5.

When case ready for trial

This case explains the situation as to when a case is ready for trial. We all know
that a case is ready for trial when the issues are joined. But how? So, here is an
example of that situation in the case of

Principe v. Eria, 90 Phil. 684, G.R. No. L-3788, January 22, 1952

Facts:

Marciano Principe filed an action against Antonio Eria for collection of sum
of money based on a promissory note signed by Eria and his son-in-law, Leoncio
Maningas, which is a joint and several obligation (I think there is no need to
explain the difference between joint liability against solidary liability, and when
the contract states “joint and several obligation” it means that it is a solidary
liability, where all the debtors undertake to pay the debt (amount plus interest),
and stated that anyone of them may be made to pay the whole amount. Contrary
to joint liability whereby each debtor is liable only for his specific portion of the
obligation).

Going back, after service of summons, defendant Eria petitioned the court to
include Maningas as a party defendant. This was objected by Principe since Eria
may be sued alone and full relief could be obtained without the inclusion of
Maningas. Thus, the trial court denied said petition. Then, defendant Eria filed an
amended answer which was admitted by order of the court. Thereafter, the clerk of
court issued a notice, setting the case for hearing on December 13, 1949.

Before the said date of hearing, Eria filed a petition for leave to file a third
party complaint, and at the same time filing said third party complaint against his
co-signer of the promissory note, Leoncio Maningas, which was granted and
admitted by the court. It likewise gave Maningas a reglrementary period to file his
answer.

However, on December 13, 1949 (the original date of scheduled hearing),

despite admission of the said third party complaint, and before Maningas’ period to
file his Answer expires, and before Maningas could file his Answer, and in the
absence of defendant Eria and his counsel, the case was tried, and the plaintiff was
allowed to present his evidence. In other words, Eria was declared in default.

Upon learning the same, Eria filed a “Manifestation” that he would petition
the court for relief from said order. Consequently, he filed his petition for new trial
contending that he believed that with the admission of the third party complaint
and the giving to third party defendant Maningas the reglementary period to file his
answer, it cancelled the original date of hearing on December 13, 1949. Thus, Eria
and counsel did not appear on the said date. This was denied by the trial court.
Reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court may try the case before the third party
defendant filed his answer.

Ruling:

No, the trial court may not try the case.

Rules of Court (Sec. 1, Rule 31) applicable that time provides, “Upon the
filing of the last pleading, the case shall be included in the trial calendar of the
court.”

Chief Justice Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. I, third edition,
p. 573. States, “The case may be said to be ready for trial and, therefore, should he
included in the trial calendar when the issue is joined. And the issue is joined when
all the parties have pleaded their respective theories and the terms of the dispute
are plain before the court.”

Here, the case was not yet ready for trial under the said provision of the
Rules of Court. On December 13, 1949, when the case was tried, the issues had
not yet been joined; all possible claims, cross-claims or counterclaims had not yet
been filed. Consequently, the trial court could not have validly ordered a separate
trial because it did not know nor was it in a position to know if the third party
defendant Maningas had any claim, cross-claim or counterclaim against either the
plaintiff Principe or the defendant Eria, or both. In other words, the trial was
altogether premature.

The trial court may had forgotten or overlooked the third party complaint against
Maningas and the fact that his answer to it was still pending submission.

Under those circumstances, if the trial court proceeds with the trial in the absence
of the defendant, the proceeding may be set aside and the case returned to the said
trial court for a re-hearing.

It is reasonable to suspect that the trial court had forgotten or completely

overlooked the third party complaint against Maningas and the fact that his answer
to it was still pending submission. Under those circumstances, if the trial court
proceeds with the trial in the absence of the defendant, the proceeding may be set
aside and the case returned to the said trial court for a re-hearing.
14. Consolidation of Civil and Criminal cases; allowed (Sec. 2 (a) Rule 111 of
1985 Criminal Procedure)

The topic is when the consolidation of Civil and Criminal cases is allowed.

Republic v. Court of Appeals, 116 SCRA 505, G.R. Nos. L-41115-6,

September 11, 1982

Facts:

Obviously, this case involves two actions, a civil case and a criminal case
originated from the same incident. The factual background of this case are as
follows:

In 1964, Isidro S. Baculio, for and on behalf of his mother, Benedicta

Macabale Salcedo, by way of verified petition before the CFI of Misamis
Oriental sitting as Cadastral Court, successfully secured a decree of
registration over Lot 1982 and subsequently an OCT was issued in his favor,
using as evidence purporting to be a 3-page decision of Judge Ricardo
Summers issued on December 19, 1940 declaring the said lot 1982 as private
land and adjudicated the same to Benedicta Macabale Salcedo.

HERE IS THE CIVIL CASE.

Upon learning the same, the Solicitor General and the City Fiscal of
Cagayan de Oro filed a petition before the CFI of Misamis Oriental to declare null
and void the said decree and OCT (OCT No. 0-257) and all transfer certificates of
title issued therefrom, alleging among others that the 3- page decision of Judge
Ricardo Summers, which was presented as evidence to the petition of Isidro S.
Baculio, is a forgery and was fraudulently procured, and the truth is that Lot No.
1982 was declared public land in a 7-page decision rendered by Judge Summers on
December 19, 1940. After trial, the CFI of Misamis Oriental, Branch IV, rendered
a decision declaring that Lot 1982 a public land, the 3-page decision of Judge
Summers fraudulent, and the order for the issuance of decree of Judge Gorospe as
null and void, and all subsequent transfers and transactions null and void.

FOR CRIMINAL CASE

A criminal information for falsification of public documents (Art. 171 of

RPC) was filed in the CFI of Misamis Oriental, against Isidro S. Baculio and
Benedicta Macabale Salcedo among others for falsifying a 3-page decision of
Judge Summers. But before judgment, Benedicta died. Thus, in the judgment
except Benedicta, all the accused including Baculio was found guilty of the crime
charged.
 Aggrieved by the decisions of the trial courts, the defendants in the civil case
and the accused in the criminal case filed separate appeals to the Court of Appeals,
and a Special Division of Five was created. The decision in the civil case was
reversed and set aside by the CA in favor of Benedicta. Thus, the OSG filed a
motion for reconsideration.

However, initial scrutiny of the appeal of said criminal case, Justice Chanco,
upon finding the civil and criminal cases related, he suggested that they be
consolidated for decision by the Special Division of Five. To this suggestion, the
parties agreed. Thus, after the necessary arrangement was made to effect the
assignment of the criminal case to the Special Division of Five and after due
hearing on both the motion for reconsideration in the civil case and the merits of
the criminal case, the two cases were submitted for decision. Thereafter, the
appellate court reversed the CFI ruling and acquitted all the accused. The Solicitor
General now aggrieved filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied.
Hence, this petition assailing the rendition of a single decision of the CA and
resolving them jointly in violation of Section 9, Article X of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in rendering a single

decision in two distinct and separate cases.

Ruling: Yes, the Court of appeals is correct.

Sec. 9, Art, X of the 1973 Constitution provides, “Every decision of a court

of record shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based.
The Rules of Court shall govern the promulgation of minute resolutions.”

Here, the Supreme Court do not find any violation by the respondent Court
of Appeals of the due process clause of the Constitution in finally disposing of the
civil and criminal cases in a single decision. For one thing, the civil case was
actually decided by the Special Division of Five. Only the motions of the
Solicitor General and the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City for
reconsideration of the said decision in the civil case were resolved together
with the criminal case in the decision. Hence, the reversal of the trial court’s
decision in Civil Case No. 2560 is based solely on the records then on hand
without considering the records of the criminal case, for respondent court (the CA
division who decided the civil case) was not even aware of the pendency of the
criminal case.

What remains to be seen, therefore, is whether or not the evidence in the civil
case was used to arrive at the judgment of acquittal and whether or not the
evidence in the criminal case was considered in the denial of the two motions
for reconsideration in the civil case. It was likewise noted that despite the
vigorous protest raised by petitioners against the rendition of a single decision,
their arguments consisted merely of generalities. They failed to point out
specifically where respondent court took and considered evidence in the civil case
in deciding the criminal case. Actually, the assailed decision (dated July 22, 1975)
was mainly a review or a recital of the evidence presented in the trial of the
criminal case and reference to the civil case was only by way of stressing certain
matters existing or common in both cases.

Actually it is consistent with the Rules of Criminal Procedure, that in case of

consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed
automatically reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of
the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the offended party in
the criminal case and of the parties to present additional evidence. The
consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.

Petitioners argument that respondent court cannot resolve the two cases
in a single decision because they were heard, tried and decided by two
different judges and evidence was offered and admitted separately in the civil
as well as criminal case. It is contended that Civil Case No. 2560 was decided by
the Hon. Bernardo Teves, Presiding Judge of Branch IV, Court of First Instance of
Misamis Oriental, while Criminal Case No. 4683 was decided by the Hon.
Eduardo de G. Montenegro, Presiding Judge of Branch III of the same court.
Supreme Court do not find any merit in this argument as this COURT HAS
CONSOLIDATED CASES TRIED SEPARATELY BY DIFFERENT
COURTS AS LONG AS THE FACTUAL AND/OR LEGAL ISSUES
INVOLVED ARE SIMILAR OR THE SAME.

In other words, or in summary, civil and criminal cases may be consolidated

as long as the factual and/ or legal issued involved are similar or the same.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

In 1964, Isidro S. Baculio, for and on behalf of his mother, Benedicta Macabale
Salcedo, filed a verified petition for issuance of a decree of registration over Lot
1982 before the CFI of Misamis Oriental presided by Judge Gorospe sitting as
Cadastral Court. He attached as evidence purporting to be a 3-page decision of
Judge Ricardo Summers issued in 1940 declaring the said lot 1982 as private land
and adjudicated the same to Benedicta Macabale Salcedo. The certified true copy
of said decision was prepared by Josefina W. Bacarrisas, the Docket Clerk of the
CFI of Misamis Oriental, who was also the custodian of pre-ward salvaged
cadastral records, on the basis of an unsigned carbon copy thereof allegedly found
among the file of documents under her custody.
 Upon receipt of the petition, the Clerk of Court, Pedro G. Perez, prepared an
order for the issuance of the decree and certified that the three-page decision of
Judge Summers has not been amended, modified, rectified or otherwise
supplemented by any other decision, order or process of the Court. The said
petition together with the supporting papers were then presented to Judge Gorospe,
who signed the order for issuance of the decree and directed the transmittal of the
records to the Land Registration Commission.

Then on July 24, 1964, the decree issued by the Land Registration
Commission was transcribed in the registration book of the Register of Deeds of
Misamis Oriental and pursuant thereto Original Certificate of Title No. 0-257 was
issued by the Register of Deeds of Misamis Oriental in the name of Benedicta
Macabale Salcedo. On the very same date, July 24, 1964, this original title was
cancelled upon the sale of the lot to Isidro S. Baculio and a TCT was issued in his
name. However, Baculio subdivided the said lots into two and sell it. Said lots
were again subdivided and being sold to different persons.

Consequently, for the civil case, and upon the said decree and entry thereof
to Land Registration Commission, and its subsequent sale, the Solicitor General
and the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro filed a petition before the CFI of Misamis
Oriental to declare null and void OCT No. 0-257 and all transfer certificates of title
issued therefrom. The petition alleged among others: (1) that the lower court,
through Judge Gorospe had acted without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or in violation of due process of
law, in issuing the order for the issuance of the decree and in ordering Lot No.
1982 to be registered in the name of Benedicta Macabale Salcedo, (2) that the 3-
page decision of Judge Ricardo Summers, which was annexed to the petition of
Isidro S. Baculio, is a forgery and was fraudulently procured, (3) that Lot No. 1982
was declared public land in a 7-page decision rendered by Judge Summers on
December 19, 1940, and (4) that the registration of the order of Judge Gorospe for
the issuance of the decree was fraudulent, as well as the subsequent transcription of
said decree in the books of the Register of Deeds and the issuance of the original
and succeeding transfer certificates of title.

After trial, the CFI of Misamis Oriental, Branch IV, rendered a decision
declaring that Lot 1982 a public land, the 3-page decision of Judge Summers
fraudulent, and the order for the issuance of decree of Judge Gorospe as null and
void, and all subsequent transfers and transactions null and void.

For the criminal case, a criminal information for falsification of public

documents was filed in the CFI of Misamis Oriental, against Isidro S. Baculio and
Benedicta Macabale Salcedo among others for falsifying a 3-page decision of
Judge Summers. But before judgment, Benedicta died. Thus, in the judgment
except Benedicta, all the accused including Baculio was found guilty of the crime
charged.
 Aggrieved by the decisions of the trial courts, the defendants in the civil case
and the accused in the criminal case filed separate appeals to the Court of Appeals,
and a Special Division of Five was created. The decision in the civil case was
reversed and set aside by the CA in favor of Benedicta. Thus, the OSG filed a
motion for reconsideration.

However, finding the civil and criminal cases related, Justice Chanco
suggested that they be consolidated for decision by the Special Division of Five.
To this suggestion, the parties assented. Thus, after the necessary arrangement was
made to effect the assignment of the criminal case to the Special Division of Five
and after due hearing on both the motions for reconsideration in the civil case and
the merits of the criminal case, the two cases were submitted for decision.
Thereafter, the appellate court reversed the CFI ruling and acquitted all the
accused. The Solicitor General now aggrieved filed a motion for reconsideration,
but it was denied. Hence, this petition assailing the rendition of a single decision
of the CA and resolving them jointly in violation of Section 9, Article X of the
Constitution.
23. For judgment on demurrer to evidence (Rule 33) –
Concept and Rationale of Rule

Siayngco v. Costibolo, 27 SCRA 272, G.R. No. L-22506, February 28, 1969

Facts:

The respondent in this case in Costibolo, is the plaintiff in the trial court
originally sought the annulment on the ground of extrinsic fraud of a decision of
the Justice of the Peace Court in Leyte.

Respondent Martin Costibolo as plaintiff in the trial court originally sought the
annulment on the ground of extrinsic fraud of a decision of the Justice of the Peace Court of
Dagami, Leyte, in Civil Case 46 thereof, wherein the Siayngco spouses had obtained a money
judgment against said Costibolo by virtue of a confession of judgment entered by Costibolo in
favor of the Siayngco spouses.

He alleged that he had confessed judgment in favor of the Siayngco spouses in the Justice
of the Peace Court case, on the representation promise and assurance of the latter that they would
not ask for a writ of execution of the judgment within five years from the date of the judgment.
However, after said judgment, spouses Siyangco had secured a writ of execution. He then filed
for petition for relief from judgment but it was denied for having filed out of time. Costibolo
finally asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction pendente lite against the
execution of the judgment and sheriff's sale of his properties, which was granted by the trial
court, and for P5,500.00 by way of actual and moral damages.

The Siayngcos filed their Answer. Hearing was conducted by trial court.
After Costibolo had submitted his evidence and rested his case, the Siayngco
spouses orally moved for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that since the
supposed fraud was committed in 1955 and the original complaint had been filed
by them against Costibolo in the Justice of the Peace Court on March 4, 1954 and
the judgment of said Court had been rendered two months later on May 31, 1954,
the fraud alleged by Costibolo could not have possibly influenced the said
judgment and make out a case for its annulment. The Siayngco spouses expressly
reserved their right to present their evidence should their motion be denied by the
Court. The trial court however informed them that it could not grant such
reservation and announced that it would reserve its resolution so that it would have
time to peruse and study their motion for dismissal or demurrer to evidence. The
trial court thereafter rendered its judgment denying the Siayngco's motion to
dismiss and at the same time annulling the judgments of the Justice of the Peace
Court of Dagami, Leyte, in Civil Case 46, and of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte, in Civil Case No. 1935, in favor of the Siayngcos; it sentenced the Siayngco
spouses furthermore to pay to Costibolo the amount of P4,000.00 in actual and
moral damages and attorney's fees.

Concept and Rationale of Rule of judgment on demurrer to evidence (Rule 33) –

Facts:

The respondent in this case in Costibolo, is the plaintiff in the case filed
before the CFI of Leyte which originally sought the annulment on the ground of
extrinsic fraud of a decision of the Justice of the Peace Court in Leyte

The Siayngcos filed their Answer. Hearing was conducted by trial court.
After plaintiff Costibolo submitted his evidence and rested his case, the defendant
Siayngco spouses orally moved for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that
plaintiff has shown no right to relief (obviously it is a demurrer to the evidence) In
particular, the defendants averred that the alleged fraud was committed in 1955,
but the judgment sought to be annulled had been rendered in 1954. Thus, the
defendant could not have possibly influenced the said judgment and make out a
case for its annulment.

In addition to said oral motion for dismissal, defendant Siayngco spouses

expressly reserved their right to present their evidence if their motion be denied.
But, the trial court informed them that it could not grant such reservation and
announced that it would reserve its resolution so that it would have time to
examine and study their motion for dismissal (or demurrer to evidence).

Consequently, the trial court rendered its judgment denying the Siayngco's
motion to dismiss and at the same time annulling the judgments of the Justice of
the Peace Court of Dagami, Leyte, in Civil Case 46, and of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, in Civil Case No. 1935, in favor of the Siayngcos; it sentenced
the Siayngco spouses furthermore to pay to Costibolo the amount of P4,000.00 in
actual and moral damages and attorney's fees.

Issue:

Whether or not upon denial of motion to dismiss or demurrer to plaintiff's

evidence, defendant should have been granted the right to present their evidence in
accordance with their express reservation.

Ruling:
 Yes, defendant should have been granted the right to present their evidence
in accordance with their express reservation.

Sec. 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court provides, “After the plaintiff has
completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant without waiving his right
to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal
or the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief. However, if the motion is granted and the order of dismissal is reversed on
appeal, the movant loses his right to present evidence in his behalf.”

applying the rule on demurrer to evidence, Supreme Court held that the trial
court after denying the motion to dismiss for insufficiency of plaintiff's evidence or
demurrer to the evidence, should permit the defendant to present his own evidence
and give him his day in court, regardless of whether or not the defendant has
made a reservation of his right to present his evidence in the event of denial of
his motion or demurrer.

Here, the Supreme Court explained the rationale behind the rule and doctrine
in this wise:

The defendant is permitted to move for a dismissal, without waiving his

right to offer evidence in the event that his motion is not granted, (for example,
demurrer to the plaintiff's evidence) on the ground that upon the facts established
and the applicable law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.

If the trial court denies the motion, for example, if the court finds that
plaintiff's evidence is sufficient for an award of judgment (based on the evidence
presented by the plaintiff) in the absence of contrary evidence, the trial court should
proceed to hear and receive the defendant's evidence so that all the facts and
evidence of the contending parties may be properly filed before rendering the
decision. Or in case of appeal, before adjudication of the appellate courts.

Supreme Court also explained that this doctrine is consistent with the
procedural rules pertaining the conduct of trial, that courts should liberally receive
all preferred evidence during trial with all possible relevant proofs on record before
rendering decision. It likewise assures also that in case of appeal, the appellate
courts have all the material necessary to make a correct judgment, to avoid
subsequent delays because there is a need to remand the case for retrial or
reception of evidence improperly excluded, because of possibility of another
appeal.

However, the defendant is warned, that the same rule imposes the condition
that if his demurrer is granted by the trial court, and the order of dismissal is
reversed on appeal by the trial court, the defendant loses his right to present
evidence in his behalf (and has deemed to stand on the insufficiency of plaintiff's
case and evidence.) So, the appellate court which reverses the order of dismissal
shall proceed to render judgment on the merit on the basis of plaintiff's evidence.

In summary, a defendant who present a demurrer to plaintiff's evidence

retains the right to present his own evidence, if the trial court disagrees with
him; BUT if the trial court agrees with him and on appeal, the appellate court
disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal order, he has lost the
right to present his own evidence.

Even assuming that the trial court denied the demurrer to evidence on the
issue of the alleged fraud, the trial court should not automatically render the
decision pertaining the principal case. This case should involve two hearings, first
is whether or not the alleged fraud is true and the judgment is annulled, and second
the hearing of the principal case (the case of the annulled judgment) as if the
judgment was neved issued.

Supreme Court held that, if the court finds that the allegations of the fraud
are not true, the petition shall be dismissed and the entire proceedings terminate;
and second, if the court finds the allegations to be true, however, then the same
rule provides that it shall set aside the judgment complained of and shall proceed to
hear and determine the merits, for the case will then stand as if the judgment set
aside had never been issued.

All in all, under the rule of demurrer to evidence, since the trial court denied
the petitioners' motion to dismiss or demurrer, petitioners could not be held to have
waived their right to present their own evidence, to refute respondent Costibolo's
evidence, both on the issue of the alleged fraud as well as on the merits of the
principal case (which is the judgment sought to be annulled).
32. Other cases/updates in jurisprudence (Rule 33)

Gonzales v. Bugaay, G.R. No. 173008, 22 February 2012

Facts:

In their Amended Complaint for Partition and Annulment of Documents

with Damages... against Enrico, Consolacion and the respondents, petitioners
alleged, inter alia, that the only surviving children of the Spouses Ayad are Enrico
and Consolacion, and that during the Spouses Ayad's lifetime, they owned several
agricultural as well as residential properties. The RTC rendered a Decision
awarding one-fourth (¼) pro-indiviso share of the estate each to Enrico,
Maximiano, Encarnacion and Consolacion as the heirs of the Spouses Ayad.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial from the said
Decision. Consequently, the court granted respondents' motion for reconsideration
and/or new trial for the specific "purpose of receiving and offering for admission
the documents referred to by the respondents. However, instead of presenting the
documents adverted to, consisting of the documents sought to be annulled,
respondents demurred to petitioners' evidence. This was denied by the court as
well as respondents' motion for reconsideration. Through a petition for certiorari,
the CA reversed the RTC order, and dismissed the original complaint filed by
herein petitioners.

Gonzales v. Bugaay

This case under Rule 33 answers the issue as to whether or not the filing of a
demurrer to evidence after a Decision had been rendered is proper.

Facts:

Emanated from a Complaint for Partition and Annulment of Documents with

Damages against the respondents, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the
petitioner. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial from
the said Decision. Consequently, the court granted respondents' motion but for the
specific purpose only of receiving and offering for admission the documents
referred to by the respondents which was not presented during trial. However,
instead of presenting the said documents, respondents filed a demurrer to the
petitioners' evidence. This was denied by the court as well as respondents' motion
for reconsideration. Through a petition for certiorari, the CA reversed the RTC
order, and dismissed the said complaint filed by herein petitioners.

Issue:
 Whether or not the filing of a demurrer to evidence after a Decision had
been rendered in the case is proper.

Ruling:

No, it is not proper.

In the case of Celino v. Heirs of Alejo and Teresa Santiago, G.R. No.
161817, July 30, 2004, it was held that, “A demurrer to evidence is a motion to
dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and said demurrer should
be presented after the plaintiff rests his case. It is an objection by one of the
parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is
insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the
issue. The evidence contemplated by the rule on demurrer is that which pertains to
the merits of the case.”

In Choa v. Choa, G.R. No. 143376, November 26, 2002, “In passing upon
the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to
ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof, whether true or not, to
sustain the judgment.”

Here, being considered a motion to dismiss, thus, a demurrer to evidence

must clearly be filed before the court renders its judgment. In this case,
respondents filed their demurrer to the petitioners' evidence after the RTC already
promulgated its Decision. While respondents' motion for reconsideration and/or
new trial was granted, it was only for the sole purpose of receiving and offering for
admission the documents not presented at the trial. As respondents never complied
with the directive but instead filed a demurrer to evidence, it is as if their motion
for reconsideration should be deemed abandoned. Consequently, the RTC's
original Decision stands.