Republic of the Philippines

National Capital Judicial Region

METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT
Branch 47, Pasay City

RODELIO HILARIO,
Petitioner,

-versus- CIVIL CASE NO. B-03-08

For: Enforcement or Execution
of Barangay Compromise
SHIRLEY PABILONA ET AL., Agreement
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------X

RESOLUTION

Before this Court is a Motion for Reconsideration of its Order dated June 17,
2010, the dispositive portion reads as follows:

Acting on the petition filed on July 30, 2008 by the petitioner Rodelio R. Hilario,
finding the reasons therein to be impressed with merit, this Court resolves to grant the
same.
Accordingly, let a Writ of Execution be issued in this case for the enforcement of
the compromise agreement between the parties before the Barangay.

In order to fully understand this Courts resolution of this motion for

reconsideration, the facts of this case are substantially re-stated as follows:

THE PETITION

Petitioner Rodelio R. Hilario , through his counsel Atty. Renato C. Pineda,

alleges that he is the registered owner of a property located at 817 I. Santos St., Malibay
City where the respondents spouses Shirley Pabilona, spouses Rosemarie Rosel, Teddy
Espinosa, spouses Rowena Mendoza, spouses Virginia Rosel, spouses Francesca Benito,
and spouses Leonida Qumpano are occupying. He wanted to fully develop this
particular property to the exclusions of the herein respondents as occupants. He
brought this matter before a barangay on August 5, 2006. In the presence of Barangay
Chairman Felix Felix S.J. Francisco, the herein parties voluntarily and freely entered

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into a compromise agreement before the barangay signed by all of them. The pertinent
portion provides among others:

Na, sa ibinigay na halaga ni Ginoong Hilario na 5.6 ay hindi kayang bayaran ng

nakatira kaya nagdisisyon na lang siya (may-ari) na bigyang taning hanggang 1 st
week ng January 2008 na lamang sila mamamalagi.

Na sinang-ayunan naman ito ng lahat ng pinatawag.

Pinatunayan nila ito sa harap ng Punong Brgy ngayong ika-5 ng Agosto at sa

kanilang lagda.

This duly executed and authentic copy of the barangay compromise agreement
was submitted to this Court. Despite repeated demands by the petitioner, the
respondents did not abide with the said compromise agreement. The implementation
and execution of Compromise agreement is imperative pursuant to Section 417 of the
1991 Local Government Code:

The amicable settlement or arbitration award may

be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6)
months from the date of settlement. After the lapse
of such time, the settlement may be enforced by
action in the appropriate city or municipal court.

The Katarungang Pambarangay Rules and Regulation were promulgated to

implement the mandate of the 1991 Local Government Code, among other things:

The amicable settlement or arbitration award may be

enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6) months
from the date of settlement or date of receipt of award or from
the date the obligation stipulated in the settlement or adjudged
in the arbitration award becomes due and demandable. After
the lapse of such time, the settlement or award may be enforced
by the appropriate local trial court pursuant to the applicable
provisions of the Rules of Court. An amicable settlement reached in
a case referred by the court having jurisdiction over the case to
the lupon shall be enforced by execution by the said court.

For failure of the respondents to comply with the barangay compromise

agreement, this matter was brought to the barangay on January 6, 2008, but some of
the respondents demanded that the compliance of the compromise agreement should be
filed in court. Earnest effort to arrive at peaceful mean for the compliance of barangay

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compromise agreement was rpoved to be futile. The petitioner exhausted all legal
means before resorting to this Court for an action. He prayed, among others that a writ
of execution be issued in accordance with the barangay compromise agreement dated
August 5, 2007.

ANSWER

Respondents Shirley Pabilona, Teddy Espinosa, Virginia Rosel, Rosemarie

Rosel, Francisca Benito and Leonida Quimpano , through their counsel Atty. Renato A.
Abejero, admitted that on August 5, 2006, they were called at the barangay before
barangay chairman Felix Francisco in the presence of petitioner Rodelio R. Hilario who
offered to sell Lot 256-B consisting of two hundred fifteen (215) square meters to them
in the amount of Five Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P5,600,000.00) or Twenty
Six Thousand Forty Seven Pesos (P26, 047.00) per square meter which they cannot
afford to pay. They were requested to affix their signatures in the minutes of the meeting
which they signed to indicate their presence in the meeting. They are not aware that
what they signed was a compromise agreement. They did not voluntarily agree that they
would vacate the premises on the first week of January, 2008. They should not be
evicted from the subject premises because the law gave them the right of first refusal
from the owner. They are willing to purchase the subject lot at fair market value through
governments housing program. They prayed, among others, for the dismissal of action
and the compromise agreement be declared null and void.

PETITIONERS POSITION

The petitioner opines, among others, that the respondents introduce other
matters to muddle the issue and to confuse. These matters such as to question the
ownership or title as well as to attack collaterally the transfer of certificate of title, are
beyond the ambit of the jurisdiction of this Court because the present controversy is a
simple enforcement of barangay compromise agreement. Contrary to respondents claim
that that compromise agreement signed by the parties was thought to be minutes of
barangay meeting, this is farthest from the truth. The compromise agreement was
written in Tagalog and none of them claimed they cannot understand Tagalog. The
regularity of performance of duty of the barangay chairman prevails over the self-
serving assertions of the respondents. Their non-compliance of the compromise

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agreement was brought back to the barangay on January 6, 2008. They challenged the
petitioner to bring the matter to the court. They did not initiate any proceedings to
nullify the compromise agreement. They did not file any complaint questioning the
legality of the compromise agreement except in their answer to this Court.

The law mandates that the period to question the validity or legality of a
barangay compromise agreement is ten (10) days from the day of settlement.

Section 418 of RA No. 7160 (1991 Local Government Code):

Repudiation. Any party to the dispute may, within ten (10)
days from the date of the settlement, repudiate the same by
filing with the lupon chairman a statement to that effect
sworn to before him, where the consent is vitiated by fraud,
violence, or intimidation. Such repudiation shall be sufficient
basis for the issuance of the certification for filing a complaint
as hereinabove provided.

In the case at bar, no repudiation was made under oath within the period of
ten (10) days from August 5, 2006. More than two years have passed from the time of
the execution of the barangay compromise, no respondent repudiated it.

RESPONDENTS POSITION

Respondents Shirley Pabilona, Teddy Espinosa, Virginia Rosel, Rosemarie

Rosel, Rowena Mendoza, Francisca Benito and Leonida Quimpano, through their
counsel Atty. Renato A. Abejero, allege that petitioners torrens title on Lot 256 B is
spurious. He has no right whatsoever from the subject property. They further allege that
the barangay compromise agreement is fraudulent and unenforceable.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

In their motion for reconsideration, the respondents counsel Atty. Renato A.

Abejero avers that the present judges predecessor Honorable Josephine A. Vito Cruz
issued the following: (1) the Order dated December 10, 2008 declaring that this case is
not covered by the Summary Procedure pursuant to the case of Vidal vs. Escueta, G.R.
No. 156229; (2) the Pre-trial order dated February 13, 2009 whereby the parties

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submitted their stipulation of facts, marked their exhibits, identified their witnesses,
formulated the issues and set the initial presentation of petitioners evidence on March
27, 2009. Because the regular procedure was adopted by Acting Presiding Judge
Josephine A. Vito Cruz, the petitioner completed the presentation of his evidence by the
regular procedure. To change the rules now by preventing the respondents to present
their evidence is a denial of their due process. He contends that because the present
judge and the predecessor judge are of the same level, the former cannot overrule the
regular procedure of the latter.

OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Petitioners counsel Atty. Renato A. Abejero prays for the denial of the
motion for reconsideration because it is a mere dilatory tactic. The respondents and
their counsel failed to appear on the scheduled hearing on June 17, 2010. The Court
made a clarificatory questioning with respect to the barangay compromise agreement.
Upon the verification of the original barangay records which was testified to by the
barangay chairman and barangay secretary, this Court submitted the case for resolution
and resolved the petition on that day. He believes that the Honorable Court can motu
proprio correct itself. He brought to the Courts attention that it is absurd to undergo a
formal hearing in a barangay enforcement case when the procedure of an ejectment
case is only summary in nature. The Vidal vs. Escueta case cited did not categorically
provide that a full blown trial is to be made. The reason behind is that Barangay Justice
System is inexpensive and expeditious proceedings.

ISSUES

(1) Whether or not this Court is bound by the ruling of the predecessor judge.

(2) Whether or not the instant petition for the enforcement or execution of
barangay compromise agreement is governed by the regular procedure where a
full blown trial is necessary.

(3) Whether or not the issuance of the writ of execution is proper in this case.

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 RULING

This Court resolves to deny the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

This Court is not bound by the ruling of the predecessor judge.

There is nothing in the Rules of Court which prohibits this Court from correcting
an erroneous application of the procedural laws where there is manifest showing that
the same procedures defeat justice or operate to perpetrate fraud or delay like in this
instant case.

In Beltran vs. Judge Cabrera, G.R. No. L-48109 , September 7, 1942, Our Supreme
Court through its ponente Justice Manuel Moran held that a justice of the peace court
has the inherent power "to amend and control its process and orders so as to
make them conformable to law and justice" (par. 7, sec. 11, Act No. 190, now Rule
124, sec, 5, par. (g), Rules of Court). In other words "a judge has an inherent right,
while his judgment is still under his control, to correct errors, mistakes, or
injustices" (page 563).

In fact, the respondents and their counsel Atty. Renato Abejero did not protest
with the previous order of Honorable Acting Presiding Judge Josephine A. Vito Cruz
correcting herself, to quote, The Order dated October 31, 2008 submitting the case for
resolution after the submission of Position Papers is hereby ordered reconsidered and
set aside. They took a contrary position in the motion for reconsideration, that this
presiding judge cannot reconsider and set aside any order to conform it to law and
justice.

In one case, our Supreme Court held that the motion to dismiss was first
denied but there is nothing in the Rules prohibiting a court from later on reversing itself
and granting the motion to dismiss. This ruling was supported by earlier decisions of
the Supreme Court in Lucas vs. Mariano, et al. (L-29157, April 27, 1972) and Vda. De
Haberer vs. Martinez, et al. (L-39386, Jan. 29, 1975) where the trial court dismissed the
complaint, then set it aside and finally ordered it dismissed again.

The Illinois Supreme Court in Towns v. Yellow Cab Company, a United States
jurisprudence, further discussed what is meant by an interlocutory order and it stated
that the finding by the motion judge was in the nature of an interlocutory order. In other
words, any order that is not a final judgment order is, loosely defined, an interlocutory

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order, and a court is not bound by an order of a predecessor judge because courts
have the inherent power to amend and revise such orders at any time
before final judgment.

In another US jurisprudence with respect to the ruling of predecessor judge, it

is apparent that the trial court was under the erroneous impression that it could not
disturb the ruling of a predecessor judge on the interlocutory protective order. Until
final judgment, a successor judge does have the power to vacate or modify the
interlocutory rulings or orders of any predecessor judge in the case. 1 While it is true
that a judge should hesitate to undo his own work, and hesitate still more to
undo the work of another judge because of the "code" of restraint based
upon comity and courtesy, nevertheless when presented with a prior
interlocutory ruling that is based on a clearly mistaken interpretation of the
law it is indeed appropriate for the succeeding judge to vacate or modify the
prior order.2

Thus, there was no reversible error committed by this Court in issuing its
Order dated June 15, 2010 when it set aside its Order dated May 19, 2010 for the
continuation of respondents presentation of evidence on June 17, July 7 and July 29,
2010 because there was a palpable error in the interpretation of the Katarungang
Pambarangay law as well as grave mistake in adopting a regular procedure when this
case need not have to undergo a full blown trial.

With due respect, the principle of co-equality between the two courts,
provided in paragraph 5 of the motion for reconsideration, to wit, In essence, the
incumbent Presiding judge cannot over-rule the regular procedure adopted by her
predecessor judge, because they are of the same level, finds no application in this case
because a predecessors judge orders can be interfered and encroached upon by the
incumbent judge when they are contrary to the principle of equity, existing law and
jurisprudence. Moreover, the predecessor judge, Honorable Josephine A. Vito Cruz, is
a Municipal Trial Court Judge of Cardona, Rizal while undersigned judge is a
Metropolitan Trial Court Judge of Pasay City, their salary grades are not at par with
each other so it is quite incorrect with respondents counsel declaration that the
predecessor judge and the incumbent judge are of the same level.

This Court is guided by Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
which mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional

1
See Tingle v. Dade County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 245 So. 2d 76, 78 (Fla. 1971); State v. Glass, 657 So. 2d 934, 935
n.3 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
2
Keathley v. Larson, 348 So. 2d 382, 384 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).

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competence. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court and statutory laws is a sign of
incompetence. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules and laws,
such incompetence erodes the publics confidence in the competence of our courts. Basic
rules of procedure and laws must be at the palm of a judges hands. When the rules and
the laws are so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a
law, or a principle in the discharge of his duties, the judge is either too incompetent and
undeserving of the position and title he holds or is too vicious that the oversight or
omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.

This petition for the enforcement or execution of barangay

compromise agreement is not governed by the regular procedure where a
full blown trial is necessary.

The case law Vidal vs. Escueta, G.R. No. 156228, December 10, 2003 cited by
resopndents counsel Atty. Renato Abejero in their Motion for Reconsideration which
was also cited by the predecessor judge on her December 10, 2008 order providing:
Pursuant to the case of Vidal vs. Escueta, G.R., No. 156228, SCRA 617, an action for
the enforcement of the settlement should be instituted in the proper municipal or City
Court and the same is not one of those covered by the rules on Summary procedure in
civil cases, hence the instant case is hereby set for further pre-trial on 13 th day of
February 2009 at 8:30 A.M. was no longer controlling. The facts of the case in Vidal
vs. Escueta are not similar with the facts of the herein case.

The Vidal vs. Escueta case was decided on December 10, 2003 which was
implicitly abandoned by the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, one of which is Quiros
vs. Arjona, G.R. No. 158901, March 9, 2004, where our Supreme Court through its
ponente Justice Consuelo Ynares Santiago ruled:

Cognizant of the beneficial effects of amicable settlements, the Katarungang

Pambarangay Law (P.D. 1508) and later the Local Government Code provide for a
mechanism for conciliation where party-litigants can enter into an agreement in the
barangay level to reduce the deterioration of the quality of justice due to indiscriminate
filing of court cases. Thus, under Section 416 of the said Code, an amicable settlement
shall have the force and effect of a final judgment of the court upon the expiration of 10
days from the date thereof, unless repudiation of the settlement has been made or a
petition to nullify the award has been filed before the proper court Petitioners submit
that since the amicable settlement had not been repudiated or impugned before the
court within the 10-day prescriptive period in accordance with Section 416 of the Local
Government Code, the enforcement of the same must be done as a matter of course and

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a writ of execution must accordingly be issued by the court. Generally, the rule is that
where no repudiation was made during the 10-day period, the amicable settlement
attains the status of finality and it becomes the ministerial duty of the court
to implement and enforce it.

The Supreme Court observed that special and exceptional circumstances, the
imperatives of substantial justice, or facts that may have transpired after the finality of
judgment which would render its execution unjust, may warrant the suspension of
execution of a decision that has become final and executory.

In the case at bar, the respondents are not paying rentals from the time of the
execution of the compromise agreement to date. Not to enforce and execute a final
barangay compromise agreement, by adopting a wrong procedure or by siding with
legal technicalities raised by herein respondents is not only contrary to law, it is
manifestly unjust which every litigant, every lawyer, and every judge should not just
close their eyes and do nothing.

This Court has to act swiftly to render justice to the litigants. Because the
petition is actually a motion, this Court shall resolve it not more than three (3) months.
It bears stressing that this petition for enforcement or execution of barangay
compromise agreement dated July 22, 2008 was filed on July 30, 2008 before the Office
of the Clerk of Court of Pasay City. It was unresolved for nearly two (2) years. The
respondents in this case are not paying any rentals for the enjoyment of the subject
property to the petitioner for almost two (2) years from the time of the execution of the
barangay compromise agreement. Thus this Court has no alternative but to grant it in
open court on June 17, 2010 with the aim of efficient, effective and speedy dispensation
of justice.

The Constitution requires all lower courts to decide or resolve cases or

matters within three months from the time said matter is submitted for
decision or resolution. The New Code of Judicial Conduct in Canon 6, Section 5,
also mandates judges to perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved
decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness; while its antecedent, the
Code of Judicial Conduct provides in Rule 3.05 thereof that "judges shall dispose of the
court's business promptly and decide cases within the required periods." These rules are
in recognition of the right of every person to the speedy disposition of their cases.
Justice delayed is justice denied. Indeed, the public's faith and confidence
in the judiciary depends, to a large extent, on the judicious and prompt

9
disposition of cases and matters pending before the courts. Any delay in the
disposition of cases diminishes the people's faith and confidence in the
judiciary. It erodes faith in the judicial system and unnecessarily blemishes its stature.
Judges must therefore perform their official duties with utmost competence and
diligence, and they should be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the
discharge of their obligation to promptly administer justice. Judges must cultivate a
capacity for quick decision, and must not delay the judgment which a party justly
deserves. For, truly, inability to decide a case within the required period is inexcusable
and constitutes gross inefficiency, which warrants the imposition of administrative
sanction against the erring magistrate.3

The cancellation of the clarificatory hearing is proper because to conduct such

hearing when it is no longer serving its purpose is to give premium to delay in the
dispensation of justice.

Delay is apparent when Atty. Renato A. Abejero, respondents counsel, did not
appear on the scheduled hearing on June 17, 2010 despite having received this Courts
Order dated June 15, 2010. In fact, he requested for the issuance of subpoena to the
Register of Deeds of Pasay City to appear and to testify on June 17, 2010 hearing which
this Court denied for being an immaterial witness pursuant to Rule 21, Section 4 of the
Revised Rules of Court. None of the respondents appeared, too on the June 17, 2010
hearing despite of notice to them on May 19, 2010. This Court wants to remind Atty.
Renato A. Abejo of his lawyers oath and his faithful adherence to the precepts of the
Code of Professional Responsibility(CPR) . It is among his duties as a lawyer to abide
Canon 1 of CPR providing that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. He shall not counsel or abet
activities that defy the laws or lessen confidence to our justice system (Rule 1.02, Canon
1 of CPR). He shall not encourage any case or proceeding that delay any mans cause
(Rule 1.03, Canon 1 CPR).

The issuance of a writ of execution is proper in this case.

The full blown trial of this case is useless as earlier pointed out. The end of
every trial is to arrive at a decision. Why would this Court render a decision pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 36 of the Revised Rules of Court stating: Entry of judgments and final
orders. - If no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time

3
Mina vs. Judge Mupas, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2067, June 18, 2008.

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provided in these Rules, the judgment or final order shall forthwith be entered by the
clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date of finality of the judgment or final
order shall be deemed to be the date of its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive
part of the judgment or final order and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate
that such judgment or final order has become final and executory when there was
already a decision at the barangay in the form of a compromise that was not repudiated
for more than two (2) years?

This Court has no jurisdiction to interpret, much less reverse, the barangay
compromise agreement between the herein petitioner and respondents because it is a
final and executory judgment. This Court is bound by the Katarungang Pambarangay
law, and it must carry the law into execution according to its mandate. The import of
the Katarungang Pambarangay law and the barangay compromise agreement are
clear, there is no room for another interpretation.

This Court is not empowered to modify or alter a valid barangay compromise

agreement, or to examine it under careful scrutiny in order to reverse it , because other
purpose which is not for its enforcement or for its execution, is disallowed in the
Barangay Justice System, unless there was a patent and gross error equated to a grave
abuse of discretion amounting lack or excess of jurisdiction or gross ignorance of the
law. Once the barangay compromise became final, like in this case where no
repudiation was made by all of the respondents within the prescribed period, the
winning party, herein petitioner, should not deprived of the fruits of it. Any court
must guard against any scheme calculated to frustrate the result of the finality of
barangay compromise agreement and it must frown upon any vicious attempt to
prolong the controversy at hand. To impose oppressive delay upon the issuance, service
and enforcement of a writ of execution, is tantamount to unjust deprivation of the
prevailing party of the fruits of the compromise agreement before the barangay that
can only bring a dark cloud of suspicion and stinging disrepute upon the competency,
integrity, probity and independence of the judge.

In Santos vs. Judge Isidro, A.M. No. MTJ-89-300 August 16, 1991, our Supreme
Court held, We agree with the conclusion of the Investigating Executive Judge. Under
Section 11 of P.D. No. 1508, the amicable settlement here had "the force and effect of a
final judgment of a court upon the expiration of ten (10) days from the date thereof," no
repudiation of that settlement having been made during that period. It was,
therefore, the clear ministerial duty of respondent Judge to implement and

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enforce the amicable settlement agreement. Enforcement of writ of execution
may, of course, be suspended in certain exceptional circumstances.

In the case at bar, the issuance of the writ of execution did not exceed to the
tenor of the barangay compromise. It was not issued contrary to the laws and
jurisprudence. There are no exceptional circumstances in this present case that will
warrant the nullification of the enforcement of the writ of execution.

In Philippine Veterans Bank vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, our Supreme

Court held: The rule that once a decision has become final and executory, it is the
ministerial duty of the court to order its execution, admits of certain exceptions as in
cases of special and exceptional nature where it becomes imperative in the higher
interest of justice to direct the suspension of its execution; or whenever it is necessary to
accomplish the aims of justice; or when certain facts and circumstances transpired after
the judgment became final which would render the execution of the judgment unjust.

In the instant case, no exceptional circumstance was presented by respondents

to stop the ministerial duty of this Court in issuing the writ of execution. The parties
had already amicably settled their case on the barangay level, which settlement had
resulted in the preparation and execution of the amicable settlement agreement. There
was no repudiation made by any respondent. This Courts legal duty is to enforce the
amicable settlement agreement not to conduct a full blown trial. When this Court
assumes this case, it was apparent that what the petitioner and respondents are
doing, because of the erroneous adoption of the procedural laws, was to allow the
defendants to re-open the barangay compromise agreement and litigate the underlying
dispute which had in fact been terminated by the conclusion of it. This cannot be and
should not be.

Upon the finality of the compromise agreement executed in the barangay, this
Court lost all jurisdiction in respect of the case, save only to enforce that compromise
agreement. This is elementary, so elementary that not to know it, or to act as if this
judge did not know it, constitutes an ignorance of the law. This Court has no
jurisdiction to try this case because of the existence of the final and executory barangay
compromise agreement between the herein petitioners and respondents. Since it has
no jurisdiction, the orders issued or to be issued including the subsequent decision to
be made out of the trial, which are vivid contravention of the laws and jurisprudence,
have no force and effect. The said orders or the subsequent decision to be rendered are
void.

It is well-settled that when a barangay compromise agreement which is in

the nature of a final judgment, attained finality and it became executory, it thereby
became immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if

12
the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of
law or fact, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the
court rendering it or by the Supreme Court as the highest court of the land. The only
recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called
nune pro tunc entries which cause no injury to any party, and, of course, where the
judgment is void.

At the end, this Court chose to uphold its ministerial duty of enforcing
and executing the barangay compromise agreement that attained finality sans any
repudiation made, otherwise, it would constitute ignorance of the law, dereliction of
duty and misconduct in the carrying out of duties. As stated earlier and it is oft
repeating, this Court is always guided by Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Order dated June 17, 2010 is
hereby AFFIRMED. The motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.

The Courts Sheriff is hereby ordered to proceed with the implementation of the
writ of execution.

SO ORDERED.

Pasay City, July 1, 2010.

ELIZA B. YU
Judge

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Copy furnished:
Atty. Renato C. Pineda
Counsel for the Petitioner
AGUIRRE, ABANO, PAMFILO, PINEDA
AND AGUSTIN LAW OFFICES
Suite 2104 B East Tower,
Philippine Stock Exchange Center bldg.,
Ortigas center, Pasig City

Atty. Renato A. Abejro

Counsel for the Respondents
1165 P. Noval St., Sampaloc, Manila City

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