G.R. Nos.

141810 & 141812 February 2, 2007

VICENTE DELOS SANTOS, et al., Petitioners,
vs.
FRED ELIZALDE et al., Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:

DOCTRINE:

To reiterate, service upon the parties’ counsels of record is tantamount to service upon the
parties themselves, but service upon the parties themselves is not considered service upon their
lawyers. The reason is simple—the parties, generally, have no formal education or knowledge of
the rules of procedure, specifically, the mechanics of an appeal or availment of legal remedies;
thus, they may also be unaware of the rights and duties of a litigant relative to the receipt of a
decision. More importantly, it is best for the courts to deal only with one person in the interest
of orderly procedure—either the lawyer retained by the party or the party him/herself if s/he
does not intend to hire a lawyer.

Even assuming that petitioners had replaced Atty. Victoriano prior to his receipt of the assailed
Decision, the reglementary period for filing a Motion for Reconsideration would still be reckoned
from his receipt of the Decision.

Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court requires that "[i]n case of substitution, the name of
the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former
one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party."

FACTS:

Petitioners filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title, Damages and Attorney’s Fees before the Kalibo,
Aklan RTC, involving four (4) adjoining lots designated as Lots 393-A, 393-B, 394-D, and 394-E,
located in Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan. An amended complaint was thereafter filed.

Petitioners claimed the aforementioned lots as their inheritance from the late Mariano delos
Santos, their common ascendant, either by their own right or by right of representation.
Petitioners alleged that the late Mariano delos Santos was the original owner of the lots. On the
other hand, respondents spouses Fred and Joan Elizalde, the first set of intervenors before the
trial court, claimed that they purchased the lots from the heirs of Leonardo delos Santos, he being
the rightful and exclusive owner of the said lots. Respondents Gloria Martin, Domingo Casimero,
Sergio Casimero, Abundio Casimero, and Teodoro Casimero, the second set of intervenors before
the trial court, claimed ownership over Lots 393-B and 394-E, as heirs of Tomasa Prado, who also
allegedly owned said lots. Respondents Rosita delos Santos-Flores and Jesus delos Santos, the
third set of intervenors and two of the three legitimate children of the late Leonardo delos
Santos, claimed 2/3 of the disputed lots as their rightful inheritance. Respondents delos Santos
alleged that they did not sell nor assign their share in the property to anyone, including
respondent Fred Elizalde.

After due hearing of the case, the trial court issued the Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(1.) Dismissing the complaint filed by the plaintiffs as well as the complaint in intervention
filed by the second set of intervenors Casimeros, et al. for lack of merit;

(2.) Declaring the two deeds of sale (Exhibits 29 and 30) as null and void insofar as they
affect the two-thirds (2/3) share of intervenors Jesus and Rosita;

(3.) Declaring intervenors Jesus delos Santos and Rosita delos Santos Flores as the lawful
owners of the two-thirds portion of the land in question or 9,915 square meters on the
northwest portion, representing as their shares in the intestate estate of Leonardo delos
Santos;

(4.) Declaring defendant Fred Elizalde as the rightful owner of one-third of the land in
question or 4,957 square meters on the southeast portion, segregated by a boundary line
running from the seashore to the inland or from the southwest to northeast;

(5.) Ordering the cancellation or revision of Tax Declaration No. 4422 in the name of Fred
Elizalde (Exhibit 26) and all tax declarations issued subsequent thereto to conform to
paragraphs 3 and 4 hereof as well as the issuance of a new tax declaration to intervenors
Jesus delos Santos and Rosita Flores covering their two-thirds (2/3) share;

(6.) Ordering the plaintiffs or any persons claiming interest therein to deliver complete
possession of the land to defendants and first set intervenors.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.6

Thus, petitioners and respondent Fred Elizalde filed their separate Notices of Appeal. The cases
were docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 48475 for respondent Elizalde and CA-G.R. CV No. 54136 for
petitioners. Subsequently, the CA issued Notice to File Brief, requiring petitioners and
respondent Elizalde to file their briefs within forty-five (45) days from receipt of said notice.

Petitioners filed by registered mail a Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief for Plaintiffs-
Appellants. In their motion, petitioners admitted having received a copy of the Notice to File
Brief; thus, they had until July 30, 1998 to file their brief, and prayed for an extension of forty-
five (45) days from July 30, 1998 to September 13, 1998. On September 10, 1998, petitioners filed
another motion for extension,11seeking another forty five (45)-day extension, or until October
27, 1998, within which to file their brief.

In the meantime, respondents Fred Elizalde, Jesus delos Santos, and Rosita delos Santos-Flores
filed Joint Manifestation and Motion,12 whereby respondent Elizalde abandoned his appeal by
virtue of an amicable settlement between the parties through the Agreement. They agreed to
swap and re-adjust the areas adjudged by the trial court in their favor, without prejudice to a
final judgment by the CA. In addition, Elizalde moved that his appeal be considered as withdrawn
and that he be excused from filing an appellant’s brief.

Petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Final Extension of Period to File Brief for Plaintiffs-
Appellants, seeking an extension of thirty (30) days, or until November 27, 1998, within which to
file their brief. Petitioners filed another motion for extension, asking for another thirty (30)-day
extension. And yet again, petitioners filed another motion for extension, asking for another thirty
(30)-day extension to file their brief, such that the period sought to file appellant’s brief would
be until January 27, 1999. In sum, petitioners had a total extension of one hundred eighty (180)
days from July 27, 1998, when they filed a motion for extension before the CA for the first time.

Respondents delos Santos opposed the foregoing motions for extension and moved for the
dismissal of the appeal for petitioners’ failure to file the required appellants’ brief.

However, petitioners, through their former counsel Atty. Napoleon M. Victoriano, filed an Ex-
Parte Motion to Withdraw Appeal.17 Said motion sought the withdrawal of the appeal on the
ground that petitioners and respondents delos Santos entered into an amicable settlement,
denominated as an Undertaking executed on September 19, 1998,18 whereby petitioners would
be paid the amount of Four Million Pesos (PhP 4,000,000.00), in consideration of their leaving
the disputed lots peacefully. Notably, the Undertaking was signed by 39 of the 46
petitioners,19 and notarized by Atty. Edgar S. Calizo. More so, it was alleged in said motion that
the counsel for respondents delos Santos, Atty. Romeo R. Robiso, executed a promissory note on
October 15, 199820 on behalf of petitioners, for the amount of Four Million Pesos (PhP
4,000,000.00).

The CA issued the assailed Decision dismissing CA-G.R. CV No. 54136 and SP No. 48475 and
considering them withdrawn. It justified its Decision in this wise: "For failure to file their
respective appellants’ briefs, and in accordance with the prayer in the ‘Joint Manifestation and
Motion’, and in the ‘Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw Appeal’, the appeal should be dismissed, and
considered as withdrawn."21

Thereafter, an Entry of Appearance22 was filed on June 17, 1999 by Atty. Cesar T. Verano,
allegedly in representation of petitioners. The entry contained the solitary conformity of
petitioner Vicente delos Santos. On the same day, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of Decision with Prayer for Reinstatement of Appeal,23which was verified solely by petitioner
Vicente delos Santos. In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners alleged that: (1) they did
not have any knowledge of the promulgation of the assailed Decision of the CA; (2) they never
entered into any amicable settlement with respondents delos Santos; (3) their alleged signatures
in the May 27, 1997 Agreement were forged; and (4) they never authorized their former counsel,
Atty. Victoriano, to withdraw their appeal. Thus, petitioners prayed that: (1) their Motion for
Reconsideration be considered as filed on time; (2) the said Agreement allegedly entered into by
petitioners and respondents delos Santos be considered as invalid; (3) the portion of the assailed
Decision dismissing their appeal be reconsidered; (4) their appeal be reinstated; and (5) they be
granted a period of ninety (90) days within which to file their appellants’ brief.

On July 16, 1999, respondents delos Santos then filed an Opposition to Motion for
Reconsideration.24 The opposition was based on the following: (1) that petitioners’ motion
should be considered as mere scrap of paper for not containing any notice of hearing; (2) that
the appeal was validly dismissed for petitioners’ failure to file their appellants’ brief; and (3) that
the Agreement was valid.

Petitioners subsequently filed a Reply (To Opposition) on July 30, 1999,25 refuting the allegations
made by respondents delos Santos; and attached to the reply a handwritten note in
Filipino,26 stating that: (1) the signatories did not sign the alleged Agreement; (2) they did not
receive a single centavo of the money alleged in the Agreement; (3) they did not authorize Atty.
Victoriano to withdraw their appeal; and (4) Atty. Victoriano did not furnish them a copy of the
Decision of the CA. The note was purportedly signed by Vicente delos Santos, Constancia delos
Santos, Terry Ann S. Carnacete, Greta delos Santos, Daisy delos Santos, Jose delos Santos,
Herminigildo delos Santos, Peter delos Santos, Vivar delos Santos, Ibarra delos Santos, Rosemarie
Tuazon, Natividad Prado, Lito Prado, Felisa Casidsid, Ricardo Fernando, Jesus Fernando, Rogelio
Lacandula, Mergie C. Nieves, Anita C. Baltazar, and Claire S. Lacandula. Of the signatories, only
eight (8) are among the forty-six (46) petitioners before the appellate court.

On January 31, 2000, the CA issued the assailed Resolution, wherein it was ruled that:

The "Motion for Reconsideration With Prayer for the Reinstatement of Appeal" filed on June 17,
1999 by the said new counsel for plaintiffs-appellants, to which an Opposition has been filed by
the first set of intervenors-appellees, is DENIED admission for being late by nine (9) days. The
records show that plaintiffs-appellants’ counsel of record, Atty. Napoleon M. Victoriano, who has
not filed any notice of withdrawal as counsel as per report of the Judicial Records Division,
received copy of the Court’s Decision dated May 11, 1998, on May 24, 1999. Thus, appellants had
only until June 8, 1999 to file their Motion for Reconsideration.27

Hence, this petition is before us.

ISSUES:

Petitioners raise the following issues:

I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING ADMISSION TO
PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WITH PRAYER FOR THE REINSTATEMENT OF
APPEAL FILED BY THEIR NEW COUNSEL FOR HAVING BEEN FILED NINE (9) DAYS LATE,
OVERLOOKING AND DISREGARDING THE FACT:

A. THAT PETITIONERS LEARNED OF THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DATED MAY
11, 1999 ONLY ON JUNE 2, 1999, AND ON JUNE 17, 1999, OR WITHIN THE FIFTEEN (15)-
DAY REGLEMENTARY PERIOD THEY FILED THEIR AFORESAID MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION;

B. THAT PETITIONERS’ FORMER COUNSEL, ATTY. NAPOLEON M. VICTORIANO, DID NOT

FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WITHIN THE FIFTEEN [15]-DAY REGLEMENTARY
PERIOD FROM HIS RECEIPT OF A COPY OF THE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION ON MAY 24,
1999, SAID COUNSEL WAS CLEARLY AT FAULT AND/OR GROSSLY NEGLIGENT IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES TO HIS CLIENTS. MOREOVER, THE COUNTING OF THE 15-
DAY PERIOD TO FILE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION SHOULD BE COUNTED FROM
PETITIONERS’ KNOWLEDGE OF THE DECISION ON JUNE 2, 1999, AND NOT ON ATTY.
VICTORIANO’S RECEIPT OF A COPY THEREOF; AND

C. THAT THE NON-ADMISSION OF PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FOR

HAVING BEEN FILED NINE (9) DAYS LATE IS MANIFESTLY UNJUST AND INEQUITABLE
BECAUSE IT GIVES PREMIUM TO TECHNICALITIES RATHER ON SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS’

APPEAL FROM THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION AND CONSIDERING THE APPEAL
WITHDRAWN AS PRAYED FOR BY COUNSEL FOR PETITIONERS CONSIDERING THAT THE
ALLEGED AGREEMENT BETWEEN PETITIONERS AND FIRST SET [OF] INTERVENORS
THROUGH THEIR COUNSEL IS NULL AND VOID AND WITHOUT FORCE AND EFFECT
BECAUSE THEIR ALLEGED SIGNATURES THEREIN WERE FORGED, [AND BESIDES,] THEY
NEVER RECEIVED A SINGLE CENTAVO OF THE ALLEGED CONSIDERATION OF THE
AGREEMENT. MOREOVER, PETITIONERS’ APPEAL FROM THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION IS
MERITORIOUS AS THEIR CLAIM THAT THEY ARE OWNERS OF THE DISPUTED PROPERTIES
ARE SUPPORTED BY SUSBTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE.28

HELD:

The petition must be denied.

Petitioners argue that their Motion for Reconsideration was filed on time as the reglementary
period for the filing of it should be counted from the time when petitioners themselves obtained
a copy of the assailed Decision of the CA on June 2, 1999, and not from the time that their former
counsel, Atty. Victoriano, received a copy of said Decision on May 24, 1999.
However, petitioners’ allegation is incorrect.

Reglementary period for filing a Motion for Reconsideration

Section 1 of Rule 37, in conjunction with Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, provides for
the period within which a Motion for Reconsideration may be filed, to wit:

Section 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or reconsideration.—Within the
period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the
judgment or final order and grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes materially
affecting the substantial rights of said party:

xxxx

Within the same period, the aggrieved party may also move for reconsideration upon the
grounds that the damages awarded are excessive, that the evidence is insufficient to justify the
decision or final order, or that the decision or final order is contrary to law.

Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal.—The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice
of the judgment or final order.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
(Emphasis supplied.)

The abovementioned fifteen (15)-day period begins to run upon receipt of notice of the decision
or final order appealed from. Such period has been considered to begin upon receipt of notice
by the counsel of record, which is considered notice to the parties.29 Service of judgment on the
party is prohibited and is not considered the official receipt of the judgment.30

Thus, the fifteen (15)-day period should run from May 24, 1999, when Atty. Victoriano received
a copy of the assailed Decision of the CA, and not from June 2, 1999, when petitioners claimed
to have been informed of the CA decision.31

To reiterate, service upon the parties’ counsels of record is tantamount to service upon the
parties themselves, but service upon the parties themselves is not considered service upon their
lawyers. The reason is simple—the parties, generally, have no formal education or knowledge of
the rules of procedure, specifically, the mechanics of an appeal or availment of legal remedies;
thus, they may also be unaware of the rights and duties of a litigant relative to the receipt of a
decision. More importantly, it is best for the courts to deal only with one person in the interest
of orderly procedure—either the lawyer retained by the party or the party him/herself if s/he
does not intend to hire a lawyer.
Even assuming that petitioners had replaced Atty. Victoriano prior to his receipt of the assailed
Decision, the reglementary period for filing a Motion for Reconsideration would still be reckoned
from his receipt of the Decision.

Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court requires that "[i]n case of substitution, the name of
the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former
one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party."

In GCP-Manny Transport Services, Inc. v. Principe, the Court ruled that unless the change of
attorneys is carried out properly, the counsel of record shall still be considered as the party’s
counsel, and the notice sent to such counsel shall be considered as notice to the party
represented.32

In the present case, the assailed CA Decision was rendered on May 11, 1999, and the notice of it
was received by Atty. Victoriano on May 24, 1999. Petitioners’ current counsel, Atty. Verano,
filed his appearance only on June 17, 1999, with the sole conformity of Vicente delos Santos. The
CA correctly served a copy of the Decision on Atty. Victoriano, which is considered notice to
petitioners themselves. Therefore, May 24, 1999 is the correct reckoning point for the
reglementary period of filing a Motion for Reconsideration to the assailed Decision which ended
on June 8, 1999. Hence, petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration filed on June 17, 1999 was
belatedly filed and correctly rejected by the CA.

Liberal application of the period for filing a Motion for Reconsideration

Even assuming that, indeed, their Motion for Reconsideration was filed out of time, petitioners
further allege that a delay of nine (9) days in the filing of their Motion for Reconsideration cannot
justify why the CA did not admit it. In support of such contention, petitioners cite Republic v.
Court of Appeals,33 and Ramos v. Bagasao,34 where this Court allowed the filing of an appeal six
(6) and four (4) days beyond the reglementary period, respectively.

In Neypes v. Court of Appeals, the Court stressed that "[s]eldom have we condoned late filing of
notices of appeal, and only in very exceptional instances to better serve the ends of justice"; and
also emphasized that the liberal application of the rules is confined to "situations where
technicalities were dispensed with, our decisions were not meant to undermine the force and
effectivity of the periods set by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare cases where
procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to prevent the
commission of a grave injustice (emphasis supplied)."35

In Republic,36 cited by petitioners, We ruled that the CA should have admitted the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioners to prevent gross miscarriage of justice, as the government
stood to lose close to three hundred (300) hectares of prime sugar land already titled in its name
and devoted to educational purposes; while in Ramos, it was enunciated that a four (4)-day delay
"in filing a notice of appeal and a motion of extension of time to file a record on appeal can be
excused on the basis of equity and considering that the record on appeal is now with the
respondent judge."37

In the instant case, there is no exceptional circumstance to justify the disregard of the
reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration. Hence, petitioners’ position is devoid
of merit.

Furthermore, petitioners contend that despite their Motion for Reconsideration had been filed
out of time, this should have been admitted on the ground of equity. However, equitable grounds
cannot be sought when the party is guilty of negligence. Thus, We ruled in Mesina v. Meer that
"this Court will not allow petitioners, in guise of equity, to benefit from their own negligence."38

Petitioners’ are guilty of inexcusable negligence

Petitioners attribute the dismissal of their appeal and their failure to file a motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period to their former counsel’s negligence, Atty.
Victoriano. Thus, petitioners seek the liberal application of the rules, citing Ginete v. Court of
Appeals, wherein the counsel of record did not file an appellant’s brief within the prescribed
period and continued with the case for fear of reprisal from respondents who were judges. In
said case, We ruled that the negligence of the clients’ counsel does not bind them. The departure
from the rule was explained, thus:

[T]he lawyer’s negligence without any participatory negligence on the part of petitioners is a
sufficient reason to set aside the resolutions of the Court of Appeals. Aside from matters of life,
liberty, honor or property which would warrant the suspension of the rules of the most
mandatory character and an examination and review by the appellate court of the lower court’s
findings of fact, the other elements that should be considered are the following: (1) the existence
of special or compelling circumstances, (2) the merits of the case, (3) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) a
lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, (5) the other party
will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.39(Emphasis supplied.)

However, the Ginete case is not a precedent to the case at bar because in said case, the party
had no participatory negligence, while in the case at bar, petitioners were negligent in not
monitoring the developments in their case. Petitioners’ acts are considered inexcusable
negligence in line with our ruling in Bernardo v. Court of Appeals (Special Sixth Division), where
we explicated the vital participation of the parties in the effective handling of the case by their
lawyers, thus:

Worth mentioning is the fact that petitioner was likewise not entirely blameless in his alleged
deprivation of his day in court. In a recent case, this Court enunciated:
"Litigants, represented by counsel, should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax
and await the outcome of their case. They should give the necessary assistance to their counsel
for what is at stake is their interest in the case."

In his concurring opinion in Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, Mr. Justice Teodoro R. Padilla
emphasized the value and significance of the party’s presence and diligence in the advancement
of his cause, thus:

"x x x An almost lifetime of experience in litigation is the best witness to the indispensability of
party’s presence (aside from his lawyer, in case he has the assistance of counsel) in order to
litigate with any reasonable opportunity of success. x x x especially during the cross-examination
of adverse party’s witnesses—where the truth must be determined—every counsel worth his salt
must have the assistance and presence of his client on the spot, for the client invariably knows
the facts far better than his counsel. In short, even in civil cases, the presence of party (as
distinguished from his lawyer alone) is essential to due process."

True enough, the party-litigant should not rely totally on his counsel to litigate his case even if
the latter expressly assures that the former’s presence in court will no longer be needed. No
prudent party will leave the fate of his case entirely to his lawyer. Absence in one or two hearings
may be negligible but want of inquiry or update on the status of his case for several months (four,
in this case) is inexcusable. It is the duty of a party-litigant to be in contact with his counsel from
time to time in order to be informed of the progress of his case. Petitioner simply claims that he
was busy with his gravel and sand and trading businesses which involved frequent traveling from
Manila to outlying provinces. But this was not a justifiable excuse for him to fail to ask about the
developments in his case or to ask somebody to make the query for him. Petitioner failed to act
with prudence and diligence; hence, his plea that he was not accorded the right to due process
cannot elicit this Court’s approval or even sympathy.40 (Emphasis supplied.)

Concurrently, petitioners did not even know that Atty. Victoriano failed to file an appellants’ brief
on their behalf during the more than one hundred eighty (180)-day extension that he sought
from the CA, aside from their failure to learn of the Decision of the appellate court. Ordinary
prudence would dictate that petitioners must give utmost importance to the case considering
that it involves their residences, presumably their most valued material possession, and
considering further that they had already lost at the trial court. Petitioners’ failure to apprise
themselves of the status of the case from the time that Atty. Victoriano received a copy of the
notice to file brief on June 15, 1998 up to June 2, 1999, when petitioners allegedly obtained a
copy of the assailed Decision from the CA, is unjustified. Petitioners cannot be shielded from the
repercussions of their counsel’s and their own negligence. Petitioners themselves are as much to
blame in losing their appeal.

The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts

Finally, petitioners claim that the Undertaking or Agreement allegedly entered into by them and
respondents delos Santos is invalid considering that their purported signatures in it were forged.
They argue that the motion to withdraw is likewise invalid; therefore, there is no basis for the
withdrawal of the appeal. In other words, petitioners question the authenticity of said
documents, raising a question of fact.

There is a "question of fact" when "the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of
the alleged facts."41This is distinguished from a question of law when the doubt or difference
arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and which does not call for an examination
of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants.

Furthermore, in Sampayan v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled, thus:

[S]ettled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally embark on a re-
examination of the evidence adduced by the parties during trial. Of course, the rule admits of
exceptions. So it is that in Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. CA, we wrote:

"[i]t is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review, the Court is not
a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented
by the contending parties' during the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the
CA are conclusive and binding on the Court. However, the Court had recognized several
exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its
findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to
the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the
trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when
the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion."42

A perusal of the exceptions enumerated above reveals that the instant case does not fall under
any of them. Thus, this Court cannot entertain the factual issues raised in the petition, which
include the issue of authenticity of the Undertaking or Agreement, as well as the issue of non-
payment of the amount mentioned, particularly, in the Undertaking.

Failure to file appellants’ brief

Assuming arguendo that the withdrawal of the appeal was groundless, the CA still did not commit
a reversible error in dismissing the appeal for petitioners’ failure to file an appellant’s brief.

Contrary to petitioners’ allegation, the assailed Decision did not dismiss the case solely on the
basis of the motion to withdraw filed by their former counsel. To reiterate, the Decision stated
that "[f]or failure to file their respective appellants’ briefs, and in accordance with the prayer in
the ‘Joint Manifestation and Motion’, and in the ‘Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw Appeal’, the
appeal should be dismissed, and considered as withdrawn (emphasis supplied)." 43

Section 7 of Rule 44 of the Rules of Court provides forty-five (45) days from receipt of notice
within which to file an appellant’s brief, while Section 12 declares that an extension of time for
filing of briefs shall not be allowed except for a good and sufficient cause.1awph?1.net

The general rule is that motions for extension of time to file an appellant’s brief shall not be
granted except for a good cause. No such justification is present in this case. Petitioners’ failure
to apprise themselves of the status of their case during its pendency before the CA is inexcusable.
Moreover, their former counsel’s failure or neglect to file the required appellant’s brief shall bind
them.

No meritorious cause

With the loss of their right of appeal to the CA, we see no need to resolve the issue of ownership.
Such issue should have been first resolved by the CA, but it was not able to do so because of the
dismissal of the appeal. Thus, the claim of ownership is a non-issue before this Court.

WHEREFORE, We DENY the petition and AFFIRM the May 11, 1999 Decision and the January 31,
2000 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 54136 and SP No. 48475, with no costs.

SO ORDERED.