Labour Law

LABOUR LAW
Anand Prakash*
Revised by Dr. S S. Jaswal''
General Introduction
The law relating to labour in India deals mainly with the regulation of the
contract of employment under which the servant, or the employee,
undertakes to work for his master, or the employer, for hire or reward.
Under the concepts of law, which, under British rule, were imported into
India from the common law of England, this relationship was treated mainly
as a contractual relationship. The Indian Contract Act, 1872 is based mainly
on the law of contract as interpreted by courts of law in England. In
interpreting the provisions of this Act, the courts in India borrowed heavily
from the case law of English courts.
The central doctrine, which runs through the law of contract, is that the
parties are free to make their own contracts. The relationship between
master and servant is a voluntary relationship into which the parties may
enter on terms laid down by themselves within the limitations imposed only
by the general law of contract. 1 The law of contract, however, assumes that
there is equal freedom in the parties to enter into a contract, but shuts its
eyes to the inequality inherent in the employment relationship. It ignores the
superior economic strength and the bargaining power of the employer vis-a
vis the person who has to make a living getting employment, or perhaps
starves. Workers have sought to redress the balance in this sphere through
their organizational strength, by forming themselves into trade union and
adopting the device of collective bargaining. They have also sought
legislative protection and privilages by exercise of their political power, and
thus persuaded the state to intervene effectively on their behalf by providing
for matters like safety, health and welfare, regulation of hours of work, leave
and holidays and social security. And, depending upon their organizational
strength, have also sought regulatory legislation for protection and
enhancement of their material well-being and security of their employment.
* Formerly Honorary Professor, Indian Law Institute, New Delhi; Senior Advocate,
Supreme Court of India, New Delhi.
** Asst. Research Professor, Indian Law Institute, New Delhi.
1. Mansfield Cooper and J.C. Wood, Outlines ofIndustrial Law, 3rd ed., 1958, p. 2.
392 INDIAN LEGAL SYSTEM
In India, legislation relating to labour has grown mainly in the twentieth

century. Till the First World War, such legislation was scanty. In the inter-
war years, that is, between 1919 and 1939, some essential legislation for the
protection of labour was introduced. But the law relating to labour, as we
know it today, is mostly the product of the legislation passed after, or soon
before India achieved political independence in 1947.
It may, broadly, be stated that labour law of India has given the go-bye
to the doctrine of freedom of contract, or laissez-faire, and has recognized
the need for giving adequate legal protection to labour. Labour legislation in
India has now become an important part of that social and economic
legislation in India, which derived its inspiration for the recognition of the
wider responsibilities, which the state has undertaken to protect the
economically weaker sections of the community. These are often summed
up under the convenient heading of the 'welfare state', whose responsibility
it is to assure to its citizens not only physical liberty to pursue their
avocations according to their liking, and political liberty to choose their own
government at reasonable intervals, but also assure social well-being and
economic and material opportunities to make the foregoing liberties
meaningful and effective.
The ideals of the welfare state are embedded in the directive principles
of state policy enunciated in the Constitution of the Republic of India.
These directives principles emphasise the responsibility of the state to
secure just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief; public
assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement and
in other cases of undeserved want; protection of the health and strength of
workers, and avoiding circumstances which force citizens to enter
avocations unsuited to their age or strength. These directive principles also
place the responsibility on the state to strive to secure work, a living wage, a
decent standard of living; leisure and social and cultural opportunities for
people, which, it is axiomatic, must be available for all sections of people,
including the working class. The Constitution of India also protects the right
of labour to form associations and unions by enshrining it as a fundamental
right. These directive principles and fundamental rights already formed the
ethos and c o m m i t m e n t of the national m o v e m e n t for political
independence, and had found expression in several resolutions of the Indian
National Congress and the reports of the National Planning Committee
under the Chairmanship of Jawaharlal Nehru. Soon after, and even before,
power was formally transferred to Indian hands in 1947; these principles
were implemented with vigor in the field of labour legislations in India,
adding greatly to the scanty legislation that existed on the subject previous
to 1947.
The main source of labour law in India is legislation, but it is
supplemented by judgments of courts, delivered particularly in the sphere of
adjudication of industrial disputes.
LABOUR LAW 393
It will be convenient to divide the subject into certain broad categories.

It will be wrong, however, to think of these categories as watertight
compartments. As a matter of fact, they overlap, and the division of the
subject into various heads may at best be considered helpful for the
understanding of the main feature of labour law in the country.
The earliest attempt of the government, or the state, to intervene in the
field of labour, was through certain protective measures to provide for the
health and the safety of the Indian worker, and to regulate hours of work in
factories and other places of employment. Improvements have been made in
this respect from time to time and are a continuing process. Such legislation
may be conveniently dealt with under the heading of legislation relating to
health, welfare, working conditions and hours of work including leave and
holidays of the Indian worker. The next important heading under which
labour legislation can be dealt with is 'social security' under which we shall
consider Acts like the Workmen's Compensation Act, the Employees' State
Insurance Act, Maternity Benefit Act, and legislation dealing with retrial
benefits. Legislation and judicial decisions relating to wages, bonus
allowances, fringe benefits, regulation of contract labour and other such
matters would be another branch of the labour code of India. Lastly, we
shall examine legislation and case law relating to trade unions and trade or
industrial disputes, which have assumed greater and greater importance, as
the state has sought to encourage trade unions and regulate industrial
conflict by providing machinery for settlement, arbitration and adjudication
of industrial disputes, and imposed restrictions on strikes and lock out, and
the ordinary common law right of the employer to hire and fire employees,
taking disciplinary action against them or change their conditions of service
at his sweet will.
LEGISLATION RELATING TO
WORKING CONDITIONS
General
Legislation on working conditions comprises Acts dealing with subjects like

hours of work, rest days, restrictions on employment of women and young
persons, safety, health and welfare. Such legislation lays down certain
standards w h i c h are t h e n enforced t h r o u g h appropriate inspection
machinery and penal measures. Generally speaking, the standards laid down
in the various Acts are minimum standards, with provision for exemptions
in suitable cases, leaving scope through collective bargaining or industrial
adjudication to improve these standards in appropriate cases.
The basic and the most important legislation, with the longest history, is
the legislation relating to factories, now incorporated in the Factories Act,
1948, which regulates working conditions in factories where manufacturing

process is carried with or without the aid of power. The next in importance
from the point of view of number of workmen employed is the Mines Act,
1952, which regulates working conditions in mines. The Plantation Labour
Act, 1951 has also a long history and applies to labour employed on land
used for growing tea, coffee, rubber, cinchona, or any other plant and
connected offices, etc. In addition to the above, there are Acts dealing with
special categories of labour like the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961,
which covers all persons employed in transport undertakings engaged in
carrying passengers and goods or both by motor vehicles; the Indian Dock
Labourers Act, 1934, and the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment)
Act, 1948, which deals with dock labour; the Indian Railways Act, 1890,
which deals with rail labour, and the Working Journalists (Conditions of
Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, which lays down the
conditions of service of a highly specialized class of employees called
'working journalist'. Besides there, the Shops and Establishments Acts of
the various states lay down the working conditions of employees in shops
and commercial establishments, which generally means places where goods
are sold by retail or whole-sale or where business is carried on. In this
category of employment will fall employees in places like offices, shops,
hostels, cinema halls, theatres etc.
Hours of work of adults
The broad pattern in the above Acts with regard to hours of work of
adults is 48 hours work in a week, with a maximum of 9 hours work in a day,
and a compulsory day of rest in the week which should generally be Sunday.
There are also restrictions on spread-over of hours of work, which vary,
generally speaking, between 10-1/2 hours to 12 hours in a day depending
upon the nature of the industry. If any worker is required to work beyond
the above maximum hours, he has to be compensated for such over-time
work generally at the rate of twice the ordinary rate of wages. Such overtime
work is, however, subject to certain maximum limits during the week.
The above is the general pattern. However, there are special restrictions
on h o u r s of w o r k in certain hazardous or m o r e o n e r o u s jobs like
underground mining, where hours of work are more severally restricted, or
in highly intellectual employments, like that of working journalists for whom
the h o u r s of w o r k are as low as 144 hours during a p e r i o d of four
consecutive weeks, or 36 hours a week. Plantations have longer permissible
hours of work, the normal work allowed in a week being fifty-four hours,
with no limit on the number of hours worked on a particular day.
Statutes on the matter of working hours generally lay down only
maximum limits. There are industries and particularly offices not attached to
factories where the hours of work are less-may be as low as 36 hours per
LABOUR LAW 395
week- as a result of custom, usage, contract, settlement or award of

industrial tribunals. Although statutes generally provide for payment at the
overtime rate for hours of work worked in excess of the statutory limits, the
general practice in cases where the actual hours of work are below the
statutory limit is to pay at a higher rate for any hours of work beyond those
prevalent in the establishment, although the rate of overtime payment in
such cases upto the statutory limit is generally less, say one and a half or one
and a quarter time the ordinary rate, as against twice the ordinary rate for
overtime work in excess of the statutory maximum hours of work. 2
Restrictions on working hours and conditions for women and young

persons
There are further restrictions in the matter of hours of work of young

persons and women. For example, under the Factories Act, 1948, no woman
shall be employed in any factory between 6 p.m. and 7 a.m. and no
exemption with regard to daily hours of work can be granted by the chief
inspector of factories, as he may grant for male workers. There shall further
be no change of shifts in their case except after a weekly holiday or any
other holiday. Employment of children below the age of 14 years has been
completely prohibited. Further, a child who has completed his fourteenth
year or is an adolescent, who has been defined as a person w h o has
completed his fifteenth year of age but has not completed his eighteenth
year, shall not be required or allowed to work in a factory unless he is
certified to be fit to work by the certifying surgeon appointed under the Act.
N o child shall be employed or permitted to work in any factory for more
than four and a half hours in a day or by night. Further, no adolescent who
has not attained the age of seventeen years shall be employed or permitted
to work in any factory during night.
In the mines the restrictions on employment or women and children
and adolescents are even more stringent. T h u s , no w o m a n shall be
employed in any mine below ground nor in any mine above ground except
between the hours of 6 a.m. and 7 p.m. Moreover, every woman employed
in a mine above ground shall be allowed an interval of rest of not less than
eleven hours between the termination of employment on any one day and
the commencement of the next period of employment. With regard to
young persons, it is provided that no child, who is defined as a person who
has not completed his fifteen years, shall be employed in a mine nor shall
any child to be allowed to be present in any part of a mine which is below
ground, or in any open cast working in which any mining operation is being
2. Workmen ofOverseas Airways Corporation v. British Overseas Airways Corporation (1962) I

LLJ 257 SC and Karam Chana Thapar & Bros. Ltd. and Others v. Their Workmen (1964)
I LLJ 429.
carried on. An adolescent, who is a person between the ages of fifteen and
eighteen years, may, however, be permitted to work in a mine subject to
certain restrictions. Thus, no adolescent shall be allowed to work in any part
of a mine which is below ground unless he has completed his sixteenth year,
and has been certified to be fit for working below ground by the certifying
surgeon appointed under the Act. Moreover, he shall not be allowed to work
except between 6 a.m. to 6 p. m. and must have an interval of rest of at least
half and hour after every four and a half hours of continuous work on any
day. With regard to above ground work, it has been provided that no
adolescent who has not been granted a medical certificate certifying that he
is fit for work as an adult, shall be employed or be permitted to be employed
above ground in a mine for more than four and a half hours in any day or
between the hours of 6 p.m. and 6 a.m.
On the plantations, the restrictions on employment of women and
young persons are less stringent than under the Mines Act, or even the
Factories Act, naturally, because they work in the open and the hazard to
their health is not so much. Employment of women, except midwives and
nurses and of a child worker, that is a person who has not completed his
fifteenth year is, however, completely prohibited except with the permission
of the state government. N o child who has completed his twelfth year or an
adolescent, i.e., who has completed his sixteenth year but not completed his
eighteenth year, shall be required or allowed to work unless he has been
certified as fir to work by the certifying surgeon appointed under the Act.
Restrictions on employment of young persons and their hours of work
are also placed in respect of motor transport industry under the Motor
Transport Workers Act. The Shops and Establishments Acts of the various
states also generally place such restrictions on employment of women and
children. With regard to employment of children there was also a special Act
called the Employment of Children Act, 1938, which was repealed by the
Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986. This Act provides that
no child who has not completed his fourteen year shall be employed or
p e r m i t t e d to w o r k in any occupation connected w i t h t r a n s p o r t of
passengers, goods or mails by railway. The Act clearly lays down that no
child will be allowed to work for more than three hours of work before he
has had an interval of rest for at least one hour. Once a week he will be
given a holiday. N o child will be allowed to work between 7 p.m. and 8 a.m.
N o over time will be permitted. The Act states that the government can
make rules for the health and safety of children who are permitted to work
in any establishment. These rules can be provided for matters such as
cleanliness, ventilation, dust and fumes, lighting, drinking water and sanitary
facilities etc. The penalty for violation of the Act will range from three
months to one year of imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 20,000.
Part '' of the schedule has added one more process into existing list and
LABOUR LAW 397
that is "building and construction industry". All other provisions are similar
to the ones already existing in the Act of 1938. Finally, as early as 1933, the
evil of pledging of child labour was outlawed under the Children (Pledging
of Labour) Act, 1933, whereby any agreement under which the parent or
guardian of a child, in return for any benefit received or to be received by
him undertook to cause or allow the services of a child to be utilized in any
employment was declared to be void. The ban under the Act does not apply
t o such agreement as is made without detriment to the child and for
reasonable wages and is terminable at not more than one week's notice.
Weekly day of rest, holidays and leave

(i) Weekly rest day
There is a provision in almost all statutes with regard to a weekly day of rest,
which generally should be on a Sunday. Workers who are deprived of their
day of rest are, generally, to be given a substituted rest day in such manner
that they do not work continuously for more then ten days. Although all
statutes do not necessarily provide for payment for the rest dayfor
example, the Factories Act and the Mines Act provide for rest day but not
for payment for such rest day. However, the trend in recent legislation is to
provide such payment. Even in mines and factories the standing orders
framed under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946,
generally provide for payment for the rest day. Moreover, the Minimum
Wages Act, wherever applicable, makes payment for the weekly rest day
compulsory. So also do the Shops and Establishments Acts of various
states. Wherever payment for rest day is not provided for by legislation,
tribunals to w h o m references may be made in this regard under the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 have, through their awards, generally speaking,
required employers to pay their workmen for the weekly rest day. It would,
therefore, be broadly correct to say that the Indian worker is not only
entitled to a rest day every week, but also for payment of full wages for the
said rest day.
(ii) Holidays
Apart from weekly rest day, through legislation by various states, but more
often by practice or through awards of industrial tribunals, provision has
also been made for grant of festival holidays to employees, the exact
quantum of which, however, varies in accordance with the industry and the
region. There has, however, lately been a tendency to reduce the number of
such holidays wherever permissible, but without making any drastic
changes. 3
3. Pfizer (P) Ltd. v. Its Workmen (1962) I LLJ 543: AIR 1963 SC 1103 and Bijli Cotton
Mills (P) Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal 1972 (II) LLJ 320: AIR 1972 SC
1903.
(Hi) Leave
Practically all statutes provide for minimum annual leave with wages at the
rate of one day's leave for every 20 days of work for employees who have
worked 240 days or more in the previous year. This does not preclude,
however, more generous standards of leave being provided by awards,
collective agreements, contracts of service or custom and usage. The
Factories Act provides that every worker who has worked for 240 days or
more in the previous year, will be allowed leave with wages in the
subsequent year at the rate of one day for every 20 days of work performed
by him during the previous calendar year. In the case of a child, the
quantum of leave allowed is at a higher rate being one day for every 15 days
of work performed during the previous calendar year. The Mines Act
provides for similar leave benefits, except that persons employed below
ground are to be allowed leave at the rate of one day for every 15 days of
work performed by them. The leave standards for motor transport workers
are the same for adults as under the Factories Act, while an adolescent
motor transport worker is entitled to one day of leave for every 15 days of
work during the previous year. The Plantation Labour Act, 1951, makes
provision for annual leave with wages calculated at the rate of one day for
every 20 days of work performed by an adult and one day for every 15 days
of work performed by a young person. Similarly, the various Shops Acts also
make provision for leave, with wages, or privilege leave, as it is sometimes
called, at the rate of one day's leave for 20 days of work performed.
Generally speaking, under all statutes, the leave entitlements under them are
the minimum and not the maximum. The employees are entitled to more
leave, if so allowed under any contract, custom, usage, settlement, agreement
or award applicable to them. 4
Accumulation of leave is generally allowed to the extent of two years'
leave entitlement. Encashment of such leave is allowed only at the time of
termination of service by the employer, and in case of resignation, only
where the employee had applied for leave but had not been granted leave by
his employer. Restrictions are generally placed on the manner of availment
of such leave so that normal work is not disrupted. Most Acts, therefore,
require that sufficient notice of such leave should be given by the employee.
Most statutes do not provide for casual and sick leave, except for special
Acts in various states. Casual and sick leave is, however, generally provided
in the certified standing orders which are applicable to establishments which
employ 100 workmen or more. Moreover, when disputes with regard to
casual or sick leave are referred to tribunals or labour courts, they are
generally favorably inclined to provide for such leave, particularly if practice
4. Alembic Chemical Works Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen (1961) ILLJ 328: AIR 1961 SC 647.
LABOUR LAW 399
with regard to the same is prevalent in other establishments in the region

and the industry. Several states have also passed legislation for minimum
casual and sick leave to be provided to workers working in industrial
establishments. As a general rule, it may, therefore, be stated that there is
practice in Indian industry for grant of casual and sick leave in addition to
earned or privilege leave, although its exact quantum varies according to the
industry and the region.
Health, welfare and safety
Almost all the Acts and/or rules framed thereunder make it obligatory
on the employers to provide certain minimum welfare facilities for the
workers, such facilities varying in detail with the nature of each industry. It
is also well accepted that one of the primary duties of the modern industrial
state is to protect the worker against physical and health hazards to which
he may otherwise be exposed on account of his employment. The law on
this subject is contained in the Acts dealing with various employments and
differs with each employment. For detailed provisions in this regard, the
reader may turn to the statutory provisions contained in the enactments
governing various employments.
II
SOCIAL SECURITY
General
Hitherto, we have dealt with certain safeguards that have been provided to
labour in matters such as safety, hours of work, leave, health and welfare.
Such safeguards are perhaps a general feature in all industrial stages,
although the means by which such safeguards are provided may differ from
country to country, and the nature of the safeguards also inevitably differs
with the economic, social and industrial advancements of the country
concerned. We shall, however, now deal with another, and somewhat allied,
subject-the subject of social security-in which the ideas and ideals of the
'welfare state' as we know it today have found more concrete expression. In
this field, as we shall notice, although a modicum of social security was
p r o v i d e d t o the Indian w o r k e r even before India achieved political
i n d e p e n d e n c e , m o s t of the progress has been made in the post-
independence era only.
We shall now deal briefly with the various Acts bearing on social
security for the industrial worker.
The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923
The earliest legislative measure by which a modicum of social security was

provided to the Indian worker was through the Workmen's Compensation

Act, 1923. As originally passed, the Act was limited in its scope, but by
subsequent amendments, the scope has been extended, and certain
loopholes plugged. The first major amendment in the Act was carried out as
a result of the Report of the Royal Commission on Labour in India, which
recommended that the Act should be extended to cover as completely as
possible the workers in organized industry, and should be gradually
extended to workers in less organized employment, beginning with those
who are exposed to more risks. As a result of these recommendations, the
Act was amended in 1933, thereby substantially modifying the Act of 1923
in scope, title to compensation, amount of compensation, and classes of
dependents entitled to compensation and benefits payable under the Act.
Since then, amendments have been carried out in the Act from time to time.
Large section of the Indian workers earning salary not exceeding Rs. 1,000 a
month, are protected by the Workmen's Compensation Act or other
ancillary legislation which extends the operation of the Act to other
employments or provides for alternative ways of safeguarding the employees
who suffer injury, or contract disease, during the course of, and arising out
of, their employment. The minimum amount of compensation payable
under the Workman's Compensation Act, has been enhanced from Rs.
50,000/- to Rs. 80,000/- in case of death and from Rs. 60,000/- to Rs.
90,000/- in case of permanent total disablement with effect from 8-12-
2000. 5 F r o m the same date ceiling of the m a x i m u m a m o u n t of
compensation has been doubled from Rs. 2.28 lakhs to Rs. 4.56 lakhs in case
of death and from Rs. 2.74 lakhs to Rs. 5.48 lakhs in case of permanent total
disablement. 6
The Act gives s t a t u t o r y recognition t o t h e need for adequate
compensation to workmen, in cases where personal injury is caused to them
by accident arising out of, and in the course of, their employment. The
employer would not, however, be liable to pay such compensation where
the injury does not result in the total or partial disablement of the workman
for a period exceeding three days. Ordinarily, the employer is not liable to
pay any compensation where the injury complained of is the result of an
accident which is directly attributable to the workman having been at the
time thereof under the influence of drinks or drugs; or his having willfully
disobeyed an order expressly given or a rule expressly framed for the
purpose of securing his safety, or having willfully removed or disregarded
any safety guard or other device which he knew to have been provided for
the purpose of securing the safety of the workmen. Except in such cases,
the workman would be entitled to compensation as provided under the Act,
provided he is able to establish that the injury was caused owing to an
5. Gazette of India, 8.12.2000 Part , S. 4 (Extra).

6. See Annual Repon 2003-2004 (Ministry of Labour, Government of India), p. 3; also
see, Thomas Paul, XXXIX ASIL (2003), p. 537.
LABOUR LAW 401
accident arising out of, and in the course of, his employment. Even these
defences are not open to an employer for avoiding liability in cases where
the injury has resulted in the death of the workman. This is for the reason
that the deceased workman's dependents must be provided for in any event,
and should not undergo acute suffering due to the default of the earning
member which brought about his death.
The expression "arising out of" suggests the cause of accident and the
expression 'in the course of points out to the place and circumstances
under which the accident takes place at the time when it occurred. A casual
connection or association between the injury by accident and employment is
necessary. The onus is on the claimant to prove that accident arose out of
and in the course of employment. 7
Where the workman died due to natural lightning while working at
the site, it was held by the Supreme Court that in order to succeed in
his claim for compensation, it is no doubt, that the accident must have
causal connection with the employment and arise out of it; but if the
workman is injured as a result of natural force of lightning, though it in
itself has no connection with employment of deceased, the employer can
still be held liable if the claimant shows that the employment exposed the
deceased to such injury. In the present case the deceased was working on
the site and would not have been exposed to such hazard of lighting had she
not been working so. Therefore, the appellant was held liable to pay
compensation. 8
In another case,9 a person was employed as a driver of the bus. He died
of heart failure at a bus stop where he stepped out to have refreshment. His
widow claimed compensation, which was awarded by the Commissioner of
W o r k m e n ' s Compensation against the insured employer and not the
insurance company. O n appeal, the single judge of the high court held that
both the insurance company and the employer are jointly and severally liable
to pay compensation. And therefore, two appeals were filed, one by the
insurance company and the other by the employer. It was held by the
division bench of the high court that the connection between accident and
employment might be established if the strain had contributed to or
accelerated the accident. If probabilities were in favour of the applicant,
then, the Commissioner of Workmen's Compensation was justified in
inferring that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment.
In this case there could be no dispute that the driver died in the course of
his employment since there was no occasion for him to be at the bus stand
7. M/s Chowgate and Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Smt Felicidate AIR 1970 Goa 127.
8. State ofRajasthan v. Ram Prasad and Another (2001) 1 LLJ 177 (SC).
9. Divisional Manager, United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanmuga Mudliar T. and others
(2003) 1 LLJ. 776 (Mad.).
(where he died) unless he had been driving the bus. The death was capable
of being attributed to the strain ordinarily inherent in the discharge of his
duty.
The liability of the employer under the Act is conceptually quite
different from the liability under the tort. The Act should be construed in a
broad and liberal manner. Therefore, the death of a bus driver of a state
road transport corporation who sustains heart attack and collapsed while
changing destination name board is death arising out of and in the course of
employment. 10
Apart from compensation for personal injury caused to workmen arising
out of and in the course of their employment, the Act also provides for
compensation to the workmen who contract any occupational disease
peculiar to the employment in which they are employed. In the case of
certain occupational disease, the law presumes that if a workman has been
employed in a particular employment for a continuous period of not less
than six m o n t h s , and the occupational disease is peculiar t o that
employment, the contracting of the disease must have been caused by his
being employed therein unless the contrary is proved. Detailed provisions
are made in the Act to deal with situations where the workman may have
served with more than one employer, in which case the responsibility of the
particular employer for the disease may have to be determined. Except in
cases where presumption may arise as aforesaid, in respect of disease
peculiar to particular employments for which a schedule is provided under
the Act, the workman can claim compensation from the employer for any
disease only if he proves that the disease is directly attributable to a specific
injury or accident arising out of and in the court of his employment.
The Act makes detailed provisions for determining the employer who is
liable to pay compensation under the Act, and places the responsibility for
payment of compensation primarily on the person on whose establishment
the person concerned was working at the time of his injury or death. Thus,
in the case of persons employed through contractors, the owner of the
establishment is made responsible for payment of compensation, although
he may, in turn, recover the compensation so paid from the contractor.
Moreover, the workman is given a double protection for recovery of
c o m p e n s a t i o n due to him in such cases. H e may choose to recover
compensation from the contractor instead of from the principal employer,
as there is no bar under the Act for his doing so.
C o m p e n s a t i o n is provided for under the Act for the following
contingencies:
(a) where death results from the injury;
10. Zubeda Bano and others v. Maharastra S. R.TCorpn and Others (1991) 1 LLJ 66 (Bom.).
LABOUR LAW 403
(b) where total disablement, temporary or permanent, results from the

injury; and
(c) where there is temporary disablement, total or partial, due to the
injury.
The employer is bound to pay the compensation as soon as it falls due.
If he does not accept the liability for compensation to the extent claimed, he
is bound, under pain of penalty, to make provisional payment to the extent
of the liability which he accepts, without prejudice to the right of the
workman to make any further claim against him. All claims relating to
compensation payable under the Act are to be decided by a commissioner
appointed under the Act.
The date of payment of compensation falling due shall be the date of
accident. 11 The liability to pay interest arises as soon as the injury is caused
to the workman. 12 Further, if the commissioner considers the delay by the
employer in payment of any compensation due as unjustified, he may
impose a penalty not exceeding fifty percent of the amount of compensation
due.
The most usual cases which have gone to the courts relating t o
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act arise out of the
controversy as to whether an accident has arisen out of, and in the course
of, employment of a workman. In this connection, cases decided by the
English courts have often been relied upon by the courts in India. The tests
applied relate to time, place and casual relationship. The test of time is
applied to find out whether the accident happened while the workman was
engaged in duties directly arising out of, or incidental to, his employment.
The test of place is applied to determine whether the accident occurred on,
or near, the premises which are under the control of the employer, or at
which he normally carries on his trade or business. The casual relationship
appears to be the most important and controversial matter and has regard to
the question whether there is sufficient link between the employment and
the injury.
The Employers' Liability Act, 1938
Even when the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 was on the statute
book, the legislature in 1938 passed the Employers' Liability Act, providing
that if personal injury is caused to a workman by reason of the negUgence of
the employer or his servant, the suit of the employee for damages will not
be defeated on this account. Thus, the notorious doctrine of 'common
employment' which imputed to the worker an intention to assume certain
risks of injury, especially those caused by fellow-workers, was abolished by
11. Superintending Engineer KEB Hubli v. Kadappa MaUappa (1984) 1 LLJ 179 (Kara.).
12. Madan Mohan Verma v. Mohan Lai (1983) LLJ 322 (All).
statute in India as far back as 1938, while in England such abolition took
place as late as in 1948 by the Law Reforms (Personal Injuries) Act. 1948.13
The Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948
The Employees' State Insurance Act of 1948 seeks to replace the benefits as
available to the workmen under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, by
a more comprehensive scheme not only of accident benefit, but for other
contingencies like sickness, maternity and funeral expenses. The Act applies,
in the first instance, to all factories other than seasonal factories, including
factories belonging to the government, but the appropriate government is
a u t h o r i z e d , in consultation with the E m p l o y e e s ' State Insurance
Corporation, after complying with the needful formalities, to extend the
provisions of the Act to any o t h e r establishment or classes of
establishments- industrial, commercial, agricultural or otherwise.
The definition of 'employee' under the Act is wide so as to include
within the ambit of the Act all persons employed in the establishment of the
employer, whether directly or through an intermediary and even taken on
hire from other employer. There has also been notional extension of the
definition to include all employee connected with the administration of the
factory or establishment covered by the Act including those concerned with
the sales or purchases relating to the factory or establishment. 1 4 In
Pondkherry State Weaver's Co op. Society v. Regional Director, Employees'State
Insurance Corporation, Madras15 the question was whether the provisions of
the Act are applicable to Weavers' Co-operative Society whose workers are
shareholders of the society. It was held that a co-operative society, on
registration, becomes a body corporate with a perpetual succession and it is
legally independent of its members who constitute the society. Once the
society is independent of its members and has a separate legal existence
apart from its members, then there is no bar for the society employing its
members. And if such members are employed, they are entitled to be
covered by the Employees State Insurance Act.
In Kunnathunad C.S. Co-operative Society v. Regional Director, E.S.I, C.16 it
was held that a co-operative society is a separate legal entity distinct from its
m e m b e r s . Hence a society employing its m e m b e r s for wage in
manufacturing process is liable to be covered under the Act. Further, the
branch office of Brooke Bond engaged in buying the exporting tea was held
to be covered by the definition of shop for the purposes of notification
13. O. Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law, 1972, p. 17.

14. Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Products etc. v. E.S.I. Court & Others (1978) ILLJ 181.
15. (1983) I LLJ 17 (Mad.).
16. (1989) I LLJ 11 (Ker.).
LABOUR LAW 405
under Section 1 (5) of the Act. 17

The premises where the businesses of undertaking electrical w o r k
contracts in the factories and other places of customers was carried on is a
shop and the Act applies by virtue of the notification issued by Karnataka
Government extending the provisions of the Act to shop. 18
In Balachandra Aggrawal and another v. Union of India and others19 the
p e t i t i o n e r ' s firm was registered under the West Bengal Shops and
Establishments Act, 1963 as a commercial establishment. The Employees
State Insurance Act, 1948 was made applicable to the firm which was
challenged by it. It was held by the high court that the petitioner's
establishment is engaged in rendering services to its customers by providing
technical services and such selling of services by the firm brings the
establishment within the purview of section 1(5) of the Employees' State
Insurance Act, 1948.
The provisions of the Act have to be construed liberally.
Where the driver employed by the transport corporation to drive the
truck on payment of remuneration for each trip is employed in connection
with its business, it was held that he comes within the definition of
employee under the Act.20 Injodhpur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Karamchari
Rajya Beema Nigam and another21 it was observed that the central government
by a notification extended the provisions of the Employees State Insurance
Act to H a n u m a n g a r h T o w n and therefore the insurance scheme was
applicable in this area also. The appellant contended before the high court
that it was not a factory and as such its employees were not covered by the
Employees State Insurance Scheme. It was held by the high court that the
term 'employee' in section 2 (9) of the Act was not confined to those
employed in a factory but extended as well to those engaged in w o r k
incidental or preliminary to work of establishment. Hence the appellant was
held liable under the Act.
In Saraswati Films v. Regional Director E.S.I. Corporation, Trkhur22 security
guards in cinema hall were employed through another agency which used to
send the guards by rotation. The appellant pleaded that these security guards
were not their employees. The Supreme Court referring to sub-sections (9),
(13), (15) and (17) of Section 2 of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948
held t h a t the definition of ' e m p l o y e e ' in the Act was wide and
comprehensive. The appellant was the principal employer of the security
17. The Brooke Bond India v. E.S.I. Corporation (1980) ILLJ 352 (Ker.).
18. Reunion Engg. Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. E.S.I.C (1993) 1 LLJ 31 (Kara.).
19. (2000) LLJ 127 (Cal.).
20. .5.7. Corporation v. RajKamal Transport & Others (1995) 1 LLJ 94 (A.P.).
21. (2003) 1 LLJ 104 (Raj.).
22. (2002) III LLJ 169 (SC).
guards and they were employees under Section 2 (9) of the Employees State
Insurance Act, 1948.
The Act establishes a c o r p o r a t i o n t o implement the scheme of
insurance under the Act. The main funds of the corporation are derived
from the employers' and employees' contribution, which are specified
percentage of their salary or wages. The principal employer is required to
pay the employees' contribution in the first instance, with a right to recover
the same from the immediate e m p l o y e r . As far as the e m p l o y e e s '
contribution is concerned, the deduction is to be made from the current
wages of the employee, and not otherwise, and paid by the principal
employer to the corporation. Recovery of the employer's contribution
however, cannot be made from the wages payable to an employee either
directly or indirectly. The corporation may also accept donations to augment
its funds.
Under the Act, the following benefits are available to an employee:
(a) periodical payments in case of his sickness;
(b) periodical payments to an insured woman w o r k e r in case of
confinement or miscarriage or sickness arising out of pregnancy
(maternity benefit);
(c) periodical payments to an insured person suffering from
disablement as a result of an employment injury (disablement
benefit);
(d) periodical payments to dependents of an insured person who dies
as a result of an injury sustained as an employee under the Act
(dependants' benefits);
(e) medical treatment for and attendance on insured person (medical
benefit); lastly
(f) funeral benefits towards expenditure on the funeral of the deceased
insured person.
Provision is also made for the payment of compensation in case an
employee contracts what is called 'an occupational disease'. Protection is
given to an employee who is in receipt of sickness or maternity benefit
under the Act so that he cannot be dismissed or discharged or otherwise
punished during the time he is in receipt of such benefit.
The Maternity Benefit Act, 1961

The Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 provides for a scheme of maternity benefit
to women employees employed in factories, mines, plantations and
establishments where person are employed for the exhibition of equestrian,
acrobatic and o t h e r performances. It may be extended by the state
government with the approval of the central government to o t h e r
LABOUR LAW 407
establishments, industrial, commercial, agricultural or otherwise. The

benefits under the Act are available only to employees in factories and other
establishments to whom the provisions of the Employees' State Insurance
Act, 1948 do not apply.
To give the woman employee security of service during the period she is
drawing benefit of maternity leave, it is provided that if a woman absents
herself from work in accordance with the provisions of the Act, it shall be
unlawful for her employer to discharge or dismiss her during, or on account
of, her absence, or to give notice of discharge or dismissal on such a day
that t h e notice will expire during such absence, or to vary t o her
disadvantage any of the conditions of her service. Moreover, any discharge
or dismissal of a woman at any time during her pregnancy shall not have the
effect of depriving her of the maternity benefit or medical bonus otherwise
payable to her under the Act.
In State of Kerala v. N. Ramani23 the respondent petitioner, working as
senior assistant in the High Court of Kerela applied for maternity leave,
which was sanctioned. In continuation thereof, she was sanctioned leave
without allowances for one year. She applied for extension of leave for one
more year along with a medical certificate, and a letter of recommendation
from the high court. The state government while sanctioning the leave
imposed the condition that the period of leave will not be counted for any
service benefits including pension. The petitioner in the high court
challenged this action. Single judge of the high court set aside the part of the
order imposing the condition. The division bench affirmed the view taken
by the single judge and held that imposition of the condition that the
extended period of medical leave would not be included for service benefits
including pension was illegal and incorrect.
In Municipal Corporation ofDelhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll/* question
before the court was whether the female workers on the muster roll of the
appellant were entitled to maternity benefit or not? The respondents were
denied the maternity benefit on the ground that their services were not
regularized. The tribunal had by its award allowed the claim of the
respondent and directed the corporation to extend the benefit under the
Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 to all those muster roll female workers who had
put in three years of continuous service. Appeal filed in the high court
against the award was dismissed by the single judge and the letters patent
appeal was also dismissed on the ground of delay. Therefore, special leave
was filed in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the direction
issued by the tribunal should be complied with by the appellants.
23. (1999) II LLJ 485.

24. (2000) LLR 499 (SC).
The provisions of the Act have overriding effect over any other law or
the terms of any award, agreement or contract of service whether made
before or after coming into force of the Act. This is only so far as the
woman employee is deprived of any rights under the Act. But there is no bar
to any agreement or contract of service, or any award providing to her
benefits more favourable to her than those under the Act.
Provident fund and pensionary benefits
Before 1947 very little attention, if at all, was paid by the government to
making provision for retiral benefits to the workmen, or for benefits in case
of premature termination of their employment for no fault of theirs. The
industrial tribunals appointed under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
however, even without there being any statutory provisions in that behalf,
entertained such claims on a reference being made to them for adjudication.
Such claims were allowed by such tribunals having regard to the facts and
circumstances of each case, the financial capacity of the employer being
given primary importance. Eventually, however, it was felt by the
government that a statutory retirement benefit should be laid down for the
employees which should be more or less uniform in its terms, so that the
employees covered by the scheme could be assured a certain minimum sum
or, benefit, on their retirement or premature termination of services. This is
intended to provide a modicum of social security to the worker.
Initially, a provident fund scheme was provided for u n d e r t h e
Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952. Later on, through an amendment
made in the year 1971, the scope of the Act was extended to cover provision
for a family pension scheme also. The Act applies to (a) every establishment
which is a factory engaged in any industry specified in scheduled I to the Act
and in which 20 or more persons are employed; and (b) any o t h e r
establishment e m p l o y i n g 20 or m o r e persons, or class of such
establishments which the central government may, by notification in the
official gazette, specify in this behalf. In addition to this, the scheme may be
extended to an establishment not otherwise covered by the Act, where the
employer and the majority of employees employed in that establishment
agree to the same. Further, the Act under section 4 authorises the central
g o v e r n m e n t to add to schedule I of the Act so as t o cover m o r e
establishments and more industries. The Act covers not only, the direct
employees of the employer to whom the Act applies, but also employees
engaged by or through a contractor, or in connection with the work of the
establishment. Under the provision of the Act, it is provided that the
employer shall make a contribution of 6W% of the basic wages, dearness
allowance and retaining allowance, if any, for the time being, for each of his
employees whether employed by him directly and through a contractor. The
employees' contribution shall be equal to the contributions payable by the
LABOUR LAW 409
employer in respect of him, and may, if any employee so desires and if the
scheme make provisions therefor, be an amount not exceeding 8V3% of his
basic wages, dearness allowance and retaining allowance, if any. Further, it
has also been provided that the central government after making such
enquiries as it deems fit may by notification in the official gazette increase
the employer's contribution from 6V4% to 8%. N o employer to whom the
scheme applies is permitted by reason only of his liability under the Act to
reduce, whether directly or indirectly, the wages of any employee to whom
the scheme applies, or the total quantum of benefits in the nature of old age
pension, gratuity or provident fund to which the employee is entitled under
the terms of his employment, express or implied. Provision is also made in
the Act, so that the amount payable to the employee or his nominees is not
attached for discharging other liabilities owed by the employee.
Gratuity benefit
Apart from the statutory provident fund and pension schemes provided for
under the aforesaid Act, demands had often been made by the workmen
covered under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for additional benefit of
gratuity in cases of retirement or premature termination of their service, or
even resignation after putting in a certain minimum period of service. The
industrial tribunals set u p under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
considered such demands on the basis of references made to them by the
government, and granted the demand in appropriate cases. The award of
such a scheme by a tribunal depended, however, on whether the financial
capacity of the employer concerned permitted introduction of such a
scheme, and also whether such a scheme, existed in other units of the
industry in the region. There was also no uniform standard laid down to give
guidance to the tribunals as to the quantum of gratuity payable, or the
contingencies in which such gratuity should be paid. Decisions of the
tribunals with regard to gratuity scheme were often challenged in the high
courts but more often in the Supreme Court, which tried to establish certain
guidelines for industrial tribunals as to the circumstances in which a gratuity
scheme should be framed, the quantum of gratuity and the contingencies in
which it should be payable. However, even these decisions of the Supreme
Court did not establish any sufficiently definite principles which could avoid
disputes in individual cases. Disputes regarding gratuity, therefore, often
came up for decision before the industrial tribunals, the high courts as well
as the Supreme Court.
Meanwhile, demands were being made on the government for laying
down a statutory gratuity scheme which would be uniform, and which would
not depend on the financial capacity of the employer or the practice in any
particular industry. Certain states like West Bengal and Kerala took initiative
in this matter by framing gratuity schemes under Acts applicable to these
states, even before the central government was persuaded to pass the
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. These state Acts no longer have much
relevance in view of section 14 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972,
enacted by Parliament, under which it is provided, inter alia, that the
provisions of the Act or any rule made thereunder, shall have effect
notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment
other than the central Act under consideration.
The Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 applies to every factory, mine,
oilfield, plantation, coal and railway company, and to every shop or
establishment within the meaning of any law for the time being in force in
relation to shops or establishments in a state in which 10 or more persons
are employed, or were employed, on any day of the preceding 12 months. In
addition to this, the provisions of the Act can also be extended by the
central government to other establishments, or class of establishments, in
which 10 or more employees are employed. The Act applies to only such
employees whose wages do not exceed Rs. 1,000 a month and who do any
skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled, manual, supervisory, technical or clerical
work. The Act is wide enough to bring within its scope, the entire organized
sector of industry and commerce. In relation to its application to shop or
establishment, in view of clause (b) of section 1(3) it applies to every shop
or establishment within the meaning of any law for the time being in force.
It has been held in B. N. Sarda (Pvt.) Ltd v. Kishan K. Borade25 that there is no
justification whatsoever to qualify the words 'any law' by introducing a
qualification that the law should be either a Central law or a State law. It
does n o t apply to any person who is employed in managerial or
administrative capacity or who holds a civil post under the central
government or a state government or who is subject to the Air Force Act,
1950, or the Army Act, 1950, or the Navy Act, 1957.
Municipal Board 26 is held to be an 'establishment' governed by the
Payment of Graduity Act, 1972. It is not necessary for a legal heir of an
employee to first obtain a succession certificate and then apply for payment
of gratuity amount. It will depend upon the facts of the case as to whether
such certificate could be necessary or not.
Andhra Pradesh High Court in Laxmi D. V. A. P. Agricultural University
and another11 has held that the educational institutions such as university
carrying on systematic activity by employing more than ten persons was
'establishment' within the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. It was observed
that the definition of establishment under section 1 (3) (b) of the Payment
25. (1981) Lab IC 911.

26. Nagar Palika Moradabad v. App. Authority and AMI. Labour Commr. U.P., Kanpur and
others (1990) IILLJ 156 (All).
27. (2002) 1 LLJ 69 (A.P.).
LABOUR LAW 411
of Gratuity Act, 1972 was comprehensive to include 'establishment' within

the meaning of any law, not only law relating to shops and establishments,
for the time being in force in a State.
In case of employee drawing wages exceeding Rs. 1000/- per month on
the date of coming into force the Payment of Gratuity Act, the gratuity is
payable if the termination of the employment is after the date of coming
into force of the Act for that period during which the employee came within
the definition of "Employment" under Section 2 (e) of the Act. A person
whose services are terminated for the reasons mentioned in Section 4 (1) of
the Act after coming into force of the Act is entitled to payment of gratuity
if he has rendered continuous service for not less than five years for that
period during which he satisfied the definition of employee under section 2
(e) of the Act. 28
In view of provisions of section 4 (3) of the Payment of Gratuity Act,
1972, the amount of gratuity payable shall not exceed on lakh rupees. This
ceiling limit has been fixed by the Amendment of the Act of 1994. The
maximum amount of gratuity payable was fixed at twenty months wages
prior to the amendment of Section 4 (3) when this amount was fixed as Rs.
50,000. In the Regional Manager, Punjab National Bank, Kanpur v. Regional
Labour Commissioner (Central) Kanpur & others29 the employee was awarded
gratuity exceeding twenty months wages by an order dated April 9, 1986. It
was held that the employee is not entitled to any amount of gratuity in
excess of twenty month's wages.
G r a t u i t y is payable to an employee covered by the Act on t h e
termination of his employment after he has rendered continuous service for
not less than five years in the following contingencies: -
(a) on his superannuation;
(b) on his retirement, the word 'retirement' being defined very broadly
to mean termination of service of an employee otherwise then on
superannuation;
(c) on his resignation
In addition to this, gratuity is also payable to an employee on his death
or disablement due to accident or disease. In such a case, there is no
requirement of minimum continuous service of 5 years as in other cases
mentioned above. An employee so entitled to gratuity shall be paid such
gratuity at the rate of 15 days wages based on the rate of wages last drawn
by the employee concerned subject to a maximum of 20 months' wages.
Wages as defined under the Act include basic wages and dearness allowance
but not other allowances. However, if an employee is entitled to receive
28. The Management ofGoodyear India Ltd. v. Shn K. G. Devassar (1986) ILLJ 25 (SC).
29. (1995) I LLJ 852 (All).
better terms of gratuity under any award or agreement or contract with the
employer, the employee's right to receive such better terms of gratuity is not
affected by the provisions made under the Act.
Retrial benefit for the worker: Summing up
With the adoption of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, therefore,

practically all industrial establishments of certain minimum size are required
to introduce a double retirement scheme of provident fund and gratuity. As
a matter of fact, with the amendment of the Employees' Provident Funds
Act, 1952, in 1971, the employees and their nominees covered by the two
Acts above may be entitled to triple benefits namely provident fund, gratuity
and pensionary benefit. Such retirement benefits are not dependent any
more on the financial capacity of the employer, but accrue to an employee
after he has satisfied the requirements as laid down under the respective
Acts. Provided an employer is covered under the Act and has not been
granted exemption, he cannot claim immunity on grounds of financial
incapacity. There is also uniformity in this respect between different kinds
of industrial establishments, leaving some scope for better retirements
benefits under awards or agreements or contracts with the employer. There
is not little scope for any industrial dispute arising on the subject of
retirement scheme in view of the statutory provisions made under the
Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952, and the Payment of Gratuity Act,
1972. it can now be, more or less, definitely stated that statute has given
ample protection and benefits to the employees in the form of retirement
benefits, which previously depended on the financial capacity of the
employer concerned and the industry-cum-region basis, for which an
industrial dispute has to be raised by the employees concerned and, many a
time, prolonged litigation took place.
Ill
CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT, JOB SECURITY AND

REGULATION OF CONTRACT LABOUR
The general principal or contract, which in India have been incorporated

under the Indian Contract Act, 1872, regulated the relation between
employers and employees, or between master and servant, before the
emergence of modern system of industrial jurisprudence. Under the general
law of contract, any one can agree to work for another for hire or reward
and thereby put himself under his control and supervision, and in return be
paid such remuneration as has been agreed upon mutually. The ordinary
courts of the country, in case of disputes between the employers and the
employees, enforce the contractual rights of the parties. Such contractual
rights need not be incorporated in any written document, in which case the
LABOUR LAW 413
terms of the contract of employment have to be gathered from the

surrounding circumstances, supplemented by certain implied conditions,
which are deemed to have been agreed upon between the employer and the
employee, unless otherwise stated in writing. U p t o 1946, apart from
legislation laying down certain safeguards to protect the health and safety of
the workmen, and to ensure payment of wages in time and providing for
payment of compensation in case of accidents, there was little regulation of
the contract of employment with the result that the whole matter was left to
the sweet will of the parties. In the absence of effective collective bargaining
in most industrial establishments, such bargain used t o be, generally
speaking, a one-sided matter, because of the superior bargaining position of
the employer, and the inability of unorganized individual labourer to hold
out for a better bargain. He had either to accept employment on the terms
offered by the employer, or to face starvation. With the emergence of
modern industrial jurisprudence, which had its birth during theSecond
World War and took concrete form only after the achievement of political
independence by India, these concepts have undergone drastic changes
which have interfered with the contractual relations between employers and
employees in favour of the employees, so as to give them protection against
the superior economic strength and bargaining position of the employer.
The Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 which came
into force on 1 st February 1971 aims at abolition of contract labour in
respect of such categories as may be notified by the appropriate government
in the light of certain criteria that have been laid down, and at regulating the
service conditions of contract labour where abolition is not possible. It
provides for setting up of Advisory Boards of a tripartite character,
representing various interests, to advise Central and State Governments in
administrating the legislation and regulation of establishments and
contractors. Under the scheme of the Act, the provision and maintenance of
certain basic welfare amenities for contract labour, like drinking water and
first-aid facilities, and in certain cases rest-rooms and canteens, have been
made obligatory. Provisions have also been made to guard against delays in
the matter of wage payment.
The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946
The first attempt by the legislature at the central level to interfere with the
contract of employment, or at least, to have the terms of employment
defined with sufficient precision was the enactment of the Industrial
Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. To start with, the object of the
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act was a limited one, viz., to
require employers in industrial establishments employing 100 workmen or
more, formally to define conditions of employment under them. It was not
the purpose of the Act at that time to give any powers to the statutory
authorities set u p under the Act, t o decide w h a t t h e conditions of

employment should be. 30 It was merely intended to deal with malpractices
arising from the fact that many employers left the conditions of service
indefinite and undefined. 31 By the Industrial Disputes (Amendment &
Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956, a radical departure was made from the
previous scheme of the Act, inasmuch as it was provided under the
aforesaid amending Act that it would be the function of the certifying
officer or appellate authority (as hereinafter described) to adjudicate upon
the fairness or reasonableness of the provisions of the standing orders
submitted to them and make amendments and changes as considered
reasonable and fair by t h e m . That these powers would not be used
arbitrarily was ensured by providing for appeals against the decisions of the
certifying officers to an appellate authority appointed under the Act. The
standing orders as finally certified under the procedure as aforesaid are also
subject to modification on the application of either party. Provision is made
in the Act for the appropriate government to refer disputed arising out of
application and interpretation of the standing orders certified under the Act
to a labour court for decision, which decision then is made binding on the
parties.
The standing orders as certified under the aforesaid procedure acquire
the force of law in the sense that there cannot be any individual contract of
employment contrary to the standing orders. However, in spite of this fact,
industrial disputes can still be raised with respect to matters covered by the
standing orders. Till such a dispute is raised and decided, the standing orders
hold the field, and it is in accordance with these standing orders that the
rights and obligations of the parties, namely, the employer and the
workmen, are determined in matters provided for under the standing orders.
Where the Standing O r d e r contemplates a notice t o be given t o the
workman for the purpose of enabling him to show cause, within a specified
period, against his dismissal, the notice must give a reasonable opportunity
to the workman. That is a condition precedent which must be satisfied
before an order of dismissal can be validly passed by the employer. 32 The
other matters like hours of work, holidays, etc., have been covered under
their respective heads. However, one subject which has acquired primary
importance in the field of industrial law in India and which is also covered
under the certified standing orders to a certain extent, may now be dealt
with under the broad heading of security of employment.
30. See Guest, Keen Williams (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Sterling (PJ) (1959) LLJ 405: AIR 1959 SC
1279.
31. Rohtak Hissar District Electric Supply Co. v. State ofU.P. and Others (1966) LLJ 330:
AIR 1966 SC 1471.
32. Lakshirattan Cotton Mills v. Workman AIR 1975 SC 1689.
LABOURLAW 415
The Standing Orders provide for giving opportunities to workers to

offer explanation before imposing punishment by dismissal. It was held in
Associated Cement Companies Ltd v. T. C. Srivastava and others*3 that neither
under the ordinary law of the land nor under the industrial law a second
opportunity t o show cause against the proposed punishment is necessary.
This does not mean that a standing order may not provide for it, but unless
the standing order provides for it, either expressly or by necessary
implication, no inquiry which is otherwise fair and valid will be vitiated by
non-affording of such second opportunity.
Security of employment
To an industrial worker anywhere, security of employment has a great deal

of i m p o r t a n c e . In the Indian conditions where there is large scale
unemployment, security of employment assumes added and overriding
importance to the worker. The legislature and the courts, however, have had
to look at the problem from a two-fold angle-from the point of view of the
employee for whom, of course, it is of utmost importance that he should
have security of service. But, as against the employees' legitimate desire for
security of e m p l o y m e n t due consideration has t o be given t o t h e
requirements of discipline, without which no industry can grow or prosper.
Moreover, there may be situations where for economic reasons or on
considerations of efficiency, the employer may have to discharge employees
and resort to retrenchment of surplus staff. There may also be temporary
contingencies due to which he may not be able to provide work to the
employees. As a result employees may have to be laid off, or 'played off, as
the expression goes in some western countries.
We will divide the subjects under four headings as below:
(i) simple termination of service or 'discharge simpliciter'.
(ii) termination for misconduct generally termed in India as 'dismissal';
(iii) retirement on reaching the age of superannuation; and
(iv) lay off or retrenchment of surplus staff, transfer of undertaking and
closure.
(i) Termination of service or discharge simpliciter
Under the Indian Contract Act, contract of service or employment is the

result of volitional act of the parties. Under the contract of employment
parties are also free t o agree as to how the termination of contract of
employment may be brought about. Such termination may be without notice
or by such notice as may be agreed upon. This has been conveniently
33. (1984) 11 LLJ 105 (SC).

summed up in the expression- "freedom to hire and fire". Under the

ordinary civil law there could be no question of the employer being required
to retain an employee in service against his wishes, just as the employee
could not be forced to continue to serve the employer against his wishes.
Any constraints in this connection could only be such as are agreed upon
between the parties. Moreover, in the event of breach of obligations by any
party, the only remedy the other party would have is a claim for damages.
There could be no specific enforcement of a contract of personal service.
N o employer could be compelled to continue in service any employee
against his wishes. Nor, correspondingly, the employee could be compelled
to serve a master whom he is unwilling to serve.
However, in India since Independence we have come a long way from
the doctrine of freedom to hire and fire. The change has been brought about
mainly by the awards of adjudicators while deciding disputes relating to
termination of service of workmen under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
The principles laid down by such adjudicating authorities have received the
final imprint of the Supreme Court of India. In the case of Western India
Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal?4 the Federal Court of India held
that in deciding industrial disputes referred to them, industrial tribunals are
not merely to enforce the contractual right of the parties. They may modify
contracts in the interest of industrial peace so that there is no unfair labour
practice or victimization, and order reinstatement of an employee whose
services have been dispensed with by the e m p l o y e r although such
reinstatement is not permissible under the ordinary civil law. This judgment
of the Federal Court has been affirmed and reaffirmed many a time by the
Supreme Court. In the case of termination of service by the employer,
industrial tribunals are not satisfied by the plea of the employer that he has
acted in accordance with his contractual rights. Even where the termination
of service is in accordance with the certified standing orders the requirement
of bonafide is essential, and capricious or arbitrary discharge, or discharge for
ulterior considerations like trade union activities of the workmen has been
set aside by industrial tribunals. This does not mean, however, that the
employers cannot discharge employees under any circumstances except for
misconduct. There may be cases where misconduct may not be proved
against the employee, and yet the employer may be justified in terminating
the services of his employee for good and sufficient reasons like bonafide
loss of confidence in the employee. However, in each case, the tribunal, to
which the dispute is referred, would be entitled to go behind the order of
discharge or simple termination of service, and not accept merely the form
of such an order as final. If the discharge is really based on misconduct, the
employer will have to show that either he conducted a proper enquiry as a
34. (1949) LLJ 245: AIR 1949 FC 111.

LABOUR LAW 417
result of which he bonafidely came to the conclusion that the employee was
guilty of such misconduct as warranted such discharge, or satisfy the
tribunal about his bona fides by leading relevant evidence before it.35
Section 11-A of the Industrial Dispute Act 1947 confers power on the
labour court to evaluate the severity of misconduct and to assess whether
punishment imposed by the employer is commensurate with the gravity of
the misconduct. If the labour court after evaluating the gravity of the
m i s c o n d u c t held that p u n i s h m e n t of t e r m i n a t i o n of service is
disproportionately heavy in relation to misconduct and exercised its
discretion, the Supreme Court in the absence of any important legal
principles would not undertake to re-examine the question of adequacy or
inadequacy of material for interference by labour court. 36
In Regional Manager, R.S.R.T.C. v. Ghanshyam Sbarmai7 the respondent
was employed as conductor by the appellant. He was charge- sheeted for not
issuing tickets to the passenger. On a reference being made to the labour
court it directed his reinstatement without back wages, but the single bench
of the high court set aside the award, which was reversed by the division
bench of the high court. In appeal, it was held by the Supreme Court that
the labour court was not justified in interfering with the punishment of
dismissal. Though under section 11-A the labour court has jurisdiction and
power to interfere with the quantum of punishment, but the discretion has
to be used judiciously. When the main duty or function of the conductor is
to issue tickets and collect fares and then deposit the same with the Road
Transport Corporation and when he fails to do so, then it will be misplaced
sympathy to order his reinstatement instead of dismissal.
(ii) Retirement on reaching the age of superannuation
The services of an employee may also be dispensed with by the employer on

reaching the age of superannuation, provided there is a provision in that
behalf in the contract of employment or service rules or the certified
standing orders. The tribunals set up under the Industrial Disputes Act are,
however, competent, and very often have either laid down the age of
retirement for the first time, or modified the age of retirement fixed under
the contract of employment or service rules or even under the certified
standing orders. In deciding such disputes, the tribunals are mostly guided
by what has come to be termed 'the industry-cum-region basis' or 'the
region-cum-industry basis'. The tendency lately is for the tribunals to fix the
35. U.B. Dutt & Co. (P) Ltd. v. Its Workmen (1962) I LLJ 374: AIR 1963 SC 411 and
Michael L. v. M/s Johnson Pumps Ltd. (1975) I LLJ 262: AIR 1975 SC 661.
36. Hindustan Machine Took Limited, Bangalore v. Mohd. Usman &Anr. (1983) 11 LLJ 386
(SC).
37. (2002) 1 LLJ 234 (SC).
age of retirement at 58 years or 60 years depending upon the region and the
industry with which they are dealing.
Prior to 1972, there was no specific legislation to regulate gratuity. The
gratuity was, however, determined by the court. Prior to the Payment of
Gratuity Act, 1972, gratuity, on reaching the age of superannuation raised
two important questions:
(i) What is the age of superannuation for the purpose of entitlement of
gratuity?
(ii) What is qualifying period of service?
As to the first, the tribunals were not unanimous. They took two
different views regarding the age of superannuation in different industries.
Sometimes, the age of superannuation also varied from region to region. But
the controversy was set at rest in Bengal Chemical and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Its
Workmen?* where the Supreme Court following its earlier decision in
Workmen ofjessop & Co. Ltd. v. Jessop and Co. Ltd?9 and keeping in view the
trend in the area, age of superannuation of an employee for the purpose of
claiming gratuity fixed at fifty eight years. This view appears to have been
approved and adopted by the Parliament in enacting section 2 (r). Thus,
section 2 (r) defines "superannuation" in relation to an employee as:
(i) the attainment by the employee of such age as is fixed in the
contract or conditions of service as the age on the attainment of
which the employee shall vacate the employment; and
(ii) in any other case the attainment by the employee of the age of fifty-
eight years.
In Fibre Foam Pvt. Ltd. v. K. Kannan Nair*0 the Kerela High Court has
held that where the contract of employment does not specify the age of
superannuation, the attainment of age of fifty-eight years by the employee
would amount to superannuation.
In Cawnpore Sugar Works Ltd. v. AppelUte Authonty41 the Allahabad High
C o u r t has held that where the employee had attained the age of
superannuation of sixty years prior to the coming into force of the Act, his
employment stood vacated before the commencement of the Act itself so
that he could not claim to be entitled to payment of gratuity under the Act
on the occasion of termination of employment by his superannuation.
The aforesaid view of the high court created practical difficulties. The
Payment of Gratuity (Amendment) Act, 1984, therefore, provides for the
substitution of the existing definition by the following:
38. (1969) 1 LLJ 751.

39. (1964) 6 SCR 15: AIR 1964 SC 1040.
40. (1980) 1 LLJ 421 at 423.
41. (1982) Lab IC 969 (All).
LABOURLAW 419
Superannuation in relation to an employee means the attainment

by the employee of such age as is fixed in the contract or
condition of service as the age of attainment of which the
employee shall vacate the employment.
In the pre-1972 period, there were t w o views prevailing for the
determination of the question of payment of gratuity in case of dismissal of
an employee for misconduct resulting in financial loss to the concern: (i)
Gratuity should not be paid to the workmen dismissed for misconduct
involving financial loss to the management; (ii) The amount of loss may be
deducted from the gratuity in case of financial loss to the concern. The
Payment of Gratuity Act has made a departure from the practice prevailing
prior to 1972. Under sub-section (6), the gratuity payable to an employee
can be partially or wholly forfeited if the services of the employee have been
terminated for an offence involving moral turpitude. 42
(Hi) Dismissal or discharge for misconduct

The services of an employee may also be dismissed or otherwise terminated
for misconduct, or for the employee conducting himself in a way as is
inconsistent with the due discharge of his duties to the employer. Industrial
establishments which have in their employment 100 workmen or more, are
guided in this matter by the certified standing orders, or, in the absence of
such standing orders, b y the model standing orders framed by the
appropriate government. Under these standing orders, a list of misconducts
for which an employee may be proceeded against by way of disciplinary
action is set out. Where the Standing Orders Act is, however, not applicable
and no written or disciplinary rules exist, the matter has to be decided by the
general common law relating to master and servant, and has to be seen as to
whether the employees' conduct can be termed as such that interferes, or is
inconsistent with, the due discharge of his obligations vis-a-vis his employer.
If an employee is reported to be guilty of misconduct, the employer is
not expected to act hastily or arbitrarily or capriciously in terminating his
services for such misconduct. Before such termination he must give a
reasonable opportunity to the employee concerned to be heard, or, to put it
in legal jargon, comply with the principles of natural justice. Such principles
of natural justice have, however, not been exhaustively defined by the
Supreme Court. They include, however, the right of the employee to know
in advance what are the charges against him, a reasonable time within which
to reply to the charges; and if he denies the charges, reasonable opportunity
to defend himself in respect of the same. Generally proof of misconduct
42. Dtrkt Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. v. Vuianagaram, by its General Manager 1999 LLR
850 (AP).
requires a regular domestic enquiry where all the witnesses in support of the
charges are examined in the presence of the person proceeded against, he is
then given the opportunity to cross-examine such witnesses and thereafter
to produce relevant evidence in his defence. Thereafter, the enquiry officer
is expected to make a report discussing the evidence and stating his findings
as to whether the charges have been proved against the employee or not. If
the enquiry officer has come to the conclusion that the employee is guilty of
the charges contained in the charge sheet, and the employer accepts his
findings, he has then to determine as to what punishment should be
imposed for the charges proved against the employee.
Till the amendment of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, by the
Amendment Act of 1971, the tribunal's jurisdiction to interfere in cases of
dismissal or discharge of employees for misconduct was, however, limited.
The tribunal was not supposed to sit in appeal over the findings of the
enquiry held by the employer. All that the tribunal could examine was
whether the employer's action was bonafide, and not actuated by malafi % or
taken for ulterior considerations or an act of unfair labour practice or
victimization. The tribunal had also to examine whether in discharging or
dismissing the employee, the employer had contravened any principles of
natural justice or that the findings of the enquiry officer or the e m p l o y e
with regard to the charges were based on legal evidence and were not
baseless or perverse in the sense that they were not supported by any legal
evidence, or such evidence as would not be acceptable by any reasonable
person. With regard to the quantum of p u n i s h m e n t , the t r i b u n a l ' s
jurisdiction was similarly limited. The tribunal was only to see whether the
punishment was imposed bonafide and was not such as would shock the
conscience or was not an act of discrimination or victimization. However,
with the addition of section 11-A in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which
has become effective from 16 December 1971, the tribunal's jurisdiction in
connection with such cases has been considerably enlarged. 43 The tribunal
is now entitled to sit in appeal over the findings of the enquiry officer, and
set aside the same in suitable cases. With regard to punishment also, the
t r i b u n a l is now competent to examine w h e t h e r the p u n i s h m e n t is
commensurate with the misconduct or excessive in its view. If it is excessive
in its opinion, such opinion being, of course, a judicial opinion and not an
arbitrary one, then it has the jurisdiction to interfere, and substitute some
other punishment in place of that which has been imposed by the employer,
and grant reinstatement or such other relief to the workman as the tribunal
deems fit.
The conduct of a domestic enquiry in accordance with the principles of
natural justice is desirable and necessary. But if such an enquiry is not
43. See Workmen "j(Fire Stone Tyre and Rubber Company v. Management (1973) 1LLJ278:
AIR 1973 SC 1227.
LABOUR LAW 421
conducted, or the enquiry is set aside for non-compliance with the standing
orders or service rules applicable in this behalf or the principles of natural
justice, the action of discharge or dismissal is not void ab initio on that
account. In such a case, the employer has the right, if he so requests the
tribunal, to lead the necessary evidence before the tribunal, in which event,
the workman would have the corresponding right to cross-examine the
witness produced by the employer and to produce his own evidence in
defence. In such cases, the tribunal would be entitled to come to its own
conclusion with regard to the alleged misconduct of the employee and pass
appropriate orders as it deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the
case.
Any discussion with regard to the law of discharge or dismissal would
be incomplete without something being said on the question of relief. As is
well known, under the ordinary civil law, a contract of personal service
cannot be specifically enforced. Thus, if an employee has been illegally and
wrongfully discharged or dismissed, he cannot claim reinstatement or re-
employment with the employer as a matter or right; he can only claim
damages. However, inasmuch as industrial tribunals are not bound by the
ordinary civil law or the law of master and servant, they are not fettered by
any such limitations. The general rule where the dismissal or discharge of
the workman is found illegal or unjustified by the tribunal is to grant
reinstatement with full back wages. However, the employer may lead
evidence that reinstatement or grant of full back wages would not be the
proper relief in a particular case, in which event, the tribunal may in suitable
cases grant only monetary compensation to the workman concerned, or
even when granting reinstatement may refuse to grant full or even part back
wages.
The question of riotous and disorderly misconduct came up before the
Supreme Court for consideration in Management of Touramulla Estate v.
Workmen.** In this case, the workman was charge-sheeted for riotous and
disorderly behaviour for assaulting a tea-maker. In a departmental enquiry
he was found guilty of misconduct and dismissed; the management forfeited
his gratuity. The Supreme Court considered in detail the circumstances in
which the gratuity would be forfeited for misconduct of a particular nature
and observed that misconduct could be of three kinds: (a) technical
misconduct which leaves no trail of indiscipline; (b) misconduct resulting in
damages to the employer's property which might be compensated by
forfeiture of gratuity and part thereof; and (c) serious misconduct, such as
acts of violence against the management or other employee or riotous or
disorderly behaviour in or near the place of employment which though not
directly causing damage, may lead to grave indiscipline. The first should
44. AIR 1973 SC 2344.

involve no forfeiture, the second may involve forfeiture of an amount equal to

the loss directly suffered by the employer in consequence of the misconduct
and the third will entail forfeiture of gratuity due to the workmen. So if the
workman is guilty of riotous or disorderly behavior, which is conducive to
grave indiscipline the employer can forfeit the gratuity in its entirety.
(iv) Lay off, retrenchment, transfer of undertaking and closure
There may be circumstances where the employer may find that he is not
able to give employment to his workman owing to decline in business,
temporary shortages, shut downs, lack of supply of electricity and other such
reasons. Where his inability to provide employment is merely temporary and
likely to be overcome within a reasonable period, it would be unwise of him,
and indeed not permissible under law, to terminate the services of his
employees. At the same time it would be unfair and unreasonable to compel
him to continue to employ persons for whom he has no work. In such
cases, the employer may 'lay off his workmen. Under the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, except in cases of seasonal establishments or small
establishments employing 50 workmen or less, however, the employer is
required to pay to his workman during the period of such lay off wages
equivalent to half the basic wage and dearness allowance which would
otherwise be payable to them. If he eventually finds, however, that the
difficulties which he initially thought to be temporary are going to continue
and that he has to retrench workmen in accordance with the provisions of
law, as discussed hereinafter, he may deduct the lay off compensation paid
to such w o r k m e n and pay only the balance by way of retrenchment
compensation. Such lay off compensation is, however, not payable if the
workmen so laid off do not report for work daily at the time fixed or do not
accept alternative employment or where they have had to be laid off owing
to go slow or strike in another part of the establishment of the employer.
The lay off by the employer, however, has to be bonafide, must not be for
ulterior considerations. If its bona fides are not established, the tribunals to
whom disputes may be referred in such cases may award even full wages for
the period of lay off.
The more serious consequence from the workmen's point of view,
however, is when they are thrown out of employment, because the employer
finds that they have become surplus to his requirements, or decides to
retrench them from service. It is an accepted principle that it is for the
employer to decide how to run his business, and , if in the process of
reorganization of his business, the services of some of the workmen are
rendered surplus, much as industrial adjudication may be sympathetic to the
workmen, it would not interfere with the action of the employer unless it
finds that the action of the employer is not bonafide or has been resorted to
without complying with the statutory requirements, which are contained in
LABOUR LAW 423
section 25 F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Under this section, no

workman who has completed one year of continuous service with the
employer can be retrenched by him unless he gives one month's notice
stating the reasons for retrenchment or pays to the workmen so retrenched
one month's wages in lieu of notice. The employer is further required to pay
to such workmen retrenchment compensation equivalent to 15 days' average
wages for every completed year of service. The above are conditions
precedent to retrenchment and non-compliance with them renders the
retrenchment itself void and ineffective.45 The employer is also required to
inform the appropriate government with regard to such retrenchment. Such
notice is, however, directory and not mandatory. 46 Even where conditions
precedent have been observed, the tribunal is not precluded from examining
whether the retrenchment was actually warranted by facts, or is actuated by
ulterior motives or is an act of unfair labour practice or victimization on the
part of the employer. In the event of the verdict being adverse to the
employer in such matters, the tribunal is competent to give appropriate
directions which may even be reinstatement with full back wages to those so
illegally or unjustifiably retrenched.
In Nathanial Masih v. U. P. Scheduled Caste Finance and Development
Corporation Ltd and others*7 the services of a driver of a corporation was
terminated without paying any compensation under Section 25F of the Act.
The function of the corporation is to organize and work in various ways for
upliftment of down trodden, help them financially for various purposes,
including starting industries and help them in getting technical training. It
was held that in view of the various activities being carried on by the
corporation it is an industry within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes
Act and termination of their services amounts to retrenchment which being
in violation of section 25F is illegal.
When the service of petitioner who was a chowkidar and had worked
for more than 240 days in a year was terminated without complying with
section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it was held that the
petitioner has w o r k e d for more than 240 days in a year prior to his
termination, therefore, he was entitled to reinstatement with full back
wages. 4 8 Similarly, the respondents who had worked in the telecom
department as a Mazdoor for about two and half years, was held to be
entitled to the benefit of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. 49
45. State of Bombay and Ors. v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha & Ors (1960) LLJ 251: AIR 1960
SC 610.
46. Bombay Union of Journalists v. State ofBombay (1964) I LLJ 351: AIR 1963 SC 1617.
47. (1991) II LLJ 347 (All).
48. Shern Singh v. State ofPunjab and others (2002) LLJ 210 (P&H).
49. Divisional Engineer, Telecom Coaxial Cable Project, Rajahmundry v. Mamidi Venkata
Ramanna and another (2003) LLJ 907 (A.P.).
The definition of workmen in section 2 (s) does not make a distinction

between a full time employee and a part time employee. The termination of
even a part time employee amounts to retrenchment and if provisions of
section 25F are not followed the retrenchment will not be valid.50 In Alex
Fernandes of Bombay v. (Smt.) N. A. Kadam and others51 the question was
whether a workmen who was in service of the employer for about 11 years
could be validly retrenched for being absent for m o r e than a year
unauthorisedly and being irregular. The workman remained absent in 1974
and 1975 but was retrenched in 1977 without following the rule of last come
first go. It was held that the workman was retrenched by way of punishment
for his long absence without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being
heard to explain his misconduct. The action of the company was not bonafide
and the retrenchment was void ab initio. The employee was entitled to
reinstatement with full back wages and continuity of service. In Deepchandra
v. State ofU.P. and another52 it was held that in case of an employee having
put in service for more than 240 days in each year for several years would
entitle the employee to be reinstated in service on same conditions as before
termination.
There may be cases where the undertaking or the management or
ownership of an undertaking itself may be transferred. In such an event
under section 25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, by a fiction of law, the
workmen employed with the employer who has transferred the undertaking
would be deemed to be retrenched by him and he would be liable to give
notice or notice pay and retrenchment compensation to his workmen.
However, if there is an agreement between such an employer and the
transferee of the management or ownership of the undertaking under which
the w o r k m a n would be continued to be employed by the transferee
employer with continuity of service and without change in conditions of
service to the detriment of the workmen, there would be no liability to pay
such compensation. If after the transfer, however, the transferee employer
retrenches such w o r k m e n , he would have t o pay r e t r e n c h m e n t
compensation to them on the basis of continuity of service of their
employment with the previous employer.
It was held in Gurusharan Thappa v. Abdul Khuddus53 by the Supreme
Court that when a government undertaking was taken over by the company
as a going concern the employee working in the undertaking was also taken
over and since, in law, the company has to be treated as an entity distinct
and separate from the government, the employees as a result of transfer of
the undertaking became employees of the company and ceased to be
employees of the government.
50. Yasbwant Singh Yadav v. State ofRajasthan and on. (1991) 1 LLJ 501 (Raj.).
51. (1988) II LLJ 287 (Bom.).
52. (2001) I LLJ 742 (SC).
53. AIR 1969 SC 744.
LABOUR LAW 425
There may be cases also where the undertaking itself may be closed
down by the employer. In such an event, it has been held by the Supreme
Court that the definition of retrenchment under the Industrial Disputes Act
is not attracted and there is no liability in the employer to give notice or pay
compensation as in the case of retrenchment. To remedy this lacuna in the
Act, the legislature added section 25FFF to the Industrial Disputes Act,
under which it is provided that in cases of such closure workmen would be
entitled to the same notice or notice pay and compensation as in the case of
retrenchment. By an amendment in 1972, there has been still another
addition by which it is not required that the notice of intended closure of
undertakings in which fifty workmen or more are employed and which are
not engaged in construction work or project work should be given at least
60 days in advance together with the reasons for such closure. In case the
employer closes an undertaking, the tribunal cannot direct the employer to
re-start the same, provided it comes to the conclusion that the closure is a
real closure and not a sham closure. However, the tribunal is not precluded
from enquiring whether the closure is genuine or merely a pretence for lock
out, in which event, the tribunal can interfere and give the necessary
directions and in proper cases award full payment of wages for the period of
pretended closure to the workmen affected by it.
By amendments made in the Act in 1976 drastic changes have been
carried out in regard to lay off, retrenchment and closure of industrial
establishments in which not less than 400 workmen are employed. In such
cases, it had been made a condition precedent for lay off, retrenchment or
closure of the undertaking that permission of the appropriate authority set
up under the Act is obtained before the same are resorted to.
Abolition and regulation of contract labour
Another serious inroad has been made into the sphere of free contractual
relations inasmuch as even in cases where there is no employer employee
relationship between the owner of an establishment and the persons who
work on that establishment, the law interferes to give protection to labour
employed on the establishment. Initially, the welfare and social security
legislation kept labour employed by the contractor outside its scope. But
gradually it was realized that this resulted in gross abuses, and labour
employed t h r o u g h such contractors was left without any protection
whatsoever. To remedy such a situation, there has been a general tendency
on the part of the legislature to extend the benefits of social welfare
legislation relating to labour to contract labour also. This would be
evidenced by the extended definition given to the definition of employee in
various Acts like the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948, and the
Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952. Even so, the evils of contract
labour were not entirely overcome by such legislation. In this context, the
judgment in Standard Vacuum Oil Co., Ltd. v. Their Workmen5* has a rather
revolutionary significance. In this case, Gajendragadkar, J., (as he then was),
speaking on behalf of the Supreme Court, held that an industrial dispute can
legitimately be raised under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for abolition
of contract labour inasmuch as the direct employees of the employer have a
direct and substantial interest in their conditions of service. In this case, the
Supreme C o u r t also indicated some criteria for deciding as to the
circumstances in which the tribunal may direct abolition of the system of
employment of contract labour for certain jobs. In subsequent cases the
principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the Standard Vacuum Company
case were further elaborated and applied, having regard to the circumstances
of those cases. Ultimately, in order to bring about uniformity in this matter,
the legislature passed the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act,
1970. The constitutional validity of this Act was challenged before the
Supreme Court, but has been upheld by it in Gammon India Ltd. v. Union of
India & Ors.55 it has further been held by the Supreme Court in Vegoils
Private Ltd. v. The Workmen56 that the Act is a self-sufficient code in respect
of regulation and abolition of contract labour. The underlying policy of the
Act is to abolish contract labour, wherever possible and practicable and
where it cannot be abolished altogether it is to see that the working
conditions of contract labour are so regulated as to ensure payment of
wages and provisions of essential amenities.
The Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 merely
regulates the employment of contract labour in certain establishments and
provides for its abolition in certain circumstances. But the Act does not
provide for the total abolition of contract labour. It provides for abolition
by the appropriate government in appropriate cases.57
Regarding application of the Act, the Gujarat High Court in Food
Corporation of India Workers Union v. Food Corporation of India and others5* has
held that having regard to the provisions of the Act it is evident that (i)
principal employer should have a certificate of registration and (ii) the
workman can be employed on contract labour basis only through licensed
contractor. The certificate of registration is required to be obtained by the
principal employer, issued by the appropriate government under the
provisions of section 7 of the Act. The license is to be obtained by the
contractor under the provisions of section 12 of the Act. The workman can
be employed as contract labourer only through licenced contractors. Unless
54. (1960) II LLJ 233.

55. (1974) I LLJ 489.
56. (1972) I LLJ 567.
57. Dena Nath v. National Fertilisers Ltd. (1992) 1 LLJ 289.
58. (1992) 1 LLJ 257.
LABOUR LAW 427
both these conditions are complied with, the provisions of the Act would
not be attracted. Therefore, in a situation wherein either of these two
conditions is not satisfied, the position would be that a workmen employed
by an intermediary would be deemed to have been employed by the
principal employer.
IV
L A W RELATING TO WAGES, ALLOWANCES,

BONUS AND OTHER TERMS
OF EMPLOYMENT
The Payment of Wages Act, 1936 and other allied legislations
The first attempt to protect industrial workers with respect to their wages
was designed to ensure that payment of wages to them is made in time and
that unauthorized deductions are not made from their wages. The Royal
Commission on Labour in India, which gave its report in June 1931, thought
that delayed payment of wages was one of the factors leading to the
indebtedness of Indian labour, and it needed p r o t e c t i o n against
unauthorized deductions by employers from its wages. The Payment of
Wages Act, 1936 was the direct result of the recommendations made by the
Royal Commission. The Act has been modified and amended from time to
time. The main provisions of the Act, as it exists on the statute book today,
are discussed below.
The Act does not purport to regulate wages or to interfere with the
c o n t r a c t of e m p l o y m e n t , except to the extent necessary t o stop
unauthorized deductions or delay in payment of wages. The Act initially
applied to payment of wages to persons employed in factories, or persons
employed in railways, but power was given to the state governments to
extend the operation of the Act to persons employed in any other industrial
establishment, or group of industrial establishments. By virtue of the powers
vested in the governments as above, the provisions of the Act have been
extended to various other industrial establishments as defined under the Act
including mines and oil fields. They have also been extended to motor
transport workers under the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961 and to
shops and commercial establishments under the provisions of the Acts
passed by the respective states.
Employers covered by the Act are required to make payment of wages
to their employees covered by the Act within certain period and without
deductions of any kind, except those authorized under the Act. A list of
deductions which may be made from the wages of an employee covered by
the Act is laid down under the Act, and detailed provisions are made as to
the conditions subject to which such deductions can be made. Employers

covered by the Act are required to maintain registers and records which
would show that the provisions of the Act have been duly complied with.
Inspectors have also been appointed u n d e r t h e Act, t o see t o the
enforcement of its provisions, and penalties are provided against the
employers for non-compliance. Recognizing the weak bargaining position of
the employees, it has also been provided that any contract or agreement,
whether made before or after the commencement of the Act," whereby an
employed person relinquishes any right conferred by the Act shall be null
and void in so far as it purports to deprive him of such right.
The procedure under the Act for recovery of delayed wages or of
unauthorized deductions is also a summary procedure and special authorities
are appointed for expeditious disposal of such cases.
So much for the machinery provided under the Act for recovery of
wages due to the employees and of unauthorized deductions. Such
machinery, as we have seen was provided much before India achieved
political independence. However, far more revolutionary changes have taken
place in this field after 1947, when the state has actively intervened to
provide not only minimum, but also fair wages, to certain categories of
employees. This legislation and case law on the subject we shall now
proceed to examine.
The Minimum Wages Act, 1948
Wage regulation by statute has generally a two fold aim-first, to prevent

sweating and payment of unduly low wages to sections of workers who have
not yet organized themselves into trade unions; and second, to maintain
industrial peace by resolving conflicts between employers and employees in
this regard. Towards the attainment of the above objectives, the Indian
legislature has adopted two-fold measures (i) to regulate minimum wages by
statute; and (ii) to resolve conflicts of labour and capital on the question,
inter alia, of wages by providing a machinery for the settlement and
adjudication of industrial disputes. The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and
the legislation in various states for settlement and adjudication of industrial
disputes, are meant to meet the latter objective. We shall deal first with
regulation of minimum wages under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, which
has been characterized by the first National Commission on Labour, which
gave its report in 1969, as a "landmark in the history of labour legislation in
the country."
The whole concept of minimum wage as underlying the Minimum
Wages Act has been called 'new and revolutionary' by the N a t i o n a l
Commission on Labour (1969), because it recognizes that wages cannot be
left to be determined entirely by market forces, and that it is not open to the
LABOUR LAW 429
employer to plead inability to pay the wages to its employees. In the absence
of such regulation, it would be difficult to prevent sweating or exploitation
of labour through payment of unduly low wages. The statement of objects
and reasons appended to the Bill emphasis the importance of statutory
fixation of minimum wage rates in India, where workers' organizations are
yet to fully develop and the workmen's bargaining position is consequently
poor. The Act adopted the policy of gradualness which had been so much
emphasized by the Royal Commission on Labour in India. Although the
coverage of the Act is wide as indicated in the various definitions, the Act in
the first instance is confined to what are called 'scheduled employments'
with power in the appropriate government to add to the schedule. These
powers have been liberally exercised by the appropriate government from
time to time, with the consequence that, the list of industries covered by the
Act is now much longer than it was when the Act was originally passed and
brought into force.
T w o alternative procedures have been provided by the Act for the
fixation of revision of minimum wages. The appropriate government may
either appoint a committee or sub-committees, as it considers necessary, to
hold enquiries and advise it in this respect, or it may publish its proposals in
the official gazette, and after considering representations by persons likely to
be affected by such proposals, and taking the advice of the advisory board,
fix or revise the minimum wages in respect of each scheduled employment
by notification in the official gazette. All the committees, sub-committees
and advisory boards under the Act, have been given a tri-partite character
inasmuch as they are to have equal representatives of the employers and
employees, and independent persons not exceeding 1/3 of its total number
of members.
For fixation and revising minimum wages, wide discretion has been
vested in the appropriate government, subject, of course, to compliance
with statutory provisions.
The constitutional validity of the Act has been questioned by the
employer on grounds of discrimination and interferences with the rights of
the employers to carry on their lawful business as well as on the ground that
it vests unguided, uncontrolled, and arbitrary discretion in the government.
But the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutional validity of the Act
including the power vested in the government to add to the list of industries
covered by the Act, and fix different wages for different industries and in
different local areas, which powers have been held necessary for proper
implementation of minimum wages in the light of local conditions and the
conditions prevalent in the particular industries.59
59. Edward Mills Co. Ltd. v. The State ofAjmer AIR 1955 SC 25 and Bijoy Cotton Mills &
Others v. The State ofAjmer AIR 1955 SC 33.
Minimum wages payable under the Act are normally to be paid in cash,
but the appropriate government may authorize payment of minimum wages
either wholly or partly in kind, and may also provide for supply for essential
commodities at concessional rates. Once a notification is made under the
Act fixing minimum wages the employer is bound to pay such minimum
wages without any deductions except such as may be authorized.
The central object of the Act being to prevent exploitation of labour,
and to ensure that certain minimum wages are paid to labour, who may not
be in a bargaining position for this purpose, it is provided under the Act that
any contract or agreement whether made before or after the commencement
of the Act, whereby an employee either relinquishes or reduces his right to
the minimum rate of wages, or any privilege or concession accruing to him
under the Act, shall be null and void insofar as it purports to reduce the
minimum rate of wages fixed under the Act.
Fixation of minimum wages by industrial adjudication
Apart from minimum wages fixed under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, the
industrial tribunals to whom disputes may be referred on the subject by the
appropriate government have also the jurisdiction to fix minimum wages
regardless of whether any particular industrial establishment is covered
under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, or not. Thus, in Crown Aluminium
Company v. Their Workmen^ the Supreme Court, while adjudicating an
industrial dispute with regard to wage structure observed that "no industry
has a right to exist unless it is able to pay workmen at least a bare minimum
wage".
Fixation of fair wage by industrial adjudication
While adjudicating industrial disputes relating to wage structure, industrial

tribunals have granted in suitable cases more than the bare subsistence wage.
In this connection, the concepts adopted as useful tools are the living wage,
the fair wage and the minimum wage. The minimum wage has to be paid by
an industry irrespective of its capacity to pay, while the living wage
represents a standard of living which provides not merely for bare physical
subsistence of the worker, but also for the maintenance of his health and
decency, a measure of frugal comfort including education for the children,
protection against old age, requirements of essential social needs, and some
insurance for important misfortunes. The living wage, however, in Indian
conditions, has been considered more as an ideal rather than one which can
be achieved in actual practice. Even in the case of oil companies, which
were paying very high wages to their workmen as compared with the general
60. (1958)ILLJI.
LABOURLAW 431
standard in the country, the Supreme Court held that the wages so paid did
not amount to a living wage. 61 Where an industry has the capacity to pay
more than the minimum wage, industrial adjudication has attempted to lay
down a fair wage which has broadly been termed by the Supreme Court as a
means between the living wage and the minimum wage. Such fair wage has
to be fixed by striking a balance between the demands of social justice,
which require that the workmen should receive their proper share of the
national income which they produce, the financial capacity of the employer,
the legitimate desire of the employer to make a reasonable profit, the rise in
the price structure which may result from the fixation of the wage structure
and the reasonableness of the additional burden which may be imposed
upon the consumer by the wage structure. 62 All these considerations have
carefully to be weighed by adjudicating authorities when laying down the
wage structure for a particular industry.
In most cases wage structures have been fixed for individual industries
when disputes are referred to the tribunal for adjudication in relation to
them, but cases of industry-wise adjudication as in the case of banks,
collieries, etc., are not unknown. In certain cases, as in the case of working
journalists, statutory provisions have been made for laying down a wage
structure through the machinery of wage boards, although in cases of other
industries such wage boards have not been set up under statute but through
resolutions of the government and their recommendations have often been
enforced, either through voluntary acceptance by the parties, or through
industrial or governmental pressures, or industrial adjudication.
It is not for the labour court or tribunal to fix the minimum rates of
wages. While fixing fair rates of wages the courts or tribunals take into
consideration the minimum rates of wages and where the government has
not fixed the minimum rates of wages then the courts or tribunals ascertain
for themselves what would be the minimum rate of wage. In fact, minimum
rate of wages are fixed by the government. Courts or tribunals merely
ascertain what are the minimum rates of wages for the purpose of deciding
'fair wages'. 63
Dearness allowance
O n e particular feature of the wage structure in Indian industry is the

importance of schemes of dearness allowance, which were started during the
First World War, but have acquired much greater prominence after the
61. Standard Vacuum Refinery Company of India Ltd. v. Workmen (1%1) ILLJ 227.
62. Ahmedabad Millowners Association and Others v. Textile Labour Association Ahmedabad
(1966) I LLJ I: AIR 1966 SC 497.
63. Transport Corporation of India Ltd. v. State ofMaharastra & Ors. (1993) II LLJ 365
(Bom.).
Second World War. There is an increasing tendency during recent years to

link dearness allowance with the cost of living index, the extent of
neutralization varying with the circumstances of each case. However, if the
case of dearness allowance schemes, as in case of wage structure as a whole,
where more than the minimum wage is fixed, the tribunals have given due
importance to the financial capacity of the employer, always keeping in mind
that, where permissible, the workmen should be provided relief against the
rise in cost of living particularly in the lower income brackets. 64
Dearness allowance depends upon the place of posting of an employee.
In a case where the flat and steamer clerks had no definite place of posting
because of their playing in the river, it was held that their place of posting
should be the place where their families are residing. 65 In view of the
Supreme Court, all categories of staff getting the same wages and posted at
one place should be given the same scale of dearness allowance irrespective
of the fact that they are working as clerks or members subordinate staff or
factory workmen. 66
It was further said that the pressure of high prices is the same on
various categories of employees and the subordinate staff and factory
workmen these days are as keen to educate their children as clerical staff.67
Other allowances and fringe benefits
Apart from the basic wage and dearness allowance, various other allowances
have also been granted to employees as a result, mainly, of awards
emanating from industrial tribunals. These allowances have been granted to
the employees, either due to special circumstances relating to their
employment, like some additional burden of work peculiar to a particular
category of employees, or to meet certain additional expenses incidental to
their employment like transport, or to grant them certain amenities and
fringe benefits like medical allowances, vacation allowances or house rent
allowance. These allowances go to supplement the earnings of the
employees, and in certain cases may form a substantial part of their total
earnings. In granting such allowances also, industrial adjudication authorities
have had to consider the claims of the employees on the basis of their
justifiability, but without ignoring the capacity of the industry to pay on the
region-cum-industry basis.
64. For a full statement of law regarding principles of fixation of dearness allowance, see
the judgment of Supreme Court in Killick Nixon Ltd. v. Killik and Allied Companies
Employees Union (1975) LLJ 53: AIR 1975 SC 1778.
65. Indian General Navigation and Railway Co. Ltd Calcutta v. Thar Workmen AIR 1960 SC
219.
66. Greaves Cotton and Co.Ltd v. Their Workmen AIR1964 SC 689.
67. Ibid
LABOUR LAW 433
Bonus system
One category of fringe benefits, however, has to be considered separately

from wage structure, allowances and other fringe benefits, and that is the
system of bonus that has grown up in Indian industry, and is now regulated
by the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965.
The Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, applies to every factory, and to every
other industrial establishment in which 20 or more persons are employed on
any day during an accounting year. It provides for payment of bonus in any
industry to employees whose salary or wages do not exceed Rs. 1600 per
mensem, the words 'salary' or 'wage' being defined to include basic wage
and dearness allowance, but no other allowances. The Act brought about a
radical change in the concept of bonus, in so far as it provided for payment
of minimum bonus of 4%, or Rs. 40, whichever is more, later on raised to
8!/3%. As a counter-balance to payment of such minimum bonus, the Act
also provides for a ceiling on bonus payment to the extent of 20% of the
total salary or wage earned by an employee during the year. It also provides
for a scheme of set-on and set-off, so that the surplus left with the employer
after payment of maximum bonus can be added on to the available surplus
in future years, and the minimum bonus paid during years of loss can be set
off against higher available surplus in future years, account being kept open
in this respect for four years only. Exemption is granted to new units for the
first five years after they go into production and sell their products, unless
they make profits earlier, after wiping out earlier losses. The Act lays down
a scheme as to h o w the gross profits of an establishment are to be
computed, and also the items of prior charges which are to be deducted
from the gross profit to arrive at the figure of available surplus. Out of the
available surplus thus arrived at, the Act provides for payment of 60% of the
available surplus to the employees as allocable surplus, which is to be
distributed amongst the employees entitled to bonus under the Act subject
to the condition, however, that the employees receiving salary above Rs. 750
but not in excess of Rs. 1600 per mensem, and otherwise entitled to bonus,
would be paid bonus on their salary as if it is Rs. 750 only and not more.
The provisions of the Act have been applied to establishments in the
private sector, and also to establishments in the public sector provided they
are competitive public sector undertaking for determination of which a
formula is laid down under the Act. Exemptions from the provisions of the
Act are, however, provided to undertakings like certain financial institutions,
charitable organizations and others. Reference of disputes with regard to
bonus can be made under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, and adjudicated upon under the Act in accordance with the provisions
of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, and not otherwise. There is, however,
no bar to the employers and employees coming to an agreement either
substituting the bonus as provided under the Act by a production bonus

scheme.
LAW RELATING TO TRADE UNIONS

AND TRADE DISPUTES
Law relating to trade unions
N o single developments has helped to bring about a more radical change in

equation between employers and employees in industry than the growth of
collective bargaining. In the hey day of lausezfaire and the near deification of
freedom of contract, it was assumed by the policy makers that full justice
would be done to both capital and labour if the parties concerned were left
free to settle between themselves the terms on which the servant would
work for the master. However, labour refused to accept the assumptions
underlying the above dogma. They experienced in their own every day life,
the inequity of a bargain struck between the atomized individual workman
and the employer who, because of his superior economic position, was a
combination in himself. It was this experience which led labour to form
itself into combinations, which survived in Englandthe land where trade
union as we know them today were first formedin spite of relentless
persecution. Trade unions in India, however, because they came into
existence only in the 20 " Century, did not have to pass through the same
trials and tribulations as in England, because, by then, opinion all over the
western world had crystallized itself in favour of permitting workmen to
form trade unions, and against their persecution, as long as they pursued
legitimate trade union objectives. The law in India, however, took its own
time to adjust itself to the formation of trade unions. Till the Trade Unions
Act of 1926 was passed, consequent u p o n the u p r o a r caused by the
injunction and damages awarded against one Mr. Wadia, who in 1918
organized a strike in a leading textile mill in Madras, it was virtually
impossible for a trade union to carry on its legitimate activities because of
the legal difficulties arising out of the ordinary law of contract, torts and
civil and criminal conspiracy, in respect of which the Indian law had
borrowed heavily from the common law of England. The Trade Unions Act
of 1926, although it fell short of the protection provided to trade union by
the Trade Disputes Act of 1906 in Britain still gave certain basic protection
to trade unions in pursuit of their objective of organizing labour into trade
unions, and carrying on collective bargaining on their behalf. This Act of
1926 has remained virtually in its original form on the statute book ever
since 1926, with certain minor amendments, the major amendments made in
the Act in 1947 having not been brought into force till date.
LABOUR LAW 435
The Act provides for registration of trade unions and grants the
immunities and privileges contained therein to registered trade unions only.
There is no compulsion on a trade union to register under the Act; in that
sense the registration is voluntary under the Act. However, inasmuch as
certain basic protections required by a trade union in pursuit of its activities
are not available except to a registered trade union, it becomes necessary for
trade unions to register under the Act, if they wish to pursue their activities
with any vigour or seriousness, and still not fall foul of the law.
Any seven or more members of a trade union may apply to the registrar
of trade unions for registration under the Act. Certain requirements have
been laid down under the Act, like framing of rules, etc., which the trade
union must comply with before it is registered. However, once the trade
union has complied with all the requirements of the Act in regard to
registration, the Registrar is bound to register the trade union; and, on such
registration, to issue a certificate of registration. Such certificate may be
withdrawn or cancelled by the Registrar only under certain contingencies
and protection as laid down under the Act. The order of the Registrar either
refusing registration to a trade union, or withdrawing or canceling such
registration, is an appealable order. The Act also provides for amalgamation
of trade unions and dissolution of trade unions in certain circumstances.
Registered trade unions are required to s nd annual returns to the
Registrar, together with accounts duly audited, and also to send particulars
of their office bearers including all changes made in the same periodically.
Detailed provisions are made under the Act for inspection of records, and
penalties are provided for either giving false information or otherwise not
c o m p l y i n g w i t h the requirements of the Act relating to supply of
information to the Registrar, so as to see that compliance is made with the
provisions of the Act.
A trade union registered under the Act is a body corporate by the name
under which it is registered. It has perpetual succession and a common seal
with power to acquire and hold both movable and immovable property and
to enter into contracts. As a corporate body, it can sue and be sued in its
name.
Registered trade unions are given immunities against the ordinary law of
the land regarding criminal conspiracy and civil liability under the law of
torts. Section 17 of the Act provides that no office bearer or member of a
registered trade union shall be liable to punishment under sub-section 2 of
section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, in respect of any agreement made
between the members for the purpose of furthering any such object of the
trade union as is specified in section 15 of the Act; these being objects on
which the general funds of a trade union may be spent.
However, such protection against the law of criminal conspiracy does
not extend to an agreement to commit an offence. Thus, where, for
example, there is an agreement to go on illegal strike, or to commit any

other illegality which constitutes an offence under the law of the land, it
would be no defence that such agreement was arrived at for the purpose of
conduct of trade disputes on behalf of the trade u n i o n or any of its
members. Indeed any agreement to commit an offence would, under section
17, make them liable for criminal conspiracy.68 Section 18 of the Act gives
protection to registered trade unions in respect of damages incurred by the
employer on account of a trade dispute. Thus, n o suit or other legal
proceeding is maintainable in any civil court against any registered trade
union, or any of its office bearers or members, in respect of any act done in
contemplation, or furtherance, of a trade dispute, to which a member of the
trade union is a party, on the ground only that such act induces some other
person to break a contract of employment, or that it is interference with
trade, business or employment of some other person, or with the right of
some other person to dispose of his capital or of his labour as he wishes.
This is an essential immunity without which it would be impossible for the
trade union to conduct its activities in any meaningful manner. Further, a
registered trade union is also not liable in any suit or other legal proceeding,
in respect of any tortuous act done in contemplation or furtherance of a
trade dispute by an agent of the trade union. Such immunity, however, is
restricted and circumscribed as compared to the law, for example, in Britain.
Such tortuous liability can be avoided by the trade union only if it is able to
prove-the burden of proof being upon it-that the person who committed
the tortious act acted without the knowledge of, or contrary to express
instructions given by, the executive of the trade union. Where the trade
union is not able to establish its innocence as aforesaid it cannot escape
liability for tortuous acts of its agents.
The last important protection given to the trade union is in respect of
agreements arrived at between the members of the registered trade unions
by which restrictions are imposed on individual members' right to dispose
of their capital or labour as they wish. This becomes necessary in order to
make collective bargaining effective. Under section 19 of the Act, it is
provided that such agreements shall not be void or voidable merely by
reason of the fact that any of the objects of the agreement is in restraint of
trade. However, civil courts cannot entertain any legal proceedings for the
express purpose of enforcing, or recovering damages for breach of, any
agreement concerning the conditions on which any member of a trade union
shall or shall not sell his goods, transact business, work employ or be
employed.
68. R.S. Ruikarv. Emperor AIR 1935 Nagpur 149.

LABOUR LAW 437
Encouragement of collective bargaining and regulation of trade

disputes
Apart from removing legal impediments in the way of trade unions carrying
on their legitimate activities in pursuit of collective bargaining, legislation in
countries wedded to democratic value with free elections, has often
interfered more positively in the sphere of employer-employee relations.
Such interference has been mainly in a two-fold direction. One, in the
direction of giving positive support to collective bargaining and placing
restrictions on employers against victimization for trade union activities,
outlawing company trade unions or trade unions sponsored and supported
by the employers, providing for choosing a proper collective bargaining
agent by the workmen, and enforcing obligation on the employer to enter
into collective bargaining in good faith with the trade unions or the
bargaining agent so nominated or elected. The other direction of legislative
and governmental interference has been by regulating trade disputes and -
providing for contingencies where the two parties concerned-namely, the
employers and the employees or the trade unions on their behalf - are not
able to settle disputes or controversies through collective bargaining. In such
contingencies, the state through legislation, or otherwise, has often lent a
helping hand to the parties by providing the services of expert mediators or
conciliators, who, with their experience, are often able to thrash out
differences between the parties, and persuade them to a settlement. The
other mode is to provide for courts of inquiry or investigation, which would
conduct comprehensive investigation into the issues which are holding up a
settlement and give their report and recommendations on such issues. Such
courts of inquiry serve a two-fold purpose. One, to make the facts known to
the parties, so that they can then negotiate and settle on the basis of such
facts. T w o , they help to educate public opinion which may then exert
pressure on the parties to settle on a reasonable basis. These two modes of
intervention, namely, conciliation or mediation and investigation are almost
a universal feature in all democratic countries which permit settlements of
terms and conditions of service ordinarily through free collective bargaining.
However, there are differences of approach in democratic systems as to
whether state intervention should go beyond conciliation and investigation.
The tradition in England, and to a lesser extent in the United States, has
been for legislation or the state to stop short of compulsion except for
requiring a certain 'cooling off' period or a 'strike ballot', so that strikes are
not launched in ' h o t blood', but only after mature deliberation after
exploring all avenues of mutual settlement. There are, however, other
countries, like Australia and New Zealand where the industrial disputes
machinery established by law interferes more positively in a sphere of
employer-employee relations. In these countries, a system of compulsory
adjudication has emerged, with concomitant restrictions on the rights o the
parties to declare strikes and lock-outs on issues which are u n d e r

adjudication or have already been adjudicated upon or may be referred for
adjudication.
India, initially, was strongly influenced by the British tradition in the
matter of regulation of trade disputes. As a matter of fact, to start with, the
state in India was even less interventionist than what it was in Britain. Not
until 1929 did the government assume power to set up conciliation boards
and courts of inquiry for the settlement or investigation of trade disputes.
These were, however, coupled with restrictions on general strikes and
restrictions on strikes in public utility industries, without a corresponding
machinery for providing justice to the demands or claims of the workmen,
and thus considerably angered labour with the consequence that the famous
bomb was thrown by Sardar Bhagat Singh in the Legislative Assembly when
it passed this Act and the much resented Public Security Act, 1929. During
the short-lived period of provincial autonomy from 1937 to 1940, the
popular ministries, particularly the Congress ministries, made an attempt to
intervene more positively in trade disputes. But apart from the Bombay
Industrial Disputes Act, 1938, the period appeared much too short for the
other states (then called provinces) to pass legislation on the subject. During
the period of the Second World War, however, the thinking on the subject
underwent a radical change. Under rule 81 A of the Defence of India Rules,
1939 government assumed the power to refer disputes for adjudication, to
make awards of adjudicators binding, and to ban strikes and lock-outs
during the period of such adjudication or on the issues covered by the
adjudicator's award. The adjudicators, while adjudicating industrial disputes
referred to them, made innovations, and directed the employer to give fairer
and better conditions of service to their workers than they enjoyed before,
and , in that way granted them what they might not have been able to
achieve through collective bargaining, because of the weak bargaining
position of the trade unions. It was this experience which was to be drawn
upon and become the basic foundation of the establishment of a permanent
machinery for settlement, investigation and adjudication of industrial
disputes in India.
To students of the history of industrial adjudication in India, it is a
fascinating study to understand how the very same leaders who previously
were dead set against compulsory adjudication or drastic restriction on
strikes and lock-outs went through a radical change in their out-look and
approach when they took over the reins of government after achievement of
political independence by India. In making such a radical departure from
their previous approach they appear to have been influenced by the fact that
the post-war period was a period of unprecedented industrial unrest and
record loss of man-days of production. There was a new sense of urgency
regarding industrial development, and it was thought that the country could
LABOUR LAW 439
not afford loss of production through strikes and lockouts. It was also
recognized that left to themselves trade unions in their then state of
organization may not be in a position to bargain on equal terms with their
employers, and to obtain fair conditions of service through rocess of
collective bargaining. All these factors, along with certain othe absidiary
factors led to the adoption of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which, more
or less, has formed the basic legislation for the regulation of trade disputes
after independence. The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is a complete code
for regulation of trade disputes, and with certain modifications and
amendments from time to time, has held the field till now. In addition to the
central Act, there are also state Acts regulating trade disputes. But these
have only local importance and need not be considered in this all India
survey.
The coverage of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is confined to such
establishments as are covered by the definition of 'industry' under the Act.
This definition is contained in section 2 (j) of the Act, according to which
' i n d u s t r y ' u n d e r the Act means any business, trade, u n d e r t a k i n g ,
manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service,
employment, handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen.
The definition has been a subject of much controversy and conflicting
judicial interpretations. The Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply and
Sewage Board v. A Rajappah9 gives a broad scope to the definition of industry
over ruling earlier judgments. According to this judgment, an 'industry'
includes all systematic activity organized by cooperation between employer
and employees, the direct and substantial element in which is commercial,
and which is carried on for the production and/ or distribution of goods
and services calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes. Absence of
profit-motive or gainful objective is irrelevant. The true focus is functional
and the decisive test is the nature of the activity with special emphasis on
the employer-employee relationship. This judgment has further clarified that
if the organization is a trade or business, it does not cease to be one because
p h i l a n t h r o p y animates the u n d e r t a k i n g . The Industrial D i s p u t e
(Amendment) Act, 1982 enacted altogether a new definition of Industry.
This amended definition has not been enforced till now. It nullifies the
effect of many judicial decisions and attempts to clarify the conflicting views
arising out of different interpretations of the word 'industry' adopted by the
Supreme Court in various cases. On account of conflicting judicial decisions
it had became difficult to understand the meaning of the word industry. The
amended definition, to a great extent, incorporates the views of the Supreme
Court expressed in Bangalore Water Supply Case.
69. (1978) I LLJ 349.

Another definition which is important in connection with the coverage

of the Act, is that of 'workman' under section 2, sub-section (s). Broadly
speaking, the sub-section provides that any person employed in any industry
to do any skilled or unskilled, manual, clerical, technical or supervisory work
for hire or reward would be covered by the definition. However, those
employed mainly in managerial or administrative capacity are outside the
scope of the Act, as also those who are employed in a supervisory capacity
and drawing wages exceeding one thousand and six hundered rupees a
month. In the case of S. K. Maini v. Carona Sahu Co. Ltd.70 the Supreme
C o u r t observed that the designation of an employee is not of much
importance. What is important is the nature of duties performed by the
employee. A n o t h e r most essential element is that a person t o be a
'workmen' must be employed in any industry. In other words, there must be
a 'contract ofservice' (i.e., master servant relationship) not a 'contract for service'
(i.e., the position of an independent contractor).
Another definition which may be briefly noticed is that of 'industrial
dispute' under section 2 (k) of the Act, which means any dispute or
difference between employers and employees, or between employers and
workmen, or between workmen and workmen which is connected with the
employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the
conditions of labour, or any person.
In Workmen of Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd.71 the
question before the court was whether a demand to confirm employees in
an acting capacity in a grade is an industrial dispute? It was held that a
demand of the workmen to confirm employees employed in an acting
capacity in a grade would unquestionably be an industrial dispute without
anything more. It was held in Sarva Shramik Sangh v. Indian Hume Pipe
Company Ltd.72 that the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 does not limit the
power of Industrial Tribunal to grant relief only from the date of raising of
Industrial Dispute. The definition of the industrial dispute in Section 2 (k) of
the Act does not contain any such limitation. The tribunal has power to
grant relief from the date anterior to the date of raising industrial dispute.
The words 'any person' used in the definition have been confined by judicial
interpretation to such persons in whose terms of employment, etc., the rest
of the workmen have a direct and substantial interest. Further, by judicial
interpretation industrial disputes were specifically confined to such disputes
as are of a collective nature, so that before the amendment of the Act in
1965, any dispute regarding an individual w o r k m a n could not be an
industrial dispute unless espoused by substantial number of workmen of the
70. AIR 1994 SC 1824.

71. (1984) n i X J 391 (SC).
72. (1993) I LLJ 965 (SC).
LABOUR LAW 441
establishment or of a union of whom they might be members. The law was,

however, changed by the Amendment Act of 1965 according to which any
dispute regarding discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or other form of
termination of service of an individual workman shall be deemed to be
industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workmen no my union of
workmen is a party to the dispute.
Having noticed briefly the definitions under the Act, we might now
examine some of the main provisions of the Act which seek to provide for
investigation, settlement, arbitration and adjudication of industrial disputes.
T h e Acts sets u p various types of authorities w i t h t h e aim of
maintaining industrial peace. Provision is made under section 3 of the Act
for the setting up of works committees consisting of equal number of
representatives of the employers and w o r k m e n engaged in t h e
establishment. Such works committees, however, are to be formed only in
such industrial establishments in which 100 or more workmen are employed.
Detailed provisions have been made under the rules framed under the Act
for the election of representatives of workmen on the works committee,
under the overall supervision of the labour department. It is the duty of the
works committees to promote measures for securing and preserving amity
and good relations between the employer and workmen, and to that end to
comment upon matters of their common interest and concern, and to
endeavor to compose any material difference of opinion in respect of such
matters. The function of the works committees is mainly recommendatory
as was held by the Supreme Coun in Northbrook Jute Company Ltd. and another
v. Their Workmen71 where the court emphasized that the works committee
could not take the place of collective bargaining or trade unions, or
combinations of workmen, which alone could arrive at a settlement with
regard to the terms and conditions of service of the w o r k m e n . The
expression 'collective bargaining', as such, does not find any mention in the
Act, but the importance of collective bargaining is implicit in the Act and
has been repeatedly emphasized by the courts while deciding cases under
the Act. To emphasize this aspect, settlements arrived at through collective
bargaining were given legal force by amendment of the definition of
'settlement' contained in section 2(p) of the Act by the Industrial Disputes
(Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956. Where the parties
themselves settle the dispute amicably and a settlement is signed between
them, these is no question of the machinery set up under the Act for
investigation or settlement of the trade disputes being set in motion. All that
they are required to do to make the settlement legally binding on the parties
is to sign the settlement in accordance with the form prescribed, and to send
copies of the settlement to the prescribed authorities under the Act.
73. (1960) I LLJ 580: 1960 AIR SC 879.

However, where the parties are not able to settle the dispute mutually,
provision is made under the Act for the appointment of conciliation officers
charged with the duty to intervene and promote the settlement of industrial
disputes. The conciliation officers are bound to intervene in an industrial
dispute, whether existing or apprehended, in cases where the dispute relates
to a public utility industry and a notice under section 22 of the Act has been
given by either of the parties for strike or lock-out. However, in other cases,
it is left to the discretion of the conciliation officer whether or not to
intervene in an industrial dispute. Where the conciliation officer decides to
so intervene, he is required to take all steps necessary for the purpose of
inducing the parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement of the
dispute. If a settlement is arrived at, he is required to reduce the settlement
into writing, and have it signed by the parties in accordance with the rules
made under the Act. Such a settlement arrived at through the good offices
of the conciliation officer is given a wider coverage than a settlement arrived
at outside conciliation proceeding, and binds not only the employers who
are parties to the settlement, but also their heirs, successors or assigns in
respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates, and, in the case of
workmen, not only those who are parties to the settlement, but all those
persons w h o are employed in the establishment, or part of the
establishment, to which the dispute relates, on the date of the dispute and all
persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or
part. 74 This apparently is for the purpose of bringing about uniformity in
the conditions of service of the workmen in the establishment. Before
signing the settlement, however, it is the duty of the conciliation officer to
satisfy himself that it is fair and reasonable. Thus, for example, where the
settlement is not a genuine settlement, and is the result of collusion between
the management and a group of workmen and does not have the backing of
the majority of workmen or is against their interest, the conciliation officer
may refuse to have the same recorded and signed in conciliation
proceedings.
Where, however, the conciliation officer fails in bringing about a
settlement, he is required to make a report to the government, whereafter
the government may either close the matter and inform the parties
accordingly along with the reasons why no reference is being made, or make
a reference to either of the authorities set out under section 10 of the Act.
Thus, if the government feels that there is still scope for a settlement, it may
refer the dispute to a conciliation board for settlement. The conciliation
board has, more or less, the same function as the conciliation officer, except
that the board is required not only to give details as required by the
conciliation officer, but also to make recommendations for settlement of the
74. Ramnagar Cane and Sugar Co. v. Jatin Chakravorty (1961) ILLJ 244.
LABOUR LAW 443
dispute, which recommendations, however, are not binding on the parties.

The constitution of the board is also different, inasmuch as it is composed
of equal representatives chosen by the parties with an impartial chairman.
The government might also decide that the dispute needs investigation, and
for this p u r p o s e it may refer the dispute to a court of i n q u i r y for
investigation. Such courts of inquiry are required to submit their report to
the government ordinarily within a period of six m o n t h s after the
commencement of inquiry. The courts of inquiry, however, merely
investigate disputes and cannot make award or give directions which may be
binding on the parties.
Before dealing with the provisions in the Act with regard to compulsory
adjudication, it is necessary to pause and consider the machinery set up
under the Act for voluntary reference of disputes to arbitration. The general
criticism of the Act previously was, and in spite of the amendment
continues to be, that the Act has discouraged settlement of disputes
between the parties, and encouraged them to lean too much on outside held
for resolving their disputes. To meet this criticism, at least partially, the Act
was amended in 1956, by providing under section 10A for voluntary
reference of disputes to arbitration. Thus, employers and workmen may
agree to arbitration by an arbitrator of their choice. The awards of such
arbitrators are made binding on the parties, and where the reference to
arbitration has been made at the instance of parties who represent the
majority of the employers and the workmen, as the case may be, the award
is made binding even on those who are not parties to the dispute, in a
similar manner as a settlement arrived at in conciliation proceedings or the
award of an adjudicator. Awards by arbitrators in the latter case, and the
proceedings before such arbitrators, are given the same sanctity as
adjudication proceedings by placing a ban on strikes and lock-outs during
pendency of such proceeding and by imposing restrictions on alteration of
conditions of service, to the prejudice of the workmen or discharging or*
dismissing or punishing the workmen concerned, during such pendency.
The most important feature of the Act is the provision for compulsory
adjudication of industrial disputes at the instance of the government. For
this purpose, the Act provides for labour courts, tribunals or national
tribunals which are all to exercise original jurisdiction in relation to industrial
disputes. Labour courts generally deal with individual cases, or matters not
having large financial repercussions on the industry, or where the number of
workmen affected by the dispute does not exceed 100, whereas industrial
tribunals are empowered to deal not only with matter within the jurisdiction
of the labour courts, but with regard to other important matters like bonus,
classification by grades, wages, allowances, hours of work, etc. National
tribunals are provided for under the Act for the adjudication of such
disputes which in the opinion of the central government involve questions
of national importance, or are of such a nature that industrial establishments

situated in more than one state are likely to be interested in or affected by
them.
Adjudication authorities set up under the Act, become seized of an
industrial dispute only on a reference made to them by the appropriate
government under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Discretion is conferred on the government under the Act to decide whether
or not a reference should be made having regard t o the facts and
circumstances of each case. Even in public utility services, although
seemingly an obligation is cast on the government to refer disputes for
adjudication where a notice of strike or lock-out is given by either of the
parties, the government may refuse to make a reference where the notice of
lock-out or strike has been frivolously or vexatiously given, or the
government considers it would be inexpedient t o made a reference.
However, the discretion vested in the government is not arbitrary and must
be exercised bonafide and for germane reasons. Thus, if the government
refuses to refer the dispute on extraneous considerations or on
considerations which are not germane or relevant, the High Courts are
competent to issue an appropriate writ or order directing the government to
do its duty in accordance with law.75 Once a reference has been made to the
tribunal, the government stands outside the reference and is not permitted
to supersede the same. 76 Limited power is given to the government for
transferring such disputes to another labour court, tribunal or national
tribunal, as the case may be, for disposal. This power is also conditional on
the government's stating reasons for such transfer; this condition being
fulfilled not only in form but also in substance77 so that, if the government
exercises the power arbitrarily or capriciously or for extraneous reasons,
courts are competent to strike down such an order of transfer. Except for
this limited power of transfer, once the government has referred the dispute
to an adjudicating authority, it is the adjudicating authority which has
exclusive control over the proceedings and the government thereafter stands
completely outside the proceedings.
The powers of the tribunal under the Act are quasi-judicial, as held by
the Supreme Court in the Bbarat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. The Employees of the Bharat
Bank Ltd., Delhi and Bharat Bank Employees Union.79 Although the tribunal is
not restricted by the same rules of procedure as a civil court, because it is
not a court in the strict sense of the term, the tribunal has all trappings of a
75. State ofBombay v. Krishnan (KP)and Others (1960) LLJ 592.

76. State of Bihar v. D. N. Ganguli (1958) LLJ 634.
77. Associated Electrical Industries (India) Ltd. v. Its Workmen (1961) LLJ 122.
78. (1950) LLJ 921.
LABOUR LAW 445
court and is not allowed to act arbitrarily or like a benevolent despot. 79 It

must give a fair hearing to the parties before making its award. Once it
pronounces its award, the same has to be published in the appropriate
gazette and the award becomes enforceable 30 days after the date of such
publication. The award so pronounced and published is binding not only on
the parties to the dispute, but on other parties summoned to appear in the
proceedings as well as on the heirs, successors and assigns in respect of the
establishment to which the dispute relates, in the case of employers, and to
all workmen employed in the establishment or part of the establishment on
the date of the dispute and those employed even thereafter as far as the
workmen are concerned. Such award remains in operation for a period of
one year except in cases where the government in accordance with the
procedure set up under the Act chooses to reduce or extend the period.
However, even after the expiry of the period of the award, and termination
of the same by either of the parties, which can be done on giving two
months' notice, the rights conferred on conditions of service under the
award continue to govern the relations between the parties, unless
substituted by a new award or settlement. 80 In the case of continuing
obligations, courts are reluctant to reopen an issue which has already been
decided in adjudication proceedings unless there is a change of
circumstances after the last award was passed. Thus, although the principle
of res judicata as applicable to civil disputes is in terms not applicable to
industrial adjudication, the principle is applicable to industrial adjudication
subject to qualifications and modifications due to the nature of industrial
adjudication itself which is dynamic in character, and is not concerned with
merely enforcing existing rights between the parties but also laying down
new rights and modifying contracts in the light of prevailing conditions and
circumstances.
The central government is empowered to appoint National Industrial
Tribunals for adjudication of Industrial Disputes involving questions of
national importance or involving an establishment situated in more than one
state. The National Tribunal shall consist only of one person, who shall not
be qualified for appoint unless he is, or has been, a judge of a high court.
The central government, if it so thinks fit, can appoint two assessors to
advise the Tribunals in the proceedings before it.
There is little guidance under the Act as to the right and obligations of
the employers and workmen towards each other. The principles regulating
employer-employee relations have been evolved by industrial adjudication in
course of time while deciding individual cases. In doing so, the tribunals
79. /. K. Iron & Steel Co. v. Iron & Steel Mazdoor Union (1956) ILLJ 227: 1956 AIR SC
237.
80. South Indian Bank v. A. R. Chacko (1964) I LLJ 19: AIR 1964 SC 1552.
have tried to balance the rights of labour and employer with a view to
establishing and maintaining industrial peace by ensuring security of service
and a contented labour force, but at the same time protecting discipline in
industry and encouraging industrial growth.
Early in the history of industrial adjudication, intervention of the
Supreme Court was sought to set aside awards which were arbitrary or
where there was no fair trial by the tribunal. The Supreme Court held in the
Bharat Bank case&1 that it had jurisdiction to entertain petitions for special
leave to appeal against such awards where interference was required in the
interest of justice or where issues of general importance or issues of law
were raised. As a result of this jurisdiction exercised by the Supreme Court
under article 136 of the Constitution of India, a large body of case law has
been built up in which the Supreme Court has pronounced almost on every
aspect of industrial law particularly the rights and obligations of the capital
and labour towards each other in various affairs connected with employer-
employee relations and relating to employment or non-employment or
conditions of service of the workmen.
Apart from conferring jurisdiction on industrial t r i b u n a l s for
adjudicating industrial disputes, the Act has also placed severe restrictions
on strikes and lock-outs. For example, no strike in a public utility industry
can take place without 14 days' notice. As soon as a notice is given,
conciliation proceedings are deemed to start in such a public utility service
and no strikes are allowed during the pendency of conciliation proceedings.
Where a conciliation proceeding was pending and one of the unions of the
w o r k m e n was a party to it was held by the Supreme C o u r t that the
settlement according to section 18 (3) will bind not only those workmen
who are members of this union but to all w o r k m e n w o r k i n g in the
establishment. Therefore, if the proceeding relates to a matter concerning all
the employees its pendency would bar against all the employees. 82 In case,
the government decides to refer the disputes for adjudication arising out of
the aforesaid notice, no strike is permitted during the pendency of such
proceedings. Once the award of the industrial tribunal is pronounced, no
strike is possible on any of the issues settled under the award. The
restrictions on strike and lockouts in ordinary industries, that is, industries
which are not public utility services, although not so severe as on strikes in
public utility services, are all the same quite far-reaching. N o strike is
permitted while the dispute is pending before an adjudicating authority on
whatever issue nor is any strike permitted on any of the matters covered by
a settlement of award. Strikes are also not permitted while proceedings are
pending before a conciliation board for settlement. Severe penalties are
81. 1950 LLJ 921.

82. Ram Nagar Cane and Sugar Co. Ltd. v.Jatin Chakravarty and Others (1961) LLJ 244 (SC).
LABOUR LAW 447
provided for going on illegal strike or inciting or instigating the same. Even
financial aid to those participating in illegal strike constitutes an offence
under the Act and those guilty of such offence are liable to penalties
provided under the Act. Although, such severe penalties have been
provided, criminal proceedings can only be started either by or on sanction
by the government.
Apart from restrictions on strikes and lockouts, the Act also attempts to
preserve the status quo during the pendency of proceedings before a tribunal
by providing for restrictions on change of conditions of services to the
prejudice of the w o r k m e n as well as on discharge o r dismissal o r
punishment of employees during the pendency of such proceedings. With
regard to matters connected with the dispute, prior permission is necessary
before any such change or discharge, dismissal or punishment of workmen
can be resorted to, while on matters not connected with the dispute, there is
no such restriction save and except in the case of protected workmen who
are officers of registered trade unions and who have been recognized as
such in accordance with the rules made under the Act. However, even while
discharging or dismissing workmen for misconduct not connected with the
dispute, the employer is required to make an application for the approval of
the tribunal and tender one month's wages simultaneously with the order of
discharge or dismissal, as the case may be. C o n t r a v e n t i o n of these
provisions which are contained in section 33 of the Act is punishable under
the Act. Aggrieved employees also have the right to move the labour court
or the tribunal before whom the dispute is pending by way of complaint
under section 33 A of the Industrial Disputes Act without asking for a
reference by the government in this behalf. On such complaint being made,
the triburial is competent to grant complete relief to the aggrieved workman
in the same manner as it would do in a regular reference.
In order to claim protection under section 33 A a workman must satisfy
the Tribunal by evidence that he is a workman concerned in a pending
dispute and aggrieved by the contravention of section 33 by the employer. 83
The complaint must be filed by the workman himself or by a registered
trade union with the written authorization by the aggrieved workman. 84 A
registered trade union of which the aggrieved workman is a member has no
right to file a complaint under section 33 A unless there is authorization by
the aggrieved workman. 85
We might finally notice section 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act,
under which workmen entitled to benefits under a settlement or award or
under the provisions of chapter V A of the Act or under their existing
83. Digwadib Colliery v. Ramji Singh (1964) LLJ 43 (SC).

84. National Power Supply Corporation Ltd. v. State ofAssam (1963) LLJ 10 (Assam).
85. K.L. Reddi v. A.S.RR. T. Corpn. AIR 1971 AP 57.
conditions of service, may move the appropriate government where the

monetary benefit is already quantified, and the labour court where it is not
so quantified, for realization of their dues and computation of their benefits.
In such cases, there is no necessity for workmen to apply for a reference to
the industrial tribunal. Such computation of benefits of money due can be
made by any labour court which has been specified in this behalf without
any specific reference being made to it by the appropriate government of
any particular claim provided a particular court has been specified for the
entertainment of such claims.
The machinery for regulation, investigation and settlement of industrial
disputes has been subject matter of much discussion and there has been a
serious controversy as to the utility of compulsory adjudication which, it is
complained, has discouraged collective bargaining and encouraged a litigious
attitude between the employees and employers. One of the failings of the
existing legislation is the omission to provide proper bargaining agent in the
absence of which industrial relations have often been disturbed. Criticism
has also been voiced of the wide discretion vested in the government to
refer or not to refer disputes for adjudication under the Act. The first
National Commission on Labour which gave its report in 1968 has
suggested some far-reaching changes in the machinery for regulations of
trade disputes as provided under the Industrial Disputes Act. But opinion
on this subject particularly among the trade unions is very much divided.
Indian government in 1977 took up seriously the matter of passing a
comprehensive Industrial Relations Act to replace the present Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, the Trade Unions Act, 1926, and the Industrial
Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 by more satisfactory method for
regulation of industrial disputes, panicularly in the matter of designation of
a collective bargaining agent, about the modalities of which there has been
acute controversy between trade unions, and making other changes
considered desirable for dealing with multiplicity of trade unions and
dilatory adjudication proceedings which have often stood in the way of
establishing a proper industrial relations system. Meanwhile, it is through the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, mainly that the industrial relations in the
country will continue to be regulated.
The Government of India appointed the Second National Commission
on Labour to investigate the whole question of rationalization of existing
labour laws in the organized sector so as to make them more relevant in the
changing economic conditions under the impact of globalization. The
Commission submitted its report in 2002 to the Central Government. The
Commission has recommended for consolidation of all existing labour laws
into a single law called the Labour-Managements Relations Law or the Law
on Labour Management Relations.
LABOUR LAW 449
Suggested Readings
1. C. K. Johri, Incomes Policy and Industrial Relations, Sri Ram Centre, New
Delhi, 1974.
2. Dr. R. G. Chaturvedi, Law ofEmployees Provident Funds, 2003.
3. Dr. Sanjeev Kumar, Industrial and Labour Laws, 1 st ed., Bharat Law
House, New Delhi, 2004.
4. G. B. Pai, Labour Law in India, Butterworths, New Delhi, 2001.
5. G. M. Kothari, Labour Demands and their Adjudication, Tripathi, Bombay,
1977.
6. Indian Law Institute, Labour Law and Labour ReUtions, ILI, New Delhi,
1968.
7. K.N. Vaid, State and Labour in India, Asia Publishing House, Bombay,
1965.
8. National Commission on Labour, Report, Manager of Publications,
Delhi, 1969.
9. O. Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law, 3 r d ed., Stevens, London, 1983.
10. O. P. Malhotra, The Law of Industrial Disputes, 6 th ed., Buttersworths
Nexis Lexis, New Delhi, 2004.
11. P.L. Malik, The Industrial Law, 18th ed., EBC, Lucknow, 2001.
12. R. S. Kulkarni, Industrial Adjudication, Progressive Corp. Bombay, 1973.
13. S. C. Srivastava, Commentary on the Payment ofGratuity Act, 1972, Universal
Publishers, Delhi, 2002.
14. S. L. Agarwal, Labour Relations Law in India, 2 n d ed., Macmillan, New
Delhi, 1980.
15. S. N . Dhyani, Trade Unions and the Right to Strike, Sultan Chand, Delhi,
1971.
16. S. N . Mishra, Labour and Industrial Laws, 2 nd ed., Allahabad Law Agency,
Faridabad, 2004.
17. V.V. Giri, Labour Problems in the Indian Industry, 2 nd ed., Asia Publishing
House, New Delhi, 1972.

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LABOUR LAW

In India, legislation relating to labour has grown mainly in the twentieth

It will be convenient to divide the subject into certain broad categories.

Legislation on working conditions comprises Acts dealing with subjects like

1948, which regulates working conditions in factories where manufacturing

Hours of work of adults

week- as a result of custom, usage, contract, settlement or award of

Restrictions on working hours and conditions for women and young

There are further restrictions in the matter of hours of work of young

2. Workmen ofOverseas Airways Corporation v. British Overseas Airways Corporation (1962) I

Weekly day of rest, holidays and leave

with regard to the same is prevalent in other establishments in the region

Health, welfare and safety

The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923

The earliest legislative measure by which a modicum of social security was

provided to the Indian worker was through the Workmen's Compensation

5. Gazette of India, 8.12.2000 Part , S. 4 (Extra).

(b) where total disablement, temporary or permanent, results from the

The Employers' Liability Act, 1938

The Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948

13. O. Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law, 1972, p. 17.

under Section 1 (5) of the Act. 17

The Maternity Benefit Act, 1961

establishments, industrial, commercial, agricultural or otherwise. The

23. (1999) II LLJ 485.

Provident fund and pensionary benefits

25. (1981) Lab IC 911.

of Gratuity Act, 1972 was comprehensive to include 'establishment' within

Retrial benefit for the worker: Summing up

With the adoption of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, therefore,

CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT, JOB SECURITY AND

The general principal or contract, which in India have been incorporated

terms of the contract of employment have to be gathered from the

The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946

authorities set u p under the Act, t o decide w h a t t h e conditions of

The Standing Orders provide for giving opportunities to workers to

To an industrial worker anywhere, security of employment has a great deal

(i) Termination of service or discharge simpliciter

Under the Indian Contract Act, contract of service or employment is the

33. (1984) 11 LLJ 105 (SC).

summed up in the expression- "freedom to hire and fire". Under the

34. (1949) LLJ 245: AIR 1949 FC 111.

(ii) Retirement on reaching the age of superannuation

The services of an employee may also be dispensed with by the employer on

38. (1969) 1 LLJ 751.

Superannuation in relation to an employee means the attainment

(Hi) Dismissal or discharge for misconduct

44. AIR 1973 SC 2344.

involve no forfeiture, the second may involve forfeiture of an amount equal to

(iv) Lay off, retrenchment, transfer of undertaking and closure

section 25 F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Under this section, no

The definition of workmen in section 2 (s) does not make a distinction

Abolition and regulation of contract labour

54. (1960) II LLJ 233.

L A W RELATING TO WAGES, ALLOWANCES,

The Payment of Wages Act, 1936 and other allied legislations

the conditions subject to which such deductions can be made. Employers

The Minimum Wages Act, 1948

Wage regulation by statute has generally a two fold aim-first, to prevent