CASE DIGEST: ROSALES V. ROSALES, ET. AL.

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Intestate Estate of Petra V. Rosales.

Irenea C. Rosales v. Fortunato Rosales, et. al.
G.R. No. L-40789, February 27, 1987

FACTS:

On February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra Rosales died intestate. She was survived by her
husband Fortunato Rosales and their two children Magna Rosales Acebes
and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosario, predeceased her, leaving
behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the
herein petitioner. Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased. The trial court ordered that
Fortunato, Magna, Macikequerox and Antonio be entitled each to share in the
estate of decedent. Irenea, on the other hand, insisted in getting a share of the
estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of
the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Irenea is entitled to inherit from her mother-in-law.

RULING:

No. Under the law, intestate or legal heirs are classified into two groups,
namely, those who inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right
of representation. There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a
widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The law has
already meticulously enumerated the intestate heirs of a decedent.
The Court held that Irenea misinterpreted the provision of Article 887 because
the provision refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the
surviving spouse is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-
in-law. Therefore, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as
regards the estate of the parent-in-law.

MARINA DIZON-RIVERA vs. ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON,

JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON

June 30, 1970 G.R. No. L-24561

Teehankee, J.:
Facts:

On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles,
Pampanga, and was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate
children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon
(herein executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate
granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of
Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent. Six of these seven
compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the oppositors-
appellants.

The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and written in
the Pampango dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will were the above-named
compulsory heirs, together with seven other legitimate grandchildren, namely Pablo
Rivera, Jr., Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly
Jimenez and Laureano Tiambon.

In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties
appraised at P1,801,960.00 (except two small parcels of land appraised at
P5,849.60, household furniture valued at P2,500.00, a bank deposit in the sum of
P409.95 and ten shares of Pampanga Sugar Development Company valued at
P350.00) among her above- named heirs. The lower court, after hearing, sustained
and approved the executrix' project of partition, ruling that "(A)rticles 906 and 907
of the New Civil Code specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or
prejudiced, the same shall be completed and satisfied. While it is true that this
process has been followed and adhered to in the two projects of partition, it is
observed that the executrix and the oppositors differ in respect to the source from
which the portion or portions shall be taken in order to fully restore the impaired
legitime. The proposition of the oppositors, if upheld, will substantially result in a
distribution of intestacy, which is in controversion of Article 791 of the New Civil
Code" adding that "the testatrix has chosen to favor certain heirs in her will for
reasons of her own, cannot be doubted. This is legally permissible within the
limitation of the law

Issue:

Whether use of the words "I bequeath" in her assignment or distribution of

her real properties to the respective heirs are in the nature of devises of real
property

Ruling:

For the adjudications and assignments in the testatrix' will of specific

properties to specific heirs cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly appear
from the whole context of the will and the disposition by the testatrix of her whole
estate (save for some small properties of little value already noted at the beginning
of this opinion) that her clear intention was to partition her whole estate through
her will. The repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her testamentary
dispositions acquire no legal significance, such as to convert the same into devises to
be taken solely from the free one-half disposable portion of the estate. Furthermore,
the testatrix' intent that her testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications
to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere devisees, and that said dispositions
were therefore on account of the respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is
expressly borne out in the fourth paragraph of her will, immediately following her
testamentary adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I likewise
command that in case any of those I named as my heirs in this testament any of
them shall die before I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced at the time of my
death shall inherit the properties I bequeath to said deceased."

The testamentary dispositions of the testatrix, being dispositions in favor of

compulsory heirs, do not have to be taken only from the free portion of the estate, as
contended, for the second paragraph of Article 842 of the Civil Code precisely
provides that "One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he
does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said
heirs." And even going by oppositors' own theory of bequests, the second paragraph
of Article 912 Civil Code covers precisely the case of the executrix-appellee, who
admittedly was favored by the testatrix with the large bulk of her estate in providing
that "The devisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain the entire property,
provided its value does not exceed that of the disposable portion and of the share
pertaining to him as legitime." For "diversity of apportionment is the usual reason
for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate."
Fundamentally, of course, the dispositions by the testatrix constituted a partition by
will, which by mandate of Article 1080 of the Civil Code and of the other cited codal
provisions upholding the primacy of the testator's last will and testament, have to be
respected insofar as they do not prejudice the legitime of the other compulsory
heirs.

Buhay De Roma v. CA (July 23, 1987)

Facts: Candeleria De Roma adopted two daughters, Buhay and Rosalinda. She died
intestate. When administration proceedings was ongoing, Buhay was appointed
administratrix and filed an inventory of the estate. Opposed by Rosalinda on the
ground that certain properties donated by their mother to Buhay and fruits thereof
had not been included. The Parcels of Land totaled P10,297.50 and the value is not
disputed. The TC issued an order in favor of Buhay because when Candelaria
donated the properties to Buhay she said in the Deed of Donation sa pamamagitan
ng pagbibigay na din a mababawing muli which the TC interpreted as a prohibition
to collate and besides the legitimes of the two daughters were not impaired. On
appeal, it was reversed as it merely described the donation as irrevocable not an
express prohibition to collate.
Issue: Whether or not these lands are subject to collation.

Held: The pertinent Civil Code provisions are:

Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must
bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received
from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other
gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the
legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition. (1035a)

Art. 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor should
have so expressly provided, or if the donee should repudiate the inheritance, unless
the donation should be reduced as inofficious. (1036)

The SC affirmed the appellate courts decision and that it merely described the
donation as irrevocable. The Fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily
exempt the donated properties from collation as required under the provisions of
the NCC. Given the precise language of the deed of donation the decedent donor
would have included an express prohibition to collate if that had been the donors
intention. Absent such indication of that intention, the rule not the exemption
should be applied.-MJA
FIRST DIVISION; G.R. No. 89783; February 19, 1992
MARIANO B. LOCSIN, JULIAN J. LOCSIN,
et al., petitioners, vs.
The CA, JOSE JAUCIAN, et al., respondents.

Facts:

Don Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife, Catalina
Jaucian Locsin, as the sole and universal heir of all his properties. The spouses being childless,
had agreed that their properties, after both of them shall have died should revert to their
respective sides of the family, i.e., Mariano's properties would go to his "Locsin relatives" (i.e.,
brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces), and those of Catalina to her "Jaucian relatives."
Don Mariano died of cancer on September 14, 1948 after a lingering illness. In due time,
his will was probated in Special Proceedings No. 138, CFI of Albay without any opposition from
both sides of the family. Don Mariano relied on Doa Catalina to carry out the terms of their
compact, hence, nine (9) years after his death, as if in obedience to his voice from the grave, and
fully cognizant that she was also advancing in years, Doa Catalina began transferring, by sale,
donation or assignment, Don Mariano's as well as her own, properties to their respective
nephews and nieces. She made the following sales and donation of properties which she had
received from her husband's estate, to his Locsin nephews and nieces:
Four years before her death, she had made a will on October 22, 1973 she had made a
will affirming and ratifying the transfers she had made during her lifetime in favor of her
husband's, and her own, relatives. After the reading of her will, all the relatives agreed that there
was no need to submit it to the court for probate because the properties devised to them under
the will had already been conveyed to them by the deceased when she was still alive, except
some legacies which the executor of her will or estate, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, proceeded to
distribute.
In 1989, some of her Jaucian nephews and nieces who had already received their
legacies and hereditary shares from her estate, filed action in the RTC-Legaspi to recover the
properties which she had conveyed to the Locsins during her lifetime, alleging that the
conveyances were inofficious, without consideration, and intended solely to circumvent the laws
on succession. Those who were closest to Doa Catalina did not join the action.
After the trial, judgment was rendered in favor of Jaucian, and against the Locsin. The CA
affirmed the said decion,hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the nephews and nieces of Doa Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin, are entitled
to inherit the properties which she had already disposed of more than ten (10) years before her
death.

Held: NO
They are not entitled since those properties did not form part of her hereditary estate, i.e.,
"the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of (the decedent's)
death and those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession."
The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death, and do
not vest in his heirs until such time.
Property which Doa Catalina had transferred or conveyed to other persons during her
lifetime no longer formed part of her estate at the time of her death to which her heirs may lay
claim. Had she died intestate, only the property that remained in her estate at the time of her
death devolved to her legal heirs.
Even if those transfers were, one and all, treated as donations, the right arising under
certain circumstances to impugn and compel the reduction or revocation of a decedent's gifts
inter vivos does not inure to the respondents since neither they nor the donees are compulsory
(or forced) heirs.
Said respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended that she had any
such, hence there were no legitimes that could conceivably be impaired by any transfer of her
property during her lifetime. All that the respondents had was an expectancy that in nowise
restricted her freedom to dispose of even her entire estate subject only to the limitation set forth in
Art. 750, Civil Code which, even if it were breached, the respondents may not invoke: Art. 750.
The donation may comprehend all the present property of the donor or part thereof, provided he
reserves, in full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for the support of himself, and of all
relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of the donation, are by law entitled to be supported
by the donor. Without such reservation, the donation shall be reduced on petition of any person
affected.
Petition for review is granted.

CASE DIGEST: MANONGSONG V. ESTIMO

Published by bigboy on December 13, 2013 | Leave a response

Milagros Manongsong v. FelomenaJumaquio Estimo

G. R. No. 136773. June 25, 2003

FACTS:

Allegedly, AgatonaGuevarra (Guevarra) inherited a property from

Justina Navarro, which is now under possession of the heirs of Guevarra.
Guevarra had six children, one of them is Vicente Lopez, the father of petitioner
Milagros Lopez Manongsong (Manongsong). The respondents, the Jumaquio
sisters and Leoncia Lopez claimed that the property was actually sold to them by
Justina Navarro prior to her death. The respondents presented deed of sale dated
October 11, 1957. Milagros and CarlitoManongsong (petitioners) filed a
Complaint on June 19, 1992 praying for the partition and award to them of an
area equivalent to one-fifth (1/5), by right of representation. The RTC ruled that
the conveyance made by Justina Navarro is subject to nullity because the
property conveyed had a conjugal character and that AgatonaGuevarra as her
compulsory heir should have the legal right to participate with the distribution of
the estate under question to the exclusion of others. The Deed of Sale did not at
all provide for the reserved legitime or the heirs, and, therefore it has no force
and effect against AgatonaGuevarra and should be declared a nullity ab initio.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the rights of the compulsory heirs were impaired by the
alleged sale of the property by Justina.

RULING:

No. The Kasulatan, being a document acknowledged before a notary public, is

a public document and prima facie evidence of its authenticity and due execution.
There is no basis for the trial courts declaration that the sale embodied in the
Kasulatan deprived the compulsory heirs of Guevarra of their legitimes. As
opposed to a disposition inter vivos by lucrative or gratuitous title, a valid sale for
valuable consideration does not diminish the estate of the seller. When the
disposition is for valuable consideration, there is no diminution of the estate but
merely a substitution of values, that is, the property sold is replaced by the
equivalent monetary consideration. The Property was sold in 1957 for P250.00.

The trial courts conclusion that the Property was conjugal, hence the sale is
void ab initio was not based on evidence, but rather on a misapprehension of
Article 160 of the Civil Code, which provides: All property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership; unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. The presumption under
Article 160 of the Civil Code applies only when there is proof that the property
was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is an
essential condition for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership. There was no evidence presented to establish that Navarro acquired
the Property during her marriage.

Spouses Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 126376. November 20, 2003

FACTS:

Defendant spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the parents
of plaintiffs Consolacion, Nora, Emma and Natividad as well as of defendants
Fidel, Tomas, Artemio, Clarita, Felicitas, Fe, and Gavino, all surnamed
JOAQUIN. The married Joaquin children are joined in this action by their
respective spouses. Sought to be declared null and void ab initio
are certain deeds of sale covering 6 parcels of land executed by defendant parents
Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito in favor of their co-defendant children
and the corresponding certificates of title issued in their names. In seeking
the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid deeds of sale and certificates of title,
plaintiffs, in their complaint, aver that the purported sale of the properties in litis
was the result of a deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of
the compulsory heirs (plaintiffs herein) of their legitime.

ISSUE:

Whether Petitioners have a legal interest over the properties subject of

the Deeds of Sale

RULING:

Petitioners do not have any legal interest over the properties subject of
the Deeds of Sale. As the appellate court stated, petitioners right to their
parents properties is merely inchoate and vests only upon their parents death.
While still living, the parents of petitioners are free to dispose of their properties.
In their overzealousness to safeguard their future legitime, petitioners forget that
theoretically, the sale of the lots to their siblings does not affect the value of their
parents estate. While the sale of the lots reduced the estate, cash of equivalent
value replaced the lots taken from the estate.

Spouses Buenaventura vs. CA

Post under case digests, Civil Law at Wednesday, March 07, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: Sought to be declared null and void ab initio

are certain deeds of sale of real property executed by
defendant parents Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana
Landrito in favor of their co-defendant children. The
petitioners contend that there was no actual valid
consideration and that assuming that there was
consideration in the sums reflected the properties are
more than three-fold times more valuable than the
small sums appearing therein. The RTC ruled in favor
of the defendants and dismissed the case. RTCs
ruling was affirmed by CA. Hence the appeal.
Issue:Whether or not there was a valid consideration
in the deeds of sale

Held: If there is a meeting of the minds of the parties

as to the price, the contract of sale is valid, despite
the manner of payment, or even the breach of that
manner of payment. If the real price is not stated in
the contract, then the contract of sale is valid but
subject to reformation.

Art. 1355. Except in cases specified by law, lesion or

inadequacy of cause shall not invalidate a contract,
unless there has been fraud, mistake or undue
influence.

Article 1470 of the Civil Code further provides:Gross

inadequacy of price does not affect a contract of sale,
except as may indicate a defect in the consent, or that
the parties really intended a donation or some
other act or contract.

Petitioners failed to prove any of the instances

mentioned in Articles 1355 and 1470 of the Civil Code
which would invalidate, or evenaffect, the Deeds of
Sale. Indeed, there is no requirement that the price be
equal to the exact value of the subject matter of sale.
All the respondents believed that they received the
commutative value of what they gave.
ARELLANO v. PASCUAL
G.R. No. 189776 December 15, 2010
Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his
siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her
daughters
Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco
Pascual
and Miguel N. Pascual. In a petition for Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate
and Issuance of Letters of Administration filed by respondents on April 28,
2000, respondents alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of land (the donated property)
located in Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by
the decedent to petitioner the validity of which donation respondents assailed,
may be considered as an advance legitime of petitioner. Respecting the donated
property, now covered in the name of petitioner by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds of Makati, which respondents assailed but
which they, in any event, posited that it may be considered as an advance
legitime to petitioner, the trial court, acting as probate court, held that it was
precluded from determining the validity of the donation.

ISSUE: WON the property is subject of collation.

NO. The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs
in so far as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the
legitime, so
that inofficious donations may be reduced. Collation takes place when there are
compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine the legitime and the free
portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded.
The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or
concurring
compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his collateral
relatives
and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime that part of the testators
property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for
compulsory heirs.The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is
entitled to any legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if
nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to
petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is deemed as donation made to a
stranger, chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There being no
compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject to collation.

Arellano vs. Pascual Digest

G.R. No. 189776: December 15, 2010

AMELIA P. ARELLANO, represented by her duly appointed guardians,

AGNES P. ARELLANO and NONA P. ARELLANO, Petitioner,v. FRANCISCO
PASCUAL and MIGUEL PASCUAL, Respondents.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS:

Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his siblings,
namely: petitioner Amelia who is represented by her daughters Agnes and Nona,
and respondents Francisco and Miguel.

In a petition for Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of

Administration, , respondents alleged that a parcel of land (donated property)
located in Makati, , transferred by the decedent to petitioner, "may be considered
as an advancelegitime" of petitioner.

The probate court provisionally passed upon the validity of the donation then
further held that the land in contention is subject to collation following Art. 1061 of
the New Civil Code. On appeal, the CA sustained the probate courts ruling that
the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

I. Whether or not the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation.

II. Whether or not the property of the estate should have been ordered equally
distributed among the parties.

HELD: Petition is GRANTED.

CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; COLLATION

First Issue; Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its
purposes being to determine the legitime and the free portion.

The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical
operation by the addition of the value of donations made by the testator to the
value of the hereditary estate; and second, it is the return to the hereditary estate
of property disposed of by lucrative title by the testator during his lifetime. The
purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far
as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that
inofficious donations may be reduced.

The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or
concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his
collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime that part of the
testators property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for
compulsory heirs. The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is
entitled to any legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if
nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to
petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is deemed as donation made to a
"stranger," chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There being no
compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject to collation.

CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; DETERMINATION OF ESTATE

Second Issue; The decedents remaining estate should thus be partitioned

equally among his heirs-siblings-collateral relatives, herein petitioner and
respondents, pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code (Arts. 1003 & 1004).

CA Decision ordering the collation of the property donated to Amelia, to the

estate of the deceased is SET ASIDE and the records of the cases is
REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings in the case for the
purpose of determining what finally forms part of the estate, and thereafter to
divide whatever remains of it equally among the parties.

ROLANDO SANTOS vs. CONSTANCIA SANTOS ALANA

G.R. No. 154942. August 16, 2005

FACTS:

Rolando Santos and Constancia Santos Alana are half-blood

siblings both asserting their claim over a 39-square meter lot
in Manila. It was registered in the name of their father who
died intestate in 1986. During his lifetime, Gregorio donated
the lot to Rolando which the latter accepted. By virtue of the
deed of donation annotated on Gregorio's title, a transfer
certificate of title was issued in Rolando's name. In 1991
Constancia Santos filed with the RTC of Manila a complaint
for partition and reconveyance against Rolando alleging that
during the lifetime of their father, he denied having sold the
subject lot to petitioner; that she learned of the donation in
1978; and that the donation is inofficious as she was
deprived of her legitime. Rolando countered that
respondent's suit is barred by prescription considering that
she is aware of his possession of the lot as owner for more
than ten (10) years; and that the lot was sold to him by
Gregorio. Hence, respondent can no longer claim her
legitime. Affirmed on appeal are the findings of the trial
court which declared as invalid contract the Deed of
Absolute Sale since it was not signed by the parties nor
registered in the Registry of Deeds and sustained as valid
the deed of donation as it was duly executed by the parties
and registered.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the donation is inofficious

(2) Whether or not action of respondent is barred by
prescription

RULING:

(1) Yes. Pursuant to Article 752 of the Civil Code, a donation

is inofficious if it exceeds this limitation - no person may
give or receive, by way of donation, more than he may
give or receive by will. Gregorio could not donate more
than he may give by will. At the time of his death, he left no
property other than the entire lot he donated to petitioner
and that the deceased made no reservation for the legitime
of respondent, his daughter and compulsory heir. The
donation is therefore inofficious as it impairs respondent's
legitime which, under Article 888 of the Civil Code, consists
of one-half (1/2) of the hereditary estate of the father and
the mother. Since the parents of both parties are already
dead, they will inherit the entire lot, each being entitled to
one-half (1/2) thereof.

(2) No. "Donations, the reduction of which hinges upon the

allegation of impairment of legitime (as in this case), are not
controlled by a particular prescriptive period, as held in
Imperial vs. Court of Appeals but by ordinary rules of
prescription. Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions
upon an obligation created by law must be brought within
ten years from the time the right of action accrues. Thus, the
ten-year prescriptive period applies to the obligation to
reduce inofficious donations, required under Article 771 of
the Civil Code, to the extent that they impair the legitime of
compulsory heirs. The case of Mateo vs. Lagua, which
involved the reduction for inofficiousness of a donation
propter nuptias, recognized that the cause of action to
enforce a legitime accrues upon the death of the donor-
decedent, since it is only then that the net estate may be
ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes may be
determined. Since Gregorio died in 1986, respondent had
until 1996 within which to file the action. She filed her suit in
1992, well within the prescriptive period.

Lauro Vizconde v. CA
G.R. No. 118449, February 11, 1998

FACTS:

Spouses Rafael and Salud Nicolas have five children, namely: Estrellita Nicolas-
Vizconde (wife of herein petitioner LauroVizconde); Antonio Nicolas; Ramon
Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas de Leon; and Ricardo Nicolas, an incompetent. On June
30, 1991, Estrellita and her two daughters were killed. In an Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita, Rafael and Salud, together with
petitioner Vizconde, inherited from Estrellitas estate.

Subsequently, when Rafael died in 1992, an intestate estate proceeding was

instituted by one of the heirs of Rafael. Private respondent Ramon, among other
things, averred that petitioner should be impleaded as one of Rafaels children
by right of representation as the widower of deceased legitimate
daughter Estrellita. Pursuant to the order of the probate court, petitioner filed
a Manifestationcontending that he was neither a compulsory heir nor an intestate
heir of Rafael and he has no interest to participate in the proceedings. The
trial court granted Ramons motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the inclusion of petitioner Vizconde in the intestate estate

proceeding regarding Rafaels estate is proper.

RULING:

No. The enumeration of compulsory heirs in Article 887 of the Civil Code is
exclusive, which negates the rulings of the RTC and CA that Lauro shall be
included in the proceeding as a compulsory heir for he is only a son-in-law of
decedent Rafael. Thus, petitioner who was not even shown to be a creditor of
decedent is considered a third person or stranger. Petitioner may not be dragged
into the proceeding herein instituted; neither may he be permitted to intervene as
he has no personality or interest in the said proceeding. Thus, petition is granted.

VIZCONDE vs. COURT OF APPEALS 286 SRA 217

FACTS:
Lauro Vizconde and his wife Estrellita has 2 daughters. On May 22, 1979, Estrellita
purchased from her father a parcel of land (Valenzuela property). Later on, she sold
the Valenzuela property Lim.

On June 1990, she bought from Premier Homes a parcel of land with improvements
(Paranaque property) using the proceeds from the sale of the Valenzuela property.
On June 1991, the Vizconde massacre happened. Estrellita and her daughters were
killed thereafter leaving Lauro as t sole heir of their estate. Later on, Rafael
(Estrellitas father) died intestate. The heirs of Rafael averred that their legitime
should come from the collation of all the properties distributed by Nicolas to his
children during his lifetime, including the Paranaque property. The trial court in its
decision did not include the Paranaque property as part of the estate of Rafael.
Ramon, one of the heirs of Rafael, filed his objection against the order of the trial
court.

ISSUE: WON the collation is proper.

RULING:

NO. The probate court made a reversible error in ordering collation of the
Paran aque property. It was the Valenzuela property that was transferred to
Estrellita, by way of deed of sale. The Paran aque property which Estrellita acquired
by using the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property does not become
collationable simply by reason thereof. Indeed, collation of the Paran aque property
has no statutory basis. The order of the probate court presupposes that the
Paran aque property was gratuitously conveyed by Rafael to Estrellita. Records
indicate, however, that the Paran aque property was conveyed for and in
consideration of P900,000.00, by Premier Homes, Inc., to Estrellita. Rafael, the
decedent, has no participation therein, and Lauro who inherited and is now the
present owner of the Paran aque property is not one of Rafael's heirs. Thus, the
probate court's order of collation against Lauro is unwarranted for the obligation to
collate is lodged with Estrellita, the heir, and not to herein Lauro who does not have
any interest in Rafael's estate. As it stands, collation of the Paran aque property is
improper for, to repeat, collation covers only properties gratuitously given by the
decedent during his lifetime to his compulsory heirs which fact does not obtain
anent the transfer of the Paran aque property. Moreover, Rafael, in a public
instrument, voluntarily and willfully waived any "claims, rights, ownership and
participation as heir" in the Paran aque property.