor and self-regulate
my actions via group norms so as to coordinate with the expectations of the
group. In this normative self-monitoring, as we may call it, what one is often
trying to protect is a public reputation, ones status as a cooperative member
of the group (Boehm, 2012). That is to say, with modern human collaboration
taking place on the level of the entire cultural collectivity, my behavior in
various contexts might be known to some degree in the cultural common
ground of the group as a whole (e.g., because of the pervasiveness of gossip,
done best in a conventional language; see below). This means that early humans
concern with being judged is transformed by modern humans into a concern
for ones public reputation and social status. And, critically, reputational status
is more than just a sum of many social evaluations; it is nothing less than a
Searlian status function (see next section) in which my public persona is a reified
cultural product created by the collectivity, who can take it away in a second,
as any scandalized modern politician can attest.
Institutional Reality
In the limit, some conventional cultural practices turn into full-blown institu-
tions. Obviously, the dividing line is fuzzy, but a basic prerequisite is that the
cultural practice is not a solo activity but is in some sense collaborative, with
well-defined, complementary roles. But the key feature distinguishing cul-
tural institutions is that they comprise social norms that do not just regulate
existing activities but, rather, create new cultural entities (the norms are not
regulative but constitutive). For example, a human group might tend to make
decisions about such things as where to travel next, how to set up defenses
against potential predators, and so forth, by simply arguing among themselves.
But if there are difficulties in making decisions, or infighting among several
coalitions, then the group could institutionalize the process into some kind
of governing council. Creating this council would give otherwise normal indi-
viduals abnormal status and powers. The council might then designate a
chief, whom they would empower to do still other abnormal things, like ban-
ish people from the group. The council and chief are thus cultural creations,
and their entitlements and obligations are bestowed upon them by the mem-
bers of the group, who can, in theory, take them away and so turn the council
members and chief back into everyday people again. The roles in institutions
are explicitly agent neutral because, in theory if not in practice, anyone may
play any role.
Searle (1995) has been most explicit about how this process works. First,
obviously, is some kind of mutual agreement or joint acceptance among group
members to designate, for example, an individual as chief. Second, there must
be some kind of symbolizing capacity so as to enact Searles well-known
formula X counts as Y in context C (X counts as chief in the context of
group decision making). Related to this, there should be some actual physical
symbolsomething like a leaders headdress or scepter or presidential sealto
help in marking the new status in a public way. The fact that institutions are
public means that everyone knows that everyone knows about them and can-
not plead ignorance in the face of overt symbolic marking. This is one reason
why new institutions and officials are anointed with their new obligations and
entitlements not just implicitly but explicitly and publicly. One could not do
something bad to a chief wearing his official headdress, right after his official
inauguration, and then plead ignorance of his status. Similarly with formally
written rules and laws: their public nature essentially means that one cannot
break them and expect to be excused by pleading ignorance.
Rakoczy and Tomasello (2007) argue that a simple model for understand-
ing cultural institutions is rule games. Of course one may move a piece of
wood shaped like a horse all around a checkered board in any way one likes.
But if one wants to play chess, then one acknowledges that this horse-shaped
piece is a knight, and one moves a knight only in certain ways, and the other
pieces in other ways, toward the goal of winning the game, where winning is
defined by certain agreed-upon configurations of pieces. The pieces are given
their statuses by the norms or rules, whose existence comes from, and only
from, the explicit agreement of the players. Thus, we would argue that the
ontogenetic cradle of such cultural status functions is young childrens joint
pretense when they, for example, designate together a stick to be a snake. In
doing this they are engaging in the fundamental act that creates new statuses
since, we would claim, this designation is a social, public agreement with ones
play partner (see Wyman et al., 2009). Importantly, although the ability to
pretend derives evolutionarily, as we have argued, from the way that early hu-
mans created pretend realities by pantomiming situations for others commu-
nicatively, the normative dimension comes only with the group-mindedness
and collectivity characteristic of modern human cultures.
The most important point for current purposes is that there are in the
modern human world social or institutional facts. These are objective facts
about the world: Barack Obama is president of the United States, the piece of
paper in my pocket is a 20 note, and one wins at chess by checkmating ones
opponent. At the same time that they are objective, however, these facts are
observer relative; that is, they are created by individuals in social groups, and
so they may be just as easily dissolved (Searle, 1995). Barack Obama is president
but only as long as we say so, euros are legal tender but only as long as we act
so, and, in theory, the rules of chess may be changed at any time. What is ab-
solutely extraordinary about social facts, then, is that they are both objectively
real and socially created, speaking once again to the power of the objectifi-
cation/reification process. Indeed, if one gives five-year-old children some
objects with almost no instruction, they very quickly create their own rules
for how to play with them, and they then apply these rules both to them-
selves and to new players as objective facts: One must do this first, It works
like this, and so forth (Goeckeritz et al., unpublished manuscript). As in
adult teaching and norm enforcement, the must here implies the guiding
hand of an objective reality, independent of the perspective or wishes of any
particular individual.
Summary: Group-Mindedness and Objectivity

The social interactions of early humans were wholly second-personal. The
social interactions of modern humans added on top of this a group-minded
layer, starting with identification with ones group. Individuals in a particular
cultural group know that everyone knows certain things, knows that every-
one else knows them, and so on, in the cultural common ground of the group.
There are collectively accepted perspectives on things (e.g., how we classify
the animals of the forest, how we constitute our governing council) and col-
lectively known standards for how par ticu lar roles in par ticu lar cultural
practices should be performedindeed, must be performedif one is to be
a member of the group. The group has its perspective and evaluations and
Iaccept them; indeed, I myself help to constitute the groups perspective and
evaluations, even if the target is myself.
Crucially, the generality involved in this new group-mindedness is not just
schematicity. We are not talking here about an individual perspective some-
how generalized or made large, or some kind of simple adding up of many
perspectives. Rather, what we are talking about is a generalization from the
existence of many perspectives into something like any possible perspective,
which means, essentially, objective. This any possible or objective perspec-
tive combines with a normative stance to encourage the inference that such
things as social norms and institutional arrangements are objective parts of
an external reality. The generic nature of the communicative intention in
both norm enforcement and pedagogy derives from the inherently generic
group-mindedness and social normativity governing the way that we expect
us to do things, which is then objectified into this is the way things are, or
ought to be, in the world at large.
Early humans dual-level cognitive model of jointness and individuality is

thus scaled up by modern humans into a group-minded cognitive model of
objectivity and individuality. Human group-mindedness thus reflects a pro-
found shift in ways of both knowing and doing. Everything is genericized to
fit anyone in the group in an agent-neutral manner, and this results in a kind
of collective perspective on things, experienced as a sense of the objectivity
of things, even those we have created. Thus is human joint intentionality
collectivized.
The Emergence of Conventional Communication

In addition to conventionalizing their social lives in general into collective
cultural practices, norms, and institutions, modern humans also convention-
alized their natural gestures into collective linguistic conventions. Early
humans spontaneous, natural gestures of the moment were important for
coordinating their many collaborative activities, but conventionalized ges-
tures and vocalizations collectively known by all of those who have grown
up in our cultural group, past and present, but not by others enabled much
more decontextualized and flexible forms of communication and social coor-
dination with all members of the cultural group, even those with whom one
had never before interacted.
Given a naive view of the nature of linguistic communication, one might
assume that the use of language obviates the need for thinking in the commu-
nicative coordination of intentional states: I encode my meaning in language,
and you decode itthe way telegraph operators used to work with Morse code.
But, in fact, this is not the way linguistic communication works (Sperber and
Wilson, 1996). For example, a large proportion of words in everyday spoken
discourse are pronouns (he, she, it), indexicals (here, now), or proper names
( John, Mary), whose referents cannot be determined from a codebook but
rather must be determined by accessing some kind of nonlinguistically consti-
tuted common conceptual ground. Moreover, our everyday discourse is liber-
ally peppered with seemingly incoherent sequences, for example, Me: Want to
go to a movie tonight? You: I have a test in the morning. For me to interpret
your answer as a No, we must share in common ground an understanding
that tests require studying beforehand, one cannot study and watch a movie at
the same time, and so forth. This common ground then makes possible my
abductive leap that you will not be coming with me to the movie.
And so the most basic thinking processes in linguistic communication are

the same as in the account of pointing and pantomiming in chapter 3. In in-
formative linguistic communication, I intend that you know something, and
so I refer your attention or imagination to some situation (my referential act)
in the hope that you will figure out what I intend you to know (my communi-
cative intention). Then you, relying on our common ground (both personal
and cultural), hypothesize abductively what my communicative intention
might be, given that I want you to attend to this referential situation. Thus, I
might come into your office and say, The city of Leipzig is running a tennis
camp for two months this summer. You comprehend my referential act per-
fectly well, but you have no idea why I am informing you of this situation. But
then the abductive light bulb comes on: oh, if he intended to make a sugges-
tion about what my children might do this summer (since we were talking
about that last week), then referring my attention to this fact would make
perfect sense. Anticipating this process, and in order to be an effective com-
municator, I attempt to simulate your potential abductive inference ahead of
time and so formulate my referential act to guide it in the intended direction
just as in pointing and pantomiming. For example, I might anticipate that if
Irefer to tennis camp without referring to this summer, she will think I
mean a tennis camp for herself and not for her kids summer activities a
process that is essentially me thinking about her thinking about my commu-
nicative act (which is itself an intention toward her intentional states).
Needless to say, communicative conventions add much more articulate
semantic content to the communicative act than do pointing and pantomim-
ing, perhaps making things easier, but they do not thereby obviate all of the
simulating, inferring, and thinking that must be done for two language users
to communicate about complex situations successfully. In addition, despite
this commonality of process with the use of spontaneous gestures at some
basic level, linguistic communication also provides some powerful new re-
sources for human thinking. We may focus on four of these, each elaborated
in its own section below: (1) communicative conventions as inherited concep-
tualizations, (2) linguistic constructions as complex representational formats,
(3) discourse and reflective thinking, and (4) shared decision making and the
giving of reasons.
Communicative Conventions as Inherited Conceptualizations

Early humans use of spontaneous iconic gestures as symbols to direct one
anothers attention and imagination to relevant situations now became, with
modern humans, conventionalized in the group. This meant not only that
interpreting a gesture depended on some personal common ground between
communicative partners in the moment, as before, but also that it now de-
pended on some cultural common ground about how we in this group expect
others in this group to use and interpret this gesture (and expect others to
expect us to, etc.). Thus, for instance, we all know in cultural common ground
that when one wants to direct the attention or imagination of a partner to a
snake-danger situation, one produces a wavy hand gesture in the direction
of the potential danger. Such conventions are coordination devices in the
sense that individuals want to use them only if everyone else uses them as well
(Lewis, 1969; Clark, 1996). Communicative conventions thus come to be
governed by constitutive norms in the sense that if I do not use them in the
conventional way, I am just not in the game. As Wittgenstein (1955) argued so
trenchantly, the criteria for conventional use are determined not by the indi-
vidual but by the community of users. I can rebel, but to what effect?
This cultural dimension to communicative conventions everyone in the
group is expected in cultural common ground to know them and to conform
to themmeans that we can now consider human communicative acts to
be fully explicit. Early humans made overt the way they were perspectivizing
situations for others, for example, by pointing out relevant situations with a
gesture, but the recipient could easily misunderstand, or even feign misun-
derstanding, and that would be the end of it. But now, if a modern human
uses a communicative convention such as a snake-danger gesture, the partner
cannot claim not to know it or, under normal circumstances, not to compre-
hend it. Since we all know the convention in cultural common ground, it is
explicit, and so one must respond. The modern human was thus now not only
under a second-personal pressure from the communicative partner to compre-
hend but also, in a sense, under normative pressure from the entire community:
if you are one of us, then you know how to operate with this convention.
Anyone not comprehending this communicative convention is just not one
of uswhich makes it culturally normative.
Iconic communicative conventions can quickly become noniconic. Th is
happens reliably in the birth of sign languages, as isolated deaf individuals,
who have been communicating their whole lives with hearing parents using
spontaneous iconic gestures, come together and conventionalize some of these
home signs. This often leads to a kind of stylization or shortening of signs
(see Senghas et al., 2004). Thus, the wavy hand for snake danger might be-
come abbreviated to the point of almost no waving. Typically this is because
the recipient can predict what is coming in the communicative situation; for
example, if she is about to turn over a rock, as soon as someone sticks out his
hand she can anticipate the snake-danger gesture. Children and other new-
comers would then just imitate or conform to the abbreviated hand-out (with
no waving) gesture to direct attention to snake-danger situations.2 Powerful
skills of imitation and conformity thus undermine iconicity in communica-
tion, as iconicity is not necessary in a group with cultural common ground
about what gesture to use for communicating about certain situations conven-
tionally. Communicative conventions can thus become arbitrary.
The implications of this conventional-arbitrary way of doing things for the
individual and her processes of thinking were, needless to say, momentous.
For one thing, children were now born into a group of people using a set of
communicative conventions that their ancestors had previously found useful
in coordinating their referential acts, and everyone was expected to acquire
and use exactly these conventions. Individuals thus did not have to invent
their own ways of conceptualizing things; they just had to learn those of oth-
ers, which embodied, as it were, the entire collective intelligence of the entire
cultural group over much historical time. Individuals thus inherited myr-
iad ways of conceptualizing and perspectivizing the world for others, which
created the possibility of viewing one and the same situation or entity simul-
taneously under different construals as, for example, berry, fruit, food, or
trading resource. The mode of construal was not due to reality, or even to the
communicators goals, but rather to the communicators thinking about how
best to construe a situation or entity so that a recipient would most effectively
discern his communicative intention.
In addition to this fundamentally new form of conventional/normative
and perspectival cognitive representation, communicating conventionally with
arbitrary devices also creates, or at least facilitates, two other new processes of
cognitive representation. The first is that the arbitrariness leads to a higher level
of abstractness. Thus, when gestures are purely iconic, the level of abstraction
is typically low and local. For example, with spontaneous iconic signs, open-
ing a door is pantomimed in one way whereas opening a jar is pantomimed
in another. This pattern is typical of the individually created home signs of

deaf children, which are under pressure to remain iconic since there is no
community of users with whom to conventionalize them. However, in a
community, as the iconicity fades for new learners, and arbitrary conventions
arise, there comes a more stylized depiction of open that is highly abstract and
resembles no particular manner of opening. This abstractness is characteristic
of many signs in conventional sign languages, and of course vocal languages
as well. Conventionalization, after a drift to the arbitrary, breeds abstractness.
One can imagine that acquiring large numbers of arbitrary communicative
conventions could lead to some kind of general insight that most of the com-
municative signs we use have only arbitrary connections to their intended
referents, and so, voil, we can make up new ones as needed.
The second new process of cognitive representation created, or at least facili-
tated, by arbitrary communicative conventions also involves abstractness, but
of a different type. Many of the most abstract conceptualizations in contem-
porary languages are single items for highly complex situations involving mul-
tiple agents doing things over time; for example, to define a term like justice,
one would most naturally proceed with a kind of narrative: justice is when
someone . . . and then someone. . . . It is difficult to imagine how to indicate
for others complex situations and events such as justice in pantomime, except
by acting out a kind of full narrative, and this is true even for more concrete
narrative events like a celebration or a funeral, for which one would also have to
pantomime whole sequences. But with arbitrary signs one may simply desig-
nate these complex situations with a single sign. This means that, in essence,
arbitrary signs open up the novel possibility of symbolizing aspects of the rela-
tional, thematic, or narrative organization of human cognitionin addition to
its straightforward categorical or schematized structure as symbolized by tree
or eatwhich expands the range and complexity of human thinking im-
mensely. As argued in box 1 (chapter 3), the source of human conceptual access
to this relational-thematic-narrative organizationwhich may now be desig-
nated with simple signsis complex collaborative activities with joint goals and
various constitutive roles. Markman and Stillwell (2001) refer to role-based
concepts for the role slots (e.g., tracker in a hunt) and schema-based concepts
for the overall activity (e.g., the hunting trip itself ), and it is unlikely that any
other organisms conceptualize this thematic dimension of experience.
Arbitrary communicative conventions after there is a critical mass
also create two new processes of inference. First, because humans communicate
for different purposes and at different levels of abstraction on different occa-

sions, the individual in a community of conventional communicators inher-
its a large inventory of communicative conventions that relate to one another
in complex ways. For example, one can imagine that in some contexts indi-
viduals would conventionalize a gesture or vocalization for indicating a gazelle,
whereas on other occasions they would conventionalize a gesture or vocalization
for indicating an animal in general (or maybe a potential animal prey of
whatever species). Children in this culture would learn, in different contexts,
both of these expressions. This now opens the possibility for not just causal
inferences but formal inferences. If I indicate for you that a gazelle is over the
hill, you may infer, based on your knowledge of things, that there is a poten-
tial animal prey over the hill, but you cannot make a similar inference in the
opposite direction from animal to gazelle. Although in theory one could have
spontaneous pantomimes at different levels of generality, it is only with col-
lectively known conventionalized signs that communicators can be certain
that recipients have the conventional means necessary to make such formal
inferences and so count on these inferences in formulating their communi-
cative acts.
Second, arbitrary communicative conventions come to form a kind of
system such that, precisely because of their arbitrariness, the referential range
of one is constrained by the referential range of others in the same semantic
field (Saussure, 1916). It is thus in our cultural common ground that I am
making a choice between certain conventional expressions that we both
know together I have available to me. For example, if I report to a friend that
I saw his brother foraging with a woman, the inference is that this was not
his wife, even though his wife is a woman, too, because if it had been his wife
I would have said wife and not woman. Or, if I say that our child ate
some of the meat, the inference is that he did not eat all of it because at
least in the context where we are both quite hungryif he had eaten all of it
I would have said so. These kinds of pragmatic implicatures permeate dis-
course among contemporary language users based on the common cultural
ground that we both have a certain inventory of conventional linguistic ex-
pressions from which we choose for communicative purposes. (Some of these
inferences are recurrent and thus become what are often called, conten-
tiously, conventional implicatures [Grice, 1975; Levinson, 2000].) Inferences
of this type are not generated in the same way by spontaneous pantomimes
or any other kinds of unconventionalized signs because in these cases it is not
in the cultural common ground of the group that everyone knows all of the
alternatives and so will be making inferences about a communicators choice
among them.
And so, with the advent of communicative conventions, we now have some
new forms of conceptualization. Modern humans inherit a set of commu-
nicative conventions in their cultural common ground with others in the group,
and the use of these conventions is normatively governed, in the sense that
deviance from them puts one outside the cultural practice. The arbitrariness
of communicative conventions means that they may be used to conceptual-
ize situations and entities of almost unlimited abstractness, including role-
relational, thematic, and narrative schemas. And with communicative con-
ventions, we now have collectively known inferential connections among
conceptualizations, both formal and pragmatic, which were not possible in
the same way with natural gestures.
Linguistic Constructions as Complex Representational Formats

If we imagine early modern humans with a small inventory of single-unit
(holophrastic) communicative conventions, along with general cognitive abili-
ties for creating novel mental combinations (possessed by all apes), we can
easily imagine them creating multiunit linguistic combinations. And so, for
example, perhaps there was a communicative convention for requesting eating
by moving the hand to the open mouth. And perhaps there was an unrelated
communicative convention for requesting going foraging for berries (miming
a picking motion). It would not take a genius, in a situation in which someone
offered something unpalatable to eat, to gesture eating followed by berries.
Then, given an existing ability for schematization (possessed by apes and early
humans, but now applied to conventions), one could imagine this individual
generalizing the conventional eating gesture to other conventional food ges-
tures, much like human toddlers do as they first say things like more juice,
followed soon by more milk, more berries, and so forth in a more X pat-
tern (so-called item-based schemas; Tomasello, 2003a).
Linguistic constructions begin with such simple item-based schemas but
then are elaborated and made more abstract through discourse interactions. The
key aspect of the process for current purposes is the communicative pressure
the demand for sufficient information coming from the recipient. This forces
the communicator to make things explicit that he might otherwise have left
implicit. Communicators stutter out a string of different utterances, pidgin

style, and recipients have to fill in the gaps inferentially. But communicative
breakdowns occur, and recipients demand more information about how to
relate the bits to one another, and so communicators must be more explicit
about their communicative intentions. This processin combination with
skills for integrating and automatizing sequencesturns things like I spear
antelope . . . he dead into I speared the antelope dead. When other, similar
schemas are created (e.g., I drank the gourd empty), the result is a conven-
tionalized linguistic construction, in this example the resultative construction
(Langacker, 2000; Tomasello, 1998, 2003b, 2008). In the words of Givn (1995),
todays syntax is yesterdays discourse.3
And so are born fully abstract linguistic constructions, which become
gestalt-like symbolic conventions in their own right, with their own abstract
communicative significance indicating different types of situations. For
example, young English-speaking children learn early abstract constructions
for (1) straightforward causal situations (e.g., the transitive construction: X
VERBed Y); (2) causal situations viewed from the perspective of the affected
object (e.g., the passive construction: Y got VERBed by X); (3) situations of
object movement (the intransitive locative construction: X VERBed to/into/
onto Y); (4) situations of transfer of possession (e.g., the ditransitive construc-
tion: X VERBed Y a Z); (5) situations in which an agent acts with no affected
object (e.g., the unergative intransitive construction: X smiled/cried/swam);
(6) situations in which objects change states with no specification of the
agent or cause (e.g., the unaccusative intransitive construction: X broke/
died); and so forth (Goldberg, 1995). Importantly, the communicative func-
tion of these abstract patterns is independent of the particular words used in
them, as these schematic depictions illustrate.
In using a construction, communicators invite recipients to view or imag-
ine situations from a particular perspective. Thus, in a conventional language
there are various ways of designating subject, as perspectival topic, no matter
who is performing or receiving the action. Thus, one and the same action
may be referred to as John broke the window, The window got broken by
John, Johns throwing of the rock broke the window, The window was
broken by Johns throwing of the rock, The rock broke the window, The
window was broken by the rock, and so on, depending of how the speaker
wishes to conceptualize the situation for the listener on a particular occasion
of use. Other constructions perspectivize the situation based on the commu-
nicators judgment of the recipients knowledge and expectations. For example,

the English cleft construction, as in It was John who broke the window, is
used to indicate that John did the breaking when the recipient currently
believes that someone else did; that is, it is used as a correction to a mistaken
belief (e.g., You: Bill broke the window. Me: No, it was John who broke
the window). MacWhinney (1977) argues that these different construals
derive from what communicators choose as their starting point or perspec-
tive for entering the event cognitivelywhich is conventionalized into the
grammatical topic or subject.
From a cognitive point of view, abstract constructions give humans a new
kind of abstract, syntagmatically organized conventional format for cogni-
tive representation. These abstract constructions enable linguistic items to
be used, and then reused, in a wide variety of different constructions, playing
different roles on different occasions. Importantly, this flexibility in how items
are used creates the need to explicitly mark the roles being played by different
items. If I gesture or vocalize man, tiger, eat, it is important to know who is
the agent and who is the patient of the eating activity. Modern-day languages
have a variety of means for doing this, such as case marking and contrastive
word order. Markers used to indicate participant roles may be seen as kind of
second-order symbols, because they are about the role the participant is playing
in the larger construction (Tomasello, 1992).4 Importantly for current pur-
poses, Croft (2001) argues that the linguistic items in an utterance gain
their communicative functions not via their syntactic relations to other items
but, rather, from the collaborative syntactic role they play in the utterance/
construction as a whole. A linguistic construction may thus be seen, in a way,
as a symbolic collaboration.
Abstract constructions are thus the main source of conventional linguistic
productivity, and thus conceptual productivity in thinking. Individuals sche-
matize and analogize to create abstract constructions, and they then can read-
ily put new items into the slots of these constructions based on a more or less
good fit with the communicative role of that slot. Indeed, using an item in a
constructions slot coerces a construal that may be atypical for that item; for
example, we quite often say such things as he treed the cat, he ate his
pride, he coughed his age, and so forth, which force atypical construals on
some of the items. Such metaphorical or analogical thinking is testament to
the fact that the construction itself has its own communicative function
from the top down, as it wereinto which, up to some limit, items must be
forced (Goldberg, 2006). In all, this system of conventionalized abstract

constructions and items that can be used and reused as needed in different
constructions enables the kind of creative conceptual combination by which
humans may think, or at least try to think, of everything from flying toasters
to colorless green ideas sleeping furiously.
All of this is about how the communicator specifies the referential situa-
tion that he and the recipient are communicating about during their ongoing
second-personal communicative interaction. In addition, modern human com-
municators often use language as well to specify things about their commu-
nicative motive and their modal or epistemic relation to this referential material
in their ongoing second-personal communicative interaction. Critically, this
is something almost wholly new in the communicative process. Early humans
made reference to things in the world in various ways, but their own relation
to that referential material was left implicitperhaps expressed unintention-
ally (procedurally) in a facial expression or vocalization, but not an intentional
part of the communicative act under the communicators voluntary control
in decision making.
But now modern human communicators explicitly indicate their commu-
nicative motive in communicative conventions. Thus, most languages have
different constructions for speech acts such as requestives and informatives
(assertives). Philosophers of mind and language believe it to be very important
that the same fact-like propositional content may be used in different con-
structions with different communicative motives, as in She is going to the
lake, Is she going to the lake?, Go to the lake!, Oh, that she could go to
the lake, and so forth. The idea is that this independence of the propositional
content from any particular illocutionary force makes the propositional
content into a kind of quasi-independent, fact-like entity, free of particular
instantiations in particular linguistic utterances (e.g., Searle, 2001). As speech
act function came to be expressed conventionally, in either linguistic items or
constructions as a whole (as above), both the communicative motive and the
propositional content were now conventionalized into the same representa-
tional format of words and constructions. In this totally new communicative
move, the communicators motive in the communicative interaction is now
itself referred to and so conventionally conceptualized. This fact, among others,
is what prompted Wittgensteins (1955, #11) observation that a major difficulty
in understanding how language works is that very different functions are all
expressed in the same basic way in words and constructions: Of course,
what confuses us is the uniform appearance of words when we hear them

spoken. . . . For their application is not presented to us so clearly.
In addition, communicators indicate through various linguistic devices
their modal or epistemic attitude toward some propositional content in an
utterance. Thus, a communicator might opine, modally, that She must go to
the lake or that She can go to the lake, or, epistemically, that I believe she
is going to the lake or that I doubt she is going to the lake. Again, the evo-
lutionary raw material for the conventionalization of modal and epistemic
attitudes is presumably facial expressions and prosody as expressed simultane-
ously with some utterance, for example, uncertainty, surprise, or indignation.
But then these became conventionalized.5 Communicators thus now encase
propositional content also in a kind of modal-epistemic envelope (Givn,
1995)again, with all items in the same conventionalized representational
format of words and constructionsthat further encourages us to conceptual-
ize them as quasi-independent mental entities. In this case, the independence
is not only from speaker motive but also from how speakers feel or think about
them. This distinction between content and attitude is also foundational to the
idea of some kind of timeless, objective, propositionally structured facts that
are independent of how anyone thinks or feels about them and, therefore, also
to the general idea of an independent, objective reality.
If we now combine all of the distinctions we have madethat is, those
that the communicator actively controls (and for which he must choose from
among alternatives)we have the basic structure of a conventional linguistic
utterance: the force-content distinction, within that the attitude-content dis-
tinction, and within that the topic-focus (subject-predicate) distinction, as
shown in Figure 4.1.
Overall, then, we may say that linguistic constructions are conventional-
ized and automatized segments of discourse that organize human experience
into abstract patterns of various sorts, as individuals conceptualize things for
Figur e 4.1 The basic structure of a conventional linguistic utterance

others in communication. Constructions contain abstract rolessuch as agent,

recipient, locationmarked via second-order symbols such as case markers,
adpositions, or contrastive word order. The possibility of placing an almost
unlimited inventory of linguistic items into these role slots is a major source
of creative conceptual combination (see Clarks [1996] famous The newspaper
boy porched the newspaper). Topic-focus (subject-predicate) organization
within specific constructions serves to conceptualize situations from the per-
spective of one or the other of the roles. Communicative devices for indicating
speaker motives, along with the modal-epistemic envelope, serve to partition
out fact-like propositional content as indicating some kind of timeless, objec-
tive facts about an objective world, independent of how anyone thinks or feels
about them. These are all aspects of human linguistic communication unique
to the species (see box 3).
Discourse and Reflective Thinking

Once we have linguistic communication, we have discourse. And what hap-
pens in discourse quite often is that the recipient responds to an utterance by
signaling noncomprehension, requesting clarification, and so forth. The com-
municator then does his best to provide the needed information explicitly in
further discourse. The key point for human thinking is that explicating con-
ceptual content in conventional linguistic format (content that was only
implicit in some original communicative act) makes this content ripe for self-
reflection. That is to say, invoking again the analysis of Mead (1934; and to
some degree that of Karmiloff-Smith, 1992), the collaborative nature of human
communication means that the communicator can perceive and comprehend
his own communicative act as if he were the recipient, which enables him to
think about his own thinking, from an external perspective, as it were (see
also Bermudez, 2003). Although the pointing and pantomiming of early
humans enabled them to engage in some degree of reflection on their own
overtly expressed thoughts, with modern humans and conventional linguistic
communication, some new types of thoughts could now be expressed. More-
over, now the self-monitoring process came not just from the perspective of the
recipient, but from the normative perspective of all users of the conventions.
Three especially important examples are as follows.
First, one important piece of information often needing explication is the
communicators intentional states (or propositional attitudes). For example,
box 3. The Language of Kanzi et al.
Over the past few decades, a handful of great apes have been raised by humans
and taught some form of human-like communication. They end up doing very
interesting things, but it is not clear in which ways they are human-like and in
which ways they are not. With particular regard to linguistic constructions,
there is no doubt that apes can combine their signs, sometimes creatively, but
they do not seem to have anything resembling human constructions (even
though they are perfectly capable of schematizing conceptual content in
general). Why is this? To help answer this question, here are some examples of
the kinds of utterances they produce, with either manual gestures or human-
provided visual symbols (not resembling their referents):
BIT E BA L L wanting to do this

GU M HUR RYwanting to have some
CH E E SE E AT wanting to
You(point) CH A SE me(point)requesting it from other
The first thing to note is that these are all requests, reflecting the fact that
systematic studies have found that over 95% of the communicative acts
produced by these individuals are some form of imperative (and the other
5% are questionable; Greenfield and Savage-Rumbaugh, 1990, 1991; Rivas,
2005). This is because no matter how they are trained by humans, great apes
will not acquire a motive to simply inform others of things or share
information with them (Tomasello, 2008). And in strictly imperative
communication, there is little functional need for all the complexities of
human linguistic communication (prototypically, no subject, no tense, etc.).
Nevertheless, many of the communicative acts produced by these individu-

als are clearly complex, structured by a kind of event-participant structure,
reflecting a partitioning of situations into the participants involved in the
relations or actions indicated. But despite this complexity, some key things
relative to human linguistic communication are missing. Basically what is
missing is all of those aspects of human grammar that conceptually
structure constructions for others and their knowledge, expectations, and
perspective. Over and above events and participants (and perhaps locations),
the linguistic apes have learned items that indicate their own desire (e.g.,
although not apparent on the human gloss, their use of the item hurry
indicates that they want it now). But what is missing is all of those aspects
(continued )
box 3 (continued )
of syntax that are geared at making the utterance comprehensible to the
recipient a key part of the cooperative motive. For example:
They do not ground their acts of reference for the listener to help
them identify the referent. That is to say, they do not have noun
phrases with things like articles and adjectives that help to specify
which ball or cheese is wanted, for example. Nor do they have any
kind of markers of tense that would indicate which event, as
indicated by when it occurred, they intend to indicate.
They do not use second-order symbols such as case markers or word
order to mark semantic roles and so to indicate who is doing what to
whom in the utterance. Communicators do not need this information;
it is provided to make sure that the listener understands the role of each
participant in the larger situation or event being communicated about.
They do not have constructions or other devices for indicating for
listeners what is old versus new versus contrasting information. For
example, if you adamantly expressed that Bill broke the window, I
probably would correct you by using a cleft construction and say
No, it was FRED that broke the window. Apes do not have such
constructions.
They do not choose constructions based on perspective. For
example, I might describe the same event either as I broke the vase
or The vase broke, based on your knowledge and expectations and
my communicative intentions, whereas linguistic apes have not
learned constructional alternatives of this type.
They do not specifically indicate in their utterances their communica-
tive motive (why should they, since it is always requestive) or anything
of their epistemic or modal attitudes toward the referential situation.
The key theoretical point is that, beyond just supplying ordering preferences for
utterances, human linguistic constructions are created with adaptations for the
recipients knowledge, expectations, and perspective in mind. And even very
simple constructions like noun phrases require adaptations to the recipients
knowledge, expectations, and perspective. Humans also conventionalize
expressions of motives and epistemic and modal attitudes in their constructions.
Call all of this the pragmatic dimension of grammar, and call it uniquely human.
let us suppose that on my way back from a hunting trip I see gazelles drinking
at watering hole no. 2, leading me to infer that their preferred watering hole
no. 1 is currently dry (given the recent dry weather). Back at the home base,
you inform me that you are headed to watering hole no. 1 to fetch water. I
want to inform you that it very likely does not have water, but I do not want
to just state as fact It does not have water since I am not certain. Presum-
ably the first marker of speaker uncertainty used in such situations was some
involuntary facial expression (see above). But then humans conventionalized
ways of indicating doubt, for example, by saying something like, Maybe it
does not have water or I think it does not have water. Interestingly, young
English- and German-speaking children first use words for thinking not to
indicate a specific mental act of thinking but rather to express their uncer-
tainty in the same way as maybe (thus, I think it does not have water means
maybe it does not; Diessel and Tomasello, 2001). Only later do they make
explicit reference to third-person mental happenings. And so one hypothesis
is that it was the demands of discourse that led humans to begin talking explic-
itly about mental states, and they did not do this across-the-board initially, but
only for their own epistemic attitudes toward propositional contents. Later,
they came to refer to the mental states of anyone and everyone, including both
others and the self, with the exact same set of communicative conventions.
Once humans could make explicit reference to intentional states, they could
think reflectively about them in some new ways.
A second set of cognitive processes often in need of explication is the
communicators logical inferring processes. These include most prominently
those indicated by and and or, various kinds of negation (e.g., not), and impli-
cation (if . . . then . . . ). For example, in response to pressure from the recipient
in argumentative discourse, the speaker requires terms such as these to make
explicit his reasoning processes. And so, analogous to communicative pres-
sure in normal discourse, logical pressure in argumentative discourse forces
disputants to make explicit in language the logical operations that until that
time were only procedural and not representational at all. One can imagine a
first gestural/iconic step in which, for example, or is expressed in some kind
of pantomiming in which one offers someone either this object (held out
with one hand) or that object (held out with the other). An if . . . then . . .
implication could be acted out in pantomiming such everyday social interac-
tions as threats and warnings (if X . . . then Y). But, as always, symbolizing
these logical operators in linguistic conventions would make them much
more abstract and powerful and, once again, much more readily available
for self-monitoring and self-reflection.
Third, speakers are often forced to make explicit some of the background
assumptions and/or common ground to help the recipient to comprehend. For
example, assume we are foraging together for honey, a cultural practice with
which we are both very familiar from our cultural common ground. The
knowledge we share about this practicewhat kind of hive we are looking
for, the height in the tree we should scan, the tools we will need, the container
we will need for transport, and so forth directs many of our activities. Thus,
if you go off and start picking and weaving together leaves, I wait for you
patiently as we both know that a vessel will be needed for transport. But this
shared knowledge is all implicit in our (cultural) common ground. An early
human might make this knowledge overt by pointing out to his partner the
presence of some appropriate leaves. But now imagine that I, as modern human,
express my intention that you notice the leaves presence by means of some
shared communicative conventions: Look, there are some good leaves over
there. This draws your attention to the leaves in a much more explicit way,
but there is still room for misunderstanding (good for what?). So perhaps you
look over at the leaves but draw a blank. Depending on my assessment of what
you are not comprehending, I might say, Its banyan leaves, or We are going
to need a vessel, or We need banyan leaves to make the vessel, or whatever.
I am making explicit for you the reason I am directing your attention to the
leaves presence (which I erroneously thought you could infer from our com-
mon ground), and, in the process, make explicit the bases for my own think-
ing for communicating. Once more, this makes it possible for me to reflect on
my thoughts and their connections in a way that I could not when they were
only an implicit part of our common ground.
And so with modern humans such things as intentional states, logical
operations, and background assumptions could be expressed explicitly in a
relatively abstract and normatively governed set of collectively known lin-
guistic conventions. Because of the conventional and normative nature of
language, new processes of reflection now took place not just as when apes
monitor their own uncertainty in making a decision, and not as when early
humans monitor recipient comprehension, but rather as an objectively and
normatively thinking communicator evaluating his own linguistic conceptu-
alization as if it were coming from some other objectively and normatively
thinking person. The outcome is that modern humans engage not just in in-
dividual self-monitoring or second-personal social evaluation but, rather, in
fully normative self-reflection.
Shared Decision Making and the Giving of Reasons

We must single out, finally, a very special discourse context in human com-
munication with world-changing implications for the process of human
thinking: shared decision making. Prototypically, we may imagine as an ex-
ample collaborative partners or even a council of elders attempting to
choose a course of action, given that they know together in common ground
that multiple courses of action are possible. Given their equal power in their
interdependent situation, they cannot just tell the other or others what to
do; rather, they must suggest a possible course of action and back it up with
reasons.
Let us start with early humans. Because early human collaborators typi-
cally had much in common ground, they could point and pantomime in
ways suggesting reasons implicitly. Thus, we may imagine two early humans
following an antelope. They lose sight of the beast, and so pause in a clearing
to make a joint decision about which way to go. One individual might in this
context point to some tracks on the ground. They are relevant to the hunters
because it is in their common ground that these are antelope tracks, possibly
of the animal they were following. Also relevant is the direction of the tracks,
which again is significant for the two of them because they know in common
ground what this means for the antelopes likely travel direction. The point is
that in directing his partners attention to the tracks, the communicators
goal is that his partner travel with him in a certain direction. But he is not
pointing in that direction; he is only pointing to the ground. The communi-
cators act is thus providing a kind of implicit reason for the recipient, which
we may gloss as: see the tracks; given our common ground about what they
mean for our preys likely travel direction, they give us a reason for going in
this direction. The recipient might counter by pointing in a different direc-
tion, where they spy the antelopes offspring next to some bushes, which is a
better reason for traveling in this other direction. None of these reasons is
explicit, of course, and so it does not constitute what we might call fully rea-
soned thinking. But it is a start.
With modern humans and their skills of conventional linguistic commu-

nication, we get to full-blooded reasoning, where reasoning means not just
to think about something but to explicate in conventional formfor others
or oneselfthe reasons why one is thinking what one is thinking. This con-
flicts with the traditional view that human reasoning is a private affair. Most
articulate on this point are Mercier and Sperber (2011) who recast the reason-
ing process in terms of communication and discourse, specifically argumen-
tative discourse in which individuals make explicit to others their reasons for
believing something to be the case. The basic idea is this: When a communi-
cator informs a recipient of something, she wants to be believed, and often is
(based on mutual assumptions of cooperation). But sometimes there is not
enough trust on the recipients part (for whatever reason), and so the com-
municator gives reasons for her informative statement. In reason-giving dis-
course of this kind, individuals are attempting to convince others. Many
lines of evidence suggest that the main function of reasoning is to convince
others, for example, peoples tendency to look for supporting rather than
disconfirming evidence (the confirmation bias). In this view, convincing oth-
ers is good for individual fitness, and so humans evolved reasoning abilities
not for getting at the truth but for convincing others of their views.
The proposal that human reasoning, including individual human reason-
ing, has a social-communicative origin is almost certainly correct. But Mercier
and Sperbers account tends to background the cooperative processes involved,
and so here is an alternative account that foregrounds these processes: The
key social context is joint or collective decision making, as it occurred regu-
larly in collaborative activities. Thus, on a hunting trip, perhaps you think we
should hunt for antelopes in this direction, and I think we would be better
off going in that direction. To make your case, you make your reasoning
more explicit in our conventional language by, for instance, noting that there
is a watering hole to the south. I counter, also in language, by making explicit
my reasoning that at this time of day it is likely that lions will be at the water-
ing hole and so no antelopes will be and besides, here are some antelope
tracks going to the north. You say these tracks look old, but I think that is
because they were in the direct sunlight this morning and actually they are
from around dawn or so. And on and on. The key point is that arguing in
this way assumes a cooperative context. As Darwall (2006, p.14) puts it: It
is only in certain contexts, say, when you and I are trying to work out what to
believe together, that either of us has any standing to demand that one another
reason logically.
Such cooperative argumentation, as we may call it, may be modeled in game
theory as a battle of the sexes: our highest goals are collaborativewe will
hunt together under all circumstances because otherwise there is zero hope of
success but within that cooperative framework we each argue our case.
Critically, in this context, neither of us wants to convince the other if we are
in fact wrong about the location of antelopes; each would rather lose the
argument and eat tonight than win the argument and go hungry. And so a
key dimension of our cooperativeness is that we both have agreed ahead of
time, implicitly, that we will go in the direction for which there are the best
reasons. That is what being reasonable is all about.
An appeal to best reasons invokes what Sellars (1963) calls common
standards of correctness and relevance, which relate what I do think to what
anyone ought to think. Our cooperative argumentation in the context of
joint or collective decision making is thus premised on a shared metric that we
both use in determining which reasons are indeed best. There have thus
arisen social norms that govern cooperative argumentation in group decision
making specifying, for example, that reasons based on direct observation trump
reasons based on indirect evidence or hearsay. An even deeper, conceptual
point is that to be in an argument in the first place means to accept as infra-
structure certain rules of the game, namely, the groups social norms for
arguing cooperatively. This is the difference between a street fight and a boxing
match. The early Greeks made explicit some of the most important of these
norms of argumentation in Western culture, for example, the law of noncon-
tradiction (a disputant cannot hold the same statement to be both true and
false at the same time), and the law of identity (a disputant cannot change the
identity of A during the course of the argument). Even before the Greeks, we
can imagine that individuals who, for example, held the same statement to
be both true and false at the same time were either ignored by others or else
exhorted to argue rationally. The cooperative infrastructure was thus deci-
sive in determining what it means to reason at all. The natural world itself
may be totally isthe antelopes are where they are. However, the cultur-
ally embedded discourse processes by which we determine what that is in
fact isin the space of reasons, to use Sellarss evocative phrase are fraught
with ought.
Cooperative argumentation would thus have been the birthplace of asser-

tive speech acts. Assertions go beyond the informative speech acts from
which they derive in that the asserter commits himself to the truth of a state-
ment (i.e., I commit not just to honesty but to the objective truth of the state-
ment) and, crucially, to backing it up with reasons and justifications as neces-
sary. Reasons and justifications are intended to make explicit to others the
bases on which I believe something, which, because they share these bases,
might give them reason to believe it as well (e.g., we all know and accept
ahead of time that if there are lions at the watering hole, then there will be no
antelopes). One may also reject an argument because it violates the norms of
argumentation (e.g., you just contradicted yourself ) or implies something
that we both know is not true. Overall, this ability to connect thoughts to
other thoughts (both those of others and ones own) by various inferential
relations (prototypically by providing reasons and justifications) is key to hu-
man reason in general, and it leads to a kind of interconnection among all of
an individuals potential thoughts in a kind of holistic web of beliefs.
The capstone of all of thisrecognized by all modern thinkers who take a
sociocultural view of human thinkingis the internalization of these vari-
ous interpersonal processes of making things explicit into individual rational
thinking or reasoning. Making things explicit to facilitate the comprehension
of a recipient leads the communicator to simulate, before actually producing
an utterance, how his planned communicative act might be comprehended
perhaps in a kind of inner dialogue. Making things explicit to persuade
someone in an argument leads the disputant to simulate ahead of time how a
potential opponent might counter his argument, and so to make ready, in
thought, an interconnected set of reasons and justifications again, perhaps,
in a kind of inner dialogue. As Brandom (1994, pp.590591) describes the
process: The conceptual contents employed in monological reasoning . . . are
parasitic on and intelligible only in terms of the sort of content conferred by
dialogical reasoning, in which the issue of what follows from what essentially
involves assessments from the different social perspectives of scorekeeping
interlocutors with different background commitments.
The norms of human reasoning are thus at least implicitly agreed upon in
the community, and individuals provide reasons and justifications as ways of
convincing any rational person. Human reasoning, even when it is done inter-
nally with the self, is therefore shot through and through with a kind of collec-
tive normativity in which the individual regulates her actions and thinking
based on the groups normative conventions and standardswhat some have
called normative self-governance (e.g., Korsgaard, 2009).
Agent-Neutral Thinking
The second-personal thinking of early humans was aimed at solving coordina-
tion problems presented by direct collaborative and communicative interactions
with specific others. Modern humans faced different kinds of coordination
problems, namely, those involving unknown others, with whom one had little
or no personal common ground. The solution on the behavioral level was the
creation of group-wide, agent-neutral conventions, norms, and institutions,
to which everyone expected everyone, in cultural common ground, to con-
form. To coordinate with others communicatively in such a world, human
communication had to be conventional as well, based again not on personal
but rather on cultural common ground. And to be a good communicative
partner in conventional communication especially, to be a cooperative par-
ticipant in shared decision makingmodern humans needed to express their
reasons for thinking in certain ways explicitly in language and then simulate
the cultural groups normative judgments of the intelligibility and rationality
of those linguistic acts and reasons. Modern humans participate not only in
joint intentionality with other individuals but also in collective intentionality
with the entire cultural group.
Representing Objectively
Early humans cognitively represented to themselves various situations and
entities simultaneously from more than one perspective, and they then indi-
cated or symbolized particular perspectives on those situations and entities
for others in their deictic and iconic communicative acts. Modern humans
then began collaborating and communicating with sometimes unfamiliar
others structured by agent-neutral conventions, norms, and institutions, so that
the cognitive models they were building and the perspectives they were simu-
lating concerned not just particular others but, rather, some kind of generic
other or, perhaps, the group at large. The linguistic conventions individuals
were born into embodied the way that the group as a whole, from many years
past, perspectivized and schematized experience, so that this way seemed inevi-
table. This new way of operating socially led to cognitive representations with
three important new features.
C o n v e n t i o n a l . For the first time in the history of life, modern human

individuals inherited a culturally constructed representational system in the
form of a conventional language, comprising a structured inventory of con-
ceptualizations that forebears in the culture had previously found useful in
communicating with others. The uses of linguistic conventions were shared
within the cultural common ground of the group, and this meant, given
human group-mindedness and conformity, that they became normatively
grounded in community standards governing their proper use. This made
it seem, especially to language-acquiring children, that the way that ones
linguistic conventions carved up the world was somehow natural.
In addition, the arbitrariness of linguistic conventions created, or at least
facilitated, the ability to operate with highly abstract conceptualizations such
as justice or blackmail that schematize not a taxonomic class but, rather, a the-
matically or narratively defined entity. The arbitrariness of linguistic symbols
also led to more abstract conceptualizations of relatively concrete terms, such
as open or break, across different particular situations. Most important, because
of their conventional nature, linguistic conventions and their interrelations
made possible conceptualizations with explicitly contrasting aspectual shapes
gazelle, animal, dinnerknown to everyone in the cultural common ground
of the group. These contrasting aspectual shapes created a gap for the indi-
vidual between the world as she conceptualized it for her own instrumental
actions and the world as conceptualized in various contrastive ways in her
conventional language, a gap that humans have been pondering from the
early Greeks to Benjamin Lee Whorf.
P ro p o s i t i o n a l . Modern humans began to use linguistic conventions

together in combination in patterned ways that led to the creation of abstract
linguistic constructions as kinds of linguistic gestalts. Many linguistic con-
structions conceptualize whole propositions, and they do this with internal
constituents that are marked with second-order symbols as playing specified
roles in the construction. Proposition-level linguistic constructions are per-
spectival (e.g., active vs. passive), and one of the elements (subject) provides a
perspectival entry point into the conceptualized situation. The abstractness
of linguistic constructions makes possible especially productive conceptual

combinations, so that we may represent to ourselves all kinds of imaginary
entities and situations, from a happy sun to a man in the moon. Linguistic
constructions thus create the possibility of various kinds of metaphorical
representations in which structural analogies provide a new framework for
thinking, from one idea undermining another to activities eating up my
free time. Making explicit in linguistic constructions various kinds of com-
municative motives and attitudes contributed to an objectified view of expe-
rience, as it suggested a fact-like propositional content independent of the
desires or attitudes of any particular individual.
With their linguistic constructions, modern humans also began to make
assertionsto whose objective truth they were committedthat could be
either about particular episodic events or else, importantly, about generic
events or facts of a type. They did this especially in norm enforcement (One
does not do that in public) and teaching (It works this way). This generic-
ness presumably originated from the normative group voice that lay behind
the assertive expression and gave it an objectivity that transcended the
individual.
O b j e c t i v e . Early humans lived in a world of different individual per-

spectives. Modern humans live in this world too, but in addition, in the
context of group-minded cultures, there arose a kind of public world compris-
ing collectively created entities such as conventions, norms, and institutions
from marriage to money to governments. These entities existed before the
individual arrived on the scene, and they existed independent of the thoughts
and wishes of any single individual, giving them the same kind of always
already there status as the physical world. In addition, these collective enti-
ties had preestablished roles into which, in theory, any agent could seamlessly
fit; and, indeed, in some cases these roles created new realities, such as presi-
dents and money, whose very real deontic powers were readily observable.
Operating in this public world required that individuals be able to take a
kind of agent-neutral perspective on things, a kind privileged, transcenden-
tal perspective that constituted the world objectively and that then justi-
fied personal judgments of true and false, right and wrong.
As modern human individuals were building their cognitive models of the
world, the use of simple causal and intentional relations was not enough. To
explain such things as chiefs and marriage, not to mention language and
culture, they needed some understanding of things created by collective agree-

ment and maintained by collective normative judgment. Said another way, they
needed some new conceptualizations of collective realities that transcended
the thoughts and attitudes of single individuals, even multiple individuals.
Constructing such models would lead naturally to judgments such as real,
true, and right that come not from the individual herself but rather from her
appropriation of the transpersonal, objective perspective engendered by her
cultural world. Linguistic representations especially assertions with a distinc-
tion between the second-personal attitudes of the communicator and some
timeless, generic propositional content (e.g., I think its raining) only
added additional force to these objectifying and reifying tendencies. Modern
humans thus collectivized early humans ways of life, and so objectified
their cognitive models of the world.
Reasoning Reflectively
The inferences of the common ancestor to humans and great apes were simple
causal and intentional inferences. The inferences of early humans were recur-
sively structured, enabling them to produce and interpret cooperative com-
municative acts comprising nothing but a protruding finger. But now, the
linguistic communication of modern humans opened up whole new vistas of
inference and reasoning. We now have such things as formal and pragmatic
inferences, and external communicative vehicles can be reflected upon by the
communicator from an objective and normative perspective. And the giving
of reasons and justifications to others and to the self in internal reasoning
now serves to connect up an individuals various conceptualizations into a
single inferential web.
L i n g u i s t i c I n f e r e n c e s . The hierarchical relationship between the ref-

erents of different linguistic conventions is part of the conventionalization
process. Thus, everyone knows collectively that everyone uses gazelle only for
a particular type of animal, and animal for all kinds of animals, of which
gazelle is one type, and so we now have the possibility of formal inferences: if
we know that a gazelle is over the hill, then we know that an animal is over
the hill (but not the reverse). Much of the early development of formal logic
was built on inferences of this type, and in contemporary conceptual role
semantics, inferences of this type play an important role as well. Also crucial
is the fact that we all know collectively that we all know the linguistic options
available to a communicator, which leads to the kind of pragmatic inferences
that Grice (1975) made famous: if I refer to someone as an acquaintance,
that almost certainly means that we are not friendsbecause if we were friends
I would have used the word friend. These implicatures and corresponding
inferences are possible because, and only because, the options available are
part of the groups cultural common ground, so that we can wonder together
why I made the choice that I did. Conventional linguistic communication
thus makes possible powerful new kinds of inferences.
In addition, linguistic communication, and the arbitrary nature of lin-
guistic conventions, enabled modern humans to express explicitly in lan-
guage some conceptualizations that could not be expressed easily, if at all,
in the natural gestures of early humans, for example, intentional states and
logical operations. Based on the hypothesis that one can reflect on ones
thinking only as it is expressed in external behavior directed at another
because only then can one play the others role and attempt to comprehend
it from her perspectivelinguistic communication now made available to
modern humans many new conceptualizations about which they could think
reflectively. Importantly, as modern humans thought about their own think-
ing reflectively, at least in some situations, they did not do so merely from
their own perspective, or even that of the other, but from a more objective
perspective.
R e f l e c t i v e I n f e r e n c e s . A special discourse situation is cooperative

argumentation, in which we attempt to come to a group decision about either
action or beliefs. We do this not only by making assertions, committed to the
truth, but also by backing up those assertions with reasons and justifications,
which means making connections to things that are collectively agreed to be
true and reliable. The outcome of this process is that the various conceptual-
izations and propositionally structured thoughts of modern humans as ex-
pressed in language become ever more inferentially interconnected in a vast
web of beliefs, such that each element in the web gains significance from its
inferential relations with others. This interconnectedness is a key component
in being a fully rational creature who knows his way about an entire con-
ceptual system in which propositionally structured thoughts provide reasons
and justifications for one another (i.e., they can be used as premises and con-
clusions for one another in argumentation; Brandom, 2009).
In addition, as modern humans began engaging in such cooperative argu-

mentation, implicitly accepted norms emerged. These norms operated such
that individuals who contradicted themselves from one assertion to the next,
or changed the meaning of their terms in the middle of an argument, or held
a single assertion to be both true and false, were basically ignored or excluded
from the group decision-making process. The process of cooperative argu-
mentation, then, was the special language game within which human norms
of rationality came to govern all those who wanted a voice in collective deci-
sions (such as political, judicial, and epistemic decisions).
All of this may be internalized. Internalization means simply that one
directs a communicative act, as communicator, to oneself, as recipient, includ-
ing holding the other to objective normative criteria of intelligibility, coop-
erative participation, and so on. The resulting internal dialogue is one especially
salient type of human thinking (Vygotsky, 1978). When the communicative
context is cooperative argumentation, what now get internalized are whole
lines of argumentation and justifications for arguments. Now, an individual
can give to himself a normatively justified reason for why he is thinking what
he is thinking, and so his conceptualizations become defined, in large part, by
their normatively sanctioned inferential relations with other conceptualiza-
tions. The resulting web of beliefs, and humans ability to navigate this web
facilely, is foundational for the ability to engage in individual reasoning.
At this point, then, the inferring of modern humans is not just imagining
causal and intentional sequences, as in apes, or even just perspectivizing and
recursivizing them, as in early humans; rather the inferring of modern humans
now includes new kind of inferences made possible by a conventional language,
and new forms of reflecting on their own thinking, including in a kind of inner
dialogue. When these processes operate in the special context of cooperative
argumentation, the result is something we might call reasoning. Modern
humans thus are on occasion able to engage in a kind of reasoned, or reflective,
inferring in the context of the normative standards of the cultural group.
Normative Self-Monitoring
Early humans engaged in what we have called cooperative self-monitoring
regulating their collaborative activities by the evaluative reactions of specific
partners; and communicative self-monitoringregulating their communica-
tive acts by the anticipated interpretations of specific partners. Scaling up

these processes to the cultural way of life characteristic of modern humans
means that individuals now regulate their behavioral decision making instead
via the collectively known and collectively accepted norms of the cultural
group. Modern humans thus came to feel not only a second-personal pressure
in their decision making but also, on top of this, as it were, a group-level nor-
mative pressure to conform to the group. Thus, I do not renege on my commit-
ments, first of all, because I do not want to disappoint my partner, and second
of all, because we in this group do not treat others like that. This more gen-
eralized normativity thus ends up back at group identity: if I want to be a
member of this group, I must behave as they do, that is, follow the norms to
which we all together (including me) have committed ourselves.
Modern human thinking and reasoning become normatively structured
and governed in multiple ways. When one communicates with others via com-
municative conventions, one needs to do it in the way that they do it to par-
ticipate successfully. In addition, in the context of group decision making and
cooperative argumentation, one must agree to certain norms of argumenta-
tion. Others in the group decision making have a stake in me participating in
useful ways, and so everyone has a stake in everyone else making true asser-
tions, following the norms of inference and argumentation, justifying by con-
necting to propositions and arguments already collectively accepted, and so
forth. Internalized, this communicative process becomes individual reason.
N o r m at i v e S e l f - G ov e r n a n c e . Normative self-governance results from

an internalization of the processes of collective normativity, as the individual
self-monitors and, indeed, self-regulates her actions by taking into account
the social norms of the group, both cooperative and communicative. Modern
humans communicate with themselves and so reflect on and evaluate their
own thinking with group-held normative standards. This reflection means
that humans know what they are thinking and can provide to themselves
normatively sanctioned justifications and reasons for thinking in this way
thus connecting up their many and diverse thoughts in an intricate inferential
web that is governed, to some extent, by community standards. The think-
ing subject also uses this reflection in exercising executive control over her own
thinking and reasoning. Korsgaard (2009), in particular, has emphasized
that humans not only have goals and make decisions and reason in particular
ways but also attempt to assess ahead of time whether those are good goals to
pursue or good decisions to make or good reasons to have a clearly extra
layer of reflection and evaluation. And the normative judgment here is not
simply mine alone, nor that of a specific other partner, but rather a judgment
about whether that would be a good goal or decision or line of reasoning for
any rational person, that is, for anyone from our group who does things the
way that we do them.
Modern humans thus operate with the social norms of the group as inter-
nalized guides to both action and thinking. This means that in their collab-
orative interactions modern humans conform to the collectively accepted
ways of doing things, based on norms of cooperation, and in their communi-
cative interactions they conform to the collectively accepted ways of using
language and also linguistically formulated arguments, based on the groups
norms of reason.
Objectivity: The View from Nowhere

Unlike other great apes, who all live in the general vicinity of the equator,
modern humans have migrated all over the globe. They have done this not as
individuals but as cultural groups; in none of their local habitats could a
modern human individual survive for very long on his own. Instead, in each
specific environment, modern human cultural groups have developed col-
lectively a set of specialized and cognitively complex cultural practices to ac-
commodate the local conditions, from seal hunting and igloo building to
tuber gathering and bow-and-arrow makingnot to mention science and
mathematics. What we have attempted to do here is to specify the skills of
cognition and thinking that enable modern human individuals to coordinate
with those around them, both collaboratively and communicatively, in their
efforts to adapt together to the novel exigencies they encounter in their spe-
cific corner of the world.
An image for the advent of modern humans is this: Earlier humans are
living quite nicely by collaborating and communicating with others in vari-
ous ways for a variety of cooperative purposes. Then, in the face of some seri-
ous demographic challenges, a great wave of group-mindedness and confor-
mity washes over everyone. Humans who were spontaneously coordinating
with partners to hunt or gather their daily meals then began to develop for
foraging a number of conventionalized cultural practices. Humans who were

spontaneously communicating with their partners in coordinating their
complex collaborative activities using ad hoc gestures then began developing
skills of conventional linguistic communication. And humans who were spon-
taneously exhorting or admonishing one another second-personally in various
cooperative directions then began to develop collectively known and applied
social norms of morality and rationality. Early humans lived together and
interacted with others jointly; modern humans lived together and interacted
with others collectively.
One effect of this great wave of group-mindedness and conformity was
cultural group selection accompanied by cumulative cultural evolution. Cul-
tural group selection takes place when individuals conform within their
groupand differentiate themselves from other groupsto the extent that the
group itself becomes a unit of natural selection (Richerson and Boyd, 2006).
In this way, successful cultural adjustments to local conditions stay around,
and unsuccessful attempts die out. Cumulative cultural evolution takes place
when the inventions in a cultural group are passed on with such fidelity that
they remain stable in the group until a new and improved invention comes
along (the so-called ratchet effect; Tomasello et al., 1993). Modern humans
had a stronger ratchet than early humans and apes because they hadin addi-
tion to powerful skills of imitationproclivities both to teach things to others
and also to conform to others when they themselves were being taught. And
so it is with this wave of group-mindedness and conformity that we get the
possibility of cultural groups creating and constantly improving their own cog-
nitive artifactsfrom procedures for whale hunting to procedures for solving
differential equationsthat help them both to adapt to local conditions and
to mark themselves as distinct from other cultural groups.
The subterranean effect of this wave of group-mindedness and conformity,
as it were, was new and culturally collective forms of cognitive representation,
inference, and self-monitoring for use in thinking. Modern humans began
representing the world objectively, reflecting a kind of generic, agent-neutral
perspective possible by any rational person. Further, humans new skills of
conventional linguistic communication enabled them to talk about many
things that they previously could not (e.g., mental states and logical opera-
tions), and this enabled reflective inferencesthinking about ones own
thinkingwith much greater depth and breadth. In the context of cooperative
argumentation, modern humans made explicit the reasons for their assertions,
thus connecting them in an inferential web to their other knowledge, and
then this social practice of reason-giving was internalized into fully reflective
reason. And the self-monitoring of modern humans for the first time reflected
not just their expectations about the second-personal evaluations of specific
others but, rather, their expectations about the normative evaluations of us
as a cultural group. Given all of these new ways of behaving and thinking, the
crack in the human experiential egg now became a veritable chasm: the indi-
vidual no longer contrasted her own perspective with that of a specific other
the view from here and there; rather, she contrasted her own perspective with
some kind of generic perspective of anyone and everyone about things that
were objectively real, true, and right from any perspective whatsoever a
perspectiveless view from nowhere.
And so, if from a moral point of view, cooperation always entails some
kind of effacing of ones own interests in deference to those of others or the
group, then, from a cognitive point of view, cooperative thinking always
entails some kind of effacing of ones own perspective in deference to the more
objective perspective of others or the group (Piaget, 1928). Thus, in coop-
erative communication I must always honor the perspective of my recipient,
and in cooperative argumentation I must be committed to accept the reasons
and arguments of others if they are better than my ownby the yardstick of
our agreed upon normative criteria of rationality, which include our agreed
upon objective reality and so to abandon mine for theirs. In the words of
Nagel (1986. p.4): Objectivity is a method of understanding . . . To acquire
a more objective understanding of some aspect of life or the world, we step
back from our initial view of it and form a new conception which has that
view and its relation to the world as its object. . . . The process can be repeated,
using a still more objective conception. In this formulation, objectivity is
the result of being able to think of things from ever wider perspectives and
also recursively, as one embeds ones perspective within another, more en-
compassing perspective. In the current view, more encompassing means sim-
ply from the perspective of an ever wider, more transpersonally constituted
generic individual or social groupthe view from anyone.
The monumental second step on the way to modern humans thus took the
already cooperativized and perspectival thinking of early humans and collec-
tivized and objectified it. Whereas early humans internalized and referenced
the perspective of what Mead (1934) calls the significant other, modern
humans internalized and referenced the perspective of the group as a whole,

or any group member, Meads generalized other. Human thinking at this
point is no longer a solely individual process, or even a second-personal social
process; rather, it is an internalized dialogue between what I do think and
what anyone ought to think (Sellars, 1963). Human thinking has now be-
come collective, objective, reflective, and normative; that is to say, it has now
become full-blown human reasoning.
5
Human Thinking as Cooperation
The internalization of socially rooted and historically developed

activities is the distinguishing feature of human psychology.
lev vygotsky, Mind in Society
Human cognition and thinking are much more complex than the cognition
and thinking of other primates. Human social interaction and organization are
much more complex than the social interaction and organization of other pri-
mates as well. It is highly unlikely, we would argue, that this is a coincidence.
Complex human cognition is of course responsible for complex human
societies in the sense that human societies would fall apart if human-like cog-
nition were not available to support them. But this cognition-to-society
causal link is not a plausible direction for an account of evolutionary origins.
For that direction of effect, there would need to be some other behavioral
domain in which powerful cognitive skills were selected, and then those
skills were somehow extended to solving social problems. But it is not clear
what other behavioral domain that might be, given that we are trying to ex-
plain the many particularities of cognitive skills supporting humans unique
forms of collaboration and communication, including in the end such things
as cultural conventions, norms, and institutions. It seems highly unlikely
that cognitive skills adapted for, say, individual tool use or the tracking of
prey could be exapted in this way for such complex cooperative enterprises.
And so, in the current view, the most plausible evolutionary scenario is
that new ecological pressures (e.g., the disappearance of individually obtain-
able foods and then increased population sizes and competition from other
groups) acted directly on human social interaction and organization, leading
to the evolution of more cooperative human lifeways (e.g., collaboration for
foraging and then cultural organization for group coordination and defense).
Coordinating these newly collaborative and cultural lifeways communica-
Hu m a n T hink ing a s Cooper at ion 125
tively required new skills and motivations for co-operating with others, first
via joint intentionality, and then via collective intentionality. Th inking for
co-operating. Th is, in broadest possible outline, is the shared intentionality
hypothesis.
But our evolutionary story has taken many more detailed twists and turns
as we have attempted to account, in detail, for the many different aspects of
uniquely human thinking as they relate, in detail, to the many different aspects
of uniquely human collaboration and communication. Because there are no
other contemporary evolutionary stories with exactly this focus, we have thus
far made scant reference to other theories. But there are a number of other
contemporary accounts of the evolution of uniquely human cognition and/or
uniquely human sociality in general, and a broad survey of these will help to
better situate the shared intentionality hypothesis within the current theo-
retical landscape.
Theories of Human Cognitive Evolution

When asked what makes human cognition and thinking unique, a kind of
default answer for many cognitive scientists would be something like gen-
eral intelligence. Since humans have evolved very large brains (roughly three
times larger than those of other great apes), and since larger brains have more
computing power, the idea is that humans are able to engage in all kinds of
cognitive processing, including thinking, in bigger, better, and faster ways.
But even if this description is in some sense true, the question remains of how
it came about evolutionarily. It is implausible in the extreme to just say that
being smart is more adaptive than being dumb and so humans became smarter.
This is a just-so story of the most egregious kind. Being able to fly and walk
would be better than being able to walk only, so why did humans not come
to fly as well? The point is that a plausible evolutionary account must be built
on an adaptive scenario involving a specific set of circumstances in which a
specific set of cognitive skills provided a specific set of advantages to the indi-
viduals who possessed them.
In the case of general intelligence, if this is a useful construct at all, recent
data suggest that the more specific story would almost certainly be some vari-
ant of our social account. Thus, Herrmann et al. (2007, 2010) administered a
comprehensive battery of cognitive tests assessing skills for dealing both
with the physical world and with the social worldto large numbers of two
of humans closest primate relatives, chimpanzees and orangutans, and to

2.5-year-old human children. If the difference between human and ape cogni-
tion were based on general intelligence, then the children in this study should
have differed from the apes uniformly across all the different tasks. But this
was not the case. The finding was that the children and apes had very similar
cognitive skills for dealing with the physical world, but the children old
enough to use some language but still years away from reading, counting, or
going to school already had more sophisticated cognitive skills than either
ape species for dealing with the social world. The hypothesis was thus that
human adults are cleverer than other apes at almost everything not because
they possess an adaptation for greater general intelligence but, rather, because
they grew up as children using their special skills of social cognition to coop-
erate, communicate, and socially learn all kinds of new things from others in
their culture, including the use of all of their various artifacts and symbols
(Herrmann and Tomasello, 2012).
A similar but different argument applies to theories that propose nar-
rower, but still domain general, cognitive processes to distinguish humans
from other primates. The most systematic such attempt is that of Penn et al.
(2008). They claim that what distinguishes human from nonhuman primate
cognition is humans ability to understand and reason with various kinds of
higher-order relations. In addition to several empirical disputes about the
data they cite for great apes, the overall problem is that this theory would also
predict across-the-board differences in how well humans and other great apes
deal with various kinds of problems in different domains of activity. But,
again, the Herrmann et al. (2007, 2010) results are not consistent with this
account. Furthermore, Penn et al. have no evolutionary story specifying the
adaptive context(s) that could account for humans special skills with rela-
tional conceptualizations. The discussion in box 1 (chapter 3) proposed an
alternative account, namely, that humans especially sophisticated relational
thinking derives from comprehension of the individual roles involved in vari-
ous types of joint and collective intentionality. Thus, this special form of re-
lational thinking is just one outcome of the process of adapting cognitively to
new forms of social engagement. And something similar may be said about
Corbaliss (2011) proposal that the key to human cognitive uniqueness is re-
cursion, especially as manifested in language, mental time travel, and theory
of mind. Recursion also plays a key role in the current account, but again, we
would claim that it is not the whole story. Rather, it is an outcome of the pro-
cess by which humans came to collaborate and communicate with others in

special ways; specifically in this case, it is the special way that individuals
had to make inferences to participate in cooperative (ostensive-inferential)
communication.
A second set of hypotheses to explain human cognitive uniqueness invoke
language and/or culture. In the case of language, some theorists have pointed
to the unique kinds of computational processes that language enables, namely,
various kinds of combinatorial/syntactic productivity, including recursion
(see Bickerton, 2009, for a recent version of this view). More philosophically
minded theorists have focused on the role of language in reasoning, that is,
on the way that humans make assertions aimed at truth, and then attempt to
justify them to others with articulated reasons (as in science and mathematics
and, perhaps, courts of law and political disputes), and this is only possible in
the medium of a language of some kind (see, e.g., Brandom, 1994). Of course,
no one can dispute the crucial role of language in human thinking and
language is a key part of our proposed second step in human cognitive
evolutionbut, in the current view, it plays its role only fairly late in the pro-
cess. Indeed, we have argued previously that human language was made pos-
sible by a number of earlier adaptations for joint intentionality (e.g., joint
goals, common conceptual ground, recursive inferences), and that its even-
tual emergence was part of a larger process in which many human activities
were conventionalized and normativized (Tomasello, 2008). In our view,
saying that only humans have language is like saying that only humans build
skyscrapers, when the fact is that only humans, among primates, build any
kind of stable shelters at all. Language is the capstone of uniquely human
cognition and thinking, not its foundation.
Somewhat relatedly, many social and cognitive anthropologists have insisted
that what is most remarkable about human cognition, compared with that of
other primates, is its variability across different human populations, which
attests to its grounding in processes of culture (e.g., Shore, 1995; Chase, 2006).
More radically, various postmodern theorists have claimed that basically all
of human experience takes place within the discursive practices of a human
culture, and so uniquely human thinking is only imaginable within this cul-
tural framework (e.g., Geertz, 1973). Again, these claims for the key role of
culture are all, in some general sense, true. But again, if our question is evo-
lutionary origins, they are not sufficient. Human thinking became unique
even before the flourishing of human cultural variability, specifically, in the
evolution of species-wide skills of collaboration, cooperative communication,

and joint intentionality more generally (and it can be seen today in the species-
unique skills of prelinguistic human children). These skills then enabled the
evolution and development of culture at a subsequent time. This analysis also
applies to the account of Richerson and Boyd (2006), who have argued for
the crucial role of cultural group selection in most things uniquely human.
Again, the second (cultural) step of our story invoked this process as well, but
again, there are numerous prerequisite and concomitant uniquely human
capacities that make cultures, and consequently cultural group selection, pos-
sible in the first place (e.g., conformity, conventionalization, and normativ-
ization). Since a culture comprises conventionalized ways of doing things, for
modern human cultures to be the way that they are, some things must have
already been complex and fundamentally cooperative naturally, before they
were conventionalized.
And so we agree with almost everyone that language and culture were
necessary for the evolutionary emergence of modern human cognition and
thinking. We have just argued that they were made possible by other uniquely
human social and cognitive processesnamely, those associated with joint
and collective intentionality more generallythat emerged earlier or con-
comitantly in human evolution. A full account must therefore acknowledge
the role of these earlier and/or concomitant processes, and indeed, our own
view is that an understanding of how language and culture work as modes of
social engagement and interaction at all requires a full explication of the
underlying processes of joint and collective intentionality involved (Toma-
sello, 1999, 2008).
The third and final set of hypotheses comes from evolutionary psychol-
ogy. Tooby and Cosmides (1989) have proposed a Swiss army knife metaphor
in which the human mind comprises a varied collection of special-purpose
modules evolved to solve specific and unrelated problems, the most numer-
ous and crucial of which arose with early humans and their small-group
social interactions. This focus on specific adaptive challenges and the evolved
cognitive capacities for solving them is a necessary and important propaedeu-
tic in the mostly evolution-free field of cognitive psychology. But, in practice,
evolutionary psychologists have focused mainly on noncognitive (or only
weakly cognitive) problems such as mate selection and incest avoidance. In
terms of cognition, Tooby and Cosmides (2013) have been content simply to
point out various ways in which human cognition shows the imprint of its
evolutionary history in various domains. For example, in the domain of rea-

soning, humans solve some logical problems better if they are presented in
social contexts similar to those from the environment of evolutionary adapted-
ness; in the domain of spatial cognition women have better spatial memories
than men because they are adapted for plant gathering; and in the domain of
visual attention humans pay special attention to the comings and goings of
animals. So far, however, these theorists have given no comprehensive account
of human cognitive modules in general, or of their unique aspects relative to
other primates in particular.
There are several theories from this general perspectivethat is, focusing
on modularity and adaptednessthat make more systematic attempts to
account for human cognitive uniqueness. First, Sperber (1996, 2000) argues
that humans, like all animal species, possess a host of highly specific cogni-
tive modules, such as snake detection and face recognition, as well as some
more general modules, such as intuitive physics and intuitive psychology. These
support what he calls intuitive beliefs (fast, resistant to evidence). What makes
human cognition especially powerful is a kind of supermodule that enables
individuals to entertain metarepresentations, that is to say, representations
that not only cognitively represent the world but also represent others or their
own representations of the world. Individuals do this propositionally (com-
positionally and recursively), leading to what Sperber calls reflective beliefs
(which may be formed either by having good reasons or by adopting the beliefs
of others whom one trusts). If other animals engage in meta-representation at
all, it is only in very rudimentary fashion, without compositionality and recur-
sivity. This metarepresentational ability (Sperber actually thinks there may
be three different metarepresentational modules) enables everything from
cooperative (ostensive-inferential) communication, to teaching and cultural
transmission, to reasoning by arguing with others. The capacity for metarepre-
sentation coevolved with and interacts with a separate language module, which
is also, obviously, uniquely human.
Carruthers (2006) gives an account of nonhuman primate cognition that
involves representations and inferences, but he also stresses the limitations
imposed by the compartmentalization of nonhuman primate cognitive
modules. Human cognition is much more creative and flexible because, in the
course of human evolution, additional modules were added, the most impor-
tant of which are a mind-reading system (going beyond what apes do), a
language-learning system, and a normative reasoning system. These modules
can be applied simultaneously in the same situation, which creates some nov-
elties, and in addition, humans evolved a disposition to imagine and rehearse
action plans creatively in working memory, a capacity that enables all of the
other modules to interact with one another more flexibly.
Mithen (1996) makes a systematic attempt to provide a modular theory of
human cognitive evolution closely tied to the artifactual record. He makes a
distinction between early humans and modern humans, noting that early
humans were relatively limited cognitively, using the same tools everywhere
over many millennia, with no symbolic behavior, and so forth. He explains
this limitation by positing that early humans, like most animals, possessed
several different cognitive modules that were not integrated with one another.
Specifically, they had a technical intelligence with tools, a natural history in-
telligence with animals, and a social intelligence with conspecifics, none of
which interacted any other module. With modern humans, we get symbolic
capacities and language, which enabled the modules to work together, creat-
ing the kind of cognitive fluidity associated with modern human thinking.
What all of these more specific evolutionary psychology accounts have in
common is the proposal that nonhuman primates, and perhaps even early
humans, are dominated by highly compartmentalized modules, and this
means that their cognitive processes are relatively narrow and inflexible. In
contrast, human cognition is broader and more flexible because humans have
modules, including some novel modules, that somehow work together or
communicate with one another (via metarepresentation, symbols and lan-
guage, or some horizontal processes such as creative imagination in working
memory). The means that nonhuman animals (and perhaps early humans)
operate only with system 1 intuitive inferences, whereas modern humans op-
erate in addition with system 2 reflective inferences based on actual thinking.
But this view a kind of strict view of modularity for all animals except
modern humansis not compatible with the data on great ape thinking at
all. There is no evidence that great apes operate only with highly compart-
mentalized modules, and indeed, chapter 2 presented evidence that they do
not; they often use system 2 processes to think before they act in both the
physical and social domains, in both cases using abstract representations,
simple inferences, and protological paradigms (structured by physical causal-
ity or social intentionality). In our view, then, these attempts to both be true
to modularity theory and simultaneously make room for human flexible
thinking simply do not accord well with available empirical evidence.
It is also disconcerting to see how different are the specific modules that
the different theorists positindeed, they often operate at very different lev-
els of analysis (compare snake detection and face recognition with technical
intelligence and normative reasoning). Perhaps a more systematic and com-
prehensive list could be compiled, but the real problem is that modularity
theorists do not often ask the question of origins beyond seeking a single
evolutionary function for a module (what it is good for). It is well known
that in evolution new functions are often subserved by existing structures,
perhaps put together in some new ways. Thus, for example, the proposed mod-
ule for normative reasoning would almost certainly have been constructed
out of earlier skills and motivations for such things as making individual
inferences, conforming to others and the group, evaluating others and being
sensitive to their evaluations, cooperative communication, and other skills.
Looking at the architecture of contemporary human cognition for a single
evolutionary function (via reverse engineering) misses out on the dynamics
of evolution, the way that new functions are created by cobbling together
already existing structures as evolution proceeds. This dynamic means that
there are deep relations among many cognitive functions via common de-
scent. A complex adaptive behavior such as collaborative foraging, for example,
may comprise many component process such as fast running, accurate throw-
ing, and skillful trackingnot to mention skills of joint intentionalitythat
may each have other adaptive functions, either on their own or in other com-
plex behaviors. Once we get past narrowly defined problems with immediate
and urgent fitness benefits (e.g., mate selection and predator detection), this
hierarchical structure is crucial for understanding how different cognitive
skills interrelate with others.
Our preference would thus be not to use the word module, which suggests
a static architectural or engineering perspective. Rather, we would prefer the
word adaptation, which suggests dynamic evolutionary processes. Adapta-
tions may be quite narrowly targeted, and we ourselves have invoked the etho-
logical notion of adaptive specialization (e.g., spiders building webs), which is
very close in spirit to the notion of a module. But other adaptations may apply
more broadly, either initially or through extensions over time. For example,
great apes do not seem to be specifically adapted for tool use, as neither goril-
las nor bonobos (and only some orangutan populations) use tools in the wild.
But all great apes use tools, and quite adeptly, in appropriate circumstances
in captivity. The adaptation thus seems to be more for causal understanding
in the manipulation of objects, which can then be applied in the use of tools
if the need arises for an individual (in contrast to some bird species, which
seem to be specifically adapted for tool use).
Even more generally along these lines, the question arises whether there
exist any truly domain-general horizontal abilities. (The metaphor is that
specific content, like space or quantity, is vertical, whereas general processes
like representation, memory, and inference are horizontal.) Some modularity
theorists believe that seemingly horizontal abilities do not represent single
domain-general processes; rather, each module has its own computational
procedures that have nothing to do with those in other modules. Our view is
that this again misses the importance of hierarchical organization in complex
adaptations. Processes such as cognitive representation, inference, and self-
monitoring may have evolved initiallyin some ancient vertebrate ancestor
in the context of some fairly narrow behavioral specializations. But as new
species have evolved, in the face of new and complex problems, these pro-
cesses have been co-opted for use as subcomponents, as it were, in many dif-
ferent adaptations, some quite broad. This co-option process is especially
important in highly flexible organisms such as great apes and humans, and
indeed, wide-ranging occurrence of this process is a key component of cogni-
tive flexibility.
Finally, we must also note that human skills and motivations for shared
intentionality do not, in our view, represent typical cognitive adaptations
occurring within individuals. Early humans had their own individual cognitive
skills, but then they began attempting to coordinate with others toward joint
goals with joint attention. Solving these coordination problems did not end
the matter, however; rather, it opened up a whole new way of operating for
early humans, especially the possibility of communicating referentially about
basically everything in their experience with modified processes of represen-
tation and inference. The emergence of shared intentionality thus effected a
restructuring, a transformation, a socialization, of all the processes involved
in individual intentionality and thinkingan unusual, if not unprecedented,
evolutionary event. This does not mean that humans do not also operate with
many system 1 processes impervious to this transformation; they do, quite
often making gut decisions about event probabilities, moral dilemmas, dan-
gerous situations, and so forth (see, e.g., Gigerenzer and Selton, 2001; Haidt,
2012). But still, humans may consider and even communicate about all of these
things in their system 2 thinking, even if this does not affect their eventual
behavioral decision. Skills and motivations for shared intentionality thus

transform the way that humans think about almost everythingbecause they
can communicate about almost everything.
In any case, as noted at the outset, none of these various hypothesesin
any one of the three sets just reviewedis a direct competitor to the shared
intentionality hypothesis, as none of them focuses specifically on human
thinking and its component processes. Each has captured its own segment of
the truth about uniquely human cognition and thinking, we would argue, but
the current account is both more comprehensive in covering all of the many
different aspects of human thinking and more true to the way that evolution-
ary processes operate in cobbling together complex behavioral functions
out of preexisting component processes. In addition, as we shall now see, the
shared intentionality hypothesis also fits quite well with contemporary theories
of the evolution of human sociality.
Sociality and Thinking

There are a number of different theories of the evolution of human sociality,
but they all agree on one thing: the general direction is one of ever more coop-
eration (at least until the rise of agriculture, cities, and stratified societies,
some 10,000 years ago). As distinct from other great apes, early humans began
mating via pair bonding, with the result that nuclear families became newly
cooperating social units (Chapais, 2008). Relatedly, humansagain as opposed
to other great apesbegan various forms of cooperative childcare in which
adults other than mothers cared for youngsters (Hrdy, 2009). This new form
of childcare may have been a precursor to, but also may have occurred in con-
junction with, collaborative foraging, as grandmothers and other females
remained at home with the children while the healthiest females foraged and
brought back the food to sharewhich turned the network of families in-
volved into new cooperating units (Hawkes, 2003). And with the rise of mod-
ern humans, entire cultural groupspotentially encompassing whole clans or
tribes with individuals who might not even know one anotherbecame coop-
erating units as they competed with other human groups for valuable resources
in cultural group selection (Richerson and Boyd, 2006).
How this trend toward cooperation might have interacted with humans
ever increasing cognitive competencies has been little explored, or even spec-
ulated about. There are two main exceptions. First, in support of the social
brain hypothesis, Dunbar (1998) has documented across primate species a

strong positive correlation between brain size (presumably reflecting cogni-
tive complexity) and population size (presumably reflecting social complex-
ity). Modern humans are the extreme case: human brain size and population
size are both several times larger than those of their nearest great ape rela-
tives. Gowlett et al. (2012) attempted to trace this relationship across human
evolution and found an especially big jump in both brain size (as estimated
by cranial volume) and estimated group size at around 400,000 years ago
with Homo heidelbergensiswhich is, of course, precisely at the time of our
hypothesized first step in the evolution of human thinking via joint intention-
ality. However, group size is only a very gross indicator of social complexity
(Dunbar focuses on the greater numbers of social relationships and reputations
to be kept track of ), and brain size is only a very gross indicator of cognitive
capacities, so the social brain hypothesis gives us only a very general indication
of the actual processes involved on either side of the correlation.
A more specific attempt to link human sociality and cognition is provided
by Sterelny (2012), who has focused on human cooperation and its many
facets, including cooperative childcare, cooperative foraging, and coopera-
tive communication and teaching. The human cooperative lifestyle depends
on individuals acquiring huge amounts of information during ontogeny
everything from how to track an antelope, to how to make a spear, to how
the kinship relations of the group are constructed and so the cooperative
transmission of information from expert adults to novice children is crucial
for individual survival. Humans have thus constructed learning environ-
ments within which their own offspring develop, which ensures that these
offspring gain the information they need to perform critical subsistence ac-
tivities such as toolmaking and collaborative foraging. Tomasello (1999) also
offers a version of this theory, focusing especially on the ways in which hu-
man cognitive ontogeny is made possible by children acquiring the material
and symbolic artifacts (including language) created by their forebears. In a
generally similar vein, Levinson (2006) focuses on the uniquely human in-
teractive engine of cooperative social engagement and how its evolution has
created uniquely human forms of multimodal communication. Hrdy (2009)
stresses that some of the adaptations involved here could have been for infant
behavior itself, for example, special skills of cooperation and communication
that enabled infants to navigate the newly complex world of multiple caregiv-
ers from an early age.
From the current perspective, these two accounts of the interrelation of

human sociality and cognition are both useful and generally correct. But we
have focused here specifically on the underlying processes of thinking in-
volved. We have done this at a level of detail showing relatively precisely how
specific problems in the coordination of action (collaboration) and the coor-
dination of intentional states (cooperative communication) might have pre-
sented themselves to humans at two different evolutionary periods, and how
humans might have solved them via new forms of thinking (employing new
forms of cognitive representation, inference, and self-monitoring). Early hu-
mans needed not just to keep track of social relationships and transmit useful
information to their young, but in addition and most immediately they also
needed to meet the many and varied challenges of subsistence via social
coordinationwhich they did by developing the many and varied skills and
motivations of shared intentionality, including the ability to conceptualize
situations for others recursively in cooperative and conventional communi-
cation. The indissociability of social coordination and human thinking is
captured quite nicely by Sellars (1962/2007, p. 385), who writes: Conceptual
thinking is not by accident that which is communicated to others, any more
than the decision to move a chess piece is by accident that which finds an
expression in a move on a board between two people.
And so, by way of a general summary of our account, let us focus on the
specific issue of the relation between sociality and thinking as it arises at each
step of the proposed natural history. The main conclusions may be expressed
in four very general propositions.
1 . C o m pe t i t i o n w i t h g ro u p m at e s l e d to s o ph i s t i c at e d
f o r m s o f n o n h u m a n p r i m at e s o c i a l c o g n i t i o n a n d t h i n k -
ing without human-like forms of sociality or communi-
c at i o n . Basic mammalian sociality is simply the motivation to live in
asocial group. Within-group competition engenders social relations of domi-
nance and, along with other factors, affi liation. Great apes, and perhaps
other primates, engage in more-than-average social competition and so
have developed skills for understanding the goals and perceptions of others
as a way of flexibly predicting their behavior. They also are especially skillful
at manipulating physical causes in tool use and the intentional states of
others in gestural communication. Great apes collaboratethat is, actually
work togethervery little, and when they do, it is best characterized as
what Tuomela (2007) calls group behavior in I-mode, as in chimpanzees

group hunting in which each individual is attempting to capture the mon-
key for itself. Great ape communication is almost exclusively about at-
tempting to direct the recipients attention and behavior in some desired
ways, not to inform them of things useful to them. There are no human-
like joint goals; there is no cooperative communication for coordinating
actions.
Great ape cognition and thinking are adapted to this social, but not very
cooperative, way of life. Great apes attend to situations relevant to their goals
and values and, in certain problem situations, simulate or imagine the effects
of various causes on the problem ahead of time before acting, as a way of
making an effective behavioral decision. They do this with cognitive repre-
sentations that are imagistic and schematic, understanding that this is another
one of those. They also understand in many cases how situations (and their
components) relate to one another causally or intentionally, which enables
them to simulate nonactual situations and make all kinds of causal and in-
tentional inferences about them, including logical inferences organized into
paradigms. For example, they infer not only if X is present, then Y will be
absent, but also if there is only silence coming from here, then X must be
there, and even if X wants Y and perceives it in location Z, then she will
go to location Z. These causal and intentional inferences also generate a
kind of instrumental rationality in decision making, as the individual infers
if situation X obtains, then the best action to choose is Y. Great apes also
self-monitor their own decision making not only by monitoring how out-
comes match goals but also by monitoring the information available to them,
and their confidence in it, before making a decision.
And so, the upshot is that great ape sociality has led to some remarkable
skills of social cognition, to complement sophisticated skills of physical con-
dition, what we have called skills of individual intentionality. But this form
of sociality has not led to any transformations in the way that individuals
conceptualize the world or think about problems in general. Individual in-
tentionality has enabled great apes, and perhaps other nonhuman primates,
to actually think about problems in specific situations, and to do this without
any of humans unique forms of sociality or communication. Individual in-
tentionality and instrumental rationality may thus be considered general
primate issue for thought in a hostile world (Sterelny, 2003.)
2 . E a r ly h u m a n c o l l a b o r at i v e ac t i v i t i e s a n d c o o pe r a -
t i v e c o m m u n i c at i o n e m p l oy i n g n ew f o r m s o f s o c i a l
c o o rd i n at i o n l e d to n ew f o r m s o f h u m a n t h i n k i n g
w i t h o u t e i t h e r c u lt u r e o r l a n g uag e . For more than 5 million
of the 6 million years that humans have been on their own evolutionary
pathway, their thinking was mainly ape-like (though their skills at making
tools may have enhanced their causal understanding). But then there was a
change in ecological conditions that forced some early humans to begin col-
laborating in new ways to obtain food. This made individuals interdependent
with one another in an especially urgent way. In mutualistic activities such as
these, communication could become fully cooperative since it was in the in-
terest of each individual to coordinate with others toward their mutualistic
goal and to inform them of things useful to them in their role. And so were
born early humans who could survive and thrive only by collaborating and
communicating cooperatively with social partners.
Collaborative foraging created a number of difficult problems of social
coordination. The basic solution was to form with others joint goals to do
things together, to which both participants were jointly committed. This cre-
ated the dual-level structure: joint goals with individual roles, along with
joint attention with individual perspectives. In the cooperative communica-
tion used to coordinate individuals perspectives (and so actions) within these
activitiesinitially via pointing and pantomimingthe communicator was
committed to cooperation in the form of an honest informative act, and
communicator and recipient collaborated to ensure successful communica-
tion. The recipient followed the pointing gesture, or imagined the referent of
the pantomime, and then made an abductive inference from that to what,
given their common ground, the communicator intended to communicate.
The communicator, for his part, knew that this was what the recipient would
be doing and so attempted to conceptualize the situation for her in his choice
of referents anticipating her perspective of his perspective on her perspec-
tive recursivelyin a way that facilitated her abductive leap. Moreover, in
the special context of joint decision making, early human communicators
sometimes pointed out relevant situations to their partner that (implicitly)
provided reasons for them to jointly decide on a certain course of action based
on their common ground understanding of the causal and/or intentional
implications of the indicated situation.
To do all of this effectively required thinking of a type not possible for great
apes and their individual intentionality: the communicator had to make
judgments not only about his common conceptual ground with recipient but
also about which aspects of the current situation the recipient would find
both relevant and new and so what kind of abductive inference she would
make given different possible referential acts. Doing this led to what we have
called second-personal thinking, comprising (1) cognitive representations that
are perspectival and symbolic, (2) inferences that are recursively structured to
include intentional states within intentional states, and (3) self-monitoring that
incorporates the imagined social evaluation and/or comprehension of the col-
laborative and/or communicative partner. These changes all served to basically
cooperativize great ape individual intentionality into a kind of second-personal
joint intentionality and thinking.
And so, early humans joint intentionality and second-personal thinking
represented a radical break, a new type of relation between sociality and think-
ing. The cooperative and recursive sociality of early humans created an adaptive
context requiring individuals, if they were to survive and thrive, to coordinate
their actions and intentional states with others, which required them to co-
operativize their cognitive representations, inferences, and self-monitoring,
and so the processes of thinking that these enabled. Importantly for theories
of the relation of sociality and thinking, this new type of second-personal
thinking took place without conventionalization, culture, or language or any-
thing else going beyond direct, second-personal, social engagements.
3 . M o d e r n h u m a n p ro c e s s e s o f co n ve n t i o n a l i ze d c u lt u r e
a n d l a n g uag e l e d to a l l o f t h e u n i qu e c o m p l e x i t i e s o f
m o d e r n h u m a n t h i n k i n g a n d r e a s o n i n g . Modern humans
faced some new social challenges due to increases in group sizes accompanied
by competition among groups. For survival, modern human groups had to
begin operating as relatively cohesive collaborative units, with various division-
of-labor roles (see Wilson, 2012). This created the problem of how individuals
could coordinate with in-group strangers, with whom they had no personal
common ground. The solution was the conventionalization of cultural prac-
tices: everyone conformed to what everyone else was doing, and expected
others to conform as well (and expected them to expect them to, etc.), which
created a kind of cultural common ground that could be assumed of all
members of the group (but not other groups). Modern humans ways of com-
municating were conventionalized in this same way as well, which meant

that individuals operated in a cultural common ground comprising a kind of
group perspective and with conventionalized linguistic items and construc-
tions that could be used effectively with anyone in the group.
This group-minded structuring of modern humans activities and interac-
tions, along with their conventional means of communication, meant that
modern humans came to construct a kind of transpersonal, objective per-
spective on the world. Conventional communication became fully proposi-
tional, not only because of its conventional, normative, objective format
and topic-focus structuring, but also because the speakers communicative
motives and epistemic/modal attitudes could be independently controlled in
conventional signs, which meant that the propositional content was con-
ceptualized independent of the motives and attitudes of particular individu-
als. Linguistic constructions enabled unprecedented creativity of conceptual
combination, and moreover, they enabled full propositions representing a kind
of generic, timeless, objective state of affairs, as in pedagogy (It works like
this) and the enforcement of social norms (One must not do that). Group-
minded individuals thus constructed an objective world.
Conventional linguistic communication provided developing children with
a preexisting representational system of alternative means of conceptualiza-
tion, and everyone knew together in cultural common ground the available
alternatives. This opened up a whole new world of both formal and pragmatic
inferences. Processes of discourse aimed at effective communication encour-
aged communicators to make explicit many aspects of their own psychological
processes left implicit in previous forms of communication (e.g., intentional
states, logical operations), which enabled new ways of reflecting on thinking.
In addition, cooperative argumentation for making joint decisions required
that individuals make explicit their reasons and justifications to others in order
to convince them of their truth; therefore, to be effective, they had to meet the
groups normative expectations for rational discourse. Internalizing this reason-
giving process meant that individuals now knew why, for what group-accepted
reason, they were thinking what they were thinking. This process provided
conceptual links between the individuals myriad thoughts and propositional
representations, leading to a kind of holistic conceptual web. Each individual
was also now practicing a kind of normative self-governance in which she, as
emissary of the group to which she was a committed member, regulated her own
actions and thoughts in terms of the groups normative standards.
Figur e 5.1 Summary of the shared intentionality hypothesis
And so, modern humans creation of the various form of collective

intentionality comprising cultural conventions, norms, and institutions,
including languageled to a kind of agent-neutral, objective thinking
comprising conventional and objective representations; processes of inferring
that were reasoned, reflective, and aimed at truth; and normative self-
governance in which individuals monitored and adjusted their thinking to fit
with that of the group. Culture and language, as agent-neutral conventional
phenomena, thus provide another setting within which a new form of human
sociality can lead to a new form of human thinking, specifically, objective-
reflective-normative thinking.
From an evolutionary point of view, then, our overall argument is an exten-
sion of that of Maynard Smith and Szathmry (1995): humans have created
genuine evolutionary novelties via new forms of cooperation, supported and
extended by new forms of communication. Further, this has led to new forms
of cognitive representation, inference, and self-monitoring together consti-
tuting new forms of thinking. And humans have done this twice, the second
step building on the first. Figure 5.1 summarizes the three component pro-
cesses of human thinking at each of the three steps (i.e., including apes as
step 0) of the shared intentionality hypothesis.
4 . C u m u l at i v e c u lt u r a l evo lu t i o n l e d to a p l e t h o r a o f
c u lt u r a l ly s pe c i f i c c o g n i t i v e s k i l l s a n d t y pe s o f t h i n k -
i n g . All of these processes of joint and collective intentionality are universal
in the human species. Most likely, the first step of joint intentionality evolved
in Africa before the split between Neanderthals and modern humans and so
characterized both species. The second step of collective intentionality likely
evolved in a population of modern humans in Africa before they migrated
out into other parts of the world after 100,000 years ago. But once they started
migrating out and settling in highly variable local ecologies, differences in
cultural practices became pronounced. Different human cultures created
very different sets of particular cognitive skills, for example, for navigating
across large distances, for building important tools and artifacts, and even for
communicating linguistically. This meant that different cultures created, on
top of their species-wide cognitive skills of individual, joint, and collective
intentionality, many culturally specific cognitive skills and ways of thinking
for their own local purposes.
Importantly, these culturally specific skills build on one another over his-
torical time within a culture in a kind of ratchet effect, leading to cumulative
cultural evolution. Because of humans especially powerful skills of cultural
learning, along with adult teaching and childrens tendency to conform, the
artifacts and practices of a culture acquire a history. Individuals mediate their
interactions with the world through the cultures artifacts and symbols from
early in ontogeny (Vygotsky, 1978; Tomasello, 1999), thus absorbing something
of the wisdom of the entire cultural group and its history. Cumulative cul-
tural evolution is what enabled humans to conquer all kinds of otherwise
uninhabitable places all over the globe.
As one dramatic example in the contemporary world, we may point to
what are arguably the most abstract and complex forms of human thinking,
that is, those involved in Western science and mathematics. The point here is
that these forms of thinking are simply not possible without special forms of
socially constructed conventions, namely, those in written form, that devel-
oped over historical time in Western culture. This point is stressed especially
by Peirce (19311958) and is summarized in the classic text of modern logic by
Lewis and Langford (1932, p.4): Had it not been for the adoption of the new
and more versatile ideographic symbols, many branches of mathematics could
never have been developed because no human mind could grasp the essence of
their operations in terms of the phonograms of ordinary language. Many
scholars of literacy would also argue that written language makes certain forms
of reasoning, if not possible, at least more accessible (Olson, 1994). Writing also
greatly facilitates metalinguistic thinking and the possibility to analyze, criti-
cize, and evaluate our own linguistic communication, as well as that of others.
Pictures and other graphic symbols used as communicative devices are collec-
tive representations that contribute to the process in important ways as well.
Those modern cultures that have created active communities of scientists,
mathematicians, linguists, and other scholars are pretty much unthinkable
without written language, written mathematical numerals and operations,
and other forms of visually based and semipermanent symbols. Cultures
that have not created and do not currently possess any of these kinds of graphic
symbols cannot currently participate in these activities. Th is demonstrates
quite clearly that many of the most complex and sophisticated human cog-
nitive processes are indeed culturally and historically constructed. It also
opens the possibility that some other human cognitive achievements are a
kind of co-evolutionary mixture. Our own view would be that many of the
complexities of human language are of this nature: built on universal cogni-

tive processes but with culturally constructed concrete manifestations
(Tomasello, 2008).
It is theoretically possible that this entire account applies not to human think-
ing in general but only to a kind of modularized thinking for collaboration
and communication specifically (see Sperber, 1994, for something in this
general direction). But this does not seem to be the case. Human perspectival
and objective representations, recursive and reflective inferences, and norma-
tive self-monitoringthe constituents of uniquely human thinking do not
just go away when humans are not collaborating or communicating. On the
contrary, they structure nearly everything that humans do, with the possible
exception of sensory-motor activities. Thus, humans use recursive inferences
in the grammatical structures of their languages, in mind-reading in non-
communicative contexts, in mathematics, and in music, to name just the
most obvious examples. Humans use perspectival and objective representa-
tions for thinking about everything, even in their solitary reveries, and they
are engaged in normative self-monitoring whenever they are concerned about
their reputationwhich is pretty much all of the time. We might also recall
here skills of relational thinking, which are products of dual-level collabora-
tion but used more broadly, and skills of imagination and pretense, which are
products of imagining in pantomime but are now used in all kinds of artistic
creation. Collaboration and communication may play the crucial instigating
roles in our story, but their effects on cognitive representation, inference, and
self-monitoring extend much more broadly to basically all of humans con-
ceptually mediated activities.
Along these same lines, we should also be clear that the new forms of
social cognition that this account proposes are not just modularized theory
of mind skills. Rather, such things as perspectival representations, recursive
inferences, and social self-monitoring evolved so that individuals could now
understand the world in new ways by putting their heads together with others
in acts of shared intentionality. Doing this requires more than just some spe-
cific cognitive skill aimed at some specific content domain, because coordi-
nating actions and intentional states with others toward outside referents
requires new ways of operating across the board. Skills and motivations for
shared intentionality thus changed not just the way that humans think about
others but also the way they conceptualize and think about the entire world,
and their own place in it, in collaboration with others.
The Role of Ontogeny

Although we have used ontogenetic data in various ways in this account, our
focus here has not been on human ontogeny per se. It is thus important to make
two key points about the role of ontogeny in the origins of uniquely human
thinking.
First, although ontogeny does not have to recapitulate phylogeny, in the
current case the relation between joint intentionality and collective intention-
ality is partly logical one must have some skills for coordinating with other
individuals before coordinating with the groupand so the ontogenetic or-
dering is basically the same as our hypothesized phylogenetic ordering (Toma-
sello and Hamann, 2012). In fact, however, things are more complicated than
this because, as noted, young children are modern human beings, and they
are exposed to many cultural artifacts, including a conventional language,
practically from birth. But we would claim that, until around their third
birthday, young childrens social interactions with others are basically second-
personal, not group based, and they do not fully understand how such things
as language, artifacts, and social norms work as conventional creations.
And so, in the current view, the sequence is roughly this: Young children
begin collaborating and communicating cooperatively with others with a
second-personal orientationthrough direct participation with specific other
individualsat around their first birthday. This includes engaging with others
in joint attention, taking others perspective in simple ways, and using the
pointing gesture with others creatively (Carpenter et al., 1998; see Moll and
Tomasello, in press, for a review). Importantly, this developmental timing is
characteristic of children from a wide variety of cultural settingsincluding
small-scale, nonliterate societies (Callaghan et al., 2011)but it is not char-
acteristic of chimpanzee ontogeny, even those raised by humans (Tomasello
and Carpenter, 2005; Wobber et al., in press). This set of facts suggests a highly
canalized and species-specific developmental pathway for the first emergence
of skills of joint intentionality.
Skills of collective intentionality begin to emerge at around the third birth-
day. This is when young children first begin to understand social norms and
other conventional phenomena as products of some kind of collective agree-
ment. Thus, at around three years of age, young children do not just follow
social norms but begin actively to enforce them on others (and to feel guilty
when they break norms themselves). They do this in ways that demonstrate their
understanding that particular norms apply only in particular contexts and
only to individuals in the group who have conventionalized them. They also
understand that some pieces of language, for example, common nouns, are
conventional for everyone in the group, whereas proper names are conventional
only for those who know the person (see Schmidt and Tomasello, 2012, for a
review). Skills of collective intentionality have not been studied in any depth
outside of Western, middle-class culture, and so the cross-cultural generality
of this developmental timing is not known.
The second point about the role of ontogeny is this: neither joint nor collec-
tive intentionality would exist without it. This is true of many human traits,
as the human species has evolved an extended ontogeny for all kinds of things
that other species possess in mature, or almost mature, form at birth. Thus,
whereas many small primates have brains that develop very rapidly in the first
months of life, maturing in less than a year, and chimpanzees have brains that
develop to maturity in only about five years, the human brain takes more
than ten years to reach its fully mature adult volume (Coqueugniot et al., 2004).
Because this extended ontogeny is highly risky both for youngsters and
mothers, there must be off setting advantages, presumably in terms of such
things as especially flexible behavioral orga nization, cognition, and decision
makingas well as time to master the local groups cultural artifacts, symbols,
and practices (Bruner, 1972).
Human skills of joint and collective intentionality thus come into existence
during an extended ontogeny in which the child and her developing brain are
in constant interaction with the environment, especially the social environ-
ment. Our hypothesis is that they would not come into existence without this
interaction. To make the point as concretely as possible, let us invoke a thought
experiment we have used before, and then add a novel twist. Imagine a child
born on a desert island, miraculously kept alive and healthy until adulthood,
but all alone. The hypothesis is that this child, as an adult, would not have
skills of either joint or collective intentionality. This social isolate could not,
as an adult, enter a human group and start collaborating by forming joint goals
with individual roles, or communicating cooperatively in the context of joint
attention with individual perspectives. This individual would thus not develop
during its isolated lifetime second-personal thinking with perspectival and
symbolic representations, recursive inferences, and social self-monitoring. How

could he develop an appreciation for perspectives that differ from his own
without in fact experiencing different perspectives? How could he develop
socially recursive inferences without any social partners with whom to com-
municate? How could he worry about others evaluating him if no such others
existed? No, skills of shared intentionality are not simply innate, or matura-
tional; they are biological adaptations that come into existence as they are
used during ontogeny to collaborate and communicate with others.
This thought experiment might be called Robinson Crusoe, as the child
is alone on the desert island. But now imagine a Lord of the Flies scenario.
In this case it would be multiple infants born and growing to maturity on a
desert island, with no one to interact with but each other. Perhaps surpris-
ingly, the hypothesis in this case is that these children would indeed have the
kind of social interactions necessary for developing joint intentionalitybut
not collective intentionality. That is to say, these orphaned peers should de-
velop, through their social interactions with one another, skills of second-
personal, recursive sociality. They would find ways to collaborate with one
another with joint goals and attention, communicate with one another tak-
ing different perspectives (by pointing and pantomiming), and monitor their
behavior through the eyes of their interdependent partner. To develop in
this way, sophisticated adults and all of their cultural paraphernalia are not
necessary.
But we do not think that peer interaction alone would be sufficient for our
orphaned peers to develop skills of collective intentionality in their lifetimes.
They might develop on their own some conventions and norms of some kind,
as skills of joint intentionality plus imitation might be sufficient, and they
might create something like a culture over many generations. But they would
not develop during their own lifetimes a full-fledged culture or conventional
language, as these take multiple generations over historical time to develop.
And the same could be said of cultural institutions with standing status
functions, like chiefs and money. In general, fully fledged skills of collective
intentionality and agent-neutral thinking require, on our hypothesis, ontog-
eny in the midst of a preexisting cultural collective with preexisting conven-
tions, norms, and institutions, including a conventional language. How could
one become group minded, represent things objectively, and regulate ones
behavior and reasoning by the cooperative and communicative norms of the
social group if there was in fact no social group that antedated ones social
and cognitive development? No, skills of collective intentionality are not sim-
ply innate or maturational either; they are biological adaptations that come
into existence only through an extended ontogeny in a collectively created
and transmitted cultural environmentwhich takes multiple generations
to emerge. In this case, then, adults and all of their cultural paraphernalia
are indeed necessary for the ontogenetic development of skills of collective
intentionality.
It is not incoherent to believe that all of the cognitive and thinking skills
we have described could be built-into the degree that our wild child or
orphaned peers could, if discovered as adults, immediately display perfectly
mature forms of uniquely human thinking at both levels. It is just, in our
view, highly unlikely. Humans biologically inherit their basic capacities for
constructing uniquely human cognitive representations, forms of inference,
and self-monitoring, from out of their collaborative and communicative inter-
actions with other social beings. Absent a social environment, these capacities
would wither away from disuse, like the capacity for vision in a person born
and raised completely in darkness.
One could, in principle, collect data on the role of ontogeny in the emergence
of uniquely human thinkingbut only if one had no moral scruples. One
would have to be prepared to randomly assigned newborn children to differ-
ent rearing environments. Natural experiments, such as the feral child Victor
of Aveyron and other wolf children, are not definitive on the question for
many reasons, not the least of which is that some of these children could have
been abandoned by their parents precisely because they were not normally
functioning (Candland, 1995)and none of them was tested for the relevant
cognitive skills either. Some interesting indirect evidence for the important
role of a human-like social environment is provided by so-called enculturated
apes. When apes are raised by humans in the midst of all kinds of human-like
social interaction and artifacts, they do not develop more human-like skills of
physical cognition (e.g., space, object permanence, tool use), but they do develop
more human-like skills of imitation and communication (Call and Tomasello,
1996; Tomasello and Call, 2004). The significance of these findings for human
ontogeny are, however, not straightforward.
In any case, while everyone will continue to be fascinated by the question of
wild children and how much and what kinds of social experience are necessary
for humans to develop their unique forms of cognition and thinking, the
question is very likely to remain a deep mystery for the foreseeable future. In
the meantime, our hypothesis is that, like many human adaptations, adapta-
tions for shared intentionality are built to grow and flourish only in the midst
of rich social and cultural nourishment of particular kinds.
6
Conclusion
In both the evolution of thought in the history of mankind,

and the evolution of thought in an individual, there is a stage at
which there is no thought followed by a subsequent stage at which
there is thought. . . . What we lack is a satisfactory vocabulary
for describing the intermediate steps.
donald davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective
At least since Aristotle, human beings have wondered how they differ from
other animal species. But for almost all of that time the appropriate informa-
tion for making this comparison was not availablemost important, because
for the first several thousand years of Western civilization there were no non-
human primates in Europe. Aristotle and Descartes could readily posit things
like only humans have reason or only humans have free will because they
were comparing humans to birds, rats, various domesticated animals, and
the occasional fox or wolf.
In the nineteenth century nonhuman primates, including great apes, came
to Europe via newly created zoological gardens. Darwin himself was dumb-
struck by his encounter in 1838 with an orangutan named Jenny at the London
Zoo (whom Queen Victoria termed disagreeably human). After publication
of the Origin of Species some twenty-one years later, and the Descent of Man
some twelve years after that, the differences between humans and other
animalsas now represented by our closest living relatives became much
more difficult to pinpoint. Many philosophers reacted by simply defining away
the problem: thinking is a process that takes place in, and only in, the medium
of language, and so other animal species cannot think by definition (the most
prominent modern proponents being Davidson [2001] and Brandom [1994]).
Recent research on great ape cognition and thinking, such as that reviewed
here, should already be undermining this radical discontinuity view. Great
apes cognitively represent the world in abstract format, they make complex
causal and intentional inferences with logical structure, and they seem to
know, at least in some sense, what they are doing while they are doing it.
Although this may not be fully human thinking, for sure it has some key
components.
But the problem is deeper than finding a line of demarcation. The point is
that the great ape species alive today are arbitrarily far from humans; it is just a
matter of who survived and who did not. So what if we discovered, in some
remote jungle, surviving members of the species Homo heidelbergensis or Homo
neanderthalensis? How would we decide whether they possess fully human
thinkingyes or nogiven that, in all probability, they would be somewhere
in between contemporary humans and great apes? Even more radical, what if
we discovered some earlier side branches from the human evolutionary tree
who had their own ways of doing and thinking about things, overlapping only
partially with modern human thinking? Perhaps these creatures never devel-
oped pointing and so did not evolve skills of recursive inferring. Or perhaps
they never imitated at a level sufficient for pantomime and so did not symbolize
their experience for others gesturally. Or perhaps they collaborated but did not
care about others evaluations and so did not become socially normative. Or
perhaps they never had situations in which they had to make group decisions
and so never came to offer one another reasons and justifications for their asser-
tions. Our question is what would these creatures version of thinking look
like if it skipped a key ingredient (along with all of its cascading effects) of the
modern human version? We might end up with something sharing many fea-
tures with modern human thinking but having its own unique features as well.
The point is that, considered evolutionarily, human thinking is not a monolith
but a motleyand it could have turned out other than it did.
What we have done in the current natural history is to imagine one pos-
sible missing link in the evolution of human thinking from great apes to
modern humans based on selected aspects of the way of life of contemporary
hunter-gatherers and selected aspects of the thinking of young children (ac-
companied by a few, admittedly indeterminant, paleoanthropological facts).
But, importantly, our claim is not just that such an intermediate step can be
imagined and that it probably occurred, but that it was necessary. It was nec-
essary because one cannot even imagine going directly from ape-like com-
petitive interactions and imperative communication to modern human cul-
ture and language with no evolutionary intermediary. Human culture and
Conclusion 151
language are simply conventionalizations of existing social interactions, and

to provide the appropriate raw material, these interactions had to have been
already highly cooperative. Put in terms of our two historical strands, we
cannot get to processes of culture and language (as invoked by Vygotsky and
other culture theorists) without some kind of already existing and already
cooperative social infrastructure (as described by Mead, Wittgenstein, and
other social infrastructure theorists). We thus need our middle stepwe would
be very happy with multiple middle steps, if ours could be broken down
furtherto prepare the way for culture and language and all of their uniquely
powerful structuring of human thinking. This intermediate step does not
solve Davidsons (1982) problem of a common theoretical vocabulary that
spans from no thought to thought, but it does narrow the distance to be
traversed by any one step significantly.
In any case, no matter the precise number of steps, our account presupposes
that to understand uniquely human thinking we must situate it in its evolu-
tionary context. Wittgenstein (1955, no. 132) says about language that the
confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine idling, not
when it is doing its work. It seems to us that many of the perplexities of
human thinking pointed out by philosophers arise precisely when we attempt
to understand it in the abstract, outside of its functioning in solving adaptive
problems. It is natural to do this in the contemporary world because so much
contemporary thinking is, in some sense, idling. But uniquely human think-
ing was almost certainly selected evolutionarily for its role in organizing and
regulating adaptive actions, and so to understand it fully we must identify the
relevant problems. If creatures from outer space came across a complex hu-
man artifact such as a traffic light, idling, they could dissect it and analyze its
structure forever and not understand why it behaves in the way that it does.
The wires and lights by themselves could never reveal (not even with the help
of an fMRI) why the red light on one side activates only when the green light
on the other side activates. To understand these actions, we must first under-
stand traffic and how the traffic light was designed to solve the specific prob-
lems created by traffic. In the case of biological structures and this is a
central lesson of evolutionary psychology, of coursethere is the additional
possibility that they evolved to serve one set of functions at an earlier time,
and now they serve a different set. In any case, the current proposal is that to
understand the way that contemporary humans think, we must understand
how human thinking evolved to meet the specific evolutionary challenges
that early and modern humans faced as they moved toward ever more coop-
erative ways of making a living.
It is certain that some parts of our evolutionary story are incomplete. The
main problem is that collaboration, communication, and thinking do not
fossilize, and so we will always be in a position of speculation about such
behavioral phenomena, as well as the specific events that were critical to their
evolution. Most crucial, we do not know how much contemporary great apes
have changed from their common ancestor with humans because there are
basically no relevant fossils from this era. Furthermore, our intermediary step
of early humans very likely had much more of a gradual evolution than de-
scribed here; indeed, it is not even clear that Homo heidelbergensis was a sepa-
rate species at all. And we have given only cursory attention to humans after
agriculture and all of the complexities arising from the intermixing of cultural
groups, from literacy and numeracy, and from institutions such as science
and government. And so our attempt is less of an explicitly historical exercise
than an attempt to carve nature at some of its most important joints, specifi-
cally, at some of its most important evolutionary joints.
A list of open questions at this point would be quite long. But two par-
ticularly big ones are these: First is the nature of the jointness or collectivity
or we-ness that characterizes all forms of shared intentionality. Many theo-
rists subscribe to something like an irreducibility thesis (e.g., Gallotti, 2012)
in which such things as joint attention and shared conventions are irreducibly
social phenomena, and attempting to capture them in terms of the individu-
als involved, and what is going on in their individual heads, is doomed to
failure. Our view is that shared intentionality is indeed an irreducibly social
phenomena in the momentjoint attention only exists when two or more
individuals are interacting, for example but at the same time we may ask
the evolutionary or developmental question of what does the individual bring
to the interaction that enables her to engage in joint attention in a way that
other apes and younger children cannot. And so for us this means that some-
thing like recursive mind-reading or inferring still not adequately charac-
terized, and in most instances fully implicithas to be a part of the story of
shared intentionality. From the individuals point of view, shared intentional-
ity is simply experienced as a sharing, but its underlying structure, reflecting
its evolution, is that each participant in an interaction can potentially take
the perspective of others taking her perspective taking their perspective, and
so forth for at least a few levels. But this, as they say, is a point on which rea-
sonable people may disagree.
Conclusion 153
A second open question is how and why modern humans reify and objectify
what are essentially socially created entities. Money is not just a piece of paper
but legal tender, and Barack Obama is not just a person living in a large white
house but commander in chiefbecause we act and talk as if they are these
things. We also reify such things as morality, arguing not about the moral
norms of different social groups, including those shared by all human groups,
but rather about what is the right and wrong way to do things, where right
and wrong are considered objective features of the world. And nowhere is
this tendency stronger than in language, where everyone has a tendency
correctable but only with much effortto reify the conceptualizations codified
in our own natural language. About all of these things, we are like the young
child who says that even if long ago everyone agreed to call the striped feline in
front of us a gazzer, it would not be right to do so because, well, Its a tiger.
Our own view is that such objectifying tendencies could come only from the
kind of agent-neutral, group-minded perspective that imagines things from the
view of any one of us, the view of any rational person, the view from nowhere,
in the context of a world of social and institutional realities that antedate our
own existence and that speak with an authority larger than us. This is the au-
thoritative voice that lies behind the use of genericized linguistic expressions in
norm enforcement (That is wrong) and pedagogy (It works like this), and
it determines, in large part, what we consider real. But, again, this is a point on
which reasonable people may disagree.
Despite these gaping questions, and others, we cannot conceive any com-
prehensive theory of the origins of uniquely human thinking that is not fun-
damentally social in character. To be as clear as possible: we are not claiming
that all aspects of human thinking are socially constituted, only the species-
unique aspects. It is an empirical fact that the social interaction and organi-
zation of great apes and humans are hugely different, with humans being
much more cooperative in every way. We find it difficult in the extreme to
believe that this is unrelated to the huge differences in cognition and think-
ing that also separate great apes from humans, especially when we focus on
the details. What nonsocial theory can explain such things as cultural insti-
tutions, perspectival and conventional conceptualizations in natural languages,
recursive and rational reasoning, objective perspectives, social norms and
normative self-governance, and on and on? These are all coordinative phe-
nomena through and through, and it is almost inconceivable that they arose
evolutionarily from some nonsocial source. Something like the shared inten-
tionality hypothesis just must be true.
Notes
2. Individual Intentionality
1. Importantly, complex organisms embody hierarchies of control systems, so that
most of their actions are attempts to regulate multiple goals simultaneously at mul-
tiple levels (e.g., the same act is simultaneously attempting to place left foot in front
of right, pursue a prey, feed the family, etc.).
2. This account is related to the notion of Gibsonian affordances, but it is much
broader in including not only direct opportunities for the self s concrete actions but
also situations that are relevant to the organism in many more indirect ways. In addi-
tion, we should also acknowledge that all organisms are hardwired to attend to some
things as naturally salient (e.g., for humans, loud noises) because of potential relevance
to biological goals and values (so-called bottom-up processes of attention).
3. In none of these studies did chimpanzees understand and predict that, when a
dominant was not just ignorant but had a false belief, she would reliably go to the
place where she (falsely) thought the food was located. They treated ignorance and
false belief as the same (see also Kaminski et al., 2008; Krachun et al., 2009, 2010;
chapter 3 discusses this distinction further).
3. Joint Intentionality
1. Contemporary human foragers are not good models for the early humans we
are imagining here, as they have gone through both steps of our evolutionary story
156 N o t e s t o Pa g e s 3 6 6 0
and so live in cultures with social norms, institutions, and languages. Moreover,
contemporary foragers have tools and weapons that make individual foraging (then
sharing at the end) feasible, whereas the early humans we are imagining here had
more primitive weapons and so needed to work together.
2. Of course, contemporary human societies are also full of selfishness and non-
cooperation, not to mention cruelty and war. Much of this is generated by conflicts
between people from different groups (however this is defined) and concerns compe-
tition for private property and the accumulation of wealth that began only in the last
10,000 years or so, after the advent of agriculture, that is, after humans had spent
many millennia as small-group collaborative foragers.
3. Davidson is actually concerned with a special kind of perspective, namely, be-
lief: a cognitive representation of the world that the subject knows might be in error.
His claim is that a necessary condition for the notion of error is a social situation in
which I and another person simultaneously focus on the same object or event simul-
taneously yet differently, what we have called perspective. But the notion of error
introduces an additional consideration because it privileges one of the perspectives as
accurate (and the other as in error), and this requires some notion of an objective
perspective. This notion of objectivity and so the notion of beliefwill not be
available to humans until the next step in our story when agent-neutral perspectives
are possible (see chapter 4).
4. The possibility of lying meant that recipients had to practice epistemic vigi-
lance (Sperber et al., 2010). And so the notion of true propositions also arose from
the comprehension side of the interaction, as comprehenders attempted to distin-
guish truthful from deceptive communicative acts.
5. For purposes of simplicity, the terminology herereferential acts underlain by
communicative intentionsis slightly different from that of Tomasello (2008).
What is here called the communicative intention comprises what was there called
the social intention in the context of the Gricean communicative intention.
6. Some researchers think that this characterization of childrens early communi-
cation via pointing is too cognitively rich (see, e.g., Gomez, 2007; Southgate et al.,
2007) and that infants are actually doing something simpler.
7. Said another way, it is one thing to throw an object at another person (which,
coincidently, many apes do), but it is quite another to throw something to someone
in anticipation of her task of catching (Darwall, 2006)which is what the commu-
nicator does, metaphorically, in human cooperative communication.
8. Some researchers have claimed that some great ape intention-movements are
actually functioning iconically, for example, when one gorilla ritualistically pushes
another in a direction in a sexual or play context (Tanner and Byrne, 1996). But these
are most likely garden-variety ritualized behaviors that appear to humans to be
iconic because they derive from attempts to actually move the body of the other in
the desired directionthey are not functioning iconically for the apes themselves.
N o t e s t o Pa g e s 6 1 1 0 1 157
9. Some contemporary cultures have more than one (e.g., pointing with the in-
dex finger and pinky extended simultaneously for a certain subclass of situations),
but the presumption is that those are derived from the original primordial index
finger pointing, with which all children begin.
10. We have until this point discussed only propositional contents in the sense
of fact-like situations that are expressed in cooperative communication. By the term
proposition we mean a communicative act expressed as a fully articulated act of con-
ventional linguistic communication.
4. Collective Intentionality
1. Children also find it difficult for some time to comprehend situations in
which objective reality is unaffected by the fact that we humans may describe it from
different, even conflicting, perspectives, for example, situations in which there is an
undisturbed objective reality despite the fact that this entity is simultaneously a dog
an animal and a pet (see Moll and Tomasello, in press).
2. This is not unlike the way that some motivated linguistic forms, such as meta-
phors, become opaque (dead) across historical time as new learners are ignorant of
the original motivation.
3. A number of unusual situations in the contemporary world have illustrated the
process, at least in broad outline. Most spectacular is the case of Nicaraguan Sign
Language. A number of young deaf individuals each had their own kind of pidgin
signing, or home sign, with very little grammatical structuring, that they used with
their hearing families. But soon after they were brought together into a community
within three generationstheir various idiosyncratic home signs turned into a sys-
tem of conventionalized signs used in numerous constructions with all kinds of gram-
matical organization (Senghas et al., 2004). A very similar process was observed in the
birth of Al-Sayyid Bedouin Sign Language (Sandler et al., 2005), and indeed, some-
what similar processes have been at least indirectly observed in many cases in which
spoken pidgin languages have turned into creoles and full languages (Lefebvre, 2006).
What seems to happen is that pidgin communication (or home sign) works well
among family members, coworkers, and others with very strong common ground,
typically in highly restricted and recurrent situations such as mealtime or a work task.
But especially as a wider community of communicators and communicative situa-
tions must be accommodated, this process breaks down, and new grammatical means
must be found to help recipients to reconstruct the events and participants (and their
roles) in the intended referential situation. Communicator and recipient then work
together further until there is comprehension, and successful grammatical solutions
are repeated and imitated and so conventionalized in the community.
4. Participants and events in situations may be linguistically indicated at many
different levels of specificity, depending on the common ground between communicator
158 N o t e t o Pa g e 1 0 3
and recipient (Gundel et al., 1993). Pronouns are used to indicate entities already well
established in common ground, whereas nouns with relative clauses are used for new
entities that the recipient may identify using our common ground (e.g., the man we
saw yesterday). In addition, many languages have determiners such as the and a,
which specifically indicate whether something is or is not in our common ground in
the current communicative interaction. Events are typically grounded in the current
communicative interaction by specifying when they occurred or will occur relative
to, ultimately, now (i.e., via tense). This way of specifying referents thus leads to the
kind of hierarchical tree structures diagramed in traditional linguistic analyses, as
the different linguistic items of a noun phrase or a verbal complex, each with its own
function, are used together, collaboratively as it were, toward the overall goal of indi-
cating a particular participant or event in the referential situation.
5. Sandler et al. (2005) provide a very interesting description of how successive
generations of the newly created Al-Sayyid Bedouin Sign Language conventional-
ized speaker motive and attitude, mostly by conventionalizing slightly exaggerated
facial expressions. Thus, across generations signers came to use conventionalized fa-
cial expressions to signal such things as the illocutionary force of an utterance, such
as assertions vs. questions (p.31) as in mature sign languages. In addition, com-
municators in later but not earlier generations came to symbolize conventionally
their various modal and epistemic attitudes, such things as necessity, possibility, uncer-
tainty, or surprise.
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Index
Abstract linguistic constructions, 97 98, Beliefs, false, 87, 156n3

101102, 114115 Brain: population size and, 134; develop-
Adaptation and adaptedness, 128129, ment of human, 145
131132, 148 Brandom, Robert, 32, 112
Adaptive specializations, as self-regulating
systems, 8 Carruthers, P., 129130
Agent-neutral thinking: objective represen- Category terms, 62
tation and, 113116; ontogeny and, 146 Causal inferences: and primate cognition of
Al-Sayyid Bedouin Sign Language, 157n3, physical world, 1620; and primatecogni-
158n5 tion of social world, 24; of great apes, 74
Arbitrary communicative conventions, 9699 Children: collaboration and individual
Argumentation, cooperative, 110112, thinking in, 2, 6; and joint goals in
117118, 119, 121122 collaboration, 3940; and individual roles
Assertions, 112, 115, 117118 in collaboration, 4041; joint attention
and individual perspectives among, 44,
Backward-facing inferences: and primate 45; cooperative communication and, 51,
cognition of physical world, 1620; and 5859; relevance inference and, 5253,
primate cognition of social world, 2224 5556; pantomime and pointing in,
Behavioral self-monitoring: evolution of 62 66; pretend play in, 63 64; spacial
cognition and, 14; of great apes, 2425, 26 conceptualization and, 65; combined
Behaviorism, 7 gestures and, 66; culture and, 82, 86 87;
174 Inde x
Children (continued) 120123; cumulative cultural evolution

cultural common ground and, 85; social and, 141; in children, 144145; ontogeny
norms and, 87; cognitive skills of, 126; and, 144147
family cooperation and, 133; in human Common ground: joint intentionality and,
cooperative lifestyle, 134; conventional 38, 44; cooperative communication and,
communication and, 139; social interac- 50; relevance and, 5455, 56; in panto-
tions of, 144145 mime, 61; combined gestures and, 67 68;
Clark, H., 38 cultural, 85; social norms and, 89; in
Cognition: evolution of, 714, 26, 125133, language, 93, 157158n4; in conventional
151152; for competition, 2631, 76 78; as communication, 95; arbitrary communi-
cooperation, 124125; sociality and, cative conventions and, 98 99; discourse
133144; role of ontogeny in origins of and, 108; agent-neutral thinking and, 113.
human, 144148; intermediate step in, See also Joint attention
150151. See also Human thinking Communication: shared intentionality and,
Cognitive repre sentation(s): and individual 3; of great apes, 22; in evolution of
intentionality, 912; of great apes, 27 28 complexity of living things, 3233;
Cognitive self-monitoring, of great apes, perspectivity and, 77 78; conventional
2426, 26, 3031 cultural practices and, 86 87; effects of,
Collaboration: shared intentionality and, 3, 143. See also Conventional communica-
4 6; emergence of, among early humans, tion; Cooperative communication
3338; joint goals and individual roles in, Communicative self-monitoring, 75 76
3843; joint attention and individual Competition: collaboration in, 5 6;
perspectives in, 4346; social self- cognition for, 2631, 76 78; group
monitoring in, 4647; second-personal identification and, 82 83; sociality and,
social engagement and, 4749; collective 135136
intentionality and, 80 81; group Complexity of living things, evolution of
identification and, 82 83; shared decision transitions in, 3233
making and reason giving and, 109113; Conformity: to social norms, 88; to
sociality and, 133138, 136138, 150151; communicative conventions, 95. See also
effects of, 143. See also Cooperation Self-monitoring
Collective entities, 115116 Conventional communication: emergence
Collective intentionality: evolution of, 5 6, of, 93 94; as inherited conceptualization,
139141; overview of, 80 81; emergence of 95 99; and linguistic constructions as
culture and, 81 93; emergence of complex representational formats,
conventional communication and, 93 94; 99104; discourse and reflective thinking
and communicative conventions as in, 104109; shared decision making and
inherited conceptualizations, 95 99; and reason giving in, 109113; agent-neutral
linguistic constructions as complex thinking and, 113, 114; reasoning and,
representational formats, 99104; 138141; development of, 146; sign
discourse and reflective thinking and, language and, 157n3
104109; shared decision making and Conventional cultural practices, 85 87
reason giving and, 109113; agent-neutral Cooperation: Piaget on, 1; human sociality
thinking and, 113120; objectivity and, and, 31, 133138, 150151; in evolution of
Inde x 175
complexity of living things, 3233; Evolution: of human thinking, 714, 26,

objectivity and, 122; human thinking as, 125133, 151152; of complexity of living
124125; among great apes, 135136. things, 3233
See also Collaboration Eye direction, 77
Cooperative argumentation, 110112,
117118, 119, 121122 False beliefs, 87, 156n3
Cooperative communication: evolution of, 5; Families, 133
among humans, 36; joint intentionality Foraging: collaboration in, 5, 3438, 137; and
and, 4950, 78 79; motivation for, 5054; primate cognition of physical world, 15;
relevance in, 5459; pantomime in, 59 66; contemporary, 155156n1
and combined gestures, 66 68; cognitive
representations and, 69 72; sociality and, General intelligence, 125126
136138 Gestures, iconic. See Iconic gestures;
Cooperative self-monitoring, 75, 118119 Pantomime
Cosmides, L., 128129 Goals: cognitive representation and, 912;
Cultural evolution, cumulative, 83, 121, great apes understanding of individual,
141143 20; and individual roles in collaboration,
Cultural group selection, 121, 128, 133 3843
Culture: individual thinking and, 12; Great apes: cognition of physical world
competition and, 5; emergence of, 81 82; of, 1520; cognition of social world of,
group identification and, 82 84; 2024; cognitive self-monitoring of,
conventional practices in, 85 87; social 2426; and cognition for competition,
norms and normative self-monitoring 2631; cooperation among, 3436; joint
and, 87 90; institutional reality and, attention and individual perspectives
90 92; group-mindedness and objectivity among, 46; social self-monitoring among,
in, 92 93; and conventional communica- 4647; joint intentionality among, 47;
tion, 95; human cognitive uniqueness cooperative communication and, 49,
and, 127128; reasoning and convention- 51; relevance inference and, 52, 59;
alized, 138141; development of, 146; pantomime and, 60, 66, 73, 156n8;
cooperation and, 150151 perspectival repre sentations and, 69;
socially recursive inference in, 72;
Darwall, S., 110111 second-personal self monitoring among,
Darwin, Charles, 149 74; culture and, 82; linguistic construc-
Davidson, Donald, 9, 149, 156n3 tions of, 105106; cognitive skills of, 126,
Decision making, shared, 109113 149150; adaptation in, 131132; social
Diachronic transmission of skills, 80 competition in, 135136; enculturated, 147
Discourse, reflective thinking and, 104109 Group hunting: among chimpanzees, 35;
Dunbar, R., 134 among early humans, 3637
Group identification, and emergence of
Enculturated apes, 147 culture, 82 84
Ethology, evolution of cognition and, 7 Group selection, cultural, 121, 128, 133
Event schema, imitation and establishment Guilt, collective, 84
of, 2930 Guilt, social norms and, 89
176 Inde x
Hegel, G. W. F., 1 Intelligence, general, 125126

Home signs, 95 96, 97, 157n3 Intentional states, discourse and, 104107
Homo heidelbergensis, 36, 48, 79 Intuitive beliefs, 129
Honesty. See Truth Irreducibility thesis, 152
Horizontal abilities, 132
Human thinking: evolution of, 714, 26, Joint attention: in collaboration, 23, 3334,
125133, 151152; as cooperation, 124125; 4346; in evolution of human thinking, 5;
sociality and, 133144; role of ontogeny second-personal social engagement and, 48;
in origins of, 144148; intermediate step among early humans, 132; sharedintentio-
in, 150151. See also Cognition nality and, 152. See also Common ground
Hunting, group: among chimpanzees, 35; Joint commitment, 3940
among early humans, 3637 Joint goals: in evolution of human thinking,
5; in collaboration, 3334; individual roles
Iconic gestures: combining, 66 68, 73 74; and, 3843; relational thinking and, 4243;
cognitive representations of, 69 72; individual perspectives and, 4344;
conventionalization of, 93, 95 97. See also cooperative communication and, 50
Pantomime Joint intentionality: evolution of, 5; and
Imagination, pantomime and, 63 64, 70 evolution of complexity in living things,
Imitation: and establishment of even 3233; and emergence of collaboration
schema, 29; in cooperative communica- among early humans, 3338; joint goals
tion, 61; group identification and, 83 and individual roles in, 3843; joint
Individual intentionality: evolution of attention and individual perspectives in,
cognition and, 714; great apes and, 4346; social self-monitoring in, 4647;
1526, 136; and cognition for competition, second-personal social engagement and,
2631 4749; cooperative communication and,
Individual roles and perspectives: joint 4950; and motivation for cooperative
intentionality and, 33, 78; joint goals and, communication, 5054; relevance in
35, 4043; relational thinking and, 4243; cooperative communication and, 5459;
in collaboration, 4346; cooperative pantomime and, 59 66; and combined
communication and, 68, 137 gestures, 66 68; second-personal
Inference(s): evolution of cognition and, 1213; thinking and, 68 76; perspectivity and,
and behavioral self-monitoring, 14; and 76 79; cumulative cultural evolution and,
primate cognition of physical world, 1620; 141; ontogeny and, 145147
and primate cognition of social world,
2021, 24, 136; causally and intentionally Langford, C. H., 142
logical, 28; productive, 2830; recursive, Language: individual thinking and, 12;
38, 72 74, 143, 152; relevance, 5259; pantomime and, 62, 63; spacial conceptu-
arbitrary communicative conventions alization and, 64 65; combined gestures
and, 97 99; discourse and, 107108; and, 66 67; sign language, 95 96, 97,
linguistic, 116117; reflective, 117118 157n3, 158n5; conventional, 114; human
Informative communicative motive, cognitive uniqueness and, 127128;
emergence of, 5054 reasoning and conventionalized, 138141;
Institutional reality, 90 92 written, 142; cooperation and, 150151;
Inde x 177
specificity in, 157158n4. See also Ontogeny, in origins of human thinking,

Communication 144148
Leslie, A., 60
Levinson, S. C., 58 Pantomime: social coordination and, 4950;
Lewis, C. I., 142 in cooperative communication, 59 66; as
Linguistic constructions: as complex imagining in space, 63 65; shared
representational formats, 99104; of great decision making and, 109; sociality and,
apes, 105106; objective representation 137; in great apes, 156n8. See also Iconic
and, 113116; objectivity and, 139 gestures
Linguistic inference, 116117 Peirce, C. S., 1
Logical inference, 107108, 136 Penn, D. C., 126
Perspectival representations, 69 70, 143
Manipulation, social, 22 Perspective: in collaboration, 4346;
Markedness, 5859 relevance inference and, 5657; category
Mathematics, 142 terms and, 62; joint intentionality and,
Maynard Smith, J., 32 76 79; linguistic constructions and,
Mead, G. H., 2 100101; belief as, 156n3
Mercier, H., 110 Piaget, Jean, 1, 2
Meta-representation, 129 Pointing: social coordination and, 4950;
Mithen, S., 130 emergence of, among early humans, 50;
Modular theory of human cognitive among infants, 51; relevance inference and,
evolution, 128131 5257; pantomime and, 61 62, 66 68,
Morality, 75, 153 70 71; in children, 62 66; shareddeci-
Mutual recognition, in second-personal sion making and, 109; sociality and, 137
social engagement, 48 Population size: group identification and, 83;
brain size and, 134
Nagel, T., 122 Pretend play, 63 64, 92 93
Natural pedagogy, 61 Pride, collective, 84
Negation, 19. See also Protonegation Propositional attitudes, 104107
Nicaraguan Sign Language, 157n3 Propositional linguistic conventions,
Nonconformity, to social norms, 88 114115
Normative self-governance, 119120 Protonegation, 2122, 24
Normative self-monitoring: social norms and,
87 90, 145; discourse and, 104108;agent- Quasi-propositional representations, 71 72
neutral thinking and, 118120; convention-
alized culture and language and, 139; Ratchet effect, 83, 121, 141
collaboration and communication and, 143 Reality, institutional, 90 92
Reasoning: shared decision making and,
Objective representation, 113116 109113, 121122; reflective, 116118; in
Objectivity: collective intentionality and, human cognition, 126; language and, 127;
5 6, 120123; culture and, 92 93; conventionalized culture and language
conventionalized culture and language and, 138141
and, 139141; belief and, 156n3 Recognition, group identification and, 83
178 Inde x
Recursion, in human cognition, 126127 Sociality: primate cognition and, 2024;

Recursive inferences, 38, 143, 152 dimensions of, 80; complex humancogni-
Reflective reasoning, 116118 tion and, 124; thinking and, 133144
Reflective thinking, 104109 Socially recursive inferences, 72 74
Reification of socially created entities, Social norms, normative self-monitoring
91 92, 153 and, 87 90, 145
Relational thinking, 4243 Social selection, and collaborative foraging,
Relevance inference, 5259 3738
Representation: and individual intentional- Social self-monitoring: in collaboration,
ity, 912; of great apes, 2728; relevance 4647; in cooperative communication,
inference and, 5657; perspectival, 69 70, 5758, 59, 78; in great apes, 136; evolution
143; characteristics of cognitive, 69 72; of, 143
linguistic constructions and, 99104;ob- Social transmission, 80, 81 82
jective, 113116; meta-representation, 129 Spacial conceptualization, 64 65
Role-based categories, in relational Sperber, D., 110, 129
thinking, 4243 Status functions, 64, 91, 146
Rule games, 92 93 Sterelny, K., 134
Symbols and symbolic representations,
Schematization, 12, 27, 73 74, 99 70 71, 90 91
Science and mathematics, Western, 142 Szathmary, M., 32
Second-personal self-monitoring, 74 76
Second-personal social engagement, 4749 Talmy, L., 65
Second-personal thinking, 68 76, 138 Teaching: imitation and, 61; culture and, 82;
Self-governance, normative, 119120 group identification and, 83 84;
Self-monitoring: behavioral, 14, 2425, 26; conventional cultural practices and,
cognitive, 2426, 26, 3031; second- 86 87; social norm enforcement and,
personal, 74 76; cooperative, 75, 118119; 88 89; ratchet effect and, 121; in human
communicative, 75 76. See also Normative cooperative lifestyle, 134
self-monitoring; Social self-monitoring Tooby, J., 128129
Sellars, Wilfrid, 80, 111, 135 Tool use, 16, 82, 131132
Shame: collective, 84; social norms and, 89 Truth: in cooperative communication,
Shared decision making, 109113 5152; socially recursive inferences and, 72
Shared intentionality hypothesis: summary Types, experiences as, 12
of, 1 6, 140; two-step evolutionary
sequence in, 31; cooperation and, 124125; Vygotsky, Lev, 1, 124
and theories on human thinking, 132133;
collectivity and, 152 Western science and mathematics, 142
Sign language, 95 96, 97, 157n3, 158n5 Wittgenstein, Ludwig: on framework
Simulation, 1213 forindividual thought, 2; on under-
Social brain hypothesis, 133134 standing, 7; and schematic cognitive
Social coordination: and emergence ofcollabo- repre sentations, 27; on language,
ration among early humans, 34, 3638; 102103, 151
cooperative communication and, 4950 Written language, 142

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A Natural History

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

or cognition. Based on much research reported here, the critical difference

The Shared Intentionality Hypothesis

Only cooperation constitutes a process that can produce reason.

Thinking would seem to be a completely solitary activity. And so it is for other

Theoretically, recent advances in the philosophy of action have provided

point forced by ecological circumstances into more cooperative lifeways, and

and communication at this point were conventional, institutional, and nor-

Understanding consists in imagining the fact.

This description in control system terms is basically identical to the classic

Figur e 2.1 What a chimpanzee sees

that many bananas are in the tree

Simulation and Inference

in behavioral decision making of the what would happen if . . . variety. For

Thinking like an Ape

Great Apes Think about the Physical World

(requiring skills of feature recognition and categorization), (3) quantifying

to necessary conclusions: if A happens, then B happens (because A caused B).

Great Apes Think about the Social World

physical cognition, in these food competition experiments chimpanzees make

self-monitoring (and in some cases, self-reflection), for more cognitive versions

later that it is notbecause it lacks a social/perspectival dimension), this ability

Cognition for Competition

Schematic Cognitive Representations

I m ag i s t i c . Great ape cognitive representations are iconic or imagistic in

S c h e m at i c . Great apes imagistic representations are generalized or ab-

S i t uat i o n a l c o n t e n t. Great ape cognitive representations have as

is absent). Obviously, representational content structured as whole situations

Causal and Intentional Inferences

C au s a l ly a n d i n t e n t i o n a l ly l o g i c a l . Great ape inferences are

P ro d u c t i v e . Great apes cognitive representations and inferences are pro-

C o g n i t i v e s e l f - m o n i to r i n g . Great apes (and some other primate

Individual intentionality is what is needed for creatures whose social inter-

Conceptual contents are essentially expressively perspectival.

In their magisterial survey of life on planet earth, Maynard-Smith and Szath-

A New Form of Collaboration

Then, out of the elements of these sophisticated processes of individual

The Cooperative Turn

2012).1 Human foragers also collaborate in many other domains of activity in

In the original analyses of Schelling (1960) and Lewis (1969), coordinating

Joint Goals and Individual Roles

box 1. Relational Thinking

Their evaluation of the literature is decidedly one-sided, as they dismiss

Joint Attention and Individual Perspectives

Davidsons [2001] metaphor) for an understanding of different perspectives to

came to understand that different individuals can have different perspectives

not appear to engage in such social self-monitoring. Thus, when Engelmann

Summary: Second-Personal Social Engagement

This new form of joint engagement is second-personal: an engagement of

Figur e 3.1 The dual-level structure of joint collaborative activity

A New Form of Cooperative Communication

people who share no conventional language can use to communicate effectively

A New Motive for Communicating

distinct motives for their deictic communication, requestive and informative,

New Ways of Thinking for Communicating

in which communicators simulated the perspective of the recipient as a kind

or pantomime. These gestures are used to direct the imagination of others to

Another prerequisite for an individual to produce an iconic gesture is that

box 2. Pantomime as Imagining in Space