People vs. Verra

2/26/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 382
542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Verra
*
G.R. No. 134732. May 29, 2002.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ACELO

VERRA, respondent.
Judgments; Annulment of Judgments; Fraud; Requisites; For

fraud to cause the annulment of a judgment, it must be established
by clear and convincing evidence; It is one thing to allege deceit
and fraud but another to prove by evidence the specific acts
constituting the same.—Well settled is the rule that for fraud to
cause the annulment of a judgment, it must be established by
clear and convincing evidence. The petitioner must sufficiently
prove the specific acts constituting the deceit on the part of
Damiana. It must demonstrate that “(1) her statements are
untrue, made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless and
conscious ignorance thereof, especially if parties are not on equal
terms, made with intent that petitioner act thereon or in a
manner apparently fitted to induce it to act thereon, and (2)
petitioner must act in reliance on the statements in the manner
contemplated, or manifestly probable to its injury.” Damiana’s
declarations on the witness stand regarding the hostility of the
other witnesses and lack of interest in prosecuting the case may
be false, but there is no proof that they were made with
knowledge of its falsity or with reckless and conscious ignorance
thereof. It is one thing to allege deceit and fraud but another to
prove by evidence the specific acts constituting the same.
Same; Same; Same; Fraud as a ground for nullity of a
judgment must be extrinsic to the litigation.—To be sure, fraud as
a ground for nullity of a judgment must be extrinsic to the
litigation. Were this not the rule, there would be no end to the
litigation, perjury being of such common occurrence in trials.
Fraud is extrinsic or collateral where it prevents a party from
having a trial, or real contest, or from presenting all of his case to
the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining, not to the
judgment itself, but to the manner in which it was procured so
that there is never a fair submission of the controversy. In other
words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the
http://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000161d2c9ac870d8e8a70003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/11
prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of

trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented
from exhibiting fully his side of the case, by fraud or deception
practiced on him by his opponent.
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
543
VOL. 382, MAY 29, 2002 543
People vs. Verra
Same; Same; Same; The fraud or deceit cannot be of the losing

party’s own doing, nor must it contribute to it.—Further, it must
be emphasized that the fraud or deceit cannot be of the losing
party’s own doing, nor must it contribute to it. The extrinsic fraud
must be employed against it by the adverse party, who because of
some trick, artifice, or device naturally prevails in the suit. The
end result not only defeats legitimate rights of the losing party in
the lawsuit. On a larger scale, it circumvents the adversarial
system of our litigation process and makes a mockery of our
judicial contests. That instead of having two antagonists who
genuinely compete to fully ventilate their cause and demolish that
of his opponent’s, what transpires is a scripted theatrical drama
played before the august hall of an officer of the court.
Same; Same; Same; Allegation of collusion must be
established by competent and credible proof.—Examining the facts
of the case at bar, we find that no fraud or deceit was properly
proved against the respondent. Indeed, petitioner admits that if
there was fraud or deceit here, it was practiced by its own
witness, Damiana, in making her false testimony. As such, it has
no reason to protest. Even assuming, arguendo, that she misled
the petitioner and the court, her action should not be taken
against the accused. Petitioner has not proffered any proof that
Damiana and the respondent were in collusion. Allegation of
collusion must be established by competent and credible proof.
Criminal Law; Double Jeopardy; Requisites.—Under Article
III, Section 21 of the Constitution, “No person shall be twice put
in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under
either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same
act.” In a long line of decisions, we have enumerated the following
requisites for double jeopardy to attach: (1) upon a valid
indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4)

when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant
was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused. There are
however two occasions when double jeopardy will attach even if
the motion to dismiss the case is made by the accused himself.
The first is when the ground is insufficiency of evidence of the
prosecution, and the second is when the proceedings have been
unreasonably prolonged in violation of the right to a speedy trial.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

544

People vs. Verra
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney’s Office for respondent.
PUNO, J.:
A day in court is the touchstone of the right to due process

in criminal justice. It is an aspect of the duty of the
government to follow a fair process of decision-making
1
when it acts to deprive a person of his liberty. But just as
an accused is accorded this constitutional protection, so is2
the State entitled to due process in criminal prosecutions.
It must similarly be given the chance to present its
evidence in support of a charge.
In the case at bar, petitioner, People of the Philippines,
claims that it was denied its day in court and its due
process right was breached. Filing this Petition under Rule
45, it seeks to set aside, on pure questions of law, the April
6, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals.
On November 14, 1988, respondent Acelo Verra was
charged with the crime of murder for killing a certain Elias
Cortezo. A warrant of arrest was issued by the Regional
Trial Court against him on November 21, 1988. He
remained at-large until May 24, 1996 when he voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court
accompanied by his counsel. Immediately, arraignment
proceeded during which he entered a plea of “Not Guilty.”
On the same day, the prosecution called to the witness
stand the wife of the victim, private complainant Damiana
Cortezo. She testified
3
that: (1) she has executed an affidavit
3
of desistance; (2) she is no longer interested in prosecuting
the case; and (3) other witnesses of the shooting incident
have turned hostile and have similarly lost concern in
pursuing the same. Thereafter, the prosecution, joined by
the counsel for the accused, moved for the dismissal of the
case. In light of these developments, the trial judge issued
an Order dated May 24, 1996 granting the motion, thus:
_______________
1 See 16B Am. Jur. 2d. § 946.

2 Depamaylo v. Brotarlo, 265 SCRA 151 (1996).
3 Exhibit “A”.
545
VOL. 382, MAY 29, 2002 545

People vs. Verra
“WHEREFORE, after considering the testimony of the private

complainant and the motion of the prosecution joined by counsel
for the accused, this Court is hopeless (sic) in proceeding with this
case. Therefore let this case be considered DISMISSED and the
Warrant of Arrest for
4
the accused is hereby cancelled.
SO ORDERED.”
Subsequently, two other witnesses of the shooting incident

appeared after learning of the dismissal of the case and
manifested their willingness to testify. Further, two sisters
of the victim assailed the allegation of lack of interest.
Consequently, the prosecution filed a Motion to Set Aside
the Order of Dismissal on July 22, 1996 asserting that
Damiana and the accused misled the trial court and
deprived the plaintiff, People of the Philippines, its day in
court. For which reason, it argued, the Order dismissing
the case should be voided.
On August 21, 1996, the trial court set aside the Order
of Dismissal dated May 24, 1996. Respondent moved for its
reconsideration but his motion was denied on September
26, 1996. He then instituted before the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Certiorari challenging the August 21 Order.
The appellate court rendered a Decision on April 6, 1998
granting the petition. It ruled that the dismissal of the case
against petitioner has attained finality, and that its revival
requires the filing of a new case or information, viz:
“Thus in the case at bar, when the trial court issued its order of
dismissal, as far as the court is concerned, the case was ended. To
revive the case against the same accused or to prosecute him

anew for the same act imputed to him, the government has to file
a new case or information for the reason that the dismissed case
had already been terminated, definitely and finally.
x x x x x x x x x
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and the orders
dated August 21, 1996 and September 26, 1996 are hereby
5
SET
ASIDE, and the Order dated May 24, 1996 reinstated.”
_______________
4 Annex “C”, Petition for Review; Rollo, p. 28.

5 Decision, Annex “A”, p. 4; Rollo, p. 25.
546

People vs. Verra
Hence, the present course of action. In this Petition for

Review, petitioner impugns the Decision of the appellate
court in that:
“The Court of Appeals decided a question of substance in a way

that is not in accord with law and jurisprudence when it ruled
that: (i) the state was not denied its day in court and was not
misled by private complainant in the dismissal of the case; and (ii)
the order 6
of the trial court dismissing the case has attained
finality.”
The petition is devoid of merit.
Petitioner cannot complain that it was denied its day in

court. It was, in the first place, represented by a public
prosecutor who was personally present in every stage of the
proceeding—from the arraignment to the promulgation of
the dismissal order—to protect its interests. It was given
the chance to submit its evidence as it in fact called to the
stand its own witness, Damiana (who incidentally was the
only witness presented here), during the day of the
hearing. Then, the prosecutor was able to conduct her
direct examination. More importantly, petitioner was the
one who jointly moved with accused’s counsel for the
dismissal of this case due to lack of evidence. The Order of
Dismissal was given in open court by the presiding judge
without any remonstrance from the prosecution.
II
We are similarly not persuaded by petitioner’s contention

that by reason of the deceit employed by Damiana, the
prosecution and the trial court were misled.
Well settled is the rule that for fraud to cause the
annulment of a judgment, it must be established by clear
and convincing evidence. The petitioner must sufficiently
prove the specific acts constituting the deceit on the part of
Damiana. It must demonstrate that “(1) her statements are
untrue, made with knowledge of their falsity or with
reckless and conscious ignorance thereof, especially if
parties are not on equal terms, made with intent that
petitioner
_______________
6 Petition, p. 7; Rollo, p. 13.
547
VOL. 382, MAY 29, 2002 547

People vs. Verra
act thereon or in a manner apparently fitted to induce it to

act thereon, and (2) petitioner must act in reliance on the
statements in the manner7
contemplated, or manifestly
probable to its injury.”
Damiana’s declarations on the witness stand regarding
the hostility of the other witnesses and lack of interest in
prosecuting the case may be false, but there is no proof that
they were made with knowledge of its falsity or with
reckless and conscious ignorance thereof. It is one thing to
allege deceit and fraud but another to prove by evidence
the specific acts constituting the same.
To be sure, fraud as a ground for nullity of a judgment
must be extrinsic to the litigation. Were this not the rule,
there would be no end to the litigation,
8
perjury being of
such common occurrence in trials. Fraud is extrinsic or
collateral where it prevents a party from having a trial, or
real contest, or from presenting all of his case to the court,
or where it operates upon matters pertaining, not to the
judgment itself, but to the manner in which it was procured
so that there is never a fair submission of the controversy.
In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act
of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed
outside of trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has
been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case,

9
by
fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent.
Enlightening are the following examples given by
Justice Miller, viz:
“x x x. Where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from

exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him
by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false
promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had
knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the
plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority
assumes to represent a party and connives at his defeat; or where
the attorney regularly employed corruptly sells out his client’s
interest to the other side—these, and similar cases which show
that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of
the case, are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set
aside and annul a for-
_______________
7 Hood v. Wood, 161 P. 210, 213 (1916).

8 Libudan v. Gil, 45 SCRA 17 (1976).
9 Macabingkil v. People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation, 72 SCRA 326
(1976).
548

People vs. Verra
mer judgment or decree, or open the case for a new and fair
hearing. See, Wells, Res Judicata, sec 499; Pearce v. Olney, 20
Conn., 544; Wierich v. De Zoya, 7 111., (2 Gilm. ) 385; Kent v.
Richards, 3 Md. Ch., 396; Smith v. Lowry, 1 Johns. Ch., 320; De
Louis v. Meek, 2 Green (Iowa), 55.
“In all these cases and many others which have been examined,
relief has been granted on the ground that, by some fraud
practiced directly upon the party seeking relief against the
judgment or decree, that party has 10
been prevented from
presenting all of his case to the court.”
Further, it must be emphasized that the fraud or deceit

cannot be of the losing party’s own doing, nor must it
contribute to it. The extrinsic fraud must be employed
against it by the adverse party, who because of some trick,
artifice, or device naturally prevails in the suit. The end
result not only defeats legitimate rights of the losing party
in the lawsuit. On a larger scale, it circumvents the
adversarial system of our litigation process and makes a
mockery of our judicial contests. That instead of having two

antagonists who genuinely compete to fully ventilate their
cause and demolish that of his opponent’s, what transpires
is a scripted theatrical drama played before the august hall
of an officer of the court.
Examining the facts of the case at bar, we find that no
fraud or deceit was properly proved against the respondent.
Indeed, petitioner admits that if there was fraud or deceit
here, it was practiced by its own witness, Damiana, in
making her false testimony. As such, it has no reason to
protest. Even assuming, arguendo, that she misled the
petitioner and the court, her action should not be taken
against the accused. Petitioner has not proffered any proof
that Damiana and the respondent were in collusion.
Allegation of collusion must be established by competent
and credible proof.
To be sure, petitioner has only itself to blame for jointly
moving for the dismissal of this case too soon, without first
verifying the truth of Damiana’s statement. It could have
easily confirmed whether indeed the other witnesses to the
shooting incident have turned hostile by contacting them.
It cannot put forth the excuse that it did not know their
whereabouts or could not get in touch
_______________
10 U.S. v. Throckmorton, 25 L. ed. 93, 95, cited in Macabingkil, supra.,

at 344.
549
VOL. 382, MAY 29, 2002 549

People vs. Verra
with them, since their addresses were indicated on the

Sworn Statements they executed in connection with the
killing on September 1, 1987 during the period of police
investigation. The Sworn Statements actually formed part
of the basis for the filing of the Information against the
respondent. Contacts could have similarly been established
with the victim’s relatives.
III
As there is no vice which taints the Order of Dismissal of

the trial court issued in open court on May 24, 1996,
subsequently reduced to writing and entered in the Book of
Judgment on May 30, 1996, we hold that it has now

attained finality.
11
Petitioner’s reliance
12
on the cases of Villa
v. Lazaro and Paulin v. Gimenez is misplaced. We held in
Villa that a judgment rendered without due process is null
and void, could never become final, and could be attacked
in any appropriate proceeding. We ruled in Paulin, on the
other hand, that a violation of the state’s right to due
process ousts courts of their jurisdiction and warrants a
remand of the case to the trial court for further proceeding
and reception of evidence. In those two cases, however, it is
clear that the aggrieved parties were denied their day in
court. In Villa, petitioner was not informed of the
complaint against her; the administrative inquiry involving
her was conducted in the most informal manner by means
only of communication requiring submission of certain
documents; and the documents she submitted were never
given consideration on the pretense of lack of compliance.
Similarly, in Paulin, the prosecution was stripped of its
right to complete the presentation of its evidence when the
case therein was prematurely terminated and dismissed.
Obviously, the facts in Villa and Paulin are different. That
petitioner, to reiterate, was never denied its day in court
nor was it deceived by its own witness is a point already
well-belabored.
_______________
11 189 SCRA 34 (1990).

12 217 SCRA 386 (1993).
550

People vs. Verra
IV
Finally, we agree with the respondent’s claim that to revive

the case against him would be violative of his
constitutional right against double jeopardy.
Under Article III, Section 21 of the Constitution, “No
person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall 13
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.”
In a long line of decisions, we have enumerated the
following requisites for double jeopardy to attach: (1) upon
a valid indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3) after

arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and
(5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted or the
case was dismissed or otherwise 14
terminated without the
express consent of the accused. There are however two
occasions when double jeopardy will attach even if the
motion to dismiss the case is made by the accused himself.
The first is when the ground is insufficiency of evidence of
the prosecution, and the second is when the proceedings
have been unreasonably
15
prolonged in violation of the right
to a speedy trial.
In the case at bar, we find all the above-cited requisites
present. First, there was a valid information, sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction, filed on
November 14, 1988 duly16 signed by 4th Assistant Provincial
Fiscal Cesar M. Merin. Second, the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 10 of Tacloban City clearly had jurisdiction to hear
and try the murder charge against the respondent. Third,
he was arraigned in open court on May 17
24, 1996 with the
assistance of a counsel de officio. Fourth, during18
the
arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty. Finally,
there was a valid termination of this case on the basis of
the trial judge’s Order to Dismiss the case. While it is true
that the respondent joined the prosecution in praying for
its dismissal, double jeopardy will still
_______________
13 1987 Constitution.
14 Tecson v. Sandiganbayan, 318 SCRA 80 (1999).
15 People v. Quizada, 160 SCRA 516 (1988).
16 Information, Original Record, p. 28.
17 Certificate of Arraignment, Original Records, p. 31.
18 Ibid.
551
VOL. 382, MAY 29, 2002 551

People vs. Verra
attach since the basis for the ruling was the insufficiency of
evidence of the prosecution. In view of private
complainant’s desistance and her testimony that other
witnesses have turned hostile and are also no longer
interested in prosecuting this case, petitioner clearly lacks
the evidence to support the charge.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, there being no showing that the
Court of Appeals committed any reversible error, the
instant petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Kapunan, Ynares-

Santiago and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed.
Notes.—It is the Court of Appeals not the Supreme

Court which has jurisdiction to annul judgments of
Regional Trial Courts. (Lapulapu Development & Housing
Corporation vs. Risos, 261 SCRA 517 [1996])
It is well-settled that the use of forged instruments or
perjured testimonies during trial is not an extrinsic fraud,
because such evidence does not preclude the participation
of any party in the proceedings. (Strait Times, Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, 294 SCRA 714 [1998])
——o0o——
552
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2/26/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 382

542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ACELO

Judgments; Annulment of Judgments; Fraud; Requisites; For

prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of

VOL. 382, MAY 29, 2002 543

People vs. Verra

Same; Same; Same; The fraud or deceit cannot be of the losing

indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4)

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

A day in court is the touchstone of the right to due process

1 See 16B Am. Jur. 2d. § 946.

VOL. 382, MAY 29, 2002 545

“WHEREFORE, after considering the testimony of the private

Subsequently, two other witnesses of the shooting incident

revive the case against the same accused or to prosecute him

4 Annex “C”, Petition for Review; Rollo, p. 28.

546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Hence, the present course of action. In this Petition for

“The Court of Appeals decided a question of substance in a way

The petition is devoid of merit.

Petitioner cannot complain that it was denied its day in

We are similarly not persuaded by petitioner’s contention

6 Petition, p. 7; Rollo, p. 13.

VOL. 382, MAY 29, 2002 547

act thereon or in a manner apparently fitted to induce it to

been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case,

“x x x. Where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from

7 Hood v. Wood, 161 P. 210, 213 (1916).

548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Further, it must be emphasized that the fraud or deceit

mockery of our judicial contests. That instead of having two

10 U.S. v. Throckmorton, 25 L. ed. 93, 95, cited in Macabingkil, supra.,

VOL. 382, MAY 29, 2002 549

with them, since their addresses were indicated on the

As there is no vice which taints the Order of Dismissal of

Judgment on May 30, 1996, we hold that it has now

11 189 SCRA 34 (1990).

550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Finally, we agree with the respondent’s claim that to revive

a valid indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3) after

VOL. 382, MAY 29, 2002 551

instant petition is DISMISSED.

Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Kapunan, Ynares-

Notes.—It is the Court of Appeals not the Supreme

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