Whose Language? Exploring The Attitudes of Bulgaria's Media Elite Toward Macedonia's Linguistic Self-Identification
Whose Language? Exploring The Attitudes of Bulgaria's Media Elite Toward Macedonia's Linguistic Self-Identification
Whose Language? Exploring The Attitudes of Bulgaria's Media Elite Toward Macedonia's Linguistic Self-Identification
KARADJOV
California State University, Long Beach
1
Istorija na Bulgaria: Uchebnik za kandidat-studenti i zrelostnici [A history of
Bulgaria: A textbook for candidate-students and high-school graduates], ed. by V. Gy-
uzelev, Marin Drinov Academic Publishers, Sofia 2000.
2
R. J. Crampton, Bulgaria, 1878–1918: A history, Columbia University Press,
New York 1983; R. J. Crampton, A short history of modern Bulgaria, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, U.K. 1987; R. J. Crampton, A concise history of Bulga-
ria, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K. 1997.
112 Christopher D. Karadjov SP 1 ’10
3
BTA, “Daily bulletin in English”, November 21, 1996.
4
Nova Macedonia, “Editorial” 1996, p. 7.
5
It is perhaps a twist of historical irony that Macedonia’s governments in the
1990s have been quite ambiguous in their policies toward the large Albanian minority,
which encompasses about 25% of the population. In 2001, clashes between Macedo-
nians and Albanians put the country on the brink of a full-fledged civil war.
6
L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, New York University Press, New
York 2000.
7
Bulgaria’s official state holiday is still March 3, and not July 13, reflecting the
popular attitudes toward these two events. R. J. Crampton, op. cit.
SP 1 ’10 Whose language? Exploring the attitudes of Bulgaria’s... 113
8
R. J. Crampton, A concise history..., op. cit., p. 240.
9
R. J. Crampton, A concise history..., op. cit.
10
That is, since the 1947 proposal of Bulgaria’s then leader Georgi Dimitrov to Marshal
Tito for a Balkan federation of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, which would include Macedonia.
11
J. Pettifer, FYROM after Ochrid, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Mili-
tary Academy, Sandhurst 2002; The new Macedonian question, ed. by J. Pettifer,
St. Martin’s Press, New York 1999; J. Phillips, Macedonia: Warlords and rebels in the
Balkans, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT 2004.
12
D. M. Perry, Bulgarian nationalism: Permutations of the past, in: P. Latawski,
Contemporary nationalism in East Central Europe, St. Martin’s Press, New York
1995, p. 62.
114 Christopher D. Karadjov SP 1 ’10
13
B. Anderson, Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of
nationalism, Verso, London 1983.
14
M. Todorova, Balkan identities: Nation and memory, Hurst & Company, Lon-
don 2004.
15
R. J. Crampton, A short history..., op. cit.
16
Bulgaria’s major university in Sofia bears the name of St. Climent Ohridski, the
most prominent trainee of Cyril and Methodius.
17
Not the least because it is coming close to the end of the traditional school year,
which no doubt makes this time exciting for most students.
18
C. D. Karadjov, Unimagining a nation: Media framing of the language dispute
between Bulgaria and Macedonia in the 1990s, Paper presented at the 18th Annual In-
tercultural Communication Conference, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL,
March 2001.
19
S. Bozhilov, Za i protiv kirilitsata [For and against the Cyrillic script], “Nova te-
levizija”, May 16, 2005.
20
J. Phillips, op. cit.
SP 1 ’10 Whose language? Exploring the attitudes of Bulgaria’s... 115
21
C. D. Karadjov, op. cit.
22
Standard, Makedonskijat ezik – naj-posle reshenie [Macedonian language – a
solution at last], p. 2–3, 1999.
23
As above, p. 3.
24
Unfortunately, the results of this survey were not broken by ethnicity. A popular
speculation that could be heard in Sofia in the late 1990s had it that Bulgaria’s Muslims
(about 10% of the population) may be biased in their responses toward non-recogni-
tion of Macedonian nation/language because of the tensions between the Albanian
(Muslim) minority in Macedonia and the mainstream Slav population. This is not very
plausible, but possible.
25
BBSS Gallup International, Bulgaria: Annual index, BBSS, Sofia 1999.
26
Istorija na Bulgaria..., op. cit.
27
As above.
116 Christopher D. Karadjov SP 1 ’10
28
As above, p. 253.
29
Macedonia: Documents and materials, ed. by V. Bozhinov and L. Panayotov,
Izdatelstvo na Bulgarskata Akademija na Naukite (Bulgarian Academy of Sciences),
Sofia 1987.
30
See: Standart, Otnovo biti bulgari v Makedonija [Bulgarians assaulted again in
Macedonia], p. 1–2, September 25, 1996.
31
They still do, although the most recent (February 2005) story that preoccupied
Bulgarian media was on a journalist with a dual Serbian-Bulgarian citizenship who
was sentenced (and pardoned) by the authorities in Serbia for calling someone a “Ser-
boman,” that is, blindly serving Serb interests. (SOURCE)
32
ACCESS, Obrazat na drugija na Balkanite [The image of the other on the Bal-
kans], Sofia 1999.
SP 1 ’10 Whose language? Exploring the attitudes of Bulgaria’s... 117
33
Macedonian Scientific Institute (2004), Macedonian Scientific Institute – Histo-
ry [Online]. Available from http://www.macedoniainfo.com/index_eng.html [Re-
trieved: August 29, 2004].
34
As above.
35
Quite predictably, these views are met with consternation by the authorities in
Macedonia, and, as far as one can observe, by a significant numbers in the population.
36
T. Petev, Knigoizdavaneto v Bulgaria – predpriemachestvo i otgovornost [Book
publishing in Bulgaria: Entrepreneurship and responsibility], Unpublished lecture,
Department of Journalism, Sofia University (May 16, 2000).
37
M. Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, war and the Great Powers, 1804–1999,
Viking, New York 2000.
118 Christopher D. Karadjov SP 1 ’10
One can only wonder why the third-person effect was not conceptual-
ized earlier than 1983, the year of the formulation of its basic hypothesis.
The main premise – that others are more susceptible to extraneous influ-
ences that we are – is instantly recognizable by most of us. To make up
for the lost time, since 1983 the third-person effect has received full atten-
tion from researchers, and the empirical evidence of its manifestations is
abundant.
In fact, Davison, whose 1983 oft-cited article first conceptualized the
third-person effect, acknowledged to have nurtured the idea for years. The
initial thrust to Davison’s thought came from the story of an all-Black mil-
itary unit, stationed in the Pacific, which was withdrawn from combat area
and disbanded, after being showered with Japanese propaganda leaflets.
The flyers contained appeals to the Black soldiers not to fight in “a white-men
war,” in which Blacks, ostensibly, had nothing to gain39.
Unit’s commanding officers, all Caucasian, feared that the Japanese
propaganda may indeed find fertile ground in soldiers’ psyche, and re-
sorted to preventive action. As Davison pointed out, no evidence was ever
found that Black soldiers’ morale was affected. The effect of that Japanese
propaganda attempt on officers’ thinking and decisions, on the other hand,
was striking40.
With this episode in mind, Davison tested the idea of perceptions of
differential impact of mass communication, and formulated this state-
ment: “People will tend to overestimate the influence that mass communi-
cations have on attitudes and behaviors of others.”41
Generally, individuals will expect persuasive communication to have
greater effect on others – members of any different group – than on them-
38
J. H. Altschull, Agents of power: The media and public policy (2nd ed.),
Longman, New York 1995.
39
W. P. Davison, The third-person effect in communication, “Public Opinion
Quarterly” 1983, no. 47, p. 1–15.
40
As above.
41
As above, p. 3.
SP 1 ’10 Whose language? Exploring the attitudes of Bulgaria’s... 119
42
As above.
43
A. Gunther, E. Thorson, Perceived persuasive effects of product commercials
and public service announcements: Third-person effects in new domains, “Communi-
cation Research” 1992, no, 19, p. 574–596.
44
A. Gunther, Overrating the X-rating: The third-person effect and support for
censorship of pornography, “Journal of Communication” 1995, no. 45, p. 21–39.
45
D. Rucinski and C. Salmon, The “other” as the vulnerable voter: A study of the
third-person effect in 1988 U.S. presidential campaign, “International Journal of Pu-
blic Opinion Research” 1990, no. 2, p. 345–368.
46
J. Cohen and R. G. Davis, Third-person effects and the differential impact in ne-
gative political advertising, “Journalism Quarterly” 1991, no. 68, p. 680–688.
47
J. Cohen, D. Mutz, V. Price and A. Gunther, Perceived impact of defamation:
An experiment on third- person effects, “Public Opinion Quarterly” 1998, no. 52,
p. 161–173.
48
D. L. Lasorsa, Real and perceived effects of “America”, “Journalism Quarterly”
1989, no. 66, p. 373–378.
49
D. L. Lasorsa, How media affect policy-makers: The third person effect, in: Pu-
blic Opinion, the Press and Public Policy, ed. J. D. Kennamer, Praeger, New York
1992.
50
D. C. Mutz, The influence of perceptions of media influence: Third person
effects and the public expression of opinions, “International Journal of Public Opinion
Research” 1989, no. 1, p. 3–23; D. C. Mutz, The political effects of perceptions of mass
opinion, “Research in Micropolitics” 1994, no. 4, p. 143–167; D. C. Mutz, Reading
Public Opinion: The Influence of news coverage on perceptions of public sentiment,
“Public Opinion Quarterly” 1997, vol. 61, no. 3, p. 431–451; D. C. Mutz, Impersonal
influence: How perceptions of mass collectives affect Political Attitudes, Cambridge
University Press, New York 1998.
120 Christopher D. Karadjov SP 1 ’10
the O. J. Simpson trial51, to mention only a few. Cohen and Davis,52 in par-
ticular, found that the magnitude of third-person effect is more pro-
nounced with negative news, or with perceived negative framing of the
story’s characters.
Neuwirth and Frederick further scrutinized some of the background as-
sumptions in third-person effect studies53, while Perloff (1993, 1999) and
Paul et al. (2000) offered some comprehensive and useful reviews of the
third-person effect literature54.
Of particular interest to this project are the findings by Rucinski and
Salmon, who studied how respondents perceived that harm to “others”
might be caused by certain messages55. These researchers built up on
Davison’s suggestion that when communication is understood as biased or
propagandistic in some way, deservedly or not, the perceived differential
impact on “others” vs. “us” is maximized56.
A by-product of this finding is that people who hold more extreme
views on an issue will think of others as more fallible to “misleading” in-
formation. When such strong ideologues (in the broadest sense of this
term, which certainly includes nationalists) detect that media are framing
their cause in a negative way, this will trigger concern not about their own
beliefs, but about the “vulnerable others” who may be swayed by the “mis-
representation” of reality. In a study by Perloff, highly-involved support-
ers of a cause (Israelis and Palestinians) were found to exaggerate the
magnitude and directional influence of news coverage on a group of “reg-
ular” television viewers, and the resulting reaction was rather hostile57.
Both sides accused media of prejudice, favoritism, bias and lack of fair-
51
P. D. Driscoll, M. Salwen, Self-perceived knowledge of the O. J. Simpson trial:
Third-person perception and perceptions of guilt, “Journalism and Mass Communica-
tion Quarterly” 1997, no. 74 (3), p. 541–556.
52
J. Cohen, and R. G. Davis, op. cit.
53
K. Neuwirth, E. Frederick, Extending the framework of third-, first-, and se-
cond-person effects, “Mass Communication and Society” 2002, no. 5(2), p. 113–140.
54
See: B. Paul, M. B. Salwen and M. Dupagne, The third-person effect: A me-
ta-analysis of the perceptual hypothesis, “Mass Communication and Society” 2000,
no. 3(1), p. 57–85; R. M. Perloff, Third-person effect research 1983–1992: A review
and synthesis, “International Journal of Public Opinion Research” 1993, no. 5,
p. 167–184; R. M. Perloff, The third-person effect: A critical review and synthesis,
“Media Psychology” 1999, no. 1, p. 353–378.
55
D. Rucinski and C. Salmon, op. cit.
56
W. P. Davidson, op. cit.
57
R. M. Perloff, op. cit.
SP 1 ’10 Whose language? Exploring the attitudes of Bulgaria’s... 121
Method
This study presented two methodological challenges. The first one was
the complexity of the problem, which led to some compromises in order to
make the questionnaire and statistical analysis manageable. The second is-
sue related to designing a sampling procedure that would identify and tar-
get only a certain professional elite among Bulgarian journalists, that is,
those who hold the most power in determining media content.
Sample. During the changes of the 1990s, journalists’ organizations
built a membership that was hardly inclusive of all professionals in this
field. Simply put, Bulgarian journalists did not seem likely to join a pro-
58
R. P. Vallone, L. Ross and M. R. Lepper, The hostile media phenomenon: Bia-
sed perception and perceptions of media bias in coverage of the “Beirut Massacre”,
“Journal of Personality and Social Psychology” 1985, no. 49, p. 577–585.
59
R. M. Perloff, op. cit.
122 Christopher D. Karadjov SP 1 ’10
60
I. G. Nikoltchev, The post-communist Bulgarian journalist: Transition to demo-
cracy (Doctoral dissertation, University of Maryland – College Park), “Dissertation
Abstracts International”, 59, no. 10A, (1998): 3683. This is also confirmed by author’s
own experience. During his times as an active journalist (1990–1997), he recalls working
with only a handful of reporters and editors who belonged to a journalistic organization.
61
Even the process of becoming a journalist was tightly controlled: In order to be
admitted to the Journalism Department at Sofia University, the prospective student had
to be cleared by the regional Communist Party organization.
62
E. Ognianova, The transitional media system of post-Communist Bulgaria, “Jo-
urnalism Monographs” 1997, no. 162.
63
Influence was defined as “being the best in the profession” as judged by their pe-
ers (Sofia Press, 1998, p. 7).
64
The principal consultants for this revision were: Boyko Vassilev, anchor with
the Bulgarian National Television; Dimitri Ivanov, commentator for Sega; Lyudmil
Karavasilev, representative of United Bulgarian Bank and professor at the Department
SP 1 ’10 Whose language? Exploring the attitudes of Bulgaria’s... 123
list were reduced to 189 (eliminating all retirees, potential retirees, trans-
fers to other occupations, and a number of provincial media professionals).
The second part – adding names – took considerably longer, because
there was less agreement on that issue. The author, who accrued 10 years
of journalistic experience in Bulgaria, had to intervene much more often,
mostly by asking questions about the career prospects of a particular per-
son. After several iterations of the list, an additional 59 names were added,
all of them editors and senior reporters who rose to prominence during
the 1990s.
The resulting list had 248 journalists, who, for all practical intents and
purposes, could be considered the most influential individuals in Bulgar-
ian journalism, above all with respect to the topic of this study65.
The method may not be perfect, but it is far superior to having a conve-
nience sample, as is often the case in studies of foreign journalists66. It is
also much better, in this author’s opinion, than randomly selecting journal-
ists from a proprietary list assembled by unknown parameters67. The larg-
est deficiency of this selection procedure is the undeniable degree of
subjectivity in determining who is an influential journalist in Bulgaria and
who is not. Yet it proved to be the only feasible and methodologically ac-
ceptable way of creating a sampling frame for this study.
Questionnaire. As previously noted, this project was a part of a much
more complex study. All 248 journalists selected as “elite” received the
full study questionnaire, and 133 completed questionnaires68 were re-
69
A. H. Eagly and S. Chaiken, The psychology of attitudes, Harcourt Brace Jova-
novich, New York 1993, p. 51–55 and p. 64–72.
70
J. Phillips, op. cit.
SP 1 ’10 Whose language? Exploring the attitudes of Bulgaria’s... 125
the cities of Ohrid (on the eponymous lake), Prespa and Struga71, and in
the capital of Skopje.
None of the situations is out of question, even though an element of ar-
tificiality exists in this as in most other third-person effect studies72.
Methodological limitations. This study has two obvious limitations.
The first one is related to the relatively small sample size and the
non-random sampling procedures, which may have introduced biases in
the sample selection or obscured some valid inferences. Yet obtaining lim-
ited data is better than no data at all – and given the dearth of research on
Bulgarian journalists (Nikoltchev’s 1998 project was the only serious at-
tempt in the area during the 1990s), this study should be viewed as a pre-
liminary exploration of a potentially very interesting subject.
The second limitation refers to the development of the instrument of
this study. Again, to this author’s knowledge, no researcher in Bulgaria
has ever attempted to quantify attitudes toward Macedonia, with the ex-
ception of the occasional question or two included in other polls. The ex-
ploratory nature of the study makes some mistakes inevitable on such
a complex topic. Only subsequent systematic research can lead to the full
validation of sampling approaches, questions and findings presented here.
Research questions and hypotheses. Two overall research questions
were posited for this study:
RQ1: What is the attitude of elite Bulgarian journalists on the issue of
Macedonian language, defined as whether Macedonian language is
a mere dialect of Bulgarian or a separate language?
RQ2: What do elite Bulgarian journalists think is the average attitude of
the rest of Bulgarians (non-journalists) on the same issue?
Two hypotheses were formulated as well to test for the third-person ef-
fect on the issue of Macedonian language:
H1: On the issue of Macedonian language, Bulgarian journalists would
consider themselves to be less likely to undergo an attitude change un-
der the influence of Macedonian media when compared with other
Bulgarians (non-journalists).
71
Ohrid, Struga, Prespa are names tightly related to Bulgarian history, as Ohrid
was the capital of King Samuil, claimed today by both Bulgarians and Macedonians as
the leader who ruled during a ‘golden age’ of his kingdom. Both sides are calling it, re-
spectively, Great Bulgaria or Great Macedonia.
72
R. M. Perloff, Ego-involvement, op. cit.
126 Christopher D. Karadjov SP 1 ’10
Results
The Likert scale designed to measure the attitude toward Macedonian lan-
guage comprised 10 statements selected during the pre-test, each item coded
on a five-point scale, from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree,” with
a midpoint of “undecided/cannot tell.” Some of the items had reverse coding
to forestall any design artifacts in the questionnaire, which was re-coded dur-
ing analysis. Overall, results closer to 1 mean higher agreement with the gen-
eral statement that Macedonia’s language is a mere dialect of Bulgarian, and
results closer to 5 mean stronger disagreement with this position.
The first task of this research was to address any potential reliability is-
sues, so Cronbach’s alpha was calculated for both Likert scale sets (jour-
nalists rating themselves and journalist rating other Bulgarians). The first
alpha came out as .75 and the second was .71, which affirmed the stability
of the scale from the pretest phase.
The next step was to produce a summated rating, or an index, using the
Likert scale items. On the set of questions referring to journalist’s judg-
ment of their own attitude toward Macedonian language’s nature and ori-
gin, the mean was 1.51, with a SD = .81, SE mean = .70 and n = 133. This
is a strong indicator that elite Bulgarian journalists were very much in
agreement with the position that Macedonian language is a dialect of Bul-
garian, and not an independently-developed language. Journalists evaluated
the rest of Bulgarians with a mean score of 1.64 (SD = .68, SE mean = .57,
n = 133).
The overall difference between these means was not significant, which
is indicative that Bulgarian journalists consider themselves to be of the
same mind on the issue of language as their average Bulgarian counter-
parts (again, this is what journalists think). A strong predisposition toward
non-acceptance of the Macedonian language is apparent from this survey.
For instance, despite the presence of a midpoint on the questionnaire, only
about 2.2% of answers on all 20 items (10+10) fell into this category. This
hints at established preferences among respondents, who obviously dis-
played little hesitation on the subject.
SP 1 ’10 Whose language? Exploring the attitudes of Bulgaria’s... 127
Discussion
The fact that elite journalists in Bulgaria believe they are sharing atti-
tudes presumed to be common in Bulgaria is not surprising at all and does
not carry automatically negative connotations. Media professionals’ seeming
unwillingness to accept any other point of view, at least on the issue of lin-
guistic identity of Macedonia, is a bit more troubling, though. After all,
even if one accepts that Macedonian language was created artificially, it be-
comes apparent to anyone who has ever traveled to Macedonia that most lo-
cals insist on their distinctiveness from Bulgarians. Why Bulgaria’s most
influential journalists are unwilling to put history behind and accept this re-
ality is an issue that merits further investigation. Journalists by definition are
supposed to present the world as it is, not as they wish it to be74. In this
sense, the findings of the present study are somewhat disheartening.
73
Perloff, Ego-involvement, op. cit.
74
B. Kovach, T. Rosenstiel, The elements of journalism: What newspeople should
know and the public should expect, Crown, New York 2001.
SP 1 ’10 Whose language? Exploring the attitudes of Bulgaria’s... 129
It is hardly a surprise, too, that Bulgarian journalists will see their own
compatriots as more difficult to sway on Macedonia-related issues than
some possibly “clueless” foreigners. Bulgarians growing in their own
country are presumed to share the same culture, not the least stemming
from textbooks, media, collective mythology, and so on. The surprise
came with the finding that elite Bulgarian journalists clearly do not trust
Bulgarian visitors (tourists) to remain “unspoiled” by Macedonian media
on the language issue. It is an unexpected result, because Bulgarian jour-
nalists’ opinion of what other Bulgarians think on the language issue also
did not promise such a development (there was no significant difference
between the two variables). It is clearly a matter for further study why
journalists view themselves as more “resistant” than their compatriots.
The evidence of a strong third-person effect when the “others” are as-
sumed to be foreigners is logical and has been repeatedly confirmed in
studies75. Bulgarians have long perceived themselves to be victims of the
foreign Great Powers in losing Macedonia76. The underlying assumption
is that foreigners (particularly Westerners) are “against Bulgaria” or at
least care more about furthering their own national agenda than upholding
historical justice in the Balkans. This probably accounts for the belief
among the respondents that non-Bulgarians, if not a priori hostile, at the
very least will have no vested interest in the Bulgarian cause and will fall
prey to whoever advises them.
Patronizing attitudes toward Macedonia among Bulgaria’s media pro-
fessionals are not a mere matter of scholarly interest. A renowned Bulgar-
ian journalist, Albena Shkodrova, explains the mechanisms which Bulgaria,
as a larger and economically and militarily stronger country may use to
bully its smaller neighbor77. Shkodrova discusses in particular the “lure of
the Bulgarian passport”78, which unlike its Macedonian counterpart opens
the doors to virtually the entire world without the need for a visa (the
United States, however, are a notable exception to visa-free travel for Bul-
garians). Higher levels of economic prosperity in Bulgaria – especially af-
ter the entry into the European Union in 2007 – made it appealing to
75
R. M. Perloff, Ego-involvement, op. cit.
76
R. J. Crampton, A short history, op. cit.
77
A. Shkodrova, Macedonia: Bulgaria’s warm embrace, in: Balkan Crisis Report
No. 537 by Institute for War and Peace Reporting [Online], Accessed Jan. 21, 2005
from: http://iwpr.net.
78
As above, p. 5.
130 Christopher D. Karadjov SP 1 ’10
Macedonians, whose own economy has been stalled by years of war and
mismanagement79.
Bulgarian government has instituted a relatively easy way for Macedo-
nians to “reclaim” their Bulgarian identity, which includes full stipends
for students wishing to study in Bulgaria80 and granting of Bulgarian citi-
zenship based on a simple “affidavit of origin”81. Under pressure from the
European Union, the passport procedures have been somewhat tightened,
requiring more documents to verify a Bulgarian identity, but it is still an
easy way to achieve “cross-border mobility at the expense of a changed
national identity”82.
The big question is can Bulgarian media become complicit should such
an “identity shift” be initiated by any future Bulgarian government? After
all, as Giorgi (1995) noted for Eastern Europe as a whole, and Daynov83,
Ognianova84 and Raycheva85 for Bulgaria in particular, during times of
transition media are more influential in providing bearings to the popu-
lace. In this context, any biases of journalists may become important and
even crucial in shaping public attitudes and enabling policy decisions.
In the light of this study’s findings, the next reasonable step would be
to conduct a full-scale content analysis of Bulgarian media and make in-
ferences about the actual effects of Bulgarian journalists’ attitudes toward
Macedonian language. Other aspects of attitudes toward Macedonia must
be investigated as well.
Streszczenie
79
As above; J. Phillips, op. cit.
80
A. Shkodrova, op. cit.
81
Sega, Bitkata za Balgarskija pasport [The fight for the Bulgarian passport], Ac-
cessed May 14, 2005, from www.segabg.com.
82
As above.
83
E. Daynov, Diskursat na mediite i prehodat v Bulgaria [Media discourse and
Bulgarian transition], “Chetvarta vlast” [Fourth power] 1997, no. 1, p. 16–19 (A quar-
terly publication of Free Speech Forum, Sofia).
84
E. Ognianova, op. cit.
85
L. Raycheva, Bulgarian mass media in transition (1988–1994), Paper presented
to the International Association for Mass Communication Research conference, Porto-
rozh, Slovenia, June 27–30, 1995.
SP 1 ’10 Whose language? Exploring the attitudes of Bulgaria’s... 131