2 Cruz vs. Pandacan Hiker's Club, Inc.
2 Cruz vs. Pandacan Hiker's Club, Inc.
2 Cruz vs. Pandacan Hiker's Club, Inc.
*
NATIVIDAD C. CRUZ and BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, petitioners, vs. PANDACAN HIKER’S
CLUB, INC., represented by its President, PRISCILA ILAO, respondent.
Administrative Law; Public Officers; Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; It is held
that the administrative offense of conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service is committed when the
questioned conduct tarnished the image and integrity of the officer’s public office; the conduct need not be
related or connected to the public officer’s official functions for the said officer to be meted the corresponding
penalty.—It is held that the administrative offense of conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service is
committed when the questioned conduct tarnished the image and integrity of the officer’s public office; the
conduct need not be related or connected to the public officer’s official functions for the said officer to be
meted the corresponding penalty. The basis for such liability is Republic Act No. 6713, or the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, particularly Section 4(c) thereof, which
ordains that public officials and employees shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain
from doing acts contrary to public safety and public interest. In one case, this Court also stated that
the Machiavellian principle that “the end justifies the means” has no place in government service, which
thrives on the rule of law, consistency and stability.
Civil Law; Nuisance; Other than the statutory definition, jurisprudence recognizes that the term
“nuisance” is so comprehensive that it has been applied to almost all ways which have interfered with the
rights of the citizens, either in person, property, the enjoyment of his property, or his comfort.—There is a
nuisance when there is “any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else
which: (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or (2) annoys or offends the senses; or (3)
shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any
public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5)
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* THIRD DIVISION.
386
hinders or impairs the use of property.” But other than the statutory definition, jurisprudence
recognizes that the term “nuisance” is so comprehensive that it has been applied to almost all ways which
have interfered with the rights of the citizens, either in person, property, the enjoyment of his property, or
his comfort.
Same; Same; Classifications of Nuisance.—A nuisance is classified in two ways: (1) according to the
object it affects; or (2) according to its susceptibility to summary abatement. As for a nuisance classified
according to the object or objects that it affects, a nuisance may either be: (a) a public nuisance, i.e., one
which “affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of
the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal”; or (b) a private nuisance, or one “that
is not included in the foregoing definition” which, in jurisprudence, is one which “violates only private rights
and produces damages to but one or a few persons.” A nuisance may also be classified as to whether it is
susceptible to a legal summary abatement, in which case, it may either be: (a) a nuisance per se, when it
affects the immediate safety of persons and property, which may be summarily abated under the undefined
law of necessity; or (b) a nuisance per accidens, which “depends upon certain conditions and circumstances,
and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal
authorized to decide whether such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance”; it may only be so proven in a
hearing conducted for that purpose and may not be summarily abated without judicial intervention.
Same; Same; Basketball Ring; Nuisance Per Accidens; In the case at bar, none of the tribunals below
made a factual finding that the basketball ring was a nuisance per se that is susceptible to a summary
abatement. And based on what appears in the records, it can be held, at most, as a mere nuisance per
accidens, for it does not pose an immediate effect upon the safety of persons and property, the definition of a
nuisance per se.—In the case at bar, none of the tribunals below made a factual finding that the basketball
ring was a nuisance per se that is susceptible to a summary abatement. And based on what appears in the
records, it can be held, at most, as a mere nuisance per accidens, for it does not pose an immediate effect
upon the safety of persons and property, the definition of a nuisance per se. Culling from examples cited in
jurisprudence, it is unlike a mad dog
387
on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and
lives of the people; nor is it like pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs which are
inherently pernicious and which may be summarily destroyed; nor is it similar to a filthy restaurant which
may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health. A basketball ring, by itself, poses no
immediate harm or danger to anyone but is merely an object of recreation. Neither is it, by its nature,
injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community and, thus, it may not be abated as a
nuisance without the benefit of a judicial hearing.
Same; Same; Public Nuisance; Under Article 700 of the Civil Code, the abatement, including one without
judicial proceedings, of a public nuisance is the responsibility of the district health officer.—Under Article
700 of the Civil Code, the abatement, including one without judicial proceedings, of a public nuisance is the
responsibility of the district health officer. Under Article 702 of the Code, the district health officer is also
the official who shall determine whether or not abatement, without judicial proceedings, is the best remedy
against a public nuisance. The two articles do not mention that the chief executive of the local government,
like the Punong Barangay, is authorized as the official who can determine the propriety of a summary
abatement.
Political Law; Police Power; Delegation of Powers; Police power is vested primarily with the national
legislature, which may delegate the same to local governments through the enactment of ordinances through
their legislative bodies (the sanggunians). The so-called general welfare clause, provided for in Section 16 of
the Local Government Code (LGC), provides for such delegation of police power.—The general welfare clause
provides for the exercise of police power for the attainment or maintenance of the general welfare of the
community. The power, however, is exercised by the government through its legislative branch by the
enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional and civil rights. Jurisprudence defines police
power as the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. The Latin maxim
is salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law). Police power is vested
primarily with the national legislature, which may delegate the same to local govern-
388
ments through the enactment of ordinances through their legislative bodies (the sanggunians). The so-
called general welfare clause, provided for in Section 16 of the Local Government Code, provides for such
delegation of police power.
Civil Law; Nuisance; The complete destruction of the basketball ring by the petitioners is justified neither
by law or ordinance nor even by equity or necessity, which makes the act illegal and petitioners liable; Their
good intentions do not justify the destruction of private property without a legal warrant, because the
promotion of the general welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law.—Clearly, the
complete destruction of the basketball ring by the petitioners is justified neither by law or ordinance nor
even by equity or necessity, which makes the act illegal and petitioners liable. And even as an action to
maintain public order, it was done excessively and was unjustified. Where a less damaging action, such as
the mere padlocking, removal or confiscation of the ring would have sufficed, petitioners resorted to the
drastic measure of completely destroying and rendering as unusable the said ring, which was a private
property, without due process. Such an act went beyond what the law required and, in being so, it tarnished
the image and integrity of the offices held by petitioners and diminished the public’s confidence in the legal
system. Petitioners who were public officials should not have been too earnest at what they believed was an
act of restoring peace and order in the community if in the process they would end up disturbing it
themselves. They cannot break the law that they were duty-bound to enforce. Although the Court bestows
sympathy to the numerous constituents who allegedly complained against the basketball court to
petitioners, it cannot legally agree with the methods employed by the said officials. Their good intentions do
not justify the destruction of private property without a legal warrant, because the promotion of the general
welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law.
389
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to annul and set aside the Court of Appeals’ Decision1dated March 31, 2008 in C.A.-G.R.
S.P. No. 104474. The appellate court reversed and set aside the earlier decision of the Office of
the Ombudsman dismissing the complaint filed against petitioners.
Below are the facts of the case.
Petitioner Natividad C. Cruz (Cruz) was Punong Barangay or Chairperson of Barangay 848,
Zone 92, City of Manila.2 On November 10, 2006, around five o’clock in the afternoon, and along
Central Street, Pandacan, Manila, within the vicinity of her barangay, she allegedly confronted
persons playing basketball with the following statements:
Bakit nakabukas ang (basketball) court? Wala kayong karapatang maglaro sa court na
‘to, barangay namin ito! x x x x x x x x x Wala kayong magagawa. Ako ang chairman dito.
Mga walanghiya kayo, patay gutom! Hindi ako natatakot! Kaya kong panagutan lahat!3
Then, she allegedly gave an order to the other petitioner, Barangay Tanod Benjamin dela Cruz
(Dela Cruz), to destroy the basketball ring by cutting it up with a hacksaw which Dela Cruz
promptly complied with, thus, rendering the said basketball court unusable.4
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice (now Presiding Justice) Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes Jr.
and Normandie B. Pizarro, concurring; Rollo, pp. 69-73.
2 Id., at pp. 7, 33.
3 Id., at pp. 33-34.
4 Id., at pp. 34, 36.
390
The acts of petitioners prompted the filing of a Complaint (for Malicious Mischief, Grave
Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Abuse of
Authority)5before the Prosecutor’s Office and the Office of the Ombudsman by the group that
claims to be the basketball court’s owners, herein respondents Pandacan Hiker’s Club, Inc. (PHC)
and its president Priscila Ilao (Ilao). In the complaint, they alleged that PHC, a non-stock,
nonprofit civic organization engaged in “health, infrastructure, sports and other so-called poverty
alleviation activities” in the Pandacan area of Manila, is the group that had donated,
administered and operated the subject basketball court for the Pandacan community until its
alleged destruction by petitioners.6
The complaint averred that the damage caused by petitioners was in the amount of around
P2,000.00. It was supported by the affidavits of ten (10) members of PHC who allegedly witnessed
the destruction. Meanwhile, respondent Ilao added that the acts of petitioner Cruz,
the Barangay Chairperson, of ordering the cutting up of the basketball ring and uttering abusive
language were “unwarranted and unbecoming of a public official.”7
In answer to the complaint, Cruz alleged that the basketball court affected the peace in
the barangayand was the subject of many complaints from residents asking for its closure. She
alleged that the playing court blocked jeepneys from passing through and was the site of rampant
bettings and fights involving persons from within and outside the barangays. She claimed that
innocent persons have been hurt and property had been damaged by such armed confrontations,
which often involved the throwing of rocks and improvised “molotov” bombs. She also averred
that noise from the games caused lack of sleep among some residents and that the
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391
place’s frequent visitors used the community’s fences as places to urinate. Cruz maintained
that the court’s users never heeded the barangay officials’ efforts to pacify them and when the
basketball ring was once padlocked, such was just removed at will while members of the
complainants’ club continued playing. When Cruz asked for the PHC to return the steel bar and
padlock, the request was simply ignored, thus, prompting her to order Dela Cruz to destroy the
basketball ring. The destruction was allegedly also a response to the ongoing clamor of residents
to stop the basketball games.8 Cruz denied allegations that she shouted invectives at the PHC
members. In support of her answer, Cruz attached copies of the complaints, a “certification” and
letters of barangay residents asking for a solution to the problems arising from the disruptive
activities on the said playing venue.9
After the parties’ submission of their respective Position Papers,10the Office of the
Ombudsman rendered its Decision11 dated April 26, 2007 dismissing the complaint filed by
Ilao, et al.The Ombudsman found that the act of destroying the basketball ring was only
motivated by Cruz and Dela Cruz performing their sworn duty, as defined in the Local
Government Code.12 It found the act to be a mere response to the clamor of
_______________
392
constituents.13 The office found that though the cutting of the ring was “drastic,” it was done
by the barangay officials within their lawful duties, as the act was only the result of the
unauthorized removal of and failure to return the steel bar and padlock that were earlier placed
thereon.14Neither did the office give credence to the allegation that Cruz uttered invectives
against the complainants’ witnesses, noting that the said witnesses are tainted by their personal
animosity against the barangayofficials.15
After the Ombudsman’s ruling dismissing the complaint filed against Cruz and Dela Cruz, the
complainants Ilao, et al. filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals praying for the
latter court to nullify the Ombudsman’s decision.16The petition’s thesis was that any actions in
furtherance of the community’s welfare must be approved by ordinance and that unless a thing is
a nuisance per se, such a thing may not be abated via an ordinance and extrajudicially.17
Commenting on the petition for review, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, averred that Section 389 of the Local Government Code, which defines the
powers, duties and functions of the punong barangay, among which are the power to enforce all
laws and ordinances applicable within the barangay and the power to maintain public order in
the barangay and, in pursuance thereof, to assist the city or municipal mayor and
the sanggunianmembers in the performance of their duties and func-
_______________
(3) Maintain public order in the barangay and, in pursuance thereof, assist the city or municipal mayor and
the sanggunianmembers in the performance of their duties and functions; x x x id., at pp. 144-145. (Emphasis supplied)
13 Id., at p. 145.
14 Id., at p. 147.
15 Id., at p. 148.
16 Id., at pp. 164-173.
17 Id., at p. 171.
393
tions, does not require an ordinance for the said official to perform said functions.18The acts
were also in pursuance of the promotion of the general welfare of the community, as mentioned in
Section 16 of the Code.19
In its assailed Decision dated March 31, 2008, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman. The appellate court found petitioner Natividad C. Cruz
liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and penalized her with a
suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day, while it reprimanded the other petitioner Benjamin
dela Cruz, and also warned both officials that a future repetition of the same or similar acts will
be dealt with more severely.
The appellate court sustained the contentions of Ilao, et al. that Cruz and Dela Cruz performed
an abatement of what they thought was a public nuisance but did the same without following the
proper legal procedure, thus making them liable for said acts.20 It held Cruz to be without the
power to declare a thing a nuisance unless it is a nuisance per se.21 It declared the subject
basketball ring as not such a nuisance and, thus, not subject to summary abatement. The court
added that even if the same was to be considered a nuisance per accidens, the only way to
establish it as such is after a hearing conducted for that purpose.22
A motion for reconsideration filed by Cruz and Dela Cruz was likewise denied by the appellate
court.23 Hence, they filed this petition.
Petitioners maintain that they acted merely with the intention to regain free passage of people
and vehicles over the
_______________
18 Id., at p. 209.
19 Id.
20 Id., at pp. 41-43.
21 Id., at p. 44.
22 Id., at p. 45.
23 Id., at pp. 10-13.
394
street and restore the peace, health and sanitation of those affected by the basketball court.
Cruz, in particular, asserts that she merely abated a public nuisance which she claimed was
within her power as barangay chief executive to perform and was part of her duty to maintain
peace and order.24
We deny the petition.
Under normal circumstances, this Court would not disturb the findings of fact of the Office of
the Ombudsman when they are supported by substantial evidence.25However, We make an
exception of the case at bar because the findings of fact of the Ombudsman and the Court of
Appeals widely differ.26
It is held that the administrative offense of conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service is
committed when the questioned conduct tarnished the image and integrity of the officer’s public
office; the conduct need not be related or connected to the public officer’s official functions for the
said officer to be meted the corresponding penalty.27The basis for such liability is Republic Act
No. 6713, or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,
particularly Section 4(c) thereof, which ordains that public officials and employees shall at all
times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to public safety and
public interest.28 In one case, this Court also stated that the Machiavellian principle that “the
end justifies the means” has no place in government service, which thrives on the rule of law,
consistency and stability.29
_______________
24 Id., at p. 23.
25 Tolentino v. Loyola, 670 Phil. 50, 62; 654 SCRA 420, 432 (2011).
26 Office of the Ombudsman v. Bernardo, G.R. No. 181598, March 6, 2013, 692 SCRA 557, 567.
27 Largo v. Court of Appeals, 563 Phil. 293, 305; 537 SCRA 721, 733 (2007).
28 Id.; Avenido v. Civil Service Commission, 576 Phil. 654, 662; 553 SCRA 711, 720-721 (2008).
29 National Power Corporation v. Olandesca, 633 Phil. 278, 291; 619 SCRA 264, 276 (2010).
395
For these reasons, in the case at bar, We agree with the appellate court that the petitioners’
actions, though well-intentioned, were improper and done in excess of what was required by the
situation and fell short of the aforementioned standards of behavior for public officials.
It is clear from the records that petitioners indeed cut or sawed in half the subject basketball
ring, which resulted in the destruction of the said equipment and rendered it completely
unusable.30Petitioners also moved instantaneously and did not deliberate nor consult with
the Sangguniang Barangay prior to committing the subject acts; neither did they involve any
police or law enforcement agent in their actions. They acted while tempers were running high as
petitioner Cruz, the Barangay Chairperson, became incensed at the removal of the steel bar and
padlock that was earlier used to close access to the ring and at the inability or refusal of
respondents’ group to return the said steel bar and padlock to her as she had ordered.
The destructive acts of petitioners, however, find no legal sanction. This Court has ruled time
and again that no public official is above the law.31 The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that
although petitioners claim to have merely performed an abatement of a public nuisance, the same
was done summarily while failing to follow the proper procedure therefor and for which,
petitioners must be held administratively liable.
Prevailing jurisprudence holds that unless a nuisance is a nuisance per se, it may not be
summarily abated.32
There is a nuisance when there is “any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of
property, or anything else
_______________
396
which: (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or (2) annoys or offends the
senses; or (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or (4) obstructs or interferes with
the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs
the use of property.”33 But other than the statutory definition, jurisprudence recognizes that the
term “nuisance” is so comprehensive that it has been applied to almost all ways which have
interfered with the rights of the citizens, either in person, property, the enjoyment of his
property, or his comfort.34
A nuisance is classified in two ways: (1) according to the object it affects; or (2) according to its
susceptibility to summary abatement.
As for a nuisance classified according to the object or objects that it affects, a nuisance may
either be: (a) a public nuisance, i.e., one which “affects a community or neighborhood or any
considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon
individuals may be unequal”; or (b) a private nuisance, or one “that is not included in the
foregoing definition” which, in jurisprudence, is one which “violates only private rights and
produces damages to but one or a few persons.”35
A nuisance may also be classified as to whether it is susceptible to a legal summary
abatement, in which case, it may either be: (a) a nuisance per se, when it affects the immediate
safety of persons and property, which may be summarily abated under the undefined law of
necessity;36 or (b) a nuisance per accidens, which “depends upon certain conditions
_______________
and circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due
hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing does in law constitute a
nuisance”;37 it may only be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose and may not be
summarily abated without judicial intervention.38
In the case at bar, none of the tribunals below made a factual finding that the basketball ring
was a nuisance per se that is susceptible to a summary abatement. And based on what appears in
the records, it can be held, at most, as a mere nuisance per accidens, for it does not pose
an immediate effect upon the safety of persons and property, the definition of a nuisance per se.
Culling from examples cited in jurisprudence, it is unlike a mad dog on the loose, which may be
killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people; nor
is it like pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs which are inherently
pernicious and which may be summarily destroyed; nor is it similar to a filthy restaurant which
may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health.39 A basketball ring, by itself,
poses no immediate harm or danger to anyone but is merely an object of recreation. Neither is it,
by its nature, injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community and, thus, it
may not be abated as a nuisance without the benefit of a judicial hearing.40
But even if it is assumed, ex gratia argumenti, that the basketball ring was a nuisance per se,
but without posing any
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398
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399
as the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays exercise police power through their
respective legislative bodies.42
The general welfare clause provides for the exercise of police power for the attainment or
maintenance of the general welfare of the community. The power, however, is exercised by the
government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other
constitutional and civil rights.43 Jurisprudence defines police power as the plenary power vested
in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.44 The Latin maxim is salus
populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law).45 Police power is vested
primarily with the national legislature, which may delegate the same to local governments
through the enactment of ordinances through their legislative bodies (the sanggunians).46The so-
called general welfare clause, provided for in Section 16 of the Local Government Code, provides
for such delegation of police power, to wit:
Section 16. General Welfare.—Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
_______________
42 Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin, 496 Phil. 82, 92; 456 SCRA 176, 186-187 (2005); City of
Manila v. Laguio, Jr., supra note 38 at p. 319; p. 328.
43 Gallego v. People, 118 Phil. 815, 819; 8 SCRA 813, 817 (1963), citing Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71 (1948).
44 Social Justice Society v. Atienza Jr., 568 Phil. 658, 700; 545 SCRA 92, 136 (2008).
45 JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 87, 93; 260 SCRA 319, 324 (1996).
46 Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., 385 Phil. 586, 603; 328 SCRA 836,
845 (2000); Gallego v. People, supra; Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 385 Phil. 956, 968-969; 329 SCRA
314, 343 (2000).
400
effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure
and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote
health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and
support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote
full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort
and convenience of their inhabitants.
Flowing from this delegated police power of local governments, a local government unit
like Barangay 848, Zone 92 in which petitioners were public officials, exercises police power
through its legislative body, in this case, its Sangguniang Barangay.47 Particularly, the
ordinances passed by the sanggunian partly relate to the general welfare of the barangay, as also
provided for by the Local Government Code as follows:
Section 391. Powers, Duties, and Functions.—
(a) The sangguniang barangay, as the legislative body of the barangay, shall:
(1) Enact ordinances as may be necessary to discharge the responsibilities
conferred upon it by law or ordinance and to promote the general welfare of the
inhabitants therein. (emphasis supplied)
Even the powers granted to the punong barangay consist mainly of executing only those laws
and ordinances already enacted by the legislative bodies, including the said official’s
own sangguniang barangay, to wit:
_______________
47 Supra note 44.
401
_______________
48 Emphasis supplied.
402
as unusable the said ring, which was a private property, without due process. Such an act
went beyond what the law required and, in being so, it tarnished the image and integrity of the
offices held by petitioners and diminished the public’s confidence in the legal system. Petitioners
who were public officials should not have been too earnest at what they believed was an act of
restoring peace and order in the community if in the process they would end up disturbing it
themselves. They cannot break the law that they were duty-bound to enforce. Although the Court
bestows sympathy to the numerous constituents who allegedly complained against the basketball
court to petitioners, it cannot legally agree with the methods employed by the said officials. Their
good intentions do not justify the destruction of private property without a legal warrant, because
the promotion of the general welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of the rule of
law.49 Unlike the examples cited earlier of a mad dog on the loose, pornography on display or a
filthy restaurant, which all pose immediate danger to the public and, therefore, could be
addressed by anyone on sight, a basketball ring as a nuisance poses no such urgency that could
have prevented petitioners from exercising any form of deliberation or circumspection before
acting on the same.
Petitioners do not claim to have acted in their private capacities but in their capacities as
public officials, thus, they are held administratively liable for their acts. And even in their
capacities as private individuals who may have abated a public nuisance, petitioners come up
short of legal requirements. They do not claim to have complied with any of the requisites laid
down in Article 704 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 704. Any private person may abate a public nuisance which is specially injurious
to him by removing, or if necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes
_______________
49 Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., supra note 46 at p. 622; p. 863.
403
the same, without committing a breach of the peace, or doing unnecessary injury. But it
is necessary:
(1) That demand be first made upon the owner or possessor of the property to
abate the nuisance;
(2) That such demand has been rejected;
(3) That the abatement be approved by the district health officer and executed
with the assistance of the local police; and
(4) That the value of the destruction does not exceed three thousand pesos.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision
dated March 31, 2008 in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 104474 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Notes.—Considering that this is respondent’s second offense for conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, such offense carries the penalty of dismissal from the service. (Bernabe vs.
Grimaldo, 578 SCRA 11 [2009])
A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may
be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. (Telmo vs. Bustamante, 592 SCRA
552 [2009])
——o0o——