Phil 8: Introduction To Philosophy of Science: Lecture 11: Falsificationism and Popper
Phil 8: Introduction To Philosophy of Science: Lecture 11: Falsificationism and Popper
Phil 8: Introduction To Philosophy of Science: Lecture 11: Falsificationism and Popper
Like the positivists, he started out in Vienna and fled during the rise of
Nazism. But he is not a logical positivist.
PGS tells a story in our book of going to see a lecture by a Nobel Prize
winning researcher. Most of the lecture was about Popper instead of his
research. Popper is a big deal!
Unlike the positivists, Popper doesn’t draw the conclusion that psuedo-
science is meaningless.
For Popper, we never have evidence of a theory’s truth. All we can ever say
for a theory is that it has not yet been falsified.
It’s important not to confuse Popper’s view with fallibilism. Fallibilism is the
idea that we can never be certain of the truth of our scientific theories. Lots
of people think fallibilism is true.
Popper’s view is much stronger, and much more strange. His view is that we
can never have any incremental confirmation at all in a scientific theory.
Nevertheless, Popper thinks that scientific theories aim at the truth. The goal
of science is to discover the truth. However, we can never be justified in
believing our theories. Again, we can only ever say that they haven’t yet been
proven false.
For Popper, science changes through a two-step cycle that endlessly repeats.
o Step 1: Conjecture. A good conjecture is bold- it has lots of
obseverational consequences
o Step 2: Attempted Refutation: The theory is subjected to critical testing.
We try very hard to prove the theory false.
o If step 2 is completed, we go back to step 1.
During this process, we may want to suggest a new conjecture that is similar to
an older falsified conjecture. That’s okay, but we want to avoid ad hoc
hypotheses.
It’s hard to say precisely what makes a hypothesis ad hoc, but it’s not so hard to
come up with examples.
Avoiding “ad hoc hypotheses” seems to involve not adding auxiliary hypotheses for
the sole purpose of dealing with one-counter instance.