(2.17 - 17/07/04 - China) India China Border Standoff
(2.17 - 17/07/04 - China) India China Border Standoff
(2.17 - 17/07/04 - China) India China Border Standoff
Maos Chinas might policy and its present continuation is a reflection of Chinas greater aim for regional and world
domination.
China's self-perception of being the leader of the region reflects in its territorial claims. One such territorial claim is
the Doklam plateau region of Bhutan (China calls it Donglang. The same plateau extends to the India-Bhutan-China
tri-junction at the southern tip of Chumbi valley and India calls this part as Doka La).
Indian army blocked Chinese troops engaged in road construction in disputed Doklam plateau region which is under
the control of Bhutan.
Similar face off took place in Dapsang Plains of Arunachal Pradesh in 2013.
Indias strategic interest in the region lies with the fact that Indias mainland is connected to the NE through a narrow
strip of land known as the Chickens neck or Siliguri Corridor.
Any presence of Chinese in the region is an obvious threat to Indias connectivity with the NE, especially in case of
an eventuality.
Limitation on the Indian Side of the border
Growing infrastructural gaps across the Indo-China border. [Snail paced infrastructure development along LAC (CAG
report)].
Severely restricted mobility of Indian troops due to infrastructural shortcomings.
Lack of adequate troops to counter Chinese inroads in the mountainous region.
Needs to be done
Faster implementation of projects promised to neighbors (Nepal and Bhutan).
Developing infrastructure along the border on a war footing.
Chinese muscle
China is already playing a leading role in Multilateral organizations where India doesn't have a substantial say.
China feels empowered after US pulled out of TPP. China is ceasing the moment by assigning itself a greater role in
the International arena. OBOR is just another means to this end.
Chinese presence in Indian Ocean region through its String of Pearls is significant. China has recently opened its
first overseas naval base in Djibouti.
2005 India-US nuclear deal is a significant step by India towards achieving regional strategic balance with China.
Indo US joint statement recognizing the freedom of navigation in International waters is aimed at countering China
(South China sea dispute).
Enemy's enemy is friend: India's closer links with S Korea, US and Japan is aimed at hindering Chinese presence in
Indian Ocean region (Exercise Malabar).
China too needs trade and is concerned about its dwindling economy. India can leverage Chinas economic
dependence on Indian market and can use it as a bargaining chip to counter Chinese misadventures.
{2.17 17/07/04 China} Souring relations between India and China
Sino-Indian relations are characterised by strategic restraint at the highest level but a certain degree of tactical
turbulence. [Modi Jinping romance while the spokespersons on either side trade barbs and there is some sort of
military showdown every time]
Chinas concerns
China sees India as a part of USAs encirclement of China policy. Recent developments in Indo-US relations (Modi-
Trump bonhomie) have further strengthened Chinas apprehensions.
o 2005 Indo-US nuclear deal.
o India's closer links with S Korea, US and Japan, Trilateral Malabar Naval Exercise (USA, India and Japan).
o The United States and India also participate in the VAJRA PRAHAR Special Forces exercise, the RED
FLAG air force exercise, and YUDH ABHYAS army exercise.
o The US has cleared the sale of predator Guardian drones (Sea Guardian Unmanned Aerial Systems) to India.
The Indian Navy can use these drones to put the whole Indian Ocean under its surveillance
o "President Trump and Prime Minister Modi pledged to deepen defense and security cooperation, building on
the United States' recognition of India as a Major Defense Partner.
o Trump welcomed Modi's strong support for the US to join as an Observer in the Indian Ocean Naval
Symposium.
o United State offer to sell F-16 and F/A-18 fighter aircraft to India.
China is suspicious about India working under the hood along with USA to undermine Chinas position in the South
China Sea dispute.
o Indo US joint statement recognizing the freedom of navigation in International waters is aimed at countering
China.
The respect and stature enjoyed by Dali lama among the top Indian political class and his recent visit to Tawang in
Arunachal Pradesh (April, 2017).
India has opened a trade corridor with Afghanistan (through Chabahar Port) bypassing CPEC.
India has objected to the CPEC (that passes through POK) on sovereignty grounds.
India boycotted OBOR talks held in China citing Chinas CPEC activity in POK. Given Indias geographical location,
China needs Indias participation to plug key gaps in OBOR project.
India not only boycotted OBOR summit but has also portrayed OBOR as an opaque, neo-colonial enterprise seeking
to ensnare (catch in a trap) smaller, cash-strapped states in a debt trap.
Indias concerns
China kept blocking Indias proposal at the UN to list Jaish-e-Muhammads Chief Masood Azhar as a global
designated terrorist.
China has repeatedly blocked Indias application for NSG membership of the NSG. The recent one being the 27th
plenary session of the NS, held at Bern in June, 2017].
Chinese activity in the disputed territories and frequent incursions into Indian soil.
The latest episode on 16 June: India-China Stand-off at Sikkim Border.
16 June, 2017: Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) road construction party entered Doklam area. The Bhutanese
protested.
Bhutanese contention is that while the process of boundary negotiations is on, the status quo should not be changed.
In co-ordination with the Bhutanese, Indian Army in Doka La also tried to dissuade the Chinese from road-building.
Chinese blocked the entry of Kailash Mansarovar yatra pilgrims through Nathu La in retaliation.
As for the location of the Sikkim-Bhutan-Tibet tri-junction, it is Indias contention that it would be finalized only after
consultations with concerned countries.
The Chinese reiterate that, as per Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, the tri-junction is at Mount Gipmochi. But
India contests that Batang La is the point of trijunction.
To recall, Bhutan was the only South Asian state that did not participate at the 14-15 May Belt and Road Forum in
Beijing, along with India.
Livemint
Only section of the 3,488km long Sino-Indian border on which both countries agree that there is no dispute is the
220km Sikkim-Tibet section.
Under the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, the Sikkim-Tibet border was agreed upon and in 1895 it was jointly
demarcated on the ground.
PRC in 1949 refused to deal with India as far as the affairs of Sikkim and Bhutan were concerned.
India stressed that it had treaty rights (British era) to represent both Sikkim and Bhutan. Chinese refused to
acknowledge Indias colonial era treaty rights.
In 1967, the Chinese opened fire on an Indian patrol party near Nathu La pass. India did not lose any ground.
India incorporated Sikkim as a state of the Union in 1975. China was adamant to recognize this merger of Sikkim
with India.
1996: Beijing indicated it was ready to swap territorial claims in northern Bhutan in lieu of Donglang (Because
Donglang is of much greater strategic importance).
2003: Prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee conceded that the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) was a part of the
PRC with the expectation that China would recognize Sikkim as a part of India.
2005: Indian sovereignty over Sikkim was finally recognized by China.
Conflict zone
India and Bhutan friendship treaty of 2007 commits India to protecting Bhutans interests.
Lack of clarity with respect to demarcation of the border between the two countries.
Maos Chinas might policy and its continuation: Chinas self-perception of being the leader of the region and, its
unending territorial claims.
One such territorial claim is the Doklam plateau region of Bhutan which is close to the Sikkim border.