9/5/2017 G.R. No.

188448

TodayisTuesday,September05,2017

THIRDDIVISION

January11,2017

G.R.No.188448

RODOLFOLAYGOandWILLIELAYGO,Petitioners,
vs.

MUNICIPALMAYOROFSOLANO,NUEVAVIZCAYA,Respondent.

DECISION

JARDELEZA,J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court from the Decision2dated
December 16, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 103922 and its Resolution3 dated June 19,
2009.

Facts

InJuly2005,AnizaBandrang(Bandrang)senttwolettercomplaints4tothenMunicipalMayorSantiagoO.Dickson
(MayorDickson)andtheSangguniangBayanofSolano,NuevaVizcaya,informingthemoftheillegalsubleaseshe
enteredintowithpetitionersRodolfoLaygoandWillieLaygooverPublicMarketStallsNo.77A,77B,78A,and78
B,whichpetitionersleasedfromtheMunicipalGovernment.Bandrangclaimedthatpetitionerstoldhertovacatethe
stalls, which they subsequently subleased to another. Bandrang expressed her willingness to testify against
petitionersifneedbe,andappealedthatshebegivenpriorityinthefuturetoleasethestallsshevacated.5

InAugust2005,theSangguniangBayanendorsedtheletterofBandrangandacopyofResolutionNo.18320046to
Mayor Dickson for appropriate action. The Sanggunian informed Mayor Dickson that the matter falls under the
jurisdiction of his office since it (Sanggunian)has already passed and approved Resolution No. 1832004, which
authorizedMayorDicksontoenforcetheprovisionagainstsubleasingofstallsinthepublicmarket.7

Mayor Dickson, in response, informed the Sanggunian that the stalls were constructed under a BuildOperate
Transfer(BOT)scheme,whichmeantthatthepetitionershadtherighttokeeptheirstallsuntiltheBOTagreement
wassatisfied.HethenaskedtheSanggunianifprovisionsweremadetosanctionlesseesundertheBOTscheme
similartotheprovisionagainstsubleasing(ItemNo.9)inthecontractoflease.8

Thereafter,BandrangwroteanotherlettertotheSanggunian,prayingandrecommendingtoMayorDickson,byway
of a resolution, the cancellation of the lease contract between the Municipality and petitioners for violating the
provision on subleasing. She suggested that after which, the stalls can be bidded upon anew and leased to the
successful bidder. She made the suggestion because Mayor Dickson did not act on her concerns even after the
Sanggunianreferredthemtohim.9

TheSanggunianonce again referred the letter of Bandrang, together with a copy of Resolution No. 1832004, to
Mayor Dickson for appropriate action. The Sanggunian opined that they no longer need to make any
recommendation to Mayor Dickson because Resolution No. 1832004 already empowered and authorized him to
canceltheleasecontractspursuanttoitspertinentprovisions.10

Mayor Dickson, however, did not act on the letter of Bandrang and on the referrals of the Sanggunian. Thus,
Bandrang filed a Petition for Mandamus 11 against him before the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya (RTC). Subsequently, she amended her petition to implead petitioners. 12 Bandrang alleged that despite
alreadybeingawareoftheviolationsoftheleasecontractsofpetitionerswiththeMunicipality,MayorDicksonstill
refused to enforce the provisions of the lease contracts against subleasing. Bandrang concluded that Mayor
Dickson'sinactioncanonlybeconstruedasanunlawfulneglectintheperformanceandenforcementofhispublic
duty as the Chief Executive of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya. Thus, she sought an order directing Mayor Dickson to
immediatelycanceltheleasebetweentheMunicipalGovernmentandpetitionersoverPublicMarketStallNos.77
A,77B,78A,and78B,andtoleasethevacatedstallstointerestedpersons.13
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In his Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses, 14 Mayor Dickson claimed that under the principle of pari
delicto,Bandranghadnorighttoseekremedywiththecourtasshewasguiltyherselfinleasingthemarketstalls.
Mayor Dickson insisted that he acted in accordance with law by referring the matter to the Sanggunian for
appropriateaction.HealsoarguedthatBandranghadnocauseofactionagainsthimandthatshewasnotareal
partyininterest.Helikewiseassertedthatthesubjectofthemandamuswasnotproperasitentailedanactwhich
waspurelydiscretionaryonhispart.15

InhisPreTrialBrief,16MayorDicksonelaboratedthatBandranghadnocauseofactionbecausethestallswereon
aBOTschemecoveredbyanordinance.Duringthehearing,MayorDicksonpresentedacopyoftheresolutionof
the Sanggunian indicating that there was a directive to all stall owners in the public market of Solano, Nueva
Vizcayatobuildtheirownstallsafterafireguttedthepublicmarket.17

Ontheotherhand,petitionersdeniedthattheywerethelesseesofStalls77AandBand78AandB.Theyclarified
thatClaritaLaygo(Clarita),theirmother,wasthelesseeofthestallsbyvirtueofaBOTschemeoftheMunicipality.
AtthetimetheyenteredintoacontractofleasewithBandrang,itwasagreedthatthecontractwassubjecttothe
consent of the other heirs of Clarita. The consent, however, was never given hence, there was no subleasing to
speakof.Evenontheassumptionthattherewas,petitionersmaintainedthattheprohibitiononsubleasingwould
notapplybecausethecontractbetweentheMunicipalityandClaritawasoneunderaBOTscheme.ResolutionNo.
1832004onlycoveredstallholderswhoviolatedtheirleasecontractswiththeMunicipalGovernment.Sincetheir
contractwiththeMunicipalGovernmentwasnotaleasecontractbutaBOTagreement,ResolutionNo.1832004
wouldneitherapplytothem,norbeenforcedagainstthem. 18Further,evengrantingarguendothattheprohibition
would apply, petitioners claimed that there was no more ground for the revocation of the lease because the
subleasingclaimedbyBandranghadendedandthesubsequentreceiptbytheMunicipalityofpaymentsratifiedthe
contractwithpetitioners.19

Meanwhile, on July 23, 2007, the RTC issued an Order directing the substitution of then incumbent mayor Hon.
PhilipA.Dacayo(MayorDacayo)asrespondentinplaceofMayorDickson.20

BandrangfiledaMotionforSummaryJudgment21onJanuary8,2008arguingthatnogenuinefactualissuesexisted
tonecessitatetrial.Bandrangreiteratedtheviolationofpetitionersagainstsublettingintheirleasecontractswiththe
Municipal Government. She stated that the will of the Sanggunian to enforce the policy against subleasing was
bolsteredbythefactthatitpassedtwomoreresolutions,ResolutionNo.0172006andResolutionNo.1352007,
reiteratingtheimplementationofResolutionNo.1832004.22Shealsoallegedforthefirsttimethatafterthefilingof
thecase,anotherviolationbesidestheprohibitiononsublettingsurfaced:thenonpaymentofstallrentalfees.She
pointed out that petitioners admitted this violation when they exhibited during a hearing the receipt of payment of
rentalsinarrearsforover17months.BandrangquotedSection7B.06(a)ofMunicipalOrdinanceNo.164,Seriesof
1994,whichstatedthatfailuretopaytherentalfeeforthreeconsecutivemonthsshallcauseautomaticcancellation
ofthecontractofleaseofspaceorstall.ShethenconcludedthatthissectionleftMayorDicksonwithnochoicebut
tocomply.23

RTCRuling

InitsResolutiondatedJanuary28,2008,theRTCgrantedthepetition. Thus: 1wphi1

"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, let a Writ of Mandamus to issue ordering the Municipal
MayorofSolanotoimplementNos.9and11oftheprovisionsoftheContractofleaseofstallbetween
theMunicipalGovernmentofSolanoandprivaterespondentsRodolfoandWillieLaygo.

TheMunicipalMayorofSolano,Hon.PhilipA.Dacayo,isherebyorderedasitishisdutytoenforce
[SangguniangBayan]ResolutionNos.1832004and[135]2007immediatelyandwithoutfurtherdelay.

SOORDERED."24

The RTC held that the contract between petitioners and the Municipal Government was a lease contract, as
evidencedbyacertificationsignedbyMayorEpifanioLD.Galima(MayorGalima)datedSeptember17,2006.25The
RTCbrushedasidethenonpresentationofthewrittencontractoflease,notingthatpublicpolicyandpublicinterest
mustprevail.TheRTCalsoheldthatevenontheassumptionthattherewasaBOTagreementbetweenpetitioners
andtheMunicipalGovernment,petitionershadalreadybeencompensatedforit,asevidencedbycertificationsof
theMunicipalGovernmentdatedAugust28,2006andSeptember17,2006.26Asregardsthenonpaymentofstall
rentals,theRTCruledthatpetitionersdeemedtohaveadmittedtheallegationwhentheyexhibitedtothecourtthe
receiptofpaymentofrentalsinarrears.27

TheRTC,thus,concludedthatpetitionersclearlyviolatedthetermsandconditionsoftheleasecontract,whichgave
risetotheenactmentofResolutionNo.1832004. SinceMayorDicksonfailedinhisdutytoenforcetheresolution
1wphi1

anddelayeditsimplementationwithoutvalidreason,manamusisaproperremedy.28

PetitionersappealedtotheCA,whilethenincumbentMayorDacayofiledamanifestationexpressinghiswillingness
toimplementResolutionsNo.1832004and1352007.29

CourtofAppealsRuling

On December 16, 2008, the CA rendered the now assailed Decision30 dismissing the appeal and sustaining the
resolutionoftheRTC.

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The CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that the contract between petitioners and the Municipal Government is a
leasecontractand,thus,ResolutionNo.1832004appliestothem.31

On the issue of whether mandamus is proper, the CA also affirmed the ruling of the RTC stating that although
mandamus is properly availed of to compel a ministerial duty, it is also available to compel action in matters
involvingjudgmentanddiscretionbutnottodirectanactioninaparticularway,towit:

x x x However, mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, in matters involving

anddiscretion,though notto directthe exerciseofjudgmentordiscretioninaparticularwayorthe

Inthecaseatbar,theSangguniangBayanofSolano("Sanggunian")delegatedtoMayorDicksonand
subsequentlytoincumbentMayorDacayo,thepowertocanceltheleasecontractsofthosemarket
stallholderswhoviolatedtheircontractswiththeMunicipality.Inferredfromthispoweristhepower
of the Mayor to determine who among the market stallholders violated their lease contracts with the
Municipality.Suchpowerconnotesanexerciseofdiscretion.

WhenthenMayorDicksonrefusedtoexercisethisdiscretion,evenaftertheSanggunianassuredhim
that thesubjectresolutionempoweredhimto havethe leasecontractsofthe Laygoscancelled,said
act of refusal became proper subject of mandamus, as it involved a duty expected of him to be
performed.SowiththeincumbentMayor,theHon.PhilipDacayo,aswasorderedbytheCourtbelow.
32

Willie Laygo filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated January 20, 2009, which was denied by the CA in a
Resolution33datedJune19,2009.

Hence,thispetition,whichraisedthefollowingquestions:

1.May the Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 1832004 be applied against petitioners despite the absence of a
contractofleasebetweenthemandtheMunicipalGovernmentofSolano,NuevaVizcaya?

2.MaytheSangguniangBayanResolutionNo.1832004beenforcedbyanybodyelse,exceptMayorDickson?

PetitionersreiteratetheirpositionthatResolutionNo.1832004cannotbeenforcedagainstthembecausetherewas
nocontractofleasebetweenthemandtheMunicipalGovernmentandtherefore,therecannotbeanyoccasionfor
petitionertoviolateanyprovision.

Moreover,petitionersarguethattheresolutioncanonlybeenforcedbyMayorDicksonbecauseitspecifiedMayor
Dicksonandnoother.Consequently,sinceMayorDicksonisnolongerinoffice,hecannotnowenforceResolution
No.1832004.34

TheMunicipalGovernment,throughtheProvincialLegalOfficerofNuevaVizcaya,statedinitsComment35thatthe
policyagainstsubleasingwasbolsteredbytheenactmentoftheSanggunianofanotherresolution,ResolutionNo.
1352007,withthesamepurpose,butauthorizingthenMayorDacayotoimplementtheNo.9andNo.11provisions.
inthecontractoflease.36

OurRuling

Wegrantthepetition.

Thereispreponderantevidence
thatthecontractbetween

petitionersandtheMunicipal
Governmentisoneoflease.

The type of contract existing between petitioners and the Municipal Government is disputed. The Municipal
Governmentassertsthatitisoneoflease,whilepetitionersinsistthatitisaBOTagreement.Bothparties,however,
failed to present the contracts which they purport to have. It is likewise uncertain whether the contract would fall
underthecoverageoftheStatuteofFraudsandwould,thus,beonlyproventhroughwrittenevidence.Inspiteof
these, we find that the Municipal Government was able to prove its claim, through secondary evidence, that its
contractwithpetitionerswasoneoflease.

We have no reason to doubt the certifications of the former mayor of Solano, Mayor Galima, and the Municipal
Planning and Development Office (MPD0)37 which show that the contract of the Municipal Government with
petitioners'mother,Clarita,wasconvertedintoaBOTagreementforatimein1992duetothefirethatrazedthe
publicmarket.Thesecertificationswerepresentedandofferedinevidencebypetitionersthemselves.Theyprove
thatClaritawasallowedtoconstructherstallsthatweredestroyedusingherownfunds,andwiththepaymentofthe
leaserentalsbeingsuspendeduntilsherecoversthecostshespentontheconstruction.Theconstructionwas,in
fact,supervisedbytheMPDOforaperiodofthreemonths.Thestallswereeventuallyconstructedcompletelyand
awardedtoClarita.ShethereafterreoccupiedthestallsunderaleasecontractwiththeMunicipalGovernment.In
fact,inhisNoticedatedAugust21,2007,theMunicipalTreasurerofSolanoremindedpetitionersoftheirdelinquent
stall rentals from May 2006 to July 2007. 38 As correctly posited by the Municipal Government, if the stalls were
underaBOTscheme,theMunicipalTreasurercouldnothaveassessedpetitionersofanydelinquency.39
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Also,petitionersthemselvesraised,forthesakeofargument,thatevenifthecontractmaybeconcededasoneof
lease,themunicipalityisnonethelessestoppedfromcancelingtheleasecontractbecauseitsubsequentlyaccepted
paymentofrentalsuntilthetimeofthefilingofthecase.40

Inthesamevein,theSangguniangBayanResolutionNo.1832004,whichquotedItemsNo.9and11ofthelease
contractontheabsoluteprohibitionagainstsubleasingandthepossibleterminationofthecontractinviewofback
rentals or any violation of the stipulations in the contract, is presumed to have been regularly issued. It deserves
weight and our respect, absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the members of the
Sanggunian.

Mandamus,however,isnot
proper.

Mandamusisacommandissuingfromacourtofcompetentjurisdiction,inthenameofthestateorthesovereign,
directedtosomeinferiorcourt,tribunal,orboard,ortosomecorporationorpersonrequiringtheperformanceofa
particulardutythereinspecified,whichdutyresultsfromtheofficialstationofthepartytowhomthewritisdirected
orfromoperationoflaw.41Asarule,mandamuswillnotlieintheabsenceofanyofthefollowinggrounds:[a]that
thecourt,officer,board,orpersonagainstwhomtheactionistakenunlawfullyneglectedtheperformanceofanact
whichthelawspecificallyenjoinsasadutyresultingfromoffice,trust,orstationor[b]thatsuchcourt,officer,board,
orpersonbasunlawfullyexcludedpetitioner/relatorfromtheuseandenjoymentofarightorofficetowhichheis
entitled.42 Neither will the extraordinary remedy of mandamus lie to compel the performance of duties that are
discretionary in nature.43 In Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Villaflor,44we explained the difference between the exercise of
ministerialanddiscretionarypowers,towit:

"Discretion,"whenappliedtopublicfunctionaries,meansapowerorrightconferreduponthembylaw
or

actingofficially,undercertaincircumstances,uncontrolledbythejudgmentorconscienceofothers.A
purely ministerial act or duty in contradiction to a discretional act is one which an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
authority,withoutregardtoortheexerciseofhisownjudgmentupontheproprietyorimproprietyofthe
actdone.Ifthelawimposesadutyuponapublicofficerandgiveshimtherighttodecidehoworwhen
thedutyshallbeperformed,suchdutyisdiscretionaryandnotministerial.Thedutyisministerialonly
when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.45
(Citationomitted.)

Applyingtheforegoingdistinction,wefindthatthePetitionforMandamusmustfailbecausetheactssoughttobe
donearediscretionaryinnature.

ThepetitionsoughtanordertodirectMayorDicksontocanceltheleasecontractofpetitionerswiththeMunicipal
Governmentandtoleasethevacatedmarketstallstointerestedpersons.Wehavealreadysettledintheearlycase
ofAprueba v. Ganzon46that the privilege of operating a market stall under license is always subject to the police
power of the city government and may be refused or granted for reasons of puplic policy and sound public
administration.47BeingadelegatedpolicepowerfallingunderthegeneralwelfareclauseofSection16oftheLocal
GovernmentCode,thegrantorrevocationoftheprivilegeis,therefore,discretionaryinnature.48

Moreover,ResolutionNo.1832004,orevenitssubsequentequivalent,ResolutionNo.1352007,merelyauthorizes
the mayor "to enforce the No. 11 provision of the contract of lease of market stalls between the Municipal
GovernmentandthestallholdersattheSolano[P]ublicMarketwhoviolatedtheNo.9provisionofsaidcontractxx
x."49 Item No. 11 provides that "[i]f any back rental remains unpaid for more than [15] days or if any violation be
madeofanyofthestipulationsofthisleasebytheLESSEE,theLESSORmaydeclarethisleaseterminatedand,
thereafter,reentertheleasedpremisesandrepossessthesame,andexpeltheLESSEEorothersclaimingunder
him/her from the leased premises."50 Clearly, Item No. 11 does not give the mayor a mandate to motu propio or
automaticallyterminateorcanceltheleasewithalesseewhoisdelinquentinthepaymentofrentalsorwhoisin
violation of any of the provisions of the contract. This is apparent from the permissive word "may" used in the
provision.Itdoesnotspecificallyenjointhemayortocanceltheleaseasamatterof"duty."Wherethewordsofa
statuteareclear,plain,andfreefromambiguity,itmustbegivenitsliteralmeaningandappliedwithoutattempted
interpretation.51

We do not discount, however, our ruling in previous cases where we cited exceptions to the rule that only a
ministerialdutycanbecompelledbyawritofmandamus.InRepublicv.Capulong,52weheldthatasageneralrule,
a writ of mandamuswill not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer since it is his
judgmentthatistobeexercisedandnotthatofthecourt.53Courtswillnotinterferetomodify,controlorinquireinto
the exercise of this discretion unless it be alleged and proven that there has been an abuse or an excess of
authorityonthepartoftheofficerconcerned.54

In Angchango, Jr. v. Ombudsman, 55 we also held that in the performance of an official duty or act involving
discretion,thecorrespondingofficialcanonlybedirectedbymandamustoact,butnottoactonewayortheother.
However, this rule admits of exceptions such as in cases where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest
injustice,orpalpableexcessofauthority.56Theseexceptionsdonotapplyinthiscase.

Firstly,whileMayorDicksonmaybecompelledtoactonthedirectiveprovidedinResolutionNo.1352007,hemay
notbecompelledtodosoinacertainway,aswhatwasprayedforbyBandranginseekingthecancellationofthe
contract and to release the vacated market stalls to interested persons. It was enough that Mayor Dickson be
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remindedofhisauthoritytocancelthecontractunderItemNo.11,butwhetherornothisdecisionwouldbeforor
againstBandrangwouldbeforMayorDicksonalonetodecide.NoteventheCourtcansubstituteitsownjudgment
overwhathehadchosen.

Asitwas,MayorDicksondidactonthematterbeforehim.Heexercisedhisdiscretionbychoosingnottocancelthe
contractonthegroundofparidelicto,explaining that Bandrang, as the sublessee herself, was in violation of the
samepolicyonsubleasing.Thecomplaintdoesnotallegethatindecidingthisway,MayorDicksoncommittedgrave
abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority. Neither did Bandrang present proof that
MayorDicksonactedarbitrarily,wantonly,fraudulently,andagainsttheinterestofthepublicwhenhechosenotto
canceltheleasecontractofpetitioners.57

Further, aside from the imperative duty of the respondent in a petition for mandamus to perform that which is
demandedofhim,itisessentialthat,ontheonehand,thepersonpetitioningforithasaclearlegalrighttotheclaim
thatissought.58Tobegivenduecourse,apetitionformandamusmusthavebeeninstitutedbyapartyaggrievedby
the alleged inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board or person which unlawfully excludes said party from the
enjoymentofalegalright.Thepetitionerineverycasemustthereforebeanaggrievedparty,inthesensethathe
possesses a clear right to be enforced and a direct interest in the duty or act to be performed. The Court will
exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to
raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government act that is being
challenged.59DoesBandranghavesuchlegalstandingtoinstitutethepetition?Weanswerinthenegative.

FollowingourrulingintheearlycaseofAlmariov.CityMayor,etal.,60whereweruledthatthepetitionerseekingto
compel the city mayor toeject occupants of stalls in the public market had no locus standi to file thepetition for
mandamus,wealsoarriveherewiththesameconclusion.SimilarlywithAlmario,Bandrang is not an applicant for
any stall in thepublic market which is the subject of the controversy. She is neither arepresentative of any such
applicant,stallholder,oranyassociationofpersonswhoaredeprivedoftheirrighttooccupyastallinsaidmarket.
AswehavededucedinAlmario:

xxxVerily,heisnottherealpartyininterestwhohasthecapacity,rightorpersonalitytoinstitutethe
present action. As this Court has well said in an analogous case, "the petitioner does not have any
specialorindividualinterestinthesubjectmatteroftheactionwhichwouldenableustosaythatheis
entitledtothewritasamatterofright.Hisinterestisonlythatacitizenatlargecoupledwiththefactthat
inhiscapacitya[s]presidentoftheAssociationofEngineersitishisdutytosafeguardtheinterestsof
themembersofhisassociation."61(Italicsintheoriginal,citationomitted.)

WHEREFORE,in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 16, 2008 and
Resolution dated June 19, 2009of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 103922, and the Resolutiondated
January28,2008oftheRegionalTrialCourtofBayombong,NuevaVizcayaareREVERSEDandSETASIDE.The
PetitionforMandamusagainstMayorSantiagoO.DicksonisDISMISSED.

SOORDERED.

FRANCISH.JARDELEZA
AssociateJustice

WECONCUR:

PRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.
AssociateJustice
Chairperson

LUCASP.BERSAMIN BIENVENIDOL.REYES
AssociateJustice AssociateJustice

ALFREDOBENJAMINS.CAGUIOA*
AssociateJustice

ATTESTATION

IattestthattheconclusionsintheaboveDecisionhadbeenreachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassigned
tothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.

PRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.
AssociateJustice

Chairperson,ThirdDivision

CERTIFICATION

PursuanttotheSection13,ArticleVIIIoftheConstitutionandtheDivisionChairpersonsAttestation,Icertifythat
theconclusionsintheaboveDecisionhadbeenreachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothewriter
oftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.

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MARIALOURDESP.A.SERENO
ChiefJustice

Footnotes
*
DesignatedasFifthMemberoftheThirdDivisionperSpecialOrderNo.2417datedJanuary4,2017.
1
Rollo,pp.39.
2
Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, and concurred in by Associate Justices Rebecca De
GuiaSalvadorandRicardoR.RosariooftheTenthDivision,id.at1425.
3
Id.at27.
4
Records,pp.56.
5
Id.
6
Records,pp.89.Entitled"ResolutionAuthorizingtheHon.MayorSantiagoO.DicksontoEnforcetheNo.
11 Provision of the Contract of Lease of Market Stalls Between the Municipal Government and the Stall
HoldersattheSolanoPublicMarketWhoViolatedtheNo.9ProvisionofSaidContractWithoutPrejudiceto
theCollectionoftheUnpaidRentalsoftheViolators."
7
Id.at7.
8
Id.at135.
9
Id.at10.
10
Id. at 11 Item No. 9 of the Lease Contract allegedly stipulates that "[t]here shall absolutely be no
subleasingoftheleasedpremisesoranypartthereof,"whileItemNo.11allegedlystatesthat"[i]fanyback
rentalremainsunpaidformorethanfifteen(15)daysorifanyviolationbemadeofanyofthestipulationsof
thisleasebytheLESSEE,theLESSORmaydeclarethisleaseterminatedand,thereafter,reentertheleased
premisesandrepossessthesame,andexpeltheLESSEEorothersclaimingunderhim/herfromtheleased
premises.xxx"Id.at8.
11
Id.atl4.
12
Id.at4448,56.
13
Id.at4547.
14
Id.at1517.
15
Id.at1516.
16
Id.at2627.
17
Id.at32.
18
Id.at7375.
19
Id.at7475.
20
Rollo,p.17.
21
Records,pp.122125.
22
Id.at124.
23
Id.at124125.
24
Rollo,p.15.AscitedintheCADecision.
25
Id.atl8.
26
Id.
27
Rollo,pp.1920.
28
Id.at19.
29
Id.at20.

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30
Supranote2.Thedispositiveportionreads:

WHEREFORE,theinstantappealisDISMISSED.TheassailedResolutiondatedJanuary28,
2008isherebyAFFIRMED.

SOORDERED.
31
Rollo,pp.2224.
32
Id.at23.Emphasistheoriginal,citationomitted.
33
Supranote3.
34
Rollo,pp.67.
35
Id.at2937.
36
Id.at3334.
37
Records,pp.136137.
38
Id.at126
39
Rollo,p.35.
40
Records,pp.7475.
41
Abagav.Panes,G.R.No.147044,August24,2007,531SCRA56,6162,citingProfessionalRegulation
Commissionv.DeGuzman,G.R.No.144681,June21,2004,432SCRA505,518.
42
Star Special Watchman and Detective Agency, Inc. v. Puerto Princesa City, G.R. No. 181792, April 21,
2014,722SCRA66,81.
43
SpecialPeople,Inc.Foundationv.Canda,G.R.No.160932,January14,2013,688SCRA403,424.
44
G.R.No.128509,August22,2006,499SCRA434.
45
Id.at451.
46
G.R.No.L20867,September3,1966,18SCRA8.
47
Id.at1112.
48
SeeRobleArrastre,Inc.v.Villaflor,supranote44at449450andRimandov.NaguilianEmissionTesting
Center,Inc.,G.R.No.198860,July23,2012,677SCRA343.
49
Rollo,p.31.Emphasisomitted.
50
Id.Emphasissupplied.
51
PhilippineAmusementandGamingCorporationv.PhilippineGamingJurisdiction,Incorporated,G.R.No.
177333,April24,2009,586SCRA658,664.
52
G.R.No.93359,July12,1991,199SCRA134.
53
Id.at149,citingMagtibayv.Garcia,G.R.No.L28971,January28,1983,120SCRA370.
54
Id.,citingCalvov.DeGutierrez,4Phil.203(1905).
55
G.R.No.122728,February13,1997,268SCRA301.
56
Id.at306.
57
SeeRepublicv.Capulong,supra
58
Olamav.PhilippineNationalBank,G.R.No.169213,June22,2006,492SCRA343,351.
59
Id.at353.
60
G.R.No.L21565,January31,1966,16SCRA151.
61
Id.at153.

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