IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,

IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA

CIVIL DIVISION

HSBC BANK, USA, NATIONAL ASSOCATION, CASE NO. 52-2009-CA-005696-WS

AS TRUSTEE FOR THE ACE SECURITIES
CORPORATION HOME EQUITY LOAN TRUST,
SERIES 2005-AG1, ASSET BACKED PASS-
THROUGH CERTIFICATES

                            Plaintiff,

 
v.                                            
                                                                                        
ANNABEL E. MONTGOMERY, et al,
 
                            Defendant(s).
_________________________________________/

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF CHRISTOPHER SPRADLING

AND FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

COMES NOW, the Defendant ANNABEL E. MONTGOMERY (hereinafter

“Defendant”), by and through the undersigned counsel MATTHEW D. WEIDNER, and

respectfully MOTIONS THIS COURT TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF CHRISTOPHER

SPADLING AND FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS, pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. Pro. 1.510,

and in support thereof states as follows:

FACTS

1. This is an action for foreclosure of real property owned by the Defendant.

2. The named plaintiff in this case is HSBC BANK, USA, NATIONAL ASSOCATION, AS

TRUSTEE FOR THE ACE SECURITIES CORPORATION HOME EQUITY TRUST, SERIES

2005-AG1, ASSET BACKED PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATE (hereinafter “Plaintiff”).

3. On February 2, 2010 Plaintiff, by and through its counsel Florida Default Law Group,

P.L. (hereinafter “Florida Default Law Group”), gave Notice of Filing of Affidavit as to Amounts
Due and Owing and the accompanying Affidavit (hereinafter “Affidavit”).

4. The Affiant of the above-mention Affidavit was identified as CHRISTOPHER

SPRADLING (hereinafter “Spradling”). Spradling identified himself as a “Foreclosure

Manager” for LITTON LOAN SERVICING, LP (hereinafter “Litton”). Litton, in turn, was

identified as “the servicer of the loan…[Litton] is responsible for the collection of this loan

transaction and pursuit of any delinquency in payments.”1

5. Spradling, based upon his personal knowledge, averred in the Affidavit that: (1) the

Plaintiff or its assigns was owed a total of $408,809.30; (2) the Plaintiff was entitled to enforce

the Note and Mortgage; and (3) Plaintiff was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 2 The

Affidavit does not contain any mention as to who owes the Plaintiff the sum alleged save for one

sentences line which cryptically state “[s]pecifically, I have personal knowledge of the facts

regarding the sums which are due and owing to Plaintiff or its assigns pursuant to the Note and

Mortgage which is the subject matter of the lawsuit” and a second which states “I am familiar

with the books of account…concerning the transactions alleged in the Complaint.” 3 Emphasis

added.

6. Nowhere in the Affidavit was either Litton or Spradling identified as either the Plaintiff

or the Plaintiff’s authorized agent.

7. Upon information and belief, Litton is simply a “middleman” of sorts who is responsible

for the transfer of funds between the various assignees of the underlying Mortgage and Note and

has no knowledge of the underlying transactions between the Plaintiff and Defendant.

8. Upon information and belief, Spradling, as employee of Litton and not the Plaintiff, has

1 See Affidavit As to Amounts Due and Owing, pg. 1.

2 Id, pgs. 1, 2.

3 Id.
no knowledge of the underlying transactions between the Plaintiff and Defendant.

LEGAL REASONING IN SUPPORT OF MOTION

I. Plaintiff Failed to Attach Documents Referred to in the Affidavit

a. Failure to Attach Documents Violates Fla. Stat. §90.901 (1989)

Florida Statue §90.901 (1989) states, in pertinent part, that “[a]uthentication or

identification of evidence is required as a condition precedent to its admissibility.” The failure to

authenticate documents referred to in affidavits renders the affiant incompetent to testify as to the

matters referred to in the affidavit. See Fla. R. Civ. Pro. 1.510(e) (which reads, in pertinent part,

that “affidavits…shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters

stated therein”); Zoda v. Hedden, 596 So. 2d 1225, 1226 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (holding, in part,

that failure to attach certified copies of public records rendered affiant, who was not a custodian

of said records, incompetent to testify to the matters stated in his affidavit as affiant was unable

to authenticate the documents referred to therein.)

Here, Spradling affirmatively states in the Affidavit that he is “familiar with the books of

account and have examined all books, records, and documents kept by LITTON LOAN

SERVICING, LP concerning the transactions alleged in the Complaint.” 4 Furthermore,

Spradling averred that the “Plaintiff or its assigns, is owed…$408,809.30.” 5 Nevertheless,

Spradling has failed to attach any of the books, records or documents referred to in the Affidavit.

In addition, Spradling does not meet the definition of “custodian,” which is “a person or

institution that has charge or custody (of…papers).” See Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed. 2004,

custodian. By Spradling’s own admission “[t]he books, records, and documents which

[Spradling] has examined are managed by employees or agents whose duty it is to keep the

4 See Affidavit As to Amounts Due and Owing, pg. 1.

5 Id, pg. 2.
books accurately and completely.”6 Emphasis added. Thus, Spradling has only examined the

books, records, and documents which he refers to in the Affidavit while the true custodians of

these documents are the employees or agents whose duty it is to keep the books accurately and

completely. In essence, Spradling averred to records which he did not submit nor could he

testify for the authenticity of just as the affiant in Zoda did.

Spradling’s failure to attach the documents referred to in the Affidavit without being

custodian of same is a violation of the authentication rule promulgated in Fla. Stat. §90.901

(1989), which renders him incompetent to testify to the matters stated therein as the Second

District in Zoda held. Therefore, the Affidavit should be struck in whole.

b. Failure to Attach Documents Violates Fla. R. Civ. Pro. 1.510(e)

Fla. R. Civ. Pro. 1.510(e) provides, in part, that “[s]worn or certified copies of all papers

or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.” Failure

to attach such papers is grounds for reversal of summary judgment decisions. See CSX Transp.,

Inc. v. Pasco County, 660 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (reversing summary judgment granted

below where the affiant based statements on reports but failed to attach same to the affidavit.)

As previously demonstrated, Spradling referred to books, records, and documents kept by

Litton which allegedly concerned the transaction referred to in the Complaint against the

Defendant. Nevertheless, as previously demonstrated, Spradling has not attached any of these

books, records or documents. This failure to do so is a violation of Fla. R. Civ. Pro. 1.510(e) and

is grounds for a reversal of a summary judgment decision in favor of the Plaintiff. Therefore, the

Affidavit should be struck in whole.

II. Affidavit Was Not Based Upon Spradling’s Personal Knowledge

As a threshold matter, the admissibility of an affidavit rests upon the affiant having

6 See Affidavit As to Amounts Due and Owing, pg. 1.

personal knowledge as to the matters stated therein. See Fla. R. Civ. Pro. 1.510(e) (reading, in

pertinent part, that “affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge”); Enterprise Leasing Co. v.

Demartino, 15 So. 3d 711 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); West Edge II v. Kunderas, 910 So. 2d 953 (Fla.

2d DCA 2005); In re Forefeiture of 1998 Ford Pickup, Identification No.

1FTZX1767WNA34547, 779 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Additionally, a corporate officer’s

affidavit which merely states conclusions or opinion is not sufficient, even if it is based on

personal knowledge. Nour v. All State Supply Co., So. 2d 1204, 1205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).

The Third District, in Alvarez v. Florida Ins. Guaranty Association, 661 So. 2d 1230 (Fla.

3d DCA 1995), noted that “the purpose of the personal knowledge requirement is to prevent the

trial court from relying on hearsay when ruling on a motion for summary judgment and to ensure

that there is an admissible evidentiary basis for the case rather than mere supposition or belief.” 

Id at 1232 (quoting Pawlik v. Barnett Bank of Columbia County, 528 So. 2d 965, 966 (Fla. 1st

DCA 1988)). This opposition to hearsay evidence has deep roots in Florida common law. In

Capello v. Flea Market U.S.A., Inc., 625 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), the Third District

affirmed an order of summary judgment in favor of Flea Market U.S.A as Capello’s affidavit in

opposition was not based upon personal knowledge and therefore contained inadmissible hearsay

evidence. See also Doss v. Steger & Steger, P.A., 613 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Mullan v.

Bishop of Diocese of Orlando, 540 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); Crosby v. Paxson Electric

Company, 534 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Page v. Stanley, 226 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 4th DCA

1969). Thus, there is ample precedent for striking affidavits in full which are not based upon the

affiant’s personal knowledge.

Here, the entire Affidavit is hearsay evidence as Spradling has absolutely no personal

knowledge of the facts stated therein. As an employee of Litton, which purports to be the
servicer of the loan, he has no knowledge of the underlying transaction between the Plaintiff and

the Defendant. Neither Spradling nor Litton: (1) were engaged by the Plaintiff for the purpose of

executing the underlying mortgage transaction with the Defendant; or (2) had any contact with

the Defendant with respect to the underlying transaction between the Plaintiff and Defendant. In

addition, the Affidavit fails to set forth with any degree of specificity what duties Litton performs

for the Plaintiff, save for one line which states that Litton “is responsible for the collection of this

loan transaction and pursuit of any delinquency in payments.”7 At best, Litton acted as a

middleman of sorts, whose primary function was to transfer of funds between the various

assignees of the underlying Mortgage and Note. Litton is not the named Plaintiff in this case,

nor does the Affidavit aver that either Spradling or Litton is the agent of the Plaintiff.

Because Spradling has no personal knowledge of the underlying transaction between the

Plaintiff and Defendant, any statement he gives which references this underlying transaction

(such as the fact that the Plaintiff is allegedly owed sums of monies in excess of $400,000) is, by

its very nature, hearsay. The Florida Rules of Evidence define hearsay as “a statement, other

than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to

prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Fla. Stat. §90.801(1)(c) (2007). Here Spradling is

averring to a statement (that the Plaintiff is allegedly owed sums of money) which was made by

someone other than himself (namely, the Plaintiff) and is offering this as proof of the matter

asserted (that Plaintiff is entitled to enforce the Note and Mortgage and that Plaintiff is entitled to

a judgment as a matter of law.) At best, the only statements which Spradling can aver to are

those which regard the transfer of funds between the various assignees of the Mortgage and

Note.

The Plaintiff may argue that while Spradling’s statements may be hearsay, they should

7 See Affidavit As to Amounts Due and Owing, pg. 1.

nevertheless be admitted under the “Records of Regularly Conducted Business Activity”

exception. Fla. Stat. §90.803(6) (2007). This rule provides that notwithstanding the provision of

§90.802 (which renders hearsay statements inadmissible), hearsay statements are not

inadmissible, even though the declarant is available as a witness, if the statement is

[a] memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events,
conditions, opinion, or diagnosis, made at or near the time by, or from information
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity and if it was the regular practice of that business
activity to make such memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as
shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, or as shown
by a certification or declaration that complies with paragraph (c) and s.
90.902(11), unless the sources of information or other circumstances show lack of
trustworthiness. Emphasis added.

There are, however, several problems with this argument. To begin, and as previously

demonstrated, no memorandums, reports, records, or data compilation have been offered by the

Plaintiff. Furthermore, the books, records, and documents referred to by Spradling in the

Affidavit (which, of course, were not attached) were kept by Litton, who cannot be a person with

knowledge as Litton does not have any personal knowledge of underlying transaction between

the Plaintiff and the Defendant. Finally, Litton, as the source of this information, shows a lack of

trustworthiness because Spradling failed to attach the books, records, and documents to the

Affidavit and because neither Litton nor Spradling have knowledge of the underlying transaction

between the Plaintiff and the Defendant.

Because Spradling’s statements in the Affidavit are not based upon personal knowledge,

they are inadmissible hearsay evidence. As no hearsay exception applies to these statements, the

Affidavit should be struck in whole.

III. Affidavit Included Impermissible Conclusions of Law Not Supported by Facts

An affidavit in support of a motion for summary judgment may not be based upon factual
conclusions or opinions of law. Jones Constr. Co. of Cent. Fla., Inc. v. Fla. Workers' Comp.

JUA, Inc., 793 So. 2d 978, 979 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Furthermore, an affidavit which states a

legal conclusion should not be relied upon unless the affidavit also recites the facts which justify

the conclusion. Acquadro v. Bergeron, 851 So. 2d 665, 672 (Fla. 2003); Rever v. Lapidus, 151

So. 2d 61, 62 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963).

Here, the Affidavit contained conclusions of law which were not supported by facts stated

therein. Specifically, Spradling averred that the Plaintiff was entitled to enforce the Note and

Mortgage and that the Plaintiff was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, two legal

conclusions, but did not support this conclusion with statements which referenced exactly who

the Plaintiff was entitled to enforce the Note and Mortgage against. In fact there is no mention of

any of the parties in question save for one cryptic line in where Spradling states that

“[s]pecifically, I have personal knowledge of the facts regarding the sums which are due and

owing to Plaintiff or its assigns pursuant to the Note and Mortgage which is the subject matter of

the lawsuit” and another which states “I am familiar with the books of account…concerning the

transactions alleged in the Complaint.”8 Nowhere in the Affidavit does Spradling state that the

Plaintiff is entitled to enforce the Note and Mortgage against the Defendant nor does Spradling

state that the Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because the Defendant owes the

Plaintiff money. At best the Affidavit accuses someone of owing the Plaintiff $408,809.30 and

that the Plaintiff should be able to enforce some Note and Mortgage against that particular

someone. By not clearly identifying the parties in question, Spradling has not adequately

supported his two legal conclusions.

Because the Affidavit contained impermissible conclusions of law which were not

supported by facts stated therein, the Affidavit should be struck in whole.

8 See Affidavit As to Amounts Due and Owing, pg. 1.

 IV. Sanction of Attorney’s Fees is Appropriate

Fla. R. Civ. Pro. 1.510(g) reads, in full, that

[i]f it appears to the satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits
presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose
of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the
other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the
affidavits caused the other party to incur, including reasonable attorneys' fees, and
any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. Emphasis
added.

The undersigned counsel has expended considerable time and resources preparing to defend

against an affidavit which has, on its face, no basis in law. Both Florida Default Law Group and

the Plaintiff both knew that Spradling’s affidavit lacked authenticity and reliability yet still chose

to file it with the Court. In addition, this is not Florida Default Law Group’s first time filing

affidavits in bad faith. Recently, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida

sanctioned both Florida Default Law Group and its client, WELLS FARGO, $95,130.45 for false

representations made in affidavits in that court as well as other bankruptcy courts in Florida. See

In re: Fazul Haque, Case No. 08-14257-BKR-JKO (Order Granting Wells Fargo, N.A.’s Motion

for Relief from Stay and Imposing Sanctions for Negligent Practice and False Representations,

Oct. 28, 2008). This is indicia of a modus operandi on Florida Default Law Group’s part to

present misrepresentations and false affidavits to the Court which make an award of attorney’s

fees and costs an appropriate sanction.

WHEREFORE, Defendant asks this Court to GRANT its MOTION TO STRIKE

AFFIDAVIT OF CHRISTOPHER SPRADLING and enter an ORDER granting ATTORNEY’S

FEES AND COSTS and any other relief the Court deems just and proper.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished by
U.S. Mail on this ____ day of February, 2010 to KATHERINE RENNINGER, KATHERINE E.

TILKA, and CHRISTINA N. RILEY, Florida Default Law Group, P.L., P.O. Box 25018, Tampa,

FL 33622-5018.

By:__________________________
MATTHEW D. WEIDNER
Attorney for Defendant
1229 Central Avenue
St. Petersburg, FL 33705
(727) 894-3159
FBN: 0185957