Petitioners Vs VS: Second Division

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129008. January 13, 2004.]
TEODORA A. RIOFERIO, VERONICA O. EVANGELISTA assisted by her

husband ZALDY EVANGELISTA, ALBERTO ORFINADA, and ROWENA
O. UNGOS, assisted by her husband BEDA UNGOS , petitioners, vs .
COURT OF APPEALS, ESPERANZA P. ORFINADA, LOURDES P.
ORFINADA, ALFONSO ORFINADA, NANCY P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO
JAMES P. ORFINADA, CHRISTOPHER P. ORFINADA and ANGELO P.
ORFINADA , respondents.
DECISION
TINGA , J : p
Whether the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the
appointment of an administrator is the issue in this case.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks to set
aside the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42053 dated January 31,
1997, as well as its Resolution 2 dated March 26, 1997, denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. EDSHcT
On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in Angeles City leaving several
personal and real properties located in Angeles City, Dagupan City and Kalookan City. 3 He
also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he married on July 11, 1960
and with whom he had seven children who are the herein respondents, namely: Lourdes P.
Orfinada, Alfonso "Clyde" P. Orfinada, Nancy P. Orfinada-Happenden, Alfonso James P.
Orfinada, Christopher P. Orfinada, Alfonso Mike P. Orfinada (deceased) and Angelo P.
Orfinada. 4
Apart from the respondents, the demise of the decedent left in mourning his paramour and
their children. They are petitioner Teodora Riofero, who became a part of his life when he
entered into an extra-marital relationship with her during the subsistence of his marriage to
Esperanza sometime in 1965, and co-petitioners Veronica, 5 Alberto and Rowena. 6
On November 14, 1995, respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada discovered
that on June 29, 1995, petitioner Teodora Rioferio and her children executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the
properties of the estate of the decedent located in Dagupan City and that accordingly, the
Registry of Deeds in Dagupan issued Certificates of Titles Nos. 63983, 63984 and 63985
in favor of petitioners Teodora Rioferio, Veronica Orfinada-Evangelista, Alberto Orfinada
and Rowena Orfinada-Ungos. Respondents also found out that petitioners were able to
obtain a loan of P700,000.00 from the Rural Bank of Mangaldan Inc. by executing a Real
Estate Mortgage over the properties subject of the extra-judicial settlement. 7
On December 1, 1995, respondent Alfonso "Clyde" P. Orfinada III filed a Petition for Letters
of Administration docketed as S.P. Case No. 5118 before the Regional Trial Court of
Angeles City, praying that letters of administration encompassing the estate of Alfonso P.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com
Orfinada, Jr. be issued to him. 8
On December 4, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of
Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim, Real Estate
Mortgage and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Titles with Nos. 63983, 63985 and
63984 and Other Related Documents with Damages against petitioners, the Rural Bank of
Mangaldan, Inc. and the Register of Deeds of Dagupan City before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 42, Dagupan City. 9
On February 5, 1996, petitioners filed their Answer to the aforesaid complaint interposing
the defense that the property subject of the contested deed of extra-judicial settlement
pertained to the properties originally belonging to the parents of Teodora Riofero 1 0 and
that the titles thereof were delivered to her as an advance inheritance but the decedent had
managed to register them in his name. 1 1 Petitioners also raised the affirmative defense
that respondents are not the real parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O.
Orfinada, Jr. in view of the pendency of the administration proceedings. 1 2 On April 29,
1996, petitioners filed a Motion to Set Affirmative Defenses for Hearing 1 3 on the
aforesaid ground.
The lower court denied the motion in its Order 1 4 dated June 27, 1996, on the ground that
respondents, as heirs, are the real parties-in-interest especially in the absence of an
administrator who is yet to be appointed in S.P. Case No. 5118. Petitioners moved for its
reconsideration 1 5 but the motion was likewise denied. 1 6
This prompted petitioners to file before the Court of Appeals their Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court docketed as CA G.R. S.P. No. 42053. 1 7 Petitioners
averred that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed order
which denied the dismissal of the case on the ground that the proper party to file the
complaint for the annulment of the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased
is the estate of the decedent and not the respondents. 1 8
The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision 1 9 dated January 31, 1997, stating
that it discerned no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
by the public respondent judge when he denied petitioners' motion to set affirmative
defenses for hearing in view of its discretionary nature. DAEIHT
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners but it was denied. 2 0 Hence, the
petition before this Court.
The issue presented by the petitioners before this Court is whether the heirs have legal
standing to prosecute the rights belonging to the deceased subsequent to the
commencement of the administration proceedings. 2 1
Petitioners vehemently fault the lower court for denying their motion to set the case for
preliminary hearing on their affirmative defense that the proper party to bring the action is
the estate of the decedent and not the respondents. It must be stressed that the holding
of a preliminary hearing on an affirmative defense lies in the discretion of the court. This is
clear from the Rules of Court, thus:
SEC. 5. Pleadings grounds as affirmative defenses. — Any of the grounds for
dismissal provided for in this rule, except improper venue, may be pleaded as an
affirmative defense, and a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion
to dismiss had been filed. 2 2 (Emphasis supplied.)

Certainly, the incorporation of the word "may" in the provision is clearly indicative of the
optional character of the preliminary hearing. The word denotes discretion and cannot be
construed as having a mandatory effect. 2 3 Subsequently, the electivity of the proceeding
was firmed up beyond cavil by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with the inclusion of the
phrase "in the discretion of the Court", apart from the retention of the word "may" in Section
6, 2 4 in Rule 16 thereof.
Just as no blame of abuse of discretion can be laid on the lower court's doorstep for not
hearing petitioners' affirmative defense, it cannot likewise be faulted for recognizing the
legal standing of the respondents as heirs to bring the suit.
Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal
personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the
provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code "that (t)he rights to succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." The provision in turn is the
foundation of the principle that the property, rights and obligations to the extent and value
of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his
will or by operation of law. 2 5
Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring
the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite
the total lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation, namely Section
3, Rule 3 2 6 and Section 2, Rule 87 2 7 of the Rules of Court. In fact, in the case of Gochan v.
Young, 2 8 this Court recognized the legal standing of the heirs to represent the rights and
properties of the decedent under administration pending the appointment of an
administrator. Thus:
The above-quoted rules, 2 9 while permitting an executor or administrator to
represent or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs
from representing the deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in
which an administrator has already been appointed. But no rule categorically
addresses the situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an
estate have already been instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed. In
such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of an
administrator; then wait further to see if the administrator appointed would care
enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of the deceased; and in
the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent are
violated or dissipated.
Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two exceptions, viz

(1) if the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit; 3 0 and (2) when the
administrator is alleged to have participated in the act complained of 3 1 and he is made a
party defendant. 3 2 Evidently, the necessity for the heirs to seek judicial relief to recover
property of the estate is as compelling when there is no appointed administrator, if not
more, as where there is an appointed administrator but he is either disinclined to bring suit
or is one of the guilty parties himself.
All told, therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for the recovery of
property of the estate during the pendency of administration proceedings has three
exceptions, the third being when there is no appointed administrator such as in this case.
As the appellate court did not commit an error of law in upholding the order of the lower
court, recourse to this Court is not warranted. IaAHCE
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 17-20.

2. Id. at 21-22.
3. Id. at 95.
4. Ibid.
5. The Complaint for Annulment/Rescission of the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of
a Deceased Person dated December 2, 1995 contains an allegation under paragraph 9
that Veronica is not one of the illegitimate children of the decedent Alfonso P. Orfinada,
Jr. by Teodora Riofero but of one Alonzo Orfinada.
6. Rollo, p. 95.
7. Id. at 95-96.
8. Id. at 96.
9. Id. at 28-37.
10. CA Rollo, p. 38.
11. Id. at 10.
12. Id. at 38.
13. Rollo, pp. 107-108.
14. CA Rollo, pp. 113-116.
15. Id. at 32-34.
16. Id. at 39-40.
17. Id. at 1-12.
18. Id. at 7.
19. Rollo, pp. 17-20.
20. Id. at 21-22.
21. Id. at 124.
22. Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. It is Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure which reads:
Section 6. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. — If no motion to dismiss

has been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this Rule may be pleaded
as an affirmative defense in the answer and, in the discretion of the court, a preliminary
hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.
The dismissal of the complaint under this section shall be without prejudice to the
prosecution in the same or separate action of a counterclaim pleaded in the answer.
(Emphasis supplied)
23. Republic Planters Bank v. Agana, Sr., G.R. No. 51765, 269 SCRA 1, 12 (1997).
24. Supra note 22.
25. Coronel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103577, October 7, 1996, 263 SCRA 15.
26. Section 3 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. Representatives as parties. — Where the action is allowed to be
prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity,
the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the
real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an
executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in
his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued
without joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the
principal.
27. Section 2 of Rule 87:

Sec. 2. Executor or administrator may bring or defend actions which survive. —
For the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the deceased, an executor or
administrator may bring or defend, in the right of the deceased, actions for causes which
survive."
28. G.R. No. 131889, March 12, 2001, 354 SCRA 207.
29. Supra, note 26.
30. Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561 (1942).
31. Velasquez v. George, G.R. No. L-62376, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 456.
32. Borromeo v. Borromeo, 98 Phil 432 (1956).

Petitioners Vs VS: Second Division

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Petitioners Vs VS: Second Division

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Petitioners Vs VS: Second Division

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 129008. January 13, 2004.]

TEODORA A. RIOFERIO, VERONICA O. EVANGELISTA assisted by her

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two exceptions, viz

1. Rollo, pp. 17-20.

Section 6. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. — If no motion to dismiss

27. Section 2 of Rule 87:

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

You might also like