Paras V Comelec
Paras V Comelec
Paras V Comelec
Facts:
Petitioner is an elected barangay chairman of Pula, Cabanatuan City in 1994. Sometime in October 1995, A petition for
his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by his constituents. Public respondent COMELEC resolved to approve the
petition and set the recall election on November 13. In view of the petitioners opposition, COMELEC deferred the
election and rescheduled it on December 16, 1995. To prevent the recall election from taking place, the petitioner filed a
petition for injunction before the RTC. The trial court issued a TRO. After conducting a summary hearing, the court
dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order. The public respondent on a resolution date January 5, 1996,
rescheduled the recall election to be held January 13, 1996. Hence, this petition for certiorari. The petitioner argues the
pursuant to Section 74b of the Local Government code: no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of
the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that
the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 1996.
Issue:
Whether or not the recall election in question is in violation to the provisions of Section 74b of the Local Government
Code.
Hxeld:
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that
every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of
the whole enactment. Paras interpretation of the law is too literal that it does not accord with the intentions of the
authors of the law. The spirit rather that the letters of a law determines its construction. Hence, it was held that the
regular local election refers to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled.
TRENT, J.:
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Hart, Miller and Natividad were accused of Gambling and Vagrancy where they all appealed.
Hart had ran gambling games in his saloon ever night one in Angeles and one in the Bario of Tacondo. He also
operated a hotel Angeles in which he did a business. He was also a proprietor He raised hogs which he sold to the Army
garrison at Camp Stotsenberg. He was also authorized to sell several hundered hectarcs of land owned by one Carrillo in
Tacondo. With the power of an attorney, he furnished the same property and paid for the 1st public school in Tacondo.
Miller had the reputation of being a gambler and that he was fined for gambling and was seen in houses of
prostitution. Miller was discharged from the Army last year. He had the position of Sergeant and received a rating as
"excellent" on being discharged. He had a partnership with one Buckered and invested P1000. The business netted him
P300 per month.
Natividad was also a gambler. During his visits to saloons, he sometimes acted as a banker. His occupancy is that
of a tailor which was sufficient enough to support his family.
The appellants, Hart, Miller, and Natividad, were arraigned in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga on a charge of vagrancy under the provision of Act No. 519, found guilty, and were
each sentenced to six months imprisonment. Hart and Miller were further sentenced to a fine
ISSUE:
Whether or not Hart, Miller and Natividad have committed the act of Vagrancy.
RULING:
It is insisted by the Attorney General (AG) that visible means of support, which are evident in the occupations of
the accused, would not be a bar to the conviction under any one of the last four (4) clauses of the said act. The AG contends
that "visible means of support" only applies to those "staying through the country".
The courts decided that the mere missing of the punctuation cannot hold bar the argument of the AG, since the
intention of the legislators was to prevent "loitering". It was stated that loitering was idling or wasting one's time. The
time spent in saloons drum shops, and gambling houses is anything but that.
The three defendants were earning a living by legitimate means in a degree of comfort higher than the average. Their sole
offense was gambling, which the legislature has yet to make a subject of penal law.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
For these reasons, the defendants are ACQUITTED, with the costs de oficio.
FACTS:
Sergio Nicolas applied for a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija and was approved in 1917. In 1943, the final proof
was approved by the Director of Lands who issued a patent in his favor, but because Sergio Nicolas died, he was
substituted by his heirs, represented by his widow. In 1947, the heirs transferred their rights to the homestead to the
defendants, with approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, and secured the issuance of a homestead
patent in their favor. In 1953, heirs of the deceased Sergio Nicolas wanted to annul the sale of a homestead and
to recover the land, together with the fruits of the land as damages.
ISSUE:
WON, the sale or transfer of right of the heirs of Sergio Nicolas over the parcel of land was valid.
HEsLD:
No. Conveyance made by the heirs of the homesteader to the Defendants do not comply with the first requirement
of Sec. 20 of the Public Lands Act that the Director of lands is satisfied from proofs submitted by the homesteader
that he could not continue with his homestead through no fault of his own, and that the conveyance must be made
with the prior or previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. Thus the conveyance made by
the heirs of Nicolas was null and void.