1. The document discusses three cases - Baking v. Director of Prisons, Manila Railroad Company v. Insular Collector of Customs, and Lao Lim v. Court of Appeals.
2. In Baking v. Director of Prisons, the court ruled that Article 97 of the RPC regarding good conduct allowance does not apply to detention prisoners, but only to those already convicted and sentenced.
3. In Manila Railroad Company v. Insular Collector of Customs, the court ruled that dust shields used on railway wagons should be classified as detached parts of vehicles for tariff purposes rather than as manufactures of wool.
4. In Lao Lim v. Court of Appeals, the court
1. The document discusses three cases - Baking v. Director of Prisons, Manila Railroad Company v. Insular Collector of Customs, and Lao Lim v. Court of Appeals.
2. In Baking v. Director of Prisons, the court ruled that Article 97 of the RPC regarding good conduct allowance does not apply to detention prisoners, but only to those already convicted and sentenced.
3. In Manila Railroad Company v. Insular Collector of Customs, the court ruled that dust shields used on railway wagons should be classified as detached parts of vehicles for tariff purposes rather than as manufactures of wool.
4. In Lao Lim v. Court of Appeals, the court
1. The document discusses three cases - Baking v. Director of Prisons, Manila Railroad Company v. Insular Collector of Customs, and Lao Lim v. Court of Appeals.
2. In Baking v. Director of Prisons, the court ruled that Article 97 of the RPC regarding good conduct allowance does not apply to detention prisoners, but only to those already convicted and sentenced.
3. In Manila Railroad Company v. Insular Collector of Customs, the court ruled that dust shields used on railway wagons should be classified as detached parts of vehicles for tariff purposes rather than as manufactures of wool.
4. In Lao Lim v. Court of Appeals, the court
1. The document discusses three cases - Baking v. Director of Prisons, Manila Railroad Company v. Insular Collector of Customs, and Lao Lim v. Court of Appeals.
2. In Baking v. Director of Prisons, the court ruled that Article 97 of the RPC regarding good conduct allowance does not apply to detention prisoners, but only to those already convicted and sentenced.
3. In Manila Railroad Company v. Insular Collector of Customs, the court ruled that dust shields used on railway wagons should be classified as detached parts of vehicles for tariff purposes rather than as manufactures of wool.
4. In Lao Lim v. Court of Appeals, the court
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BAKING V.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
FACTS: Petitioners concededly had been under detention
for more than eighteen (18) years under the charge of respondent Director of Prisons when, on May 16, 1969, this Court in its decision in People vs. Lava, et al., G.R. Nos. L-4974-5-6-7-8, convicted petitioners for the crime of rebellion and sentenced each of them to ten (10) years' imprisonment. This decision has since become final. Petitioner is claiming for allowance for good conduct as provided for by Art 97 of the RPC.
ISSUE: W/N Art 97 of the RP is applicable to detention
prisoners or prisoners who are just serving preventive imprisonment
RULING: NO.
The term "any prisoner" in the English text of Art. 97 regarding
good conduct allowance is, in the Spanish text, "el penado," who is a convict or a person already sentenced by final judgment. There is no doubt that Article 97 does not embrace detention prisoners within its reach because it speaks of the buena conducta observada por el penado - not one under "prison preventiva." The allowance for good conduct "for each month of good behavior" the nun questionably refers to good behavior of a prisoner while he is serving his term as a convict and not otherwise. Inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code was originally approved and enacted in Spanish, the Spanish text governs. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY V. INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS
FACTS: Appellee Manila Railroad Company used dust
shields made of wool on all of its railway wagons to cover the axle box which protects from the oil deposited therein which serves as lubricant of the bearings of the wheel. Under par.141 of Sec. 8 of the Tariff Law of 1909, manufactures of woo;, not otherwise provided for are subject to 40% ad valorem. On the other hand, under par.197 of same law, vehicles for use on railways and tramways, and detached parts thereof are subject to 10% ad valorem. Appellant Insular Collector of Customs classified dust shields as manufactures of wool, not otherwise provided for. Upon appeal, however, the CFI overruled the decision and classified dust shields as detached parts of vehicles for use on railways.
ISSUE: Whether or not dust shields should be classified as
manufactures of wool or as detached parts of vehicles for use on railways
RULING: Dust shields are classified for the purposes of tariff as
detached parts of vehicles under par.197. It is a general rule in the interpretation of statutes levying taxes not to extend their provisions beyond the clear import of the language used. In case of doubt, they should be construed strictly against the government and in favor of the citizen. And when there is in the same statute a particular enactment and a general one which in its comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general one must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment. LAO LIM V. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Records show that Francisco Lim, entered into a
contract of lease with Benito Dy for a period of 3 years, from 1976 to 1979. After the stipulated term expired the respondent refused to leave the premises, so Francisco Lim filed an ejectment suit against Benito Dy. This case was then taken over by a judicially approved compromise agreement which provides an automatic increase in rent of 20% every 3 years. On 1985 Dy, informed Lim of his intention to renew the lease up to 1988, Lim did not agree to the renewal. In 1987 another ejectment suit was filed by Lim after the failure of Dy to vacate the premises. It was dismissed by the RTC and later affirmed by the CA for the following reasons: (1) the stipulation in the compromise agreement which allows the lessee (Benito Dy) to stay on the premises as long as he needs it and can pay rents is valid, being a resolutory condition, and therefore beyond the ambit of art 1308 of the NCC; and (2) the compromise agreement has the effect of res judicata.
ISSUES: Was the stipulation in the compromise agreement
which allows the lessee to stay on the premises as long as he needs it and can pay rents is valid?
RULING: NO.
Since the stipulation for as long as the defendant needed the
premises and can meet and pay said increases is a purely potestative condition because it leaves the effectivity and enjoyment of leasehold rights to the sole and exclusive will of the lessee. The continuance, effectivity, and fulfillment of a contract of lease cannot be made to depend exclusively upon the free and uncontrolled choice of the lessee between continuing payment of the rentals or not, completely depriving the owner of any say in the matter. Mutuality does not obtain in such a contract of lease and no equality exists between the lessor and the lessee. The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Benito Dy is ordered to immediately vacate and return the possession of the premises and pay the monthly rentals due thereon in accordance with the compromise agreement until he shall have actually vacated the same. This Judgment is immediately executory.