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I USAF SEARCH & RESCUE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
I 1 JUL 69 • 31 D,EC 70
I 23 APR 71
I
AlllffEm ifGR
I PllliC iEL~ASE
'
' ~

I HQ PACAF .
~
atre·'!P~···"·.- ...· .. ··~~r a'?r'M'-i'

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I Directorate of Operation~
Analysis ·
CHECO/CORONA HARVEST DIVtSqN I
I !

Prepared by: I

I MR WALTER f. LYNCH
Proiect CHICO 7th AP, DOAC
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 Form Approved
Report Documentation Page OMB No. 0704-0188

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does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED

APR 1971 N/A -
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
USAF Search And Rescue in Southeast Asia 1 Jul 69 - 31 Dec 70 5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

REPORT NUMBER
HQ PACAF Directorate of Operations Analysis CHECO Division
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT

NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF
ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE
SAR 166
unclassified unclassified unclassified

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)

Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
I ·U.NCLASSIFIED
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

I
HEADQUARTERS PACIFIC AIR FORCES
APO SAN FR.ANCISCO 96!5153

I urtJCl "; 1111 lllllt Ot !·rAlf

I PROJECT CHECO REPORTS

The counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare environment of

I Southeast Asia has resulted in the employment of USAF airpower to meet
a multitude of requirements. The varied applications of airpower have
involved the full spectrum of USAF aerospace vehicles, support equip-
I ment, and manpower. As a result, there has been an accumulation of
operational data and experiences that, as a priority, must be collected,
documented, and analyzed as to current and future impact upon USAF poli-
I cies, concepts, and doctrine.
Fortunately, the value of collecting and documenting our SEA experiences
was recognized at an early date. In 1962, Hq USAF directed CINCPACAF to
I establish an activity that would be primarily
requjrements and direction, and would provide
responsive to Air Staff
timely and analytical studies
of USAF combat operations in SEA.
I Project CHECO, an acronym for Contemporary Historical Examination of
Current Operations, was established to meet this Air Staff requirement.
Managed by Hq PACAF, with elements at Hq 7AF and 7AF/l3AF, Project CHECO
I provides a scholarly, "on-going" historical examination, documentation, and
reporting on USAF policies, concepts, and doctrine in PACOM. This CHECO
report is part of the overall documentation and examination which is being
I accomplished.
tic
ong with the other CHECO publications, this is an authen-
ment of the effectiveness of USAF airpower in PACOM.

I , Major General, USAF

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I UNCLASSIFIED
 SECRET
DEPARTMENT O.F THE AIR FORCE .
HEADQUARTERS PACIFIC A.IR FORCES
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96553

REPLY TO
ATTN OF DOAD 23 Apri 1 1971

SUBJECT Project CHECO Report, 11 USAF Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia,
1 Jul 69-31 Dec 70 11 (U)
I
TO SEE DISTRIBUTION PAGE
1. Attached is a SECRET document. It shall be transported, stored,
safeguarded, and accounted for in accordance with applicable security
I
directives. Each page is marked according to its contents. Retain
or destroy in accordance with AFR 205-1. Do not return. I
2. This letter does not contain classified information and may be
declassified if attachment is removed from it. I
FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
I
#...J.~~(..j·.~G1i~~
CHECO/CORO~~~~~~~Division
USAF 1 Atch
hief,
Directorate of Operations Analysis
Proj CHECO Rprt (S), 23 Apr 71 I
DCS/Operations
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SECRET I
I u·NCL.ASSIFIID ..
I
DISTRIBUTION LIST
I
1. SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE j. AFPDC
I (1) AFDPW •• ....• • • 1
a. SAFAA . . • . 1
b. SAFLL . • • 1 k. AFRO
c. SAFOI • • . . .. . 2 1l2 AFRDP .• .• 1,.
I
2.
d. SAFUS . •
HEADQUARTERS USAF
• . • 1
!3
(4)
.••
AFRDQ .•
AFRDQPC.
AFRDR ••
• ._ 1
• • 1
I a. AFNB. • • . . • • 1
(5) AFRDQL . • • . . . 1

1. AFSDC
b. AFCCS (1) AFSLP. • • • 1
I (1) AFCCSSA . .
(2} AFCVC ..•
• 1
• . 1
(2l
AFSME. .
(3 AFSMS. • •
••
• •
1
1
(3) AFCAV ..• • 1 (4 AFSSS ••••••••• 1
I (4) AFCHO •• . 2 (5} AFSTP .•••••••• 1
c. AFCSA m. AFTAC ..• ... • • • • • 1
I (1) AFCSAG . . .
(2} AFCSAMI •
• 1
. . 1 n. AFXO o • . • • • • • •
( 1} AFXOB. . • • • • • • •.
1
1
d. AFOA .• . 2 (2} AFXOD. • • • • 1
I e. AFIGO
(3} AFXODC •
(4) AFXODD • •
o•
• • • •
1
1
(5) AFXODL o ••••• 1
I (1) OSIIAPo
(2) IGS .
o. 3
. .• o . 1
(6) AFXOOAB. • • • • • • •
(7} AFXOSL • • o •••••
1
1
(8} AFXOOSN. • • • • ••• 1
I f.
g.
AFSG. • . . . .
AFNIATC .
. 1
• 5
(9) AFXOOSO.
(10) AFXOOSS.
(11) AFXOOSV.
•
• •
•
1
1
1
12) AFXOOTRo •• 1
I h. AFAAC • . . .
(1) AFACMI.
. • 1
. 1 !13) AFXOOTW. • •
14) AFXOOTZ. • • • .
(15) AFXOOCY .•••••••
•
•
1
1
1
I i. AFODC
(1) AFPRC . .
(2) AFPRE • •
. 1
. • 1
(16) AF/XOX .
(17} AFXOXXG.
• • • •
• •
6
1

I (3) AFPRM • . . . • . • 1

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I UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLA.SSIFIED I
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3. MAJOR COMMAND
a. TAC
b. SAC
(1) HEADQUARTERS
I
(a) DOPL. . . • . 1
(1) HEADQUARTERS
(a) DO ..• . . • . 1
(bl XPX • • • . . . • . 1
(c OM. • • • • • 1
I
(b) XP . • . . . • • • . 1 (d IN • • • • . • • • • 1
(c) DOCC .•.
(d) DREA • . . • . •
{e) IN . • • .
• • 1
• • 1
• • 1
(e) OA. . • . • • • 1
(f) HO. • • • • • • • • 1 I
(2) AIR FORCES
(2) AIR FORCES
(a) 12AF
(a) 2AF(INCS) ••••• 1
(b) 8AF(DOA) •••••• 2
I
1• DOO. . . . • • • 1 (c) 15AF(INCE). • • 1
!. IN . • .
(b) l9AF( (N). .
. • • .
. . . .
1
1 c. MAC I
(c) USAFSOF{DO) ..•• 1
(3) WINGS
a) 1SOW(DOI) . . . • • 1
(1) HEADQUARTERS
(a) OOI ••• • • 1
(b) DOO •••• • • • • 1
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!
b) 23TFW(OOI).
c) 27TRW{DOI).
(d) 33TFW(DOI).
(e) 64TAW(DOI).
.
. .
.
• .
1
1
1
1
(c) CSEH ••••
· (d) MACOA . .

{2) MAC SERVICES

• • 1
. • • 1 I
(f) 67TRW(DOI) • . . . •
(g) 75TRW(DOI). .
(h) 316TAW(DOX) ••••
.
1
1
1
(a) AWS(HO) •• • • 1
(b) ARRS ( XP) • • • • • • 1 I
(c) ACGS(CGO) • • • 1
( i ) 31 7T AW ( DO I l .
(j) 363TRW(DOI •
(k) 464TFW(DOI . . . .
.
.
1
1
1
d. ADC I
(1) 474TFW(DOil . . . • 1 (1) HEADQUARTERS
(m) 479TFW(DOI .
(n) 516TAW(DOX .
.
•
1
1
(a) DO. . • • .
(b) DOT . . • .
. • 1
. . 1 I
(o) 4403TFW(DOI). . • . 1 {c) XPC • • . • • • • . 1
(p) 58TAC FTR TNG WG ••
(q) 354TFW(DOI) •.••
( r) 60MAWG(OOOXI) • . .
1
1
1
(2) AIR DIVISIONS
(a) 25AD{DOI) •• . • • 1
I
(b) 29AD(DO) •• • • 1
(4) TAC CENTERS, SCHOOLS
{a) USAFTAWC(DRA) • . • 1
{c) 20AD (DO I) . . • . . 1 I
(b) USAFTFWC(DRA) •.. 1 e. ATC
(c) USAFAGOS(EDA) . . . 1 (1) DOSPI • . • . • • • • • 1
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UNCLASSIFIED
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UNC-LA.SSI;FIE.D ·..
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f. AFLC k.. PACAF
I (1) HEADQUARTERS
(a} XOX . • . . . .• . • • 1
(1). HEADQUARTERS ·
{a} DP . . ••• • • • • 1
(b) IN ••• • 1
I g. AFSC (c) XP .•••• . . . .
(d) CSH. • • • 1
2
( l} HEADQUARTERS (e) DOAD •• . . . . 5
I (a} XRP • . . • • • 1
(b) XRLW ••••• • • • • 1
(c) SAMSO(XRW).
(f) DC • • • •
(g) OM •••
. • .. 1
• • • . 1
• 1
(d) SDA . . • . (2) AIR FORCES
I (e) CSH . • • •
(f) DLXP. . • . •
• • 1
. • • 1
• • 1
(a) SA.F
1. CSH • • • • • • • 1
(g) ASD{RWST) . . . . 1 ~. XP. • • • • • • •. 1
I (h) ESD{XO} ....
{i} RADC(DOTL}.
• • 1
• • 1
3. DO. . • . . • • • 1
(b) Det 8, ASD(DOASD) •• 1
(j) ADTC( CCS) . • •. • 1 (c) 7AF
I {k) ADTC(SSLT) .• • . • . 1
(1) ESD(YW) •.•
{m} AFATL(DL} .
• • 1
• • 1
1. DO • • • • • • • • 1
2. IN. • • • • • • •
'!. XP. . . • • • .. •
1
1
l. DOCT. • . • . • •
I h. USAFSS ~. DOAC •••••••
(d) T3AF
1
2
(1) HEADQUARTERS 1. CSH • • • • 1
I (a) AFSCC(SUR) . . • . . . 2 ~. XP. • • . • • • •
(e) 1/13AF(CHECO}. •
1
1
(2) SUBORDINATE UNITS
{a} Eur Scty Rgn(OPD-P} • 1
I (b) 6940 Scty Wg(OOD) .. 1
(3) AIR DIVISIONS
(a) 313AD(DOI) •••.•
(b) 314AD(XOP) •••••
1
2
i. AAC {c) 327AD
I (l ) HEADQUARTERS
1. IN. • • • • •
(d) 834AD(DO) •••.••
1
2
(a) ALDOC-A • . . •..• 1
I j. USAFSO
(1) HEADQUARTERS
I (a) CSH . . • • 1

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(4) WINGS 4. SEPARATE OPERATING AGENCIES
(a) 8TFW(DOEA) •.•••••
(b) 12TFW(OOIN). . .
1
1 a. ACIC(DOP) • • • • • . . • 2
I
(c) 35TFW(DOIN) . . . . • • . 1 b. AFRES{XP). • • • • . 2
(d) 56SOW(WHD) . . . . • . .
(e) 366TFW (DO) . . . .
1
1
c. AU
1. ACSC-SA • • . . • • . 1
I
(f) 388TFW (DO) . . . . 1 2. AUL{SE)-69-108 •••• 2
{g) 405TFW(DOEA) . . . . . .
(h) 432TRW(DOI). . .
(i) 460TRW(DOI)..
. •
.
1
1
1
'!. ASI {ASD-1). . . • • •
4. ASI (HOA). • . . . • •.
d. ANALYTIC SERVICES, INC .
1
2
1
I
(j) 475TFW(DCO). . . . • 1 e. USAFA
{k) 1st Test Sq{A) . . . 1 1 • DFH • • • • • • . • . 1 I
(5) OTHER UNITS
(a) Task Force ALPHA(IN) .. 1
(b) 504TASG (DO"). • . . . . . 1 I
(c) Air Force Advisory Gp .• 1
1. USAFE I
(1) HEADQUARTERS
(a) DOA. . . . . .
(b) DOLO .•.
•
•
•
•
1
1
I
(c) DOO. ~ . . . . . • • • . 1
(d) XDC • . • • .
(2) AIR FORCES
• • 1
I
(a) 3AF (DO) . . .
(b) 16Af.(DO) ..
( c) 17AF (IN ) •
• • 2
. . . • • . 1
. . • . 1
I
(3) WINGS
(a) 36TFW(DCOID) . . • 1
I
(b) 50TFW(DOA) . . • . 1
(c) 20TFW(DOI) .
(d) 81TRW{DCOI) ..
(e) 401TFW(DCOI) ..
•
. •
• .
1
1
1
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(f) 513TAW(OOI). • 1
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I UNCLASSIFIED _
I 5. MILITARY DEPARTMENTS, UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS, AND JOINT STAFFS

I a.
b.
c.
COMUSJAPAN . . . . . . • .
CINCPAC (SAG). . . • . • •
CINCPAC (J301) . . . . . .
. • •
• • • •
. • • • •
• • • •
• • • • • •
•
1
1
1
d. CINCPACFLT {Code 321).,. • . • . • .•••••• 1
I e.
f.
COMUSKOREA (ATTN: J-3). •
COMUSMACTHAI . .
. • • .
. • • • • . • • • •
1
1
g. COMUSMACV (TSCO) . . . . . • . • . • • • • 1
I h.
, i.
COMUSTDC {J 3) • .
USCINCEUR (ECJB)
. . • . . . . • • • • • • •
. • • • . • • • •
1
1
j. USCINCSO (DCC) . . . . • . • • . • • 1
I k.
1.
m.
CINCLANT (N31) • . . . . . . . • • . . . •
CHIEF, NAVAL OPERATIONS . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • • • • • • •
COMMANDANT, MARINE CORPS (ABQ) . . .•••
• • 1
1
1
n. CINCONAD (CHSV-M). . . . . . . • • ••••• 1
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p.
DEPARTMENT OF"THE ARMY (TAGO). •
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (J3RR&A) .
. • • •
. • • .
• •••.•
• •
1
1
q. JSTPS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . • 1
I r. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (OASD/SA) . • . •
s. CINCSTRIKE (STRJ-3). . . . . . . • • . . .
t. CINCAL (HIST). . . . . . . . . .
• .•••••••
. • • . • • • . .
• . • • • • • •
1
1
1
u. MAAG-CHINA/AF Section (MGAF-0) . . • . . • • • • • • • • . 1
I v. HQ ALLIED FORCES NORTHERN EUROPE (U.S.S DOCUMENTS OFFICE) ••••
w. USMACV (MACJ031) • . . . . • . • •
1
1
x. AFAG (THAILAND) . . . . . • • . . . • • • . • . . • . • • • • • • 1
I 6. SCHOOLS

I a.
b.
c.
Senior
Senior
Senior
USAF
USAF
USAF
Representative, National War College • • • •
Representative, Armed Forces Staff College •
Rep, Industrial College of the Armed Forces •••••
•
•
1
1
1
d. Senior USAF Representative, Naval Amphibious School. • 1
I e.
f.
Senior
Senior
USAF
USAF
Rep, U.S. Marine Corps Education Center. .
Representative, U.S. Naval War College . • • . •
1
1
g. Senior USAF Representative, U.S. Army War College. . • . • 1
I h.
i.
Senior
Senior
USAF
USAF
Rep, U.S. Army C&G Staff College :· • • • • •
Representative, U.S. Army Infantry School.
• 1
l
j. Senior USAF Rep, U.S. Army JFK Center for Special Warfare •••• 1
k. Senior USAF Representative, U.S. Army Field Artillery School •• l
I 1. Senior USAF Representative, U.S. Liaison Office • . • • • • • • • l
7. SPECIAL
I a. The RAND Corporation . . . . .••• .. • 1
b. U.S. Air Attache, Vientiane •. . . . • . 1
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c. Aerospace Rescue & Recovery Training Center . . . • 1
d.
e.
f.
3rd Air Rescue and Recovery Group. .
40th Air Rescue and Recovery Wing . .
. •••
.
41st Air Rescue and Recovery Wing . . . . . • . . . . . •
• • 1
. . . 1
• . 1
I
g. National Search and Rescue School •. . . . . . . . . . .
h. PACAF Jungle Survival School . . . . . .
. . . 1
. . . 1 I
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3~ AEROSPACE RESCUE & RECOVERY GROVP
I X

I I.IN,..,
-
A,.,.,c, .. n
~~·-· ~~~d ~~·· .

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ORGANIZATIONAL EMBLEM: 3d AEROSPACE RESCUE AND RECOVERY GROUP I
I
SIGNIFICANCE: The emblem is symbolic of the Group. The color blue
alludes to the sky, the primary theater of Air Force operations, and I
yellow to the excellenc~ of Air Force personnel in assigned duties.
The globe represents worldwide search, rescue and recovery operations
I
performed by the Groap. The cross depicts location of distressed per- I
sonnel or required rescue operations. The lightning bolt denotes
adversity (hostile forces or elements) which must be overcome to effect I
successful SAR operations and the arrow the response of ·the Group's
forces to all emergencies.
I
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MOTTO: PER ADVERSA AD EREPTIONEM - Through Adversity to the Rescue
I
BLAZON: On a shield of the sky proper, a sphere azure, rimmed and I
gridded or, superimposed in the southwest areas of the sphere a cross
and three lightning bolt gules, a lightning flash bendwise argent, I
pierced by an arrow vert, all within a diminished bordure or.
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I ·POLICY OF AEROSPACE RESUCE AND RECOVERY

I Air Rescue Service exists as an integral part of the

military air power of the United States; its primary mission

I is the support of the Air Force in being upon implementation.

of the emergency war plan.
I The thoughts and efforts of every man in Air Rescue Service
I must be directed toward creating an organization better equipped
and trained to carry out the recovery of irreplaceable airmen in
I the least possible time under combat conditions.

I
CODE OF AN AIR RESCUE MAN
I
It is my duty, as a member of the Air Rescue Service, to
I save life and to aid the injured.

I I will be prepared at all times to perform my assigned

duties quickly and efficiently, placing these duties before per-
I sonal desires and comforts.

I These things I do that others may live.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS I
FOREWORD • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • XV
I
CHAPTER I - MISSION AND ORGANIZATION I
MISSION • ~......................................... 1
ORGANIZATION • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2
I
CHAPTER II - SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT
I
SYSTEMS • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
EQUIPMENT • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
6
9
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CHAPTER I I I - PERSONNEL
'
I
MANNING ••••••••••••••••••••••••• ~ •••••••••••••••••• 30
TRAINING •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 32
AWARDS AND DECORATIONS •...••••••.•••..•..••••••••• 38
CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM ..•.•••.••••.•.••.••••••••••••• 39
I
CHAPTER IV - OPERATIONS I
TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES •.•••.....•.•.••.•..•••.•••• 42
ACCOMPLISHMENTS ..•..•.•.•••..••.•••..••.•.•••.••.. 56
LOSSES • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 70
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CHAPTER V - VIETNAMIZATION
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT ••.•...••..•.••.•••••••••••• 73
I
CURRENT ACTIVITIES •••••.•.•.•••.•.••.••.••••.•.••• 77
FOOTNOTES
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CHAPTER
CHAPTER
I • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 82
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CHAPTER I I I ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••. 84
CHAPTER
CHAPTER
IV. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 85
V • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 86 I
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I APPENDICES
A--- SUMMARY OF SAR DEVELOPMENT AND ACTIVITIES IN SEA ••••• 87
B --- RESCUE PROGRESS REPORTS .•.••••.•••.••••••••••.••••••• 106
I GLOSSARY ........................................................ 113
I FIGURES Follows Page
1 --- 3 ARRGp Organizational Structure ••••••••••••••••••••• 2
2 --- 3 ARRGp Organizational Units ....••••••••••••••••••••• 4
I 3
4
--- SAR A1ert Posture . • • • • • . • •.• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .. • • • • • • • •
--- A-1 SPAD Configuration •••••.•..••••••••••••••.•.•••••
46
54
5 --- A-1 SANDY Configuration .••.•••••••••••••••••••••••••• 54
I 6 --- A-1 RESCAP Configuration ••.••.••.•••••••••••••••••••• 54
TABLES Follows Page
I 1 --- 3 ARRGp Combat Saves ....•................•.•.....•.•.
2 --- 3 ARRGp Non-Combat Saves •••••••••••••••••••• , •••••••• 58
58
3 --- 3 ARRGp Total Saves • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • •.• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 60
I 4 ---Aircraft Losses .....................................• 60
A.l ---SEA SAR Directors ...•..........•...........•.......•. 105
A.2 --- 3 ARRGp Personnel Data •••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 105
I A.3 --- 3 ARRGp Aircraft Data ••••••••••.•••••••.••••••••••••• 105

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 ·UNCLASsi:FIED .· I
FOREWORD
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This report represents the fifth study by the Southeast Asia CHECO
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office of Search and Rescue operations, and the fourth of a chronological
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series beginning with the early efforts to reestablish a combat SAR capa-
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bility in 1961. In consideration of the current United States foreign policy
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towards disengagement in the SEA conflict, it was felt that this may be
the last report of this series. In view of this an effort was expended I
to (1) include those aspects considered important to a complete under-
standing of the problems as well as the accomplishments of SAR that were
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not previously covered and (2) present a summary of the significant develop-
ments and activities which have occurred to provide the .reader with a single
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documentary reference of the highlights of the SEA SAR mission. I
While principal emphasis was placed on the July 1969 through December I
1970 period, where it was felt that suitable background information was not
otherwise available, such was i'ncluded for the purpose of presenting a I
more understandable view of d~velopments occurring during the principal
eighteen-month period. By the same rationale, the particular section on
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Mission and Organization an4 other subject material such as Maintenance
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and Safety were not accorded less attention due to any consideration of
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their lesser importance, but because they were adequately covered previous- I
ly, or were felt to be the subject matter of other reports.
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In view of the exte,nt of information presented inthe report, the
author had to rely on the invaluable assistance of many individuals. In I
XV I
UNCLASSIFIED ·I
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 UNCLASSI·FIE~ ·

addition to the personnel of the 3 ARRGp headquarters staff and individual

squadrons, who accorded the author unlimited support throughout the prep-
aration of the report, particular acknowledgment is extended
' to the Office
of the Historian, Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Services Headquarters.

xvi

UNCLASSIFIED
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I CHAPTER I
MISSION AND ORGANIZATION
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MISSION
I The 3d Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group is organized and equipped
I to provide a Search and Rescue (SAR) Capability in Southeast Asia. Its
mission is to: Command and control all USAF Aerospace Rescue and Recovery

I forces in the Southeast Asia Sub-Region; operate a Joint Rescue Coordina-

tion Center (JRCC} and Sub-Regional Rescue Coordination Centers established
I to control and direct the Rescue/Recovery mission in Southeast Asia.

I Implementation of this mission by the Commander, 3d Aerospace

Rescue and Recovery Group (3 ARRGp), who served on the 7th Air Force (7AF)
I staff as Director of Aerospace Rescue (DSR) was exercised through the
following functions.
I
1. Advised the Commander, 7AF on the matters pertaining to
I rescue and recovery requirements and procedures.
2. Coordinated on matters pertaining to all ARRS activities,
I requirements and responsibilities in SEA.
3. Exercised operational control of all rescue forces in SEA
in accordance with policies established by the Commander,
I 7AF and/or Commander, 41st Aerospace Rescue and Recovery
Wing (41 ARRWg).

I 4. Kept the Commander, 41 ARRWg, informed of SAR require-

ments and all planned or conducted SAR operations.

I 5. Reported directly to the Commander, 41 ARRWg, on all com-

mand and administrative matters.

I 1

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ORGANIZATION
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Although the 3 ARRGp was operationally controlled by 7AF, its parent
command organization was the 41 ARRWg, located at Hickam Air Force Base, I
to which it reported on command and administrative matters. Through the
41 ARRWg, the 3 ARRGp exercised its local area responsibilities to the ARRS
I
of the Military Airlift Command (MAC). Figure 1 indicates the organizational I
structure of the 3 ARRGp as it existed at the close of 1970.

The SAR mission in SEA was executed by the 3 ARRGp, with headquarters
I
at Tan Son Nhut Airfield, Republic of Vietnam (RVN). To implement this I
mission the 3 ARRGp was composed of four Aerospace Rescue and Recovery
Squadrons (ARRSqs), operating from various locations within the 7AF area I
of operations, the land mass of SEA and adjacent territorial waters con-
sisting of the Saigon, Bangkok and Rangoon Flight Information Regions
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(FIRs).
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Overall command and control of these mission operations were exercised
from the Joint Rescue Coordi~ation Center (JRCC), collocated with the 7AF
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Command Center. Individual SAR missions were often allocated for direct I
control to either of the associated Rescue Coordination Centers (RCCs),
Operating Locations (Ols) OL-A located at Son Tra Air Base, RVN, and OL-B I
at Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB), when operations fell within
their respective areas.
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The four squadrons of the 3 ARRGp were establish,ed on the basis of
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SAR operational functions as follows: The 37 ARRSq at Da Nang AB was

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2
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• C8NPIBINYIAL I
------------------ ~Nr IUC:ii I lAC

l- ARRS
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l PACAF

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41st ARRWg
l
7th AIR FORCE
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• (

L----------- 3rd ARRGp ...-

~

..,.....

:---- ----------- --r -----------;------:

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Ci) ~
c:: l
::::0
m
- ~- ~---
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OL-A RCC .
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~
..._I
--.- JRCC
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L..
~ ...... OL-8 RCC
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l
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~
~~.------~-----------~---------------------~ • (
L--------,
I ~--------------~
l

37th ARRSq I I 38th ARRSq 39th ARRSq . 40th ARRSq - DET

40 I
ARRS

4 ~ OPERATIONAL CONTROL FUNCTIONS

- - - ADMINISTRATIVE COMMAND CHANNELS
3rd ARRGp ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
. . oaacrnr-a,ITlA I
~· ruass:escu
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 .. C8NF181NTI·A 1 a .,.
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I generally responsible for recovery operations in the Gulf of Tonkin,
South Vietnam and the southern and eastern portions of North Vietnam and
I Cambodia. The 40 ARRSq, with headquarters at Udorn RTAFB and a detach-

I· ment at Nakhon Phanom RTAFB, was generally responsible for recovery opera-
tions in Thailand, Laos and the western and northern sections of North
I Vietnam. Depending on availability of resources at any given time, it was
not unusual to have an overlapping of operational areas, with location of
I the available aircraft with the shortest to site reaction time normally

I being the determining assignment criterion. The 38 ARRSq with Headquarters

at Tan Son Nhut Airfield was responsible for LBR operations. With its
I complement of twenty-four HH-43s at ten major USAF utilized bases through-
out RVN and Thailand, it was responsible for nonnally non-hostile re.covery
I operations within approximately seventy-five miles of home bases. The 39

I ARRSq at Cam Ranh AB, RVN, employing eleven HC-130Ps, was responsible for
the airborne mission control activities for all of SEA~

I In addition to these dedicated USAF SAR units, the 3 ARRGp acting for

I the Commander, 7AF, as SAR Coordinator for SEA, exercised operational direc-
tion over any other available FWF resources with a capability of SAR parti-
I cipation or support. This responsibility and extension of the Group mission
was only exercised, however, during emergency situations to supplement the
I inherent USAF capability in accordance with Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
1/
I direction for interservice support of SAR operations.-

Changes in the organizational structure of the SAR forces during this

I reporting period generally reflected the reduction in operations which

I 3

I e8NFIBENTIAL ,.
 ·u E8NFIDINTI.J-L ·.· ta
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occurred. A total of four units were· inactivated - Detachments (Dets)
2/
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2, 8, 10, and 11 of the 38 ARRSq previously located at Takhli RTAFB-
3/ 4/ 5/
and Cam Ranh AB-; Binh Tuy AB,- and Tuy Hoa AB,- in RVN respectively. I
Additionally Det 9, 38 ARRSq was relocated from Pleiku AB, RVN, to Nakhon
6/ . ·I
Phanom RTAFB- and the 39 ARRSq was relocated from Tuy Hoa AB to Cam Ranh
71
AB, RVN.- I
At the close of calendar year 1970, the organizational structure of
I
SAR forces in SEA consisted of the following units and subordinate elements
at the locations indicated. Figure 2 depicts these organizational components I
geographically.
I
Headquarters, 3 ARRGp Tan Son Nhut Afld, RVN
JRCC Tan Son Nhut Afld, RVN I
OL-A Son Tra AB, RVN
OL-B Udorn RTAFB, Thailand
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Headquarters, 37 ARRSq Da Nang AB, RVN
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Headquarters, 38 ARRSq Tan Son Nhut Afld, RVN
Det 1, 38 ARRSq Phan Rang AB, RVN I
Det 3, 38 ARRSq Ubon RTAFB, Thailand
Det 4, 38 ARRSq Korat RTAFB, Thailand
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Det 5, 38 ARRSq Udorn RTAFB, Thailand
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Det 6, 38 ARRSq Bien Hoa AB, RVN
Det 7, 38 ARRSq Da Nang AB, RVN I
Det 9, 38 ARRSq Nakhon Phanom RTAFB, Thailand
Det 12, 38 ARRSq U-Tapao RTNA, Thailand I
4 I
... 'ON Fl DiNT Ia' I~ , I
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LAOS
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I THM.AND

UION •
I Dlfi.. ARRS

I lit BANGKOK

SOUTH
VIET
CAMBODIA NMi

I 1l PIIIOM
PIIIH

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I T~JeNHUT
3 ARWG
JRCC
I 38ARRS
DET 14,38ARRS

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.I
I Oet 13, 38 ARRSq Phu Cat AB, RYN
Det 14, 38 ARRSq
I Hea.dE:Juarters, 39 ARRSq
Tan Son Nhut Afld, RVN

Cam Ranh AB , RVK

I Headquarters, 40 ARRSq Udorn RTAFB, Thailand

Det 1 , 40 ARRSq K.akhon Phanom RTAFB, Than and

I In addition to these establi:shed organizational elements, the 3 ARRGp

I mainta.ined operations at three Forward Operating Locations (FOls). The

37 ARRSq maintained an alert force at Bie.n Hoa AB, SVN, the 39 ARRSq main-
I tained a unit at Udorn RTAFB and the 40 AARSq had a unit at Ubon RTAFB.

I Utilization of these FOLs is covered in detail in Chapter IV, Operations.

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CHAPTER II I
SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT
I.
SYSTEMS

The most significant development, in tenns of advancement, which

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occurred during this reporting period was the culmination of ARRS Programming I
Plan 69-1 to provide two full squadrons of HH-53 Super Jolly Greens or
BUFFs as they were known in SEA--for Big Ugly Friendly Fellows, as one I
version had it. This marked the completion of a series of development
plans initiated several years before and originally implemented under
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3 ARRGp Plan I in 1967 and superseded 'by ARRS Programming Plan 589 in I
the summer of 1968. This action, delayed by over a year beyond its original
target date for a variety of reasons, provided the SAR force with the quality I
and quantity of assigned aircraft which it needed, but had lacked previously
for so long that the success level of SAR efforts in SEA was as high as
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it was can only be attributed to the ingenuity of SAR person.nel over the
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years in utilizing equipment ill suited for the demands placed upon it. The
following comments outline the situation as it existed during the period
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preceding the ·time frame covered by this report, and the impact of accession
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of the HH-53s on the situation.
§I I
The build-up of ACR helicopters and the develop-
ment of an effective ACR capability in the combat
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environment of SEA was a sloo, Laborious process.
The first seven HH-3Es arrived-in the second
quarter of CY 66 and were based at Udorn replac-
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ing the si:x: CH-3Cs on loan from TAC. A year
later, the total number had risen to 16, nine I
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of which were based at Da Nang. This was a
year of very extensive tacticaZ air operations
I against North Vietnam and a period of heavy
Zosses due to the intense resistance put ·
forth by enemy defenses. It was a period
I during which the disparity between aircrew
rescue requirements, as a function of the
number of tactiaaZ aircraft Zosses over NVN, and
out-country resaue capabiZity in terms of ACR
I aircraft avaiZabZe was the widest for the entire
war • . • • Not unti Z a year after the taaticaZ
aircraft Zosses had reached their peak in 1967
I did .the resaue forces reaah their prog~ed
ZeveZ.

I WhiZe the Zaak of sufficient ACR aircraft was the

major obstaaZe to fuZfiZZing the totaZ resaue
requirement • . • mere numbers of resaue aircraft
I couZd not, of course, cZose the gap between capa-
biZities and requirements. Other factors not as
readiZy quantifiabZe inaZuded: Umited range,
I speed and endurance of the resaue force; vuZnera-
bi Zi ty; Zack of capabi U ty in weather and darkness;
Zimitations in communications between resaue force
and survivor; .inabiZity of survivor to evade
I capture; ineffective suppression of enemy resistance
during rescue operations. In due time, however, as
these probZems were recognized through experience,
I the gap between capabiZities and requirements was
significantLy narrowed. The range and endurance
probZem, for exampZe, was virtuaZZy eZiminated with
I the advent of air refueZing in mid-CY 67. Speed
was improved when the HH-53 became avaiZabZe.
VuZnerabiZity, ZargeZy a function of speed, wiZZ
aZways confound the rescueman, especiaZZy whiZe
I hovering over the survivor. Weather and darkness
can become assets rather than ZiabiZities if and
when systems are deveZoped which permit effective
I rescue operations in these environments. PersonaZ
radios, by far the most important item of aircrew
survivaZ equipment, had been a source of untoZd
exasperation for survivors when weak batteries,
I broken antennas, unwanted voZume or Zaak of needed
channeZ seZect~on resuZted in unsuccessfuZ rescue
attempts.
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Six HH-53 helicopters • • . brought to SEA the last I
significant increment of aircrew rescue improvement
to date • . • • This aircraft featured additional
speed, range and endurance, greater lifting power
at extreme altitudes and temperatures, better
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defensive ~ament, and more internal space. It
was not the ultimate, by any means, but it did
provide a measure of enhancement over the HH-3E.
I
At the close of 1970 the 3 ARRGp possessed a total of twenty-one HH-53s I
assigned as follows: 37 ARRSq - nine HH-53Cs, 40 ARRSq - eight HH-53Cs
and four of the surviving original six HH-53Bs. Completion of trans-
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forming the 40 ARRSq to an all BUFF configuration, begun in September
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1967, was accomplished in February 1970. The last five HH-3Es of Det
1, 40 ARRSq were then transferred to the 37 ARRSq. Conversion of the 37 I
ARRSq to full HH~53C configuration, begun in April 1970 was completed the
following October. The last of the HH-3Es were transferred from the 37
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ARRSq inventory in December.
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In terms of regression, the most significant item was the depletion
of the A-lE rescue escort (RESCORT) force inventory.
I
The following comments by Colonel Sohle, Commander of the 3 ARRGp, I
commenting on principal considerations of his tour, reflect the feelings
9/
of SAR personnel regarding both of these items.-
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The two most significant aspects of my tour, with
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regards to changes taking place in SAR facilities, are
the diminishing number of A-lEs available for SAR and
the replacement of the HH-3Es by the HH-53s. The attri- I
tion of the Als, and the turnover of many to the VNAF,
presents a serious problem to SAR efforts in SEA. There
is presently no other aircraft available with the speed,
man.euverabi li ty and ordnance carrying characteristics to
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I replaae it and the vital role it haa played in the
BAR program. It 'a possible the A-7 may provide a
I limited solution~ or use of heliaopter gunships
may prove feasible~ but nothing that I know of aan
ever do the job as well as the A-la have. On the
brighter aide~ the phase out of the older Jolly
I Greens for an all BUFF forae has aontributed
greatZ.y to an improved SAR posture here. It 's
too bad we didn't have them years ago, but con-
I sidering what they had to work with, I think the
men have done a magnificent job over the years.

I EQUIPMENT

I During this reporting period the Southeast Asia Operational Require-

ment (SEAOR) system was reviewed and later discontinued. Approximately
half of the outstanding SEAOR's in July of 1969 were cancelled. The
remaining programs approved for further development during the first
half of CY 1970 were converted under revisions of AFR 57-1, to the Combat
Required Operational Capabilities (Combat ROC) program {su.ccessor to
SEAOR), Command ROC's or regular Class V Modifications status. The
following infonnation reflects the action taken on the equipment develop-
ment programs of particular interest to SAR operations during. this reporting
period.

SEAOR #4 - Airborne Ground Fire Warning Device. The original SEAOR was
converted to PACAF Command ROC 33-68. Attempts to satisfy tnis require-
ment were unsuccessful. Tests revealed the equipment developed was
incapable of distinguishing between hostile ground fire and friendly
airborne weapons. During this reporting period, the requirement was
cancelled unfulfilled.

9
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SEAOR #11 - Miniature Aircrew Survival Radio. This UHF conmunication I
requirement was completed after problems, experienced during the early
portion of this reporting period, with battery leakage and short trans-
I
mission life, were modified and corrected. All SEA aircrew members were I
equipped with either the ACR RT-10 or AN/URC-64, the former single channel
units being phased out by the end of 1970, in favor of the four channel I
64s as they became available. Operational characteristics of this item
10/
are described as follows:--
I
This solid state survival. radio provides broadband I
frequency perfo~ance (225 to 285 MHZ) and gives the
user four channels with 1200 alternatives. As
frequencies are compromised in combat~ they may be
changed by instaZ.Z.ation of new crystals. The radio
I
wiZ.Z. provide a power output of 200 miZ.Z.iwatts across
the entire frequency band~ through the systems
matching network. AdditionaZ.Z.y~ the radio was a two
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way voice and beacon capability~ an integral. battery~
quick frequency change capability and a visual. indica-
tion of battery serviceability and transmitter output. I
SEAOR #17V - 622A FM Radio. This requirement, carried as a SEAOR (Class I
V Modification, was initiated to permit the SAR forces to communicate
during SAR missions with other ground and air elements of the Army, Navy,
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and Marine Corps, some of which employ FM exclusively. As an interim
measure to elevate this requirement, established in 1966, 3 ARRGp air-
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craft and coordination centers had begged and borrowed a limited number I
of AN/PRC-25 FM tunable portable radios from 1967 until the requirement
was completed early in this reporting period. I
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I SEAOR #27- Foliage Penetrating Distress Signal. This requirement was

I established on 4 December 1965. On 16 September 1969 the status was

reported as being funded for R&D activities, but that no production funds
11/
I had been identified for continuation of the program for hardware.--
Following later review of SEAOR programs during 1970, this requirement
I was also cancelled unfulfilled.

I SEAOR #46 - Rescue Direction Finding and Ranging System. This require-
ment was formally established on 3 April 1966 to overcome then current
I problems associated with locating and identifying downed aircrew members

I in minimum time. Principal problem areas included the following:

a. Current equipment did not have the capability of providing

I adequate location information when more than one ground locator beacon

I was operating in the immediate area of search. This situation caused a

serious degradation of signal intelligence, thus hampering rescue efforts.
I b. Current equipment required a search pattern or positive ground

I signal, such as a smoke flare, to pinpoint the position of the aircrewmen;

thus exposing both the rescue craft and the man to enemy action.
I c. Heavy voice traffic caused by radio failure on operational
channels and airborne emergencies on the rescue frequency at times
seriously hampered rescue attempts requiring the use of new beacon
frequencies, relatively free from other traffic.

11
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d. Adverse jungle and climatic conditions limited the useful range I
of available equipment.
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During the latter half of CY 69 the AN/ARD-19 was modified in an attempt
to satisfy this requirement providing a unit to monitor four channels
I
with a capability to process six signals per channel. Deficiencies of
this equipment included signal ambiguity and inadequate range capability.
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The AN/ARD-19 program was later terminated and SEAOR #46 cancelled with the I
original requirement to be transferred to a PACAF Command ROC. TAC later
requested that MAC establish the Command ROC as a long term requirement. I
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At the close of this reporting period, the overall requirement remained

unfilfilled. The portion of the requirement covered in item c, above,
I
was partially alleviated in completion of SEAOR #11 with the AN/URC-64 radio I
providing the downed airman with selection of one df three alternate fre-
quencies in addition to the emergency frequency. I
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SEAOR #58 - Pararescue Transceiver Helmet. The detailed history of this I
program represents an interesting, and unfortunately not untypical example
of the problems of response time which were experienced in developing new
I
equipment to meet SAR requirements in SEA. In 1964, the ARS submitted
in a MAC Qualitative Operational Requirement (QOR) the request for develop-
I
ment and procurement of an integral helmet mounted radio transmitter/ I
receiver for use by pararescue personnel to permit continuous contact with
the aircraft commander during a mission. On 2-4 June 1965 this require- I
ment was reviewed at a Hq, USAF SEA conference. On 28 September, SEAOR
I
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58-FY-67 was submitted re-establishing the requirement. Following another

two and a half years of reviews, approvals contract negotiations and
development,

forma~ testing began in Apri~ 1969. Aftez> appro:x:i-

mateZy 1 month, six of the seven test items expez>-
ienced faiZures of the audio cabZes. AZZ test
articZes wez>e z>eturned to ASD in May 1969 foz>
z>epaiz>/modification. In Novembez> 1969, the test
artic~es, with z>edesign (sic) audio cabZes, wez>e
z>eturned to ARBS and opez>ationaZ testing was z>esumed.
In Januaz>y 19?0, testing was again deZayed due to
unacceptabZe backgz>ound noise ZeveZa within the
z>eceivez>/earphones. 12/ ASD deveZoped and impZe-
mented hardware changes to cowect the pz>obZem. On
16 March 19?0, a~Z teat objectives had been
demona.tmted with the exception of a jungZe environ-
ment evaLuation. Howevez>, testing was te!'ITiinated
since it was feLt that sufficient data had been
coZZected to adequateZy evaZuate the item. It
was z>ecommended that the PRC-8? be appz>oved foz>
pz>oduction. The pz>oduction articZe must incoz>-
poz>ate the numez>ous z>ecommended modifications
outZined in pamgz>aph ?.* Fiz>at article acceptance
of the pz>oduction modeL by MAC/ARBS pez>sonneZ ia .
z>equiz>ed to verify that adequate co!'!'ective actions
wez>e taken. '&

One of the problems attendant in the jungle environment, amplified

when it was also a combat environment for which the item was ostensibly
developed, was that the pararescueman found himself in isolation more
dangerous than he was in without the helmet. While he could now conununicate
with the aircraft, the design of the helmet precluded his hearing any of

I *Paragraph 7 listed eighteen specific items requiring corrective action

and three additional recommended actions.

13

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the sounds in his immediate vicinity, even hostile fire, which was an I
extremely undesirable situation from the standpoint of enhancing
longevity.
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When the SEAOR program was revised the requirement became Combat I
ROC 4-70. In August of 1970, the CSAF, relating that latest estimates
placed program costs at $1,200,000 stated there would be no further
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action taken to procure this item without OSD approval.-- This I
message then requested CINCPACAF and MAC provide a current assessment
and recommendations pertaining to the PRC-87 requirement. PACAF--
15/
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and MAC cited the continuing valid requirement for the item and
strongly recommended procurement upon correction of deficiencies.
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In November 1970, CSAF updated information on this requirement to I
indicate logistical support and increased costs problems and requested
reevaluation of the program.
J1j .
At the close of this reporting period, I
over six years after establishing the requirement, the SAR forces were
still waiting, albeit somewhat skeptically, for this item of equipment.
I
SEAOR #97V - HH-3/HH-53 Doppler Navigation Modifications. Following the I
request from 3 ARRGp in June 1967 this class V Modification was established
in July based on the following requirement as outlined.in the SEAOR
I
!§/
proposal. I
The AN/APN-1?5(V) Doppler system instaUed in the
HH-3E and HH-53B heliaopter uses the C-8046 aontrol I
indiaator. This indiaator gives destination and
present position indiaations in natural mileage
readouts. The mileage readouts are related to an I
14 I
I
 arbitrary square grid system. This system requires
a grid overlay or predrawn mileage grid on all fZight
maps for flight planning and in-fZight programming
purposes. Excessive time is spent on rescue missions
converting longitude and latitude coordinates to the
Doppler mileage grid coordinates. Maps with the
Doppler mileage grid lines add confusion to a map
already covered with important information and magni-
fies the possibility of navigational error. A new
Dopp Zer contra l indicator is required that accepts
destination programming and computes present position
in latitude and longitude coordinates.

This requirement was also among those cancelled unfilfilled by PACAF in

[

July 1969, during review and revision of the overall SEAOR program.

SEAOR #102 - Automatic Integral Weight and Balance System. This item
was initiated as a result of the requirement where ARRS helicopters
often air evacuated personnel and removed cargo of unknown weights. These
helicopters often operated from unprepared and remote locations with limited
or no support facilities. Weighing devices were not normally available
and the pilot had to estimate weight of the load. Accidents occurred
because helicopters were loaded with heavier cargo than the pilot realized.
A load and center of gravity measuring device to provide direct cockpit
readout of gross weight and center of gravity was therefore requested
to insure safe operations. This requirement was among those cancelled
early in the reporting period.
I
SEAOR #102V - Lightweight Armor for HH-3E/HH-43B/F. This requirement
established on 11 August 1967 as a class V Modification was initiated
to provide crew and aircraft protection from .30 caliber armor piercing
(AP) bullets as a minimum and preferably from .50 caliber APs. After

15
 I
two years of conducting various studies of this problem, no practical I
solution was found that could provide the necessary protection without
imposing an unacceptable weight penalty. In Augus,t of 1969, 7 AF
I
requested cancellation of the outstanding SEAOR and conversion of the
I
requirement to a Command (PACAF or MAC) ROC as a long term requirement.

SEAOR #111 - Aircraft Fuel Cell Explosion Suppression. This requirement

I
I

was established as a general SEA aircraft requirement with the HH-3Es I

and HH-53Bs assigned priorities of three and four respectively of the
fifteen aircraft considered. The HH~43s and HC-130s were later included I
in the SEAOR coverage. Action to complete this requirement item was
initiated in December 1967 on the HH-53Bs and was finally fulfilled in
I
April 1970 by final completion of foam kit modification to all in-theater I
SAR aircraft.

SEAOR #114 - Night Recovery System. This represented one of the more
I
significant areas of improvements evaluated for enhancing SAR operations I
during this period. The following review describes the background of
the program and its status during the early portion of this reporting I
19/
period.--
I
SEAOR 114, dated 3 April 196?, stated'the aUnost
total deficiency of the present recovery system to
effect a recovery at night and during low visibility
I
conditions, and the need for an integrated night
search and rescue system to enable rescue heli-
copters (HH-53s) to search for, locate and recover
downed airmen at night and during low visibility
I
conditions.
I
16
I
I
The SEAOR and first Best Preliminary Estimate (BPE)~
dated 24 April 1967~ calZed for installation of the
proposed Night Recovery System in the then contracted
Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service (ARRS) buy of
eight (8) HH-53Bs. HOLJever~ a review of a Sikorsky
Aircraft proposal for a night recovery system
indicated an 'excessive leadtime requirement for the
proposed system~ which would result in an unaccept-
able delay of a night rescue aapability in Southeast
Asia (SEA).

On 5 March 1968 a Modification Program D~rective was

issued to provide a Limited Night Recovety capability
to SEA HH-53Bs. The operational objectives for the
aircraft to be modified were to be satisfied by
installation of the following equipment: ·
1. A passive night system, Low Light Level Television
(LLLTV) with displays for the pilot and copilot.
2. An automatic hover and approach coupler to include
the pararesaueman cabin trim control.
3. Two {2) hand held modified starlight scopes and
swivel mounts {since revised to one (1) pintZe mounted
Direct Viewing Device (DVD) for pararesaueman use).
4. Landing light filters. (Since revised to replace-
ment of the hover lights with infrared (IR) lights.')
5. An additional requirement~ because of cabin door
space limitations, brought about by installation of the
DVV, has since been initiated for removal of the cabin
door mini gun and its substitution with a M-60 maahine
gun. For day operations, when the DVD is not required~
1

the capability to reinstall the mini gun is available.

Two HH-53Bs have been modified to the LNRS configura-
tion and are aurrently being utilized by ARRS for
OT&E ·testing and combat aircrew training.
Five additional HH-53Bs will be modified in SEA~ the
first to be completed in January 1970 and the remain-
ing at the rate of one every 30 days thereafter. The
eighth HH-53B was lost in combat.
The LNRS will increase rescue effectiveness by (a) allow-
ing a rescue attempt to continue from daylight into
darkness, (b) allOLJing a night rescue/recovery attempt

17
 to be initiated if no adverse weather aonditions
exist enroute to the resaue.

The LNRS has no terrain following/terrain avoidanae

(TF/TA) aapability and will not allow penetration
of areas where adverse weather aonditions exist.

One of the HH-53Bs of the 40 ARRSq was modified starting on 18

November 1969 for limited field tests. Due to recurring component
malfunctions and generally unreliable test results, the decision was
made to suspend proposed modification of additional SEA aircraft.
I
Problems encountered were mainly in the automatic approach and hover I
coupler functional areas of the Automatic Flight Control System {AFCS).
As reported in mid 1970 the following represented the status of the I
20/
Night Recovery System {NRS) program at that time.---
I
The HH-53 Night Reaovery System, PAVE STAR, has been
aanaelled due to a laak of additional funds required
to aomp lete the program. Efforts are being made to I
utilize aomponents and materials obtained from PAVE
STAR with the ultimate objeat being to develop an
adverse weather day/night reaovery aapability. An
improvement program for the Limited Night Reaovery
I
System (LNRS) has been direated by Headquarters,
USAF. This program has been identified as PAVE
IMP.
I
·At the close of this reporting period the requirement for the LNRS had I
been cancelled out as a SEAOR and was being followed up as Combat ROC
11-70. Under this program eight production aircraft were to incorporate
I
a LNRS which was to undergo an in-theater combat evaluation after delivery I
of six of the aircraft to the 40 ARRSq during the first half of CY 1971.
The long standing requirement for a Full Night Recovery System {FNRS}, I
18 I
I
I
I to increase capability for recovery to approximately the same conditions

I as prevailed for daylight SAR missions, was cancelled.

SEAOR #123 ·- DiscretionaryDescelit System. This requirement to provide

I an ejected air..crew member a delayed and controlled descent was established

I as a SEAOR on 19 April 1967 and was later converted to PACAF C01l111and

ROC 21-68. The original desired characteristics specified a capability
I of supporting 250 lbs, aloft for a minimum of 30 minutes at SOOO feet or
more AGL with option of ascending, descending, remaining stationary or
I moving laterally upon command. rn November 1970, the evaluation of Systems

I Analysis and Definition Study data was submitted to the Air Staff along
with recommendations of the Major Air Commands for further progranrning
21/
I decisions.-

I SEAOR #125 - Bullet Resistant Windshields and Side View Panels. This
requirement, established 17 April 1967, underwent several stages of
I proposals and studies, but could not be satisfactorily met within weight
increase limitations. During the review of the overall program this
I SEAOR item was cance 11 ed in December 1969 and was conv.erted to :MAC Conmand

I ROC 28-69.

I SEAOR #129V - Redundant Start System and Battery for HH-53. This item,
originated as a class V Modification SEAOR on 21 February 1968., was

I based on the following requirement.

I a. Helicopter operations in SEA dictate that they be used at forward

operating locations, sites and airfields not accessible to fixed wing
I 19

I
 I
aircraft. This in turn exposes the equipment to locations devoid of I
facilities, maintenance or parts availability. With the advent of
rescue operations in a combat environment in SEA using long range heavy
I
lift helicopters, the extended range and endurance has pressed the I
machine into an environment that requires the maximum operational capa-
bility. At forward operating bases utilized by the HH-53s to prosecute I
the search and rescue effort, it is essential that they not only have an
immediate response capability but a redundant system that can guarantee
I
engine start. In the present operational employment the aircraft would I
have to be abandoned and possibly lost to hostile forces if it could not
be evacuated during daylight hours. I
b. To fully utilize the HH-53 in a combat environment as a Search I
and Rescue Recovery Vehicle during hours of darkness and instrument
conditions, it is mandatory that a battery installation be provided for I
emergency operation in the event of generator failure. Additionally,
a redundant start system requiring electrical ignition will need battery
I
power. I
In February 1970, the requirement had still not be fulfilled and
I
PACAF requested ARRS reevaluate position on requirement. Following
review the outstanding SEAOR was converted to a MAC Command ROC. I
SEAOR #144 - Survival Kit and Rescue Force Gas Mask. This requirement I
was established on 31 January 1967 based on the following considerations:
(1) The US State Department and Hq MACV had granted approval for Rescue I
20 I
I
II
I Forces to employ riot control agents in specified areas of Southeast

I Asia.· The riot control agents then in use would incapacitate any
individual upon contact, thus necessitating the need for adequate air-

I crew protection proposed to be met by a Chemical, Biological, Radio-

logical (CBR) Mask to be developed especially for aircrews use. (2) The
I use of riot control agents against enemy forces near a downed airman greatly

I enhanced the versatility of our combat rescue and recovery forces. It

was imperative that the Air Rescue crewmembers also be provided adequate

I protection by a mask which would not keep the air crewmember from accom-
plishing his crew duties. Normal radio communications had to be main-
I tained by use of an integral microphone, and the mask worn with the
standard AF helmet. The use of riot control agents was considered so
I significant that the unsatisfactory and potentially dangerous M-24

I CBR Mask was used until a satisfactory mask could be developed. The
highest priority was requested for this SEAOR because the M-24 greatly
I restricted the helicopter pilot's peripheral vision in the critical
approach and hover modes of flight, which are largely dependent upon
I unrestricted peripheral vision.

I This program was developed in two phases as related items, one for

I SEA aircrews and one for the SARTF crews. The survival kit mask con-
sisted of a thin plastic hood with aronasal cup. The rescue forces

I mask was to be a modified version of the standard M-17 gas mask to

accommodate the headgear and communications requirements of the SAR
I personnel. At the close of the reporting period, the requirement was
I 22/
still involved in test evaluation.---
I 21

I
.... .I
SEAOR #147V - Voice Recorders for HC-130P Rescue Aircraft. Although the I
original statement of requirement for this equipment was initiated in
May of 1967, the class V Modification SEAOR was not established until
I
5 August 1968. The recorders were to provide a permanent record of I
all transmissions made and received by the Airborne Mission Commander
aircraft on HF, UHF, VHF (AM and FM) radios and the aircraft interphone I
during SAR missions. During the early portion of this reporting period,
the requirement was partially met on an interim basis through employment
I
of small portable cassette recorders. In October of 1969 a review of I
the program requirement indicated an estimated cost of over $600,000.
Based primarily on this escalated cost, the SEAOR was cancelled 1 May I
1970 based on findings of the PACAF SEAOR review of April.
I
In addition to these established SEAORs the 3 ARRGp submitted
requests for the following additional equipment development programs I
during this reporting period.
I
1.
Improved Armament System on HH-53 Helicopters. The requirement
23/
for this development program was outlined in 10 September 1969 as follows:--
I
The current armament configuration on BAR HH-53 heli-
copters does not provide adequate defensive firepower
I
during the most criticaZ phases of a BAR mission -
finaZ approach, extraction and departure. The current
system consists of three mini-guns - one each firing
I
from Zeft side, right side and rear ramp. During
hoist operation, the weapon on the right side is useZess -
due to congestion at the door and hoist cabZe interference.
I
In effect, the protective fire of the helicopter is
Zimited to a narrow fieZd of fire on the Zeft side and
a 160° arc from the rear during the most criticaZ phase I
22 I
I
I
I of the SAR mission. Recommended the attached SEAOR
proposal be approved and submitted for funding and
I impLementation.

Since SEAOR funds were near depletion at this time, 7AF forwarded the
I endorsed requirement to PACAF recofllllending development under MAC

I Command ROC, which action was followed up by PACAF recommendation to

MAC on 20 October 1969.
I 2. Visual Reference Light on SAR Helicopters. This requirement
24/
I was initiated on 11 September 1969. As stated:-

I Current aircrew recovery tactics errrp'Loy two heli-

copters; one f'Lying high~ the other lOUJ - at tree
top Zeve Z. Fi:ced wing ai:r>craft (A-ls) are also
I pa:Pt of the SAR task force. These elements
generalZy Zead or direct the helicopter force
to the incident area. In the event the area is
hostile~ these A-ls and frequentZy other tactical
I airr:!Nft in the area including high perfozrmance
vehicles provide suppression support against the
hostiZe fire areas. It is imperative for mission
I success and safety that all aircraft involved
continualLy maintain visual contact with rthe
ZOUJ helicopter. Recommend the attached SEAOR
proposal, be approved and submitted for design~
I funding and implementation.

I The requirement was not considered as a combat deficiency and fell within
the class V Modification SEAOR category, and since these funds had been
I exhausted, it was recOfllllended for consideration as a PACAF or MAC Command
ROC.
I
I
I 23

I
 &IE M AUt
I
3. Oxygen System for HH-53 Helicopters. On 15 November 1969 I
3 ARRGp initiated this requirement based on the following considera-
tions:
?2/ I
HH-53B/C helicopters aurrently do not have any oxygen
I
system. In prosecuting SAR missions in a high threat
area, it is often necessary to fly at 14-15,000 feet.
Exposure to physiological stress effects aircrew I
members efficiency. Recommend the attached SEAOR
proposal be approved and submitted for finding and
implementation. · I
On recommendations of 7AF, based on the same rationale as in the above I
two items, PACAF recommended on 7 January 1970 the program be followed
up as a MAC Command ROC. I
4. Crash Net Communications for HH-43 .Helicopters. This resulted I
from the inability of the Pedro LBR aircraft to communicate directly
with other elements of joint air-ground crash and rescue operations. I
Following the loss of an HH-438 while on a crash coverage mission at
U-Tapao RTN Airfield on 19 July 1969, the accident investigation board
I
. : '!:E)
listed the following factors as contributing causes to the loss. I
1. Miscellaneous Unsafe Condition in that lack of
compatible communication equipment precluded a I
coordinated, controlled resaue effort between the
he Zicopter and the on-scene crash/resaue agenaies.
2. Miscellaneous Unsafe Condition in that there is
I
unsufficient detailed guidance to insure effective
integration of the LBR into the host base crash/
resaue system; especially on bases involving
I
numerous AF Commands.
I
24
I
I
 J. Supervisory Personnel, in that the. Detachment Commander>
faiZed to effect the necessary coordihation and cross-
training to meet operational, requirements and the Commander~
JBth ARRSq faiZed to insure necessary coordination had been
compZeted prior to the unit becoming operational,.

?11
Included in the recommendations of the board was tbe following: ·

Hq USAF designate specific FM frequency band for aU fire/

crash control. Further recommend that Hq USAF take
immediate action to provide HH-43 aircraft with radio
equipment capable of operating in the designated
frequency band. This action hlouZd insure communications
continuity in the event of redepLoyment of rescue
heUcopters hlOr.Zd wide. In the interim~ recommend
Hq ARRS task its subordinate units to insure that
firm procedures are in effect hlhich provid-e for
communication of essential, info~tion from the
on-s<'ene fire/crash commander to the rescu-e
heUaopter.

Ouri:ng the briefing of the accident rep.ort at Hqs MAC in October

l969. General Catton, C.onllliYlder, ,MAC., directed t.ft.at action be taken to

implement this recommendation for all .ARRS LBR aircraft .on a .worlclwide
basis.

During this reporting period, all LBR Detachments were provided .with
Motorola Mod P33 DEN Single channel transceivers to provide this capa-
bility.

5. Secure Communications for HH-53 Helicopters. This req.uir.ement

for airborne communications security {COMSEC) originated in 1965 with
the program to provide secure voice communications for COLLEGE EYE
aircraft in support of the Command and.Control mission in SEA. Subsequent
developments and expansion of requir.ements into the SEEK SILENCE program

25
 I
included 7 AF Operations Plan (OPLAN)575-69 and PACAF Programming Action
I
Directive {PAD) 69-8 of February and March 1969 respectively.
I
The particular application of this requirement to SAR operations
.
in SEA were detailed as follows:
?:Y I
With minor exceptions, all communications concerned with
I
BAR operations are in-the-clear on unprotected radio
and land lines. From the moment a SAR breaks, a stream
of valuable info~ation for the enemy begins to flow,
such as: {1) The position of the survivors; this
I
information is broadcast widely on UHF, VHF and HF,
in initiating the SAR effort and at times, from 30
to 60 minutes before the first SAR forces are in the
I
area. Position data could be valuable to enemy area
control stations and agencies in organizing and dis-
patching resistance teams to the area of the SAR. I
Conversations with BAR aircrews indicate that the enemy
is directing a major effort against SAR forces, often
using the downed crew members as bait. (2) Composition
of SAR forces during a SAR effort; this is a subject
I
of almost continuous in-the-clear discussion between
the A-1, HC-130, RCC and JRCC. Discussion reveals
numbers of aircraft as well as types of ordnance to be
I
used and frequently discloses planned actions as much
as three to four hours in advance. The enemy gets some
bonus effects when these exchanges expand to include
discussions of characteristics and limitations of new
I
weapons. {3) Routes of approach; after scrambling,
Jolly Green and Sandy pilots discuss routes to the SAR
area with special emphasis on crossing points along the
I
"trail" where the enemy antiaircraft defenses are the
weakest. Our knowledge of the enemy's weaknesses is of
interest and value to him. In addition, when circum- I
stances permit, the enemy may close one of these gaps
and make the crossing by SAR forces more costly. {4)
Holding point for SAR forces; holding points for various
types of SAR forces are discussed and established by
I
Sandy lead early in the SAR effort. If the enemy plans
to employ counter measures against SAR forces, know-
ledge of where the various types of aircraft are hold-
I
ing is obviously of value in planning attacks. Recog-
nizing that BAR forces may be within enemy radar coverage,
the knowledge of holding points nevertheless allows the enemy I
26
I
I
 to pick the most advantageous attack and choose the
moBt profitabl.e target. (5) Plan of attack; once the
SAR forces are in the area~ complete details of pre-
parations and pick-up operations are discussed over
unsecure radio channels. At times such discussions may
be two to three hours in advance of the planned action
so that the enemy had ample time to take counter action.
Even Zesser amounts of warning can be used by the enemy.
(6) Detailed activity reports; during the entire period
of a SAR operation~ a current and detailed description
of the SAR activities is given in-the-clear on HF Padio.
This broadcast originates from the HC-130 that is acting
as the airborne mission contra l and is required by 7
AF Regulations to permit supervision of the SAR effoPt
by the RCCs and JRCC. This broadcast could provide
the enemy with a detailed report on the progPess and
effectiveness of the SAR effoPt~ giving the enemy the
opportunity to initiate counter actions~ take coveP
to minimize the effects of smoke or C/S agent and with-
ho Zd gunfire to decoy forces into ezposing themse Zves
prematurely. It is realized that some actual or
potential sources of enemy foreknowledge cannot be
totatly eliminated due to logistical limitations or
operational necessity.

A change in operational requirements e.liminated the need for secure

votce capability aboard the HH-43 rescue helicopter, but not before the
secure voice equipment was installed. The primary LBR mission of the
HH-43 rarely required aircrews to talk to stations other than the control
tower or ground teams, none of which had secure voice capability. The
I secure voice system was used only for test purposes. Therefore, approval
was obtained from CSAF to direct the detachments to turn in their KY-28
I encryption equipment. This eliminated unnecessary classified storage
and reHeved the detachments of accountability for this equipment.
I
The modification of the A-ls required the replacing of the installed
I UHF RT units with SEEK SILENCE modified UHF RT units. As of 31 December

I 27

I
 I
1970, seven of the ten A-lEs assigned to the 56 SOW at NKP had been I
equipped with SEEK SILENCE modified UHF RT radios. None, however,
had encryption devices installed. All HC-130P aircraft had been modified
I
and were equipped with the AN/ARC-133 UHF radio and the FM 622. None of I
the aircraft were equipped with the Y-8 encryption device. Only the
installation of the KY-8 was required to make the secure voice system I
operational. The KY-8s were on hand but were not installed.
I
A combat ROC 60-70, was initiated in September 1970 for class V
Modification to provide tactical secure voice for twenty-four HH-53s. I
The Combat ROC was validated by PACAF who recommended installing AN/
29/
ARC-133 (V)s in all the helicopters.-- This action represented the
I
final status of this requirement at the close of the reporting period. I
6. UHF LBR Detachments Transceivers. This requirement was esta-
30/ I
blished on 16 July 1969.-- It was initiated to satisfy the requirement
for direct communications between Rescue Operations Control Centers of I
the detachments and the LBR aircraft.
I
The LBR aircraft on crash/fire suppression missions normally were
only in contact with the control tower and/or other elements of the I
mission. On ACR missions their contacts were with the JRCC, the RCCs
or the AMC supervising the mission. They had no capability to communi-
I
cate with their detachments directly. The requirement was confirmed I
by PACAF, but later cancelled unfilfilled in requirements review meeting
of 12 February 1970. I
28
I
I
'I JfiS,ih¥JP!f. .tfJif -~Qp

I In suRIJlary, of the twenty-one requirements outstanding at the

I beginning of, or introduced during this reporting period, only four

were completed, five were cancelled unfulfilled and twelve were con-

I verted to Combat or Command ROCs and were still outstanding at the

c1ose of the repo,rti ng period.
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I 29

I
 I
I
CHAPTER III
PERSONNEL I
MANNING I
During this reporting period, 3 ARRGp, including subordinate units,
personnel authorized and assigned decreased by ten and nineteen per cent
'
I
respectively to reach the lowest levels in four years. As may be seen
from data of Table A.2. (Appendix A) the percentage of,manning also
I
decreased substantially during the period, recovering slightly in the
'
1

I
last quarter. Unfortunately the low level of manning was not evenly dis-
I
1

tributed by Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC), but was most critical in the
areas directly affecting flight operations. Typical examples of this
problem are indicated in the following.
I
DuPing the quar>ter, 3 ARRGp e:cpe:r>ience two major man- I
ning problems. 1

1. A293X2 (AirboPne Radio Opeyoator). This AFSC at the

39 ARRSq aontinued to be a:r>itiaally manned for the third
I
straight quar>ter. Projeated inbounds ar>e ar>Piving vecy
late after their TED date. This problem is aaused by the
losing CBPO as it does not figure enroute tPaining and
I
leave time against the TED date when the PCB oroers ar>e
published. The 39 ARRSq is pPesently reaeiving TDY assis-
tanae from 41 ARRWg resOUPaes. The estimated get-U)eU
date on this problem is 30 May 19?0, provided projeated
I
inhounds ar>Y'ive on time.
2. A923XO (Par>ar>esaueman). At the end of the quar>ter,
I
3 ARRGp 's total. authorization was 92 versus 60 assigned.
Higher headquarters has been bJ:'iefed on this situation
but a:Pe unable to provide assistanae due to the shortage I
in parar>esaue manni'!f[ worldwide. TheY'B is no get-weZZ
date projeated at th1,s time. 3 ARRGp wiZZ aZoseZy monitor
the status of this manning problem and keep higher head-
quarters fully advised. 1!f
I
30 I
I
I
I Du1>ing the quarter~ 3 ARRGp eq:perienced four ma.j01"
manning prob Zems.
I 1. 431XOB and A431XOB (HH-43 Mechanic and Airborne
Mechanic) . At the end of the quarter, 3 ARRGp 's

I totaZ authorization in these AFSC 's was 121 veNus

91 assigned. Numerous attempts have been made to
p:ro(JUl'e addi tionaZ personne Z having these AFSCs
and an estimated get-we'LZ date of N()Vember 1970
I is progrcormed, pr()Vided projected inbounds az"Pive
on schedu'Le.

I 2. A431XOC (HH-53 and HH-3 Ftight Mechanic). The

~ntinued debi'Litation of the 37 ARRSq and 40 ARRSq
in this aareer fietd has tevied a criticaZ probtem
on 3 ARRGp. At the end of the quarter, the totaZ
I authorization for 3 ARRGp was 42 versus· 32 assigned.
A projected get-weZZ date for this AFSC is November
19'10.
I 3. A435XOA (Ftight Engineer). At the end of the
q'Ua1'wr~3 ARRGp had a totaZ of 33 authorized versus

I 28 assigned. 39 ARRSq is present'Ly receiving manning

assistance f!'om the 41 ARRWg. No projected get-we'LZ
date is known at this time.

I 4. A923XO (Pararescrueman). Again this qu.apter PJ

manning has been ve:ry criticaZ ••• No get weZZ date is
projected at this tims. IJj
I This was not a problem unique to this reporting period, but one

I that plagued the SAR forces since inception of SEA operations. The causes
of the problem were twofold - one past and one current. Originally caused
I by the extent to which worldwide USAF rescue forces were virtually elim-

I· inated between the Korean and SEA conflicts, the training ofsufficient
SAR personnel to meet requirements was not able to keep.up with what had

I beeo, up until the latter portion of this reporting period, an ever

increasing demand. The reasons for this were many and varied, but some
I
I 31

I
 ·a
of the principal considerations were that helicopter operations were
I
an unusual facet of the overall USAF mission, the requirements of training I
were extensive (see following section) and one of the positions which had
presented continuing shortages over the years--the pararescueman or PJ was -I
still a 100 percent voluntary AFSC and unique to the ARS. The problem
was further amplified by the inefficiencies in use of the trained personnel
I
available inherent in one-year SEA tours. To the further credit of the SAR I
personnel in their devotion to duty was the fact that their rate of extended
and return tours in SEA was among the highest of· any combat units in the I
theater.
I
TRAINING
SAR AFSCs I
Prior to assignment to SEA, all SAR aircrew personnel had to complete
their advanced specialty code SAR training course at the Aerospace Rescue
I
and Recovery Training Center (ARRTC), Eglin AFB, Florida. This was either I
the Commander/Co-pilot, Navigator, Flight Engineer, Pararescue/Recovery
Specialist, Radio Operator or Loadmaster course for the particular aircraft I
for which he was to be qualified; HH-3, HH-43, HH-53 or the HC-130. This
training was in addition to all the normal basic AFSC courses which must
I
have been completed prior to assignment to the ARS. I
Each of these ARRTC training courses included from 10 to 13 days of
academic training and 27 to 29 days of flight training to provide a prac-
I
tical knowledge of operational Rescue Procedures, Aircrew Survival and I
32 I
I
I
I 33/
Mission Orientation and Indoctrination.- In addition, ea'ch of the cours.es

I provided a comprehensive description of the particular aircraft and a

practi ca 1 krrowledge of the norma 1 and emergency functions of the aircraft
I and its systems.

I PACAF Jungre Survival School (PJSS)

Since 1968 it had been a requirement that all USAF aircrew members
I 34/
must attend' PJSS prior to reporting for SEA assignment.- The PJSS

I provided the student with an intensified training period covering all

aspects of Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) and the

I elements of SAR which he would expect to count on, and also the specific
phases which he was expected to assist in to enhance his chances of rescue.
I The program of four days duration during the latter part of this reporting

period was divided into two days of academic training and two days of
I jungle exposure to supplement as well as put to practical use the informa-

I tion gained in the classroom.

I During the five and a half years which had passed since the first
class was graduated from PJSS on 12 April 1965, more than 42,000 personnel,

I for an average of over 600 per month, had completed this jungle survival
training at the close of this reporting period. In addition to members of
I the other U.S. Armed Services, which accounted for approximately ten per-
f~ee world nu.tions were
I cent of the student body, personnel from many other
found among the alumni of the 11
College of Jungle Knowledge ... At the end

I of this reporting period, two classes were conducted every week, averaging

I 33

I
 I
roughly a hundred students per class. Facilities were available for I
training up to a 130 students per class. This was not an unusual occurrence,
since PJSS had no indication whatsoever of how many students would be sent
I
in for training at any given time, until registration the first day of I
class. This resulted from variations in SEA personnel assignment levels,
and when more applied than could be accommodated, those who were not en- I
rolled were placed at the head of the following class roster. This way no
one was delayed for more than three or four days due to limited facilities.
I
One class was in academic session on Monday and Tuesday and the other class I
on Thursday and Friday.

Throughout the entire course, the students were instilled with the
I
philosophy of SARin SEA. As stated by one of the PJSS instructors, TSgt I
Wayne G. L. Russell, to the author•s class, Remember, rescue will not
11

give up on you. For all practical purposes, when you go down, the war I
stops to provide every necessary resource to get you out so long as there is
35/
any reasonable hope of locating you ... - Of the total number of personnel
I
attending PJSS, approximately 25-30 percent had no previous survival train- I
; ng such as provided at the other forma 1 Arctic, Desert, Land and Water
Survival Training Centers at Homestead, Fairchild, Ladd and other USAF bases. I
In order to provide the students with a maximum amount of information I
in the short period permitted during such an accel~rated course, the
students were briefed on SAR procedures and equipment and also underwent I
actual equipment operation familiarization sessions. Class instruction
I
34
I
I
I
I was provided through instructor presentations of SAR procedures, life

I support equipment demonstrations and descriptions of operational character-

istics, and use of slides and motion pictures where appropriate. Equipment
I familiarization-included parachutes utilized in SEA, Personnel Lowering
Device (PLD), the principal USAF aircraft recovery equipment, the forest
I penetrato~and various other items of equipment utilized by other aircraft

I which may have been encountered during rescue operations in SEA.

I One of the more important aspects of this training was the exposure
to actual vectoring of helicopters by the students employing their life

I support equipment, recovery by helicopter and general exposure to helicopter

operations during the equipment familiarization session and during transit
I to and from the Jungle Survival Field Training Area. Until early in 1970,
PJSS had maintained an internal CH-19 capability to provide a dedicated
I force for this phase of training. Since that time their Table of Equipment

I (TOE) had deleted these aircraft and the local (Clark Air Base) Aerospace
Rescue and Recovery Squadron had been assigned responsibility for providing
I PJSS with aircraft as required. Conmitments were not always met because
of the low priority assigned to school support among the LBR units various
I missions and an inadequate number of aircraft to support all the mission

I requirements.

I The PJSS had an assigned complement of about fifty personnel of whom

approximately two-thirds were Rescue and Survival Instructors. The remaining

I specialties included Medics, Operational Intelligence Specialists and various

I 35

I
 ..
stUn
' I
administrative and supervisory skills. I
The value of the PJSS is difficult to measure in terms of an exact I
contribution to SAR in SEA. However, the extremely high percentage of
saves achieved in SEA, roughly 60 percent of all situations were a I
recovery was consi·dered possible, compared to about 10 percent during the
Korean conflict, was greatly enhanced by this SEA aircrew training program.
I
Some of the comments of successfully recovered aircrew members ~ttest to I
their opinion of the excellence of the training received and esteem in
which they regarded the PJSS. I
11
The SAR procedures was excellent, .. Captain Trible, BARRACUDA 3,
37/
I
14 September 1968.--

Major Albright (WALT 30A, 12 November 1968) stated that his survival
I
training was excellent, and that the PACAF Jungle Survival School had
38/
I
prepared him to face being alone in the jungle.--
I
.. I tied myself to the tree •.• and made myself as comfortable as
possible •.. I knew that if I moved I would betray my position. I just I
sat, listened and thought for the next 15 hours ••• The night in the jungle
at Clark really helped me. I knew the sound of the jungle and realized any
I
change in the pattern would alert me,.. Lieutenant Boone, WOLF 28, 18 Novem-
ber 1969.
'!ll I
11
I believe the survival training I received at Clark and Fairchild
I
40/
was invaluable, .. Lieutenant Shepherd, 26 November 1968.-- I
36 I
I
I
I Recondo Tra i·ntng ( RT)

I In addition to this formal training for all SAR personnel at h

ARRTG and PJS5 prior to their SEA assignment, :s.e1ecterl -pararesc.1Je111!m .attend-
I ed the U.S. ArntY Special Forces Recondo School, fonnerly at Nha Trang~. RVN,
and relocated to CONUS in December 1970. Thi·s tnree-week course included
I rugged physical training and comfttioning and review of specific SEA area

I infil tration/exfi ltration procedures, reconnaissance patrol operations, map

reading and actual patrols in known VC/NVA territory. folTowing the gradua-
I tion in June of 1968 of Sergeant Harwell P. Quill ian, Jr., the first USAF
man to attend the course, the 3 ARRGp had a quota of two slots for each
I class, which was later increased to three. However, due to manning problems

I and operational requirements this quota was later reduced to one per class
and was used only intermittently. During the first seven months of parti-

I cipation from June to December 19£8, an average of three or four persunnel

per month attended the course, compared with one per month during the next
I six-months period. During the eighteen-month period covered by this report,

I twenty-one PJs attended this course.

Informa 1 Trai-ning
I Personnel of the 3 ARRGp JRCC and RCC units also provided SAR .bri:ef-

I ings on a regular basis to the various USAF units in SEA for newly arrived
personnel. Teams were also dispatched to Subic Point, Philippine Islands,
I to conduct briefings for Yankee Station personnel upon rotation of carriers
and also to Ching Chuan Kang Air Base, Taiwan, and Clark Air Base", Philip-
I pine Islands, to brief personnel from these stations conducting air opera-

I tions in the SEA theater. Wherever preplanned missions were scheduled,

37

I
 ':,;
''' 7 mro ...

,',
!,
I
such as a known first light effort, they also conducted briefings to the
I
various unit personnel composing the SARTF. In addition, the individual I
unit's Life Support Equipment and Mission briefings continually updated
the aircrews on SAR equipment, tactics and requirements. I
AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
I
During this reporting period, the personnel of the 3 ARRGp received
almost five thousand awards and decorations as indicated below by quarter. I
AWARD* AFC SS LOM DFC AMN MSM BS AM AFCM TOTAL I
Jul-Sep 69 11 108 9 25 916 121 1190
Oct-Dec 69 2 37 12 416 53 520 I
Jan-Mar 70 44 264
Apr-:Jun 70
6
3 11
2

1 234
10
11 1
83 967
39 525
154
99
1530
924
I
Jul-Sep 70 1 18 3 134 5 32 406 110 709 I
Oct-Dec 70 4 1 6 101 1 113
----
Totals 10 86 6 781 36 1 197 3331 538 4986 I
This brings the total awards and decorations received by SEA rescue
I
forces in 3 ARRGp to over 13,000 since January of 1966. These figures do not
include individual Purple Hearts and other awards such as the Cheney and I
I
* AFC--Air Force Cross; SS--Silver Star; LOM--Legion of Merit; DFC--Distin-
guished Flying Cross; AMN--Airman's Medal; MSM--Meritorious Service Medal; I
BS--Bronze Star; AM--Air Medal; AFCM--Air Force Commendation Medal
I
38
I
I
 UNCLASSIFIED

Avco citations and unit awards received including the Presidential Unit
Citations, Outstanding Unit Awards and the Vietnamese Gallantry Cross with
Palm.

While these figures are indeed impressive, it was the praise and respect
of recovered personnel which had a far greater meaning to the members of
the Rescue Service. As expressed by Lieutenant Woodrow Bergeron, Jr.,
after a fifty-one hour ordeal on the ground in enemy territory, .. I was
41/
just confident that they would get me out ... -

CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM

Whi 1e the number of Saves wi 11 never be recorded in the hi story of the
11 11

3 ARRGp, the success of the rescues of hundreds of lost individuals through

11 11

the efforts of members of the 3 ARRGp are nonetheless important. Exemplify-

ing the finest tradition of the ARRS, 3 ARRGp personnel extended the motto
of their service to their off-duty activities as well as the execution of
their professional assignments.

Since its formation in 1966, the members of this organization actively

supported the CHO-NHI-VIEN-VIET-HOA Orphanage located in the Cholon District
of Saigon. Founded in 1869 by French nuns, the operations of the Orphanage
were taken over by Vietnamese sisters of the Catholic Congregation of St.
Paul de Chartres in 1954. During this reporting period, there were approxi-
mately 150 children in the orphanage, ranging in age from a few weeks to
teenagers who had known nor had no other home.

39
 UNCLASSIFIED I
Monetary contributions to the orphanage by the SAR units totaled
I
over $3,000.00. More than 1,800 pounds of clothing, food, toys, cloth
I
and medical supplies were also donated. In addition, many 11 Self-help 11
projects were completed that greatly enhanced the facility. The follow~ I
ing is only a partial list:·
I
a. Ceiling fans installed in classrooms
b. Floor tile installed I
c. Refrigerator purchased and repaired
d. Lighting installed in classrooms
I
e. Painting and general maintenance performed
I
Group personnel visited the orphanage on a·weekly basis. In addition,
an English class for the Sisters was conducted from 1967 to 1971. Annual
I
Christmas and Tet parties were held and various trips arranged for the I
children to local zoos, fairs and expositions. The words of Sister Robert,
Order of the Sacred Heart and Director of the orphanage, in an interview I
during the 1968 Christmas party summarize what these efforts accomplished
and meant to the orphanage. 11
We call him £Major Carroll Shershu!if our
·I
little father. He and his men gave us a Lambretta you know, which, for I
us, is the most wonderful thing that could happen. We used to have to
take the sick children to the doctor by taxi or bus and it took a lot of I
money and much of the day. These last three years {1966-196~ they have
been the very best the orphanage has ever known. War brings sadness, but
I
42/
it also brings good. These Americans have been wonderful to us ...-
I
40
I
UNCLASSIFIED I
 Ill£~~~
. .,....._F&IIIIIIIl&C•

In addition, many other similar activities were conducted by indi-

vidual units in their locations throughout Vietnam and Thailand too numerous
to cover in detail in this report. The presentation by members of the 37
ARRSq of Da Nang Air Base of 131 scholarships to students of Hoa Vang High
School, valued at over $1,500 raised during the base's 0ollars for Scholars ..
11

43/
drive in 1969, was only one example of this outstanding effort.--

41

(This page is UN.CLASSIFIED.)

 I
CHAPTER IV I
OPERATIONS I.
TACTICS AND iECHNIQUES
I
Rotary Wing SAR Aircraft
I
During the early portion of this reporting period, the helicopter
complement of the 3 ARRGp consisted of the HH-43 Pedros, HH-3E Jolly I
Greens and the HH-53 BUFFs. By this time, the Pedros were assigned
primarily to the LBR mission. While the 38 ARRSq had been assigned
I
thirty aircraft with which to operate fourteen detachments on 1 July
1969, they had been reduced to twenty-one aircraft assigned to ten
I
detachments by the close of 1970.
'
This resulted from the inactivation I
of Detachments 2, 8, 10 and 11. Although the primary mission was LBR,
the Pedros accomplished a total of two hundred and two saves during I
this period, one hundred combat and one hundred and two non-combat.
Their continued use in the SAR role was occasioned by their locations
I
scattered throughout SVN and Thailand, where (1) they were often able I
to respond to downed aircrew members or others requiring air recovery
more readily than the Jolly Greens or BUFFs and (2) the expected level I
of enemy activity would permit their employment within an acceptable
risk factor level.
I
The nineteen HH-3Es assigned to the 37 ARRSq and Det 1, 40 ARRSq,
I
'i

phased out during conversion to an all BUFF configuration, constituted

I
the most significant change influencing SAR operations. This conversion

42
I
I
I
I provided the SAR forces with (1) an increased performance envelope,

I (2) a greatly improved load capacity, and (3} improved armament.

The increased performance, compared to that of the HH-3E is re-

I flected in the following table:

I Characteristic HH-3E HH-53C

I Weight (pounds) normal

gross {with crew, fuel
and ammo) 18,000 36~000

I Useful Load Capacity 3,000 13,000

Engines
I Number/Type (1) T-58-GE-5 (2) T-64-GE-7s

I Available Horsepower (SHP)

Speed (knots)
1,250 3,925

I Normal Cruise Limit 120 140

At Maximum Military Power 143 170
I Altitude (feet ASL)
Cruise ceiling 12,000 16,000
I Hover Limit 4,000 6,500

I Crew Complement 4 5-6

Armament
I Number/Type (2) M-60 .30
Cal Machine
(3} GAU-28/A
7.62nm Mini
guns guns
I
Since both aircraft were refuelable, the range and endurance
I were not normally a significant consideration, although the greater

I 43

I
 I
reaction speed of the BUFFs and their twin 450 gallon external tank con- I
figuration against the limited 200 gallon tip tanks of the HH-3Es did
provide the HH-53s with an added advantage when necessary. T~e increased
I
power and size which permitted taking on bigger loads at higher altitudes I
was of major significance as indicated from the following description of
the type of problems encountered by the smaller Jolly Greens:
lli I
~t a 4.~poo foot operating elevation and an anibient
air temperature of 20 degrees c;· the HH;;._;f"is Umited
I
to an 18.~000 pound hover weight out of ground effeat.
The basia weight of the helicopter is 14.~000 pounds.
With the arew.~ equipment.~ guns.~ ammunition and 2.~000 I
pounds of fuel.~ the gross weight is 18.~000 pounds.
With this air temperature and altitude.~ an HH-3.~ to
effeat a suaaessful rescue.~ must dwnp fuel to reduae
poundage to an allowable hover weight. As the air-
I
craft burns 1.~400 pounds per hour of fuel while in
a hover.~ a delicate balancing aat is waged between
dumping enough fuel to aaaompZish the rescue.~ and
I
retaining enough to make it to friendly te~itory
and the tanker for top off. At times.~ th-ts balancing
aat is so aritiaal and the fuel so valuable.~ the crew
is obliged to throw equipment overbo~d.
I
As a result of the greater size and load capacity, the BUFFs also
I
carried two PJs in lieu of the one limited to the H-3s, for a standard
I
crew of five. On many recovery missions, a combat photographer was also
carried as a sixth crew member, normally just on the high bird, but I
occasionally on both high and low. The lesser degree of vulnerability
of the HH-53 was also an important factor. This resulted from its
I
increased defensive fire power, the higher ingress and egress speed
I
available and ability to just take a lot more punishment. It could
I
44
I
I lose complete use of one engine, which spelled destntction for H KH-3.

I and although at reduced speed and load capacity, still -.ke it safely
back to base. These advantages were only obtained, however, at the

I expense of providing the enetf\Y with a larger target.

I The operational procedures developed during this reporting period

reflected a southern deployment of SAR alert forces~ in response to a
I similar shift in tactical air operations. The use of Lima Site 98 in
North Central Laos as a FOL was discontinued, as was the use of Quang Tri
I AB in SVN. The culmination of these developments is presented in Figure

I 3, reflecting disposition of the conmand and control centers and normal

ground alert and airborne orbit locations.
I Under normal day posture alert, the 37 ARRSq maintained two BUFFs

I on a fifteen-mi-nute g-round a1ert at Da Nang AS from first l i gtlt to

forty minutes pr_ior to sunset. Depending on strike mission coosiderations
I these two aircraft were directed by the JRCC to fl~
i
airborne alert on
INDIA o,rbit in th.e vicinity of coordinates 16° 55' N 107° 25' E in lieu
I of maintaining ground alert for selected time periods, to provide the

I tactical strike force with an increased reaction capability. Two air-

craft were also maintained on a 45-minute night ground alert as a "feet
I wet .. only recovery reserve force. Since no RESCORT was normally required
!
for Tonkin Gulf operations these two BUFFs and one AMC aircraft con-
I stituted the only night alert force since no capability existed for

I conducting night SAR. The 37 ARRSq also maintained two HH-53s on

I 45

I
 vw ,,_. I
fifteen-minute ground alert at its FOL at Bien Hoa AB from first light
I
to forty minutes prior to sunset.
was rotated every three days.
The pair of aircraft at Bien Hoa AB
The 40 ARRSq supported the normal day
I
posture with two BUFFs at its Det 1 location, Nakhon Phanom RTAFB and I
two more at its FOL at Ubon RTAFB. on fifteen-minute ground alert from
first light to one hour before sunset. During the latter part of the I
reporting period, these pairs of aircraft were normal,ly also rotated on
a three-day assignment cycle as follows:
I
Day 1 - Two JGs proceed from Udorn RTAFB at 0600 hours to Ubon RTAFB
I
for fifteen minutes ground alert from arrival till one hour prior to
I
sunset. Aircraft at Nakhon Phanom RTAFB in place on same ground alert
status. I
Day 2 - Aircraft at Nakhon Phanom RTAFB stand fifteen-minute ground I
alert from first light until takeoff for airborne alert in TANGO orbit,
in the vicinity of coordinates 19° 16' N 102° 56' E, from two and a half I
hours prior to sunset till one hour before sunset and then return to
Udorn RTAFB if not mission assigned. Aircraft at Ubon RTAFB in place on
I
fifteen-minute ground alert from first light until one hour prior to I
sunset.

Day 3 - Two JGs proceed from Udorn RTAFB at 0600 hours to Nakhon
I
Phanom RTAFB for fifteen-minute ground alert from arrival till one hour I
prior to sunset. Aircraft in place at Ubon RTAFB stand fifteen-minute
I
46
I
I
I ... ,
I
,_.,
'T'
I
I
UOORH•
I OL-1 RCC
3HC-130s

I LOAS
THAILAND
I
I e!CQRAT

I*BANGKOK
PHUCAT,•

SOUTH
CAMBODIA VIET
NAM
•
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I p T
~ ~

:rs . . ;
..

. Nli&g!t:t'ffi

I ground alert from first light until takeoff for airborne alert in JULIET

I orbit in the vicinity of coordinates 15° 30 N 106° 00 E, from two and

1 1

a half hours prior to sunset to one hour prior to sunset and then return
Jl to Udorn RTAFB if not mission assigned.

I This procedure insured that four sets of SAR aircraft were available
during all daylight hours on either immediate call, when in airborne
I orbit, or on fifteen-minute call on ground alert to respond to emergencies
throughout SEA from their separate geographic locations. The orbits in-
I dicated in Figure 3 were the most commonly used although several others

I were available and used when variations in strike force disposition

dictated. The most commonly used alternate was the November orbit in

I the vicinity of coordinates 17° 00 N 105° 40 E, due west of the DMZ.

1 1

Prior to October 1970, the helicopters flew the evening orbits on a

I daily basis with the A-1 RESCORT aircraft but for the last two and a
half months of the reporting period, they were only able to maintain the
I three-day cycle outlined above, due to limitations of personnel and
II equipment.

Jl The tactics/techniques employed by the primary recovery helicopters

while on SAR mission continued through this reporting period from those
I developed previously, with a few variations based on the alert status
evolved during the period. The High/Low approach enroute to and after
I 45/
arrival in the immediate recovery area was executed as follows:--

I
47
I
I
 ..
,. I
When a mission broke, and the helicopters were called
in, the high bird would orbit over the pickup area
I
between 5,000-6,000 feet. If weather or hostile
activity prevented orbiting directly over the area,
he would orbit at a position from which the recovery
I
operation could be observed. He would advise the
SARTF of enemy activity and could act as a forward
air controller if called upon. If the low helicop- I
ter were disabled, the high helicopter would attempt
the recovery, unless denied by hostile activity.
The low helicopter Aircraft Commander would determine.
his best course of action while proceeding to the
I
recovery site . .. . Normally the best approach was a
high speed, descending pass over the survivor's
position, and then a teardrop turn to arrive back
I
over the survivor's position headed into the wind.
Ideally, the survivor would then use a smoke flare,
pen flare, or some other visual signal to pinpoint
his position. The helicopter crew would be alert
I
for hostile fire during the approach; and the gunners
would return the fire if encountered. RESCORT or
RESCAP aircraft would then take the necessary action
I
to suppress the hostile fire, if any occurred. When
the helicopter came to a hover, the flight engineer
would provide directional information to the pilot I
to position the helicopter for the recovery. During
the approach and recovery, the pararescuemen would
stand at their positions prepared to return enemy
fire. The flight engineer would be in position by
I
the open cabin door with his weapon readily accessible.
Meanwhile, the high bird Aircraft Commander would de-
termine the heading and estimated time en route (ETE)
I
to the land or air refueling location. After the
survivor had been recovered, the pararesaueman would
administer first aid if necessary. The flight en-
gineer would cheak the helicopter for battle damage,
I
and report to the Aircraft Commander. The copilot
would report pertinent information to the AMC to in-
clude ETE to the refueling point, condition of the
I
survivor, damage to the helicopter and so on.
Normally, the helicopter would return to its home base;
however, fuel status, weather or medical condition of
I
the survivor might require a deviation. If the
survivor required medical attention, the Aircraft
Commander would notify the AMC to arrange to have an
ambulance waiting at the recovery base.
I
I
48
I
I
lc_\
I As an example of tactics developed, the low helicopter approach described
above was modified as a result of hostile fire threat to provide a high
I speed descent to an IP followed by a high speed-low altitude run straight

I into the survivor as directed by the RESCORT aircraft to reduce helicopter

vulnerability.
I Normally.when the first set of BUFFs was assigned to the SAR mission,
I another set would be taken from their ground alert status and execute an
airborne alert orbit, at a location convenient for dispatch to the re-
I covery area, in the event it became necessary to replace the primary

I force. This technique was instituted as SOP in October 1969 following

experienced gained from the KNIFE 61/62 recovery mission where such an

I immediate backup force could possibly have spelled the difference between
success and failure of the mission. To maintain a maximum readiness
I posture at all times, whenever the aircraft on alert status were committed
to an SAR mission, their alert positions would be assumed by replacements
I from other squadron aircraft at Da Nang AB or Udorn RTAFB, respectively,

I to the extent that OR aircraft and available crews permitted.

I Fixed Wing Airborne Mission Commander Aircraft

During this reporting period, the transfer of 39 ARRSq from Tuy Hoa
I AB to Cam Ranh AB in September 1970, without loss due to a single in-
terruption in the assigned mission, was indicative of the quality of
I operational performance provided in execution of the SAR AMC function.

I
I 49

I
 I
As shown in Figure 3, the 39 ARRSq maintained an alert force of six I
HC-l30Ps, three out of Cam Ranh AB and three out of their FOL at Udorn
RTAFB.
I
The assignment of aircraft at Cam Ranh AB was as follows: One
I
aircraft designated KING 27, was maintained on a day status thirty-
minute ground alert and a forty-five-minute night ground alert.
I
A second aircraft, call sign KING 24, maintained airborne orbit roughly I
between Channels 82 at Pakse, Laos and 107 at Pleiku AB, RVN from first
light to midday. The third HC-130P, KING 26, maintained this airborne I
orbit relieving KING 24 at midday and st~ing on station till last light.
I
A similar assignment of duties was divided among the FOL aircraft,
with KING 23 maintaining a thirty-minute ground alert from first light
I
to one hour prior to sunset. KING 21 performed the early airborne orbit
I
on the Laos/Thailand border in the area of Paksane, Laos from first
1i ght to midday, re 1i eved by KING 22 which continued the orbit through I
last light.
I
Rotation of assignment at the FOL was cycled so that the aircraft
on departing Cam Ranh AB at 0600 hours would proceed to Udorn RTAFB to I
assume the KING 23 ground alert the first day. The second day it would
stand the KING 21 early orbit and on the third day, the afternoon KING
I
22 position, and then return to the squadron at Cam Ranh AB following I
pickup of the maintenance personnel at Udorn RTAFB. The primary mission
I
50
I
I
I
I of the ground alert HC-130Ps was to provide the aerial refueling capa-
bility for the BUFFs upon initiation of a SAR missiont the airborne
I orbit bird assuming the AMC role. As individual aircraft were diverted

I from their alert assignment they would also be replaced to the extent
.that available aircraft and crews permitted to maintain a maximum alert
I posture.

I As was the case with the BUFFs, the role of the AMC remained much
the same during this reporting period as it had been previously developed.
I When a SAR mission was launched, the AMC aircraft closest to the indi-

I cated recovery area would immediately proceed to an· orbit location which
would afford the best position considering communications requirements,

I SAR and support forces to be utilized and vulnerability to hostile

action either from the ground or airborne attack. In the role of co-
I ordinator of the overall SAR operations, the AMC maintained communica-
tions with the survivor, whenever radio contact was possible, with each
I of the aircraft constituting the SARTF, the JRCC and the RCC concerned,

I and other'ground and airborne units as necessary. The AMC in addition

to monitoring current activities was also responsible for anticipating
I and providing for·changes in tactics, ordnance and/or additional force
requirements, preplanning AR rendezvous requirements, and alerting the
I JRCC/RCC of all significant developments in conduct of the mission.

I
I 51

I
I
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RESCORT Aircraft I
'As indicated in Chapter II, it was the universal opinion of the SEA
SAR personnel that the reduction of the A-1 force was the severest blow
I
to the SAR posture during this reporting period. It would be impossible I
to overstate the importance of the role of these aircraft as an el.ement
of the SARTF. I
To complete the SAR alert posture configuration, the A-lEs stood I
alert in much the same form as the HH-53s. Two aircraft, call sign
SANDY 9/10, stood fifteen-minute ground alert with the JGs at Da Nang AB I
from first light to forty minutes prior to sunset. There was a differ-
ence in employment in that the A-ls would remain on ground alert during
I
the airborne orbit of the BUFFs on INDIA station. In the event of assign- I
ment to a SAR mission, the SANDIES would be scrambled from ground alert
and rendezvous with the BUFFs enroute to the recovery site. Two other I
birds, SANDY 7/8, maintained the same three-day cycle ground alert as
the JGs at the Bien Hoa AB FOL from first light until forty minutes
I
before sunset. arriving early the first day and departing late the third
I
day.

The arrangement of the Thailand A-1 alert forces differed from that
I
of the helicopters to a larger degree. Two aircraft, designated SANDY I
l/2 were maintained on a fifteen-minute ground alert status from first
light to one hour before sunset as an independent RESCORT reserve force I
normally at Nakhon Phanom RTAFB but frequently at Ubon RTAFB depending
I
52
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I -
I on changes in tactical strike force co11111itment. Additionally, SANDIES
3/4 stood ground alert in conjunction with the JGs at Nakhon Phanom RTAFB
I from first light until takeoff for airborne alert orbit on TANGO station

I on a daily basis from two and a half hours to one hour prior to sunset.
On the third day cycle when the BUFFs flew orbit, they flew as a team.
I Similarly SANDY 5/6 maintained the same three-day assignment period to
Ubon RTAFB as the JGs, standing ground alert from first light until
I takeoff for daily orbit in JULIET from two and a half till one hour prior

I to sunset. Again on the three-day cycle which saw the BUFFs on orbit,
they flew as a team. When flying orbit, if a SAR mission had not been
I assigned thirty minutes prior to completion of normal orbit assignment,
the SANDIES were considered available to expend ordnance as strike
I aircraft. This policy permitted the dedicated SARTF crews to maintain

I attack proficiency during periods of intermittent SAR mission assignment.

During the early portion of the reporting period, the A-1 force
I aircraft call signs employed SPAD for in-country (SVN) assets and SANDY

I to designate the out-country (Thailand) based aircraft. However, this

was changed and the single call sign S~DY was later used to indicate· all
I 56 Special Operations Wing (SOWg) dedicated SAR support aircraft.
Figure 4 and 5 indicate the visual weapons configuration of the two, the
I slight difference being continued although they both later had the same

I call sign.

I
53
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 & ..
;!

I
The reduction of the A-1 force did not seriously jeopardize their I
alert status function outlined above. The outcome was to effectively
wipe out the reserve force posture they had previously maintained. It
I
was not at all unusual for a SAR mission to employ between six and ten
I
RESCORT aircraft. During larger efforts many more were required. The
following account provides an example of such employment. ~ I
Fo~ th~ee mo~e hoUPs~ the area was sanitized with
smoke~ CBU-30 and o~dnanae. By 1140 hoUPs~ the
I
aPmada was foPmed fo~ anothe~ attempt. Ten A-ls
foPmed a daisy ahain on the west side of the ~ve~
and 12 othe~s set one up on the east side. The
JaZZy G~een began its desaent on the east side with
I
A-1s ai~aZing above and a~ound it, using thei~ o~d­
nanae to foPm a proteative ~ng a~ound the suroivo~. I
During the period of this operation (December 1969), there were over
I
sixty A-1 aircraft available for all mission roles. Approximately half
of this total force was SAR qualified and available for assignment to I
SAR missions·.. In addition to normal force attrition due to combat and
operational losses, the loss of twenty-eight additional A-ls to the VNAF
I
during the latter portion of the reporting period (as part of the VNAF
I
I&M Program), found that one year later in December 1970, the total
force had been reduced to thirty-nine aircraft. Almost half of this I
number were sti 11 committed to other critical mission roles, which
created a situation where it would have been impossible to any longer I
conduct such a SAR operation if necessary.
I
54
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 STA STA STA STA STA RIGHT LEFr STA STA STA STA STA STA
11 10 9 8 7 STUB STUB 6 5 4 3 2 1

.....
"'T'I
G')
c:: 3 59
::0
rr'l (BE-+PL) (WP)
~

* Includes aircraft basic weight, crew,

12 fuel load, and 20 mm ammo.
H/J LOAD ONLY WEIGHT ~

AIRCRAFT* 19847 55
4 CBU-25 1000 140
2 CBU-22 450 70
2 t.AU-3 .:· 850 56
2 M-47 210 20
2 LAU-59 368 22
2 suu-11 ~ ~
23375 407

A•lE Spad Configuration

------------------

STA STA STA STA STA STA RIGBT LEFI' STA STA STA STA STA STA
12 u· 10 9 8 7 STUB STUB 6 5 4 3 2 1

"'T1
.......
Ci)
c
;;o
rrt

'"

H/ J LOAD ONLY WEIGHT 1mM!. * Includes aircraft basic weight, crew, 12 fuel load,
and 20 mm ammo.
Ar.R<mAF!'* ·· 19847 55
4 CBU-25 1000 140 NC1rE: When available, tracer mixture will be loaded
2 CBU-22 450 70 on one outboard and one inboard gun; other two
2.LAtJ.,.3· · 850 56 wi 11 be loaded with 2+3 INC/HE I.
2 M-47 210 20
2 LAU-59 368 22
1 SUU-11 325 22
1 150 GAL TANK 1102 29
24'ffi' 414

A-lE Sandy Configuration

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 ------------------

STA STA STA STA STA STA RIGHT LEFI' STA STA STA STA STA STA
12 11 10 9 8 7 STUB STUB 6 5 4 3 2 1

-
-rt
G ')
c:
~
en

B/J LOAD WBlQI'.t DRAG E/G LOAD WEIGHT DRAG

AIRCRAPT * 19802 55 AIRCRAFI' * 20455 135
12x M-47 1260 120 12x M-47 1260 120
2x CBU-30 1124 ---2! 2x CBU-30 1124 ~
22186 229 22839 309

· ·;* Includes aircraft basic weight, crew, 12 fuel load, and 20 nm anmo.

A-lE SAR Support Configuration

•
I
I RESCAP Aircraft
The RESCAP force during this reporting period consisted of specially
I configured A-ls as shown in Figure 6 and additional fast movers, normally

I F-4s, for special coverage as required. The fast movers provided defense
from MIG and SAM attack, saturation ground fire suppression and special
I weapon delivery not available with the A-ls. A typical example of these
combined efforts in support. of the SAR mission quoted above was described
I 47/
as follows:-

I Between rescue attempts~ the A-1s rebuilt the smoke

walls while the jets used air-to-ground missiles
against the heavier guns. WaZZeye and BuUpup
I miss.i les struck the guns to the north. Paveways were
delivered against the guns in the cave behind the
survivor ..• A total of 154 sorties were flown on
I this second day [of the three day mission].

The SARTF
I The integration of these individual components under the appro-

I priate command and control activities constituted the SARTF. Operations

involved in the initiation, direction and execution of the SARTF were
I documented during this report period, to provide a firm outline for all
~
activities concerned with SAR in SEA. In the words of Colonel Sohle,
I
Our> tactics are now as well documented as it is
I possible to prescribe tactics and techniques for SAR
operations~ where each mission presents a unique
situation. Our> development of present SAR capability
I has been a history of relearning lessons already
learned by someone else~ but who unfortunately could
not or did not document it for others to profit by.
We feel that in ?AF Manual 64-1 [Search and Rescue -
I Southeast Asia] this has been overcome or at least

I 55

I
 I
rrrinirrri:wd. Uf cour>se, it is impossible to substitute
any doaument for> aatual e:x:perienae. You aould read
I
every item ever written on BAR, but there is no alter-
native to the learning proaess of involvement in a
aombat reaover>y mission.
I
The tactics and techniques documented in the above referenced 7AF I
49/
manual---- outline the individual operational procedures to be employed by
each of the individual components of the SARTF, and the overall command
I
and control relationships of the integrated force. I
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
I
Combat Saves
During the eighteen-month period of this report, the 3 ARRGp was
I
officially credited with two-hundred-twenty-four combat saves bringing I
its total over the five-year period to 2,039. A break-down by quarters
is contained in Table A.2. This represents approximately thirty-four I
combat saves a month, or the recovery of an average of better than one
individual who would have otherwise faced death or capture by hostile
I
forces for every day of their activation in SEA. Colonel Pinyerd,
I
Commander, 3 ARRGp at the close of this reporting period had the
following comments regarding these accomplishments:
§!Y
I
The aaaomplishments of the BAR foraes during this
aonfliat in SEA have been aahieved only through over-
I
aoming what at times have seemed like insurmountable
odds. During the first few years, the available
faailities - both in te~s of systems and personnel -
aould not keep up with the developing demands. There
I
was the aontinuous strain of playing aatah-up ball
aU the time. Another thing that has hampered our
aativities until relatively recently, is the amount
I
56 I
I
I
I of lost effort in relearning lessons~ which re-
sulted from inadequate opportunities to document
what predecessors had previously learned. This
I resulted from the tremendous efforts required to
build up a combat recovery capability from scratch~
and everyone immediately involved was so concerned
I with day-to-day operations there was little time for
anyting else.

I Now it seems that having at long last developed aU

the individual elements of the SARTF during the last
year to a fully effective and integrated team~ we are
I losing it again. Having gained the all BUFF heli-
copter force we are faced with a diminishing RESCORT
force to the point where once again it will not be
I possible for the SAR forces to meet demands due to
lack of facilities~ in this case the required A-1 force.
The accomplishments to date have been achieved only
through a total team effort~ and the contributions of
I each element are equally important to the success of
the overall mission. As a chain~ the SARTF can only
be as strong as its weakest link. Unfortunately I
I do not see how this particular link can be replaced
by a substitute. There just isn't another aircraft
in our inventory with the performance characteristics
I and the capacity and diversity of weapons load avail-
able that can come close to meeting the particular
needs of RESCORT.

I As shown in Table 1, of the total number of combat saves, forty-

I eight percent represented the recovery of downed aircrew members~

Within the 980 ACR combat saves, Air Force personnel constituted
I 58.2 percent of the total group. It is also interesting to note
that the HH-3s accounted for more combat ACR than all other aircraft
I combined. The values also indicate the lateness of introduction of the

I HH-53s into the SEA conflict. When considering their superiority in

the combat SAR role, it is interesting to note that they accounted
I for less than twelve percent of the combat ACR and only 18.2 percent
of all combat saves.
I 57

I
 I
Non-Combat Saves I
The information on Table 2 reflects a similar breakdown of non-
combat saves. Again it may be seen that the old reliables, the HH-43
I
PEDROS, bore their share of the SAR effort over the years in SEA, I
accounting for over seventy-one percent of the non-combat saves. Here
again the largest numerical group by personnel category, was the US I
Air Force.
I
Combining these figures with those of Table 1, it can be seen
from Table 3 that the PEDROS accounted for more saves, 52.5 percent, I
than all the other aircraft categories collectively. Along with the
HH-3s, with approximately 32 percent of all saves, the large numerical
I
values were accumulated during the large-scale air operations through I
October of 1968, prior to the bombing halt restricting operations over
North Vietnam. A comparison of these figures with the HH-53s is I
therefore impossible, since the 53s were not presented the same opera-
tional environment for a relative analysis on the basis of number of
I
saves. The greater capability of the BUFFs, outlined in previous I
sections, and their performance wherein similar environments were
presented leave no doubt that had they been available earlier, the I
accomplishments summarized in these tables would have been even more
spectacular.
I
It is impossible to evaluate the success of SAR in monetary terms I
with a very high degree of accuracy, but if no other factor than personnel
I
58
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------ .
3 ARRGp COMBAt SAVES
----- .

1966 1967 1968 1969 19.70 TOTALS

ACR NAC ACR IIAC ACR NAC ACR NAC ACR NAC ACR NAC ALL
\
HH-·S 92 38 122 68 163 138 72 1 47 14 496 259 75~

HH- 45 65 186 68 147 79 . 92 94 102 37 18 343 545 888

HH- sa 0 0 1 0 21 79 48 164 46 12 116 255 371

HU- 18 22 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 0 23

HC- aso· 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

ir- OTHER.!./ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 2

"' TOTALS .
-'
179 224 192 215 263 309
l/CREDIT Of: 2 COMBAT SAVES TO PJ RON ON GROUND WITH SURVIVORS
214 . 267 132 44· 980
•
1059 2039

1966 1967. 1968 1969 1970 TOTALS

ACR NAC ACR NAC .ACR ~c ACR NAC ACR. N-AC ACR NAC ALL
USAF 117 1 99 43 129 '1'2 138 6 87 3 570 65 635 .
USA 27 169 45 66 80 47" 46 32 17 21 215 335 550
USN 29 3 41 55 47 69 26 45 . .6 0 150 172 322
FWMF 6 23 2 43 . 6 45 4 181 0 7 18 299 317
CIVIL 0 10 4 4 1 136 . 0 2 0 . 0 5 1.52 157

OTHER 0 18 0 4 0 0 . 0 1 22 13 22 36 58

TOTALS 179 224 192 . 215 263 309 214 267 132 44 980 1059 2039
&8~
I Vii
Q liiliiil Q I II
Vi I ICIAC •••• ....... -.c.
0"1:.-----vl~~
 I

3 ARRGp NON COMBAT SAVES

1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 TOTA LS
ACR NAC ACR NAC ACR NAC ACR NAC ACR NAC ACR NAC ALL
HH-5 7 0 18 63 22 54 14 23 1 3 62 143 205
HH- 43 17 49 49 100 45 213 31 116 18 50 160 528 688
HH- 55 0 0 1 0 5 5 .4 1 8 11 18 17 35
HU- 18 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 o. 0 0 ·o 7 7
HC- 110 0 0 0 ·0 0 0 0 1 0 30 0 31 31
OTHER 0 0 1
.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
i! 1
to
r-
rrl
i
TOTALS . 24 49 69 170 72 272 49 141 27 94 241 726 967
'·
N

1966 1967 1968 . 1969 1970. TOTA LS

ACR NAC ACR NAC ACR -NAC ACR NAC ACR NAC ACR NAC ALL
USAF 18 2 47 8 43 35 36 29' 18 7 162 81 243
USA 5 1 16 39 9 38 2 21 0 29 ·32 128 160
USN 0 5 2 72 18 65· 6 36 . 9 4 35 182 217
.FWMF 1 3 2 11 1 55 2 19 0 2 6 90 96
CIVIL 0 38 1 39 1 74 3 36 0 46 5 233 238
OTHER 0 0 1 1 0 5 0 0 0 6 1 12 13
TOTALS
........................ . ........ _
24 49 69 170 72 272 49 141 27 94 241 726 967

ONLY •
---~_
~·
I OR 0 I I ICIAE tJt!JL
0
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I CONA.WIAt. -
I replacement and retraining costs are considered, a figure on the order
of $100,000,000 represents a minimum value attributed to the ACR phase
I alone. In addition to the 1188 US and FWMF ACR saves, the 1352 non-ACR

I recoveries of US and FWMF (armed forces) personnel -constitute the return

to duty of 2540 military personnel whose services may have, or in many
I cases it is known they would have been otherwise lost.

I Other Air Operations

WhiTe- the recovery of downed aircrewmen and other personnel exposed
I to danger in hostile areas, has represented one of, if not the most,
exemplary chapters of USAF operations in the SEA conflict of itself,
I the personnel of.the 3 ARRGp have not contented themselves with anything

I less than the maximum possible effort in emulating the code of the air
rescue man. As expressed by Lieutenant Colonel Tomlinson, Chief of the
I 51/
JRCC, during the end of this reporting period:-

I WhiLe we have a unique status within the worLdWide

ARRS organisation, that of maintaining as a prima:zoy
mission a aombat SAR readiness posture to support the
I US str·Z:ke foroes at aU times throughout the SEA
theater of operations, we azie atso aorrmitted to ~e_ __
g~raZ poZicies and objectit)es of the ARRS. To filie
I e:ctent that our pPima:zoy misBion is not degmded, we
are aLways ready to Zend assistance to anyone in dis-
tress requiring the speaia'L services norrma'L'Ly on'Ly
avai Zab Ze from the 3 ARRGp ztesources. To not ina·Zude
I suah operations in any discussion of SAR in SEA wou Zd
provide a less than compZete piatUPe of the subjeat.
While there are no hard and fast regulations or
I directives aovering suah op~tions, we have ovezt the
years had to use OUP heads on initiating SUOh missions,
aZZ decisions subjeat to the t~equirements of maintain-
ing a combat SAR posture. In the not~thel'n area of
I
59
I
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 I
operations~ we have a little more leeway in dispatch-
ing resources on such missions because of the normal
I
reserve forces in being at Udorn and Da Nang. However~
in the. geographical area of Mi-litary Regions III and
IV of SVN and the remainder of Southern SEA~ the only
I
force we maintain are the BUFFs and SANDIES at Bien
Boa AB. On several. occasions we have recovered pel'-
sonneZ from Con Son Island off the Southern coast of I
SVN~ due to reluctance of the Vietnamese to fZy heZi-
copters over water~. prima:I'il.y due to r~uirements for
immediate medical. evacuation to a maintand hospital.~
but normally our operations are more often concerned
I
with rescue activities off the East coast of SVN or
in isolated mainland locations. I
Some of the more spectacular as well as typical examples of this
activity include the following episodes:
I
As a result of an unexpected level of attack by enemy forces,
I
personnel-at Lima Site 108 at Muong Soui in Laos were faced with being I
overrun with no possibility of escape by land, having been completely
surrounded. As a result the 40 ARRSq was requested and authorized to I
proceed with the aerial evacuation of the friendly troops. At the
end of the single day's operation three BUFFs had successfully evacuated I
a hundred and eleven personnel to safey, once again demonstrating the
excellent capabilities of the HH-53s.
I
An example of both the tenacity of SAR operations and the effective
I
coordination of efforts of many organizations was displayed in the ex- I
ecution of Mission Number 3-022-29 Nov 70. At 0855L on the 29th of
November 1970, the JRCC was notified by the 834th Air Division Command I
I
60
I
I
 3. ARRGp TOTAL SAVES
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 TOTALS
ACR NAC ACR NAC ACR NAC ACR NAC ACR NAC ACR NAC ALL
HH- 3 98 38 140. 131 185 192 86 24 48 17 557 402 959
HH- 43 82 235 117 247 124 305 125 218 55 68 503 1073 1576

HH- 53 0 0 2 0 26 84 52 165 54 23 134 272 406

HU- 16 22 0 1 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 7 30

HC- 110 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 0 1 0 30 0 31 31

-t OTHER 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 0 3
~
,... TOTALS •
1'1'1 ,202 273 261 385 335 581 263 408 159 138 1220 1785 3005
w

1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 TOTALS

ACR NAC ACR NAC ACR "NAC ACR NAC ACR NAC ACR NAC ALL
USAF 135 3 146 51 172 47 174 35 105 10 732 146 878
USA 32 170 61 105 89 85 48 53 17 so 247 463 710
USN 29 8 . 44 127 65 134 32 81 ' 15 4 185 354 539
FWMF 7 26 4 54 7 100 6 200 0 9 24 389 413
CIVIL 0 48 5 43 2 210 3 38 0 46 10 385 395 J
OTHER 0 18 1 5 0 5 0 1 22 19 23 48 71
TOTALS 203 273 261 385 335 581 263 408 159 138 1221 1785 3006

F8R Q F~liiAL tJ!! et~L'I'.

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- - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - ·-·~·»·
--......v~

TABLE4
3RD ARRGP AIRCRAFT LOSSES IN SEA
DATE TMS IIEtMRKS

8-7-66 IIB·43B 59-1587 OPI.'tllt SVN N/A 10/38 DanOYID BY MOITAll HIT ON PAD
1•9-66 HH·3E 64-14227 ACDNTL LAOS RCYD 5/38 CRASHBD DUE TO PILOT EDOI. 1 PAX KIA

18-10-66 JIU•l6B. 51•7145 . QfBT SVN 7KIA 37 LaiT ON TONKIN GULP CICim ORBIT MISSION
20-lo-66 BB•31 65-12778 QfBT LAOS RCVD 51J8 HtT BY Elf!MY GROUND FIRE

28-10-66 BB-43F 62•4511 atB'1' 8VII 2KIA 9/SS BIT BY E1IIMY GROOlU> FlU • 3 PAX KIA
29·11-66
-·
IJI•H
"'""''- · - - - "'"'""""""""'"'"

6-2-67 1111•31
~ ..-- - "'*'·
64-14,231
-"~~----

65-12779
~

<lCBT
LAOJ

NVN
RCVD

3KIA
5/38

2/37
. -AIIt<SAFl' LAilOED IN. 008T___
--~--"""~""'~-- ~- ..

HIT BY ENEMY GRO'£J'lm FIRE.

,__
AND ROLLBD OVD
,_..,.. ...

1 PAX KIA
--,-~ _____
....."'-'"'_"""'

8-5-67 1lli-43F 63-9715 CMBT SVN RCVD 7/38 BIT BY. 37/57t'M. DUlUBG ATTEMPTED TAKE OPF

21·5-67 HB•43F 63-9711 CMBT SVN RCVD 6/38 HIT BY 37/57MM RECOVDING RAMROD 2 CRF.W

27-10-67 HII•3E 66-13283 QfBT LAOS RCVD 37 HIT BY 37/57MM DURING HOYER TO PICK UP CREW

9-11-67 BB-3E 66-13279 omT LAOS. 3KIA 37 HIT BY 37/57tlflli DURING TAKEOFF FR<Jf MEDEVAC
~---~,-----...-

15-1-68 BB-3E 64-14233 QIBT NVN RC\TD 1/37 HIT BY 37/57MM, LOST POWER AND ClASH LANDED
8-2-68 11R-43P 62-4525 CJIBT SVN lKIA 9/38 HIT BY 37/57MM OW IIUliSS, CRASHED AND EXPLODED

9-6-68 HB•3E 67-14710 afBT SVN 4KIA 37 HIT BY SA /37HH DURINC EClESS, EXPLODED AND CRASHED
28-7-68 HC•l30P 66-0214 OPRTNL SVN N/A 39 DESTROYED BY SAPPERS ON PAD AT TUY HOA AB

28-7-68 HC·l30P 66-0218 OPRTNL SVN N/A 39 DESTROYED BY SAPPERS ON PAD AT TUY HOA AB
5-10-68 HH•3E 65-12782 <MBT LAOS 2IflA .. 37 HIT BY AW AU, CRASHED AND BURNED
fiiliiriiiU!f
--------
I
--·----- ~ ..

TABLE 4 cONTINUED
-· .. -- -·-- _I ..

DATE TMS UNIT REMARKS

10-10-68 1UI-43B 65-1845 I Acmm.. SVN 4KIA 1/38 I CCMPONEN'l' FAILURE DUE TO INADEQUATE MAIR'J."ENANCE DOCS

16-1o-61 D·)E 65-12786 I OllmiL SVN 'RCVD 37 I LOS'1' XHIN OIL PK&ISUIE OVER WATER AND IWIK

19-10.68 66·13282 I OGT !IVN JlCVJ) 37 IBIT BY 37MM DURilfG WATEI RECOYDY AJm SAJtK

66·14430 1 amr LAOS :RC\'D 40 I HIT BY AW FIRE. LOST HYD PUll All> LA.ftll DIS'BOYED

26-1-69 ......,, 63-9712 011'1' SVN RCVD 9/38 I HIT BY SA AND LOST ENGINE 'PafD., CRASJmD

28-6-69 D-431 59-1590 CMBT SVN RCVD 1/38 I HIT BY UNKNQlH GROUND PS AND <2tASimD AT SIA

10·7-69 BB-431 60·0278 AcmtrL SVN RCVD 12/38 I LOST DUE TO PILOT EltROR DURING LANDIIIG

19·7-69 1DI-43B 59-1562 OYfaJfL THAI 2KIA 12/38 I CIASBBD FRc:M HITS ROM EXPLODING B•52

7-8-69 1111-43B 60-0282 SVN RCVD 11/38 I EMGINE FAILURE OVER WATER. AND SANK

24-10.69 BR•lE 66-13281 LAOS RCVD 37 I HIT BY SA/AW, CRASH LANI)ED, DESTROYED BY FRIJOO>LIES

28-1•70 HH•53B 66-14434 CMBT LAOS 6KIA 40 DISINTEGRATED IN MID AIR FROM MIG-21 AIM

15-4-70 HB•3E 66-13280 CMBT SVN 3KIA 37 HIT BY SA FIRE, CRASHED AND BURNED

30-6-70 I DI•53C I 68•8283 I tMBT

I LAOS
I 6KIA J 40 I HIT BY SA/ AW' ROLLED OVER AND CRASHED

NON 3RO ARRIP SAR AIRCAFT LOS.S IN SEA

2-6-65 Hli-43F 63-9713 CMBT SVN RCVD 7/38 HIT BY 37/57MM AND CRASHED

3-7-65 HU•16B 51-0058 OPRTNL SVN RCVD NDA LOSS ATTRIBUTED TO WEATHER CONDITIONS
lKIA
2G-9-65 H11·43B 62-4510 CMBT NVN 3CAP 5/38 HIT BY 37/57MM AND CRASHED

6-11-65 CB•3C 63-9685 CMBT NVN 3CAP 1/38 CREW BAILED OUT WHEN HIT BY 37/51MM
it!..,.. ~;. ..
• •
I
I Post that one of its C-123s, Call Sign Bookie 540, was overdue while
I en route from,Phan Rang AB to Cam Ranh AB. The last contact with the
aircraft had been received at 0736 with a last known position (LKP} of
I 11° 46' N 109° 08' E. At 0930 KING 24 was diverted to the LKP to per-

I form visual and electronic search, with a PEDRO from Det 1, 38 ARRSq,
joining the search force at 0943. By the·end of the day the airborne
I search effort had included the following units, and the status of the
?11
mission when darkness dictated its suspension was as follows:
I
39 ARRS/2 Sorties/14.8 hours; Det 1~ 38 ARRS/2 Sorties/
I 2.2 hours; 21 TASS/1 Sortie/1.3 hours; 4 Inf Div/1
Sortie/2.0 hours; 254 Aeramed Det/5 Sorties/8.2 hours;
48 Avn Co/3 Sorties/2.4 hours ••• 12 helicopter sorties
were flown during daylight hours with negative results.
I The Helo's searched the ridge tine surrounding· the LKP
to an elevation of 1100FT. The LKP is at the 3000PT
level. The coast Une was searched from Phan Rang to
I Cam Ranh Bay. Low aeiZings and visi'biUty hampered
today's efforts. The weather is not ~ected to im-
prove until 30/1400Z. An HC-130 witt launch after
first light tomorrow to aontinue visual and electronic
I search. Helos from Det 1~ 38 ABRS and I Field Force
will be on standby for search should weathszt improve.

I The next day KING 24 and KING 26 continued the search for the

I forty-four missing personnel - five USAF crewmembers and thirty-nine

passengers, including twelve foreign nationals. Activity of the day
w
I was described as follows:

I
I
61
I
UNCLASSIFIED
I
 UNCLASSIFIED I
J9 ARRS/2 Sorties/17.J hours; 48 Avn Co/12 Sorties/
I
24.5 hours; 247 Med Det/10 Sorties/10.8 hours .•.
Weather hampered visual search efforts throughout
the day. Search was concentrated primarily in vicinity
I
of LKP since this position was a positive fix by Cam
Ranh Bay RAPCON. Coastline from Phan Rang to Cam Ranh
Bay was searched twice today. One hour priozo to sun-
set a large burned out area was sighted at 11° 43' N
I
109° 10' E. Burned area extended up. the ridge into
the cloud cover. No wreckG.(Je was sighted. A ground
team was alerted at Nha Trang but clouds obsaured the
I
area within minutes preventirlfl visual search. A
ground team is on standby for tomorrow and wiJ} _b~ _
inserted as soon as weather permits. Weather forsoast I
for the area is 100FT scattered~ 2500FT scattered
variable broken~ visibility 7 miles in rain~ wind NE
15 to 20 "KTS. I
On the third day of the search KING 24 and KING 26 directed 23 I
helicopter sorties for a total of 47.4 flying hours in .spite of con-
tinued bad weather in the area.
W I
The planned search area • •• has been searched with
100% effectiveness with the exception of a '~ome
I
plate" shaded area ••• The western half of the "home
plate" area has been searahed to an elevation of 1600FT/
100% effective~ 1600FT to 2000FT 60% effective. Above
I
2000FT/100% effective~ 2000FT to 2500FT/75% effective.
Above 2500FT/20% effective. The LKP of Bookie 540
lies within this area. However~ weather has prevented
searching the higher elevations. A vil~er living
I
near the LKP reported hearing a loud ezp Zosion the
morning of 29 Nov which suggests Bookie 540 may be
located near the LKP. Weather forecast for tommorow's
I
search is lOOOFT scattered variable broken~ JOOOFT
broken~ visibility J to 5 mites~ wind NE at 10 KTS.
The large burned area mentioned in progress report I
#1 was closely examined today and no wreckage of any
kind was sighted. Area had been purposely burned by
local farmers. I
I
62
I
UNCLASSIFIED
I
I UNCLASSIFIED
I On the fourth day total srur-actlVfty-was--restricteC! -tOTess tnan--:-M
I minutes of air effort consisting of two short electronic search attempts
by KING 24 and KING 26. The entire area was visually unworkable due to
I low cloud cover obscuring the ground. The following day. 4 D~cember,
~

I King 24 perfonrned visuaZ and eZectronic search and

directed 6 aircr>aft on visuaZ search. 39 ARRS/1 Sortie/
6.2 hours; Det 1~ 38 ARRS/1 Sortie/1.7 hours; 247 Med
I Det/2 Sorties/4.5 hours; 21 TASS/1 Sortie/2.0 hours.
Weather permitted onZy Zimited visuaZ search today.
A cirCJUZar area with a radius of 2 kiZometers at 11°
I 46' N 109° 08' E was searched with 90% effectiveness.'
Parts of "wreckage were sighted in this area. PEDRO
20 (HH-43) Zowered his fZight mechanic to the ground
to examine the wreckage and retrieve some readiZy
I movab Ze parts. Parts were fZown to Phan Rang AB and
seriaZ nw!Wers on the wreckage parts were put into_
the computer for identification. Items were .identi-
I fied as parts from an F-4C type aircr>aft. The PEDRO
fZight mechanic cZoseZy e~amined a C-123 airaraft at
Phan Ra'YI{J and confirmed that none of the wreckage
I sighted on the ground was part of a C-123. No sig-
nificant improvement in the weather is forecast for
tomorrow. Terrain to be searched is above 25000FT
MSL broken to overcast~ wind east 10-15 KTS ••• Future
I pZans: KING 24 and DUSTOFF 58 (UBIH) wiZZ be on ·
scene after first Zight to check weather in the SAR
area. SAR forces wiZZ be standing by for immediate
I response shouZd weather permit. An ARVN ground party
with MACV Advisors wiZZ begin searching on foot
tomorrow.

I The following day further airborne SAR efforts were precluded by

I weather conditions, but a ground team was inserted as close to the

estimated crash site as possible at 0905L. Details of the discovery
I of two survivors and related activities of the
56/
d~-- are contained in
Appendix E. The last large effort on the part of the SAR forces was
I
I 63

UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED I
I
executed the next day, 5 December, with the PJs assisting in the evacua-
, 57/
tion of the two survivors.-- The complete text of this mission report I
is also included in Appendix E to provide the reader with a detailed re-
view of the SAR participation and examples of SAR action reports.
I
For the next several d~s AMC aircraft provided communications I
relay facilities between airborne and ground elements in the effort to
insert the graves registration team and security force to confinm that
I
no other survivors had been missed. Continued bad weather in the rugged I
terrain severely hampered the efforts of the ground el~ments in getting
to and from the scene of the crash, locating and identifying the remains I
of personnel aboard. The mission was not closed out until all survivors
had been accounted for and recovered on 17 December 1970. During the
I
execution of this mission nine organizational units, three of which were
from the 3 ARRGp, had conducted ninety-nine sorties consisting of over
I
two hundred flying hours, over half of which were flown by the USAF SAR I
aircraft as outlined in Appendix E.
I
To attest to the ability of the SAR forces to deploy throughout the
SEA operational area simultaneously on varied missions, on the same day I
the above mission was initiated, a second SAR effort was begun which
involved the coordinated efforts of USAF SAR and US Navy aircraft, three
I
US Naval Ships and three other surface vessels. At approximately 1100 I
local on the 29th of November, the Indonesian registered tanker SS Langir,
I
64
I
-UNC-LASSIFIED
.. - . . . -~·
I UNCLASSIFIED
I transmitted distress signals stating that she was sinking in- heavy seas

I and the crew was abandoning the ship at position 10° 10' N 101° 10' E.
The first ship to reach the area was the SS Benc1euch shortly after
I 1500 local. Upon receipt of the original distress signal by the USNS
Muskingum COMUSNAVPHIL assumed controlling agency direction and ordered
I the Muskingum along with the USNS Sgt Kimbro and USNS Sgt Miller to

I proceed to the area. Upon arrival of the Muskingum after dark, the
Bencleuch departed the area and the Muskingum assumed OSC duties. During
I the early morning hours, the Genman registered vessel B C Rickmers joined
~
the search effort. Initial 3 ARRGp participation was described as follows:
I
At 30/0043Z ?AF JRCC notified OL-B, 3 ARRGp that an
I IndOnesian registered tanker, catZ sign LAGIR [ sic ]
was in distress and the crew had abandoned the vessel.
COMUSNAVPHIL reported at 30/0249Z to proceed to the

I area. KING 23 estabtished contact with the USNS Mitter

at 30/0440Z NA D arrived on scene at 30/0445Z. The OSC
was USNS Muskingum untit 30/0633Z. USNS Kimbro asswned
OSC at that time. KING 23 departed SAR area at 30/1000Z
I and arrived Udom RTAFB at 30/1145Z. A debrief with
KING 23 Cl"ew indicated a sighting of one survivor
drifting on debris. Position was marked with smoke and
I sea marker. A German ve8set, caU sign Rickmers, was
directed to the area for a successfUl pickup of survivor.
Search was hampered by tow visibility due to frequent

I rain squatZs. KING 23 reported exceZZent communications

with USN ships on 3023.5 KHZ. Per conversation with
duty officer at COMUSNAVPHIL~ four survivors have been
picked up as of 30/1020Z. A first tight effort search
I wi l Z be conducted on 1 Dec ?0.

I During the closing daylight hours of the 30th, the surface vessels
were joined by the SS Tun Ming of Nationalist Chinese registry. At
I 0545L on 1 December KING 27 departed Cam Ranh AB arriving in the search
m
area at 0715 and initiated an area search at 500 feet AGL.
I 65

I UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED I
I
At 0900 King 27 Zocated what appeared to be a Zife
jacket in the water~ the position was marked with a
smoke fZoat and a sea dye marker. This was _p_assed
to the Kimbro who in turn notified the Tun.MiiiiJ~-
I
the vesseZ cZosest to the sighting. This first
sighting was Zater confi~ed by the Kimbro as being
one of the crewmen from the Langir and he was re-
I
covered by the Tun Ming. The search was oontinued
and at 0920L KING 27 sighted a Zife boat with nine
persons aboard. This position was marked with smoke I
fZoats and sea dye markers. The Kimbro was adVised
of the sighting and position of the survivors. KING
27 then depZoyed an MAl kit which was immediateZy re-
covered by the nine survivors in the Zife boat. After
I
making aertain the creiJmen in the Zife boat were
reasonabZy secure~ KING 27 proceeded back to the
vicinity of the Kimbro and the Rickmers. Vectors
I
were passed to the Kimbro who in turn notified the
Rickmers~ the ship cZosest to the seoond sighting.
By 1010L the Rickmers had recovered the nine survi-
vors and the ~1 kit. Radio communications with the
I
Rickmers via the survivaZ radio from the ~1 kit re-
veaZed that the Captain of the Langir was on board
the Rickmers and that 10 additionaZ crewmen had
I
abandoned the Langir with onZy Zife jaokets for
survivaZ equipment. KING 27 con#nued the search
and at 1030L two more survivors were spotted standing I
on a smaZZ wooden raft. This position was marked and
the information passed to the Kimbro who in turn
notified KING 27 that the USNS Muskingum was the
vesseZ aZosest to the third sighting. The Muskingum
I
was vectored toward the two survivors on the raft
and had them in sight by 1050L. At 1131L the MUskingum
had put a smaZZ boat over the side and was in the
I
process of recovering the two crewmen and the raft.
At 1123L~ KING 27 passed a request to JOKER for an-
other aircraft to assist in the search. By 1158L I
KING 27 had received confi~ation that a!!:_addi~ionq.}
aircraft ••• IC [aaU sign INDIA CHARLIE] 34?~ a Navy
P3V~ wouZd proceed to the area. The search continued
with negative resuZts untiZ about 1540L when KING 27
I
spotted an area of extensive debris and possibZy a
body in a Zife jaaket at 10° 00' N 100° 43' E. I
I
66 I
UNCLASSIFIED
I
I The Kimbro, the Muskingum and the Rickmers were noti-
fied of this fourth sighting and were vectored into
I the area by KING 27. Some of the debris and the Zife
jacket had been marked with sea dye and smoke floats.
KING 27 continued to search the aPea of the fourth
I sighting and requested IC 347 to proceed to that area
to aid in the search. B]i 1640L the endurance of KING 27
was down to approximateZy 3+00 and the decision was
I made to RTB to CH 71. IC 347 was notified and agreed
to remain in the area to work with the Kimbro. At
1645L the Kimbro was notified of KING 27's intentions
and at that time KING 27 departed the area. The Kimbro
I confirmed that 12 survivors had been Zocated by KING 27
and aZZ 12 had been recovered by the surface vesseZ in
the area. FZying time 12.6 hrs.
I On 3 December KING 27 was launched from Cam Ranh AB at 0555
I arriving at the search area shortly after 0700L. Efforts by both
airborne and surface units throughout the day yielded the recovery of
I one body. found in life jacket by the USNS Sgt Kimbro. Having completed
a 100% search coverage, with no further survivors discovered the OSC
I USNS Muskingum recommended termination of search effort and COMUSNAVPHIL

I terminated the mission at l830L. As a result of this combined effort

the 3 ARRGp was credited with 12 non-aircrew members non-combat saves
I having flown three sorties for a total of 33.7 hours. At the close

I of the mission seven personnel of the original crew of twenty-four

remained missing.

I Three months earlier, during the period from the eighth through the

I thirteenth of October 1970, members of the 3 ARRGp had completed a

series of more typical missions of this nature.
§91
·
I
67
I
I 0
 I
Tan Son Nhut - HelicopteP cPewmen saved foUP lives in
I
six days last week. GeoPge Mardkis, a LibePian seaman
suffePed an acute attack of appendicitis and the
LibePian fPeighteP Buena VentuPa, Pequested immediate
assistance. The ship was about 200 miles off the
I
Vietnam coast. An HH-53 Buff on alePt at Bien Hoa AB
rushed to the scene. Sgt Ewin Petty, a medical _tec}J.-
nician, assisted in bPinging the seaman into the
I
heZicopteP.
I
The patient was bPought to 3d Field Hospital neaP hePe,
just oveP six hoUPB afteP the Pequeat was made.
I
The Buff made two inflight Pefueling with HC-130
HePcules fPom Cam Ranh Bay. The C-130 was also the
ai~boPne command post duPing the mission.
I
ThPee days earZieP, two badly bUPned Noruegian aailoPB I
fPOm the M.V. To~e Knudsen we~e aiPlifted to Cam Ranh
Bay's hospital. The fPeighteP was damaged by. an ex-
plosion and fiPe that killed two othe~a. I
An HH-53 Buff was also used fo~ that mission. MSgt
Malcolm E. WiZUams descended to hoist the man off I
the fPeighteP. Again an HC-130 aePVed as aiPboPne
command post.
I
AnotheP HH-53 picked up a aailoP on a British ship
110 miles fPom Cam Ranh Bay. The injUPed man was
taken to the 483d USAF Hospital at Cam Ranh Bay. An
I
HC-130 fi~ed parachute flares to light the area while
coordinating the Peacue effoPt.
I
Another operation which constituted a very significant achievement
within the ARRS was conducted in August of 1970. This involved the trans-
I
continental and transPacific ferry flight of two HH-53C helicopters from
Eglin AFB, Florida, Florida to Da Nang AB, RVN. The trip covered almost
9,000 nautical miles and was completed in seven days involving seven
stopovers en route. During the 71 hours and 11 minutes of flight time
68
I
I
logged during the trip, a total of thirteen aerial refuelings were
·I accomplished. A breakdown of the flight itinerary is presented in
the following summary:
I
FliGHT LOG DATE DISTANCE DURATION REFUELINGS
I Eglin AFB
15 Aug 1353 10:28 2
I Minot AFB·
Elmendorf AFB
16 Aug 1850 14:10 3
17 Aug
I Shemya AFS ·
(Int'l Dateline)
1272 9:56 1

18/19 Aug 1514 14:18 4

I Misawa AB
20 Aug 1137 8:51 1
Kadena AB
I Clark AB
21 Aug
22 Aug
815
798
7":18
6:10 1
1

Da Nang AB
I
Each of the helicopters carried a special configured crew of an
I Aircraft Commander/Pilot, two additional Pilots and two Flight Engineers.
Due to the extent and importance of this mission, additional BUFF
I special crewmembers included an overall Mission Commander, Major James

I A. Butera, an ARRS helicopter standardization officer; a Mission

Navigator, Captain Robert J. Meyer, Assistant Director for Current
I Operations, ARRS; and an attendent Flight Surgeon, Dr. (Major) Gordon
K. Lochridge, the ARRS Staff Surgeon.
I
I 69

I
-te~O!IIN•PPttiDIII!I!INlfflf.·tti••'•.&L...,.,..,
I
 I
I
Crewmembers of the accompanying HC-130N aircraft provided long
range communications facilities, navigation information and in-flight I
refueling. This successfully concluded mission emphatically demon-
strated the operational capability of the ARRS to meet SAR requirements
I
in a minimum response time as a completely integrated and independent I
organizational element to support tactical forces deployment throughout
the world. Having learned the lessons of the last decade, the ARRS I
hoped that this capability, the culmination of many years of development
and dedication, would not again be allowed to disintegrate as it had
I
before.
I
LOSSES
I
Aircraft
During the period of this report a total of eight SAR aircraft were
I
lost - two accidentally; two attributed to operational related factors, I
and four in combat due to eneii\Y action. Two of these losses were the
first experienced in their respective categories. On 19 July 1969 an I
HH-438 was lost while on a routine LBR mlssion covering the crash and
crew recovery of a B-52 which had crashed on takeoff from U-Tapao RTNA.
I
Due to lack of proper communications between the PEDRO and other elements
I
covering the crash, the bomb load aboard the B-52 exploded without the
crew of the HH-43 knowing of the immediate threat. As a result of this I
70 I
I
• 18NPI.DIItllat'· · * .

II
I
I loss, additional communications equipment was provided the LBR units
and improved procedures for integrating the PEOROs into the overall
I base rescue operations were instituted throughout SEA. On 28 January

I 1970, an HH-538 was shot out of the air by a MIG during a recovery
mission in Laos. The BUFF was on low bird orbit when it took a direct
I hit from an air-to-air missile and disintegrated in midair. The in-
formation of Table 4, outlining these as well as previous SAR losses,
I indicates a total of thirty-two during the activation of 3 ARRGp and

I four during previous assignment of 38 ARRSq as the principal SEA SAR

organization.
I Of the total of thir~-six losses two-thirds were attributed to

I combat loss from enemy action during conduct of a SAR mission. Of

the~e fourteen were HH-3Es and one CH-3C, for 41.7% of all losses.
I These also accounted for 45.9% of the combat losses. The HH-43s, seven
Bs and six Fs, comprised 36.1% of total losses and 33~3% of combat
I losses. In terms of monetary value these losses represented an. expendi-

I ture of approximately 33.4 million dollars. This figure represents

total wipe-out costs, and on many occasions it was possible to salvage
I portions of aircraft, such as engines, avioni.cs and armament sub-systems,
which would reduce the net loss figure to a level closer to 30 million.
I The additional losses incurred by RESCORT and RESCAP aircraft were not

I wi thin the scope of this report.

I
71
I
I
 - a 4
I
Personnel I
During this report period, the 3 ARRGp sustained the loss of fourteen
personnel during conduct of SAR missions. Added to the previous loss of
I
thirty-two personnel, as indicated in Item 4 of Table A.2, this brought I
the total number of 3 ARRGp personnel KIA, MIA or captured to forty-six.
No data were available on losses incurred by SAR forces prior to re- . I
activation of the 3 ARRGp. ·As in the case of aircraft losses, no attempt
was made to determine personnel losses resulting from RESCORT or RESCAP
I
participation.
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
72
I
I
I
I CHAPTER V

I VIETNAMIZATION

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
I On 15 November 1962, a joint United States - Vietnamese Search and

I Rescue Agreement was consummated designating the Vietnamese Air Force

{VNAF) as the responsible agency for direction and execution of all civil
I and military SAR activities in RVN. It was many years, however, before
this paper designation would extend to any semblance of a SAR capability.
I As noted five years later:
§Jj

I The Repub Zia of Vietnam, a signato:ry state to the

aonvention of Intema.tiona't CiviZ. Aviation Organisa-
I tion (ICAO J, is ob 'Ligated to provide assistanae to
ai~araft in distress within its terPit~. In ordeP
to fu'tfiU this obUgation, ·the Republic of Vietnam
shou'td possess a Resaue Coo~dination Cente~ and have.
I ~ained fo~aes identified to ~fo:rrm the SAR mission.
~o the best of my 'knowledge, the1 possess neithe~.
Present'ty, the Joint Vietnam/US "Ssfiiieh and Resoue
I Agreement that is in effeat satisfies the ICAO obli-
gations with the use of USAF SAR fo~aes. The~efozoe,.
upon the withd.PazuaZ. of US foroes f1'0Tn Vietnam,. the
RepubUa of Vietnam witt be unable to aaoompz.ish its
I SAR mission.

I In June of 1964 a field detachment of the Air Training Command (ATC)

was assigned to Tan Son Nhut Airfield, SVN to assist the VNAF in developing
I . w .
a professionally trained helicopter force. Although helicopters
were made available to VNAF they did not devote any significant atten-
I tion to developin~ a SAR capability. What limited helicopter capability
Jl the VNAF developed during the mid 1960s was concentrated on offensive

1 73

I
 ''' I
operations, by increasing their tactical strike capability with anything I
they could get airborne. In spite of TAC and other USAF efforts to
assist the VNAF in developing a viable SAR capability, their endeavors
I
created very limited interest beyond acquisition of additional aircraft
I
based on SAR requirements. The general lack of VNAF interest in pro-
viding even a basic medevac capability is reflected in the following I
account:
I
Throughout 1964~ US Army and Air Force officers
reported that two VNAF H-34 heZicopter squadrons were
not providing adequate medicaZ evacuation service.
MedicaZ evaauation and aeriaZ resuppZy were the main
I
missions for these squadrons. NearZy every afteraction
report from the IV Corps area made same comment criti-
caZ of VNAF performance. Either the heZicopters were
I
Zate or did not arrive; when they did arrive~ they
departed sometimes without carrying (}.b)Q.1J the wounded.
There were 189 requests from IV Corps area during the
I
months of August~ September and October 1964 for
med-evac~ of which onZy 38 were honored. The number
of requests wouZd have been higher had it not been
for the support of Army UH-lBs. The practice was
I
for the Army heZicopters to support the VNAF when
needed; however~ they took a Large part of the VNAF
:roesponsibiUty.
I
The comments of several officers sum up the VNAF performance in I
this area:
I
The ARVY appears to have a definite Zack of con-
fidence in the VNAF H-34 med-evac operation • • • •
(The US Army UH-lBs) particutar~y make the VNAF
I
Zook bad by making night med-evacs of ARVN in the
battZe zone • • • •
I
They can think of many reasons not to fZy and
appear to wait out the US Army to do the work •
they are a sZovenZy Zot in appearanoe • • • in I
74
I
I
I
I oontPa8t to the ordinapy ARVN troops in oombat
boots~ the airo~ws look tePribte~ many wearing

I bLue suede Low aut shoes • • • •

Inadequate med-evac continued to be a serious
probLem that is pointed out in nearLy every
I after-action ~port.

I On 24 April 1965, the Commander, 2d Air Division reported to MACV

on difficulties experienced in eliciting cooperation of RVN forces as
I follows:
§lj

I A most important facet reLated to casuaLty reporting

and disposition of remains is that of the searoh for
and recovery of missing persons. The in-country
I environment often dictates the participation of
ground farces as weLL as airborne forces • • • •
ConsiderabLe difficuLty and extensive deLays have
been incurred in obtaining the ground force support
I to effect timeLy and appropriate resoLution of BAR
endeavor • • • • Request the issuanoe of instruc-
tions or poLicy for Corps Senior Advisors which
I wiLL promote more positive and aggressive reaction
to requests foP assistance in recovering missing
personneL. · · · .
I The reader unfamiliar with the oriental environment should also
I understand that the humanitarian aspects of US SAR operations was a
concept foreign to oriental philosophy. While our development as a
I society stresses the team effort and responsibility to others, the
oriental culture is basically individual in emphasis. It is also
I fatalistic with no particularly deep rooted drive to influence circum-

I stances, especially resulting from combat operations. The failure to

recognize these very basic differences in outlook led one observer of
I the SEA conflict to describe as 11 Two different worlds . . .... Our error

I 75

I
- :au .:&¥ 111 • I
begins with the assumption that ARVN shares our objective. Everything I
that follows, no matter how well-intentioned, takes us further from their
goal."
~
Recognizing this, we must view any departure from their
I
natural inclinations, which were the antipathy of the philosophy funda-
I
mental to the allocation and expenditure of valuable resources to SAR,
as either a temporary and expedient concession or one of the greatest I
psyops accomplishments to come out of the conflict.
I
In March of 1967, the VNAF published the first indication of a
possible shift in viewing the SAR function as a firm responsibility and I
§!
commitment. Although it would be several years before any positive
implementation would be realized, it did provide a sufficiently hopeful
I
basis for renewed USAF efforts to develop an internal VNAF capability. I
Over a year later, however, this capability was still non existent in
terms of either combat SAR as we know it, or even in the more limited I
area of routine medical or natural emergency situation evacuation.
\ I
On 20 June 1968, Bq 3 ARRGp entered into an agr-eement
with RVN Joint For-ecasting Ser-vice, Dir-ector-ate of
Meteor-ology for the emergency evacuation of Pattle I
Island. ~ Pattle Island is a Vietnamese manned
weather station located 210 N.M. east of Da Nang AB,
RVN. Emergency evacuation is construed to mean in
the agreement evacuation of Vietnamese personnel
I
due to ser-ious illness/injury/ and/or severe weather
condi tiona. §JJ I
It was not until 1969 that, with the exception of the 1967 SAR Reg
I
64-1, the VNAF began to seriously approach the problem of establishing
I
76
I
I
I
I a SAR force within RVN resources. An early indication of this emergi11g
68/
interest is reflected in the following briefing note:-
I
During March~ the most significant briefing conducted
I was one hel.d for the combined VNAF/AF Advisory Group
Staffa. Both Major General Minh~ the VNAF Chief of
Staff and Brigadier General Carson~ C01'/'VI'ICD'Uler~ AF
I Advisory Group and their key staffs - numbering
around 40 people - were in attendance for the
briefing on Saturday morning~ 22 March at the
Officers Open Mess. As a resuZt of the briefing~
I General Minh expressed great interest in the Air
Rescue mission~ and requested the VNAF view
Rescue with considerably more interest than in
I the past. General Carson indicated that his staff
woul.d work cZoseZy with our personnel at each of
the detachments in RVN.

I CURRENT ACTIVITIES

I During this reporting period, the first significant action in terms

I of Vietnamization of SAR activities began. The first significant actiDn

was concerned with the turnover of several bases to the VNAF where SAR
I had previously been provided by USAF units. This action was initiated
w
late in 1969 and continued throughout 1970.
I
Det 10~ 38 ARRSq~ Binh Thuy AB~ RVN~ was inactivated
I on 27 December 1969 by ~C special Order G-311~ 15
December 1969. Detachment 10 was equipped with two
HH-43F "Pedro" helicopters with a LBR mission. The
aircrew rescue mission wiZZ be assumed by units of
I the US Army and the Vietnamese Air Force equipped
with helicopters in the delta area. Coordination
and control of aircrew rescue missions remain with
I the 7th Air Force JRCC at Tan Son Nhut AB~ RVN.
HC-130P "King" aircraft of the 39 ARRSq wiZZ con-
tinue to provide electronic and extended search
I capability and act as Airbome Mission Commander
as required.

I 77

I
 I
On 16 February 1970, Det 9, 38 ARRSq left Pleiku AB and was reassigned I
to Nakhom Phanom RTAFB as Pleiku was turned over to the VNAF. Det 9 had
provided the same mission operations in this area of SVN as Det 10 had
I
provided in IV CTZ, and these activities were assumed in a similar I
breakdown of responsibility as in the case of Det 10.

Det 8, 38 ARRSq at Cam Ranh AB was inactivated in place on 15

I
September 1970 following relocation of the 12 TFW to Phu Cat AB. I
During the last quarter, Det 11, 38 ARRSq was inactivated as respon-
I
sibility for the operation of Tuy Hoa was assigned to the US Army.

As a result of this realignment of responsibilities as a part of

I
the overall VNAF Improvement and Modernization Program, the nine in- I
country detachments of the 38 ARRSq in being at the beginning of the
reporting period were reduced to five. It should be noted that in those I
instances where USAF responsibility was relinquished to the VNAF, i.e.,
Binh Thuy and Pleiku Air Bases, there was no comparable transfer of
I
capability. Whereas USAF has previously maintained a dedicated force
I
of two HU-43s, the VNAF had only one UH-1 manned by a crew unqualified
in SAR procedures and operations, and this was not employed on a dedicated I
basis.
I
The second significant area of activities during this reporting period
was concerned with documentation. As mentioned previously, publication I
of VNAF Reg 64-1 in 1967 was the original documentation covering SAR
operations for SVN forces. This document was republished on 1 May
I
78 I
I
I
I 1970,
7J!I
during a period of renewed interest and efforts in behalf of
initiating a SAR capability. This was initiated locally by 7 AF Chief
I of Staff (C/S) letter to all 7 AF staff agencies outlining goals and
I responsfbilities for implementation of the Vietnamese Air Force Improve-
lJJ
ment and Modernization (VNAF I&M) Program.
I
On 16 December 1969, 3 ARRGp replied outlining the approach to
I establishing a SAR capability felt to be realistic in terms of current
and proposed facilities and capabilities on the basis that SAR missions
11

I within the Republic of Vietnam would essentially group into two basic

I categories: (1) Search, rescue and recovery over aerial routes, costal
[sic] waters and in remote areas, and (2) Recovery of military personnel
!.lJ
I from hostile areas~

I On 30 December, C/S 7 AF followed up the letter of 28 November

amplifying the training requirements inherent in accomplishing the goals
I of the VNAF I&M Program. 3 ARRGp then presented on 14 February 1970, ·
a detailed draft Concept of Operations for inclusion, as the SAR Annex,
I in the proposed Programmed Action Directive (PAD) 70-105 citing current
73/
I status as follows:--

I a. CuiTent VNAF reguLations direct the establ-ishment

of a complete VNAF SAR capabiLity.
(1) VNAF Regulation 64-l establishes a VNAF SAR
I organization which includes both MainLand and Naviga-
tion SAR zones, a SAR Mobilisation Center in TACC,
SAR Mobilization Offices in each DASC and SAR stand-
I by forces neaP each SAR Mobilisation Office.

I 79

I
.. I i'; ',I. i!! l'.' 1 ' tt I
(2) VNAF Regutation estabLishes a Search
64-~
and Rescue Training Program to exeraise and test the
I
SAR organization and forces.
(3) VNAFM 55-1/34 es.tabUshes Airorew Operational
I
Procedures for conducting Search Resaue Operations.
and

( 4) VNAF Regulation 51-5 estabLishes ground and I

flying training requirements for VNAF helicopter
aircraft commanders. Search and Resaue training is
inaluded. I
(5) VNAF 50 series regulations direct training
for all VNAF airorew members in survival techniques
associated resaue procedures.
and
I
b. Although the framework for a VNAF BAR organization
exists~
its viability has not yet been tested. I
Management of the Southeast Asia BAR sub-region~
including management of the VNAF Mainland SAR Zone
has been vested in ?th AF. I
w
This and related activities of the period were summarized as follows: I
During the reporting period~ 3
ARRGp became an
active partiaipant in the program to improve and
modernize the Vietnamese Air Force BAR organization.
I
Although titled otherwise~
the program is actually
one of creating a viable BAR organization rather
than improving an existing one. Heretofore~
no
I
force had existed except on paper. An initial
proposal which includes the
of operations~
aircraft
organization~
concept
modifications~
additional· I
crew complements and
equ~pment requirements~
training requirements has been fo~d
to the
Air Force Advisory Group whezte it is being staffed
before being submitted to VNAF Headquazttezts fozt
I
approval.
I
Following several months of defining concepts and establishing
materiel .and training requirements, 3 ARRGp in August 1970 also sub- I
mitted to the Air Force Advisory Group (AFGP), a draft proposal for
I
80
I
I
 " 1 ~·. f· - - ' -·
¢ j j ttt f' I . 5I ; t q Jq ....

publication as revised VNAF Manual 64-1, 11 Search and Rescue- Mainland

SAR .Force.•• At the end of this reporting period, this proposal was
still being coordinated with AFGP and VNAF elements.

In summation, this reporting period saw (1) an increased respon-

sibility placed upon Republic of Viet Nam forces to assume SAR operations
in various areas of SVN through the turnover of previously maintained
USAF bases, (2) a significant increase in documentation of this respon-
sibility and the actions required to implement it under the VNAF I&M
Prog.ram, (3} a very slight material indica.tion of actual development of
any limited SAR capability, and (4) the renewed all-consuming desire
and hope that sometime in the not too distant future, the efforts of
six and a half years would bear fruit.

81
________ ......_, I
FOOTNOTES
I
CHAPTER I I
1. {U) Unified Action Armed Forces, Joint Chiefs of Staff Publica-
tion 2, Jcs, Washington, D.C., dated November 1959, para 40405,
p 89.
I
2. (U) I
3. {U) MAC SO G-262, Hqs MAC, Scott AFB, Ill., dated 4 September 1970.
Doc 2. I
4. {U) MAC SO G-311, Hqs MAC, Scott AFB, Ill., dated 15 December 1969,
Doc 3.. · I
5. {U} MAC SO G-263, Hqs MAC, Scott AFB, I 11. , dated 4 September 1970,
Doc 4. I
6. (U)

7. {U) PACAF MO 24, Hqs PACAF, Hickam AFB, Hawaii, dated 21 August
I
1970, Doc 6.
I
CHAPTER II
I
I
9. (C) Interview by the Author with Colonel Frederick V. Sohle, Jr.,
on 13 October 1970 at Hq 3 ARR~p, Doc 8. I
10. (U) Combat Search and Rescue Joint Development Committee Report.
Hqs ARRS, Scott AFB, I 11 ., dated 31 October 1969, p 8-5.
Unclassified Supplement. Doc ~. Hereafter cited as Combat I
SAR Joint Dev Comm Report.
11. (C) SEAOR - 27. Letter 69ASJT-1343 from Hqs, Aeronautical Systems
Division (AFSC), Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio to Hqs, PACAF
I
(DORQ), dated 16 September 1969. Doc 10.
I
82
I
)
I
I UNCLASSifiiD
I 12. (U)
I (S)

I 13.

I 14. (U) 7AF Conbat ROC 4-70: Pararescue Helmet Transceiver. CSAF
MSG RDQPS o51557z Aug 7o. Doc 13
I 15. (U) Same Subject. CINCPACAF Unclassified EFTO DOQ 142100Z Aug
1970. Doc 14

I 16. (U) Same Subject. Hqs MAC Msg DOQS 261640Z August 1970. Doc 15
17. (U) Same Subject. CSAF Msg RDQPS 092209Z November 1970. Doc 16
I 18. (U) SEAOR 102 FY67. 3 ARRGp Msg 20261 to ARRS dated 12 September
1967.
I 19. (C) Combat SAR Joint Dev Comm Report. Hqs ARRS, Scott AFB, Ill ••
dated 31 October 1969. pp D-3, D-3/2, SECRET Supplement~
Doc 17
I 20. (S)

I 21. (U) Combat SAR Joint Dev Comm Report, dated 31 October 1970, pp
~-1, ~-1/2, Unclassified Supplement. Doc 19
I 22. (C) Combat SAR Joint Dev Comm Report. Dated 31 October 1970.
p G-5, SECRET Supplement. Doc 20
I 23.
(S)

(S)
Hq PACAF DOQ Ltr, 3 Jun 71.
SEAOR on Improved Armament for HH-53 He1ico~ter. Hqs 7AF
(DSR) letter AD-69-1862 dated lO September l969 to DPLR
I {Hqs 7AF). Doc 21
24. {S) SEAOR Request for Visual Reference Light on SAR Helicopters.
I Hqs 7AF (DSR) letter AD-69-1!61 dated 11 September 1969 to
DPLR (Hqs 7AF). Doc 22.
25. (S)
I SEAOR DRAFT - O~~n System for HH-538/C Helico~ters. Hqs
7AF (DSR) 1ette~-6g:z434, dated 15 November 1969 to DPLR
Hq 7AF. Doc 23
I 83

I UNCLASSIFIID
 UNCLASSIFIID
26. (SHR)
I
TAB A I
27. (SHR) Ibid.
28. (S) I
29. (S) Combat ROC 7AF 60-70f Class V Mod1ficJ!ion~ Tactical Secure
Voice for RR-53s. c NcPACAF Msg 1~1§ z, eptember 1970.
I
30. (U) Program Document AF Forms 524, CSOs 70-3609 through 3621.
Dated 16 July 1969. I
CHAPTER III I
31. (S) 3 ARRGp History, January-March 1970, p 8
32. (S) 3 ARRGp History, April-June 1970, p 8
I
33. (U) Course Curriculum and Job and Course Training Standards,
Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Training Center, Eglin AFB,
Florida
I
34. (U) I
35. (S) Search and Rescue, Evasion and Escape Course presentation during
I
PJSS academic session, PJSS, Clark AB, P.I., 3 November 1970
36. (S) SERE Newsletter No. 28. Fleet Intelligence Center, Pacific
Box 1275, FPO 96610. Dated April 1969, p 17
I
(U) Hq PACAF DOS Ltr, 1 Jun 71.
37. (S) SERE Newsletter No. 29. Fleet Intelligence Center, Pacific,
I
Box 1275·, FJ50 96610. Dated June 1969, p 11.
38. (S) Ibid. p 20 I
~·
39.
40.
(S)
(S) ~·
p 22
p 24
I
41. (U) Boxer 22 Mission. 5, 6, 7 December 1969 I
84 I
UNCLASSIFIED I
 ,.,~·,~~f~
I UNCLASSifl"
I
"
42. (U) UPI News Release, Helen Gibson, Sa1gtn. 15 December 1968.
Doc 24 . ,
~
I 43. (S} 3 ARRGp History, January-March 1970,
; '
49

CHAPTER IV
I 44. {S) USAF SAR, July 1966-November 1267~ P~ject CHECO SEA Report,
dated 18 January 1968. p 5 '
I 45. (S) USAF SAR, November 1967-June 196!·' Project CHECO SEA Report,
dated 30 July 1969. pp 24-26 · 1
·

I 46. (S) Rescue at Ban Phanob, 5-7 December 1969. Project CHECO SEA
Report, dated 15 Fe ruary 1970. p f1.:

I 47. (S) Ibid. pp 8-9

48. (C) Interview with Colonel Sohle. (See Footnote 9)
I 49. (S) Seventh Air Force Manual 64-l:tiSearch and Rescue- Southeast
Asia. Hq 7AF, APO 96307, dat 15 January 1971. pp 3-4 thru
3-8. Doc 25 ·
I 50. (C) Interview by the Author with Colonel George C. Pinyerd on
15 December 1970 at Hq 3 ARftGp. DOc' 2~
I 51. {C) Interview by the Author with Lieutenant Colonel William W.
Tomlinson on 1 December 1970 at JRi!c. ·
I 52. (U) Rescue ORenina Report, Mission Number 3-022, 3 ARRGp UNCL EFTO
291751z ov 1
I 53. (U) Rescue Progress Report #1, 3 ARRGp UNCL EFTO 301905Z Nov 70
54. (U) Rescue Progress Report #2, 3 ARRGp UNCL EFTO 011621Z Dec 70
I 55. (U) Rescue Progress Report #4, 3 ARRGp UN.CL EFTO 031959Z Dec 70
56. (U) Rescue Progress Report #5, 3 ARRGp UNCL EFTO 042100Z Dec 70
I 57. (U) Rescue Progress Report #6, 3 ARRGp UNfl EFTO 052100Z Dec 70

I 58. (U) Rescue Opening Report, Mission Number B-3-045, 3 ARRGp UNCL
EFTO Ol0356Z Dec 70 · .

I 59. (U) AMC Mission Repor£t Mission Number B-3-045, submitted by Capt
John S Parmeter U5AF, 39 ARR~q, A14C ·RfNG 27, dated 8 Dec 70

I 85

UNCLASSIFIED
I
 UNCLASSIFIED I
I
60. (U) Seventh Air Force News, dated October 21, 1970. p3
I
CHAPTER V
61. (U) SAR Forces. Letter from Commander, 3 ARRGp to the Air Force
Advisory Group, dated 23 September 1967. TAB A
I
62. (S) 2d Air Division History, January-June 1964. Volume 1, p 2 I
63. (S/NF) USAF SAR IN SEA 1961-66. Project CHECO Report, dated 24 Octo-

64. (U)
ber 1966. pp lO-ll
Ground Support of SAR Endeavor. Letter from Commander, 2d Air
I
Division to MACV-JO, dated 24 April 1965.
65. (U) Vinh Long. Harvey Myerson, Houghton Mifflin Co, Boston,
I
1970, p 112 .
66. (U) AF Regulation on the SAR Organization for the RVN Territory. I
Republic of Vietnam, Department of Defens~, Joint General

67. (U)
Staff, Hqs VNAF Regulation 64-1, dated 23 March 1967
I
I
68. (S) 3 ARRGp History, April-June 1968.
69. (S) 3 ARRGp History, January-March 1969. p 16 I
70.
~~~
3 ARRGp Histor~, OctobE!r-December 1969. p 30
Air Force Regu1ation on the SAR Organization for the Republic
of Vietnam. RVN Department of Defense, Joint General Staff,
I
Hq VNAF AF Regulation 64-1, dated 1 M~ 1970. TAB B
71. (S)
I
72. (S) VNAFI&M Program, 3 ARRGp letter AD-69-2753 to AFGP, dated
16 December 1969. p 2, TAB E
I
73. (S) VNAFI&M Program, 3 ARRGp letter AD-70-9454 to AFGP.
14 February 1970. pp 1-2, TAB J
Dated I
74. (S) 3 ARRGp HistorY, January-March 1970. pp 29-30 I
86 I
I
UNCLASSIFIED
I
I APPENDIX A

I 1 April 1962
SUMMARY OF SAR DEVELOPMENT AND ACTIVITIES'IN'SEA

I Detachment 3 (Det 3) of the Pacific Air Rescue Center (PARC) was activated
by MATS Special Order (SO) G-27, dated 23 March 1962. Det 3 was established
I to coordinate SEA SAR activities from the Search and Rescue Coordination
Center (RCC) to be located at Tan Son Nhut AB. Since Det 3 was without
I aircraft, initial operations were largely confined to collection and dissem-

I ination of SAR information and investigation of aircraft accidents. During

the following two-year period of U.S. forces in SEA, the USAF personnel
I· had to rely on the U.S. Army, Navy and Marine Corps and Vietnamese Air
Force (VNAF} for implementation of actual SAR operations. On many occasions
I the lack of professionally trained SAR personnel contributed to the loss of

I downed aircrews.

I 19 June 1964
Initial deployment to SEA of a USAF SAR force of 36 TOY personnel of the.

I 33rd Air Rescue Squadron (ARSq) from Naha AB, Okinawa, with two HH-43B
helicopters was completed to Nakhon Phanom Airport, Thailand. During
I this same time frame two HU-16s were assigned to Korat, Thailand to provide
an airborne SAR mission control capability. This original force was de-
I ployed to support U.S. personnel engaged in the RANCH HAND and YANKEE TEAM

I missions. This force was later supplemented in August with another TOY
unit sent to Da Nang AB, SVN, with three HH-43Bs to provide SAR capability
I
87
I
I
 I
for the northern portion of SVN and the Gulf of Tonkin and in October I
with three additional HH-43Bs, which had staged at Bien Hoa AB, SVN, ~nd
transferred to Nakhon Phanom in November.
I
21 Mqy 1965 I
The ARS request to assign pararescue volunteers from the Pacific area to
Vietnam was indorsed by MATS to USAF. MATS supported the ARS position of
I
providing a 100% volunteer pararescue core in Vietnam. This situation pre- I
vailed throughout the SEA conflict.

2 June 1965
I
The first SAR aircraft, an HH-43F, 63-9713, was shot down in SEA by enemy I
37/57mm AW fire during execution of a combat recovery mission. All crew-
members were recovered. I
June 1965 I
The Thailand based HU-16s at Korat were replaced by the HC-54s to provide
an improved SAR airborne mission control capability, and the HU-16s were
I
relocated to Da Nang AB, SVN.
I
1 July 1965
The TOY helicopter SAR detachments on duty in SEA from PARC and parent
I
rescue squadrons in the Pacific area, were consolidated organizationally I
as PCS detachments of the reactivated 38th Air Rescue Squadron with head-
quarters at Tan Son Nhut AB, SVN. Locations of detachments as directed in I
88
I
I
I
I
I MATS SO G-18, dated 25 June 1965, were as follows:

I Det One, Nakhon Phanom Aprt, Thailand

Det Two, Takhli AB, Thailand
I Oet Three, Ubon Afld, Thailand
Oet Four, Korat RSI, Thailand
I Det Five, Udorn Afld, Thailand

I Oet Six, Bien Hoa AB, Vietnam

Det Seven, Da Nang AB, Vietnam
I The two fixed wing units, at Korat and Da Nang AB, SVN, continued in a TOY

I status from the parent PACAF organizations.

I 3 July 1965
Det 1 of the 38 ARSq received the first two CH-3s (series C) from the
I Tactical Air Warfare Center {TAWC). From that time on, the Jolly Green
Giants became one of the most welcome sights a downed airman ever saw.
I By the end of the year the total of six CH-3s on loan from TAC had been

I transferred to SEA.

August 1965
I The 602nd Air Conmando Squadron {602 ACSq) began taking 1ts A-1 E' s from

I Bien Hoa AB, SVN to Udorn RTAFB to provide cover escort for the two CH-3s
from NKP and HH-43s, now four in number, at Udorn. By February of 1966
I. the 602 ACSq had completed movement of all operations to Udorn with SAR
RESCORT as one of its primary missions. This capability has proved, over
I the years, to be one of the most vital and integral elements of the SAR

I mission.

89
I ·, ... -
 I
20 Sept 1965 I
First loss of a USAF SAR aircraft in North Vietnam (NVN). An unmodified
HH-438, 62-4510, of Det 5, 38 ARSq was hit by 37/57mm AW fire during attempt-
I
ed SAR mission to recover downed F-105 crewmember. SAR crew listed as one
I
killed in action (KIA) and three captured as intensity of ground fire
from ene~ forces necessitated suspension of SAR mission. This incident I
also claimed the first combat personnel losses of the SEA SAR forces.
I
1 Oct 1965
The following ARS units were designated and organized, IAW MATS SO G-123, I
15 Sep 65:
Det Nine, 38th ARSq, Pleiku Aprt, Vietnam
I
Det Ten, 38th ARSq, Binh Thuy AB, Vietnam I
6 Nov 1965
First Jolly Green (JG) lost due to forced bail out of crew after the air-
I
craft, one of Detachment 1 CH-3Cs from NKP, was hit by enemY ground fire I
while attempting to locate an A-lE lost to automatic weapons (AW) fire
during a SAR mission. One crewmember was later recovered, but remaining I
three crew men were listed as captured.
I
Dec 1965
The first two HC-130H aircraft arrived in SEA on a TOY basis from the 36 ARSq
I
at Tachikawa and the 79 ARSq at Guam. Stationed at Udorn RTAFB, these
I
aircraft provided a new dimension to SAR operations. The HC-54Cs which
I
90
I
I
I =
--~
I they replaced, and which were phased out of SEA by April of 1966, as well
as the HU-16 albatrosses, were extremely limited for SAR use. Due to
I limitations of equipment their principal contribution had been to provide

I a communication link between the low flying helicopters and the Joint Search
and Rescue Center (JSARC) or RCCs which would otherwise have been impossible

I due to terrain interference. Although the two original HC-130 birds had
little more in the way of communications equipment, they did have an aerial
I tracker, the ARD-17, which enhanced survivor location, and they proved to
be much more reliable and versatile. Through periodic development the
I HC-130s were gradually modified to provide a complete airborne command post

I facility to allow them to effectively assume the role of SAR Airborne Mis-
sion Controller, serving as the communication link between the JSARC, RCCs
I and others comprising the Search and Rescue Task Force (SARTF).

I 8 Dec 1965
The 33 ARSq was awarded the Air Force Outstanding Unit Award for exception-
I ally meritorious service in support of mi 1itary operations in SEA during
the period 15 Jun 64 to 31 May 65. This was the second such award received
I by the 33 ARSq. The first, for the period of 1 July 1956 - 31 December 1958,

I was received on the Department of the Air Force General Order (GO) 56 in
1959.
I 3 Jan 1966

I MAC Special Order G-2, this date, directed organization of two additional
detachments to the 38 ARRSq as follows:
I
91
I
I
 Ip ncr;n• iF !IRPRIIW £
I
Det 8 Cam Ranh AB, SVN Effective 18 Jan 66 I
Det 11 Tuy Hoa AB, SVN Effective 18 Feb 66
I
Although SO G-7, dated 11 January later amended effective date for Det 11
to also read 18 January 1966, it did not become operationally ready until I
15 November 1966, due to limitations of personnel and aircraft.
I
8 Jan 1966
The Third Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group (3 ARRGp) was activated at I
Tan Son Nhut AB, SVN to establish more effective command and control through
the JSARC over the increasing number of scattered SAR activities. At the
I
time these included the RCCs at Da Nang AB, SVN and Udorn RTAFB designated I
as Dets 1 and 2, respectively, of the 3 ARRGp. The 37 ARRSq with Hqs at
Da Nang AB, SVN was activated concurrently with the 3 ARRGp. The 38 ARRSq, I
with Hqs at Tan Son Nhut AB and outlying Dets at several SVN and Thailand
bases was the redesignated and reassigned 38 ARRSq. At this time 3 ARRGp
I
and all subordinate units, comprising the total dedicated USAR SAR effort I
in SEA, consisted of less than 400 officers and airmen.

Feb 1966
I
Lt Col Edward Krafka, first commander of the 38 ARSq received the Distin- I
guished Unit Citation award from President Johnson on behalf of the 38
ARSq for outstanding SAR operations from 1 August 1964 through 31 July I
1965.
I
18 March 1966
Det 1, 38 ARRSq became operationally ready at Phan Rang AB, SVN following I
inactivation of the Det 1, 38 ARRSq unit previously assigned to Nakhom
92
I
I
I
I
Phanom Airport, Thailand which became Det 1, 37 ARRSq upon establishment
I of 3 ARRGp in January.

I Apri 1 1966
The overall command facilities for control and coordination of SAR efforts
I were greatly enhanced by relocation of the JSARC, 3 ARRGp and the 38 ARRSq

I into a consolidated area with improved communications equipment and opera-

tions monitoring aids.

I 8 April 1966

I Det 12, 38 ARRSq was designated by MAC Special Order G-59, dated 18 March
1966, and organized at Nha Trang Airport, SVN.
I 4 July 1966

I Detachment 1, 37 ARRSq located at Udorn AB, was declared OR. Although

attached to the 37 ARRSq the unit reported directly to the Commander,
I 3 ARRGp. The initial complement of four HC-130s comprised the skeleton
force of what was to later become the 39 ARRSq with responsibility for air-
I borne command and control of SAR missions.

I July 1966

I The first group of the HH-3Es, a specially modified helicopter specifically

intended for a primary SAR sole, were assigned to Det 7, 38 ARRSq at Da

I Nang. Improvements over the cargo model CH-3Cs previously employed included
increased survivability due to,,armor plating and annament. Other opera-
I tional improvements included an increased speed and altitude capabilities
resulting from a 20% increase in engine power, and a 240-foot, 600-pound
I
93
I
 I
I
load limit cable/forest penetrator. The latter was extremely significant
in terms of the triple canopy jungle cover in many parts of SEA, often I
attaining heights of over 200 feet.
I
16 Jan 1967
The 39 ARRSq was activated at Udorn RTAFB by MAC SO G-10, dated 13 Jan 67. I
Concurrently Det 1 of the 37 ARRSq at Udorn was discontinued, and Det 2,
37 ARRSq was designated and organized at Udorn RTAFB. During this period
I
a realignment of SAR responsibilities was completed which resul~ed in I
the following assignments. All recovery operations were normally assumed by
the HH-3E Jolly Green Giants of the 37 ARRSq. The twenty-eight HH-438/Fs I
of the 38 ARRSq were primarily responsible for Local Base Rescue {LBR)
operations which included crash rescue and aircraft fire suppression within
I
the immediate area of their respective bases. The ten F series 43s with I
armor plating, self-sealing tanks and aux.iliary fuel tanks were capable of
combat rescue and occasionally continued to be utilized in this role where I
conditions permitted; limited primarily by the Pedros speed, range and
load capacity. The fact that during the first two and a half years of
I
employment in SEA in the combat Air Crew Recovery (ACR) role, they were
I
credited with over 350 saves can only be explained by the dedication,
ingenuity and extraordinary heroism of their crews. To complete the SAR I
operational assignments the newly formed 39 ARRSq was assigned the Airborne
Mission Control function with the six HC-130Ps at Udorn RTAFB and the six
I
HU-16Bs of the 37ARRSq at Da Nang AB, SVN.
I
94 I
I
I ..
I 10 Mar 1967
The President of the United States, at a White House ceremony. presented
I the Presidential Unit Citation to the 3rd ARRGp for exceptional gallantry

I in assisting fliers downed in the Vietnam war. The unit was specifically
cited for the rescue of 339 friendly troops of whom 304 would have faced
I almost certain death or capture by the enemy from 1 August 1965 through
30 June 1966.
I
23 April 1967
I The rescu~ Coordination Center, OL-1, 3 ARRGp was relocated from Da Nang

I AB, to Son Tra AB, SVN as directed by MAC SO G-110, dated 5 June 1967. The
two bases are physically adjacent, but the new location provided better

I access to centralized communications facilities at Monkey Mountain. On

this date Det 13, 38 ARRSq was established and assigned to Phu Cat AB,
I SVN by MAC SO G-62, dated 27 March 1967. This activation was timed to
coincide with the activation of Phu Cat AB.
I
28 May 1967
I One of the first efforts to investigate the possibility of providing the

I SEA SAR forces with Night Recovery System (NRS) Capability was initiated
on this date and is described as follows in the 3 ARRGp History April-June
I 1967.

I This project was conducted at Udom AB., Thai Zand and

lasted five days. Participating units were Det 2.,
3? ARRSq., 802 Air Corrmando Squad.Pon and a TAC G-130.

I
I 95

I
- 'LampZighter' aircraft. During the e~eroise~ the
I
I
C-130 'LampZighter' aircraft t:b>opped paitachute fZares
from various aZtitudes~ directions~ and distances in
re~tion to the helicopter and simutated rescue scene.
SimuZtaneousZy to this, the A-lE aircraft fZew simuZated
I
ground fire suppression passes to evaZuate their capa-
biZity to support the heZicopter dUring this type of
operation. From these tests, severaZ recomnendations I
were made to the Commander ?th Air Force on the aspects
of night BAR recove~ in a combat environment. The
resuZts presented in a briefing for General Morrryer
accepted the feasibility of the method evaluated, but
I
contained several inherent risks involved with night
operations involving aircr~ft at low altitudes operat-
ing around high intensity flares, and disc losing the
I
exact position of the downed airman and the probabiZity
of his being captured if the rescue was not immediately
effected was pointed out as a major problem. I
As it turned out the disadvantages were sufficient to prohibit the use of I
this approach in a hostile environment and in a nonhostile environment it
would only be required on rare occasions where a first light effort would I
not suffice due to medical considerations.
I
8 June 1967
The 39 ARRSq was relocated from Udorn RTAFB, due to the overdemand placed
I
on facilities there by expanded tactical fighter and other support opera- I
tions, to Tuy Hoa AB, SVN, in accordance with MAC SO G-105 dated 24 Mar
1967. By MAC SO G-115 dated 9 June 1967, OL-1, 39 ARRSq was also established I
on this date at Udorn RTAFB and Det 2, 39 ARRSq was established at Clark
AB, P.I. with the assigned task of providing organizational maintenance on
I
the HC-130 aircraft of the 39 ARRSq. This odd arrangement was brought about
by the troop ceiling limitation in Vietnam being exceeded by the relocation
I
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96 I
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I and accompanied transfer of manning spaces of the 39 ARRSq. Permanent
assignment of the maintenance personnel to Det 2 in the Philippines was the
I means employed to circumvent this problem.

I 21 June 1967
\
Airborne Refueling (AR) of the HH-3Es was instituted in SEA and provided
I the SAR forces with a new dimension of ACR capability. The following

I excerpt from the 3 ARRGp History April-June 1967 describes this significant
event.
I The quest for a new aoncept in rescuing dotmed piZots in
hostile territory was culminated on 21 June~ when the
I first operational mission to utiUze the air-to-air re-
fUeling aapability of the HH-3E heZicopter and the HC-130P
tanker was acaorrrpZished in the GuZf of Tonkin. The 'JoZZy
I Green' from the 37th ARRSq flew the north orbit mission
formerly performed by the HU-16B. By employing this new
conaept in he Ucopter opem.tions ~ the SAR foree has enhanced
I their rescue capability by gaining the abnost unZimited range
and [Zight time and versati'tity of the heUcopter in one
package.

I Piloted by CoZonel Albert P. LoveZady, Corrmander 3ztd ARRGp,

the 'Jolly Green' was refueled twice in fUght by an HC-130P
of the 39th ARRSq. It was signifiaant that one of the pilots
I who was responsible for the original aoncept was aboard for
this historic f7,ight. Major John H. McLeaish~ Group PZans
Offiaer, was the prime e~onent of this idea while assigned

I to Plans, Hq ARRS in 1964. In the short time span of 2 1/2

years~ Major McLeaish salJ his dream g'l'OIJ [%tom a pZan to a
reaUty.

I With the advent of air-to-air refueling the Jolly Greens were able to

I effectively eliminate a range limitation. It also provided them with an

increased capability to remain in orbit at preselected locations, thus
I
I 97

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 I
reducing their response time to reach a downed crewmember to a minimum. I
This factor has proven to be most important factor in determining the
success of SAR missions in a hostile environment. Within six months 3 ARRSp
I
units were averaging 120 air-to-air refueling operations per month. I
14 Aug 1967
The previously unnumbered LBR unit stationed at Tan Son Nhut AB, was re-
I
designated as Det 14, 38 ARRSq. This action completed the organizational I
development of the 38 ARRSq LBR function in SEA.
I
15 Sep 1967
First group of two HH-53B Super Jolly Green Giants (or BUFFs for Big Ugly I
Friendly Fellows) arrived in SEA. Concurrently Det 1, 37 ARRSq was organized
at Nakhon Phanom RTAFB, and consisted of the HH-3E aircraft and personnel
I
which had previously been assigned to Det 2, 37 ARRSq, which in turn received
the HH-53s and personnel newly arrived from CONUS. Two more aircraft were
I
received in October and two in December for a total of six assigned to Det 2 I
at the end of the year.
I
15 Oct 1967
Lt Col John J. Collins, U.S. Army, joined the JSARC staff as the first joint I
service representative. This position has provided the SAR forces with a
valuable source of information and has been instrumental in effecting more
I
efficient SAR operations, since the Army Aviation Units maintain about
I
3,000 helicopters in SEA, they are in a position to provide for recovery
of their own and other friendly ground forces personnel, on most occasions. I
98
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I --~·~~~ ''·. "~

I They were however, limited by lack of a dedicated SAR force with appro-
priately equipped aircraft. Typical U.S. Anmy rescue operations required
I landing the helicopter and loading personnel on board from the ground.

I When landing is impossible they do have limited retrieval capability with

horse collars, rope ladders, slings and other improvised apparatus. In
I those cases where more sophisticated rescue procedures are required. the
3rd ARRGp forces are called upon, and it is during these operations that
I the presence of the USARV Liaison Officer at JSARC has immeasurably benefit-

I ed SAR in SEA.

10 Jan 1968
I The JSARC was collocated with the 7AF Command Center to provide a much

I improved capability for total coordination of all available resources

assigned to SAR operations. This move resulted in much better communica-
I tions, intelligence, and weather information availability to the JSARC
coordinators and dissimination to units involved. It also enabled a much
I closer relationship between the other services liaison officers, located

I in the Command Center, and the JSARC operations.

I 28 Feb 1968
Major Dale Oderman and his Jolly Green crew of Det 1, 37 ARRSq at Nakhon

I Phanom made the lOOOth combat save since rescue operations started in South-
east Asia in 1964. The recovery was made near the Mu Gia pass separating
1. North Vietnam and Laos. The F-105 pilot, Captain Gene I. Basol, from the
355 Tactical Fighter Wing was picked up on his 79th combat mission. As a
I result of his misfortune he received two broken legs and during the

I 99

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 I
course of the rescue the pararescueman, Sergeant Joseph M. Duffy, made a I
hoist descent into the jungle to assist in recovering the pilot. This was
Major Oderman's first pickup and Sergeant Duffy's 21st. Other crewmembers
I
of Det 1 making the save were Capt George
Mickey D. Berry,· Flight Mechanic.
w. Greer, Copilot and Sergeant
I
18 Mar 1968
I
Det 2, 37 ARRSq at Udorn RTAFB was discontinued and activated as the 40th I
ARRSq. This organization change had no effect on the ARRGp mission or
overall SAR operations which at this time were distributed as follows: I
the 11 HC-130Ps assigned to the 39 ARRSq operating out of Tuy Hoa AB, SVN
and Det 1, 39 ARRSq at Udorn RTAFB: the 31 HH-43s (24 Band 7 F series)
I
operating from the 14 Dets of the 38 ARRSq scattered throughout South I
Vietnam and Thailand; the 22 HH-3Es assigned to the 37 ARRSq and Det 1,
40 ARRSq and the six HH-53-B in the 40 ARRSq. I
1 May 1968 I
The Rescue Coordination Center, OL-2, 3 ARRGp at Udorn RTAFB, Thailand was
relocated from the 7/13 Tactical Air Control Center building to the new I
Seventh Air Force Alternate Tactical Air Control Center, North Sector (ATACC,
NS) complex at the same base. The new facility provided expanded working
I
space, better radio and land line communications, immediate access to com- I
puterized aircraft command and control equipment, and radar scopes for track-
ing aircraft experiencing emergency conditions. I
100
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I 14 May 1968
President Johnson presented the Medal of Honor to Captain Gerald 0. Young
I for his heroic actions on 8 and 9 November 1967 as an HH-3E Rescue Crew

I Commander. Captain Young was shot down on a combat rescue mission while
serving with the 37 ARRSq. This was the first time the nation's highest
I honor had been awarded to any one for actions while assigned to U.S. Air
Force Search and Rescue Operations.
I
31 May 1968
I This date marked initiation of the greatest SAR effort to be conducted in
SEA to date. The SAR operation was triggered when a Navy A-7 Corsair, call
I sign STREET CAR 304, was shot down in the Steel Tiger area of Laos. When

I the survivor was finally rescued by a Oet 1, 40 ARRSq HH-3E on 2 June, this
mission had involved an estimated 109 aircraft flying 189 sorties and
I delivering 86 tons of ordnance on enemY defenses.

I 9 June 1968
The riot Control agent CS was employed for the first time during an attempted
I SAR mission. This mission was later canceled, following the loss of an
HH-3E and 11 crewmen on board, KIA, preventing a full evaluation of its
I effectiveness. However, later application of CS to the immediate area of

I a downed crewman enhanced SAR operations considerably by reducing the survi-

vo~s chance of being captured and hostile groundfire as well. This date
I also marked the loss of the nineteenth SAR aircraft in SEA; 9 C/HH-3s, 7
HH-43s and 3 HU-16s.
I
I 101

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Oct 1968 I
The intial USAF/US Navy Rescue helicopter exchange program was completed
with four personnel from each service serving a 30-day TOY transfer. Both
I
the USAF and Navy rescue personnel considered the program very beneficial. I
but recommended reducing the period to 15 to _20 days, and the nurmer of
personnel to two for each exchange phase. I
14 Feb 1969 I
On this date the 3 ARRGp celebrated its Silver Anniversary. Older than
both parent services, the Air Rescue Service and the U.S. Air Force, the I
unit had its inception as the 3rd Emergency Rescue Squadron at Gulfport,
Mississippi on 14 February 1944.
I
28 Feb 1969 I
Det 12, of the 38 ARRSq was relocated from Nha Trang AB, SVN to U-Tapao
Royal Thai Navy Airfield, Thailand in accordance with PACAF MO 2 dated
I
1 February 1969. This transfer was occasioned by the dual consideration I
of activation of USAF units based at U-Tapao and transfer of base facilities
at Nha Trang AB to the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) following transfer or I
deactivation of USAF operational units at Nha Trang AB.
I
18 March 1969
Det 1 of the 37 ARRSq located at Nakhon Phanom RTAFB, was redesignated as
I
Det 1, 40 ARRSq by MAC SO 6-40 with no other attendant changes in personnel,
location, assigned aircraft or mission. As a detachment of the 37 ARRSq
I
I
102
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I
I it had previously functioned as essentially an independent unit, reporting
directly to 3 ARRGp for operational command and control, and it continued
I to do so as the redesignated Det.l, 40 ARRSq. The effect of the redesig-

I nation merely enhanced administrative liaison with the more conveniently

located Hqs, 40 ARRSq at Udorn RTAFB; 37 ARRSq Hqs was at Da Nang AB, SVN.
I This change also provided supervision for the phaseout of HH-3 helicopters
in Thailand. During this same time frame the 3 ARRGp recommended changes
I to effect the beddown of all HH-53s at Udorn RTAFB, and to use Nakhon

I Phanom RTAFB as a FOL. This action, later approved by higher commands, was
initiated to consolidate and enhance maintenance in particular, but also to
I facilitate personnel activities such as training, crew rotation and assign-
ment.
I 27 Dec 1969
I Det 10, 38 ARRSq was inactivated at Binh Tuy AB, SVN in accordance with
MAC SO G-311 dated 15 December 1969. The aircrew rescue mission was to be
I assumed by U.S. Army and VNAF helicopter equipped units in the delta.

I 16 Feb 1970
Det 9, 38 ARRSq was relocated from P1eiku AB, SVN to Nakhon Phanom RTAFB
I as directed by PACAF Movement Order 4, dated 26 January 1970. This resulted

I from withdrawal of USAF units from Pleiku AB, which was turned over to the
VNAF, as part of the Vietnamization program.
I
I 103

I
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_ _.i!IIIF!Iiiliilllf'~-~ •
I
Feb 1970 I
The 40 ARRSq at Udorn RTAFB received the last of its assignment of twelve
HH-53 aircraft as the first phase of ARRSq Progranming Plan 69-1 was com- I
pleted. Future SEA HH-53E deliveries were to be assigned to the 37 ARRSq
then equipped with the HH-3Es, until it had received its complement of nine
I
HH-53s under phase two of the plan. I
15 Sep 1970
I
Det 8, 38 ARRSq was inactivated at Cam Ranh AB, SVN in accordance with MAC
SO G-262, dated 4 Sep 1970. This was a result of deactivation of the 12 I
Tactical Fighter Wing (TFWg) which Det 8 had been supporting previously.
I
16 Sep 1970
Transfer of the 39 ARRSq from Tuy Hoa ·AB to Cam Ranh AB was completed on I
this date. This PCS move, directed by PACAF MO 24, dated 21 August 1970,
was successfully accomplished without interruption of the function. This
I
move resulted from withdrawal of USAF units from Tuy Hoa AB. I
15 Oct 1970
Det 11, 38 ARRSq was inactivated at Tuy Hoa AB, SVN per MAC SO G-263,
I
dated 4 Sep 1970. This resulted from withdrawal of USAF units from Tuy I
Hoa AB, as was the case with the 39 ARRSq.

15 Nov 1970
I
Det 2, 38 ARRSq was inactivated at Takhli RTAFB, Thailand by MAC SO dated I
I
104
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I
I 30 October 1970. This action resulted from a withdrawal of USAF units
from Takhli to either other Thailand bases or to CONUS as part of the
I U.S. reduction of forces in Thailand program.

I
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105

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I UNCLASSIFIED
SEA SAR DIRECTORS
I Oet 3, PARC - - - - - - - 1 April 1962
Major E J Trexler
I Fall of 1963

I Major Alan WSaunders

I Fall of 1964
Lieutenant Colonel Edward Krafka
I 38 ARRSq - - - - - - - - 1 July 1965
Lieutenant Colonel Edward Krafka
I
3 ARRGp - - - - - - 8 January 1966
I Colonel Arthur WBeall

I 1 November 1967
Colonel Albert P Lovelady
I 6 October 1967
Colonel Paul E Leske
I 20 September 1968

I Colonel Hollon H Bridges

17 June 1969
I Colonel Rayvon Burleson
17 August 1969
I Colonel Malcolm C Frazee

I 17 July 1970
Colonel Frederick V Sohle, Jr.
I 18 October 1970
Colonel George C Pinyerd
I
TABLE A.l
I
UNCLASSIFtiD
I
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 --- - - .... --- ........ e&JJFI8iNT IAk
_

3 ARRGP PERSONNEL DATA

1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
IQ- 20 3Q 40 IQ 20 30 40 IQ 20 3Q 40 IQ 2Q 3Q 4Q IQ 20 3Q 4QI
1. PRSNL AUTHORIZED
!I
513 765 1012 1157 1227 1241 125) 1224 118n 1195 1170 1201 1183 1186 1197 1103 1093 il081 11" itot.C} I
!I 781 96n 1059 1152 1226 1116 1113 1118 1149 1190 1184 1088 1077 957 952 969
2. PRSNL ASSIGNED 415 508 689 113)

3. % MANNED 81 66 68 68 79 8') 92 100 96 93 95 93 97 100 99 99 99 89 86 91

£1 4 7 0 0 2 0 6 6 0 0
4. PRSNL LOSSES 2 1 0 9 4 () 0 3 I 1

s. COMBAT SAVES 85 145 100 73 100 87 lOR 102 2b!t 111 50 148 143 190 39 109 51 82 9 34

~
03 6. NON COMBAT SAVES 7 12 10 44 .nj )7 9.0 47 1() j 79 65 97 79 66 26 19 33 19 17 52
..,
r-
7. TOTAL SAVES 92 157 110 117 I '>d 144 202 149 ]b 7 190 115 244 222 256 65 128 84 101 26 86
.
)>

ll
THESE FIGURES WERE OBTAINED FROM VARIOUS DATA SOURCES AND ARE PRESENTED AS BEST AVAILABLE INFORMATION CONSIDERED ACCURATE TO WITHIN • S%
2/
KIA/~IA/CAPTURED DURING RESCUE MISSION - DOES NOT INCLUDE ACCIDENTAL OR GROUND ATTACK LOSSES

--. ... ............

l'!ANP'*IRfi'N YIAI
'""-.;;;::"
 I
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•
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--- --- .. --- --- -- -·-- ~
3 ARRGP AIRCRAFT DATA !
i

1966 1967 1968 1969 1970

10 20 30 40 10 20 30 40 10 20 30 40 10 2Q 3Q 40 10 2Q 30 40
1. ASSIGNED AIRCIAFT 38 44 48 47 50 57 62 64 70 70 71 69 71 68 64 65 62 62 61 53
1_/ '}_/
HU-168 4 4 5 5 6

HH-438 16 18 17 18 18 22 23 23 24 24 24 25 25 24 22 23 21 20 19 lS

HII-43F 9 10 11 10 10 8 8 8 7 8 8 7 6 6 5 6 6 6 6 6

HH-3E 6 8 11 10 10 16 18 16 22 21 22 20 20 19 18 17 12 9 5 X

-1
>t:O
r-
HH-538 - 2 6 6 6 6 6 5
4
s
3
5
3
s
3
4

8
4

12
4
16
4
17
fTI HH-S3C
.w
?:»
HC-130 H/P
~I ~~
3
3
4- 4 4 6 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 il 11 11 11 11

2. MISSIONS FLOW 62 160 132 107 148 144 176 160 ~45 166 128 172 181 139 62 62 76 73 32 59

3. SORTIES FLOW 269 601 SlS 376 429 481 480 SlO 1"2 420 323 466 493 3S7 153 142 l02 286 113 204

4. HOURS FLOW x 1000 3.1 3.5 5.7 7.0 6.7 7.4 8.6 9.0 ~-8 9.4 ~0.7 10.6 11.0 11.1 10.2 9.8 8.8 9.0 a.s 7.7

5. ACFT BAn'LE IWim

£1

!I
NDA 12 2 7 5 !I -4/ ..
4/ 2 13 s 6 4 0 3 24 8 7 1 2

b. ACFT BATTLE LOSSES 1 0 0 3 1 2 0 2 2 1 0 2 2 1 0 1 1 2 0 0

7. llTHER ACFT LOSSES 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 oi

~. TOTAL ACFT LOSSES 1 0 2 4 1 2 0 2 2 1 2 4 2 1 3 1 2 2 0 o jI

I/ REDESIGNATED TO P SEIUES EARLY IN 1967 WHEN MODIFIED FOR All-TO-AIR REFUELIJIG

_;' lll'RISG RESCUE MISSION-DOES NOT INCLUDE ACCIDENTAL OR GROUND ATTACK LOSSES
ON TDY BASIS
..\1 Stl,\SSlGNF.D
!lATA AVAILABLE

., I 1. !:
I UNCLASSIFIED
I APPENDIX B

I RESCUE PROGRESS REPORTS

1. Rescue Progress Report #5/4 Dec 70.
I 2. Mission Number: 3-022-29 Nov 70.
3. Situation: C123, Bookie 540 missing.
I A. Description of SAR Objective:

I (1) Cl23/55-0649/Camouflaged/Bookie 540

B. Actions taken:
I (1) KING 24 as AMC and DUSTOFF 58 as OSC and coordination
between aircraft and ground party.
I C. Personnel Information:

I (1) 44 involved/UNK missing/19 located/17 deceased/2 known

survivors not yet recovered. Ground team performed body count but was
I only able to confirm 17 bodies. Portions of the wreckage were consumed
by fire.
I (2) Location agency was ground party, 40lst RF Co (Vietnamese
Regional Forces with US MACV Advisors) at 04 0700Z. Wreckage site at
I 1145N 10907E.

I (3) None recovered at this time.

D. Flying Activity:
I 39ARRS/2 Sorties/14.2 Det 1, 38ARRS/l Sortie/1.7 247 Met Det/2 Sorties/
7.8 192 AHC/2 Sorties/3.8
I F. Future Plans:

I (1) Weather permitting, DUSTOFF 58 (UHIH) and 2 Jolly Greens

(HH-53s) will rendevous [sic] at 04 2315Z. DUSTOFF will lead the Jolly
I 106

I UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED I
I
Greens to the site, and then PJs will be lowered to attempt to raise
the two survivors by hoist. It is quite probable the survivors may have I
to be moved further down the ridge due to the rough terrain and weather.
PJs will assist in this movement. In the event weather does not permit
I
these flights, a ground medical team is being moved into the area during
I
the night. Members of the ground party will have to lead the medical
team in during daylight hours tomorrow. KING 24 (HC-130) will be on I
scene to provide weather recon and communications.
(2) SAR Forces available: I
(A) 1-HC-130 FM 39 ARRS
{B) 2-HH-53 FM 37 ARRS
I
(C) UHIDS FM 17 BRIG/17CAV I
(D) AUIGS FM 17 BRIG/l7CAV
{E) UHIDs FM 192 AHC I
I Field Forces ground party (Vietnamese Regional
(F)
Forces with MACV Advisors) number classified.
I
G. Summary of Today•s SAR actions: I
At First Light this morning KING 24 evaluated the weather in the area
as being unsafe for SAR operations. At 04/0022Z DUSTOFF 58 entered the I
search area and reported weather conditions as impossible for search
operations. A ground team was inserted as close as possible to the
I
last known position at 04/0105Z. At 1632Z the lead element reported
I
seeing aircraft wreckage and at 0700Z reported finding one person alive.
20 minutes later 2 US personnel were reported alive, but seriously I
107
I
I
LASSIFIED
I UNCLASSIFIED
I injured with multiple broken bones and delirious. Bodies were found
I in a 30 yard area around the site. The DUSTOFF helo was unable to get
to the site due to weather ceilings varying between 200FT and 2300FT.
I The c~ash site was at 2320FT in extremely rough terrain. The ground party

I reported taking 5 hours to cross a one kilometer area between a landing

zone and the crash site. A medical team from the AF Dispensary at Phan
I Rang was placed aboard an HH-43 and transported to an area down the ridge
from the crash site. However, they were unable to reach the survivor's
I .
site, and had to be extracted due to approaching darkness. One element
of the ground party is with the survivors at this time, and the rest of
I the ground party is camped around their position. No hostilities have

I been reported. Several pickup attempts were attempted by Capt Hartman

(US Army) as DUSTOFF 58. This is his 4th day on this SAR effort and
I he wi 11 again be on-scene commander tomorrow. His effo.rts are to be
catm~ended.
I 1. Rescue Progress Report #6/5 Dec 70.

I 2. Mission Number: 3-022-29 Nov 70.

3. Situation: Cl23, Bookie 540, Recovery of 2 Survivors.
I A. Actions Taken: Team departed landing zone at 05/0020Z.
B. Personnel Information:
I (1) 44 invo1ved/25 missing/19 located/17 deceased/2 survivors.

I Due to conditions of bodies on scene, a definite determination as to

number of deceased personne 1 wi 11 have to await the i ns.erti on of graves
I registration team.

I 108

I
UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED I
(2) Location agency was ground party, 40lst RF Company
I
(Vietnamese Regional Forces with US MACV Advisors) at 04/0700Z. Wreck-
I
age site at 1146N 10907E (UTM BP 961 015).
(3) Recovery Agency: US Army Helicopter UH-IH from 192d I
Assault Helicopter Company (AHC). Survivors were treated and then moved
to landing zone by 5 USAF pararescue technicians. This landing zone I
was accessible to the UH-IH, and the Helo picked up the two survivors.
D. Flying Activity:
I
(1) 39 ARRS/2 Sorties/13.6 hours I
(2)· 37ARRS/7 Sorties/21.7 hours
(3) 192AHC (US Army)/4 Sorties/4.5 hours I
(4) 247 Med Det (US Army)/10 Sorties/9.5 hours
E. Saves Data:
I
(1) USAF Pararescue Team from the 37 ARRS and 38 ARRS enabled I
the survivors to be picked up. (Ref Item C(3)).
Members of the Team: I
(A) MSgt James F Scott, 37 ARRS
(B) SSgt Robert T Martin, 38 ARRS
I
(C) AlC Donald J Recoraro, 37. ARRS I
(D) AlC Randy Zoniker, 37 ARRS
(E) AlC William McDonald, 37 ARRS I
(F) Capt R N Montemayor, USAF Flt Surgeon from 6251
CSGP, Bien Hoa AB, RVN
I
Pilot accomplishing pickup was Capt Malcolm Hartman, 247 Med Det, US
I
Army, Phan Rang AB, RVN.

109
I
.UNCLASSIFIED I
I UNCLASSIFIED
I {2) Names of personnel saved have not been released at this

I time, but are available through 7th AF Personnel Affairs.

{3) 2 combat saves credited to pararescue team and Capt
I Hartman, 247 Med Det.

I F. Future Plans:
{1) Graves registration team will be inserted at the earliest

I possible time. Due to weather and terrain, the ground party on scene
recommended the grave registration party not be inserted today.
I {2) No future Search and Rescue Forces will be committed
until grave registration has been able to count and identify remains on
I scene. Conversation with US members of ground team indicate that the

I possibility of more survivors is extremely remote.

G. Summary of SAR actions:
I {1) Jolly Green (JG) 72 and JG 65 departed Bien Hoa at
04/2100Z (OSOOLOCAL) in order to be on scene at First Light. The JGs
I established radio contact with the ground party and learned that both

I survivors were okay. One man had a broken leg, but was in good spirits,
the other was sleeping and his condition was serious. At 04/2315Z
I DUSTOFF 58 (DO 58, Capt Hartman in his (UH-IH) arrived on scene to meet
prearranged rendezvous. DO 58 was at first unable to locate the landing
I zone (LZ) due to the LZ being in the clouds. Weather lifted slightly

I and DO 58 dropped off maps and radios for the pararescue technicians {PJs)
on the landing zone. The JGs were unable to land due to the size of the
I Helos and closeness of the cliffs. The PJs picked up the radios and maps

I 110

I UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED I
by descending on the JG hoist and then returned to the Helos. They were I
then moved at 05/0020Z by Helo to a point just at the bottom of the cloud
layer and 500 yards from the survivors, where they were lowered by hoist
I
along with the Flt Surgeon. Terrain was extremely rough. The PJs reported I
the underbrush was so thick their feet were not touching the ground. The
ground party and PJ Team established direction to one another by firing I
shots. At 05/0215Z the two parties made contact. At 05/0240Z the PJs
reached the survivors and with the Flight Surgeon started intravenous
I
injections of dextrose, splinted injuries and generally prepared the I
survivors for the trip out. After the survivors were prepared, DO 58,
both JGs and Polecat 320 (another US Army UHIH) attempted to lower hoists I
and pickup patients from the site. Due to weather and terrain, and after
many attempts this action was deemed impossible. The PJs and doctor then
I
moved the survivors, down the path hacked out of the jungle on the way I
up, to the LZ. At 05/0722Z DO 58 picked up the survivors and transported
them to the Cam Ranh Bay Hospital. The condition of the survivors .was I
reported as both suffering from shock, exposure and exhaustion. One
definitely had a broken leg and the other quite probably does also.
I
Later, the Hospital reported the condition of one as fair and the other
I
as serious. KING 24 in the morning and KING 26 in the afternoon (HC-130s)
remained overhead to provide communication relays. Upon debriefing the I
PJs reported the terrain as sloping at 45 degrees and a solid wall of vines
and jungle growth. The Army ground team is remaining a.n the scene over-
I
night.
(2) Total Flying activity to date:
I
111
I
UNCLASSIFIED I
I UNCLASSIFIID
I ORGAN SORTIES FLYlNG HOURS

I 39 ARRS 13 78..6
5.6
Det 1 , 38 MRS. 4
I 21 TASS 7 16.1

4th Inf Div 1 2.0

I 254 Aeromed Det 5 8.2

I 48 Avn Co 15
29
26.9
48.6
247 Med Det
I 192 AHC 17 22.• 6

37 ARRS 7 21.7
I
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I
I
112
I
I UNCLASSifiED
 UNCLASSIFI,,ED I
GLOSSARY
I
AB Air Base I
AC
ACR
Aircraft Commander
Aircrew Recovery
I
ACSq Air Commando Squadron I
ADF Automatic Direction Finder
Aeromed Aeromedical I
AF
AFB
Air Force
Air Force Base
I
AFCS Automatic Flight Control System I
AFGP Air Force Advisory Group
AFM Air Force Manual I
AFR Air Force Regulation
AFSC Air Force Specialty Code
I
AGL Above Ground Level I
AHC Assault Helicopter Company
AIM Air Intercept Missile I
AM Amplitude Modulation
AMC Airborne Mission Commander
I
AP Armor Piercing I
AR Air Refueling
ARRGp Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group I
ARRS Aerospace Rescue and Recovery'Service
I
113 I
UNCLASSIFIED
I
I
I ARRSq Aerospace Rescue_an~ Recovery.~

ARRTC Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Training ._Center

I ARRWg Aerospace Rescue and Recovery.Wigg

I ARS Air Rescue Service (now ARRS}

'
i
ARSq Air Rescue Squadron (now ARRSq}
I ASL Above.Sea Level
ATACC•NS Alternate Tactical Air Control Genter··- '~OI"th Sector
I ATC Air Training Command

I Avn
AW
Aviation
Automatic Weapons
I BPE Best Preliminary Estimate
I BUFF Big Ugly Friendly Fellows (HH-53 Heli:copter}

c
I CAP
Centigrade
Combat Air Patrol/Captured
I CBPO Consolidated Base Personnel Office
CBR Chemical, Biological, Radiological
I CHECO Contemporary Historical Examination.of Current
Operations
I CINC Commander-in-Chief
coc Combat Operations Center
I COMSEC Communications Security

I COMUSNAVPHIL
CROWN
Commander, US Naval Forces, Philippines
Call Sign, Airborne Missidn CoDmander (now KliNG}
I C/S Call Sign/Personnel Incapacitating Agent

I 114

I
 UNCLASSIFIED I
CSAF Chief of Staff, USAF I
CSGp
CY
Combat Support Group
Calendar Year
I'
DASC Direct Air Support Center
I
Det Detachment I
DMZ Demilitarized Zone
Doc Document I
DOCC 7th AF Combat Operations Center
OSR Director Search and Rescue (now Director Aerospace
I
Rescue)
DVD Direct Viewing Device I
ETA Estimated Time of Arrival I
ETD Estimated Time of Departure
ETE Estimated Time Enroute I
Evac Evacuation
I
F Fahrenheit
FIR Flight Information Region
I
FL Fletchet
I
FM Frequency Modulation
FNRS Full Night Recovery System I
FOL Porward Operating Location
Ft Feet
.I
FWF Free World Forces
I
115
I
UNCLASSIFIED I
 UNCLASSIFIED I
LBR Local Base Rescue
I
LKP Last Known Position I
LLLTV low light Level Television
LNRS Limited Night Recovery System
I
M Manual I
MAC Military Airlift Comnand
MACV Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
I
MATS Military Air Transport Service (now MAC) I
Med Medical
MIA Missing in Action I
MHZ Mega Hertz (106 cycles per second)
mm Millimeter (lo-3 meters)
I
MO
Mod
Movement Order
I
Model/Modification

NAC Nonaircrew
I
NKP Nakhom Phanom. Thailand I
NRS Night Recovery System
NVA North Vietnamese Army I
· NVN North Vietnam; North Vietnamese
j
I
OL Operating Location
OR Operationally ReaQy I
osc On Scene Commander
I
117'
I
LASSIFIED
I
I UNCLASSIFIID
I
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
I OT&E Operational Test and. Evaluation

I PAC Pacific Area Command

PACAF Pacific Air Forces
I PAD Programmed Action Directive

I PCS
PEDRO
Pennanent Change of Stati.on
Call sign HH-43 LBR Helicopters
I PJ Para Jumper (now Pararescue Recovery Specialist)
PJSS PACAF Jungle SUrvival School
I PLD Personne1 lowering Devi ce 1

I QOR Qualitative Operational Requirement

QUEEN Call sign Ol-A Rescue Coordination Center
I
RCC Rescue Coordination Center/Rescue Crew Commander
I RECONDO Reconnaissance Commando
RESCAP
I RESCORT
Rescue Combat Air Patrol
Rescue Escort
I ROC Required Operational Capability
RT Receiver-Transmitter/Recondo Training
I RTAF Royal Thai Air Force
RTAFB Royal Thai Air Force Base
I RTNA Royal Thai Navy Airfield

I RVN Repub1i c of "(South) Vietnam

I 118

I UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED I
I
SA Small Arms
SAM Surface-to-air missile I
SANDY Call sign A-1 Search and Rescue Task Force aircraft
SAR Search and Rescue
I
SARTF Search and Rescue Task Force I
SEA Southeast Asia
SEAOR Southeast Asia Operational Requirements I
SERE Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape
SER NR Serial Number
I
SHP Shaft Horse Power
I
so Speci a1 Order
SOP Standard Operating Procedure I
SOWg Special Operations Wing
SPAD Call sign A-1 Search and Rescue Task Force South I
Vietnam based aircraft {now SANDY)
SVN South Vietnam I
TA Terrain Avoidance I
TAC Tactical Air Co11111and
TACC Tactical Air Control Center I
TASS
TAWC
Tactical Air Support Squadron
Tactical Air Warfare Center
I
TOY Temporary Duty I
TED Transfer Effective Date
TF Terrain Following I
119
I
UNCLASSIFIED
I
I UNCLASSIFIED
I
TFWg Tactical Fighter Wing
I TMS T.Ype~-llooel~ ·ancrserftis--- ·
TOE Table of Equipment
I
UHF Ultra High Frequency
I us United States
USAF
I USARV
United States Air Force
united states Army ;·vietnam ··-~. ------ --~····---

I USNS United States Naval Ship

UTM Universal Transverse Mercator
I vc Viet Cong
I VHF Very High Frequency
VNAF Vietnanese Air Force
I
WP White Phosphorus
I
I
I
I
I
I
120
I
I UNCLASSIFIED PACAF - HAFB, Hawaii
 I
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