Psychoanalysis and/as Philosophy?

The Anthropological Significance of Pathology

in Freuds Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality
and in the Psychoanalytic Tradition*

Phillipe van Haute

University of Nijmegen, Holanda
E-mail: phillipe.van.haute@skynet.be

Abstract: This article wants to determine the specificity of

psychoanalytic anthropology in general, Freudian anthropology in
particular. It shows that this specificity consists in the use of the so-
called crystal-principle: human existence has to be understood from
the point of view of its psychopathological variations. It is further
argued that this approach allows for the articulation of the project of
a clinical anthropology that is broader then psychoanalysis as such.
Key-words: psychoanalysis; clinical anthropology; sexuality; crystal-
principle.

Resumo: Este artigo quer determinar a especificidade da antropologia

psicanalca em geral, e da antropologia freudiana em particular.
Mostra que essa especificidade consiste no uso do chamado princpio
cristalino: a existncia humana tem que ser compreendida do ponto
da vista de suas variaes psicopatolgicas. Discute-se ainda que essa
aproximao permite a articulao do projeto de uma antropologia
clnica que seja, assim, uma psicanlise mais ampla.
Palavras-chave: psicanlise; clnica antropolgica; sexualidade;
princpio cristalino.

* Dedicated in friendship to Guido Berns.

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Phillipe van Haute

1. Introduction

What does the challenge which psychoanalysis poses to

philosophy consist of? Traditionally the assumption is often made that
psychoanalysis needs philosophy to provide its foundation. Merleau-Ponty,
for example, is of the opinion that psychoanalysis contains an implicit
philosophy that, hidden from view by the scientistic presuppositions of
its founder, can only be formulated adequately by phenomenology. The
insights of psychoanalysis must be translated into the language of
phenomenology. Only then can they reveal their truth.1
In so doing, do we not run the risk to reduce psychoanalysis all
too easily to well known philosophical topics, and thereby risk to avoid a
genuine confrontation and debate? Regardless of the extent to which
psychoanalysis may need philosophy, must we not first ask what in
psychoanalysis resists philosophy? Must we not first ask which
psychoanalytic insights offer resistance to what the philosophical tradition
offers to thought? This is the only way in which to do justice to the
originality of the psychoanalytic problematic while uncovering its proper
philosophical radicality.
The radicality of the psychoanalytic project does not allow itself
to be captured any more clearly than through a reading of one of Freuds
fundamental texts: Three Essays on the theory of sexuality. Indeed, in
the Three Essays Freud formulates his most important insights in the
central roles of sexuality and of the unconscious in human existence. The
central tenets of the Three essays are well known. Freud thematizes the
foundational significance of sexuality, of phantasy and of the unconscious
in human existence. In so doing he establishes the central role of human
corporeality, while emphasizing its instinctual (triebhaft) character.

1 See for example Merleau-Ponty, 1960, p.7. I primarily refer to the phenomenological
tradition because the reductive interpretation of psychoanalysis against which I
object is mainly to be found in that tradition. The relationship of psychoanalysis to
the work of other philosophers, such as Nietzsche and Foucault, is probably more
complex. I will return to these in my conclusion.

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 Psychoanalysis and/as Philosophy?

Undoubtedly, all of these are traditional topics of philosophy.

Freud is not the first or the only one in the history of philosophy to have
made the sexual body an explicit topic of discussion, and the significance
and importance of phantasy is an equally popular subject of philosophy.
Consequently it is understandable that any number of philosophers deem
themselves to be on familiar ground when dealing with Feud. At the
same time these philosophers can not take satisfaction with Freuds
scientistic use of language and the lack of philosophical depth that
accompanies it. For example, Freud defines the pleasure principle which
dominates human instinctual life exclusively in terms of the reduction of
tension. The latter is so manifestly untrue how, for example, could we
describe the pleasure we experience when looking at a work of art in
terms of a reduction of tension that we are almost compelled to perform
a philosophical cleansing and reformulation. 2 Without such a purification
and reformulation the Three essays merely have a historical value, and
can not possibly be in any way normative for contemporary philosophical
anthropology. Those who exclusively limit themselves to such a point of
view, at the same time imply that there is no fundamental opposition
between philosophy (phenomenology) and psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic
theory contains errors and must be corrected in a philosophical fashion, it
merely states in a less successful manner what philosophy already knew,
or it makes claims which could also be put into words without any
psychoanalytical input.
Yet do we thereby do justice to the wealth of Freuds text? In
this manner we neglect at least one crucial aspect of the problematic that
is brought to the fore. Next to the constitutive claims made about sexuality,
the phantasy, instincts and the unconscious which we have just mentioned,
in the Three Essays Freud also outlines and defends a methodology for
the study of the human being. This methodology implies that human
existence must be studied and articulated on the basis and in terms of its
2 For a philosophical interpretation of the Freudian pleasure principle, see, for example,
Bernet 2001.

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Phillipe van Haute

pathological variants. In order to plumb the depths of human existence

we must start with psychopathology. In this context Freud speaks about
the crystal-principle. Just as a crystal breaks along fault-lines which had
previously not been visible, pathology informs us about the fundamental
structures of human existence. The latter is often lost from sight by
philosophical readers of the Three essays. And yet it is exactly for that
very reason that the text may be considered to be one of the fundamental
texts of psychoanalytic anthropology. 3 The crystal-principle rather than
the entirety of meta-psychological insights as such confers onto
psychoanalytic theory an identity which implies a powerful critique of
traditional philosophical anthropology.4 It is this identity and critique
which at the same time offers the ultimate justification for the fact that
until today psychoanalysis deserves the attention of philosophy in general
and that of philosophical anthropology in particular. We clarify

2. The Three Essays as a philosophical project

Three Essays on the theory of Sexuality contains three chapters.

The first deals with sexual aberrations, the second deals with infantile
sexuality and the third with the changes of puberty. Most commentators
focus on the second and third chapter. Yet the first chapter is at least as
important in order to reconstruct the peculiar state and nature of Freudian
theory. Freud criticizes the popular view of sexuality according to which
sexuality is a heterosexual instinct aimed at reproduction and entirely
3 Furthermore, Freud continuously reworked this text in the light of the insights at
which he arrived in the course of the years after the publication of the first edition
in 1905. In this way the text in a succinct way also bears witness to the evolution of
Freuds thought between 1905 and 1925, the year in which the last edition of the
text was published.
4 Next to the crystal-principle here we must also make mention of the constitutive
opposition or confusion of tongues between the child and the adult. In their mutual
interrelatedness these two insights constitute the fundamental principles of a
psychoanalytic anthropology. We shall return on this point briefly in our conclusion.
For a further elaboration of this topic see Van Haute e Geyskens 2004.

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 Psychoanalysis and/as Philosophy?

absent from childhood. Freud finds his starting point in the frequent
occurrence of all sorts of perversions and in homosexuality.5 Perversions
as well as homosexuality call the self-evident character of popular view
of sexuality into doubt. Yet Freud goes much further. He is of the opinion
that perversions and homosexuality cast a light on the essence of the
sexual instinct as such. Homosexuality for example, is not the privilege of
a clearly delineated segment of the population. On the contrary, according
to Freud, we have all made our homosexual object choices in infancy, and
these choices remain determinative for the further development of our
sexual orientation no matter what. According to him this implies that
without exception no one escapes homosexuality and that the distinction
between homo- and heterosexuality at least in as much as their
determinative factors are concerned is merely a matter of degree. 6
Furthermore, the perversions voyeurism and exhibitionism,
fetishism and sado-masochism reveal the constituent parts of sexuality
in a magnified form. For example, voyeurism, according to Freud, is an
exaggeration of the pleasure of looking, without which no sexual relations
are said to be possible. Fetishism as a clinical phenomenon is also nothing
other than the exaggeration of a tendency which belongs to sexuality as
such. According to Freud there is merely a difference in degree between
the safe-keeping of a lock of hair of the a loved one and the exclusive
sexual inclination towards female footwear.
Here we lack the space to develop this problematic in full, 7 but
the foregoing already allows us to draw a couple of conclusions with regard
to the way in which Freud proceeds and his methodology. Freud does not
start from the assumption of a hypothetical ideal of normality or
psychological health in contrast to which pathology is determined. On
5 For what follows, see Freud 1999, pp. 33 ss. References to the English text are
taken from: Freud 1953, [Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, Standard Edition of
the complete works of Sigmund Freud, Volume VII, translated by E. Strachey,
pp. 125-243 (hence forth annotated as SE VII)]
6 Freud 1999, p. 44. SE VII, pp. 145-146.
7 I refer to Van Haute e Geyskens 2004, pp. 33-82.

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Phillipe van Haute

the contrary, he accepts the nosological categories of classical psychiatry

and sexology as self-evident, and on their basis articulates the constitutive
elements of the sexual instinct. According to Freud every different
perversion refers to a partial instinct that becomes independent from the
other partial drives and of which it is a magnification. 8
This implies that something like a heterosexual instinct of which
the perversions are simply a form of deviation, does not exist. On the
contrary, Freud inscribes the perversions to be more precise the partial
drives to which they must be reduced in the very heart of sexuality.
The heterosexual instinct, the existence of which is assumed by popular
opinion, and in which it has unshakeable faith, appears to be nothing
other than the result of a delicate and dynamic interplay of partial instincts
in which principally nothing is ever definitively acquired. Freud does not
cease to repeat that altering circumstances may bring back to life long
slumbering potentialities and reinforce long forgotten identifications and
object choices. 9
Therefore in the Three Essays Freud does not only describe
the central significance of sexuality and the unconscious for human
existence. At the same time he emphasizes that human sexuality only
reveals its secrets through its pathological variants.10 Freud intends the
latter in the most radical sense. It is not merely the case that pathology
casts a light on our existence by providing a contrast. Even though Freud
does not deny this, we may not limit the function of the crystal principle
to this idea alone. According to him pathology not only informs us about
the basic structures of our corporeal existence, existence as such must be
8 One may think of the oral and anal instinct, the scopic instinct and so on. Freud
calls these instincts partial instincts because they do not arise from the body as a
whole. On this point see Laplanche e Pontali 1967, pp. 367-368. English translation:
Laplanche & Pontalis 1973, p 301.
9 Freud 1999, passim. SE VII, passim.
10 It is obvious that this thought causes as many problems as it solves. For example
Freud silently assumes that psycho-pathology is a typically human phenomenon.
An in-depth discussion of this problematic would lead us astray too far. See in this
context: Van Coillie 2004, pp. 115-162.

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 Psychoanalysis and/as Philosophy?

reformulated in terms of the different pathologies in casu; the perversions,

homosexuality and the various neuroses. In this way psychiatry and, more
precisely put, psychiatric nosography receives an intrinsic anthropological
significance. That is the basic premise of Freudian anthropology.
Consequently, the philosophical significance of the Freudian
crystal principle can hardly be over-estimated. After all, not only does it
imply that human existence can fail, but also, and more importantly,
that this failure is inscribed in a very radical way in the very heart of
human existence itself. Indeed, according to Freud the fundamental
tendencies which characterize what it means to be human do out of
themselves lead to pathology, and that which we call psychical health is
nothing other than the precarious balance of these tendencies. For Freud
this immediately also implies that there is no intrinsic natural norm
against which normality or psychical health can be measured.11 Out
of itself or by nature sexuality does not self-evidently aim at coitus and
reproduction. On the contrary, genital sexuality is the product of a complex
human history which never quite succeeds. After all, no one ever quite
escapes pathology entirely there is, for example, no genital sexuality
without perverse additions such that the distinction between psychical
health and pathology can only be a matter of degree. In this sense
pathology, according to Freud, is not a secondary modification of being
human, but rather it is characteristic of the latter from the inside out.
The crystal principle much more so than the (one-sided?)
emphasis on the role of sexuality in the etiology of neurosis and psychosis?
confers a very particular identity to (Freudian) psychoanalysis. In this
context it is notable how rarely this principle is addressed in philosophical

11 It is true that in the text which we are discussing Freud repeatedly appears to draw
an essential difference between normality and pathology. However, a thorough
analysis of the text quickly reveals that the reference to normality occurs for
purposes of classification only rather than possessing any normative value. According
to Freuds own logic this cannot be otherwise. On this point see Van Haute e
Geyskens 2004, passim.

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Phillipe van Haute

discussions of psychoanalysis.12 More often than not the discussion is limited

to any number of claims concerning the content of psychoanalysis, and in
so doing misses the redefinition of the relation between normality and
pathology, which, however, is presupposed in any psychoanalytic assertion.
Is it possible that this omission has to do with the fact that it is exactly on
this point hat psychoanalysis and the philosophical tradition part ways?
Philosophy much rather considers psychopathology as a deviation
from the norm that is its proper object of study.13 Here one may for
example think of Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty. In their work they describe
the fundamental structures of Dasein and the incarnated subject
respectively, the possible failure of which they do indeed consider, yet not
as something which essentially characterizes this Dasein and this existence
form the inside out. Heidegger as well as Merleau-Ponty do recognize
the philosophical importance of psychopathology. 14 However they both
do so in an exclusively negative sense.15 Just like a fish that, if it could
think, would only recognize the indispensable character of a humid
environment when finding itself cast on dry land, according to these
authors pathology only reveals the importane of something from the
perspective of its lack for example the lack of a feeling of self-evidence
which accompanies our relation to reality.16 It is exactly when something
is missing that our attention is drawn to it. In this particular view
pathology does reveal the fundamental structures of human existence
that philosophy must describe and articulate, but it is in no way

12 The honor of having continuously drawn attention to this dimension in Freuds

work belongs to Jacques Schotte. In this context see Schotte 1990.
13 Also in places where such a norm is explicitly rejected (Nietzsche, Foucault)
psychopathology does not receive the same central significance as it does in the
work of Freud and his followers. I will come back to this point.
14 In this context see Merleau-Ponty 1949 & Heidegger 1987.
15 The latter is also true for phenomenological psychiatry which also describes
pathology with reference to being the negative aspect of a state of psychiatric
health which can be described independent of pathology. In this context see for
example Tatossian 1997.
16 On this point see Blankenburg 1970.

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determinative for this description. In other words, pathology does not

contribute any positive insight particular to itself in the elucidation of
human existence that philosophical anthropology aspires to. On this point
Freud breaks with the philosophical and in particular the
phenomenological tradition. He is the founder of clinical anthropology17,
the originality of which in contrast to the philosophical tradition cannot
be emphasized sufficiently. 18

3. The crystal principle and the psychoanalytic tradition

The crystal principle, more than one of Freuds assertions of

content concerning sexuality or the unconscious, determines the singular
character of his psychoanalytic theory. In our opinion this also applies to
psychoanalytic theory as a whole. In this context one may for example
think of the work of Melanie Klein or Jacques Lacan. Unlike Freud, Klein
does not characterize infancy immediately on the basis of sexual
development, but rather in terms of positions a complex of psychical
mechanisms to deal with (ones own) aggression in particular which she
describes and thematizes on the basis of the clinical picture of psychoses.
On the one hand Klein speaks of a paranoid-schizoid position in which
a mechanism of splitting (for example between a good and a bad breast)
is prevalent and in which anxiety for ones continued existence is
predominant. On the other hand she speaks of a depressive position that
is structured around the anxiety to have caused harm to the other by

17 In this context one may also think of the work of Leopold Szondi who radicalizes
Freuds clinical anthropology and develops it further. On this point see Geyskens
2005 [De mens als Schicksal. Over de antropologische grondslagen van de
Schicksalsanalyse, to be published in Tijdschrift voor Filosofie.]
18 As we have already pointed out, Freudian clinical anthropology is characterized by
two fundamental axioms that must be investigated further: on the one hand the
anthropological significance of psychopathology which we address here and the
gap between the world of the child and the world of the adult on the other hand.
The latter we have discussed at length elsewhere. See Geyskens e Van Haute 2003.

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Phillipe van Haute

ones own aggression as well as the (phantasmatical) attempts to repair

that damage. An exhaustive definition of these positions would lead as
too far a field. 19 Two aspects of Kleins theory are however of particular
relevance to our problematic. First, the two positions which according to
Klein characterize childhood as such are described with reference to
psychotic pathologies. 20 Even if it would be nave or simply false to
assume that Klein considers adult psychotic pathologies as a mere
regression to these infantile positions, this does not take away from the
fact that, like Freud, she describes normal psychical development from
the stand point of an intrinsic reference to pathology.21 Second, this
normal development is not aimed at an ideal state of health or normality
that can be defined apart from any reference to psychopathology.
According to Klein, the final outcome of psychical development can only
be described, in analogy to what Freud teaches us about sexuality, in
terms of a precarious and dynamic interplay between the two positions
mentioned. And in this interplay nothing is ever definitively acquired by
principle. In other words, also according to Klein pathology resides as an
intrinsic possibility in the heart of subjectivity itself.
A reference to Lacan may even further elucidate the relation
between psychoanalysis and philosophy as we seek to formulate it here.
The basic axioms of Lacanian psychoanalysis are well known. In essence
the human being is a speaking being. On the basis of the human beings
inscription in the order of the law and of language it is characterized by
an unappeasable lack that gives life to (in essence insatiable) desire. The
19 For a more detailed discussion of this problematic and more refernces to the work
of Klein see: Geyskens e Van Haute 2003, pp. 60-124.
20 Incidentally we here encounter an important problem that must be addressed by
any clinical anthropology. It is indeed noticeable that different psychoanalytical
authors take different pathologies as their starting point for their reflections on
human existence. On which basis can the relative privilege assigned to a particular
pathology neurosis and perversion in Freuds early work, traumatic neurosis in
his later work, psychosis in the work of Klein be justified?
21 On the relation between pathology and the kleinian positions see Geyskens e Van
Haute 2003, pp. 88-89.

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 Psychoanalysis and/as Philosophy?

neurotic, Lacan teaches us further, has never accepted this lack and
psychoanalytic therapy now aims to achieve this acceptance in extremis.
Furthermore Lacan himself often articulates these insights in the language
of the philosophical tradition (Kant, Hegel, Kojeve, Heidegger and
Merleau-Ponty). For example he describes the attitude of the neurotic
that characterizes desire in terms of Heideggerian inauthenticity (Das
Man) and the acceptance of this lack which psychoanalysis pursues becomes
the equivalent of the acceptance of the Sein zum Tode.22 Hence it comes
as no great surprise that the suspicion has arisen in many that there is no
real contrast between the philosophical tradition and psychoanalysis, and
that in fact the latter is merely an extension of the former.
Yet in this manner no justice is done to the originality of Lacans
thought. Even though Lacan undoubtedly defines the human being on
the basis of a (symbolic) lack, that is not the whole story. At the same
time Lacan describes various subjective positions one may think of the
hysterical position or that of obsessive compulsive neurosis which are
that many ways to deal with that lack.23 And it is noteworthy that Lacan
formulates these positions of the subject from the perspective of an intrinsic
reference to pathology. Furthermore, there is no normal or healthy
position. This means that also for Lacan psychical health must rather be
understood I terms of an interplay of positions which out of themselves
refer to pathology, rather than as the attainment of a state that can be
defined entirely independent from psychopathology.
One might object at this point that already very early on a
number of psychoanalytic authors one may for example think of Freuds
daughter, Anna24 , and the ego-psychologists abandoned the crystal-
principle as determinative methodological principle. Without a doubt
this is the case. At the same time it is obvious that the relinquishing of

22 Lacan 1953, pp. 237-322. English Translation Lacan, Jacques 1953a.

23 Concerning the problematic of these positions see: Van Haute 2002, pp. 217-282.
24 In this context see for example: Freud, A. 1982.

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Phillipe van Haute

this principle25 is directly linked with the explicit wish of these authors to
make psychoanalysis acceptable to the established sciences. This proves
as it were a contrario that what brings psychoanalysis into conflict with
these sciences and the philosophical tradition/ - is nothing other than
the concept of a clinical anthropology as we have briefly tried to sketch it
in the foregoing.

4. Conclusion: the project of a clinical anthropology

in Freud and beyond?

Freud stands at the cradle of the project of a clinical anthropology.

Although the anthropologizing of psychiatry and psychiatric nosography
which we addressed in the foregoing is not the only pillar on which this
project is built, it is undoubtedly the most important one.26 Thinking
the human condition from out of its pathological variations implies a
break with the philosophical tradition that presupposes a strict and
essential distinction between normality and pathology. The philosophical
originality of psychoanalytic thinking lies indeed much more in this radical
questioning of the relation between normality and pathology, than in
Freuds insights on the primacy of sexuality or of the unconscious as such.
This questioning delineates its proper field of research which
transcends psychoanalysis sensu stricto. Indeed, the deepening and
development of the psychoanalytic project of a clinical anthropology will
undoubtedly gain advantage from, sometimes unexpected, confrontations
with other domains of science. One may for example think of certain currents
in evolutionary psychiatry in which, following the example set by Freud

25 As well as, abandoning the concept of a constitutive confusion of tongues between

the child and the adult.
26 We should also mention here the constitutive confusion of tongues between the
child and the adult (Ferenczi) which is another crucial presupposition of Freudian
and psychoanalytic clinical anthropology. For an explanation of this confusion in
its relation to the anthropopogizing of psychiatry we are discussing here see Van
Haute e Geyskens 2004.

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 Psychoanalysis and/as Philosophy?

and psychoanalysis, normality is understood as an extension of, or even on

the basis of, psychopathology. Psychopathology is there conceived as the
effect of principally adaptive mechanisms which are present in everyone -
becoming unhinged.27 We could think here e.g. of anxiety that in itself is
an adaptive mechanism, but which when occuring at the wrong occasions
or in the wrong intensities can also lead us to pathology. In the same manner,
creativity and schizophrenia may be situated on the same continuous scale,
for example.28 Hence we find in evolutionary psychiatry a problematic
that in many respects comes close to Freudian thinking.29
The field of research that is determined in this way can further be
specified and articulated by the number of problems it raises and which
must be investigated further. Freud and together with him the
psychoanalysis tradition wishes to investigate human existence from the
perspective of its pathological variants. This implies that, according to him,
psychopathology is typically human. At the very least this is not self-evident,
and this thought must be deepened and further elucidated.30 We have also
already pointed out that different psychoanalytic authors take their starting
point in different pathologies and hence arrive at different conclusions
regarding the fundamental structures of human existence. This problematic
also deserves closer attention and must be studied further in view of the
fact that it appears to introduce a moment of arbitrariness into the debate.
We have claimed that the crystal principle confers onto
psychoanalysis its own identity such that it cannot simply be recuperated
into the philosophical tradition. Freud and psychoanalysis are of course
not the first and only to subject this hypocritical opposition between
normality and pathology to a critical inquiry. On the contrary, we may
find the same concern in, for example, the work of Nietzsche, Foucault or
Deleuze. The confrontation of psychoanalysis with the work of these

27 In this context see for example Stevens & Price 2000.

28 Stevens & Price 2000, p. 151ss.
29 See in this respect Baron-Cohen 1997.
30 On this point see Van Coillie 2004.

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Phillipe van Haute

authors consequently provides an ideal opportunity to investigate the

crystal principle and its possible added value with regard to more
traditional approaches. Even though these authors do not appear to defend
the same anthropologization of psychopathology, this does in no way
mean that psychoanalysis would not have anything to gain or learn from
a debate with Foucault and Nietzsche. What is the status of the nosological
categories that psychiatry works with, and how do they come about?31
Are they not the result of hidden strategies of power which must be
analyzed and unmasked? And is the child the primacy of which
psychoanalysis affirms, not a historical construction, the genealogy of
which is yet to be written?
If it is to be viable, clinical anthropology must be able to provide
an answer to the critiques that have been leveled against traditional
philosophical anthropology during the course of the twentieth century.
The latter has indeed increasingly come under much hostile fire in the
wake of the work of, for example, Heidegger, Foucault and Derrida. Foucault,
for example, is of the opinion that the human being in its modern form
of a self-conscious subject at the absolute origin of its own meaning and
sense is a recent invention which is doomed to disappear in the not to
distant future.32 Philosophical anthropology makes this self-conscious
human being the object of its study and consequently risks disappearing
with its object, or at the least stands to loose its legitimacy. Heidegger
and Derrida are also of the opinion that the project of a philosophical
anthropology is intrinsically linked to the triumph of modern
subjectivity.33 The future will tell whether Freuds project of a clinical
anthropology will offer sufficient possibilities to outline a philosophical
anthropology that is the philosophical reflection on the anthropological
difference able to answer the criticisms mentioned above.

31 See on this e.g. De Block e Adriaens 2005 [The Evolution of a Social Construction.
The Case of Male Homosexuality (forthcoming).]
32 Foucault 1966, p. 398.
33 Heidegger 1946, pp. 311-366.

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Referncias

Bernet, R 2001: Lust en onlust. Poging tot een filosofische fundering

van de psychoanalytische begrippen. In Tijdschrift voor filosofie,
Leuven v. 63, n. 3, pp. 517-542.
Blankenburg, William 1970: Der Verlust der natrlichen
Selbstverstndlichkeit. Ein Beitrag zur Psychopathologie der
symptomarmen Schizophrenie. Stuttgart, Enke.
De Block, Andreas e Adriaens, Pieter: The Evolution of a Social Construction.
The Case of Male Homosexuality (manuscrito).
Freud, Sigmund 1999: Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie (1905).
In Gesammelte Werke v. V, Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt am Main.
_____ 1953: Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905). In:
Standard Edition of the complete works of Sigmund Freud, v. VII,
translated by James Strachey et al. London, The Hogarth Press.
Freud, Anna 1982: Psychoanalytic Psychology of normal Development. London,
The Hogarth Press and The Institute of Psycho-Analysis.
Foucault, Michel 1966: Les mots et les choses. Paris, Galimard.
Geyskens, Tomas 2005 : De mens als Schicksal. Over de antropologische
grondslagen van de Schicksalsanalyse. (manuscrito) to be published
in Tijdschrift voor Filosofie.
Geyskens, Tomas e Van Haute, Philippe 2003: Van doodsdrift tot
hechtingstheorie. Het primaat van het kind in het werk van Freud, Klein
en Hermann (From Death Instinct to Attachment Theory. The Primacy of
the Child in Freud, Klein and Hermann). Amsterdam, Boom.
Heidegger, Martin 1946: Brief ber den Humanismus. Frankfurt am Main,
Vittorio Klostermann.
_____ 1987: Zollikoner Seminare. Frankfurt am Main, Vitorio Klostermann,
Heraugeber Medard Boss.
Hesnard, Angelo 1960 : Loeuvre de Freud et son importance pour le Monde
Moderne. Paris, Payot.
Lacan, Jacques 1953 : Fonction et champ de la parole et du langage en
psychanalyse. In Lacan 1966, pp. 237-322.

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Lacan, Jacques 1953a. The function and field of Speech and Language
in psychoanalysis. In Lacan 2002, pp. 31-106
_____ 1966: crits. Paris, Seuil.
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Recebido em 10 de outubro de 2005.

Aprovado em 20 de dezembro de 2005.

374 Natureza Humana 7(2): 359-374, jul.-dez. 2005