Tomahawk Manual

SW820-AP-MMI-010 REVISION 15 27 MARCH 2009
SW820-AP-MMI-010
REVISION 15
TECHNICAL MANUAL
TOMAHAWK CRUISE MISSILE RGM/UGM-109
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
THIS DOCUMENT SUPERSEDES SW820-AP-MMI-010 REVISION 14 DATED 15 MARCH 2008.
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT D: Distribution authorized to the Department of Defense and U.S.

DOD contractors only; administrative or operational use: 7 April 1998. Other requests
for this document shall be referred to Program Executive Officer for Unmanned Aviation
and Strike Weapons [PEO(U&W)].
WARNING: This document contains technical data whose export is restricted by the Arms Export
Control Act (Title 22, U.S.C., Sec 2751, et seq.) or the Export Administration Act of 1979, as
amended, (Title 50, U.S.C., App. 2401 et seq.). Violations of these export laws are subject
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5230.25.
DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or
reconstruction of the document.
PUBLISHED BY DIRECTION OF PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER FOR UNMANNED

AVIATION AND STRIKE WEAPONS
27 March 2009
1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
FOREWORD.............................................................................................. 17
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................... 19
SECTION I. DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION ................................................... 19
1.1 SCOPE. .......................................................................................... 19
1.1.1 Chapter 1. ................................................................................. 19
1.1.2 Chapter 2. ................................................................................. 19
1.1.3 Chapter 3. ................................................................................. 19
1.1.4 Chapter 4. ................................................................................. 19
SECTION II. TOMAHAWK WEAPON SYSTEM............................................... 20
1.2 TWS DESCRIPTION.......................................................................... 20
1.3 MISSION. ....................................................................................... 20
1.4 ALL-UP-ROUND. ............................................................................. 20
1.4.1 Tactical AURs. ........................................................................... 20
1.4.2 Exercise AURs. .......................................................................... 21
1.5 MISSILE IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM.................................................... 21
1.6 SUPPORT EQUIPMENT. .................................................................... 21
1.7 LOADING AND HANDLING TRAINING EQUIPMENT.............................. 21
1.8 DOCUMENTATION. ......................................................................... 22
1.8.1 Record Books. ............................................................................ 22
1.8.2 Procedural Documentation. ............................................................. 22
1.8.2.1 Figures. ............................................................................... 22
1.8.2.2 Evolutions. ........................................................................... 22
1.8.3 Procedural Documentation Terminology. ............................................. 23
1.8.3.1 Procedural Guides. .................................................................. 23
1.8.3.2 Operating Procedures. .............................................................. 23
1.8.3.3 Inspection Table Specifics. ........................................................ 23
1.8.3.4 Standard Inspection Procedures. .................................................. 24
1.8.3.5 Supervisors. .......................................................................... 24
1.8.3.6 Readers. .............................................................................. 24
1.8.3.7 Workers. .............................................................................. 24
1.8.3.8 Observers. ............................................................................ 24
1.8.4 Quality Assurance (QA). ................................................................ 24
1.8.4.1 Philosophy and Scope. ............................................................. 24
1.8.4.2 QA Functions and Responsibilities. .............................................. 25
1.8.4.3 IP Stop Points. ....................................................................... 25
1.8.5 Reference Documentation. .............................................................. 25
1.8.6 Abbreviations and Acronyms. .......................................................... 25
1.9 REPORTS. ...................................................................................... 25
SECTION III. TOMAHAWK CRUISE MISSILE ................................................ 26
1.10 GENERAL..................................................................................... 26
1.11 TACTICAL VARIANTS..................................................................... 26
1.11.1 Land-Attack 109A. ..................................................................... 26
2
1.11.1.1 Guidance Section. ................................................................. 26

1.11.1.2 Forward Body Payload Section. ................................................. 26
1.11.1.3 Forward Body Fuel Section. ..................................................... 26
1.11.2 Land-Attack 109C. ..................................................................... 26
1.11.2.1 Forward Body Guidance Section. ............................................... 27
1.11.3 Land-Attack 109D. ..................................................................... 27
1.11.3.1 Forward Body Guidance Section. ............................................... 28
1.11.4 Block IV Tactical TOMAHAWK. .................................................... 29
1.11.4.1 Forward Body Section. ........................................................... 29
1.11.4.2 Midbody Section. .................................................................. 29
1.11.4.3 Aftbody and Tailcone Section. .................................................. 30
1.11.4.3.1 Air Data Module (ADM). ................................................... 31
1.11.4.3.2 Alternator Voltage Control Converter (AVCC). .......................... 31
1.11.4.3.3 Anti-Jam Global Positioning System Antenna. .......................... 31
1.11.4.3.4 Anti-Jam Global Positioning System Receiver (AGR). ................. 31
1.11.4.3.5 Cruise Missile Airframe (CMA) Battery. ................................. 31
1.11.4.3.6 Digital Scene Matching Area Correlator Processor Subsystem. ....... 32
1.11.4.3.7 Digital Scene Matching Area Correlator Sensor Assembly. ........... 32
1.11.4.3.8 Fin Control System. .......................................................... 32
1.11.4.3.9 Guidance Electronics Unit (GEU). ......................................... 32
1.11.4.3.10 Mission Control Input/Output (MCIO). ................................. 32
1.11.4.3.11 Mission Control Processor (MCP). ....................................... 32
1.11.4.3.12 Navigation Processor (NP). ................................................ 32
1.11.4.3.13 Power Filter Unit (PFU). ................................................... 33
1.11.4.3.14 Pyro and Power Control Assembly (PPCA). ............................ 33
1.11.4.3.15 Radar Altimeter (RA). ...................................................... 33
1.11.4.3.16 Satellite Data Link (SDL) Antenna. ...................................... 33
1.11.4.3.17 Satellite Communications (SATCOM) Data Link Terminal. ......... 33
1.11.4.3.18 Secondary Power Unit (SPU). ............................................ 33
1.11.5 TCM Body Sections Common to 109A/C/D. ....................................... 33
1.11.5.1 Midbody Section. .................................................................. 33
1.11.5.2 Aft Body Section. ................................................................. 34
1.11.5.3 Propulsion Section. ................................................................ 34
1.11.6 Rocket Motor Assemblies. ............................................................ 34
1.11.6.1 Mk 106 Mod 0 Rocket Motor. ................................................... 34
1.11.6.2 Mk 111 Mod 0 Rocket Motor. ................................................... 34
1.11.6.3 Mk 135 Rocket Motor Assembly. ............................................... 35
1.11.7 TCM Components Common to 109A/C/D. ......................................... 35
1.11.7.1 Missile Retention Devices. ....................................................... 35
1.11.7.2 Underwater Protection Devices. ................................................. 35
1.11.7.2.1 Wing Slot Plugs. .............................................................. 35
3
1.11.7.2.2 Engine Inlet Cover. .......................................................... 35

1.11.7.2.3 Continuity Shroud. ........................................................... 35
1.12 EXERCISE VARIANTS. .................................................................... 36
1.12.1 Recovery Exercise Module Equipped Missile. ..................................... 36
1.12.1.1 Parachute Compartment. ......................................................... 36
1.12.1.2 Riser Stowage Compartment. .................................................... 36
1.12.1.3 Flotation Equipment Compartment. ............................................ 36
1.12.1.4 Instrumentation/Avionics Compartment. ....................................... 36
1.12.2 Range Safety System Equipped Missile. ............................................ 37
1.12.3 Midbody Range Safety Subsystem (MRSS). ....................................... 37
1.13 LAND-ATTACK TCM TARGETING. .................................................... 37
1.13.1 Mission Data. ........................................................................... 37
1.13.2 Terrain Contour Matching (TERCOM). ............................................. 37
1.13.3 Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation (DSMAC). ............................. 38
1.13.4 Global Positioning System Subsystem (GPSS). .................................... 38
1.13.5 Block IV Tactical TOMAHAWK Targeting. ....................................... 38
1.14 TYPICAL MISSION PROFILE. ........................................................... 39
1.14.1 Prelaunch Phase. ........................................................................ 39
1.14.2 Launch Phase. ........................................................................... 39
1.14.3 Boost Phase. ............................................................................. 39
1.14.4 Transition to Cruise Flight. ............................................................ 40
1.14.5 Cruise Phase. ............................................................................ 40
1.14.6 Terminal Phase (109A/C). ............................................................. 40
1.14.7 Target Attack Phase (109D). .......................................................... 40
1.14.8 Block IV TACTOM Terminal Phase. ................................................ 41
1.14.9 Recovery Phase (REM-equipped variants). ......................................... 41
SECTION IV. TORPEDO TUBE LAUNCH CONFIGURATION ............................. 42
1.15 AUR IDENTIFICATION. ................................................................... 42
1.16 CAPSULES.................................................................................... 42
1.16.1 Capsule Mk 1 Mod 0. ................................................................... 42
1.16.1.1 Nose Cover. ........................................................................ 42
1.16.1.2 Nose Diaphragm. .................................................................. 42
1.16.1.3 Capsule Barrel. .................................................................... 42
1.16.1.4 Alignment and Retention Provisions. .......................................... 43
1.16.1.5 Sleeve. .............................................................................. 43
1.16.1.6 Barrel Closure. ..................................................................... 43
1.16.1.7 Slot Covers. ........................................................................ 43
1.16.1.8 Protective Covers. ................................................................. 43
1.16.2 Capsule Mk 3 Mod 0. .................................................................. 43
1.16.2.1 Nose Cover. ........................................................................ 43
1.16.2.2 Nose Diaphragm. .................................................................. 44
1.16.2.3 Capsule Barrel. .................................................................... 44
1.16.2.4 Alignment and Retention Provisions. .......................................... 44
4
1.16.2.5 Barrel Closure. ..................................................................... 44

1.16.2.6 Slot Covers. ........................................................................ 44
1.16.2.7 Protective Covers. ................................................................. 44
1.17 UMBILICAL ASSEMBLIES. .............................................................. 44
1.17.1 Electrical Umbilical. ................................................................... 45
1.17.2 Pneumatic Umbilical. .................................................................. 45
1.18 INERT VARIANTS........................................................................... 45
1.18.1 TOMAHAWK Test Missile (TOTEM) UTM-109-1. .............................. 45
1.18.2 Encapsulated No-Launch No-Wet TOTEM (NL TOTEM). ...................... 45
1.18.3 Crew Training Shape (CTS) UTM-109-1A. ........................................ 45
1.18.4 Warhead Installation Trainer (WIT) Mk 35 Mod 0. ............................... 45
1.18.5 TOMAHAWK Fitment Shape (TOMFISH) Mk 1 Mod 0. ........................ 46
1.18.6 Commercial Off The Shelf TOMAHAWK Test Missile (COTS TOTEM). .... 46
1.18.7 Pressure Vent Test Vehicle TOMAHAWK Test Missile (PVTV TOTEM). .... 46
1.19 CNU-308/E SHIPPING CONTAINER. ................................................... 46
1.19.1 Function. ................................................................................. 46
1.19.2 Description. .............................................................................. 46
1.20 RECORD BOOKS............................................................................ 46
1.20.1 PEO(W) PUB 4440, Record Book for Tomahawk Cruise Missile. .............. 47
1.20.2 CMP PUB 4440/2, Record Book for TOMAHAWK Test Missile (TOTEM). . 47
1.21 WEIGHTS AND CENTERS OF GRAVITY. ............................................. 47
SECTION V. CAPSULE LAUNCHING SYSTEM CONFIGURATION ..................... 48
1.23 CAPSULE LAUNCHING SYSTEM MK 45. ............................................ 48
1.23.1 CLS Mk 45 Mod 1. ..................................................................... 48
1.23.1.1 Capsule. ............................................................................. 48
1.23.1.2 Capsule Closure Assembly. ...................................................... 49
1.23.1.3 Sabot. ............................................................................... 50
1.23.1.4 Lateral Support Group. ........................................................... 50
1.23.1.5 Launch Seals. ...................................................................... 50
1.23.1.6 Separation Nuts. ................................................................... 51
1.23.1.7 Vertical Support Assembly (VSA). ............................................. 51
1.23.1.8 Capsule Extension. ................................................................ 51
1.23.1.9 Aft Closure Assembly. ............................................................ 51
1.23.1.10 Gas Generator. .................................................................... 51
1.23.1.11 Aft Cover. ......................................................................... 51
1.23.1.12 Aft Fairing Device. .............................................................. 51
1.23.1.13 Instrumentation and Controls. .................................................. 52
1.23.2 CLS Mk 45 Mod 2. ..................................................................... 52
1.23.2.1 Capsule. ............................................................................. 52
1.23.2.2 Capsule Closure Assembly. ...................................................... 53
1.23.2.3 Lateral Support Group. ........................................................... 53
1.23.2.4 Launch Seals. ...................................................................... 53
5
1.23.2.5 Separation Nuts. ................................................................... 54

1.23.2.6 Vertical Support Assembly (VSA). ............................................. 54
1.23.2.7 Capsule Extension. ................................................................ 54
1.23.2.8 Aft Closure Assembly. ............................................................ 54
1.23.2.9 Gas Generator. ..................................................................... 54
1.23.2.10 Aft Cover. ......................................................................... 54
1.23.2.11 Aft Fairing Device. .............................................................. 55
1.23.2.12 Instrumentation and Controls. .................................................. 55
1.24 INERT VARIANTS........................................................................... 55
1.24.1 All-Up-Round Simulator (AURS) Volumetric Shape. ............................. 56
1.24.2 CLS Loading and Handling Training Shape Mk 3 Mod 0. ....................... 56
1.24.3 Ballast Can Variants. .................................................................... 56
1.24.4 Missile Tube Bore Gage. .............................................................. 56
1.25 CLS SHIPPING CONTAINERS. .......................................................... 56
1.25.1 Shipping and Storage Skid Mk 30. ................................................... 56
1.25.2 AUR Simulator Shipping Skid. ....................................................... 57
1.25.3 Shipping and Storage Skid Mk 34. ................................................... 57
1.26 RECORD BOOKS............................................................................ 57
1.26.1 PEO(W) PUB 4440, Record Book for TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile. ......... 57
1.26.2 Record Book All-Up-Round (AUR) Simulator Volumetric Shape. .............. 57
1.26.3 Record Book Missile Tube Ballast Can (MTBC). .................................. 57
SECTION VI. VERTICAL LAUNCHING SYSTEM CONFIGURATION................... 58
1.29 CANISTERS. ................................................................................. 58
1.29.1 Mk 10 Canister. ......................................................................... 58
1.29.1.1 Canister Fly-Through Cover Assembly. ........................................ 58
1.29.1.2 Canister Barrel. .................................................................... 58
1.29.1.3 Canister Baseplate Assembly. ................................................... 58
1.29.2 Mk 14 Mod 1/Mod 2 Canister. ........................................................ 58
1.29.2.1 FWD Closure Assembly. ......................................................... 59
1.29.2.2 AFT Closure Assembly. .......................................................... 59
1.29.2.3 Umbilical Connector. ............................................................. 59
1.29.2.4 Deluge Connector. ................................................................. 59
1.29.2.5 Antenna Connector. ............................................................... 59
1.29.2.6 Canister Safe Enable Switch (CSES) (Mk 14 Mod 1/Mod 2). .............. 59
1.29.2.7 Canister Code Plug. ............................................................... 59
1.29.2.8 Nitrogen Supply Valve. ........................................................... 59
1.29.3 Mk 14 Mod 2 Canister. ................................................................ 59
1.30 INERT VARIANTS........................................................................... 59
1.30.1 Canister Trainer Mk 17. ............................................................... 60
1.30.2 Mk 14 Canister Trainer. ................................................................ 60
1.31 RECORD BOOK. ............................................................................ 60
6

CHAPTER 2 SECURITY AND SAFETY ...........................................................168
2.1 SCOPE. .........................................................................................168
2.2 SECURITY. ....................................................................................168
2.2.1 Security Classification. .................................................................168
2.2.2 Maintaining Unwarheaded 109A Certification. .....................................168
2.2.3 Warheaded 109A. .......................................................................168
2.2.4 Transportation Security. ................................................................168
2.2.4.1 Receipt. ..............................................................................169
2.2.4.2 Transfer. .............................................................................169
2.3 SAFETY. .......................................................................................169
2.3.1 Explosives Safety Quantity Distance (ESQD) Arc Restrictions. .................169
2.3.1.1 ........................................................................................169
2.3.1.2 ........................................................................................170
2.3.1.3 ........................................................................................170
2.3.2 TCM Hazardous Components. ........................................................170
2.3.3 Permits. ...................................................................................170
2.3.4 Hazards Associated With Composite Material Breakdown/Combustion. .......170
2.3.4.1 ........................................................................................171
2.3.4.2 ........................................................................................171
2.3.4.3 ........................................................................................171
2.3.4.4 ........................................................................................171
2.3.5 CLS Post-Launch Waste Water. .......................................................171
CHAPTER 3 FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION .....................................................182
SECTION I. CHAPTER ORGANIZATION......................................................182
3.1 SCOPE. .........................................................................................182
SECTION II. GENERAL............................................................................183
3.2 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM. ........................................................183
3.2.1 Prelaunch Electrical Power. ............................................................183
3.2.1.1 Converter/Operate Power. ........................................................183
3.2.1.2 Cruise Missile (CM) Identification Power. .....................................183
3.2.1.3 REM Heater Power. ...............................................................183
3.2.1.4 Monitor/Reset Power. .............................................................183
3.2.1.5 DC Monitor/Reset Power Return. ...............................................183
3.2.1.6 Chassis/Static Ground. ............................................................183
3.2.2 Launch/Boost Electrical Power. .......................................................183
3.2.2.1 CMA Battery Activation. .........................................................184
3.2.2.2 CMGS Battery Activation. .......................................................184
3.2.2.3 REM Battery Activation. .........................................................184
3.2.2.4 Bus Isolation. .......................................................................184
3.2.2.5 First Motion. ........................................................................184
3.2.3 Cruise Electrical Power. ................................................................184
3.2.4 RSS Thermal Battery Activation. .....................................................185
7
3.3 DIGITAL DATA LINK. ......................................................................185

3.4 DIGITAL COMMANDS/DATA BLOCKS SENT TO A LAND-ATTACK TCM. ..185
3.4.1 Bootstrap Load (Program). ............................................................185
3.4.2 Request Status. ..........................................................................185
3.4.3 Alignment Data. .........................................................................186
3.4.4 Mission Data. ............................................................................186
3.4.5 Battery Activate. ........................................................................186
3.4.6 Launch Sequence Command. ..........................................................186
3.5 DIGITAL DATA RESPONSES FROM A LAND-ATTACK TCM. ...................186
3.5.1 Good Data Word. ........................................................................186
3.5.2 Missile Status Word. ....................................................................186
3.6 DISCRETE COMMANDS SENT TO A TCM. ..........................................186
3.6.1 Booster Safe Command. ...............................................................187
3.6.1.1 Mk 106 Rocket Motor. ............................................................187
3.6.1.2 Mk 111 Rocket Motor. ............................................................187
3.6.2 Booster Arm Command. ...............................................................187
3.6.2.1 Mk 106 Rocket Motor. ............................................................187
3.6.2.2 Mk 111 Rocket Motor. ............................................................187
3.6.3 Warhead Safe Control/Command (109A only). .....................................187
3.6.4 Warhead Prearm Control/Command (109A only). .................................187
3.6.5 Reprogram Command (Land-Attack only). .........................................187
3.6.6 Fire Command or Intent to Launch. ..................................................187
3.6.7 REM Abort Command. ................................................................188
3.7 DISCRETE SIGNALS SENT FROM A TCM. ...........................................188
3.7.1 Weapon Identification. .................................................................188
3.7.2 Simulator Present. .......................................................................188
3.7.3 Booster Safe Monitor. ..................................................................188
3.7.4 Booster Armed Monitor. ...............................................................188
3.7.5 Warhead Safe Monitor (109A only). .................................................188
3.7.6 Warhead Prearmed Monitor (109A only). ...........................................188
3.7.7 Missile Bus Monitor. ...................................................................188
3.7.8 Missile Enabled. .........................................................................188
3.7.9 Differential Pressure (TTL only). .....................................................188
SECTION III. TORPEDO TUBE LAUNCH .....................................................189
3.8 GENERAL. ....................................................................................189
3.9 MISSILE/CAPSULE AND TORPEDO TUBE PHYSICAL INTERFACES. ........189
3.9.1 Mechanical Interfaces. .................................................................189
3.9.2 Electrical and Pneumatic Interfaces. .................................................189
3.9.2.1 Electrical Umbilical. ...............................................................189
3.9.2.2 Pneumatic Umbilical. .............................................................189
3.10 PRESSURIZATION/VENT CONTROL SYSTEM.....................................189
3.11 SECURITY SYSTEM.......................................................................190
3.12 NAVIGATION SYSTEM. ..................................................................190
8
3.12.1 Navigation Equipment Alignment. ..................................................190

3.12.2 Velocity and Position Computation. ................................................190
3.12.3 Reset Computations. ..................................................................190
3.12.4 Status and Performance Monitoring. ................................................190
SECTION IV. CAPSULE LAUNCHING SYSTEM ............................................192
3.13 GENERAL....................................................................................192
3.14 CLS UNIQUE ELECTRICAL INTERRELATIONSHIPS.............................192
3.14.1 CLS Unique Prelaunch Electrical Power Requirements. .........................192
3.14.2 CLS Unique Commands. .............................................................192
3.14.3 CLS Unique Discrete Responses. ...................................................192
3.15 MISSILE/CAPSULE AND MISSILE TUBE PHYSICAL INTERFACES..........193
3.15.1 Mechanical Interfaces. ................................................................193
3.15.2 Electrical Interfaces. ..................................................................193
3.16 PRESSURIZATION/VENT (P/V) SYSTEM. ...........................................193
3.17 MISSILE TUBE CONTROL SYSTEM. .................................................194
3.17.1 Missile Tube Control Panel. ..........................................................194
3.17.2 Differential Pressure Transducers. ..................................................194
3.17.3 Environmental Monitoring Sensor. .................................................194
3.17.4 Dew Point Monitor. ...................................................................194
3.17.5 Hatch and Valve Position Sensors. ..................................................194
3.18.1 Navigation Equipment Alignment. ..................................................195
3.18.2 Velocity and Position Computation. ................................................195
3.18.3 Reset Computations. ..................................................................195
3.18.4 Status and Performance Monitoring. ................................................195
SECTION V. VERTICAL LAUNCHING SYSTEM ............................................196
3.19 GENERAL....................................................................................196
3.20 MISSILE/CANISTER AND LAUNCH CELL PHYSICAL INTERFACES........196
3.20.1 Mechanical Interfaces. ................................................................196
3.20.2 Electrical Interfaces. ..................................................................196
3.20.3 Pneumatic Interface. ..................................................................196
3.21.1 Inertial Navigation Set (INS). ........................................................197
3.21.2 Digital Linear Switch (DLS). ........................................................197
3.21.3 Data Terminal Group (DTG). ........................................................197
3.21.4 Radio Navigation Set (RNS). ........................................................197
3.21.5 Global Positioning System (GPS). ..................................................197
3.22 VLS DAMAGE CONTROL SYSTEM...................................................197
3.23 EXHAUST GAS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. .........................................197
CHAPTER 4 OPERATIONS ..........................................................................204
SECTION I. ...........................................................................................204
4.1 SCOPE. .........................................................................................204
SECTION II. TORPEDO TUBE LAUNCH ......................................................205
9
4.2 LAUNCH PLATFORMS.....................................................................205

4.2.1 Submarine Combat System. ...........................................................205
4.2.2 Combat Systems Electronic Space (CSES). .........................................205
4.2.3 Navigation Equipment. .................................................................205
4.2.4 Weapon Launch and Pressurization/Vent Equipment. .............................205
4.2.5 Weapon Shipping/Unshipping Equipment. ..........................................205
4.2.6 Weapon Handling and Stowage Equipment. ........................................206
4.3 WEAPON ONLOAD. ........................................................................206
4.4 OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS/RESTRICTIONS. ..................................206
4.4.1 Launch Constraints. .....................................................................206
4.4.2 Weapon Mix. ............................................................................206
4.4.3 Alert Messages and Interlocks. ........................................................206
4.5 LAND-ATTACK TCM OPERATIONAL SEQUENCE. ................................207
4.5.1 Weapon Preparation and Tube Loading. .............................................207
4.5.1.1 ........................................................................................207
4.5.1.2 ........................................................................................207
4.5.2 Weapon Power-Up and Make Ready. ................................................208
4.5.2.1 ........................................................................................208
4.5.2.2 ........................................................................................208
4.5.2.3 ........................................................................................208
4.5.3 Mission Assignment. ...................................................................208
4.5.3.1 ........................................................................................209
4.5.3.2 ........................................................................................209
4.5.4 Tube Ready. ..............................................................................209
4.5.5 Rocket Motor Arming. .................................................................209
4.5.6 Warhead Prearming (UGM-109A only). .............................................209
4.5.7 Weapon Firing. ..........................................................................209
4.6 POST-LAUNCH OPERATIONS. ..........................................................210
4.6.1 Tube Reset. ...............................................................................210
4.6.2 Capsule Ejection. ........................................................................210
4.6.2.1 ........................................................................................210
4.6.2.2 ........................................................................................210
4.6.3 Capsule Return to Stowage. ...........................................................210
4.7 LAND-ATTACK TCM CASUALTY MODE. ............................................ 211
SECTION III. CAPSULE LAUNCHING SYSTEM ............................................212
4.8 LAUNCH PLATFORM. .....................................................................212
4.8.1 Submarine Combat System (SCS). ...................................................212
4.8.2 Combat Systems Electronic Space (CSES). .........................................212
4.8.3 Navigation System. .....................................................................212
4.8.4 Weapon Launch System. ...............................................................212
4.8.4.1 Missile Tube Assembly. ...........................................................212
4.8.4.2 Hydraulic System. .................................................................213
4.8.4.3 Pressurization/Vent System. ......................................................213
10
4.8.4.4 Flood and Drain System. ..........................................................213

4.8.4.5 Missile Tube Control System. ....................................................213
4.9 ONLOAD AND OFFLOAD.................................................................213
4.9.1 Onload. ...................................................................................213
4.9.1.1 Prepare Missile Tube and Ship Systems. .......................................214
4.9.1.2 Install Loading Equipment. .......................................................214
4.9.1.3 Prepare Weapon. ...................................................................215
4.9.1.4 Load Weapon in Missile Tube. ...................................................215
4.9.1.5 Remove Loading Equipment. ....................................................215
4.9.1.6 Post-Loadout. .......................................................................215
4.9.1.7 SSGN Onload Overview. .........................................................216
4.9.1.8 AUR Onload Sequence. ...........................................................216
4.9.1.9 Organizational-Level Preparations. .............................................216
4.9.1.10 Installing Loading Equipment. .................................................216
4.9.1.11 Uprighting and Inserting. ........................................................216
4.9.1.12 Removing Loading Equipment. ................................................216
4.9.1.13 Organizational-Level Closeout Operations. ..................................217
4.9.2 Offload. ...................................................................................217
4.9.2.1 Prepare Missile Tube and Ship Systems. .......................................217
4.9.2.2 Prepare Spent CLS for Offload. ..................................................217
4.9.2.3 Prepare Weapon for Offload. .....................................................218
4.9.2.4 Install Offload Equipment. .......................................................218
4.9.2.5 Remove Weapon from Missile Tube. ...........................................218
4.9.2.6 Remove Offload Equipment. .....................................................218
4.9.2.7 Secure Missile Tube and Ship Systems after Weapon Offload. .............218
4.9.2.8 Post-Launch P/V Refurbishment after Spent CLS Offload. ..................219
4.9.2.9 Post-Launch Missile Tube Refurbishment after Spent CLS Offload. .......219
4.9.2.10 SSGN Offload Overview. .......................................................219
4.10 OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS/RESTRICTIONS..................................219
4.10.1 Weapon Mix. ...........................................................................219
4.10.2 Alert Messages and Interlocks. ......................................................219
4.11 LAND-ATTACK TCM OPERATIONAL SEQUENCE. ...............................220
4.11.1 Weapon Preparation. ..................................................................220
4.11.2 Weapon Power-Up and Make Ready. ...............................................220
4.11.3 Mission Assignment. ..................................................................221
4.11.3.1 .......................................................................................221
4.11.3.2 .......................................................................................221
4.11.4 Rocket Motor/Capsule Prearm. ......................................................221
4.11.5 Tube Ready. ............................................................................221
4.11.6 Weapon Firing. .........................................................................222
4.11.6.1 .......................................................................................222
4.11.6.2 .......................................................................................222
4.11.7 Multiple Launch/Salvo Fire. .........................................................222
11
4.12 POST-LAUNCH OPERATIONS. .........................................................222

4.13 LAND-ATTACK TCM CASUALTY MODE............................................222
4.14 BLOCK IV TACTOM OPERATIONAL SEQUENCE.................................223
4.14.1 Prelaunch Sequence. ..................................................................223
4.14.2 Launch Sequence. .....................................................................224
4.14.3 Submarine Weapon System Interfaces. .............................................224
4.14.4 TOMAHAWK Strike Network In-Flight Communications. .....................225
4.14.5 GPS To Missile Interface. ............................................................225
SECTION IV. VERTICAL LAUNCHING SYSTEM ...........................................227
4.15 LAUNCH PLATFORMS. ..................................................................227
4.15.1 Launch Control Unit. ..................................................................227
4.15.2 Launchers. ..............................................................................227
4.15.2.1 8-Cell Module. ....................................................................227
4.15.2.2 8-Cell System Module. ..........................................................227
4.15.2.3 5-Cell Strikedown Module. .....................................................228
4.15.3 Remote Launch Enable Panel (RLEP). .............................................228
4.15.4 Status Panel. ............................................................................228
4.15.5 TOMAHAWK Weapon Control System (TWCS). ................................228
4.15.5.1 Track Control Group (TCG). ....................................................228
4.15.5.2 Launch Control Group (LCG). .................................................228
4.16 ONLOAD, OFFLOAD AND CROSSDECK WEAPONS. ............................228
4.16.1 Onload. ..................................................................................228
4.16.1.1 Prepare Launcher. ................................................................229
4.16.1.2 Prepare Cell. ......................................................................229
4.16.1.3 Prepare Weapon. ..................................................................229
4.16.1.4 Load Weapon. .....................................................................229
4.16.1.5 Post-Loadout. .....................................................................230
4.16.2 Offload. .................................................................................230
4.16.2.1 Prepare Launcher. ................................................................230
4.16.2.2 Prepare Crane. ....................................................................230
4.16.2.3 Remove Weapon. .................................................................230
4.16.3 Crossdeck Weapons. ..................................................................231
4.17 OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS/RESTRICTIONS..................................231
4.17.1 Weapon Mix. ...........................................................................231
4.17.2 Weapon Availability. ..................................................................231
4.18 LAND-ATTACK TCM OPERATIONAL SEQUENCE................................231
4.18.1 Prelaunch Reprogramming. ..........................................................232
4.18.2 Missile Selection. ......................................................................232
4.18.3 Cell Selection. ..........................................................................232
4.18.4 Cell/Missile Preparation. .............................................................232
4.18.5 Select Response Evaluation. .........................................................232
4.18.6 Mission Assignment. ..................................................................233
4.18.6.1 .......................................................................................233
12
4.18.6.2 .......................................................................................233
4.18.7 Rocket Motor Arm. ....................................................................233
4.18.8 Missile Activation. ....................................................................233
4.18.9 Rocket Motor Ignition and Missile Release. .......................................233
4.18.10 Cell Safing. ............................................................................234
4.19 POST-LAUNCH. ............................................................................234
4.20 LAND-ATTACK TCM CASUALTY MODE............................................234
13
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1-1. Land-Attack 109A.......................................................................... 61
Figure 1-2. Cruise Missile Guidance Set (CMGS)................................................... 62
Figure 1-3. Land-Attack 109C.......................................................................... 63
Figure 1-4. Digital Scene Matching Correlation (DSMAC) ........................................ 64
Figure 1-5. Land-Attack 109D.......................................................................... 65
Figure 1-6. Land-Attack 109D Payload Section ..................................................... 66
Figure 1-7. Block IV Tactical TOMAHAWK Missile General Arrangement .................... 67
Figure 1-8. TACTOM Forward Body Section ........................................................ 68
Figure 1-9. Mk 106 Rocket Motor ..................................................................... 69
Figure 1-10. Mk 111 Rocket Motor .................................................................... 70
Figure 1-11. Underwater Protection Devices ......................................................... 71
Figure 1-12. Recovery Exercise Module .............................................................. 72
Figure 1-13. TACTOM Midbody Section............................................................. 73
Figure 1-14. Range Safety System (109C)............................................................ 74
Figure 1-15. Range Safety System (109D)............................................................ 75
Figure 1-16. Typical Land-Attack TCM Pre-landfall Flyout Route ............................... 76
Figure 1-17. Terrain Contour Matching (TERCOM) Process ...................................... 77
Figure 1-18. TACTOM Aftbody and Tailcone Section.............................................. 78
Figure 1-19. Typical Mission Profile (109A/C) ...................................................... 79
Figure 1-20. Typical Mission Profile (109D) ......................................................... 80
Figure 1-21. CLS Missile Tube Loading and Handling Trainer Assembly ....................... 81
Figure 1-22. Typical Parachute Recovery of REM-Equipped Missile ............................ 82
Figure 1-23. TTL Capsules (2 Sheets)................................................................. 83
Figure 1-24. Electrical and Pneumatic Umbilicals................................................... 85
Figure 1-25. CNU-308/E Shipping Container ........................................................ 86
Figure 1-26. Capsule Launching System (CLS) Mk 45 ............................................. 87
Figure 1-27. Capsule Launching System (CLS) Components...................................... 88
Figure 1-28. All-Up-Round Simulator (AURS) Volumetric Shape................................ 89
Figure 1-29. All-Up-Round Electronic Simulator (AURES) Mk 101............................. 90
Figure 1-30. AURES/AURS Interface................................................................. 91
Figure 1-31. Missile Tube Ballast Can ................................................................ 92
Figure 1-32. Shipping and Storage Skid Mk 30 ...................................................... 93
Figure 1-33. AUR Simulator Shipping Skid .......................................................... 94
Figure 1-34. Mk 10 Canister ............................................................................ 95
Figure 1-35. Mk 14 Canister (2 Sheets) ............................................................... 96
Figure 1-36. Shipping and Storage Skid Mk 34 ...................................................... 98
Figure 1-37. CLS Submarine Missile Tube Trainer Assembly..................................... 99
Figure 1-38. SMTT Training Shape...................................................................100
Figure 1-39. CLS Mk 45 Mod 2 Aft Cover ..........................................................101
Figure 1-40. CLS Mk 45 Mod 2 Capsule Closure Assembly......................................102
Figure 1-41. SSGN (Prototype) Multiple All-Up-Round Canister (MAC) ......................103
Figure 2-1. Explosive Safety Quantity Distance (ESQD) Arc Restrictions (Typical)..........172
14
Figure 2-2. TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile Hazardous Component Locations (2 Sheets) .....173
Figure 3-1. TTL Electrical and Pneumatic Umbilical Routing (2 Sheets) .......................199
Figure 3-2. CLS Electrical Umbilical Routing ......................................................201
Figure 3-3. VLS Exhaust Gas Control ...............................................................202
Figure 4-1. General Locations of SSN Complexes .................................................235
Figure 4-2. SSN/TWS-related Equipment TTL Interfaces.........................................236
Figure 4-3. SSN TTL Pressurization/Vent Control System ........................................237
Figure 4-4. MTEL Work Platforms ...................................................................238
Figure 4-5. TTL Weapon Shipping, Handling and Stowage Equipment (SSN 688 Class) ....239
Figure 4-6. UGM-109-1 Land-Attack TCM Operational Sequence (7 Sheets) .................240
Figure 4-7. MTEL With MTEL Adapter Installed ..................................................247
Figure 4-8. General Locations of SSN 688 Class Submarine Complexes .......................248
Figure 4-9. SSN 688 Class Submarine TWS-related Equipment Interfaces (2 Sheets) ........249
Figure 4-10. SSN 688 Class Submarine Missile Tube Assembly.................................251
Figure 4-11. SSN 688 Class Submarine Hydraulic System........................................252
Figure 4-12. SSN 688 Class Submarine Pressurization/Vent System ............................253
Figure 4-13. SSN 688 Class Submarine Flood and Drain System ................................254
Figure 4-14. SSN 688 Class Submarine Missile Tube Control System ..........................255
Figure 4-15. Loading Platform Installed .............................................................256
Figure 4-16. SSN 688 Class Submarine Missile Tube Equipment................................257
Figure 4-17. CLS Weapon Onload ....................................................................258
Figure 4-18. CLS Weapon Seating in Missile Tube ................................................259
Figure 4-19. Secure CLS Weapon in Missile Tube .................................................260
Figure 4-20. UGM-109-2 Land-Attack TCM Operational Sequence (10 Sheets) ..............261
Figure 4-21. Lifting Adapter and Extension .........................................................271
Figure 4-22. Vertical Launching System Mk 41 Mod 0 ............................................272
Figure 4-25. Launch Control Unit (LCU) ............................................................275
Figure 4-26. Vertical Launching System Launcher .................................................276
Figure 4-27. Remote Launch Enable Panel (RLEP) ................................................277
Figure 4-28. Status Panel ...............................................................................278
Figure 4-29. Mk 14 VLS Canister PHS&T Equipment ............................................279
Figure 4-30. Secure Canister to Mk 23 Tilt Fixture.................................................280
Figure 4-31. Upright Mk 14 VLS Canister to Vertical Position...................................281
Figure 4-32. RGM-109-4 Land-Attack TCM Operational Sequence (15 Sheets) ..............282
Figure 4-33. Multiple All-Up-Round Canister (Fully Loaded)....................................297
Figure 4-34. Tilt Fixture Mk 23 Mod 0 with Kit B .................................................298
Figure 4-35. Multiple All-Up-Round Canister MTEL Orientation ...............................299
Figure 4-36. AUR Aft Cover Viewed in MAC ......................................................300
15
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1-1. Support Equipment Description ..........................................................104
Table 1-2. Shipboard Equipment Used for TOMAHAWK Support ..............................123
Table 1-3. Reference Documentation .................................................................124
Table 1-4. Abbreviations and Acronyms .............................................................133
Table 1-5. Summary of Reports .......................................................................147
Table 1-6. Common Descriptive Data ................................................................150
Table 1-7. Variant Unique Descriptive Data .........................................................154
Table 1-8. Container Weights and Dimensions ......................................................156
Table 1-9. Weights of TTL Variants and Related Material.........................................157
Table 1-10. Centers of Gravity for TTL Variants ...................................................159
Table 1-11. Weights of CLS Variants and Related Material .......................................161
Table 1-12. Centers of Gravity for CLS Variants ...................................................164
Table 1-13. Weights of RGM-109-2 Mk 10 Variants and Related Material .....................165
Table 1-14. Centers of Gravity for RGM-109-2 Variants ..........................................166
Table 1-15. Weights of VLS Variants .................................................................167
Table 2-1. General Safety Summary ..................................................................175
Table 2-2. Storage and Hazard Data ..................................................................178
Table 2-3. Pyrotechnic and Hazardous Materials Data .............................................179
Table 3-1. Land-Attack TCM CMGS Alignment Modes ..........................................203
Table 4-1. Missile Availability Factors ...............................................................301
16
SW820-AP-MMI-010 REVISION 15 27 MARCH 2009 FOREWORD
FOREWORD
SCOPE: This document consists of four volumes which provide information, data and procedures
for operations and support of the TOMAHAWK Weapon System (TWS).
a. Volume 1 - SW820-AP-MMI-010 - TOMAHAWK CRUISE MISSILE SYSTEM
DESCRIPTION - This volume presents information pertinent to the submarine
and surface launch TOMAHAWK Weapon System (TWS) to include physical and
functional descriptions of system components, safety and security considerations, and
operations aboard platforms employing the TWS.
b. Volume 2 - SW820-AP-MMI-020 - TOMAHAWK CRUISE MISSILE GENERAL
HANDLING PROCEDURES - This volume contains Procedural Guides (PGs),
Operating Procedures (OPs) and Standard Inspection Procedures (SIP) to permit
afloat and ashore activities to perform receipt, handling, inspection, transfer, and
reconfiguration processes for TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile (TCM) configurations.
This volume does not include procedures for combatant onload/offload or submarine
tender unique on board handling. Combatant onload/offload procedures are contained
in NAVSEA OD 44979 for Torpedo Tube Launch (TTL) variants; in NAVSEA OD
44979 and SW820-AD-WHS-010 for Capsule Launching System (CLS) variants; and
in SW394-EE-PRO-010 for Vertical Launching System (VLS) variants. Processes
unique to handling TCM configurations on board submarine tenders are contained in
SW820-AA-WHM-010 for TTL and in SW820-AD-WHS-030 for CLS and VLS on
AS 39 Class.
c. Volume 3 - SW820-AP-MMI-030 - TOMAHAWK CRUISE MISSILE MAINTENANCE
PROCEDURES - This volume contains PGs, OPs, SIPs, and Repair Parts Breakdown
(RPB) to permit afloat and ashore activities to perform authorized maintenance on
TCM configurations.
d. Volume 4 - SW820-AP-MMI-040 - TOMAHAWK CRUISE MISSILE UGM 109A-1
WARHEAD INSTALLATION/REMOVAL AND AIR VEHICLE MAINTENANCE
- This volume contains PGs, OPs and RPBs to handle and prepare UGM 109A
All-Up-Rounds for installation or removal of the warhead and to perform authorized
maintenance on the UGM 109A Air Vehicle.
PURPOSE: This document provides information, data and procedures for operations and support
of the TOMAHAWK Weapons System (TWS).
TOMAHAWK ALL-UP-ROUND LOGISTICS AND MAINTENANCE INFORMATION
PRODUCT (TALMIP) DEFICIENCY/EVALUATION REPORTING: All errors,
omissions, discrepancies and suggestions for improvements to PEO(U&W) TALMIPs, shall
be reported to Naval Surface Warfare Center Division, Naval Systems Data Support Activity
using NAVSEA/SPAWAR Technical Manual Deficiency/Evaluation Report (TMDER),
NAVSEA Form 4160/1. The preferred reporting method, for activities with suitable internet
access, is the on-line TMDER input page at the uniform resource locator (URL) address:
https://nsdsa2.phdnswc.navy.mil. A copy of NAVSEA Form 4160/1 for local reproduction is
included in this TALMIP, on the CDs root directory under "FORMS" as "tmderform_rev-2003".
Extra copies of the form may be requisitioned from Naval Inventory Control Point - Cog "I"
17
SW820-AP-MMI-010 REVISION 15 27 MARCH 2009 FOREWORD
Material, 700 Robbins Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19111-5089. Hard copies may be submitted
to Commander, NAVSURFWARCENDIV NDSDA, 4363 Missile Way, Port Hueneme, CA
93043-4307, Attn: Code 312 . FAX transmissions may be submitted using: DSN 296-0726
or commercial (805) 228-0726. All feedback comments will be thoroughly investigated and
originators will be advised of action resulting therefrom.
TOMAHAWK ALL-UP-ROUND LOGISTICS AND MAINTENANCE INFORMATION
PRODUCT (TALMIP) DISTRIBUTION CHANGES, ADDITIONS OR DELETIONS:
Direct all requests for TALMIP distribution changes, additions or deletions to: Program Executive
Officer for Unmanned Aviation and Strike Weapons (Attn: PMA-280713), 47123 Buse Road,
Unit IPT, Patuxent River, MD 20670-1547.
STOCK REPLENISHMENT: Request additional copies of TOMAHAWK All-Up-Round
Logistics and Maintenance Information Products (TALMIP) via normal MILSTRIP procedures
from: Naval Inventory Control Point - Cog I Material, 700 Robbins Avenue, Philadelphia,
PA 19111-5098.
18
SW820-AP-MMI-010 REVISION 15 27 MARCH 2009 CHAPTER 1
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
SECTION I. DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION
1.1 SCOPE.
This document presents information pertinent to the submarine-launched and
surface-ship-launched Tomahawk Weapon System (TWS) to include physical and functional
descriptions of system components, safety and security considerations, and operations aboard
platforms employing the TWS.
1.1.1 Chapter 1. Chapter 1 discusses the TWS mission and physical descriptions of system
components and equipment required to support the system; identifies the types of documentation
and documentation terminology associated with TWS operations and support; describes
TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile (TCM) mission profiles from prelaunch to target engagement; and
provides TWS reference data. Section I of this chapter provides an outline of this documents
organization and content. Section II provides an overview of the TWS to include a discussion
of the TWS mission, the TCM All-Up-Round, support equipment, and documentation and
documentation terminology. Section III provides a description of the TCM without regard
to launch configuration and discusses targeting and the typical missile profile for each TCM
variant. Section IV discusses the submarine Torpedo Tube Launch (TTL) launch configuration
and provides information and data unique to the TTL system. Section V discusses the submarine
Capsule Launching System (CLS) launch configuration and provides information and data unique
to CLS. Section VI discusses the surface Vertical Launching System (VLS) launch configuration
and provides information and data unique to VLS.
1.1.2 Chapter 2. Chapter 2 discusses TWS security and safety requirements, regulations and
general policies relating thereto.
1.1.3 Chapter 3. Chapter 3 discusses functional descriptions of TWS components and
interfaces between the TCM and its launch platforms. Section I provides an outline of the
organization and content of the chapter. Section II discusses the TCM electrical power system and
type commands and requests for status issued to the TCM and TCM responses to those commands
and requests for status. Section III discusses unique interfaces between TTL TCMs and the
submarine. Section IV discusses unique interfaces between CLS TCMs and the submarine.
Section V discusses unique interfaces between VLS TCMs and the surface ship.
1.1.4 Chapter 4. Chapter 4 discusses TWS operations aboard launch platforms to include a
description of the launch platform and on board equipment used to load, store and launch TCMs;
TCM onload scenarios; and launch operations. Section I provides an outline of the organization
and content of the chapter. Section II discusses TTL unique operations. Section III discusses CLS
unique operations. Section IV discusses VLS unique operations.
19
SECTION II. TOMAHAWK WEAPON SYSTEM

1.2 TWS DESCRIPTION.
The TWS consists of the submarine TTL system employed aboard SSN 688, SSN 21, and SSN
774 Class submarines; the submarine CLS employed aboard selected SSN 688 Class submarines,
SSN 774 Class submarines and SSGN Class submarines; and the surface VLS employed
aboard DD 963 Class, CG 47 Class, and DDG 51 Class ships. Each system employs a unique
All-Up-Round (AUR) configuration to launch a TCM. In addition to tactical TCM variants, each
system also includes applicable exercise, certification, and training variants as well as related
support, test, handling and training equipment. Within the broad definition, each system also
includes those ship systems necessary to stow and launch TCMs.
1.3 MISSION.
The mission of the TWS is to provide theater and force commanders with a capability to use
surface and sub-surface platforms to employ, either independently or in coordination with other
strike capabilities, highly accurate, all-weather TOMAHAWK Cruise Missiles (TCM), armed
with a variety of highly destructive payloads, against land targets at stand-off ranges.
1.4 ALL-UP-ROUND.
An AUR consists of a TCM installed in a capsule or canister configuration. For a TTL AUR,
the separate pneumatic and electrical umbilicals are considered part of the AUR. For horizontal
submarine launch, the depot installs an appropriately configured TCM into a Capsule, Mk 1
Mod 0 (for UGM-109A/C/D-1) or a Capsule, Mk 3 Mod 0 (for UGM-109E-1). For vertical
submarine launch, the depot installs an appropriately configured TCM into either a Capsule
Launching System (CLS), Mk 45 Mod 1 (SSN use only), or a CLS, Mk 45 Mod 2. CLS, Mk
45 Mod 1 assemblies are being converted to the Mod 2 configuration which can be used on
both SSN and SSGN platforms. For surface launch, TCMs are encanistered at the depot into
the Mk 10 Canister and then subsequently encanistered into the Mk 14 Canister at designated
intermediate maintenance activities to permit surface vertical launch. The capsules/canisters
provide protection during handling, storage, and transportation. The capsules and Mk 14 Canister
also serve as launching devices for TCMs. Tactical and exercise AURs are delivered to the launch
platform fueled and ready for launch. Tactical AURs are warheaded. Exercise AURs may be
equipped with a depot-installed Range Safety System (RSS) and a live or inert warhead, or
a depot-installed Recovery Exercise Module (REM) without warhead. Tactical and exercise
AURs with conventional explosive warheads are classified as Class 1 Division 1 explosives.
UGM-109A is classified as Class 1 Division 3. AURs with inert, or without warheads, are
classified as Class 1 Division 3 explosives.
1.4.1 Tactical AURs. Tactical AURs are used for land-attack missions to strike high-value
or heavily defended targets. Tactical AURs are configured for either surface launch (RGM)
or submarine launch (UGM). Anti-ship TOMAHAWK is no longer employed. Each TCM is
equipped with various devices for launch, a rocket motor to boost it to a specified altitude after
launch, a sustaining engine for cruising to the target, wings and fins to affect course changes, a
guidance section, and an explosive warhead.
20
1.4.2 Exercise AURs. Exercise variants are classified as either REM- or RSS-equipped TCMs
and provide the capability to launch TCMs for testing or training. REM- and RSS-equipped TCMs
are identified by a J prefix in the missile designator. A REM-equipped TCM (JUGM-109A
or JRGM/JUGM-109C only) has a parachute system that permits recovery upon test flight
completion. REM-equipped TCMs are identified by an "M" suffix in the missile designator. An
RSS-equipped TCM (JRGM- or JUGM-109C or D) or MRSS-equipped Block IV TACTOM
(JRGM- or JUGM-109E) is used for an exercise flight involving a target hit and may have a W
(live warhead) or an S (inert warhead) suffix in the missile designator.
1.5 MISSILE IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM.
The Missile Identification System (MIS) is a method of differentiating between operationally
significant features within a weapon type. Digital data can be electronically read from TCM
variants containing a Programmable Read Only Memory in the Mission Control Module or from
data stored in the protected memory of the guidance set. The MIS code consists of a series of
digital data words followed by a checksum. These data are transmitted to the submarine/ship
launch control system upon request. Matching data plates, containing the AUR serial number and
MIS code, are mounted in the Record Book for TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile (TRB), PEO(W)
PUB 4440, and on the AUR. A removable data plate is provided for VLS variants for attachment
to the Mk 14 Canister. The MIS data plate may also contain canister code plug values which
are applicable only to surface launched variants. Refer to PEO(CU)INST 8800.1 for complete
identification of AUR nomenclatures, National Stock Numbers, Navy Ammunition Logistics
Codes, discriminators, and MIS codes.
1.6 SUPPORT EQUIPMENT.
TOMAHAWK Weapon System planning identified requirements for support, test and handling
equipment aboard submarines, surface ships, submarine tenders, shore bases, and training
activities. Requirements include equipment already in the Navy inventory as well as peculiar
equipment designed and developed for TWS unique application. Table 1-1 "Support Equipment
Description" consolidates and provides identifying data for equipment required for TWS
evolutions at submarine and surface launch operational and support activities. Table 1-2
"Shipboard Equipment Used for TOMAHAWK Support" identifies on board submarine tender
and surface ship equipment that is used to support TWS evolutions.
1.7 LOADING AND HANDLING TRAINING EQUIPMENT.
The CLS Missile Tube Loading and Handling Trainer Assembly (Figure 1-21 "CLS Missile
Tube Loading and Handling Trainer Assembly") is a facsimile of an SSN 688(I) submarine
missile tube that is used to train submarine tender and shorebase personnel in all facets of CLS
onload and offload evolutions. This trainer can be used to simulate the SSN-774 Class platform
as well as the SSN-688(I).
For SSGN-726 class, the Submarine Missile Tube Trainer (SMTT) Assembly (Figure 1-37 "CLS
Submarine Missile Tube Trainer Assembly") emulates MAC AUR cells for onload and offload
training evolutions. Installation of an SSN top plate over the SSGN platform, transforms the
trainer assembly from SSGN to SSN use.
21
A SMTT training shape (Figure 1-38 "SMTT Training Shape") is required to handle and train
on the SMTT . The SMTT training shape is a modified version of the CLS capsule, shortened to
approximately 15 inches. The SMTT training shape includes a Capsule Loading Cover.
1.8 DOCUMENTATION.
1.8.1 Record Books. Record books form an integral part of maintaining inventory and historical
data on TWS variants. Each variants record book accompanies the variant at all times throughout
the logistics cycle and is returned to the depot with the variant at the time of recertification or
unscheduled maintenance. The record book identifies the variant configuration and determines
the data necessary for Fleet use; provides a log for tracking and recording security seal data;
provides a history of movement, maintenance, and significant events between initial acceptance
and return to the depot; and provides a record of authorized waivers and deviations to technical
manual acceptance/rejection criteria. PEO(W) PUB 4440, Record Book for TOMAHAWK Cruise
Missile, is used to record data pertinent to tactical and exercise AURs and specific trainers.
PEO(W) PUB 4440 has been structured to accommodate both surface and submarine launched
variants. Therefore, some forms contained in the record book are not applicable to some launch
configurations. Instructions for use, forms completion, and disposition are contained in the
record book and in PEO(W) INST 4440.2 .
1.8.2 Procedural Documentation. To perform TWS handling, maintenance and warheading
evolutions, procedural documentation utilizes Procedural Guides (PG), Operating Procedures
(OP) and Standard Inspection Procedures (SIP). All requirements, equipment, tools, material and
procedures necessary for the safe and efficient handling, maintenance and warheading of weapons
are contained in those PGs, OPs and SIPs. The PGs and OPs are self-explanatory and only
require personnel be familiar with ship/shore base facility weapons systems. The SIPs are used by
inspection personnel, when applicable. Inspection steps are indicated in the OPs by the following
line ***IP STOP*** centered prior to a sequence of IP steps. The check line will be marked
with IP on the right edge. All paragraphs, steps and sub-steps are of equal standing when
determining if there is a sequence break requiring IP stop markings.
1.8.2.1 Figures. Figures are provided in procedural documents to visually supplement
procedural information in the OPs and, except for certain assembly sequences, provide typical
views of events. Illustrations are not intended to restrict operations. Interpretation of visual
depictions of events and variance from these same depictions are within the scope of the Weapons
Officer/Weapons Repair Officer/Civilian Counterparts authority and should only be governed by
standard safety procedures and proper performance of equipment/operation being performed with
no degradation of mission/weapon effectiveness.
1.8.2.2 Evolutions. Procedural documents contain only the PGs, OPs and SIPs required for the
performance of pertinent evolutions. The combination of PGs and OPs/SIPs provides procedural
documentation for an overall task. Evolutions are controlled by the PGs which will refer the user
to the appropriate OPs or other external references. The PGs are presented in order of use and in
a general to specific type sequence. OPs are arranged in a step-by-step sequence which allows
personnel to read a procedural step, perform the work and check off the accomplishment of
22
the work in the space provided. The procedures stand alone to the extent that referral to other
steps, procedures or documents is minimized. The SIPs are used with their corresponding OPs
whenever IP is involved as indicated in the OPs by the IP stops. SIPs are numbered to track
with the OP with which they are used (i.e., SIP 3 is used with OP 3). There will be gaps in the
numbering sequence of the SIPs because every OP does not have a SIP.
1.8.3 Procedural Documentation Terminology. The following paragraphs discuss terminology
used in TWS procedural documentation.
1.8.3.1 Procedural Guides. PGs are used to coordinate major evolutions. Accomplishment of
OPs may be prescribed. Appropriate steps for the evolution in process should be selected and
all non-selected steps can be disregarded. Non-selected steps should be appropriately marked,
i.e., N/A. Selected steps should be accomplished in the sequence listed unless a deviation
has been authorized by the Weapons Officer/Weapons Repair Officer/Civilian Counterpart.
When deviating from the listed sequence and/or illustrations, the Weapons Officer/Weapons
Repair Officer/Civilian Counterpart must evaluate the broad task to ensure that the deviation
is both safe and correct. Referral to the PG during the evolution is mandatory and status of
steps accomplishment shall be indicated by a physical check-off of PG steps or N/A type
indication. The Reader-Worker Method is not mandatory, but is recommended. When not using
the Reader-Worker Method, reading aloud or making oral reports at the end of each step is not
required. The terms as required, as necessary, etc. indicate a choice of action is required
within the step, usually as a result of actions taken within the step, such as test results, presence
of varying conditions, etc.
1.8.3.2 Operating Procedures. OPs are used where the rigid method required for Checklists
is not necessary, and where specific tasks may be completed in other than the listed sequence.
OPs may include steps which refer to other procedures and documents when it is not practical to
include all the required steps in one procedure. Steps may be performed in any correct sequence
or concurrently. A correct sequence results in safe and reliable operations and is determined by
the person in charge of the evolution. Illustrations supporting an event are considered typical.
Deviation from depicted events is allowed under the same guidelines used when deviating
from procedural text. Referral to the OP during the evolution is mandatory and status of steps
accomplishment shall be appropriately indicated by a physical checkoff of the OP steps or N/A
type indication. The Reader-Worker Method is not mandatory, but is recommended. When not
using Reader-Worker Method, reading aloud or making oral reports at end of each step is not
required. The terms as required, as necessary etc. indicate a choice of action is required
within the step, usually as a result of actions taken within the step, such as test results, presence
of varying conditions, etc.
1.8.3.3 Inspection Table Specifics. Some OPs contain Inspection Tables to be used as
references during the performance of the OP steps. These tables list the specific items and features
to be inspected, describe unacceptable conditions for these items and prescribe a disposition
for items which are not acceptable. An Inspection Table has four columns with headings of
Inspection Point, Inspection Criteria, Action and Check Off. The Inspection Point column
identifies the specific item, or subassembly, being examined. Inspection Criteria describes the
particular conditions or items to be assessed at the Inspection Point. The Action column indicates
23
actions to be taken to resolve any problems associated with the specific Inspection Point. The
Check Off column allows monitoring the Inspection Table status. Three terms are used in the
"Action" column: Repair; Replace; and Reject. In the cases of Repair or Replace, the prescribed
action applies to the Inspection Point only, not to the higher assembly. For TOMAHAWK
AUR processing, "Reject" indicates the Inspection Point discrepancy is neither replaceable nor
repairable at the IMA level. The "Reject" action "flows up" and results in rejecting the AUR
unless a waiver is requested and approved. "Repair" indicates the Inspection Point discrepancy
can and should be repaired at the IMA level in accordance with procedures contained in
SW820-AP-MMI-030 or other applicable documentation. "Replace" indicates the Inspection
Point discrepancy is a replaceable component at the IMA level, however the component is not
repairable at the IMA.
1.8.3.4 Standard Inspection Procedures. The SIPs can be reproduced and used and/or
retained by QA personnel as records and check sheets. They contain each and every IP step
from the referenced OP rephrased for QA requirements. Warnings, cautions, notes, figures and
tables are not repeated in the SIP.
1.8.3.5 Supervisors. The responsibility of the supervisor is to define handling team roles and
operational requirements based on appropriate local directives and controls team actions. He
acknowledges all verbal statements of completion from the team members.
1.8.3.6 Readers. The responsibility of the reader is to ensure the procedure has been verified;
read aloud all warnings, cautions, and notes as they occur; read aloud the complete step verbatim;
observe the workers performance as a double check to ensure proper execution of the step (when
physically possible). In some situations, it may be more efficient to have a second worker or
observer perform this double check observation, providing this individual reports satisfactory
completion of the step; and check off the step when it is completed (it is considered completed
when reports are received from all workers). A verbal acknowledgement shall be made upon
completion of each step. Ensure all steps are performed in proper sequence; and report completion
of the procedure by appropriate checkoff in the PG, completion of the certification form or by
continuation to the next procedure.
1.8.3.7 Workers. The responsibility of the worker is to verbally acknowledge all warnings,
cautions, and notes (after they are read), perform the step and report completion of the step using
the standard term check.
1.8.3.8 Observers. The responsibility of the observer is the same as that of the worker except
that the observer observes the step instead of performing the step.
1.8.4 Quality Assurance (QA). Within procedural documents, certain OPs have procedural
check-off steps followed by IP. These steps are procedures which should be witnessed by QA
personnel and are repeated in a modified form for QA use on the SIPs. The SIP can be used for
record purposes by QA, if required.
1.8.4.1 Philosophy and Scope. The policy and practice of designating steps for
inspection/verification is not intended to provide solutions for training deficiencies, operation
tempo, variations in personnel performance, or other hardware/system features susceptible
24
to procedural error. Neither do they cover all facets involved in administering a total QA
program. Inspection verification points generally create a record that significant operations
were accomplished by or in the presence of specific personnel. The record may be useful in a
failure investigation, suggesting candidates for interview, and the involvement of a QA function
may heighten worker attentiveness at affected steps, however the record is not a guarantee
of compliance. Safety of operations and reliability of product are dominated by the training,
proficiency, and professionalism of the personnel accomplishing the tasks. In the limit, record
worthy steps are those which, if not performed correctly, may create a hidden condition that may,
in turn, cause a post-launch mission failure. Steps meeting this "record-worthy" criteria from a
standpoint of AUR design features are designated as Inspection Points in the technical manual
products. Technical manual user activities may designate additional steps as Inspection Points to
support local safety, production management, quality assurance or administrative processes, as
prescribed by local command/activity policies and procedures.
1.8.4.2 QA Functions and Responsibilities. Responsibility for quality and safety is not
restricted to QA and safety organizations, but extends to every person. The workers task
assignment is to perform all operations in order displayed or as directed by the supervisor and
to honor all IP hold points. Verification of significant operations at IP stop points should be
performed by personnel qualified and designated by the command QA program.
1.8.4.3 IP Stop Points. IP stop points are located at the highest level of assembly possible
which will allow inspections to be performed. These points are preceded by banners ***IP
STOP*** in the body of the steps. Check-off lines for affected steps are marked with IP at the
end of the line. These indications require QA witness/approve (signature/stamp/verbal approval)
before production personnel may continue. The assembler will notify the QA representative
whenever such notations are encountered in the course of an operation. Upon QA approval of
a marked step, production will continue with the next step. QA representatives will follow the
operations by using SIPs and OPs, when necessary.
1.8.5 Reference Documentation. Table 1-3 "Reference Documentation" provides a
consolidated list of TWS unique documentation, as well as directives, instructions and technical
and general reference documents applicable to the TWS.
1.8.6 Abbreviations and Acronyms. Table 1-4 "Abbreviations and Acronyms" provides a
consolidated list of abbreviations and acronyms applicable to the TWS.
1.9 REPORTS.
Table 1-5 "Summary of Reports" provides a consolidated list of reports applicable to the TWS.
Requirements for report submission are contained in the applicable submarine and surface ship
Users/Operational Logistics Support Summary.
25
SECTION III. TOMAHAWK CRUISE MISSILE

1.10 GENERAL.
This section provides a physical description of tactical and exercise TCM variants and presents a
typical mission profile for each variant.
1.11 TACTICAL VARIANTS.
The following paragraphs describe the sections and components that make up tactical TCM
variants. Table 1-6 "Common Descriptive Data" provides data common to multiple TCM
variants. Table 1-7 "Variant Unique Descriptive Data" provides variant unique data common
to multiple launch configurations.
1.11.1 Land-Attack 109A. The land-attack 109A (Figure 1-1 "Land-Attack 109A") is a long
range missile which carries a non-conventional W80 Warhead with guidance provided by Terrain
Contour Matching (TERCOM) techniques. The missile measures 243.33 inches long by 20.375
inches in diameter. The missile has a modular construction aluminum airframe. The unique body
sections are the guidance section, forward body payload section and forward body fuel section.
Each section is described in the following paragraphs.
1.11.1.1 Guidance Section. The guidance section, extending from station 0.00 to station 18.35,
includes the positive retention nose cone and the Cruise Missile Guidance Set (CMGS) (Figure
1-2 "Cruise Missile Guidance Set (CMGS)"). The positive retention nose cone is made of an
aluminum alloy and threads onto the missile forward body payload section. The CMGS provides
missile navigation, guidance and control functions and consists of a Reference Measuring Unit
and Computer (RMUC), a Rate Gyro/Accelerometer Package (RGAP), a Missile Radar Altimeter
(MRA), an Analog Filter Assembly (AFA), a Warhead Interface Unit (WIU), a DC-DC Converter
Module (DCM) and a Battery Power Unit (BPU). The CMGS attaches to the payload section via a
mechanical hinge and link assembly using five mounting bolts. This arrangement permits the
CMGS to be swung aside after positive retention nose cone removal for access to the warhead
cavity in order to install and remove the warhead without having to break electrical connections
between the airframe and CMGS.
1.11.1.2 Forward Body Payload Section. The forward body payload section, extending from
station 18.35 to station 52.45, houses a W80 Warhead (Joint Test Assembly (JTA) or Launch Test
Payload (LTP) in the REM-equipped missile), with the remaining section volume serving as a fuel
tank. Two flush-mounted radar altimeter antennas (one a transmitter and the other a receiver) are
installed on the bottom centerline to provide altitude and terrain inputs to the CMGS.
1.11.1.3 Forward Body Fuel Section. The forward body fuel section, extending from station
52.45 to station 99.80, contains fuel and an expansion bladder to accommodate changes in fuel
volume due to fuel expansion and contraction. For test and exercise flights, the forward body fuel
section is replaced by a REM section.
1.11.2 Land-Attack 109C. The land-attack 109C (Figure 1-3 "Land-Attack 109C") is a
medium range missile armed with a WDU-25/B or WDU-36/B conventional warhead with
guidance provided by Terrain Contour Matching (TERCOM) techniques and Digital Scene
26
Matching Area Correlation (DSMAC) or DSMAC IIA and a Global Positioning System
Subsystem (GPSS) to increase terminal accuracy. Time of Arrival (TOA) and Time on Target
(TOT) software are also used to enhance coordination with other strike capabilities. The missile
has a modular construction aluminum airframe with a diameter of 20.375 inches. The length is
243.33 inches with the Mk 106 Mod 0 Rocket Motor or 246.06 inches with the Mk 111 Mod 0
Rocket Motor. The unique body sections are the forward body guidance section and the forward
body payload section which are described in the following paragraphs.
1.11.2.1 Forward Body Guidance Section. The forward body guidance section extends
from station 0.00 to station 52.45. Major components are the positive retention nose cone, the
Cruise Missile Guidance Set (CMGS) (Figure 1-2 "Cruise Missile Guidance Set (CMGS)"),
the Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation (DSMAC) (Figure 1-4 "Digital Scene Matching
Correlation (DSMAC)") or DSMAC IIA and Global Positioning System Subsystem (GPSS)
sets and an illuminator assembly. Also included are a junction box in a well on the right side
and two radar altimeter antennas on the bottom centerline. The positive retention nose cone,
made of an aluminum alloy, threads on to the payload section. The CMGS provides missile
navigation, guidance and control functions and consists of a Reference Measuring Unit and
Computer (RMUC), a Rate Gyro/Accelerometer Package (RGAP), a Missile Radar Altimeter
Module (DCM) and a Battery Power Unit (BPU). The CMGS attaches to the payload section
via a mechanical hinge and link assembly using five mounting bolts. This arrangement permits
the CMGS to be swung aside after positive retention nose cone removal in order to install and
remove the warhead without having to break electrical connections between the airframe and
CMGS. The DSMAC or DSMAC IIA set mounts aft of the CMGS. The GPSS Receiver Processor
Unit (RPU) mounts aft of the RMUC. A window for the DSMAC lens is provided on the bottom
centerline, along with a pyrotechnically jettisoned cover. Shields protect the DSMAC set from
electromagnetic interference (EMI). The illuminator assembly (strobe), which lights the DSMAC
scenes for night flights, also mounts on the bottom centerline. Two fuel lines run through the
section for CMGS cooling. A fuel tank is also provided.
1.11.2.2 Forward Body Payload Section. The forward body payload section, extending
from station 52.45 to station 99.80, houses the warhead, the warhead fuze-booster assembly
and a pyrotechnically activated dual air valve to arm the warhead. On WDU-36/B warhead
configurations, this section also houses the GPSS Antenna Module and additional fuel for
extended flight. Warhead support is provided by a series of adjustable wedges and bolts. Two
fuel tube assemblies run through the section for CMGS cooling. Quick-disconnect couplings at
each end of the tube assemblies permit removal and installation of the payload section without
having to defuel the missile. For test and exercise flights involving Recovery Exercise Module
(REM)-equipped missiles, the forward body payload section is replaced by a REM section.
1.11.3 Land-Attack 109D. The land-attack 109D (Figure 1-5 "Land-Attack 109D") is
a medium range missile armed with BLU-97/B combined effects bomblets with guidance
provided by Terrain Contour Matching (TERCOM) techniques and Digital Scene Matching
Area Correlation (DSMAC) or DSMAC IIA and Global Positioning System Subsystem (GPSS)
to increase terminal accuracy. Time of Arrival (TOA) and Time on Target(TOT) software are
27
also used to enhance coordination with other strike capabilities. The missile has a modular
construction aluminum airframe with a diameter of 20.375 inches. The length is 243.33 inches
with the Mk 106 Mod 0 Rocket Motor or 246.06 inches with the Mk 111 Mod 0 Rocket Motor.
The unique body sections are the forward body guidance section and the forward body payload
section which are described in the following paragraphs.
1.11.3.1 Forward Body Guidance Section. The forward body guidance section extends
from station 0.00 to station 52.45. Major components are the positive retention nose cone, the
Cruise Missile Guidance Set (CMGS) (Figure 1-2 "Cruise Missile Guidance Set (CMGS)"),
the Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation (DSMAC) (Figure 1-4 "Digital Scene Matching
Correlation (DSMAC)") or DSMAC IIA and Global Positioning System Subsystem (GPSS)
sets and an illuminator assembly. Also included are a junction box in a well on the right side
and two radar altimeter antennas on the bottom centerline. The positive retention nose cone,
made of an aluminum alloy, threads on to the payload section. The CMGS provides missile
navigation, guidance and control functions and consists of a Reference Measuring Unit and
Computer (RMUC), a Rate Gyro/Accelerometer Package (RGAP), a Missile Radar Altimeter
Module (DCM) and a Battery Power Unit (BPU). The CMGS attaches to the payload section
via a mechanical hinge and link assembly using five mounting bolts. This arrangement permits
the CMGS to be swung aside after positive retention nose cone removal in order to install and
remove the warhead without having to break electrical connections between the airframe and
CMGS. The DSMAC or DSMAC IIA set mounts aft of the CMGS. The GPSS Receiver Processor
Unit (RPU) mounts aft of the RMUC. A window for the DSMAC lens is provided on the bottom
centerline, along with a pyrotechnically jettisoned cover. Shields protect the DSMAC set from
electromagnetic interference (EMI). The illuminator assembly (strobe), which lights the DSMAC
scenes for night flights, also mounts on the bottom centerline. Two fuel lines run through the
section for CMGS cooling. A fuel tank is also provided.
1.11.3.2 Forward Body Payload Section. The unique payload section (Figure 1-6
"Land-Attack 109D Payload Section") extending from station 18.35 to station 99.80, houses
four submunition dispenser modules, 24 submunition packs, two fuel modules, electrical
harnesses, pyrotechnic transfer lines, initiators and detonators. Each submunition pack consists
of an ejection system and a separator assembly. Two submunition packs contain six combined
effects bomblets (CEB) and the remaining 22 packs contain seven CEBs each, for a total of 166
CEBs. The payload section incorporates a longitudinal avionics trough on the top centerline for
electrical harnesses, pyrotechnic transfer lines and pyrotechnic initiators and detonators. On
GPSS equipped configurations, an avionics cover, which covers the trough, houses the GPSS
Antenna and antenna electronics. Also housed in the payload section is the DSMAC set, a sensor
window for the DSMAC lens, the DSMAC illuminator unit electronics assembly, the DSMAC
illuminator unit reflector and two radar altimeter antennas. The radar antennas, illuminator
reflector (strobe), which lights the DSMAC scenes for night flights, and the sensor window, with
its pyrotechnically jettisoned cover, are all mounted on the bottom centerline. Two payload covers
are installed on the right and left sides of the payload section and are pyrotechnically jettisoned in
the target area before the submunitions are ejected.
28
1.11.4 Block IV Tactical TOMAHAWK. The Tactical TOMAHAWK (TACTOM) Cruise

Missile (Figure 1-7 "Block IV Tactical TOMAHAWK Missile General Arrangement") is part of
the Baseline IV upgrade to the TOMAHAWK Weapon System. The Block IV TACTOM carries
the WDU-36/B warhead. The Navigation Processor provides navigation solution updates to the
Mission Control Processor (MCP) using multiple onboard sensors. These sensors include the
improved DSMAC IV system, Radar Altimeter, TERCOM System, Inertial Measurement Unit,
Air Data Module, GPS Subsystem, and Anti-Jam GPS Receiver.
During flight, target relocation to alternate land targets may be selected by the Strike Controller
through communications with the Satellite Data Link Transceiver. The Block IV TACTOM has
a "loiter" function used for post launch Time Of Arrival adjustments to ensure precise timing
of diversionary and suppressive strikes. In addition, the Block IV TACTOM can be re-targeted
while enroute or in a loiter pattern. The MCP is the central executive during all phases of the
mission including flight control management and warhead detonation.
The Block IV TACTOM uses the existing WDU-36/B warhead, thermal battery, and many of
the electro-explosive devices used in other TOMAHAWK missiles. However, the composition
of each of the body sections is considerably different from other TOMAHAWK configurations,
and is described in the following paragraphs.
1.11.4.1 Forward Body Section. The forward body section (Figure 1-8 "TACTOM Forward
Body Section") extends from Sta. 0.00 to Sta. 74.0 and consists of the nose and payload
structure. It provides the necessary brackets and configuration to support the WDU-36/B
warhead. Fuel is distributed throughout the entire missile including the forward section. There is
approximately 455 lb. of JP-10 fuel located in the forward section.
1.11.4.2 Midbody Section. The midbody section (Figure 1-13 "TACTOM Midbody Section")
extends from Sta. 74.0 to Sta. 148.0 and contains four access doors, tactical mission cover, RSS
mission cover, wing plugs and wing doors, three fuel tanks, and other electrical components. The
midbody section structure is a machined A357-T6 casting. The skin of this missile is thicker than
that of Block III TOMAHAWK. The Block IV TACTOM wings are slightly larger than previous
generations of TOMAHAWK and measure approximately 40 in. in length and 14 in. in width.
The midbody section contains three fuel tanks. The lower midbody tank is the largest with a
capability of 357 lbs. and is actually built into the structure of the midbody. The gravity tank,
which is a sealed part of the midbody structure, similar to the lower midbody tank, contains 64
lbs. of fuel. The hopper tank is the smallest with a capacity of 15 lbs. The midbody section
houses a fuel metering pump used to send the fuel to the engine, and a ullage bladder filled with
air that is submerged in the fuel connected to a relief line that passes through the exterior of the
missile. This system allows for expansion and contraction of fuels and other components.
The midbody section also houses the following three electrical components for the missile: the
Inertial Monitoring Unit (IMU), the DSMAC Illuminator Unit (DIU), and the radar altimeter
antennas.
29
The IMU measures linear acceleration and rotational angular rates to assist in the navigation of
the missile to the intended target. It uses three gyros and three accelerometers positioned on three
axes as sensors. All data is output to the Navigation Processor for navigation aiding.
The DIU provides lighting for the DSMAC IV System for use during night flights. The DIU is a
camera flash device that is optimized for coverage, uniformity, and spectral output. The unit is
designed to produce twice the optical energy of IIA Illuminator used on Block III Missiles.
There are two identical radar altimeter antennas on each Block IV TACTOM Missile. These
antennas provide the radar altimeter the ability to transmit (rear) and receive (forward). The
radar altimeter system transmits RF signals to the ground and receives the reflected signals to
determine altitude based on timing. The updated altitude data is then provided to the Mission
Control Processor.
1.11.4.3 Aftbody and Tailcone Section. The aft body (Figure 1-18 "TACTOM Aftbody and
Tailcone Section") extends from Sta. 148.0 to Sta. 196.0 and contains the cruise engine, flush
inlet, inlet cover, and aft body cover. The aftbody and tailcone section runs from Sta. 194.75
to Sta. 219.16. The aftbody and tailcone section structure is machined from A357-T6 castings.
The aft portion of the tailcone is designed to mate with the rocket motor. In the case of the
submarine configurations, the missile also contains continuity shrouds. The Block IV TACTOM
has three fins, vice four, which are made of foam core sheet composite that deploy 134 degrees in
approximately 0.25 seconds. The fins are used by the vehicle to provide stability and control.
The cruise engine is started by means of a single pyrotechnic start cartridge. The engine is
controlled by an engine control module integrated in the air vehicles mission control system and
an in-the-loop fuel metering pump. An alternator powers direct current sources, which are used
by the missile during cruise flight. The engine is equipped with an Alternating Voltage Control
and Converter (AVCC). The AVCC provides two sources of power and an engine speed signal
to the missile.
The major features of the cruise engine include:

the Model XF415-WR-400 engine, which includes an internal 4 kw alternator,
a separate power conditioner - AVCC, a single pyrotechnic start cartridge,
one ignition cartridge,
an exhaust extension, and
an exhaust extension thermal covering.
Fuel is distributed throughout the entire missile, including the aftbody and tailcone section. There
is approximately 106 lbs. of JP-10 fuel located in the aft body. The aftbody and tailcone section
houses the majority of the electrical components for the entire missile. The components contained
within the aftbody and tailcone section are:
Air Data Module
Alternator Voltage Control Converter (AVCC)
30
Anti-Jam Global Positioning System Antenna

Anti-Jam Global Positioning System Receiver (AGR)
Cruise Missile Airframe (CMA) Battery
Digital Scene Matching Area Correlator Processor Subsystem
Digital Scene Matching Area Correlator Sensor Assembly
Fin Control System
Guidance Electronics Unit (GEU)
Mission Control Input/Output (MCIO)
Mission Control Processor (MCP)
Navigation Processor (NP)
Power Filter Unit (PFU)
Pyro and Power Control Assembly (PPCA)
Radar Altimeter (RA)
Satellite Data Link (SDL) Antenna
Satellite Communications (SATCOM) Data Link Terminal
Secondary Power Unit (SPU)
1.11.4.3.1 Air Data Module (ADM). The ADM is used to determine altitude and air
temperature using two pressure sensors. Analog data is converted to a digital format, which
compensates for sensor characteristics. The ADM provides the Mission Control Input/Output
(MCIO) with pressure and temperature data as requested. This unit resides in the GEU.
1.11.4.3.2 Alternator Voltage Control Converter (AVCC). The AVCC converts alternator
high frequency AC power into two DC voltage outputs used by the missile electrical system
during cruise and terminal flight. The DC power is filtered by the Power Filter Unit (PFU) before
distribution to missile components.
1.11.4.3.3 Anti-Jam Global Positioning System Antenna. The Anti-Jam GPS Antenna is
tuned for reception at 1227 MHz and 1575 MHz for military GPS signals. The antenna is made
using multi-layer micro-strip technology and comprised of five crossed slot elements with
integrated frequency selective surface design.
1.11.4.3.4 Anti-Jam Global Positioning System Receiver (AGR). The AGR is used to assist
in directing the missile to the intended target. It is a single-channel sequencing, dual frequency,
P(Y) Code, Military GPS Receiver with high anti-jam capability. The AGR has nulling and beam
steering processing using a five-element antenna to distinguish the GPS signals from various
jamming sources. The AGR provides line of sight measurements, position, velocity, and time to
aid the Navigation Processor.
1.11.4.3.5 Cruise Missile Airframe (CMA) Battery. The CMA Battery provides missile
electrical power during mission boost. It is a pyro activated lithium thermal battery. The pyro
activates iron/potassium perchlorate (heat pellets), and melts the ternary electrolyte. This process
provides an electrical path between the lithium silicon anode and iron disulfide cathode. Within
31
the battery are two independent cell stacks to power missile CM regulated and unregulated busses.
The CMA Battery outputs DC power to the PFU before distribution to missile components.
1.11.4.3.6 Digital Scene Matching Area Correlator Processor Subsystem. The Digital Scene
Matching Area Correlator (DSMAC) Processor Subsystem is part of the DSMAC IV System,
which also includes the DSMAC Sensor and the Illuminator. There are two processor cards
within the subsystem, DSMAC Control Processor (DCP) and DSMAC Signal Processor (DSP).
Both of these cards reside within the Guidance Electronics Unit. The DCP provides interfaces
to the sensor, illuminator, Mission Control Subsystem, and telemetry. The chief function of the
DSP is to process the DSMAC video data from the sensor and compares it with the reference
maps stored in its memory.
1.11.4.3.7 Digital Scene Matching Area Correlator Sensor Assembly. The Digital Scene
Matching Area Correlator (DSMAC) Sensor is part of the DSMAC IV System, which also
includes DSMAC Processors and the Illuminator. The Sensor is an optical device (camera)
that captures digital grayscale images for the DSMAC IV System. Images are processed in
the DSMAC Processor Subsystem against reference images for missile navigation assistance.
DSMAC images of pre-planned locations can be obtained and transmitted as part of midcourse
Health and Status messages for use as Battle Damage Indication Imagery (BDII).
1.11.4.3.8 Fin Control System. The Fin Control System controls all three missile fins (right,
left, and vertical) located at the rear of the missile. The system consists of one controller and
three actuators and ballscrew assemblies. The FCS is controlled by the MCP and returns feedback
and status data to the MCP.
1.11.4.3.9 Guidance Electronics Unit (GEU). The GEU provides centralized housing of
various electronic cards for guidance, pyro and power control, mission control, and secondary
power. The GEU motherboard provides interconnections among the cards and with the rest
of the missile.
1.11.4.3.10 Mission Control Input/Output (MCIO). The MCIO provides the interface
between the Mission Control Processor and other missile subsystems. These subsystems include
the Fin Control System, Thrust Vector Control, Air Data Module, Radar Altimeter, Satellite Data
Link Terminal, Engine, and Mid-body Range Safety System. Collectively, these interfaces are
referred to as Mission Control I/O Low Priority (MCIOLP). This unit resides in the GEU.
1.11.4.3.11 Mission Control Processor (MCP). The MCP is the central executive for the
Block IV TACTOM missile during all phases of the mission and functions as the manager of all
other elements. The MCP provides the computational functions necessary to enable autonomous
vehicle flight from launch to mission completion. The MCP also provides control of SATCOM
Data Link Terminal communications. MCP is the hardware host for TACTOM mission control
operational flight software. This unit resides in the GEU.
1.11.4.3.12 Navigation Processor (NP). The NP is a single board computer that provides a
navigation solution to the MCP for directing the missile to the intended target. The NP takes in
AGR, IMU, DSMAC, Radar Altimeter, and TERCOM inputs. The outputs are passed to the
32
MCP in the form of position, velocity, acceleration, and attitude. The NP is considered a highly
critical item. This unit resides in the GEU.
1.11.4.3.13 Power Filter Unit (PFU). The PFU provides DC power filtering and protection
features and distributes electrical power throughout the missile. It receives power inputs from
the surface launch platform (prelaunch), AC/DC Converter (pre-launch phase, submarine only),
the CMA Battery (boost phase), and the AVCC (cruise phase). The PFU will isolate all power,
until commanded, before distribution to missile components during the pre-launch phase. The
PFU will apply launch platform power to the TVC, FCS, and FMP to perform self-tests when
commanded. The PFU incorporates a deadface to the TVC just prior to booster jettison, and
incorporates a positive disarming mechanism to isolate launch platform power from the pyro
circuits during the prelaunch phase.
1.11.4.3.14 Pyro and Power Control Assembly (PPCA). The PPCA consists of three
circuit cards located within the GEU. It controls and monitors designated missile avionics and
pyrotechnic (pyro) devices. PPCA functions are performed under control of the launch platform
or the missile Mission Control Processor (MCP) or both.
1.11.4.3.15 Radar Altimeter (RA). The Radar Altimeter, also referred as the Single Card
Altimeter (SCA), resides inside the GEU. The RA determines the altitude of the missile in
relation to the ground below. The RA transmits RF signals to the ground via the rear RA Antenna
and processes return signals received from the forward RA Antenna. The updated altitude data
is provided to the Mission Control Processor and forwarded to the Navigation Processor. The
altitude data is also used for TERCOM navigation.
1.11.4.3.16 Satellite Data Link (SDL) Antenna. The SDL Antenna provides the SDLT the
ability to transmit and receive RF signals. It is designed around center frequencies of 256 MHz
and 296 MHz for 5 kHz and 25 kHz channel SATCOM coverage. The conformal antenna is
made using multi-layer micro-strip technology and is comprised of a single crossed slot element
(dual-tuned for transmit and receive frequencies) with an integrated frequency selective surface.
1.11.4.3.17 Satellite Communications (SATCOM) Data Link Terminal. The SDLT is a UHF
SATCOM terminal that operates on DOD Demand Assigned Multiple Access channels. It is used
for data communications between the missile and missile/strike controller via satellite. The
SDLT uses half duplex encrypted data communications and is interoperable with standardized
DOD protocols for UHF SATCOM.
1.11.4.3.18 Secondary Power Unit (SPU). The SPU receives +28 VDC power from the PFU
and provides +15 VDC, -15 VDC, +5 VDC, and +3.3 VDC power to the GEU and other avionics
sub-assemblies. This unit resides in the GEU.
1.11.5 TCM Body Sections Common to 109A/C/D. The midbody, aft body and propulsion
sections are common to the 109A/C/D TCM variants and are discussed in the following
paragraphs.
1.11.5.1 Midbody Section. The midbody section, extending from station 99.80 to station
155.20, consists of a standard mission cover and an upper and lower fuel tank section separated by
a lateral through-slot. The through-slot contains the wings, one stowed above the other, in scissor
33
fashion, and the wing pneumatic actuator and associated control valves. Two pneumatically
actuated doors, one on each side of the missile, open to permit wing deployment, then close again
to provide aerodynamic smoothness. The midbody lower fuel tank section contains an expansion
bladder to accommodate fuel expansion and contraction and to provide the initial fuel pressure for
engine start. The lower section also contains the fuel hopper that supplies fuel to the sustainer
engine. The Cruise Missile Airframe (CMA) thermal battery is located in a dry well on the right
side. A single-point fuel/defuel panel is provided on the left side. A coolant pump, used to
circulate missile fuel through the CMGS, mounts on the aft side of the forward bulkhead.
1.11.5.2 Aft Body Section. The aft body section, extending from station 155.20 to station
182.50, consists of an integral dry well and a domed housing. The upper half also serves as the
missile aft fuel tank for the 109C. Inside the dry well is the Mission Control Module (MCM)
which interfaces the airframe electrical systems with the CMGS. Inside the domed housing is
the airframe pneumatic storage bottle that is used to erect the fins and to deploy the wings and
the engine inlet. The aft body lower half contains the molded fiberglass/epoxy engine inlet and
its pneumatic actuator and associated control valve. The aft body lower half also contains the
pilot-static system air data package which provides barometric and differential pressure inputs
to the CMGS to determine altitude, dynamic pressure and flight Mach number and supplies
air pressure to arm the conventional warhead.
1.11.5.3 Propulsion Section. The propulsion section, extending from station 182.50 to station
219.16, includes the tail cone structure, the turbofan sustainer engine and four pneumatically
erected, fiberglass/polycarbonate stabilizer fins. The lower fin is fixed, while the other fins move
to provide pitch, roll and yaw control. An engine-driven dc generator-regulator, three electrically
driven servo-actuators (one for each movable fin) and the fin Power Switching Amplifier are also
housed within the propulsion section.
1.11.6 Rocket Motor Assemblies. RGM-109C and RGM-109D variants are configured with
the Mk 106 Mod 0 Rocket Motor. UGM-109A variants are also configured with Mk 106 rocket
motor assemblies. UGM-109C and UGM-109D variants are configured with the Mk 111 Mod 0
Rocket Motor. RGM/UGM-109E (Block IV TACTOM) is configured with the Mk 135 Rocket
Motor Assembly. Each rocket motor assembly is described in the following paragraphs.
1.11.6.1 Mk 106 Mod 0 Rocket Motor. The Mk 106 Rocket Motor (Figure 1-9 "Mk 106 Rocket
Motor") is a single-chamber, fixed-nozzle assembly that extends from station 219.16 to station
243.33. The major components are an insulated steel case containing solid-grain propellant, a
safe/arm igniter assembly, a fixed nozzle, pneumatic/hydraulic thrust vector control (TVC) tabs
and a pyrotechnic separation assembly. The nozzle is fitted with a moisture-tight plug that includes
a pressure relief valve to prevent rocket motor collapse in the event of a submarine torpedo or
missile tube over-pressure condition. The nozzle plug blows out upon rocket motor ignition. The
rocket motor aft cover supports the electrical connector and the missile retention devices.
1.11.6.2 Mk 111 Mod 0 Rocket Motor. The Mk 111 Rocket Motor (Figure 1-10 "Mk 111
Rocket Motor") is mounted on the missile tail cone at station 219.16 through a separation ring
and extends to station 246.06. The rocket motor has a pneumatically actuated, hydraulically
operated movable ball and socket nozzle which directs the rocket motor exhaust and controls the
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directional movement of the missile during the boost phase of the missile flight. The rocket
motor consists of a heat treated steel case containing solid grain propellant, insulation, movable
nozzle and thrust vector actuator system, arming-firing device and igniter assembly, and aft cover
assembly. The nozzle comes equipped with an aluminum nozzle seal plug fitted with a flood
valve. The nozzle plug blows out upon rocket motor ignition. The rocket motor aft cover supports
the electrical connector and the missile retention devices.
1.11.6.3 Mk 135 Rocket Motor Assembly. The Mk 135 Rocket Motor Assembly consists of
an air melt 4330 steel, cadmium plated motor case, loaded with 322 pounds of Arcadene 360B
HTPB, a high performance, aluminized composite propellant. Arcadene 360B HTPB has been
assigned a Department of Defense (DOD) hazard classification of 1.3C. The propellant is cast into
and bonded to the insulated steel case. Other major subcomponents include the Arm-Fire Device
(AFD) and a fixed nozzle to which the TVC is attached. The TVC employs electrically actuated
jet tabs. The rocket motor assembly is approximately 19.9 inches in diameter and 24.5 inches in
length. The total weight of the assembly is approximately 600 pound
1.11.7 TCM Components Common to 109A/C/D. The following components are common
to the 109A/C/D variants.
1.11.7.1 Missile Retention Devices. Two retention devices are installed between the rocket
motor and capsule or canister to restrain the missile in the capsule/canister during storage,
shipping and handling. Each device consists of a stud and nut that releases at launch to permit
egress of the missile from the launching device.
1.11.7.2 Underwater Protection Devices. Submarine launch variants employ underwater
protection devices consisting of two wing slot plugs, an engine inlet cover and a continuity
shroud (Figure 1-11 "Underwater Protection Devices"). The devices are described in the
following paragraphs.
1.11.7.2.1 Wing Slot Plugs. Jettisonable wing slot plugs cover the wing cutouts on each side of
the missile to prevent the entry of seawater during underwater launch. Each consists of a plug that
is shaped to fit the wing cutout, an integral vent valve and a pyrotechnic thruster. The thruster,
which also attaches to the wing pivot fitting, provides the means to jettison the plug. The vent
valves prevent possible structural damage due to overpressure by venting the through-slot cavity
pressure during underwater ascent. The wing slot plugs are jettisoned immediately following
broach.
1.11.7.2.2 Engine Inlet Cover. An engine inlet cover is installed on the underside of the missile
to cover the inlet cavity and prevent the entry of seawater during underwater launch. The cover
includes seven vent valves and two vent holes to vent the engine inlet and propulsion section
cavities during underwater ascent. The cover is jettisoned by a pyrotechnic thruster immediately
following broach.
1.11.7.2.3 Continuity Shroud. The continuity shroud consists of two shroud halves that
bolt together to form a watertight closure around the propulsion section. A dual differential
pressure transducer is installed in the upper shroud half to monitor differential pressure between
the shroud cavity and the sea. A pressure relief valve is installed in the lower shroud half to
35
prevent overpressurizing the missile. Also installed in the lower shroud is an ac-dc converter that
converts ship wye power to dc to power the missile during prelaunch operations. Linear-shaped
pyrotechnic charges, assisted by leaf springs, jettison the shroud halves following broach.
1.12 EXERCISE VARIANTS.
The following paragraphs describe the components of the REM and RSS kit which may be
installed for use in test and exercise flights of the TCM.
1.12.1 Recovery Exercise Module Equipped Missile. TCMs used for test and exercise flights
and subsequent recovery/reuse are equipped with a depot-installed REM (Figure 1-12 "Recovery
Exercise Module"). The compartmentalized REM body section replaces the 109A forward
fuel tank section, or the forward body payload section of the 109C TOMAHAWK variant. A
housing assembly replaces the standard mission cover on the upper midbody. The various REM
compartments and equipment are described in the following paragraphs.
1.12.1.1 Parachute Compartment. The REM parachute compartment houses the main
parachute pack and a drag parachute pack. The compartment also contains the forward attachment
fitting for the main parachute Y-harness. A jettisonable cover, held by two pyrotechnic thrusters,
covers the compartment. The compartment is vented through two tubes to an orifice plate located
on the top of the forward body section.
1.12.1.2 Riser Stowage Compartment. The parachute Y-harness and risers are routed
along two shallow channels in the top of the missile midbody. Excess harness is stowed in the
riser compartment. Additionally, the compartment contains two pyrotechnically released riser
attachment fittings and the attachment fitting for the aft leg of the main parachute Y-harness. It
also contains the recovery beacon antenna and its flotation assembly. Rubber-impregnated cloth
strips, held by aluminum retainers, cover the riser channels. A jettisonable cover, held by a single
pyrotechnic thruster, encloses the riser compartment.
1.12.1.3 Flotation Equipment Compartment. The flotation equipment compartment houses
the flotation equipment used for water recovery. The equipment consists of a pneumatically
inflated flotation bag, two pyrotechnically activated pressure bottles, and the tubing and fittings
to route pneumatic pressure to the flotation bag. The compartment contains lead ballast to
compensate for the differences in weight between the REM and the forward body section it
replaces. Fuel lines for the land-attack REM-equipped variants are also provided for the transfer
of fuel between the CMGS, the payload section fuel tank and the midbody.
1.12.1.4 Instrumentation/Avionics Compartment. The instrumentation/avionics compartment
makes up the aft one-third of the REM. The equipment mounts on a removable shelf as well as
on the REM body structure. Equipment mounted on the shelf includes two pyrotechnically
activated batteries, two lithium active batteries, an inertia switch, a test control module, an
auxiliary relay unit, a digital delay module, a telemetry support package, an electronic support
package, a relay enclosure, a dual Range Safety Command (RSC) receiver/decoder, a Pulse Code
Modulation (PCM) encoder, a recovery beacon transmitter, an S-band telemetry transmitter, a
C-band transponder, a hybrid antenna coupler and an RSC test oscillator. REM body-mounted
equipment includes two RSC antennas, two S-band antennas and two C-band antennas. Two
36
inertia switches are mounted on the compartment forward bulkhead. A saltwater sensor switch
is mounted near the bottom centerline. Two acoustic pingers (one 9 kHz and one 45 kHz) are
flush-mounted on the sides. The REM antennas consist of two S-band, two C-band and two RSC
antennas. The S-band antennas are flush-mounted on the REM top and bottom centerline. The
C-band and RSC antennas are flush-mounted on the sides.
1.12.2 Range Safety System Equipped Missile. The land-attack TCMs used for test and
exercise flights with live or inert warheads/submunitions are equipped with a depot-installed RSS
kit. The J-109C has the RSS equipment installed primarily on a vertically mounted plate in the aft
portion (fuel tank) of the guidance section (Figure 1-14 "Range Safety System (109C)"). The
J-109D has the RSS equipment mounted on two shelf assemblies in the payload section and an
RSS antenna nose cone installed in place of the positive retention nose cone (Figure 1-15 "Range
Safety System (109D)"). RSS instrumentation consists of a dual RSC receiver/decoder, a
PCM encoder, an FM multiplexer (J-109C/D), an RSC test oscillator, a power monitor unit, a
thermal battery, a C-band transponder (J-109C/D), an S-band telemetry transmitter and associated
antennas (J-109C/D) and a squib-activated thermal battery.
1.12.3 Midbody Range Safety Subsystem (MRSS). Block IV TACTOM missiles used
for test or exercise flights are equipped with MRSS. The MRSS provides the missile with
a communications link with test ranges during flight tests. This subsystem is only present
during such exercises and comprises of a Range Safety Electronics Unit (RSEU) and a Tri
Band Antenna. The RSS provides telemetry data at a rate of 2.5 megabits per second. The
communications includes missile instrumentation data, range command and control, flight
termination, position tracking, and underwater telemetry data transmission (submarine launch
only). Major Subcomponents include: Tri-band Antenna; Command Control Decoder; C-Band
Transponder; Flight Termination Battery; Flight Termination CCA; Flight Termination Receivers
(2); Harnessing; I/O CCA; Power Monitoring Unit; Pulse Control Modulation Encoder; S-Band
Transmitter; Test Oscillator; OTL payload cover.
1.13 LAND-ATTACK TCM TARGETING.
The capabilities and special employment considerations of the land-attack TCM makes it
necessary to limit the access to mission data and displays presented. This is accomplished by
requiring the use of mission codes to access data. Only when the correct code is entered, can data
be displayed and evaluated. The evaluation of mission data is generally concerned with the
establishment of flyout routes and introducing waypoints which define specific latitude and
longitude intersections along the flight path to the target (Figure 1-16 "Typical Land-Attack
TCM Pre-landfall Flyout Route").
1.13.1 Mission Data. Route, map and target data for the land-attack variants are stored on
disks. Access is gained by entering the disk serial number and correct mission number. The data
consist of trajectory segment data, TERCOM maps, DSMAC scenes (109C, 109D and 109E
only) and mission definition data.
1.13.2 Terrain Contour Matching (TERCOM). The guidance system is periodically corrected
and updated in flight through TERCOM. The process (Figure 1-17 "Terrain Contour Matching
(TERCOM) Process") compares a set of digital maps stored in the CMGS with ground
37
elevation readings supplied by the missile radar altimeter. The digital maps consist of several
TERCOM maps used to maintain the missile on flight path to the target. Correlation and position
updating parameters include the latitude and longitude of map center, map heading (centerline),
length, width, cell size, altitude data and estimated fix accuracy. Although maps may overlap,
the data for each map are stored separately for software efficiency. Predetermined waypoints
define specific latitude and longitude intersections along the flight path to the target. Enroute to
target, TERCOM is updated upon reaching each waypoint. Since distance traveled is measured
from the last waypoint, not total distance flown, terminal accuracy is very high. TERCOM is
also relatively insensitive to weather, season and ground cover.
1.13.3 Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation (DSMAC). Stored digitized images or scenes
are used by the TCM 109C, 109D and Block IV TACTOM to perform terminal updates. A sensor
in the DSMAC set takes a visible wavelength image of ground features, digitizes the images,
and compares them with the stored digitized images. Since the DSMAC scenes are smaller and
contain more detail than TERCOM maps, they result in more accurate position updates. With
Block IV TACTOM, DSMAC images of pre-planned locations can be obtained and transmitted as
part of midcourse Health and Status messages for use as Battle Damage Indication Imagery (BDII)
1.13.4 Global Positioning System Subsystem (GPSS). A GPSS is used by the TCM 109C,
109D and Block IV TACTOM to perform periodic navigational updates. A GPSS receiver
receives signals from GPS satellites, processes the signals, and provides navigational data
for the missile. This GPSS navigational data can be used in lieu of, or in combination with,
TERCOM/DSMAC fixes to provide more flexibility and higher reliability in accomplishing
mission objectives
1.13.5 Block IV Tactical TOMAHAWK Targeting. The Tactical TOMAHAWK Cruise
Missile is part of the Block IV upgrade to the TOMAHAWK Weapon System. The Block IV
upgrade also includes improvements to the planning and launch control systems that, coupled
with improvements to the Tactical TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile, provide increased capabilities
to the operational forces.
The Block IV TACTOM combines the capabilities of the current system with faster response time
and more flexibility. Multiple outcome missions can be created at shore-based planning centers
or the Afloat Planning System installed on aircraft carriers. Each mission can have up to 15
outcomes. The default outcome may be reset prior to launch or via communication with the
missile while in flight. Mission data for Block IV TACTOM can also be created onboard launch
platforms. Launch platform planned missions are GPS-only with a single outcome.
During flight, the Block IV TACTOM can report Health and Status (H & S) at predetermined
intervals or when requested by the Strike Controller. Near the end of the mission, the missile
can transmit a Battle Damage Indication (BDI) message that contains its estimate of navigation
error as it approaches the target. In addition, the Block IV TACTOM can transmit compressed
images taken by the DSMAC Sensor as part of a H & S message. The locations for acquiring
BDI images are part of a preplanned mission. The Block IV TACTOM can also be redirected
in-flight. The Strike Controller (at a Command and Control facility) or the Missile Controller (on
38
a launch platform, for a missile launched by the launch platform) can command the missile to
execute a new preplanned mission outcome. The Strike Controller or Missile Controller can also
send the missile a newly planned terminal segment to direct the missile to an emerging target.
Target coordinates are supplied external to the TWS. The controller can also send an aimpoint
update message to allow the missile to autonomously navigate a direct GPS route to the target.
The Block IV TACTOM GPS receiver provides increased ESM resistance compared to TLAM
Block III. The GPS Receiver is tightly coupled with inertial navigation and several other sensors
to provide robust navigation performance. In the terminal area, the Block IV TACTOM is capable
of dive angles between five and 85 degrees. The expanded range of dive angles removes the need
for a Horizontal Attack Mode, and provides greater resistance to vertical errors in targeting data
1.14 TYPICAL MISSION PROFILE.
The typical mission is divided into six phases: prelaunch, launch, boost, transition to cruise,
cruise, and either a terminal phase for 109A/C/Block IV (Figure 1-19 "Typical Mission Profile
(109A/C)") or a target attack phase for 109D (Figure 1-20 "Typical Mission Profile (109D)").
A REM-equipped missile also includes a seventh or recovery phase in which, the REM-equipped
missile, instead of detonating a warhead, continues on to a pre-determined recovery site. Typical
mission profiles are described as having either a lo-lo and hi-lo penetration of the general target
area. Maximum protection from detection is provided by a lo-lo penetration. A hi-lo penetration
provides maximum range. The missile is programmed to fly at a specific altitude and speed, which
may or may not include a terminal maneuver prior to warhead detonation. Flight path altitude also
depends on the roughness of terrain, evasive maneuvers to avoid enemy defenses, and climb and
dive rates of the missile. The various mission phases are described in the following paragraphs.
1.14.1 Prelaunch Phase. The prelaunch phase begins with the decision to launch a
TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile against a predetermined land target. It covers preparation of the
missile and launching device, weapon power-up, guidance set initialization and alignment and
loading target data. The prelaunch phase is described in detail in Chapter 4 for each launch
configuration.
1.14.2 Launch Phase. Following the closing of various preset firing interlocks and verification
of firing status ready, Intent to Launch (ITL) is signaled. The final firing sequence occurs
automatically. The missile batteries activate and the essential electrical power buses are isolated.
A status check is then performed by the CMGS using battery power. If the status check is go,
a MISSILE ENABLED signal is sent. Upon receipt of this signal, launch equipment separate
and eject the TCM from its launcher. The launch phase is described in detail in Chapter 4 for
each launch configuration.
1.14.3 Boost Phase. After 1.5 to 4 seconds from first motion, the rocket motor pull switch
actuates. With CMGS concurrence of safe eject velocity and distance, the CMGS initiates
signals that activate the rocket motor TVC system and ignite the rocket motor. The CMGS also
enables the anti-circular run (ACR) system. At the same time that rocket motor ignition occurs, a
momentary pitchup command is sent to deflect the exhaust, causing the missile to pitch up as it
begins to accelerate. Should the missile deviate from the planned trajectory, or the CMGS fail to
39
reset the MCM timer, the ACR system will automatically terminate the mission by jettisoning
the continuity shroud and rocket motor which stops the uncontrolled acceleration of the missile
and prevents it from turning back toward the launch platform. The fins deploy and active roll
control is initiated. After a velocity test is passed, the engine inlet and wings are deployed and a
pushover command initiated.
1.14.4 Transition to Cruise Flight. The transition to cruise flight begins about 14 seconds
after first motion and coincides with rocket motor thrust decay. As the thrust decays, the ACR
enable is turned off and the TVC nulled. The rocket motor is then jettisoned and the sustainer
engine started. As the sustainer engine comes up to speed, the engine-driven generator/regulator
comes on-line to supply the electrical power needs. The transition to cruise flight continues at
maximum engine thrust until the missile descends or climbs to the commanded cruise altitude and
accelerates to the commanded Mach number.
1.14.5 Cruise Phase. The cruise phase commences with the descent or climb to cruise altitude
and acceleration to cruise speed. For a land-attack variant, it includes pre-landfall inertial plus
GPSS aiding navigation; crossing the initial TERCOM field and making altitude corrections for
terrain following; overland inertial plus GPSS aiding navigation to the programmed mission
waypoints; and performing enroute or midcourse position fixes using TERCOM maps plus
GPSS aiding. For REM- or RSS-equipped variants, radio frequency (RF) carrier is continually
sent by the chase aircraft. If the missile loses RF carrier, the missile will climb or descend to a
predetermined altitude. After a prescribed time, if the carrier remains lost, a REM-equipped
missile will initiate recovery; a RSS-equipped missile will terminate flight (throttle is driven off
and the vertical fin is driven hard-over). Additionally, if electrical power is lost, or the CMGS
fails in a REM-equipped missile, a zoom command may be initiated to enhance the probability
of missile recovery. Emergency flight termination by chase aircraft command is also provided
wherein the vertical fin is driven hard-over, the throttle is driven off, and the parachute recovery
sequence (REM-equipped missile only) is initiated.
1.14.6 Terminal Phase (109A/C). The terminal phase covers the terminal flight events which
consist of a final position fix(es) by TERCOM (109A) or DSMAC/DSMAC IIA/GPSS (109C),
terrain following, warhead arming, and determining final target range and bearing. These events
also include the terminal maneuver and warhead detonation or missile impact. The exact sequence
of events will depend on the mission data loaded into the CMGS.
1.14.7 Target Attack Phase (109D). The target attack phase consists of five position fixes by
DSMAC or multiple periodic updates by DSMAC IIA/GPSS before attacking the first target,
payload cover jettison, submunition pack ejection over the first target and additional navigation
fixes and submunition pack ejection for subsequent targets. As each submunition pack is ejected,
door assemblies in the dispenser module close, allowing the missile to maintain an aerodynamic
surface. A submunition separation system is used to separate the submunition pack after ejection
from the payload section. The submunition pack combined effects bomblets are armed when
exposed to the airstream, allowing the primary or secondary firing mechanism to detonate the
explosive upon impact.
40
1.14.8 Block IV TACTOM Terminal Phase. The Block IV TACTOM terminal phase begins
with Terminal BDI image acquisition and ends with the missile impacting the target. The terminal
subphase of the Block IV TACTOM mission differs from the Block III mission in several
respects. If the mission is autonomous strike, the Block IV TACTOM will proceed to target after
the DSMAC update and function the same as Block III. If an alternate target has been designated
during enroute navigation or in the loiter pattern, the remainder of the navigation will be GPS
only. The Block IV TACTOM missile will use a pushover maneuver that will induce negative Gs.
The Block IV TACTOM Missile can be programmed to attack targets with either a Programmed
Warhead Demolition (PWD) maneuver or a Variable Dive Attack Maneuver (VDA) with
a terminal dive angle from five to 85 degrees. The PWD attack is the same as that used for
the Block III TOMAHAWK Land Attack Missile. The range of angles available for a VDA is
significantly wider than that used in Block III and also serves to replace the Horizontal Attack
Maneuver used in Block III.
The Block IV TACTOM Missile uses an elliptical steering algorithm to determine its terminal
maneuver. The ellipse is sized to provide impact at the target with the programmed terminal dive
angle. Depending on the ingress altitude, either a Low-Approach Ellipse or High-Approach
Ellipse is selected.
For a Low-Approach Terminal maneuver, the missile executes a pull-up maneuver to put it in
position to transition to the selected ellipse. The ellipse is sized to be the minimum flyable size that
meets the terminal dive requirements. At the apex of the ellipse, the missile executes a pushover,
and then enters proportional navigation for the terminal dive. For a High-Approach maneuver, the
ellipse is sized to intersect with the missiles current trajectory. Upon reaching the ellipse, the
missile executes a pushover, and then enters proportional navigation for the terminal dive.
1.14.9 Recovery Phase (REM-equipped variants). REM-equipped missiles are
pre-programmed to fly to a designated recovery site. Normal recovery is initiated by on board
pre-programmed signals, chase aircraft command, or by loss of RF signal - a function of range
safety. The programmed recovery events include initiation of the recovery sequence, transfer
of telemetry and tracking systems to REM battery power, parachute deployment, and engine
and CMGS shutdown. Also included are radio beacon activation, flotation bag inflation (water
recovery only), main parachute jettison and REM power shutdown. Figure 1-22 "Typical
Parachute Recovery of REM-Equipped Missile" shows a typical parachute recovery of
a REM-equipped missile.
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SECTION IV. TORPEDO TUBE LAUNCH

CONFIGURATION
1.15 AUR IDENTIFICATION.
Each tactical and exercise AUR is identified by a unique numeric, six digit serial number. The
serial number for all configurations is located on a nameplate in the wing slot but is inaccessible
to activities below depot level. At the depot, the AUR configuration and serial number are printed
in the upper right-hand corner of the Record Book for TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile (TRB),
PEO(W) PUB 4440, which accompanies each AUR. Additionally, an MIS data plate is placed on
the AUR and a matching data plate is placed in the TRB. Activities below depot level verify AUR
identity by comparing TRB data with data contained on an identification washer installed on the
TCM electrical connector or identification plate placed on the TCM near the electrical connector;
an identification plate on the capsule aft end; and an MIS data plate on the capsule aft end. A
UGM-109A-1 TCM with W80 Warhead installed will have a warhead identification decal on the
capsule aft end to reflect the seven digit W80 Warhead serial number. The decal is applied when
the warhead is installed and is removed when the warhead is removed.
1.16 CAPSULES.
1.16.1 Capsule Mk 1 Mod 0.The UGM-109A/C/D-1 is protected by the Capsule Mk 1 Mod 0
(Figure 1-23 "TTL Capsules (2 Sheets)") measuring 248.17 inches long (including the nose
cover and loading button) by 20.97 inches in diameter. Capsule components are described in
the following paragraphs.
1.16.1.1 Nose Cover. The capsule nose cover, which is made of forged aluminum alloy or a
fabric-reinforced composite material, protects the capsule nose diaphragm and the nose of the
missile during stowage and handling. Each cover measures 14.48 inches long by 20.95 inches in
diameter. The aluminum nose cover weighs about 27 pounds and the composite cover weighs
about 13.5 pounds. Attachment to the capsule barrel is provided by seven screws. The cover
uppermost screw hole is stencilled TOP to indicate the proper position for installation. The nose
cover must be removed prior to launch. The TCM must be fully depressurized prior to removing
or installing the cover.
1.16.1.2 Nose Diaphragm. The nose diaphragm consists of a neoprene-impregnated, nylon
cloth diaphragm, a capsule-to-diaphragm seal, four leashes and a steel attachment ring. The nose
diaphragm is shaped to match the contour of the missile. The diaphragm attaches to the capsule
barrel with 24 screws.
1.16.1.3 Capsule Barrel. The capsule barrel is a seamless, corrosion-resistant steel tube 232.88
inches long by 20.97 inches in diameter. Four rows of 12 flow slots each are located at about
three-quarters of the length of the barrel to permit the entry of torpedo tube launch pulse pressure.
Another single row of nine flow slots is provided around the aft end of the barrel. Bonded to the
barrel inside surface are a number of Teflon-coated rubber strips to absorb shock and reduce
missile drag during ejection. Also located inside the barrel is a seal that butts against the missile
continuity shroud to provide a water-tight seal.
42
1.16.1.4 Alignment and Retention Provisions. Capsule alignment and retention provisions
consist of two guide studs, mounted on the top centerline of the barrel, and two spring-loaded
latches, located at the aft end of the barrel. The guide studs engage the guide slot in the top of
the torpedo tube. The forward guide stud is engaged by the torpedo tube stop bolt (depending
on the stop bolt position). The two spring-loaded latches engage slots in the torpedo tube aft
circumferential land and are held extended by two spring-loaded plungers mounted on the aft end
of the capsule sleeve. Release of the latches is accomplished either by pneumatically actuating
the capsule sleeve to close the flow slots, or by manually depressing the spring-loaded plungers
and raising the latches. The latches are held retracted by pins for tube loading/unloading. The
pins must be removed to release the latches and stowed in holes provided in the barrel closure
prior to TCM launch.
1.16.1.5 Sleeve. The capsule sleeve, measuring 60.80 inches long by 20.50 inches in diameter,
consists of a machined, corrosion-resistant steel sleeve and a sleeve ring. The sleeve contains
flow slots that match the flow slots in the barrel. It also includes a number of Teflon-coated rubber
strips to absorb missile shock and reduce drag. The sleeve ring attaches to the aft end of the sleeve
and supports the two spring-loaded plungers used to lock the capsule latches.
1.16.1.6 Barrel Closure. The barrel closure is a machined, corrosion-resistant steel plate 20.97
inches in diameter. It supports the sleeve pneumatic actuator that moves the capsule sleeve to
close the flow slots and the pneumatic coupling used to pressurize the TCM and actuate the
actuator. A loading button is installed in the center of the barrel closure to permit torpedo tube
loading or unloading of the weapon. On TCM configurations with the Mk 106 Mod 0 Rocket
Motor, the button supports a nozzle plug retainer to prevent the rocket motor nozzle plug from
being dislodged prior to launch. Holes are provided in the barrel closure to access the two missile
holdback assemblies, rocket motor pull switch lanyard and TCM electrical umbilical connector.
1.16.1.7 Slot Covers. Slot covers are installed over the capsule flow slots to prevent the entry of
foreign matter into the flow slots. Tension latches are provided for cover retention. The covers
must be removed prior to tube loading.
1.16.1.8 Protective Covers. Capsule protective covers consist of two molded polyethylene
plates. The electric connector access protective cover covers the upper shipping nut, the electrical
connector access opening and the lanyard attachment on the barrel closure. The pneumatic
coupling protective cover covers the capsule pneumatic coupling. Captive thumbscrews attach
the protective covers to the barrel closure. The electrical connector access protective cover is
replaced with a security plate after loading aboard the submarine (UGM-109A-1 only). The plate
and/or cover(s) must be removed to permit connection of umbilicals to the missile prior to launch.
1.16.2 Capsule Mk 3 Mod 0. The UGM-109E-1 is protected by the Capsule Mk 3 Mod 0
(Figure 1-23 "TTL Capsules (2 Sheets)") measuring 248.17 inches long (including the nose
cover and loading button) by 20.97 inches in diameter. Capsule components are described in
the following paragraphs.
1.16.2.1 Nose Cover. The capsule nose cover, which is made of forged aluminum alloy, protects
the capsule nose diaphragm and the nose of the missile during stowage and handling. Each cover
measures 14.48 inches long by 20.95 inches in diameter. The nose cover weighs about 27 pounds.
43
Attachment to the capsule barrel is provided by seven screws. The cover uppermost screw hole
is stenciled TOP to indicate the proper position for installation. The Mk 3 Mod 0 nose cover
has the words BLOCK IV stenciled to distinguish it from the Mk 1 Mod 0 capsule nose cover.
The nose cover must be removed prior to launch. The TCM must be fully depressurized prior
to removing or installing the cover.
1.16.2.2 Nose Diaphragm. The nose diaphragm consists of a neoprene-impregnated, nylon
cloth diaphragm, a capsule-to-diaphragm seal, four leashes and a steel attachment ring. The nose
diaphragm is shaped to match the contour of the missile. The diaphragm attaches to the capsule
barrel with 24 screws.
1.16.2.3 Capsule Barrel. The capsule barrel is a seamless, corrosion-resistant steel tube 232.88
inches long by 20.97 inches in diameter. A single row of twelve flow slots is provided at about
three-quarters of the length of the barrel to permit the entry of torpedo tube launch pulse pressure.
Another single row of twelve flow slots is provided around the aft end of the barrel. Bonded to
the barrel inside surface are a number of Teflon-coated rubber strips to absorb shock and reduce
missile drag during ejection. Also located inside the barrel is a seal that butts against the missile
continuity shroud to provide a water-tight seal.
1.16.2.4 Alignment and Retention Provisions. Capsule alignment and retention provisions
consist of two guide studs, mounted on the top centerline of the barrel, and a capsule retention
fixture, a separate piece of shipboard equipment. The guide studs engage the guide slot in the top
of the torpedo tube. The forward guide stud is engaged by the torpedo tube stop bolt (depending
on the stop bolt position). The capsule retention fixture engages slots in the torpedo tube aft
circumferential land and secures the capsule via an access hole on the barrel closure.
1.16.2.5 Barrel Closure. The barrel closure is a machined, corrosion-resistant steel plate 20.97
inches in diameter. A loading button is installed in the center of the barrel closure to permit
torpedo tube loading or unloading of the weapon. The barrel closure provides access to the
pressure transducer arrangement, electrical umbilical connector, two missile holdback assemblies,
retention fixture latch locking hole, pneumatic umbilical connector, and rocket motor pull switch
lanyard attachment.
1.16.2.6 Slot Covers. Two universal slot covers are installed on the capsule. One covers the
forward capsule slots and another covers the aft capsule slots. The slot covers prevent entry of
foreign matter. There are two straps on each slot cover for cover retention. The covers must
be removed prior to tube loading.
1.16.2.7 Protective Covers. The electrical access protective cover is on the starboard side of
the barrel closure. The pneumatic coupling protective cover is on the port side. These two covers
are also referred to as shipping covers. Both covers provide protection to a separate missile
holdback assembly. Additionally the pneumatic coupling protective cover protects the rocket
motor pull switch lanyard attachment. The transducer protective cover protects the transducer
arrangement including the transducer pneumatic and electrical connectors.
1.17 UMBILICAL ASSEMBLIES.
44
Separate electrical and pneumatic umbilicals (Figure 1-24 "Electrical and Pneumatic
Umbilicals") are supplied to interface with the submarine launch and pressure/vent control
systems. The umbilicals are described in the following paragraphs.
1.17.1 Electrical Umbilical. The electrical umbilical measures 40.50 inches long and consists
of a multiconductor electrical cable with quick-release connectors on each end. One end connects
to the breech door inside Y-connector. The other end connects to the electrical connector on the
aft end of the missile. The connector at the missile end of the umbilical has a hand-pull lanyard to
aid manual release.
1.17.2 Pneumatic Umbilical. The pneumatic umbilical measures 30 inches long and consists
of a hose assembly, two pneumatic couplings, a lanyard, and a shackle and PIP pin. One end of
the umbilical connects to the breech door penetrator. The other end connects to the capsule
pneumatic coupling. The lanyard secures to an eyebolt on the inside of the breech door via the
shackle and PIP pin.
1.18 INERT VARIANTS.
The paragraphs below discuss certification, training, and other inert variants provided to Fleet
and shorebase operational and support activities to conduct TTL training, maintain technical
proficiency, and complete personnel, crew, and ship certifications.
1.18.1 TOMAHAWK Test Missile (TOTEM) UTM-109-1. The TOTEM is an encapsulated,

launchable, inert test vehicle having the same general configuration as a tactical TTL AUR that,
when used with the Digital Missile Simulator Mk 75, is able to simulate the launch sequence of
any TTL TCM variant. The electrical umbilical issued with the TOTEM may be a used AUR
electrical umbilical or the TOTEM Umbilical Cable Assembly (P/N 1553AS120). The pneumatic
umbilical will be a used tactical umbilical. (Use of unused tactical umbilicals with TOTEM is not
authorized.) Used tactical umbilicals are readily identified by an orange identification band.
1.18.2 Encapsulated No-Launch No-Wet TOTEM (NL TOTEM). The NL TOTEM is a

modified, non-launchable TOTEM that is used to train submarine crews in TTL operations and to
verify operability of the TTL pressure/vent system aboard the submarine. The electrical umbilical
issued with the NL TOTEM may be a used AUR electrical umbilical or the TOTEM Umbilical
Cable Assembly (P/N1553AS120). The pneumatic umbilical will be a used tactical umbilical.
(Use of unused tactical umbilicals with NL TOTEM is not authorized.) Used tactical umbilicals
are readily identified by an orange identification band.
1.18.3 Crew Training Shape (CTS) UTM-109-1A. The CTS is a modified, non-launchable
TOTEM used to train and certify submarine crews in TTL loading and handling procedures
for the UGM-109A-1 variant. At Type Commander discretion, the CTS may be used aboard
submarine tenders and at shore bases to train personnel in UGM-109A-1 handling procedures.
1.18.4 Warhead Installation Trainer (WIT) Mk 35 Mod 0. The WIT is an inert,

non-launchable facsimile of the UGM-109A-1 that is used to train and certify designated
personnel in all aspects of W80 Warhead installation and removal.
45
1.18.5 TOMAHAWK Fitment Shape (TOMFISH) Mk 1 Mod 0. The TOMFISH is an inert,

non-functional, ballasted shape that duplicates the physical dimensions, weight, and center of
gravity (CG) of a TTL AUR. The TOMFISH is used by shipyards and Fleet activities to test and
certify TTL handling, loading and stowage capabilities aboard submarines and submarine tenders.
1.18.6 Commercial Off The Shelf TOMAHAWK Test Missile (COTS TOTEM). The COTS
TOTEM is a non-launchable assembly comprised of an inert Pressure Vent Test Vehicle (PVTV)
within a capsule. The assembly simulates the appearance, mechanical interface, pressure/vent
control (PVC) transducer and PVC ullage characteristics of a Block III AUR. It can be used in
a dry torpedo tube for flow rate testing or it can be connected as a NL TOTEM with the BBY
adapter and Missile Simulator for PVC/FCS testing or training in a flooded torpedo tube.
1.18.7 Pressure Vent Test Vehicle TOMAHAWK Test Missile (PVTV TOTEM). The PVTV
TOTEM is a non-launchable assembly comprised of an inert Pressure Vent Test Vehicle (PVTV)
within a capsule. The assembly simulates the appearance, mechanical interface, pressure/vent
control (PVC) transducer characteristics and PVC ullage characteristics of a Block IV AUR. It
can be used in a dry torpedo tube for flow rate testing or it can be connected as a NL TOTEM with
the BBY adapter and Missile Simulator for PVC/FCS testing or training in a flooded torpedo tube.
1.19 CNU-308/E SHIPPING CONTAINER.
The CNU-308/E Shipping Container (Figure 1-25 "CNU-308/E Shipping Container") is a
reusable, stackable container to provide protection for TCMs and capsules during handling,
storage, and transportation. The basic design functions of the container are to:
a. Attenuate shock and vibration.
b. Permit handling by forklift, handlift truck, or sling/crane arrangement.
c. Provide a means to stack containers during transport or storage.
1.19.1 Function. The function of the container is to handle, store, and transport TTL tactical
and exercise AURs; and handle and transport TTL certification and training variants, post-launch
REM-equipped TCMs and TOTEM test vehicles with an adapter (76Z7908-1) installed, and
TTL capsules.
1.19.2 Description. The container consists of a fiberglass lower and upper shell, the latter in
two sections. Thirty-two quarter turn fasteners are located around the upper edge of the lower
shell with matching slots located on the mating edges of the upper shell. Shock mounts, integral
supports, and internal straps attenuate the shipping and handling stresses to safe levels. Four
handles on each upper shell and five tie-down rings on each side of the lower shell are used for
lifting and tie-down. The container has integral skids having fittings for use with forklifts. Also
built into the container are fork pockets and hoisting fittings. Small, non-steerable, retractable
wheels on the aft end of the container permit limited fore and aft movement. An access door on
the container aft end permits activities to check for fuel leaks and gain access to the record
book. The empty container weighs 1709 pounds. Container dimensions are provided in Table
1-8 "Container Weights and Dimensions".
1.20 RECORD BOOKS.
46
1.20.1 PEO(W) PUB 4440, Record Book for Tomahawk Cruise Missile. PEO(W) PUB 4440
is utilized to maintain data for tactical and exercise TTL AURs. PEO(W) PUB 4440 is also
utilized to maintain data for the Crew Training Shape and Warhead Installation Trainer Mk 35
Mod 0. Instructions for use, forms completion, and disposition are contained in PEO(W) INST
4440.2 and the record book.
1.20.2 CMP PUB 4440/2, Record Book for TOMAHAWK Test Missile (TOTEM). CMP
PUB 4440/2 is a tailored version of PEO(W) PUB 4440 that is used to record data pertinent to
launchable and non-launchable TOTEMs. Instructions for use, forms completion, and disposition
are contained in the record book.
1.21 WEIGHTS AND CENTERS OF GRAVITY.
Weights and centers of gravity of TTL variants and related material are contained in Tables
1-9 "Weights of TTL Variants and Related Material" and 1-10 "Centers of Gravity for TTL
Variants" respectively.
47
SECTION V. CAPSULE LAUNCHING SYSTEM

CONFIGURATION
identity by comparing TRB data with data contained on two identification plates and two MIS
data plates placed inboard and outboard on the upper end of the electrical umbilical.
1.23 CAPSULE LAUNCHING SYSTEM MK 45.
The Capsule Launching System (CLS) Mk 45 (Figures 1-26 "Capsule Launching System (CLS)
Mk 45" and 1-27 "Capsule Launching System (CLS) Components") is a pressurizable
cylindrical enclosure that encapsulates, supports, protects, and launches a TOMAHAWK Cruise
Missile. There are two configurations of the CLS; the Mk 45 Mod 1 and Mod 2. The Mk 45
Mod 1 is used on SSN class submarines. In order to accommodate the unique requirements of
the SSGN launch platform (Figure 1-41 "SSGN (Prototype) Multiple All-Up-Round Canister
(MAC)"), the Mk 45 was redesigned to Mod 2 and will be used interchangeably between SSN
and SSGN platforms, without the requirement for Intermediate or Depot Level maintenance or
reconfiguration. All Mod 1 capsules will eventually be modified to Mod 2. Except for differences
in the positioning of handling equipment necessitated by changes in the center of gravity between
the two configurations, CLS operations are the same for both configurations.
Paragraphs 1.23.1 through 1.23.1.13 describe the CLS Mk 45 Mod 1; paragraphs 1.23.2 through
1.23.2.12 describe the CLS Mk 45 Mod 2.
1.23.1 CLS Mk 45 Mod 1. The CLS Mk 45 Mod 1 uses a filament wound composite capsule
with titanium flanges mounted on each end for attaching CLS forward and aft components. The
CLS accepts a specified amount of reflood water after missile launch to preclude the necessity
for a missile compensation system. The Mk 45 Mod 1 configuration has a nominal weight of
2,121 pounds.
1.23.1.1 Capsule. The capsule is a tube, 243 inches in length, which forms the main structural
member of the CLS. The capsule increases in diameter from 24 inch at the aft end to 26.61 inches
at the upper flange. The capsule is sealed on the forward end by the capsule closure assembly
and at the aft end by the aft closure assembly. Within the capsule shell is mounting space for the
lateral support group and six lip type circumference seals which protect the exterior surface of the
missile and constrain eject gases. External mounting arrangements are provided for lateral support
pads and an umbilical guard and cable. The capsule has provisions for attaching the vertical
support assembly (VSA) and capsule extension as well as handling and support equipment.
48
The upper flange has penetrations for the pressure/vent port, the annular space vent line, and a slot
which allows the flat umbilical cable to pass through the flange. There are two lip seal grooves
around the circumference of the upper flange to provide a seal at the upper end of the missile tube.
There are two alignment slots, located at 53 and 233 azimuth, which engage pins at the upper end
of the missile tube. The alignment slots serve to align the AUR in the missile tube as it is seated.
When installed in the missile tube, the AUR is supported and secured by eight retention segments
on its upper flange. Three of the retention segments provide mounting for cable clamps. The
segments secure the capsule by exerting downward pressure on the upper closure ring while
exerting upward pressure in a groove on the inside surface of the missile tube upper flange.
The aft closure is located below the VSA and capsule extension. The aft closure assembly
encloses the lower end of the capsule and provides a mounting surface for the gas generator
mechanism and electrical components. The umbilical cable attaches to a through-connector which
is installed in the aft closure assembly. The cable is unbonded 24 1 inches forward of the end of
the composite capsule. The capsule has a stripe at the expended capsule CG location.
1.23.1.2 Capsule Closure Assembly. The capsule closure assembly (CCA) is attached to the
flange at the upper end of the capsule. The closure consists of a nylon cloth-reinforced rubber
diaphragm with an internal stainless steel band around the outer edge; a low-permeance mylar
dome installed over the diaphragm; and an upper and lower retaining ring. A diaphragm bead is
clamped between the two retaining rings in a compression fit to form a seal between the rings. A
barrier flange is adhesively bonded to the bottom of the upper closure ring. The rings are bolted
together. Bolts pass through both rings to attach the closure to the capsule. An O-ring fits in a
groove in the capsule forward flange and provides an air-tight seal between the closure assembly
and the capsule upper flange while in the missile tube. The rings also provide mounting for
the pressure-sensing line.
The low-permeance dome is made up of six triangular sections, a flange section and a split
polar cap assembled with a foil laminate tape. The dome material is a three layer laminate of
mylar, tin foil, and mylar (MTM). The tin foil makes the dome nearly impermeable to water
vapor. The foil laminated tape forms a separation line across the dome which extends between
segments and the hemispheres of the polar cap. This separates at launch to allow the missile to
pass through unimpeded.
The diaphragm membrane is purposely weak along a diametrical line called the "tear line".
Yet it is strong enough to withstand maximum external pressure at launch depth and maximum
prelaunch internal over-pressure. Perpendicular to the membrane tear strip are two peel strips
which initiate the tearing of the membrane to reduce the loads on the missile nose. The ends
of each peel strip are attached to under-side of membrane at apex near tear line and to lower
retaining ring. Between attachment points, two peel strips hang free. As capsule is pressurized
before launch, the nylon cloth in the diaphragm allows diaphragm to stretch and grow slightly.
The fabric in the peel strips does not stretch because it is kevlar reinforced; thus, peel strips are
49
placed under tension. This tension is transmitted to the apex of the tear line. When launched, the
missile nose contacts the tear strips increasing tension until tearing of the membrane is initiated.
1.23.1.3 Sabot. CLS Mk 45 1 capsules containing a UGM-109C/D or JUGM-109C/D variant of
the TCM with a Positive Retention (Chine) Nosecone, have a sabot assembly installed between
the nosecone and capsule closure assembly (CCA). The sabot is used to prevent damage to
the CCA during shipping, handling, loading and prelaunch pressurization activities. The sabot
consists of two closed-cell foam halves attached together with plastic tie wraps. The foam
material is negatively buoyant due to the inclusion of iron particles within each molded foam half.
The sabot is coated with a zinc-rich primer and a polyurethane top coat to provide a corrosion
resistant surface compatible with the CCA and the missile nosecone. The sabot assembly weighs
approximately 26 pounds.
When launched, the missile nose pushes the sabot against the CCA tear strips. As the CCA tears
and the missile leaves the launch tube, the sabot is broken into several small pieces by the ejection
forces. These pieces will gradually sink to the bottom away from the launch tube. Some pieces
may sink to the bottom of the capsule. This is an acceptable condition.
1.23.1.4 Lateral Support Group. The lateral support group is bonded to the inner surface of
the capsule. The lateral support group has thirteen rows of elastomeric liner pads. There are four
separate liner pads in each circumferential row. Each liner pad consists of an inner and outer wall
jointed by chevron-shaped struts. Teflon is bonded to the inside surface of each pad to reduce
friction against the missile surface. Dual plateau pads, with a corrugated inside surface, are
incorporated into the lateral support group to further reduce friction during encapsulation and
decapsulation of the missile and during launch.
The design of the elastomeric pads provides necessary lateral support and protects the missile
from shock and vibration. In this function, the lateral support group acts in concert with the
interface support pads which are bonded to the exterior of the capsule and capsule extension. The
lateral support group also serves to provide in-tube guidance for the missile during launch.
1.23.1.5 Launch Seals. There are six circumferential launch seals adjacent to the bands of liner
pads which are bonded to the inner surface of the capsule. The seals have a projecting lip which
bears against the surface of the missile. The surface of the seal lip which contacts the missile
surface is coated with Teflon to minimize friction. Also, the Teflon coating eliminates seal lip
inversion. Seal lip inversion may result from upward forces acting upon lip from launch gas
pressure under the lip and from missile motion against the lip.
During launch, the launch seals minimize gas pressure buildup in the space between the capsule
inner wall and the missile skin. The seals also enhance eject performance by minimizing gas
leakage from the volume pressurized by the gas generator. By reducing asymmetric pressure
forces during the in-tube travel of the missile, the seals serve to reduce launch vibrations. Holes
spaced around the circumference of the seal lip allow air to flow between the compartments
during capsule pressurization.
50
1.23.1.6 Separation Nuts. Two separation nuts attach to two hold-down studs on the missile
aft end to position the missile before launch and secure the missile to the VSA. Each separation
nut has two explosive initiators which, when fired just prior to missile launch, cause the nut to
separate from the hold-down stud thus permitting missile egress.
1.23.1.7 Vertical Support Assembly (VSA). The VSA consists of a vertical shock and
vibration mitigation device, a metal bellows anti-rotation device, two missile retention devices,
a gas generator gas deflector, two missile-away switches, and a capsule extension. The VSA
mitigates shock and vibration to the missile in the axial direction, positions the missile vertically
and azimuthally in the capsule, provides a flow path for gases from the gas generator to the missile
during launch, and provides for mounting electrical control components.
1.23.1.8 Capsule Extension. The capsule extension provides a watertight connection between
the VSA and the aft closure assembly. It also provides attachment for the aft closure assembly.
1.23.1.9 Aft Closure Assembly. The aft closure assembly has provisions for mounting the gas
generator and the electrical cabling and controls. It also provides through access for electrical
cabling and ensures a watertight barrier at the capsule aft end. An aft cover attaches to the aft
closure to provide a closed environment for the gas generator and electrical cabling and controls.
1.23.1.10 Gas Generator. The gas generator is contained in a cylindrical steel case
approximately 15 inches long and 12 inches in diameter. An integral flange at the gas generators
CG attaches to the aft closure with a spigot fit. The flange seals the capsule from the upper end
of the aft closure. The ends of the cylinder are fitted with flat, steel plate closures. The closures
are sealed with O-rings and retained in the assembly with threaded rings. The forward closure
provides mounting for an electrical bridgewire initiator on the outside and an ignitor housing on
the inside. The gas generator aft closure has a nozzle.
A polyester resin inhibitor is molded on the outer surface and forward end of the propellant grain
to form a propellant cartridge. Two circular, molded-rubber gaskets are bonded to the grain
spacer to provide shock isolation for the cartridge. Four tapped holes in the aft closure provide
attachment for the thrust neutralizer. The thrust neutralizer is a safety device installed on the gas
generator when it is not installed on the AUR.
The gas generator is a component of the AUR, rather than the CLS, because it is installed during
missile encapsulation. It is described because of its close physical and functional relationship to
major components described above.
1.23.1.11 Aft Cover. An aft cover attaches to the aft closure to provide a closed environment
for the gas generator and electrical cabling and controls.
1.23.1.12 Aft Fairing Device. The aft fairing is a cylindrical urethane elastomer which attaches
to the aft end of the CLS capsule by eight bolts. The aft fairing protects the aft end of the AUR
during installation into the missile tube. Because of its tapered shape, the aft fairing also serves to
guide the AUR into the missile tube.
51
1.23.1.13 Instrumentation and Controls. The main electrical umbilical cable runs from a
through-connector at a penetration in the upper missile tube wall, through a slot in the capsule
upper flange, down the outside of the capsule wall to another through-connector in the aft
closure. The umbilical cable is a flat, low-profile cable which is bonded to the outside surface
of the capsule.
Three cables are installed within the capsule: one cable from the missile, one cable from the two
separation nuts, and one cable from the departure switches. The three cables pass through the VSA
and connect to three penetration connectors in the aft closure. There are three additional cables on
the aft side of the aft closure: one cable connects the firing unit to the gas generator; one cable
connects the firing unit to the separation nuts; and one cable connects the umbilical cable to the
firing unit, the missile cable, the departure switches, liquid sensors, and the interconnecting box.
1.23.2 CLS Mk 45 Mod 2. The CLS Mk 45 Mod 2 incorporated new designs to successfully
integrate the existing SSN class AUR configuration, as cost effectively as possible, for use with
SSGN. The three primary areas of concern in achieving this were: 1.) at the aft end connection,
the Multiple All-Up-Round Canister (MAC) was unable to connect the existing P130A connector
with the umbilical cable installed, 2.) there was possible interference from the sabot with the
hatch closure and there existed the possibility of damage to adjacent AURs due to post-launch
sabot debris, and 3.) there was concern over the CCA and umbilical cable performance in the
SSGN environment over the AUR life cycle.
Solutions to these three areas were to install a new CCA, umbilical cable, and aft end components.
The major components of the CLS Mk 45 Mod 2 are discussed in the following paragraphs.
1.23.2.1 Capsule. The capsule is a tube, 243 inches in length, which forms the main structural
member of the CLS. The capsule increases in diameter from 24 inch at the aft end to 26.61 inches
at the upper flange. The capsule is sealed on the forward end by the capsule closure assembly
and at the aft end by the aft closure assembly. Within the capsule shell is mounting space for the
lateral support group and six lip type circumference seals which protect the exterior surface of the
missile and constrain eject gases. External mounting arrangements are provided for lateral support
pads and an umbilical guard and cable. The capsule has provisions for attaching the vertical
support assembly (VSA) and capsule extension as well as handling and support equipment.
The upper flange has penetrations for the pressure/vent port, the annular space vent line, and a
slot which allows the flat umbilical cable to pass through the flange. There are two lip seal
grooves around the circumference of the upper flange to provide a seal at the upper end of the
missile tube or AUR cell. There are two alignment slots, located at 53 and 233 azimuth, which
engage pins at the upper end of the tube/cell. The alignment slots serve to align the AUR in
the tube/cell as it is seated.
When installed in the tube/cell, the AUR is supported and secured by eight retention segments
on its upper flange. Three of the retention segments provide mounting for cable clamps. The
segments secure the capsule by exerting downward pressure on the upper closure ring while
exerting upward pressure in a groove on the inside surface of the tube/cell upper flange.
52
The aft closure is located below the VSA and capsule extension. The aft closure assembly
encloses the lower end of the capsule and provides a mounting surface for the gas generator
mechanism and electrical components. The umbilical cable attaches to a through-connector which
is installed in the aft closure assembly. The cable is unbonded 6 1 inches forward of the aft end
of the composite capsule. The capsule has a stripe at the expended capsule CG location.
1.23.2.2 Capsule Closure Assembly. The CCA (Figure 1-40 "CLS Mk 45 Mod 2 Capsule
Closure Assembly") is compatible with both, the Block III and Block IV AUR configurations.
The CCA is attached to the flange at the upper end of the capsule. The closure consists of a nylon
cloth-reinforced rubber diaphragm with an internal stainless steel band around the outer edge.
Incorporated within the underside of the diaphragm are four sabots. The intent of the sabots is to
reduce the stress in the diaphragm at maximum launch pressures. Upper and lower retaining rings
are utilized for diaphragm assembly. A diaphragm bead is clamped between the two retaining
rings in a compression fit to form a seal between the rings. The rings are bolted together. The
bolts pass through both rings to attach the closure to the capsule. An O-ring fits in a groove in
the capsule forward flange and provides an air-tight seal between the closure assembly and the
capsule upper flange while in the AUR cell/missile tube. The rings also provide mounting for the
pressure-sensing line. The diaphragm membrane is purposely weak along a diametrical line called
the "tear line". Yet it is strong enough to withstand maximum external pressure at launch depth
and maximum prelaunch internal over-pressure. As the capsule is pressurized before launch, the
nylon cloth in the diaphragm allows diaphragm to stretch and grow slightly.
1.23.2.3 Lateral Support Group. The lateral support group is bonded to the inner surface of
the capsule. The lateral support group has thirteen rows of elastomeric liner pads. There are four
separate liner pads in each circumferential row. Each liner pad consists of an inner and outer wall
jointed by chevron-shaped struts. Teflon is bonded to the inside surface of each pad to reduce
friction against the missile surface. Dual plateau pads, with a corrugated inside surface, are
incorporated into the lateral support group to further reduce friction during encapsulation and
decapsulation of the missile and during launch.
The design of the elastomeric pads provides necessary lateral support and protects the missile
from shock and vibration. In this function, the lateral support group acts in concert with the
interface support pads which are bonded to the exterior of the capsule and capsule extension. The
lateral support group also serves to provide guidance for the missile during launch.
1.23.2.4 Launch Seals. There are six circumferential launch seals adjacent to the bands of liner
pads which are bonded to the inner surface of the capsule. The seals have a projecting lip which
bears against the surface of the missile. The surface of the seal lip which contacts the missile
surface is coated with Teflon to minimize friction. Also, the Teflon coating eliminates seal lip
inversion. Seal lip inversion may result from upward forces acting upon lip from launch gas
pressure under the lip and from missile motion against the lip.
During launch, the launch seals minimize gas pressure buildup in the space between the capsule
inner wall and the missile skin. The seals also enhance eject performance by minimizing gas
53
leakage from the volume pressurized by the gas generator. By reducing asymmetric pressure
forces during the in-tube/cell travel of the missile, the seals serve to reduce launch vibrations.
Holes spaced around the circumference of the seal lip allow air to flow between the compartments
during capsule pressurization.
1.23.2.5 Separation Nuts. Two separation nuts attach to two hold-down studs on the missile
aft end to position the missile before launch and secure the missile to the VSA. Each separation
nut has two explosive initiators which, when fired just prior to missile launch, cause the nut to
separate from the hold-down stud thus permitting missile egress.
1.23.2.6 Vertical Support Assembly (VSA). The VSA consists of a vertical shock and
vibration mitigation device, a metal bellows anti-rotation device, two missile retention devices,
a gas generator gas deflector, two missile-away switches, and a capsule extension. The VSA
mitigates shock and vibration to the missile in the axial direction, positions the missile vertically
and azimuthally in the capsule, provides a flow path for gases from the gas generator to the missile
during launch, and provides for mounting electrical control components.
1.23.2.7 Capsule Extension. The capsule extension provides a watertight connection between
the VSA and the aft closure assembly. It also provides attachment for the aft closure assembly.
1.23.2.8 Aft Closure Assembly. The aft closure assembly has provisions for mounting the gas
generator and the electrical cabling and controls. It also provides through access for electrical
cabling and ensures a watertight barrier at the capsule aft end. An aft cover attaches to the aft
closure to provide a closed environment for the gas generator and electrical cabling and controls.
1.23.2.9 Gas Generator. The gas generator is contained in a cylindrical steel case
approximately 15 inches long and 12 inches in diameter. An integral flange at the gas generators
CG attaches to the aft closure with a spigot fit. The flange seals the capsule from the upper end
of the aft closure. The ends of the cylinder are fitted with flat, steel plate closures. The closures
are sealed with O-rings and retained in the assembly with threaded rings. The forward closure
provides mounting for an electrical bridgewire initiator on the outside and an ignitor housing on
the inside. The gas generator aft closure has a nozzle.
A polyester resin inhibitor is molded on the outer surface and forward end of the propellant grain
to form a propellant cartridge. Two circular, molded-rubber gaskets are bonded to the grain
spacer to provide shock isolation for the cartridge. Four tapped holes in the aft closure provide
attachment for the thrust neutralizer. The thrust neutralizer is a safety device installed on the gas
generator when it is not installed on the AUR.
The gas generator is a component of the AUR, rather than the CLS, because it is installed during
missile encapsulation. It is described because of its close physical and functional relationship to
major components described above.
1.23.2.10 Aft Cover. The aft cover (Figure 1-39 "CLS Mk 45 Mod 2 Aft Cover") attaches to
the aft closure to provide a closed environment for the gas generator and electrical cabling and
controls. The Mod 2 aft cover configuration is a one-piece design cast from Passivated 316
54
stainless steel. The aft cover incorporates a pressure test port, and also allows for the use of the
redesigned P1130/J1130 connector and for stowage of the P1130 connector.
The design of the aft cover allows for loading and unloading on both the SSN and SSGN
platforms. An umbilical clamp has been added to provide protection for the umbilical. An
ordnance ground has been added, as well as a vent/pressure test port.
1.23.2.11 Aft Fairing Device. The aft fairing is cylindrical urethane elastomer which attaches
to the aft end of the CLS capsule by eight bolts. The device protects the aft end of the missile.
Because of its tapered shape, the aft fairing also serves to guide the AUR into the tube/cell.
The aft fairing device for the Mod 2 is a slightly modified version of the Mod 1 configuration. The
new device accepts the new aft cover and allows for the redesigned umbilical and the umbilical
cable clamp. The revised aft fairing device will still work on the Mod 1 capsule.
1.23.2.12 Instrumentation and Controls. The only umbilical cable required for application
use in the SSGN is located at the bottom of the MAC cell. With the CLS AUR loaded into the
MAC cell, SSGN personnel remove the P1130 connector from the J1130, and install it in its
stowage position. The ships umbilical is then installed in the J1130. Each AUR requires one of
these umbilical cables; seven umbilical cables for each fully loaded MAC. These umbilical cables
plug into the ships control interface cable and to a connector located at the bottom of the AUR.
Three cables are installed within the capsule: one cable from the missile, one cable from the two
separation nuts, and one cable from the departure switches. The three cables pass through the VSA
and connect to three penetration connectors in the aft closure. There are three additional cables on
the aft side of the aft closure; one cable connects the firing unit to the gas generator; one cable
connects the firing unit to the separation nuts; and one cable connects the umbilical cable to the
firing unit, the missile cable, the departure switches, liquid sensors, and the interconnecting box.
The AUR umbilical cables are not used on the SSGN for umbilical cable applications. The
umbilical cable at the top of the AUR is strapped to the MAC cell wall and plugged into a dummy
connector. The long electrical umbilical cable that runs from a through-connector at a penetration
in the upper MAC cell wall, through a slot in the capsule upper flange, down the outside of the
capsule wall to another through-connector in the aft closure. This flat low-profile umbilical
cable is bonded to the outside surface of the capsule and plugs into a dummy connector at the
bottom of the AUR.
Onboard SSN class, the umbilical can be connected to the same through-connector in the upper
missile tube wall as is done with the Mod 1 capsule.
The paragraphs below discuss certification, training, and other inert variants provided to Fleet
and shorebase operational and support activities to conduct CLS training, maintain technical
proficiency, and complete personnel, crew, and ship certifications.
55
1.24.1 All-Up-Round Simulator (AURS) Volumetric Shape. The AURS (Figure 1-28
"All-Up-Round Simulator (AURS) Volumetric Shape") is an inert, non-launchable volumetric
shape that is used for pre- and post-delivery test programs, crew certification trials, and at-sea
testing. Its design permits simulation of the CLS AUR to allow for pressurization/venting and
flood/drain system operations aboard the submarine. Its design also provides a watertight,
pressure-proof enclosure for installing the All-Up-Round Electronic Simulator (AURES) (Figure
1-29 "All-Up-Round Electronic Simulator (AURES) Mk 101") on a hoisting frame. This
permits the AURES to be raised without electrical disconnection so that topside operators
have access to the AURES front panel controls and indicators (Figure 1-30 "AURES/AURS
Interface"). The AURES is a testing and training device used to simulate land-attack CLS
variants thereby permitting the submarine launch control system to operate through the complete
CLS launch cycle in single or salvo launch modes. The AURES Mk 101 and Mk 112 are
presently in use in the fleet.
1.24.2 CLS Loading and Handling Training Shape Mk 3 Mod 0. The CLS Loading and
Handling Training Shape Mk 3 Mod 0 is an inert CLS MK 45 containing a non-launchable,
ballasted training vehicle that is used by submarine tender and shorebase personnel to train for, and
maintain proficiency in, all facets of CLS AUR handling and submarine onload/offload operations.
1.24.3 Ballast Can Variants.The Missile Tube Ballast Can (Figure 1-31 "Missile Tube Ballast
Can") is an inert, non-launchable, enclosed steel cylinder that may be loaded in SSN CLS
missile tubes to enhance launch platform buoyancy control when a full complement of CLS
AURs is not carried aboard the SSN. Missile Tube Ballast Cans may be loaded in SSGN MAC
cells to close cells against water intrusion during non-deployed underway periods if AURs are not
carried. The All-Up-Round Ballast, Grade B (AURBb) is a ballast can which may be carried in
MAC cells during SSGN deployment.
1.24.4 Missile Tube Bore Gage. The Missile Tube Bore Gage is a cast iron facsimile of the CLS
AUR that is used to verify the proper missile tube clear bore to ensure compatibility with the AUR.
1.25 CLS SHIPPING CONTAINERS.
Reusable, stackable shipping containers have been designed to provide protection for the CLS
AUR, AUR Simulator and empty CLS during handling, storage, and transportation. The basic
design functions of the containers are to:
a. Attenuate shock and vibration.
b. Permit handling by forklift, handlift truck, or sling/crane arrangement .
c. Provide a means to stack containers during transport or storage.
1.25.1 Shipping and Storage Skid Mk 30. The Shipping and Storage Skid Mk 30 (Figure 1-32
"Shipping and Storage Skid Mk 30") is used to handle, store, and transport CLS tactical and
exercise AURs; and to handle and transport CLS Loading and Handling Trainers and spent CLSs.
The skid is also used for loading CLS weapons aboard submarines, and may also be used to
perform weapon maintenance, by installing the Uprighting Fixture Mk 26 and Forward Support
Mk 167 in the skid. The main body of the skid is constructed of aluminum and consists of an
inner frame assembly, saddles, restraint straps, lifting eyes, and forklift slots. Lightweight plastic
56
covers, fore and aft, are provided to cover the AUR or capsule during shipment or storage. The
forward cover contains an access door. Pins secure the covers to the outer frame assembly.
Stacking posts are provided to permit stacking of containers. The Mod 1 configuration includes a
storage location for the Closure Protective Cover Mk 19 Mod 0. Skid dimensions are provided in
Table 1-8 "Container Weights and Dimensions".
1.25.2 AUR Simulator Shipping Skid. The AUR Simulator Shipping Skid (Figure 1-33
"AUR Simulator Shipping Skid") is used to handle and transport the AURS. The skid consists
of a steel frame with two aluminum covers secured to the frame with capscrews. A cradle and
restraining straps are provided to secure the shape in the skid. Hardwood skids attached to the
bottom of the frame allow lifting straps to be used to move the skid. Lifting rings on the covers
facilitate use of a sling/crane arrangement to remove the covers. Skid dimensions are provided in
Table 1-8 "Container Weights and Dimensions".
1.25.3 Shipping and Storage Skid Mk 34. The Shipping and Storage Skid Mk 34 (Figure
1-36 "Shipping and Storage Skid Mk 34") is also used to handle, store and transport the
AURS. With the installation of the Uprighting Fixture and Forward Support, this skid can be
used for uprighting/lowering the AURS during loading/unloading. The main body of the skid is
constructed of aluminum and consists of an inner and outer frame assembly, saddles, restraint
straps, lifting eyes, and forklift slots. Lightweight plastic covers, fore and aft, are provided to
cover the AURS during shipment or storage. Pins secure the covers to the outer frame assembly.
Stacking posts are provided to permit stacking of containers.
1.26 RECORD BOOKS.
1.26.1 PEO(W) PUB 4440, Record Book for TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile. PEO(W) PUB
4440 is used to record data pertinent to the CLS Loading and Handling Trainer Shape Mk 3
Mod 0 as well as tactical and exercise CLS AURs. Instructions for use, forms completion, and
disposition are contained in PEO(W) INST 4440.2 and the record book.
1.26.2 Record Book All-Up-Round (AUR) Simulator Volumetric Shape. The AURS record
book is used to record data pertinent to the AURS. Data recording requirements are similar as
those required for PEO(W) PUB 4440. Instructions for completing required records are contained
in the record book.
1.26.3 Record Book Missile Tube Ballast Can (MTBC). The ballast can record book is used
to record data pertinent to the CLS ballast can. Data recording requirements are similar as those
required for PEO(W) PUB 4440. Instructions for completing required records are contained in
the record book.
Weights and centers of gravity of CLS variants and related material are contained in Tables
1-11 "Weights of CLS Variants and Related Material" and 1-12 "Centers of Gravity for CLS
Variants" respectively.
57
SECTION VI. VERTICAL LAUNCHING SYSTEM

CONFIGURATION
identity by comparing TRB data with data contained on an identification plate and an MIS data
plate on the aft end of the Mk 10 Canister prior to encanisterization of the RGM-109-2 variant
into the Mk 14 Canister. A detachable MIS data plate is removed from the TRB and placed on the
bottom of the Mk 14 Canister near the deluge connector after encanisterization to identify the
VLS configured RGM-109-4 variant. RGM-109C-2, RGM-109D-2, and RGM-109E-2 as well as
their corresponding exercise variants are employed in VLS configurations after encanisterization
in the Mk 14 Canister.
1.29 CANISTERS.
1.29.1 Mk 10 Canister. The Mk 10 Canister (Figure 1-34 "Mk 10 Canister") is used to
encanister RGM-109-2 variants and measures 253.5 inches long and 21.2 inches in diameter.
Canister components are described in the following paragraphs.
1.29.1.1 Canister Fly-Through Cover Assembly. The canister fly-through cover assembly
measures about 22.85 inches in diameter and about 0.18 inch thick. The assembly consists of
eight frangible segments and a flange and attaches to the canister barrel with 36 bolts.
1.29.1.2 Canister Barrel. The canister barrel is a seamless aluminum tube measuring 247.35
inches long and 21.2 inches in diameter. The barrel provides environmental and physical
protection for the missile and rocket motor and serves as the launch tube.
1.29.1.3 Canister Baseplate Assembly. The canister baseplate is a machined, aluminum
alloy plate measuring 21.2 inches in diameter. It supports the cable and conduit assembly and
its associated connector, a nitrogen servicing pneumatic quick-disconnect coupling, and the
umbilical adapter. It also contains three rupture disks for thrust augmentation and for the exit
of rocket motor exhaust. Two loading bracket assemblies can be mounted on the baseplate for
alignment of the canister.
1.29.2 Mk 14 Mod 1/Mod 2 Canister. The Mk 14 Mod 1 and Mod 2 Canisters (Figure 1-35
"Mk 14 Canister (2 Sheets)") are thermally lined, rectangular shells with 16 lateral supports
to allow longitudinal movement of the encanistered TCM for shock isolation. The canisters
provide environmental protection and structural and alignment support for the encanistered TCM
as well as a mounting platform for various command, control and safety devices. The canisters
also serve as shipping and storage containers and launch tubes for TCMs. Canister components,
safety/security devices and canister circuits are discussed in the following paragraphs.
58
1.29.2.1 FWD Closure Assembly. The FWD Closure Assembly consists of two vertical lift
lugs, a cover seal that ruptures during TCM egress and a closure with a breakwire to indicate
missile away during TCM launch.
1.29.2.2 AFT Closure Assembly. The AFT Closure Assembly consists of a grid closure, a
closure with breakwire and a support ring that provides an exhaust gas seal.
1.29.2.3 Umbilical Connector. The umbilical connector is the exterior interface to connect
the Mk 14 Canister cable assembly. The cable assembly connects the code plug, FWD and AFT
closure breakwires, temperature sensor, cable and conduit assembly connector and umbilical
connector adapter.
1.29.2.4 Deluge Connector. The quick-disconnect deluge connector provides the means of
activating the three-piece deluge manifold surrounding the warhead in the canister should a
signal be received over the deluge circuit that canister conditions indicate that detonation of a
warhead in a canister is imminent. The manifold, with its 22 equally spaced holes, provides an
even distribution of water on the warhead area.
1.29.2.5 Antenna Connector. The antenna connector provides the means for data to be
transmitted from telemetry monitoring equipment to the encanistered TCM.
1.29.2.6 Canister Safe Enable Switch (CSES) (Mk 14 Mod 1/Mod 2). The CSES provides
two-position manual control of the booster ignition circuit for encanistered TCMs in the Mk 14
Mod 1/Mod 2 Canisters. The CSES status (safe or enable) is continuously monitored by the
VLS weapon control system.
1.29.2.7 Canister Code Plug. The canister code plug electrically identifies the type of missile
in the canister and the type of payload. It is attached to the canister cable assembly, near the
forward cover, when the encanistered TCM is placed in the Mk 14 Canister.
1.29.2.8 Nitrogen Supply Valve. The nitrogen supply valve, located near the antenna connector,
provides a means of pressurizing the Mk 10 Canister via a nitrogen line inside the Mk 14 Canister.
1.29.3 Mk 14 Mod 2 Canister. The Block IV TACTOM AUR is encanistered in the Mk 14
Mod 2 VLS Canister and interfaces mechanically and electrically with the Mk 41 VLS launcher.
The Mk 14 Mod 2 Canister serves as the launch tube support for the missile when installed in the
Mk 41 VLS, and as the Packaging, Handling, Storage, and Transportation (PHS&T) container
for the Block IV TACTOM AUR when installed with PHS&T equipment. The major difference
between the Mk 14 Mod 1 and the Mk 14 Mod 2 canister is the new Mechanical Longitudinal
Shock Mitigation Devices (Mechanical Springs). The Mk 14 Mod 2 canister configuration also
includes ablative blocks and burn through protection plates that are affixed to the aft end of the
canister to protect against canister sidewall burn through during a restrained firing.
The paragraphs below discuss certification, training, and other inert variants provided to Fleet and
shorebase operational and support activities to conduct training, maintain technical proficiency,
and complete personnel, crew, and ship certifications.
59
1.30.1 Canister Trainer Mk 17. The Mk 17 Canister is an inert facsimile of the Mk 10 Canister
used to train personnel to handle RGM-109-2 variants and the Mk 10 Canister.
1.30.2 Mk 14 Canister Trainer. The Mk 14 Canister Trainer is an inert unit used to train
personnel to handle the Mk 14 Mod 1/2 Canister and to encanister and decanister RGM-109-2
variants using the Mk 17 Trainer.
1.31 RECORD BOOK.
PEO(W) PUB 4440, Record Book for the TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile is used to record data
pertinent to the RGM-109-2 variant and the VLS AUR. Instructions for use, forms completion, and
disposition are contained in PEO(W) INST 4440.2 and the record book. PEO(W) PUB 4440 is not
used to record data applicable to the Mk 14 Canister without an encanistered RGM-109-2 variant.
Weights and centers of gravity of RGM-109-2 variants and related material are contained in
Tables 1-13 "Weights of RGM-109-2 Mk 10 Variants and Related Material" and 1-14 "Centers
of Gravity for RGM-109-2 Variants" respectively. Weights of VLS variants are contained
in Table 1-15 "Weights of VLS Variants".
60
Figure 1-1. Land-Attack 109A
61
Figure 1-2. Cruise Missile Guidance Set (CMGS)
62
Figure 1-3. Land-Attack 109C
63
Figure 1-4. Digital Scene Matching Correlation

(DSMAC)
64
Figure 1-5. Land-Attack 109D
65
Figure 1-6. Land-Attack 109D Payload Section
66
Figure 1-7. Block IV Tactical TOMAHAWK Missile

General Arrangement
67
Figure 1-8. TACTOM Forward Body Section
68
Figure 1-9. Mk 106 Rocket Motor
69
Figure 1-10. Mk 111 Rocket Motor
70
Figure 1-11. Underwater Protection Devices
71
Figure 1-12. Recovery Exercise Module
72
Figure 1-13. TACTOM Midbody Section
73
Figure 1-14. Range Safety System (109C)
74
Figure 1-15. Range Safety System (109D)
75
Figure 1-16. Typical Land-Attack TCM Pre-landfall

Flyout Route
76
Figure 1-17. Terrain Contour Matching (TERCOM)

Process
77
Figure 1-18. TACTOM Aftbody and Tailcone Section
78
Figure 1-19. Typical Mission Profile (109A/C)
79
Figure 1-20. Typical Mission Profile (109D)
80
Figure 1-21. CLS Missile Tube Loading and Handling

Trainer Assembly
81
Figure 1-22. Typical Parachute Recovery of

REM-Equipped Missile
82
Figure 1-23. TTL Capsules (2 Sheets)
83
84
Figure 1-24. Electrical and Pneumatic Umbilicals
85
Figure 1-25. CNU-308/E Shipping Container
86
Figure 1-26. Capsule Launching System (CLS) Mk 45
87
Figure 1-27. Capsule Launching System (CLS)

Components
88
Figure 1-28. All-Up-Round Simulator (AURS)

Volumetric Shape
89
Figure 1-29. All-Up-Round Electronic Simulator

(AURES) Mk 101
90
Figure 1-30. AURES/AURS Interface
91
Figure 1-31. Missile Tube Ballast Can
92
Figure 1-32. Shipping and Storage Skid Mk 30
93
Figure 1-33. AUR Simulator Shipping Skid
94
Figure 1-34. Mk 10 Canister
95
Figure 1-35. Mk 14 Canister (2 Sheets)
96
97
Figure 1-36. Shipping and Storage Skid Mk 34
98
Figure 1-37. CLS Submarine Missile Tube Trainer

Assembly
99
Figure 1-38. SMTT Training Shape
100
Figure 1-39. CLS Mk 45 Mod 2 Aft Cover
101
Figure 1-40. CLS Mk 45 Mod 2 Capsule Closure

Assembly
102
Figure 1-41. SSGN (Prototype) Multiple All-Up-Round

Canister (MAC)
103
Table 1-1. Support Equipment Description

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION ILLUSTRATION
Adapter Box Assy Used with Rocket Motor/Ident Test Set
P/N JCM-17683 Box Assembly for performing CLS
missile electrical checks.
Adapter, Capsule Interface between TTL

Pneumatic Capsule/TOTEM Capsule pneumatic
P/N 7324001-01 coupling and pressurization equipment.
Adapter, Endlift, Handle CNU-308/E Shipping Container

Container Mk 156 Mod 0 with pallet truck.
P/N 5166882
Adapter, Hook Mk 91 Use with forklift and sling to handle

Mod 0 uncontainerized TTL and Mk 10
P/N 2643315 weapons.
Adapter, Hook Mk 176 Use with forklift and sling to handle

Mod 0 uncontainerized CLS weapons.
P/N 6213621
Adapter, Missile Round Perform VLS weapon pressure check

Pneumatic Test and pressure service.
P/N 6242918-1
104

Adapter, Support Cradle, Supports forward end of CLS weapon
Forward Mk 168 Mod 0 when connected to the Mk 26
P/N 5917395 Uprighting Fixture.
Adapter, Trunnion Bearing Attaches to CLS weapon to act as pivot

Assembly Mk 174 Mod 0 to permit transitioning between vertical
P/N JCM-17863 and horizontal during onload/off-load.
Alignment Guide, Nose Aligns nose cover/capsule screw holes

Cover Attachment to attach nose cover to Capsule Mk 1
P/N 76Z7894-1 Mod 0/TOTEM Capsule.
Alignment Guide, Nose Aligns nose cover/capsule screw holes

Cover Attachment to attach nose cover to Capsule Mk 3
P/N 76Z7897-3 Mod 0/TOTEM Capsule.
Alignment Tool, Guidance Maintain control of the Cruise Missile

Set Guidance Set during 109A warheading
P/N 6145719 and dewarheading.
Assembly, Chain and Secure weapons and containers in small

Adjuster boats.
P/N MB-1/CGU-4E
105

Assembly, Protective Protect O-rings on CLS weapon.
Sleeve, O-ring
P/N 101-
5951066/4/5/50/6
(SSN 688)
P/N 7066384-71
(SSN 774)
Band, CLS, Used with Taglines Mk 4 Mod 0 to
TOMAHAWK, Mk 90 maintain control of uncontainerized
Mod 0 CLS weapons.
P/N 5167268
Band, Mk 87 Mod 0 Used with Taglines Mk 3 Mod 0 to

P/N 5166711 maintain control of uncontainerized
TTL and Mk 10 weapons.
Beam, Hoisting, AUR Handle containerized TTL and Mk 10

Container Mk 46 Mod 0 weapons.
P/N 5167804
Beam, Lifting, MK 44, Handle uncontainerized TTL and Mk

Mod 0 10 weapons.
P/N 5167164
Cable Adapter Umbilical Used with Rocket Motor/Ident Test Set

Assy Box Assembly for performing TTL
P/N 3193140-028- missile electrical checks.
101
Cable Adapter Umbilical Used with Rocket Motor/Ident Test Set
Assy Box Assembly for performing TTL
P/N 3193140- missile electrical checks.
028-102
(Conventional
Use Only)
106

Cable Assy Used with Rocket Motor/Ident Test Set
P/N 3193140-013- Box Assembly for performing missile
101 electrical checks.
Canister Loader, VLS, Mk Encanister/decanister VLS weapons

33 Mod 0
P/N 5167196
Cap, Faraday, Upper Provides electrical shielding for the

Umbilical Connector electrical umbilical connector on CLS
P/N JCM-14339-001 AUR and CLS Loading and Handling
Training Shape.
Container, Closure Protects the CLS AUR and CLS
Shipping Loading and Handling Training Shape
P/N JCM-14843-002 Capsule Closure Assembly during
transport and handling.
Cover Assy, Shock Plate Used to cover the AUR bore holes in
P/N 7124611-002 the middle and lower shock plates.
Provides a flat, non-skid surface
without raised handles and will prevent
items from falling into the MAC cell.
Cover Assy, Top Hat Placed over loaded AURs to protect

P/N 7124611-004 them from damage after the CLC
has been removed, during the AUR
close-out procedure, or in the event that
an AUR has to be pulled and replaced.
Provides a level surface strong enough
for a worker to stand on.
Cover Assy, Top Plate Used to cover the MAC AUR cells
P/N 7124611-003 and to provide a flat, non-skid surface
without raised handles. It prevents
items from falling into the MAC cell.
107

Cover, Capsule Loading Used instead of CPC when
P/N JCM-17759 loading/offloading CLS AUR and
CLS Loading and Handling Training
Shape, when working on weapons
loaded in missile tube or MAC cell.
Protects the Capsule Closure Assembly.
Cover, Closure Protective Protects the CLS AUR and CLS

(CPC), Mk 19 and Clamp Loading and Handling Training Shape
Ring Capsule Closure Assembly during
P/N JCM-14865-001 transport and handling.
Cover, Counterbore Installed on missile tube aboard

P/N 101-5580126- SSN-688 class to prevent personnel,
171 (SSN 688) tools, water, debris, etc from entering
empty missile tube.
Cover, Counterbore Installed on missile tube aboard

P/N 7066384-73 SSN-774 class to prevent personnel,
(SSN 774) tools, water, debris, etc from entering
empty missile tube.
Cover, Counterbore Inserted into the individual AUR

P/N 7124611-001 stowage locations, supported on the
Datum B of SSGN MAC AUR cell. It
permits inspection of the counterbore
area prior to loading and prevents items
from falling into the AUR cell.
108

Cover, Missile Tube Protect muzzle hatch magnets in hatch
Muzzle Hatch and Magnet opening of submarine.
Protective
P/N 101-5951066-54
(SSN 688)
Cover, Missile Tube
Muzzle Hatch and Switch
Probe Protective
P/N 7066384-72
(SSN 774)
Cover, Muzzle Face Used to prevent damage to muzzle
Protective hatch gasket sealing surface in missile
P/N 101-5951066-49 tube.
Cover, Safety MTEL Installed on MTEL prior to CLS

P/N JCM-14566-001 weapon onload/after offload. Protects
MTEL, missile tube, and MAC cell
(SSGN).
Cover, VLS Missile Tube, Installed over spent CLS to prevent

CLS Spent Capsule personnel, tools, debris, etc from
P/N 6510965 entering spent capsule.
Cradle Mk 33 Mod 0 Secure and transport TTL and Mk 10

P/N 6213118 weapons by truck and small boat.
109

Cradle Mk 34 Mod 0 Secure and transport CLS weapons by
P/N 6213249 small boat.
Cradle, Undersea Transfer weapons on small boats.

Weapons Transporting
Mk 27 Mod 0
P/N 5165994
Device, Tie-down Secure weapons and containers in small
P/N CGU-1/B boats.
Dolly Assembly, Missile Transport Mk 30 Shipping and Storage

Handling Mk 34 Mod 0 Skid.
P/N 5167224
Dolly, VLS Transport Mk Transport Mk 14 Canister

35 Mod 0
P/N 5167396
Fixture, CLS Capsule Transition CLS weapons between

Uprighting Mk 26 Mod 0 vertical and horizontal during onload
P/N 5917401 and off-load.
or Mk 26 Mod 1
P/N 6213396
Fixture, Missile Move the missile about nine inches

Positioning MTU-68/E out of/into the capsule during
P/N 76Z3550-30 UGM-109A-1 warheading and
dewarheading.
110

Fixture, Tilt Mk 23 Mod 0 With Kit A, transition Mk 14 Canister
P/N 5167473 between the horizontal and vertical
positions. With Kit B, transition CLS
weapon between vertical and horizontal
for onload and offload.
Gauge, Load Button Verify any TTL capsule load button

P/N 7339399/No is not oversized, bent or otherwise
NSN distorted so as to cause problems during
tube loading aboard a submarine
Hoist, Chain, Hand, 2-ton, Used with Hoisting Sling Mk 157 to

15-ft Lift change position of lifting adapter or
P/N LHH-2B-15 MTEL.
Hydraulic Power Unit With MTEL, provides insertion and

(HPU) Mk 8 Mod 0 extraction force to seat/unseat CLS
P/N JCM-14899-001 weapons (except ballast can) into/out of
the missile tube/MAC cell.
Installation Guide Mk 116 Align MTEL to prevent missile tube

Mod 0 damage during MTEL installation and
P/N JCM-14375-001 removal.
Kit, Pressure Servicing Pressurize TTL and Mk 10 weapons

Mk 182 Mod 0
P/N 5759440
Kit, Pressure Servicing, Pressurize CLS AUR and CLS Loading

CLS Forward Mk 184 and Handling Training Shape forward
Mod 0 section.
P/N 6199900
Consists of:
111

Closure Pressure Hose
Pneumatic Adapter
P/N 6146684
CPC Pneumatic Adapter

P/N 6199896
Pressurizing Gear Tester

T3159
P/N 5545882
CLS Pressurizing Hose

Assembly, FWD
P/N 6146623
Lifting Adapter Assembly Attaches to CLS weapon (except

Mk 169 Mod 0 ballast can) to upright, lift or lower
P/N JCM-14699-001 CLS weapon during submarine
onload/off-load.
Missile Tube Aligns, and with HPU, inserts/extracts

Extension/Loader CLS weapon (except ballast can)
(MTEL) Mk 23 Mod into/out of missile tube/MAC cell.
1
P/N JCM-14455-002
Multi-Test Box Mk 71 Verify electrical continuity and isolation
Mod 0 of specific wires in the pyro harness.
P/N 6574418
112

Pin, Trunnion Alternate to Mk 174 Trunnion Bearing
P/N 5768606 Adapter to transition the All-Up-Round
Simulator and CLS Ballast Can
between vertical and horizontal during
onload/off-load.
Platform, Loading Used on SSN 688 Class submarines for

P/N 5580126 access to missile tubes.
Platform, Loading Used on SSN 774 Class submarines for

P/N 7066384-A1 access to missile tubes.
Platform, MTEL Work Allows access to the area above

P/N 7126403-002 the MTEL during SSGN handling
operations.
Plug Assembly, Moisture Seals pressure/vent port on CLS AUR,

and Dust AUR Simulator and CLS Loading and
JCM-17838/4730- Handling Trainer.
01-346-3387
Pressure Vacuum Purge and backfill warhead cavity and

Distributor H3353 missile during 109A warheading and
P/N 5758382 dewarheading.
113

Protective Shield, Installed on the CLS AUR and CLS
Umbilical Cable Loading and Handling Training Shape
P/N JCM-17873 umbilical cable during off-load to
prevent damage from contact with
the missile tube while extracting the
weapon from the tube. Not required
with new design umbilical cable
with angled cable flange penetrator
overmold.
Pump, Submersible, 440 Remove ballast from CLS ballast can.
Volt with Foot Valve
Assembly
Retainer, Separation Nut Prevent Mk 10 separation nut lockring

Lockring Wrench wrench from backing out of lockring
P/N 76L5319-1 and rounding holes.
Security Band Assembly Attaches over nose cover

P/N 5979383 of UGM-109A-1 to prevent
unauthorized/inadvertent tube load
aboard the submarine.
Security Cover 4FZ Replaces electrical connector protective

P/N 76A2994-1 cover on UGM-109A-1 aboard
submarine to allow connection of 4FZ
security system.
114

Sling, Hoisting, Container Handle CNU-308/E Shipping
HLU-265/E Container.
P/N 76Z3525-16
or Mk 152 Mod 0
P/N 5167256
Sling, Lifting Mk 95 Mod Handle uncontainerized TTL and Mk

0 10 weapons.
P/N 2642629
Sling, Lifting Mk 114 Handle uncontainerized TTL and Mk

Mod 0 10 weapons in areas where clearance
P/N 2643810 does not allow use of Mk 95 Sling.
Sling, Lifting Mk 162 Connect lifting apparatus and lifting

Mod 0 device. Shall not be used to handle
P/N 1001-6212682 CLS AUR and AURS.
Sling, Lifting Assembly Handle CLS loading platform.

P/N 5580126-271
(SSN 688)
P/N 7066384-A14
(SSN 774)
Sling, Lifting Assembly Used to lift ballast can.
P/N 6510856 (SSN
688)
P/N 7066384-A13
(SSN 774)
115

Sling, Lifting, AUR, Mk Handle uncontainerized CLS weapons.
154 Mod 0
P/N 5167321
Sling, Lifting, AUR Remove/install AUR Simulator

Simulator Shipping Skid Shipping Skid covers.
Cover
P/N 5951067
Sling, Lifting, AUR Handle AUR Simulator Shipping Skid

Simulator Shipping Skid
P/N 6510902
Sling, Lifting and Tilting Transition the Lifting Adapter and

(Lifting Adapter/MTEL) MTEL between vertical and horizontal.
Mk 157 Mod 1
P/N JCM-14748-002
Sling, Pendant Mk 165 Interface between lifting device and

Mod 0 load.
P/N 6213009
or Mk 165 Mod 1
P/N 6213750
Sling, Weapon, Handling Handle Mk 30 AUR Shipping and

Mk 153 Mod 0 Storage Skid or Mk 34 AUR Simulator
P/N 5167582 Shipping and Storage Skid
116

Socket, Special, 3/8-inch Remove/install Moisture and Dust Plug
P/N JCM-16654 Assembly.
Special Hose Assembly Perform Mk 14 Canister nitrogen line

P/N 6309846 leak check.
Consists of:
Regulator Hose Assembly
P/N 6309846-1
Digital Pressure Gage

Hose Assembly
P/N 6309846-2/ Setra
Model 360
Pneumatic Test Adapter

P/N 6309846-3
Rocket Motor/Ident Test Used when performing missile

Set, Box Assy electrical checks.
6557811
Stand, Deployment Used to support sections of SSN 688

P/N 6510854 Class loading platform.
Stand, Deployment Used to support sections of SSN 774

P/N 7066384-A3 Class loading platform.
117

Straps, Tie-down, Special Secure weapons and containers in small
Purpose boats.
P/N CBU
Strongback, Horizontal, Handle Mk 14 Mod 1 Canister

VLS Mk 3 Mod 0
P/N 5598249-9
Strongback, Horizontal, Handle Mk 14 Mod 1 or Mod 2 Canister

VLS Mk 3 Mod 1
P/N 72511117-9
Strongback, Vertical, VLS Onload/off-load Mk 14 Canister

Mk 4 Mod 0
P/N 5497606
Support System Mk 8 Support TTL and Mk 10 weapons in

Mod 0 storage.
P/N 6213373
Tagline, Mk 3 Mod 0 With Mk 87/Mk 90 Band, maintain

P/N 5166715 control of uncontainerized weapons
or Mk 4 Mod 0 during handling. Maintain control of
containers during handling.
P/N 5166702
118

Tester, Igniter, Used for testing the igniters in solid
Amptec Model fuel rocket engines, detonation circuits
630AN/630BN/641N in warheads, explosive separation bolts
or any other squib actuated devices.
Threadsaver, Trunnion Used in place of trunnion bearing

Bearing assemblies to preserve threads in
P/N JCM-17679 trunnion bearing holes.
Tool Kit, Nose Diaphragm Remove/install nose diaphragm

P/N 76Z0667-1 during UGM-109A-1 warheading and
dewarheading.
Tool Kit, Special Weapons Set of four tools to: align

P/N 76Z6333-8 missile/capsule; detach/attach holdback
nuts; protect holdback assembly; and
remove/install booster lanyard nut
during UGM-109A-1 warheading and
dewarheading.
Tool, Lip Seal Used to install lip seals.
P/N JCM-17678
Trailer, Munitions Aero Transport containerized and

51 B/C/D uncontainerized weapons.
P/N 67A314F100
119

Truck, Handlift Mk 45 Handle CNU-308/E Shipping Container
Mod 2
P/N 5167104
Truck, Pallet, Low Lift Handle CNU-308/E Shipping Container
Trunnion Used when lowering the CLS AUR

P/N JCM-14514-001 into the Mk 23 Tilt Fixture. Can also be
used for uprighting the All-Up-Round
Simulator and Ballast Can.
Umbilical Breakout Box Perform VLS weapon electrical tests.
(UBOB) Mk 674 Mod 1
P/N 7379010
Universal Restraint Stand Warhead 109A. May be used for

Mk 121 Mod 0 maintenance on TTL, Mk 10 and VLS
P/N 6146521 weapons
Vertical Launch System Determine VLS canister code plug

(VLS) Canister Code Plug configuration.
Test Set Mk 673 Mod 0
P/N 6375451
Weapons Skid Aero 21C With Mk 130 Mod 0 Extension Handle,

P/N 64A114H1-4 Aero 64A/64B Soft Belt Adapters
or Munitions Transporter and front and rear Aero 58A/58B
MHU-191-M Skid Adapters installed, transport
uncontainerized TTL and Mk 10
P/N 1500AS100-1
weapons.
120

Wrench, Canister Loosen and tighten separation nut
Separation Nut Lockring lockring during Mk 10 encanisterization
P/N 76Z4738-1 and decanisterization.
Wrench, Spanner Tighten CLS AUR and CLS Loading

P/N JCM-17635 and Handling Training Shape umbilical
cable connector P130B
Wrench, Canister Loosen and tighten separation nut

Separation Nut Lockring lockring during Mk 10 encanisterization
P/N 76Z4738-1 and decanisterization.
Wrench, Spanner Tighten CLS AUR and CLS Loading

P/N JCM-17635 and Handling Training Shape umbilical
cable connector P130B
121

Wrench, Spanner Remove/install positive retention nose
P/N 76M0235-1 cone during 109A warheading and
dewarheading.
Wrench, Spanner, Nose Remove/install positive retention nose

Coupler KMU-467/E cone during 109A warheading and
P/N 76Z3553-8 dewarheading.
122
Table 1-2. Shipboard Equipment Used for

TOMAHAWK Support
Adapter, Dolly Adapt tender stowage rack dollies to
P/N SK5711-735 support TTL weapons.
Chocks, Portable Adapt stowage rack for TTL stowage

(Stowage Rack) on board AS- 39 Class submarine
P/N SK5111-738 tenders.
Decking, Small Boat Provide a platform to secure weapons
(LCM Mk 6) in LCM Mk 6. Consists of four deck
sections secured together with iron
bolts and angle irons.
Dolly, Stowage Rack Stow TTL weapons on AS-39 Class

Submarine Tenders. A telescoping tug
bar is used with the dolly. All dollies
are modified with the Adapter, Dolly,
P/N SK5711-735.
Plenum Cell Cover Seals the bottom of a launcher cell
Assembly to permit launch gases to be vented
through the uptake into the atmosphere
Sill Assembly Seal the Mk 14 Canister in the launch

cell to divert launch gases to the
atmosphere via the plenum cell.
123
Table 1-3. Reference Documentation

DOCUMENT NUMBER TITLE
Record Book All-Up-Round (AUR) Volumetric Shape
Record Book Missile Tube Ballast Can (MTBC)
0348-LP-078-1000 Technical Manual for Magazine Sprinkler System
0924-LP-066-6010/-6020 Electrically Suspended Gyro Navigator (ESGN)
AN/WSN-3A(V)2
0967-LP-529-6010 Dual Miniature Inertial Navigation System (DMINS)

AN/WSN-1(V)2
0978-LP-040-0910 Weapon Delivery Systems Equipments Manual for SSN
688 Class Submarines
ASME/ANSI B30.5-1989 Safety Standards for Mobile and Locomotive Cranes
ASME/ANSI B30.8-1988 Safety Standards for Floating Cranes and Floating

Devices
CINCLANTFLTINST 8010.4 Atlantic Fleet Conventional Ordnance Management
Manual
CINCPACFLTINST 8010.12 Pacific Fleet Ammunition Requisitioning and Reporting
Guide
CMP PUB 4440/2 Record Book for TOMAHAWK Test Missile (TOTEM)
CMP PUB PMA 280-1203 Users Logistics Support Summary (ULSS) for the
TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile UGM-109-1 and
TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile UGM-109-2
CMP PUB PMA 280-1207 Integrated Logistics Support Plan (ILSP) for Sea
Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM) TOMAHAWK
All-Up-Round
CMP PUB ULSS 4105-D Advanced TOMAHAWK Weapon Control System
AN/SWG-4(V) Launch Control Group Replacement
(TL4 Configuration)
CMP PUB ULSS PMA 280-1205 VLS Mk 14 Canisters with TOMAHAWK Cruise
Missiles at Intermediate Maintenance Activities and
Limited Maintenance Activities
CMPINST 5102.1 Explosive Mishap Reporting Procedures
Code of Federal Regulations Title Shipping
46
124

Code of Federal Regulations Title Transportation
49
DOD Regulation 4500.32-R Defense Transportation System, Policies and Procedures
DOD-STD-1686 Electrostatic Discharge Control Program for Protection
of Electrical and Electronic Parts, Assemblies and
Equipment (Excluding Electrically Initiated Explosive
Devices)
ILSP-167 P/D Integrated Logistics Support Plan (ILSP) for Vertical
Launching System Mk 41
JCS PUB 6 VOL II Part 4 Joint Reporting Structure (JRS) Volume II, Joint Reports,
Part 4, Nuclear Weapons (NUREP)
MD 4790.100/.200 Shore Activity Maintenance Data Collection System
MD 55658 Checkout Procedures and Inspection Requirements for
Vertical Launching System Umbilical Breakout Box Mk
674 Mod 0
MD 56068 Users Manual for VLS Canister Code Plug Test Set Mk
673 Mod 0
MIL-STD-129 Marking for Shipment and Storage
MIL-STD-1320-235 Truckloading Encapsulated TOTEM, TOTEM Capsule
and Expended Capsule
MIL-STD-1320-246 Truckloading CLS Ballast Cans Chocked
MIL-STD-1320-264 Truckloading VLS Canisters Mk 13, 14 & 15 and All
Mods and Mixed Loads "Empty and w/o PHS&T"
MIL-STD-1949 Military Standard Inspection Magnetic Particle
MIL-STD-2000 Standard Requirements for Soldered Electrical and
Electronic Assemblies
MIL-STD-410 Nondestructive Testing Personnel Qualification and
Certification
MIL-STD-6866 Military Standard Inspection Liquid Penetrant
NAVAIR 19-15BC-13 Operations and I-Level Maintenance Instructions with
Illustrated Parts Breakdown, Weapons Skid Aero 21C;
Part Number 64A114H-4
NAVSEA Dwg. 6213981 Truckload Guided Missile U/RGM-109 (TOMAHAWK)
in Shipping and Storage Container CNU- 308/E
125

NAVSEA Dwg. 6213982 Truckload Guided Missile UGM-109-2 (TOMAHAWK-
CLS) in Shipping and Storage Skid Mk 30 Mods 0, 1
and 2
NAVSEA Dwg. 6213983 Truckload Guided Missile RGM-109 (TOMAHAWK) in
VLS Canister Mk 14 Mods 0 and 1
NAVSEA Dwg. 6213987 Truckload, Guided Missile RGM-109 (TOMAHAWK) in
VLS Canister MK 14 Mods 0 and 1 and Guided Missile
U/RGM-109 (TOMAHAWK) in Container CNU-308/E
NAVSEA Dwg. 6214071 ISO Container Load, Shipping and Storage Skid Mk 30
Mods (TOMAHAWK) in 40 Ft Full Height Open Top
ISO Container
NAVSEA OD 44979 Firing Craft Operating Procedures and Checklists
NAVSEA OD 46574 Weapon and Combat Systems Quality Assurance
Requirements for Shore Stations and Engineering Agents
NAVSEA OD 48845 Metrology Requirements List
NAVSEA OD 48854 Field Calibration Activity Metrology Requirements List
NAVSEA OP 2239 Explosive Drivers Handbook
NAVSEA OP 3206 Handling and Stowage of Naval Ordnance Aboard
Ammunition Ships
NAVSEA OP 3221 Loading and Stowage of Military Explosives Aboard
Breakbulk Merchant Ships
NAVSEA OP 3347 United States Navy Ordnance Safety Precautions
NAVSEA OP 3565 Radio Frequency Hazards to Ordnance, Personnel and
Fuel
NAVSEA OP 4 Ammunition Afloat
NAVSEA OP 5, Vol I Ammunition and Explosives Ashore Regulations for
Handling, Storing, Production Renovation and Shipping
NAVSEA OR 99 Series Intermediate and Depot Maintenance Instructions for
(Specified Handling and Support Equipment)
NAVSEAINST 5511.28 Guided Missiles: Security Classification Guide
NAVSEAINST 8020.9 Non-Nuclear Ordnance and Explosive Handling
Qualification and Certification Program
NAVSEAINST 8020.13 Emergency Response Procedures for Transportation
Accidents
126

NAVSEAINST 8023.2 US Navy Explosive Safety Policies, Requirements and
Procedures (Department of Navy Explosive Safety Policy
Manual)
NAVSEAINST 4855.7 Reporting of Unsatisfactory Material
NAVSUP PUB 409 MILSTRIP/MILSTRAP Desk Guide
NAVSUP PUB 437 Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue Procedures
(MILSTRIP)
NAVSUP PUB 4500 Consolidated Hazardous Items List (CHIL)
NAVSUP PUB 485 Afloat Supply Procedures
NAVSUP PUB 505 Preparing Hazardous Materials for Air Shipment
NAVSUPINST 4400.189 Reporting of Non-Conforming and Quality Deficient
Material Obtained Through the Supply Systems
NAVSUPINST 4423.14 Navy Uniform Source, Maintenance and Recoverability
Codes
NAVSUPINST 4440.120 Disposition of Used or Damaged Material
NAVSUPINST 4600.70 Military Traffic Management Regulations
NSPCCINST P8010.12 Supply Management of Ammunition
NTP-A-20-7703 Navy Training Plan (NTP) UGM-109 TOMAHAWK
Cruise Missile Submarine Torpedo Tube Launch (TTL)
and SSN 688 Class Vertical Launch System (VLS)
Capsule Launching System (CLS)
OD 44979 Firing Craft Operating Procedures and Checklists for
Weapon Loading and Handling Systems SSN 774 Class
OPNAVINST 4790.4 Ships Maintenance and Material Management (3M)
Manual
OPNAVINST 5102.1 Mishap Investigation and Reporting
OPNAVINST 5510.1 Department of Navy Information and Personnel Security
Program Regulation
OPNAVINST 5530.13 Physical Security Instructions for Sensitive Conventional
Arms, Ammunition and Explosives (A A&E)
OPNAVINST C8126.1/DOD Nuclear Weapons Security Manual
C-5210.41M
OPNAVINST S5513.2 Cruise Missile Classification Guide
127

PEO(CU) INST 4601.1 Physical Security Measures for Sea Launched Cruise
Missiles During Transportation
PEO(CU) INST 8023.1 TOMAHAWK Conventional All-Up-Round Qualification
and Certification
PEO(CU) INST 8800.1 TOMAHAWK Missile Nomenclature
PEO(CU) letter 5513 Ser Security Classification Guidance
PEO(CU)/142 12 May 1990
PEO(CU) P1540/1 Capsule Launching System (CLS) Missile Tube Loading
and Handling Trainer Assembly Setup/Breakdown and
Maintenance Procedures
PEO(W) PUB 4440 Record Book for TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile
PEO(W) INST 4440.2 TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile Record Book (PEO(W)
PUB 4440)
S4140-AA-ASY-010 Capsule Launching System (CLS) Submarine Missile
Tube Trainer Assembly Setup/Breakdown and
Maintenance Procedures
S9086-T8-STM-010/CH593 Naval Ships Technical Manual, Chapter 593, Pollution
Control
S9086-XG-STM-000/CH-613 Navy Ships Technical Manual - Chapter 613, Wire, Fiber
Rope and Rigging
S9086-XG-STM-010 Naval Ships Technical Manual, Chapter 700, Shipboard
Ammunition Handling and Stowage
S976-AC-MMA-010 Instructions for Missile Tube Ballast Can: Description,
Installation, Maintenance and Repair
S9CG0-B2-CSM-000/ CG 59-CG Combat System Technical Operator Manual (CG 59 thru
64 CG 64)
S9CG0-BU-CSM-000/ CG 52-CG Combat System Technical Operator Manual (CG 52 thru
55 CG 55)
S9CG0-BY-CSM-000/ CG 56-CG Combat System Technical Operator Manual (CG 56 thru
58 CG 58)
S9DDG-BT-CSM-000 Combat System Technical Operator Manual for DDG-51
Class
S9SSN-W4-SSM-Series Ship Systems Manual for SSN 688 Class
SECNAVINST 4855.5 Product Quality Deficiency Report Program
128

SECNAVINST 5000.2 Implementation of Defense Acquisition Management
Policies, Procedures, Documentation, and Reports
SG420-AP-MMM-010 NAVSEA Periodic Testing Arrangements for Ordnance
Handling Equipment
SG420-BQ-MMA-010 Lift System Strikedown CG 47 Class Ship
SG420-BU-MMA-050 NAVSEA SSN 688 Class Weapon Delivery System
Equipment Manual, Volume 5 - Vertical Launch System
SG420-C9-MME-010 Operation and Maintenance Instruction with Parts List
Intermediate and Depot Maintenance Levels Virginia
Class Vertical Launch System (VLS) Loading Platform
SG420-CC-MME-010 Vertical Launch System Loading Platform
SG420-DG-IEM-090 Introduction to Vertical Launch System Mechanical
Equipment
SG420-DG-IEM-100 Vertical Launch System Mechanical Equipment
SG420-DG-IEM-120 Missile Tube Control and Indication Equipment
SG420-DG-IEM-130 Weapons Launch Console
SW020-AC-SAF-010/-020/-030 Transportation and Storage Data for Ammunition,
Explosives and Related Hazardous Materials
SW020-AG-SAF-010 Navy Transportation Safety Handbook for Ammunition,
Explosives and Related Hazardous Materials
SW260-DE-MMO-000 TOMAHAWK Weapon System Mk 36 and Mk 37 (Block
III)
SW261-PB-MMO-000 TOMAHAWK Weapon System Mk 37 (Block III)
SW279-AC-OMP-010 All-Up Round Electronic Simulator (AURES) Mk 101
AURES User Manual
SW279-AC-OMP-020 All-Up Round Electronic Simulator (AURES) Mk 101
Mod 4 AURES User Manual
SW279-AD-URM-010 Users Manual For All-Up Round Electronic Simulator
(AURES) Mk 112
SW281-DO-MMM-010 thru 050 VLS Systems Manual
SW282-B4-GTP-010 CCS Mk 1 Mod 0 General Information Manual
SW282-B4-MMO-010 thru 050/(C) CCS Mk 1 Mod 0/2 - Description, Operation and
CCS Mk 1 Maintenance SSN 688 Class
SW394-AF-MMO-010 thru 050 Vertical Launch System Mk 41
129

SW394-AG-MMA-010 Description, Operation, Installation and Maintenance
Instructions for AUR Simulator
SW394-EE-PRO-010 Vertical Launching System (VLS) Canister Dockside
Handling Procedures
SW395-AA-IFM-010/ SWIM 010 Submarine Torpedo Tubes and Weapons Handling
- 060 Systems Interface Manual
SW820-AA-WHM-010/ TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile UGM-109-1 Intermediate
UGM-109-1 Level Activity Handling and Stowage
SW820-AD-WHS-010/ TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile UGM-109-2 Intermediate
UGM-109-2 Level Activity Handling, Loading and Stowage
SW820-AD-WHS-030/ TOMAHAWK Vertical Launch All-Up-Rounds, Handling
UGM/RGM-109 and Stowage Aboard AS-39 Class
SW820-AF-OMP- TOMAHAWK Support and Test Equipment Description,
010/TOMAHAWK EQUIP Maintenance and Repair Parts Breakdown (RPB)
SW820-AF-OMP-020/VLS/SSN TOMAHAWK Support and Test Equipment Description,
SUPP EQUIP Maintenance and Repair Parts Breakdown (RPB)
(Vertical Launch System/Submarine Launch (VLS/SSN)
Support Equipment)
SW820-AP-MMI-010 TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile System Description
SW820-AP-MMI-020 TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile General Handling
Procedures
SW820-AP-MMI-030 TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile Maintenance Procedures
SW820-AP-MMI-040 TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile UGM-109A-1 Warhead
Installation/Removal and Air Vehicle Maintenance
SW850-D9-PRO-010/ REM MSL TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile Recovery Procedures:
RECOVERY Recovery Exercise Module (REM) Configurations
SW850-EA-MMM-010/ TOTEM TOMAHAWK Test Vehicles Description, Operation,
Maintenance and Repair Parts Breakdown (RPB)
TOMAHAWK Test Missile (TOTEM) UTM-109-1
SW850-EA-MMM-020/ CTS TOMAHAWK Test Vehicles Description, Operation,
TOMAHAWK Crew Training Shape (CTS)
UTM-109-1A
SW850-EA-MMM- TOMAHAWK Test Vehicles Employment Procedures
050/EMPLOYMENT
130

SW850-EA-MMM-060 TOMAHAWK Test Vehicles; COTS TOTEM
Description, Operation, Maintenance and Repair Parts
Breakdown (RPB)
SW850-EB-MMM-010/TOMFISH TOMAHAWK Inert Fitment Shape (TOMFISH)
Description, Certification, Verification, Operation,
(Submarine and Tender/Shorebase)
SW850-FA-MMM-010/WIT MK TOMAHAWK Warhead Installation Trainer Mk 35
35 Mod 0 Description, Operation and Maintenance with
Repair Parts List (RPL) and Quality Assurance Test and
Inspection Procedures (QATIP) (Shorebase)
SWOP 0-1 Numerical Index to Joint Nuclear Weapons Publications
SWOP 0-1B Numerical Index to Joint Nuclear Weapons Publications -
Navy Supplement
SWOP 4-1 Glossary of Nuclear Weapons Material
SWOP 5-8 Unsatisfactory/Information Report
SWOP 20-5 Plutonium Contamination Standards
SWOP 20-7 Nuclear Safety Criteria
SWOP 20-11 Firefighting with Nuclear Warheads
SWOP 45-51 Transport of Nuclear Weapons Material
SWOP 45-56 Instructions for Logistical Movement of Nuclear
Weapons. Includes SAFEPOT Maintenance with IPB and
Command Disablement Procedures
SWOP 50-2 Procedures for the Use and Control of Logistics Codes
for Permissive Action Linked (PAL) Equipped Weapons
SWOP 100-4 Custody, Accountability and Control of Nuclear Weapons
and Nuclear Material
SWOP DE-2 Operator Maintenance Instruction with IPB for
Disablement Equipment
SWOP H-1 Navy Nuclear Weapons Handling Equipment Certification
Policies and Maintenance Instructions
SWOP W80.82-0 Weapon Summary, TOMAHAWK Land-Attack Missile
UGM- 109A
SWOP W80.82-1 Depot Level Warhead Assembly, Test, Maintenance and
Storage Procedures (Shorebase) Ship and Sub
131

SWOP W80.82-9 Operator and Organizational Maintenance, TOMAHAWK
Land-Attack Missile UGM-109A
TO300-AM-ORD-10 (NAVSEA Weapons and Combat Systems Quality Assurance
OD 465743) Requirement for Shore Stations and Engineering Agents
TW120-AA-PRO-010 Nuclear Weapons Radiological Controls Program
TW510-AA-PRO-020/TMIS Torpedo Management Information System Submarine
Organizational Level Maintenance Activity Reporting
Instructions for Submarine Fired Weapons/Vehicles
TW510-AA-PRO-030/ TMIS Torpedo Management Information System Intermediate
Level Maintenance Activity Reporting Instructions for
Submarine Fired Weapons/Vehicles
TWA390-BA-GSE-010 Attack Submarine Vertical Launch System Peculiar
Support Equipment Item Management Plan
ULSS PMA 280-1206 TOMAHAWK Cruise Missiles for Transhipment
Activities.
132
Table 1-4. Abbreviations and Acronyms

ABBREVIATION/ACRONYM DEFINITION
AA&E Arms, Ammunition and Explosives
ACC Attack Control Console
ACN Advance Change Notice
ACR Anticircular Run
ADM Air Data Module
AE Ammunition Ship
AEL Allowance Equipage List
AFA Analog Filter Assembly
AFIRT Aft Flange Installation and Removal Tool
AGR Anti-Jam Global Positioning System Receiver
ANSI American National Standards Institute
AOE Fast Combat Support Ship
APL Allowance Parts List
APML Assistant Program Manager, Logistics
AS Submarine Tender
ASDS Advanced Seal Delivery System
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
ATR Ammunition Transaction Report
AUR All-Up-Round
AURBb All-Up-Round Ballast, Grade B
AURES All-Up-Round Electronic Simulator
AURS All-Up-Round Simulator
AURVS All-Up-Round Volumetric Shape
AVCC Alternator Voltage Control Converter
BDI Battle Damage Information
BDII Battle Damage Indication Imagery
BIT Built-in-Test
BPU Battery Power Unit
BR Bend Radius
133
BSTR Booster
BUS Bus Voltage
CAGE Commercial and Government Entity
CAIMS Conventional Ammunition Integrated Management System
CAL Calibration
CATMIS Canister Asset Tracking Management Information System
CC/A Combat Control Acoustics Set
CCA Capsule Closure Assembly; Circuit Card Assembly
CCC Central Computer Complex
CCLS Composite Capsule Launching System
CCN Certification Control Number
CCS Combat Control System; Central Control Station
CCW Counter-Clockwise
CD Command Disable
CDS Command Disable System
CG Center of Gravity; Guided Missile Cruiser
CHIL Consolidated Hazardous Items List
CHT Collection, Holding and Transfer
CII Configuration Item Identifier
CINCLANTFLTINST Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet Instructions
CINCPACFLTINST Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet Instructions
CL Checklist
CLC Capsule Loading Cover
CLF Combat Logistics Force
CLS Capsule Launching System
CMA Cruise Missile Airframe
CMFR Cruise Missile Feedback Report
CMGS Cruise Missile Guidance Set
CMP Cruise Missile Project
CMP PUB Cruise Missiles and Joint Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Publication
134
CMPINST Cruise Missiles and Joint Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Instruction
CMTS Combined Missile Test Set
CNTT Chief, Naval Technical Training
COE Certificate of Equivalency
COSAL Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List
COSBAL Coordinated Shorebase Allowance List
COTS TOTEM Commercial Off The Shelf TOMAHAWK Test Missile
CPC Closure Protective Cover
CPSL Capsule
CRF Container Repair Facility
CRPA Controllable Radiation Pattern Antenna
CRS Corrosion Resistant Steel
CSAS Configuration Status Accounting System
CSES Canister Safe Enable Switch; Combat System Electronic
Space
CTS Crew Training Shape
CW Clockwise
DAMA Demand Assigned Multiple Access
DCASPRO Defense Contract Administration Services Procurement
Office
DCM DC-DC Converter Module
DCP DSMAC Control Processor
DDG Guided Missile Destroyer
DDS Dry Dock Shelter
DECAN Decanisterization
DECAP Decapsulate
DIU DSMAC Illuminator Unit
DIUE DSMAC Illuminator Unit Electronics
DIUR DSMAC Illuminator Unit Reflector
DLS Digital Linear Switch
DMINS Dual Miniature Inertial Navigation System
135
DMS Digital Missile Simulator
DOD Department of Defense
DODIC Department of Defense Information Code
DOE Department of Energy
DOT Department of Transportation
DPG Digital Pressure Gauge
DRAI Dead Reckoning Analyzer Indicator
DSMAC Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation
DSN Defense Switching Network
DSP DSMAC Signal Processor
DTD Data Transfer Device; Dated
DTG Data Terminal Group
E-CMFR Electronic Cruise Missile Field Report
EAB Emergency Air Breathing
EBW Exploding Bridgewire (Squib)
ECP Engineering Change Proposal
EED Electroexplosive Device
EID End Item Description
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
EMS Environmental Monitoring Sensor
ENCAN Encanisterization
ENCAP Encapsulate
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
EQUIP Equipment
ESD Electrostatic Device; Electrostatic Discharge
ESDS Electrostatic Discharge Sensitive
ESGN Electrically Suspended Gyro Navigator
ESM Electronic Support Measures
ESQD Explosive Safety Quantity Distance
ESSD Electrostatic Sensitive Devices
136
EXT Extend; Extraction
FBM Fleet Ballistic Missile
FCA Fleet Calibration Activity
FCS Fire Control System
FEDLOG Federal Logistics Data
FFIRT Forward Flange Installation and Removal Tool
FIC Firing Interlocks Closed
FM Frequency Modulation
FP Flash Point
FTCTU Fleet Training Center Training Unit
GEU Guidance Electronics Unit
GFE Government Furnished Equipment
GN2 Gaseous Nitrogen
GPS Global Positioning System
GPSS Global Positioning System Subsystem
GS Guidance System
GSM Guidance Set Mockup
H&S Health and Status
He Helium
HEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air
HERO Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance
Hg Mercury
HPU Hydraulic Power Unit
HRA Hydraulic Ram Assembly
HTML HyperText Markup Language
HYD Hydraulic
IAW In Accordance With
I/O Initial Outfitting; Input/Output
IC Interlocks Closed
ID Inside Diameter; Identification
IFF Identification Friend or Foe
137
ILSP Integrated Logistics Support Plan
IMA Intermediate Maintenance Activity
IMMM In-Flight Mission Modification Messages
IMU Inertial Measuring Unit
InHg Inches of Mercury
INS Insertion; Inertial Navigation Set
INST Installation; Instruction
INSTL Installation
IP Inspection Point
IPB Illustrated Parts Breakdown
IRTU Insulation Resistance Test Unit
ISEA In-Service Engineering Agent
ITL Intent to Launch
IW/ER Insensitive Warhead/Extended Range
JRS Joint Reporting Structure
JTA Joint Test Assembly
KB Kilobyte
KW Kilowatt
LA Land Attack
LCG Launch Control Group
LCM Landing Craft, Mechanized
LCU Landing Craft, Utility; Launch Control Unit
LFS Launch Capable Flight Software
LLCE Limited Life Component Exchange
Lo-temp Low temperature
LOG Logistics
LOGAIR Logistics Airlift
LP Low Pressure
LSEQ Launch Sequencer
LTP Launch Test Payload
MAC Military Airlift Command, Multiple All-Up-Round Canister
138
MCE Maximum Credible Event
MCIO Mission Control Input/Output
MCM Mission Control Module
MCP Mission Control Processor
MDD Maintenance Due Date
MDS Missile Designator Series
MEASURE Metrology Automated System for Uniform Recall and
Reporting
METRL Metrology Requirements List
MIC Missile Interface Console
MIL-SPEC Military Specification
MIL-STD Military Standard
MILSTAMP Military Standard Transportation and Movement
Procedures
MILSTRIP Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue Procedures
MIP Maintenance Index Page
MIS Missile Identification System
Mk Mark
Mod Model; Modification
MON Monitor
MRA Missile Radar Altimeter
MRC Maintenance Requirements Card
MRSS Midbody Range Safety Subsystem
MS Military Specification
MSA Mine Safety Apparatus
MSD Material Support Date
MSDDC Military Surface Deployment & Distribution Command
MSDS Material Safety Data Sheet
MSEM Maintenance Standard Electronic Module
MSL Missile
MTB Multi-test Box
139
MTBC Missile Tube Ballast Can
MTCP Missile Tube Control Panel
MTEL Missile Tube Extension Loader
MV Millivolts
NALC Naval Ammunition Logistics Code
NAS Naval Air Station
NAVICP-M Navy Inventory Control Point Mechanicsburg
NAVMAG Naval Magazine
NAVMAT Navy Material Command
NAVMATINST Naval Material Command Instruction
NAVSEA Naval Sea Systems Command
NAVSEAINST Naval Sea Systems Command Instruction
NAVSUP Naval Supply Systems Command
NAVSUP PUB Naval Supply Systems Command Publication
NAVSUPINST Naval Supply Systems Command Instruction
NAVSURFWARCENDET Naval Surface Warfare Center Detachment
NC Normally Closed
NCC Navigation Control Console
NESIP Naval Explosive Safety Improvement Plan
NL TOTEM Encapsulated No-Launch No-Wet TOMAHAWK Test
Missile
No. Number
NOTTS Naval Ordnance Transportation Tracking System
NP Navigation Processor
NSDSA Naval Sea Data Support Activity
NSN National Stock Number
NSSF Naval Submarine Support Facility
NSTM Naval Ships Technical Manual
NSWC Naval Surface Warfare Center
NSWCDET Naval Surface Warfare Center Detachment
NSWCDIVPH Naval Surface Warfare Center Division, Port Hueneme
140
NTIK Non-Tactical Instrumentation Kit
NTP Navy Training Plan
NTSP Navy Training System Plan
NUREP Nuclear Weapons Report
NUWC Naval Undersea Warfare Center
NUWCDIV Naval Undersea Warfare Center Division
NUWCDIVNPT Naval Undersea Warfare Center Division, Newport
NWAD Naval Weapons Assessment Division
NWS Naval Weapons Station
OD Ordnance Data; Outside Diameter
OFP Operational Flight Program
OLSS Operational Logistics Support Summary
OP Operating Procedure; Ordnance Publication
OPNAV Office of Chief of Naval Operations
OPNAVINST Chief, Naval Operations Instruction
OR Ordnance Requirement
ORDALT Ordnance Alteration
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
OTH Over the Horizon
OTL Operational Test Launch
OTLP Operational Test Launch Payload
PAL/CD Permissive Action Link/Command Disable
P/N Part Number
PCM Pulse Code Modulation
PEO(CU)INST Program Executive Officer, Cruise Missiles and Joint
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Instruction
PEO(U&W) Program Executive Officer for Unmanned Aviation and
Strike Weapons
PEO(W) Program Executive Office for Strike Weapons and
Unmanned Aviation
PEO(W)INST Program Executive Office for Strike Weapons and
Unmanned Aviation Instruction
141
PFU Power Filter Unit
PG Procedural Guide
PGA Pneumatic Gauge Assembly
PHS&T Packaging, Handling, Storage and Transportation
PIP Push-In-Pull
P/L Position Launch
PLA Plain Language Address
PMS Planned Maintenance System
PPCA Pyro and Power Control Assembly
PPM Parts Per Million
PROM Programmable Read Only Memory
PSA Power Switching Amplifier
psid Pound(s) Per Square Inch Differential
psig Pound(s) Per Square Inch Gauge
PTMCR Preliminary Technical Manual Change Request
PUB Publication
P/V Pressure/Vent
PV Pressure Velocity
PVC Pressurization/Vent Control
PVD Pressure Vacuum Distributor
PVTV Pressure Vent Test Vehicle
PVTV Pressure Vent Test Vehicle TOMAHAWK Test Missile
PWD Programmed Warhead Demolition
Q-D Quantity-Distance
QA Quality Assurance
QAST Quality Assurance Service Test
QATIP Quality Assurance Test and Inspection Procedure
QDR Quality Deficiency Report
QUICKTRANS Contractor-Operated Logistics Airlift
RA Radar Altimeter
RASS Random Access Storage Set
142
RDX Cyclonite
REM Recovery Exercise Module
REPROG Reprogram
RF Radio Frequency
RFI Ready-For-Issue
RGAP Rate Gyro/Accelerometer Package
RJA Relay Junction Assembly
RLEP Remote Launch Enable Panel
RM Rocket Motor
RMUC Reference Measuring Unit and Computer
RNS Radio Navigation Set
ROID Report of Item Discrepancy
RPB Repair Parts Breakdown
RPL Repair Parts List
RPU Receiver Processor Unit
RSC Range Safety Command
RSEU Range Safety Electronics Unit
RSS Range Safety System
S&TE Support and Test Equipment
S/N Serial Number
SAFEPOT Small Arms Fire Enclosure for the Protection of Ordnance
in Transit
SAMDS Shore Activity Maintenance Data System
SATCOM Satellite Communications
SATNAV Satellite Navigation
SB Shore Base
SCG Storage Compatibility Group
SCS Submarine Combat System
SDL Satellite Data Link
SEC Second
SHIPALT Ship Alteration
143
SIB Ship Information Book
SIP Standard Inspection Procedure
SLCM Sea Launched Cruise Missile
SMDC Shielded Mild Detonating Cord
SMR Source, Maintenance and Recoverability
SMTT Submarine Missile Tube Trainer
SOF Special Operations Forces
SPAWAR Space and Naval Warfare Systems
SPU Secondary Power Unit
SRA Specialized Repair Activity
SSGN Submarine, Guided-Missile, Nuclear Propulsion
SSN Submarine, Nuclear Propulsion (Fast Attack)
STA Station
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
SUBASE Submarine Base
SUBROC Submarine Rocket
SWF Strategic Weapons Facilities
SWFTR Submarine Weapon Field Trouble Report
SWL Safe Working Load
SWOP Special Weapons Ordnance Publication
T&E Test and Evaluation
TACTOM Tactical TOMAHAWK
TAE Ammunition Ship (Military SEALIFT)
TALMIP TOMAHAWK AUR Logistics and Maintenance Technical
Information Products
TCG Track Control Group
TCM TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile
TEMP Temperature
TERCOM Terrain Contour Matching
TFBR Technical Feedback Report
TGT Target
144
TLAM Land-Attack TOMAHAWK Missile
TMDER Technical Manual Deficiency/Evaluation Report
TMIS Torpedo Management Information System
TMPS Theater Mission Planning System
TNT Trinitrotoluene
TOA Time of Arrival
tol Tolerance
TOMFISH TOMAHAWK Fitment Shape
TOMIS TOMAHAWK Management Information System
TOT Time-On-Target
TOTEM TOMAHAWK Test Missile
TR Trainer (i.e., Warhead Installation Trainer TR1001)
TRB Record Book for TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile, PEO(W)
PUB 4440
TRNR Trainer
TRS Technical Repair Standard
TRT Tensioner Rigging Tool
TSN TOMAHAWK Strike Network
TTL Torpedo Tube Launched
TVC Thrust Vector Control
TWCS TOMAHAWK Weapon Control System
TWS TOMAHAWK Weapons System; Tactical Weapons
Simulator
TYCOM Type Commander
UBOB Umbilical Breakout Box
UIC Unit Identification Code
ULSS Users Logistics Support Summary
UOC Usable on Code
UR/IR Unsatisfactory/Information Report
URL Uniform Resource Locator
UWARS Universal Restraint Stands
145
VDA Variable Dive Attack Maneuver
VDC Volts DC
VLA Vertical Launch Anti-Submarine Rocket
VLC Vertical Launch Console; Vertical Launch Center
VLS Vertical Launching System
VLT Vertical Launch TOMAHAWK
VLV Valve
VSA Vertical Support Assembly
W/H Warhead
WARHD Warhead
WB Work Boat
WCC Weapon Control Console
WDC Weapon Data Converter
WH INST TRNR TOMAHAWK Warhead Installation Trainer
WIT Warhead Installation Trainer
WIU Warhead Interface Unit
WLC Weapon Launch Console
WMP Weapon Monitor Panel
WPNSTA Weapons Station
WSA Warhead Support Assembly
146
Table 1-5. Summary of Reports

WEAPON GOVERNING
SYSTEM REPORT MEDIA DIRECTIVE PURPOSE OF REPORT
UGM-109-1 ELECTRONIC Web-based An electronic reporting
UGM-109-2 CRUISE E-CMFR system that replaces the
RGM-109-2 MISSILE Form lo- former CMFR system.
RGM-109-4 FIELD cated in For use by Intermediate
REPORT TOMA- Maintenance Activities to
(E-CMFR) HAWK report damaged, faulty,
Manage- or failed equipment,
ment In- ineffective documentation,
formation routine requests for
System technical assistance,
(TOMIS) corrective maintenance
database and/or results of PMS
accomplishment for
RGM-/UGM-109C/D/E
AURs and related
equipment.
UGM- NUCLEAR NAVSEA SWOP 5-8 Report damaged, faulty
109A-1 WEAPONS Form or failed equipment or
UNSATISFAC- 8110/4 ineffective documentation
TORY/ INFOR- for 109A and related
MATION RE- equipment.
PORT (UR/IR)
UGM-109-1 PMS NAVSEA OPNAVINST Report PMS
UGM-109-2 TECHNICAL Form 4790.4 documentation
RGM-109-2 FEEDBACK 4790/7B deficiencies.
RGM-109-4 REPORT
(TFBR)
UGM-109-1 CONVEN- Ammuni- CINCLANT- Report transfer/change
UGM-109-2 TIONAL AM- tion Trans- FLTINST in condition of items
RGM-109-2 MUNITION action Re- 8010.4/ CINC- identified in PEO(CU)
RGM-109-4 INTEGRATED port PACFLTINST INST 8800.1.
MANAGE- 8010.12/ NSPC-
MENT SYS- CINST P8010.12
TEM (CAIMS)
147
WEAPON GOVERNING
UGM-109-1 PRODUCT Standard NAVSEAINST Report receipt of defective
UGM-109-2 QUALITY Form 368 4855.7 AURs or material.
RGM-109-2 DEFICIENCY
RGM-109-4 REPORT
(QDR)
UGM-109-1 REPORT OF Standard NAVMATINST Report shipping and
UGM-109-2 ITEM DIS- Form 364 4355.7 packaging discrepancies
RGM-109-2 CREPANCY
RGM-109-4 (ROID)
UGM-109-1 SUBMARINE SWFTR For use by Organizational
UGM-109-2 WEAPON Form Level Activities under
FIELD the cognizance of
TROUBLE the Submarine Type
REPORT Commanders (TYCOMs)
(SWFTR) to report damaged, faulty,
or failed equipment,
ineffective documentation,
routine requests for
technical assistance,
corrective maintenance
and/or results of PMS
accomplishment for
UGM-109C/D/E AURs
and related equipment.
UGM-109-1 TECHNICAL NAVSEA NAVSEAINST Report errors, omissions
UGM-109-2 MANUAL Form 4160.3 or discrepancies or
RGM-109-2 DEFICIENCY/ 4160/1 recommend changes
RGM-109-4 EVALUATION to basic manuals.
REPORT
(TMDER)
UGM-109-1 HAZARDOUS Message OPNAVINST Report accident or incident
UGM-109-2 INCIDENT 5102.1 for Navy/ with material loss or
RGM-109-2 REPORT CMPINST 5102.1 damage to any variant
RGM-109-4 for contractor creating hazard/potential
hazard.
148
WEAPON GOVERNING
RGM-109-4 CANISTER OP- NAVSEAINST Report Mk 14 Canister
SHORE AC- NAVINST 4790.6 preventive and
TIVITY MAIN- Form unscheduled maintenance
TENANCE 4790/5(2A) and defects
DATA SUM-
MARY
RGM-109-4 CANISTER/ NAVSEA NAVSEAINST Report Mk 14 Canister
MISSILE CON- Form 4790.6 configuration changes to
FIGURATION 4790/5(2B) include encan/decan
SUMMARY
SHORE AC-
TIVITY MAIN-
TENANCE
DATA SUM-
MARY
149
Table 1-6. Common Descriptive Data

ITEM DESCRIPTION
Engine:
Designation F107-WR-400(a) or F107-WR-402(b)
Type Turbofan
Thrust. 600 lb
Rocket Motor Assembly:(a)
Designation Mk 106 Mod 0
Type Single-chamber, fixed nozzle
Propellant Arcadene 228G solid grain (304 lb)
Control Jet tab thrust vector
Safe-Arm Igniter Assy Electromechanical, dual initiator
Rocket Motor Assembly:(b)
Type Single-chamber, omnidirectional nozzle
Propellant UTP-25201C solid grain (349 lb)
Control Nozzle thrust vector
Safe-Arm Igniter Assy Electromechanical, dual initiator
Electrical System:
Shroud Converter:
Type AC/DC
Input 115/200V, 400Hz, 3 phase, Y
Output 27.5-28.5 Vdc
Guidance Set Battery:
Type Thermal
Output 23-33 Vdc
Airframe Battery:
Type Thermal, dual output
Output 1/Output 2 25-32 Vdc/26-44 Vdc
Engine Generator/Regulator:
Type Dual output
150
ITEM DESCRIPTION
Output 28+/1 Vdc (regulated)
Output 2 24-40 Vdc (semi-regulated)
REM Batteries (2):(c)
Type Silver oxide-zinc, remotely activated
Output 25-32 Vdc
RSS Battery:(d)
Type Thermal
Output 23-33 Vdc
Fuel: Propellant, high density synthetic hydrocarbon, JP-10,
MIL-P-87107C
Pneumatic System:
Airframe Supply Bottle:
Pressure 6000 psi (helium)
Volume 39 cu in
TVC Supply Bottle:(e)
Pressure 6000 psi (nitrogen)
Volume(g) 23 cu in
Volume(h) 60 cu in
REM Flotation Supply
Botles(2):(c)
Pressure 6000 psi (nitrogen)
Volume 60 cu in each
Hydraulic System:(f)
Hydraulic Reservoir/Accumulator 3550 psi
Pressurization/Vent System:
Transducer:(g)
Type Dual differential, pressure sensing
Range 0.5 - 12.5 psid
Pressure Relief Valve:(g)
Type Poppet, spring-loaded
Cracking Pressure 12-16 psid
151
ITEM DESCRIPTION
Reseat Pressure 10.8 psid (min)
Pressure Relief Valve:(h)
Type Poppet, spring-loaded
Cracking Pressure 3.4-17.0 psid
Reseat Pressure 3.0 psid
CLS Electrical System:(h)
Type Vdc
Input 24-30 Vdc and 4.5-5.5 Vdc
Output 24-30 Vdc
Engine:(i)
Designation Model F415-WR-400
Type Turbofan
Thrust 650 lb
Rocket Motor Assembly:(i)
Type Single-chamber, fixed nozzle
Propellant Arcadene 360B HTPB, high performance, aluminized
composite propellant (322 lb)
Control Jet tab thrust vector
Safe Arm Igniter Assy Mk 38
Airframe Battery:(i)
Type Lithium thermal, dual output
Output 1/Output 2 28-34 Vdc/40-65 Vdc
Alternator:(i)
Type Engine shaft mounted, three phase permanent magnet
generator
Output 4.3 KVA (max)
152
ITEM DESCRIPTION
Voltage 140-250 Volts
NOTES:
(a) - Applicable to UGM/JUGM-109A.
(b) - Applicable to UGM/JUGM-109C/D only.
(c) - Applicable to JRGM/JUGM-109A/C-M only.
(d) - Applicable to JUGM-109C/D-S/W only.
(e) - Applicable to variants with Mk 106 Mod 0 Rocket Motor only.
(f) - Applicable to variants with Mk 111 Mod 0 Rocket Motor only.
(g) - Applicable to UGM/JUGM-109-1 only.
(h) - Applicable to UGM/JUGM-109-2 only.
(i) - Applicable to JUGM/UGM-109E-1/2 only.
153
Table 1-7. Variant Unique Descriptive Data

ITEM 109A 109C 109D 109E
Guidance: Land Attack Land Attack Land -Attack Land At-
AN/DWS-15 AN/DWS-15 AN/DWS-15 tack Guid-
(V)I Block III (V)I Block III (V)I Block III ance Electron-
w/ DSMAC or w/ DSMAC or ics Unit w/DS-
DSMAC IIA and DSMAC IIA and MAC,GPSS, and
GPSS GPSS TERCOM
Warhead:
Type/Weight W80 Mod 0 Non- WDU-25/B BLU-97/B WDU-36/B
Conventional Conventional Conventional Conventional
high explosive high explosive High Explosive
(Picratol/H-6) (Cyclotol 70/30) Warhead
992 lb (378 lb 287grams each (PBXN-107 Type
explosive) II) 690 lb (265 lb
explosive)
Warhead:
Type/Weight WDU-36/B
Conventional
high explosive
(PBXN-107 Type
II) 690 lb (265 lb
explosive)
Fuel Capacity:
TACTICAL; 1121 lb (a) 350 lb (a) 546 lb 527 lb (a) 568 lb 1100 lb
(b) (b)
REM 1121 lb (a) 354 lb (a) 558 lb
(b)
RSS 350 lb (a) 468 lb 474 lb (a) 474 lb
(b) (b)
Warhead Arming
Devices:
Dual Air Valve: FZU-43/B FZU-43/B
Pyrotechnic Pyrotechnic
actuated dual actuated dual
initiator initiator
154
ITEM 109A 109C 109D 109E

Fuze Booster
Assembly
Type FMU-138/B BBU-47/B Elec-
Electropneu- tropneumatic
matic armed,im- armed, pro-
pact detonated grammable deto-
nated
Type FMU-148/B
Electropneu-
matic armed,
programmable
detonated
NOTES:
(a) - Variant with Mk 106 Mod 0 Rocket Motor
(b) - Variant with Mk 111 Mod 0 Rocket Motor
155
Table 1-8. Container Weights and Dimensions

ITEM WEIGHT LENGTH WIDTH HEIGHT
(empty) (inches) (inches) (inches)
(pounds)
CNU-308/E SHIPPING 1709 265.00 34.00 35.00
CONTAINER
MK 30 SHIPPING AND 2650 312.63 40.00 44.00
STORAGE SKID
AUR SIMULATOR SHIPPING 2700 321.19 39.12 49.88
SKID
MK 14 VLS CANISTER 3241 280 40.34 43.45
(w/PHS&T)
(kilograms) (centimeters) (centimeters) (centimeters)
CNU-308/E SHIPPING 775 673 86 89
CONTAINER
MK 30 SHIPPING AND 1202 794 102 112
STORAGE SKID
AUR SIMULATOR SHIPPING 1225 816 99 127
SKID
MK 14 VLS CANISTER 1470 711 102 110
(w/PHS&T)
156
Table 1-9. Weights of TTL Variants and Related

Material
ITEM HANDLING WEIGHT* (LBS)
Pounds Kilograms
lbs kg
TACTICAL AUR
UGM-109A-1 4273 1938
UGM-109C-1 4548 2063
UGM-109D-1 4391 1992
UGM-109E-1 4510 2046
EXERCISE AUR
JUGM-109A-1 4245 1926
JUGM-109A-1(QAST) ** **
JUGM-109C-1 4483 2033
JUGM-109D-1 4367 1981
TRAINING/CERTIFICATION VARIANTS
TOMAHAWK TEST MISSILE (TOTEM) 3550 1610
UTM-109-1
ENCAPSULATED NL TOTEM 3550 1610
COMMERCIAL OFF THE SHELF (COTS) TOTEM 4050 1837
PRESSURE VENT TEST VEHICLE (PVTV) 4550 2063.9
TOTEM
CREW TRAINING SHAPE (CTS) UTM-109-1A 3576 1622
WARHEAD INSTALLATION TRAINER (WIT) MK 4137 1877
35/0 w/WARHEAD
TOMAHAWK FITMENT SHAPE (TOMFISH) MK 4250 1928
1/0
VEHICLES AND CAPSULES
TOTEM TEST VEHICLE TM-109-1C 2600 1179
CAPSULE MK 1/0 938 425
CAPSULE MK 3/0 1005 456
TOTEM CAPSULE 950 431
157
ITEM HANDLING WEIGHT* (LBS)

Pounds Kilograms
lbs kg
WIT MK 35/0 CAPSULE w/nose and slot covers 864 392
WIT MK 35/0 CAPSULE w/o nose and slot covers 832 377
WIT MK 35/0 TRAINER w/WARHEAD 3273 1485
TTL NOSE COVER (aluminum/lightweight/Block 27/14/27 12.2/6.4/12.2
IV)
TTL FWD SLOT COVER (metal/Kevlar/Universal) 4/3/2 1.8/1.4/0.9
TTL AFT SLOT COVER (metal/Kevlar/Universal) 1/1/2 0.5/0.5/0.9
SHIPPING CONTAINER CNU-308/E (empty) 1709 775
NOTES:
* AUR handling weights calculated using heaviest components plus a small safety factor.
** Weight will vary depending on test requirements. Refer to Test and Evaluation Plan
for data.
158
Table 1-10. Centers of Gravity for TTL Variants

*APPROXIMATE FWD
MEASUREMENT (IN)
ITEM FROM CAPSULE CG
TACTICAL AUR
UGM-109A-1 w/ W80 Warhead 10.0
UGM-109A-1 w/o W80 Warhead 2.5
UGM-109C-1 12.0
UGM-109D-1 11.5
UGM-109E-1 10.6
EXERCISE AUR
JUGM-109A-1 w/ NTIK or REM & Inert Warhead 10.0
JUGM-109A-1w/QAST **
JUGM-109C-1-M 11.5
JUGM-109C-1-S/W 10.5
JUGM-109D-1-S/W 11.5
TRAINING/CERTIFICATION VARIANTS AND
CAPSULES
TOMAHAWK TEST MISSILE (TOTEM) UTM-109-1 7.5
ENCAPSULATED NL TOTEM 7.5
COMMERCIAL OFF THE SHELF (COTS) TOTEM 7.5
ENCAPSULATED PVTV TOTEM 20
CREW TRAINING SHAPE (CTS) UTM-109-1A 6.0
WARHEAD INSTALLATION TRAINER (WIT) MK 35/0 9.5
w/W80
WARHEAD INSTALLATION TRAINER (WIT) MK 35/0 3.5
w/o W80
TOMAHAWK FITMENT SHAPE (TOMFISH) MK 1/0 0.0
CAPSULE MK 1/0, empty w/nose and slot covers 0.0
CAPSULE MK 1/0, empty w/o nose and slot covers -5.0
CAPSULE MK 3/0, empty w/nose and slot covers 0.0
CAPSULE MK 3/0, empty w/o nose and slot covers -2.39
159
*APPROXIMATE FWD
MEASUREMENT (IN)
ITEM FROM CAPSULE CG
TOTEM CAPSULE, empty w/ nose and slot covers 0.0
TOTEM CAPSULE, empty w/o nose and slot covers -3.5
WIT CAPSULE, empty w/nose and slot covers 7.0
WIT CAPSULE, empty w/o nose and slot covers 2.5
*Measure from center of capsule CG stripe.
AUR CG calculation is for AUR configured with Mk 111 Rocket Motor, aluminum nose
cover and slot covers installed. Add up to 1.0 inch to measurement for variants with
Mk 106 Mod 0 Rocket Motor. Subtract 0.5 inch from measurement with lightweight
nose cover installed.
AUR/WIT/CTS CGs at station 142.1.
TOTEM, NL TOTEM and COTS TOTEM Capsule CGs at station 144.0.
PVTV TOTEM Capsule CG at station 155.0.
** QAST CG will vary depending on test requirements. Refer to Test and Evaluation
Plan for data.
160
Table 1-11. Weights of CLS Variants and Related

Material
MAX. HANDLING MAX. HANDLING
WEIGHT (POUNDS)* WEIGHT
(KILOGRAMS)*
ITEM CLS Mk 45 CLS Mk 45 CLS Mk 45 CLS Mk 45
Mod 1 Mod 2 Mod 1 Mod 2
TACTICAL VARIANTS:
UGM-109C-2 5905 5905 2679 2679
UGM-109D-2 5749 5749 2608 2608
UGM-109E-2 5900 5900 2676 2676
EXERCISE VARIANTS:
JUGM-109C-2 5816 TBF 2638 TBF
JUGM-109D-2 5696 TBF 2584 TBF
JUGM-109E-2-S/W 5625 TBF 2552 TBF
JUGM-109E-2-W 5612 TBF 2546 TBF
CAPSULE:
Capsule Launching System Mk 45 2132 2290 967 1039
(w. CPC)
Capsule Launching System Mk 45 2218 2376 1006 1078
(Spent)**
(KILOGRAMS)*
TRAINING/INERT VARIANTS:
AUR VOLUMETRIC SHAPE 6800 3084
AUR SIMULATOR 6870 3116
AURES Mk 101 70 32
AURES Mk 112 70 32
Missile Tube Ballast Can (w/o 6800 3084
additional ballast)
AURBb 5680 300 2576 136
161

(KILOGRAMS)*
CLS Loading and Handling Trainer 6390 2899
Assembly (Mod 1)
CLS Loading and Handling Trainer TBF TBF
Assembly (Mod 2)
SHIPPING SKID:
Shipping and Storage Skid Mk 30 2650 1202
Mod 2 w/covers
AUR Simulator Shipping Skid 2700 1225
w/covers
MISCELLANEOUS:
SABOT 26 12
Closure Protective Cover (CPC) Mk 84 38
19
Capsule Loading Cover (CLC) 17 8
Clamp Ring 30 14
Forward Capsule Support Adapter 50 23
Mk 168
CLS Uprighting Fixture Mk 26 130 59
Lifting Adapter Mk 169 500 227
Lifting Adapter Extension 300 136
Missile Tube Extension Loader 2000 907
(MTEL) Mk 23
MTEL Adapter 480 218
Container, Shipping/Storage, MTEL 2120 962
Adapter, Lifting Adapter Extension
(Loaded)
Container, Shipping/Storage, Work 750 340
Platform (Loaded)
MTEL Shipping Pallet 1100 499
Installation Guide Mk 116 185 84
Hydraulic Power Unit (HPU) Mk 8 290 132
Tilt Fixture, Mk 23 3000 1361
162

(KILOGRAMS)*
SSN 688 Class Loading Platform:
Forward Section 5800 2631
Starboard Section 3800 1724
Port Section 3800 1724
All Three Sections-Stacked 13400 6078
SSN 774 Class Loading Platform:
Forward Section 6100 2767
Starboard Section 3900 1769
Port Section 3900 1769
All Three Sections-Stacked 13900 6305
** Includes approximately 86-gallons (325 liters) of water.
163
Table 1-12. Centers of Gravity for CLS Variants

ITEM CENTER OF GRAVITY
(INCHES)
CLS MK 45 1/2
TACTICAL AUR
UGM-109C-2 126 6
UGM-109D-2 127 6
UGM-109E-2 127 6
EXERCISE AUR
JUGM-109C-2-M 133
JUGM-109C-2-S/W 132
JUGM-109D-2-S/W 132
JUGM-109E-2-S/W 143
CAPSULE LAUNCHER
SPENT CLS * 163 6
OTHER CENTER OF GRAVITY
(INCHES)
AUR SIMULATOR SHIP SKID (LOADED) 141
AUR SIMULATOR SHIP SKID (EMPTY) 160
AUR SIMULATOR VOLUMETRIC SHAPE w/ AURES 153
AUR SIMULATOR VOLUMETRIC SHAPE w/o AURES 155
AURBb 122.51 1.00
MISSILE TUBE BALLAST CAN 132
CLS LOADING AND HANDLING TRAINING SHAPE 127
AUR variant, AUR Volumetric Shape, AURBb, AUR Simulator and CLS Loading and
Handling Trainer CGs are measured from datum B (lower edge of upper flange).
Missile Tube Ballast Can CG is measured from brass protector ring (flat gasket mounting
surface).
AUR Simulator Shipping Skid: Trunnion end.
*CG will vary for empty/spent capsule depending on amount of residual water remaining
in capsule after draining.
164
Table 1-13. Weights of RGM-109-2 Mk 10 Variants

and Related Material
HANDLING WEIGHT*
ITEM Pounds Kilograms
TACTICAL AUR
RGM-109C-2 3973 1802
RGM-109D-2 3823 1734
RGM-109E 3837.5 1741
EXERCISE AUR
JRGM-109C-2 3973 1802
JRGM-109D-2 3823 1734
JRGM-109E-2 3938 1786
TRAINING/CERTIFICATION VARIANTS
CANISTER TRAINER MK 17 3662 1661
CANISTER
CANISTER MK 10 495 225
NOTE:
165
Table 1-14. Centers of Gravity for RGM-109-2 Variants

*APPROXIMATE FWD
MEASUREMENT (IN)
ITEM FROM CANISTER CG
TACTICAL AUR
RGM-109C-2 11.5
RGM-109D-2 11.5
RGM-109E-2 14.8
EXERCISE AUR
JRGM-109C-2-M 11.5
JRGM-109C-2-S/W 10.0
JRGM-109D-2-S/W 11.5
TRAINERS AND CANISTERS
CANISTER TRAINER MK 17 MOD 0 0.0
CANISTER MK 10 (Empty) 2.0
* Measure from center of canister CG stripe.
AUR CG calculation is for AUR configured with Mk 111 Rocket Motor. Add up to 0.5
inch to measurement for variants with Mk 106 Mod 0 Rocket Motor.
AUR CG at station 138.0.
Mk 17 Trainer Canister CG at station 130.0.
166
Table 1-15. Weights of VLS Variants

ITEM * HANDLING WEIGHT
Pounds Kilograms
AUR
JRGM/RGM-109C-4 7290 3307
JRGM/RGM-109D-4 7133 3236
RGM-109E-2 7154 3245
TRAINER
CANISTER TRAINER MK 14 6528 2961
NOTE:
* Handling weights calculated using heaviest components plus a small safety factor.
167
CHAPTER 2 SECURITY AND SAFETY

2.1 SCOPE.
This chapter discusses TOMAHAWK Weapon System (TWS) security and safety requirements,
regulations and general policies relating thereto.
2.2 SECURITY.
TOMAHAWK mission criticality, high cost and political sensitivity require an adequate level of
security be maintained regarding security safeguards and physical protective measures used for
commercial/government transport. OPNAVINST 5530.13, PEO(CU)INST 4601.1 and NAVSEA
SW020-AG-SAF-010 contain specific security requirements for transport of TOMAHAWK
Cruise Missiles (TCM) variants over public highways. Storage and transport of TCM variants
on military installations will be IAW NAVSEA OP 5, NAVSEA OP 4461 and amplifying local
directives.
2.2.1 Security Classification. All TCMs carry a minimum security classification of
CONFIDENTIAL. OPNAVINST S5513.28 contains specific information on the security
classification of TCM variants and their components.
2.2.2 Maintaining Unwarheaded 109A Certification. Prior to, during, and subsequent to
warhead installation, the 109A variant receives no missile systems testing at the intermediate
level. To ensure that the variant retains its certification, the following requirements apply to
the 109A without warhead installed:
a. The 109A without warhead shall be safeguarded in accordance with the provisions of
OPNAVINST 5530.13 and OPNAVINST C8126.1/DOD C-5210.41-M and shall be
protected at the same level of security provided Category II Arms, Ammunition and
Explosives (AA&E).
b. Formal entry and access control shall be maintained in accordance with OPNAVINST
5530.13 after the tamper resistant tape seals are broken on the shipping container.
c. Upon breaking the tamper resistant tape seals on the shipping container, the 109A
shall be provided two-person control which is defined in Special Weapons Ordnance
Publication (SWOP) 4-1 as The close surveillance and control of materials at all
times by a minimum of two authorized persons, each capable of detecting incorrect or
unauthorized procedures with respect to the task to be performed, and each familiar
with established security requirements.
2.2.3 Warheaded 109A. Warheaded 109A TCMs are secured, handled, maintained and
transported in accordance with applicable SWOPs.
2.2.4 Transportation Security. All shipping containers containing TCM variants are secured
by wire seals. Shipping containers containing 109A variants without warhead are shipped from
the manufacturer to the military first destination with tamper resistant tape seals, as well as wire
seals, applied to the container. Additionally, the manufacturer places tamper resistant tape seals
on the 109A variant prior to shipment. Tamper resistant tape seals are serially numbered with the
back of the seal coated with a bar pattern release agent that will show the bars if the seal was
168
removed and re-affixed or has been subjected to tampering. Serial numbers or seal identifying
data are recorded in the Record Book for TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile, PEO(W) PUB 4440, that
accompanies each TCM variant. Seal locations are illustrated in the record book as well as in
applicable volumes of this document addressing removal/installation of seals during handling
and maintenance processes.
2.2.4.1 Receipt. During receipt inspections, tamper resistant tape and wire seals are inspected
for integrity. Additionally, seal serial numbers/identifying data are compared with the information
contained in the record book. If seals are missing, broken, or show evidence of tampering,
compromise of the variant is suspected and Program Executive Officer for Unmanned Aviation
and Strike Weapons [PEO(U&W)] (PMA-280714) as well as the applicable In-Service
Engineering Agent are notified.
2.2.4.2 Transfer. Navy activities apply wire seals to shipping containers when transferring
TCMs out of Navy custody. Additionally, activities apply tamper resistant tape seals to a 109A
variant without warhead and its shipping container prior to shipment to the depot or to another
intermediate maintenance activity. Seal serial numbers/identifying data are recorded in the record
book.
2.3 SAFETY.
Operations associated with the TOMAHAWK Weapons System (TWS) present a number of
safety considerations at all levels. The TCM contains a number of hazardous components.
Handling evolutions involve moving heavy weights using dollies or hoists where free-wheeling
or pendulum effects can occur. Operations may have to be performed under adverse conditions
where weather or sea state can impact safety. During TCM or related equipment maintenance
processes, personnel may be exposed to various hazardous materials which may require the use
of protective equipment or employing special procedures. To maximize safety, only qualified
ordnance certified personnel as specified in NAVSEA OP 4 and OP 5 and NAVSEAINSTs 8020.9
and 8023.2 shall be used to perform TWS evolutions. Additionally, procedural volumes of this
document contain the general safety summary, Table 2-1 "General Safety Summary", as well
as generic and specific warnings and cautions to identify potential hazards to personnel or
equipment. These warnings and/or cautions appear prior to the step or series of steps in which
potential hazards exist.
2.3.1 Explosives Safety Quantity Distance (ESQD) Arc Restrictions. At some activities,
other than designated ammunition handling facilities (i.e., WPNSTA), handling of explosives is
substantially restricted because nonexplosive ordnance activities (i.e., inhabited buildings) are in
close proximity to ordnance handling operations. To safely accommodate handling of more than
one TOMAHAWK All-UP-Round (AUR) at these ESQD restricted activities, special handling
procedures have been developed and approved for the conventional TOMAHAWK AUR.
2.3.1.1 The concept for these special handling procedures is based on maintaining a Maximum
Credible Event (MCE) of one TOMAHAWK AUR regardless of the number of AURs involved.
The acknowledged ESQD arc to inhabited buildings for one conventional TOMAHAWK AUR is
600 feet. The conventional TOMAHAWK AUR ESQD area is 600 feet.
169
2.3.1.2 A maximum of two conventional TOMAHAWK AURs in their launch configuration,

either in or out of their shipping containers, must be maintained in a nose-to-tail configuration
with respect to each other either horizontally or vertically. Other stacking restrictions regarding
numbers in stacks on or off transport vehicles still apply. This nose-to-tail configuration is to
be maintained on the bed of a truck driven onto a pier, in small boats or on the pier itself.
Additionally, a maximum of two other conventional TOMAHAWK AURs in their launch
configuration (off-loaded from combatant) may be placed in a nose to-tail configuration in
specially positioned chocks or shipping containers on the pier. All four missiles must be in a
nose-to-tail configuration in groups of two, and each group of two must be positioned no closer
than 10 feet side-to-side or 5 feet nose-to-tail (Figure 2-1 "Explosive Safety Quantity Distance
(ESQD) Arc Restrictions (Typical)").
2.3.1.3 The use of these procedures will prevent sympathetic detonation and maintain an MCE
of one conventional TOMAHAWK AUR. If ESQD restrictions are less than 600 feet to inhabited
buildings, these procedures will not provide relief, and the requirements of NAVSEA OP 4 or
OP 5 prevail. Conversely, where ESQD arcs to inhabited buildings are well beyond 600-ft arc,
the ordnance handling activity may utilize the procedure to reduce, thus enhance the effect of
the available ESQD arc. These procedures are not applicable in magazines, bunkers, workshops
or inside ships.
2.3.2 TCM Hazardous Components. TCM hazardous components range from the
nonexplosive, combustible JP-10 fuel used by the TCM to cruise to the target, comparatively
low-explosive electro-explosive devices (EED) used to separate the TCM from its launching
device, to the highly destructive, high explosive warhead. Also included in the general category of
explosives are the solid propellant rocket motor and the Capsule Launching System gas generator.
TCM hazardous component locations are illustrated in Figure 2-2 "TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile
Hazardous Component Locations (2 Sheets)". All TOMAHAWK AURs are assigned to Storage
Compatibility Group J and to a DOT Hazard Class IAW SW020AC-SAF-010/020/030. Table
2-2 "Storage and Hazard Data" summarizes storage and hazard data for all AURs. Table 2-3
"Pyrotechnic and Hazardous Materials Data" provides AUR pyrotechnic and hazard data
associated with composite material breakdown/combustion and postlaunch waste water in spent
CLS capsules.
2.3.3 Permits. As all TCMs contain some hazardous materials in their shipping configurations,
current Department of Transportation (DOT) Exemptions and Certifications of Equivalency
(COE) are required to authorize the movement of these items. Copies of the applicable permits
must accompany the shipment, and any special instructions contained in the permit must be
observed. The permits have the force and effect of federal law, and failure to have a permit or to
comply fully with its provisions may result in fine and/or imprisonment. The fact that a shipment
is made by or for the government in no way relieves the shipper from full compliance with permit
requirements. Five permits have been issued by federal agencies that effect shipment of TCMs.
2.3.4 Hazards Associated With Composite Material Breakdown/Combustion. CLS AURs
may be encapsulated in a steel or a composite material CLS. If a CLS made of composite material
is subjected to fire, additional precautions must be taken as outlined below and summarized in
Table 2-3 "Pyrotechnic and Hazardous Materials Data".
170
2.3.4.1 Composite materials composed of carbon/graphite fibers present several hazards when
subjected to fire, explosion, etc. Carbon/graphite fibers can be released into the atmosphere if
their epoxy binder burns. When subjected to temperatures of approximately 752F (400C) the
epoxy binder will ignite or decompose, possibly releasing fiber material. Once free, the fibers can
be transported up to several miles by air currents. The fiber material is highly conductive and
fibers can potentially damage electric/electronic equipment. Mechanical agitation, especially an
explosion, can also fragment the composite causing fibers to become airborne.
2.3.4.2 Fires should be extinguished with CO2, dry chemicals (AFFF), or water. Special
firefighting equipment such as Scott airpacks/MSAs/positive pressure self-contained breathing
apparatuses will be required. Hazardous combustion by-products may consist of carbon
monoxide, carbon dioxide, acrolein, phenols, amines, aldehydes, aromatic amines, hydrofluoric
acid and fluoroboric acid.
2.3.4.3 Personnel should wear protective clothing, such as:
a. Disposable coveralls and shoe covers
b. Gloves, preferably with leather palms
c. Safety glasses with side shields for cleanup personnel
d. Full face respirators for cleanup personnel
e. Positive-pressure self-contained breathing apparatus for firefighting personnel.
2.3.4.4 Waste materials should be collected with a vacuum cleaner equipped with High
Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filter elements. Waste materials should be packaged in
polyethylene plastic bags. If sheeting or bags are not available, fibers shall be contained using
an acrylic floor wax (i.e., Wax, Floor, Water Emulsion, P-W-155C). Affected areas shall be
decontaminated by washing down and/or vacuuming. Local solid waste disposal authorities shall
be consulted for approved burial sites/techniques for composites or composite contaminated
materials. Local cognizant industrial hygienist or medical department representative shall be
consulted for detailed health hazard control guidance, based upon extent of exposure.
2.3.5 CLS Post-Launch Waste Water. CLS post-launch waste water has a lead (Pb)
concentration consistently averaging between 5 to 10 milligrams per liter (mg/l) (particle setting
may cause concentrations to range from 1 to 5 mg/l at the top and 10 to 30 mg/l at the bottom of the
capsule) and cyanide concentration consistently between 20 to 25 mg/l. Because Environmental
Protection Agency regulations identify lead concentrations equal to or greater than 5 mg/l and
cyanide in any amount as hazardous, CLS post-launch waste water is considered hazardous waste
(HW). The internal volume of an expended CLS contains approximately 700 gallons of HW. Tube
flushing will produce approximately 300 additional gallons of HW. Therefore, approximately
1,040 gallons of HW are generated during off-load of one expended CLS.
171
Figure 2-1. Explosive Safety Quantity Distance (ESQD)

Arc Restrictions (Typical)
172
Figure 2-2. TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile Hazardous

Component Locations (2 Sheets)
173
174
Table 2-1. General Safety Summary

GENERAL
Operators and maintenance personnel shall strictly observe all safety precautions applicable to
their work or duty station. Personnel are to immediately report any unsafe conditions or any
equipment that is considered unsafe.
Carelessness is one of the major causes of injury to personnel. Personnel shall be thoroughly
and frequently instructed in the general safety precautions associated with the system. Should
situations arise which are not covered in the safety precautions presented in this or other
applicable documents, the commanding officer, or other authorities, may issue orders as deemed
necessary.
For handling or maintenance of ordnance, personnel performing operations shall be qualified
and ordnance certified IAW NAVSEA OP 4 and OP 5, NAVSEAINST 8020.9 and 8023.2 and
other applicable documents. Familiarity with safety standards ASME/ANSI B30.5-1989 and
B30.8-1988 will help ensure safe crane operations.
The following are general safety precautions not related to any specific procedures and
therefore do not appear elsewhere in this publication. These are precautions that personnel must
understand and apply during many phases of operations and maintenance.
LIVE CIRCUITS
Personnel must observe all safety precautions while working on and around electrical
equipment. Do not replace components or make adjustments with the high voltage supply
turned on. Under certain conditions, dangerous potentials may exist when the power control is
in the OFF position. To avoid casualties, always remove power and discharge and ground a
circuit prior to touching it.
SERVICING OR ADJUSTING EQUIPMENT
Under no circumstances should the servicing or adjusting of equipment be attempted alone. The
immediate presence of someone capable of rendering aid is required.
RESUSCITATION
Personnel working with or near high voltages shall be thoroughly instructed in the latest
methods of cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). Should someone be injured by electricity and
stop breathing, begin resuscitation at once: a delay could result in the death of a victim.
VENTILATION
Ensure there is adequate ventilation to vent flammable and harmful vapors. Keep away from
heat, sparks, and open flame. Avoid prolonged breathing of vapors or repeated contact with
the skin. Failure to comply may result in injury to personnel.
RESPIRATORS
Personnel shall wear approved respirators when working with toxic cleaning agents, adhesives,
and other toxic materials.
175
FIRST AID
An injury, no matter how slight, shall never remain unattended. First aid or medical attention
shall be given immediately.
HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH COMPOSITE MATERIAL COMBUSTION/BREAK-
DOWN
Composite materials composed of carbon/graphite fibers present several hazards when subjected
to fire, explosion, etc. The epoxy binder will ignite or decompose at high temperatures,
possibly releasing fiber materials. Mechanical breakdown (i.e., explosion) will also liberate
and fragment fibers. Such fibers can be spread via air currents for considerable distances.
Fiber material is highly conductive and can potentially damage electric/electronic equipment.
Combustion by-products may consist of carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, acrolein, phenols,
amines, aldehydes, aromatic amines, hydrofluoric acid, and fluoroboric acid.
COMMUNICATIONS
During a weapon loading/handling evolution, communications must be established and
maintained among all parties (e.g., handling/loading supervisor, security, crane/hoist operators,
handling personnel, damage control party) throughout the evolution. Should communications
become lost to any party engaged in an evolution, stop the operation and secure the weapon
until communications are reestablished.
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS AND SITUATIONS
Procedures involving hazardous materials or situations where there is potential for personnel
injury or damage to equipment are preceded by WARNING or CAUTION as appropriate.
For each hazardous material used, a Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) shall be posted and
reviewed to determine specific hazards involved, protective equipment requirements, and
appropriate handling and emergency procedures to be utilized.
NUCLEAR SAFETY PRECAUTIONS
All personnel performing technical operations on a TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile "A" variant
containing the W80 Warhead must be familiar with the Nuclear Safety Rules for Operations
provided in applicable Type Commander directives and SWOP 20-7.
FUEL PRECAUTIONS
TOMAHAWK Cruise Missiles are fueled with JP-10, a nonexplosive, combustible liquid. The
flashpoint for JP-10 is 130 degrees F and auto-ignition may occur at 474 degrees F.
Firefighting involving JP-10 is the same as for any other hydrocarbon fuel. Carbon dioxide, dry
chemical and water spray are the methods used to combat fire.
The probability of fuel leaking from the missile is highly unlikely since the capsule/canister
also serves as a fuel tight barrier. In the event leakage should occur, the affected areas should be
wrapped in Buna-N rubber sheeting and/or ordnance tape to provide a fuel tight seal.
176
Do not use organic cartridge respirators or oxygen breathing apparatus to combat fuel associated
casualties, including cleanup of spills or combustion by-products. A minimum of two personnel
shall be present during operations involving fuel spills. No smoking, matches, or open flames
are permitted in the area of a fuel spill.
EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS
The TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile contains a number of explosive components. They range
from comparatively low-explosive electroexplosive devices (EED) to the highly destructive,
high explosive warhead. Also included in the general category of explosives is the solid
propellant rocket motor. General safety precautions regarding handling and storage of
explosives shall be observed at all times. Personnel shall be familiar with the operating
procedures and precautions necessary to prevent the spurious initiation of EEDs. Areas
containing explosives shall be clearly posted with the appropriate warning signs. See NAVSEA
OP 4 and OP 5.
POST LAUNCH WASTE WATER DISPOSAL
Removal of post launch waste water from expended capsules involves handling material which
is not authorized for direct dumping into coastal or inland waters. In many locations, disposal
of post launch waste water into shore sewage systems is prohibited. Contact the local public
works department and advise them of detailed disposal considerations to obtain guidance
for waste water disposal.
SAFETY HARNESSES
Personnel performing over-the-side operations or working in or around open hatches/missile
tubes shall wear safety harnesses with safety lines secured.
LITHIUM BATTERIES
REM-equipped TOMAHAWK missiles contain two lithium active battery packs, one used
to power the recovery beacon and one used to power a special instrumentation electronics
package. Lithium active batteries can become hazardous if the case is ruptured or the leads
are shorted together causing the battery to discharge at a high rate. Either situation can cause
a violent chemical reaction, the venting of potentially hazardous gasses including sulfur
dioxide (SO2), hydrochloric acid (HCl), sulfuric acid (H2SO4), and sulfurous acid (H2SO3), and
possible explosion. This violent reaction can also be caused by water entering the battery
through a rupture in the case. Extreme care shall be used when disconnecting the active lithium
batteries to prevent the leads from shorting. Cease all operations and notify Explosive Ordnance
Disposal (EOD) if a ruptured or crushed lithium battery is observed. Do not spray water into
the REM compartment during missile washdown or decontamination operations.
177
Table 2-2. Storage and Hazard Data

Q-D CLASS 1.1
DOT HAZARD MARKING "ROCKET AMMUNITION W/EXPLOSIVE PROJECTILE"
UN ID No.: UN0397
RGM/UGM-109C w/WDU-25/B/WDU-36/B Warhead, Rocket Motor Mk 106 Mod 0/Mk
111 Mod 0 and Liquid Sustainer Engine (Land Attack-Conventional)
JRGM/JUGM-109C-W w/WDU-25/B/WDU-36/B Warhead, RSS, Rocket
Motor Mk 106 Mod 0/Mk 111 Mod 0 and Liquid Sustainer Engine (Land
Attack-Conventional-Exercise)
RGM/UGM-109D w/BLU-97/B Payload Module (Kit-001/-002), Rocket
Motor Mk 106 Mod 0/Mk 111 Mod 0 and Liquid Sustainer Engine (Land
Attack-Conventional-Submunition)
JRGM/UGM-109D-W w/BLU-97/B Payload Module (Kit-003/-004), RSS,
Rocket Motor Mk 111 Mod 0 and Liquid Sustainer Engine (Land
Attack-Conventional-Submunitions-Exercise)
RGM/UGM-109E w/WDU-36/B Warhead, Rocket Motor Mk 135 Mod 0 and Liquid
Sustainer Engine (Land Attack-Conventional)
Q-D CLASS 1.3
DOT HAZARD MARKING "ROCKET MOTOR, CLASS B EXPLOSIVE"
UN ID No.: all UN0396
UGM-109A with W80 Warhead, Rocket Motor Mk 106 Mod 0 and Liquid Sustainer
Engine (Land Attack)
UGM-109A w/o W80 Warhead, Rocket Motor Mk 106 Mod 0 and Liquid Sustainer
Engine (Land Attack)
JUGM-109A-M/S w/ or w/o Inert W80 Warhead, REM or RSS, Rocket Motor Mk 106
Mod 0 and Liquid Sustainer Engine (Land Attack-Exercise)
JRGM/JUGM-109C-M/S w/Inert Warhead, REM or RSS, Rocket Motor Mk 106 Mod
0/Mk 111 Mod 0 and Liquid Sustainer Engine (Land Attack-Conventional-Exercise)
JRGM/JUGM-109D w/Inert Submunitions or Functional Indicator BLU-97/B Payload
(Kit 003), RSS, Rocket Motor Mk 106 Mod 0/Mk 111 Mod 0 and Liquid Sustainer
Engine (Land Attack-Conventional-Submunitions-Exercise)
JRGM/JUGM-109E w/Inert Warhead, REM or RSS, Rocket Motor Mk 135 Mod 0 and
Liquid Sustainer Engine (Land Attack-Conventional-Exercise)
178
Table 2-3. Pyrotechnic and Hazardous Materials Data

ITEM HAZARD
ROCKET MOTOR Mk 106/0 = 304 lb propellant; Mk 111/0 = 349 lb
propellant; Mk 135/0 = 322 lb propellant
CONVENTIONAL WARHEAD WDU-25/B = 378 lb explosive WDU-36/B = 265 lb
explosive
PAYLOAD MODULE BLU-97/B = 106 lb explosive
FUEL JP-10 Flashpoint (FP) = 130 degrees F Auto-Ignition Temperature
= 474 degrees F
CLS SEPARATION NUT Zirconium Potassium Perchlorate/Titanium
INITIATORS (4) Hydride/Potassium Perchlorate Mixture = 295
milligrams
CLS GAS GENERATOR Class B Pyrotechnic Propellant Grain Material = 7 lb
CLS IGNITER Boron/Potassium Nitrate Binder Mixture = 100 grams
CLS GAS GENERATOR EBW Boron Phosphate Nitrate/Superfine RDX Mixture = 240
INITIATOR milligrams
GN2 BOTTLES 6000 psi for Mk 106/0 Rocket Motor thrust vector control;
5000 psi for REM flotation system
He BOTTLES 6000 psi for air frame wing slots, wings, and inlet
deployment jet tab control
HYDRAULIC RESERVOIR/AC- 3500 psi for Mk 111/0 Rocket Motor thrust vector control
CUMULATOR
BLEED AIR VALVE Zirconium/potassium perchlorate (65 mg) and Titanium
hydride/potassium perchlorate (220 mg)
FUEL SYSTEM ISOLATION Zirconium/potassium perchlorate (65 mg) and Titanium
VALVE hydride/potassium perchlorate (220 mg)
BOOSTER IGNITER BKNO3 Pellets, 107.5 gm
BOOSTER SEPARATION RING (FLSC)/CH6 (5.76 gm) and Loaded Charge Case HNS
(.17 gm)
SHROUD EXPLOSIVE BOLT ZPP (16 mg), Lead azide (14 mg) and RDX (200 mg)
CABLE CUTTER Zirconium/potassium perchlorate (65 mg) and Titanium
INLET COVER THRUSTER Zirconium/potassium perchlorate (65 mg) and Titanium
179
ITEM HAZARD
ENGINE START CARTRIDGE Ammonium nitrate based propellant (298 gm), Igniter mix
AND IGNITERS IB-43, and Boron/potassium nitrate (17.5 gm)
WING PLUG THRUSTERS Zirconium/potassium perchlorate (65 mg) and Titanium
WING DEPLOYMENT Zirconium/potassium perchlorate (65 mg) and Titanium
PNEUMATIC VALVES hydride/potassium perchlorate (220 mg)
FIN CABLE CUTTER Hercules Hi Temp (Boron, Calcium Chlorate, Tellurium
Dioxide, Viton B) (285 gm)
FIN DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM 1.3C Main Charge Talley TAL 11.0g, 1526 HTB Enhanced
PYROTECHNIC LINEAR Thiokol 2D 140 mg Pellet, Equivalent to MIL-P-46994A
ACTUATORS (UGM-109E) 11B Pellet
CMA BATTERY Iron sulfide, lithium fluoride, potassium chloride, lithium
bromide, magnesium oxide, Iron powder (MH 100 and NH
100), Cab-O-Sil, potassium perchlorate
NOTE: Refer to SW020-AC-SAF-010/-020/-030 for Net Explosive Weights
COMPOSITE CLS HAZARD INFORMATION
Composite materials in the Composite CLS are reinforced with carbon/graphite
fibers to provide stiffness, high strength-to-weight ratio, and ease of fabrication.
Carbon/graphite fibers can be released into the atmosphere if their epoxy binder
burns. (approximately 752 degrees F (400 degrees C) will cause epoxy binder to
ignite or decompose.) Once free, the small lightweight fibers can be transported
up to several miles by air currents. Because of their high electrical conductivity,
they can damage unprotected electrical/electronic equipment. Similarly, mechanical
agitation, especially an explosion, can fragment the composite and cause fibers to
become airborne.
EXTINGUISHING AGENTS: Carbon dioxide; dry chemical (AFFF); water.
SPECIAL FIREFIGHTING EQUIPMENT: Scott air packs; mine safety apparatus (MSA);
or positive pressure self-contained breathing apparatus.
HAZARDOUS PRODUCTS OF COMBUSTION: carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide;
acrolein; phenols; amines; aldehydes; aromatic amines; and hydrofluoric and
fluoroboric acids.
PERSONNEL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT:
a. All personnel - Disposable coveralls and shoe covers; gloves (leather palm preferred)
b. Firefighters - Positive pressure self-contained breathing apparatus
c. Clean-up personnel - Full face respirator; safety glasses w/side shield.
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ITEM HAZARD
CLEAN-UP MATERIALS: Polyethylene sheeting and tape (for containing debris);
vacuum cleaner equipped w/High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filter elements;
polyethylene bags; water emulsion floor wax (P-W-155C (NSN 7930-00-141-5888)).
HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL: Local solid waste disposal authorities
shall be consulted for approved burial sites/techniques for composites or
composite-contaminated materials. In addition, the local cognizant industrial
hygienist or medical department representative should be consulted for detail health
hazard control, guidance, based upon extent of exposure.
POST-LAUNCH WASTE WATER IN SPENT CLS CAPSULES: Removal of post-launch
water from expended CLS capsules involves handling material which may be harmful
to personnel and which is not authorized for direct dumping into coastal or inland
waters.
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CHAPTER 3 FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION

SECTION I. CHAPTER ORGANIZATION
3.1 SCOPE.
This chapter discusses functional descriptions of TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile (TCM)
components and systems as well as interfaces between the TCM and its launch platform. Section
II discusses the TCM electrical power system and type commands and requests for status issued
to the TCM by the launch platform systems and TCM responses to those commands and requests
for status which are, in general, common among all TCMs irrespective of launch platform.
Section III discusses unique interfaces between torpedo tube launch TCMs and the submarine.
Section IV discusses unique interfaces between Capsule Launching System (CLS) TCMs and the
submarine. Section V discusses unique interfaces between Vertical Launching System (VLS)
TCMs and the surface ship.
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SECTION II. GENERAL

3.2 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM.
The TCM electrical power system consists of a dc monitor/reset power bus, regulated bus,
semi-regulated bus, and a Cruise Missile Airframe (CMA) bus, a Mission Control Module
(MCM) bus, a pyro bus and an arm battery activate bus.
3.2.1 Prelaunch Electrical Power. The launch platforms electrical power distribution system
converts 3-phase 400 Hz delta power to 3-phase wye power to provide operating power for the
missile; provide single phase wye power for Recovery Exercise Module (REM) heater power; and
dc power for commands to and responses from the TCM. The routing of power in the missile is
described in the following paragraphs.
3.2.1.1 Converter/Operate Power. Ship wye power is routed to the TCM ac-dc converter. The
dc output of the converter is connected to the missile REGULATED bus via the POWER BUS
control relay. For land-attack TCMs, power is fed to the DSMAC set, GPSS (109C and 109D
only) and the CMGS from the REGULATED bus. For all TCMs, power is also fed through
the normally closed contacts of the BUS ISOLATE relay to power the CMA and MCM buses.
The CMA bus supplies power to the airframe electrical equipment. The MCM bus powers the
decoder/relay drivers inside the MCM.
3.2.1.2 Cruise Missile (CM) Identification Power. The dc CM identification power is applied
to the TCM when the launch operator selects the missile designated for launch. Power is routed
back to confirm the identity of the TCM selected and permit it to be prepared for launch or to
advise the launch operator that there is a mismatch between the TCM selected and the actual TCM
in the launching device. In the latter instance, further processing is automatically precluded.
3.2.1.3 REM Heater Power. When the launch operator selects a REM-equipped TCM and
the identity of the TCM has been confirmed, power is applied to the REM battery heaters. The
heaters warm the battery electrolyte in preparation for REM battery activation.
3.2.1.4 Monitor/Reset Power. A dc monitor/reset voltage is applied to the DC
MONITOR/RESET POWER bus. The DC MONITOR/RESET POWER bus powers the
submarine launch TCM dual differential pressure transducer, the WARHEAD DEADFACE
relay (109A) and the rocket motor safe-arm monitoring circuits. The bus also supplies power
to energize the POWER BUS CONTROL relay and connects the ac-dc converter output to the
missile REGULATED bus. It supplies power to energize the FIRST MOTION relay via the first
motion loop to generate the MISSILE ENABLED mark that is sent prior to missile launch.
3.2.1.5 DC Monitor/Reset Power Return. The DC MONITOR/RESET POWER RETURN
provides the return leg back for dc monitor/reset power.
3.2.1.6 Chassis/Static Ground. A copper ground path is provided to assure that the launch
platform and missile are at the same ground potential.
3.2.2 Launch/Boost Electrical Power. Launch/boost electrical power is supplied by two
remotely activated thermal batteries. One battery, located in the missile midbody, is the CMA
battery. The second battery is the BPU located in the CMGS (109C/D). A REM-equipped TCM
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also has two electrically activated REM batteries. The CMA and CMGS batteries supply short
duration power (about 30 seconds) to power the TCM until the engine-driven generator/regulator
can take over. The REM batteries power REM subsystems and, once activated, last about 15
hours. Activation of batteries is described in the following paragraphs.
3.2.2.1 CMA Battery Activation. When the launch operator sets the switch to FIRE (Intent to
Launch (ITL), DC power is routed to the coil of the ARM BATTERY ACTIVATE BUS relay.
The relay energizes and applies CMA bus power to the ARM BATTERY ACTIVATE bus.
Upon CMGS command, the CMA BATTERY ACTIVATE relay energizes and fires the battery
pyros to activate the battery. Output 1 powers the MCM and CMA buses. Output 2 powers the
SEMI-REGULATED bus, which in turn, supplies power to the fin servoactuators.
3.2.2.2 CMGS Battery Activation. The CMA battery output is sensed by the MCM. When the
specified voltage is attained, a CMA BATTERY GO signal is sent to the CMGS. Upon CMGS
command, the CMGS BATTERY ACTIVATE relay energizes and applies power to fire the CMGS
battery pyros. Battery output is applied to the CMGS subsystems and the REGULATED bus.
3.2.2.3 REM Battery Activation. To allow time to activate the REM batteries and perform the
REM BIT, about 29 seconds are added between ITL and CMA battery activation. REM battery
activation begins when the REM ACTIVATE command is issued by the CMGS after receipt of
ITL. BATTERY ACTIVATE power is provided by the ARM BATTERY ACTIVATE bus. Upon
receipt of REM ACTIVATE, the REM performs a pre-battery activate BIT. If REM BIT fails, the
REM will not issue the REM ENABLE command and, as a result, the MISSILE ENABLED signal
will not be sent. If BIT passes, the REM batteries activate and post-battery activate BIT is begun.
3.2.2.4 Bus Isolation. Battery power is supplied only to those circuits essential to the
launch/boost phase. For a land-attack TCM, power-up of the BPU is sensed by the CMGS
RMUC. The RMUC, in turn, sends a discrete coded word to the MCM. From the MCM, power is
applied to the coil of the BUS ISOLATE relay. The relay energizes to isolate the REGULATED
bus from the MCM and CMA buses. The BUS ISOLATE relay remains energized until the
engine-driven generator/regulator comes on line during the transition to cruise flight.
3.2.2.5 First Motion. Upon first motion, the electrical connection between the TCM and the
launch platform is disconnected and deenergizes the FIRST MOTION relay. The opening of relay
contacts is sensed by the CMGS, which starts the safe eject test. The ARM ENABLE relay
energizes and the normally open contacts of the ARM ENABLE relay close, applying power to
the normally-open contacts of the SAFE/ARM relay. The CMGS confirms safe eject velocity
and distance, then commands the MCM to energize the SAFE/ARM relay. This action routes
electrical power from the CMA battery to energize the PYRO bus. The SAFE EJECT relay
energizes, completing the circuits that hold the SAFE EJECT relay and the ARM ENABLE relay
energized. The PYRO bus supplies the power to activate the CMA pyros. The PYRO bus remains
energized until the completion of transition to cruise flight.
3.2.3 Cruise Electrical Power. After the sustainer engine has started and comes up to speed, a
dual-output generator/regulator assumes the airframe and CMGS electrical loads. Output 1 is
dedicated to the CMGS and airframe equipment. Output 2 serves the fin servoactuator system.
Load transients occurring on Output 2 have no influence on Output 1.
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3.2.4 RSS Thermal Battery Activation. In the event that an RSS-equipped TCM loses cruise
electrical power, the RSS thermal battery is activated to provide electrical power to close the
throttle and initiate fin flip, thus aborting the mission.
3.3 DIGITAL DATA LINK.
Communications between the TCM and the launching platform is performed via the digital data
lines. The lines consist of four pairs of twisted wires (1 true and 1 complement per pair). Also
provided are a shield carry-through and a digital I/O power supply return. The lines are connected
when the launch operator selects the designated missile and disconnected prior to launch. The
digital data link utilizes serial 17 bit (16 data and 1 odd parity) data words. The least significant
bit is sent first and the parity bit is sent last. The first word is always the same in every data block,
and is used to initialize the CMGS/launch platform system interface software. The second word is
always a control word to request status or identify the data block and the number of data words
within the data block. The last word in the data block is a checksum (2s complement addition)
of the control word and all following data words. Information transferred over the digital data
link includes the operational flight program, platform alignment data, missile status/command
sequences and mission data (land-attack TCM). The digital data lines used for communication are:
a. DATA ENABLE - Lines used to send the DATA ENABLE command, a discrete signal,
to permit the RMUC to accept and transmit data.
b. CLOCK - Lines used to send timing signals to synchronize commands and data.
c. DATA UPLINK - Lines used to transmit digital data sent to the RMUC.
d. DATA DOWNLINK - Lines used to transmit digital data from the RMUC.
e. SHIELD CARRY THROUGH - Line used to provide shield continuity on wires carrying
digital data. The shield is floated at the launch platform and grounded in the missile.
f. DIGITAL I/O POWER SUPPLY RETURN - Line used to provide a common ground
reference for digital input/output power to the I/O channel power supply and the CMGS.
3.4 DIGITAL COMMANDS/DATA BLOCKS SENT TO A LAND-ATTACK
TCM.
Digital commands and data blocks sent to a land-attack TCM over the digital data link discussed
in paragraph 3.3 are described in the following paragraphs. Commands unique to a CLS
TCM are discussed in Section IV.
3.4.1 Bootstrap Load (Program). A BOOTSTRAP LOAD program permits the loading of
programs into the RMUC. When REPROGRAM discrete is received by the RMUC, it activates
the Programmable Read Only Memory (PROM) and reestablishes the serial data link. The
program is loaded into computer memory and data transmission begins.
3.4.2 Request Status. The REQUEST STATUS block is sent once every second to request a
go/no-go summary of missile BIT results. It is also used to request the present operating mode
of the CMGS (e.g., warmup, coarse level, navigate (Table 3-1 "Land-Attack TCM CMGS
Alignment Modes").
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3.4.3 Alignment Data. The ALIGNMENT DATA block is sent once every second to send
reference data to align the CMGS inertial platform relative to the launch platform inertial
reference system. Alignment data blocks continue to be sent until the missile is commanded to
terminate alignment.
3.4.4 Mission Data. The MISSION DATA block includes target characteristics, waypoints,
guidance parameters, terrain correlation maps and DSMAC scenes (109C and 109D only). It also
identifies the type missile and the type mission to be flown. Each group is sent by a unique data
block that is repeatedly sent until all data for that group are transferred to the CMGS.
3.4.5 Battery Activate. Receipt of the ITL command causes the CMGS to initiate the battery
activate sequence. For a tactical TCM, the CMA battery activates first, followed by the CMGS
battery. For a REM-equipped TCM, the REM batteries activate first, followed by the CMA
and CMGS batteries.
3.4.6 Launch Sequence Command. The LAUNCH SEQUENCE COMMAND block is
used to reinitialize the RMUC, terminate CMGS alignment, zero mission data, shut down the
CMGS, and declassify the CMGS memory. When the REINITIALIZE command is sent, the
CMGS recycles to Mode 0, begins normal operation to transfer mission data and begins a new
alignment. (For an explanation of alignment modes, see Table 3-1 "Land-Attack TCM CMGS
Alignment Modes".) When the TERMINATE ALIGNMENT command is sent, the RMUC
continues to accept alignment data and switches to the NAVIGATION mode. At this time, the
CMGS becomes an independent navigator. The ZERO MISSION DATA command causes the
program to zero all memory locations dedicated to mission data. The SHUT DOWN CMGS
command causes the CMGS to perform a controlled shutdown that includes a gyro despin to
preclude gyro damage. The DECLASSIFY CMGS MEMORY command is used to declassify the
CMGS memory following an abort.
3.5 DIGITAL DATA RESPONSES FROM A LAND-ATTACK TCM.
Two types of digital data responses are sent by the missile. The first, GOOD DATA word, is sent
after receipt of each data block that passes the parity and checksum tests. The second, MISSILE
STATUS word, is sent in response to a status request.
3.5.1 Good Data Word. As the CMGS accepts data, each word is checked for odd parity. The
data words are read, stored in a data table, and added to form a checksum that is checked against
the checksum word at the end of the data list. If the word parities are good and checksums agree,
a GOOD DATA word is sent (except in response to a missile status request).
3.5.2 Missile Status Word. The MISSILE STATUS word, sent once every second in response
to a status request, shows the results of pre-launch BIT via a combination of software commanded
and hardware continuous tests conducted by the CMGS prior to MISSILE ENABLED. It also
shows the present mode of the CMGS. The CMGS software will decode any BIT failure and
transmit the information to the launch platform as a zero bit in the appropriate bit position of the
MISSILE STATUS word.
3.6 DISCRETE COMMANDS SENT TO A TCM.
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The following paragraphs discuss discrete commands issued to the TCM by the launch platform.
Discrete commands unique to CLS are discussed in Section IV.
3.6.1 Booster Safe Command. The BOOSTER SAFE command is a dc signal that sets the
rocket motor in the SAFE position.
3.6.1.1 Mk 106 Rocket Motor. For the Mk 106 Rocket Motor, the BOOSTER SAFE
command interrupts the armed holding circuit. The command allows the safe-arm mechanism
to spring-return to SAFE, thus positioning a physical barrier between the igniter initiators and
propellant igniter. The signal is applied continuously until the BOOSTER ARM command is
received.
3.6.1.2 Mk 111 Rocket Motor. For the Mk 111 Rocket Motor, the safe-arm indicator plate is
held in the SAFE position by spring tension. In the safe position, the safe-arm indicator plate
will not complete the electrical circuit to the bridgewires and ARM monitor which are necessary
for rocket motor ignition. It also prevents the proper alignment of the barrier slots with the
poppet slots and consequently prevents a vent path for the initiator output to reach the igniter and
subsequent rocket motor ignition. The Mk 111 Rocket Motor will remain in SAFE position until
such time as the BOOSTER ARM command is received. The Mk 111 Rocket Motor arming-firing
device cannot be manually safed.
3.6.2 Booster Arm Command. The BOOSTER ARM command is a dc signal that places the
rocket motor in the ARMED position.
3.6.2.1 Mk 106 Rocket Motor. For the Mk 106 Rocket Motor, the BOOSTER ARM command
removes the physical barrier between the igniter initiators and propellant igniter to arm the rocket
motor.
3.6.2.2 Mk 111 Rocket Motor. For the Mk 111 Rocket Motor, the BOOSTER ARM command
is sent to the solenoid rotor of the arming-firing device. The energized rotor causes the safe-arm
indicator plate to rotate, which in turn moves the sweep contacts on the switch plate assembly to
complete the electrical circuit to the pyros and aligns the barrier slots to allow initiator output to
reach the igniter explosive thereby arming the rocket motor.
3.6.3 Warhead Safe Control/Command (109A only). The WARHEAD SAFE
control/command is a dc signal that sets the warhead to the safe condition.
3.6.4 Warhead Prearm Control/Command (109A only). The WARHEAD PREARM
control/command is a unique signal placing the warhead in the prearmed condition.
3.6.5 Reprogram Command (Land-Attack only). The REPROGRAM command is a dc
signal that allows the CMGS to be reprogrammed. It zeros the RMUC memory except for
calibration coefficients. To prevent gyro damage, this command is never issued without first
performing a controlled shutdown of the CMGS.
3.6.6 Fire Command or Intent to Launch. The FIRE or ITL command is a dc signal that
energizes the ARM BATTERY ACTIVATE BUS relay. The CMA battery activates first, followed
by the CMGS battery about one second later. For a REM-equipped missile, the REM batteries
activate first, followed by the CMA and CMGS batteries.
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3.6.7 REM Abort Command. The REM ABORT command is a dc signal that disconnects the
REM batteries which results in a turnoff of all REM-battery-powered equipment.
3.7 DISCRETE SIGNALS SENT FROM A TCM.
The following paragraphs discuss the discrete signals transmitted from a TCM to the launch
platform. Discrete signals unique to CLS are discussed in Section IV.
3.7.1 Weapon Identification. Electrical identification of the TCM is derived from CM
identification power. Decode circuit defects open on the identification lines not applicable to the
identified TCM. Weapon identification also allows the launch platform to configure for REM and
applies ac power to the REM battery heaters.
3.7.2 Simulator Present. SIMULATOR PRESENT is a continuity to DC MONITOR/RESET
POWER that indicates that a simulator is connected instead of an actual TCM.
3.7.3 Booster Safe Monitor. The BOOSTER SAFE monitor is a continuity to DC
MONITOR/RESET POWER that indicates the rocket motor igniter is safed.
3.7.4 Booster Armed Monitor. The BOOSTER ARMED monitor is a continuity to DC
MONITOR/RESET POWER that indicates the rocket motor igniter is armed.
3.7.5 Warhead Safe Monitor (109A only). The WARHEAD SAFE monitor is a continuity to
DC MONITOR/RESET POWER RETURN that indicates the warhead has been safed.
3.7.6 Warhead Prearmed Monitor (109A only). The WARHEAD PREARMED monitor is a
continuity to DC MONITOR/RESET POWER RETURN that indicates the warhead has been
prearmed.
3.7.7 Missile Bus Monitor. The MISSILE BUS monitor is a dc signal that monitors the dc
output of the ac-dc converter. Upon loss of voltage, prior to MISSILE ENABLED, the launch
platform automatically safes the warhead (109A only) and rocket motor igniter.
3.7.8 Missile Enabled. MISSILE ENABLED is a continuity to DC MONITOR/RESET
POWER that indicates the missile batteries have been successfully activated, BIT has passed and
the MISSILE STATUS word is good. The signal is combined in software with other conditions
to complete the closing of firing interlocks. For a REM/RSS-equipped missile, the MISSILE
ENABLED signal is routed through the REM/RSS. Before the MISSILE ENABLED signal can
be sent, the REM/RSS must first pass all REM/RSS BITs and issue a REM/RSS ENABLED to
complete the circuit.
3.7.9 Differential Pressure (TTL only). Because encapsulated TTL TCMs are subjected to
pressure differences when in a flooded torpedo tube prior to launch, two dc signals (A and B)
are provided by the missile dual differential pressure transducer to indicate differential pressure
between the shroud compartment and ambient outside pressure. The redundant signals, which
are derived from DC MONITOR/RESET POWER, are used to monitor the missile pressure
and provide a PRESSURE IN BAND signal.
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SECTION III. TORPEDO TUBE LAUNCH

3.8 GENERAL.
This section discusses launch platform and TCM physical and functional interfaces aboard the
submarine. These interfaces include missile/capsule and torpedo tube physical interfaces as well
as the submarine systems utilized to:
a. Maintain pressure in TCMs during preparation for launch.
b. Secure and prevent unauthorized launch of the UGM-109A-1.
c. Compute TCM attack solutions.
3.9 MISSILE/CAPSULE AND TORPEDO TUBE PHYSICAL INTERFACES.
The missile/capsule and torpedo tube physical interfaces consist of the mechanical, electrical and
pneumatic interfaces described in the following paragraphs.
3.9.1 Mechanical Interfaces. The mechanical interfaces consist of the following restraining
devices:
a. Loading button on the capsule barrel closure to load/unload the missile/capsule from the
torpedo tube.
b. Two guide studs on the capsule barrel to align the capsule in the torpedo tube. The
forward guide stud also engages the tube stop bolt.
c. Two shear holdback assemblies to restrain the missile in the capsule until ejection.
d. Two spring-loaded latches at the aft end of the capsule to restrain the capsule in torpedo
tube (UGM-109A/C/D-1).
e. Capsule retention fixture installed on the capsule to restrain the capsule in the torpedo
tube. The retention fixture also houses a clamp that is removed and installed on the
capsule barrel closure in order to secure the eletrical umbilical cable (UGM-109E-1).
3.9.2 Electrical and Pneumatic Interfaces. The electrical and pneumatic interfaces consist of
the electrical and pneumatic umbilical discussed below. The routing of the umbilicals is shown in
Figure 3-1 "TTL Electrical and Pneumatic Umbilical Routing (2 Sheets)".
3.9.2.1 Electrical Umbilical. The electrical umbilical connects between the breech door and
the missile to transfer power/commands and status signals between the missile and submarine
combat system.
3.9.2.2 Pneumatic Umbilical. The pneumatic umbilical connects between the breech door and
the capsule to connect the PVC system to pressurize the missile and supply pneumatic pressure to
close the capsule flow slots in preparation for capsule ejection, when authorized.
3.10 PRESSURIZATION/VENT CONTROL SYSTEM.
The PVC system features independent four-tube controls to regulate internal TCM pressure
to withstand sea ambient pressure during pre-launch operations. With the electrical and
pneumatic umbilicals connected to the TCM and the PVC system activated, dual-differential
transducers in the TCM (one operator selected and one alternate) compare internal free volume
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pressure with outside ambient pressure and output signals to PVC system equipment. The
signals energize/deenergize manifold pressure/vent block solenoids which permit pressurization
or venting to occur in order to maintain TCM internal pressure within prescribed limits.
When pressure is not within prescribed limits, the system inhibits launch until the TCM is
pressurized/vented and the PRESSURE IN BAND indication is restored. Should the selected
transducer fail, the system automatically vents the TCM and likewise inhibits launch until the
operator selects the alternate transducer and the PRESSURE IN BAND indication is restored.
Should the automatic PVC system fail, the PVC system can be operated manually utilizing the
TCM pressure relief valve as the backup to prevent TCM overpressurization. Just prior to launch,
the fire control system sends an IMPULSE FIRE mark to terminate pressure/vent commands to
prevent pressure cycling and a possible out-of-band condition at launch.
3.11 SECURITY SYSTEM.
Security of the UGM-109A-1 is maintained by connecting the missile to the submarine 4FZ
Security Alarm System using a special security plate. The security plate is a kidney-shaped plate
that replaces the electrical connector access protective cover and covers the pull switch lanyard
attachment, the electrical umbilical connection and the upper holdback assembly on the aft end of
the capsule. It is held in place by two captive thumbscrews that are lockwired together to provide
visual evidence of any tampering. A pneumatic coupling is installed in the plate to provide a
connection to the 4FZ Security Alarm System. The security plate is provided separately and is
installed after weapon shipping aboard the submarine and replaced by the electrical connector
access protective cover prior to weapon unshipping.
3.12 NAVIGATION SYSTEM.
Navigation and ownship parameter data are used in computing attack control solutions. Data
include latitude, longitude, velocity, heading, pitch, roll and depth computations. Except for
navigation equipment digital data, input data are supplied as either synchro or event data and are
converted to digital data for use by the submarine computer equipment.
3.12.1 Navigation Equipment Alignment. Computer equipment, through closed-loop control,
maintains true vertical alignment of navigation equipment stable platforms by collecting
velocity data from the velocity meters and using these data to provide torquing pulses to the
gimbal-mounted torquing motors.
3.12.2 Velocity and Position Computation. True position of the submarine is continuously
updated by computer equipment, using primarily navigation equipment data and secondarily,
Dead Reckoning Analyzer Indicator (DRAI) data. The electromagnetic underwater log (EM Log),
which measures ownship speed through the water, is used in conjunction with the computers to
provide damping to the navigation equipment. It also provides ownship speed to the DRAI.
3.12.3 Reset Computations. Latitude and longitude information is periodically computed by
the computer equipment from navigation satellite receiver data. These data are used to reset
navigation equipment position at the direction of the system operator.
3.12.4 Status and Performance Monitoring. The computer equipment reacts to navigation
operator directions concerning mode of operation and requests for data to be displayed on the
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Navigation Control Console (NCC). Navigation software continuously monitors the equipment to
provide the navigation operator with equipment failure or misalignment indications.
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SECTION IV. CAPSULE LAUNCHING SYSTEM

3.13 GENERAL.
This section discusses CLS unique electrical interrelationships between the submarine fire control
system and CLS. Additionally, this section discusses launch platform and TCM physical and
functional interfaces aboard the submarine. These interfaces include missile/capsule and missile
tube physical interfaces as well as the submarine systems utilized to:
a. Maintain pressure in TCMs during stowage and preparation for launch.
b. Operate missile tubes.
c. Compute TCM attack solutions.
3.14 CLS UNIQUE ELECTRICAL INTERRELATIONSHIPS.
In addition to common electrical interrelationships between the submarine combat system and
the TCM discussed in Section II, the CLS has unique requirements for pre-launch electrical
power in order to receive commands and provide responses to those commands. Unique power
requirements, commands and responses for CLS TCMs are discussed in the following paragraphs.
3.14.1 CLS Unique Prelaunch Electrical Power Requirements. CLS unique pre-launch
electrical power requirements are:
a. CLS Regulator Power - Supplies power to the CLS regulator which in turn provides
power to CLS components.
b. CLS Converter Power - Supplies power to the CLS Firing Unit Converter.
c. CLS Monitor Power - Supplies power to monitor discrete events from CLS prelaunch
and launch sensors.
d. CLS Power Return - Provides the return path for CLS Regulator Power, CLS Converter
Power and CLS Monitor Power.
e. Liquid Detector Power - Supplies power to the CLS liquid detector.
f. Coded Charge Signal Excitation - Initiates dc power to allow the Coded Charge Signal to
charge the CLS firing capacitor.
g. Coded Launch Signal Excitation - Initiates dc power to allow the Coded Launch Signal
to discharge the firing capacitor to fire the CLS gas generator.
3.14.2 CLS Unique Commands. The Coded Charge Signal and Coded Launch Signal are
unique digital commands and the Capsule Arm Command is a unique discrete command sent by
the submarine fire control system to the CLS:
a. Coded Charge Signal - A coded signal sent to charge the firing capacitor.
b. Coded Launch Signal - A coded signal sent 700 milliseconds after the Coded Charge
Signal to discharge the firing capacitor which, after separation nut release, fires the gas
generator to launch the TCM.
c. Capsule Arm Command - A command which causes capsule firing circuits to be placed
in the armed position.
3.14.3 CLS Unique Discrete Responses. The following are discrete signals sent by the CLS:
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a. Capsule Safe Monitor - A continuity of CLS Monitor Power indicating that the CLS
firing circuits are in the SAFE position.
b. Capsule Armed Monitor - A continuity of CLS Monitor Power indicating that the CLS
firing circuits are in the ARMED position.
c. Liquid in Capsule - A signal indicating the presence of liquid in the capsule.
d. Capsule Dry - A continuity of CLS Monitor Power indicating the absence of liquid
in the capsule
e. Fire Pulse Detected - A continuity of CLS Monitor Power indicating that the CLS firing
capacitor has discharged.
3.15 MISSILE/CAPSULE AND MISSILE TUBE PHYSICAL INTERFACES.
The missile/capsule and missile tube interfaces consist of mechanical and electrical interfaces
which are described in the following paragraphs.
3.15.1 Mechanical Interfaces. The mechanical interfaces consist of the following restraining
devices and connections:
a. The lateral support group on the interior of the CLS provides positioning and lateral
shock and vibration mitigation for the missile.
b. Six launch seals on the CLS prevent high pressure gases from the ejected missile from
contacting the missile surfaces forward of missile station 180.6.
c. Two holddown studs on the aft end of the missile position and secure the missile to the
vertical support assembly inside the CLS.
d. Eight retention segments on the top of the capsule mate with the upper missile tube
flange to restrain the CLS in the missile tube.
e. Lateral support pads on the CLS bear against shock lands bolted to the missile tube to
position and provide lateral shock support for the CLS in the missile tube.
f. An umbilical cable bracket is attached to the CLS exterior to provide protection for
the umbilical on the outside of the CLS.
g. A differential pressure transducer sensing line connects the CLS to the ships differential
pressure transducer via connections on the CLS and missile tube.
3.15.2 Electrical Interfaces. All electrical interfaces are routed through the electrical umbilical
cable. The routing of the electrical umbilical is shown in Figure 3-2 "CLS Electrical Umbilical
Routing".
3.16 PRESSURIZATION/VENT (P/V) SYSTEM.
The P/V system features automatic independent missile tube controls to replenish internal AUR
pressure during stowage in the missile tube; and to pressurize/vent the space below the capsule
closure assembly within a specified range of positive pressure over the underhatch volume
pressure prior to TCM launch. A differential pressure transducer in the missile tube monitors
pressure above the capsule closure assembly and sends a continuous signal to the Vertical Launch
Console (VLC). When the underhatch volume pressure is not within prescribed limits, the signal
causes a pressurization/vent control valve to activate to permit pressurizing/venting of the
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AUR to occur in order to maintain pressure within band. When underhatch volume pressure is
not equal to sea ambient pressure or AUR pressure is not within prescribed limits, the system
inhibits launch until required pressurization/venting has occurred and the PRESSURE IN BAND
indication is restored. Immediately prior to TCM launch, the P/V control valve is closed to
terminate pressurization/venting and to prevent reflood water or missile launch by-products
from entering the ship.
3.17 MISSILE TUBE CONTROL SYSTEM.
The Missile Tube Control System monitors the status of the missile tubes and supports launch. The
system provides all the interfaces between the ship systems and the submarine fire control system.
Monitoring and control occur in the Vertical Launch Center (VLC). A brief functional description
of the components of the missile tube control system is presented in the following paragraphs.
3.17.1 Missile Tube Control Panel. Missile Tube Control Panels (MTCP), located in the VLC,
provide two normal modes of system operation: MONITOR and OPERATE. When switches
are in the MONITOR position, command functions are disabled but monitoring functions and
displays are operating. When a switch is locked in the OPERATE position, monitoring and
display functions are operating and command functions are enabled for the common functions
and for the selected tube. The MTCP also has a special SIMULATE mode of operation to support
maintenance and trouble-shooting.
3.17.2 Differential Pressure Transducers. Two differential transducers, one adjacent to each
missile tube, sense the differential pressure between the underhatch area and the CLS. A pressure
switch senses TCM pressure. When underhatch differential pressure or AUR pressure is outside
the specified pressure range, the differential pressure transducer activates the pressure/vent system
to increase/vent pressure as required.
3.17.3 Environmental Monitoring Sensor. An Environmental Monitoring Sensor is located
in the underhatch area of each missile tube to sense underhatch pressure, temperature, and the
presence of fluid. Detection of one of these conditions outside the specified range results in an
alarm signal being sent to the MTCP.
3.17.4 Dew Point Monitor. The Dew Point Monitor, consisting of a sensor in the 700 psig
piping and electronics equipment, monitors the moisture level of the air being supplied to the
TCM by the pressurization/vent system.
3.17.5 Hatch and Valve Position Sensors. Hatch and valve position sensors are magnetic
proximity switches that sense the position of missile tube hatches and flood and drain system
outboard valves. The sensors provide a constant status of hatches and valves and will signal an
alarm when conditions are not consistent with operations.
Navigation and ownship parameter data are used in computing attack control solutions. Data
include latitude, longitude, velocity, heading, pitch, roll and depth computations. Except for
navigation equipment digital data, input data are supplied as either synchro or event data and are
converted to digital data for use by the submarine computer equipment.
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3.18.1 Navigation Equipment Alignment. Computer equipment, through closed-loop control,

maintains true vertical alignment of navigation equipment stable platforms by collecting
velocity data from the velocity meters and using these data to provide torquing pulses to the
gimbal-mounted torquing motors.
3.18.2 Velocity and Position Computation. True position of the submarine is continuously
updated by computer equipment, using primarily navigation equipment data and secondarily,
Dead Reckoning Analyzer Indicator (DRAI) data. The electromagnetic underwater log (EM Log),
which measures ownship speed through the water, is used in conjunction with the computers to
provide damping to the navigation equipment. It also provides ownship speed to the DRAI.
3.18.3 Reset Computations. Latitude and longitude information is periodically computed by
the computer equipment from navigation satellite receiver data. These data are used to reset
navigation equipment position at the direction of the system operator.
3.18.4 Status and Performance Monitoring. The computer equipment reacts to navigation
operator directions concerning mode of operation and requests for data to be displayed on the
Navigation Control Console (NCC). Navigation software continuously monitors the equipment to
provide the navigation operator with equipment failure or misalignment indications.
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SECTION V. VERTICAL LAUNCHING SYSTEM

3.19 GENERAL.
This section discusses launch platform and TCM physical and functional interfaces aboard the
ship. These interfaces include missile/canister and launch cell physical interfaces as well as ship
systems utilized to:
a. Compute TCM attack solutions.
b. Provide a means of detecting and controlling hazardous conditions in launch cells.
3.20 MISSILE/CANISTER AND LAUNCH CELL PHYSICAL INTERFACES.
The missile/canister and launch cell/module physical interfaces consist of the mechanical,
electrical and pneumatic interfaces described in the following paragraphs.
3.20.1 Mechanical Interfaces. The mechanical interfaces consist of the following:
a. Pyrotechnically activated separation bolts to restrain the missile in the canister until
launch.
b. Thermal lined, corrugated shell structure for loading in the launch cell.
c. 16 lateral supports inside the Mk 14 Canister to provide shock isolation for the TCM
in the Mk 10 Canister.
d. Deluge connector to connect the ships deluge system to provide distribution of water on
the missile warhead in the event of an emergency.
e. Latches to secure the Mk 14 Canister in the cell.
f. Mk 14 Canister and sill assembly interface to direct rocket motor exhaust gas into the
module plenum.
3.20.2 Electrical Interfaces. The electrical interfaces consist of the following:
a. Telemetry monitoring connector to transmit data from a telemetry missile prior to launch.
b. Umbilical connector connects to the MK 14 Canister Cable Assembly which, in turn,
connects the code plug, FWD closure breakwire, temperature sensor, AFT closure
breakwire, All-Up-Round (AUR) cable and conduit assembly and AUR umbilical
connector adapter to transmit commands from the fire control system and receive
responses from the canister and TCM.
c. Antenna connector to transmit data from telemetry monitoring equipment to the missile.
d. Canister Safe Enable Switch (CSES) (Mk 14 Canister) to monitor weapon status (safe
or enable).
3.20.3 Pneumatic Interface. The nitrogen supply valve provides a means to pressurize the Mk
10 by way of a nitrogen line inside the Mk 14 Canister.
The navigational systems provide data on ownships time, position, heading, velocity, pitch
angular rate, and roll angular rate. The data is used for track data management and engagement
planning.
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3.21.1 Inertial Navigation Set (INS). Most ships have two INSs aboard. One is in the forward
Gyro Room, the other in the aft Gyro Room. The INSs are designated FWD and AFT. They serve
as the primary navigation data source. Each set provides ownship heading, position, speed,
roll, pitch, and time. These data are provided to the TOMAHAWK Weapons Combat System
(TWCS) by the Launch Data Processing Control Center via an interface with the Digital Linear
Switch (DLS).
3.21.2 Digital Linear Switch (DLS). The DLS determines if the input to the TWCS is from
the FWD or AFT INS unit. During a casualty to one, when one unit may be inoperable, an
operator can switch the DLS to the operating unit.
3.21.3 Data Terminal Group (DTG). The DTG (also called Input/Output Control Console
[IOCC]) provides an interface with the INS. Data is manually loaded by keyboard and
automatically though a paper tape reader. The control panel furnishes DTG control and indicators.
Output is displayed on a panel for operator evaluations. The printer and paper tape provide two
means of producing hard copies of output data. Reset and control data may be transmitted to
either INS as selected by the DLS.
3.21.4 Radio Navigation Set (RNS). The RNS receives Satellite Navigation (SATNAV) data
for updating INS. Reset data is transmitted to either INS as selected at the DLS that also interfaces
with the DTG.
3.21.5 Global Positioning System (GPS). The GPS is a satellite navigation system which
provides continuous worldwide information. The information is used to calculate 3-dimensional
speed and precise time of data. GPS also provides a parallel digital interface for information
exchange with the INS.
3.22 VLS DAMAGE CONTROL SYSTEM.
The VLS Damage Control System provides for detection and control of hazardous conditions
within launch cells and modules. Elements of the damage control system include the damage
control monitoring system which utilizes sensors located inside and outside launch cells to
monitor conditions; deluge system which distributes water over a missile warhead when activated
in an emergency; and the magazine sprinkler system that provides remote fire fighting capability in
missile modules. Conditions monitored include the status of the anti-icing system, deluge system
operating, module high-water level condition (one-half inch or deeper), a continuous launch
sequencer (LSEQ) power-off condition, and, when implemented, missile fuel leak. In the event a
sensor reports a hazardous condition, the Local Status Panel, located at the entrance to magazines,
displays the hazard and advises the Central Control Station of the hazardous condition. The LSEQ,
which continually monitors cell conditions, generates the hazard message to the launch control
unit, which after analysis of the hazard, directs the VLS to act to eliminate or reduce the hazard.
3.23 EXHAUST GAS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.
The exhaust gas management system (Figure 3-3 "VLS Exhaust Gas Control") directs the gas
from the rocket motor to the external atmosphere. Exhaust gas from the rocket motor expands
downward from the bottom of the canister into the module plenum where is vented through the
uptake and open uptake hatch. Sealing of the system is particularly critical to ensure that all
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exhaust gas is vented to the atmosphere, and not into the ship. The Mk 14 Canister and the sill
assembly installed at the time of loading provide this effective seal against improper venting of
gases.
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Figure 3-1. TTL Electrical and Pneumatic Umbilical

Routing (2 Sheets)
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200
Figure 3-2. CLS Electrical Umbilical Routing
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Figure 3-3. VLS Exhaust Gas Control
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Table 3-1. Land-Attack TCM CMGS Alignment Modes

MODE COMMENT
0, Warmup Mode 0 performs the first set of BITs and sequences the CMGS
inertial platform into gyro control. Operations include warmup,
loading of operational flight program, initialization, BIT, gyro
caging and gyro spinup. BIT results are contained in the MISSILE
STATUS word. If all BITs are passed and gyros have spun up, the
mode number advances to Mode 1.
1, Standby Mode 1 tests availability to present position and checks to see
if inertial platform is under gyro control. Program will advance
to Mode 2 when present position is available and platform is
determined to be under gyro control.
2, Course Level During Mode 2, the inertial platform is torqued to level by
computer program torquing commands. Mode is complete when
the computed tilt angle and mode time tests are passed.
3, Spare Not used.
4, Align Axis#1 Mode 4 performs the first fine alignment phase and is completed
when a series of mode time, computed tilt angle, gyro bias
change and azimuth angle change tests are satisfied. If sufficient
maneuvering occurs in this mode to estimate the platform azimuth
angle, Modes 5 and 6 are bypassed and Mode 7 will be entered
at alignment completion.
5, Slue During Mode 5, the platform is slued 90 from its previous
orientation by torquing the vertical gyro.
6, Align Axis #2 Mode 6 performs the second fine alignment phase and duplicates
the Mode 4 alignment. Upon passing of mode completion tests, the
alignment process advances to Mode 7.
7, Alignment Complete Mode 7 is used only to indicate that alignment complete tests have
been passed. The computer program continues to perform the Mode
6 alignment until the CMGS is commanded to terminate alignment.
When this occurs, the computer program advances to Mode 8.
8, Navigate Mode 8 signals that the CMGS has terminated alignment, and it has
become an independent navigator.
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CHAPTER 4 OPERATIONS
SECTION I.
4.1 SCOPE.
This chapter discusses TWS operations aboard the various types of launch platforms. These
discussions include: brief descriptions of the launch platforms and on board equipment used to
load, store and launch weapons; typical weapon onload scenarios; and typical launch operations.
Section II discusses TTL launch platforms, procedures and operations. Section III discusses
CLS launch platforms, procedures and operations. Section IV discusses VLS launch platforms,
procedures and operations.
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SECTION II. TORPEDO TUBE LAUNCH

4.2 LAUNCH PLATFORMS.
The TTL TWS is employed aboard SSN 688, SSN 774, and SSN 21 Class submarines. TCM
launch operations are performed utilizing equipment located in the Attack Center, Combat
Systems Electronic Space (CSES) and Torpedo Room. General locations of the complexes are
shown in Figure 4-1 "General Locations of SSN Complexes". The following paragraphs
describe the major TWS-related TTL systems aboard the submarine. A simplified interface
block diagram of submarine TWS-related equipment is shown in Figure 4-2 "SSN/TWS-related
Equipment TTL Interfaces".
4.2.1 Submarine Combat System. Submarine Combat Systems (SCS) include the Combat
Control System (CCS) and the AN/BSY-1 Combat Control/Acoustic Set (CC/A). SSN 688 Class
submarines may employ either the CCS or CC/A. Each SCS, supported by the ownship navigation
system, CSES, Over-the-Horizon (OTH) targeting and the appropriate software programs,
provides the necessary power, discretes and data to power up weapons, transmit orders, process
and display data, initialize and align the missile guidance set, and initiate weapons launch. Also
included are control and monitoring circuits as well as various firing interlocks.
4.2.2 Combat Systems Electronic Space (CSES). The CSES equipment is shared by both the
SCS and the navigation system. Computer software programs, which include the operational
flight program, preplanned land-attack mission/targeting data generated at a shore-based Theater
Mission Planning System (TMPS) installation and provided to the submarine prior to deployment,
platform alignment data and sequential control commands, are stored on disks in the CSES. The
data are loaded into computer memory and sent to the missile on command. Missile responses
and status are evaluated by the CSES to provide data for displays on TCM status, Built-In-Test
(BIT), checksums and launch countdown.
4.2.3 Navigation Equipment. TOMAHAWK capable submarines are equipped with either the
Electrically Suspended Gyro Navigator (ESGN) AN/WSN-3A(V)2 or the Dual Miniature Inertial
Navigation System (DMINS) AN/WSN-1(V)2. Each system consists of two Inertial Measuring
Units (IMUs) and one dual-channel Navigation Control Console (NCC). Velocity and attitude
data are generated in raw form by the IMUs and transmitted to the CSES via the NCC. The raw
data are processed by the CSES computers to obtain velocity, attitude and position data and then
transmitted to various ship user subsystems.
4.2.4 Weapon Launch and Pressurization/Vent Equipment. The SSN 688 Class submarine
weapon launch equipment consists of a weapon launch console (WLC) flanked by two banks
of canted torpedo tubes; two tubes port and two tubes starboard. Also included are four PVC
manifolds (one for each torpedo tube) to control the air which pressurizes the TCM prior to
launch. Pressurization and torpedo tube pre-launch operations are controlled from the WLC.
Figure 4-3 "SSN TTL Pressurization/Vent Control System" depicts the PVC system.
4.2.5 Weapon Shipping/Unshipping Equipment. Both the SSN 688 and SSN 774 Class
submarines use a shipping line to ship and unship weapons. On SSN 688 Class submarines, the
major components are a portable topside deck skid, intermediate shipping rails and a shipping
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tray located in the torpedo room. The weapons, restrained by a shipping harness, are lowered
or raised along the shipping line, aft end down, using a chain drive. Figure 4-5 "TTL Weapon
Shipping, Handling and Stowage Equipment (SSN 688 Class)" depicts SSN 688 Class
submarine shipping, handling and stowage equipment. On SSN 774 Class submarines, the major
components are a portable topside deck skid, intermediate and shipping trunk mounted shipping
rollers, and a shipping cradle located in the torpedo room. The weapons, restrained by a shipping
nose piece and shipping cables, are lowered or raised along the shipping line, forward-end down,
using a pier-side crane connected to the shipping cables.
4.2.6 Weapon Handling and Stowage Equipment. Two-level stowage racks are provided aft
of the torpedo tubes for stowage of weapons. On the SSN 688 Class, the weapons are supported
by dollies on athwartship tracks and are restrained by lashing straps. On the SSN 774 Class, the
weapons are supported in cradles which in turn are supported at each end by an end truss track
and restrained by lashing bands. Transfer of weapons to the torpedo tube, or to any other stowage
position or working space, is accomplished via athwartship transfer mechanisms, vertical hoist(s),
pivot mechanisms/trays and loading rammers.
4.3 WEAPON ONLOAD.
The supporting submarine tender or shore base removes the weapon from its shipping container
and places the weapon on the topside skid (SSN 688 Class). Subsequent actions to lower the
weapon to the torpedo room are depicted in Figure 4-5 "TTL Weapon Shipping, Handling and
Stowage Equipment (SSN 688 Class)" for SSN 688 Class submarines. Weapon onload is
performed in accordance with applicable volumes and parts of NAVSEA OD 44979.
4.4 OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS/RESTRICTIONS.
Tactical employment of a TCM may impose constraints on the operating parameters of the
submarine and restrictions on the submarines tactical flexibility. The following paragraphs
identify the different constraints and methods of alerting the ships commanding officer to an
operational constraint or restriction.
4.4.1 Launch Constraints. The launch constraints imposed on the operational parameters of
the submarine during employment of tactical and exercise variants are described in the applicable
tactical employment manuals.
4.4.2 Weapon Mix. Weapon mix will depend on the particular conditions that exist at the time
the decision is made to load torpedo tubes. The SCS is capable of processing a combination of
TOMAHAWK variants, Mk 48 Torpedoes and other defensive systems. Prime consideration
for specific weapon mix is the time required to prepare and launch a TCM, to include the time
required to recycle the torpedo tube and, when authorized, to eject the capsule.
4.4.3 Alert Messages and Interlocks. Various alert messages and firing interlocks are used to
warn operators or inhibit launch when conditions exist that could impact missile performance,
endanger the submarine or result in the launch of a dud missile. Firing interlocks may be either
software or hardware interlocks. Prior to permitting activation of the FIRE switch, the submarine
fire control system must receive an indication that the following interlocks are closed:
a. WPN IDENT - Indicates that the designated weapon is loaded in torpedo tube
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b. INPUTS MATCHED - Indicates that all mission data have been transferred to the
missile and the CMGS has responded with appropriate MISSILE STATUS and GOOD
DATA words
c. WITHIN LIMITS - Indicates that speed and depth of the submarine are within limits
d. TUBE READY - Indicates that the torpedo tube outer door is open
e. BOOSTER ARMED - Indicates that the rocket motor igniter is armed
f. WARHEAD PREARMED - Indicates that the UGM-109A-1 warhead is in prearmed
condition.
g. PRESSURE IN BAND - Indicates that missile pressure is between 3.8 - 7.2 psid.
Upon activation of the FIRE switch and indication of MISSILE ENABLED (i.e., batteries
activated, BIT passed, MISSILE STATUS word good), the fire control system performs a firing
interlock check and closes final interlocks prior to permitting the impulse fire relay to energize
and eject the TCM from the torpedo tube.
4.5 LAND-ATTACK TCM OPERATIONAL SEQUENCE.
This paragraph describes typical actions and responses required to launch a land-attack TCM.
Primary coverage is given to a normal launch. Abnormal launch conditions and abort procedures
are discussed by highlighting only those events that differ from a normal launch. Typical launch
operations are shown in Figure 4-6 "UGM-109-1 Land-Attack TCM Operational Sequence (7
Sheets)". The figure illustrates the orders given by the ships commanding officer, typical
actions taken by equipment operators and typical equipment operations, status displays and
machine decisions. The operational sequence is described in the following paragraphs. Operating
procedures and checklists, as well as actions to be taken under abnormal conditions, are contained
in appropriate volumes and parts of NAVSEA OD 44979.
4.5.1 Weapon Preparation and Tube Loading. Preparation starts with the authorization to
launch a land-attack TCM. A torpedo tube is made ready for loading. For a UGM-109A, the 4FZ
Security Alarm System is disconnected and the capsule security band unlocked and removed.
The weapon serial number is reverified. The missile is then depressurized and moved to the
loadline where the slot covers are removed.
4.5.1.1 The loading pole is attached between the rammer and capsule loading button. Upon order
to load tube, the loadline rollers are raised and ramming is commenced. The capsule nose cover
and lashing straps are removed as they clear the forward loadline rollers. Ramming is continued
until the capsule forward guide stud contacts the tube stop bolt. The stop bolt is then rotated to the
LOCK position. On a UGM-109A/C/D-1, the capsule latch pins are pulled to allow the capsule
latches to extend and engage the slots in the aft land of the torpedo tube. On a UGM-109E-1, the
retention fixture is installed in the torpedo tube and secured to the capsule. The loading pole is
removed. Two shipping nuts are then removed from the missile holdback assemblies.
4.5.1.2 After verifying STOP BOLT LOCKED indication, covers are removed and the electrical
umbilical is connected between the breech door Y-connector and the missile and secured to the
inside of breech door. The pneumatic umbilical is connected between the breech door penetrator
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and the capsule and secured to the eyebolt on the inside of the breech door. The breech door is
shut and locked.
4.5.2 Weapon Power-Up and Make Ready. Weapon power-up and make ready is initiated
by the weapon control console (WCC) operator in the attack center. The WCC operator
activates switches to select Land-Attack TOMAHAWK mode, Land-Attack TOMAHAWK
Preset Submode and the designated torpedo tube to be used for launch. These selections permit
the WCC operator to monitor the selected tube and any alerts concerning launch. The weapon
launch control (WLC) operator in the torpedo room positions the designated tube weapon loaded
switch to the assigned missile variant. This action initiates alignment of torpedo room equipment
to the selected weapon and allows verification in the attack center, through displays on equipment
indicators, that the appropriate weapon is loaded in the tube. If such verification can not be
obtained, the launch is recycled or aborted.
4.5.2.1 When ordered, FIRING ORDER and MAKE READY ORDERED are input by the
attack control console (ACC) operator which permit other operator actions and equipment
responses to commence in preparation for launch. The mission disk pack is removed from secure
storage and mounted on the random access storage set (RASS). The disk pack serial number is
entered and the RASS is initialized.
4.5.2.2 The WLC operator positions the designated tube weapon supply switch to POWER ON.
WEAPON READY indicators appear on the WCC, ACC and WLC to reflect that the weapon
is ready to receive commands. A tube status check is again performed to verify readiness. If
WEAPON READY indicators are not obtained, the launch is recycled or aborted.
4.5.2.3 Positioning the weapon supply switch to POWER ON applies DC MONITOR/RESET
POWER to the PVC system and a PRESSURIZE indicator appears on the WLC. Upon receipt of
this indicator, the ship 700-psi air isolation valve of the designated tube pressure/vent manifold is
opened to supply air to the missile. When missile pressure stabilizes between 3.8 and 7.2 psid,
a PRESSURE IN BAND indicator appears on the WLC and the PRESSURIZE indicator goes
out. PRESSURE IN BAND, PRESSURIZE and VENT indicators may cycle on and off during
the preparation for launch due to changes in missile pressure.
4.5.3 Mission Assignment. With RASS initialized, the CMGS is ready to accept mission
data when BALLISTICS SET and CMGS PROGRAMMED are indicated to the WCC operator
(CMGS flight program has been transferred to the missile and the missile has responded with
a valid Missile Status Word.). The WCC operator changes the submode until Land-Attack
TOMAHAWK Evaluation is indicated on the WCC. THEATER, MPS, MISSION and VERIFY
codes are received from the appropriate authority and entered on the WCC. Mission data are
then indicated on the WCC. Mission data are also transferred to the central computer resident
memory. The WCC operator enters the target number and the pre-established waypoints to that
target are displayed on the WCC. The WCC operator reviews the mission data and approximate
flight path to the target and makes route alterations by introducing or deleting waypoints. The
WCC operator then assigns the mission to a designated torpedo tube and a verification that the
mission is assigned to the correct tube is performed. Once a mission has been assigned, no
further modifications can be made without resetting the mission and then reentering the mission
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number and verification code. After assigning the mission, the WCC operator normally selects the
Land-Attack TOMAHAWK Preset submode for the remainder of the launch in order to monitor
torpedo tube and missile status and any alerts concerning launch.
4.5.3.1 CMGS alignment begins automatically upon completion of a successful upload of the
Operational Flight Program (OFP). The mission data are loaded into the CMGS and a course level
is performed, followed by the alignment of axis#1. The inertial platform is then slued 90 and
alignment of axis #2 is performed. The two-position alignment technique eliminates the need to
perform submarine maneuvers at latitudes below 75. If the submarine is maneuvering and the
CMGS can estimate platform azimuth angle during alignment of axis#1, the slue and alignment
of axis #2 will be bypassed. Launches at latitudes above 75, however, will require submarine
maneuvers to meet the alignment timeline. Upon completion of alignment, the CMGS will
provide an ALIGNMENT COMPLETE message to the WCC operator.
4.5.3.2 If CMGS computer BIT is not passed, or valid communications can not be established
or becomes lost with the CMGS computer, an alert message is provided to the WCC operator.
To establish or restore communications, a controlled shutdown of the CMGS is performed and
missile electrical power recycled. The normal start-up sequence is then repeated and program load
reattempted. When program load is accomplished, the reprogram command is sent to the CMGS.
4.5.4 Tube Ready. The final steps to launch the missile are making the torpedo tube ready and
arming the weapon. Upon receipt of indications that alignment and mission transfer are complete
and that inputs match, the ACC operator gives the order to flood the designated torpedo tube.
Responding to the order, the WLC operator floods the tube, and when so ordered, equalizes
tube pressure with ambient sea pressure. Indicators advise operators that the tube is flooded
and equalized. When ordered, the ACC operator orders OPEN DOOR for the designated tube.
Responding to the order, the WLC operator opens the muzzle door. Indicators advise ACC and
WLC operators that the muzzle door is open. When ordered, the WLC operator turns the launch
mode switch to EJECT. The ACC operator selects the firing tube and a NEXT indicator appears.
4.5.5 Rocket Motor Arming. When ordered, the booster armed and warhead arm supply
key-lock (UGM- 109A only) switches are activated by the ACC operator for the designated tube.
BOOSTER ARMED indicators on the ACC and WLC advise operators of successful arming
of the rocket motor. If indicators do not reflect that the rocket motor is armed, the launch is
recycled or aborted.
4.5.6 Warhead Prearming (UGM-109A only). When ordered, the warhead arm switch on the
ACC is activated for the designated tube. After approximately 24 to 40 seconds, WARHEAD
ARMED indicators on the ACC and WLC will advise operators that the warhead has been
successfully prearmed.
4.5.7 Weapon Firing. With INTERLOCKS CLOSED indicated and firing status ready, the
order is given to the ACC operator to position the STANDBY/FIRE switch to STANDBY.
Upon order, the switch is then positioned to FIRE and held until the FIRE indicator is present.
Subsequent actions occur automatically. The missile batteries activate and missile essential
busses are isolated. The CMGS performs a status check using battery power and, if successful,
sends a MISSILE ENABLED signal. With the closing of final interlocks, the impulse fire
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relay energizes, the stop bolt rolls, the electrical umbilical deadfaces, and the tube fires. Upon
firing, TUBE FIRED indicators on the ACC and WLC advise operators that the tube has been
successfully fired. If indicators reflect that the tube was not successfully fired, the launch is
aborted in accordance with NAVSEA OD 44979.
4.6 POST-LAUNCH OPERATIONS.
The post-launch operational sequence begins after the missile has been launched from the torpedo
tube. Operations consist of those evolutions to either eject the capsule or return the capsule to the
stowage racks. The operations also include resetting the tube if required, and securing the torpedo
tube. A typical post-launch sequence is briefly described in the following paragraphs. Post-launch
operations are preformed in accordance with NAVSEA OD 44979.
4.6.1 Tube Reset. If the WLC indicator continues to show TUBE FIRED at the completion of
missile launch, the WLC operator takes action to reset the tube and close the outer door.
4.6.2 Capsule Ejection. (UGM-109A/C/D-1) When ordered to eject capsule, the WLC operator
positions the missile interrupter switch to MANUAL and the tube stop to LOCK. The WLC
operator then activates the switch to route ship 700-psi air to the capsule. Upon application of air
pressure, the capsule sleeve moves forward, unlocking the capsule latches. Continued movement
of the capsule sleeve retracts the capsule latches and closes the flow slots. With the closing of the
flow slots, the weapon supply switch on the WLC is turned to OFF.
(UGM-109E-1) When ordered to eject capsule, the WLC operator shall unload the capsule from
the torpedo tube in accordance with NAVSEA OD 44979. The capsule nose cover shall be
re-installed. The AUR will then be loaded back into the torpedo tube.
4.6.2.1 When ordered, the ACC operator orders OPEN DOOR. Responding to the order, the
WLC operator opens the muzzle door. WLC and ACC indicators advise the operators that the
tube is ready to eject the capsule. On order, the tube is fired and the capsule ejected. If indicators
show that the tube did not fire, operators refer to NAVSEA OD 44979 for further guidance.
4.6.2.2 Upon receipt of indicators that the tube successfully fired, the WLC operator closes the
muzzle door, turns the weapon loaded switch to OFF, secures the ship 700-psi air isolation valve
to the pressure/vent manifold, and drains the tube. After the tube is drained, the breech door is
opened. The umbilicals and inside of the breech door are rinsed with fresh water to remove salt
water residue, and then dried. The umbilicals are then disconnected and removed, and the tube is
secured using procedures contained in NAVSEA OD 44979.
4.6.3 Capsule Return to Stowage. Upon order to stow capsule, the WLC operator turns the
weapon supply and weapon loaded switches to OFF, secures the ship 700-psi air isolation valve to
the pressure/vent manifold and drains the tube. The breech door is then opened and the umbilicals,
the inside of the breech door and the aft face of the capsule are rinsed with fresh water to remove
salt water residue, and dried. The umbilicals are then disconnected and removed. The capsule
latches are manually retracted by pressing and holding their spring-loaded plungers; then lifting
the latches and securing them with the pins provided. The capsule is removed from the tube using
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procedures contained in NAVSEA OD 44979 rinsed with fresh water, dried, covers installed and
the capsule is then moved and secured to a stowage position.
4.7 LAND-ATTACK TCM CASUALTY MODE.
There is no casualty mode for land-attack TCM variants.
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SECTION III. CAPSULE LAUNCHING SYSTEM

4.8 LAUNCH PLATFORM.
The TWS provides selected SSN-688 Class, SSN-774 Class and SSGN-726 Class submarines
with the capability to carry, target, and launch TCMs against enemy land targets. TCM launch
operations are performed aboard the submarine utilizing equipment located in the Attack Center,
Combat Systems Electronic Space (CSES) and Vertical Launch Center. General locations of
the complexes are shown in Figure 4-8 "General Locations of SSN 688 Class Submarine
Complexes". The following paragraphs describe the major TWS-related CLS systems aboard
the submarine. A simplified interface block diagram of TWS-related equipment aboard the
submarine is shown in figure 4-9 "SSN 688 Class Submarine TWS-related Equipment Interfaces
(2 Sheets)".
4.8.1 Submarine Combat System (SCS). The SCS include the Combat Control System
(CCS) and the AN/BSY-1 Combat Control/Acoustic Set (CC/A). SSN 688 Class submarines
may employ either the CCS or CC/A. Each SCS, supported by the ownship navigation system,
CSES, Over-the-Horizon targeting (OTH-T) and the appropriate software programs, provides the
necessary power, discretes and data to power up weapons, transmit orders, process and display
data, initialize and align the missile guidance set, and initiate weapons launch. Also included are
control and monitoring circuits as well as various firing interlocks.
4.8.2 Combat Systems Electronic Space (CSES). The CSES equipment is shared by both the
SCS and the navigation system. Computer software programs, which include the operational
flight program, preplanned land-attack mission/targeting data generated at a shore-based Theater
Mission Planning System (TMPS) installation and provided to the submarine prior to deployment,
platform alignment data and sequential control commands, are stored on disks in the CSES. The
data are loaded into computer memory and sent to the missile on command. Missile responses
and status are evaluated by the CSES to provide data for displays on TCM status, Built-In-Test
(BIT), checksums and launch countdown.
4.8.3 Navigation System. SSN/VLS capable submarines are equipped with the Electrically
Suspended Gyro Navigator (ESGN) AN/WSN-3A(V)2. The system consists of two Inertial
Measuring Units (IMUs) and one dual-channel Navigation Control Console (NCC). Velocity and
attitude data are generated in raw form by the IMUs and transmitted to the CSES via the NCC.
The raw data are processed by the CSES computers to obtain velocity, attitude and position data
and then transmitted to the various ship user subsystems.
4.8.4 Weapon Launch System. The weapon launch system consists of the missile tube
assembly and the various ship systems which operate the missile tube assembly during stowage
and launch operations. The following paragraphs describe the components of the weapon launch
system.
4.8.4.1 Missile Tube Assembly. The missile tube assembly (Figure 4-10 "SSN 688 Class
Submarine Missile Tube Assembly") houses and physically protects the weapon in the
missile tube. The assembly consists of the missile tube, hatch and linkage gear, and interfaces
to operate the assembly. Ship system interfaces include connections for the flood and drain and
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pressurization/vent systems. AUR interfaces provide shock mitigation and alignment of the
AUR as well as a means to pressurize the AUR in the missile tube. Missile tubes are topped by
hatches that are individually operated by outboard hydraulic rotary actuators and are locked by an
over-center toggle linkage mechanism with locking further enhanced by a device to assure that
hatches do not inadvertently open when adjacent tubes are subjected to launch pressure.
4.8.4.2 Hydraulic System. The hydraulic system (Figure 4-11 "SSN 688 Class Submarine
Hydraulic System") provides power to actuate flood and drain system valves and missile
tube hatches.
4.8.4.3 Pressurization/Vent System. The pressurization/vent system (Figure 4-12 "SSN 688
Class Submarine Pressurization/Vent System") replenishes the AUR internal atmosphere
during stowage and pressurizes or vents the AUR to maintain internal pressure within a specified
range of positive pressure over the underhatch volume pressure prior to launch using 700 psig
ship service air.
4.8.4.4 Flood and Drain System. The flood and drain system (Figure 4-13 "SSN 688 Class
Submarine Flood and Drain System") floods and equalizes the missile tube underhatch volume
to sea pressure so that the hatch can be opened, drains the underhatch volume to remove water
and allows this volume to be maintained at submarine internal ambient pressure.
4.8.4.5 Missile Tube Control System. The missile tube control system (Figure 4-14 "SSN 688
Class Submarine Missile Tube Control System") contains the controls, indicators, and interlock
circuitry necessary to ready the missile tubes for launch and to monitor missile tube operation.
The system also provides all of the interfaces between the ship systems and the SCS.
4.9 ONLOAD AND OFFLOAD.
The following paragraphs provide general information regarding preparation for, and onload
and offload of weapons, as well as offload of a spent CLS. Various volumes of NAVSEA
OD 44979 contain specific procedures to be used by SSN personnel. Technical manual
SW820-AD-WHS-010/UGM-109-2 contains specific procedures for submarine tender and shore
based personnel supporting SSNs. For SSGN Class procedures refer to NAVSEA OD 64501 and
SW820-AD-WHS-040/UGM-109-2.
4.9.1 Onload. Submarine onload begins when the submarine arrives at a designated shore
base activity or supporting submarine tender to receive a complement of weapons. Wind and
sea motion, which affect the submarines position and movement, are factors in determining
the feasibility of loading operations. To prevent damage to the missile, ship, or equipment,
it is recommended that weapons not be onloaded or offloaded if roll exceeds 3 degrees or pitch
exceeds 1/2 degree, and winds exceed 30 knots. The submarine tender/shore base loading
supervisor and the submarines commanding officer will determine if conditions are satisfactory
prior to commencing onload. Prior to onload, the security system is neutralized for each missile
tube to be loaded; flood and drain system and pressure/vent system operability are verified at the
VLC; and SCS operability is verified through operator conducted system diagnostics. During
loading, responsibility for all operations is shared between the submarines commanding officer
and the submarine tender/shore base loading supervisor. All actions involving ship system
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preparation are the responsibility of the submarines commanding officer. His permission is
required prior to commencing loading operations. His designated representative is responsible
for weapon handling operations and ensures that a weapon transfer inspection is conducted.
Upon completion of submarine preparation, responsibility for loading transfers to the submarine
tender/shore base loading supervisor. The submarine crew conducts the final hookup and
closeout of the missile tube upon disconnect and removal of the loading equipment from the
submarine. The following paragraphs provide a general overview of procedures used during
loading operations. For purposes of illustration, loading of a generic weapon into one missile
tube is discussed. There are some minor differences in loading procedures among AURs, AUR
Simulator Volumetric Shapes and ballast cans which are not discussed. For multiple loadings,
the procedures are the same except that multiple actions may be occurring simultaneously to
prepare missile tubes and weapons. Additionally, loading equipment is moved from missile
tube to missile tube until the full complement of weapons is aboard the submarine. Similarly,
post-loadout is accomplished on a tube by tube basis until full closeout is accomplished. Onload
terminates when the submarine has received its scheduled complement, final hookup has been
accomplished, all loading equipment has been removed, missile tube hatches are closed and
secured, and ship system equipment has been activated.
4.9.1.1 Prepare Missile Tube and Ship Systems. After supporting submarine tender/shore
base personnel have erected the loading platform (Figure 4-15 "Loading Platform Installed").
submarine personnel prepare the missile tube and ship systems for onload. The missile tube hatch
is opened and gagged (Figure 4-16 "SSN 688 Class Submarine Missile Tube Equipment"). and
the missile tube is visually inspected to ensure it is free of potential contaminants. Contaminants,
if present, will damage the lip seal on an AUR or o-ring on an AUR Volumetric Shape/Simulator
during loading. The muzzle face protective cover and the missile tube muzzle hatch and
magnet protective cover are installed (Figure 4-16 "SSN 688 Class Submarine Missile Tube
Equipment"). For the AUR Volumetric Shape/Simulator onload, the mylar O-ring protective
sleeve assembly is also installed. Special procedures like direct tube to tube transfer of AURs
on the same submarine or between different submarines may utilize lip seal protective covers
(fabricated from split garden hose or equivalent) or a lip seal protective sleeve (fabricated from
various sheet materials). The counterbore cover is installed to prevent personnel, tools, water
and debris from entering the empty missile tube. The Environmental Monitoring Sensor (EMS)
pressure and temperature ambients are checked, and a leak test performed. SCS circuits are
checked using the All-Up-Round Electronic Simulator (AURES). The accuracy of the differential
pressure transducer is verified and the pressurize/vent (P/V) plug is removed and stowed. The
counterbore cover is removed.
4.9.1.2 Install Loading Equipment. After the missile tube and ship systems have been
prepared for loading, submarine tender/shore base personnel install the loading equipment aboard
the submarine. This includes the Installation Guide Assembly Mk 116, Hydraulic Power Unit
(HPU) Mk 8, Missile Tube Extension Loader (MTEL) Mk 23 and the MTEL Safety Cover. The
installation guide is installed on the missile tube inner shoulder to assist in centering the MTEL
over the missile tube. The MTEL is lowered over the missile tube, maneuvered to align its
guide holes with the missile tube pins, and bolted to the muzzle face. The installation guide is
then removed. The MTEL safety cover is installed over the MTEL mouth to prevent objects from
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falling into the open missile tube. The HPU is positioned on the loading platform and connected
to the electrical source aboard the submarine. Hoses are connected between the HPU and the
MTEL. A check is made to insure the centering guides and the insertion pin stop-plates are in
the correct position on the MTEL
4.9.1.3 Prepare Weapon. As the missile tube and ship systems are being prepared for loading
and loading equipment is being installed, submarine tender/shore base personnel prepare the
weapon for loading. After opening the Shipping and Storage Skid Mk 30, two trunnions or
trunnion bearing assemblies are installed in the weapon to allow vertical uprighting with either
the Tilt Fixture, Mk 23 Mod 0 with Kit B, or a Shipping and Storage Skid Mk 30 that has
been rigged for uprighting. The weapon is removed from the skid and placed in the uprighting
equipment being used where, if not previously performed, a pressure check and inspection, to
include rocket motor safe/armed and weapon configuration tests, are performed. Interface support
and elastomer loading guard pads as well as the upper flange grooves are greased to facilitate
loading the weapon into the missile tube. The forward section of the weapon is depressurized
and the Closure Protective Cover (CPC) is replaced with the Capsule Loading Cover (CLC). The
annular space vent plug is removed and stowed. Two lip seals are then greased and carefully
installed into the upper flange grooves. The lifting adapter is then attached to upright the weapon
to the vertical position.
4.9.1.4 Load Weapon in Missile Tube. The weapon is uprighted about the trunnions or
trunnion bearing assemblies and lifted off the Mk 23 fixture (Figure 4-34 "Tilt Fixture Mk 23
Mod 0 with Kit B") or uprighting skid (Figure 4-17 "CLS Weapon Onload"). The trunnions
or trunnion bearing assemblies are removed and the weapon is lifted over the MTEL and aligned
for insertion into the missile tube. The MTEL safety cover is removed. The weapon is lowered
into the MTEL until the bellyband and the moisture and dust plug can be sequentially removed.
The MTEL centering guides are released to allow the flange to pass, permitting the weapon to be
lowered until the lifting adapter is above the bellmouth. The lifting adapter arm is then pinned
in the vertical position and the weapon is further lowered until the lifting adapter insertion pins
rest on the MTEL stop plates (Figure 4-18 "CLS Weapon Seating in Missile Tube"). Seating
the weapon in the missile tube is accomplished hydraulically using the HPU. The lifting adapter
arm is disconnected from the crane and the MTEL hydraulic cylinders are connected to the
lifting adapter insertion pins. The hydraulic cylinders are extended using the HPU until the
weapon seats in the missile tube.
4.9.1.5 Remove Loading Equipment. After the AUR has been fully seated in the missile tube,
the MTEL hydraulic cylinders are disconnected from the lifting adapter insertion pins. The
insertion pins are inserted into the lifting adapter and the MTEL hydraulic cylinders are then fully
retracted. The HPU is disconnected from the MTEL and the MTEL unbolted from the muzzle
face and removed from the deck. The lifting adapter is unbolted and removed from the weapon
which signifies completion of the loading sequence and final hookup and testing becomes the
responsibility of submarine personnel.
4.9.1.6 Post-Loadout. Post-loadout involves connecting the weapon to the ship systems
through missile tube interfaces (Figure 4-19 "Secure CLS Weapon in Missile Tube"). The
umbilical cable connector is connected to the missile tube umbilical connector. Eight retention
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segments are installed to restrain the CLS in the missile tube at launch. Umbilical cable brackets
are connected to the retention segments to restrain the umbilical. The SCS, missile tube, and
weapon are then tested to ensure operability. The annular space vent is plugged and the P/V
sensing line connected to the pressure transducer in the missile tube. A leak test at the missile
tube hatch opening is conducted and the underhatch area cleaned. The CLC is removed and the
capsule closure is inspected to ensure no damage occurred during loading. The missile tube hatch
and fairing are then closed and the loading platform removed.
4.9.1.7 SSGN Onload Overview. The following paragraphs provide a brief description of the
unique aspects of onloading the Tomahawk onboard a SSGN-726 Class submarine.
4.9.1.8 AUR Onload Sequence. An onload sequence begins with staging and preparing the
work platform (Figure 4-4 "MTEL Work Platforms") onto the MTEL, attaching the MTEL
adapter (Figure 4-7 "MTEL With MTEL Adapter Installed") onto the MTEL, and attaching
the lifting adapter extension (Figure 4-21 "Lifting Adapter and Extension") onto the lifting
adapter. The MTEL work platform, the MTEL adapter and the lifting adapter extension are
support equipment unique to SSGN.
4.9.1.9 Organizational-Level Preparations. The submarine crew opens the missile tube
hatch providing access to the Multiple All-Up-Round Canister (MAC) (Figure 4-33 "Multiple
All-Up-Round Canister (Fully Loaded)") and its individual AUR cells, and tags out the
hydraulic system. The appropriate AUR cells are inspected for dirt, debris or foreign material that
will damage lip seals during loading, and the area is cleaned as required.
4.9.1.10 Installing Loading Equipment. The HPU is transferred and secured to the SSGN
work area. There are two different MTEL Adapters and each must be used in the appropriate
AUR cells. The 7124601-003 Adapter is used with MAC cells A, C, E, and G. The 7124601-004
Adapter is used with MAC cells B, D and F (Figure 4-35 "Multiple All-Up-Round Canister
MTEL Orientation"). The prepared MTEL/MTEL Adapter is lowered onto the AUR cell and
oriented with the large and small alignment pins temporarily placed in the MAC top plate. The
MTEL/MTEL Adapter is secured to the MAC with four bolts. The hydraulic hoses from the HPU
are connected to the manifold on the MTEL.
4.9.1.11 Uprighting and Inserting. Procedures to upright the AUR are similar to the SSN Class
with the exception of installing the lifting adapter extension. Inserting the AUR is essentially
the same as for the SSN Class as well, with the MTEL adapter providing an interface between
the existing MTEL design and the MAC top plate. The additional height of the MTEL adapter
requires the lifting adapter be attached to the AUR with an extension of equal height.
The MTEL adapter is outfitted with a guide ring. The guide ring can be rotated to the open or shut
position to engage or disengage the guide shoes. The guide shoes perform the same function as
the MTEL centering guides, which is to assist in keeping the AUR in the center of the cell during
loading and offloading operations.
4.9.1.12 Removing Loading Equipment. The MTEL/Adapter is unbolted from the MAC top
plate and removed. The lifting adapter/extension is unbolted from the capsule upper flange and
removed. The HPU is disconnected from the electrical power source and removed.
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4.9.1.13 Organizational-Level Closeout Operations. Topside personnel connect the

pressure/vent sensing line and install the eight retention segments to secure the AUR in the AUR
cell. Topside personnel mate the AUR upper umbilical cable connector to the MAC umbilical
cable stowage receptacle. Inside the MAC, the crew connects the AUR ground strap, moves the
P1130 connector to the stowage position of the aft cover, and mates the MAC umbilical cable to
the J1130 connector (Figure 4-36 "AUR Aft Cover Viewed in MAC"). Each AUR requires
one MAC umbilical to be connected to the J1130 connector. A bubble test is performed on the
installed AUR to check for leaks at the MAC top plate.
4.9.2 Offload. Submarine offload begins when the submarine arrives at a designated shore
base activity or supporting submarine tender to discharge a complement of weapons or spent
CLSs. Wind and sea motion, which affect the submarines position and movement, are factors
in determining the feasibility of offload operations. To prevent damage to the missile, ship,
or equipment, it is recommended that weapons not be offloaded if roll exceeds 3 degrees or
pitch exceeds 1/2 degree, and winds exceed 30 knots. The submarine tender/shore base loading
supervisor and the submarines commanding officer will determine if conditions are satisfactory
prior to commencing offload. Prior to offload, ship systems are neutralized for each missile tube to
be offloaded. During offload, responsibility for all operations is shared between the submarines
commanding officer and the submarine tender/shore base loading supervisor. All actions involving
ship system and weapon preparation are the responsibility of the submarines commanding officer.
His permission is required prior to commencing offload operations. His designated representative
is responsible for weapon handling operations and ensures that a weapon transfer inspection is
conducted. Upon completion of submarine and weapon preparation, responsibility for offload
transfers to the submarine tender/shore base. The following paragraphs provide a general
overview of procedures used during offload operations. For purposes of illustration, offload of a
generic weapon from one missile tube is discussed. There are some minor differences in offload
procedures among AURs, AUR Simulator Volumetric Shapes, ballast cans and spent CLSs which
are not discussed. For multiple offloads, the procedures are the same except that multiple actions
may be occurring simultaneously to prepare missile tubes and weapons. Additionally, loading
equipment is moved from missile tube to missile tube until the full complement of weapons is
offloaded from the submarine. Similarly, post-offload procedures are accomplished on a tube by
tube basis until full closeout is accomplished. Offload terminates when all weapons scheduled for
offload have been removed from the submarine and all loading equipment has been removed
4.9.2.1 Prepare Missile Tube and Ship Systems. Initially, the SCS must be disengaged from
those missile tubes containing weapons to be offloaded. After the SCS has been disengaged
from those missile tubes to be offloaded and the loading platform (Figure 4-15 "Loading
Platform Installed") installed by supporting submarine tender/shore base personnel, the first
missile tube hatch is opened and gagged (Figure 4-16 "SSN 688 Class Submarine Missile Tube
Equipment"). The muzzle face protective cover, the missile tube muzzle hatch and magnetic
protective cover and the EMS protective cover are installed to protect submarine personnel and
equipment while preparing AUR weapons for removal.
4.9.2.2 Prepare Spent CLS for Offload. In addition to those above tasks to be performed to
prepare for weapon offload, reflood water and residue must be removed from a spent CLS prior
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removing it from the missile tube. Submarine tender/shore base personnel pump approximately
half of the reflood water in the spent CLS into a holding tank using a submersible pump. The
submarine crew then performs a P/V piping blow-down to ensure reflood water is removed. The
upper tube and muzzle hatch areas are then flushed with fresh water and all residual reflood water
is pumped from the spent CLS. Remaining residue and by-products are cleared from above the
CLS in order to attach the lifting adapter. Additionally, egress of the TCM from the CLS causes
the diaphragm to rupture leaving residue which must be removed to permit attachment of the CLC
and to secure the umbilical cable to the cover.
4.9.2.3 Prepare Weapon for Offload. Once the missile tube has been prepared, the submarine
crew prepares the weapon for offload. The CLC is installed. The umbilical cable connector is
disconnected, the connector protective cap installed, and the connector is secured to the CLC.
Umbilical cable clamps, retention segments and the annular space vent plug are then removed.
A protective shield is installed on the umbilical to prevent contact with the missile tube and
damage to the umbilical.
4.9.2.4 Install Offload Equipment. Submarine tender/shore base personnel connect the lifting
adapter to the weapon. The MTEL is positioned, and secured over the missile tube. The HPU is
positioned on the loading platform and connected to the electrical source aboard the submarine
and to the MTEL cylinders. The lifting adapter insertion pins are installed and the MTEL
hydraulic cylinders are connected to the insertion pins.
4.9.2.5 Remove Weapon from Missile Tube. With the MTEL cylinders attached to the lifting
adapter insertion pins, the HPU is energized causing the hydraulic cylinders to retract thereby
extracting the weapon from its seated position in the missile tube. The weapon is positioned on
the stop plates and the hydraulic cylinders are detached from the insertion pins. A crane hook is
attached to the lifting adapter arm to withdraw the weapon. As the weapon is raised, the insertion
pins are retracted, the moisture and dust plug is installed, and the bellyband and tag lines are
attached. The weapon is fully extracted from the missile tube, lifted clear of the submarine and
transferred to the tender or dockside where trunnions or trunnion bearing assemblies are installed.
The weapon is positioned on the Tilt Fixture, Mk 23 Mod 0 with Kit B, or on a MK 30 skid rigged
with a Mk 26 Uprighting Fixture.
4.9.2.6 Remove Offload Equipment. After the weapon has been removed from the missile
tube, the offload equipment is removed from the submarine or moved to another missile tube.
The MTEL centering guides are disengaged, the HPU/MTEL connection is severed and the
hydraulic cylinders are stowed on the MTEL. After detaching the MTEL from the missile tube,
the MTEL is removed.
4.9.2.7 Secure Missile Tube and Ship Systems after Weapon Offload. After the offloading
equipment has been removed from the missile tube, the submarine crew secures the missile tube
and ship systems. The crew installs the missile tube counterbore cover, the P/V port plug, and the
missile tube umbilical security cap. The missile tube muzzle hatch protective cover, muzzle face
protective cover, fairing, cofferdam, and counterbore cover are removed. The missile tube hatch
is ungagged and the hatch is closed. Flood and drain, pressurization/vent and security systems are
then energized to return the submarine to normal operations. The loading platform is removed.
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4.9.2.8 Post-Launch P/V Refurbishment after Spent CLS Offload. After the offload
equipment has been removed from the missile tube, the submarine crew conducts post-launch P/V
refurbishment. The P/V valve is disassembled, cleaned, and reinstalled. Differential transducer
lines are cleaned and the transducer is checked and tested. P/V piping is flushed, dried and tested
for serviceability. Upon completion of the refurbishment, the P/V plug is reinstalled.
4.9.2.9 Post-Launch Missile Tube Refurbishment after Spent CLS Offload. Launching a
TCM and exposure to sea water during the launch may cause minor damage to the missile tube
necessitating post-launch missile tube refurbishment. The submarine crew removes the missile
tube counterbore cover, inspects the interior of the missile tube and performs, or arranges for,
missile tube maintenance depending on the complexity of repairs required.
4.9.2.10 SSGN Offload Overview. The following paragraphs describe unique aspects of
offloading the Tomahawk from a SSGN-726 Class submarine. Primary elements unique to
offloading from the SSGN platform are the location of the umbilical for disconnection by
submarine personnel, and the requirements for the MTEL work platform, MTEL adapter, and
lifting adapter extension.
As discussed in the SSGN onload overview, there are two MTEL adapters each of which must be
used in the appropriate AUR cells. The 7124601-003 Adapter is used with MAC cells A, C, E and
G. The 7124601-004 Adapter is used with MAC cells B, D and F.
Similar to the MTEL centering guides, the guide ring of the MTEL adapter is rotated to the
shut position to engage the guide shoes and assist in keeping the AUR in the center of the cell
during offload.
Tactical employment of the TCM imposes a number of constraints on the operating parameters of
the submarine. The constraints imposed during tactical launch operations of the TOMAHAWK
Cruise Missile are provided in applicable tactical publications. Employment also places
restrictions on the submarines tactical flexibility which are described in Operating Guidelines,
tactical employment manuals and operation manuals.
4.10.1 Weapon Mix. Weapon mix will depend on the particular conditions that exist at the
time the decision is made to prepare weapons for launch. The SCS is capable of processing a
combination of land-attack TCM variants for single or salvo launch from vertical missile tubes,
as well as a combination of land-attack TCM variants, Mk 48 Torpedoes and other defensive
systems for launch from torpedo tubes. Prime consideration for selecting a specific weapon for
launch should be the time required to prepare and launch a single TCM or, in the case of salvo
fire, the time required to prepare and launch multiple TCMs.
4.10.2 Alert Messages and Interlocks. Various alert messages and firing interlocks are used to
warn operators or inhibit launch when conditions exist that could impact missile performance,
endanger the submarine or result in the launch of a dud missile. Firing interlocks may be either
software or hardware interlocks. Prior to permitting activation of the FIRE switch, the fire control
system must receive an indication that the following interlocks are closed:
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a. OPERATIONAL FLIGHT PROGRAM TRANSFERRED - Indicates that the flight

program has been successfully transferred to the missile.
b. MISSILE ALIGNED - Indicates that the CMGS inertial platform relative to the
submarines inertial reference system has been aligned.
c. MISSION DATA TRANSFERRED - Indicates that all data relative to the mission have
been transferred to the missile.
d. WITHIN LIMITS - Indicates that speed and depth of the submarine are within limits.
e. INPUTS MATCHED - Indicates that the CMGS has responded with good MISSILE
STATUS, missile presetting is complete and launch constraints are satisfied,
f. TUBE IN ACTIVE FIRING SEQUENCE - Indicates that the proper tube has been
selected and sequenced, all controls have been positioned and all indicators are go.
g. TUBE READY - Indicates that the underhatch volume has been flooded and the
pressurization/vent control valve is closed.
h. CAPSULE/BOOSTER PREARMED - Indicated that the capsule and rocket motor are
in the prearmed position.
Upon activation of the FIRE switch and indication of MISSILE ENABLED (i.e., , hatch open,
booster armed, capsule armed, batteries activated, BIT passed, MISSILE STATUS word good),
the fire control system closes firing interlocks prior to permitting the coded charge and launch
signals to be sent to the CLS.
Primary coverage is given to normal launch of a single weapon. For salvo launch, the operational
steps for a single launch are sequentially accomplished for each weapon selected for launch.
Abnormal launch conditions and abort procedures are discussed by highlighting only those
events that differ from a normal launch. Typical launch operations are shown in Figure 4-20
"UGM-109-2 Land-Attack TCM Operational Sequence (10 Sheets)". The figure illustrates the
orders given by the ships commanding officer, typical actions taken by equipment operators and
typical equipment operations, status displays and machine decisions. The operational sequence
is described in the following paragraphs. For a full discussion of operating procedures and
checklists, as well as actions to be taken under abnormal conditions, refer to the appropriate
volumes and parts of NAVSEA OD 44979.
4.11.1 Weapon Preparation. Preparation for launch commences with the authorization from
the commanding officer. He will issue the necessary make ready command for a single or salvo
launch. Based on that command, the MAKE READY command is issued and the appropriate
land-attack weapon for the mission is selected. To verify the correct missile has been selected and
to permit weapon power-up, the Weapon Supply Switch is placed in the IDENT position. Should
a weapon conflict result from CM IDENT POWER application, an ID ERROR will be displayed
and all relays to the weapon will remain closed.
4.11.2 Weapon Power-Up and Make Ready. When the correct designator is reflected, the
Missile Power keyswitch is placed in the ENABLE position and the Weapon Supply Switch is
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moved from IDENT to ON. This permits MONITOR/RESET POWER and CAPSULE POWER
to flow to the missile and CLS respectively so the SCS can transmit commands, receive responses,
and open relay circuitry for missile OPERATE POWER. Additionally, activation of the switches
permits the flow of REM BATTERY HEATER POWER to exercise weapons. Weapon responses
are monitored to ensure that BOOSTER SAFE and CAPSULE SAFE indicators show that the
weapon is in a safe status. If a BOOSTER ARMED or CAPSULE ARMED indication exists,
or there is no condition status indicated, the launch is aborted.
4.11.3 Mission Assignment. The appropriate mission disk pack is removed from secure storage
and mounted on the random access storage set (RASS). The disk pack serial number is entered
and the RASS initialized. With RASS initialized, the Cruise Missile Guidance Set (CMGS) is
ready to accept mission data when BALLISTICS SET and CMGS PROGRAMMED are indicated
to the Weapon Control Console (WCC) operator (CMGS flight program has been transferred to
the missile and the missile has responded with a valid Missile Status Word.). The WCC operator
changes the submode until Land-Attack TOMAHAWK Evaluation is indicated on the WCC.
THEATER, MPS, MISSION and VERIFY codes are received from the appropriate authority
and entered on the WCC. Mission data are then indicated on the WCC. Mission data are also
transferred to the central computer resident memory. The WCC operator enters the target number
and the pre-established waypoints to that target are displayed on the WCC. The WCC operator
reviews the mission data and approximate flight path to the target and makes route alterations by
introducing or deleting waypoints. The WCC operator then assigns the mission to the designated
missile tube and a verification that the mission is assigned to the correct tube is performed. Once
a mission has been assigned, no further modifications can be made without resetting the mission
and then reentering the mission number and verification code. After assigning the mission, the
WCC operator normally selects the Land-Attack TOMAHAWK Preset submode for the remainder
of the launch in order to monitor tube and missile status and any alerts concerning launch.
4.11.3.1 CMGS alignment begins automatically upon completion of a successful upload of the
Operational Flight Program (OFP). A two-position alignment technique eliminates the need to
perform submarine maneuvers at latitudes below 75. Launches at latitudes above 75, however,
will require submarine maneuvers to meet the alignment timeline. Upon completion of alignment,
the CMGS will provide an ALIGNMENT COMPLETE message to the WCC operator.
4.11.3.2 If CMGS computer built-in test (BIT) is not passed, or valid communication can not
be established or becomes lost with the CMGS computer, an alert message is provided to the
WCC operator. To establish or restore communications, a controlled shutdown of the CMGS is
performed and missile electrical power recycled. The normal start-up sequence is then repeated
and program load reattempted. When program load is accomplished, the reprogram command
is sent to the CMGS.
4.11.4 Rocket Motor/Capsule Prearm. When proper authorization is given, the BOOSTER
ARM and CAPSULE ARM switches are activated to prearm the rocket motor and capsule
respectively.
4.11.5 Tube Ready. When the WCC display indicates INPUTS MATCHED YES, and when
proper authorization is given, the READY TO FLOOD pushbutton at the Vertical Launch Console
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(VLC) is depressed and the FLOOD/DRAIN valve opened. The Hatch Control Switch must be
in REMOTE. FLOOD/DRAIN VALVE OPEN and EQUALIZE indicators illuminate, and the
PRESSURE IN BAND indicator remains illuminated. Consoles are continuously monitored to
ensure that all systems are operational. Any anomaly will be displayed on the WCC as a systems
alert or mode message which must be resolved prior to proceeding with the launch.
4.11.6 Weapon Firing. When the STANDBY ENABLE is displayed, the STANDBY switch is
activated. A STANDBY indicator illuminates at the VLC which directs the closing of the P/V
valve and unlatching of the missile tube hatch. The command is then given to activate the FIRE
switch. Activation of the FIRE switch activates the HATCH OPEN RELAY which automatically
routes all subsequent commands directly to the weapon. The FIRE command opens the missile
tube hatch, arms the rocket motor and CLS, and sends the ITL signal to the missile. It also sends
the coded charge and launch signals to the CLS after the missile batteries are activated and
MISSILE ENABLED and FIC signals have been sent to the VLC.
4.11.6.1 Once the FIRE command has been sent, operators no longer have the ability to
intervene in the launch with the exception of sending an ABORT command. An abort can be
accomplished any time until the MISSILE ENABLED signal is sent to the SCS. Once batteries
have been activated and the ABORT command issued, the missile is dudded and cannot be
recycled for firing.
4.11.6.2 Upon receipt of the coded launch signal, the gas generator ignites, initiating missile
launch. FIRE PULSE DETECTED signal is received from the CLS and all functions to the
missile are terminated. At first motion, a MISSILE AWAY signal is received from the CLS
and all commands are terminated.
4.11.7 Multiple Launch/Salvo Fire. Upon receipt of the multiple launch/salvo fire order from
the commanding officer, and subsequent to selection of the missile tube firing order, commands
and orders are inputted into each weapon sequentially until FIRE is ordered. During multiple
launch/salvo fire, activation of the FIRE switch initiates the salvo fire. Interlocks for all weapons
programmed for launch must be closed prior to launching the first missile. Once the FIRE switch
is activated, firing is automatic and only the loss of HATCH OPEN, CAPSULE ARMED, or
MISSILE ENABLE will inhibit launch automatically. The salvo firing sequence may be manually
interrupted by pushing the STANDBY or FIRE button a second time. Manual interruption will
not abort or stop a weapon in process of being fired after ITL has been issued to a missile in the
firing sequence. The salvo may be restarted by manually pressing the FIRE button again.
4.12 POST-LAUNCH OPERATIONS.
After first motion and transmittal of the MISSILE AWAY signal, the missile clears the missile
tube and missile launched is indicated. The order is given to close the missile tube and secure
the system after ensuring a HANGFIRE alert is not indicated. The Hatch Control Switch is
moved from REMOTE to CLOSE, and the Weapon Supply Switch turned OFF. The Missile Tube
Power Switch is moved to MONITOR and Missile Power turned OFF. Post-launch operations are
performed in accordance with NAVSEA OD 44979.
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4.14 BLOCK IV TACTOM OPERATIONAL SEQUENCE.
The following paragraphs describe typical actions and responses during a Block IV TACTOM
launch.
4.14.1 Prelaunch Sequence. The Block IV TACTOM Missile prelaunch sequence includes
checks of missile hardware and software; loading of missile flight capable software, mission data,
and strike data; and alignment of the inertial measurement unit. The prelaunch sequence starts
when the application of power is initiated and completes when the missile is ready for launch.
The missile prelaunch sequence initiates with the application of power from the launch platform.
The missiles first operation, upon power application is to run Built-In-Tests of the air data
module, inertial measurement unit, mission control processor, and navigation processor.
Once the initial Built-In-Tests are completed, the platforms SCS interrogates the missile for its
ID number, tail number, OFS cyclic redundancy check status, and OFS version ID. The SCS
also requests version IDs from other missile software components such as the DSMAC flight
software and GPS flight software. After these checks are passed, the SCS loads the Missile
Launch Capable Flight Software (LFS). Once the LFS is loaded, the Missile Response Status
Word reported to the SCS will show the missile to be launch capable.
After the software loads are completed, the Anti-Jam GPS Receiver, Digital Scene Matching Area
Correlator, and Satellite Data Link Transceiver are powered up and Built-In-Tests are performed.
Next, the Thrust Vector Control and Fin Control System Built-In-Tests are performed.
Initialization of the Inertial Measurement Unit begins with the transmittal of the missile
initialization message from the FCS, which contains data from the platforms inertial navigation
system. This allows the navigation processor to transition from Mode 1 (Ready to Align) to
Mode 2 (Aligning).
Alignment data from the platform is combined with up to 220 KB of mission data and loaded
into the missile. The Mission Data also includes strike data and communications parameters.
Mission data loads are verified by checksum tests after download completion. The loading of
mission data continues with the over-water data (planned by the launch platform), GPS almanac
data, and GPS keys.
The FCS continues to monitor the navigation processor status until Mode 3 (aligned) is reported.
At that point, the FCS issues the Booster Arm and the Intent to Launch (ITL) commands. Once
the ITL is issued, responsibility for aborting the launch passes from the FCS to the missile. Next,
the FCS issues a Terminate Alignment to the missile, which causes the Mission Control Processor
(MCP) to command the navigation processor into Navigate mode. The MCP then initiates the
rocket motor, thrust vector control, and fin control system. The cruise missile airframe battery
is also enabled.
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Before the MCP issues the Enable Missile command, it performs several initial status checks,
including a status update from the navigation processor and verification of proper GPS load data.
4.14.2 Launch Sequence. The Block IV TACTOM Missile launch sequence from application
of Intent-To-Launch (ITL) to wing deployment includes discrete signals from missile, removal of
launcher power, digital interface deadfacing, gas generator ignition, first motion, booster ignition,
deployment of fins and wings, rocket motor jettison, and engine start-up.
The missile launch sequence begins upon transmission of Firing Command (ITL) by the launch
platform to the missile. The ITL and subsequent sequence results in missile battery activation,
transition from platform power to internal missile power, execution of missile Built-In-Test, and
the subsequent return of Missile Enable to the launch platform. After receipt of Missile Enable,
the launch platforms SCS removes launcher power to the missile and the Mission Control
Processor (MCP) issues a Mk-82 deadface command to prevent spurious digital commands.
Following the deadface command, the SCS issues a gas generator ignition command. When the
missile senses first motion a launcher position and velocity test is initiated. When launcher
position and velocity is detected the missile disables the booster and waits for a deceleration
indication and when the deceleration occurs the booster is ignited and the missile enables ACR
monitor, TVC control, and initiates booster guidance/autopilot. Missile enable is then turned off.
When water broach is detected the wing slot plugs are ejected. Shroud separation occurs, fins
are deployed, and boost roll control is initiated. Regardless of the launch platform, the missile
then jettisons the inlet cover and deploys the wings. When the rocket motor thrust decays the
missile jettisons the rocket motor and starts the cruise engine and follows the cruise route to
the designated target.
4.14.3 Submarine Weapon System Interfaces. During the pre-launch phase, the Block
IV TACTOM AUR interfaces directly to the SCS and the Mk 45 Capsule Launching System
(CLS). The Mk 45 Capsule provides for all mechanical and environmental interfaces to the
AUR (including the longitudinal shock isolation, lateral support, mounting to Mk 45 canister
aft structure restraint/gas generation system, umbilical cable connection, temperature control,
humidity control, and storage). Each SCS provides the Mk 82 digital data link for all command
and response message traffic to/from the AUR. Each SCS also provides power, discrete, and
analog signals to the AUR via the capsule wiring harness that connects to the side of the Mk
45 capsule. All commands, power application, data loads and status requests to the missile
are applied by submarine class SCS.
Once in flight, the Block IV TACTOM missile is capable of receiving various directions (flex
command, re-targeting, BDI request, H&S requests) via the use of In-Flight Mission Modification
Messages (IMMM) transmitted by the Strike Controller via the TOMAHAWK Strike Network
(TSN). It is also capable of acquiring and receiving GPS information directly from the GPS
satellite constellation.
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4.14.4 TOMAHAWK Strike Network In-Flight Communications. The TOMAHAWK Strike

Network (TSN) is used to link communications between a Block IV TACTOM with a strike
controller or missile controller during flight. The missile sends health and status (H&S) messages
and receives commands from the controller to modify mission outcome or communication
parameters. Messages are transmitted via UHF Satellite Communications on 5 KHz and 25 KHz
UHF Demand Assigned Multiple Access (DAMA) channels.
Message Types:
From Block IV TACTOM Missile:

H&S: Sent to controller to report missile location, current mission outcome, and status of
selected missile subsystems. H&S messages may be prescheduled, triggered by events,
or in response to a request by the controller.
Battle Damage Information: This is an H&S message that also contains an estimate of
navigation error at the target. BDI messages are sent during the terminal portion of the
mission.
Battle Damage Indication Imagery: This is an H&S message that includes a compressed
single frame of imagery collected with the DSMAC sensor. Collection of images is
controlled by mission data.
From Strike/Missile Controller (In-Flight Mission Modification):

Preplanned Outcome: These messages can be used to select one of up to 16 preplanned
mission outcomes. The missile will transition to the chosen outcome at a preplanned
point in the route. This type of message can also be sent to modify communications
parameters or request missile status.
Aimpoint Update: This message is used to command the missile to directly transition to a
new target location, specified by GPS location. The message also provides commands
for flyout altitude to the target, dive angle, and warhead fuze delay. This type of message
can also be sent to modify communications parameters or request missile status.
Retarget: This message also provides a new aim point to the missile, but also includes a
segment of mission data to guide the missile to the target. The message also specifies
where in the preplanned mission the missile shall divert to the new mission data. This
type of message can also be sent to modify communications parameters or request
missile status.
4.14.5 GPS To Missile Interface. The Block IV TACTOM missile uses the Global Positioning
System (GPS) for navigation aiding throughout its flight. GPS signals are received by the
Anti-jam GPS Receiver (AGR) via the AGR Antenna. These components provide the missile
with improved resistance to GPS jamming as compared to Block III.
As in Block III, the Block IV TACTOM missile receives GPS crypto keys and almanac data from
the launch platform during missile preparation. GPS crypto keys are transferred in a matter that
memory locations are zeroed after the key information is transferred.
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Initial GPS satellite acquisition occurs shortly after launch. The missile tries to acquire all
satellites that are in view to its antenna, up to a total of eight. The missile will select to receive
data from the best set of four satellites based upon the accuracy of the navigation solution.
Satellites are tracked first using C/A (Coarse Tracking) code, and then using P/Y (Precision
Tracking) code. First Fix is achieved when P/Y measurements are achieved from the best set
of four satellites. During normal GPS track, the AGR will keep track of up to eight satellites to
enable faster reacquisition.
The AGR with its Controllable Radiation Pattern Antenna (CRPA) allows it to vary its pattern
to avoid jamming sources.
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SECTION IV. VERTICAL LAUNCHING SYSTEM

4.15 LAUNCH PLATFORMS.
The VLS TWS is employed using the VLS Mk 41 aboard CG 47 Class ships, CG 52 and up (VLS
Mk 41 Mod 0), DD 963 Class ships (VLS Mk 41 Mod 1) and DDG 51 Class ships (VLS Mk 41
Mod 2). The VLS Mk 41 is a multi-purpose launching system capable of launching TCMs as well
as STANDARD Missiles and the Vertical Launch Anti-Submarine Rockets (VLA). The VLS Mk
41 Mod 0 configuration (Figure 4-22 "Vertical Launching System Mk 41 Mod 0") consists of
two Mk 211 Mod 0 or Mod 1 Launch Control Units (LCU), two Mk 158 Mod 0 Launchers having
61 cells each, one fore and one aft, two status panels, one fore and one aft, and a Remote Launch
Enable Panel (RLEP). The VLS Mk 41 Mod 1 configuration (Figure 4-23 "Vertical Launching
System Mk 41 Mod 1") consists of two Mk 211 Mod 0 or Mod 1 LCUs, one Mk 158 Mod 0
Launcher having 61 cells forward, one status panel forward, and an RLEP. The VLS Mk 41 Mod
2 configuration (Figure 4-24 "Vertical Launching System Mk 41 Mod 2") consists of two Mk
211 Mod 1 LCUs, one Mk 159 Mod 0 Launcher having 29 cells forward, one Mk 158 Mod 0
Launcher having 61 cells aft, two status panels, one fore and one aft and an RLEP. Launch control
is provided by the TOMAHAWK Weapon Control System.
4.15.1 Launch Control Unit. LCUs (Figure 4-25 "Launch Control Unit (LCU)"), designated
LCU 1 and LCU 2, maintain control of the launcher sequencer (LSEQ) in the launchers, which, in
turn, monitor launcher conditions and provide the interface to permit weapon launch. Each LCU
consists of a data processing set which receives orders from the weapon control system, selects
the weapon to engage the target, and issues pre-launch and launch commands to the launcher;
a signal data recorder-reproducer set which contains the tapes that control the launch control
computer program and record operational history and digital data pertinent to fault isolation and
data analysis; and a data terminal group which allows manual access to the VLS program and
provides hard copy of data received from the data processing set.
4.15.2 Launchers. Each launcher (Figure 4-26 "Vertical Launching System Launcher")
consists of 8-cell modules, six each for the Mk 158 Mod 0 Launcher and two each for the Mk 159
Mod 0 Launcher, an 8-cell system module, and a 5-cell strike down module.
4.15.2.1 8-Cell Module. Each 8-cell module consists of the following:
a. An upright structure to provide vertical storage space for eight missile canisters.
b. A deck to protect the canisters during stowage with a hatch assembly that opens to permit
missile launch.
c. A plenum and uptake assembly to capture and vent exhaust gases to the atmosphere.
d. Electronic equipment to monitor stored missile canisters and module components and
to assist in launching missiles.
4.15.2.2 8-Cell System Module. The 8-cell system module is like the 8-cell module except
that equipment is added to serve the entire launcher. The 8-cell system module receives and
distributes power and control signals from outside the launcher to all modules and collects control
and damage control signals from all modules and sends them outside the launcher.
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4.15.2.3 5-Cell Strikedown Module. The 5-cell strikedown module replaces three cells with a
crane on an elevator, both hydraulically operated. The crane is used for maintenance, loading
STANDARD Missile-2 BLK II and VLA canisters, removing empty canisters and reconfiguring
cells. The crane is stowed inside the module when not in use.
4.15.3 Remote Launch Enable Panel (RLEP). The RLEP (Figure 4-27 "Remote Launch
Enable Panel (RLEP)"), located in the Combat Information Center (CIC), interfaces directly
with the status panel and is used to control Remote Launch Enable and Remote Magazine Power
Enable signals when the status panel permits remote operation.
4.15.4 Status Panel. The status panel (Figure 4-28 "Status Panel") receives and displays
module status and launcher hazard signals from sensors within the launcher, forwards such
signals to the Central Control Station (CCS), and receives enable signals from the RLEP to enable
launcher enable power and launch enable functions within the launcher when the CONTROL
key-switch is set to REMOTE.
4.15.5 TOMAHAWK Weapon Control System (TWCS). The TWCS is a general purpose
computer system that receives track and target data from weapon and sensor systems from own
and other ships. Targets are selected by operators for engagement by the VLS. Missile select
commands, target related data, and launch commands are transmitted to the VLS for launch
control. The VLS provides the TWCS with missile inventory and equipment availability status.
The TWCS is comprised of two functional groups: Track Control Group and Launch Control
Group.
4.15.5.1 Track Control Group (TCG). The TCG performs targeting and track data processing,
threat evaluation and weapon assignments using an Operator Interactive Display Terminal and
TCG Preprocessor Control Center, Data Processor Control Center and Data Storage Control
Center equipment.
4.15.5.2 Launch Control Group (LCG). The LCG receives engagement plans and launch
orders from the TCG to prepare, control, evaluate and launch TCMs using Operator Interactive
Display Terminals and LCG Data Processor Control Center and Data Storage Control Center
equipment. The LCG also provides direct interface with LCU data processors.
4.16 ONLOAD, OFFLOAD AND CROSSDECK WEAPONS.
This paragraph provides general information regarding preparation for, and onload and offload of
weapons as well as offload of a spent canister. Technical manual SW394-EE-PRO-010 contains
the procedures for shore base personnel to prepare the weapon for onload and to perform weapon
onload or offload. Technical manual SW394-AF-MMO-050 provides a detailed discussion of on
board procedures for: preparing launchers and cells for onload and offload; securing weapons in
launch cells; preparing weapons/canisters for offload; and activating launchers upon completion
of operations.
4.16.1 Onload. Ship onload begins when the ship arrives at a designated shore activity to
receive a complement of weapons. Wind and sea motion, which affect the ships position and
movement, are factors in determining the feasibility of loading operations. The shore base loading
supervisor and the ships commanding officer will determine if conditions are satisfactory prior
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to commencing onload. Prior to onload, launchers are neutralized and placed in the strikedown
mode at the status panel. During onload, responsibility for operations is shared between the ships
commanding officer and the shore base loading supervisor. All actions involving ship system
preparation are the responsibility of the ships commanding officer. His permission is required
prior to commencing loading operations. His designated representative is responsible for weapon
handling operations and ensures that a weapon transfer inspection is conducted. Upon completion
of ship preparation, responsibility for loading transfers to the shore base loading supervisor. The
ships crew conducts the final hookup and closeout of the launcher upon disconnect and removal
of the loading equipment. The following paragraphs provide a general overview of procedures
used during loading operations. For purposes of illustration, loading of a generic weapon into one
launcher is discussed. For multiple loadings, the procedures are the same except that multiple
actions may be occurring simultaneously to prepare launch cells and weapons. Additionally,
loading equipment is moved from missile to missile until the full complement of weapons is
aboard the ship. Similarly, post-loadout is accomplished on a cell by cell basis until full closeout
is accomplished. Onload terminates when the ship has received its scheduled complement, final
hookup has been accomplished, all loading equipment has been removed, cell hatches are closed
and secured, and ship system equipment has been activated.
4.16.1.1 Prepare Launcher. Launcher preparations include preparing below-deck and
above-deck areas for loading. The launcher entry procedure takes the launcher offline, puts
the launcher in strikedown, ensures power is available to strikedown controls, and, if required,
performs launcher blowout to ensure residual launch gases are not present in the plenum area.
In addition, the launcher crew performs the prior-to-use inspection of torque tools to be used to
undog and dog the dogdown latches. The above-deck preparations include positioning required
handling equipment and ensuring the area is free of unnecessary equipment.
4.16.1.2 Prepare Cell. Cell preparation may include the requirement to transfer weapons
between cells prior to commencing onload of new weapons. This may be necessitated by the need
for certain missiles to be located in certain cells for accessibility to telemetry connections or the
Critical Function Interrupt Switch. Transfer of missiles between cells may involve removal and/or
installation of sill assemblies, canister adapters and plenum cell covers. Exact requirements for
tasks to be performed are dictated by the types of missiles to be transferred between cells.
4.16.1.3 Prepare Weapon. As the launchers and cells are being prepared for onload, shore base
personnel prepare the weapon for loading. If using a Mk 3 Horizontal Strongback, the strongback
is installed and secured to the canister. A crane hook is attached to the strongback lifting shackle,
and the canister is raised to remove the packaging, handling, storage, and transport (PHS&T)
equipment (Figure 4-29 "Mk 14 VLS Canister PHS&T Equipment") from the canister. If a
forklift is used, the fork tines are inserted into the canister forklift channels, the canister is raised
and all PHS&T equipment except the forklift channels are removed. FWD and AFT protective
covers are removed. The canister is then moved to, and secured on, the Tilt Fixture, Mk 23 Mod 0
with Kit A (Figure 4-30 "Secure Canister to Mk 23 Tilt Fixture") in the horizontal position.
The strongback or forklift and forklift channels are removed.
4.16.1.4 Load Weapon. The Mk 4 Vertical Strongback is installed on the FWD canister lifting
lugs. Pins securing the canister in the horizontal position are removed and the canister is raised to
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the vertical position (Figure 4-31 "Upright Mk 14 VLS Canister to Vertical Position"). Pins
securing the canister to the tilt fixture are removed and the canister is raised and positioned over
the launch cell. The canister is oriented so that the umbilical connector will be on the walkway
side of the canister when installed in the launch cell. The canister is slowly lowered into the
launch cell until the bottom of the canister contacts the sill assembly. The strongback is removed
from the canister and lowered to the pier. The canister is secured in the cell and connected to the
electronic circuitry of the VLS and the deluge system.
4.16.1.5 Post-Loadout. Post-loadout is the reactivation of the launcher. This process brings
the launcher back on line and able to launch missiles. It includes returning power to the launch
sequencer and taking the launcher out of strikedown mode at the status panel.
4.16.2 Offload. Ship offload begins when the ship arrives at a designated shore base activity to
discharge a complement of weapons or expended canisters. Wind and sea motion, which affect the
ships position and movement, are factors in determining the feasibility of offloading operations.
The shore base loading supervisor and the ships commanding officer will determine if conditions
are satisfactory prior to commencing offload. Prior to offload, launchers are neutralized and
placed in the strikedown mode at the status panel. During offload, responsibility for operations is
shared between the ships commanding officer and the shore base loading supervisor. All actions
involving ship system and weapon preparation are the responsibility of the ships commanding
officer. His permission is required prior to commencing offloading operations. His designated
representative is responsible for weapon handling operations and ensures that a weapon transfer
inspection is conducted. Upon completion of ship and weapon preparation, responsibility for
offload transfers to the shore base loading supervisor. The following paragraphs provide a general
overview of procedures used during offload operations. For purposes of illustration, offloading
of a generic weapon from one launch cell is discussed. For multiple offloads, the procedures
are the same except that multiple actions may be occurring simultaneously to prepare launch
cells and weapons. Additionally, loading equipment is moved from missile to missile until the
full complement of weapons is offloaded from the ship. Similarly, post-offload procedures are
accomplished on a cell by cell basis until full closeout is accomplished. Offload terminates when
all weapons scheduled for offload have been removed from the ship.
4.16.2.1 Prepare Launcher. Launcher preparations include preparing below-deck and
above-deck areas for offload. The launcher entry procedure takes the launcher offline, puts the
launcher in strikedown, ensures power is available to strikedown controls, and, if required,
performs launcher blowout to ensure residual launch gases are not present in the plenum area.
In addition, the launcher crew performs the prior-to-use inspection of torque tools to be used to
undog and dog the dogdown latches. The above-deck preparations include positioning required
handling equipment and ensuring the area is free of unnecessary equipment.
4.16.2.2 Prepare Crane. If the offload involves expended Mk 14 Canisters, the shipboard
strikedown crane may be utilized for offload. Preparation of the crane includes bringing the crane
up to the 01 level and preparing it for operation.
4.16.2.3 Remove Weapon. The weapon is disconnected from all VLS electrical circuitry and
the deluge system. Additionally, all devices securing the canister in the cell are removed. The
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Mk 4 Vertical Strongback is installed on the FWD canister lifting lugs. The canister is slowly
extracted from the launch cell and swung outboard to the pier. The canister is oriented so that
the canister bottom faces the Tilt Fixture, Mk 23 Mod 0 with Kit A, FWD rest. The canister is
lowered to and locked on the tilt fixture. The canister is lowered to the horizontal position and the
Mk 4 Strongback is removed. The Mk 3 Horizontal Strongback or forklift channels/forklift are
installed, the canister is removed from the tilt fixture and PHS&T equipment is installed.
4.16.3 Crossdeck Weapons. Crossdecking of weapons is performed similar to onload and
offload except weapons may be transferred from one launcher to another aboard the same ship
or between different ships without lowering the weapon to the pier into the Mk 23 Tilt Fixture.
Crossdecking is accomplished using the Mk 4 Vertical Strongback and crane hook arrangement
to extract, transfer and insert weapons between launch cells.
Tactical employment of the TCM imposes a number of constraints on the operating parameters of
the ship. The constraints imposed during tactical launch operations of the TOMAHAWK Cruise
Missile are provided in applicable tactical publications. Employment also places restrictions on
the ships tactical flexibility which are described in Operating Guidelines, tactical employment
manuals and operation manuals.
4.17.1 Weapon Mix. Weapon mix will depend on the particular conditions that exist at the time
the decision is made to prepare weapons for launch. The TWCS is capable of processing a
combination of TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile variants. Other weapons control systems are used
to launch STANDARD missiles and VLA. Prime consideration for selecting a specific weapon
for launch should be the time required to prepare and launch a single TCM. Additionally, the
VLS will neither select a TCM in a module with a launch in progress nor suspend a launch in
progress in order to support a TCM launch.
4.17.2 Weapon Availability. Various factors are used by the VLS to verify that a particular
TCM is available for selection. These factors summarize missile, cell and module status
conditions. A particular missile is available for selection if no availability factor applies. If any
factor does apply, the missile may still be available if the factor can be overridden. Table 4-1
"Missile Availability Factors" identifies availability factors and the capability for override.
Primary coverage is given to normal launch of a single weapon. For multiple launch, the
operational steps for a single launch are sequentially accomplished for each weapon selected for
launch. Abnormal launch conditions and abort procedures are discussed by highlighting only
those events that differ from a normal launch. Typical launch operations are shown in Figure 4-32
"RGM-109-4 Land-Attack TCM Operational Sequence (15 Sheets)". The figure illustrates the
orders given by the ships commanding officer, typical actions taken by equipment operators and
typical equipment operations, status displays and machine decisions. The operational sequence is
described in the following paragraphs. For a full discussion of operating procedures, as well as
actions to be taken under abnormal conditions, refer to SW261-DE-MMO-030.
231
4.18.1 Prelaunch Reprogramming. Before Intent to Launch is signalled, the TWCS can
identify and reprogram land-attack Block III TCMs. During the reprogramming process, TWCS
issues a READY ALERT request to the VLS, issues a non-launch select order, and applies power
to the missile in the selected cell. The TWCS downloads mission information and updates
DSMAC and GPSS Flight Software. When download is complete, the missile is deselected,
power is removed and the TWCS orders the VLS to STANDBY.
4.18.2 Missile Selection. Missile selection is controlled by the MISSILE SELECT ORDER
issued by the TWCS. The TWCS may select a specific missile by launcher, module and cell
(WCS MISSILE SELECTOR ORDER) or the TWCS may designate a type missile and allow
the VLS to select the specific TCM to be launched (VLS MISSILE SELECT ORDER). Upon
receipt of the VLS MISSILE SELECT ORDER, the VLS selects the cell to be used for launch
based on the following:
a. The cell selected must have the least number of launches of those TCMs available.
b. The TCM must be in a module or half-module which contains the most available TCMs
with no TCM launch that has progressed beyond rocket motor arming.
c. If all modules or half-modules have the same number of TCMs available that satisfy a
and b above, the module or half-module with the lowest designation number is selected.
If the same number module in both forward and aft launchers can meet the criteria, the
forward magazine is selected.
4.18.3 Cell Selection. When the MISSILE SELECT ORDER is received by the launch control
unit (LCU), the LCU determines if the ordered TCM is available, confirms missile identification,
and sends cell identification, position and alignment data to the TWCS. The LCU also sends a cell
select message to the launch sequencer (LSEQ) and starts a 650-ms timer.
4.18.4 Cell/Missile Preparation. Upon receipt of the cell select order, the LSEQ begins to
prepare the cell and the missile for launch. The LSEQ performs a status check to verify missile
selection as well as warhead and rocket motor safed. If missile selection is not verified or
warhead and/or rocket motor safe indications are not received, the LSEQ takes no further action
until the LCU completes evaluation of the failure. With missile selection and warhead and rocket
motor safed verified, the LSEQ applies OPERATE POWER, and, if applicable, REM HEATER
POWER to the missile and starts a 400-ms timer. At the end of 400-ms delay, the LSEQ sends
a select response message to the LCU confirming the type missile and warhead selected. The
LSEQ continuously monitors missile functions and sends a failure message to the LCU if monitor
functions change to an improper condition.
4.18.5 Select Response Evaluation. If the LCU receives the select response message prior
to the end of the 650-ms delay, the LCU starts an 80 second clock and updates the missile
availability file. This delay is used to ensure that the TWCS remains in communication with the
LCU throughout the launch sequence. The 80 second delay is reset each time a valid message
pertaining to the selected missile is received from the TWCS. If 80 seconds pass without
receiving a message, the LCU sends an equipment failure status message and commences the
cell safing procedure.
232
4.18.6 Mission Assignment. The appropriate mission disk pack is removed from secure storage
and mounted on the random access storage set (RASS). The disk pack serial number is entered
and the RASS initialized. With RASS initialized, the TWCS is ready to transmit missile and
alignment data messages to the missile via the LCU. THEATER, MPS, MISSION and VERIFY
codes are received from the appropriate authority and entered. Mission data are then indicated and
transferred to the central computer resident memory. The operator enters the target number and
the pre-established waypoints to that target are displayed. The operator reviews the mission data
and approximate flight path to the target and makes route alterations by introducing or deleting
waypoints. The operator then assigns the mission to the designated cell and a verification that
the mission is assigned to the correct cell is performed. Once a mission has been assigned, no
further modifications can be made without resetting the mission and then reentering the mission
number and verification code.
4.18.6.1 CMGS alignment begins automatically upon completion of a successful upload
of the Operational Flight Program (OFP). Alignment data are repeatedly sent about each
second during the prelaunch stage. A two-position alignment technique eliminates the need to
perform maneuvers at latitudes below 75. Launches at latitudes above 75, however, require
maneuvers to meet the alignment timeline. Upon completion of alignment, the CMGS provides
an ALIGNMENT COMPLETE message.
4.18.6.2 If CMGS computer built-in test (BIT) is not passed, or valid communications can
not be established or becomes lost with the CMGS computer, an alert message is provided. To
establish or restore communications, a controlled shutdown of the CMGS is performed and
missile electrical power recycled. The normal start-up sequence is then repeated and program load
reattempted. When program load is accomplished, the reprogram command is sent to the CMGS.
4.18.7 Rocket Motor Arm. When all data has been loaded into the CMGS, the TWCS orders
BOOSTER ARM via the LCU to the LSEQ. When this order is received by the LCU, the LCU
dedicates the half-module containing the selected missile to a TOMAHAWK launch and activates
the circuits necessary for launch. The LSEQ removes REM power, if applied, and prepares the
cell for firing. The cell and uptake hatches are opened and the plenum drain closed. The rocket
motor is then armed.
4.18.8 Missile Activation. After receiving the missile/module ready status message from the
LCU, the TWCS issues a MISSILE FIRE ORDER to the LCU. Upon receipt of this order, the
LCU issues a BATTERY ACTIVATE command to the TCM which causes the CMGS to terminate
alignment and activates missile batteries. When the batteries are fully operational, the TCM sends
a MISSILE ENABLE signal to the LSEQ. The LSEQ removes power to the TCM and reports
the missile enabled. The LCU sends a launch status message to the TWCS to report MISSILE
ENABLED. If the launch sequence is stopped after battery activation, the missile is dudded
and cannot be recycled for firing.
4.18.9 Rocket Motor Ignition and Missile Release. After receiving MISSILE ENABLED,
the TWCS send a BOOSTER IGNITION order to the LCU. Upon receipt of this order, the LCU
checks the status of current launches and waits until launch rate and priority requirements are
met before issuing the IGNITION command to the LSEQ. The LSEQ applies booster ignition
233
voltages to the TCM causing the rocket motor to ignite. After rocket motor ignition and receipt
of the CLOSURE RUPTURE signal indicating the aft closure plate has been blown open, the
LSEQ applies power to detonate the explosive restraining bolts allowing release of the TCM.
When the canister forward closure is broken, the breakwire opens to send a MISSILE AWAY
signal to the LSEQ which, in turn, notifies the LCU of missile away.
4.18.10 Cell Safing. The cell safing sequence may begin at any time when an unsafe condition
is monitored, a launch sequence is terminated (ABORT command issued), interrupted (SAFE
command issued by the TWCS), or when a MISSILE AWAY signal is not sent (missile misfire
or restrained fire). During this sequence, the SAFE MISSILE command is sent, relays open to
disconnect power and data lines to the cell. In the case of a restrained fire, the deluge system is
activated. If missile batteries were activated prior to an unsuccessful firing attempt, missile
inventory is updated to reflect the unavailability of that TCM for launch. If batteries were not
activated, the TCM is placed in a 30-minute cool down period prior to being made available
for future launch.
4.19 POST-LAUNCH.
When the LSEQ receives the MISSILE AWAY signal, the LSEQ disconnects prelaunch cell
power and signals from the cell and cancels the missile/cell selection. After a delay to allow the
missile and exhaust gases to clear the launcher, cell and uptake hatches are closed.. The LCU
evaluates the launch and updates missile inventory and cell firing count to reflect the change in
status brought about by the launch.
234
Figure 4-1. General Locations of SSN Complexes
235
Figure 4-2. SSN/TWS-related Equipment TTL

Interfaces
236
Figure 4-3. SSN TTL Pressurization/Vent Control

System
237
Figure 4-4. MTEL Work Platforms
238
Figure 4-5. TTL Weapon Shipping, Handling and

Stowage Equipment (SSN 688 Class)
239
Figure 4-6. UGM-109-1 Land-Attack TCM

Operational Sequence (7 Sheets)
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
Figure 4-7. MTEL With MTEL Adapter Installed
247
Figure 4-8. General Locations of SSN 688 Class

Submarine Complexes
248
Figure 4-9. SSN 688 Class Submarine TWS-related

Equipment Interfaces (2 Sheets)
249
250
Figure 4-10. SSN 688 Class Submarine Missile Tube

Assembly
251
Figure 4-11. SSN 688 Class Submarine Hydraulic

System
252
Figure 4-12. SSN 688 Class Submarine

Pressurization/Vent System
253
Figure 4-13. SSN 688 Class Submarine Flood and

Drain System
254

Control System
255
Figure 4-15. Loading Platform Installed
256

Equipment
257
Figure 4-17. CLS Weapon Onload
258
Figure 4-18. CLS Weapon Seating in Missile Tube
259
Figure 4-19. Secure CLS Weapon in Missile Tube
260
Figure 4-20. UGM-109-2 Land-Attack TCM

261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
Figure 4-21. Lifting Adapter and Extension
271
Figure 4-22. Vertical Launching System Mk 41 Mod 0
272
273
274
Figure 4-25. Launch Control Unit (LCU)
275
Figure 4-26. Vertical Launching System Launcher
276
Figure 4-27. Remote Launch Enable Panel (RLEP)
277
Figure 4-28. Status Panel
278
Figure 4-29. Mk 14 VLS Canister PHS&T Equipment
279
Figure 4-30. Secure Canister to Mk 23 Tilt Fixture
280
Figure 4-31. Upright Mk 14 VLS Canister to Vertical

Position
281
Figure 4-32. RGM-109-4 Land-Attack TCM

282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
Figure 4-33. Multiple All-Up-Round Canister (Fully

Loaded)
297
Figure 4-34. Tilt Fixture Mk 23 Mod 0 with Kit B
298
Figure 4-35. Multiple All-Up-Round Canister MTEL

Orientation
299
Figure 4-36. AUR Aft Cover Viewed in MAC
300
Table 4-1. Missile Availability Factors

AVAILABILITY FACTOR OVERRIDE
Failure in cell Yes
Number of firings from cell exceeds eight (w/o Yes
ORDALT 16235)
Number of firing counts from cell is/will be Yes
10.75 or greater (w/ ORDALT 16235)
Missile in cooldown Yes
Missile fuel leak Yes
Module hazard/fault Yes
Module BITE faults Yes
Launch-sequence detected fault Yes
Launcher unauthorized by TWCS No
Canister or plenum cover not present/not No
dogged down
Module declared unavailable No
Restrained missile firing within module No
MCP BITE is on but should not be No
Module set to an offline status No
No missile in cell No
Cell and missile already selected for a No
launching
Fault previously reported in half module No
containing the missile
Fault previously reported in missile No
Launch sequence failure previously reported No
Launch operations not enabled in VLS No
Cell-select relay (K1) not energized No
301

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SW820-AP-MMI-010 REVISION 15 27 MARCH 2009

THIS DOCUMENT SUPERSEDES SW820-AP-MMI-010 REVISION 14 DATED 15 MARCH 2008.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT D: Distribution authorized to the Department of Defense and U.S.

PUBLISHED BY DIRECTION OF PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER FOR UNMANNED

1.11.1.1 Guidance Section. ................................................................. 26

1.11.7.2.2 Engine Inlet Cover. .......................................................... 35

1.16.2.5 Barrel Closure. ..................................................................... 44

1.23.2.5 Separation Nuts. ................................................................... 54

1.32 WEIGHTS AND CENTERS OF GRAVITY. ............................................. 60

3.3 DIGITAL DATA LINK. ......................................................................185

3.12.1 Navigation Equipment Alignment. ..................................................190

4.2 LAUNCH PLATFORMS.....................................................................205

4.8.4.4 Flood and Drain System. ..........................................................213

4.12 POST-LAUNCH OPERATIONS. .........................................................222

SECTION II. TOMAHAWK WEAPON SYSTEM

SECTION III. TOMAHAWK CRUISE MISSILE

1.11.4 Block IV Tactical TOMAHAWK. The Tactical TOMAHAWK (TACTOM) Cruise

The major features of the cruise engine include:

Anti-Jam Global Positioning System Antenna

SECTION IV. TORPEDO TUBE LAUNCH

1.18.1 TOMAHAWK Test Missile (TOTEM) UTM-109-1. The TOTEM is an encapsulated,

1.18.2 Encapsulated No-Launch No-Wet TOTEM (NL TOTEM). The NL TOTEM is a

1.18.4 Warhead Installation Trainer (WIT) Mk 35 Mod 0. The WIT is an inert,

1.18.5 TOMAHAWK Fitment Shape (TOMFISH) Mk 1 Mod 0. The TOMFISH is an inert,

SECTION V. CAPSULE LAUNCHING SYSTEM

SECTION VI. VERTICAL LAUNCHING SYSTEM

Figure 1-1. Land-Attack 109A

Figure 1-2. Cruise Missile Guidance Set (CMGS)

Figure 1-3. Land-Attack 109C

Figure 1-4. Digital Scene Matching Correlation

Figure 1-5. Land-Attack 109D

Figure 1-6. Land-Attack 109D Payload Section

Figure 1-7. Block IV Tactical TOMAHAWK Missile

Figure 1-8. TACTOM Forward Body Section

Figure 1-9. Mk 106 Rocket Motor

Figure 1-10. Mk 111 Rocket Motor

Figure 1-11. Underwater Protection Devices

Figure 1-12. Recovery Exercise Module

Figure 1-13. TACTOM Midbody Section

Figure 1-14. Range Safety System (109C)

Figure 1-15. Range Safety System (109D)

Figure 1-16. Typical Land-Attack TCM Pre-landfall

Figure 1-17. Terrain Contour Matching (TERCOM)

Figure 1-18. TACTOM Aftbody and Tailcone Section

Figure 1-19. Typical Mission Profile (109A/C)

Figure 1-20. Typical Mission Profile (109D)

Figure 1-21. CLS Missile Tube Loading and Handling

Figure 1-22. Typical Parachute Recovery of

Figure 1-23. TTL Capsules (2 Sheets)

Figure 1-24. Electrical and Pneumatic Umbilicals

Figure 1-25. CNU-308/E Shipping Container

Figure 1-26. Capsule Launching System (CLS) Mk 45

Figure 1-27. Capsule Launching System (CLS)

Figure 1-28. All-Up-Round Simulator (AURS)

Figure 1-29. All-Up-Round Electronic Simulator

Figure 1-30. AURES/AURS Interface

Figure 1-31. Missile Tube Ballast Can

Figure 1-32. Shipping and Storage Skid Mk 30

Figure 1-33. AUR Simulator Shipping Skid