TATEL V.

MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC

Facts: Based on complaints received by the residents of barrio Sta. Elena against the disturbance
caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside Tatel’s warehouse, Resolution
291 was enacted by the Municipal Council of Virac declaring Tatel’s warehouse a public
nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the Civil Code and directing the petitioner to
remove and transfer said warehouse to a more suitable place within two months from receipt
of the said resolution. The municipal officials contend that petitioner's warehouse was
constructed in violation of Ordinance 13, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a
block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance
of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental
fire. Tatel contends that said ordinance is unconstitutional, contrary to the due process and
equal protection clause of the Constitution and null and void for not having been passed in
accordance with law.

Issue: 1. WON Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional. NO

 Ordinance 13, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its
police power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies
of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such
are endowed with the police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out
the declared objects of their creation.

 Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the Administrative
Code, which reads: The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such
regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem
necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity,
improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the municipality
and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.

 For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the
municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed
by law.

 These principles require that a municipal ordinance

(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
Ordinance 13 meets these criteria.

 In spite of its fractured syntax, what is regulated by the ordinance is the construction
of warehouses wherein inflammable materials are stored where such warehouses are
 located at a distance of 200 meters from a block of houses and not the construction
per se of a warehouse. The purpose is to avoid the loss of life and property in case of
fire which is one of the primordial obligation of the government.

 The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the ordinance have not
been substantiated. Its purpose is well within the objectives of sound government. No
undue restraint is placed upon the petitioner or for anybody to engage in trade but
merely a prohibition from storing inflammable products in the warehouse because of
the danger of fire to the lives and properties of the people residing in the vicinity. As
far as public policy is concerned, there can be no better policy than what has been
conceived by the municipal government.

SALVADOR VILLACORTA vs. GREGORIO BERNARDO

FACTS: Ordinance 22 entitled AN ORDINANCE REGULATING SUBDIVISION PLANS

OVER PARCELS OF LAND IN THE CITY OF DAGUPAN was enacted by the municipal
board of Dagupan City. The said ordinance was imposing additional requirements to that of the
national law Act 496. Ordinance 22 was annulled by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals whose decision reads as follows:

Section 1 of said ordinance clearly conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law
does not require subdivision plans to be submitted to the City Engineer before the same is
submitted for approval to and verification by the General Land Registration Office or by the
Director of Lands as provided for in Section 58 of said Act. Section 2 of the same ordinance also
contravenes the provisions of Section 44 of Act 496, the latter being silent on a service fee of
PO.03 per square meter of every lot subject of such subdivision application; Section 3 of the
ordinance in question also conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not
mention of a certification to be made by the City Engineer before the Register of Deeds allows
registration of the subdivision plan; and the last section of said ordinance imposes a penalty for
its violation, which Section 44 of Act 496 does not impose. In other words, Ordinance 22 of the
City of Dagupan imposes upon a subdivision owner additional conditions.

ISSUE: Were the decisions of the CFI and CA to annul the said ordinance was correct?

HELD: Yes. To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances
amending and so violating national laws in the guise of implementing them. Thus, ordinances
could be passed imposing additional requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to
prevent bigamy; the registration of vehicles, to minimize carnaping; the execution of contracts,
to forestall fraud; the validation of passports, to deter imposture; the exercise of freedom of
speech, to reduce disorder; and so on.

This advice is especially addressed to the local governments which exercise the police power
only by virtue of a valid delegation from the national legislature under the general welfare
clause. In the instant case, Ordinance No. 22 suffers from the additional defect of violating this
authority for legislation in contravention of the national law by adding to its requirements.
THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL
vs.
 THE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, HON. JOSE ATIENZA, JR., and THE CITY COUNCIL OF
MANILA

G.R. No. 154599             January 21, 2004

FACTS:
Petitioner Liga is the national organization of all the barangays in the Philippines which pursuant
to the Local Govt Code, constitutes the duly elected presidents of highly-urbanized cities,
provincial chapters, Metro Manila chapter, and metropolitan political subdivision chapters. On
March 2000, the Liga adopted and ratified its own Constitution and By-laws. Pursuant to its
Constitution, it also adopted and ratified its own Election Code. Thereafter, it came out with its
calendar of activities and guidelines for the implementation of its election code. The
synchronized elections for highly-urbanized city chapters was also set on Oct. 21, 2002.

On June 28, 2002, respondent City Council of Manila enacted an ordinance providing among
other things, for the election of representatives of the District Chapters in the City Chapter of
Manila and setting the elections for both chapters 30 days after the barangay elections.

Upon being informed that the ordinance had been forwarded to Mayor Atienza for his approval,
the Liga sent him a letter requesting that said ordinance be vetoed considering that it encroached
upon or even assumed the functions of the Liga through legislation. However, Atienza
stillapproved and signed the ordinance, and issued an executive order for its implementation.

This prompted the Liga to file a petition for certiorari with the SC. Respondents defend the
validity of the assailed ordinance and executive order and prays for the dismissal of the petition
on the ff grounds: 1) certiorari under Rule 65 is unavailing; 2) two actions were pending before
the RTC Manila questioning the ordinance and executive order; 3) petitioner is guilty of forum
shopping; 4) act sought to be enjoined is fait accompli; and 5) the city council does not fall
within the ambit of “tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions”

ISSUE:
WON the City Council of Manila and Atienza committed grave abuse of discretion when they
enacted and approved the ordinance purposely to govern the elections of the Manila Chapter of
the Liga, and which provides a different manner of electing its officers, despite the fact that the
law mandates such elections to be governed by the Liga Constitution and By-laws

HELD:
The SC ruled that the action, in its essence, seeks to declare the unconstitutionality/illegality of
the ordinance. Thus it partakes of an action for declaratory relief of which the SC has only
appellate and not original jurisdiction.

Rule on Hierarchy of Courts. The concurrence of jurisdiction is not to be taken, as according to

parties seeking any of the writs, an absolute unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which
the application therefore will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. The hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate
forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for issuance of extraordinary writs against the first level
(inferior) courts should be filed with RTC, and those against the latter, with the CA. A direct
invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue the writs should be allowed only when there
are special and important reasons therefore, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is
an established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s
time and attention, which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and
to prvent further overcrowding of the Court’s docket.

Forum Shopping; Exists if elements of Litits Pendentia are present. Forum shopping exists where
the elements of litis pendentia are present or when a final judgment in one case will amount to
res judicata in the other. For litis pendentia to exist, the following requisites must be present: 1)
identity of the parties, or at least such parties as are representing the same interest in both
actions; 2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same
facts; 3) identity with respect to the @ preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any
judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful,
would amount to res judicata in the other case.

Requisites for filing of a Writ of Certiorari. For the Writ of Certiorari to issue, the following
requisites must concur: 1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; 2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and 3) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.

GORDON VS. VERIDIANO

FACTS: Private respondent Rosalinda Yambao owned two drug stores in Olongapo City, the
San Sebastian Drug Store and the Olongapo City Drug Store. A joint team from the Food &
Drug Administration (FDA) and Philippine Constabulary conducted a "test buy" at San Sebastian
Drug Store of Valium without a doctor's prescription. Consequently, Mayor Gordon (petitioner)
issued a letter revoking mayor's permit of San Sebastian Drug Store for rampant violation of
R.A. 5921, otherwise known as the Pharmacy Law and R.A. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972. FDA Administrator likewise directed the closure of the drug store for 3 days and its
payment of a fine and was allowed to resume operations after 3 days. Yambao wrote a letter to
the petitioner seeking reconsideration of the revocation of mayor's permit but got no reply. They
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a complaint for mandamus. Meanwhile,
Yambao’s request of permission from the FDA to exchange the locations of the San Sebastian
Drug Store and the Olongapo City Drug was granted. But when petitioner came to know about it,
he disapproved it and suspended also the mayor’s permit of the other drug store. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the Yambaos to the FDA was denied. The RTC judge rendered
decision declaring the revocation of the mayor’s permit for San Sebastian Drug Store as null and
void and thereafter denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: May the mayor revoke the mayor’s permit of the San Sebastian Drug Store based on the
above-stated facts?

HELD: FDA was created under R.A. No. 3720 and vested with all drug inspection functions in
line with "the policy of the State to insure safe and good quality supply of food, drug and
cosmetics, and to regulate the production, sale and traffic of the same to protect the health of the
people. P.D. No. 280 gave more teeth to the powers of the FDA in regulating the drugstores in
the sale or dispensation of drugs, or rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto. For the mayor,
it was granted by the charter of Olongapo the power to to arrest violators of health laws,
ordinances, rules and regulations and to recommend the revocation or suspension of the permits
of the different establishments to the City Mayor for violation of health laws, ordinances, rules
and regulations.

A study of the said laws will show that the authorization to operate issued by the FDA is a
condition precedent to the grant of a mayor's permit to the drug store seeking to operate within
the limits of the city. This requirement is imperative. The power to determine if the opening of
the drug store is conformable to the national policy and the laws on the regulation of drug sales
belongs to the FDA. Hence, a permit issued by the mayor to a drug store not previously cleared
with and licensed by the said agency will be a nullity. Thus, if the FDA grants a license upon its
finding that the applicant drug store has complied with the requirements of the general laws and
the implementing administrative rules and regulations, it is only for their violation that the FDA
may revoke the said license. By the same token, having granted the permit upon his
ascertainment that the conditions thereof as applied particularly to Olongapo City have been
complied with, it is only for the violation of such conditions that the mayor may revoke the said
permit.

Conversely, the mayor may not revoke his own permit on the ground that the compliance with
the conditions laid down and found satisfactory by the FDA when it issued its license is in his
own view not acceptable. This very same principle also operates on the FDA. The FDA may not
revoke its license on the ground that the conditions laid down in the mayor's permit have been
violated notwithstanding that no such finding has been made by the mayor. As the infraction
involved the pharmacy and drug laws which the FDA had the direct responsibility to execute, the
mayor had no authority to interpose his own findings on the matter and substitute them for the
decision already made by the FDA. The condition allegedly violated related to a national law,
not to a matter of merely local concern, and so came under the 'jurisdiction of the FDA.