Property Die-Gests Part II

Civil Law Review 1: Atty.
Legaspi 2015
Accession (Arts. 440 – 475, 502, 420, 457); PD 1067 (Water Code);
Art. 58, PD 1067
Title Facts Issue/s Held

Rep. v. Santos III Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than Whether or not Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of lands
ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio Article 457 of the adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
GR 160453, Nov Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot Civil Code was receive from the effects of the currents of the waters."
12, 2012, 685 4998-B (the property) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC). applicable herein;
SCRA 51 and whether or not Xxx The Republic’s submission is correct. Respondents would be held
On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for respondents could entitled to claim the property as their own and apply for its registration
land registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant claim the property under the Torrens system only if they established that, indeed, the
By law, accretion - because of the latter’s co-ownership of the property. He by virtue of property was an accretion to their land.
the gradual and alleged that the property had been formed through acquisitive
imperceptible accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious, prescription
pursuant to Section Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks
deposit made public, continuous and adverse possession for more than of rivers.12 The deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a)
through the effects 30 years.2 14(1) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the current
of the current of the of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of
water- belongs to (Property
The City of Parañaque (the City) opposed the application Registration rivers.13
the owner of the for land registration, stating that the property was an
land adjacent to the Decree).
orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from Accordingly, respondents should establish the concurrence of the
banks of rivers accretion.3
where it forms. The elements of accretion to warrant the grant of their application for land
drying up of the registration. However, respondents did not show that the gradual and
river is not On May 10, 2000,4 the RTC granted the application for land imperceptible deposition of soil through the effects of the current of the
accretion. Hence, registration. The Republic, through the Office of the river had formed Lot 4998-B. Instead, their evidence revealed that the
the dried-up river Solicitor General (OSG), appealed. The CA affirmed the property was the dried-up river bed of the Parañaque River.
bed belongs to the ruling of the RTC. The Republic filed a motion for
State as property of reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on October Respondents ignore that the effects of the current of the river are not
public dominion, 20, 2003.7 the only cause of the formation of land along a river bank. There are
not to the riparian several other causes, including the drying up of the river bed. The
owner, unless a law The CA upheld the RTC’s pronouncement, holding: drying up of the river bed was, in fact, the uniform conclusion of both
vests the ownership lower courts herein. In other words, respondents did not establish at all
in some other It could not be denied that "to the owners of the lands that the increment of land had formed from the gradual and
person. adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which imperceptible deposit of soil by the effects of the current. xxx
they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters" (Article 457 New Civil Code) as in this case, The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as
Arcadio Ivan Santos III and Arcadio Santos, Jr., are the an accretion that became respondents’ property pursuant to Article 457
owners of the land which was previously part of the of the Civil Code. That land was definitely not an accretion. The process
Parañaque River which became an orchard after it dried up of drying up of a river to form dry land involved the recession of the
and considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property water level from the river banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to
is owned by the applicant which was obtained by the latter accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil on
from his mother (Decision, p. 3; p. 38 Rollo).10 the river banks through the effects of the current. In accretion, the water
level did not recede and was more or less maintained. Hence,
The Republic submits, however, that the application by respondents as the riparian owners had no legal right to claim
1
Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi 2015
both lower courts of Article 457 of the Civil Code was ownership of Lot 4998-B. xxx
erroneous in the face of the fact that respondents’ evidence
did not establish accretion, but instead the drying up of the The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its
Parañaque River. right of ownership. Article 502 of the Civil Code expressly declares that
rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of the State.18 It
follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to
belong to the
State as its property of public dominion, unless there is an express law

that provides that the dried-up river beds should belong to some other
person. xxx
The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual
deposits of soil does not need to make an express act of possession,
and that no acts of possession are necessary in that instance because
it is the law itself that pronounces the alluvium to belong to the riparian
owner from the time that the deposit created by the current of the water
becomes manifest has no applicability herein. This is simply because
Lot 4998-B was not formed through accretion. Hence, the ownership of
the land adjacent to the river bank by respondents’ predecessor-in-
interest did not translate to possession of Lot 4998-B that would ripen to
acquisitive prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B.
Even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed

Lot 4998-B for more than thirty years in the character they claimed, they
did not thereby acquire the land by prescription or by other means
without any competent proof that the land was already declared as
alienable and disposable by the Government. Absent that declaration,
the land still belonged to the State as part of its public dominion.
Article 419 of the Civil Code distinguishes property as being either of

public dominion or of private ownership. Article 420 of the Civil Code
lists the properties considered as part of public dominion, namely: (a)
those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents,
ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads,
and others of similar character; and (b) those which belong to the State,
without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or
for the development of the national wealth. As earlier mentioned, Article
502 of the Civil Code declares that rivers and their natural beds are of
public dominion.
Whether the dried-up river bed may be susceptible to acquisitive

prescription or not was a question that the Court resolved in favor of the
2
State in Celestial v. Cachopero, a case involving the registration of land

found to be part of a dried-up portion of the natural bed of a creek.
There the Court held:
xxx Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man

and not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription,
the adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in the
confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable
portions of the public domain. It is only after the Government has
declared the land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land that
the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can
be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.
A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a

river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea. As such, under
Articles 420(1) and 502(1) of the Civil Code, the Salunayan Creek,
including its natural bed, is property of the public domain which is not
susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. And,
absent any declaration by the government, that a portion of the creek
has dried-up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable character. x x x x
Article 461 provides, "river beds which are abandoned through the
natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the
owners of the land occupied by the new course," and the owners of the
adjoining lots have the right to acquire them only after paying their
value.
And both Article 370 of the Old Code and Article 461 of the present Civil
Code are applicable only when "river beds are abandoned through the
natural change in the course of the waters." xxx Article 370 applies only
if there is a natural change in the course of the waters. The rules on
alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial accretions nor to
accretions to lands that adjoin canals or esteros or artificial drainage
systems. xxx
The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as

forming part of the land of the public domain which cannot be subject to
acquisition by private ownership. xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where there has been

a change in the course of a river, not where the river simply dries up. In
the instant Petition, it is not even alleged that the Salunayan Creek
changed its course. In such a situation, commentators are of the
3
opinion that the dry river bed remains property of public dominion. (Bold
emphases supplied)
Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing
to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State.30 No public land can be acquired by private persons without any
grant, express or implied, from the Government. It is indispensable,
therefore, that there is a showing of a title from the State. 31Occupation
of public land in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen
into ownership and be registered as a title.32
Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code, all
river beds remain property of public dominion and cannot be acquired
by acquisitive prescription unless previously declared by the
Government to be alienable and disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-
B was not shown to be already declared to be alienable and disposable,
respondents could not be deemed to have acquired the property
through prescription.
Fernando v. Petitioners herein –Jose Fernando, Jr., Zoilo Fernando, Whether or not the The principle of accretion is embodied in Article 457 of the Civil Code
Acuña Norma Fernando Banares, Rosario Fernando Tangkencgo, Sapang Bayan is which states that "[t]o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
the heirs of Tomas Fernando, the heirs of Guillermo validly owned by the belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
GR 161030, Sept Fernando, the heirs of Iluminada Fernando and the heirs of petitioners. current of the waters." We have held that for Article 457 to apply the
14, 2011 657 Germogena Fernando – are the heirs and successors-in- following requisites must concur: (1) that the deposit be gradual and
SCRA 499 interest of the deceased registered owners. However, imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the current of
petitioners failed to agree on the division of the subject the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent
property amongst themselves. to the banks of rivers.45The character of the Sapang Bayan property
Petitioners, except for the heirs of Germogena Fernando, was not shown to be of the nature that is being referred to in the
filed a Complaint for partition against the heirs of provision which is an accretion known as alluvion as no evidence had
Germogena Fernando. Defendants did not oppose the been presented to support this assertion.
partition and even offered to share in the expenses that will
be incurred in the course of the proceedings. From the transcripts of the proceedings, the parties could not agree
how Sapang Bayan came about. Whether it was a gradual deposit
Respondent Leon Acuna filed a complaint in intervention received from the river current or a dried-up creek bed connected to the
averred that in the Decision of the Cadastral Court of main river could not be ascertained.
Baliuag, Bulacan, the portion of the property identified as
Lot 1303 and 1302 was already adjudicated . Norma Even assuming that Sapang Bayan was a dried-up creek bed, under
Fernando, one of the petitioners in the instant case, even Article 420, paragraph 146 and Article 502, paragraph 147 of the Civil
testified in one of the cases. Subsequently, a Motion for Code, rivers and their natural beds are property of public dominion. In
Intervention was filed by respondent Hermogenes the absence of any provision of law vesting ownership of the dried-up
Fernando (Hermogenes). According to him, in the July 30, river bed in some other person, it must continue to belong to the State.
1980 Decision of the CFI of Bulacan, their predecessors-in-
interest had already been adjudged owners of Lots 1302-A,
1302-F, 1302-G, 1302-H and 1302-J of OCT No. RO-487 In Republic v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that portions of the bed are
not open to registration under the Land Registration act. The
4
(997). adjudication of the lands in question as private property in the names of

the private respondents is null and void.49 1avvphi1
On September 19, 2000, petitioner Elizabeth Alarcon
testified that they (plaintiffs) are not claiming the entire Furthermore, in Celestial v. Cachopero,50 we similarly ruled that a dried-
property covered by OCT No. RO-487 (997) but only the up creek bed is property of public dominion.
area referred to as Lot 1303 and Sapang Bayan. Petitioner
Norma Fernando testified that Sapang Bayan was
supposedly included in Lot 1302 and was previously a river
until it dried up.
The trial court found that the parties failed to clearly show
whether Sapang Bayan was previously a dry portion of
either Lot 1302 or Lot 1303. Neither was there any proof
that Sapang Bayan was a river that just dried up or that it
was an accretion which the adjoining lots gradually
received from the effects of the current of water. It was
likewise not established who were the owners of the lots
adjoining Sapang Bayan. The trial court concluded that
none of the parties had clearly and sufficiently established
their claims over Sapang Bayan. Hence, plaintiffs and
defendants in the court a quo elevated the matter for our
review through the instant petition.
Mayor of Respondents claim that they are the absolute owners of a Whether the creek, It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the
Parañaque v. Ebio parcel of land consisting of 406 square meters. Said land being a tributary of alluvial deposits that have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut
was an accretion of Cut-cut creek. Respondents assert that the river, is creek. This being the case, the law that governs ownership over the
GR 178411, June the original occupant and possessor of the said parcel of classified as part of accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866,
23, 2010, 621 land was their great grandfather, Jose Vitalez. Sometime in the public domain, which remains in effect, in relation to Article 457 of the Civil Code.
SCRA 555 1930.From then on, Pedro continuously and exclusively any land that may
occupied and possessed the said lot. Respondent Mario have formed along Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 specifically covers
Ebio married Pedro’s daughter, Zenaida. Upon Pedro’s its banks through ownership over alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek. It reads: “
advice, the couple established their home on the said lot. time should also be Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks,
Pedro executed a notarized Transfer of Rights ceding his considered as part streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters
claim over the entire parcel of land in favor of Mario Ebio. of the public domain thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.”
On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Interestingly, Article 457 of the Civil Code states:” To the owners of
Barangay of Vitalez passed Resolution No. 08, series of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
1999 for the construction of an access road along Cut-cut. gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.”
When the city government advised all the affected
residents to vacate the said area, respondents immediately
registered their opposition thereto. As a result, the road It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits
project was temporarily suspended. Respondents were along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the
ordered them to vacate the area, or be physically evicted alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to
from the said property. Respondents sent a letter to the which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law
Office of the City Administrator asserting, in sum, their is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under
5
claim over the subject property. the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to
acquisition through prescription by third persons.28
Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC
of Parañaque City on April 21, 2005 and applied for a writ In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by
of preliminary injunction against petitioners.18 In the course prescription. No matter how long the possession of the properties has
of the proceedings, respondents admitted before the trial been, there can be no prescription against the State regarding property
court that they have a pending application for the issuance of public domain.29Even a city or municipality cannot acquire them by
of a sales patent before the Department of Environment prescription as against the State.30
and Natural Resources (DENR).
Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, 31 the
On April 29, 2005, the RTC issued an Order denying the land which is formed by the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of
petition for lack of merit. The trial court reasoned that sediments along its banks does not form part of the public domain by
respondents were not able to prove successfully that they clear provision of law.
have an established right to the property. Respondents
moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied. xxx We also find that the character of possession and ownership by the
Aggrieved, respondents elevated the matter to the Court of respondents over the contested land entitles them to the avails of the
Appeals. On January 31, 2007, the Court of Appeals issued action. A right in esse means a clear and unmistakable right.34 A party
its Decision in favor of the respondents. According to the seeking to avail of an injunctive relief must prove that he or she
Court of Appeals they are fully convinced and so hold that possesses a right in esse or one that is actual or existing. 35 It should not
the Appellants [have] amply proven their right over the be contingent, abstract, or future rights, or one which may never arise.
property in question.
In the case at bar, respondents assert that their predecessor-in-interest,
Pedro Vitalez, had occupied and possessed the subject lot as early as
1930. From these findings of fact by both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, for more than thirty (30) years, neither Guaranteed Homes,
Inc. nor the local government of Parañaque in its corporate or private
capacity sought to register the accreted portion. Undoubtedly,
respondents are deemed to have acquired ownership over the subject
property through prescription. Respondents can assert such right
despite the fact that they have yet to register their title over the said lot.
It must be remembered that the purpose of land registration is not the
acquisition of lands, but only the registration of title which the applicant
already possessed over the land. Registration was never intended as a
means of acquiring ownership.37 A decree of registration merely
confirms, but does not confer, ownership.
Regent v. Petitioner New Regent Sources, Inc. (NRSI) filed a Whether or not Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 31 of the
Tanjuatco Complaint for Rescission/Declaration of Nullity of Contract, Tanjuatco validly Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that
Reconveyance and Damages against respondent derived his title to the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that
GR 168800, April Tanjuatco and the Register of Deeds of Calamba before the lands. it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the
16, 2009, 585 the RTC of Calamba, Laguna. NRSI alleged that in 1994, it land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of
SCRA 329 authorized Vicente P. Cuevas III, its Chairman and rivers.32 Thus, it is not enough to be a riparian owner in order to enjoy
President, to apply on its behalf, for the acquisition of two the benefits of accretion. One who claims the right of accretion must
parcels of land by virtue of its right of accretion. Cuevas show by preponderant evidence that he has met all the conditions
purportedly applied for the lots in his name by paying to the provided by law. Petitioner has notably failed in this regard as it did not
6
Bureau of Lands. Cuevas and his wife executed a Voting offer any evidence to prove that it has satisfied the foregoing requisites.
Trust Agreement4 over their shares of stock in the
corporation. Then, pending approval of the application with It is undisputed that Tanjuatco derived his title to the lands from Original
the Bureau of Lands, Cuevas assigned his right to Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 245 registered in the name of the Republic
Tanjuatco. On March 12, 1996, the Director of Lands of the Philippines. Said parcels of land formed part of the Dried San
released an Order,6 which approved the transfer of rights Juan River Bed, which under Article 502 (1)34 of the Civil Code rightly
from Cuevas to Tanjuatco. Transfer Certificates of Title pertains to the public dominion. The Certification issued by Forester III
were then issued in the name of Tanjuatco. Emiliano S. Leviste confirms that said lands were verified to be within
the Alienable and Disposable Project of Calamba, Laguna, certified and
According to Tanjuatco, it was Cuevas who was alleged to declared as such on September 28, 1981. Clearly, the Republic is the
have defrauded the corporation. After NRSI completed entity which had every right to transfer ownership thereof to respondent.
presenting evidence, Tanjuatco filed a Demurrer to
Evidence,13 which the RTC granted. NRSI moved for
reconsideration, but it was denied by the trial court.
Meneses vs. CA On March 1, 1977, Braulio C. Darum, then the District Land Whether the lands The decision of the land registration court in LRC Case No. B-327
Officer of Los Baños, Laguna, issued to Pablito Meneses in question are ordering the confirmation and registration of title in favor of the
GR 83059, July 14, Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title. Pablito accretion lands Quisumbings over 2,387 square meters of accretion land is binding on
1995, 246 SCRA Meneses acquired said property from Silverio Bautista petitioners in G.R. No. 82220. As correctly pointed out by the Court of
162 through a Deed of Waiver and Transfer of Rights. On the Appeals, said decision, being the result of a proceeding in rem, binds
other hand, the Quisumbing family traces ownership of the the whole world, more so because it became final and executory upon
land as far back as September 6, 1919 when their the Bureau of Lands' failure to interpose an appeal.
matriarch, Ciriaca Arguelles Vda. de Quisumbing was
issued Original Certificate of Title No. 989 covering a lot Since petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 claim that "the foreshore
with an area of 859 square meters located in Los Baños, land known as Lots 190 and 1585 are part of Laguna de Bay" and
Laguna with the Laguna de Bay as its northwestern therefore the Quisumbings "have no legal right to claim the same as
boundary. The same parcel of land was registered on accretion land," we quote the following pertinent portions of the decision
August 14, 1973 under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- in Republic v. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 532 (1984) which, although
33393 in the names of Ciriaca's heirs: Emilio, Manuel, the case deals with the registration of a reclaimed land along the
Eduardo, Norberto, Perla, Josefina, Napoleon, Honorato, Laguna de Bay, is nonetheless enlightening:
Remedios and Alfonso, all surnamed Quisumbing.
While the waters of a lake are also subject to the same gravitational
In 1962, the Quisumbing instituted and accion publiciana in forces that cause the formation of tides in seas and oceans. Thus, the
the then Court of First Instance of Biñan, Laguna to recover alternation of high tides and low tides, which is an ordinary occurrence,
possession over a portion of the property from Dominga could hardly account for the rise in the water level of the Laguna de Bay
Villamor and Lorenzo Lanuzo docketed as Civil Case No. as observed during the rainy season. Rather, it is the rains which bring
B-350. On January 3, 1966, the case was decided in favor about the inundation of a portion of the land in question. Since the rise
of the Quisumbings. On appeal, the Court of Appeals in the water level which causes the submersion of the land occurs
sustained the Quisumbings' right over the property. during a shorter period (four to five months a year) than the level of the
water at which the land is completely dry, the latter should be
In LRC Case No. B-327, the Quisumbings applied for considered as the "highest ordinary depth" of Laguna de Bay.
registration and confirmation of title over an additional area Therefore, the land sought to be registered is not part of the bed or
of 2,387 square meters which had gradually accrued to basin of Laguna de Bay. Neither can it be considered as foreshore land.
their property by the natural action of the waters of Laguna The Brief for the Petitioner Director of Lands cites an accurate definition
de Bay. In its Decision of September 28, 1978, the Court of of a foreshore land, to wit: . . . . that part of (the land) which is between
7
First Instance of Biñan confirmed the Quisumbings' title high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides. The
thereto which, after it was duly surveyed, was identified as strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is
Psu-208327. alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. As aptly found
by the Court a quo, the submersion in water of a portion of the land in
On April 17, 1979, the Quisumbings filed a casesbefore the question is due to the rains "falling directly on or flowing into Laguna de
Court of First Instance of Laguna against Lorenzo and Bay from different sources." Since the land is not due to "flux and reflux
Pablito Meneses, Braulio C. Darum and Cesar B. of tides" it cannot be considered a foreshore land within the meaning of
Almendral for nullification of the free patents and titles the authorities cited by petitioner Director of Lands.
issued to Pablito Meneses. They alleged that Lorenzo
Menesis, then the Mayor of Los Baños, using his brother Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil
Pablito as a "tool and dummy," illegally occupied their Code requires the concurrence of these requisites: (1) that the
"private accretion land" an August 6, 1976, and, deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it
confederating with District Land Officer Darum and Land be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that
Inspector Cesar Almendral, obtained free patents and the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers
original certificates of title to the land. (or the sea coast). While the trial court mainly relied on the findings in
Civil Case No. B-350 that the lands in controversy are accretion lands
On March 26, 1984, the trial court rendered the decision and it has not determined on its own the presence of said requisites, it
finding that the lands registered by the Meneses brothers is too late now for petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 to claim otherwise.
are accretion lands to which the Quisumbings have a valid Consequently, the lands held to be accretion lands could only benefit
right as owners of the riparian land to which nature had the Quisumbings, who own the property adjacent to the lands in
gradually deposited the disputed lots. controversy (Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 350 [1992]).
Co-ownership (Arts. 484 – 501) & Partition Arts. 1078 – 1105;

Art. 434 & Rule 69, Rules of Court;
Arts. 26, 91 –129, 147 – 148, 152, 153 & 159, Family Code;
RA 4726 –Condominium Law

PNB v. Garcia Sometime in 1989, the spouses Rogelio and Celedonia Whether the subject The Subject Property is Conjugal. All property acquired during marriage
Garcia (Spouses Garcia) obtained three loan facilities from property is conjugal. is presumed conjugal. Since Jose Sr. and Ligaya were married prior to
GR 182839, June the petitioner, Philippine National Bank (petitioner bank). the effectivity of the Family Code, their property relations were
2, 2014, 724 SCRA The loan was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over their governed by the conjugal partnership of gains as provided under Article
280 properties covered by TCT No. 177585, TCT No. 75324 119 of the Civil Code. Under Article 160 of the Civil Code, "all property
and the subject property covered TCT No. T-44422. Jose of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
Sr. agreed to accommodate the spouses Garcia by offering unless it can be proven that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the subject property as additional collateral security for the the wife."
latter’s increased loan.
In his testimony, Jose Sr. admitted that at the time he acquired the land
On maturity of the loan on April 20,1994, the spouses through sale, he was already married. Proof of the subject property’s
Garcia failed to pay their loan to the petitioner bank despite acquisition during the subsistence of marriage suffices to render the
repeated demands. statutory presumption operative.
On January 12, 1996, the respondents filed before the RTC xxx The registration of the property is not conclusive evidence of the
8
a Complaint for Nullity of the Amendment of Real Estate exclusive ownership of the husband or the wife. Although the property
Mortgage, Damages with Preliminary Injunction against the appears to be registered in the name of the husband, it has the inherent
spouses Garcia and the petitioner bank. The respondents character of conjugal property if it was acquired for valuable
alleged that the subject property was a conjugal property of consideration during marriage.10
Jose Sr. and his deceased spouse, Ligaya, as they
acquired the subject property during their marriage; that In order to rebut the presumptive conjugal nature of the property, the
upon Ligaya’s death, Jose Sr., together with his children petitioner must present strong, clear and convincing evidence of
Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy, by law, became owners exclusive ownership of one of the spouses. xxx
pro indiviso of the subject property; that the petitioner bank
was at fault for not including Jose Sr. as payee to the check
representing the loan despite its knowledge that Jose Sr. The petitioner bank failed to overcome the legal presumption that the
was a signatory to the real estate mortgage; that the real disputed property was conjugal.xxx
estate mortgage executed by Jose Sr. could not bind his
children as they did not give their consent or approval to Upon the death of Ligaya on January 21, 1987, the conjugal partnership
the encumbrance; and that the real estate mortgage was was automatically dissolved and terminated pursuant to Article 175(1)
also void as to Jose Sr. since he never benefitted from the of the Civil Code,13 and the successional rights of her heirs vest, as
loan. provided under Article 777 of the Civil Code, which states that"[t]he
rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death
In their answer, the Spouses Garcia alleged that Jose Sr. of the decedent."
was indebted to them. To settle this indebtedness, Jose Sr.
volunteered to give the subject property as additional Consequently, the conjugal partnership was converted into an implied
security for their loan to the petitioner bank. ordinary co-ownership between the surviving spouse, on the one hand,
and the heirs of the deceased, on the other.14 This resulting ordinary co-
The petitioner bank, on the other hand, claimed that the ownership among the heirs is governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code
mortgage was made in good faith and for value, and which reads:
maintained that the respondents’ complaint stated no
cause of action against it. Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of
the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
The RTC held that the subject property was a conjugal assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
property since it was acquired by Jose Sr. during his enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of
marriage with his now deceased wife. The respondents the alienation of the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners shall be
disagreed with the RTC ruling and elevated the case to the limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon
CA via an ordinary appeal. the termination of the co-ownership." (Emphasis supplied)
The CA upheld the trial court’s finding that the subject Under this provision, each co-owner has the full ownership of his part or
property was conjugal. The CA also declared that the share in the co-ownership and may, therefore, alienate, assign or
conjugal property could only be liable to the extent of Jose mortgage it except when personal rights are involved. Should a co-
Sr.’s shares. owner alienate or mortgage the co-owned property itself, the alienation
or mortgage shall remain valid but only to the extent of the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership.15 In Carvajal v. Court of Appeals,16 the Court said:
While under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, each co-owner shall
have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
9
pertaining thereto and he may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, the effect of the alienation or
the mortgage with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited, by
mandate of the same article, to the portion which may be allotted to him
in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. He has no right
to sell or alienate a concrete, specific, or determinate part of the thing in
common to the exclusion of the other co-owners because his right over
the thing is represented by an abstract or Ideal portion without any
physical adjudication.3 An individual co- owner cannot adjudicate to
himself or claim title to any definite portion of the land or thing owned in
common until its actual partition by agreement or judicial decree. Prior
to that time all that the co-owner has is an Ideal or abstract quota or
proportionate share in the entire thing owned in common by all the co-
owners.4 What a co owner may dispose of is only his undivided aliquot
share, which shall be limited to the portion that may be allotted to him
upon partition. [emphasis supplied].
xxx Even if he had the right to freely mortgage or even sell his
undivided interest in the disputed property, he could not dispose of or
mortgage the entire property without his children’s consent. As correctly
emphasized by the trial court, Jose Sr.’s right in the subject property is
limited only to his share in the conjugal partnership as well as his share
as an heir on the other half of the estate which is his deceased
spouse’s share. Accordingly, the mortgage contract is void insofar as it
extends to the undivided shares of his children.
Ventura v. Abuda Socorro Torres (Socorro) and Esteban Abletes (Esteban) Whether or not the Edilberto admitted that in unions between a man and a woman who are
were married on 9 June 1980. Although Socorro and Delpan and Vitas incapacitated to marry each other, the ownership over the properties
GR 202932, Oct. Esteban never had common children, both of them had properties are acquired during the subsistence of that relationship shall be based on
23, 2013, 708 children from prior marriages: Esteban had a daughter conjugal properties the actual contribution of the parties.
SCRA 670 named Evangeline Abuda (Evangeline), and Socorro had a of Esteban and
son, who was the father of Edilberto U. Ventura, Jr. Socorro. Art 148. In cases of cohabitation [wherein the parties are incapacitated
(Edilberto), the petitioner in this case. to marry each other], only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry
Evidence shows that Socorro had a prior subsisting shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
marriage to Crispin Roxas (Crispin) when she married contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions
Esteban. Socorro married Crispin on 18 April 1952. This and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule
marriage was not annulled, and Crispin was alive at the and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences
time of Socorro’s marriage to Esteban. of credit.
Esteban’s prior marriage, on the other hand, was dissolved If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the
by virtue of his wife’s death in 1960. According to Edilberto, co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
sometime in 1968, Esteban purchased a portion of a lot partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad
situated in Tondo, Manila (Vitas property). The remaining faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited
portion was thereafter purchased by Evangeline on her
10
father’s behalf sometime in 1970.4 The Vitas property was in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title dated 11 December
1980. xxx Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and Delpan properties
can be considered common property if: (1) these were acquired during
Edilberto also claimed that starting 1978, Evangeline and the cohabitation of Esteban and Socorro; and (2) there is evidence that
Esteban operated small business establishments located at the properties were acquired through the parties’ actual joint
903 and 905 Delpan Street, Tondo, Manila (Delpan contribution of money, property, or industry.
property).6
xxx The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban
On 6 September 1997, Esteban sold the Vitas and Delpan alone.The phrase "married to Socorro Torres" is merely descriptive of
properties to Evangeline and her husband, Paulino Abuda his civil status, and does not show that Socorro co-owned the
(Paulino). Esteban passed away on 11 September 1997, property.27The evidence on record also shows that Esteban acquired
while Socorro passed away on 31 July 1999. ownership over the Vitas property prior to his marriage to Socorro, even
if the certificate of title was issued after the celebration of the marriage.
Sometime in 2000, Leonora Urquila (Leonora), the mother Registration under the Torrens title system merely confirms, and does
of Edilberto filed a Petition for Annulment of Deeds of Sale not vest title.
before the RTC-Manila. Respondents argued that because
of Socorro’s prior marriage to Crispin, her subsequent xxx Both the RTC-Manila and the CA found that the Delpan property
marriage to Esteban was null and void. Thus, neither was acquired prior to the marriage of Esteban and Socorro.
Socorro nor her heirs can claim any right or interest over
the properties purchased by Esteban and respondents.
The RTC-Manila dismissed the petition. The RTC-Manila

ruled that the marriage between Socorro and Esteban was
void from the beginning and that the Vitas and Delpan
Properties are not conjugal property. The CA affirmed the
ruling of the RTC.
Arambulo v. Petitioners Raul V. Arambulo and Teresita A. Dela Cruz, Whether The Court of Appeals correctly applied the provision of Article 493 of the
Nolasco along with their mother Rosita Vda. De Arambulo, and respondents, as co– Civil Code, which states:Art. 493. Each co–owner shall have the full
siblings Primo V. Arambulo, Ma. Lorenza A. Lopez, Ana owners, can be ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto,
GR 189420, March Maria V. Arambulo, Maximiano V. Arambulo, Julio V. compelled by the and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
26, 2014, 720 Arambulo and Iraida Arambulo Nolasco (Iraida) are co– court to give their substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights
SCRA 95 owners of two (2) parcels of land located in Tondo, Manila. consent to the sale are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
When Iraida passed away, she was succeeded by her of their shares in respect to the co–owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
husband, respondent Genaro Nolasco and their children, the co–owned allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co–ownership.
Iris Abegail Nolasco, Ingrid Aileen Arambulo and properties.
respondent Jeremy Spencer Nolasco. 1. There is co–ownership whenever, as in this case, the ownership of
an undivided thing, belongs to different persons.11 Article 493 of the
On 8 January 1999, petitioners filed a petition for relief Code defines the ownership of the co–owner, clearly establishing that
under Article 491 of the Civil Code with the RTC of Manila, each co–owner shall have full ownership of his part and of its fruits and
alleging that all of the co–owners, except for respondents, benefits.
have authorized petitioners to sell their respective shares to
the subject properties; that only respondents are Pertinent to this case, Article 493 dictates that each one of the parties
withholding their consent to the sale of their shares; that in herein as co–owners with full ownership of their parts can sell their fully
11
case the sale pushes through, their mother and siblings will owned part. The sale by the petitioners of their parts shall not affect the
get their respective 1/9 share of the proceeds of the sale, full ownership by the respondents of the part that belongs to them. Their
while respondents will get ¼ share each of the 1/9 share of part which petitioners will sell shall be that which may be apportioned to
Iraida; that the sale of subject properties constitutes them in the division upon the termination of the co–ownership. In lieu of
alteration; and that under Article 491 of the Civil Code, if the petitioners, their vendees shall be co–owners with the respondents.
one or more co–owners shall withhold their consent to the
alterations in the thing owned in common, the courts may 2. xxx The rights of a co–owner of a certain property are clearly
afford adequate relief.4 specified in Article 493 of the Civil Code. As early as 1923, this Court
has ruled that even if a co–owner sells the whole property as his, the
Respondents averred that they were not aware of the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co–owners
intention of petitioners to sell the properties they co–owned who did not consent to the sale.13 This is because under the
because they were not called to participate in any aforementioned codalprovision, the sale or other disposition affects only
negotiations regarding the disposition of the property. his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond
to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common. xxx The
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered sales produced the effect of substituting the buyers in the enjoyment
respondents to give their consent to the sale. The Court of thereof.
Appeals granted the appeal and reversed the trial court’s
decision. The Court of Appeals held that the respondents From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co–owner is entitled
had the full ownership of their undivided interest in the to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co–
subject properties, thus, they cannot be compelled to sell owner without the consent of the other co–owners is not null and void.
their undivided shares in the properties. However, only the rights of the co–owner–seller are transferred, thereby
making the buyer a co–owner of the property.16 (Italics theirs).
In the 1944 case of Lopez v. Vda. De Cuaycong, the Court said:

x x x Article 399 shows the essential integrity of the right of each co–
owner in the mental portion which belongs to him in the ownership or
community.
xxxx
To be a co–owner of a property does not mean that one is deprived of

every recognition of the disposal of the thing, of the free use of his right
within the circumstantial conditions of such judicial status, nor is it
necessary, for the use and enjoyment, or the right of free disposal, that
the previous consent of all the interested parties be
obtained.18 (Underscoring supplied).
The Court in Lopez further cited Scaevola: Absolute right of each co–
owner with respect to his part or share. – With respect to the latter,
each co–owner is the same as an individual owner. He is a singular
owner, with all the rights inherent in such condition. The share of the
co–owner, that is, the part which ideally belongs to him in the common
thing or right and is represented by a certain quantity, is his and he may
dispose of the same as he pleases, because it does not affect the right
of the others. Such quantity is equivalent to a credit against the
12
common thing or right and is the private property of each creditor (co–
owner).
The ultimate authorities in civil law, recognized as such by the Court,

agree that co–owners such as respondents have over their part, the
right of full and absolute ownership. Such right is the same as that of
individual owners which is not diminished by the fact that the entire
property is co–owned with others. That part which ideally belongs to
them, or their mental portion, may be disposed of as they please,
independent of the decision of their co–owners. So we rule in this case.
The respondents cannot be ordered to sell their portion of the co–
owned properties. In the language of Rodriguez v. Court of First
Instance of Rizal,20 “each party is the sole judge of what is good for
him.”21
3. Indeed, the respected commentaries suggest the conclusion that,

insofar as the sale of co–owned properties is concerned, there is no
common interest that may be prejudiced should one or more of the co–
owners refuse to sell the co–owned property, which is exactly the
factual situation in this case. When respondents disagreed to the sale,
they merely asserted their individual ownership rights. Without
unanimity, there is no common interest.
Petitioners who project themselves as prejudiced co–owners may bring

a suit for partition, which is one of the modes of extinguishing co–
ownership. Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co–owner shall
be obliged to remain in the co–ownership, and that each co–owner may
demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as
his share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Article 498 of the Civil
Code states that whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the
co–owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall
indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly
distributed. This is resorted to (a) when the right to partition the property
is invoked by any of the co–owners but because of the nature of the
property, it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the
interests of the co–owners, and (b) the co–owners are not in agreement
as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property
upon proper reimbursement of the co–owners.22 This is the result
obviously aimed at by petitioners at the outset. As already shown, this
cannot be done while the co–ownership exists.
Essentially, a partition proceeding accords all parties the opportunity to

be heard, the denial of which was raised as a defense by respondents
for opposing the sale of the subject properties.
Bagayas v. On June 28, 2004, petitioner filed a complaint5 for At the outset, it must be stressed that Civil Case No. 04-42 was a
13
Bagayas annulment of sale and partition before the RTC, claiming complaint for annulment of sale and partition. In a complaint for
that Rogelio, Felicidad, Rosalina, Michael, and Mariel, all partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he is a co-owner of
GR 187308- surnamed Bagayas (respondents) intended to exclude her the subject properties; and second, the conveyance of his lawful
187517, Sept. 18, from inheriting from the estate of her legally adoptive shares. An action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-
2013,706 SCRA 73 parents, Maximino Bagayas (Maximino) and Eligia ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion
Clemente (Eligia), by falsifying a deed of absolute sale of the properties involved.36 The determination, therefore, as to the
(deed of absolute sale) purportedly executed by the existence of co-ownership is necessary in the resolution of an action for
deceased spouses (Maximino and Eligia) transferring two partition. As held in the case of Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia:
parcels of land (subject lands) registered in their names to
their biological children, respondent Rogelio and Orlando The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the
Bagayas (Orlando). Said deed bore the signature of Eligia determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a
who could not have affixed her signature thereon as she partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be
had long been dead.9 By virtue of the same instrument, made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the
however, the Bagayas brothers were able to secure in their property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not
favor TCT Nos. 375657 and 375658 over the subject lands. entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not
exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on the other hand,
Rogelio claimed that after their parents had died, he and with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is
Orlando executed a document denominated as Deed of proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received
Extra judicial Succession (deed of extra judicial by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. In the latter
succession) over the subject lands toeffect the transfer of case, the parties may, if they are able to agree, make partition among
titles thereof to their names. Before the deed of extra themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall
judicial succession could be registered, however, a deed of confirm the partition so agreed upon. In either case – i.e., either the
absolute sale transferring the subject lands to them was action is dismissed or partition and/or accounting is decreed – the order
discovered from the old files of Maximino, which they used is a final one, and may be appealed by any party aggrieved
by "reason of convenience" to acquire title to the said thereby.38 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
lands.15
xxx In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr. The Court categorically pronounced that
The RTC held that, even though petitioner is an adopted a resolution on the issue of ownership does not subject the Torrens title
child, she could not ask for partition of the subject lands as issued over the disputed realties to a collateral attack. It must be borne
she was not able to prove any of the instances that would in mind that what cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title
invalidate the deed of absolute sale. Moreover, the action and not the title itself. xxx
for annulment of sale was improper as it constituted a
collateral attack on the title of Rogelio and Orlando. Thus, the RTC erroneously dismissed petitioner’s petition for annulment
of sale on the ground that it constituted a collateral attack since she was
No appeal was taken from the RTC’s Decision thereby actually assailing Rogelio and Orlando’s title to the subject lands and
allowing the same to lapse into finality. not any Torrens certificate of title over the same.
Subsequently, however, petitioner filed, twin petitions xxx The declaration that petitioner is the legally adopted child of
before the same RTC, for the amendment of TCT Nos. Maximino and Eligia did not amount to a declaration of heirship and co-
375657 and 375658 to include her name and those of her ownership upon which petitioner may institute an action for the
heirs and successors-in-interest as registered owners to amendment of the certificates of title covering the subject land.
the extent of one-third of the lands covered therein. The
petitions were anchored on Section 108 of Presidential Second. Petitioner cannot avail of the summary proceedings under
Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise known as the "Property
14
Registration Decree." xxx Section 108 of PD 1529 because the present controversy involves not
the amendment of the certificates of title issued in favor of Rogelio and
To substantiate her "interest" in the subject lands, petitioner Orlando but the partition of the estate of Maximino and Eligia who are
capitalized on the finding of the RTC in its Decision dated both deceased. As held in Philippine Veterans Bank v. Valenzuela, the
March 24, 2008that she is the adopted child of Maximino prevailing rule is that proceedings under Section 108 of PD 1529 are
and Eligia. The petitions were dismissed30 by the RTC, summary in nature, contemplating corrections or insertions of mistakes
however, on the ground of res judicata. Petitioner filed a which are only clerical but certainly not controversial issues. Relief
motion for reconsideration. The motion was resolved under said legal provision can only be granted if there is unanimity
against petitioner. among the parties, or that there is no adverse claim or serious objection
on the part of any party in interest. xxx Therefore, petitioner may not
avail of the remedy provided under Section 108 of PD 1529. xxx
Casilang Sr. v. The late spouses Liborio Casilang (Liborio) and Francisca Whether in his Rosario’s only proof of Ireneo’s ownership is TD No. 555, issued in his
Casilang Dizon Zacarias (Francisca) had eight (8) children, namely: lifetime Liborio did name, but she did not bother to explain why it was dated 1994, although
Felicidad Casilang (Felicidad), Ireneo Casilang (Ireneo), in fact transmit it to Ireneo died on June 11, 1992. Liborio’s ownership of Lot No. 4618 is
GR 180269, Feb. Marcelina Casilang (Marcelina), Jacinta Casilang (Jacinta), Ireneo, and if not, admitted by all the parties, but it must be asked whether in his lifetime
20, 2013, 691 Bonifacio Casilang (Bonifacio), Leonora Casilang whether it was Liborio did in fact transmit it to Ireneo, and if not, whether it was
SCRA 385 (Leonora), Jose Casilang (Jose) and Flora Casilang conveyed to him by conveyed to him by Liborio’s heirs. xxx
(Flora). Liborio died intestate on October 11, 1982 at the Liborio’s heirs.
age of 83, followed not long after by his wife Francisca on From the testimonies of the parties, we are convinced that the
December 25, 1982. Their son Bonifacio also died in 1986, Whether the verbal conclusion of the RTC is well-supported that there was indeed a verbal
survived by his child Bernabe Casilang (Bernabe), while partition is valid. partition among the heirs of Liborio, pursuant to which each of his eight
son Ireneo died on June 11, 1992, survived by his four (4) children received his or her share of his estate, and that Jose’s share
children, namely: Mario Casilang (Mario), Angelo Casilang was Lot No. 4618.
(Angelo), Rosario Casilang-Dizon (Rosario) and Rodolfo
Casilang (Rodolfo), herein respondents.
The validity of an oral partition is well-settled in our jurisdiction. In Vda.
de Espina v. Abaya,53 this Court declared that an oral partition is valid:
The estate of Liborio, which left no debts, consisted of
three (3) parcels of land located in Barangay Talibaew,
Calasiao, Pangasinan. On May 26, 1997, respondent "An agreement of partition may be made orally or in writing. An oral
Rosario filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) a agreement for the partition of the property owned in common is valid
complaint for unlawful detainer, to evict her uncle, petitioner and enforceable upon the parties. The Statute of Frauds has no
Jose from Lot No. 4618. Rosario claimed that Lot No. 4618 operation in this kind of agreements, for partition is not a conveyance of
was owned by her father Ireneo. On April 3, 1997, the property but simply a segregation and designation of the part of the
respondents executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition property which belong to the co-owners."54
with Quitclaim3 whereby they adjudicated Lot No. 4618 to
themselves. Respondents Mario, Angelo and Rodolfo In Maestrado v. CA,55 the Supreme Court upheld the partition after it
renounced their respective shares in favor of Rosario. found that it conformed to the alleged oral partition of the heirs, and that
the oral partition was confirmed by the notarized quitclaims executed by
In his Answer, Jose raised the defense that he was the the heirs subsequently.56 In Maglucot-Aw v. Maglucot,57 the Supreme
"lawful, absolute, exclusive owner and in actual Court elaborated on the validity of parol partition: On general principle,
possession" of the said lot, and that he acquired the same independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have
"through intestate succession from his late father." Jose enforce [sic] oral partition when it has been completely or partly
was declared in default; thus, the adverse judgment against performed.
him. The MTC rendered judgment finding Rosario to be the
15
owner of Lot No. 4618, and ordering Jose to remove his Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid
house and vacate. and enforceable at law, equity will [in] proper cases, where the parol
partition has actually been consummated by the taking of possession in
On June 2, 1998, the petitioners, counting 7 of the 8 severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective
children of Liborio and Francisca,7 filed with the RTC a portions set off to each, recognize and enforce such parol partition and
Complaint, for "Annulment of Documents, Ownership and the rights of the parties thereunder. Thus, it has been held or stated in a
Peaceful Possession with Damages" against the number of cases involving an oral partition under which the parties went
respondents. Among the documents sought to be annulled into possession, exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly
was the 1997 Deed of Extrajudicial Partition executed by performed the partition agreement, that equity will confirm such partition
Ireneo’s children. and in a proper case decree title in accordance with the possession in
severalty.
The petitioners alleged in their complaint that all eight (8)
children of Liborio entered into a verbal partition of his In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partition may be
estate, pursuant to which Jose was allotted Lot No. 4618 sustained on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of
as his share; that Ireneo never claimed ownership of Lot a tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol partition as to
No. 4618, nor took possession of it; that Jose has always which possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual
resided in Lot No. 4618 since childhood, where he built his ownership were exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the
family’s semi-concrete house just a few steps away from agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual for the purpose of
his parents’ old bamboo hut. concluding the right of the parties as between each other to hold their
respective parts in severalty.
For her part, Rosario alleged in her answer with
counterclaim, that she is the actual and lawful owner of Lot A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties
No. 4618, having acquired the same by way of a Deed of thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking
Extra judicial Partition with Quitclaim; that her ownership possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect
over subject property could be traced back to her late thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition.
father IR[E]NEO which the latter inherited by way of
intestate succession from his deceased father LIBORIO A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part
sometime in 1992; that the residential house described in performance, or have stated that a part performance is necessary, to
herein Appellee JOSE’s complaint is an illegal structure take a parol partition out of the operation of the statute of frauds. It has
built by him iwithout her (ROSARIO’s) knowledge and been held that where there was a partition in fact between tenants in
consent; that thhe subject lot is never a portion of Appellee common, and a part performance, a court of equity would have regard
JOSE’s share from the intestate of his deceased father, to and enforce such partition agreed to by the parties.58
LIBORIO; that Appellee JOSE is never the rightful owner of
the lot in question and has not shown any convincing proof Jose’s possession of Lot No. 4618 is also consistent with the claimed
of his supposed ownership; that the improvements verbal partition with his siblings, and fully corroborated by his sisters,
introduced by him, specifically the structures he cited are who further testified that they each had taken possession of their own
the subject of a Writ of Demolition; that no protestation or shares and built their houses thereon.
objection was ever made by Appellee JOSE in Civil Case
No. 847 (Unlawful Detainercase) where he was the
defendant; A possessor of real estate property is presumed to have title thereto
unless the adverse claimant establishes a better right. 59 Moreover,
under Article 541 of the Civil Code, one who possesses in the concept
The petitioners asserted that the MTC committed a grave of owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with
error in failing to consider a material fact-that Jose had long a just title, and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it. Similarly,
been in prior possession under a claim of title which he
16
obtained by partition. Article 433 of the Civil Code provides that actual possession under a
claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. Thus,
The RTC in its Decision affirmed Jose’s ownership and actual possession and exercise of dominion over definite portions of the
possession of Lot No. 4618 by virtue of the oral partition of property in accordance with an alleged partition are considered strong
the estate of Liborio by all the siblings. Rosario appealed to proof of an oral partition60 which the Court will not hesitate to uphold.
the CA. The CA reversed the RTC by relying mainly on the
factual findings and conclusions of the MTC.
Vda. De The parties are the heirs of Leandro Figuracion (Leandro) The first stage in an action for partition is the settlement of the issue of
Figuracion v. who died intestate in May 1958. Petitioner Carolina is the ownership. Such an action will not lie if the claimant has no rightful
Figuracion surviving spouse. The other petitioners – Elena Figuracion- interest in the subject property. In fact, the parties filing the action are
Ancheta, Hilaria A. Figuracion (Hilaria), Felipa Figuracion- required by the Rules of Court to set forth in their complaint the nature
GR 151334, Feb. Manuel (Felipa), Quintin Figuracion, and Mary Figuracion- and the extent of their title to the property. It would be premature to
13, 2013, 690 Ginez – and respondent Emilia were Carolina and effect a partition until and unless the question of ownership is first
SCRA 495 Leandro’s children.4 definitely resolved.
Subject of the dispute are two parcels of land both acquired Here, the respondent traces her ownership over the eastern half of Lot
by Leandro during his lifetime. Both lands were registered No. 707 from the Deed of Quitclaimexecuted by Agripina, who in turn,
in the name of "Leandro Figuracion married to Carolina was the co-owner thereof being one of the legitimate heirs of Eulalio.
Adviento". Leandro executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the
above real properties in favor of his six (6) children on In this case, co-ownership of Lot No. 707 was precisely what
August 23, 1955. Their shares, however, were not respondent Emilia was able to successfully establish, as correctly
delineated with particularity because spouses Leandro and found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA.
Carolina reserved the lots and its fruits for their expenses.
The status of Agripina and Carolina as the legitimate heirs of Eulalio is
Also involved in the controversy is Lot No. 707 of the an undisputed fact. As such heirs, they became co-owners of Lot No.
Cadastral Survey owned by Eulalio Adviento (Eulalio), 707 upon the death of Eulalio on July 20, 1930. Since Faustina was
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 15867 predeceased by Eulalio, she likewise became a co-owner of the lot
issued in his name on August 21, 1917. Eulalio begot upon Eulalio’s death. Faustina’s share, however, passed on to her
Agripina Adviento (Agripina) with his first wife Marcela daughter Carolina when the former died on October 18, 1949.
Estioko (Marcela), whom Eulalio survived. When he The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Carolina did not prejudice
remarried, Eulalio had another daughter, herein petitioner the share of Agripina because it is not legally possible for one to
Carolina, with his second wife, Faustina Escabesa adjudicate unto himself an entire property he was not the sole owner of.
(Faustina).6 A co-owner cannot alienate the shares of her other co-owners – nemo
dat qui non habet.38
On November 28, 1961, Agripina7 executed a Deed of
Quitclaim8 over the eastern half of Lot No. 707 in favor of Hence, Lot No. 707 was a co-owned property of Agripina and Carolina.
her niece, herein respondent Emilia. As co-owners, each of them had full ownership of her part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto. Each of them also had the right to
Soon thereafter or on December 11, 1962, petitioner alienate the lot but only in so far as the extent of her portion was
Carolina executed an Affidavit of Self- affected.39
Adjudication9adjudicating unto herself the entire Lot No.
707 as the sole and exclusive heir of her deceased Thus, when Carolina sold the entire Lot No. 707 on December 11, 1962
parents, Eulalio and Faustina.10 On the same date, to Hilaria and Felipa without the consent of her co-owner Agripina, the
17
Carolina also executed a Deed of Absolute Sale11 over Lot disposition affected only Carolina’s pro indiviso share, and the vendees,
No. 707 in favor of petitioners Hilaria and Felipa/ Hilaria and Felipa, acquired only what corresponds to Carolina’s share.
A co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share; hence, a sale of the
In 1971, Emilia and her family went to the United States entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-
and returned to the Philippines only in 1981. Upon her owners is not null and void and only the rights of the co-owner/seller are
return and relying on the Deed of Quitclaim, she built a transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.40
house on the eastern half of Lot No. 707.
Accordingly, the deed of sale executed by Carolina in favor of Hilaria
The legal debacle of the Figuracions started in 1994 when and Felipa was a valid conveyance but only insofar as the share of
Hilaria and her agents threatened to demolish the house of Carolina in the co-ownership is concerned. As Carolina’s successors-in-
Emilia who, in retaliation, was prompted to seek the interest to the property, Hilaria and Felipa could not acquire any
partition of Lot No. 707 as well as Lot Nos. 2299 and 705. superior right in the property than what Carolina is entitled to or could
The matter was initially brought before the Katarungang transfer or alienate after partition.
Pambarangay, but no amicable settlement was reached by
the parties.14 On May 23, 1994, respondent Emilia In a contract of sale of co-owned property, what the vendee obtains by
instituted the herein Complaint15 for the partition of Lot Nos. virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as co-
2299, 705 and 707, annulment of the Affidavit of Self- owner, and the vendee merely steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-
Adjudication, Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT No. 42244, owner.b eing the successor-in-interest of Agripina’s share in Lot No.
reconveyance of eastern half portion of Lot No. 707, 707, respondent Emilia took the former’s place in the co-ownership and
quieting of title and damages. as such co-owner, has the right to compel partition at any time.42
On the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties, the xxx Co-heirs or co-owners cannot acquire by acquisitive prescription the
RTC rendered its Decision. The RTC ruled that a partition share of the other co-heirs or co-owners absent a clear repudiation of
of Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 will be premature since their the co ownership. The act of repudiation, as a mode of terminating co-
ownership is yet to be transmitted from Leandro to his heirs ownership, is subject to certain conditions, to wit: (1) a co-owner
whose respective shares thereto must still be determined in repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly
estate settlement proceedings. Anent Lot No. 707, the RTC made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear
held that petitioner Carolina transferred only her one-half and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open,
(½) share to Felipa and Hilaria and any conveyance of the continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the
other half pertaining to Agripina was void. period required by law.
Respondent Emilia appealed to the CA, which, in its The petitioners failed to comply with these conditions. The act of Hilaria
Decision ruled that the RTC erred in refusing to partition and Felipa in effecting the registration of the entire Lot No. 707 in their
Lot No. 707. names thru TCT No. 42244 did not serve to effectively repudiate the co-
ownership. Hilaria and Felipa failed to assert exclusive title in
themselves adversely to Emilia. Their acts clearly manifest that they
recognized the subsistence of their co-ownership with respondent
Emilia despite the issuance of TCT No. 42244 in 1962. Their acts
constitute an implied recognition of the co-ownership which in turn
negates the presence of a clear notice of repudiation to the respondent.
To sustain a plea of prescription, it must always clearly appear that one
who was originally a joint owner has repudiated the claims of his co-
owners, and that his co-owners were apprised or should have been
apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership before the
18
alleged prescriptive period began to run.
In addition, when Hilaria and Felipa registered the lot in their names to
the exclusion of Emilia, an implied trust was created by force of law and
the two of them were considered a trustee of the respondent’s
undivided share. xxx
Prescription can only produce all its effects when acts of ownership, or
in this case, possession, do not evince any doubt as to the ouster of the
rights of the other co-owners. Hence, prescription among co-owners
cannot take place when acts of ownership exercised are vague or
uncertain.
Moreover, the evidence relative to the possession, as a fact upon which

the alleged prescription is based, must be clear, complete and
conclusive in order to establish said prescription without any shadow of
doubt; and when upon trial it is not shown that the possession of the
claimant has been adverse and exclusive and opposed to the rights of
the others, the case is not one of ownership, and partition will lie. 52 The
petitioners failed to muster adequate evidence of possession essential
for the reckoning of the 10-year period for acquisitive prescription.
The express disavowal of the co-ownership did not happen on

December 11, 1962 when TCT No. 42244 was issued but in 1994 when
Hilaria attempted to demolish Emilia’s house thus explicitly excluding
her from the co-ownership. It was the only time that Hilaria and Felipa
made known their denial of the co-ownership. On the same year, the
respondent instituted the present complaint for partition; hence, the
period required by law for acquisitive period to set in was not met.
Anent laches, the Court finds it unavailing in this case in view of the
proximity of the period when the co-ownership was expressly
repudiated and when the herein complaint was filed.
Notarte v. Notarte
GR 180614, Aug.
29, 2012, 679
SCRA 378
Padilla vs. Juanita Padilla (Juanita), the mother of petitioners, owned a Whether the The facts show that the land was sold to Dominador by Ricardo’s
Magdula piece of land. After Juanita’s death on 23 March 1989, present action is daughters, namely Josephine Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas, during
petitioners, as legal heirs of Juanita, sought to have the already barred by the lifetime of Ricardo. However, the alleged deed of sale was not
GR 176858, Sept. land partitioned. Petitioners sent word to their eldest prescription presented as evidence and neither was it shown that Ricardo’s
15, 2010, 630 brother Ricardo Bahia (Ricardo) regarding their plans for daughters had any authority from Ricardo to dispose of the land. No
19
SCRA 573 the partition of the land. In a letter dated 5 June 1998 cogent evidence was ever presented that Ricardo gave his consent to,
written by Ricardo addressed to them, Ricardo had acquiesced in, or ratified the sale made by his daughters to Dominador.
declared the land for himself, prejudicing their rights as co-
heirs. Juanita had allegedly executed a notarized Affidavit Ricardo and petitioners are co-heirs or co-owners of the land. Co-heirs
of Transfer of Real Property (Affidavit) in favor of Ricardo or co-owners cannot acquire by acquisitive prescription the share of the
on 4 June 1966 making him the sole owner of the land. The other co-heirs or co-owners absent a clear repudiation of the co-
records do not show that the land was registered under the ownership, as expressed in Article 494 of the Civil Code which states:
Torrens system.
Art. 494. x x x No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir
Petitioners filed an action with the RTC for recovery of against his co-owners or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly
ownership, possession, partition and damages. Petitioners recognizes the co-ownership.
sought to declare void the sale of the land by Ricardo’s
daughters, Josephine Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas, to
respondent Dominador Magdua (Dominador). The sale was Since possession of co-owners is like that of a trustee, in order that a
made during the lifetime of Ricardo. co-owner’s possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que
trust or other co-owners, the following requisites must concur: (1) that
he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an
Petitioners alleged that Ricardo, through misrepresentation, ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-owners, (2) that such positive
had the land transferred in his name without the consent acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or
and knowledge of his co-heirs. Petitioners also stated that other co-owners, and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and
prior to 1966, Ricardo had a house constructed on the land convincing.11
but later on leased to third parties.
In the present case, all three requisites have been met. After Juanita’s
Dominador filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack death in 1989, petitioners sought for the partition of their mother’s land.
of jurisdiction. The RTC dismissed the case for lack of The heirs, including Ricardo, were notified about the plan. Ricardo,
jurisdiction. through a letter dated 5 June 1998, notified petitioners, as his co-heirs,
that he adjudicated the land solely for himself. Accordingly, Ricardo’s
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioners interest in the land had now become adverse to the claim of his co-heirs
argued that the action was not merely for recovery of after repudiating their claim of entitlement to the land. In Generosa v.
ownership and possession, partition and damages but also Prangan-Valera,12 we held that in order that title may prescribe in favor
for annulment of deed of sale. Since actions to annul of one of the co-owners, it must be clearly shown that he had
contracts are actions beyond pecuniary estimation, the repudiated the claims of the others, and that they were apprised of his
case was well within the jurisdiction of the RTC. claim of adverse and exclusive ownership, before the prescriptive
period begins to run.
Dominador filed another motion to dismiss on the ground of
prescription. The RTC denied the motion for However, in the present case, the prescriptive period began to run only
reconsideration and dismissed the case on the ground of from 5 June 1998, the date petitioners received notice of Ricardo’s
prescription. Petitioners filed another motion for repudiation of their claims to the land. Since petitioners filed an action
reconsideration which the RTC denied. Hence, this petition. for recovery of ownership and possession, partition and damages with
the RTC on 26 October 2001, only a mere three years had lapsed. This
three-year period falls short of the 10-year or 30-year acquisitive
prescription period required by law in order to be entitled to claim legal
ownership over the land. Thus, Dominador cannot invoke acquisitive
20
prescription.
Further, Dominador’s argument that prescription began to commence in

1966, after the Affidavit was executed, is erroneous. Dominador merely
relied on the Affidavit submitted to the RTC that Ricardo had been in
possession of the land for more than 30 years. Dominador did not
submit any other corroborative evidence to establish Ricardo’s alleged
possession since 1966. In Heirs of Maningding v. Court of
Appeals,13 we held that the evidence relative to the possession, as a
fact, upon which the alleged prescription is based, must be clear,
complete and conclusive in order to establish the prescription.
Taghoy vs. Tigol Spouses Filomeno Taghoy and Margarita Amit owned an Whether or not the The failure of the other heirs to reimburse the amounts advanced by the
11,067 square meter parcel of land,. failure to reimburse respondents in payment of the loan did not entitle the latter to claim full
GR 159665, Aug. the amounts ownership of the co-owned property.[41] It only gave them the right to
3, 2010, 626 SCRA On August 6, 1975, Filomeno and Margarita [8] executed a advanced by claim reimbursement for the amounts they advanced in behalf of the co-
341 special power of attorney, appointing Felixberto Tigol, Jr. respondents entitle ownership. The respondents' advance payments are in the nature of
as their attorney-in-fact. On August 21, 1975, Felixberto, as them to claim full necessary expenses for the preservation of the co-ownership. Article
attorney-in-fact, executed a real estate mortgage over the ownership of co- 488 of the Civil Code provides that necessary expenses may be
subject property to secure a loan of P22,000.00 with the owned property. incurred by one co-owner, subject to his right to collect reimbursement
Philippine National Bank (PNB).[10] Filomeno and Margarita from the remaining co-owners. Until reimbursed, the respondents hold a
obtained the loan to finance the shellcraft business of their lien upon the subject property for the amount they advanced.
children.[11]
Filomeno died intestate on February 12, 1976. On July 27,

1979, his widow, Margarita, and their seven children, as
heirs of the deceased, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement and Sale, adjudicating to themselves the
subject property and selling the same to Rosita and her
husband Felixberto (respondents) for P1,000.00.
Filomeno's heirs executed two (2) Deeds of Confirmation of

Sale, confirming the supposed sale. Simultaneous with the
execution of the deeds, however, the respondents
executed explanatory Joint Affidavits attesting that the sale
was without any consideration, and was only executed to
secure a loan.
On March 9, 1983, TCT No. 13250 was issued in the

respondents' names. Seven (7) years later, Anselmo and
Vicenta, together with Margarita, Felisa, Gaudencio, and
Pantaleon's surviving heir, Annabel, filed a complaint
against the respondents and Anastacia for declaration of
nullity of the respondents' TCT and for judicial partition.
They alleged that the deeds of confirmation of sale became
the bases for the transfer of the title in the respondents'
21
names, but the sale was fictitious or simulated.
The respondents admitted that they executed the joint

affidavits but countered that they acquired a valid title to the
subject property through the Extrajudicial Settlement of
Heirs and Sale. They claimed that when Filomeno died
without the PNB loan being paid, the heirs agreed that the
respondents will advance payment of the loan, subject to
reimbursement, to save the foreclosure of the subject
property; the heirs then executed the Extrajudicial
Settlement and Sale in the respondents' favor as their way
of reimbursing the amount the latter paid; the respondents
executed the joint affidavits out of generosity, expressing
their willingness to be reimbursed, but when the heirs failed
to reimburse the amounts advanced by them, then they
caused the registration of the title in their names.[18]
The RTC found that the sale of the subject property was
absolutely simulated since the deeds of confirmation of
sale were executed only to accommodate the respondents'
loan application using the subject property as collateral.
The lower court thus ordered the nullification of the
respondents' title. It likewise ordered the partition of the
subject property after reimbursement of the amount the
respondents paid for the loan. The RTC denied the motion
for new trial, the respondents filed an appeal with the CA,
under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
The CA decided the appeal on August 26, 2002, reversing

the RTC decision. After the CA denied the motion for
reconsideration that followed, the petitioners filed the
present petition.
Hulst v. PR Petitioner filed the present Motion for Partial Under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4726, otherwise known as the
Builders Reconsideration3 insofar as he was ordered to return to Condominium Act, foreign nationals can own Philippine real estate
respondent the amount of P2,125,540.00 in excess of the through the purchase of condominium units or townhouses constituted
GR 156364, Sept. proceeds of the auction sale delivered to petitioner. under the Condominium principle with Condominium Certificates of
25, 2008, 566 Petitioner contends that the Contract to Sell between Title. Section 5 of R.A. No. 4726 states:
SCRA 333 petitioner and respondent involved a condominium unit and
did not violate the Constitutional proscription against SECTION 5. xxx That where the common areas in the condominium
ownership of land by aliens. He argues that the contract to project are held by the owners of separate units as co-owners thereof,
sell will not transfer to the buyer ownership of the land on no condominium unit therein shall be conveyed or transferred to
which the unit is situated; thus, the buyer will not get a persons other than Filipino citizens or corporations at least 60% of the
transfer certificate of title but merely a Condominium capital stock of which belong to Filipino citizens, except in cases of
Certificate of Title as evidence of ownership; a perusal of hereditary succession. Where the common areas in a condominium
the contract will show that what the buyer acquires is the project are held by a corporation, no transfer or conveyance of a
22
seller's title and rights to and interests in the unit and the unit shall be valid if the concomitant transfer of the appurtenant
common areas. membership or stockholding in the corporation will cause the alien
interest in such corporation to exceed the limits imposed by
existing laws.(Emphasis supplied)
The law provides that no condominium unit can be sold without at the
same time selling the corresponding amount of rights, shares or other
interests in the condominium management body, the Condominium
Corporation; and no one can buy shares in a Condominium Corporation
without at the same time buying a condominium unit. It expressly allows
foreigners to acquire condominium units and shares in condominium
corporations up to not more than 40% of the total and outstanding
capital stock of a Filipino-owned or controlled corporation. Under this
set up, the ownership of the land is legally separated from the unit itself.
The land is owned by a Condominium Corporation and the unit owner is
simply a member in this Condominium Corporation.5 As long as 60% of
the members of this Condominium Corporation are Filipino, the
remaining members can be foreigners.
xxx Petitioner as unit owner was simply a member of the Condominium

Corporation and the land remained owned by respondent, then the
constitutional proscription against aliens owning real property does not
apply to the present case.
MBTC v. Pascual During the union, Florencia bought from spouses Whether or not the While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia
Clarito and Belen Sering a 250-square meter lot with a termination of severed their marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the
GR 163744, Feb. three-door apartment standing thereon located in Makati Conjugal Property character of the properties acquired before such declaration continues
29, 2008, 547 City. Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was Regime ipso facto to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and
SCRA 246 issued in the name of Florencia, "married to Nelson end the nature of partition of the partnership. This conclusion holds true whether we apply
Pascual" a.k.a. Nicholson Pascual. Conjugal Ownership Art. 129 of the Family Code xxx or the Civil Code on the subject,
In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of Conjugal Partnership of Gains. For, the relevant provisions of both
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Codes first require the liquidation of the conjugal properties before a
RTC declared the marriage null and void. In the same regime of separation of property reigns.
decision, the RTC, inter alia, ordered the dissolution and
liquidation of the ex-spouses’ conjugal partnership of gains. In Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we ruled that pending its
Florencia, together with spouses Norberto and liquidation following its dissolution, the conjugal partnership of gains is
Elvira Oliveros, obtained a PhP 58 million loan from converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership among the surviving
petitioner Metropolitan Bank . To secure the obligation, spouse and the other heirs of the deceased.
Florencia and the spouses Oliveros executed several real
estate mortgages (REMs) on their properties, including the
above mentioned lot. Among the documents Florencia In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern
submitted to procure the loan were a copy of TCT, a the property relationship between the former spouses, where: “Each co-
photocopy of the marriage-nullifying RTC decision, and a owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
document denominated as "Waiver" that Nicholson benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
purportedly executed on April 9, 1995. mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
23
Due to the failure of Florencia and the spouses alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
Oliveros to pay their loan obligation when it fell due, limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
Metrobank initiated a foreclosure. At the auction sale, upon the termination of the co-ownership.”
Metrobank emerged as the highest bidder.
Nicholson filed before the RTC a Complaint to declare the xxx What governed the property relations of the former spouses when
nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property. In it, the mortgage was given is the aforequoted Art. 493. Under it, Florencia
Nicholson alleged that the property, which is still conjugal has the right to mortgage or even sell her one-half (1/2) undivided
property, was mortgaged without his consent. interest in the disputed property even without the consent of Nicholson.
However, the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only to the
1/2 undivided portion that Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage
contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the
lot is null and void, Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of
his undivided half. The conclusion would have, however, been different
if Nicholson indeed duly waived his share in the conjugal partnership.
xxx
Upon the foregoing perspective, Metrobank’s right, as mortgagee and

as the successful bidder at the auction of the lot, is confined only to the
1/2 undivided portion thereof heretofore pertaining in ownership to
Florencia. The other undivided half belongs to Nicholson. As owner pro
indiviso of a portion of the lot in question, Metrobank may ask for the
partition of the lot and its property rights "shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to [the bank] in the division upon the termination
of the co-ownership."18 This disposition is in line with the well-
established principle that the binding force of a contract must be
recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so––quando res non
valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest
Cruz v. Catapang Leonor B. Cruz, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya are the co- Whether consent In our view, a co-owner cannot give valid consent to another to build a
owners of a parcel of land. With the consent of Norma given by a co-owner house on the co-owned property, which is an act tantamount to
GR 164110, Feb. Maligaya, respondent Teofila M. Catapang built a house on of a parcel of land devoting the property to his or her exclusive use.
12, 2008, 544 a lot adjacent to the abovementioned parcel of land. The to a person to
SCRA 512 house intruded, however, on a portion of the co-owned construct a house Furthermore, Articles 486 and 491 of the Civil Code provide:
property. on the co-owned
property warrants
the dismissal of a Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common,
In the first week of September 1995, petitioner Leonor B. provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for which
Cruz saw a part of respondent’s house intruding unto a forcible entry case
filed by another co- it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of
portion of the co-owned property. She then made several the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it
demands upon respondent to demolish the intruding owner against that
person. according to their rights. The purpose of the co-ownership may
structure and to vacate the portion encroaching on their be changed by agreement, express or implied.
property. The respondent, however, refused and
disregarded her demands.
Art. 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of
the others, make alterations in the thing owned in common,
On January 25, 1996, the petitioner filed a complaint8 for even though benefits for all would result therefrom. However, if
forcible entry. The MCTC decided in favor of petitioner,
24
ruling that consent of only one of the co-owners is not the withholding of the consent by one or more of the co-
sufficient to justify defendant’s construction of the house owners is clearly prejudicial to the common interest, the courts
and possession of the portion of the lot in question. The may afford adequate relief.
RTC affirmed the MCTC’s ruling.
Article 486 states each co-owner may use the thing owned in common
After her motion for reconsideration was denied by the provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is
RTC, respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-
Appeals, which reversed the RTC’s decision. The Court of ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to
Appeals held that there is no cause of action for forcible their rights. Giving consent to a third person to construct a house on the
entry in this case because respondent’s entry into the co-owned property will injure the interest of the co-ownership and
property, considering the consent given by co-owner prevent other co-owners from using the property in accordance with
Norma Maligaya, cannot be characterized as one made their rights.
through strategy or stealth which gives rise to a cause of
action for forcible entry. Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall, without the consent of
the others, make alterations in the thing owned in common. It
necessarily follows that none of the co-owners can, without the consent
of the other co-owners, validly consent to the making of an alteration by
another person, such as respondent, in the thing owned in common.
Alterations include any act of strict dominion or ownership and any
encumbrance or disposition has been held implicitly to be an act of
alteration.19 The construction of a house on the co-owned property is an
act of dominion. Therefore, it is an alteration falling under Article 491 of
the Civil Code. There being no consent from all co-owners, respondent
had no right to construct her house on the co-owned property.
Consent of only one co-owner will not warrant the dismissal of the
complaint for forcible entry filed against the builder. The consent given
by Norma Maligaya in the absence of the consent of petitioner and Luz
Cruz did not vest upon respondent any right to enter into the co-owned
property. Her entry into the property still falls under the classification
"through strategy or stealth."
xxx Respondent’s entry into the property without the permission of

petitioner could appear to be a secret and clandestine act done in
connivance with co-owner Norma Maligaya whom respondent allowed
to stay in her house. Entry into the land effected clandestinely without
the knowledge of the other co-owners could be categorized as
possession by stealth.20 Moreover, respondent’s act of getting only the
consent of one co-owner, her sister Norma Maligaya, and allowing the
latter to stay in the constructed house, can in fact be considered as a
strategy which she utilized in order to enter into the co-owned property.
As such, respondent’s acts constitute forcible entry.
25
Petitioner’s filing of a complaint for forcible entry, in our view, was within
the one-year period for filing the complaint. The one-year period within
which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the
date of actual entry to the land. However, when entry is made through
stealth, then the one-year period is counted from the time the petitioner
learned about it.
Arriola v. Arriola John Nabor C. Arriola (respondent) filed Special Civil Whether the public xxx The subject house is covered by the judgment of partition. We
Action against Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. auction should qualify, however, that this ruling does not necessarily countenance the
GR 177703, Jan. Arriola (petitioners) for judicial partition of the properties of include the subject immediate and actual partition of the subject house by way of public
28, 2008, 542 decedent Fidel Arriola (the decedent Fidel). Respondent is house. auction in view of the suspensive proscription imposed under Article
SCRA 666 the son of decedent Fidel with his first wife Victoria C. 159 of The Family Code xxx.
Calabia, while petitioner Anthony is the son of decedent The RTC excluded
Fidel with his second wife, petitioner Vilma. the subject house It is true that the existence of the subject house was not specifically
because alleged in the complaint for partition. Such omission notwithstanding,
The RTC rendered a Decision ordering the partition of the respondent never the subject house is deemed part of the judgment of partition for two
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. alleged its existence compelling reasons.
383714 (84191) left by the decedent Fidel S. Arriola by and in his complaint for
among his heirs John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola partition or
established his co- First, as correctly held by the CA, under the provisions of the Civil
and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola in equal shares of one-third Code, the subject house is deemed part of the subject land. The Court
(1/3) each without prejudice to the rights of creditors or ownership
thereof.17 On the quotes with approval the ruling of the CA, to wit:
mortgagees thereon. The decision became final on March
15, 2004. other hand, citing
Articles xxx In general, the right to accession is automatic (ipso
440,18 44519 and jure), requiring no prior act on the part of the owner or the
As the parties failed to agree on how to partition among 44620 of the Civil principal. So that even if the improvements including the
them the land covered by TCT No. 383714 (subject land), Code, the CA held house were not alleged in the complaint for partition, they
respondent sought its sale through public auction, and that as the are deemed included in the lot on which they stand,
petitioners acceded to it.5 Accordingly, the RTC ordered the deceased owned following the principle of accession. Consequently, the lot
public auction of the subject land.6 The public auction sale the subject land, he subject of judicial partition in this case includes the house
was scheduled on May 31, 2003 but it had to be reset also owned the which is permanently attached thereto, otherwise, it would
when petitioners refused to include in the auction the house subject house which be absurd to divide the principal, i.e., the lot, without
(subject house) standing on the subject land.7This is a mere accessory dividing the house which is permanently attached thereto.
prompted respondent to file with the RTC an Urgent to the land. Both
Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court,8praying properties form part
that petitioners be declared in contempt. Second, xxx the subject house is part of the estate of the deceased; as
of the estate of the such, it is owned in common by the latter's heirs, the parties herein, any
deceased and are one of whom, under Article 494 of the Civil Code, may, at any time,
The RTC denied the motion in an Order dated August 30, held in co- demand the partition of the subject house. Therefore, respondent's
2005, for the reason that petitioners were justified in ownership by his recourse to the partition of the subject house cannot be hindered xxx.
refusing to have the subject house included in the auction. heirs, the parties
The RTC denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration. herein.
xxx While we treat the subject house as part of the co-ownership
of the parties, we stop short of authorizing its actual partition by
Respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari where public auction at this time. It bears emphasis that an action for
he sought to have the RTC Orders set aside, and prayed partition involves two phases: first, the declaration of the existence of a
that he be allowed to proceed with the auction of the state of co-ownership; and second, the actual termination of that state
26
subject land including the subject house. of co-ownership through the segregation of the common property. What
is settled thus far is only the fact that the subject house is under the co-
The CA granted the Petition for Certiorari. Petitioners filed ownership of the parties, and therefore susceptible of partition among
a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same. them.
xxx Respondent claims that the subject house was built by decedent
Fidel on his exclusive property. Petitioners add that said house has
been their residence for 20 years. Taken together, these averments on
record establish that the subject house is a family home within the
contemplation of the provisions of The Family Code, particularly:
Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the

husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is
the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the
land on which it is situated.
Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a

house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family
residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any
of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home
continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced
sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the
extent of the value allowed by law. (Emphasis supplied.)
One significant innovation introduced by The Family Code is the

automatic constitution of the family home from the time of its occupation
as a family residence, without need anymore for the judicial or
extrajudicial processes provided under the defunct Articles 224 to 251
of the Civil Code and Rule 106 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore,
Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the family home
not just to the dwelling structure in which the family resides but also to
the lot on which it stands. Thus, applying these concepts, the subject
house as well as the specific portion of the subject land on which it
stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and
petitioner Vilma from the moment they began occupying the same as a
family residence 20 years back.
It being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot on which it
stands) is the family home of the deceased and his heirs, the same is
shielded from immediate partition under Article 159 of The Family
Code, viz:
Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death
27
of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the

family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a
minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same
unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This
rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property
or constituted the family home. (Emphasis supplied.)
The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the family unit
following the death of its head. To this end, it preserves the family home
as the physical symbol of family love, security and unity by imposing the
following restrictions on its partition: first, that the heirs cannot extra-
judicially partition it for a period of 10 years from the death of one or
both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family, or for a longer
period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein; and second,
that the heirs cannot judicially partition it during the aforesaid periods
unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. xxx
More importantly, Article 159 imposes the proscription against the

immediate partition of the family home regardless of its ownership. This
signifies that even if the family home has passed by succession to the
co-ownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any one of them, this
fact alone cannot transform the family home into an ordinary property,
much less dispel the protection cast upon it by the law. The rights of the
individual co-owner or owner of the family home cannot subjugate the
rights granted under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the family home.
Set against the foregoing rules, the family home -- consisting of the
subject house and lot on which it stands -- cannot be partitioned at this
time, even if it has passed to the co-ownership of his heirs, the parties
herein. Decedent Fidel died on March 10, 2003.32 Thus, for 10 years
from said date or until March 10, 2013, or for a longer period, if there is
still a minor beneficiary residing therein, the family home he constituted
cannot be partitioned, much less when no compelling reason exists for
the court to otherwise set aside the restriction and order the partition of
the property.
xxx It bears emphasis, however, that in the meantime, there is no

obstacle to the immediate public auction of the portion of the subject
land covered by TCT No. 383714, which falls outside the specific area
of the family home.
Heirs of Seraspi v. Marcelino Recasa was the owner of two parcels of land. Whether private xxx What is involved here is extinctive prescription, and the applicable
CA During his lifetime, Marcelino contracted three (3) respondent Simeon law is Art. 1141 of the Civil Code.
marriages. At the time of his death in 1943, he had fifteen Recasa acquired
GR 135602, Apr. (15) children from his three marriages. In 1948, his ownership of the
28
28, 2000, 331 intestate estate was partitioned into three parts by his properties in The question, therefore, is whether private respondent has acquired the
SCRA 293 heirs,. question through ownership of the two lands by prescription. On this point, the Civil Code
acquisitive provides:
In the same year, Patronicio Recasa, representing the heirs prescription.
of the first marriage, sold the share of the heirs in the Art. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real
estate to Dominador Recasa, an heir of the second rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.
marriage. On June 15, 1950, Dominador, representing the Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things
heirs of the second marriage, in turn sold the share of the in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.
heirs to Quirico and Purificacion Seraspi whose heirs are Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable
the present petitioners. Included in this sale was the property are acquired by ordinary prescription through
property sold by Patronicio to Dominador. possession of ten years.
Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables
In 1958, the Seraspis obtained a loan from the Kalibo Rural also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession
Bank, Inc. (KRBI) on the security of the lands in question to thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.
finance improvements on the lands. However, they failed to
pay the loan for which reason the mortgage was foreclosed Thus, acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be
and the lands were sold to KRBI as the highest bidder. ordinary or extraordinary, depending on whether the property is
Subsequently, the lands were sold by KRBI to Manuel possessed in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law. xxxx
Rata, brother-in-law of Quirico Seraspi. It appears that
Rata, as owner of the property, allowed Quirico Seraspi to In the case at bar, private respondent did not acquire possession of the
administer the property. property through any of the modes recognized by the Civil Code, to wit:
(1) occupation, (2) intellectual creation, (3) law, (4) donation, (5)
In 1974, private respondent Simeon Recasa, Marcelino’s succession, (6) tradition in consequence of certain contracts, and (7)
child by his third wife, forcibly entered the lands in question prescription.[5]
and took possession thereof.
xxx It must be remembered that in the partition of the intestate estate of
In 1983, the Seraspis purchased the lands from Manuel Marcelino Recasa, the properties were divided into three parts, each
Rata and afterwards filed a complaint against Simeon part being reserved for each group of heirs belonging to one of the
Recasa for recovery of possession of the lands. three marriages Marcelino entered into. Since the contested parcels of
land were adjudicated to the heirs of the first and second marriages, it
The trial court ruled in favor of the Seraspis, stating that follows that private respondent, as heir of the third marriage, has no
they had acquired the property through a sale and right over the parcels of land. While, as heir to the intestate estate of his
acquisitive prescription. However, on appeal, the Court of father, private respondent was co-owner of all of his father’s properties,
Appeals reversed on the ground that the action of the such co-ownership rights were effectively dissolved by the partition
Seraspis was barred by the statute of limitations. Hence, agreed upon by the heirs of Marcelino Recasa.
this petition filed by Quirico Seraspi.
xxx
Consequently, petitioners are not the owners of the property since it has
not been delivered to them. At the time they bought the property from
Rata in 1983, the property was in the possession of private respondent.
However, this does not give private respondent a right to remain in

29
possession of the property. Petitioners’ title to the property prevails over

private respondents’ possession in fact but without basis in law. As held
in Waite v. Peterson,[9] when the property belonging to a person is
unlawfully taken by another, the former has the right of action against
the latter for the recovery of the property. Such right may be transferred
by the sale or assignment of the property, and the transferee can
maintain such action against the wrongdoer.
Possession; Acquisitive Prescription – Good faith and Just Title
CASE FACTS ISSUES RULING

1. Pascual v.
Daquioag
2. REP v. Ng On 7 January 1997, respondent filed an application for the W/N the evidence Yes.
original registration of title over five lots situated at submitted is In a judicial confirmation of title under original registration proceedings,
Consolacion, Cebu. He claimed ownership of these five sufficient to prove applicants may obtain
parcels of land with a total area of 1,841 square meters. that the possession the registration of title to land upon a showing that they or their
His claim was based on his purchase thereof from the by respondent’s predecessors-in-interest have been in
vendors, who had possessed the realties for more than predecessors-in-
thirty (30) years. During the reception of evidence by the interest was of the (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
Clerk of Court, respondent furnished the following pieces of nature required by occupation of (2) agricultural lands of the public domain,
documentary evidence to establish his purchase of the lots the Public Land Act (3) under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership,
such as Deeds of Absolute Sale, Extra-judicial Settlement and the Property (4) for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the
of Estate & Sale, and Agreement of Partition. In addition, Registration Decree application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or
he attached the numerous vintage Tax Declarations dating force majeure. The burden of proof in land registration
as far back as 1948. These Tax Declarations were either cases rests on applicants who must show clear, positive and convincing
under the names of the vendors, the previous transferors evidence that their alleged possession and occupation were of the
and the original owners of the lots. The regularity and due nature and duration required by law.
execution of these contracts, Tax Declarations and realty
payments were never assailed by petitioner. Respondent
also submitted the following documents to prove his It is clear from the records that respondent presented several pieces of
ownership: (1) the Department of Environment and Natural documentary evidence to prove that he openly possessed the
Resources (DENR) Certification showing that the subject properties. He submitted notarized Deeds of Sale,
lots were within the alienable and disposable lands of the Agreements of Partition and Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate and Sale
public domain; (2) the DENR Certification stating that the to show the acquisition of the lands from his predecessors-in-interest.
lots are not covered by any other subsisting public land Moreover, he presented Tax Declarations and realty payments showing
application; and (3) the original tracing cloth plan covering that he and his
the properties. Similarly, these pieces of evidence were predecessors-in-interest had been paying real estate taxes since 1948
never assailed by petitioner. As for testimonial evidence, until the inception of this case in 1997; hence, for more than 30 years.
respondent narrated that these lots were purchased from He also submitted the original tracing cloth plan in
theaforementioned vendees and predecessors-in-interest, which the advance survey plan shows that the subject lots had
who had been in possession of the lots for more than thirty previously been under the names of the vendors, the previous
(30) years. In support of his claims, he further presented transferors, and the original owners of the lots. As we have ruled in
the testimony of the 77-year-old Josefa N. Fat (Fat), who Republic v. Sta. Ana-Burgos, while tax declarations and realty tax
30
lived near the subject lots. According to Fat, she knew the payments on property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they
original owners and vendees of the lots, as they were her are nevertheless good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for
neighbors and close friends. She also recounted that the no one in the right frame of mind would be
properties were either inherited or transferred by the past paying taxes for a property that is not in one’s actual or at least
owners to the vendors, who in turn sold them to Martin T. constructive possession. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property
Ng; and that there is no other person who laid claim over for taxation purposes is an announcement of one’s claim against the
the lots. She ended her testimony by asserting with State and all other interested parties. In fact, these documents already
certainty that the ownership and possession by respondent constitute prima facie evidence of possession. Moreover, if the holders
and his predecessors-in-interest were public, peaceful, of the land present a deed of conveyance in their favor from its former
open, continuous, and in the concept of an owner. MTC owner to support their claim of ownership,
rendered its 23 October 2002 Decision confirming the declaration of ownership and tax receipts relative to the property
respondent’s title to the subject lots and ordering the may be used to prove their good faith in occupying and possessing it.
registration of the title in his name. Petitioner, as Additionally, when considered with actual possession of the property, tax
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), receipts constitute evidence of great value in support of the
appealed to the CA. In a lone assignment of error, it claim of title of ownership by prescription.
averred that the trial court erred in granting Ng’s
application, since respondent had failed to comply with the As for testimonial evidence, although it is unfortunate that respondent’s
requirements for the original registration of title. Petitioner counsel failed to ask Fat specific questions as to the fact of possession,
contended that respondent had failed to substantiate his it is evident that respondent’s predecessorsin-
alleged possession and occupation. It asserted that the Tax interest were the witness’ longtime neighbors and close friends who
Declarations attached to the application merely provided an lived near the subject lots. Logically, it can be inferred that respondent’s
indicia of possession, and not a conclusive proof of predecessors-in-interest materially occupied
ownership. The CA affirmed the factual findings of the and continuously possessed the adjoining property.
MTC. It appreciated the statement of Josefa Fat, who lived
near the subject parcels of land. This testimony was even Possession is acquired in any of the following ways:
corroborated by Tax Declarations and realty tax payments, (1) by the material occupation of the thing;
which altogether sufficientlyestablished the possession of (2) by the exercise of a right;
the realties by respondent’s predecessors-in-interest. (3) by the fact that the property is subject to the action of our will; and
(4) by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring the
right.
In Director of Lands v. IAC, we explained the nature of the possession

required to confirm one’s title as follows:
Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and
not clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not
intermittent or occasional; exclusive
when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land
and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious
when it is so conspicuous that it is generally
known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood.
3. Soledad v. Sometime in June 2004, private complainant Henry C. Yu Whether or not We find no value in petitioner’s argument. The trial court convicted
People received a call on his mobile phone from a certain "Tess" or petitioner was petitioner of possession of the credit card fraudulently applied for,
"Juliet Villar" (later identified as Rochelle Bagaporo), a legally in penalized by R.A. No. 8484. The law, however, does not define the word
credit card agent, who offered a Citifinancing loan "possession" of the "possession." Thus, we use the term as defined in Article 523 of the Civil
assistance at a low interest rate. Enticed by the offer, credit card subject Code, that is, "possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a
31
private complainant invited Rochelle Bagaporo to go to his of the case. right." The acquisition of possession involves two elements: the corpus
office in Quezon City. While in his office, Rochelle or the material holding of the thing, and the animus possidendi or the
Bagaporo indorsed private complainant to her immediate intent to possess it.12 Animus possidendi is a state of mind, the
boss, a certain "Arthur" [later identified as petitioner]. In presence or determination of which is largely dependent on attendant
their telephone conversation, [petitioner] told private events in each case. It may be inferred from the prior or
complainant to submit documents to a certain "Carlo" (later contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding
identified as Ronald Gobenchiong). Private complainant circumstances. In this case, prior to the commission of the crime,
submitted various documents, such as his Globe petitioner fraudulently obtained from private complainant various
handyphone original platinum gold card, identification cards documents showing the latter’s identity. He, thereafter, obtained cellular
and statements of accounts. Subsequently, private phones using private complainant’s identity. Undaunted, he fraudulently
complainant followed up his loan status but he failed to get applied for a credit card under the name and personal circumstances of
in touch with either [petitioner] or Ronald Gobenchiong. private complainant. Upon the delivery of the credit card applied for, the
During the first week of August 2004, private complainant "messenger" (an NBI agent) required two valid identification cards.
received his Globe handyphone statement of account Petitioner thus showed two identification cards with his picture on them,
wherein he was charged for two (2) mobile phone numbers but bearing the name and forged signature of private complainant. As
which were not his. Upon verification with the phone evidence of the receipt of the envelope delivered, petitioner signed the
company, private complainant learned that he had acknowledgment receipt shown by the messenger, indicating therein
additional five (5) mobile numbers in his name, and the that the content of the envelope was the Metrobank credit card.
application for said cellular phone lines bore the picture of Petitioner materially held the envelope containing the credit card with the
[petitioner] and his forged signature. Private complainant intent to possess.
also checked with credit card companies and learned that
his Citibank Credit Card database information was altered Contrary to petitioner’s contention that the credit card never came into
and he had a credit card application with Metrobank Card his possession because it was only delivered to him, the above narration
Corporation (Metrobank). shows that he, in fact, did an active part in acquiring possession by
presenting the identification cards purportedly showing his identity as
Thereafter, private complainant and Metrobank’s junior Henry Yu. Certainly, he had the intention to possess the same. Had he
assistant manager Jefferson Devilleres lodged a complaint not actively participated, the envelope would not have been given to
with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which him. Moreover, his signature on the acknowledgment receipt indicates
conducted an entrapment operation. During the entrapment that there was delivery and that possession was transferred to him as
operation, NBI’s Special Investigator (SI) Salvador Arteche the recipient. Undoubtedly, petitioner knew that the envelope contained
[Arteche], together with some other NBI operatives, arrived the Metrobank credit card, as clearly indicated in the acknowledgment
in Las Piñas around 5:00 P.M. [Arteche] posed as the receipt, coupled with the fact that he applied for it using the identity of
delivery boy of the Metrobank credit card. Upon reaching private complainant.
the address written on the delivery receipt, [Arteche] asked
for Henry Yu. [Petitioner] responded that he was Henry Yu
and presented to [Arteche] two (2) identification cards
which bore the name and signature of private complainant,
while the picture showed the face of [petitioner]. [Petitioner]
signed the delivery receipt. Thereupon, [Arteche]
introduced himself as an NBI operative and apprehended
[petitioner]. [Arteche] recovered from [petitioner] the two (2)
identification cards he presented to [Arteche] earlier.
Petitioner was thus charged with Violation of Section 9(e),
R.A. No. 8484 for "possessing a counterfeit access device
or access device fraudulently applied for." Petitioner avers
32
that he was never in possession of the subject credit card

because he was arrested immediately after signing the
acknowledgement receipt. Thus, he did not yet know the
contents of the envelope delivered and had no control over
the subject credit card.
4. EDCA Publishing
v. Santos
5. Abalos v. Heirs On July 24, 1996, herein respondents filed a Complaint for Whether the Petition lacks merit. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real
of Torio Recovery of Possession and Damages with the Municipal petitioner and its rights may beordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription
GR# 175444/ DEC. Trial Court (MTC) of Binmaley, Pangasinanagainst Jaime predecessors-in- requires possession in good faith and with just title for ten (10) years.
14, 2011 Abalos(Jaime) and the spouses Felix and Consuelo interest, possessed Without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be
Salazar. Respondents contended that: they are the children the property in the extraordinary in character which requires uninterrupted adverse
and heirs of one Vicente Torio (Vicente) who died intestate concept of an owner possession for thirty (30) years. Possession “in good faith” consists in
on September 11, 1973; at the time of the death of Vicente, or by mere the reasonable belief that the person from whom the thing is received
he left behind a parcel of land measuring 2,950 square tolerance by the has been the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership. There is
meters, more or less, which is located at San Isidro Norte, defendants and “just title” when the adverse claimant came into possession of the
Binmaley, Pangasinan; during the lifetime of Vicente and their predecessors- property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition
through his tolerance, Jaime and the Spouses Salazar in-interest. of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or
were allowed to stay and build their respective houses on could not transmit any right.
the subject parcel of land; even after the death of Vicente,
herein respondents allowed Jaime and the Spouses In the instant case, it is clear that during their possession of the property
Salazar to remain on the disputed lot; however, in 1985, in question, petitioners acknowledged ownership thereof by the
respondents asked Jaime and the Spouses Salazar to immediate predecessor-in-interest of respondents. This is clearly shown
vacate the subject lot, but they refused to heed the demand by the Tax Declaration in the name of Jaime for the year 1984 wherein it
of respondents forcing respondents to file the complaint. contains a statement admitting that Jaime's house was built on the land
of Vicente, respondents' immediate predecessor-in-interest. Petitioners
Jaime and the Spouses Salazar filed their Answer with never disputed such an acknowledgment. Thus, having knowledge that
Counterclaim, denying the material allegations in the they nor their predecessors-in-interest are not the owners of the
Complaint and asserting in their Special and Affirmative disputed lot, petitioners' possession could not be deemed as possession
Defenses that: respondents' cause of action is barred by in good faith as to enable them to acquire the subject land by ordinary
acquisitive prescription; the court a quo has no jurisdiction prescription. In this respect, the Court agrees with the CA that
over the nature of the action and the persons of the petitioners' possession of the lot in question was by mere tolerance of
defendants; the absolute and exclusive owners and respondents and their predecessors-in-interest. Acts of possessory
possessors of the disputed lot are the deceased character executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the owner are
predecessors of defendants; defendants and their inadequate for purposes of acquisitive prescription. Possession, to
predecessors-in-interest had been in actual, continuous constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be en concepto de
and peaceful possession of the subject lot as owners since dueño, or, to use the common law equivalent of the term, that
time immemorial; defendants are faithfully and religiously possession should be adverse, if not, such possessory acts, no matter
paying real property taxes on the disputed lot as evidenced how long, do not start the running of the period of prescription.
by Real Property Tax Receipts; they have continuously
introduced improvements on the said land, such as houses, Moreover, the CA correctly held that even if the character of petitioners'
trees and other kinds of ornamental plants which are in possession of the subject property had become adverse, as evidenced
existence up to the time of the filing of their Answer. by their declaration of the same for tax purposes under the names of
their predecessors-in-interest, their possession still falls short of the
required period of thirty (30) years in cases of extraordinary acquisitive
33
prescription. Records show that the earliest Tax Declaration in the name
of petitioners was in 1974. Reckoned from such date, the thirty-year
period was completed in 2004. However, herein respondents' complaint
was filed in 1996, effectively interrupting petitioners' possession upon
service of summons on them. Thus, petitioners’ possession also did not
ripen into ownership, because they failed to meet the required statutory
period of extraordinary prescription.
This Court has held that the evidence relative to the possession upon
which the alleged prescription is based, must be clear, complete and
conclusive in order to establish the prescription.In the present case, the
Court finds no error on the part of the CA in holding that petitioners
failed to present competent evidence to prove their alleged good faith in
neither possessing the subject lot nor their adverse claim thereon.
Instead, the records would show that petitioners' possession was by
mere tolerance of respondents and their predecessors-ininterest.
6. People v. SPO3 Vicente Competente, chief of the Investigation and Whether or not Yes.
Penaflorida Operation Division of the Philippine National Police station appellant Appellant failed to satisfactorily establish his lack of knowledge of
GR# 175604, APR. in Tigaon, Camarines Sur, received a tip from an asset that consciously possession in the instant
10, 2008 a bundle of marijuana was being transported by appellant possess marijuana case. First, the marijuana was found in the bicycle he himself was
Salvador Peñaflorida to Huyon-huyon and therefore guilty driving. Second, the police
from another barangay in Tigaon, Camarines Sur. Major of illegal officers first readily saw in plain view the edges of the marijuana leaves
Domingo Agravante, chief of police of Tigaon, then possession of jutting out of the
organized a team composed of Competente as team prohibited drugs. package. Third, it is incredulous that appellant did not ask Obias what
leader, SPO2 Ricardo Callo, SPO1 Portugal, PO3 Pillos the package contained
and PO2 Edgar Latam. The team boarded the police when the latter requested him to do the delivery errand since the
mobile car and proceeded to SitioNasulan in Barangay package was wrapped in a
Huyon-huyon. They overtook Peñaflorida who was on a newspaper and weighed almost one kilogram.
bicycle. The police officers flagged appellant down and Furthermore, it appeared from the cross-examination of appellant that
found marijuana wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper Obias was an
together with other grocery items. The amount of P1550.00 acquaintance. In the ordinary course of things, one is expected to
was also found in appellant's possession. The police inquire about the contents of
officers confiscated these items and took a wrapped package especially when it is a mere acquaintance who
photographs thereof. Appellant was then brought to the requests the delivery and,
headquarters where he was booked. Upon arraignment, more so, when delivery is to a place some distance away.
appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
Appellant denied that he owned the package as the same
belonged to BoyetObias. On that day, he was with Igmidio
Miranda to buy a dog but failed to get the dog. On his way
home, they met BoyetObias who requested to bring the
package to Jimmy Gonzales. Appellant Peñaflorida and
Miranda parted ways in the town proper. It was on his way
to deliver the package to Gonzales that appellant was
flagged down. On October 26, 1998, the trial court
rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond
34
reasonable doubt of transporting a prohibited drug. The

case was brought to the Supreme Court on automatic
review but the case was referred to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the decision of the lower court. The case
once again
brought to the Supreme Court on automatic review.
Appellant denies any knowledge that the package in his
possession contained marijuana. He
asserted that he did not freely and consciously possess the
marijuana.
7. BPI Family v. TevestecoArrastre-Stevedoring Co., Inc. (Tevesteco) WON BPI-FB is in Article 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which
Franco opened a savings and current account with BPI-FB. Soon bad faith and as the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the
GR# 123498, NOV. thereafter First Metro Investment Corporation (FMIC) also such liable for natural and probable consequences of the breach
23, 2007 opened a time deposit account with the same branch of interest on Franco’s of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have
BPI-FB with a deposit of P100,000,000.00, to mature one time deposit, and reasonable foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted. In case
year thence. Subsequently, on August 31, 1989, Franco for moral and of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be
opened three accounts, namely, a current, 4 savings, 5 and exemplary damages responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the
time deposit, 6 with BPI-FB. The current and savings non-performance of the obligation.
accounts were respectively funded with an initial deposit
ofP500,000.00 each, while the time deposit account had We find, as the trial court did, that BPI-FB acted out of the impetus of
P1,000,000.00 with a maturity date of August 31, 1990. self-protection and not out of malevolence or ill will. BPI-FB was not in
The total amount of P2,000,000.00 used to open these the corrupt state of mind contemplated in Article 2201 and should not be
accounts is traceable to a check issued by Tevesteco held liable for all damages now being imputed to it for its breach
allegedly in consideration of Franco’s introduction of Eladio of obligation. For the same reason, it is not liable for the unearned
Teves,7 who was looking for a conduit bank to facilitate interest on the time deposit.
Tevesteco’s business transactions, to Jaime Sebastian,
who was then BPI-FB SFDM’s Branch Manager. In turn, Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it
the funding for the P2,000,000.00 check was part of imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
the P80,000,000.00 debited by BPI-FB from FMIC’s time doing of wrong; it partakes of the nature of fraud.44 We have held that it
deposit account and credited to Tevesteco’s current is a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will.45
account pursuant to an Authority to Debit purportedly In the instant case, we cannot attribute to BPI-FB fraud or even a motive
signed by FMIC’s officers. It appears, however, that the of self-enrichment. As the trial court found, there was no denial
signatures of FMIC’s officers on the Authority to Debit were whatsoever by BPI-FB of the existence of the accounts.
forged. On September 4, 1989, Antonio Ong,9 upon being
shown the Authority to Debit, personally declared his The computer-generated document which indicated that the current
signature therein to be a forgery. Unfortunately, Tevesteco account was "not on file" resulted from the prior debit by BPI-FB of the
had already effected several withdrawals from its current deposits. The remedy of freezing the account, or the garnishment, or
account (to which had been credited the P80,000,000.00 even the outright refusal to honor any transaction thereon was resorted
covered by the forged Authority to Debit) amounting to to solely for the purpose of holding on to the funds as a security for its
P37,455,410.54, including the P2,000,000.00 paid to intended court action, and with no other goal but to ensure the integrity
Franco. of the accounts. We have had occasion to hold that in the absence of
fraud or bad faith,47 moral damages cannot be awarded; and that the
On September 8, 1989, impelled by the need to protect its adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful, or
interests in light of FMIC’s forgery claim, BPI-FB, thru its the party liable for it. One may err, but error alone is not a ground for
Senior Vice-President, SeverinoCoronacion, instructed granting such damages. An award of moral damages contemplates the
35
Jesus Arangorin to debit Franco’s savings and current existence of the following requisites:
accounts for the amounts remaining therein.11 However, (1) there must be an injury clearly sustained by the claimant, whether
Franco’s time deposit account could not be debited due to physical, mental or psychological;
the capacity limitations of BPI-FB’s computer. (2) there must be a culpable act or omission factually established;
(3) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause
In the meantime, two checks13 drawn by Franco against of the injury sustained by the claimant; and
his BPI-FB current account were dishonored upon (4) the award for damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in
presentment for payment, and stamped with a notation Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
"account under garnishment." Apparently, Franco’s current
account was garnished by virtue of an Order of Franco could not point to, or identify any particular circumstance in
Attachment issued by the Regional Trial Court of Makati Article 2219 of the Civil Code, upon which to base his claim for moral
(Makati RTC) in Civil Case No. 89-4996 (Makati Case), damages. Thus, not having acted in bad faith, BPI-FB cannot be held
which had been filed by BPI-FB against Franco et al.,14 to liable for moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code for breach
recover the P37,455,410.54 representing Tevesteco’s total of contract.
withdrawals from its account. Notably, the dishonored
checks were issued by Franco and presented for payment
at BPI-FB prior to Franco’s receipt of notice that his
accounts were under garnishment.15 In fact, at the time the
Notice of Garnishment dated September 27, 1989 was
served on BPI-FB, Franco had yet to be impleaded in the
Makati case where the writ of attachment was issued.
Immediately, upon receipt of such copy, Franco filed a
Motion to Discharge Attachment which the Makati RTC
granted on May 16, 1990. The Order Lifting the Order of
Attachment was served on BPI-FB on even date, with
Franco demanding the release to him of the funds in his
savings and current accounts. Jesus Arangorin, BPI-FB’s
new manager, could not forthwith comply with the demand
as the funds, as previously stated, had already been
debited because of FMIC’s forgery claim. As such, BPI-
FB’s computer at the SFDM Branch indicated that the
current account record was "not on file." On May 17, 1990,
Franco pre-terminated his time deposit account. BPI-FB
deducted the amount of P63,189.00 from the remaining
balance of the time deposit account representing advance
interest paid to him. These transactions spawned a number
of cases, some of which we had already resolved. FMIC
filed a complaint against BPI-FB for the recovery of the
amount of P80,000,000.00 debited from its account.17 In a
related case, Edgardo Buenaventura, Myrna Lizardo and
Yolanda Tica (Buenaventura, et al.),19 recipients of a
P500,000.00 check proceeding from the P80,000,000.00
mistakenly credited to Tevesteco, likewise filed suit.
Buenaventura et al., as in the case of Franco, were also
prevented from effecting withdrawals20 from their current
36
account with BPIFB, Bonifacio Market, Edsa, Caloocan City

Branch.
Meanwhile, BPI-FB filed separate civil and criminal cases

against those believed to be the perpetrators of the multi-
million peso scam.22 In the criminal case, Franco, along
with the other accused, except for Manuel Bienvenida who
was still at large, were acquitted of the crime of Estafa as
defined and penalized under Article 351, par. 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code.23 However, the civil case24 remains
under litigation and the respective rights and liabilities of
the parties have yet to be adjudicated.
Consequently, in light of BPI-FB’s refusal to heed Franco’s

demands to unfreeze his accounts and release his deposits
therein, the latter filed on June 4, 1990 with the Manila RTC
the subject suit.
BPI-FB traversed this complaint, insisting that it was correct

in freezing the accounts of Franco and refusing to release
his deposits, claiming that it had a better right to the
amounts which consisted of part of the money allegedly
fraudulently withdrawn from it by Tevesteco and ending up
in Franco’s accounts. BPI-FB asseverated that the claimed
consideration of P2,000,000.00 for the introduction
facilitated by Franco between George Daantos and Eladio
Teves, on the one hand, and Jaime Sebastian, on the
other, spoke volumes of Franco’s participation in the
fraudulent transaction.
8. Chua-Bruce v. On August 16, 1985, Ramon Rocamora, the Manager (of Whether or not the NO.
CA Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Calapan Branch, petitioner is guilty of
GR# 109595, APR. Oriental Mindoro) requested FructuosoPeñaflor, Assistant Estafa. The accused for estafa shall only be convicted if you are able to prove,
27, 2000 Cashier, to conduct a physical bundle count of the cash through submission of documents or affidavits from witnesses, the
inside the vault, which should total P4,000,000.00, more or presence of the following elements: 1) that personal property is received
less. During this initial cash count, they discovered a in trust, on commission, for administration or under any other
shortage of fifteen bundles of One Hundred Pesos circumstance involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the
denominated bills totaling P150,000.00. The next day, to same, even though the obligation is guaranteed by a bond;
determine if there was actually a shortage, a re-verification
of the records and documents of the transactions in the (2) that there is conversion or diversion of such property by the person
bank was conducted. There was still a shortage of who has so received it or a denial on his part that he received it;
P150,000.00. The bank initiated investigations totalling four
(4) in all. The first was by Ramon Rocamora, the Manager. (3) that such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another
The second was by the bank’s internal auditors headed by and
Antonio Batungbakal.
(4) that there be demand for the return of the property
37
Then, the bank’s Department of Internal Affairs conducted

an independent investigation. We find the first element absent. When the money, goods, or any other
personal property is received by the offender from the offended party (1)
Thereafter, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) came in trust or (2) on commission or (3) for administration, the offender
in to investigate. All of these investigations concluded that acquires both material or physical possession and juridical possession
there was a shortage of P150,000.00, and the person of the thing received. 24 Juridical possession means a possession which
primarily responsible was the bank’s Cash Custodian, gives the transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may set
Cristeta Chua-Burce, the herein accused. On November 4, up even against the owner. 25 In this case, petitioner was a cash
1985, unable to satisfactorily explain the shortage of custodian who was primarily responsible for the cash-in-vault. Her
P150,000.00, the accused’s service with the bank was possession of the cash belonging to the bank is akin to that of a bank
terminated. teller, both being mere bank employees.
To recover the missing amount, $Metropolitan Bank and

Trust Company (Metrobank) filed a Civil Case for Sum of
Money and Damages with Preliminary Attachment and
Garnishment docketed as Civil Case No. R-3733 against
petitioner and her husband, Antonio Burce. Petitioner
moved for the suspension of the criminal case on the
ground of the existence of a prejudicial question that the
resolution of the civil case was determinative of her guilt or
innocence in the criminal case. The trial court, over the
vehement opposition of the private and public prosecutors,
granted the motion and suspended the trial of the criminal
case. On petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals, the
appellate court ruled that there was no prejudicial question.
On March 18, 1991, the trial court rendered a consolidated

decision finding petitioner (a) guilty of estafa under Article
315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code in the criminal case,
and (b) liable for the amount of P150,000.00 in the civil
case. Petitioner seasonably appealed her conviction in the
criminal case to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner filed a
separate appeal in the civil case.
EASEMENTS AND RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
10. Unisource vs. Petitioner Unisource Commercial and Whether Right of

Chung Development Corporation is the registered owner of a way can be As defined, an easement is a real right on another’s
parcel of land covered by TCT No. 176253. The title cancelled? property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of the latter
contains a memorandum of encumbrance of a voluntary must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or
easement which has been carried over from the Original something to be done on his property, for the benefit of another
Certificate of Title of Encarnacion S. Sandico. The certified person or tenement. Easements are established either by law or by
English translation of the annotation reads: the will of the owner. The former are called legal, and the latter,
“It is declared that Francisco Hidalgo y voluntary easements.
38
Magnifico has the right to open doors in the course of his In this case, petitioner itself admitted that a voluntary
lot towards the left of the Callejon that is used as a easement of right of way exists in favor of respondents. In its
passage and that appears as adjacent to the said Lot 2 and petition to cancel the encumbrance of voluntary easement of right of
to pass through the land of Santana, until the bank of the way, petitioner alleged that “[t]he easement is personal. It was
estero that goes to the Pasig River, and towards the right of voluntarily constituted in favor of a certain Francisco Hidalgo y
the other Callejon that is situated between the said Lot 2 Magnifico, the owner of [the lot] described as Lot No. 2, Block 2650”
and Lot 4 of the same Block N.” It further stated that “the voluntary easement of the right of way in
As Sandico’s property was transferred to favor of Francisco Hidalgo y Magnifico was constituted simply by will
several owners, the memorandum of encumbrance of a or agreement of the parties. It was not a statutory easement and
voluntary easement in favor of Francisco M. Hidalgo was definitely not an easement created by such court order because ‘[the]
consistently annotated until TCT No. 176253 was issued in Court merely declares the existence of an easement created by the
petitioner’s favor. parties.”
On May 26, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition to Having made such an admission, petitioner cannot now
Cancel the Encumbrance of Voluntary Easement of Right claim that what exists is a legal easement and that the same should
of Wayon the ground that the dominant estate has an be cancelled since the dominant estate is not an enclosed estate as
adequate access to a public road which is Matienza Street. it has an adequate access to a public road which is Callejon
Trial court granted the motion. Matienza Street. As we have said, the opening of an adequate
Trial court ordered the cancellation of the outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal or compulsory
encumbrance of voluntary easement of right of way in favor easements, not voluntary easements like in the case at bar. A
of the dominant estate owned by respondents. It found that voluntary easement of right of way, like any other contract,
the dominant estate has no more use for the easement could be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by
since it has another adequate outlet to a public road which renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate.
is Matienza Street. Neither can petitioner claim that the easement is
The appellate court reversed the decision of personal only to Hidalgo since the annotation merely mentioned
the trial court and dismissed the petition to cancel the Sandico and Hidalgo without equally binding their heirs or assigns.
encumbrance of voluntary easement of right of way. That the heirs or assigns of the parties were not mentioned in the
annotation does not mean that it is not binding on them. Again, a
voluntary easement of right of way is like any other contract. As
such, it is generally effective between the parties, their heirs and
assigns, except in case where the rights and obligations arising
from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by
stipulation or by provision of law.
We also hold that although the easement does not
appear in respondents’ title over the dominant estate, the same
subsists. It is settled that the registration of the dominant estate
under the Torrens system without the annotation of the
voluntary easement in its favor does not extinguish the
easement.
11. Goldcrest vs Petitioner Goldcrest is the developer of I.

Cypress Cypress Gardens, a ten-storey building located at Herrera [WHET Anent the first issue,
Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City. On April 26, 1977, HER OR NOT] THE We rule in favor of Cypress. At this stage of the
Goldcrest executed a Master Deed and Declaration of APPELLATE proceedings, the failure to measure the supposed encroached areas
39
Restrictionswhich constituted Cypress Gardens into a COURT ERRED IN is no longer relevant because the award for actual damages is no
condominium project and incorporated respondent Cypress RULING THAT longer in issue. Moreover, a perusal of the records shows that the
to manage the condominium project and to hold title to all GOLDCREST finding of the Court of Appeals that Goldcrest built an office structure
the common areas. Title to the land on which the BUILT AN OFFICE on the roof deck’s limited common area is supported by substantial
condominium stands was transferred to Cypress under STRUCTURE ON A evidence and established facts.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-67513. But Goldcrest SUPPOSED Likewise, there is no merit in Goldcrest’s submission that
retained ownership of the two-level penthouse unit on the ENCROACHED the failure to conduct an actual measurement on the roof deck’s
ninth and tenth floors of the condominium registered under AREA IN THE encroached areas makes the assailed directive of the Court of
Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) No. S-1079 of the OPEN SPACE OF Appeals impossible to implement. As aptly pointed out by Cypress,
Register of Deeds of Makati City. Goldcrest and its THE ROOF DECK. the limited common area of the roof deck is specifically identified by
directors, officers, and assigns likewise controlled the II. Section 4(c) of the Master Deed.
management and administration of the Condominium until [WHET
1995. HER OR NOT] THE Anent the second issue
Following the turnover of the administration APPELLATE The owner of the dominant estate cannot violate any of
and management of the Condominium to the board of COURT ERRED IN the following prescribed restrictions on its rights on the servient
directors of Cypress in 1995, it was discovered that certain RULING THAT estate, to wit: (1) it can only exercise rights necessary for the use of
common areas pertaining to Cypress were being occupied PETITIONER the easement; (2) it cannot use the easement except for the benefit
and encroached upon by Goldcrest. Thus, in 1998, IMPAIRED THE of the immovable originally contemplated; (3) it cannot exercise the
Cypress filed a complaint with damages against Goldcrest EASEMENT ON easement in any other manner than that previously established; (4) it
before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board THE PORTION OF cannot construct anything on it which is not necessary for the use
(HLURB), seeking to compel the latter to vacate the THE ROOF DECK and preservation of the easement; (5) it cannot alter or make the
common areas it allegedly encroached on and to remove DESIGNATED AS easement more burdensome; (6) it must notify the servient estate
the structures it built thereon. Cypress sought to remove A LIMITED owner of its intention to make necessary works on the servient
the door erected by Goldcrest along the stairway between COMMON AREA. estate; and (7) it should choose the most convenient time and
the 8th and 9th floors, as well as the door built in front of the manner to build said works so as to cause the least convenience to
9th floor elevator lobby, and the removal of the cyclone wire the owner of the servient estate. Any violation of the above
fence on the roof deck. constitutes impairment of the easement.
HLURB Special Division held that Cypress has no cause Here, a careful scrutiny of Goldcrest’s acts shows that it
of action regarding the use of the roof deck’s limited breached a number of the aforementioned restrictions. First, it is
common area because only Goldcrest has the right to use obvious that the construction and the lease of the office structure
the same. were neither necessary for the use or preservation of the roof deck’s
Court of Appeals, which partly granted its limited area. Second, the weight of the office structure increased the
appeal. strain on the condominium’s foundation and on the roof deck’s
common limited area, making the easement more burdensome and
adding unnecessary safety risk to all the condominium unit owners.
Lastly, the construction of the said office structure clearly went
beyond the intendment of the easement since it illegally altered the
approved condominium project plan and violated Section 4of the
condominium’s Declaration of Restrictions.
12. Valdez vs Petitioner-spouses Victor and Jocelyn Valdez Whether An easement or servitude is “a real right constituted on
Tabisula purchased via a January 11, 1993 Deed of Absolute Sale Right of way is not another’s property, corporeal and immovable, by virtue of which the
(the deed) from respondent-spouses Francisco Tabisula part of the absolute owner of the same has to abstain from doing or to allow somebody
and Caridad Tabisula a 200 square meter (sq.m.) portion deed of sale else to do something on his property for the benefit of another thing
(the subject property) of a 380 sq. m. parcel of land located or person.” The statutory basis of this right is Article 613 of the Civil
40
in San Fernando, La Union. Code which reads:

Respondents subsequently built a concrete
wall on the western side of the subject property. Believing Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance
that that side is the intended road right of way mentioned in imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable
the deed, petitioners, through their representative, reported belonging to a different owner.
the matter to the barangay for mediation and conciliation. The immovable in favor of which the easement is
Respondents failed to attend the conferences scheduled by established is called the dominant estate; that which is subject
the barangay, however, drawing petitioners to file in April thereto, the servient estate.
1999 or more than six years after the execution of the deed There are two kinds of easements according to source – by
a Complaint for Specific Performance with law or by the will of the owners. So Article 619 of the Civil Code
Damagesagainst respondents before the RTC of San provides:
Fernando City, La Union. Art. 619. Easements are established either by law or by the
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that they will of the owners. The former are called legal and the latter voluntary
purchased the subject property on the strength of easements.
respondents’ assurance of providing them a road right of From the allegations in petitioners’ complaint, it is clear
way. that what they seek to enforce is an alleged grant in the deed by
Respondents, in their Answer averred that the 2 ½- respondents of an easement reading: “they shall be provided a 2 ½
meter easement should be taken from the western portion meters wide road right-of-way on the western side of their lot but
of the subject property and not from theirs. Respondents which is not included in this sale.”
further averred that they could not have agreed to providing Article 1358 of the Civil Code provides that any transaction
petitioners an easement “on the western side of their lot” as involving the sale or disposition of real property must be in writing.
there exists a two-storey concrete house on their lot where The stipulation harped upon by petitioners that they “shall be
the supposed easement is to be located, which was provided a 2 ½ meters wide road right-of-way on the western side of
erected long before the subject property was sold to their lot but which is not included in this sale” is not a disposition of
petitioners. real property. The proviso that the intended grant of right of wayis
RTC dismissed petitioners’ complaint. “not included in this sale” could only mean that the parties would
Court of Appeals affirmed that of the trial court, it have to enter into a separate and distinct agreement for the purpose.
holding that the deed only conveyed ownership of the The use of the word “shall,” which is imperative or mandatory in its
subject property to petitioners, and that the reference ordinary signification, should be construed as merely permissive
therein to an easement in favor of petitioners is not a where, as in the case at bar, no public benefit or private right
definite grant-basis of a voluntary easement of right of requires it to be given an imperative meaning.
way.
Besides, a document stipulating a voluntary easement must be
recorded in the Registry of Property in order not to prejudice third
parties. So Articles 708 and 709 of the Civil Code call for, viz:
Art. 708. The Registry of Property has for its object the
inscription or annotation of acts and contracts relating to the
ownership and other rights over immovable property.
Art. 709. The titles of ownership, or of other
rights over immovable property, which are
not duly inscribed or annotated in the
Registry of Property shall not prejudice third
persons.
Petitioners are neither entitled to a legal or compulsory
41
easement of right of way. For to be entitled to such kind of

easement, the preconditions under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil
Code must be established, viz:
Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real
right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by
other immovables pertaining to other persons, and without adequate
outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way
through the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper
indemnity.
Art. 650. The easement of right of way

shall be established at the point least prejudicial to
the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with
this rule, where the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
(Underscoring supplied)
Thus, to be conferred a legal easement of right of way under
Article 649, the following requisites must be complied with: (1) the
property is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate
outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity must be paid; (3)
the isolation is not the result of the owner of the dominant estate’s
own acts; (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial
to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the
foregoing rule, the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest.
The onus of proving the existence of these prerequisites lies on the
owner of the dominant estate, herein petitioners.
As found, however, by the trial court, petitioners and their
family are also the owners of two properties adjoining the subject
property which have access to two public roads or highways.
Since petitioners then have more than adequate passage to
two public roads, they have no right to demand the grant by
respondents of an easement on the “western side of [respondents’]
lot.”
13. Quintanilla vs Sometime in the 1960s, Perfecta bought Lot No. Whet Petitioners claim that DARYL'S constructed the concrete fence only
Abanga 3771-B-1-A, with an area of 2,244 square meters, located h after petitioners filed the case for an Easement of Right of Way
at Inayawan, Cebu City (the dominant estate) from one e against Pedro on May 27, 1994. They submit that the criterion of
Dionisio Abasolo, who formerly owned all the properties r least prejudice should be applied at the time of the filing of the
therein. Thereafter, Perfecta donated the dominant estate original complaint.
to Apolinardito, who is now the registered owner thereof. there
Petitioners own QC Rattan Inc., a domestic corporation. In c The instant petition lacks merit.
the conduct of their business, they use vans to haul and a
transport raw materials and finished products. As they n We hold that Apolinardito as owner of the dominant estate
wanted to expand their business and construct a together with Perfecta failed to discharge the burden of proving the
warehouse on their property (the dominant estate), they be existence and concurrence of all the requisites in order to validly
42
asked for a right of way from Pedro sometime in April 1994. R claim a compulsory right of way against respondents.
However, it appears that Pedro, who was the owner i It should be remembered that to be entitled to a legal easement
of Lot No. 3771-A-1, containing an area of 1,164 square g of right of way, the following requisites must be satisfied: (1) the
meters (the servient estate) and a lot near the dominant h dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no
estate, sold the same to DARYL'Son March 24, 1994,and t adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been
thereafter, DARYL'S constructed a warehouse over the paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the
servient estate, enclosing the same with a concrete fence. of way dominant estate; and (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least
Petitioners, thus, sought the imposition of an prejudicial to the servient estate.
easement of right of way. The fourth requisite is absent.
RTC dismissed the case for lack of merit. The RTC
held that petitioners failed to establish that the imposition of We are in full accord with the ruling of the CA when it aptly and
the right of way was the least prejudicial to the servient judiciously held, to wit:
estate. As provided for under the provisions of Article 650of the
CA affirmed the RTC Decision, New Civil Code, the easement of right of way shall be established
at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar
as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
Where there are several tenements surrounding the dominant estate,
and the easement may be established on any of them, the one
where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be
chosen. But if these two circumstances do not concur in a single
tenement, as in the instant case, the way which will cause the
least damage should be used, even if it will not be the
shortest. The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate
must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance. The court is
not bound to establish what is the shortest; a longer way may be
established to avoid injury to the servient tenement, such as when
there are constructions or walls which can be avoided by a round-
about way, as in the case at bar.
14. Fajardo vs Freedom To Build is the owner-developer and Whether Restrictive covenants are not, strictly speaking,
Freedom to Build seller of low-cost housing, sold to petitioner-spouses, a restrictive covenant synonymous with easements. While it may be correct to state that
house and lot at the De la Costa Homes. The Contract to is valid restrictive covenants on the use of land or the location or character of
Sell executed between the parties, contained a Restrictive buildings or other structures thereon may broadly be said to create
Covenant easements or rights, it can also be contended that such covenants,
"Easements. For the good of the entire being limitations on the manner in which one may use his own
community, the homeowner must observe a two- property, do not result in true easements, but a case of servitudes
meter easement in front. No structure of any kind (burden), sometimes characterized to be negative easements or
(store, garage, bodega, etc.) may be built on the reciprocal negative easements. Negative easement is the most
front easement. common easement created by covenant or agreement whose effect
"x x x.............................x x x.............................x x x is to preclude the owner of the land from doing an act, which, if no
"Upward expansion. Asecond storey is not easement existed, he would be entitled to do.
prohibited. But the second storey expansion must be Courts which generally view restrictive covenants with
placed above the back portion of the house and should not disfavor for being a restriction on the use of one's property, have,
extend forward beyond the apex of the original building. nevertheless, sustained themwhere the covenants are reasonable,
"x x x.............................x x x.............................x x x not contrary to public policy, or to law, and not in restraint of trade.
43
"Front expansion: 2nd Storey: No unit may be Subject to these limitations, courts enforce restrictions to the same
extended in the front beyond the line as designed extent that will lend judicial sanction to any other valid contractual
and implemented by the developer in the 60 sq. relationship. In general, frontline restrictions on constructions have
m. unit. In other words, the 2nd floor expansion, in been held to be valid stipulations.
front, is 6 meters back from the front property line In its Memorandum, respondent states in arguing for the
and 4 meters back from the front wall of the validity of the restrictive covenant that the -
house, just as provided in the 60 sq. m. units." "x x x restrictions are not without specific purpose. In a low
The above restrictions were also contained in cost-socialized housing, it is of public knowledge that owners-
Transfer Certificate of Title. developers are constrained to build as many number of houses on a
The controversy arose when petitioners, despite limited land area precisely to accommodatemarginalized lot buyers,
repeated warnings from respondent, extended the roof of providing as much as possible the safety, aesthetic and decent living
their house to the property line and expanded the second condition by controlling overcrowding. Such project has been
floor of their house to a point directly above the original designed to accommodate at least 100 families per hectare."
front wall. Respondent filed before the RTC an action to There appears to be no cogent reasons for not upholding
demolish the unauthorized structures. restrictive covenants aimed to promote aesthetics,
After trial, judgment was rendered against petitioners. health, and privacy or to prevent overcrowding.
On appeal to it, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision Viewed accordingly, the statement of petitioners that their
of the trial court. immediate neighbors have not opposed the construction is unavailing
to their cause, the subject restrictive covenant not being intended for
the benefit of adjacent owners but to prescribe the uses of the
building, i.e., to ensure, among other things, that the structures built
on De la Costa Homes Subdivision would prevent overcrowding and
promote privacy among subdivision dwellers.
Petitioners raise the issue of the personality of respondent

to enforce the provisions of the covenant. Broadly speaking, a suit for
equitable enforcement of a restrictive covenant can only be made by
one for whose benefit it is intended. It is not thus normally
enforceable by one who has no right nor interest in the land for the
benefit of which the restriction has been imposed.
Finally, petitioners argue that for lack of a specific provision,

prescribing the penalty of demolition in the "Restrictive Covenant" in
the event of a breach thereof, the prayer of respondent to demolish
the structure should fail. This argument has no merit; Article 1168 of
the New Civil Code states:
"When the obligation consists in not doing and the obligor
does what has been forbidden him, it shall be undone at his
expense."
15. La Vista The controversy in this case is regarding the right Whether or not A legal or compulsory easement is that which is constituted
Assoc. vs CA of way in Manyan road. The road is a 15 meter wide road petitioner is entitled by law for public use or for private interest. By express provisions of
abutting Katipunan Avenue on the west, traverses the to a legal or Arts. 649 and 650 of the New Civil Code, the owner of an estate may
edges of La Vista Subdivision on the north and of the compulsory claim a legal or compulsory right-of-way only after he has established
Ateneo de Manila University and Maryknoll College on the easement of a right- the existence of four (4) requisites, namely, (a) the estate is
44
south. The said road was originally owned by the Tuasons of-way - surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a
sold a portion of their land to Philippine Building which should be public highway; (b) after payment of the proper indemnity; (c) the
Corporation. Included in such sale was half or 7.5 meters distinguished from a isolation was not due to the proprietor’s own acts; and, (d) the right-
width of the Mangyan road. The said corporation assigned voluntary of-way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate,
its rights, with the consent of the tuasons, to AdMU through easement. and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Mortgage. dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. A voluntary
Ateneo later on sold to Maryknoll the western portion of the easement on the other hand is constituted simply by will or
land. Tuason developed their land which is now known as agreement of the parties.
La Vista. On January, 1976, Ateneo and La Vista From the facts of the instant case it is very apparent that the
acknowledged the voluntary easement or a Mutual right of parties and their respective predecessors-in-interest intended to
way wherein the parties would allow the other to use their establish an easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road for their
half portion of the Manyan road (La Vista to use AdMU’s mutual benefit, both as dominant and servient estates.
7.5 meters of the mangyan road and also the other way These certainly are indubitable proofs that the parties
around.) Ateneo auctioned off the property wherein Solid concerned had indeed constituted a voluntary easement of right-of-
Homes Inc., the developer of Loyola Grand Villas, was the way over Mangyan Road and, like any other contract, the same
highest bidder. could be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation
of the owner of the dominant estate. Thus respondent Court of
ADMU transferred not only the property, but also Appeals did not commit a reversible error when it ruled that -
the right to negotiate the easement on the road. However, Concerning the pivotal question posed herein on the existence of an
La Vista did not want to recognize the easement thus they easement, we are of the belief, and thus hereby hold that a right-of-
block the road using 6 cylindrical concrete and some way was properly appreciated along the entire route of Mangyan
guards over the entrance of the road blocking the entrance Road. Incidentally, the pretense that the court a quo erred in
of the residents of Loyola Grand Villas. Solid Homes Inc. holding that Mangyan Road is the boundary road between La Vista
filed for injunction and La vista in turn filed a third party and Ateneo (page 31, Appellant’s Brief) does not raise any critical
complaint against AdMU. Some of the arguments of the eyebrow since the same is wholly irrelevant to the existence of a
petitioner were that Loyola residents had adequate outlet to servitude thereon from their express admission to the contrary
a public highway using other roads and also that AdMU has (paragraph 1, Answer).
not yet finalized the negotiation of the easement. Like any other contractual stipulation, the same cannot be
extinguished except by voluntary rescission of the contract
establishing the servitude or renunciation by the owner of the
dominant lots, cited more so when the easement was implicitly
recognized by the letters of the La Vista President to Ateneo dated
February 11 and April 28, 1976 (page 22, Decision; 19 Ruling Case
Law 745).
When the owner of the servient tenement performs acts or
constructs works impairing the use of the servitude, the owner of the
dominant tenement may ask for the destruction of such works and
the restoration of the things to their condition before the impairment
was committed, with indemnity for damages suffered (3 Sanchez
Roman 609). An injunction may also be obtained in order to restrain
the owner of the servient tenement from obstructing or impairing in
any manner the lawful use of the servitude
The argument of petitioner LA VISTA that there are other

routes to LOYOLA from Mangyan Road is likewise meritless, to say
45
the least. The opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can

extinguish only legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary
easements like in the case at bar. The fact that an easement by
grant may have also qualified as an easement of necessity does not
detract from its permanency as a property right, which survives the
termination of the necessity.
That there is no contract between LA VISTA and Solid
Homes, Inc., and thus the court could not have declared the
existence of an easement created by the manifest will of the parties,
is devoid of merit. When the easement in this case was established
by contract, the parties unequivocally made provisions for its
observance by all who in the future might succeed them in dominion.
16. Quimen vs CA Anastacia Quimen, together with her 3 brothers and sister, 1) Whether or not As defined, an easement is a real right on another’s
inherited a piece of property in Bulacan. They agreed to there was a valid property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of the latter
subdivide the property equally among themselves. The grant of an must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or
shares of Anastacia and 3 other siblings were next to the easement something to be done on his property, for the benefit of another
municipal road. Anastacia’s was at the extreme left of the 2) Whether or not person or tenement. It is jus in re aliena, inseparable, indivisible and
road while the lots on the right were sold by her brothers to the right of way perpetual, unless extinguished by causes provided by law. A right of
Catalina Santos. A portion of the lots behind Anastacia’s proposed by way in particular is a privilege constituted by covenant or granted by
were sold by her (as her brother’s adminstratix) brother to Yolonda is the least lawto a person or class of persons to pass over another’s property
Yolanda. onerous/least when his tenement is surrounded by realties belonging to others
prejudicial to the without an adequate outlet to the public highway. The owner of the
Yolanda was hesitant to buy the back property at first parties dominant estate can demand a right of way through the servient
because it d no access to the public road. Anastacia estate provided he indemnifies the owner thereof for the beneficial
prevailed upon her by assuring her that she would give her use of his property.
a right of way on her adjoining property (which was in front) The conditions sine qua non for a valid grant of an
for p200 per square meter. easement of right of way are: (a) the dominant estate is surrounded
by other immovables without an adequate outlet to a public highway;
Yolonda constructed a house on the lot she bought using (b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity; (c) the
as her passageway to the public highway a portion of isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant estate; and, (d) the
anastacia’s property. But when yolanda finally offered to right of way being claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the
pay for the use of the pathway anastacia refused to accept servient estate.
the payment. In fact she was thereafter barred by A cursory examination of the complaint of respondent
Anastacia from passing through her property. Yolanda for a right of wayreadily shows that –
[E]ven before the purchase of the said parcels of land the
After a few years, Yolanda purchased another lot from the plaintiff was reluctant to purchase the same for they are enclosed
Quimens (a brother), located directly behind the property of with permanent improvements like a concrete fence and store and
her parents who provided her a pathway gratis et amore have (sic) no egress leading to the road but because of the
between their house, extending about 19m from the lot of assurance of the defendant that plaintiff will be provided one (1)
Yolanda behind the sari-sari store of one brother, and meter wide and five (5) meters long right of way in the sum of
Anastacia’s perimeter fence. P200.00 per square meter to be taken from Anastacia’s lot at the
side of a concrete store until plaintiff reach(es) her father’s land,
In 1987, Yolanda filed an action with the proper court plaintiff was induced to buy the aforesaid parcels of land x x x. That
praying for a right of way through Anastacia’s property. The the aforesaid right of way is the shortest, most convenient and the
proposed right of way was at the extreme right of least onerous leading to the road and being used by the plaintiff’s
46
Anastacia’s property facing the public highway, starting predecessors-in-interest from the very inception x x x.
from the back of the sari-sari store and extending inward by The evidence clearly shows that the property of private respondent is
1m to her property and turning left for about 5m to avoid hemmed in by the estates of other persons including that of
the store in order to reach the municipal road. The way was petitioner; that she offered to pay P200.00 per square meter for her
unobstructed except for an avocado tree standing in the right of way as agreed between her and petitioner; that she did not
middle. cause the isolation of her property; that the right of way is the least
prejudicial to the servient estate.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of
action, explaining that the right of way through the brother’s Article 650 of the New Civil Code explicitly states that the
property was a straight path and to allow a detour by easement of right of way shall be established at the point least
cutting through Anastacia’s property would no longer make prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this
the path straight. They held that it was more practical to rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
extend the existing pathway to the public road by removing highway may be the shortest. The criterion of least prejudice to the
that portion of the store blocking the path as that was the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance
shortest route to the public road and the least prejudicial to although this is a matter of judicial appreciation. While shortest
the parties concerned than passing through Anastacia’s distance may ordinarily imply least prejudice, it is not always so as
property. when there are permanent structures obstructing the shortest
distance; while on the other hand, the longest distance may be free
CA reversed and held that Yolanda was entitled to a right of obstructions and the easiest or most convenient to pass through.
of way on Anastacia’s property. The court, however, did not In other words, where the easement may be established on any of
award damages to her and held that Anastacia was not in several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where
bad faith when she resisted the claim. the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be
chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2)
Anastacia went to the SC alleging that her lot should be circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will
considered as a servient estate despite the fact that it does cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the
not abut or adjoin the property of private respondent. She shortest.
denies ever promising Yolonda a right of way. In applying Art. 650 of the New Civil Code, respondent Court
of Appeals declared that the proposed right of way of Yolanda, which
Anastacia also argues that when Yolanda purchased the is one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters long at the extreme right of
second lot, the easement of right of way she provided was petitioner’s property, will cause the least prejudice and/or damage as
ipso jure extinguished as a result of the merger of compared to the suggested passage through the property of
ownership of the dominant and the servient estates in one Yolanda’ s father which would mean destroying the sari-sari store
person so that there was no longer any compelling reason made of strong materials. Absent any showing that these findings
to provide private respondent with a right of way as there and conclusion are devoid of factual support in the records, or are so
are other surrounding lots suitable for the purpose. glaringly erroneous, this Court accepts and adopts them. As
between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong
She also strongly maintains that the proposed right of way materials to provide egress to a public highway, and another right of
is not the shortest access to the public road because of the way which although longer will only require an avocado tree to be cut
detour and that, moreover, she is likely to suffer the most down, the second alternative should be preferred. After all, it is not
damage as she derives a net income of P600.00 per year the main function of this Court to analyze or weigh the evidence
from the sale of the fruits of her avocado tree, and presented all over again where the petition would necessarily invite
considering that an avocado has an average life span of calibration of the whole evidence considering primarily the credibility
seventy (70) years, she expects a substantial earning from of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
it. circumstances, their relation to each other, and the probabilities of
the situation.
47
17. Abellana vs Petitioners are owners of a parcel of land on the NW side Whether or not the
CA of Nonoc Subdivision, Cebu. They sued to establish an easement of a right Petitioners' assumption that an easement of right of way is
easement of a right of way over a subdivision road, which of way may be continuous and apparent and may be acquired by prescription under
they claim they’ve acquired through prescription since their acquired by Article 620 of the Civil Code, is erroneous. The use of a footpath or
ancestors have been using these since time immemorial. prescription? road may be apparent but it is not a continuous easement because
its use is at intervals and depends upon the acts of man. It can be
They pray that the concrete wall surrounding the village be exercised only if a man passes or puts his feet over somebody else's
taken down to allow easy access to the public highway. land. Hence, a right of way is not acquirable by prescription.
Neither may petitioners invoke Section 29 of P.D. 957 which
RTC found for the petitioners. CA reversed, averring that provides:
road lots in subdivisions are private property and may only Sec. 29. Right of Way to Public Road. — The owner or developer of
be used as a public highway once acquired by the a subdivision without access to any existing public road or street
government through donation, purchase or expropriation. must secure a right of way to a public road or street and such right of
way must be developed and maintained according to the requirement
of the government authorities concerned.
The above provision applies to the owner or developer of a
subdivision (which petitioners are not) without access to a public
highway.
The petitioners' allegation that the footpaths which were converted to
subdivision roads have acquired the status of public streets, is not
well taken. In the first place, whether or not footpaths previously
existed in the area which is now known as the Nonoc Homes
Subdivision, is a factual issue which this Court may not determine for
it is not a trier of facts.
The municipal ordinances which declared subdivision roads
open to public use "when deemed necessary by the proper
authorities" (p. 7, Rollo) simply allow persons other than the
residents of the Nonoc Homes Subdivision, to use the roads therein
when they are inside the subdivision but those ordinances do not
give outsiders a right to open the subdivision walls so they can enter
the subdivision from the back. As the private respondents pointed out
in their Comment:
The closure of the dead ends of road lots 1 and 3 is a valid
exercise of proprietary rights. It is for the protection of residents in
the subdivision from night prowlers and thieves. And the public is not
denied use of the subdivision roads, only that the users must get
inside the subdivision through the open ends of the road lots that link
the same to the public road. It is common to most, if not all
subdivisions in Cebu, Metro Manila and other places, that points of
ingress to and egress from the subdivision are the points where the
subdivision roads intersect with public roads. It is of judicial notice
that most, if not all, subdivisions are enclosed and fenced with only
one or few points that are used as ingress to and egress from the
subdivisions.
48
Article 712-720; Hidden Treasure- Arts. 438-439
1. Ureta vs In his lifetime, Alfonsobegot 14 children, namely, (1) Validity of the Deed of Sale
Ureta ??? Policronio, Liberato, Narciso, Prudencia, Vicente, whether the Deed
Francisco, Inocensio, Roque, Adela, Wenefreda, of Sale is valid, and Two veritable legal presumptions bear on the validity of the Deed of
(Hindi ko Merlinda, Benedicto, Jorge, and Andres. The children of (2) whether the Sale: (1) that there was sufficient consideration for the contract; and (2) that it
makita yung Policronio (Heirs of Policronio), are opposed to the rest Deed of Extra- was the result of a fair and regular private transaction. If shown to hold, these
topic kaya of Alfonso’s children and their descendants (Heirs of Judicial Partition is presumptions infer prima facie the transaction’s validity, except that it must yield
nilagay ko Alfonso). valid. to the evidence adduced.
lahat ng Alfonso was financially well-off during his lifetime.
issues) He owned several fishpens, a fishpond, a sari-sari The Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the finding of the
store, a passenger jeep, and was engaged in the CA that the Deed of Sale is null and void for being absolutely simulated. The
buying and selling of copra. Policronio, the eldest, was Civil Code provides:
the only child of Alfonso who failed to finish schooling
and instead worked on his father’s lands. Art. 1345. Simulation of a contract may be absolute or relative. The
Sometime in October 1969, Alfonso and four of former takes place when the parties do not intend to be
his children, namely, Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, bound at all; the latter, when the parties conceal their
and Francisco, met at the house of Liberato. Francisco, true agreement.
who was then a municipal judge, suggested that in
order to reduce the inheritance taxes, their father Art. 1346. An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A
should make it appear that he had sold some of his relative simulation, when it does not prejudice a third
lands to his children. Accordingly, Alfonso executed four person and is not intended for any purpose contrary to
(4) Deeds of Sale covering several parcels of land in law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy
favor of Policronio, LiberatoPrudencia and his common- binds the parties to their real agreement.
law wife, Valeriana Dela Cruz. The Deed of Sale
executed on October 25, 1969, in favor of Policronio, Valerio v. Refresca is instructive on the matter of simulation of
covered six parcels of land, which are the properties in contracts:
dispute in this case.
Since the sales were only made for taxation In absolute simulation, there is a colorable contract but it has no
purposes and no monetary consideration was given, substance as the parties have no intention to be bound by it. The main
Alfonso continued to own, possess and enjoy the lands characteristic of an absolute simulation is that the apparent contract is not really
and their produce. desired or intended to produce legal effect or in any way alter the juridical
When Alfonso died on October 11, 1972, Liberato situation of the parties. As a result, an absolutely simulated or fictitious contract
acted as the administrator of his father’s estate. He was is void, and the parties may recover from each other what they may have given
later succeeded by his sister Prudencia, and then by under the contract. However, if the parties state a false cause in the contract to
her daughter, Carmencita Perlas. Except for a portion of conceal their real agreement, the contract is relatively simulated and the parties
parcel 5, the rest of the parcels transferred to Policronio are still bound by their real agreement. Hence, where the essential requisites of
were tenanted by the Fernandez Family. These tenants a contract are present and the simulation refers only to the content or terms of
never turned over the produce of the lands to Policronio the contract, the agreement is absolutely binding and enforceable between the
or any of his heirs, but to Alfonso and, later, to the parties and their successors in interest.
administrators of his estate.
Policronio died on November 22, 1974. Lacking, therefore, in an absolutely simulated contract is consent
Except for the said portion of parcel 5, neither which is essential to a valid and enforceable contract. Thus, where a person, in
Policronio nor his heirs ever took possession of the order to place his property beyond the reach of his creditors, simulates a
subject lands. transfer of it to another, he does not really intend to divest himself of his title
49
On April 19, 1989, Alfonso’s heirs executed and control of the property; hence, the deed of transfer is but a sham. Similarly,
a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, which included all the in this case, Alfonso simulated a transfer to Policronio purely for taxation
lands that were covered by the four (4) deeds of sale purposes, without intending to transfer ownership over the subject lands.
that were previously executed by Alfonso for taxation
purposes. Conrado, Policronio’s eldest son, The primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract
representing the Heirs of Policronio, signed the Deed of is the intention of the parties. If the words of a contract appear to contravene
Extra-Judicial Partition in behalf of his co-heirs. the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail. Such intention is
After their father’s death, the Heirs of Policronio determined not only from the express terms of their agreement, but also from
found tax declarations in his name covering the six the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties. The true intention of
parcels of land. On June 15, 1995, they obtained a copy the parties in this case was sufficiently proven by the Heirs of Alfonso.
of the Deed of Sale executed on October 25, 1969 by
Alfonso in favor of Policronio. The Heirs of Alfonso established by a preponderance of
Not long after, on July 30, 1995, the Heirs of evidencethat the Deed of Sale was one of the four (4) absolutely simulated
Policronio allegedly learned about the Deed of Extra- Deeds of Sale which involved no actual monetary consideration, executed by
Judicial Partition involving Alfonso’s estate when it was Alfonso in favor of his children, Policronio, Liberato, and Prudencia, and his
published in the July 19, 1995 issue of the Aklan second wife, Valeriana, for taxation purposes.
Reporter.
Believing that the six parcels of land As found by the CA, Alfonso continued to exercise all the rights of
belonged to their late father, and as such, excluded an owner even after the execution of the Deeds of Sale. It was undisputed that
from the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, the Heirs of Alfonso remained in possession of the subject lands and enjoyed their produce
Policronio sought to amicably settle the matter with the until his death. No credence can be given to the contention of the Heirs of
Heirs of Alfonso. Earnest efforts proving futile, the Heirs Policrionio that their father did not take possession of the subject lands or
of Policronio filed a Complaint for Declaration of enjoyed the fruits thereof in deference to a Filipino family practice. Had this
Ownership, Recovery of Possession, Annulment of been true, Policronio should have taken possession of the subject lands after
Documents, Partition, and Damagesagainst the Heirs of his father died. On the contrary, it was admitted that neither Policronio nor his
Alfonso before the RTC heirs ever took possession of the subject lands from the time they were sold to
him, and even after the death of both Alfonso and Policronio.
The most protuberant index of simulation of contract is the

complete absence of an attempt in any manner on the part of the ostensible
buyer to assert rights of ownership over the subject properties. Policronio’s
failure to take exclusive possession of the subject properties or, in the
alternative, to collect rentals, is contrary to the principle of ownership. Such
failure is a clear badge of simulation that renders the whole transaction void.
It is clear that the parties did not intend to be bound at all, and as
such, the Deed of Sale produced no legal effects and did not alter the juridical
situation of the parties. The Deed of Sale is, therefore, void for being absolutely
simulated pursuant to Article 1409 (2) of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the
beginning:
(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;
50
For guidance, the following are the most fundamental

characteristics of void or inexistent contracts:
1) As a general rule, they produce no legal effects whatsoever in

accordance with the principle "quod nullum est
nullum producit effectum."
2) They are not susceptible of ratification.
3) The right to set up the defense of inexistence or absolute nullity
cannot be waived or renounced.
4) The action or defense for the declaration of their inexistence or
absolute nullity is imprescriptible.
5) The inexistence or absolute nullity of a contract cannot be invoked by a
person whose interests are not directly affected.
Since the Deed of Sale is void, the subject properties were properly
included in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of the estate of Alfonso.
Absence and Inadequacy of Consideration
For lack of consideration, the Deed of Sale is once again found to

be void. It states that Policronio paid, and Alfonso received, the ₱2,000.00
purchase price on the date of the signing of the contract.
Although, on its face, the Deed of Sale appears to be supported by
valuable consideration, the RTC found that there was no money involved in the
sale.
It is well-settled in a long line of cases that where a deed of sale states
that the purchase price has been paid but in fact has never been paid, the deed
of sale is null and void for lack of consideration
Prior Action Unnecessary
A simulated contract of sale is without any cause or consideration,

and is, therefore, null and void; in such case, no independent action to rescind
or annul the contract is necessary, and it may be treated as non-existent for all
purposes.A void or inexistent contract is one which has no force and effect from
the beginning, as if it has never been entered into, and which cannot be
validated either by time or ratification. A void contract produces no effect
whatsoever either against or in favor of anyone; it does not create, modify or
extinguish the juridical relation to which it refers. Therefore, it was not
necessary for the Heirs of Alfonso to first file an action to declare the nullity of
the Deed of Sale prior to executing the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition.
Personality to Question Sale
Article 1311 and Article 1421 of the Civil Code provide:
51
Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their
assigns and heirs, x x x
Art. 1421. The defense of illegality of contracts is not available to

third persons whose interests are not directly affected.
The right to set up the nullity of a void or non-existent contract is not

limited to the parties, as in the case of annullable or voidable contracts; it is
extended to third persons who are directly affected by the contract. Thus, where
a contract is absolutely simulated, even third persons who may be prejudiced
thereby may set up its inexistence. The Heirs of Alfonso are the children of
Alfonso, with his deceased children represented by their children (Alfonso’s
grandchildren). The Heirs of Alfonso are clearly his heirs and successors-in-
interest and, as such, their interests are directly affected, thereby giving them
the right to question the legality of the Deed of Sale.
Inapplicability of Article 842
Article 842 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 842. One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of
all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person
having capacity to succeed.
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided
he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with
regard to the legitime of said heirs.
This article refers to the principle of freedom of disposition by will.

What is involved in the case at bench is not a disposition by will but by Deed of
Sale. Hence, the Heirs of Alfonso need not first prove that the disposition
substantially diminished their successional rights or unduly prejudiced their
legitimes.
Inapplicability of Article 1412
Article 1412 of the Civil Code is as follows:
Art. 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause

consists does not constitute a criminal offense, the
following rules shall be observed:
(1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may
recover what he has given by virtue of the contract, or demand the performance
of the other’s undertaking;
52
(2) When only one of the contracting parties is at fault, he cannot recover what
he has given by reason of the contract, or ask for the fulfillment of what has
been promised him. The other, who is not at fault, may demand the return of
what he has given without any obligation to comply with his promise.
Article 1412 is not applicable to fictitious or simulated contracts,

because they refer to contracts with an illegal cause or subject-matter. This
article presupposes the existence of a cause, it cannot refer to fictitious or
simulated contracts which are in reality non-existent. As it has been determined
that the Deed of Sale is a simulated contract, the provision cannot apply to it.
Granting that the Deed of Sale was not simulated, the provision
would still not apply. Since the subject properties were included as properties of
Alfonso in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, they are covered by
corresponding inheritance and estate taxes. Therefore, tax evasion, if at all
present, would not arise, and Article 1412 would again be inapplicable.
Prescription
The Heirs of Policronio are mistaken.

Article 1410 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1410. The action for the declaration of the inexistence of a

contract does not prescribe.
This is one of the most fundamental characteristics of void or

inexistent contracts.
As the Deed of Sale is a void contract, the action for the declaration of its
nullity, even if filed 21 years after its execution, cannot be barred by prescription
for it is imprescriptible. Furthermore, the right to set up the defense of
inexistence or absolute nullity cannot be waived or renounced. Therefore, the
Heirs of Alfonso cannot be precluded from setting up the defense of its
inexistence.
2. Palero-Tan Urdaneta found jewelry inside the RTC office. Tan is Worth stressing is the well-entrenched principle that in
vs Urdaneta the owner of the jewelry. Urdaneta did not return the Whether or not administrative proceedings, such as the instant case, the quantum of proof
jewelry instead he threw it away when his wife Urdaneta can be necessary for a finding of guilt is only substantial evidence. Substantial
suspected that we bought the jewelry for a mistress. faulted for throwing evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
However, it was found out that he knew that Tan had away the jewelry he might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
lost the jewelry and that he did not bother to inform her. found. Respondent and his wife Mila confirmed that they indeed had a
quarrel over a ring and a bracelet which respondent found in his RTC office.
These declarations constitute substantial evidence required in administrative
proceedings.
When a person who finds a thing that has been lost or mislaid by the
53
owner takes the thing into his hands, he acquires physical custody only and
does not become vested with legal possession. In assuming such custody, the
finder is charged with the obligation of restoring the thing to its owner. It is thus
respondent’s duty to report to his superior or his officemates that he found
something. The Civil Code, in Article 719, explicitly requires the finder of a lost
property to report it to the proper authorities, thus:
Article 719. Whoever finds a movable,
which is not treasure, must return it to its previous
possessor. If the latter is unknown, the finder shall
immediately deposit it with the mayor of the city or
municipality where the finding has taken place.
The finding shall be publicly announced by

the mayor for two consecutive weeks in the way he
deems best.
If the movables cannot be kept without

deterioration, or without the expenses which
considerably diminish its value, it shall be sold at public
auction eight days after the publication.
Six months from the publication having elapsed without the owner
having appeared, the thing found, or its value, shall be awarded to the finder.
The finder and the owner shall be obliged, as the case may be, to reimburse the
expenses.
Contrary to respondent’s claim, this Court is convinced that respondent
had the intention to appropriate the jewelry to himself had these not been
discovered by his wife. His claim that the ring and bracelet were worthless
“fancy” jewelry is immaterial because the basis for his liability is his act of taking
something which does not belong to him.
By admittedly finding complainant’s ring and bracelet without
returning them to the rightful owner, respondent blatantly degraded the judiciary
and diminished the respect and regard of the people for the court and its
personnel. Every employee of the judiciary should be an example of integrity,
morality and honesty. Like any other public servant, respondent must exhibit
the highest sense of trustworthiness and rectitude not only in the performance
of his official duties but also in his personal and private dealings with other
people, to preserve the court’s good name and standing as a true temple of
justice. It cannot be overstressed that the image of a court of justice is mirrored
in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work there, from the
judge to the lowest employee.
3. Acap vs CA
54
Donation (Arts. 725-773); Arts. 43 (3), 44, 64, 81-87, 147, 148 FC; Arts. 907-910, 1061-1077; Arts. 1144 & 1306, et seq

1. Peralta vs The subject parcel of land, described as Lot Whether a forged It is well-settled that "a certificate of title serves as evidence of an
Heirs of Abalon 1679 of the Cadastral Survey of Legaspi, consisting of instrument may indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person
8,571 square meters, was originally covered by become the root of whose name appears therein. The real purpose of the Torrens system of land
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. (O) 16 and a valid title in the registration is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question as to
registered in the name of Abalon. It appears that a hands of an the legality of the title."
Deed of Absolute Sale was executed over the subject innocent purchaser
property in favor of Rellama. The subject property was for value, even if The main purpose of the Torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts
then subdivided into three (3) portions: Lot 1679-A, Lot the true owner of title to real estate and to facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the
1679-B, Lot 1679-C. Lot 1679-A was sold to Spouses thereof has been in public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to
Peralta. Lot 1679-B, on the other hand, was first sold to possession of the dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned
Lotivio who thereafter transferred his ownership genuine title, which has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a
thereto to the Andals through a Deed of Absolute Sale. is valid and has not reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry. Where innocent third
The Andals likewise acquired Lot 1679-C. been cancelled. persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire
Claiming that the Deed of Absolute Sale rights over the property, the court cannot disregard such rights and order the
executed by Abalon in favor of Rellama was a forged total cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such an outright cancellation
document, and claiming further that they acquired the would be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone
subject property by succession, they being the nephew dealing with property registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire
and niece of Abalon who died without issue, plaintiff- in every instance as to whether the title has been regularly or irregularly issued
appellees Mansueta Abalon and Amelia Abalon filed the by the court. Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
case below against Rellama, Spouses Peralta, and the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way
Andals, the herein defendants-appellants and the Bank oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the
of the Philippines [sic] Islands which was later dropped property.
as a party defendant. It is well-established in our laws and jurisprudence that a person who
It was alleged in their Complaint that Rellama is dealing with a registered parcel of land need not go beyond the face of the
was able to cause the cancellation of OCT No. (O) 16, title. A person is only charged with notice of the burdens and claims that are
and in lieu thereof the issuance of TCT No. 42108 in his annotated on the title.
own name from which the defendants-appellants Jurisprudence has defined an innocent purchaser for value as one
derived their own titles, upon presentation of a xerox who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a
copy of the alleged forged deed of absolute sale and right to or interest therein and who then pays a full and fair price for it at the
the order granting the issuance of a second owner’s time of the purchase or before receiving a notice of the claim or interest of some
duplicate copy of OCT No. (O) 16 in his favor. They other persons in the property. Buyers in good faith buy a property with the belief
averred that the owner’s duplicate copy of Oct NO. (O) that the person from whom they receive the thing is the owner who can convey
16 had always been with Abalon and that upon her title to the property. Such buyers do not close their eyes to facts that should put
death, it was delivered to them. Likewise, they alleged a reasonable person on guard and still claim that they are acting in good faith.
that Abalon had always been in possession of the However, we have also laid down the doctrine that there are instances
subject property through her tenant Pedro Bellen who when such a fraudulent document may become the root of a valid title. One
was thereafter succeeded by his wife, Ruperta Bellen, such instance is where the certificate of title was already transferred from the
and then his son, Godofredo Bellen. On the other hand, name of the true owner to the forger, and while it remained that way, the land
they said that Rellama had never set foot on the land he was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser. For then, the vendee had the
was claiming. They further alleged that after the right to rely upon what appeared in the certificate.
ownership over the subject property was transferred to We have been constrained to adopt the conclusion here set forth
them upon the death of Abalon, they took possession because under the Torrens system, "registration is the operative act that gives
55
thereof and retained Godofredo as their own tenant. validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land (Secs. 50 and 51, Land
However, they averred that in 1995 the defendants- Registration Act). Consequently, where there was nothing in the certificate of
appellants were able to wrest possession of the subject title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any
property from Godofredo Bellen. They alleged that the encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore farther than
defendants-appellants are not buyers in good faith as what the Torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or
they were aware that the subject land was in the inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto.
possession of the plaintiffs-appellees at the time they After executing the Deed of Sale with Bernardina Abalon under
made the purchase. They thus claim that the titles fraudulent circumstances, Rellama succeeded in obtaining a title in his name
issued to the defendants-appellants are null and void. and selling a portion of the property to the Andals, who had no knowledge of the
In his answer, Rellama alleged that the deed fraudulent circumstances involving the transfer from Abalon to Rellama. In fact,
of absolute sale executed by Abalon is genuine and that the Decisions of the RTC and the CA show no factual findings or proof that
the duplicate copy of OCT No. (O) 16 had been would rebut the presumption in favor of the Andals as buyers in good faith.
delivered to him upon the execution of the said deed of Thus, the CA correctly considered them as buyers in good faith and upheld their
transfer. title.
During the trial, Rellama passed away. He was
substituted by his heirs. The established rule is that a forged deed is generally null and cannot
Court a quo rendered judgment in favor of the convey title, the exception thereto, pursuant to Section 55 of the Land
plaintiffs-appellees and ordered the restoration of OCT Registration Act, denotes the registration of titles from the forger to the innocent
No. (O) 16 in the name of Abalon. Court of Appeals purchaser for value. Thus, the qualifying point here is that there must be a
promulgated its assailed judgment setting aside the complete chain of registered titles. This means that all the transfers starting
RTC Decision. The CA ruled that the circumstances from the original rightful owner to the innocent holder for value – and that
surrounding the sale of the subject property showed includes the transfer to the forger – must be duly registered, and the title must
badges of fraud or forgery against Rellama. be properly issued to the transferee. Contrary to what the Abalons would like to
impress on us, Fule and Torresdo not present clashing views. In Fule, the
original owner relinquished physical possession of her title and thus enabled the
perpetrator to commit the fraud, which resulted in the cancellation of her title
and the issuance of a new one. The forged instrument eventually became the
root of a valid title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. The new title
under the name of the forger was registered and relied upon by the innocent
purchaser for value. Hence, it was clear that there was a complete chain of
registered titles.
On the other hand in Torres, the original owner retained possession of
the title, but through fraud, his brother-in-law secured a court order for the
issuance of a copy thereof. While the title was in the name of the forger, the
original owner annotated the adverse claim on the forged instrument. Thus,
before the new title in the name of the forger could be transferred to a third
person, a lien had already been annotated on its back. The chain of registered
titles was broken and sullied by the original owner’s annotation of the adverse
claim. By this act, the mortgagee was shown to be in bad faith.
In the instant case, there is no evidence that the chain of registered
titles was broken in the case of the Andals. Neither were they proven to have
knowledge of anything that would make them suspicious of the nature of
Rellama’s ownership over the subject parcel of land. Hence, we sustain the
CA’s ruling that the Andals were buyers in good faith. Consequently, the validity
of their title to the parcel of the land bought from Rellama must be upheld.
56
As for Spouses Peralta, we sustain the ruling of the CA that they are indeed
buyers in bad faith. The appellate court made a factual finding that in
purchasing the subject property, they merely relied on the photocopy of the title
provided by Rellama. The CA concluded that a mere photocopy of the title
should have made Spouses Peralta suspicious that there was some flaw in the
title of Rellama, because he was not in possession of the original copy. This
factual finding was supported by evidence.
2. Villanueva Whether
vs Branoco Petitioner Villanueva, here represented by his petitioner’s title Naked Title Passed from Rodrigo to Rodriguez Under a
heirs, sued respondents, spouses Froilan, in the RTC to over the Property is Perfected Donation
recover a 3,492 square-meter parcel of land. Petitioner superior to
claimed ownership over the Property through purchase respondents’. We examine the juridical nature of the Deed – whether it passed title to
in July 1971 from Vere, who, in turn, bought the Rodriguez upon its execution or is effective only upon Rodrigo’s death – using
Property from Rodrigo. Petitioner declared the Property principles distilled from relevant jurisprudence. Post-mortem dispositions
in his name for tax purposes soon after acquiring it. typically –
In their Answer, respondents similarly
claimed ownership over the Property through purchase (1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
in July 1983 from Eufracia Rodriguez to whom Rodrigo transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain
donated the Property in May 1965. The two-page deed the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
of donation (Deed). (2) That before the [donor’s] death, the transfer should be revocable
The trial court ruled for petitioner, declared by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may
him owner of the Property. be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power
CA, imputing error in the trial court’s interpretation of in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
the Deed as a testamentary disposition instead of an (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive
inter vivos donation, passing title to Rodriguez upon its the transferee.
execution.
In this petition, petitioner seeks the Further –
reinstatement of the trial court’s ruling. Alternatively,
petitioner claims ownership over the Property through [4] [T]he specification in a deed of the causes whereby the act may be revoked
acquisitive prescription, having allegedly occupied it for by the donor indicates that the donation is inter vivos, rather than a disposition
more than 10 years. mortis causa[;]
[5] That the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a

provision in the deed to the effect that the donation is
“to take effect at the death of the donor” are not
controlling criteria; such statements are to be construed
together with the rest of the instrument, in order to give
effect to the real intent of the transferor[;] [and]
(6) That in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed

donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order
to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property
subject of the deed.
It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to

57
Rodriguez under a perfected donation inter vivos. First. Rodrigo stipulated that
“if the herein Donee predeceases me, the [Property] will not be reverted to the
Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of x x x Rodriguez,” signaling the
irrevocability of the passage of title to Rodriguez’s estate, waiving Rodrigo’s
right to reclaim title. This transfer of title was perfected the moment Rodrigo
learned of Rodriguez’s acceptance of the dispositionwhich, being reflected in
the Deed, took place on the day of its execution on 3 May 1965. Rodrigo’s
acceptance of the transfer underscores its essence as a gift in presenti, not in
futuro, as only donations inter vivos need acceptance by the recipient.Indeed,
had Rodrigo wished to retain full title over the Property, she could have easily
stipulated, as the testator did in another case, that “the donor, may transfer,
sell, or encumber to any person or entity the properties here donated x x x”or
used words to that effect. Instead, Rodrigo expressly waived title over the
Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her.
Second. What Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the beneficial title to the
Property, evident from Rodriguez’s undertaking to “give one [half] x x x of the
produce of the land to Apoy Alve during her lifetime. Thus, the Deed’s
stipulation that “the ownership shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon my demise,”
taking into account the non-reversion clause, could only refer to Rodrigo’s
beneficial title
Indeed, if Rodrigo still retained full ownership over the
Property, it was unnecessary for her to reserve partial usufructuary
right over it.
Third. The existence of consideration other than the donor’s death,

such as the donor’s love and affection to the donee and the services the latter
rendered, while also true of devises, nevertheless “corroborates the express
irrevocability of x x x [inter vivos] transfers.”
Nor can petitioner capitalize on Rodrigo’s post-donation transfer of

the Property to Vere as proof of her retention of ownership. Accordingly, having
irrevocably transferred naked title over the Property to Rodriguez in 1965,
Rodrigo “cannot afterwards revoke the donation nor dispose of the said
property in favor of another.”Thus, Rodrigo’s post-donation sale of the Property
vested no title to Vere. As Vere’s successor-in-interest, petitioner acquired no
better right than him. On the other hand, respondents bought the Property from
Rodriguez, thus acquiring the latter’s title which they may invoke against all
adverse claimants, including petitioner.
Petitioner Acquired No Title Over the Property
Good faith consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom
58
the possessor received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his
ownership. Although Vere and petitioner arguably had just title having
successively acquired the Property through sale, neither was a good faith
possessor. As Rodrigo herself disclosed in the Deed, Rodriguez already
occupied and possessed the Property “in the concept of an owner” since 21
May 1962, nearly three years before Rodrigo’s donation in 3 May 1965 and
seven years before Vere bought the Property from Rodrigo. This admission
against interest binds Rodrigo and all those tracing title to the Property through
her, including Vere and petitioner. Indeed, petitioner’s insistent claim that
Rodriguez occupied the Property only in 1982, when she started paying taxes,
finds no basis in the records. In short, when Vere bought the Property from
Rodrigo in 1970, Rodriguez was in possession of the Property, a fact that
prevented Vere from being a buyer in good faith.
Lacking good faith possession, petitioner’s only other recourse to maintain his
claim of ownership by prescription is to show open, continuous and adverse
possession of the Property for 30 years.Undeniably, petitioner is unable to meet
this requirement.
3. Del Rosario This case pertains to a gift, otherwise whethe That the document in question in this case was captioned “Donation Mortis
vs. Ferrer denominated as a donation mortis causa, which in r or not the Causa” is not controlling.
reality is a donation inter vivos made effective upon its spouses Leopoldo
execution by the donors and acceptance thereof by the and Guadalupe’s “Irrevocability” is a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of
donees, and immediately transmitting ownership of the donation to conveyances mortis causa, where “revocability” is precisely the essence of the
donated property to the latter, thus precluding a Asuncion, Emiliano, act. A donation mortis causa has the following characteristics:
subsequent assignment thereof by one of the donors. and Jarabini was a
donation mortis 1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death
causa, as it was of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor
Spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe denominated, or in should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property
Gonzales executed a document entitled “Donation fact a donation inter while alive;
Mortis Causa” in favor of their two children, Asuncion vivos.
and Emiliano, and their granddaughter, Jarabini 2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the
(daughter of their predeceased son, Zoilo) in equal transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly
shares. The deed of donation reads: by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties
conveyed; and
It is our will that this Donation Mortis
Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected 3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
by the surviving spouse. transferee. (Underscoring supplied)
It is our will that Jarabini Gonzales-del The Court thus said in Austria-Magat that the express
Rosario and Emiliano Gonzales will continue to “irrevocability” of the donation is the “distinctive standard that identifies the
occupy the portions now occupied by them. document as a donation inter vivos.” Here, the donors plainly said that it is “our
will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected
It is further our will that this DONATION by the surviving spouse.” The intent to make the donation irrevocable becomes
MORTIS CAUSA shall not in any way affect any even clearer by the proviso that a surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability
other distribution of other properties belonging to of the donation. Consequently, the donation was in reality a donation inter
any of us donors whether testate or intestate and vivos.
59
where ever situated. The donors in this case of course reserved the “right, ownership,
possession, and administration of the property” and made the donation
operative upon their death. But this Court has consistently held that such
Although denominated as a donation mortis reservation (reddendum) in the context of an irrevocable donation simply means
causa, which in law is the equivalent of a will, the deed that the donors parted with their naked title, maintaining only beneficial
had no attestation clause and was witnessed by only ownership of the donated property while they lived.
two persons. The named donees, however, signified Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the donation,
their acceptance of the donation on the face of the which acceptance the deed required. This Court has held that an acceptance
document. clause indicates that the donation is inter vivos, since acceptance is a
requirement only for such kind of donations. Donations mortis causa, being in
Guadalupe, the donor wife, died in the form of a will, need not be accepted by the donee during the donor’s
September 1968. A few months later or on December lifetime.
19, 1968, Leopoldo, the donor husband, executed a Finally, as Justice J. B. L. Reyes said in Puig v. Peñaflorida, in case
deed of assignment of his rights and interests in subject of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed a donation inter vivos rather than
property to their daughter Asuncion. Leopoldo died in mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property
June 1972. subject of the deed.
Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it was
In 1998 Jarabini filed a “petition for the immediately operative and final. The reason is that such kind of donation is
probate, After trial, the RTC rendered a decision finding deemed perfected from the moment the donor learned of the donee’s
that the donation was in fact one made inter vivos. CA, acceptance of the donation. The acceptance makes the donee the absolute
rendered a decision reversing that of the RTC. owner of the property donated.
Given that the donation in this case was irrevocable or one given
inter vivos, Leopoldo’s subsequent assignment of his rights and interests in the
property to Asuncion should be regarded as void for, by then, he had no more
rights to assign. He could not give what he no longer had. Nemo dat quod non
habet.
4. Heirs of Whether
Maramag vs The petition alleged that: (1) petitioners members of the In this case, it is clear from the petition filed before the trial court
Maramag were the legitimate wife and children of Loreto, while legitimate family that, although petitioners are the legitimate heirs of Loreto, they were not
respondents were Loreto’s illegitimate family; (2) Eva entitled to the named as beneficiaries in the insurance policies issued by Insular and
was a concubine of Loreto and a suspect in the killing of proceeds of the Grepalife. The basis of petitioners’ claim is that Eva, being a concubine of
the latter, thus, she is disqualified to receive any insurance for the Loreto and a suspect in his murder, is disqualified from being designated as
proceeds from his insurance policies from Insular Life concubine? beneficiary of the insurance policies, and that Eva’s children with Loreto, being
and Grepalife; (3) the illegitimate children of Loreto— illegitimate children, are entitled to a lesser share of the proceeds of the
Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie—were entitled __ policies.
only to one-half of the legitime of the legitimate children,
thus, the proceeds released to Odessa and those to be It is evident from the face of the complaint that petitioners are not
released to Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie were entitled to a favorable judgment in light of Article 2011 of the Civil Code which
inofficious and should be reduced; and (4) petitioners expressly provides that insurance contracts shall be governed by special laws,
could not be deprived of their legitimes, which should i.e., the Insurance Code. Section 53 of the Insurance Code states—
be satisfied first.
Petitioners alleged, among others, that part SECTION 53. The insurance proceeds
of the insurance proceeds had already been released in shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest of the
favor of Odessa, while the rest of the proceeds are to person in whose name or for whose benefit it is made
60
be released in favor of Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie, unless otherwise specified in the policy
both minors, upon the appointment of their legal
guardian. Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only persons entitled to claim
In answer, Insular admitted that Loreto the insurance proceeds are either the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if
misrepresented Eva as his legitimate wife and Odessa, the insured is already deceased, upon the maturation of the policy. The
Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie as his legitimate children, exception to this rule is a situation where the insurance contract was intended
and that they filed their claims for the insurance to benefit third persons who are not parties to the same in the form of favorable
proceeds of the insurance policies; that when it stipulations or indemnity. In such a case, third parties may directly sue and
ascertained that Eva was not the legal wife of Loreto, it claim from the insurer.
disqualified her as a beneficiary and divided the Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular
proceeds among Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha and Grepalife and, thus, are not entitled to the proceeds thereof. Accordingly,
Angelie, as the remaining designated beneficiaries; and respondents Insular and Grepalife have no legal obligation to turn over the
that it released Odessa’s share as she was of age, but insurance proceeds to petitioners. The revocation of Eva as a beneficiary in
withheld the release of the shares of minors Karl Brian one policy and her disqualification as such in another are of no moment
and Trisha Angelie pending submission of letters of considering that the designation of the illegitimate children as beneficiaries in
guardianship. Insular further claimed that it was bound Loreto’s insurance policies remains valid. Because no legal proscription exists
to honor the insurance policies designating the children in naming as beneficiaries the children of illicit relationships by the insured, the
of Loreto with Eva as beneficiaries pursuant to Section shares of Eva in the insurance proceeds, whether forfeited by the court in view
53 of the Insurance Code. of the prohibition on donations under Article 739 of the Civil Code or by the
Grepalife alleged that Eva was not designated insurers themselves for reasons based on the insurance contracts, must be
as an insurance policy beneficiary; that the claims filed awarded to the said illegitimate children, the designated beneficiaries, to the
by Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie were denied exclusion of petitioners. It is only in cases where the insured has not
because Loreto was ineligible for insurance due to a designated any beneficiary, or when the designated beneficiary is disqualified
misrepresentation in his application form that he was by law to receive the proceeds, the insurance policy proceeds shall redound to
born on December 10, 1936 and, thus, not more than the benefit of the estate of the insured.
65 years old when he signed it in September 2001; and
that the law on succession does not apply where the
designation of insurance beneficiaries is clear.
The trial court issued a Resolution in favor of
Insurace company. CA dismissed the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction, holding that the decision of the trial court
dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action involved a pure question of law.
5. Arangote vs. Elvira T. Arangote, herein petitioner married to Whether or not 1. The records disclosed that the subject property was part of a
Maglunob Ray Mars E. Arangote, is the registered owner of the there is a valid parcel of landsituated in Maloco, Ibajay, Aklan, consisting of 7,176 square
subject property, Respondents Martin (Martin II) and donation? meters and commonly owned in equal shares by the siblings Pantaleon and
Romeo are first cousins and the grandnephews of Placida. Upon the death of Pantaleon and Placida, their surviving and legal
Esperanza Maglunob-Dailisan (Esperanza), from whom heirs executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition of Estate in July
petitioner acquired the subject property. 1981, however, the Deed was not notarized. Considering that Pantaleon died
The Petition stems from a Complaintfiled by without issue, his one-half share in the parcel of land he co-owned with Placida
petitioner and her husband against the respondents for passed on to his four siblings (or their respective heirs, if already deceased),
Quieting of Title, Declaration of Ownership and namely: Placida, Luis, Martin I, and Victoria, in equal shares.
Possession, Damages with Preliminary Injunction, and It is clear from the records that the subject property was not
61
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order before the Esperanza’s exclusive share, but also that of the other heirs of her father,
MCTC. Martin I. Esperanza expressly affixed her thumbmark to the Deed of
The Complaint alleged that Esperanza inherited Extrajudicial Settlement of July 1981 not only for herself, but also on behalf of
the subject property from her uncle Victorino Sorrosa by the other heirs of Martin I. Though in the Partition Agreement dated 29 April
virtue of a notarized Partition Agreementdated 29 April 1985 Esperanza affixed her thumbmark without stating that she was doing so
1985, executed by the latter’s heirs. not only for herself, but also on behalf of the other heirs of Martin I, this does
The Complaint further stated that Esperanza not mean that Esperanza was already the exclusive owner thereof. The
executed a Last Will and Testamentbequeathing the evidence shows that the subject property is the share of the heirs of Martin I.
subject property to petitioner and her husband, but it 2. In this case, the petitioner derived her title to the subject property
was never probated. Esperanza executed another from the notarized Affidavit executed by Esperanza, wherein the latter
document, an Affidavit, in which she renounced, relinquished her rights, share, interest and participation over the same in favor
relinquished, waived and quitclaimed all her rights, of the petitioner and her husband.
share, interest and participation whatsoever in the A careful perusal of the said Affidavit reveals that it is not what it
subject property in favor of petitioner and her husband. purports to be. Esperanza’s Affidavit is, in fact, a Donation. Esperanza’s real
In 1989, petitioner and her husband constructed intent in executing the said Affidavit was to donate her share in the subject
a house on the subject property. However, property to petitioner and her husband.
respondents, together with some hired persons, entered As no onerous undertaking is required of petitioner and her
the subject property on 1994 and built a hollow block husband under the said Affidavit, the donation is regarded as a pure donation of
wall behind and in front of petitioner’s house, which an interest in a real property covered by Article 749 of the Civil Code.Article 749
effectively blocked the entrance to its main door. of the Civil Code provides:
As a consequence thereof, petitioner and her Art. 749. In order that the donation of an
husband were compelled to institute Civil Case. immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public
Respondents averred that they co-owned the subject document, specifying therein the property donated and
property with Esperanza. Esperanza and her siblings, the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
Tomas and Inocencia, inherited the subject property, in The acceptance may be made in the same
equal shares, from their father Martin Maglunob (Martin deed of donation or in a separate public document, but
I). When Tomas and Inocencia passed away, their it shall not take effect unless it is done during the
shares passed on by inheritance to respondents Martin lifetime of the donor.
II and Romeo, respectively. Hence, the subject If the acceptance is made in a separate
property was co-owned by Esperanza, respondent instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an
Martin II (together with his wife Lourdes), and authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both
respondent Romeo, each holding a one-third pro- instruments.
indiviso share therein. Thus, Esperanza could not
validly waive her rights and interest over the entire
subject property in favor of the petitioner. From the aforesaid provision, there are three requisites for the
Respondents also asserted in their validity of a simple donation of a real property, to wit: (1) it must be made in a
Counterclaim that petitioner and her husband, by public instrument; (2) it must be accepted, which acceptance may be made
means of fraud, undue influence and deceit were able either in the same Deed of Donation or in a separate public instrument; and (3)
to make Esperanza, who was already old and illiterate, if the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor must be notified
affix her thumbmark to the Affidavit wherein she in an authentic form, and the same must be noted in both instruments.
renounced all her rights and interest over the subject This Court agrees with the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the
property in favor of petitioner and her husband. Affidavit executed by Esperanza relinquishing her rights, share, interest and
The RTC adjudged respondents, as well as participation over the subject property in favor of the petitioner and her husband
the other heirs of Martin Maglunob, as the lawful suffered from legal infirmities, as it failed to comply with the aforesaid requisites
owners and possessors of the entire subject property. of the law.
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Court of Appeals rendered a Decision denying the In Sumipat v. Banga,this Court declared that title to immovable
Petition for Review of petitioner and her husband and property does not pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of a Deed of
affirming the RTC Decision Donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and
the donor duly notified thereof. The acceptance may be made in the very
same instrument of donation. If the acceptance does not appear in the same
document, it must be made in another. Where the Deed of Donation fails to
show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a
separate instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not noted in the
Deed of Donation and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null and
void.
In the present case, the said Affidavit, which is tantamount to a Deed of
Donation, met the first requisite, as it was notarized; thus, it became a public
instrument. Nevertheless, it failed to meet the aforesaid second and third
requisites. The acceptance of the said donation was not made by the petitioner
and her husband either in the same Affidavit or in a separate public instrument.
As there was no acceptance made of the said donation, there was also no
notice of the said acceptance given to the donor, Esperanza. Therefore, the
Affidavit executed by Esperanza in favor of petitioner and her husband is
null and void.
The subsequent notarized Deed of Acceptance dated 23
September 2000, as well as the noticeof such acceptance, executed by the
petitioner did not cure the defect.
It is true that the acceptance of a donation may be made at any
time during the lifetime of the donor. And granting arguendo that such
acceptance may still be admitted in evidence on appeal, there isstill need for
proof that a formal notice of such acceptance was received by the donor
and noted in both the Deed of Donation and the separate instrument
embodying the acceptance. At the very least, this last legal requisite of
annotation in both instruments of donation and acceptance was not fulfilled by
the petitioner. Neither the Affidavit nor the Deed of Acceptance bears the fact
that Esperanza received notice of the acceptance of the donation by petitioner.
For this reason, even Esperanza’s one-third share in the subject property
cannot be adjudicated to the petitioner.
3. The next issue to be resolved then is whether the RTC, as well

as the Court of Appeals, erred in declaring OCT No. CLOA-1748 in the name of
petitioner and her husband null and void.
Again, this Court answers the said issue in the negative.
Section 48 of Presidential decree No. 1529 states:
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A

certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled
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except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
The attack is considered direct when the object of an action is to

annul or set aside such proceeding, or enjoin its enforcement. Conversely, an
attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an
attack on the proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. Such
action to attack a certificate of title may be an original action or a
counterclaim, in which a certificate of title is assailed as void.
A counterclaim is considered a new suit in which the defendant is

the plaintiff and the plaintiff in the complaint becomes the defendant. It stands
on the same footing as, and is to be tested by the same rules as if it were, an
independent action.
It is clear, thus, that respondents’ Answer with Counterclaim was a
direct attack on petitioner’s certificate of title. Furthermore, since all the
essential facts of the case for the determination of the validity of the title are
now before this Court, to require respondents to institute a separate
cancellation proceeding would be pointlessly circuitous and against the best
interest of justice.
Esperanza’s Affidavit, which was the sole basis of petitioner’s claim
to the subject property, has been declared null and void. Considering that
Esperanza died without any compulsory heirs and that the supposed donation
of her one-third share in the subject property per her Affidavit dated 9 June
1985 was already declared null and void, Esperanza’s one-third share in the
subject property passed on to her legal heirs, the respondents.
4. As petitioner’s last-ditch effort, she claims that she is a possessor in

good faith and, thus, entitled to the rights provided for under Articles 448 and
546 of the Civil Code.
The Civil Code describes a possessor in good faith as follows:
Art. 526. He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there
exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
He is deemed a possessor in bad faith who possesses in any case contrary to

the foregoing.
Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good
faith.
Art. 1127. The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that
the person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could
transmit his ownership.
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Possession in good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are
made known to the possessor by extraneous evidence or by a suit for recovery
of the property by the true owner. Every possessor in good faith becomes a
possessor in bad faith from the moment he becomes aware that what he
believed to be true is not so.
6. Aluad vs Petitioners’ mother, Maria and respondent Whethe The Court finds the donation to petitioners’ mother one of mortis causa, it
Aluad Zenaido were raised by the childless spouses Matilde r there is Donation having the following characteristics:
and Crispin. inter vivos
Crispin was the owner of six lots located in (1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
Capiz. transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain
Matilde executed a document entitled the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
“Deed of Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos in favor (2) That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be
of petitioners’ mother Maria[ covering all the six lots revocable by the
which Matilde inherited from her husband Crispin. The transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for
Deed of Donation provided: indirectly by means of
That, for and in consideration of the love and a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties
affection of the DONOR [Matilde] for the DONEE conveyed; and
[Maria], the latter being adopted and hav[ing] been (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
brought up by the former the DONOR, by these transferee
presents, transfer and convey, BY WAY OF
DONATION, unto the DONEE the property above- The phrase in the earlier-quoted Deed of Donation “to become
described, to become effective upon the death of the effective upon the death of the DONOR” admits of no other interpretation than
DONOR, but in the event that the DONEE should to mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to
die before the DONOR, the present donation shall petitioners’ mother during her (Matilde’s) lifetime.
be deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and The statement in the Deed of Donation reading “anytime during
effect; Provided, however, that anytime during the the lifetime of the DONORor anyone of them who should survive, they could
lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of them who should use, encumber or even dispose of any or even all the parcels of land
survive, they could use[,] encumber or even dispose of herein donated” means that Matilde retained ownership of the lots and
any or even all of the parcels of land herein donated. reserved in her the right to dispose them. For the right to dispose of a thing
without other limitations than those established by law is an attribute of
Matilde sold Lot No. 676 to ownership. The phrase in the Deed of Donation “or anyone of them who should
respondent. Matilde executed a last will and survive” is of course out of sync. For the Deed of Donation clearly stated that it
testament, devising 4 lots Maria, and her would take effect upon the death of the donor, hence, said phrase could only
“remaining properties” including Lot No. 674 have referred to the donor Matilde. Petitioners themselves concede that such
to respondent. phrase does not refer to the donee, thus:
Matilde died on January 25, 1994, while x x x [I]t is well to point out that the last provision (sentence) in the
Maria died on September 24 of the same year. Maria’s disputed paragraph should only refer to Matilde Aluad, the donor, because she
heirs-herein petitioners filed before the RTC a was the only surviving spouse at the time the donation was executed on 14
Complaint, for declaration and recovery of ownership November 1981, as her husband – Crispin Aluad [–] had long been dead as
and possession of Lot Nos. 674 and 676, and damages early as 1975
against respondent. As the Court of Appeals observed, “x x x [t]hat the donation is
The trial court, by Decisionheld that Matilde mortis causa is fortified by Matilde’s acts of possession as she continued to pay
could not have transmitted any right over Lot Nos. 674 the taxes for the said properties which remained under her name; appropriated
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and 676 to respondent, she having previously alienated the produce; and applied for free patents for which OCTs were issued under her
them to Maria via the Deed of Donation. The Court of name.”
Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, it holding The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will
that the Deed of Donation was actually a donation should have been observedbut they were not, as it was witnessed by only two,
mortis causa, not inter vivos, and as such it had to, but not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code.
did not, comply with the formalities of a will. The Deed of Donation which is, as already discussed, one of mortis causa, not
having followed the formalities of a will, it is void and transmitted no right to
petitioners’ mother. But even assuming arguendo that the formalities were
observed, since it was not probated, no right to Lot Nos. 674 and 676 was
transmitted to Maria. Matilde thus validly disposed of Lot No. 674 to respondent
by her last will and testament, subject of course to the qualification that her
(Matilde’s) will must be probated. With respect to Lot No. 676, the same had,
as mentioned earlier, been sold by Matilde to respondent on August 26, 1991.
7. Zamboanga President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
vs Plagata Presidential Decree No. 93which legalized barter 1. THE From the records, the subject property was donated by petitioner
trading in the Sulu and adjacent areas, and empowered HONORABLE (donor) to the Republic (donee) with the following conditions already adverted
the Commander of the Southwest Command of the COURT OF heretofore but are being reiterated for emphasis:
Armed Forces of the Philippines AFP to coordinate all APPELAS ERRED
activities and to undertake all measures for the IN NOT PASSING 4. That in the event barter trading shall be phased out,
implementation of said decree. UPON THE ISSUE prohibited, or suspended
ZBTKBI, thru its President, Atty. Alam, and OF THE NULLITY for more than one (1) year in Zamboanga City, Philippines, the
the Republic, represented by Maj. Gen. Delfin C. OF THE LEVY, IT afore-described parcel
Castro, entered into a Deed of Donation whereby HAVING BEEN of land shall revert back to the DONOR without need of any further
ZBTKBI donated to the Republic a parcel of land MADE WITHOUT formality or
covered by Certificate of Title (CTC) No. T-61,628 of PRIOR NOTICE documentation, and the DONOR shall have the first option to
the Registry of Deeds of Zamboanga City, containing TO THE purchase the building
an area of 13,643 square meters. REPUBLIC. and improvements thereon.
With the acceptance of the donation, TCT
No. T-61,628in the name of ZBTKBI was cancelled and, 2. THE Effective 1 October 1988, per Memorandum Circular No. 1 of the
in lieu thereof, TCT. No. T-66,696 was issued in the HONORABLE Office of the President dated 17 June 1988, barter trade in Zamboanga City
name of the Republic. COURT OF was totally phased out. Following the condition contained in the Deed of
Pursuant to condition No. 1 of the Deed of APPEALS Donation, the donated land shall revert to the petitioner without further
Donation, the Government and Regional Office No. IX ERRED IN NOT formality or documentation. It follows that upon the phase-out of barter trade,
of the Department of Public Works and Highways DECLARING petitioner again became the owner of the subject land. Thus, when the property
(DPWH) constructed a Barter Trade Market Building THAT ALL THE was levied and sold on 1 March 1990 and 13 June 1990, respectively, it was
worth P5,000,000.00 at the said Lot No. 6. The building PROCEEDINGS already petitioner that owned the same. It should be clear that reversion
was completed on 30 March 1983 and was occupied by SUBSEQUENT applied only to the land and not to the building and improvements made
members of ZBTKBI, as well as by other persons TO THE INVALID by the Republic on the land worth P5,000,000.00.
engaged in barter trade. LEVY, SUCH AS
Prior to said donation, private respondent THE AUCTION, The Court of Appeals merely enforced or applied the conditions
Mendoza was hired by ZBTKBI as clerk. Subsequently, THE contained in the deed of donation. The Republic accepted the donation subject
in a letter through its President, Atty. Alam, informed CERTIFICATE to conditions imposed by the donor. In condition number 4, the Republic is
Mendoza that his services were being terminated on the OF SALE AND given the right to sell the building it constructed on the land and the
ground of abandonment of work. THE ISSUANCE improvements thereon. If ever such condition is disadvantageous to the
For this reason, Mendoza filed before the OF THE WRIT Republic, there is nothing that can be done about it, since it is one of the
66
DOLE, a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with payment of OF conditions that are contained in the donation which it accepted. There being
backwages and separation pay. POSSESSION, nothing ambiguous in the contents of the document, there is no room for
Arbiter rendered his decision finding the ARE VOID AB interpretation but only simple application thereof.
dismissal of Mendoza illegal. INITIO.
NLRC dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. CA denied We likewise find to be without basis petitioner’s claim that the
the petition. Republic should be reimbursed of the cost of the construction of the barter trade
building pursuant to condition number 4. There is nothing there that shows that
the Republic will be reimbursed. What is stated there is that petitioner has the
first option to purchase the buildings and improvements thereon. In other
words, the Republic can sell the buildings and improvements that it made or
built.
As above ruled, the deed of donation contains a stipulation that

allows automatic reversion. Such stipulation, not being contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy, is valid and binding on the parties
to the donation. As held in Dolar v. Barangay Lublub (Now P.D. Monfort North)
Municipality of Dumangas
When a deed of donation, . . . expressly
provides for automatic revocation and reversion of the
property donated, the rules on contract and the general
rules on prescription should apply, and not Article 764
of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of said Code
authorizes the parties to a contract to establish such
stipulations, . . . not contrary to law, . . . public order or
public policy, we are of the opinion that, at the very
least, that stipulation of the parties providing for
automatic revocation of the deed of donation, without
prior judicial action for that purpose, is valid subject to
the determination of the propriety of the rescission
sought. Where such propriety is sustained, the
decision of the court will be merely declaratory of the
revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory act.
The automatic reversion of the subject land to the donor upon

phase out of barter trading in Zamboanga City cannot be doubted. Said
automatic reversion cannot be averted, merely because petitioner-donor has
not yet exercised its option to purchase the buildings and improvements made
and introduced on the land by the Republic; or because the Republic has not
yet sold the same to other interested buyers. Otherwise, there would be gross
violation of the clear import of the conditions set forth in the deed of donation.
A judgment may be executed on motion within five years from the date
of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of
such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may
be enforced by action. If the prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced
67
by a mere motion after the lapse of five years from the date of its entry (or from
the date it becomes final and executory), the said judgment is reduced to a
mere right of action in favor of the person whom it favors and must be enforced,
as are all ordinary actions, by the institution of a complaint in a regular
form.However, there are instances in which this Court allowed execution by
motion even after the lapse of five years upon meritorious grounds. In Lancita v.
Magbanua, Court declared: Any interruption or delay occasioned by the debtor
will extend the time within which the writ may be issued without scire facias.
In the case under consideration, the decision of the NLRC was
promulgated on 15 November 1983, and it became final and executory on 18
January 1984 (not December 1983 as ruled by the Court of Appeals). On 2
July 1984, a writ of execution was issued by Executive Labor Arbiter
Abdulwahid. Said writ was returned unsatisfied. From the return of the sheriff,
there is no doubt that he was threatened by Atty. Hasan G. Alam, President of
ZBTKBI, who told him to “clad himself with iron dress” if he would enforce the
writ Thereafter a motion for issuance of an alias writ of execution dated 23
October 1984 was filed by Mendoza, because the lifespan of the first writ of
execution expired without being satisfied. Consequently, an Alias Writ of
Execution was issued on 19 November 1984. The writ remained unsatisfied.
At this point, two writs of execution were already issued but were not satisfied.
On 18 December 1989, Mendoza filed a Motion for Issuance of (Second)
Alias Writ of Execution, which public respondent Executive Labor Arbiter
Rhett Julius J. Plagata issued on 2 January 1990.
It cannot be disputed that Mendoza had not slept on his rights. In
fact, he filed three motions so that the judgment in his favor could be executed
and satisfied. The judgment was satisfied by virtue of the second alias writ of
execution, which was issued upon a motion filed beyond the five-year period.
The satisfaction of the judgment was not successful during the first two writs of
execution. The delay in the enforcement of the two writs was clearly caused by
petitioner through its President, Atty. Alam. Said delay was indeed beneficial
and advantageous to petitioner, because the judgment against it, at that time,
was yet to be implemented. It is very clear that if not for the threats received by
the sheriff tasked to implement the writs of execution, the satisfaction of
judgment would not have been delayed.
Under the circumstances obtaining, we hold that the five-year
period allowed for enforcement of a judgment by motion was deemed to have
been interrupted by petitioner. The prevention of the satisfaction of the
judgment on the first two writs of execution cannot be blamed on Mendoza.
The satisfaction of the judgment was already beyond his control. He did what
he was supposed to do – file the requisite motions so that writs of execution
would be issued. In view of the foregoing and for reasons of equity, we deem
that the Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution filed by Mendoza on 18
December 1989 has been filed within the five-year period.
As ruled above, the land reverted to petitioner without need of any
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further formality or documentation when barter trading was phased out in

Zamboanga City. Not being the owner of the land when the levy was made, the
Republic need not have been notified anymore. It cannot be deprived of a
piece of land of which it is no longer the owner. If the Republic is still in
possession of the TCT over the subject land, it must surrender the same to the
proper authorities. The fact that the Republic is no longer the owner of the
subject land does not mean that it no longer owns the buildings, structures and
improvements it made and introduced on the subject land. Control and
possession over said buildings, structures and improvements shall be returned
to the Republic. The Republic, pursuant to condition No. 4 of the Deed of
Donation, can sell the buildings, structures and improvements to interested
buyers, with petitioner being the first in line.
Ty v Ty Facts: Whether an implied Negative.

Alexander Ty, son of Alejandro B. Ty and Bella Torres, trust under Art 1448 Petitioner contends that the EDSA property, while registered in the name of his
died of cancer at the age of 34. He was survived by his was constituted son Alexander Ty, is covered by an implied trust in his favor under Article 1448
wife, Sylvia Ty, and his only daughter, Krizia Katrina Ty. over the subject of the Civil Code. This is because he paid the price when the property was
A few months after his death, a petition for the properties. purchased and did so for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the
settlement of his intestate estate was filed by Sylvia Ty property.
in the RTC of Quezon City. Article 1448 of the Civil Code provides:
Upon petition of Sylvia Ty, as Administratrix, for Art. 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal estate
settlement and distribution of the intestate estate of is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of
Alexander in the County of Los Angeles, the Superior having the beneficial interest of the property. The former is the trustee, while
Court of California ordered the distribution of the the latter is the beneficiary. However, if the person to whom the title is
Hollywood condominium unit, the Montebello lot, and conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, of one paying the price of the
the 1986 Toyota pick-up truck to Sylvia Ty and Krizia sale, no trust is implied by law, it being disputably presumed that there is a gift
Katrina Ty. in favor of the child.
Thereafter, Sylvia Ty submitted to the intestate Court in The CA conceded that at least part of the purchase price of the EDSA property
Quezon City an inventory of the assets of Alexander’s came from petitioner. However, it ruled out the existence of an implied trust
estate, consisting of shares of stocks and a schedule of because of the last sentence of Article 1448: x xx However, if the person to
real estate properties, which included the following: whom the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the one
1. Edsa property paying the price of the sale, no trust is implied by law, it being disputably
2. Meridien Condominium presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child.
3. Wack-Wack property Petitioner now claims that in so ruling, the CA departed from jurisprudence in
that such was not the theory of the parties.
Sylvia Ty asked the intestate Court to sell or mortgage Petitioner, however, forgets that it was he who invoked Article 1448 of the Civil
the properties of the estate in order to pay the Code to claim the existence of an implied trust. But Article 1448 itself, in
additional estate tax of P4,714,560.02 assessed by the providing for the so-called purchase money resulting trust, also provides the
BIR. parameters of such trust and adds, in the same breath, the proviso: "However,
Apparently, this action did not sit well with her father-in- if the person to whom the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate,
law, the plaintiff-appellee, Alejandro Ty, father of the of the one paying the price of the sale, NO TRUST IS
deceased Alexander Ty, filed a complaint for recovery IMPLIED BY LAW, it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of
of properties with prayer for preliminary injunction the child." (Emphasis supplied.)
69
and/or temporary restraining order against Sylvia Ty as Stated otherwise, the outcome is the necessary consequence of petitioner’s
defendant in her capacity as [Administratrix] of the theory and argument and is inextricably linked to it by the law itself.
Intestate Estate of Alexander Ty. The CA, therefore, did not err in simply applying the law.
the RTC granted the application for a writ of preliminary Article 1448 of the Civil Code is clear. If the person to whom the title is
injunction. conveyed is the child of the one paying the price of the sale, and in this case
Plaintiff added that defendant acted in bad faith in this is undisputed, NO TRUST IS IMPLIED BY LAW.
including the subject properties in the inventory of The law, instead, disputably presumes a donation in favor of the child.
Alexander Ty’s estate, for she was well aware that
Alexander was simply holding the said properties in The net effect of all the foregoing is that respondent is obliged to collate into
trust for his siblings. the mass of the estate of petitioner, in the event of his death, the EDSA
the RTC rendered its decision in favor of plaintiff. property as an advance of Alexander’s share in the estate of his father, to the
CA reversed the decision of the RTC extent that petitioner provided a part of its purchase price.
The Meridien Condominium and the Wack-Wack property.
Petitioner would have this Court overturn the finding of the CA that as regards
the Meridien Condominium and the Wack-Wack property, petitioner failed to
show that the money used to purchase the same came from him.
Again, this is clearly a factual finding and petitioner has advanced no
convincing argument for this Court to alter the findings reached by the CA.
Among the facts cited by the CA are the sources of income of Alexander Ty
who had been working for nine years when he purchased these two properties,
who had a car care business, and was actively engaged in the business
dealings of several family corporations, from which he received emoluments
and other benefits.
The CA, therefore, ruled that with respect to the Meridien Condominium and
the Wack-Wack property, no implied trust was created because there was no
showing that part of the purchase price was paid by petitioner and, on the
contrary, the evidence showed that Alexander Ty had the means to pay for the
same.
Petition is PARTLY GRANTED, the Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED, with
the MODIFICATION that respondent is obliged to collate into the mass of
the estate of petitioner, in the event of his death, the EDSA property as an
advance of Alexander Ty’s share in the estate of his father, to the extent
that petitioner provided a part of its purchase price.
Catalan v Basa Facts: Whether the trial Yes. A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a
On June 16, 1951, FELICIANO CATALAN (Feliciano) court and the CA thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it. Like any other contract, an
donated to his sister MERCEDES CATALAN were correct in agreement of the parties is essential. Consent in contracts presupposes the
(Mercedes) one-half of the subject parcel of land. finding that the following requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or with an exact notion of the
On March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the same property deed of donation matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it should be spontaneous.
in favor of her children Delia and Jesus Basa. The executed by The parties' intention must be clear and the attendance of a vice of consent,
Deed of Absolute Sale was registered with the Register Feliciano in favor of like any contract, renders the donation voidable.
of Deeds on February 20, 1992, and Tax Declaration Mercedes was In order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial is the donor's
No. 12911 was issued in the name of respondents. valid. capacity to give consent at the time of the donation. Certainly, there lies no
On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Feliciano's guardian, doubt in the fact that insanity impinges on consent freely given. However, the
70
filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of Documents, burden of proving such incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it; if no
Recovery of Possession and Ownership, as well as sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be presumed.
damages against the herein respondents. BPI alleged A thorough perusal of the records of the case at bar indubitably shows that the
that the Deed of evidence presented by the petitioners was insufficient to overcome the
Absolute Donation to Mercedes was void, as Feliciano presumption that Feliciano was competent when he donated the property in
was not of sound mind and was therefore incapable of question to Mercedes. Petitioners make much ado of the fact that, as early as
giving valid consent. Thus, it claimed that if the Deed of 1948, Feliciano had been found to be suffering from schizophrenia by the
Absolute Donation was void ab initio, the subsequent Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs. By itself,
Deed of Absolute Sale to Delia and Jesus Basa should however, the allegation cannot prove the incompetence of Feliciano. A study of
likewise be nullified for Mercedes Catalan had no right the nature of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano could still be presumed
to sell the property to anyone. capable of attending to his property rights.
On August 14, 1997, Feliciano passed away. The From the scientific studies, it can be deduced that a person suffering from
original complaint was amended to substitute his heirs, schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose
in lieu of BPI, as complainants. his property. By merely alleging the existence of schizophrenia, petitioners
The trial court found that the evidence presented by the failed to show substantial proof that at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951,
complainants was insufficient to overcome the Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his mental faculties. Thus, the lower
presumption that Feliciano was sane and competent at courts correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at that time and that this
the time he executed the deed of donation in favor of condition continued to exist until proof to the contrary was adduced.
Mercedes Catalan. Thus, the court declared, the
presumption of sanity or competency not having been
duly impugned, the presumption of due execution of the
donation in question must be upheld. CA affirmed the
judgment of the trial court and held that all the elements
for validity of contracts having been present in the 1951
donation, Mercedes acquired valid title of ownership
over the property in dispute, and the subsequent sale of
the property must be upheld.
Florencio v Facts: ISSUE:1) WON There is no donation. Under the New Civil Code, donation is one of the modes
Sevilla De Leon Petitioner Teresa Sevilla de Leon, owned a residential there is donation?; of acquiring ownership. Among the attributes of ownership is the right to
lot with an area of 828 square meters located in San 2)WON Petitioners, possess the property.
Miguel, Bulacan. In the 1960s, De Leon allowed the who appears to be The essential elements of donation are as follows:
spouses Respondent Rosendo and Consuelo Florencio the donee under the (a) the essential reduction of the patrimony of the donor;
to construct a house on the said property and stay unregistered Deed (b) the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and
therein without any rentals therefore. of Donation, have a (c) the intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi.
In November 1978, Pet. De Leon, died intestate. Her better right to the When applied to a donation of an immovable property, the law further requires
heirs allowed Rosendo Florencio to continue staying in physical or material that the donation be made in a public document and that the acceptance
the property. In March 1995, Florencio died intestate. possession of the thereof be made in the same deed or in a separate public instrument; in cases
On April 26, 1995, the heirs of De Leon, through property over the where the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, it is mandated that the
counsel, sent a letter to the heirs of Florencio, respondents who is donor be notified thereof in an authentic form, to be noted in both instruments.
demanding that they vacate the property within ninety the registered As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of
(90) days from receipt thereof. The latter refused and owner of the title over the property from the donor to the donee, and is perfected from the
failed to vacate the property. They filed a complaint for property? moment the donor is made aware of the acceptance by the donee, provided
ejectment against the heirs of Florencio before the that the donee is not disqualified or prohibited by law from accepting the
MTC. donation. Once the donation is accepted, it is generally considered irrevocable,
The heirs of Florencio, in their answer, alleged that the and the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property, except on account
71
plaintiffs had no cause of action against them, as of officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with the charge imposed in the
Teresa de Leon had executed a Deed of Donation on donation, or ingratitude. The acceptance, to be valid, must be made during the
October 1, 1976 over the said parcel of land in favor of lifetime of both the donor and the donee. It must be made in the same deed or
their predecessor, Rosendo Florencio. The latter in a separate public document, and the donee’s acceptance must come to the
accepted the donation, as shown by his signature knowledge of the donor.
above his typewritten name on page one of the deed. In order that the donation of an immovable property may be valid, it must be
However, the original Deed cannot be produced by the made in a public document. Registration of the deed in the Office of the
latter. The lower and the appellate court ruled in favor Register of Deeds or in the Assessor’s Office is not necessary for it to be
or Respondents. considered valid and official. Registration does not vest title; it is merely
evidence of such title over a particular parcel of land. The necessity of
registration comes into play only when the rights of third persons are affected.
Furthermore, the heirs are bound by the deed of contracts executed by their
predecessors-in-interest.
However, as pointed out by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, there are
cogent facts and circumstances of substance which engender veritable doubts
as to whether the petitioners have a better right of possession over the
property other than the respondents, the lawful heirs of the deceased
registered owner of the property, Teresa de Leon, based on the Deed of
Donation.
First. Teresa de Leon did not turned over the owner’s duplicate of TCT, to
Florencio, to facilitate the issuance of a new title over the property in his favor.
At the very least, he should have caused the annotation of the deed
immediately after the donation or shortly thereafter, at the dorsal portion of
TCT.
Second. Florencio failed to inform the heirs of De Leon that the latter, before
her death, had executed a deed of donation on October 1, 1976 over the
property in his favor. It was only in 1996, or eighteen years after the death of
De Leon when the respondents sued the petitioners for ejectment
Third. In the meantime, the respondents consistently paid the realty taxes for
the property from 1978 up to 1996.
Fourth. The petitioners never adduced in evidence the owner’s duplicate of
TCT.
Fifth. The respondents adduced in evidence the affidavit-complaint of
ValerianaMorente dated May 8, 1996, one of the witnesses to the deed, for
falsification and perjury against Florencio and Atty. TirsoManguiat.
Sixth. A reading of the deed will show that at the bottom of page one thereof,
Florencio was to subscribe and swear to the truth of his acceptance of the
donation before Municipal Mayor Marcelo G. Aure of San Miguel, Bulacan.
However, the mayor did not affix his signature above his typewritten name.
Ganuelas v Facts: Issue: Donation is mortis causa
Cawed On April 11, 1958, CelestinaGanuelasVda. deValin Whether or not the
(Celestina) executed a Deed of Donation of Real donation is inter In the donation subject of the present case, there is nothing therein which
Property covering seven parcels of land in favor of her vivos or mortis indicates that any right, title or interest in the donated properties was to be
niece UrsulinaGanuelas (Ursulina), one of herein causa. transferred to Ursulina prior to the death of Celestina.
petitioners. The phrase “to become effective upon the death of the DONOR” admits
72
of no other interpretation but that Celestina intended to transfer the ownership

On June 10, 1967, Celestinaexecuted a document of the properties to Ursulina on her death, not during her lifetime. [29]
denominated as Revocation of Donation[4] purporting to
set aside the deed of donation. More than a month More importantly, the provision in the deed stating that if the donee
later or on August 18, 1967, Celestina died without should die before the donor, the donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no
issue and any surviving ascendants and siblings. further force and effect shows that the donation is a postmortem disposition.
After Celestina’s death, Ursulina had been sharing the As stated in a long line of cases, one of the decisive characteristics of a
produce of the donated properties with private donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered void if the
respondents Leocadia G. Flores, et al., nieces of donor should survive the donee.[30]
Celestina.
More. The deed contains an attestation clause expressly confirming the
Twenty-four years after the execution of the Deed of donation as mortis causa:
Donation, Ursulina secured the corresponding tax
declarations, in her name, over the donated properties SIGNED by the above-named donor, CelestinaGanuelas, at the foot of this
and since then, she refused to give private respondents deed of donation mortis causa, consisting of two (2) pages and on the left
any share in the fruits of the properties despite margin of each and every page thereof in the joint presence of all of us who at
repeated demands. her request and in her presence and that of each other have in like manner
Private respondents filed a complaint against Ursulina subscribed our names as witnesses.[31] (Emphasis supplied)
et al alleging that the deed of donation executed by
Celestina was void (failed to comply with formalities of
wills and testaments). As the subject deed then is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the
Petitioners alleged that the donation in favor of Ursulina formalities of a will under Article 728 of the Civil Code should have been
was inter vivos as contemplated under Article 729 of complied with, failing which the donation is void and produces no effect.[35]
the Civil Code, hence, the deed did not have to comply
with the requirements for the execution of a valid will.
The RTC declared the donation executed by Celestina
null and void
Maglasang v On February 1992, ConchitaCabatingan executed in Issue:

Cabatingan favor of her brother, Nicolas Cabatingan, a "Deed of Whether or not the HELD: Mortis Causa.
Conditional of Donation Inter Vivos for House and Lot." donation is mortis
Four (4) other deeds of donation were subsequently causa In a donation mortis causa, "the right of disposition is not transferred to the
executed by ConchitaCabatingan on January 1995, donee while the donor is still alive." In determining whether a donation is one of
bestowing upon: (a) petitioner Estela C. Maglasang, mortis causa, the following characteristics must be taken into account:
two (2) parcels of land;(b) Nicolas Cabatingan, a portion
of a parcel of land; and (c) Merly S. Cabatingan, a
portion of land.These deeds of donation contain similar (1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
provisions, to wit: transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain
"That for and in consideration of the love and affection the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
of the DONOR for the DONEE, x xx the DONOR does
hereby, by these presents, transfer, convey, by way of
donation, unto the DONEE the above-described (2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at
property, together with the buildings and all will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a
improvements existing thereon, to become effective reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
upon the death of the DONOR; PROVIDED, And
73
HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE should

die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
deemed automatically rescinded and of no further force transferee.
and effect; x x x"3 (Emphasis Ours) In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed
by the fact that the donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to
pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior to Cabatingan's death. The phrase
On May 1995, ConchitaCabatingan died. "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other
interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of
the properties to petitioners during her lifetime.
Upon learning of the existence of the foregoing
donations, respondents (Heirs of Corazon Cabatingan)
filed an action for Annulment And/Or Declaration of For a donation mortis causa to be valid it must conform with the following
Nullity of Deeds of Donations and Accounting, seeking requisites:
the annulment of said four (4) deeds of donation ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the
executed. Heirs allege, inter alia, that petitioners, end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some
fraudulently caused the donations and that the other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
documents are void for failing to comply with the subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator
provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and of one another.
and testaments, considering that these are donations
mortis causa.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the
instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every
RTC ruled that the donation was mortis causa thus void page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be
for not following the requisite forms. numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is
written , and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or
caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in
the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and
signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of
one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be
interpreted to them.
ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a
copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court. (n)
Magat v CA Facts: WON THE CA CA is affirmed. The provisions in the subject deed of donation that are crucial
BasilisaComerciante is a mother of 5 children, namely, GNORED THE for the determination of the class to which the donation belongs are, as follows:
Rosario Austria, Consolacion Austria, petitioner RULES OF xxx xxx
Apolinaria Austria-Magat, Leonardo, and one of INTERPRETATION xxx(I)binibigayko at ipinagkakaloobngganap at
respondents, FlorentinoLumubos. Leonardo died in a OF CONTRACTS hindimababawisanaulitnaapatnaanakko at sakanilangmgatagapagmana,
Japanese concentration camp at Tarlac during World WHEN IT angakinglupang residential o
War II. CONSIDERED THE tirahansampungakingbahaynakatirikdoonnanasaBagongPook din, San
In 1953, Basilisa bought a parcel of residential land DONATION IN Antonio, LungsodngKabite
together with the improvement thereon covered in TCT QUESTION AS xxx xxx
No. RT-4036 (T-3268) and known as Lot 1, Block 1, INTER VIVOS. Na angKaloobpalangito ay
74
Cavite Beach Subd., with an area of 150 sq m, located magkakabisalamangsimulasaarawnaako’ypumanawsamundo, xxx.

in BagongPook, San Antonio, Cavite City. On xxx xxx
December 17, 1975, Basilisa executed a document Na angtitulonumero TCT-T-2260 (RT-4036) ngLungsodngKabite,
designated as “KasulatansaKaloobpala (Donation)”. bahaysalotengtirahanngBagongPooknanababanggitsanasabingkasulatan, ay
On February 6, 1979, Basilisa executed a Deed of mananatilisapoder o possesionng Ina, nasiBasilisaComerciantehabangsiya ay
Absolute Sale of the subject house and lot in favor of nabubuhay at
herein petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat for Gayon din angnasabingTitulo ay hindimapapasangla o
P5,000.00. The TCT No. RT-4036 in the name of the maipagbibilianglupahabangmaybuhayangnasabingBasilisaComerciante xxx.
donor was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No. T- It has been held that whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa
10434 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite depends on whether the donor intended to transfer ownership over the
City in favor of petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat. properties upon the execution of the deed. In Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, the
On September 21, 1983, respondents characteristics of a donation mortis causa, was enumerated, to wit:
TeodoraCarampot, Domingo Comia, and Ernesto Apolo (1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
(representing their deceased mother Consolacion transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain
Austria), Ricardo, Mamerto and Segunda, all surnamed the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
Sumpelo (representing their deceased mother Rosario (2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at
Austria) and FlorentinoLumubos filed before the RTC will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a
Cavite an action against the petitioner for annulment of reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
TCT No. T-10434 and other relevant documents, and (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
for reconveyance and damages. transferee.
RTC dismissed the case. CA reversed the RTC. Thus, the petitioner’s cited provisions are only necessary assurances that
during the donor’s lifetime, the latter would still enjoy the right of possession
over the property; but, his naked title of ownership has been passed on to the
donees; and that upon the donor’s death, the donees would get all the rights of
ownership over the same including the right to use and possess the same.
Furthermore, it also appeared that the provision in the deed of donation
regarding the prohibition to alienate the subject property is couched in general
terms such that even the donor is deemed included in the said prohibition. If
the donor intended to maintain full ownership over the said property until her
death, she could have expressly stated therein a reservation of her right to
dispose of the same. The prohibition on the donor to alienate the said property
during her lifetime is proof that naked ownership over the property has been
transferred to the donees.
Another indication in the deed of donation that the donation is inter vivos is the
acceptance clause therein of the donees. We have ruled that an acceptance
clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement
for donations inter vivos.
Quilala v Catalina Quilala executed a “Donation of Real Property Whether or not the Under Article 749 of the Civil Code, the donation of an immovable must be
Alcantara Inter Vivos” in favor of VioletaQuilala over a parcel of donation executed made in a public instrument in order to be valid, specifying therein the property
land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila. by Catalina in favor donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy. As a mode
Catalina Quilala died. VioletaQuilala likewise died on of Violeta is valid of acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of title over the
May 22, 1984. Petitioner Ricky Quilala alleges that he property from the donor to the donee, and is perfected from the moment the
is the surviving son of VioletaQuilala. donor knows of the acceptance by the donee, provided the donee is not
respondentsGliceriaAlcantara, Leonora Alcantara, Ines disqualified or prohibited by law from accepting the donation. Once the
Reyes and Juan Reyes, claiming to be Catalina’s only donation is accepted, it is generally considered irrevocable, and the donee
75
surviving relatives within the fourth civil degree of becomes the absolute owner of the property. The acceptance, to be valid, must
consanguinity, executed a deed of extrajudicial be made during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee. It may be made
settlement of estate, dividing and adjudicating unto in the same deed or in a separate public document, and the donor must know
themselves the above-described property. the acceptance by the donee.
espondents instituted against petitioner and Guillermo In the case at bar, the deed of donation contained the number of the certificate
T. San Pedro, the Registrar of Deeds of Manila, an of title as well as the technical description of the real property donated. It
action for the declaration of nullity of the donation inter stipulated that the donation was made for and in consideration of the "love and
vivos, and for the cancellation of TCT No. 143015 in the affection which the DONEE inspires in the DONOR, and as an act of liberality
name of VioletaQuilala. and generosity."15 This was sufficient cause for a donation. Indeed, donation
is legally defined as "an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously
The RTC declared the donation as null and void of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it.
Surely, the requirement that the contracting parties and their witnesses should
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC sign on the left-hand margin of the instrument is not absolute. The intendment
of the law merely is to ensure that each and every page of the instrument is
authenticated by the parties. The requirement is designed to avoid the
falsification of the contract after the same has already been duly executed by
the parties. Hence, a contracting party affixes his signature on each page of
the instrument to certify that he is agreeing to everything that is written thereon
at the time of signing.
Simply put, the specification of the location of the signature is merely directory.
The fact that one of the parties signs on the wrong side of the page does not
invalidate the document. The purpose of authenticating the page is served, and
the requirement in the above-quoted provision is deemed substantially
complied with.
In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the
notary public does not also render the donation null and void. The instrument
should be treated in its entirety. It cannot be considered a private document in
part and a public document in another part.
Arcaba v Facts: Whether or not the No. In Bitangcor v. Tan, we held that the term "cohabitation" or "living together
Batocael Petitioner CirilaArcaba seeks review on certiorari of the donation executed as husband and wife" means not only residing under one roof, but also having
decision of the CA, which affirmed with modification the by Francisco in repeated sexual intercourse. Cohabitation, of course, means more than sexual
decision of the RTC, declaring as void a deed of favor of Cirila is intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may no
donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco T. valid (Art. 87, FC) longer be interested in sex. At the very least, cohabitation is public assumption
Comille in her favor and its subsequent resolution by a man and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as man
denying reconsideration. and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public as such. Secret
Francisco Comille and his wife ZosimaMontallana meetings or nights clandestinely spent together, even if often repeated, do not
became the registered owners of Lot No. 437-A in constitute such kind of cohabitation; they are merely meretricious. In this
Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte with a total lot area jurisdiction, this Court has considered as sufficient proof of common-law
of 418 sq m. After the death of Zosima, Francisco and relationship the stipulations between the parties, a conviction of concubinage,
his mother-in-law, Juliana BustalinoMontallana, or the existence of legitimate children.
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of Cirila admitted that she and Francisco resided under one roof for a long time, It
rights, in which the latter waived her share of one-fourth is very possible that the two consummated their relationship, since Cirila gave
(1/4) of the property to Francisco. Francisco registered Francisco therapeutic massage and Leticia said they slept in the same
the lot in his name with the Registry of Deeds. bedroom. At the very least, their public conduct indicated that theirs was not
Having no children to take care of him after his just a relationship of caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive partners akin
76
retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia Bellosillo, to husband and wife.
the latter's cousin, LuzvimindaPaghacian, and petitioner Finally, the fact that Cirila did not demand from Francisco a regular cash wage
CirilaArcaba, then a widow, to take care of his house, is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver-employee, but Francisco's
as well as the store inside. common law spouse. She was, after all, entitled to a regular cash wage under
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the law. It is difficult to believe that she stayed with Francisco and served him
the relationship between Cirila and Francisco. She out of pure beneficence. Human reason would thus lead to the conclusion that
denied they ever had sexual intercourse. It appears that she was Francisco's common-law spouse.
when Leticia and Luzviminda were married, only Cirila Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and
was left to take care of Francisco. Cirila testified that Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the
she was a 34-year old widow while Francisco was a 75- inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila
year old widower when she began working for the latter; is void under Art 87 of the Family Code.
that he could still walk with her assistance at that time;
and that his health eventually deteriorated and he
became bedridden. ErlindaTabancura testified that
Francisco's sole source of income consisted of rentals
from his lot near the public streets. He did not pay Cirila
a regular cash wage as a househelper, though he
provided her family with food and lodging.
A few months before his death, Francisco executed an
instrument denominated "Deed of Donation Inter Vivos,"
giving 150 sq m of his lot, together with his house, to
Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same
instrument. Francisco left the larger portion of 268
square meters in his name. The deed stated that the
donation was being made in consideration of "the
faithful services [CirilaArcaba] had rendered over the
past ten (10) years." The deed was notarized by Atty.
Vic T. Lacaya, Sr. and later registered by Cirila as its
absolute owner.
Francisco died without any children. On February 18,
1993, respondents filed a complaint against petitioner
'for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter
vivos, recovery of possession, and damages.
Respondents, who are the decedent's nephews and
nieces and his heirs by intestate succession, alleged
that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco and
the donation inter vivos made by Francisco in her favor
is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
On February 25, 1999, the trial court rendered
judgment in favor of respondents, holding the donation
void under this provision of the Family Code based on
testimonies and certain documents bearing the
signature of one "CirilaComille."
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. As already
stated, the appeals court denied reconsideration. Its
77
conclusion was based on (1) the testimonies of Leticia,

Erlinda, and Cirila; (2) the copies of documents
purportedly showing Cirila's use of Francisco's
surname; (3) a pleading in another civil case
mentioning payment of rentals to Cirila as Francisco's
common-law wife; and (4) the fact that Cirila did not
receive a regular cash wage.
RP v Silim Facts: 1. Was there a valid 1. Yes. There was a valid acceptance.
Spouses Silim and Mangubat donated a 5,600 sq. m acceptance based The last paragraph of Art. 749 reads: “If the acceptance is made in a separate
parcel of land in favour of the Bureau of Public Schools, on Arts. 745 and instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this
Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur. In the Deed of 749 of the NCC? step shall be noted in both instruments.” The purpose of the formal
Donation, respondents imposed the condition that the 2. Was the requirement for acceptance of a donation is to ensure that such acceptance is
said property should "be used exclusively and forever condition in the duly communicated to the donor.
for school purposes only." This donation was accepted donation violated? Here, a school building was immediately constructed after the donation was
by Gregorio Buendia, the District Supervisor of BPS, executed. Respondents had knowledge of the existence of the school building.
through an Affidavit of Acceptance and/or Confirmation It was when the school building was being dismantled and transferred to the
of Donation. new site and when Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on
A school building was constructed on the donated land. the donated property that respondents came to know of the Deed of Exchange.
However, the BagongLipunan school building that was The actual knowledge by respondents of the construction and existence of the
supposed to be allocated for the donated parcel of land school building fulfilled the legal requirement that the acceptance of the
could not be released since the government required donation by the donee be communicated to the donor.
that it be built upon a one (1) hectare parcel of land. To Under Art. 745, the law requires the donee to “accept the donation personally,
remedy this predicament Buendia was authorized to or through an authorized person with a special power for the purpose, or with a
officially transact for the exchange of the old school site general and sufficient power; otherwise the donation shall be void.”
to a new and suitable location which would fit the The respondents claim that the acceptance by Buendia of the donation was
specifications of the government. Pursuant to this, ineffective because of the absence of a special power of attorney from the
Buendia and Teresita Palma entered into a Deed of Republic of the Philippines. The donation was made in favor of the Bureau of
Exchange whereby the donated lot was exchanged with Public Schools. Such being the case, Buendia’s acceptance was authorized
the bigger lot owned by the latter. The BagongLipunan under Section 47 of the 1987 Administrative Code which states:
school buildings were constructed on the new school SEC. 47. Contracts and Conveyances. - Contracts or conveyances may be
site and the school building previously erected on the executed for and in behalf of the Government or of any of its branches,
donated lot was dismantled and transferred to the new subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, whenever demanded by the
location. exigency or exigencies of the service and as long as the same are not
The Silim spouses learned of the Deed of Exchange prohibited by law.
when thay learned that Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was 2. No. The condition was not violated.
constructing a house on the donated property. They The exclusivity of the purpose of the donation was not altered or affected when
filed a complaint to annul the donation claiming that Buendia exchanged the lot for a much bigger one. It was in furtherance and
there was no valid acceptance made by the donee and enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot
that there was a violation of the condition in the paved the way for the release of funds for the construction of BagongLipunan
donation. school building which could not be accommodated by the limited area of the
donated lot.
Gestopa v Facts: Whether the The donation was inter vivos for the following reasons:
Pilapil Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag were the owners donation was inter (1) The granting clause shows that Diego donated the properties out of love
of six parcels of unregistered lands. They executed vivos or mortis and affection for the donee. This is a mark of a donation inter vivos.
three deeds of donation mortis causa, two of which are causa. (2) The reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the donor intended to
78
dated March 4, 1965 and another dated October 13, transfer the naked ownership over the properties. As correctly posed by the
1966, in favor of private respondent Mercedes Danlag- Court of Appeals, what was the need for such reservation if the donor and his
Pilapil. The first deed pertained to parcels 1 & 2. The spouse remained the owners of the properties?
second deed pertained to parcel 3. (3) The donor reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance in accordance
The last deed pertained to parcel 4. All deeds contained with his standing in society, indicating that the donor intended to part with the
the reservation of the rights of the donors (1) to amend, six parcels of land. (4) The donee accepted the donation. In the case of
cancel or revoke the donation during their lifetime, and Alejandro vs. Geraldez, 78 SCRA 245 (1977), we said that an acceptance
(2) to sell, mortgage, or encumber the properties clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement
donated during the donors' lifetime, if deemed for donations inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will,
necessary. On January 16, 1973, Diego Danlag, with are not required to be accepted by the donees during the donors' lifetime.
the consent of his wife, Catalina Danlag, executed a Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the right to
deed of donation inter vivos covering the dispose of the properties belonged to the donee. The donor's right to give
aforementioned parcels of land plus two other parcels consent was merely intended to protect his usufructuary interests. In Alejandro,
(6 parcels in all) again in favor of private respondent we ruled that a limitation on the right to sell during the donors' lifetime implied
Mercedes. This contained two conditions: that (1) the that ownership had passed to the donees and donation was already effective
Danlag spouses shall continue to enjoy the fruits of the during the donors' lifetime. The attending circumstances in the execution of the
land during their lifetime, and that (2) the donee cannot subject donation also demonstrated the real intent of the donor to transfer the
sell or dispose of the land during the lifetime of the said ownership over the subject properties upon its execution. Prior to the execution
spouses, without their prior consent and approval. of donation inter vivos, the Danlag spouses already executed three donations
Mercedes caused the transfer of the parcels' tax mortis causa. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the Danlag
declaration to her name and paid the taxes on them. spouses were aware of the difference between the two donations. If they did
On June 28, 1979 and August 21, 1979, Diego and not intend to donate inter vivos, they would not again donate the four lots
Catalina Danlag sold parcels 3 and 4 to herein already donated mortis causa.
petitioners, Sps. Gestopa. On September 29, 1979, the Was the revocation valid? A valid donation, once accepted, becomes
Danlags executed a deed of revocation recovering the irrevocable, except on account of officiousness, failure by the donee to comply
six parcels of land subject of the aforecited deed of with the charges imposed in the donation, or ingratitude. The donor-spouses
donation inter vivos. On March 1, 1983, Mercedes did not invoke any of these reasons in the deed of revocation. Hence the
Pilapil filed with the RTC a petition against the revocation made was not valid. Finally, the records do not show that the donor-
Gestopas and the Danlags, for quieting of title over the spouses instituted any action to revoke the donation in accordance with Article
above parcels of land. In their opposition, 769 of the Civil Code. Consequently, the supposed revocation on September
theGestopas and the Danlags averred that the deed of 29, 1979, had no legal effect.
donation dated January 16, 1973 was null and void
because it was obtained by Mercedes through
machinations and undue influence. Even assuming it
was validly executed, the intention was for the donation
to take effect upon the death of the donor. Further, the
donation was void for it left the donor, Diego Danlag,
without any property at all. On December 27, 1991, the
trial court rendered a decision in favor of the Gestopas
and the Danlags. Mercedes appealed to the Court of
Appeals. On August 31, 1993, the appellate court
reversed the trial court.
Republic v Facts: Whether or not the
Guzman David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is donation is inter Held:
the son of the spouses Simeon Guzman (naturalized vivos
79
American) and Helen Meyers Guzman (American

citizen). In 1968, Simeon died leaving to his heirs, NO.
Helen and David, an estate consisting of several
Not all the elements of a donation are present. The transfer of the properties by
parcels of land in Bulacan.
virtue of a Deed of Quitclaim resulted in the (1) reduction of her patrimony as
donor and the (2) consequent increase in the patrimony of David as donee.
In 1970, Helen and David executed a Deed of However, Helen’s (3) intention to perform an act of liberality in favor of David
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate, dividing and was not sufficiently established. The 2 Quitclaims reveal that Helen intended to
adjudicating to themselves all of the property, and convey to her son certain parcels of land and to re-affirm it, she executed a
registered it to the RD a year after. waiver and renunciation of her rights over these properties. It is clear that
Helen merely contemplated a waiver of her rights, title, interest over the lands
in favor of David, not a donation. She was also aware that donation was not
In 1981, Helen executed a Deed of Quitclaim, possible.
assigning, transferring and conveying her ½ share of Moreover, the essential element of acceptance in the proper form and
the properties to David. But since it was not registered, registration to make the donation valid is lacking. The SPA executed by David
she executed another Deed of Quitclaim to confirm the in favor of Atty. Abela was not his acceptance, but an acknowledgment that
first. David owns the property referred to and that he authorizes Atty. Abela to sell
the same in his name. Further, there was nothing in the SPA to show that he
indeed accept the donation.
In 1994, Atty. Batongbacal wrote the OSG andfurnished
it with documents showing that David’s ownership of ½
of the estate was defective. He argued that Art. XII of However, the inexistence of a donation does not make the repudiation of Helen
the Constitution only allows Filipinos to acquire private in favor David valid. There is NO valid repudiation of inheritance as Helen had
lands in the country. The only instances when a already accepted her share of the inheritance when she, together with David,
foreigner may acquire private property are by hereditary executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate, dividing and
succession and if he was formerly a natural-born citizen adjudicating between them all the properties. By virtue of that settlement, the
who lost his Filipino citizenship. Moreover, it contends properties were registered in their names and for 11 years, they possessed the
that the Deeds of Quitclaim executed by Helen were land in the concept of owner. Thus, the 2 Quitclaims have no legal force and
really donations inter vivos. effect. Helen still owns ½ of the property.
Republic filed with RTC a Petition for Escheat praying

that ½ of David’s interest be forfeited in its favor. RTC
dismissed. CA affirmed.
Sicad v CA Facts: WON the deed of NO, it is in the character of a mortis causa disposition.
A document denominated as "DEED OF DONATION donation is in the The evidence establishes that on December 11, 1979, when the deed of
INTER VIVOS," was executed by Montinola naming as character of inter donation prepared by Montinola's lawyer (Atty. Treñas) was read and
donees her grandchildren, namely: vivos. explained by the latter to the parties, Montinola expressed her wish that the
CatalinoValderrama, Judy Cristina Valderrama and donation take effect only after ten (10) years from her death, and that the deed
Jesus Antonio Valderrama: and treated of a parcel of include a prohibition on the sale of the property for such period. Accordingly, a
land located at Capiz, covered by Transfer Certificate of new proviso was inserted in the deed reading: "however, the donees shall not
Title No. T-16105 in the name of Montinola. The deed sell or encumber the properties herein donated within 10 years after the death
also contained the signatures of the donees in of the donor." The actuality of the subsequent insertion of this new proviso is
acknowledgment of their acceptance of the donation. apparent on the face of the instrument: the intercalation is easily perceived and
Said deed was registered. Montinola however retained identified — it was clearly typed on a different machine, and is crammed into
the owner's duplicate copy of the new title (No. T- the space between the penultimate paragraph of the deed and that
80
16622), as well as the property itself, until she immediately preceding it.
transferred the same ten (10) years later, on July 10, A donation which purports to be one inter vivos but withholds from the donee
1990, to the spouses, Ernesto and Evelyn Sicad. the right to dispose of the donated property during the donor's lifetime is in
Then, on August 24, 1990, she filed a petition with the truth one mortis causa. In a donation mortis causa "the right of disposition is
Regional Trial Court in Roxas City for the cancellation not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive."
of said TCT No. T-16622 and the 314 In the instant case, nothing of any consequence was transferred by the deed of
donation in question to Montinola's grandchildren, the ostensible donees. They
reinstatement of TCT No. T- 16105 (in her name), the did not get possession of the property donated. They did not acquire the right
case being docketed as Special Proceeding. Her to the fruits thereof, or any other right of dominion over the property. More
petition was founded on the theory that the donation to importantly, they did not acquire the right to dispose of the property — this
her three (3) grandchildren was one mortis causa which would accrue to them only after ten (10) years from Montinola's death. Indeed,
thus had to comply with the formalities of a will; and they never even laid hands on the certificate of title to the same. They were
since it had not, the donation was void and could not therefore simply "paper owners" of the donated property. All these
effectively serve as basis for the cancellation of TCT circumstances, including, to repeat, the explicit provisions of the deed of
No. T-16105 and the issuance in its place of TCT No. donation — reserving the exercise of rights of ownership to the donee and
T-16622. prohibiting the sale or encumbrance of the property until ten (10) years after
Her petition was opposed by her grandchildren her death — ineluctably lead to the conclusion that the donation in question
(donees) alleging that it was an inter vivos donation, was a donation mortis causa, contemplating a transfer of ownership to the
having fully complied with the requirements therefor set donees only after the donor's demise.
out in Article 729 of the Civil Code. The case was The Valderramas' argument that the donation is inter vivos in character and
subsequently changed into an ordinary civil action. The that the prohibition against their disposition of the donated property is merely a
court held that the donation was indeed one inter vivos, condition which, if violated, would give cause for its revocation, begs the
and dismissing Aurora Montinola's petition for lack of question. It assumes that they have the right to make a disposition of the
merit. property, which they do not. The argument also makes no sense, because if
In the meantime, Montinola died. An appeal was made they had the right to dispose of the property and did in fact dispose of it to a
by herein petitioner-spouses Sicad who substituted third person, the revocation of the donation they speak of would be of no utility
Montinola after her legal heirs had expressed their or benefit to the donor, since such a revocation would not necessarily result in
disinterest over the case. The CA however affirmed the the restoration of the donor's ownership and enjoyment of the property.
trial court’s decision hence the present petition. It is also error to suppose that the donation under review should be deemed
one inter vivos simply because founded on considerations of love and
affection. In Alejandro v. Geraldez, supra this Court also observed that "the
fact that the donation is given in consideration of love and affection ** is not a
characteristic of donations inter vivos (solely) because transfers mortis causa
may also be made for the same reason." Similarly, in Bonsato v. Court of
Appeals, supra, this Court opined that the fact "that the conveyance was due to
the affection of the donor for the donees and the services rendered by the
latter, is of no particular significance in determining whether the deeds,
constitute transfers inter vivos or not, because a legacy may have identical
motivation."
Finally, it is germane to advert to the legal principle in Article 1378 of the Civil
Code to the effect that in case of doubt relative to a gratuitous contract, the
construction must be that entailing "the least transmission of rights and
interests".
The donation in question, though denominated inter vivos, is in truth one
mortis causa; it is void because the essential requisites for its validity
81
have not been complied with.

Archbishop of Facts: whether or not the Held:
Manila v CA On November 29, 1984, private respondents as cause of action has The Court does not agree.
plaintiffs filed a complaint for nullification of deed of already prescribed Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an action for the
donation, rescission of contract and reconveyance of revocation of a donation must be brought within four (4) years from the non-
real property with damages against petitioners Whether or not compliance of the conditions of the donation, the same is not applicable in the
Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao and the Roman respondents have a case at bar. The deed of donation involved herein expressly provides for
Catholic Bishop of Imus, Cavite, together with the cause of action automatic reversion of the property donated in case of violation of the condition
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, before the RTC against petitioners therein, hence a judicial declaration revoking the same is not necessary, As
of Imus, Cavite. aptly stated by the Court of Appeals:
Private respondents alleged that the spouses Eusebio By the very express provision in the deed of donation itself that the violation of
de Castro and Martina Rieta, now both deceased, the condition thereof would render ipso facto null and void the deed of
executed a deed of donation in favor of defendant donation, WE are of the opinion that there would be no legal necessity
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila covering a parcel anymore to have the donation judicially declared null and void for the reason
of land located at Kawit, Cavite with an area of approx that the very deed of donation itself declares it so. For where (sic) it otherwise
964 sq m. The deed of donation allegedly provides that and that the donors and the donee contemplated a court action during the
the donee shall not dispose or sell the property within a execution of the deed of donation to have the donation judicially rescinded or
period of one hundred (100) years from the execution of declared null and void should the condition be violated, then the phrase
the deed of donation, otherwise a violation of such reading "would render ipso facto null and void" would not appear in the deed of
condition would render ipso facto null and void the deed donation.
of donation and the property would revert to the estate When a deed of donation, as in this case, expressly provides for automatic
of the donors. revocation and reversion of the property donated, the rules on contract and the
It is further alleged that on or about June 30, 1980, and general rules on prescription should apply, and not Article 764 of the Civil
while still within the prohibitive period to dispose of the Code. Since Article 1306 of said Code authorizes the parties to a contract to
property, petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, in establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions not contrary to law,
whose administration all properties within the province morals, good customs, public order or public policy, we are of the opinion that,
of Cavite owned by the Archdiocese of Manila was at the very least, that stipulation of the parties providing for automatic
allegedly transferred on April 26, 1962, executed a revocation of the deed of donation, without prior judicial action for that purpose,
deed of absolute sale of the property subject of the is valid subject to the determination of the propriety of the rescission sought.
donation in favor of petitioners Florencio and Soledad Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will be merely
C. Ignao in consideration of the sum of P114,000.00. declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory act.
As a consequence of the sale, TCT No. 115990 was
issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite on November 2. none. Nonetheless, we find that although the action filed by private
15, 1980 in the name of said petitioner spouses. respondents may not be dismissed by reason of prescription, the same should
What transpired thereafter is narrated by respondent be dismissed on the ground that private respondents have no cause of action
court in its assailed decision. On December 17, 1984, against petitioners.
petitioners Florencio Ignao and Soledad C. Ignao filed a The cause of action of private respondents is based on the alleged breach by
motion to dismiss based on the grounds that (1) herein petitioners of the resolutory condition in the deed of donation that the property
private respondents, as plaintiffs therein, have no legal donated should not be sold within a period of one hundred (100) years from the
capacity to sue; and (2) the complaint states no cause date of execution of the deed of donation. Said condition, in our opinion,
of action. constitutes an undue restriction on the rights arising from ownership of
On December 19, 1984, petitioner Roman Catholic petitioners and is, therefore, contrary to public policy.
Bishop of Imus also filed a motion to dismiss on three In the case at bar, we hold that the prohibition in the deed of donation against
(3) grounds, the first two (2) grounds of which were the alienation of the property for an entire century, being an unreasonable
identical to that of the motion to dismiss filed by the emasculation and denial of an integral attribute of ownership, should be
82
Ignao spouses, and the third ground being that the declared as an illegal or impossible condition within the contemplation of Article
cause of action has prescribed. 727 of the Civil Code. Consequently, as specifically stated in said statutory
On January 9, 1985, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of provision, such condition shall be considered as not imposed. No reliance may
Manila likewise filed a motion to dismiss on the ground accordingly be placed on said prohibitory paragraph in the deed of donation.
that he is not a real party in interest and, therefore, the The net result is that, absent said proscription, the deed of sale supposedly
complaint does not state a cause of action against him. constitutive of the cause of action for the nullification of the deed of donation is
After private respondents had filed their oppositions to not in truth violative of the latter hence, for lack of cause of action, the case for
the said motions to dismiss and the petitioners had private respondents must fail.
countered with their respective replies, with rejoinders
thereto by private respondents, the trial court issued an
order dated January 31, 1985, dismissing the complaint
on the ground that the cause of action has prescribed.
CA held that the action has not yet prescribed,
reinstated and remanded the civil case to the lower
court for further proceedings.
De Luna v Facts: Whether or not the Held:
Abrigo On January 24, 1965, Prudencio de Luna donated a rules on contracts
portion of 7,500 square meters of Lot of the Cadastral and general rules It is the finding of the trial court, which is not disputed by the parties, that the
Survey of Lucena covered by Transfer Certificate of on prescription are donation subject of this case is one with an onerous cause. It was made
Title No. 1-5775 to the Luzonian Colleges, Inc., (now applicable in the subject to the burden requiring the donee to construct a chapel, a nursery and
Luzonian University Foundation, Inc., herein referred to case at bar a kindergarten school in the donated property within five years from execution
as the foundation). The donation, embodied in a Deed of the deed of donation.
of Donation Intervivos was subject to certain terms and Under the old Civil Code, it is a settled rule that donations with an onerous
conditions and provided for the automatic reversion to cause are governed not by the law on donations but by the rules on contracts,
the donor of the donated property in case of violation or as held in cases decided by the SC. On the matter of prescription of actions for
non-compliance. The foundation failed to comply with the revocation of onerous donation, it was held that the general rules on
the conditions of the donation. On April 9, 1971, prescription applies.
Prudencio de Luna "revived" the said donation in favor It is true that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions for the revocation
of the foundation, in a document entitled "Revival of of a donation must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of
Donation Intervivos" subject to terms and conditions the conditions of the donation. However, it is Our opinion that said article does
which among others, required: not apply to onerous donations in view of the specific provision of Article 733
xxx xxxxxx providing that onerous donations are governed by the rules on contracts
3. That the DONEE shall construct at its own expense a In the light of the above, the rules on contracts and the general rules on
Chapel, a Nursery and Kindergarten School, to be prescription and not the rules on donations are applicable in the case at bar.
named after St. Veronica, and other constructions and
Accessories shall be constructed on the land herein
being donated strictly in accordance with the plans and
specifications prepared by the O.R. Quinto& Associates
and made part of this donation; provided that the
flooring of the Altar and parts of the Chapel shall be of
granoletic marble.
4. That the construction of the Chapel, Nursery and
Kindergarten School shall start immediately and must
be at least SEVENTY (70) PER CENTUM finished by
the end of THREE (3) YEARS from the date hereof,
83
however, the whole project as drawn in the plans and

specifications made parts of this donation must be
completed within FIVE (5) YEARS from the date
hereon, unless extensions are granted by the DONOR
in writing;
As in the original deed of donation, the "Revival of
Donation Intervivos" also provided for the automatic
reversion to the donor of the donated area in case of
violation of the conditions thereof, couched in the
following terms:
xxxxxxxxx.
11. That violation of any of the conditions herein
provided shall cause the automatic reversion of the
donated area to the donor, his heirs, assigns and
representatives, without the need of executing any
other document for that purpose and without obligation
whatever on the part of the DONOR.
The foundation, through its president, accepted the
donation in the same document, subject to all the terms
and conditions stated in the donation. The donation was
registered and annotated on April 15, 1971 in the
memorandum of encumbrances as Entry No. 17939 of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-5775.
On August 3, 1971, Prudencio de Luna and the
foundation executed a 'Deed of Segregation" whereby
the area donated which is now known as Lot No. 3707-
B of Subdivision Plan Psd-40392 was adjudicated to
the foundation. As a result, transfer certificate of title
No. T-16152 was issued in the name of the foundation.
The remaining portion known as Lot No. 3707-A was
retained by the donor
On September 23, 1980, herein petitioners, Evelyn,
Rosalina, Prudencio, Jr., Willard, Antonio and Joselito,
all surnamed de Luna, who claim to be the children and
only heirs of the late Prudencio de Luna who died on
August 18, 1980, filed a complaint with the RTC of
Quezon alleging that the terms and conditions of the
donation were not complied with by the foundation.
Among others, it prayed for the cancellation of the
donation and the reversion of the donated land to the
heirs.
The assailed order of the trial court stated that
revocation (of a donation) will be effective only either
upon court judgment or upon consent of the done.
Insular Life v CristorEbrado was issued by The Life Assurance Co., Can a common-law Common-law spouses are, definitely, barred from receiving donations from
84
Ebrado Ltd., a policy for P5,882.00 with a rider for Accidental wife named as each other. Article 739 of the new Civil Code provides:
Death. He designated Carponia T. Ebrado as the beneficiary in the The following donations shall be void:
revocable beneficiary in his policy. He referred to her as life insurance policy 1. Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at
his wife. of a legally married the time of donation;
Cristor was killed when he was hit by a failing branch of man claim the Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in
a tree. Insular Life was made liable to pay the coverage proceeds thereof in consideration thereof;
in the total amount of P11,745.73, representing the face case of death of the 4. Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants or ascendants
value of the policy in the amount of P5,882.00 plus the latter? by reason of his office.
additional benefits for accidental death. In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be
Carponia T. Ebrado filed with the insurer a claim for the brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donee may
proceeds as the designated beneficiary therein, be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action.
although she admited that she and the insured were We do not think that a conviction for adultery or concubinage is exacted before
merely living as husband and wife without the benefit of the disabilities mentioned in Article 739 may effectuate. More specifically, with
marriage. record to the disability on "persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage
PascualaVda. deEbrado also filed her claim as the at the time of the donation," Article 739 itself provides:
widow of the deceased insured. She asserts that she is In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be
the one entitled to the insurance proceeds. brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilty of the donee may
Insular commenced an action for Interpleader before be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action.
the trial court as to who should be given the proceeds.
The court declared Carponia as disqualified.
Prescription; Article 391 vs. Labor Code; Estoppel

James v ERDC
Teekay v On 9 November 2000, Ramier C. Concha (hereinafter Issue: Held:
Concha referred to as private respondent) was hired as an Able Whether or not the The appellate court is correct.
Seaman by petitioners under an employment CA erred in ruling The dispute is the period of prescription of action for illegal dismissal. It will be
contract for a period of eight (8) months. that private noticed that in their Motion to Dismiss before the NLRC, petitioners allege that
respondent’s claims the prescriptive period to be applied should be three (3) years from the time the
On a windy morning of 23 November 2000, while he have not yet cause of action accrued in accordance with the Labor Code. However, in their
was removing rusty fragments during his deck prescribed. petition before this Court, they changed their stand and alleged that the
assignment, a foreign particle accidentally entered his applicable provision should be that which is stated in the POEA Standard
left eye. When his eye became reddish and his vision Employment Contract for Filipino Seamen because seafarers are not regular
became blurred, the designated medical officer on employees and as such, are not covered by the Labor Code.
board administered first aid treatment. Since there
was no sign of improvement, respondent requested for As in other causes of action, the prescriptive period for money claims is
medical check-up in a hospital. subject to interruption, and in view of the absence of an equivalent Labor Code
provision for determining when said period may be interrupted, Article 1155 of
He was diagnosed to be suffering from left eye irits.
the Civil Code is applicable. It states that:
On December 6, 2000, he was repatriated to the
Philippines. Article 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted when
they are filed before the Court, when there is written extra-
judicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written
85
acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.

As he had not been assessed whether he was fit to Records reveal that after his disembarkation from the vessel “MV
work as a seafarer, he filed a complaint for illegal Kyushu Spirit” on 6 December 2000, private respondent filed on 28 May 2001
dismissal with money claims with the Arbitration Branch a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. His
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on complaint was dismissed by the Labor Arbiter on the same date. In
28 May 2001. The complaint, however, was dismissed accordance with Section 16, Rule V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure [19],
without prejudice by the Labor Arbiter on same date. private respondent can re-file a case in the Arbitration Branch of origin. Since
the filing of his first complaint on 28 May 2001 tolled the running of the period
On 13 December 2004, private respondent filed another
of prescription, both the NLRC and the CA were correct in ruling that the filing
complaint for illegal dismissal before the Arbitration
of respondent’s second complaint with money claims on 13 December 2004
Branch of the NLRC.
was clearly filed on time.
LA dismissed the complaint on the ground of
prescription.
NLRC reversed the decision of the LA
CA affirmed the decision of the NLRC
Pantollano v
Korphil
86

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty.

Title Facts Issue/s Held

State as its property of public dominion, unless there is an express law

Even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed

Article 419 of the Civil Code distinguishes property as being either of

Whether the dried-up river bed may be susceptible to acquisitive

State in Celestial v. Cachopero, a case involving the registration of land

xxx Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man

A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a

The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as

Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where there has been

(997). adjudication of the lands in question as private property in the names of

Co-ownership (Arts. 484 – 501) & Partition Arts. 1078 – 1105;

Title Facts Issue/s Held

The RTC-Manila dismissed the petition. The RTC-Manila

In the 1944 case of Lopez v. Vda. De Cuaycong, the Court said:

To be a co–owner of a property does not mean that one is deprived of

The ultimate authorities in civil law, recognized as such by the Court,

3. Indeed, the respected commentaries suggest the conclusion that,

Petitioners who project themselves as prejudiced co–owners may bring

Essentially, a partition proceeding accords all parties the opportunity to

alleged prescriptive period began to run.

Moreover, the evidence relative to the possession, as a fact upon which

The express disavowal of the co-ownership did not happen on

Further, Dominador’s argument that prescription began to commence in

Filomeno died intestate on February 12, 1976. On July 27,

Filomeno's heirs executed two (2) Deeds of Confirmation of

On March 9, 1983, TCT No. 13250 was issued in the

names, but the sale was fictitious or simulated.

The respondents admitted that they executed the joint

The CA decided the appeal on August 26, 2002, reversing

xxx Petitioner as unit owner was simply a member of the Condominium

Upon the foregoing perspective, Metrobank’s right, as mortgagee and

xxx Respondent’s entry into the property without the permission of

Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the

Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a

One significant innovation introduced by The Family Code is the

of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the

More importantly, Article 159 imposes the proscription against the

xxx It bears emphasis, however, that in the meantime, there is no

However, this does not give private respondent a right to remain in

possession of the property. Petitioners’ title to the property prevails over

Possession; Acquisitive Prescription – Good faith and Just Title

CASE FACTS ISSUES RULING

In Director of Lands v. IAC, we explained the nature of the possession

that he was never in possession of the subject credit card

reasonable doubt of transporting a prohibited drug. The

account with BPIFB, Bonifacio Market, Edsa, Caloocan City

Meanwhile, BPI-FB filed separate civil and criminal cases

Consequently, in light of BPI-FB’s refusal to heed Franco’s

BPI-FB traversed this complaint, insisting that it was correct

Then, the bank’s Department of Internal Affairs conducted

To recover the missing amount, $Metropolitan Bank and

On March 18, 1991, the trial court rendered a consolidated

EASEMENTS AND RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

10. Unisource vs. Petitioner Unisource Commercial and Whether Right of

11. Goldcrest vs Petitioner Goldcrest is the developer of I.

in San Fernando, La Union. Code which reads: