2. People vs.

Lacerna
G.R. No. 109250
September 25, 1997

Facts:
On September 12, 1992, Marlon Lacerna and Noriel Lacerna were aboard in a
taxi cab when the mobile patrol car of PO3 Angelito Camer and PO3 Carlito P.
Valenzuela, members of the Mobile Patrol Division of Western Police District stop them
for being so suspicious. The police officer asked permission if they can search the vehicle,
and the occupants answered yes. When the police officer went searching they found in
the occupants luggage a knapsack and a dark blue plastic bag. When the police officer
asked what is the content of the plastic bag, Noriel Lacerna immediately answered that it
contains his vomit. Sceptical to Noriel Lacernas answer, PO3 Valenzuela made a small
hole and peeped inside and saw several bricks wrapped in a newspaper. Officer
Valenzuela took a brick and when he opened it, it turned out to be Marijuana, a prohibited
drug.

Issue:
Whether or not the bricks of Marijuana be admissible in the court and use as
evidence against the accused

Held:
Yes, the constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable searches and
seizure are not violated and the evidences are obtained legally and the evidence does
not constitute as fruit of a poisonous tree. The accused allowed to be searched when
he gave the consent to be search to the police officers. It was his consent which validated
the search, waiver being a generally recognized exception to the rule against warrantless
search. The marijuana bricks were, therefore, obtained legally through a valid search and
seizure. They were admissible in evidence.

3. People v. Gonzales / G.R. No. 80762 / March 19, 1990

FACTS: Fausta Gonzales, Augusto Gonzales, Custodio Gonzales Sr., Custodio
Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales and Rogelio Lanida were all found guilty of murder for
killing Lloyd Peacerrada. All of them except for Custodio Sr. withdrew their appeal. The
decision of the trial court was based on the testimony of witness Jose Huntoria. Huntoria
said that appellant was also one of the attackers of the deceased. Appellant maintained
that he was asleep at the moment. The trial court and the Court of Appeals rejected
appellants defense of alibi.

ISSUE: Whether appellant was guilty.

RULING: The Supreme Court found Huntoria to be an unreliable witness. Huntoria

admitted during cross-examination that he cannot determine the group of people stabbing
the deceased. He failed to point definitely that appellant also did the crime. As stated in
Arts. 3 and 4 of the Revised Penal Code, for one to be criminally liable, an act should be
committed. The SC found no sufficient proof that appellant has acted. Lastly, the SC found
Huntoria was an interested witness as he was also the tenant of the deceased. His
testimony was sought to ingratiate himself with the deceased s family. The SC found
appellant s guilt not proven by reasonable doubt thus acquitting him.

4. 001. US v. PABLO G.R. No. L-11676

FACTS:
Andres Pablo, a policeman of the municipality of Balanga, was ordered by his chief to
raid a jueteng game. When he arrived at the reported gambling den, the players had
already run away. He saw two men leave the lot: Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo.
The three men were subsequently arrested. The memorandum submitted by Pablo was
used as evidence against them. - However, during trial, Pablo denied under oath that he
had seen Malicsi and Rodrigo run away. - Apparently, before trial, Pablo was paid P15
not to testify against Malicsi and Rodrigo. - Pablo was later on charged with perjury. He
was convicted thereof.

Issue: Given that the Administrative Code does not provide for any penalty against the
crime of perjury, should it go unpunished?

Held: NO. Act No. 1697 did not expressly repeal the articles of the penal code relating
to false testimony. Since the Administrative Code, in totally repealing Act No. 1697,
does not explicitly provide that the mentioned articles of the Penal Code are also
repealed, the Penal Code provisions are deemed to be in force. The Court thus
convicted Pablo of false testimony with the aggravating circumstance of bribery.

5. GR No. L-46228
People of the Philippines vs Hon. Rolando R. Villaraza (City Judge of CDO) and Caesar
Puerto
January 17, 1978

FACTS:
Respondent Caesar Puerto is charged with estafa (swindling) on December 3, 1975
under Art 315 of the RPC, for issuing two bouncing checks for the total sum of
Php4966.63 on October 16, 1974.
Respondent City Trial Court Judge Rolando Villaraza, noting that the accused had
waived his second stage of preliminary investigation, issued an order dated March 31,
1976 for the elevation of the case to the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental,
Cagayan De Oro City Branch 8.
On April 21, 1977, respondent Judge Villaraza, in disagreement with the Court of First
Instances ruling in returning the case to the city court, issued another order directing its
re-elevation, arguing that the Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction over the
case, as it is punishable by prision mayor medium, under Presidential Decree No. 818
which took effect on October 22, 1975 and which amended article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not City Trial Court Judge Villaraza erred in elevating the case to the Court
of First Instance, arguing that the estafa case at bar is punishable with prision mayor
medium, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 818 (which took effect on October 22,
1975) under amended Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
RULING:
Yes, City Trial Court Judge Villaraza erred in the elevating the case to the Court of First
Instance, citing Presidential Decree No. 818 which amended Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code thereby increasing the penalty of estafa to prision mayor medium from
previous punishment of prision correccional. The accused Caesar Puerto commited the
act of estafa (swindling) on October 16, 1974, while the amended law only applies to
similar cases committed on or after October 22, 1975. The Supreme Court explicitly
stated that to apply this amended law retroactively, making it an ex post facto law, is
prohibited by Articles 21 and 22 of the Revised Penal Code, and section 12, Article IV of
the Constitution (1973).

6. People v. Sindiong / GR No. L-335 / February 12, 1947

FACTS: Geronima Sindiong de Pastor and Santos T. Pastor were charged of violating
Secti ons 1458 and 1459 of the Revised Administrative Code. They deliberately evaded
p aying the percentage tax while being owners of Magazine Center , an establishment d
evoted to selling of newspapers from 1936 to1938. Sindiong said that the laws accused
to him were repealed by Commonwealth Act (C A) No. 466 and CA No. 503 which were
in force in 1939. The new law provides that Sindiong s business does not require paying
taxes.
ISSUE: Whether defendants are guilty even if the law charged against them has be en
repealed and not reenacted.
RULING: The Supreme Court pointed out that upon the enactment of the National
Internal R evenue Code (CA 466, 503), the defendants were ceased to be bound in
paying taxe s. The SC cited doctrines in other cases in which courts can be deprived of
jurisdi ction if the new law fails to penalize the offenses in the repealed law. Because
CA 466 and CA503 fails to penalize defendants, the SC affirmed their petition.

7. US vs. SWEET
GR No. 448
9/20/1901

Facts:
Sweet was employed by the United States military who committed an offense against a
POW. His case is filed with the Court of First Instance (CFI), who is given original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases for which a penalty of more than 6 months is imposed.
He is now contending that the courts are without jurisdiction because he was acting in
the line of duty.

Issues
Whether or not the military character sustained by the person charged with the offence
at the time of its commission exempts him from the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil
tribunals?

Held
No.

Ratio
The application of the general principle that the jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is
unaffected by the military or other special character brought before them for trial (R.A.
No. 7055). Appellant claims that the act was service connected. If this were true, it may
be used as a defense but this cannot affect the right of the Civil Court to takes
jurisdiction of the case.

8. US v. Antonio Abad Santos

36 Phil 243 gr no 12262;

FACTS:
Abad Santos, the appellant was charged of violating the provision in Internal Revenue
Law which states that it shall keep a day book in which one should enter in detail the
amount of money received in the conduct of the business (Circular No. 467 issued by
collector of Internal Revenue). Violation of any provisions of IRL or any lawful regulation
of BIR is stated in Sec 185 of RA 2339 (Sec 227 of Admin Code)
The appellant owns a printing establishment called The Excelsior therefore is bound to
the circular that was issued. It was charged in the information that it failed to make an
entry for Jan 5 1915 and therefore violated the said regulation.
Appellant employed a bookkeeper that is said to be in-charge of the book.

ISSUE:
Won the appellant is guilty of violating the Internal Revenue Law.
HELD:
No. The appellant must be acquitted. It is clear that the appellant had employed a
bookkeeper to be in-charge, and he took no part in keeping the book in question.
Therefore, the appellant knew nothing. Penal Statutes are to be strictly construed and
courts will not hold a person criminally responsible for the acts of another, committed
without his knowledge or consent, unless there is a statute requiring it.

9. Gonzalez et al. vs. Gen. Abaya

G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006.

FACTS:

On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers of the AFP entered Oakwood
 Premier Luxury Apartments in Makati City, where they disarmed the guards and planted
explosives around the building. They then declared their withdrawal of support from
their Commander-in-Chief and demanded that she resign as President.
After much negotiation, the group finally laid down their arms. Subsequently, an
Information for coup detat was filed against them with the RTC, at the same time that
they were tried at court martial for conduct unbecoming an officer. They question the
jurisdiction of the court martial, contending that the RTC ordered that their act was not
service-connected and that their violation of Art. 96 of the Articles of War (RA 7055) was
absorbed by the crime of coup detat.

ISSUE:

o Whether the act complained of was service-connected and therefore cognizable

by court martial or absorbed by the crime of coup d'etat cognizable by regular
courts

RULING:

The military justice system is disciplinary in nature, aimed at achieving the highest form
of discipline in order to ensure the highest degree of military efficiency. Military law is
established not merely to enforce discipline in times of war, but also to preserve the
tranquility and security of the State in times of war, but also to preserve the tranquility
and security of the State in time of peace; for there is nothing more dangerous to the
public peace and safety than a licentious and undisciplined military body.

The Court held that the offense is service-connected. Such violation allegedly caused
dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on
their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the
service-connected nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same
dismissal from the service imposable only by the military court. Such penalty is purely
disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits
and to preserve the stringent standard of military discipline.

10. THE UNITED STATES VS. LOOK CHAW

GR No. L-5887
December 16, 1910

FACTS: Defendant Chaw was found in possession of two sacks of opium on board the
steamship Errol of English Nationality departed in Hongkong bound for Mexico, via the
call ports of Manila and Cebu. He stated, freely and voluntarily that the contraband
belonged to him but prayed for the dismissal of the case on the grounds that the court
has no jurisdiction to try the same and facts therein did not constitute a crime. The court
of First Instance of Cebu ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction in as much as the crime
had been committed within its district, on the wharf of Cebu. Hence, the defendant
appealed to Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the courts of the Philippineshave jurisdiction to try unlawful
possession of opium on a foreign vessel and unlawful sale of opium on Philippine soil.

RULING: The court ruled that on the account of foreign vessel being an extension of its
own nationality, mere possession of thing of prohibited use in Philippine Islands does
not constitute a crime and therefore not triable by the courts in the Philippines.
However, in the case at bar, the can of opium landed from the vessel upon Philippine
soil is an open violation of the laws of the land, and therefore as it is a violation of the
penal law in force at the place of commission of the crime, only the court established in
the said place had competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an
international treaty. Therefore, imprisonment and fine were reduced from 5 years to six
months and 10,000 to 1,000 respectively. Other aspects were affirmed in toto with the
cost of this instance against the appellant.

11. JACINTO v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 162540
July 13, 2009

Doctrine: The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed
would be an offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with
evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the
means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual
FACTS: Petitioner Jacinto was an employee of Megafoam International, received a
check amounting to Pho 10, 000 as payment of Baby Aquino to her purchase to
Megafoam. However, instead of delivering it to Megafoam, she deposited it to her
account. The check was later discovered to be unfunded. Both RTC and CA ruled that
the petitioner was guilty of qualified theft. Petitioner filed a petition for review of certiorari
to SC.

ISSUE: WON petitioner is correctly convicted for the crime of Qualified Theft.

RULING: NO. Petitioner is guilty of committing an impossible crime of theft only. ,

The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an
offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3)
that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either
inadequate or ineffectual.

Petitioners evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check
meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for
the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which
was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the
check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime
from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be
absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam
had received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check.

Petition granted. Decision is MODIFIED. Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is

found GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six
(6) months of arrresto mayor, and to pay the costs.

12. G.R. No. L-30001 June 23, 1970

Director of Prisons vs. Ang Cho Kio

Facts:

Ang Cho Kio was convicted of various offenses and was granted conditional pardon in
1959. He was never to return to the Philippines. In violation of his pardon, he returned in
1966 under the name "Ang Ming Huy". However, he was identified by an inspector of
the Immigration Bureau. Thus, he was arrested. The Executive Secretary, by authority
of the President, ordered him recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of
the sentence that were imposed on him, for having violated the conditioned of his
pardon.

He filed a petition for habeas corpus which the CFI of Rizal denied. The CA affirmed the
decision but made a recommendation that Ang may be allowed to leave the country on
the first available transportation abroad.

Issues:

1. Was the CA decision was proper?

2. Can the CA make recommendations?

Held:

1. No. The case before the CA was for habeas corpus. The only question to be resolved
by the CA was whether, or not, the CFI of Rizal, had rightly dismissed the petition of
Ang Cho Kio for habeas corpus. The CA was not called upon to review any sentence
imposed upon Ang Cho Kio. The sentence against him had long become final, and, in
fact, he was pardoned. The majority opinion should have been limited to the affirmance
of the decision of the lower court, and no more.
2. The recommendatory power of the courts in this jurisdiction are limited to those
expressly provided in the law. Certainly, the recommendation in the majority opinion of
the special division of the CA, now in question, is not authorized under the aforequoted
provision of Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code. The CA was not called upon to review
any sentence that was imposed on Ang Cho Kio. It was simply called upon to determine
whether Ang Cho Kio was illegally confined, or not, in the insular penitentiary under the
Director of Prisons.

14. PEOPLE v. DOMINGO

March 2, 2009 (G.R. No. 184343)

FACTS:
The Court of Appeals found appellant Jesus Domingo guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of murder, attempted murder, frustrated murder, and frustrated homicide.
On or about the 29th day of March 2000, complainant and her children were sleeping
inside their house when Domingo when she was awakened when the accused entered
their kitchen armed with a screwdriver and a kitchen knife. He stabbed the complainant
and her children. Raquel Indon, complainant, pleaded the appellant to spare her
daughter but the appellant answered Ngayon pa, nagawa ko na. Two of her children
died.
Five years passed, the defense counsel said that nine days prior the commission of the
crime, appellant suffered sleeplessness, lack of appetite, and nervousness.
Occasionally, a voice would tell him to kill. Appellant averred that when he regained his
memory, one week had already passed since the incidents, and he was already
detained. They submitted a psychiatric evaluation, and psychological examination as
evidence that appellant suffered from Schizophrenia, a mental disorder characterized by
the presence of delusions and or hallucinations, disorganized speech and behavior,
poor impulse control and low frustration tolerance. The doctor could not find out when
the appellant started to suffer this illness, but the symptoms of Schizophrenia which
were manifested by the patient indicated that he suffered from the illness six months
before the Center examined the appellant. The counsel of the appellant raised the
defense of insanity of the appellant.

ISSUE: WON the appellant is exempt from criminal liability on the ground of insanity.

HELD:
No, the defense of insanity is unmeritorious. Insanity exempts the accused only when
the finding of mental disorder refers to appellants state of mind immediately before or at
the very moment of the commission of the crime. This was not the case in the issue at
bar, what was presented was proof of appellants mental disorder that existed five years
after the incident, but not at the time the crimes were committed. The RTC also
considered it crucial that appellant had the presence of mind to respond to Raquel
Indons pleas that her daughters be spared by saying, Ngayon pa, nagawa ko na.
Even assuming that nine days prior the crime the appellant was hearing voices ordering
him to kill people, while suggestive of an abnormal mental condition, cannot be equated
with a total deprivation of will or an absence of the power to discern. Mere abnormality
of mental faculties will not exclude imputability.
The law presumes every man to be of sound mind. Otherwise stated, the law presumes
that all acts are voluntary, and that it is improper to presume that acts are done
unconsciously. Thus, a person accused of a crime who pleads the exempting
circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that he or
she was insane immediately before or at the moment the crime was committed.
____________________________________________________________________

15. CABUSLAY v. PEOPLE

gr no. 129875
sept. 30, 2005

FACTS:
SPO2 Jovito Cabuslay, accused, was found guilty of homicide while the three other policemen
were acquitted as per Information from Sandiganbayan dated June 25, 1997.
Prosecution:
At around 8:30 a.m. of August 4, 1992, Zaragosa, a refrigeration technician helper was conversing
with Felix Lauriana near a school building in Lapayan, Lanao del Norte when a Hammer truck
parked in front of them. 4 policemen alighted followed by the driver and thereafter the police
halted the collector who was riding a motorcycle named Paquito Umas-as, the victim. The police
asked the collector to show his I.D then when the collector took out his I.D and reached the front
man, one of the policemen, who Zaragosa later identified as Cabuslay opened fire at Paquito whose
right hand was raised while the four other policemen had their firearm pointed at the collector.
Petitioner consumed the entire magazine of his M-16 armalite. Collector fell on the ground and
was placed by police on board a vehicle and brought him to Kolambugan while the other policeman
rode on the motorcycle of the deceased and headed to Kolambugan.
August 10, 1992, Brgy Capt. Pedro P. Legaspi ordered an NBI forensic chemist to examine body
of the victim to determine presence of gunpowder nitrate. But it yielded negative result as the
substance would be lost within 72-hour period on the average. However, accdg to the post-mortem
exam of Dr. Uy, the victims body had already been cleaned and embalmed. There were 8 gunshot
wounds each was fatal.

Defense:
Police Supt. Julunier A. Jubail, Provincial Director of the PNP Lanao del Norte Command stated
that he had received a reliable intelligence report of a plot of assassinate the Mayor and V. Mayor
of Lanao del Norte and Gov. Abalos and his family. In response to this, he dispatched a team of
PNP Personnel to conduct mobile checkpoints along national highways headed by Sr. Insp. Celso
Regencia w/ SPO4 Canoy, SPO22 Cabuslay, C2CC Montebon, and C2C Cane.
At about 8:30 in the morning, a man riding a motorcycle approached the checkpoint. Regencia
signalled the motorcycle to stop at the right side of the road and was asked for his I.D.but the rider
pulled out a gun and Regencia heard a shot, his thighs went numb, and later found out that the
motorcycle rider was shot by Cabuslay. The victim was identified as Paquito Umas-as who was
still alive when loaded in the Hummer but was pronounced dead on arrival by Dr. Caga.
Cabuslay testified that he saw the victim shoot Celso which prompted him to shoot the rider in his
belief that he was the next target.
Sandiganbayan: gave credence to the version of the prosecution as the testimony of Zaragosa was
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and consistent. It was observed that no proof was
adduced to show that Zaragosa was moved by some evil motive to falsely testify against petitioner.

ISSUE: Does the Sandiganbayan erred in not crediting the petition of self-defense or defense of a
stranger ir the lawful exercise of a right or office.
HELD:
Accdg to SC, the one who invoked self-defense admits responsibility for the killing. The burden
of proof shifts to the accused who must then prove the justifying circumstance.
(1) Unlawful aggression - there was no peril, ergo, there was no unlawful aggression as accdg to
petitioners testimony, Paquito could not have seen the Hummer jeep, sure from Paquitos
perspective, if he cannot see the hummer which is fairly large vehicle, then he could not have
seen petitioner as well. He could not have possibly shoot petitioner from that position.

Also, the claim of defense that Regencia was shot by the victim was untenable. It is contrary to
ordinary human experience that a man with only his handgun dared challenge 5 policemen, four
of them in full battlegear. Medical certificate of Regencia has no probative value as the physician
who signed the same never presented as witness for the defense,
The gun was also unclearly identified which is a vital evidence to establish this requisite.
(2) Reasonable necessity employed - failed. The law requires rational equivalence. The nature and
number of wounds suffered by Paquito negate any claim of self-defense or defense of a stranger.
8 gunshot wounds were inflicted on the bidy of the victim. One hsot to immobilize him would
have been enough. He was the one who switched the armalite to automatic.
(3) Lawful performance petitioner has not sufficiently proven that the victim had indeed fired at
Regencia. In People v. de la Cruz, Performance of duties does not include murderMurder is
never justified, regardless of the victim.
AFFIRMED HOMICIDE.

16. PEOPLE vs. PAGAL

Gr L-32040,
October 25, 1977
Topic: Sufficient provocation or threat

FACTS: Pedro Pagal and Jose Torcelino were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide,
with 4 generic aggravating circumstances. They stole the amount of P1,281.00 and killed
Gaugan, their then employer, by stabbing him with an ice pick and clubbing him with an iron
pipe. During the arraignment, the counsel for the accused informed the court of their intention to
plead guilty, provided that they be allowed afterwards to prove the mitigating circumstances of
sufficient provocation on the part of the victim immediately preceding the act, and that of having
acted upon an impulse so powerful as to produce passion and obfuscation. The judge asked if
that is truly what the accused wanted to do, and the accused agreed. The accused were arraigned
and both pleaded guilty. The accused were then allowed to present their evidence, which were
claims of maltreatment/ill-treatment by the deceased. After they rested their case, the prosecution
presented the statements of the accused and other pertinent documents. After considering the
aggravating circumstances, and accepting only the mitigating circumstance of pleading guilty,
the court rendered its decision finding both accused GUILTY, and sentenced to death. The case
was elevated to the SC for mandatory review on account of the death penalty imposed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstances of
sufficient provocation, and passion or obfuscation as claimed via evidence by the accused.

HELD: No. The trial court found the appellants contention devoid of merit. First, mitigating
circumstances presented can only be counted as one, because they arose from the same incident.
Second, the circumstance of passion and obfuscation cannot be mitigating in a crime which is
planned and calmly meditated before its execution. Third, The maltreatment that appellants claim
the victim to have committed against them occurred much earlier than the date of the
commission of the crime. Provocation, in order to be a mitigating circumstance must be
sufficient and immediately preceding the act. [When the accused pleaded guilty to the charge, he
is deemed to have admitted all the material facts alleged in the information. A plea of guilty
when formally entered on arraignment, is sufficient to sustain a conviction even for a capital
offense without the introduction of further evidence. ] (optional, not necessary to the topic, just
an FYI) After reviewing the case, the court held that there was only one generic aggravating
circumstance, instead of four, and this was then offset by the only accepted mitigating
circumstance of the guilty plea. Through this, the appellants were each imposed upon with the
lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.

17. People v. Tadeo (G.R. Nos. 127660 & 144011-12)

Facts:

Michael Tadeo was charged of 3 distinct and separate crimes of 1) murder for the
fatal shooting of Mayolito Cabatu, 2) frustrated murder for the injury sustained by
Florencia, and 3) qualified illegal possession of firearm, same firearm having been used
in the two (2) formerly mentioned crimes.

After trial, the court a quo convicted Tadeo of the crimes charged and sentenced
him to reclusion perpetua for murder; an indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, ten (10) months and
twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal as maximum, for frustrated murder; reclusion
perpetua for qualified illegal possession of firearms.
 Tadeo appealed not to challenge the finding of the trial court that he killed Mayolito
Cabatu and injured his mother Florencia Cabatu, nor that he was the possessor of the
.38 cal. revolver, but questions among others his conviction of the crime of illegal
possession of firearms despite the absence of any evidence indicating that the gun he
used was unlicensed.

The Solicitor General agrees with Tadeo that his verdict in the qualified illegal
possession of firearm is incorrect hence must be reversed and set aside.

Issue:

Whether or not the conviction for qualified illegal possession of firearms is proper?

Decision:

The conviction of Tadeo in the case for qualified illegal possession firearm used in
perpetrating the homicide and attempted homicide must be reversed and set aside, as a
result of the decriminalization of violations of PD 1866 by RA 8294 where the unlicensed
firearm is used in carrying out the commission of other crimes. These amendments
obviously blur the distinctions between murder and homicide on one hand, and qualified
illegal possession of firearms used in murder or homicide on the other. We have declared
that the formulation in RA 8294, i.e., "[i]f homicide or murder is committed with the use of
an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance," signifies a legislative intent to treat as a single offense the
illegal possession of firearms and the commission of murder or homicide with the use of
an unlicensed firearm. Thus where an accused used an unlicensed firearm in committing
homicide or murder, he may no longer be charged with what used to be the two (2)
separate offenses of homicide or murder under The Revised Penal Code and qualified
illegal possession of firearms used in homicide or murder under PD 1866; in other words,
where murder or homicide was committed, the penalty for illegal possession of firearms
is no longer imposable since it becomes merely a special aggravating circumstance.
 The use of an unlicensed firearm cannot be considered however as a special
aggravating circumstance in the Murder Case and Frustrated Murder Case. For one, it
was not alleged as an aggravating circumstance in the Informations for murder and
frustrated murder, which is necessary under our present Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Moreover, even if alleged, the circumstance cannot be retroactively applied
to prejudice accused-appellant; it must be stressed that RA 8294 took effect only on 6
July 1994 while the crimes involved herein were committed on 4 November 1993. In any
event there is no evidence proving the illicit character of the .38 cal. revolver used by
accused-appellant in killing Mayolito Cabatu and in trying to kill Florencia Cabatu, as to
which requisite of the crime the record is eerily silent.