AGENCY Summer Ed.

AGENCY COURSE SYLLABUS with List of Cases
I. Introduction
Rallos vs Felix Go Chan, 81 Scra 251 2

Orient Air Services vs CA, 197 Scra 645
Uy vs CA, 314 Scra 69
Macke vs Camps, 7 Phil. 553
Prudential Bank vs CA, 223 Scra 350
Litonjua Jr. vs Eternit Corp. 490 scra 204
Philippine Realty and Holding Corp. vs. Ley Const.
and Dev. Corp./Ley Cons. and Dev. Corp. vs.
Philippine Realty and Holding Corp., G.R. No.
165548/G.R. No. 167879. June 13, 2011 (Doctrine
of Apparent Authority)
II. Form of the Contract of Agency
Angeles vs Phil. National Railways, 500 scra 444

(2006)
Jimenez vs Rabot, 38 Phil 378
City-Lite vs CA, 325 scra 385
Cosmic Lumber vs CA, 265 scra 168
San Juan Structural Steel vs CA, 296 scra 631
Delos Reyes vs CA, 313 Scra 632
AF Realty vs Dieselman Freight, 373 Scra 385
III. Who has the obligation to determine the existence and

scope of agency?
Keeler Electric Co. vs Rodriguez, 44 Phil 19

Yu Eng Cho vs Pan American, 328 scra 717
IV. How is agency distinguished from other

contracts/relationships
Sevilla vs CA, 160 scra 171
Shell vs Firemen’s Insurance Co., 100 Phi 757
Dela Cruz vs Northern Theatrical Enterprises, 95
Phil 739
Nielson & Co. vs Lepanto Consolidated, 26 Scra 540
Quiroga vs Parsons Hardware, 38 Phil 501
Gonzalo Puyat & sons vs Arco Amusement Co., 72 3
Phil 402
Lim v People, 133 scra 333
Pacific Commercial vs Yatco, 68 Phil 398
Ker vs Lingad, 38 scra 524
Hahn vs CA, 266 scra 537
V. What are the classifications of agency contracts
Siasat vs IAC 139 scra 238

Dominion Insurance vs CA, G.R. No. 129919, 6
February 2002
PNB vs Sta. Maria 29 scra 303
BPI vs de coster 47 Phil 594
Hodges vs Salas 63 Phil 567
Strong vs Gutierrez Rupide 6 Phil 680
Katigbak vs Tai Hung Co., 52 Phil 622
Chua vs IAC, 229 scra 99
Dungo vs Lopena, 6 scra 1007
Vicente vs Geraldez 52 scra 210
Insular Drug CO. vs National Bank 58 Phil 684
Angeles V. Philippine National Railways August 31,
2006
Megan Sugar Corporation v. Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo, Br. 68, Dumangas, Iloilo; New Frontier Sugar
Corp., et al., G.R. No. 170352. June 1, 2011
(Agency by Estoppel)
VI. What are the obligations and liabilities of agents to their

principals?
Austria vs CA 39 scra 527

PNB vs Manila Surety 14 Scra 776
Domingo vs Domingo 42 scra 131
Severino vs Severino 44 Phil 343
Green Valley Poultry vs IAC, 133 Scra 697
Municipal Council of Iloilo vs Evangelista, 55 Phil
290 4
VII. Responsibility for acts of substitutes
Del Rosario vs La BAdenia, 33 Phil 316

International Films vs Lyric Films 63 Phil 778
VIII. What are the obligations and liabilities of agents to third

parties?
PNB vs Agudelo, 58 Phil 655

Philippine Products vs Primateria, 15 scra 301
NPC vs National Merchandising, 117 scra 789
National Bank vs Welch Fairchild 44 Phil 780
Tuazon vs Orosco, 5 Phil 596
Cervantes vs CA, 304 Scra 25
Agent acting in his own name
Smith Bell vs Sotelo 44 Phil 784

Rural Bank of Bombon vs CA 212 Scra 25
Sy-juco vs Sy-juco 49 Phil 634
National Food Authority vs IAC 184 scra 166
Gold Star Mining vs Lim Jimenez 25 scra 597
IX. What are the obligations and liabilities of principals to

agents?
Macondray vs Sellner, 33 Phil 370

Danon vs Brim & Co. 42 Phil 133
Rocha vs Prats 43 Phil 397
Inland Realty vs CA 273 csra 70
Infante vs Cunanan 93 Phil 691
Prats vs CA 81 scra 360
Uniland Resources vs DBP 200 scra 75
X. What are the obligations of principals to third parties?

5
Gonzales vs Haberes 47 Phil 380
XI. How is agency extinguished?
A. Revocation
Barreto vs Sta. Maria 26 Phil 440

Dialosa vs CA, 130 Scra 350
New Manila vs Republic, 107 Phil 824
Dy Buncio vs Ong Guan, 60 Phil 606
Garcia vs de Manzano, 39 Phil 577
Rallos vs Yangco, 20 Phil 269
Compania General de Tobaccos vs Diabu 20 Phil
321
Caleongco vs Claparols, 10 scra 577
B. Withdrawal
Valera vs Velasco, 51 Phil 695
C. Death
Pasno vs Ravina, 54 Phil 378

Ramon vs Caoibes, 94 Phil 440
errera vs Luy Kim Guan, 1 scra 406
A. LAW ON AGENCY
I. NATURE AND OBJECT OF AGENCY 6
1. Definition (Art. 1868); Parties in an Agency Relationship
Under Article 1868 of the Civil Code, a contract of agency is one

whereby “a person binds himself to render some service or to do
something in representation or on behalf of another, with the
consent or authority of the latter.”
The Spanish term for “principal” is “mandante”. Among the terms

used for “agent” are “mandatario”, “attorney-in-fact”, “proxy”,
“delegate” or “representative.”
2. Root and Objectives of Agency (Arts. 1317 and 1403[1])
The right of inspection given to a stockholder under the law can be

exercised either by himself or by any proper representative or
attorney-in-fact, and either with or without the attendance of the
stockholder. This is in conformity with the general rule that what a
man may do in person he may do through another. Philpotts v. Phil.
Mfg. Co., 40 Phil 471 (1919).
The purpose of every contract of agency is the ability, by legal

fiction, to extend the personality of the principal through the facility
of the agent; but the same can only be effected with the consent of
the principal. Orient Air Service & Hotel Representatives v. Court of
Appeals, 197 SCRA 645 (1991).
3. Elements of the Contract of Agency
Rallos v. Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corp., 81 SCRA 251

(1978): The following are the essential elements of the contract of
agency: 7
(a) Consent, express or implied, of the parties to

establish the relationship;
(b) Object, is the execution of a juridical act in

relation to third parties;
(c) The agent acts as a representative and not for

himself; and
(d) The agent acts within the scope of his

authority.
Whether or not an agency has been created is determined by the

fact that one is representing and acting for another. The law makes
no presumption of agency; proving its existence, nature and extent
is incumbent upon the person alleging it. Urban Bank, Inc. v.
Peña, G.R. No. 145817, 19 October 2011.
a. Consent (Arts. 1317 and 1403[1])
The basis for agency is representation. On the part of the principal,

there must be an actual intention to appoint or an intention naturally
inferable from his words or actions; and on the part of the agent,
there must be an intention to accept the appointment and act on it,
and in the absence of such intent, there is generally no agency.
Dominion Insurance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 376 SCRA 239
(2002); Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. v. Glodel
Brokerage Corp., 639 SCRA 69 (2011).
8
b. Object or Subject Matter: Execution of
Juridical Acts in Behalf of Principal
(Service)
In an agent-principal relationship, the personality of the principal is

extended through the facility of the agent. In so doing, the agent, by
legal fiction, becomes the principal, authorized to perform all acts
which the latter would have him do. Such a relationship can only be
effected with the consent of the principal, which must not, in any
way, be compelled by law or by any court. Litonjua, Jr. v. Eternit
Corp., 490 SCRA 204 (2006).
c. Consideration: Agency Presumed to Be

for Compensation, Unless There Is
Proof to the Contrary (Art. 1875)
Old Civil Code Rule: The service rendered by the agent was deemed
to be gratuitous, apart from the occupation of some of the house of
the deceased by the plaintiff and his family. . . . for if it were true
that the agent and the deceased principal had an understanding to
the effect that the agent was to receive compensation aside from the
use and occupation of the houses of the deceased, it cannot be
explained how the agent could have rendered services as he did for
eight years without receiving and claiming any compensation from
the deceased. Aguña v. Larena, 57 Phil 630 (1932)
Prescinding from the principle that the terms of the contract of

agency constituted the law between the principal and the agent,
then the mere fact that “other agents” intervened in the
consummation of the sale and were paid their respective
commissions could not vary the terms of the contract of agency with
the plaintiff of a 5% commission based on the selling price. De
9
Castro v. Court of Appeals, 384 SCRA 607 (2002).
Agency is presumed to be for compensation. Unless the contrary

intent is shown, a person who acts as an agent does so with the
expectation of payment according to the agreement and to the
services rendered or results effected… When an agent performs
services for a principal at the latter's request, the law will normally
imply a promise on the part of the principal to pay for the reasonable
worth of those services. The intent of a principal to compensate the
agent for services performed on behalf of the former will be inferred
from the principal's request for the agents. Urban Bank, Inc. v. Peña
[G.R. No. 145817, 19 October 19, 2011.
4. Essential Characteristics of Agency
a. Nominate and Principal
If an act done by one person in behalf of another is in its essential

nature one of agency, the former is the agent of the latter
notwithstanding he or she is not so called – it will be an agency
whether the parties understood the exact nature of the relation or
not. Doles v. Angeles, 492 SCRA 607 (2006).
Even when it is provided under the Agreement that the agency

manager is considered an independent contractor and not an agent,
nonetheless when the terms thereof authorized the agency manager
to solicit and remit offers to purchase interments spaces, it covers
an agency arrangement since the agency manager represented the
interest of the memorial company, and the latter in turn had
authorized her to represent in dealings with its clients/prospective
buyers. Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. v. Linsangan, 443
SCRA 377 (2004).
10
b. Unilateral and Primarily Onerous
c. Consensual (Arts. 1869 and 1870)
An agency may be expressed or implied from the act of the principal,

from his silence or lack of action, or failure to repudiate the agency.
Litonjua, Jr. v. Eternit Corp., 490 SCRA 204 (2006).
The basis for agency is representation. Here, there is no showing

that Brigida consented to the acts of Deganos or authorized him to
act on her behalf, much less with respect to the particular
transactions involved. Petitioners' attempt to foist liability on
respondent spouses through the supposed agency relation with
Deganos is groundless and ill-advised. Besides, it was grossly and
inexcusably negligent of petitioners to entrust to Deganos, not once
or twice but on at least six occasions as evidenced by six receipts,
several pieces of jewelry of substantial value without requiring a
written authorization from his alleged principal. A person dealing
with an agent is put upon inquiry and must discover upon his peril
the authority of the agent. Bordador v. Luz, 283 SCRA 374
(1997).
A co-owner does not become an agent of the other co-owners, and

therefore, any exercise of an option to buy a piece of land transacted
with one co-owner does not bind the other co-owners of the land.
The basis for agency is representation and a person dealing with an
agent is put upon inquiry and must discover upon his peril the
authority of the agent. Since there was no showing that the other
co-owners consented to the act of one co-owner nor authorized her
to act on their behalf with regard to her transaction with purported
11
buyer. The most prudent thing the purported buyer should have
done was to ascertain the extent of the authority said co-owner;
being negligent in this regard, the purported buyer cannot seek relief
on the basis of a supposed agency. Dizon v. Court of Appeals, 302
SCRA 288 (1999).
d. Preparatory and Representative
Agency is basically personal, representative, and derivative in

nature. The authority of the agent to act emanates from the powers
granted to him by his principal; his act is the act of the principal if
done within the scope of the authority. Qui facit per alium facit per
se. “He who acts through another acts himself.” Rallos v. Felix
Go Chan & Sons Realty Corp., 81 SCRA 251 (1978).
The essence of agency being the representation of another, it is

evident that the obligations contracted are for and on behalf of the
principal—a consequence of this representation is the liability of the
principal for the acts of his agent performed within the limits of his
authority that is equivalent to the performance by the principal
himself who should answer therefor. Tan v. Engineering Services,
498 SCRA 93 (2006).
The other consequence of the doctrine of representation are:
 When an agent purchases the property in bad faith,

the principal should also be deemed a purchaser in
bad faith. Caram, Jr. v. Laureta, 103 SCRA 7
(1981).
 Notice to the agent is notice to the principal. Air

France v. Court of Appeals, 126 SCRA 448 (1983). 12
 The basis for agency is representation and a person

dealing with an agent is put upon inquiry and must
discover upon his peril the authority of the agent.
Safic Alcan & Cie v. Imperial Vegetable Oil Co.,
Inc., 355 SCRA 559 (2001).
It is clear from Article 1868 that the basis of agency is

representation. On the part of the principal, there must be an actual
intention to appoint or an intention naturally inferable from his
words or actions; and on the part of the agent, there must be an
intention to accept the appointment and act on it, and in the
absence of such intent, there is generally no agency. One factor
which most clearly distinguishes agency from other legal concepts is
control; one person - the agent - agrees to act under the control or
direction of another - the principal. Indeed, the very word "agency"
has come to connote control by the principal. Victorias Milling
Co. v. Court Appeals, 333 SCRA 663 (2000).
In a situation where two agents enter into a contract of behalf of

their principals, even if the principals do not actually and personally
know each other, such ignorance does not affect their juridical
standing as agents, especially since the very purpose of agency is to
extent the personality of the principal through the facility of the
agent. Doles v. Angeles, 492 SCRA 607 (2006).
______________________
A unilateral contract has been defined as “A contract in which one

party makes a promise or undertakes a performance.” Thus, it was
observed that “[M]any unilateral contacts are in reality gratuitous 13
promises enforced for good reason with no element of bargain.”
[BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 326 (1990)] It is perhaps in this sense
that agency is unilateral because it is the agent who undertakes the
performance of the agency. However, one must not forget that
agency is still a contract with a bilateral character. Manresa explains:
“As regards whether the agency has a unilateral or bilateral
character, it is evident, in our considered opinion, from the point of
view of the Code, that the totality of cases involving agency will
always be bilateral, not because, as one ordinarily supposes, there
will be obligations exclusively for the agent and rights exclusively for
the principal. It is clear that at times it happens this way, but what is
common in agency with other contracts is the mutuality and the
reciprocity that arises from the existence of an obligation against
another obligation, a right against another right.” 11 MANRESA.
COMENTARIOS AL CODIGO CIVIL ESPAÑOL 443 (1950)
(i) Principles Flowing from Agency Characteristics of
“Preparatory and Representative” (Art. 1897)
It is said that the basis of agency is representation, that is, the

agent acts for and on behalf of the principal on matters within the 14
scope of his authority and said acts have the same legal effect as if
they were personally executed by the principal. By this legal fiction,
the actual or real absence of the principal is converted into his legal
or juridical presence – qui facit per alium facit per se. Eurotech
Industrial Technologies, Inc. v. Cuizon, 521 SCRA 584 (2007)
Article 1897 reinforces the familiar doctrine that an agent, who acts
as such, is not personally liable to the party with whom he contracts.
The same provision, however, presents two instances when an agent
becomes personally liable to a third person. The first is when he
expressly binds himself to the obligation and the second is when he
exceeds his authority. In the last instance, the agent can be held
liable if he does not give the third party sufficient notice of his
powers. Eurotech Industrial Technologies, Inc. v. Cuizon, 521
SCRA 584 (2007).
Notice to the agent should always be construed as notice binding on

the principal, even when in fact the principal never became aware
thereof. Air France v. Court of Appeals, 126 SCRA 448 (1983).
e. Personal, Fiduciary and Revocable
The relations of an agent to his principal are fiduciary and in regard

to the property forming the subject matter of the agency, he is
estopped from acquiring or asserting a title adverse to that of the
principal. Severino v. Severino, 44 Phil. 343 (1923).
By reason of the personal, representative and derivative nature of

agency, agency is extinguished by the death of the principal or
agent. Rallos v. Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corp., 81 SCRA 251
(1978).
15
A contract of agency is generally revocable as it is a personal
contract of representation based on trust and confidence reposed by
the principal on his agent. As the power of the agent to act depends
on the will and license of the principal he represents, the power of
the agent ceases when the will or permission is withdrawn by the
principal. Thus, generally, the agency may be revoked by the
principal at will. Republic v. Evangelista, 466 SCRA 544 (2005).
In an agency, the principal’s personality is extended through the

facility of the agent—the agent, by legal fiction, becomes the
principal, authorized to perform all acts which the latter would have
him do. Such a relationship can only be effected with the consent of
the principal, which must not, in any way, be compelled by law or by
any court. The Agreement itself between the parties states that
“either party may terminate the Agreement without cause by giving
the other 30 days’ notice by letter, telegram or cable.” Orient Air
Services v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 645 (1991).6
5. Distinguished from Other Similar Contracts:
a. From Employment Contract
The relationship between the corporation which owns and operates a

theatre, and the individual it hires as a security guard to maintain
the peace and order at the entrance of the theatre is not that of
principal and agent, because the principle of representation was in
no way involved. The security guard was not employed to represent
the defendant corporation in its dealings with third parties; he was a
mere employee hired to perform a certain specific duty or task, that
of acting as special guard and staying at the main entrance of the
movie house to stop gate crashers and to maintain peace and order
within the premises. Dela Cruz v. Northern Theatrical Enterprises, 95
16
Phil 739 (1954).
But to set the record straight, the concept of a single person having
the dual role of agent and employee while doing the same task is a
novel one in our jurisprudence, which must be viewed with caution
especially when it is devoid of any jurisprudential support or
precedent. All these, read without any clear understanding of fine
legal distinctions, appear to speak of control by the insurance
company over its agents. They are, however, controls aimed only at
specific results in undertaking an insurance agency, and are, in fact,
parameters set by law in defining an insurance agency and the
attendant duties and responsibilities an insurance agent must
observe and undertake. They do not reach the level of control into
the means and manner of doing an assigned task that invariably
characterizes an employment relationship as defined by labor law.
Tongko v. The Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. (Phils.),
Inc., 640 SCRA 395 (2011).
b. From Contract for a Piece-of-Work
Taking into consideration the facts that the operator owed his
position to the company and the latter could remove him or
terminate his services at will; that the service station belonged to
the company and bore its tradename and the operator sold only the
products of the company; that the equipment used by the operator
belonged to the company and were just loaned to the operator and
the company took charge of their repair and maintenance; that an
employee of the company supervised the operator and conducted
periodic inspection of the company's gasoline and service station;
that the price of the products sold by the operator was fixed by the
company and not by the operator; and that he was a mere agent,
the finding of the Court of Appeals that the operator was an agent of
17
the company and not an independent contractor should not be
disturbed. Shell v. Firemen’s Ins. Co., 100 Phil 757 (1957).
c. From Broker
The question as to what constitutes a sale so as to entitle a real

estate broker to his commissions is extensively annotated in the
case of Lunney vs. Healey (Nebraska) . . . 44 Law Rep. Ann. 593 …,
and the long line of authorities there cited support the following rule:
# “The business of a real estate broker or agent, generally, is only to
find a purchaser, and the settled rule as stated by the courts is that,
in the absence of an express contract between broker and his
principal, the implication generally is that the broker becomes
entitled to the usual commissions whenever he brings to his principal
a party who is able and willing to take the property and enter into a
valid contract upon the terms then named by the principal, although
the particulars may be arranged and the matter negotiated and
completed between the principal and the purchaser directly.”
Macondray & Co. v. Sellner, 33 Phil. 370 (1916).
“The duties and liability of a broker to his employer are essentially

those which an agent owes to his principal. Consequently, the
decisive legal provisions on determining whether a broker is
mandated to give to the employer the propina or gift received from
the buyer would be Articles 1891 and 1909 of the Civil Code.” (Yet
the facts did indicate clearly that the real estate broker was
appointed as an exclusive agent.) Domingo v. Domingo, 42
SCRA 131 (1971).
Where the purported agent was orally given authority to “follow up”
the purchase of the fire truck with the municipal government, there
is no authority to sell nor has the purported agent been empowered
to make a sale for and in behalf of the seller. Guardex v. NLRC, 191
18
SCRA 487 (1990).
When the terms of the agency arrangement is to the effect that

entitlement to the commission was contingent on the purchase by a
customer of a fire truck, the implicit condition being that the agent
would earn the commission if he was instrumental in bringing the
sale about. Since the agent had nothing to do with the sale of the
fire truck, and is not therefore entitled to any commission at all.
Guardex v. NLRC, 191 SCRA 487 (1990).
A broker is one who is engaged, for others, on a commission,

negotiating contracts relative to property with the custody of which
he has no concern; the negotiator between the other parties, never
acting in his own name but in the name of those who employed him.
His occupation is to bring the parties together, in matter of trade,
commerce or navigation. Schmid and Oberly, Inc. v. RJL
Martinez, 166 SCRA 493 (1988). An agent receives a commission
upon the successful conclusion of a sale. On the other hand, a
broker earns his pay merely by bringing the buyer and the seller
together, even if no sale is eventually made. Tan v. Gullas, 393
SCRA 334 (2002).
In relation thereto, we have held that the term “procuring cause” in

describing a broker’s activity, refers to a cause originating a series of
events which, without break in their continuity, result in the
accomplishment of the prime objective of the employment of the
broker—producing a purchaser ready, willing and able to buy on the
owner’s terms. To be regarded as the “procuring cause” of a sale as
to be entitled to a commission, a broker’s efforts must have been
the foundation on which the negotiations resulting in a sale began.
Medrano v. Court of Appeals, 452 SCRA 77 (2005).7
A real estate broker is one who negotiates the sale of real

properties. His business, generally speaking, is only to find a 19
purchaser who is willing to buy the land upon terms fixed by the
owner. He has no authority to bind the principal by signing a
contract of sale. Indeed, an authority to find a purchaser of real
property does not include an authority to sell. Litonjua, Jr. v.
Eternit Corp., 490 SCRA 204 (2006).
Since brokerage relationship is necessary a contract for the

employment of an agent, principles of contract law also govern the
broker-principal relationship. xAbacus Securities Corp. v. Ampil, 483
SCRA 315 (2006).
Contrary to the appellate court's conclusion, this arrangement shows

an agency. An agent receives a commission upon the successful
conclusion of a sale. On the other hand, a broker earns his pay
merely by bringing the buyer and the seller together, even if no sale
is eventually made. (Obiter – the issue was whether it was an
independent distributor of BMW cars in the Philippines) xHahn v.
Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 537 (1997).
d. From Sale
When the terms of the agreement compels the purported agent to

pay for the products received from the purported principal within the
stipulated period, even when there has been no sale thereof to the
public, the underlying relationship is not one of contract of agency to
sell, but one of actual sale. A real agent does not assume personal
responsibility for the payment of the price of the object of the
agency; his obligation is merely to turn-over to the principal the
proceeds of the sale once he receives them from the buyer.
Consequently, since the underlying agreement is not an agency
agreement, it cannot be revoked except for cause. Quiroga v.
20
Parsons, 38 Phil 502 (1918).
When under the agreement the purported agent becomes

responsible for any changes in the acquisition cost of the object he
has been authorized to purchase from a supplier in the United
States, the underlying agreement is not an contract of agency to
buy, since a true agent does not bear any risk relating to the subject
matter or the price. Being a contract of sale and not agency, any
profits realized by the purported agent from discounts received from
the American supplier pertained to it with no obligation to account
for it, much less to turn it over, to the purported principal. Gonzalo
Puyat v. Arco, 72 Phil. 402 (1941).
The distinctions between a sale and an agency are not difficult to

discern and this Court, as early as 1970, had already formulated the
guidelines that would aid in differentiating the two (2) contracts.
… that the primordial differentiating consideration between the two

(2) contracts is the transfer of ownership or title over the property
subject of the contract. In an agency, the principal retains ownership
and control over the property and the agent merely acts on the
principal's behalf and under his instructions in furtherance of the
objectives for which the agency was established. On the other hand,
the contract is clearly a sale if the parties intended that the delivery
of the property will effect a relinquishment of title, control and
ownership in such a way that the recipient may do with the property
as he pleases. Spouses Viloria v. Continental Airlines, Inc., G.R. No.
188288. 16 January 2012.
II. FORMS AND KINDS OF AGENCY
1. How Agency May Be Constituted (Art. 1869)
There are some provisions of law which require certain formalities 21

for particular contracts: the first is when the form is required for the
validity of the contract; the second is when it is required to make
the contract effective as against third parties; and the third is when
the form is required for the purpose of proving the existence of the
contract. A contract of agency to sell on commission basis does not
belong to any of these three categories, hence it is valid and
enforceable in whatever form in may be entered into. Consequently,
when the agent signs her signature on any face of the receipt
showing that she receives the jewelry for her to sell on commission,
she is bound to the obligations of an agent. The exact position of the
agent’s signature in the receipt (in this case near the description of
the goods and not on top of her printed name) is immaterial. Lim v.
a. From Side of the Principal (Art. 1869)
When the buyers-a-retro failed for several years to clear their title to
the property purchased and allowed the seller-a-retro to remain in
possession in spite of the expiration of the period of redemption,
then the execution of the memorandum of repurchase by the buyers’
son-in-law, which stood unrepudiated for many years, constituted an
implied agency under Article 1869 of the Civil Code, from their
silence or lack of action, or their failure to repudiate the agency.
Conde v. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 245 (1982).
Where the principal has acquiesced in the act of his agent for a long
period of time, and has received and appropriated to his own use the
benefits result in from the acts of his agent, courts should be slow in
declaring the acts of the agent null and void. Linan v. Puno, 31 Phil.
259 (1915).
22
b. From Side of the Agent (Arts. 1870, 1871 and 1872)
c. From Side of Third Parties/Public (Arts. 1873 and

1408; 1921 and 1922)
A long-standing client, acting in good faith and without knowledge,

having sent goods to sell on commission to the former agent of the
defendant, can recover of the defendant, when no previous notice of
the termination of agency was given said client. Having advertised
the fact that Collantes was his agent and having given special notice
to the plaintiff of that fact, and having given them a special
invitation to deal with such agent, it was the duty of the defendant
on the termination of the relationship of principal and agent to give
due and timely notice thereof to the plaintiffs. Failing to do so, he is
responsible to them for whatever goods may have been in good faith
and without negligence sent to the agent without knowledge, actual
or constructive, of the termination of such relationship. Rallos v.
Yangco, 20 Phil 269 (1911)
When the owner of a hotel/café business allows a person to use the

title “managing agent” and during his prolonged absences allows
such person to take charge of the business, performing the duties
usually entrusted to managing agent, then such owner is bound by
the act of such person. “One who clothes another apparent authority
as his agent, and holds him out to the public as such, can not be
permitted to deny the authority of such person to act as his agent,
to the prejudice of innocent third parties dealing with such person in
good faith and in the following pre- assumptions or deductions,
which the law expressly directs to be made from particular facts, are
deemed conclusive.” The hotel owner is bound by the contracts
23
entered into by said managing agent that are within the scope of
authority pertinent to such position, including the purchasing such
reasonable quantities of supplies as might from time to time be
necessary in carrying on the business of hotel bar. Macke v. Camps,
7 Phil 522 (1907).
When the law firm has allowed for quite a period the messenger of
another office to receive mails and correspondence on their behalf,
an implied agency had been duly constituted, specially when there is
no showing that counsel had objected to such practice or took step
to put a stop to it. Equitable PCI-Bank v. Ku, 355 SCRA 309 (2001).
2. Kinds of Agency
a. Based on Business or Transactions Encompassed (Art.

1876)
(1) General or Universal Agency
An agent may be (1) universal; (2) general, or (3) special.
A universal agent is one authorized to do all acts for his principal

which can lawfully be delegated to an agent. So far as such a
condition is possible, such an agent may be said to have universal
authority.
A general agent is one authorized to do all acts pertaining to a

business of a certain kind or at a particular place, or all acts
pertaining to a business of a particular class or series. He has usually
authority either expressly conferred in general terms or in effect
made general by the usages, customs or nature of the business
which he is authorized to transact. An agent, therefore, who is
empowered to transact all the business of his principal of a particular
24
kind or in a particular place, would for this reason, be ordinarily
deemed a general agent.
A special agent is one authorized to do some particular act or to

act upon some particular occasion. He acts usually in accordance
with specific instructions or under limitations necessarily implied
from the nature of the act to be done. Siasat v. IAC, 139 SCRA 238
(1985).
(2) Special or Particular Agency
The right of an agent to indorse commercial paper (checks) is a very

responsible power and will not be lightly inferred. A salesman with
authority to collect money belonging to his principal does not have
the implied authority to indorse checks received in payment. Any
person taking checks made payable to a corporation which can act
only by agents does so at his peril, and must abide by the
consequence if the agent who indorses the same is without
authority. Insular Drug v. PNB, 58 Phil. 684 (1933).
b. Whether It Covers Legal Matters
(1) Attorney-at-Law
Only the employee, not his counsel, can impugn the consideration of
the compromise as being unconscionable. The relation of attorney
and client is in many respects one of agency, and the general rules
of agency apply to such relation—the circumstances of this case
indicate that the employee’s counsel acted beyond the scope of his
authority in questioning the compromise agreement. That a client
has undoubtedly the right to compromise a suit without the
25
intervention of his lawyer cannot be gainsaid, the only qualification
being that if such compromise is entered into with the intent of
defrauding the lawyer of the fees justly due him, the compromise
must be subject to the said fees. J-Phil Marine, Inc. v. NLRC, 561
SCRA 675 (2008).
An attorney cannot, without a client’s authorization, settle the action

or subject matter of the litigation even when he believes that such a
settlement will best serve his client’s interest. Philippine Aluminum
Wheels, Inc. v. FASGI Enterprises, Inc., 342 SCRA 722 (2000).
(2) Attorney-in-Fact
The relationship of attorney and client is in many respects one of

agency, and the general rules of agency apply to such relation. The
acts of an agent are deemed the acts of the principal only if the
agent acts within the scope of his authority. Thus, when the lawyer
files an opposition to the compromise agreement that has been
validly entered into by his client, he is acting beyond the scope of his
authority. TJ-Phil. Marine, Inc. v. NLRC, 561 SCRA 675 (2008).
c. Whether It Covers Acts of Administration or Acts of

Dominion: “Powers of Attorney”
(1) Form of Powers of Attorney
In a case involving authority to act in baranggay conciliation cases

covering an ejectment for failure to pay rentals: “A power of
attorney is an instrument in writing by which one person, as
principal, appoints another as his agent and confers upon him the
authority to perform certain specified acts or kinds of acts on behalf
of the principal. The written authorization itself is the power of
attorney, and this is clearly indicated by the fact that it has also
26
been called a “letter of attorney.” Wee v. De Castro, 562 SCRA 695,
712 (2008).
The Letter dated January 16, 1996 relied upon by the petitioners
was signed by respondent Fernandez alone, without any authority
from the respondents-owners. There is no actuation of respondent
Fernandez in connection with her dealings with the petitioners. As
such, said letter is not binding on the respondents as owners of the
subject properties. Litonjua v. Fernandez, 427 SCRA 478
(2004).
(2) General Power of Attorney (Art. 1877)
A power of attorney is an instrument in writing by which one person,

as principal, appoints another as his agent and confers upon his the
authority to perform certain acts or kinds of acts on behalf of the
principal. Wee v. De Castro, 562 SCRA 695 (2008).
Nonetheless, we stress that the power of administration does not

include acts of disposition or encumbrance, which are acts of strict
ownership. As such, an authority to dispose cannot proceed from an
authority to administer, and vice versa, for the two powers may only
be exercised by an agent by following the provisions on agency of
the Civil Code (from Article 1876 to Article 1878). Aggabao v.
Parulan Jr., 629 SCRA 562 (2010).
(3) Special Power of Attorney

Even if a document is designated as a general power of attorney, the
requirement of a special power of attorney is met if there is a clear
mandate from the principal specifically authorizing the performance
of the act. Estate of Lino Olaquer v. Ongjoco, 563 SCRA 373 (2008).
27
It is a general rule that a power of attorney must be strictly
construed; the instrument will be held to grant only those powers
that are specified, and the agent may neither go beyond nor deviate
from the power of attorney. Olaguer v. Purugganan, Jr., 515 SCRA
460 (2007).
Although a “Special Power of Attorney” was issued by the insurance

company to its agency manager, it wordings show that it sought only
to establish an agency that comprises all the business of the
principal within the designated locality, but couched in general
terms, and consequently was limited only to acts of administration.
A general power permits the agent to do all acts for which the law
does not require a special power. Thus, the acts enumerated in or
similar to those enumerated in the “Special Power of Attorney” (i.e.,
really a general power of attorney) did not require a special
power of attorney, and could only cover acts of administration.
(2002).
Even when the title given to a deed is as a “General Power of

Attorney,” but its operative clause contains an authority to sell, it
constituted the requisite special power of attorney to sell a piece of
land. “Thus, there was no need to execute a separate and special
power of attorney since the general power of attorney had expressly
authorized the agent or attorney in fact the power to sell the subject
property. The special power of attorney can be included in the
general power when it is specified therein the act or transaction for
which the special power is required.” Veloso v. Court of Appeals,
260 SCRA 593 (1996).
When an agent has been given general control and management of

the business, he is deemed to have power to employ such agents 28
and employees as are usual and necessary in the conduct of the
business, and needs no special power of attorney for such purpose.
Yu Chuck v. “Kong Li Po,” 46 Phil. 608 (1924).
An attorney-in-fact empowered to pay the debts of the principal and

to employ legal counsel to defend the principal’s interest, has
certainly the implied power to pay on behalf of the principal the
attorney’s fees charged by the lawyer. Municipal Council of Iloilo v.
Evangelista, 55 Phil. 290 (1930).
A co-owner who is made an attorney-in-fact, with the same power

and authority to deal with the property which the principal might or
could have had if personally present, may adopt the usual legal
means to accomplish the object, including acceptance of service and
engaging of legal counsel to preserve the ownership and possession
of the principal’s property. Government of PI v. Wagner, 54 Phil. 132
(1929).
Contracts of agency, as well as a general power of attorney, must be

interpreted in accordance with the language used by the parties. The
real intention of the parties is primarily to be determined from the
language used. The intention is to be gathered from the whole
instrument. In case of doubt, resort must be had to the situation,
surroundings, and relations of the parties. Whenever it is possible,
effect is to be given to every word or clause used by the parties. It is
to be presumed that the parties said what they intended to say and
that they used each word or clause with sole purpose, and that
purpose is, if possible, to be ascertained and enforced. If the
contract be open to two constructions, one of which would while the
other would overthrow it, the former is to be chosen. If by one
construction the contract would be illegal, and by another equally
permissible construction would be lawful, the latter must be
adopted. The acts of the parties will be presumed to be done in
29
conformity with and not contrary to the intent of the contract. The
meaning of general words must be construed with reference to the
specific object to be accomplished and limited by the recitals made
in reference to such object. Linan v. Puno, 31 Phil. 259 (1915).
(4) Express Power of Attorney Excludes Powers of

Administration (e.g., General Power of Attorney)
The instrument which grants to the agent the power “To follow-up,
ask, demand, collect and receipt for my benefit indemnities or sum
due me relative to the sinking of M.V. NEMOS in the vicinity of El
Jadida, Casablanca, Morocco on the evening of February 17, 1986,”
is a special power of attorney, excludes any intent to grant a general
power of attorney or to constitute a universal agency. Being special
powers of attorney, they must be strictly construed. The instrument
cannot be read to give power to the attorney-in-fact “to obtain,
receive, receipt from” the insurance company the proceeds arising
from the death of the seaman-insured, especially when the
commercial practice for group insurance of this nature is that it is
the employer- policyholder who took out the policy who is
empowered to collect the proceeds on behalf of the covered insured
or their beneficiaries. Pineda v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 754
(1993).
d. Cases Where Special Powers of Attorney Are Necessary

(Art. 1878)
(1) To Make Payments “As Are Not Usually Considered as
Acts of Administration”
In the case of the area manager of an insurance company, it was

held that the payment of claims is not an act of administration, and 30
that since the settlement of claims was not included among the acts
enumerated in the Special Power of Attorney issued by the insurance
company, nor is of a character similar to the acts enumerated
therein, then a special power of attorney was required before such
area manager could settle the insurance claims of the insured.
Consequently, the amounts paid by the area manager to settle such
claims cannot be reimbursed from the principal insurance company.
(2002).
(2) To Effect Novations Which Put an End to Obligations

Already in Existence at the Time the Agency Was
Constituted
(3) To Compromise, To Submit Questions to Arbitration, To

Renounce the Right to Appeal from a Judgment, To
Waive Objections to the Venue of an Action, or To
Abandon a Prescription Already Acquired
 The power to compromise excludes the power to

submit to arbitration. It would also be reasonable
to conclude that the power to submit to arbitration
does not carry with it the power to compromise.
(Art. 1880)
When an agent has been empowered to sell hemp in a foreign
country, that express power carries with it the implied power to
make and enter into the usual and customary contract for its sale,
which sale contract may provide for settlement of issues by
31
arbitration. “We are clearly of the opinion that the contract in
question is valid and binding upon the defendant [principal], and
that authority to make and enter into it for and on behalf of the
defendant [principal], but as a matter of fact the contract was legally
ratified and approved by the subsequent acts and conducts of the
defendant [principal].” Robinson Fleming v. Cruz, 49 Phil 42 (1926).
True, said counsel asserted that he had verbal authority to

compromise the case. The Rules, however, require, for attorneys to
compromise the litigation of their clients, a “special authority”
(Section 23, Rule 138, Rules of Court). And while the same does not
state that the special authority be in writing, the court has every
reason to expect, that, if not in writing, the same be duly established
by evidence other than the self-serving assertion of counsel himself
that such authority was verbally given to him. For, authority to
compromise cannot lightly be presumed. Home Insurance Co. v.
USL, 21 SCRA 863 (1967).
Old Civil Code: The power to bring suit in order to collect sums of
money accruing in the ordinary course of business “as properly
belonging to the class of acts described in article 1713 of the Civil
Code as acts of ‘strict ownership’. It seems rather to be something
which is necessarily a part of the mere administration of such a
business as that described in the instrument in question and only
incidentally, if at all, involving a power to dispose of the title to
property.” [In any event, the provision to “exact the payment of
sums of money “by legal means” was construed to be express power
to sue.] Germann v. Donaldson, 1 Phil 63 (1901).
(4) To Waive Any Obligation Gratuitously

32
(5) To Enter Into Any Contract by Which the
Ownership of an Immovable Is Transmitted or
Acquired Either Gratuitously or for a Valuable
Consideration
Also, under Article 1878 of the Civil Code, a special power of

attorney is necessary for an agent to enter into a contract by which
the ownership of an immovable property is transmitted or acquired,
either gratuitously or for a valuable consideration. Pahud v. Court of
Appeals, 597 SCRA 13 (2009).
According to the provisions of Article 1874 on Agency, when the sale

of a piece of land or any interest therein is made through an agent,
the authority of the latter shall be in writing. Absent this
requirement, the sale shall be void. Also, under Article 1878, a
special power of attorney is necessary in order for an agent to enter
into a contract by which the ownership of an immovable property is
transmitted or acquired, either gratuitously or for a valuable
consideration. Estate of Lino Olaguer v. Ongjoco, 563 SCRA 373
(2008).
While the law requires a special power of attorney, the general

power of attorney was sufficient in this case, as Olaguer was
expressly empowered to sell any of Virgilio’s properties; and to sign,
execute, acknowledge and delivery any agreement therefor. Even if
a document is designated as a general power of attorney, the
requirement of a special power of attorney is met if there is a clear
mandate from the principal specifically authorizing the performance
of the act. [Bravo-Guerrero v. Bravo, 465 SCRA 244 (2005)]. The
special power of attorney can be included in the general power when
the act or transaction for which the special power is required is
specified therein.” Estate of Lino Olaguer v. Ongjoco, 563 SCRA
373 (2008).
33
(5-A) Sale of a Piece of Land or Interest Therein (Art. 1874;
City-Lite Realty Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 385
[2000]).
Absence of a written authority to sell a piece of land is ipso jure

void, precisely to protect the interest of an unsuspecting owner from
being prejudiced by the unwarranted act of another. Pahud v. Court
of Appeals, 597 SCRA 13 (2009).
Under Article 1874, when a sale of a piece of land or any interest

therein is through an agent, the authority of the agent shall be in
writing, otherwise the sale shall be void. [See Litonjua, Jr. v. Eternit
Corp., 490 SCRA 204 (2006).] Notice that the article does not
declare the agency to be void, but the resulting contract of sale
effected by the agent. Is the agency itself void?
Agency may be oral unless the law requires a specific form.

However, to create or convey real rights over immovable property, a
special power of attorney is necessary. Thus, when a sale of a piece
of land or any portion thereof is through an agent, the authority of
the latter shall be in writing, otherwise, the sale shall be void.
The Civil Code provides that in the sale of a parcel of land or any
interest therein made through an agent, a special power of attorney
is essential. [Article 1878]. This authority must be in writing,
otherwise the sale shall be void. [Article 1874]” Pineda v. Court
of Appeals, 376 SCRA 222, 228 (2002).
Where in the special power of attorney the agent was primarily
empowered by the corporation to bring an ejectment case against
the occupant and also “to compromise . . . so far as it shall protect
the rights and interest of the corporation in the aforementioned
34
lots,” and that the agent did execute a compromise in the legal
proceedings filed which sold the lots to the occupant, the
compromise agreement that effected a sale of the lots is void for the
power to sale by way of compromise could not be implied to protect
the interests of the principal to secure possession of the properties.
Cosmic Lumber v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 168 (1996).
The express mandate required by Article 1874 to enable an

appointee of an agency couched in general terms to sell must be one
that expressly mentions a sale of a piece of land or that includes a
sale as a necessary ingredient of the act mentioned. The power of
attorney need not contain a specific description of the land to be
sold, such that giving the agent the power to sell “any or all tracts,
lots, or parcels” of land belonging to the principal is adequate.
Domingo v. Domingo, 42 SCRA 131 (1971).
When no particular formality is required by law, rules or regulation,

then the principal may appoint his agent in any form which might
suit his convenience or that of the agent, in this case a letter
addressed to the agent requesting him to file a protest in behalf of
the principal with the Collector of Customs against the appraisement
of the merchandise imported into the country by the principal.
Kuenzle and Streiff v. Collector of Customs, 31 Phil 646 (1915).
Where the nephew in his own name sold a parcel of land with a
masonry house constructed thereon to the company, when in fact it
was property owned by the uncle, but in the estafa case filed by the
company against the nephew, the uncle swore under oath that he
had authorized his nephew to sell the property, the uncle can be
compelled in the civil action to execute the deed of sale covering the
property. “It having been proven at the trial that he gave his
consent to the said sale, it follows that the defendant conferred
verbal, or at least implied, power of agency upon his nephew Duran,
35
who accepted it in the same way by selling the said property. The
principal must therefore fulfill all the obligations contracted by the
agent, who acted within the scope of his authority. (Arts. 1709,
1710 and 1727) Gutierrez Hermanos v. Orense, 28 Phil. 572
(1914).
Under Sec. 335 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an agreement for the
leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real
property, or of an interest therein, is invalid if made by the agent
unless the authority of the agent be in writing and subscribed by the
party sought to be charged. Rio y Olabbarrieta v.Yutec, 49 Phil 276
(1926).
A power of attorney to convey real property need not be in a public

document, it need only be in writing, since a private document is
competent to create, transmit, modify, or extinguish a right in real
property. Jimenez v. Rabot, 38 Phil 378 (1918).
(i) Corporate Sale of Land
When the sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is through an

agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing; otherwise, the
sale shall be void. City-lite Realty Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
325 SCRA 385 (2000).
When the corporation’s primary purpose is to market, distribute,

export and import merchandise, the sale of land is not within the
actual or apparent authority of the corporation acting through its
officers, much less when acting through the treasurer. Likewise
Articles 1874 and 1878 of Civil Code requires that when land is sold
through an agent, the agent’s authority must be in writing,
otherwise the sale is void. San Juan Structural v. CA, 296 SCRA 631
36
(1998).8
(5-B) Agents Cannot Buy Property of Principal Unless

Authorized (Art. 1491[2])
The prohibition against agents purchasing property in their hands for

sale or management is, however, clearly, not absolute. When so
authorized by the principal, the agent is not disqualified from
purchasing the property he holds under a contract of agency to sell.
Olaguer v. Purugganan, Jr., 515 SCRA 460 (2007).
(6) To Lease Real Property for More Than One Year
Article 1878 of the Civil Code expresses that a special power of

attorney is necessary to lease any real property to another person
for more than one year. The lease of real property for more than one
year is considered not merely an act of administration but an act of
strict dominion or of ownership. A special power of attorney is thus
necessary for its execution through an agent. Shopper’s Paradise
Realty v. Roque, 419 SCRA 93 (2004).
Where the lease contract involves the lease of real property for a
period of more than one year, and it was entered into by the agent
of the lessor and not the lessor herself, in such a case, Article 1878
of the Civil Code requires that the agent be armed with a special
power of attorney to lease the premises. Consequently, the
provisions of the contract of lease, including the grant therein of an
option to purchase to the lessee, would be unenforceable. Vda. De
Chua v. IAC, 229 SCRA 99 (1994).
When the attorney-in-fact was empowered by his principal to make

an assignment of credits, rights, and interests, in payment of debts 37
for professional serviced rendered by laws, and the hiring of lawyers
to take charge of any actions necessary or expedient for the
interests of his principal, and to defend suits brought against the
principal, such powers necessarily implies the authority to pay for
the professional services thus engaged, which includes assignment
of the judgment secured for the principal in settlement of
outstanding professional fees. Municipal Council of Iloilo v.
Evangelista, 55 Phil. 290 (1930).
(7) To Create or Convey Real Rights over Immovable

Property
“There is no documentary evidence on record that the respondents-

owners specifically authorized respondent Fernandez to sell their
properties to another, including the petitioners. Article 1878 of the
New Civil Code provides that a special power of attorney is
necessary to enter into any contract by which the ownership of an
immovable is transmitted or acquired either gratuitously or for a
valuable consideration, or to create or convey real rights over
immovable property, or for any other act of strict dominion. Any sale
of real property by one purporting to be the agent of the registered
owner without any authority therefore in writing from the said owner
is null and void. The declarations of the agent alone are generally
insufficient to establish the fact or extent of her authority.”
Litonjua v. Fernandez, 427 SCRA 478, 493 (2004).
(8) To Make Gifts
(9) To Loan or Borrow Money 38
Except: The agent may borrow money when it s urgent and

indispensable for the preservation of the things which are under
administration.
 Power to Sell Excludes Power to Mortgage and Vice

Versa (Art. 1879)
A special power of attorney is necessary for an agent to borrow

money, unless it be urgent and indispensable for the preservation of
the things which are under administration. Yasuma v. Heirs of Cecilio
S. De Villa, 499 SCRA 466 (2006).9
It is a general rule in the law agency that, in order to bind the

principal by a mortgage on real property executed by an agent, it
must upon its face purport to be made, signed and sealed in the
name of the principal, otherwise, it will bind the agent only. Gozun
v. Mercado 511 SCRA 305 (2006).
A power of attorney, like any other instrument, is to be construed

according to the natural import of its language; and the authority
which the principal has conferred upon his agent is not to be
extended by implication beyond the natural and ordinary significance
of the terms in which that authority has been given. The attorney
has only such authority as the principal has chosen to confer upon
him, and one dealing with him must ascertain at his own risk
whether his acts will bind the principal. Thus, where the power of
attorney which vested the agent with authority “for me and in my
name to sign, seal and execute, and as my act and deed, delivery
any lease, any other deed for conveying any real or personal
property” or “any other deed for the conveying of any real or
personal property,” it does not carry with it or imply that the agent
for and on behalf of his principal has the power to execute a
promissory note or a mortgage to secure its payment. National Bank
39
v. Tan Ong Sze, 53 Phil. 451 (1929).
Where the power of attorney executed by the principal authorized

the agent “By means of a mortgage of my real property, to borrow
and lend sums in cash, at such interest and for such periods and
conditions as he may deem property and to collect or to pay the
principal and interest thereon when due,” while it did not authorize
the agent to execute deeds of sale with right of repurchase over the
property of the principal, nonetheless would validate the main
contract of loan entered into with the deed of sale with right of
repurchase constituting merely an equitable mortgage, both
contracts of which were within the scope of authority of the agent to
enter into in the name of the principal. Rodriguez v. Pamintuan and
De Jesus, 37 Phil 876 (1918).
A special power of attorney to mortgage real estate is limited to such

authority to mortgage and does not bind the grantor personally to
other obligations contracted by the grantee (in this case the personal
loan obtained by the agent in his own name from the PNB) in the
absence of any ratification or other similar act that would estop the
grantor from questioning or disowning such other obligations
contracted by the grantee. Philippine National Bank v. Sta. Maria, 29
SCRA 303 (1969).
In other words, the power to mortgage does not include the power
to obtain loans, especially when the grantors allege that they had no
benefit at all from the proceeds of the loan taken by the agent in his
own name from the bank. “It is not unusual in family and business
circles that one would allow his property or an undivided share in
real estate to be mortgaged by another as security, either as an
accommodation or for valuable consideration, but the grant of such
authority does not extend to assuming personal liability, much less
solidary liability, for any loan secured by the grantee in the absence
40
of express authority so given by the grantor.” Philippine National
Bank v. Sta. Maria, 29 SCRA 303, 310 (1969).
Where the power of attorney given to the husband by the wife was
limited to a grant of authority to mortgage a parcel of land titled in
the wife’s name, the wife may not be held liable for the payment of
the mortgage debt contracted by the husband, as the authority to
mortgage does not carry with it the authority to contract obligation.
De Villa v. Fabricante, 105 Phil. 672 (1959).
(10) To Bind the Principal to Render Some Service

Without Compensation
(11) To Bind the Principal in a Contract of Partnership
(12) To Obligate the Principal as a Guarantor or Surety
Where a power of attorney is executed primarily to enable the

attorney-in-fact, as manager of a mercantile business, to conduct its
affairs for and on behalf of the principal, who is the owner of the
business, and to this end the attorney-in-fact is authorized to
execute contracts relating to the principal’s property [“act and deed
delivery, any lease, or any other deed for the conveying any real or
personal property” and “act and deed delivery, any lease, release,
bargain, sale, assignment, conveyance or assurance, or any other
deed for the conveying any real or personal property”] , such power
will not be interpreted as giving the attorney-in-fact power to bind
the principal by a contract of independent guaranty or surety
unconnected with the conduct of the mercantile business. General
words contained in such power will not be interpreted to extend
power to the making of a contract of suretyship, but will be limited,
under the well-know rule of construction indicated in the express in
ejusdem generis, as applying to matters similar to those particularly
mentioned. Director v. Sing Juco, 53 Phil 205 (1929).
41
(13) To Accept or Repudiate an Inheritance
(14) To Ratify or Recognize Obligations Contracted

Before the Agency
Where it appears that a wife gave her husband a power of attorney

“to loan and borrow money” and to mortgage her property, that fact
does not carry with it or imply that he has a legal right to sign her
name to a promissory note which would make her liable for the
payment of a pre-existing debt of the husband or that of his firm, for
which she was not previously liable, or to mortgage her property to
secure the pre-existing debt. Bank of P.I. v. De Coster, 47 Phil 594
(1925).
Where the terms of the power granted to the substituted attorney-

in-fact was to the end that the principal-seller may be able to collect
the balance of the selling price of the printing establishment sold,
such substitute agent had no power to enter into new sales
arrangements with the buyer, or to novate the terms of the original
sale. Villa v. Garcia Bosque, 49 Phil 126 (1926).
e. Notarized Power of Attorney
A notarized power of attorney carries with it the evidentiary weight

conferred upon it with respect to its due exectuion. Velso v. Court of
Appeals, 260 SCRA 593 (1996).
When the document under scrutiny is a special power of attorney
that is duly notarized, the notarial acknowledgment is prima facie
evidence of the fact of its due execution—a buyer has every reason
to rely on a person’s authority to sell a particular property owned by
42
a corporation on the basis of a notarized board resolution—
undeniably the buyer is an innocent purchaser for value in good
faith. St. Mary’s Farm, Inc. v. Prima Real Properties, Inc., 560 SCRA
704 (2008).
III. POWER AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE AGENT
1. General Obligation of Agent Who Accepts the Agency

(Art. 1884)
a. Upon Acceptance of Appointment: Agent Is Bound

to Carry on Agency to Its Completion and for the
Benefit of Principal
OTHERWISE: Agent Will Be Liable for Damages which

Through His Non-Performance the Principal May Suffer
Damages
b. In Event of Death of Principal: Agent Must Finish

Business Already Begun Should Delay Entail Any
Danger (BUT SEE: Art. 1919(3) - Death
Extinguishes Agency)
In construing the original version of Article 1884 (Article 1718 of the

old Civil Code), the Supreme Court held that the burden is on the
person who seeks to make an agent liable to show that the losses
and damage caused were occasioned by the fault or negligence of
the agent; mere allegation without substantiation is not enough to
make the agent personally liable. Heredia v. Salina, 10 Phil 157
(1908).
Where the holder of an exclusive and irrevocable power of attorney

to make collections, failed to collect the sums due to the principal 43
and thereby allowed the allotted funds to be exhausted by other
creditors, such agent was adjudged to have failed to act with the
care of a good father of a family required under Article 1887 and
became personally liable for the damages which the principal may
suffer through his non-performance. PNB v. Manila Surety, 14 SCRA
776 (1965).
Where the prevailing statutory rule then was Article 267 of the Code
of Commerce which declared that no agent shall purchase for
himself or for another that which he has been ordered to sell, the
Court held that a sale by a broker to himself without the consent of
the principal would be void and ineffectual whether the broker has
been guilty of fraudulent conduct or not. Consequently, such broker
is not entitled to receive any commission under the contract, much
less any reimbursement of expenses incurred in pursuing and closing
such sales. The same prohibition is now contained in Article 1491(1)
of the Civil Code. Barton v. Leyte Asphalt, 46 Phil 938 (1924).
When the finance company executes a mortgage contract that

contains a provision that in the event of accident or loss, it shall
make a proper claim against the insurance company, was in effect
an agency relation, and that under Article 1884, the finance
company was bound by its acceptance to carry out the agency, and
in spite of the instructions of the borrowers to make such claims
instead insisted on having the vehicle repaired but eventually
resulting in loss of the insurance coverage, the finance company had
breached its duty of diligence, and must assume the damages
suffered by the borrowers, and consequently can no longer collect on
the balance of the mortgage loan secured thereby. BA Finance v.
The well-settled rule is that an agent is also responsible for any

negligence in the performance of its function (Art. 1909) and is liable 44
for the damages which the principal may suffer by reason of its
negligent act. (Art. 1884). British Airways v. Court of Appeals,
285 SCRA 450 (1998).
2. Obligation of Agent Who Declines Agency (Art. 1885)
a. If Goods Are Forwarded to Him: Observe diligence of

a good father of a family in custody and preservation of
goods until new agent appointed
b. Compare with Art. 1929 – Obligation of an agent who

withdraws form an agency – he must continue to act until
principal takes necessary steps to meet situation
3. General Rule on Exercise of Power
a. Agent Must Act “Within the Scope of His Authority”

(Art. 1881)
(1) Meaning of “Performance Within the Scope of

Authority” (Art. 1900)
(2) He May Perform Acts Conducive to

Accomplishment of Agency Purpose
Under Article 1881 of the Civil Code, the agent must act within the
scope of his authority to bind his principal. So long as the agent has
authority, express or implied, the principal is bound by the acts of
the agent on his behalf, whether or not the third person dealing with
the agent believes that the agent has actual authority. Thus, all
signatories in a contract should be clothed with authority to bind the
parties they represent. Sargasso Construction & Development
Corporation/Pick & Shovel, Inc.,/Atlantic Erectors, Inc. (Joint
45
Venture) v. Philippine Ports Authority, 623 SCRA 260 (2010).
Article 1881 of the Civil Code provides that "the agent must act
within the scope of his authority." Pursuant to the authority given by
the principal, the agent is granted the right "to affect the legal
relations of his principal by the performance of acts effectuated in
accordance with the principal's manifestation of consent." Pacific
Rehouse Corp. v. EIB Securities, Inc., 633 SCRA 214 (2010).
b. Compare with Art. 1887 – Agent Must Follow

Instructions of the Principal
c. Authority of Agent Not Deemed Exceeded If

Performed in a Manner More Advantageous to
Principal (Art. 1882)
(1) Compare: Agent Should Not Act If It Would

Manifestly Result in Loss or Damage to
Principal (Art. 1888).
Article 1882 of the Civil Code provides that the limits of an agent’s
authority shall not be considered exceeded should it have been
performed in a manner advantageous to the principal than that
specified by him. Olaguer v. Purugganan, Jr., 515 SCRA 460 (2007).
The admissions obtained by the agent from the adverse party prior
to the formal amendment of the complaint that included the principal
as a party to the suit, can be availed of by the principal “since an
agent may do such acts as may be conducive to the accomplishment
of the purpose of the agency, admissions secured by the agent
within the scope of the agency ought to favor the principal. This has
to be the rule, for the act or declarations of an agent of the party
within the scope of the agency and during its existence are
46
considered and treated in turn as declarations, acts and
representations of his principal and may be given in evidence against
such party” Bay View Hotel v. Ker & Co., 116 SCRA 327 (1982).
d. Effects of Non-Ratified Acts Done by Agent in

Excess of His Authority: Unenforceable, Not Void
(Arts. 1317, 1403, and 1898)
When money is received as a deposit by an agent, and that money is

turned over by the agent to the principal, with notice that it is the
money of the depositor, the principal is bound to deliver to the
depositor, even if his agent was not authorized to receive such
deposit. [There has, in effect, ratification of the unauthorized act of
the agent, thereby binding the principal]. Cason v. Rickards, 5 Phil
639 (1906).
When the administrator enters into a contract that are outside of the
scope of authority, the contract would nevertheless not be an
absolute nullity, but simply voidable [unenforceable] at the instance
of the parties who had been improperly represented, and only such
parties can assert the nullity of said contracts as to them. Zayco v.
Serra, 49 Phil 985 (1925).
Under Article 1898 of the New Civil Code, the acts of an agent
beyond the scope of his authority do not bind the principal, unless
the latter ratifies the same expressly or impliedly. Furthermore,
when the third person . . . knows that the agent was acting beyond
his power or authority, the principal cannot be held liable for the acts
of the agent. If the said third person is aware of the limits of the
authority, he is to blame, and is not entitled to recover damages
from the agent, unless the latter undertook to secure the principal’s
ratification. Cervantes v. Court of Appeals, 304 SCRA 25
47
(1999); Safic Alcan v. Imperial Vegetable, 355 SCRA 559 (2001).
Even when the agent, in this case the attorney-at-law who

represented the client in forging a compromise agreement, has
exceeded his authority in inserting penalty clause, the status of the
said clause is not void but merely voidable, i.e., capable of being
ratified. Indeed, the client’s failure to question the inclusion of the
penalty in the judicial compromise despite several opportunities to
do so and with the representation of new counsel, was tantamount
to ratification. Hence, the client is stopped from assailing the validity
thereof. Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc., 399 SCRA 601 (2003).
Contracts entered into in the name of another person by one who

has been given no authority or legal representation or who has acted
beyond his powers are classified as unauthorized contracts and are
unenforceable, unless they are ratified. Gozun v. Mercado 511
SCRA 305 (2006).
e. Consequences When Agent Acts in His Own Name

(Art. 1883)
(1) Principal Has No Right Against Third Person If

Agent Acts in His Own Name
Article 1717 of the [old] Civil Code provides that “When an agent
acts in his own name, the principal shall have no action against the
persons with whom the agent has contracted, nor the said persons
against the principal.” Article 246 of the Code of Commerce provides
that “When an agent transacts business in his own name, it shall not
be necessary for him to state who is the principal, and he shall be
directly liable as if the business were for his own account, to the
persons with whom he transacts the same, said person not having
48
any right of action against the principal, nor the latter against the
former, the liabilities of the principal and the agent to each other
always reserved.” It being established by a preponderance of the
evidence that the agent acted in his own name in selling the
merchandise to the defendants, and that the defendants fully
believed that they were dealing with the said agent, without any
knowledge of the fact that he was the agent of the plaintiffs, and
having paid him in full for the merchandise purchased, they are not
liable to the plaintiffs, for said merchandise. This is true whether the
transaction is covered by the provisions of the Civil Code or by the
provisions of the Commercial Code. Lim Tiu v. Ruiz & Rementeria, 15
Phil. 367, 370 (1910).
When an agent acts in his own name, the principal has no right of
action against the persons with whom the agent has contracted, or
such persons against the principal. In such case, the agent is directly
liable to the person with whom he has contracted, as if the
transactions were his own. Smith Bell v. Sotelo Matti, 44 Phil. 874
(1922).
Even when the agent has a special power of attorney to mortgage

the property of the principal, when such agent nevertheless
executed the real estate mortgage in his own name, then it is not
valid and binding on the principal pursuant to the provisions of
Article 1883 of the Civil Code. Philippine Sugar Estates Dev. Corp. v.
Poizat, 48 Phil. 536 (1925); Rural Bank of Bombon v. Court of
Appeals, 212 SCRA 25 (1992).
Under Article 1883 of the Civil Code, if an agent acts in his own
name, the principal has no right of action against the persons with
whom the agent has contracted; neither have such persons against
the principal. In such case the agent is the one directly bound in
49
favor of the person with whom he has contracted, as if the
transaction were his own, except when the contract involves things
belonging to the principal. Since the principals have caused their
agent to enter into a charter party in his own name and without
disclosing that he acts for any principal, then such principals have no
standing to sue upon any issue or cause of action arising from said
charter party. Marimperio Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Court of
Appeals, 156 SCRA 368 (1987).
(2) Agent Is Directly Bound to Third Person as If the

Transaction Were His Own
When the agent executes a contract in his personal capacity, the fact
that he is described in the contract as the agent of the principal and
the properties mortgaged pertain to the principal, may not be taken
to mean that he enters into the contract in the name of the principal.
A mortgage on real property of the principal not made and signed in
the name of the principal is not valid as to the principal. National
Bank v. Palma Gil, 55 Phil. 639 (1931); National Bank v. Agudelo, 58
Phil 655 (1933).
A party who signs a bill of exchange as an agent (as the President of

the company), but failed to disclose his principal becomes personally
liable for the drafts he accepted, even when he did so expressly as
an agent. Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Law says
provides expressly that when an agent signs in an representative
capacity, but does not indicate or disclose his principal would incur
personal liability on the bill of exchange. Phil. Bank of Commerce v.
Aruego, 102 SCRA 530 (1981).
EXCEPTION: When Contract Involves Things Belonging to

Principal 50
Even when the agent has written authority to convey real property
on behalf of the principal, nevertheless when the deed of sale was
executed by the agent in her own name without showing the
capacity in which she acted, although the act was doubtless
irregular, the deed operated to bind the principal who had authorized
the sale. Jimenez v. Rabot, 38 Phil. 378 (1918).
Where the plaintiffs appointed the defendant to purchase a vessel

and giving him money for that purpose, but the agent purchased the
boat and placed it in his own name, he has breached his fiduciary
obligation and is obliged to transfer the same to the plaintiffs, or the
plaintiffs have a right to be subrogated. According to the exception
under Art. 1717 of the old Civil Code (when things belonging to the
principal are dealt with) the agent is bound to the principal although
he does not assume the character of such agent and appears acting
in his own name. The money with which the launch was bought
having come from the plaintiff, the exception established in Art.
1717 is applicable to the instant case. Sy-Juco v. Sy-Juco, 40 Phil.
634 (1920).
Where a co-owner transfers the entirety of the mining claim to the

buyer, where the buyer knew that it included the one-half share pro-
indiviso of the other co-owner, then the transaction may be
considered as one where the disposing co-owner acted as agent of
the other co-owner. Consequently, under Article 1883 of the Civil
Code, such other co-owner may sue the person with whom the agent
dealt with in his (agent’s) own name, when the transaction involves
things belong to the principal. Goldstar v. Lim, 25 SCRA 597 (1968).
When a commission agent enters into a shipping contract in his own
name to transport the grains of NFA on a vessel owned by a shipping
company, NFA cannot claim it is not liable to the shipping company 51
under Article 1883 when things belong to the principal are dealt
with, the agent is bound to the principal although he does not
assume the character of such agent and appears acting in his own
name. In other words, the agent’ apparent representation yields to
the principal’s true representation and that, in reality and in effect,
the contract must be considered as entered into between the
principal and the third person Corollarily, if the principal can be
obliged to perform his duties under the contract, then it can also
demand the enforcement of its rights arising from the contract.
National Food Authority v. IAC, 184 SCRA 166 (1990).
(3) Provisions Are Without Prejudice to Actions

Between Principal and Agent [See discussions
below on breach by agent of his duty of loyalty]
4. Specific Obligation Rules for Agents
a. No Obligation of Agent to Advance Funds (Art.

1886):
 It is Principal’s obligation to advance the funds, but

Principal to pay interest on advances made by
Agent from day he advances the money (Art. 1912).
EXCEPT:
(1) If Stipulated in the Agency Agreement
(2) Where principal is insolvent (See Art.
1919[3]: Insolvency extinguishes an
agency)
52
b. Agent Should Carry Out Agency in Accordance with
Principal’s Instructions (Art. 1887)
(1) If agent followed instructions, principal cannot

set up agent’s ignorance or circumstance which
principal was, or ought to have been, aware of
(Art. 1899)
Pursuant to the instructions of the principals, the agent purchased a

piece of land in their names and in the sums given to him by the
principal, and that after the fact of purchase the principals had
ratified the transaction and even received profits arising from the
investment in the land, but that eventually a defect in the title to the
land arose, the said principals cannot recover their lost investment
from the agent. “There is nothing in the record which would indicate
that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care and diligence in
the performance of his duty as such agent, or that he undertook to
guarantee the vendor’s title to the land purchased by direction of the
plaintiffs.” Nepomuceno v. Heredia, 7 Phil 563, 566 (1907).
When an agent in executing the orders and commissions of his

principal carries out the instructions he has received from his
principal, and does not appear to have exceeded his authority or to
have acted with negligence, deceit or fraud, he cannot be held
responsible for the failure of his principal to accomplish the object of
the agency. Agents, although they act in representation of the
principal, are not guarantors for the success of the business
enterprise they are asked to manage. Guiterrez Hermanos v. Oria
Hermanos, 30 Phil. 491 (1915).
c. Obligation Not Carry Out Agency If Execution
Would Manifestly Result in Loss or Damage to
Principal (Art. 1888) 53
While it is true that an agent who acts for a revealed principal in the
making of a contract does not become personally bound to the other
party in the sense that an action can ordinarily be maintained upon
such contract directly against the agent, yet that rule does not
control when the agent cannot intercept and appropriate the thing
which the principal is bound to deliver, and thereby make the
performance of the principal impossible. The agent in any event
must be precluded from doing any positive act that could prevent
performance on the part of his principal, otherwise the agent
becomes liable also on the contract. National Bank v. Welsh
Fairchild, 44 Phil 780 (1923).
d. DUTY OF LOYALTY: Obligation in a Conflict of

Interest Situation (Art. 1889)
(1) Agent shall be liable to the principal for damages

sustained by the latter where in case of conflict
of interest situation, and agent preferred his
own interest.
(2) Agent prohibited from buying property entrusted

to him for administration or sale without
principal’s consent (Art. 1491[2]).
An agent cannot represent both himself and his principal in a

transaction involving the shifting to another person of the agent’s
liability for a debt to the principal. Aboitiz v. De Silva, 45 Phil 883
(1924).
54
The director and general manager of the stock corporation, who also
was the majority stockholder, and was designated to be the main
negotiator for the company with the Government for the sale of its
large tract of land, having special knowledge of commercial
information that would increase the value of the shares in relation to
the sale of the parcels of land to the Government, can be treated
legally as being an agent of the stockholders of the company, with a
fiduciary obligation to reveal to the other stockholders such special
information before proceeding to purchase from the other
stockholders their shares of stock. If such director obtains the
purchase of the shares of a stockholder without having disclosed
important facts or to render the appropriate report on the expected
increase in value of the company, there was fraud committed for
which the director shall be liable for the earnings earned against the
stockholder on the sale of shares. Strong v. Guiterrez Repide, 41
Phil. 947 (1909).
A confidential employee who, knowing that his principal was

negotiating with the owner of some land for the purchase thereof,
surreptitiously succeeds in buying it in the name of his wife, commits
an act of disloyalty and infidelity to his principal, whereby he
becomes liable, among other things, for the damages caused, which
meant to transfer the property back to the principal under the terms
and conditions offered to the original owner. Sing Juco and Sing
Bengco v. Sunyantong and Llorente, 43 Phil 589 (1922).
Where an uncle who was acting as agent or administrator of

property belonging to a niece had procured a Torrens title in his own
name to said property, he is deemed to be a trustee, and he must
surrender the property to the niece and transfer title to her. The
relations of an agent to his principal are fiduciary and in regard to
the property forming the subject-matter of the agency, he is
estopped from acquiring or asserting a title adverse to that of the
55
principal. Consequently, an action in personam will lie against an
agent to compel him to return or retransfer to his principal, or the
latter’s estate, the real property committed to his custody as such
agent and also to execute the necessary documents of conveyance
to effect such retransfer. Severino v. Severino, 44 Phil. 343 (1923).
e. Rule If Agent Is Empowered to Borrow/Lend Money

(Art. 1890)
(1) If empowered to borrow money, he may be the

lender at current interest;
(2) If empowered to lend money at interest, he

cannot borrow without principal’s consent.
When power granted to agent was only to borrow money and

mortgage principal’s property to secure the loan, it cannot be
interpreted to include the authority to mortgage the properties to
support the agent’s personal loans and use the proceeds thereof for
his own benefit. The lender who lends money to the agent knowing
that is was for personal purpose and not for the principal’s account,
is a mortgagee in bad faith and cannot foreclose on the mortgage
thus constituted for the account of the agent. Hodges v. Salas and
Salas, 63 Phil. 567 (1936).
f. Obligation of Agent to Render Account (Art. 1891)

(1) Agent Must Render Account to Principal
An administrator of an estate was made liable under Article 1720

(now Art. 1891) for failure to render an account of his administration
to the heirs, unless the heirs consented thereto or are estopped by 56
having accepted the correctness of his account previously rendered.
Ojinaga v. Estate of Perez, 9 Phil 185 (1907).
As a necessary consequence of such breach of trust, an agent must

then forfeit his right to the commission and must return the part of
the commission he received from his principal. Domingo v.
Domingo, 42 SCRA 131 (1971).
Petitioner was the administrator of respondent's properties for 18

years, and four letters within 18 years can hardly be considered as
sufficient to keep the principal informed and updated of the condition
and status of the latter's properties. Sazon v. Vasquez-
Menancio, G.R. No. 192085, 22 February 2012.
(2) Deliver to Principal Whatever Is Received by

Virtue of Agency
 Why include those not due the principal? Because

legally, it is the principal who receives them and
therefore agent has to account for them
The possession of an agent of the money or property of his principal

is termed “juridical possession” which means a possession which
gives the transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may
set up even against the owner. Chua-Burce v. Court of Appeals, 331
SCRA 1 (2000). Consequently:
An insurance agent may be convicted of estafa for his
failure to deliver sums of money paid to him as an
insurance agent for the account of his employer.
Where nothing to the contrary appears, the provisions
57
of article 1720 of the Civil Code impose upon an agent
the obligation to deliver to his principal all funds
collected on his account. U.S. v. Kiene, 7 Phil 736
(1907)
A travelling sales agent who misappropriated or failed

to return to his principal the proceeds of the things or
goods he was commissioned or authorized to sell, is
liable for estafa. Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 99 Phil.
703 (1956).
Whereas, a bank teller or cash custodian, being

merely an employee of the bank, cannot be held liable
for estafa, but rather for theft. Chua-Burce v. Court of
Appeals, 331 SCRA 1 (2000).
The relation of an agent to his principal is fiduciary and it is

elementary that in regard to property subject matter of the agency,
an agent is estopped from acquiring or asserting a title adverse to
that of the principal. His position is analogous to that of a trustee
and he cannot, consistently with the principles of good faith, be
allowed to create in himself an interest in opposition to that of his
principal or cestui que trust. Hernandez v. Hernandez, 645 SCRA
24 (2011).
(3) Obligation Arises and Becomes Demandable at

Agency’s End
(4) Stipulation Exempting Agent from Obligation to
Render an Accounting Is Void
“When accounts of the agent to the principal are once approved by

the principal, the latter has no right to ask afterwards for a revision 58
of the same or for a detailed account of the business, unless he can
show that there was fraud, deceit, error or mistake in the approval
of the accounts—facts not proven in this case.” Guiterrez Hermanos
v. Oria Hermanos, 30 Phil. 491, 505 (1915), quoting from Pastor v.
Nicasio, 6 Phil. 152 (1906).
g. Liability of Agent for Interest (Art. 1896)
(1) Agent Is Liable for Interest:
(a) On Sums He Applied to His Own Use

(from the Time He Used Them)
(b) On Sums Owing the Principal (from the

Time Agency Is Extinguished)
As to the interest imposed in the judgment on the amounts received

by the agent which were not turned over to the principal, “it is
sufficient to cite article 1724 of the Civil Code, which provides that
an agent shall be liable for interest upon any sums he may have
applied to his own use, from the day on which he did so, and upon
those which he still owes, after the expiration of the agency, from
the time of his default.” Mendezonna v. Vda. De Goitia, 54 Phil 557
(1930).
The successor-in-interest of the principal is not entitled to collect

interest from the agent of the father for sums loaned to and
collected by the agent from various persons for the deceased
principal. In all the aforementioned transactions, the defendant
acted in his capacity as attorney-in-fact of the deceased father, and
there being no evidence showing that he converted the money
59
entrusted to him to his own use, he is not liable for interest thereon,
in accordance with the provisions of Art. 1724 of the Civil Code. De
Borja v. De Borja, 58 Phil 811 (1933).
h. DUTY OF DILIGENCE: Agent Liable for Fraud and

Negligence (Arts. 1884 and 1909)
(1) What Shall Aggravate or Mitigate Liability Arising

Out of Negligence – Whether Agency Was for a
Compensation or Was Gratuitous
Where the agent by means of misrepresentation of the condition of

the market induces his principal to sell to him the property
consigned to his custody at a price less than that for which he has
already contracted to sell part of it, and who thereafter disposes of
the whole at an advance, is liable to principal for the difference.
Such conduct on the part of the agent constituted fraud, entitling the
principal to annul the contract of sale. Although commission earned
by the agent on the fraudulent sale may be disallowed, nonetheless
commission earned from other transactions which were not tainted
with fraud should be allowed the agent. Cadwallader v. Smith Bell, 7
Phil. 461 (1907).
In consignment of goods for sale, as a form of agency, the

consignee-agent is relieved from his liability to return the goods
received from the consignor-principal when it is shown by
preponderance of evidence in the civil case brought that the goods
were taken from the custody of the consignee by robbery, and no
separate conviction of robbery is necessary to avail of the exempting
provisions under Article 1174 for force majeure. Austria v. CAs, 39
SCRA 527 (1971).
60
The Court brushed aside the contention that since it was merely
acting as collecting bank, it was the drawee-bank that should be
held liable for the loss of a depositor: “In stressing that it was acting
only as a collecting agent for Golden Savings, Metrobank seems to
be suggesting that as a mere agent it cannot be liable to the
principal. This is not exactly true. On the contrary, Article 21909 of
the Civil Code clearly provides that” the agent is responsible not only
for fraud, but also for negligence. Metrobank v. Court of Appeals,
194 SCRA 169 (1991).
When an agent is involved in the perpetration of fraud upon his

principal for his extrinsic benefit, he is not really acting for the
principal but is really acting for himself, entirely outside the scope of
his agency – the basic tenets of agency rest on the highest
consideration of justice, equity and fairplay, and an agent will not be
permitted to pervert his authority to his own personal advantage.
Cosmic Lumber v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 168 (1996).
The well-settled rule is that an agent is also responsible for any

negligence in the performance of its function (Art. 1909) and is liable
for the damages which the principal may suffer by reason of its
negligent act. (Art. 1884). British Airways v. Court of Appeals,
285 SCRA 450 (1998).
5. When Agent Appoints a Substitute (Art. 1892)
a. General Rule: Agent Must Act in Person, But May

Appoint a Substitute If Not Prohibited
Under the terms of Art. 1892, when a special power of attorney to
sell a piece of land does not contain a clear prohibition against the
agent in appointing a substitute, the appointment by the agent of a
substitute to execute the contract is within the limits of the authority
61
given by the principle, although the agent then would have to be
responsible for the acts of the sub-agent.
Escueta v. Lim, 512 SCRA 411 (2007).
Rule Opposite Under the Old Civil Code: An agent cannot

delegate his powers under an power of attorney to a sub-agent in
view of the legal principle “delegata potestas delegare non potest” (a
delegated power cannot be delegated), inasmuch as there is nothing
in the records to show that he has been expressly authorized to do
so.” National Bank v. Agudelo, 58 Phil 655, 661 (1933).
b. Effects When Agent Appoints a Substitute: He

Is Responsible for Acts of Substitute
(1) He was not given power to appoint one
(2) He was given such power without designating

the person and substitute is notoriously
incompetent or insolvent.
A subagent cannot be held at greater liability that the main agent,

and when the subagent has not received any special instructions
from the agent to insure the object of the agency, the subagent
cannot be held liable for the loss of the thing from fire, which is
merely force majeure. International Films (China) v. Lyric Film, 63
Phil. 778 (1936).
c. All Acts of Substitute Appointed Against
Principal’s Prohibition Are Void (as Against the
Principal)
The law on agency in our jurisdiction allows the appointment by an 62

agent of a substitute or sub-agent in the absence of an express
agreement to the contrary between the agent and the principal.
Therefore, an agent who receives jewelry for sale or return cannot
be charged with estafa for there was no misappropriation when she
delivered the jewelry to a sub-agent under the sale terms which the
agent received it, but a client of the sub-agent absconded with them
and could no longer be recovered. The appointment of a sub-agent
and delivery of the jewelry, in the absence of a prohibition, does not
amount to conversion or misappropriation as to constitute estafa;
but the agent remains civilly liable for the value of the jewelry to the
principal. Serona v. Court of Appeals, 392 SCRA 35 (2002).10
The legal maxim potestas delegate non delegare potest; a power

once delegated cannot be re-delegated, while applied primarily in
political law to the exercise of legislative power, is a principle of
agency — for another, a re-delegation of the agency would be
detrimental to the principal as the second agent has no privity of
contract with the former. Baltazar v. Ombudsman 510 SCRA 74
(2006).
In a situation where the special power of attorney to sell a piece of

land contains a prohibition to appoint a substitute, but nevertheless
the agent appoints a substitute who executes the deed of sale in
name of the principal, while it may be true that the agent may have
acted outside the scope of his authority, that did not make the sale
void, but merely unenforceable under the second paragraph of
Article 1317 of the Civil Code. And only the principal denied the sale,
his acceptance of the proceeds thereof are tantamount to ratification
thereof. Escueta v. Lim, 512 SCRA 411 (2007).
63
d. Rights of Principal Against Substitute (Art. 1893)
The principal is liable upon a sub-agency contract entered into by its

selling agent in the name of the principal, where it appears that the
general agent was clothed with such broad powers as to justify the
interference that he was authorized to execute contracts of this kind,
and it not appearing from the record what limitations, if any, were
placed upon his powers to ace for his principal, and more so when
the principal had previously acknowledged the transactions of the
subagent. Del Rosario v. La Badenia, 33 Phil. 316 (1916).
6. Rule on Liability When Two or More Agents Appointed

by the Same Principal
a. Responsibility of Two or More Agents Not Solidary

(Art. 1894)
(1) Compare: Two principals with common agent –

Each principal solidarily liable (Art. 1915)
When two letters of attorney are issued simultaneously to two

different attorneys-in-fact, but covering the same powers shows that
it was not the principal’s intention that they should act jointly in
order to make their acts valid; the separate act of one of the
attorney-in-fact, even when not consented to by the other attorney
in fact, is valid and binding on the principal, especially the principal
did not only repudiate the act done, but continued to retain the said
attorney-in-fact.
Municipal Council of Iloilo v. Evangelista, 55 Phil. 290
(1930).
64
b. Where Two or More Agents Agree to Be Solidarily
Bound (Art. 1895)
7. Rule on Liability to Third Parties: Agent Not Bound to

Third Party (Art. 1897)
The settlement and adjustment agent in the Philippines of an

insurance company in New York is no different from any other agent
from the point of view of his responsibility: whenever he adjusts or
settles a claim, he does it in behalf of his principal, and his action is
binding not upon himself but upon his principal. When the agent
settles and adjust claims in behalf of the principal, the agent does
not assume any personal liability, and he cannot be sued on his own
right; the recourse of the insured is to press his claim against the
principal. Salonga v. Warner Barnes, 88 Phil 125 (1951).
The appointment by a foreign insurance company of a local settling

or claim agent, clothed with power to settle all the losses and claims
that may arise under the policies that may be issued by or in behalf
of the foreign company, does not amount to a contractual
acceptance of personal liability on the part of the local settling or
claim agent. “An adjustment and settlement agent is no different
from any other agent from the point of view of his responsibilities,
for he also acts in a representative capacity.” [quoted from Salonga
v. Warner, Barnes &Co., Ltd., 88 Phil. 125 (1951)]. In the same
manner, a resident agent, as a representative of the foreign
insurance company, is tasked only to receive legal processes on
behalf of its principal and not to answer personally for the any
insurance claims. Smith Bell v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA
530 (1997).
65
a. Principal Is the One Bound
An insurance agent who acts for fully disclosed foreign insurance

companies cannot be made personally liable for the claims arising
from the contracts of insurance made on behalf of the principals. E
Macias & Co. v. Warner, Barnes & Co., 43 Phil 155 (1922).
A promissory note and two mortgages executed by the agent for and
on behalf of his principal, in accordance with a power of attorney
executed by the principal in favor of the agent, are valid, and as
provided by article 1727 of the Civil Code, the principal must fulfill
the obligations contracted by the agent. National Bank v. Palma Gil,
55 Phil. 639 (1931).
When the buyer of shares of stock, pursuant to the terms of the

deed of sale, effects payment of part of the purchase price to one of
the seller’s creditors, then there is no subrogation that takes place,
as the buyer then merely acts as an agent of the seller effecting
payment of money that was due to the seller in favor of a third-party
creditor. Chemphil Export v. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 217
(1995).
Agents who have been authorized to sell parcels of land cannot claim
personal damages in the nature of unrealized commission by reason
of the act of the buyer is refusing to proceed with the sale. The
rendering of such service did not make them parties to the contracts
66
of sale executed in behalf of the latter. Since a contract may be
violated only by the parties thereto as against each other, the real
parties-in-interest, either as plaintiff or defendant, in an action upon
that contract must, generally, either be parties to said contract.
Uy v. Court of Appeals, 314 SCRA 69 (1999).11
A person acting as a mere representative of another acquires no

rights whatsoever, nor does he incur any liabilities arising from the
said contract between his principal and another party. Angeles v.
Philippine National Railways (PNR), 500 SCRA 444 (2006).
Article 1897 reinforces the familiar doctrine that an agent, who acts
as such, is not personally liable to the party with whom he contracts.
Eurotech Industrial Technologies, Inc. v. Cuizon, 521 SCRA 584
(2007).
Since, as a rule, the agency, as a contract, is binding only between

the contradicting parties, then only the parties, as well as the third
person who transacts with the parties themselves, may question the
validity of the agency or the violation of the terms and conditions
found therein. Villegas v. Lingan, 526 SCRA 63 (2007).
It is a basic rule in the law of agency that a principal is subject to

liability for loss caused to another by the latter’s reliance upon a
deceitful representation by an agent in the course of his employment
(1) if the representation is authorized; (2) if it is within the implied
authority of the agent to make for the principal; or (3) if it is
apparently authorized, regardless of whether the agent was
authorized by him or not to make the representation. Pahud v. Court
of Appeals, 597 SCRA 13 (2009).
b. Except When Agent:
(1) Expressly Bound Himself 67
When the attorney-in-fact of the owner of a parcel of land acted

within the scope of his authority by mortgaging the property of the
principal, the principal is bound by the mortgage, and cannot use the
fact that the agent has also bound himself personally to the debt.
There is nothing in the law which prohibits an agent from binding
himself personally for the debt incurred in behalf of the principal. In
fact the law recognizes such undertaking as valid and binding on the
agent. Tuason v. Orozco, 5 Phil 596 (1906).
Under Article 1897, when the agent expressly binds himself to the
contract entered into on behalf of the principal, then he become
personally bound thereto to the same extent as the principle. But
the doctrine is not applicable vice–versa, since everything agreed
upon by the principal to be binding on himself is not legally binding
personally on the agent. Thus when the previous agent of the union
bound itself personally liable on the contracts of the union, the new
agent is need deemed bound by the assumption undertaken by the
original agent. Benguet v. BCI Employees, 23 SCRA 465 (1968).
(2) He Exceeds His Authority Without Giving Notice

of Limited Powers
The rule under Article 1897 of the Civil Code is that when an agent
acts in behalf of the principal, he cannot be held liable personally,
except when he acts outside the scope of his authority, or even
when acting within the scope of his authority, he expressly binds
himself personally liable to the contract entered into in the name of
the principal. Therefore, a third party cannot generally sue on the
contract seeking both the principal and the agent to be liable
thereon, for by suing the principal on the contract, the agent is
deemed not to be personally liable. On the other hand, if the agent
68
is being sued on the basis that he acted outside the scope of his
authority, then it does not make sense to be also suing the principal
who cannot be held liable for the acts of the agent outside the scope
of his authority. ”At any rate, [Article 1897] does not hold that in
cases of excess of authority, both the agent and the principal are
liable to the other contracting party.” Phil. Products Co. v. Primateria
Society Anonyme, 15 SCRA 301, 305 (1965).
Where an agent defies the instructions of its principal in New York

not to proceed with the sale due to non-availability of carriage, it has
acted without authority or against its principal’s instructions and
holds itself personally liable for the contract it entered into with the
local company. National Power v. NAMARCO, 117 SCRA 789
(1982).
The special power to approve loans does not carry with it the power
to bind the principal to a contract of guaranty even to the extent of
the amount for which a loan could have been granted by the agent.
“Guaranty is not presumed, it must be expressed and cannot be
extended beyond its specified limits (Director v. Sing Juco, 53 Phil.
205. In one case, where it appears that a wife gave her husband
power of attorney to loan money, this Court ruled that such fact did
not authorized him to make her liable as a surety for the payment of
the debt of a third person. BA Finance v. Court of Appeals,
211 SCRA 112 (1992).
To reiterate, the first part of Article 1897 declares that the principal
is liable in cases when the agent acted within the bounds of his
authority. Under this, the agent is completely absolved of any
liability. The second part of the said provision presents the situations
when the agent himself becomes liable to a third party when he
expressly binds himself or he exceeds the limits of his authority
69
without giving notice of his powers to the third person. However, it
must be pointed out that in case of excess of authority by the agent,
like what petitioner claims exists here, the law does not say that a
third person can recover from both the principal and the agent. It is
well to state here that Article 1897 of the New Civil Code upon which
petitioner anchors its claim does not hold that in case of excess of
authority, both the agent and the principal are liable to the other
contracting party. Eurotech Industrial Technologies, Inc. v. Cuizon,
521 SCRA 584 (2007).
(3) When the Agent Acts with Fraud or Negligence
“The rule relied upon by the [agent to avoid the imposition of the
liquidated damages provided for in the contract of sale] that every
person dealing with an agent is put upon inquiry and must discover
upon his peril the authority of the agent would apply in this case if
the principal is sought to be held liable on the contract entered into
by the agent. That is not so in this case. Here, it is the agent that it
sought to be held liable on a contract of sale which was expressly
repudiated by the principal because the agent took chances, it
exceed its authority, and, in effect, it acted in its own name.
Defendants’ contention that Namerco’s liability should be based on
tort or quasi-delict, as held in some American case, . . ., is not well-
taken. As correctly argued by the NPC, it would be unjust and
inequitable for Namerco to escape liability after it had deceived the
NPC.” National Power v. NAMARCO, 117 SCRA 789 (1982).
The practice in group insurance business, which is consistent with
the jurisprudence thereon in the State of California from whose laws
our Insurance Code has been mainly patterned, is that the
employer-policyholder who takes out the insurance for its officers
70
and employees, is the agent of the insurer who has authority to
collect the proceeds from the insurer. Therefore, when the insurer,
through the negligence of its agent, allows a purported attorney-in-
fact who instrument does not clearly show such power to collect the
proceeds, it was liable therefor under the doctrine that the principal
is bound by the misconduct of its agent. Third persons deal with
agents at their peril and are bound to inquire as to the extent of the
power of the agent with whom they contract. Pineda v. Court of
Appeals, 226 SCRA 754 (1993).
When the bank in extending a loan required the principal borrower

to obtain a mortgage- redemption-insurance and deducted the
premiums pertaining thereto from the loan proceeds, it was wearing
two hats, as a lender and as insurance agent. And when it turned
out that the bank knew or ought to have known that the principal
borrower was not qualified at his age for MRI coverage which
prevented his insurance coverage from being made by the insurance
company at the time of the borrower’s death, the bank was deemed
to have been an agent who acted beyond the scope of its authority.
Under Article 1897, the agent who acts as such is not personally
liable to the party with whom he contracts, unless he exceeds the
limits of his authority without giving such party sufficient notice of
his powers. If the third person dealing with an agent is unaware of
the limits of the authority conferred by the principal on the agent
and he (third person) has been deceived by the non-disclosure
thereof by the agent, then the latter is liable for damages to him.
The rule that the agent is liable when he acts without authority is
founded upon the supposition that there has been some wrong or
omission on his part either in misrepresenting, or in affirming, or
concealing the authority under which he assumes to act. Inasmuch
as the non-disclosure of the limits of the agency carries with it the
implication that a deception was perpetrated on the unsuspecting
client, the provisions of Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code come
71
into play. DBP v. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 370 (1994).
c. Agent Is Criminally Liable for Crime Committed

Even in the Pursuit of the Agency
The Law on Agency, as applied in civil cases, has no application in

criminal cases, and no man can escape punishment when he
participates in the commission of a crime upon the ground that he
simply acted as an agent of any party. People v. Chowdury, 325
SCRA 572 (2000).
d. Agent’s Written Power of Attorney, Insofar as

Concerns Third Persons, Governs on Questions
Whether Agent Acted Within Scope of Authority
Even if it Exceeds Authority According to
Understanding Between Principal and Agent (Art.
1900)
Where the wife gave her husband a power of attorney “to loan and
borrow money,” and for such purpose to mortgage her property, and
where the husband signed his wife’s name to a note and gave a
mortgage on her property to secure the note and the amount of the
loan was actually paid to her husband in money at the time the note
and mortgage were executed, the transaction is binding upon the
wife under her power of attorney, regardless of what the husband
may ha e done with the money which he obtained on the loan. Bank
of P.I. v. De Coster, 47 Phil 594 (1925).
It is a settled rule that persons dealing with an assumed agent,
whether the assumed agency be a general or special one are bound
at their peril if they would hold the principal liable, to ascertain not
only the fact of agency but also the nature and extent of authority,
72
and in case either is controverted, the burden of proof is upon them
to establish it. Harry Keeler v. Rodriguez, 4 Phil. 19). Hence, when
the bank accepted a letter of guarantee signed by a mere credit
administrator on behalf of the finance company, the burden was on
the bank to satisfactorily prove that the credit administrator with
whom they transacted acted within the authority given to him by his
principal. BA Finance v. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 112
(1992).
As far as third persons are concerned, an act is deemed to have

been performed within the scope of the agent’s authority, if such is
within the terms of the power of attorney, as written, even if the
agent has in fact exceeded the limits of his authority according to an
understanding between the principal and his agent. Eugenio v.
When one knowingly deals with the sales representative of a car

dealership company, one must realize that one is dealing with a
mere agent, and it is incumbent upon such person to act with
ordinary prudence and reasonable diligence to know the extent of
the sales representative’s authority as an agent in respect of
contracts to sell the vehicles. A person dealing with an agent is put
upon inquiry and must discover upon his peril the authority of the
agent. [Normal business practice does not warrant a sales
representative to have power to enter into a valid and binding
contract of sale for the company.] Toyota Shaw, Inc. v. CA, 244
SCRA 320 (1995).
Every person dealing with an agent is put upon inquiry and must
discover upon his peril the authority of the agent. If he does not
make such inquiry, he is chargeable with knowledge of the agent’s
authority, and his ignorance of that authority will not be any excuse.
73
Persons dealing with an assumed agent, whether the assumed
agency be a general or special one, are bound at their peril, if they
would hold the principal, to ascertain not only the fact of the agency
but also the nature and extent of the authority, and in case either is
controverted, the burden of proof is upon them to establish it.
Bacaltos Coal Mines v. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 460
(1995).13
The fact that one is dealing with an agent, whether the agency be
general or special, should be a danger signal. The mere
representation or declaration of one that he is authorized to act on
behalf of another cannot of itself serve as proof of his authority to
act as agent or of the extent of his authority as agent. Yu Eng
Cho v. PANAM, 328 SCRA 717 (2000).
“The settled rule is that persons dealing with an assumed agent are
bound at their peril, and if they would hold the principal liable, to
ascertain not only the fact of agency but also the nature and extent
of authority, and in case either is controverted, the burden of proof
is upon them to prove it. In this case, respondent Fernandez
specifically denied that she was authorized by the respondents-
owners to sell the properties, both in her answer to the complaint
and when she testified. Litonjua v. Fernandez, 427 SCRA 478
(2004).
The ignorance of a person dealing with an agent as to the scope of

the latter’s authority is no excuse to such person and the fault
cannot be thrown upon the principal. A person dealing with an agent
assumes the risk of lack of authority of the agent. He cannot charge
the principal by relying upon the agent’s assumption of authority
that proves to be unfounded. The principal, on the other hand, may
act on the presumption that third persons dealing with his agent will
not be negligent in failing to ascertain the extent of his authority as
74
well as the existence of his agency. Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery, Inc. v. Linsangan, 443 SCRA 377 (2004).
A person dealing with a known agent is not authorized, under any

circumstances, blindly to trust the agents; statements as to the
extent of his powers; such person must not act negligently but must
use reasonable diligence and prudence to ascertain whether the
agent acts within the scope of his authority. The settled rule is that,
persons dealing with an assumed agent are bound at their peril, and
if they would hold the principal liable, to ascertain not only the fact
of agency but also the nature and extent of authority, and in case
either is controverted, the burden of proof is upon them to prove it.
In this case, the petitioners failed to discharge their burden; hence,
petitioners are not entitled to damages from respondent EC.
When dealing with an assumed agent, a third party should ascertain

not only the fact of agency, but also the nature and extent of the
agent’s authority. Escueta v. Lim, 512 SCRA 411 (2007).
The Bank of Commerce clearly failed to observe the required degree

of caution in ascertaining the genuineness and extent of the
authority of Santos to mortgage the subject property. It should not
have simply relied on the face of the documents submitted by
Santos, as its undertaking to lend a considerable amount of money
require of it a greater degree of diligence. That the person applying
for the loan is other than the registered owner of the real property
being mortgaged should have already raised a red flag and which
should have induced Bank of commerce to make inquiries into and
confirm Santos’ authority to mortgage the Spouses San Pablo’s
property. A person who deliberately ignores a significant fact that
could create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable person is not an
innocent purchaser for value. Bank of Commerce v. San Pablo, Jr.,
75
522 SCRA 713 (2007).
Every person dealing with an agent is put upon inquiry, and must
discover upon his peril the authority of the agent, and this is
especially true where the ac of the agent is of unusual nature. If a
person makes no inquiry, he is chargeable with knowledge of the
agent’s authority, and his ignorance of that authority will not be any
excuse. Thus, the undue haste in granting the loan without inquiring
into the ownership of the subject properties being mortgage, as well
as the authority of the supposed agent to constitute the mortgages
on behalf of the owners, bank accepting the mortgage cannot be
deemed a mortgagee in good faith. San Pedro v. Ong, 569 SCRA 767
(2008).
It is true that a person dealing with an agent is not authorized,

under any circumstances, to trust blindly the agent’s statements as
to the extent of his powers. Such person must not act negligently
but must use reasonable diligence and prudence to ascertain
whether the agent acts within the scope of his authority. The settled
rule is that persons dealing with an assumed agent are bound at
their peril, and if they would hold the principal liable, they must
ascertain not only the fact of agency, but also the nature and extent
of authority, and in case either is controverted, the burden of proof
is upon them to prove it. Soriamont Steamship Agencies, Inc. v.
Sprint Transport Services, Inc., 592 SCRA 622 (2009).
The burden of proof to show that an agent acting in excess of

authority to be able to invoke the rule under Article 1897 of the Civil
Code to make the agent personally liable is on the person who
alleges the same. Soriamont Steamship Agencies, Inc. v. Sprint
Transport Services, Inc., 592 SCRA 622 (2009).
e. Third Person Cannot Set-up Facts of Agent’s

Exceeding Authority Where Principal 76
Ratified or Signified Willingness to Ratify Agent’s Acts (Art.

1901)
(1) Principal Should Be the One to Question Agent’s

Lack or Excess of Authority
(2) Presentation of Power of Attorney (Must) Be

Required by Third Party (Art. 1902)
(3) Private or Secret Orders of Principal Do Not

Prejudice Third Persons Who Relied Upon
Agent’s Power of Attorney or Principal’s
Instruction (Art. 1902)
In an expropriation proceeding, the State cannot raise the alleged

lack of authority of the counsel of the owner to bind his client in a
compromise agreement because such lack of authority may be
questioned only by the principal or client. [Since it is within the
right or prerogative of the principal to ratify even the unauthorized
acts of the agent]. Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego,
31 SCRA 617 (1970).
8. Obligations of Commission Agents
a. Commission Agent Responsible for Goods

Received According to Terms and Conditions and
as Described in Consignment (Art. 1903)
EXCEPT: When He Makes a Written Statement of Damage and
Deterioration (Art.
1903)
77
b. Obligation in Handling Various Goods for Different
Owners (Art. 1904):
(1) Distinguish Them by Countermarks If Goods of

Same Kind and Mark
PURPOSE: To Prevent Conflict of Interest Among Owners
(2) Distinguish from Art. 1976 (Contract of Deposit)

– Depositary May Commingle Grain or Other
Articles of Similar Nature and Quality –
ownership pro-rata
c. He Cannot Sell on Credit Without Principal’s Consent

(Art. 1905)
(1) OTHERWISE: Considered as Cash Sales
Whether viewed as an agency to sell or as a contract of sale, the

liability of Green Valley is indubitable. Adopting Green Valley’s
theory that the contract is an agency to sell, it is liable because it
sold on credit without authority from its principal.” Under Article
1905, it is provided that the commission agent cannot, without the
express or implied consent of the principal, sell on credit, and should
it do so the principal may demand from him payment in cash.
Green Valley v. IAC, 133 SCRA 697 (1984).
d. When With Principal’s Authority to Sell on Credit: (Art.

1906)
(1) Inform the Principal with Statement of Buyer’s
Names;
(2) Effect of Non-Compliance – Considered Sash Sale

78
e. Effect When Agent Receives Guaranty or Del Credere

Commissions (Art. 1907)
(1) He Shall Sear the Risk of Collection
(2) He Shall Pay Principal the Proceeds of Sale on

Same Terms Agreed with Purchaser
f. Liability for Failure to Collect Principal’s Credit When

Due (Art. 1908)
(1) Liability for Damages
(2) Unless Due Diligence Proven
IV. OBLIGATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL

1. Binding Effect on Principal of Contracts Made by the
Agent
79
a. When Done Within Agent’s Scope of Authority:
Principal the Only One Bound (Art. 1897)
In investment management account, where under the terms of the

written instrument, the bank shall purchase debt securities on behalf
of the client and will handle the accounts in accordance with the
instructions of the client, creates a principal-agent relationship, and
not a trust relationship or an ordinary bank deposit account. Under
Article 1910, the client assumed all obligations or inherent risks
entailed by transactions emanating from the arrangement, and the
bank may be held liable, as an agent, only when it exceeds its
authority, or acts with fraud, negligence or bad faith. Principals in an
agency relationship are solely obliged to observe the solemnity of
the transaction entered into by the agent on their behalf, absent any
proof that the latter acted beyond its authority, and concomitant to
this obligation is that the principal also assumes the risks that may
arise from the transaction. Panlilio v. Citibank, N.A., 539 SCRA
69 (2007).
b. When Done Outside of Agent’s Scope of Authority:

Principal Not Bound (Art. 1910)
Where the memorial park company has authorized its agent to solicit
and remit offers to purchase internment spaces obtained on forms
provided by the company, then the terms of the offer to purchase,
therefore, are contained in such forms and, when signed by the
buyer and an authorized officer of the company, becomes binding on
both the company and said buyer. And the fact that the buyer and
the agent had an agreement different from that contained in the
forms accepted does not bind the company, since the same were
made obviously outside the agent’s authority. When the power of
80
the agent to sell are governed by the written form, it is beyond the
authority of the agent as a fact that is deemed known and accepted
by the third person, to offer terms and conditions outside of those
provided in writing. Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. v.
Linsangan, 443 SCRA 377 (2004).
c. EXCEPT:
(1) When Principal Ratifies, Expressly or Impliedly (Art.

1910)
Since the general rule is that the principal is bound by the acts of his
agent in the scope of the agency, therefore when the agent had full
authority to make the tax returns and file them, together with the
check payments, with the Collector of Internal Revenue on behalf of
the principal, then the effects of dishonesty of the agent must be
borne by the principal, not by an innocent third party who has dealt
with the dishonest agent in good faith. Lim Chai Seng v. Trinidad, 41
Phil. 544 (1921).
A person with whom an agent has contracted in the name of his

principal, has a right of action against the purported principal, even
when the latter denies the commission or authority of the agent, in
which case the party suing has the burden of proving the existence
of the agency notwithstanding the purported principal’s denial
thereof. If the agency relation is proved, then the principal shall be
held liable, and the agent who is made a party to the suit cannot be
held personally liable. On the other hand, if the agency relationship
is not proven, it would be the agent who would become liable
81
personally on the contract entered into. Nantes v. Madriguera, 42
Phil. 389 (1921).
Where a sale of land is effected through an agent who made

misrepresentations to the buyer that the property can be delivered
physically to the control of the buyer when in fact it was in adverse
possession of third parties, the seller-principal is bound for such
misrepresentations and cannot insist that the contract is valid and
enforceable; the seller-principal cannot accept the benefits derived
from such representations of the agent and at the same time deny
the responsibility for them. Gonzales v. Haberer, 47 Phil. 380
(1925).
When an agent has been empowered to sell hemp in a foreign

country, that express power carries with it the implied power to
make and enter into the usual and customary contract for its sale,
which sale contract may provide for settlement of issues by
arbitration. “We are clearly of the opinion that the contract in
question is valid and binding upon the defendant [principal], and
that authority to make and enter into it for and on behalf of the
defendant [principal], but as a matter of fact the contract was legally
ratified and approved by the subsequent acts and conducts of the
defendant [principal]. Robinson, Fleming and Co. v. Cruz, 49 Phil. 42
(1926).
The authority to sell any kind of realty that “might belong” to the
principal was held to include also such as the principal might
afterwards have during the time it was in force. Katigbak v. Tai Hing
Co., 52 Phil. 622 (1928).
The registered owner who placed in the hands of another an
executed document of transfer of the registered land, was held to
have effectively represented to a third party that the holder of such
document is authorized to deal with the property. Blondeau v.
82
Nano,. 61 Phil. 625 (1935); Domingo v. Robles, 453 SCRA 812
(2005).
When the principal has duly empowered his agent to enter into a
contract of mortgage over his property as well as a contract of
surety, but the agent only entered into a contract of mortgage, no
inference from the power of attorney can be made to make the
principal liable as a surety, because under the law, a surety must be
express and cannot be presumed. Wise and Co. v. Tanglao, 63 Phil.
372 (1936).
When bank officers, acting as agent, had not only gone against the
instructions, rules and regulations of the bank in releasing loans to
numerous borrowers who were qualified, then such bank officers are
liable personally for the losses sustained by the bank. The fact that
the bank had also filed suits against the borrowers to recover the
amounts given does not amount to ratification of the acts done by
the bank officers. PNB v. Bagamaspad, 89 Phil. 365 (1951).
As a general rule, the mismanagement of the business of a party by

his agents does not relieve said party from the responsibility that he
had contracted with third persons. Commercial Bank & Trust Co. v.
Republic Armored Car Services Corp., 8 SCRA 425 (1963).
Pursuant to the terms of the judgment, petitioners had issued a

check in payment of the judgment debt and made arrangements
with the bank for the latter to allow the encashment thereof; but the
check was dishonored by the bank which increased the amount of
the judgment debt. When the petitioner sought not to be made liable
for the alleged “oversight” of the bank, the Court denied such
defense on the ground that “The principal is responsible for the acts
of the agent, done within the scope of his authority, and should bear
the damages caused upon third parties. If the fault or oversight lies
on the agent bank, the petitioners are free to sue said bank for
83
damages occasioned thereby.” Lopez v. Alvendia, 12 SCRA 634
(1964).
Where the principal issued the checks in full payment of the taxes
due, but his agents had misapplied the check proceeds, it was held
that the principal would still be liable, because when a contract of
agency exists, the agent’s acts bind his principal, without prejudice
to the latter seeking recourse against the agent in an appropriate
civil or criminal action. Dy Peh v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 28
SCRA 216 (1969).
Under the principle that knowledge of the agent is considered

knowledge by the principle, the Court ruled that the spouses cannot
defend by contending lack of knowledge of the rules upon which they
received their tickets from the airline company since the evidence
bore out that their travel agent, who handled their travel
arrangements, was duly informed by proper representatives of the
airline company. Air France v. Court of Appeals, 126 SCRA
448 (1983)
When a third party admitted in her written correspondence that she

had contracted with the principal through an duly authorized agent,
and then sues both the principal and the agent on an alleged breach
of that contract, and in fact later on dismisses the suit insofar as the
principal is concerned, there can be no cause of action against the
agent. Since it is the principal who should be answerable for the
obligation arising from the agency, it is obvious that if a third person
waives his claims against the principal, he cannot assert them
against the agent. Bedia v. White, 204 SCRA 273 (1991).
The fact that the agent defrauded the principal in not turning over
the proceeds of the transactions to the latter cannot in any way
relieve or exonerate such principal from liability to the third persons
who relied on his agent’s authority. It is an equitable maxim that as
84
between two innocent parties, the one who made it possible for the
wrong to be done should be the one to bear the resulting loss.
Cuison v. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 391 (1993).
On the basis of the general principle that “the principal is responsible

for the acts of the agent, done within the scope of his authority, and
should bear the damage caused to third persons,” the principal
cannot absolve itself from the damages sustained by its buyer on the
premise that the fault was primarily caused by its agent in pointing
to the wrong lot, since the agent “was acting within its authority as
the sole real estate representative [of the principal-seller] when it
made the delivery to” the buyer, although “[i]n acting within its
scope of authority, [the agent] was, however, negligent,” since it is
negligence that is the basis of principal’s liability since under Arts.
1909 and 1910, the liability of the principal for acts done by the
agent within the scope of his authority do not exclude those done
negligently. Pleasantville Dev. v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA
10 (1996).
When a bank, by its acts and failure to act, has clearly clothed its
manager with apparent authority to sell an acquired asset (piece of
land) in the normal course of business, it is legally obliged to confirm
the transaction by issuing a board resolution to enable the buyers to
register the property in their names. Rural Bank of Milaor v.
Ocfemia, 325 SCRA 99 (2000).
“Ratification in agency is the adoption or confirmation by one person

of an act performed on his behalf by another without authority. The
substance of the doctrine is confirmation after conduct, amounting
to a substitute for a prior authority. Ordinarily, the principal must
have full knowledge at the time of ratification of all the material facts
and circumstances relating to the unauthorized act of the person
85
who assumed to act as agent. Thus, if material facts were
suppressed or unknown, there can be no valid ratification and this
regardless of the purpose or lack thereof in concealing such facts
and regardless of the parties between whom the question of
ratification may arise. Nevertheless, this principle does not apply if
the principal’s ignorance of the material facts and circumstances was
willful, or that the principal chooses to act in ignorance of the facts.
However, in the absence of circumstances putting a reasonably
prudent ma on inquiry, ratification cannot be implied as against the
principal who is ignorant of the facts.” Thus, the acts of an agent
beyond the scope of his authority do not bind the principal, unless
he ratifies them, expressly or impliedly. Only the principal can ratify;
the agent cannot ratify his own unauthorized acts. Moreover, the
principal must have knowledge of the acts he is to ratify.” Manila
Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. v. Linsangan, 443 SCRA 377,
394 (2004).
Since the basis of agency is representation, then the question of

whether an agency has been created is ordinarily a question which
may be established in the same way as any other fact, either by
direct or circumstantial evidence. Though that fact or extent of
authority of the agents may not, as a general rules, be established
from the declarations of the agents alone, if one professes to act as
agent for another, she may be estopped to deny her agency both as
against the asserted principal and the third persons interested in the
transaction in which he or he is engaged. Doles v. Angeles, 492
SCRA 607 (2006).
The general rule is that the principal is responsible for the acts of its
agent done within the scope of its authority, and should bear the
damage caused to third persons. When the agent exceeds his
authority, the agent becomes personally liable for the damage. But
86
even when the agent exceeds his authority, the principal is still
solidarily liable together with the agent if the principal allowed the
agent to act as though the agent had full powers. In other words,
the acts of an agent beyond the scope of his authority do not bind
the principal, unless the principal ratifies them, expressly or implied.
Ratification in agency is the adoption or confirmation by one person
of an act performed on his behalf by another without authority.”
Filipinas Life Assurance Co. v. Pedroso, 543 SCRA 542
(2008)
(2) Where Agent Acts in Excess of Authority, Where the

Principal Allowed Agent to Act as Though Agent Had Full
Powers (Art. 1911)
(a) Exception to the Rule that Obligations Are Presumed

to Be Joint
(b) Doctrine of Apparent Authority
The doctrine of apparent authority focuses on two factors, first the

principal’s manifestations of the existence of agency which need not
be expressed, but may be general and implied, and second is the
reliance of third persons upon the conduct of the principal or agent.
Under the doctrine of apparent authority, the question in every case
is whether the principal has by his voluntary act placed the agent in
such a situation that a person of ordinary prudence, conversant with
business usages and the nature of the particular business, is justified
in presuming that such agent has authority to perform the particular
act in question. Professional Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
544 SCRA 170 (2008); 611 SCRA 282 (2010).
Easily discernible from the foregoing is that apparent authority is
determined only by the acts of the principal and not by the acts of
the agent. The principal is, therefore, not responsible where the
agent's own conduct and statements have created the apparent
87
authority. Sargasso Construction & Dev. Corp. v. PPA, 623
SCRA 260 (2010).
There can be no apparent authority of an agent without acts or

conduct on the part of the principal, which must have been known
and relied upon in good faith as a result of the exercise of
reasonable prudence by a third party claimant, and which must have
produced a change of position to the third party’s detriment. In the
present case, the trial court’s decision was utterly silent on the
manner by which the supposed principal, has “clothed” or “held out”
its branch manager as having the power to enter into an agreement,
as claimed by petitioners. No proof of the course of business, usages
and practices of the bank about, or knowledge that the board had or
is presumed to have of, its responsible officers’ acts regarding bank
branch affairs, was ever adduced to establish the branch manager’s
apparent authority to verbally alter the terms of mortgage contracts.
Banate v. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank, 625 SCRA 21
(2010).
(c) Agency by Estoppel
By the opening of branch office with the appointment of its branch

manager and honoring several surety bonds issued in its behalf, the
insurance company induced the public to believe that its branch
manager had authority to issue such bonds. As a consequence, the
insurance company was estopped from pleading, particularly against
a regular customer thereof, that the branch manager had no
authority. Central Surety & Insurance Co. v. C.N. Hodges, 38 SCRA
159 (1971).
When collision with another vessel has been caused by the
negligence of the ship agent, both the ship owner and the ship agent
can be sued together for the recovery of damages since their liability
for the damage caused is solidary. Versoza v. Lim, 45 Phil 416
88
(1923).
Even when the agent of the real estate company acts unlawfully and
outside the scope of authority, the principal can be held liable when
by its own act it accepts without protest the proceeds of the sale of
the agents which came from double sales of the same lots, as when
learning of the misdeed, it failed to take necessary steps to protect
the buyers and failed to prevent further wrong from being
committed when it did not advertise the revocation of the authority
of the culprit agent. In such case the liabilities of both the principal
and the agent is solidary. Manila Remnants v. Court of
Appeals, 191 SCRA 622 (1990)
For an agency by estoppel to exist, the following must be

established: (1) the principal manifested a representation of the
agent’s authority or knowingly allowed the agent to assume such
authority; (2) the third person, in good faith, relied upon such
representation; (3) relying upon such representation, such third
person has changed his position to his detriment. An agency by
estoppel, which is similar to the doctrine of apparent authority,
requires proof of reliance upon the representations, and that, in
turn, needs proof that the representations predated the action taken
in reliance. Litonjua, Jr. v. Eternit Corp., 490 SCRA 204
(2006).
Since the basis of agency is representation, the question of whether

an agency has been created is ordinarily a question which may be
established in the same way as any other fact, either by direct or
circumstantial evidence; Though that fact or extent of authority of
the agents may not, as a general rules, be established from the
declarations of the agents alone, if one professes to act as agent for
another, she may be estopped to deny her agency both as against
the asserted principal and the third persons interested in the
89
transaction in which he or he is engaged. Doles v. Angeles, 492
SCRA 607 (2006).
Innocent third persons should not be prejudiced if the principal failed

to adopt the needed measures to prevent misrepresentation, much
more so if the principal ratified his agent’s acts beyond the latter’s
authority. Filipinas Life Assurance Co. v. Pedroso, 543 SCRA
542 (2008).
The law makes no presumption of agency and proving its existence,

nature and extent is incumbent upon the person alleging its
existence, nature and extent is incumbent upon the person alleging
it. An agency by estoppel, which is similar to the doctrine of
apparent authority requires the proof of reliance upon the
representation, and that, in turn, needs proof that the
representations predated the action taken in reliance. Yun Kwan
Byung v. PAGCOR, 608 SCRA 107 (2009).
2. Obligations of the Principal
a. Obligation to Pay Agent’s Compensation (Art. 1875)
Although the sale of the object of the agency to sell was perfected
three days after the expiration of the agency period, the agent would
still be entitled to receive the commission stipulated based on the
doctrine held in Prats v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 360 (1978), that
when the agent was the efficient procuring cause in bringing about
the sale that the agent was entitled to compensation. In the earlier
case of Reyes v. Manaoat, 8 C.A. Rep. 2d 368 (1965), this Court
ruled that when there is a close, proximate and causal connection
between the agent's efforts and labor and the principal's sale of his
90
property, the agent is entitled to a commission. Manotok Bros.
Inc. v. C, 221 SCRA 224 (1993).
Although the ultimate buyer was introduced by the agent to the

principal during the term of the agency, nevertheless, the lapse of
the period of more than one (1) year and five (5) months between
the expiration of petitioners' authority to sell and the consummation
of the sale, cannot authorize compelling the principal to pay the
stipulated broker’s fee, since the agent was no longer entitled
thereto. The Court takes into strong consideration that utter lack of
evidence of the agent showing any further involvement in the
negotiations between principal and buyer during that period and in
the subsequent processing of the documents pertinent to said sale.
The broker was not the efficient procuring cause in bringing about
the sale in question, and are therefore not entitled to the stipulated
broker’s commission. Inland Realty v. Court of Appeals, 273 SCRA
70 (1997).
b. Obligation to Advance Sums Requested for

Execution of Agency (Art. 1912)
(1) Agent Has Right to Reimbursement for Expenses

Advanced Including Interest from the Day It
Was Advanced
(2) Compare: Where Agent Consents and Is

Bound to Advance the Sums as Stipulated
(Art. 1886)
(3) Where Principle not Liable to Agent for Expenses
Incurred (Art. 1918)
According to Hahn, BMW periodically inspected the service centers to

see to it that BMW standards were maintained. Indeed, it would 91
seem from BMW's letter to Hahn that it was for Hahn's alleged
failure to maintain BMW standards that BMW was terminating Hahn's
dealership. The fact that Hahn invested his own money to put up
these service centers and showrooms does not necessarily prove
that he is not an agent of BMW. For as already noted, there are facts
in the record which suggest that BMW exercised control over Hahn's
activities as a dealer and made regular inspections of Hahn's
premises to enforce compliance with BMW standards and
specifications. Hahn v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 537
(1997).
However, while the law on agency prohibits the area manager from
obtaining reimbursement, his right to recover may still be justified
under the general law on obligations and contracts, particularly
Article 1236 of the Civil Code on payment by a third party of the
obligation of the debtor, allows recovery “only insofar as the
payment has been beneficial to the debtor.” Thus, to the extent that
the obligation of the insurance company has been extinguished, the
area manager may demand for reimbursement from his principal. To
rule otherwise would result in unjust enrichment of petitioner. Where
the area manager of the insurance company is only authorized to
collect insurance premiums within his designated area of
responsibility, but makes settlement and pays claims on insurance
claims without any such authority from the principal insurance
company, then the insurance company has no obligation to
reimbursement the claims for expenses incurred by the agent
outside the scope of his authority. Dominion Insurance Corp. v.
c. Obligation to Indemnify Agent for Damages (Art.
1913)
92
(1) Compare: Liability of Agent for Damages for
Non-performance of Agency (Art. 1884)
When the purchase by one company of the copra of another

company is by way of contract of purchase rather than an agency to
purchase, the former is not liable to reimburse the latter for
expenses incurred by the latter in maintaining it purchasing
organization intact over a period during which the actual buying of
copra was suspended. Albaladejo y Cia v. PRC, 45 Phil 556
(1923).
d. Right of Agent to Retain Object of Agency in Pledge

for Advances and Damages (Art. 1914)
(1) Agent Bound to deliver to principal everything he

received even if not due the principal (Art.
1891).
(2) Thing Pledged May Be Sold Only After Demand of

Amount Due – Public Auction to Take Place
within One (1) Month After Demand. Debtor May
Demand Return of Not Sold within This Period
(Art. 2122).
3. Obligation of Two or More Principals to Agent

Appointed for Common Transactions – Solidary (Art.
1915)
a. Obligation of the Principals Is Solidary Because of
Their Common Interest
When the law expressly provides for solidarity of the obligation, as in

the liability of co- principals in a contract of agency, each obligor 93
may be compelled to pay the entire obligation. The agent may
recover the whole compensation from any one of the co-principals,
as in this case. De Castro v. Court of Appeals, 384 SCRA 607
(2002).
b. Compare: Two or More Agents with One Principal –

Agent’s Obligation Is Solidary (Art 1894).
c. Right of Each Principal to Revoke Authority of

Common Agent (Art. 1925).
4. Rights of Persons Who Contracted for Same Thing, One

With Principal and the Other With Agent (Art. 1916)
a. That of Prior Date Is Preferred
b. If a Double Sale Situation – Art. 1544 Governs
5. Liability of Principal and Agent to Third Persons Whose

Contract Must Be Rejected Pursuant to Art. 1916 (Art.
1917)
a. If Agent in Good Faith – Principal Liable
b. If Agent in Bad Faith – Agent alone Liable

6. Liability of Principal to Third Persons for Acts of the
Agent’s Employees
94
The mere fact that the employee of the airline company's agent has
committed a tort is not sufficient to hold the airline company liable.
There is no vinculum juris between the airline company and its
agent's employees and the contractual relationship between the
airline company and its agent does not operate to create a juridical
tie between the airline company and its agent's employees. Article
2180 of the Civil Code does not make the principal vicariously liable
for the tort committed by its agent's employees and the principal-
agency relationship per se does not make the principal a party to
such tort; hence, the need to prove the principal's own fault or
negligence. Spouses Viloria v. Continental Airlines, Inc., G.R. No.
188288, 16 January 2012.
Compare:
Thus, with regard to the delivery of the petroleum, Villaruz was

acting as the agent of petitioner Petron. For a fee, he delivered the
petroleum products on its behalf. Notably, petitioner even imposed a
penalty clause in instances when there was a violation of the hauling
contract, wherein it may impose a penalty ranging from a written
warning to the termination of the contract. Therefore, as far as the
dealer was concerned with regard to the terms of the dealership
contract, acts of Villaruz and his employees are also acts of
petitioner. Petron Corp. v. Spouses Cesar Jovero & Erma F.
Cudilla, G.R. No. 151038, 18 January 2012.
V. EXTINGUISHMENT OF AGENCY
1. How and When Agency Extinguished (Art. 1919) 95
(a) By Principal’s Revocation of Agency (Express or

Implied)
(b) By Agent’s Withdrawal from Agency
(c) By Death, Civil Interdiction, Insanity or Insolvency
of the Principal or the Agent
(d) By the Dissolution of the Juridical Entity Which
Entrusted or Accepted the Agency
(e) By the Accomplishment of the Object or Purpose of
Agency
(f) By the Expiration of the Period for Which Agency
Was Constituted
2. Express Revocation: The Principal May Revoke an

“Agency at Will”
a. In Which Case, Principal May Compel Agent to

Return the Document Evidencing the Agency. (Art.
1920)
Where no time for the continuance of the agency is fixed by the

terms, the principal is at liberty to terminate it at will subject only to
the requirements of good faith. Dañon v. Brimo, 42 Phil 133 (1921).
b. Right of Either Two or More Principals to Revoke
(1) Obligation of Several Principals to a Common

Agent Is Solidary. (Art. 1915)
(2) Any of the Principals Can Revoke the Authority
of Their Common Agent, Without the Consent of
the Other(s). (Art. 1925)
96
3. Implied Revocation
a. Appointment of New Agent for Same

Business/Transaction (Art. 1923)
(1) Impliedly Revoked as to Agent Only
(2) As to Third Persons, Notice to Them Is Necessary

(Art. 1922)
In litigation, the fact that a second attorney enters an appearance on

behalf of a litigant does not authorize a presumption that the
authority of the first attorney has been withdrawn. Aznar v. Morris, 3
Phil. 636 (1904).
Where the father first gave a power of attorney over the business to
his son, and subsequently to the mother, the Court held that without
evidence showing that the son was informed of the issuance of the
power of attorney to the mother, the transaction effected by the son
pursuant to his power of attorney, was valid and binding. Garcia
v. De Manzano, 39 Phil 577 (1919).
b. When Principal Directly Manages Business

Entrusted to Agent (Art. 1924)
If the purpose of the principal in dealing directly with the purchaser
and himself effecting the sale of the principal’s property is to avoid
payment of his agent’s commission, the implied revocation is
deemed made in bad faith and cannot be sanctioned without
97
according to the agent the commission which is due him. Infante v.
Cunanan, 93 Phil 693 (1953).
The act of a contractor, who, after executing powers of attorney in

favor of another empowering the latter to collect whatever amounts
may be due to him from the Government, and thereafter demanded
and collected from the Government the money the collection of
which he entrusted to his attorney-in-fact, constituted revocation of
the agency. New Manila Co. v. Republic, 107 Phil 824 (1960).
The revocation of a special power of attorney, although embodied in

a private writing is valid and binding between the parties. Philippine
National Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 189 SCRA 680
(1990).
Where the purported agent was orally given authority to “follow up”
the purchase of the fire truck with the municipal government, there
is no authority to sell nor has the purported agent been empowered
to make a sale for and in behalf of the seller. But even if the
purported agent is considered to have been constituted as an agent
to sell the fire truck, such agency would have been deemed revoked
upon the resumption of direct negotiations between the seller and
the municipality, the purported agent having in the meantime
abandoned all efforts (if indeed any were exerted) to secure the deal
in the seller’s behalf. Guardex v. NLRC, 191 SCRA 487 (1990).
Principal may revoke, express or impliedly, a contract of agency at

will, and may be availed of even if the period fixed in the contract of
agency has not yet expired. As the principal has this absolute right
to revoke the agency, the agent can not object thereto; neither may
he claim damages arising from such revocation, unless it is shown
that such was done in order to evade the payment of agent’s
commission. The act of a contractor, who, after executing powers of
attorney in favor another empowering the latter to collect whatever
98
amounts may be due to him from the Government, and thereafter
demanded and collected from the government the money the
collection of which he entrusted to his attorney-in-fact, constituted
revocation of the agency in favor of the attorney-in-fact. CMS
Logging v. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 374 (1992).14
Damages are generally not awarded to the agent for the revocation
of the agency, and the case at bar is not one falling under the
exception mentioned, which is to evade the payment of the agent’s
commission. CMS Logging v. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 374
(1992).
c. General Power of Attorney Is Revoked by a Special

One Granted to Another Agent, As Regards the
Special Matter Involved in the Latter (Art. 1926)
Even though a period is stipulated during which the agent or

employee is to hold his position in the service of the owner or head
of a mercantile establishment, yet the latter may, for any of the
special reasons specified in Art. 300 of the Code of Commerce,
dismiss such agent or employee even before the termination of the
period. Barretto v. Santa Marina, 26 Phil 440 (1913).
A special power of attorney giving the son the authority to sell the
principals properties is deemed revoked by a subsequent general
power of attorney that does not give such power to the son, and any
sale effected thereafter by the son in the name of the father would
be void. Dy Buncio and Co. v. Ong Guan Ca, 60 Phil 696
(1934).
It is now well-settled that a principal may discharge or dismiss his

agent for just cause for malfeasance or misfeasance in the 99
performance of his duties. The provisions of article 300 of the Code
of Commerce expressly authorizes a merchant to discharge his
employee or agent for fraud or breach of trust, or engaging in any
commercial transaction for their own account without the express
knowledge and permission of the principal. Manila Trading v. Manila
Trading Laborers Assn., 83 Phil 297 (1949).
When the terms of the agency contract allowed the agent “to
dispose of, sell, cede, transfer and convey x x x until all the subject
property as subdivided is fully disposed of,” the agency is one with a
period and it is not extinguished until all the lots have been disposed
of. Consequently, if the contract is terminated by the principal before
all the lots in the subdivision has been disposed of, there is a breach
of contract for which the principal would be liable for damages.
Dialosa v. Court of Appeals, 130 SCRA 350 (1984).
When the revocation of the agency was effected by the principal

primarily because of the refusal of the agent to share fifty percent of
the commissions earned under the contract of agency, such
revocation was done in bad faith, and for which the principal can be
held liable for damages including the payment of full commissions
earned by the agent at the time of the revocation of the agency.
Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 1 (1990).
Courts are without authority to reinstate an agency arrangement

that has been revoked or terminated by the principal. “In an agent-
principal relationship, the personality of the principal is extended
through the facility of the agent. In so doing, the agent, by legal
fiction, becomes the principal, authorized to perform all acts which
the latter would have him do. Such a relationship can only be
effected with the consent of the principal, which must not, in any
way, be compelled by law or by any court. The Agreement itself
between the parties states that “either party may terminate the
100
Agreement without cause by giving the other 30 days’ notice by
letter, telegram or cable.” (emphasis supplied) We, therefore, set
aside the portion of the ruling of the respondent appellate court
reinstating Orient Air as general sales agent of American Air.” Orient
Air Services v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 645, 656 (1991).
4. Cases of Irrevocable Agencies (Art. 1927):
a. When a Bilateral Contract Depends on It
An exception to the revocability of a contract of agency is when it is

coupled with interest, i.e., if a bilateral contract depends upon the
agency. The reason for its irrevocability is because the agency
becomes part of another obligation or agreement. It is not solely the
rights of the principal but also that of the agent and third persons
which are affected. Hence, the law provides that in such cases, the
agency cannot be revoked at the sole will of the principal.
Republic v. Evangelista, 466 SCRA 544 (2005).
Agency is extinguished by the death of the principal. The only

exception where the agency shall remain in full force and effect even
after the death of the principal is when if it has been constituted in
the common interest of the latter and of the agent, or in the interest
of a third person who has accepted the stipulation in his favor.
Sasaba v. Vda. De Te, 594 SCRA 410 (2009).
b. When It Is the Means of Fulfilling an Obligation

Already Contracted
Unlike simple grants of a power of attorney, the agency that we
hereby declare to be compatible with the intent of the parties cannot
be revoked at will. The reason is that it is one coupled with an
interest, the agency having been created for the mutual interest of
101
the agent and the principal. It appears that Lina Sevilla is a bona
fide travel agent herself, and as such, she had acquired an interest
in the business entrusted to her. Moreover, she had assumed a
personal obligation for the operation thereof, holding herself
solidarily liable for the payment of rentals. She continued the
business, using her own name, after Tourist World had stopped
further operations. Her interest, obviously, is not limited to the
commissions she earned as a result of her business transactions, but
one that extends to the very subject matter of the power of
management delegated to her. It is an agency that cannot be
revoked at the pleasure of the principal. Accordingly, the revocation
complained of should entitle the petitioner. Sevilla v. Court of
Appeals, 160 SCRA 171 (1988).
Agency Coupled with Interest:“In the insurance business in the

Philippines, the most difficult and frustrating period is the solicitation
and persuasion of the prospective clients to buy insurance policies.
Normally, agents would encounter much embarrassment, difficulties,
and oftentimes frustrations in the solicitation and procurement of the
insurance policies. To sell policies, an agent exerts great effort,
patience, perseverance, ingenuity, tact, imagination, time and
money. . . Therefore, the respondents cannot state that the agency
relationship between Valenzuela and Philamgen is not coupled with
interest. “There may be cases in which an agent has been induced to
assume a responsibility or incur a liability, in reliance upon the
continuance of the authority under such circumstances that, if the
authority be withdrawn, the agent will be exposed to personal loss or
liability. . . . Furthermore, there is an exception to the principle that
an agency is revocable at will and that is when the agency has been
given not only for the interest of the principal but for the interest of
third persons or for the mutual interest of the principal and the
agent. In these cases, it is evident that the agency ceases to be
freely revocable by the sole will of the principal. Valenzuela v.
102
NASUTRA, in order to finance its undertaking as the marketing agent

of PHILSUCOM (which was by law the sole buying and selling agent
of sugar on the quedan permit level), applied for and was grant a
P408 Million Revolving Credit Line by PNB, by which every time
NASUTRA availed of the credit line, it executed a promissory note in
favor of PNB. Eventually, in order to stabilize sugar liquidation prices
at a targeted minimum price per picul . . . “Also, the relationship
between NASUTRA/SRA and PNB when the former constituted the
latter as its attorney-in-fact is not a simpIe agency. NASUTRA/SRA
has assigned and practically surrendered its rights in favor of PNB
for a substantial consideration. To reiterate, NASUTRA/SRA executed
promissory notes in favor of PNB every time it availed of the credit
line. The agency established between the parties is one coupled with
interest which cannot be revoked or cancelled at will by any of the
parties.” National Sugar Trading v. Philippine National Bank,
396 SCRA 528 (2003).
Even an agency coupled with interest may indeed be revoked on the

ground of fraud committed by the agent, which is really an act of
rescission, the same must be clearly be proven. Bacaling v.
Muya, 380 SCRA 714 (2002).
c. Unjustified Removal of Managing Partner –

Revocation Needs the Vote of Controlling
Partners (Art. 1800)
“. . . it must not be forgotten that a power of attorney although
coupled with interest in a partnership can be revoked for a just
cause, such as when the attorney-in-fact betrays the interest of the
principal, as happened in this case. It is not open to serious doubt
103
that the irrevocability of the power of attorney may not be used to
shield the perpetration of acts in bad faith, breach of confidence, or
betrayal of trust, by the agent for that would amount to holding that
a power coupled with an interest authorizes the agent to commit
frauds against the principal.” Coleongco v. Claparols, 10 SCRA
577, 581-582 (1964).
In an agency coupled with interest, it is the agency that cannot be

revoked or withdrawn by the principal due to an interest of a third
party that depends upon it, or the mutual interest of both principal
and agent. In this case, the non-revocation or non-withdrawal under
paragraph 5(c) [of the “Power of Attorney”] applies to the advances
made by petitioner [agent] who is supposedly the agent and not the
principal under the contract. Thus, it cannot be inferred from the
stipulation that the parties’ relation under the agreement is one of
agency coupled with an interest and not a partnership. Philex Mining
Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 551 SCRA 428 (2008).
5. Effects of Revocation on Third Parties
a. When It Affects Dealing with Specified Third Parties

(Art. 1921)
(1) Refers to an Agency Created by Principal to Deal

with Specified Third Persons
(2) For Revocation to Prejudice Them, Notice Is

Needed
(3) Compare: Effect of Special Notice or Public
Advertisement re: Appointment and Revocation
of Agent (Art. 1873).
Where the principal had expressly revoked the power of the agent to 104
handle the affairs of the business, but such revocation was not
conveyed to a long-standing client to whom the agent had been
specifically endorsed in the past by the principal, the revocation was
not deemed effective as to such client and the contracts entered into
by the agent in the name of the principal after the revocation would
still be valid and binding against the principal. Rallos v. Yangco,
20 Phil 269 (1911).
In a case covering a power of attorney to deal with the general

public, the fact that the revocation was advertised in a newspaper of
general circulation would be sufficient warning to third persons.
Rammani v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 731 (1991).
b. When Revocation of Agent’s General Powers

Effective Against Third Persons (Art. 1922)
 Refers to Agency Created to Deal with the General

Public
 Revocation Will not Prejudice Third Persons Who

Deal with the Agent in Good Faith and Without
Knowledge of Revocation
 However Notice of Revocation in a Newspaper of

General Circulation Is Sufficient Warning
Where a principal has been engaged, through his agent, in a series

of purchase and sell transactions with a merchant, and purported
suspended the agent without informing the merchant, the
suspension of the agent could not work to the detriment of the
merchant, thus: ”There is no convincing proof in the record that the
orders given by the plaintiff to its agent (Gutierrez) had ever been
105
communicated to the defendant. The defendant had a perfect right
to believe, until otherwise informed, that the agent of the plaintiff, in
his purchase of abaca and other effects, was still representing the
plaintiff in said transactions.” The Court also found anomalous the
position taken by the principal whereby he was willing to ratify the
acts of the agent in selling goods to the merchant, but unwilling to
ratify the agent’s acts in purchasing goods from the same merchant.
Cia. Gen. De Tobacos v. Diaba, 20 Phil 321 (1911).
While Art. 1358 of Civil Code requires that the contracts involving
real property must appear in a proper document, a revocation of a
special power of attorney to mortgage a parcel of land, embodied in
a private writing, is valid and binding between the parties, such
requirement of Article 1358 being only for the convenience of the
parties and to make the contract effective as against third persons.
PNB v. IAC, 189 SCRA 680 (1990).
When the principal owner of land executes a special power of

attorney giving her agent the power to mortgage the same, even
when there has been a revocation thereof, but the same has not
been made known to third parties, then those who receive a
mortgage on the properties in good faith will be protected in their
contract, for under Art. 1921 of the Civil Code, if an agency has been
entrusted for the purpose of contracting with specified persons, its
revocation shall not prejudice the latter if they were not given notice
thereof. Lustan v. CA, 266 SCRA 663 (1997).
6. Right of Agent to Withdraw (Resign) from Agency (Art.
1928)
a. By Giving Due Notice to Principal

106
b. Agent to Indemnify Principal Should Be Suffer Any
Damage
c. Unless Withdrawal Is Due to Impossibility of

Continuing Agency Without Grave Detriment to
Agent
When the agent and administrator of property informs his principal

by letter that for reasons of health and medical treatment he is
about to depart from the place where he is executing his trust and
wherein the said property is situated, and abandons the property,
turns it over to a third party, renders accounts of its revenues up to
the date on which he ceases to hold his position and transmits to his
principal a general statement which summarizes and embraces all
the balances of his accounts since he began the administration to
the date of the termination of his trust, and, without stating when he
may return to take charge of the administration of the said property,
asks his principal to execute a power of attorney in due form in favor
of and transmit the same to another person who took charge of the
administration of the said property, it is but reasonable and just to
conclude that the said agent had expressly and definitely renounced
his agency and that such agency was duly terminated, in accordance
with the provisions of article 1732 (now Arts. 1919 and 1928) of the
Civil Code. Dela Pena v. Hidalgo, 16 Phil 450 (1910).
The fact that an agent institutes an action against his principal for
the recovery of the balance in his favor resulting from the liquidation
of the accounts between them arising from the agency, and renders
a final account of his operations, is equivalent to an express
renunciation of the agency, and terminates the juridical relation
between them. The subsequent purchase by the former agent of the
principal’s usufruct rights in a public auction therefore was valid,
since no fiduciary relationship existed between them at that point.
107
Valera v. Velasco, 51 Phil 695 (1928).
d. Obligation of Agent to Continue to Act Even After

Withdrawing From Agency (Art. 1929)
 Even If Agent Withdraws from the Agency for a

Valid Reason, He Must Continue to Act;
 Until Principal has had reasonable opportunity

to Take Necessary Steps to Meet Situation;
(1) Compare: Agent Declines the Agency (Art. 1885)
7. Death of the Principal Extinguishes the Agency (ArtS.

1919[3], 1931)
The time during which the agent may hold his position is indefinite
or undertermined, when no period has been fixed in his commission
and so long as the confidence reposed in him by the principal exist;
but as soon as this confidence disappears the principal has a right to
revoke the power he conferred upon the agent, especially when the
latter has resigned his position for good reasons. Barretto v. Santa
Marina, 26 Phil 440 (1913).
Even though a period is stipulated during which the agent is to hold

his position in the service of the owner or head of a mercantile
establishment, yet the latter may, for any of the special reason
specified in article 300 of the Code of commerce, dismiss such agent
even before the termination of the period. Barretto v. Santa Marina,
26 Phil. 440 (1913).
108
By reason of the very nature of the relationship between principal

and agent, agency is extinguished by the death of the principal or
the agent. This is the law in this jurisdiction. Rallos v. Felix Go
Chan & Sons Realty Corp., 81 SCRA 251 (1978).
The death of a client divests his lawyer of authority to represent him

as counsel, since a dead client has no personality and cannot be
represented by an attorney. Lavina v. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA
691 (1988).15
a. When the Agency Continues Despite Death of

Principal (Art. 1930):
(1) If It Was Constituted for Common Interest of

Principal and Agent; or
(2) In Favor of Third Person Who Accepted

Stipulation in His Favor.
An example of an agency coupled with interest is when a power of

attorney is constituted in a contract of real estate mortgage
pursuant to the requirement of Act No. 3135, which would empower
the mortgagee upon the default of the mortgagor to payment the
principal obligation, to effect the sale of the mortgage property
through extrajudicial foreclosure. “The argument that foreclosure by
the Bank under its power of sale is barred upon death of the debtor,
because agency is extinguished by the death of the principal, under .
. . Article 1919 of the Civil Code neglects to take into account that
the power to foreclose is not an ordinary agency that contemplates
exclusively the representation of the principal by the agent but is
primarily an authority conferred upon the mortgagee for the latter’s
109
own protection. It is, in fact, an ancillary stipulation supported by
the same causa or consideration for the mortgage and forms an
essential and inseparable part of that bilateral agreement. Perez
v. PNB, 17 SCRA 833 (1966). Superseded the rule laid down in
Pasno v. Ravina, 54 Phil. 382 (1930) and Del Rosario v. Abad, 104
Phil. 648 (1958).
b. Effect of Acts Done by Agent Without Knowledge of

Principal’s Death (Art. 1931)
(1) Acts Are Valid Provided:
(i) Agent Does Not Know of Death or Other

Cause of Extinguishment of Agency;
(ii) Third Person Dealing with Agent Must Also Be

in Good Faith (Not Aware of Death or Other
Cause)
Under Article 1931 of the Civil Code, we must uphold the validity of
the sale of the land effected by the agent only after the death of the
principal, when no evidence was adduced to show that at the time of
sale both the agent and the buyers were unaware of the death of the
principal. Buason v. Panuyas, 105 Phil 795 (1959); Herrera v. Uy
Kim Guan, 1 SCRA 406 (1961).
8. Death of the Agent Extinguishes the Agency

a. Obligation of Agent’s Heirs in Case of Agent’s Death
(Art. 1932):
(1) Notify Principal

110
(2) Adopt Measures as Circumstances Demand in
Principal’s Interest
NOTE: If Principal Dies, the Law Is Silent on Whether

His Heirs Have Any Obligation to Notify the Agent
The contract of agency establishes a purely personal relationship

between the principal and the agent, such that the agency is
extinguished by the death of the agent, and his rights and
obligations arising from the contract of agency are not transmittable
to his heirs. Terrado v. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 373
(1984).
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AGENCY COURSE SYLLABUS with List of Cases

Rallos vs Felix Go Chan, 81 Scra 251 2

II. Form of the Contract of Agency

Angeles vs Phil. National Railways, 500 scra 444

III. Who has the obligation to determine the existence and

Keeler Electric Co. vs Rodriguez, 44 Phil 19

IV. How is agency distinguished from other

V. What are the classifications of agency contracts

Siasat vs IAC 139 scra 238

VI. What are the obligations and liabilities of agents to their

Austria vs CA 39 scra 527

VII. Responsibility for acts of substitutes

Del Rosario vs La BAdenia, 33 Phil 316

VIII. What are the obligations and liabilities of agents to third

PNB vs Agudelo, 58 Phil 655

Agent acting in his own name

Smith Bell vs Sotelo 44 Phil 784

IX. What are the obligations and liabilities of principals to

Macondray vs Sellner, 33 Phil 370

X. What are the obligations of principals to third parties?

XI. How is agency extinguished?

Barreto vs Sta. Maria 26 Phil 440

Valera vs Velasco, 51 Phil 695

Pasno vs Ravina, 54 Phil 378

I. NATURE AND OBJECT OF AGENCY 6

1. Definition (Art. 1868); Parties in an Agency Relationship

Under Article 1868 of the Civil Code, a contract of agency is one

The Spanish term for “principal” is “mandante”. Among the terms

2. Root and Objectives of Agency (Arts. 1317 and 1403[1])

The right of inspection given to a stockholder under the law can be

The purpose of every contract of agency is the ability, by legal

Rallos v. Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corp., 81 SCRA 251

(a) Consent, express or implied, of the parties to

(b) Object, is the execution of a juridical act in

(c) The agent acts as a representative and not for

(d) The agent acts within the scope of his

Whether or not an agency has been created is determined by the

a. Consent (Arts. 1317 and 1403[1])

The basis for agency is representation. On the part of the principal,

In an agent-principal relationship, the personality of the principal is

c. Consideration: Agency Presumed to Be

Prescinding from the principle that the terms of the contract of

Agency is presumed to be for compensation. Unless the contrary

4. Essential Characteristics of Agency

a. Nominate and Principal

If an act done by one person in behalf of another is in its essential

Even when it is provided under the Agreement that the agency

b. Unilateral and Primarily Onerous

c. Consensual (Arts. 1869 and 1870)

An agency may be expressed or implied from the act of the principal,

The basis for agency is representation. Here, there is no showing

A co-owner does not become an agent of the other co-owners, and

d. Preparatory and Representative

Agency is basically personal, representative, and derivative in

The essence of agency being the representation of another, it is

The other consequence of the doctrine of representation are:

 When an agent purchases the property in bad faith,

 Notice to the agent is notice to the principal. Air