EngineeringFailureAnalysis, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp.

157-170, 1996
Pergamon Copyright 1996 ElsevierScienceLtd
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SIX CASE HISTORIES OF PRESSURE VESSEL FAILURES

B. HAYES
TWI, Abington Hall, Abington, Cambridge CB1 6AL, U.K.

(Received 4 May 1996)

Abstract--The failures of six pressure vessels are described: Sizewell boiler (1963), John Thompson
ammonia converter for ICI Immingham (1965), Cockenzie power station boiler drum (1966), Typpi Oy
heat exchangers (1970), Robert Jenkins pressure vessel (1970) and the Union Oil Co. amine absorber
tower (1984). The failure investigations and findings are summarized. Copyright (~) 1996 Elsevier
Science Ltd.

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper reviews six pressure vessel failure cases. It is intended to complement an earlier
paper [1] published in this journal, which looked at failures of other types of large welded
structures. As in that paper, the aim here is to present the case histories in an accessible way
with references for those wishing to explore the detail. In particular, the reader is referred to
Ref [2] for fracture mechanics assessments of five of the six failures (no assessment could be
made of the first case looked at here, the Sizewell boiler, as no initiating defect was ever
identified).

2. SIZEWELL BOILER

On 31 May 1963, boiler No. 2A at the Sizewell nuclear power station failed during
hydrostatic testing [3, 4]. The full test pressure of 31 bar had been virtually reached, the test
pressure being set at 1.5 times the design pressure. The water temperature at the time of
failure was approximately 13 C.
The failure affected two strakes near one end of the cylindrical portion of the boiler. The
cracking in these strakes was fairly extensive and such that a section of the vessel wall about
5.5 m long was pushed out by the escaping water and left attached by a relatively small
ligament (Fig. 1). Witnesses reported hearing a loud bang and seeing the failed end of the
boiler lift off the test frame by about 5 cm before falling back.
The overall length of the boiler was 28.6 m and the internal diameter of the central
cylindrical shell was 6.85 m. It was made from an M n - C r - M o - V steel, 57 mm thick in the
shell section. The chemical composition of the steel and its tensile properties are given in
Table 1. The plates for the shell were supplied in the normalized condition and, after welding,
they underwent (PWHT) post-weld heat treatment at 600 C. The specified minimum tensile
strength of the steel was 525 N mm -2, and the Charpy V notch requirement was for 27 J
absorbed energy at - 1 0 C.
Examination of the fracture faces showed that the crack propagation along the lower
fractured edge of the section of material pushed out from the vessel wall was typically brittle.
Three fracture origins were identified on the lower fractured edge, each associated with
thermal sleeve attachment points. The fracture appearance of the upper fractured edge
indicated that here the final failure had been due to bending overload.
The thermal sleeves were set-through pipes of approximately 100 mm outside diameter.
These were fillet welded to the boiler shell on the inner and outer surfaces. Investigation of
157
158 B. HAYES

Fig. 1. View of failed boiler at Sizewell power station.

Table 1. Chemical composition (wt%) and tensile properties of the Sizewell boiler steel

C Mn Si S P Cr Mo V Ni Cu Sn Tensile properties

0.09 1 . 4 3 0.22 0.009 0.023 0.64 0.3 0.11 0.25 <0.15 <0.02 Yield strength (N mm -2) 486
Ultimate tensile strength 586
(Nmm -2)
Elongation (%) 30
Reduction in area (%) 70

the thermal sleeves and attachment welds in the regions of fracture initiation revealed no
significant defects. Non-destructive testing of all other thermal sleeves in the boiler indicated
that these were also free of defects.
The investigators into the failure were satisfied that the material and fabrication procedures
met the required standards, and so the stress conditions in the vessel were investigated. Strain
gauge measurements were made on another of the four boilers for the No. 2 reactor. These
indicated that the maximum stress in the region of the failure was about 300 N mm -2
Such a stress level was too low to account for the failure in the absence of significant
defects. The metallographic examination of the material, both in the region of the failure and
distant from it, showed the presence of twinning bands in considerable numbers. This was
interpreted as evidence of shock loading of the vessel.
The vessel had been supported during hydrotesting on eight piers made of steel I-beams.
Curved chocks were fitted to the top of each pier to support the vessel and the position of the
chocks was adjusted via jacking screws. After the failure, chocks from the three piers at the
fractured end of the boiler were found to be dislodged. Witnesses had seen the chocks from
the two piers closest to the end of the vessel fall off when the boiler lifted and fell back
during the failure.
It was postulated that the third dislodged chock, which had been located at the centre of
the failed section, had been insufficiently tightened and was pushed out under the weight of
the water-filled vessel. The sudden collapse of support effectively caused shock loading of the
boiler as the loads were redistributed. The material, although defect-free and of acceptable
 Six case histories of pressure vessel failures 159

quality, could not withstand these shock loading conditions. This was considered to be the
only explanation of the failure which fitted all the observations.

3. JOHN THOMPSON PRESSURE VESSEL

In December 1965, a large pressure vessel being manufactured by John Thompson

(Wolverhampton) Ltd for the ICI Immingham plant fractured during a hydraulic test [2, 4, 5].
Damage to the vessel was considerable, with four large pieces being thrown from the vessel.
One of these, weighing approximately 2 t, went through the workshop wall and landed some
46 m away. One minor casualty was reported.
The vessel consisted of a plain shell of 1.7 m inside diameter made from cylindrical strakes
of 150 mm thick silicon-killed M n - C r - M o - V steel. The chemical composition and tensile
properties of the material are given in Table 2. The end closures were forged, one end being
a flange with a flat cover. The forging material was similar to the shell steel: however, a
higher carbon content of 0.2% was used in the flange forging in order to meet the strength
requirements in the thickest section. The forgings were supplied in a normalized and
tempered condition. The overall length of the vessel was 18.2 m and it weighed 167 t. It had
been destined for use as an ammonia converter with a design pressure of 35 N mm -2 at
120 C.
The proof test requirement was for 48 N mm -2 gauge pressure at ambient temperature (not
less than 7 C), but the testing of the vessel was troubled by leaks from the bolted flange joint
and several repressurizations were required. At the first attainment of 34 N mm -2 pressure,
the vessel failed accompanied by "a kind of dull thud". No one present noticed anything
unusual before the failure. The ambient and water temperatures at the time were determined
to be less than 10 C.
The failure occurred at the flange end of the vessel. The flange forging was cracked through
in two locations, the first two shell strakes broke into several pieces, and cracking extended
into the third strake (Fig. 2).
Investigation revealed two fracture initiation sites. These were small pre-existing cracks in
the heat-affected zone (HAZ) of the submerged arc weld joining the flange end forging to the
vessel shell. The cracks were located on the forging side of the weld about 15 mm below the
outer surface in regions of segregation where the carbon and alloying element contents were
locally increased. This segregation would have increased the susceptibility of the material to
hydrogen cracking, the probable cause of the original crack formation. The welding procedure
was such that the preheat was discontinued immediately on completion of the weld, thus not
allowing the reduction of hydrogen levels in the faster cooling surface regions.
The failure occurred by the extension of these pre-existing cracks into the adjacent weld
metal which had poor toughness properties due to inadequate heat treatment. The toughness
of the forging and shell plate, although meeting the requirements, was not sufficient to arrest
a running crack of size equal to the weld cross-section. The forged flange and first strake
subassembly had been furnace post-weld heat treated. The specified conditions were
620-660 C for 6 h: however, high hardnesses measured on the casualty material indicated
that the temperature of the subassembly had not reached this level. The furnace temperature
had been monitored by pyrometers lowered from the roof. From subsequent temperature
measurements made on similar components in the furnace, it was estimated that the actual
temperatures achieved in the circumferential weld between the forging and the first strake
were between 520 and 610 C, depending on the position around the weld.

Table 2. Chemical composition (wt%) and tensile properties of the John Thompson vessel forging

C Mn Si S P Cr Mo V Cu Tensile properties

0.20 1.48 0.27 0.008 0.009 0.83 0.29 0.09 0.11 Yield strength (N mm -2) 543
Ultimate tensile strength 735
(N mm -2)
Elongation (%) 25
Reduction in area (%) 61.5
160 B. HAYES

Fig. 2. Ammonia converter after failure during pressure test.

The Charpy V notch requirements for the forging, plate and weld metal were 38 J absorbed
energy at +20 C. The weld metal did not meet these requirements and the absorbed energies
measured at +7 C were in the range 12-25 J, which was considered the lower shelf for this
material. Reheat treating the casualty material at 650 C for 6 h considerably improved the
Charpy properties of the weld metal but only at temperatures of 20 C and above.
Residual stresses were also considered a contributory factor to crack initiation at the
relatively low applied stress level as the heat treatment conditions had not been sufficient for
full relief of the residual stresses.
The British Welding Research Association report [5] of the investigation into this failure
proposed that fracture mechanics principles be used when setting fracture avoidance criteria
for thick high-strength steels. It also recommended carrying out pressure tests at temperatures
above the ductile-brittle transition temperature of the vessel material in order to reduce the
risk of failure.

4. C O C K E N Z I E P O W E R S T A T I O N B O I L E R D R U M

On 6 May 1966, a boiler drum manufactured by Babcock and Wilcox Ltd failed during
hydraulic testing at the Cockenzie power station in Scotland [2, 4, 6]. The boiler was at
approximately 270 bar gauge pressure, about 96% of the full test pressure, when the failure
occurred. The ambient temperature was 7 C. One end of the 22.8 m long boiler drum split,
with two longitudinal brittle factures extending about 4 . 9 m . The connecting pipework
prevented the pieces of failed plate from being thrown any distance (Fig. 3), and no one was
injured, although those working nearby were shaken.
The boiler drum was made of six cylindrical courses of 1.7 m inside diameter, fabricated in
140 mm thick M n - C r - M o - V steel (Ducol W30). Table 3 gives the chemical analysis and
tensile properties. The drumheads were pressed from the same steel but were slightly thicker
(152 mm). Production of the vessel involved manufacturing two-halves, each consisting of
 Six case histories of pressure vessel failures 161

Fig. 3. Fractured boiler drum at Cockenzie power station.

Table 3. Chemical composition (wt%) and tensile properties of the Cockenzie boiler steel

C Mn Si S P Cr Mo V Tensile properties

0.17 1.40 0.20 0.028 0.034 0.66 0.25 0.08 Yield strength (Nmm -2) 457
Ultimate tensile strength (N mm -2) 602
Elongation (%) 30
Reduction in area (%) 64

three courses plus drumhead. These were furnace post-weld heat treated before being joined
together. The closing circumferential weld was then locally post-weld heat treated.
Each of the six courses had four set-through nozzle attachments, which were welded by the
manual metal arc process. These welds were tested internally and externally using magnetic
particle inspection. One weld was found to contain a crack and, as the associated nozzle was
also found to be deeply seamed, the whole nozzle was replaced. An angle bracket attachment
close to the nozzle was cut down to a stub to improve access during welding of the
replacement nozzle, and subsequently reattached. The repair was carried out prior to the final
furnace PWHT.
The boiler drum was inspected during its fabrication by both the manufacturer and
independent insurance company surveyors, but no non-destructive testing was performed after
the final heat treatment. The manufacturers carded out an hydraulic pressure test at 1.5 times
the design pressure in June 1964 prior to delivery to the power station in October 1964.
The first on-site pressure tests were undertaken in March 1966, once the boiler erection was
sufficiently advanced to allow it. Faulty welds in the superheater area remote from the drum
were found and repaired. The boiler was fully pressurized on 1 April and passed by the
surveyors, except for a number of tube defects. The boiler was pressurized again on 22 April
to check that the repairs, which were not associated with the drum, were satisfactory. The
failure of the drum occurred during the final pressure test on 6 May.
The origin of the fracture was found to be a 330 mm long surface breaking arrested brittle
162 B. HAYES
crack with a maximum depth of approximately 90 mm (Fig. 4). The crack had originated in
the internal weld of the replacement nozzle and extended into the plate between the nozzle
and the adjacent angle bracket. No defect, however, was found to explain the initiation of this
brittle crack. The surfaces of the arrested brittle crack were blackened and it was concluded
that the crack had formed during the initial stage of the final PWHT, as a crack of such
dimensions would have been detected during prior inspection.
The parent material in the region of the failure had Charpy V notch energies in the range
60-80 J at room temperature, which met the requirements of the codes current at the time
(BS 1113-1958). Although it was questioned whether this level of Charpy toughness was in
fact sufficient, the material had withstood several pressurizations in the presence of a
significant crack. There was no evidence of any crack extension during these earlier
pressurizations. The argument was made at the time of the investigation into the failure that,
if the pressure test had been conducted at a higher temperature, the failure might not have
occurred and the vessel would have entered service in a severely cracked condition.
The investigation into this failure also highlighted the importance of design details. Two
main negative effects could be associated with the proximity of the angle bracket to the
nozzle: the presence of complex residual stress and stress concentration patterns, and the
difficulty of inspection of such a configuration.
The finding that failure was initiated from a crack formed during PWHT was instrumental
in modification of standards to include mandatory non-destructive testing after heat treat-
ment. It was also recommended that the heating rates at the start of stress relieving should be
carefully controlled, taking into account the shape and thickness of the vessel, although there
was no evidence of excessive heating rates in this case.

5. AMMONIA PLANT H E A T E X CH A N G E RS

A set of four high-pressure heat exchangers at the Typpi Oy ammonia plant in Oulu,
Finland, failed on 19 March 1970 [2, 7, 8]. The plant had been restarted after a 2-week
shut-down, and had been running at the process pressure of 230 bar for about 1 h when the

Fig, 4. Defect from which fractureinitiated in Cockenzieboiler drum.

 Six case histories of pressure vessel failures 163

head chambers of the water coolers fractured suddenly. Pieces of two of the head chambers
(A and B) were thrown up to 250 m, and the third chamber (C) showed extensive cracking
around the nozzles. The fourth cooler (D) appeared undamaged. The failed heat exchangers
are shown in Fig. 5.
Personnel working near the heat exchangers did not hear or see any signs of leakage prior
to the failure, and the records showed the process conditions to be normal. The inlet
temperature of the effluent was +10C and its outlet temperature +3 C. The ambient
temperature was 3 C below zero.
The head chambers were forged slightly oversized from a creep-resisting N i - M o - V steel
(chemical composition and tensile properties given in Table 4) normalized at 920 C.
Following rough machining to close to the final dimensions (outside diameter 1090 mm, length
1100 mm, with thickness 85-150 mm), the forgings were heat treated at 950 C for 4 h, oil
quenched, tempered at 675 C, and finally air-cooled. Following visual and ultrasonic
inspection, the final machining was carried out.
A mild steel overlay was deposited on the tube-plate face using manual metal arc welding.

Fig. 5. View of failed water cooler at Typpi Oy ammonia plant.

164 B. HAYES
Table 4. Chemical composition (wt%) and tensile properties of the Typpi Oy head chamber forgings
c Mn Si S P Mo V Ni Tensileproperties
0.19 1.38 0 . 3 4 0.007 0.012 0.43 0.17 0.98 Yieldstrength (Nmm -2) 647
Ultimate tensile strength (N mm-:) 755
Elongation (%) 19
Reduction in area (%) 59

The last weld metal to be deposited was around the circumference of the tube-plate, where it
joined the chamber barrel. Following welding of other attachments to the chamber (except
the tubes), the chamber was post-weld heat treated at 560-580 C. The weld overlay around
the circumference of the tube-plate was then skimmed, and the whole area inspected with a
dye penetrant prior to the attachment of the tubes. Final inspection by ultrasonics and dye
penetrant testing was carried out before leak and hydrostatic testing of the assembled water
cooler.
Investigation of the failure concentrated on heat chambers A and B, which fractured
completely around their circumferences, in a brittle manner (Fig. 6). The origin of the
fracture in chamber A was in the H A Z of a nozzle attachment weld but was not associated
with a defect. In chamber B, the fracture started from a small oxidized crack in the toe of the
weld overlay around the circumference of the tube-plate. From consideration of the
deformation of the plant and positions of the broken pieces, it was determined that chamber
B failed first.
Tests on the material of the forged chamber showed that the chemical composition was
within specification. The results of Charpy V notch impact tests were, however, much lower
than those shown on the certification test records (average of 12 J at 0 C compared to
80-180 J at the same temperature). This was determined to be due to the much slower
cooling rate from the hardening temperature (950 C) of the massive head chamber compared
to the test material ring used for the original Charpy tests.
Metallographic studies of the chamber steel revealed an upper bainite microstructure
instead of the desired tempered martensite. Upper bainite microstructures typically exhibit
strength but poor ductility. The nil-ductility transition temperature of the head chamber
material (as measured by the Pellini drop weight test) was +20 C, confirming its low
toughness. Regions of high hardness were found in weld H A Z s which had not been
appreciably softened by the P W H T . The P W H T was also shown to have been insufficient to
cause stress relaxation. The evidence indicated that the small original defect was formed
during P W H T due to an excessive heating rate for a steel of this composition. Then, during
the year between the hydrotest and the commission of the water coolers, the defect extended
by a stress-corrosion mechanism in the presence of high hardnesses and residual stresses.
Finally, while in operation, the already low-toughness material was embrittled by hydrogen
from the process environment, so creating the critical conditions for brittle fracture.
This failure illustrates the importance of acceptance tests being made on material typical of
the structure, and of correct P W H T conditions being specified.

6. R O B E R T JENKINS P R E S S U R E V E S S E L

A large pressure vessel manufactured for export by Robert Jenkins and Co. Ltd in
Rotherham failed during pressure testing at the company's works on 6 November 1970 [2, 9]
(Fig. 7). At the time of failure, the water temperature was approximately 12 C and the gauge
pressure was 29 bar, 85% of the required value. The vessel had been under pressurization
for 7.5 h, and contained 171,000 1 of water which was released into the workshop, causing
considerable damage.
The vessel was 34 m long in two sections which were joined by a flanged and bolted
connection. One section was - 4 . 5 m in diameter with a wall thickness of 41 mm. The second
section, in which the failure occurred, was 2.7 m in diameter with a wall thickness of 28 mm.
 Six case histories of pressure vessel failures 165

Fig. 6. Head chamber fracture surface with arrows pointing to initiation region.

The vessel was constructed according to A S M E Section VIII. The larger-diameter section was
post-weld heat treated, while the failed section was in the as-welded condition.
The failure initiated in the vicinity of the fillet weld of a manhole compensating plate on
the main shell. The fracture, which was brittle, extended in two directions through the strake
containing the manhole into the adjacent strake on one side and the dished end on the other
before arresting. The overall length of the fracture was 4.3 m, with a subsidiary crack of 1.5 m
long present on the other side of the manhole.
The vessel material was a C - M n A S T M 515 Grade 70 (1967) steel for intermediate- and
high-temperature use, produced in the U.K. to coarse grained practice and supplied in the
as-rolled condition. The chemical composition of the steel and its tensile properties are given
in Table 5. The yield strength of the material was in the region of 300 N mm -2 and the
Charpy properties of the strake in which the fracture initiated were poor: 8-20 J longitudinal
and 11-14 J transverse at 10 C, with fracture appearances of at least 90% crystallinity.
Examination of the fracture faces found evidence of an initial crack 115 mm long at the
fillet weld toe of the compensating plate on the external surface of the shell. This defect
extended approximately halfway through the plate thickness. Fracture mechanics analyses
 166 B. HAYES

Fig. 7. Pressure vessel which failed during hydrotest at Robert Jenkins & Co. Ltd.

Table 5. Chemical composition (wt%) and tensile properties of the Robert Jenkins pressure
vessel steel

C Mn Si S P Tensileproperties
0.32 0.78 0.14 0.033 0.024 Yieldstrength (Nmm-2) 295
Ultimate tensile strength (N mm-2) 553
Elongation (%) 26

carried out as part of the failure investigation showed that the applied stress intensity factor at
the defect was close to the measured values of fracture toughness obtained at 12 C.
The origin of the initiating defect was thought to be hydrogen cracking in the H A Z of the
fillet weld. Regions of martensite with hardnesses in the range 500-515 VPN (Vickers
pyramid) were found near the toe of the fillet weld. A hardness survey of the area of the toe
of the weld gave hardnesses from 393 to 496 VPN. (In comparison, the hardness of the parent
plate was 190 VPN.) With a carbon content of 0.33%, the plate was considered to be liable to
 Six case historiesof pressure vessel failures 167
hydrogen cracking in the high-hardness regions. Although the manufacturer's recommenda-
tions for drying the electrodes were followed (150C for 1 h), it was suggested by the
investigators that this was insufficient given the hardness levels present in the HAZ.
Tests on the failed plate showed the chemical composition in the initiation region to be
susceptible to liquation cracking. It was postulated that the initiating defect might have
formed as a liquation crack, which extended by hydrogen cracking under the conditions of
high restraint and residual stresses present at the fillet weld toe.
An investigation was made into the effects of PWHT on the welds in the aswelded failed
section of the pressure vessel. It was found that little improvement in toughness properties
was obtained in the range of temperatures associated with hydrotesting, although the peak
welding residual stresses were reduced which would be beneficial.
This failure arose from a material problem: the toughness of the parent plate was low, and
it was susceptible to liquation cracking and formation of high-hardness zones in the HAZ,
leading to probable hydrogen cracking. The selection of a fine grained steel with superior
toughness properties meeting specified levels would give greater protection against this type of
failure during hydrotest or during service should the temperature be reduced below normal
operating temperature.

7. AMINE ABSORBER TOWER

On the evening of Monday 23 July 1984, the Union Oil Co. refinery near Lemont, Illinois,
U.S.A., was seriously damaged by an explosion and fire [2, 10-14]. Seventeen people
working at the refinery were killed and the property damage was estimated to be over $100
million. The explosion was caused by the ignition of a large cloud of flammable gas (a
mixture of propane and butane) which had leaked from a ruptured amine absorber pressure
vessel.
An operator working near the absorber tower noticed gas escaping from horizontal crack
about 150 mm long near the bottom of the vessel and tried to close off the main inlet valve.
The crack grew to 600 mm, and he initiated evacuation of the area. As the company fire
fighters arrived, the absorber tower cracked further and a large amount of gas was released.
The gas ignited in a massive explosion which sent the upper part of the tower into the air,
landing over 1 km away. The explosion was felt over 20 km away, and the blaze which
followed sent flames 150 m into the sky. Figure 8 shows the area of the refinery where the
vessel had stood.
The absorber tower first went into service in 1970. It was a cylindrical vessel 2.6 m in
diameter and of overall height 16.8 m. The shell section consisted of six courses of 25 mm
thick ASTM A516 Grade 70 steel (see Table 6 for chemical composition and tensile
properties). These were joined by full-penetration submerged arc welds in the as-welded
condition. The vessel, built to ASME Section VIII, was designed to strip H2S from the
propane-butane gas mixture passing through it. Monoethanolamine was fed through the
tower as part of this process. The operating conditions were 1.4 Nmm -2 internal pressure at
38 C. The environment in the tower was corrosive.
Soon after the amine absorber tower entered service, hydrogen blisters were found in the
lower two courses of the shell, and laminations were detected in the steel. The growth of
hydrogen blisters continued, and in 1974 the second course of the tower was replaced on-site
using manual metal arc welding with no preheat or PWHT. In 1976, a Monel liner to reduce
corrosion was fitted in the bottom head and first course of the tower, but it did not cover the
repaired section.
The investigation into the failure [10, 11] found that the tower fractured at the circumferen-
tial weld between the replacement ring and the lower course. Figure 9 is a schematic drawing
of the vessel, illustrating the failure. Four large cracks in the H A Z had been present prior to
the failure, originating at the inner surface of the tower and extending almost through the
wall thickness. About 35% of the vessel circumference was affected. The location of the first
leak observed corresponded to one of these H A Z cracks, which was approximately 800 mm
long.
 168 B. HAYES

Fig. 8. Site of amine absorber tower after explosion at the Union Oil refinery.

Table 6. Chemical composition (wt%) and tensile properties of the Union Oil amine converter (course 1) steel

C Mn Si S P Cr Mo V Ni Cu AI Ti Tensile properties

0.23 1.11 0.29 0.027 0.009 0.040 0.003 0.002 0.013 0.023 0.08 0.003 Yield strength 305
(N mm -2)
Ultimate tensile strength 535
(N mm-2)
Elongation (%) 29
Reduction in area (%) 48

Microhardnesses measured in the HAZ near the surface exceeded 29 HRC (Rockwell C),
and peak hardnesses of 40-48 HRC were found near the fusion line. These facts, taken with
the in-section appearance of the pre-existing cracks (straight in the H A Z near the surface and
then zigzagging through the base material at the limit of the HAZ), pointed to the cracks
initiating by hydrogen cracking and then progressing by hydrogen-induced stepwise cracking
(HISC). Tests according to a NACE standard procedure confirmed that the material was
susceptible to HISC.
The fracture ran around the HAZ of the circumferential weld at right angles to the axial
stress of 35 Nmm -2. The fact that this stress level was so low, and the crack did not change
directions to run in a direction perpendicular to the higher hoop stress, indicated very low
toughness material in the HAZ. Charpy V notch tests of the replacement course material and
the weld between the replacement course and the upper part of the tower showed the weld
metal and H A Z to have a superior notch toughness to the base material (20 J transition
temperatures: 0 C for parent plate, -51 C for weld metal, - 4 0 C for HAZ). Fracture
toughness tests measuring crack tip opening displacement (CTOD) in the H A Z material gave
much greater critical CTOD values than the applied CTOD in the tower at the time of
failure, estimated ignoring any residual stresses as 0.064 mm. Tests on hydrogen-charged
specimens did, however, reveal much reduced CTOD fracture toughness values in the range
of approximately 0.070-0.080 mm at 38 C.
 Six case histories of pressure vessel failures 169

I~ 2.6m

MEAinlet ,==~ Course 6

Course 6

Course 5
Course 5

Course 4
Course 4
16m
Course 3
Course 3

Field
replacement ==~
Propane ==~
| m
inlet
Course 1 Course 1
I'

MEA outlet

Fig. 9. Amine absorber tower and position of rupture.

A later fracture mechanics assessment [2] of the tower found that, when residual stresses
were taken into account, failure was predicted at the level of C T O D measured in non-
hydrogen-charged specimens. This case has also been used to illustrate the application of BSI
PD6493:1991 [15] fitness-for-purpose assessment procedures [14], highlighting the importance
of appropriate input data to such assessments.
Taking all of these findings into account, it can be concluded that this failure occurred
because the welding procedure used when replacing a section of the vessel caused the
formation of a hard microstructure in the H A Z of the weld. This hard region was susceptible
to hydrogen-assisted cracking, resulting in growth of large cracks in the vessel. The uncracked
material in the vicinity of the existing cracks had low toughness due to hydrogen embrittle-
ment, and failed at the applied C T O D in the vessel arising from the operating pressure and
residual stresses associated with the weld.
For operation in corrosive conditions, the control of weld properties is critical. Welding
procedures, particularly for field repair welds, need to be formulated to avoid the formation
of high-hardness microstructures for service in hydrogen environments. Furthermore, the
presence of welding residual stresses can make a significant contribution to the applied C T O D
at a flaw present in a structure.

Acknowledgements--The author would like to express her thanks to the Department of Trade and Industry and the
industrial members of TWI who jointly funded the work from which this review is extracted.
170 B. HAYES

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SizeweU Nuclear Power Station (1964).
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5. Anon, B W R A Bull. 7(6), 149-178 (1966).
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