1.

Cruz vs Sec DENR

2. GRANDE v. CA

FACTS:
The Grandes are owners of a parcel of land in Isabela, by inheritance from
their deceased mother, Patricia Angui, who likewise, inherited it from her
parents. In the early 1930s, the Grandes decided to have their land
surveyed for registration purposes. The land was described to have
Cagayan River as the northeastern boundary, as stated in the title.
By 1958, a gradual accretion took place due to the action of the current of
the river, and an alluvial deposit of almost 20,000 sq.m. was added to the
registered area. The Grandes filed an action for quieting of title against the
Calalungs, stating that they were in peaceful and continuous possession of
the land created by the alluvial deposit until 1948, when the Calalungs
allegedly trespassed into their property. The Calalungs, however, stated
that they were the rightful owners since prior to 1933.

The CFI found for the Grandes and ordered the Calalungs to vacate the
premises and pay for damages. Upon appeal to the CA, however, the
decision was reversed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the alluvium deposited land automatically belongs to the
riparian owners?

HELD:
Art. 457 dictates that alluvium deposits on land belong to the owners of the
adjacent land. However, this does not ipso jure become theirs merely
believing that said land have become imprescriptible. The land of the
Grandes only specifies a specific portion, of which the alluvial deposits are
not included, and are thus, subject to acquisition by prescription. Since the
Calalungs proved that they have been in possession of the land since 1934
via two credible witnesses, as opposed to the Grandes single witness who
claims that the Calalungs only entered the land in 1948, the Calalungs
have been held to have acquired the land created by the alluvial deposits
by prescription. This is because the possession took place in 1934, when
the law to be followed was Act 190, and not the New Civil Code, which only
took effect in 1950.
 3. Cureg vs IAC

4. AGUSTIN V CA, June 15, 2005

Facts:

Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins

alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel Agustin, for support and
support pendente lite before the Quezon City RTC.
In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe, after which
they entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated
Fe on her 34th birthday but despite Arnels insistence on abortion, Fe
decided to give birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin. The babys birth
certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered
the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fes repeated requests
for Martins support despite his adequate financial capacity and even
suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied
having fathered the child.
On January 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the
Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van,
with the open car door hitting Fes leg. This incident was reported to the
police. Several months later, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has, since
then, been undergoing chemotherapy. Fe and Martin then sued Arnel for
support.
Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the
parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing, which Arnel
opposed by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination and
moving to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action.
The trial court denied the MTD and ordered the parties to submit
themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, thus this petition.

Issue:
W/N the respondent court erred in denying the petitioners MTD
W/N the court erred in directing parties to subject to DNA paternity testing
and was a form of unreasonable search

Held:
1. No. The trial court properly denied the petitioners motion to dismiss
because the private respondents complaint on its face showed that they
had a cause of action against the petitioner. The elements of a cause of
action are: (1) the plaintiffs primary right and the defendants
corresponding primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission
of the defendant, by which the primary right and duty have been violated.
The cause of action is determined not by the prayer of the complaint but by
the facts alleged.
2. No. In Ople v. Torres,the Supreme Court struck down the proposed
national computerized identification system embodied in Administrative
Order No. 308, we said:
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does
not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to
stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public
service and the common good... Intrusions into the right must be
accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the
common good.
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and
seizures, and the infringement of privacy of communication where the
constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioners case
involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his right against
self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water.

4.AGUSTIN V. IAC

FACTS:
Private respondents, Maria Melad and Pablo Binuyag are among those
who are occupying the western bank of the Cagayan River while on the
eastern bank is owned by petitioner Eulogio Agustin. From 1919 to 1968,
the Cagayan river has eroded the lands on the eastern bank including
Agustins Lot depositing alluvium on the land possessed by Pablo Binuyag.
In 1968, after a typhoon which caused a big flood, the Cagayan River
changed its course and returned it to its 1919 bed and it cut through the
lands of respondents whose lands were transferred on the eastern side. To
cultivate the lands they had to cross the river. When they were cultivating
said lands, (they were planting corn) Agustin accompanied by the mayor
and some policemen claimed the land and drove them away. So Melad and
Binuyag filed separate complaints for recovery of their lots and its
accretions. The Trial Court held ordered Agustin et. al to vacate the lands
and return them to respondents. On appeal, the IAC affirmed in toto the
judgment thus the case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents own the accretion and such ownership
is not affected by the sudden and abrupt change in the course of the
Cagayan River when it reverted to its old bed

HELD: YES
Art. 457 states that the owner of the lands adjoining river banks own the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the currents of
the waters. Accretion benefits a riparian owner provided that these
elements are present: 1) deposit be gradual and imperceptible 2) it resulted
from the effects of the current of the water and 3) the land is adjacent to the
river bank. When the River moved from 1919 to 1968, there was alluvium
deposited and it was gradual and imperceptible.

Accretion benefits the riparian owner because these lands are

exposed to floods and other damage due to the destructive force of the
waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject to encumbrances and
various kinds of easements, it is only just that such risks or dangers should
in some way be compensated by the right of accretion. Also, respondents
ownership over said lots was not removed when due to the sudden and
abrupt change in the course of the river; their accretions were transferred to
the other side. Art. 459 states when the current of a river x x x segregates
from an estate on its bank a known portion of land and transfers it to
another estate, the owner of segregated portion retains ownership provided
he removes the same w/in 2 years. And Art. 463 states that whenever the
current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving a piece of land or part
thereof isolated, the owner of the land retains ownership. He also retains it
if a portion of land is separated from the estate by the current.

5. Republic of the Philippines vs Santos

G.R. No. 160453 November 12, 2012

Facts: Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years,
respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for
the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Parafiaque City. The property, which had an area of 1,045 square meters, more or
less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio, Paraque City, and was bounded in the
Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio,
Jr.), in the Southeast by the Paraque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road,
and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan. On May 21,
1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to include
Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of the latters co-ownership of the property.
He alleged that the property had been formed through accretion and had been in
their joint open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for more
than 30 years.

Issue: Whether or not the subject parcel land maybe acquired through the process
of accretion.

Held: No. Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of
rivers. The deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and
imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the current of the water; and (c)
taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.

The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an
accretion that became respondents property pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil
Code. That land was definitely not an accretion. The process of drying up of a river
to form dry land involved the recession of the water level from the river banks, and
the dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which was the gradual and
imperceptible deposition of soil on the river banks through the effects of the
current. In accretion, the water level did not recede and was more or less
maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian owners had no legal right to claim
ownership of Lot 4998-B. Considering that the clear and categorical language of
Article 457 of the Civil Code has confined the provision only to accretion, we
should apply the provision as its clear and categorical language tells us to.
Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where the language of the law is clear and categorical,
there is no room for interpretation; there is only room for application. The first and
fundamental duty of courts is then to apply the law.

The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of
ownership. Article 502 of the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their
natural beds are public dominion of the State. It follows that the river beds that dry
up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the State as its property of public
dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that the dried-up river beds
should belong to some other person.

The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of
soil does not need to make an express act of possession, and that no acts of
possession are necessary in that instance because it is the law itself that pronounces
the alluvium to belong to the riparian owner from the time that the deposit created
by the current of the water becomes manifest has no applicability herein. This is
simply because Lot 4998-B was not formed through accretion. Hence, the
ownership of the land adjacent to the river bank by respondents predecessor-in-
interest did not translate to possession of Lot 4998-B that would ripen to
acquisitive prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B.

Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed Lot
4998-B for more than thirty years in the character they claimed, they did not
thereby acquire the land by prescription or by other means without any competent
proof that the land was already declared as alienable and disposable by the
Government. Absent that declaration, the land still belonged to the State as part of
its public dominion.

Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. No public land can
be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
Government. It is indispensable, therefore, that there is a showing of a title from
the State. Occupation of public land in the concept of owner, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.

Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which declares
river beds that are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the
waters as ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land occupied by the new
course, and which gives to the owners of the adjoining lots the right to acquire only
the abandoned river beds not ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land
affected by the natural change of course of the waters only after paying their
value), all river beds remain property of public dominion and cannot be acquired
by acquisitive prescription unless previously declared by the Government to be
alienable and disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B was not shown to be already
declared to be alienable and disposable, respondents could not be deemed to have
acquired the property through prescription.

6. FERNANDO et.al vs ACUNA et al.,FACTS:

A parcel of land was registered in the names of Spouses Jose Fernando and Lucila
Tinio andspouses Antonia Fernando and Felipe Galvez. When they died
inestestate, the property remainedundivided. The heirs and successors-in-
interest, herein petitioners (Jose and Zoilo Fernando, NormaFernando Banares,
Rosario Fernando Tangkencgo, heirs of Tomas Fernando, heirs of
GuillermoFernando, heirs of Iluminada Fernando and heirs of Germogena
Fernando) failed to agree on thedivision of the subject property. Thus, except for
the heirs of Germogena Fernando, filed a Complaint forpartition against the heirs
of Germogena Fernando praying that the subject property be partitioned into8
equal parts corresponding to the hereditary interest of each group of heirs.In his
Complaint in intervention, 1998, respondent Leon Acuna averred that the portion
of theproperty identified as Lot 1303 was already adjudicated the petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest. Helikewise claimed the portion identified as Lot 1302
was also already adjudicated to other people as well.TC found that Lot 1302 was
already titled in the names of third persons. With respect to Lot1303 TC found out
that the November 1929 decision was never executed and has already prescribed.
TCordered the reversion of Lot 1303 to the ownership of spouses Jose Fernando
and Lucila Tinio andspouses Antonia Fernando and Felipe Galvez and allowed the
partition of Lot 1303 among petitioners assuccessors-in-interest of said registered
owners. Excluded from the partition, however, were theportions of the property
which petitioners admitted had been sold or transferred to Ruperta Sto.Domingo
Villasenor and respondent Acuna.With respect to Sapang Bayan , TC found that
the same had not been alleged in the pleadingsnor raised as an issue during the
pre-trial conference. Also, according to the trial court, the parties failedto clearly
show whether Sapang Bayan was previously a dry portion of either Lot 1302 or
Lot 1303.Neither was there any proof that Sapang Bayan was a river that just
dried up or that it was an accretionwhich the adjoining lots gradually received
from the effects of the current of water. It was likewise notestablished who were
the owners of the lots adjoining Sapang Bayan
. The trial court concluded thatnone of the parties had clearly and sufficiently
established their claims over Sapang Bay.
All the parties, with the except Acuna, elevated this case to the CA
whichREVERSED and SET ASIDE the desicsion. Hence, plaintiffs and defendants in
the court to SC for review.

ISSUE:
Can the petitioners validly claim the ownership of the Sapang Bayan?

HELD:
NO. CA erred in ruling that the principle of accretion is applicable. the Court of
Appeals erred inruling that the principle of accretion is applicable ("to the owners
of lands adjoining the banks of riversbelong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters."
Art. 457,CC) The character of the Sapang Bayan property was not shown to be of
the nature that is beingreferred to in the provision which is an accretion known as
alluvion. In fact the parties could not agreehow Sapang Bayan came about.
Whether it was a gradual deposit received from the river current or adried-up
creek bed connected to the main river could not be ascertained.Even assuming
that
Sapang Bayan was a dried-up creek bed, under Article 420, paragraph 1 andArticle
502, of the CC, rivers and their natural beds are property of public dominion. In
the absence ofany provision of law vesting ownership of the dried-up river bed in
some other person, it must continueto belong to the State. In Republic v. Court of
Appeals Court ruled that lots were portions of the bed of the Meycauayanriver
and are therefore classified as property of the public domain under Article 420.
They are not opento registration under the Land Registration act. Furthermore, in
Celestial v. Cachopero, the Courtsimilarly ruled that a dried-up creek bed is
property of public dominion: A creek, like the SalunayanCreek, is a recess or arm
extending from a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea. As such
7.
8.
9.
10.
11
12
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14. COLLADO v. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner Edna Collado applied for registration of a parcel of land (120
hectares in Antipolo, Rizal) with the land registration court. She attached a
technical description of the Lot, signed by Robert Pangyarihan1, stating
this survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed. About a year later,
Collado amended the application to include additional co-applicants and
more applicants joined (petitioners). The Republic through the SG, and
the Municipality of Antipolo, through the Municipal Attorney and Provincial
Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to petitioners application.

ISSUES:
1. WON Petitioners have registrable title over the Lot. involves private land.
The Republic is stopped from questioning the courts jurisdiction because
the Republic participated in the proceedings before the court. Solicitor
General: The decision of the land registration court was null and void
because the land registration court had no jurisdiction over the case. The
land in question was not alienable and disposable.
3. WON the petition-in-intervention is proper. (more on procedural)

RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT: Petitioners presented sufficient evidence

to establish their registrable rights over the Lot.
RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS: CA annulled the decision of the
Trial Court. Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of public domain belong
to the State. An applicant for registration of a parcel of land has the burden
of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms
part of the public domain. The petitioners failed to present evidence that the
Lot has been segregated from the public domain and declared by
competent authority to be alienable and disposable. The technical
description which the petitioners attached to their application said that the
survey is inside in the Mariquina Watershed. This has been confirmed by
the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds in a Report.

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT: Petition is DENIED.

1. PETITIONERS HAVE NO REGISTRABLE TITLE OVER THE LOT.
Petitioners: They have occupied the Lot for a long time and their
possession has been open, public, notorious and in the concept of
owners. The Lot was surveyed in the name of one of their
predecessors-in-interest2 as early as 1902. There have been 9
transfers of rights among them and their predecessors-in-interest. Also,
they have declared the Lot for taxation and paid all the real estate
taxes. The land is not covered by any form of title or any public land
application. It is also not within any government reservation. Private
rights were vested on Leyva before the issuance of EO 33 (establishing
the Marikina Watershed Reservation). Since EO 33 contains a saving
clause that the reservations are subject to existing private rights, the Lot
is excluded from such reservation. Assuming no private rights attached
prior to the issuance of EO 33, the President had subsequently
segregated the Lot from the public domain and made the Lot alienable
and disposable through Proclamation No. 1283. They say that the
proclamation expressly excluded an area of 3780 hectares from the
MWR and made the area part of the BosoBoso Townsite Reservation.
 They contend that the Lot in question is part of the excluded town site
are and that under CA 141, town sites are considered alienable and
disposable. 2. WON the petition for annulment of judgment should have
been given due course. Petitioners failed to complete the require period
of possession under CA 1413 (Public Land Act) or under the
amendment by RA 19424 and PD 10735 (the law prevailing at the time
the petitioners applied for registration. When EO 33 was issued (1904),
Leyva had been in possession of the Lot for only 2 years. There is no
proof that prior to the issuance 3 Petitioners: The petition for annulment
of judgment was filed long after the decision of the land registration
court had become final and executor and is no longer available because
of res judicata. The land registration court had jurisdiction over the case,
which 4 1 2 Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division, Bureau of Lands
Sesinando Leyva Possession and occupation of lands of public domain
since July 26, 1894. A simple 30-year prescriptive period of occupation
by an applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title. 5 Those
who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least 30 years immediately
preceding the filing of application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by wars or force majeure.

15. VALIAO V. REPUBLIC, 28 November 2011

Facts
The petitioners (Pacifico Valiao, Lodovico Valiao, Ricardo Valiao,
and Nemesio Grandea) filed with the RTC of Kabankalan an application of
a parcel of land with an area of 504, 535 square meters in Barrio Galicia,
Ilog, Negros Occidental under the conditions of PD 1529. They claim that
they have acquired the property in 1947 after the death of their uncle
Basilio Milliarez who purchased the land from Fermin Payogao through a
Deed of Sale dated May 19, 1916, entirely handwritten in Spanish. Upon
their uncles death, they have possessed the land until 1966 when
oppositor Macario Zafra disposed them of their property compelling them to
file complaints of Grave Coercion and Qualified Theft against him. The
petitioners submitted a Tax Declaration No. 9562[6] dated September 29,
1976 under the names of the heirs of Basilio Millarez. The Court of Appeals
reversed the RTCs decision to grant the petitioners application for
registration.
 Issues

1. Whether Lot No. 2372 is an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.
2. Whether they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in an open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under a
claim of ownership.

Ruling
The petitioners application under PD 1529 should be denied.

1. The petitioners failed to prove that the subject property was classified as
part of the disposable and alienable land of the public domain.
Under the Regalian doctrine, public lands not shown to have been
reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a
private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public
domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable
or disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain. Property of the public domain is beyond the
commerce of man and not susceptible of private appropriation and
acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no
matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of
the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.
In addition, there must be a positive act declaring land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government.

2. The petitioners failed to prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest

had been in an open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. There is nothing in the records that would substantiate petitioners
claim that Basilio was in possession of the property during the period of
possession required by law.
Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it
of such a nature as a party would actually exercise over his own property.
As regards petitioners possession of the land in question from 1947 to
1966, petitioners could only support the same with a tax declaration dated
September 29, 1976. At best, petitioners can only prove possession since
said date.
Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of
ownership or of the right to possess land when not supported for other
evidence. It does not necessarily prove ownership

17.Carino V. Insular Government (1909), February 23, 1909

Lessons Applicable: (Land Titles and Deeds)
Sec. 2 Art. XII 1987 Constitution

FACTS:
Carino is an Igorot of the Province of Benguet, where the land lies filed for writ
of error because the CFI and SC dismissed his petition for application

For more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris, April 11, 1899, he and his
ancestors had held the land as recognized owners by the Igorots. (grandfather
maintain fences for holding cattle>father had cultivated parts and used parts for
pasturing cattle>he used it for pasture)

1893-1894 & 1896-1897: he made an application but with no avail

1901: petition alleging ownership under the mortgage law and the lands were
registered to him but process only established possessory title

Even if the applicant have title, he cannot have it registered, because the
Philippine Commission's Act No. 926, of 1903, excepts the Province of
Benguet among others from its operation

ISSUE: W/N Carino has ownership and is entitled to registration.

HELD: YES. Petition Granted.
Land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not always, public
land.

Spanish Law: "Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it
shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by
 prescription." For cultivated land, 20 years, uninterrupted, is enough. For
uncultivated, 30.

Applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such

proceedings against him or his father ever was made.

Every native who had not a paper title is not a trespasser.

There must be a presumption against the government when a private individual

claims property as his or her own. It went so far as to say that the lands will be
deemed private absent contrary proof.

Cario vs Insular Government, 41 Phil 935

Facts:
An Igorot applied for the registration of a certain land. He and his
ancestors had held the land as owners for more than 50 years, which he
inherited under Igorot customs. There was no document of title issued for
the land when he applied for registration. The government contends that
the land in question belonged to the state. Under the Spanish Law, all
lands belonged to the Spanish Crown except those with permit private
titles. Moreover, there is no prescription against the Crown.

Issue: WON the land in question belonged to the Spanish Crown under the
Regalian Doctrine.

Held: No. Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted title
to his land.
The United States Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes declared:
It might perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far as
testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a
claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the
same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been
public land.
There is an existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by
Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time
immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an
exception to the theory of jura regalia.
 Mateo Cario vs The Insular Government (December 1906)
7 Phil 132 Civil Law Land Titles and Deeds Ancestral Domain
Ancestral Land Claim
Political Law Regalian Doctrine
On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cario went to the Court of Land Registration
(CLR) to petition his inscription as the owner of a 146 hectare land hes
been possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only presented
possessory information and no other documentation. The State opposed
the petition averring that the land is part of the US military reservation. The
CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo lost. Mateo
averred that a grant should be given to him by reason of immemorial use
and occupation as in the previous cases Cansino vs Valdez and Tiglao vs
Government; and that the right of the State over said land has prescribed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of
his possession of it for some time.
HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government.
The government is still the absolute owner of the land (regalian doctrine).
Further, Mateos possession of the land has not been of such a character
as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many
years. It was never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except
insignificant portions thereof, and since the insurrection against Spain it has
apparently not been used by Cario for any purpose.
While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if
he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always
insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative
officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State remained
the absolute owner.

18. Republic vs Herbieto

Facts:
Respondents are Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and David, who
filed with the MTC a single application for registration of two
parcels of land. They claimed to be owners by virtue of its purchase
from their parents
Republic filed an opposition arguing that: (1) Respondents
failed to comply with the period of adverse possession required by
law; (2) Respondents muniments of title were not genuine and did
not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide
acquisition of the Subject Lots; and (3) The Subject Lots were part of
the public domain
MTC granted the application for registration of the parcels of
land of Jeremias and David.
CA affirmed the decision of MTC holding that the subject property,
being alienable since 1963 as shown by CENRO Report dated June
23, 1963, may now be the object of prescription, thus susceptible of
private ownership.
Republic appealed to the SC contending that 1) MTC had no
jurisdiction since there was a procedural defect in filing of a single
application for two parcels of land; 2) Respondents failed to
establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, continuous, and adverse possession of the Subject Lots in the
concept of owners since 12 June 1945 or earlier.

ISSUE: W/N there is a procedural defect which resulted to MTCs

lack of jurisdiction
HELD:
YES, but not with the ground stated by the petitioner, but because
respondents, failed to comply with the publication requirements
mandated by the Property Registration Decree.
Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question
of jurisdiction of the court to hear and proceed with the case.[26]
They are not even accepted grounds for dismissal thereof
PUBLICATION: MTC did not acquire jurisdiction because
publication on the Freeman and the Banat News was only done 3
months after the hearing which renders inutile the intention of the
mandatory publication. In the instant Petition, the initial hearing
was held on 03 September 1999. While the Notice thereof was
printed in the issue of the Official Gazette, dated 02 August 1999,
and officially released on 10 August 1999, it was published in The
Freeman Banat News only on 19 December 1999, more than three
months after the initial hearing. Indubitably, such publication of the
Notice, way after the date of the initial hearing, would already be
worthless and ineffective. Whoever read the Notice as it was
published in The Freeman Banat News and had a claim to the
Subject Lots was deprived of due process for it was already too late
for him to appear before the MTC on the day of the initial hearing to
oppose respondents application for registration, and to present his
claim and evidence in support of such claim
With regard to period of possession, Respondents failed to
comply with the required period of possession of the Subject Lots
for the judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or
incomplete title. The said lots are public lands classified as alienable
and disposable only on June 25, 1963 and the respondents were
seeking for a confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title through
judicial legalization. Under Sec.48 of the Public Land Act, which is
the ruling law in this case, Respondents were not able to prove their
continuous ownership of the land since June 12, 1945 or earlier,
because said lands were only classified as alienable and disposable
only on June 25, 1963

Republic v Herbieto

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, seeking the

reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in a case which affirmed
the Judgment of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion,
Cebu, granting the application for land registration of the respondents.
Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto brothers, Jeremias
and David, who filed with the MTC a single application for registration of
two parcels of land. They claimed to be owners in fee simple of the
Subject Lots, which they purchased from their parents on 25 June 1976.
The petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed an Opposition to
the respondents application for registration of the Subject Lots arguing
that: (1) Respondents failed to comply with the period of adverse
possession of the Subject Lots required by law; (2) Respondents
muniments of title were not genuine and did not constitute competent and
sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the Subject Lots; and (3)
The Subject Lots were part of the public domain belonging to the Republic
and were not subject to private appropriation.

Issues: 1. WON MTC has jurisdiction over the case at bar.

2. WON the Subject Lots are part of the public domain and thus cannot
be subject to private appropriation.

Held:
1. No. Addressing first the issue of jurisdiction, this Court finds that the
MTC had no jurisdiction to proceed with and hear the application for
registration filed by the respondents

2. Yes. Respondents failed to comply with the required period of

possession of the Subject Lots for the judicial confirmation or legalization of
imperfect or incomplete title. Respondents application filed with the
MTC did not state the statutory basis for their title to the Subject
Lots. They only alleged therein that they obtained title to the Subject Lots
by purchase from their parents, Respondent Jeremias, in his testimony,
claimed that his parents had been in possession of the Subject Lots in the
concept of an owner since 1950. Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO
Certification, the Subject Lots are within Alienable and Disposable,
The Subject Lots are thus clearly part of the public domain, classified as
alienable and disposable as of 25 June 1963. Not being members of any
national cultural minorities, respondents may only be entitled to judicial
confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. Section 48(b), as
amended, now requires adverse possession of the land since 12 June
1945 or earlier. In the present Petition, the Subject Lots became
alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963. Any period of
possession prior to the date when the Subject Lots were classified as
alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from
the computation of the period of possession; such possession can never
ripen into ownership and unless the land had been classified as alienable
 and disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply
thereto. Hence, respondents application for registration of the Subject
Lots must have complied with the substantial requirements under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act and the procedural requirements under the
Property Registration Decree. WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the
instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, is
REVERSED. The Judgment of the MTC of Consolacion, Cebu in LRC
Case No. N-75, dated 21 December 1999, and its Order, dated 02
February 2000 are declared NULL AND VOID. Respondents
application for registration is DISMISSED.

25. Republic of the Philippines vs Iglesia ni Cristo (March 1984)

In 1978, Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) purchased a parcel of land from one

Carmen Racimo in Ilocos Norte. In 1979, INC sought to register said land
under its name pursuant to Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law. The
Director of Lands opposed the application as it averred that the said parcel
of land is part of the alienable public land; that INC cannot register said
land because it is not a Filipino citizen. INC argues that it is a private land
because Racimo, its predecessor-in-interest has been in possession
thereof for more than 30 years; that the Constitutional prohibition does not
apply to INC, a corporation sole (solely incorporated by one man, Erao
Manalo, a Filipino citizen), hence it can acquire said property.
ISSUE: Whether or not INC can register said parcel of land under its name.
HELD: No.

1. The disputed land has never lost its public character. Racimo, though
occupying said land for more than 30 years, never applied for confirmation
of incomplete or imperfect title over said land. Under the law, all lands that
were not acquired from the Government either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain. As exception to the rule would be any land
that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his
predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial, for such possession would
justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public
domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish
conquest.
2. Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law allows the registration of alienable
public lands but only by Filipino citizens. INC is not a Filipino citizen. There
is no basis on the contention that as a corporation sole, INC is not
prohibited from holding said land. The benefit only applies to Filipino
citizens not to a corporation sole which has citizenship.
NOTE: 60% rule: Corporations and Partnerships of which at least 60% of
their capital belong to Filipinos may acquire real property.

26. CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY

FACTS:
From the time of Marcos until Estrada, portions of Manila Bay were being
reclaimed. A law was passed creating the Public Estate Authority which
was granted with the power to transfer reclaimed lands. Now in this case,
PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a private
corporation. Under the Joint Venture Agreement between AMARI and PEA,
several hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands and
several portions of submerged areas of Manila Bay were going to be
transferred to AMARI .

ISSUE:
Whether or not the stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to
AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution

RULING: YES!
Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands
are classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
Section 3 of the Constitution: Alienable lands of the public domain shall be
limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not
hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease The 157.84
hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered
by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public
domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not
sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may
only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership
limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws. Clearly, the Amended
JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts whose object or purpose is
contrary to law, or whose object is outside the commerce of men, are
inexistent and void from the beginning. The Court must perform its duty to
defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended
JVA null and void ab initio.
 Francisco Chavez vs Public Estates Authority (July 2002)
The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central implementing agency
tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the
leasing and selling functions of the DENR (Department of Environmental
and Natural Resources) insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed
foreshore lands are concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and Development
Corporation, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of
the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of
submerged areas of Manila Bay to Amari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.
HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to
be transferred to Amari as private lands will sanction a gross violation of
the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands
comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the
name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15
hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain. The transfer (as embodied in a joint
venture agreement) to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34
hectares of the Freedom Islands, is void for being contrary to Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore,
since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to Amari ownership of
290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is
void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural
lands of the public domain.

27. MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MIAA) vs. CA

Try to check this out this is original. Manila International Airport Authority
(MIAA) is the operator of the Ninoy International Airport (NAIA) formerly
known as MIA (Manila International Airport) located at Paranaque City of
course.

I wonder why its name was changed in the first place when MIA has more of a
universal touch to it. Well now that President Duterte is taking over, and
obviously we can sense that he is allergic to anything Liberal Party, I wonder if
he would revert back NAIA's name to MIA. Well I hope he does. NAIA sounds
like something that is wanting to be inclusive but by it sound still is exclusive.

Thing is.. I wonder how would we refer to it. "Ah.. lets meet at the MIA
formerly know as NAIA which was formerly know as MIA". Geez funny I
remember this upperclassman friend of mine when I was still new in my
previous law school. His name's Prince. So whenever I see him at the corridor
or maybe introduce him to lady batchmates I always refer to him (in a kidding
mode) as "Prince!!.. formerly known as The Artist.. which was formerly
known as Prince" LOL. (I'm reminded of Prince.. God bless his soul) "Chip you
suck!" The guy just laughs reaches out and tickles my tummy. Ah he's such a
nice friend. Works at a big bank in Makati. The guy's a prince really. His car's
really nice. And such a nice guy too. I always saw him as an upperclassman
whose not puffed-up. Well anyway.

So what happened here was.. the Officers of Paranaque City sent notices to
MIAA due to real estate tax delinquency. MIAA then settled some of the
amount.

Now when MIAA failed to settle the entire amount, the officers of Paranaque
city threatened to levy and subject to auction the land and buildings of MIAA,
which they did.

MIAA then sought for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) from the CA but
failed to do so within the 60 days reglementary period, so the petition was
dismissed.

MIAA then sought for the TRO with the Supreme Court a day before the public
auction, MIAA was granted with the TRO but unfortunately the TRO was
received by the Paranaque City officers 3 hours after the public auction. See
what I told you? See how original this case was? I mean what on earth was
MIAA doing?? Talk about all the right moves.

MIAA claims that although the charter provides that the title of the land and
building are with MIAA still the ownership is with the Republic of the
Philippines. MIAA also contends that it is an instrumentality of the
government and as such exempted from real estate tax. So in other words,
MIAA's bone of contention and defense lie solely on the principle that the
land and buildings of MIAA are of public dominion and therefore cannot be
subjected to levy and auction sale.

Let's see if it will hold.

On the other hand, the officers of Paranaque City claim that MIAA is a GOCC
(government owned and controlled corporation) therefore not exempted to
real estate tax.

ISSUE:

Whether or not:

1. MIAA is an instrumentality of the government and not a government

owned and controlled corporation and as such exempted from tax.

2. The land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public dominion and thus
cannot be the subject of levy and auction sale.

RULING:

1. Under the Local government code, (GOCCs) government owned and

controlled corporation are NOT exempted from real estate tax.

MIAA is not a government owned and controlled corporation, for to become

one MIAA should either be a stock or non stock corporation. MIAA is not a
stock corporation for its capital is not divided into shares. It is not a non stock
corporation since it has no members.

MIAA is an instrumentality of the government vested with corporate powers

and government functions. Under the civil code, property may either be under
public dominion or private ownership. Those under public dominion are
owned by the State and are utilized for public use, public service and for the
development of national wealth. When properties under public dominion
cease to be for public use and service, they form part of the patrimonial
property of the State.

2. The court held that the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public
dominion. Since the airport is devoted for public use, for the domestic and
international travel and transportation. Even if MIAA charge fees, this is for
support of its operation and for regulation and does not change the character
of the land and buildings of MIAA as part of the public dominion.

As part of the public dominion the land and buildings of MIAA are outside the
commerce of man. To subject them to levy and public auction is contrary to
public policy. Unless the President issues a proclamation withdrawing the
airport land and buildings from public use, these properties remain to be of
public dominion and are inalienable. As long as the land and buildings are for
public use the ownership is with the Republic of the Philippines

MIAA wins this case. Well I guess it has after all the luxury to take lightly such
period prescriptions in this case. It knew very well from the start its
contentions will be very strong.

MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs. COURT OF

APPEALS G.R. No. 155650. July 20, 2006. Carpio, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Complex in Paranaque City.
As operator, MIAA administers the land, improvements and equipment
within the NAIA Complex. The MIAA Charter transferred to MIAA
approximately 600 hectares of land, including the runways and
buildings. Pursuant to the opinion of the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel (OGCC) that the LGC of 1991 withdrew the
exemption from the real estate tax granted to MIAA, the local
government of Paranaque demanded MIAA to pay its real estate tax
delinquencies. MIAA failed to pay. Thereupon, the city of Paranaque
arranged for the public sale of the airport lands and buildings of MIAA.
The latter filed an urgent ex-parte and motion for TRO before the Court
questioning the validity of the demand of the city of Paranaque for it to
pay real estate tax.
 ISSUE: Whether MIAA is a government-owned and controlled
corporation with a special charter.

HELD: NO. There is no dispute that a government-owned or controlled

corporation (GOCC) is not exempt from real estate tax. However, the
Court ruled that MIAA is NOT a GOCC. Firstly, under the Administrative
Code, a GOCC is defined as any agency organized as a stock or
nonstock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs
whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the
Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or,
where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at
least 51% of its capital stock. MIAA is not organized as a stock or non-
stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no
capital stock divided into shares. MIAA has no stockholders or voting
shares. While MIAA has capital, it is not divided into shares of stock and
hence it is not a stock corporation. MIAA is also NOT a non-stock
corporation because it has no members. The Court opined that even if
we assume that the government is considered as the sole member of
MIAA, this will not make MIAA a non-stock corporation. Non-stock
corporations cannot distribute any part of their income to their members.
Moreover, it was said that MIAA is not organized for any of the
purposes that a non-stock corporation is established under the
Corporation Code, namely charitable, religious, educational,
professional, cultural, recreational, fraternal, literary, scientific, social,
civil service or similar purposes. Rather, it is organized to operate an
international and domestic airport for public use. Hence, the Court noted
that MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers
to perform efficiently its governmental functions. Pursuant to this ruling,
it was noted that MIAA does not need to meet the two conditions set
forth by the Constitution for GOCCs with special charters, to wit: (1) that
it must be established for common good; and (2) that it must meet the
test of economic viability. The second test is further elucidated as one
that applies to GOCCs that perform economic or commercial activities
and need to compete in the market place. Economic viability refers to
more than financial viability but also includes capability to make profit
and generate benefits not quantifiable in financial terms. MIAA, a
government instrumentality vested with corporate powers and
performing governmental or public functions, need NOT meet the test of
economic viability. These instrumentalities need not be economically
viable since the government may even subsidize their entire operations
 for they perform essential public services for the common good.
Comment [c1]: Requisites or elements of a stock corporation: (1) it must
have a capital stock; (2) the capital stock must be divided into shares:
(3) it is distributed to its stockholders. Comment [c2]: Requisites of a
non-stock corporation: (1) it must have members; (2) it cannot distribute
its income to its members: (3) it is organized for charitable, religious,
educational, professional, etc. purposes.

28. RAMOS VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS- Adverse Possession

The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of
land under the claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all,
if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another.

FACTS:
Restituo Romero gained possession of a considerable tract of land located
in Nueva Ecija. He took advantage of the Royal Decree to obtain a
possessory information title to the land and was registered as such.

Parcel No. 1 included within the limits of the possessory information title of
Romero was sold to Cornelio Ramos, herein petitioner.

Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered.

Director of Lands opposed on the ground that Ramos had not acquired a
good title from the Spanish government.

Director of Forestry also opposed on the ground that the first parcel of land
is forest land.
It has been seen however that the predecessor in interest to the petitioner
at least held this tract of land under color of title.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the
instrument giving color of title sufficient to give title to the entire tract of
land?

HELD:
The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of
land under the claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all,
if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another.
The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith and he has open,
peaceable, and notorious possession of a portion of the property, sufficient
to apprise the community and the world that the land was for his
enjoyment.

Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have
his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in
possession.
Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the requirements of the law
on supposition that the premises consisted of agricultural public land.

On the issue of forest land, Forest reserves of public land can be

established as provided by law. When the claim of the citizen and the claim
of the government as to a particular piece of property collide, if the
Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the
Director of Forestry should submit to the court convincing proof that the
land is not more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes.

In this case, the mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General
for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not
stop the courts from giving title to the claimant.
Petitioner and appellant has proved a title to the entire tract of land for
which he asked for registration.
Registration in the name of the petitioner is hereby granted.

Ramos Vs. Director Of Land

Facts:
In 1882, Restituto Romero y Ponce apparently gained possession of a
tract of land located in the municipality of San Jose, Province of Nueva
Ecija.
Ponce obtained a possessory information title of the land (by taking
advantage of the Maura Law or Royal Decree of Feb. 13, 1994) and
registered the land in 1896.
In 1907, the part of the land (Parcel 1) was sold by Ponce to petitioner
Ramos and to his wife Ambrosia Salamanca.
Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered.
 The Director of Lands and Director of Forestry opposed the application
on the following grounds: Ramos had not acquired a good title from the
Spanish government; The first parcel was forest land.
RTC and CA ruled against Ramos.
It has been seen however that the predecessor in interest to Ramos at
least held this tract of land under color of title.

Issue: Is that actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the

instrument giving color of title sufficient to give title to the entire tract of
land?

Held: YES.
The doctrine of constructive possession indicates the answer. The general
rule is that the possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract under claim
of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not
in the adverse possession of another.

Ramos has a color of title, is in good faith and had been in OPN
possesion
The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith; and he has had open,
peaceable, and notorious possession of a portion of the property, sufficient
to apprise the community and the world that the land was for his
enjoyment.

Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have
his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in
possession. Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the
requirements of the law on the supposition that he premises consisted of
agricultural public land.

Important law: Act NO. 926

Subsection 6 of section 54, of Act No. 926, entitled The Public Land Law,
as amended by Act No. 1908, reads as follows:

6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors and interest have

been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act of Congress
of July 1, 1902, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the
Government, for a period of 10 years next preceding the twenty-sixth day of
July, nineteen hundred and four (July 26, 1904), except when prevented by
war or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a government grant and to have received the
same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the
provisions of this chapter.

There was no satisfactory evidence to support the claim that the land
is a forest land
Forest reserves of public land can be established as provided by law.
When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the Government as to a
particular piece of property collide, if the Government desires to
demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry
should submit to the court convincing proof that the land is not more
valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes.

Great consideration, it may be stated, should, and undoubtedly will be, paid
by the courts to the opinion of the technical expert who speaks with
authority on forestry matters. But a mere formal opposition on the part of
the Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by
satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the
claimant.

Ruling:
Ramos proved a title to the entire tract of land for which he asked
registration, under the provisions of subsection 6, of section 54, of Act
No. 926, as amended by Act No. 1908, with reference to the Philippine
Bill and the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, and Ponces
possessory information.
RTC shall register in the name of the applicant the entire tract in parcel
No. 1, as described in plan Exhibit A.