SMMPC Coop Case Study
SMMPC Coop Case Study
SMMPC Coop Case Study
Fr. Anton was reelected Chairman in 2003 after having held the post for three
consecutive terms or from 1995 to 2000. Now a holder of Master in Development
Management degree from the Asian Institute of Management, Fr. Anton confessed,
This case was written by Asuncion M. Sebastian under the supervision of Prof. Francisco L. Roman, Jr. of the Asian
Institute of Management with funding support from the Microfinance Management Institute, a joint venture of the Open
Society Institute (OSI) and the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP).
All case materials are prepared solely for the purposes of class discussion. They are neither designed nor intended to
illustrate the correct or incorrect management of problems or issues contained in the case.
Copyright 2005, Asian Institute of Management, Makati City, Philippines, http://www.aim.edu.ph, e-mail:
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AIM–1-05-0003-CS
SMMPC (C): The Cooperative Revisited 2
Beginning 2002, SMMPC had refined its vision and mission statements thus:
VISION
Who does not dream of progressive and stable community in a Cooperative? How do we
go about in fulfilling the vision?
Membership in a cooperative is kind of calling, just like a vocation for a religious who
does pastoral work. Through the years, at least 12 years now, Simbayanan ni Maria
struggles for the stability it has wanted in terms of total membership and in terms of the
amount of its total assets and liabilities.
However, the development growth of (SMMPC) also foresees other than a successful
purely business activities, but towards the sustainability of entrepreneurship and
livelihood programs to improve the quality of life of all cooperators. (sic)
MISSION
Credit Services
Credit service remained SMMPC’s bread and butter, accounting for 85 percent
and 80 percent of the cooperative’s income in 1999 and 2004, respectively. Loans came
in various types: business, back to back 1 , housing, hospitalization, educational, and
consumer loans.
In 2004, the cooperative started targeting schools and factories for institutional
lending via salary loans as it was aware that “by coop tradition, individual lending is
always characterized by past due problems,” Fr. Anton explained.
1
A borrower could avail of loan up to 90 percent of his/her share capital at an interest rate of 1.25 percent
per month.
In the late 1990s, delinquencies ballooned. Loans worth Php30,000 and above
issued without a proper assessment of the members’ paying capacity—coupled with the
economic crisis prevailing then—caused repayment rates to drop from 95 percent to 68
percent. Funds were also often misused by members who invested in non-productive
assets such as housing. To arrest the problem, the SMMPC management immediately set
a loan ceiling that a member could avail of: only one type of loan at a time with one’s
capacity to pay as the primary consideration. It also resorted to PT pressure / group
liability to force the members to repay their loans, but the approach did not help.
Members were similarly required to get a co-maker for their loan applications, thereby
prolonging the application process. Finally, SMMPC employed an area management
approach which worked thus: if delinquency in a village reached 20 percent, recruitment
of borrowers was stopped until collection rates improved. This last method worked well
for the coop.
At the officers’ and directors’ levels, loan repayments were made salary
deductible to enable borrowers, who usually had loans amounting to as much as Php 1
million from the coop, to pay their dues gradually. Indefinite suspension was also
imposed on delinquent management staff and credit officers as of December 2002. A
director opined that these developments took place because “people abused Fr. Anton’s
kindness.”
Savings
Pawnshop
As SMMPC’s ordinary loan products could not compete with the quick-release
money schemes of some 12 pawnshops in Taguig because the coop took a week to assess
the creditworthiness of loan applicants, SMMPC launched jewelry collateral (JC) loans.
JC operated similarly to pawning in that clients used jewelry as collaterals for their loans,
but with a lower monthly interest rate of two percent compared to the pawnshops’ four
percent. Moreover, pawning seemed to be a lucrative business in the sense that money
obtained thus was often used as “bridge financing” while borrowers awaited the release
of their ordinary loans. In addition, as much as 80 percent of the pawned items were
retrieved thus selling the foreclosed items or getting tied down with inventory was not a
problem.
Microfinance
In 2004, SMMPC started its microfinance (group lending but with individual
liability) using the Php3 million-grant from senators as capital. Aimed at assisting those
who could not afford to pay the cooperative’s membership fee, the lending program
catered initially to Lower Bicutan residents (known to be the “taal” or original habitants
of Taguig) with permanent addresses or who had been residing in the area for at least
three years and had existing businesses. These borrowers were classified as associate
members of SMMPC. No loans were extended to start-ups as experience had proved that
start-ups were bad risks. Loans were issued at 13 percent to 14 percent interest rate per
term, applied on the declining balance and payable in four to six months. By mid-2005,
SMMPC had issued out loans totaling Php 895,000 to some 400 clients, with 100 percent
repayment rate. Fr. Anton explained,
Consumer Services
The Consumer Services group ceased operations in 2000, five years after its
inception, due to stiff competition, high overhead costs, and repayment problems. Fr.
Anton recounted,
What would make extending credits to clients in their purchase of goods different
from the defunct Consumer Services would be SMMPC’s concentrating only on
financing the purchase. The coop would not have to be bothered with inventories and
other overhead expenses such as rentals, warehousing, deliveries, and the like.
Damayan Fund
The Damayan Fund (DF) was also dropped in 2003 because “its design was
defective to begin with,” explained Fr. Anton. Members paid a one-time premium to the
DF but the amount collected was never enough to cover the number of deaths every year.
DF benefits were good only until 2006. Due to be launched in 2005, however, was the
SMMPC Insurance Benefit (SIB) which would replace DF in terms of providing burial
benefits. For the SIB, members would pay Php1 per day or Php365 per year annually.
Membership
Some members grew with the cooperative. Among them was Mrs. Juliana Burnot,
who first took out a Php30,000-loan from SMMPC in 1998 to help her expand her trading
business. Mrs. Burnot, mother of three, was an agent of two direct selling companies and
a trader of various Davao-made products. The following year, her sister was able to
acquire a property also in Taguig which she (the sister) shared with her. Mrs. Burnot
recalled,
The following year, Mrs. Burnot took out another loan amounting to Php200,000
to build the second level of the building (see picture below) and put up a play station /
gaming center.
In 2005, Mrs. Burnot, now living on her income from rent, her gaming center, and
her sari-sari store which stood beside the pawnshop, decided to stop taking out loans
from the cooperative. “After my seventh loan from SMMPC, I just want to take a break,”
she explained. Over the years, she had noticed an improvement in the cooperative:
Mr. Tommy Aliado had a different experience though. He started taking out loans
from SMMPC in 1993 to send his children to school. In 2002, however, when his first
born got married right after college instead of working and helping out the family
financially, he decided to terminate his membership and used his equity fund to repay his
loan.
Mrs. Regado joined SMMPC only recently, after having convinced by a relative.
She said,
She observed, however, that although the economic condition of Lower Bicutan
and Taguiig in general had improved since the 1990s and big commercial establishments
had mushroomed in the area, crime rate had likewise increased. The frequent gang fights
in the past were replaced by high incidents of robbery and drug addtiction.
During the 1997 Asian crisis, the original team of directors who grew the
cooperative turned delinquent, thinking that “the Lord will provide (their financial
needs).” But since the cooperative had a strict delinquency policy, these directors had to
be replaced by new ones who, however, “were not yet ripe for the position.”
In 2001, the first time that Fr. Anton was not Chairman of SMMPC, after serving
the maximum allowable tenure of three consecutive terms or six years, for the coop
experienced a “leadership crisis.” The directors got involved in various interpersonal
conflicts. They also increased each other’s salaries by Php5,000 or so.
The delineation of Board and management then became blurred so that even the
mere purchase of a sound system required a Board decision. Worse, the Chairman then
was “anti-cooperative, pro-politics” so that he even wanted to grant a Php150,000-loan to
a friend of his without the borrower’s going through the normal loan application process
(through the credit officer and credit committee). Consequently, a case was filed against
the Chairman at the village level. Since then, the screening committee began to set higher
standards for candidates to the Board in order to avoid similar circumstances in the
future.
learned to groom our leaders from the Pook Tulungan (PT) group level,
who will eventually join the committees before becoming a Director. We
have to be strict in selecting the Directors because the Board is very
powerful.
In 2002, the erring directors left their posts before they could be conferred a
delinquent status. That year, when Fr. Anton ran for reelection, the migrants (“dayo” or
those not originally from Taguig) tried to impede his candidacy, but the old members
rallied for him in a General Assembly. He stated before the body, “Kung ayaw ninyo ng
patakaran ko, huwag ninyo akong iboto. Pero kung iboboto ninyo ako, sumunod kayo. (If
you do not agree with my policies, then do not vote for me. But if you do, abide by my
policies.)” Fr. Anton was elected Director again and in 2003, he became SMMPC’s
Chairman.
Fr. Anton strongly believed that the people who wanted to destroy the coop had
political motives. He also mentioned that the coop had come to be identified with politics,
among them a candidate who had run for Mayor thrice and whom SMMPC supported
(without an open endorsement of the said candidate, however). Thus, whenever SMMPC
went out to promote its products and/or recruit members, people thought that they were
merely politicking. Since 2001 when the SMMPC-supported candidate lost to his long-
term rival, the cooperative became “purely economic” in nature. However, outsiders
continued trying to gain access to SMMPC “to put Fr. Anton down.” Because the
detractors did not succeed, they tried putting up another coop to compete with SMMPC.
“But Government- and Church-supported initiatives hardly succeed, if at all, because
people think these institutions are doing charity and thus never pay back their loans,” Fr.
Anton explained.
Vice Chairman Andres Buraga added that the Election Committee needed to
review and revise the current policies to help build the coop leadership. He said,
Fr. Anton elaborated on the kind of leaders he was looking out for:
Strategic Direction
At the Board level, the directors were discussing the coop’s sustainability. It
acknowledged that to achieve this goal, SMMPC had to work on professionalizing its
management and putting up systems. Fr. Anton expounded,
He furthered,
2
The typical underground economy of Taguig included trading, food vending (carinderia and balot), sari-
sari stores (every other house seems to operate one), transport (tricycle), and house rental that
accommodated the office workers from Makati and the Global City.
3
Financial standards used in assessing the performance of cooperatives. (see Exhibit 3)
Ms. Teresita “Tess” Cahanding used to attend Mass in Our Lady of Holy Rosary
Parish where SMMPC was founded, although geographically she belonged to another
parish. In 1991, she joined SMMPC and even worked as a volunteer bookkeeper/auditor
of the coop. Later, she also availed of loans but had a hard time repaying it then.
Nevertheless, without complaining, she paid the interest that accumulated, the penalties,
and eventually, the principal: “I never hide the fact that in the past I was not able to pay
my dues on time but I faced the consequences.”
In 2005, Fr. Anton encouraged her to assume the presidency of the coop, a
position created to address the growing delinquency problem which was attributed to the
General Manager’s lack of managerial skills. She recalled,
I had a culture shock during my first few days—the office staff then
was happy-go-lucky, seemingly not challenged enough by their work. They
came to the office late and at times, they would leave the office without
letting anyone know their whereabouts. Everyone did his own thing.
Playing favorites was rampant. Our recent reorganization, however, has
helped us address these concerns. I believe that the past GM was just so
kind that people took advantage of him.
We have a lot of policies already in place, but most have not been
implemented. Those that were implemented, on the other hand, were
implemented inconsistently so much so that people perceived the coop as
having double standards. We need to strengthen our implementation.
Current Challenges
The Board’s mandate to management was to bring down the past due rate from 30
percent to 25 percent by end 2005. To meet this target, the VP for Operations classified
the delinquent members into four categories, as follows: 1) those who did not have
anything to eat because their businesses had shut down; 2) those who tried to meet their
obligations but did not have enough to pay the amount due on time; 3) those who could
pay but did not want to; and 4) those who had migrated. For Classes 1 and 2, the coop
designed a Sagip Loan Program which extended an additional loan of Php5,000 to each
member for the setting up of other income-generating activities. A small part of the old
loan would then be included in the amortization of the new loan. For Class 3, the coop
either filed a lawsuit or foreclosed the property which was usually in the form of tax
declarations, appliances, or jewelry. 4 For Class 4, the coop wrote off the loans after the
Audit Committee determined that the members had indeed migrated.
In 2004, SMMPC also created a policy that if the past due of a PT group reached
50 percent, the other members with no outstanding loans would be allowed to borrow an
amount equal only to 90 percent of their share capital. These members would then
encourage their co-members to settle their dues so they could avail of bigger loan
amounts.
For the first term of 2005, the delinquency rate was down to 27 percent.
Microfinance
SMMPC’s microfinance (MF) program was based on the ASA model, which lent
a maximum of Php20,000 to groups of 10 to 40 associate members. In the past, these
non-voting members could avail of all the coop services except for loans unless they had
a time deposit account with the coop. Mr. Orallo said,
4
SMMPC disposed of the foreclosed properties by auctioning or raffling them off. It was also considering
designing rent-to-own packages that would suit the members’ capacity to pay. It did not want to venture
into low-cost housing yet since the coop was in a tight cash position, having just completed the
construction of its new office.
Thus far Mr. Orallo’s main concern with regard to the MF program was the
Account Officer’s ability to promote discipline among his/her 300 or so members through
value formation, bible study, and weekly center meetings. As of June 2005, SMMPC had
eight account officers (and three credit officers for individual loans). Another challenge
was to keep the repayment rate at a minimum of 98 percent as the members moved on to
their second cycle (loan terms were four to six months and the program started only in
December 2004). By mid-2005, SMMPC was counting on family pressure and the group
fund 5 to control delinquencies.
Expansion
SMMPC intended to expand at a rate of one to two branches per year. A full-time
manager would be hired for a branch once its regular membership reached 250 people.
Within their respective villages, members recruited applicants at the PT level after
which these applicants were subjected to a background check by the Community
Organizer (CO). The PT leaders assisted the CO in screening the applicants based on the
following considerations: the sources of household income of the applicants; the status of
the SMMPC account of other family members (if any); feedback from neighbors, and the
payment of Php2000 for membership and seminar fees. For every new member or time
depositor they recruited, coop members were given monetary incentives. Members also
marketed coop services to other organizations and institutions.
Considered one of SMMPC’s milestones was the construction of its own building,
which also helped the coop expand its membership. Fr. Anton explained, “The trend
among coops is that membership increases once a building has been put up because it
signals the coop’s stability.” In 2005, SMMPC was able to attract 100 new applicants
every month. It hoped to reach its target of 8,000 soon. “But for us, stability is more
important than size,” clarified Fr. Anton.
As for the competition, Mr. Bernard Orallo, Vice President for Operations and a
former General Manager of SMMPC, said,
5
The group’s regular monetary contributions intended to cover delinquencies of any of its members.
However, Mr. Edgardo Contreras, the Training Manager and former Chairman of
SMMPC, had various concerns:
The coop needs to get new members who will share the original
vision of the coop and will not pursue their personal interests. I am also
concerned about how we, as a growing coop, will adjust to the new
challenges confronting us, e.g. service delivery, the conduct of meetings,
and value formation of, say, 15,000 members. Lastly, one of my fears is
that the coop might be used by politicians to get votes during elections. In
addition, these politicians might insist on having a say on certain
decisions within the coop.
Apparently, Mr. Contreras’s fear of the SMMPC being taken over by a politician
was shared by almost everyone in the management staff.
Lessons Learned
Most of the resource persons opined that leadership was key to sustaining a
cooperative. Ms. Cahanding said,
The leaders could not afford to be lax. If you let the members
dominate you, they will eat you alive. People can be hard-headed. The less
educated ones can also be dangerous, as they are easily influenced by
outside forces and would challenge your authority, saying that they own
the coop. In our work, one must be very patient.
The leaders must be objective, focusing only on the issues and not
on the personalities involved. They must also learn to manage by
objectives (MBO). SMMPC does not have key results areas nor
performance indicators yet, but that is something I intend to introduce
during the mid-year planning in July.
The leaders must also learn to take calculated risks. Risks will
always be there so we just have to learn to manage them. My being a CPA
works to my advantage because I know how to play with numbers.
Mr. Orallo added, “Leaders should be there to serve, not to pursue their personal
interests. One way of strengthening the leadership is to educate them on the principles of
good governance.”
Mr. Contreras furthered that education should not be limited to the leaders but
should include the members as well:
These are the sure ways of failing: let a family or a politician gain
absolute control of the coop, rely on grants, do not build on the coop’s
internal sources, and keep your members uninformed.
Fr. Anton had the following thoughts on cooperatives and on the issues that
beleaguered the sector:
Types of Cooperatives
The primary issue that the Union of Church Cooperatives was trying to address
among its members, the parish-based cooperatives (PBCs), was accountability. Questions
that the PBCs needed to answer were as follows: “Who is in-charge—the Board of
Directors, the Parish Priest or the Pastoral Council? What if the Pastoral Council was not
too involved in coop operations? Who has the last say?”
Fr. Anton said that the parish-based cooperatives had their own culture:
managers would say, ‘Sabi ni Father pautangin daw e…. (Father said that
we lend to this person…).’ They also based their decisions on the virtue of
charity and not on the cooperative’s business principles.
Fr. Anton recalled the downfall of a PBC valued at Php25 million. The parish
priest was its Chairman, his brother was the President, and a sister-in-law was Finance
Manager. The members did not want to speak out even if there were seeing signs of
anomalies because the President was the priest’s brother. “If Church cooperatives are not
business oriented, they will soon collapse,” cautioned Fr. Anton.
The PBC was very similar to the cooperatives of teachers and the military
cooperatives because of their “cooperative counter-culture”. These coops were normally
run by the principals and generals, respectively.
On the other hand, the institutional coops, housed and operating within
corporations with the employees as their members, were generally professionally run
because of the type of membership they had. Repayment was also always 100 percent in
these coops because this was done through salary deduction. Their problems, however,
began when the corporation started retrenching the coops’ members. Fr. Anton added,
“The institutional coops are also weak in the sixth principle of cooperative movement –
networking with other coops – as they operate in isolation.”
The community-based coops also had their own peculiarities, depending on the
culture of the community. Natives of Bulacan were naturally entrepreneurial so that
coops thrived in the province, making it the coop capital of the country. Taguig was a
transient community so its needs were different. Fr. Anton’s advice was, “In choosing a
benchmark, one must choose a coop that is similar to one’s own. SMMPC uses the San
Dionisio Credit Cooperative as a model, and the cooperatives in Project 4 and Novaliches
as its standards. It has become an unwritten rule (that when in doubt) to ask the old,
surviving cooperatives, those 30 years old and over, for advice and to learn from their
experience. In SMMPC, when we draft policies, we consult with at least five
cooperatives—for benchmarking purposes.”
Fr. Anton said that the cooperatives’ concerns varied according to the
cooperatives’ size. The small coops’ concerns included lack of membership and
inadequate fixed assets (e.g. office), systems (e.g. bookkeeping), financial resources, as
well as the absence of a strategic direction, track record, and credibility in the
community.
The large or centennial coops—those with assets equal to or greater than Php100
million, only 50 of which were in Metro Manila by 2005—on the other hand, faced issues
such as succession, past dues and financial management, operations management,
business processes such as consolidation, and strategy management.
The cooperatives in the country had failed to develop Unions and Federations 6
that might otherwise bring the coops into a higher level of cooperation. Fr. Anton
explained,
Fr. Anton admitted that there was tension in the leadership across cooperatives,
“We do not respect people who have not yet been able to grow any cooperative.”
Financial management was also a major concern of coops. “All coops have
financial problems. Those which offer individual loans have a past due rate ranging
between 25 percent and 30 percent. In fact, none has achieved the passing mark of the
COOP PESOS, which was 80 percent; coop ratings range from 40-plus percent to 60-plus
percent.”
6
Unions took care of the non-business needs of the coop such as education, information, advocacy,
mediation; while Federations took care of the business side of coops, e.g. insurance, credit.
20,000,000
3,141,104
2,689,409
3,676,296
1,922,272 2,346,592
15,000,000
2,656,325
2,531,891
Net surplus
Gross revenue
10,000,000
17,520,573 17,330,448
15,707,569
14,498,339 14,081,332
12,893,855 13,320,096
5,000,000
-
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
50,000,000
45,000,000
40,000,000
35,000,000
30,000,000
36,760,592
Time deposits
25,000,000
Savings deposits
32,680,307
20,000,000
15,000,000
18,572,437
15,965,345
10,000,000
12,768,543
5,000,000 9,185,450
6,141,460
2,739,459 2,817,928 3,557,043
-
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
6,000 14,000
12,000
5,000
10,000
4,000
8,000
3,000
6,000
2,000
4,000
1,000
2,000
- -
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Membership 2,884 3,292 3,497 3,664 3,458 3,509 3,728
Share capital ('0000) 2,964 3,554 4,077 4,312 4,577 4,703 5,176
Deposits ('0000) 924 1,130 1,551 1,878 2,213 3,882 4,595
Loans granted ('0000) 5,606 4,295 4,183 3,737 3,830 4,427 4,610
Net surplus ('000) 3,676 3,141 2,689 1,922 2,532 2,656 2,347
Total assets ('0000) 9,535 10,135 10,133 9,421 10,058 10,664 11,665
Exhibit 2.3
Board of Directors and Management, 2005
Fr. Antonio C.T. Pascual Ordained priest of the Archdiocese of Manila
Chairperson Founder/Adviser of Simbayanan ni Maria Foundation
President of Radio Veritas
Executive Director of Caritas Manila
Had a Certificate in Program for Development Management,
Asian Institute of Management (AIM)
Master in Development Management, AIM
Dir. Andy Buraga MTE, PhD. T. E.
Vice-Chairperson Dean, College of Engineering, Rizal Technological University
Livelihood and
Entrepreneurship Committee
Head
Dir. Amado Santiago B.S. Agriculture, Central Luzon State University
Land and Building Committee B.S. I.T., Makati Polytechnic College
Head
Dir. Ricardo Austria B.S. Mechanical Engineering
Operations Committee Head Businessman
Dir. Carmela Cortes Enlisted Woman, WAC, Philippine Navy, AFP
Membership Committee Head B.S. Business Administration, San Sebastian College
Secretarial Course, Philippine School of Business
Administration
Dir. Helen Ferrer Master in Management/Business Administration, University of
Social Benefits Committee Nueva Caceres
Head Unit Manager, CMG of Australia
Dir. May Repelar B.S. Education, Manuel L. Quezon University
STERD Committee Head Master in Education, Marikina Institute
Teacher
Ms. Cheryl Cornejo B.S. Information Management, Asia Pacific College
Board Secretary Bachelor in Entrepreneurial Management, Polytechnic
University of the Philippines
Ms. Medelyn Mangao B.S. Banking and Finance, Jose Rizal College
Treasurer
Mrs. Tess Cahanding B.S. Business Administration, University of the East
President Certified Public Accountant
Director Simbayanan ni Maria Community Foundation
Member of Soroptimist International Taguig Chapter
Private Consultant
Attended seminars and training programs at the Executive
Development Academy, Technology, Livelihood and Research
Center (TLRC), and Development Management Consultants
Mr. Bernard Orallo B.S. Business Administration, St. Paul University, Tuguegarao
Vice President for Operations
Ms. Liberty Felipe B.S. Accountancy, University of the East, Manila
Finance Manager
Exhibit 3
Financial Performance, 2000-2004
LIABILITIES
CURRENT LIABILITIES
Savings Deposits 1,919,283.19 2,739,459.31 2,817,927.98 3,557,043.29 6,141,459.80 9,185,449.72
Time Deposits 9,381,631.98 12,768,543.07 15,965,344.50 18,572,436.81 32,680,307.12 36,760,591.65
Customers deposit
interest on savings/capital 3,218,302.04 3,011,886.06
Loans payable
Insurance
SSS, ECC & Philhealth Premium Payable 2,200.59 - 12,591.70
SSS Salary Loan Payable 4,526.67 - 8,972.71
Expanded Tax Payable 8,207.02 1,161.99
Withholding Tax Payable - 1,550.00
Accrued Expenses Payable 1,618,452.33 1,840,577.29 807,184.95 372,015.91 243,514.57 352,680.70
Due to CETF 126,594.56 185,588.97 172,680.11
Interest on Share Capital and Patronage Refund Payable 1,345,450.60 1,772,323.88 1,859,777.69 1,642,614.65
Unearned Income 7,073,488.98 5,112,168.95 4,739,094.53 8,192,619.69 7,565,574.26 6,790,061.58
Rent payable
Other Payable 27,638.91 463,560.94 72,863.16
Current portion of loan 32,052,699.72 25,171,781.30 14,957,574.40 12,500,729.21
Total Current Liabilities 55,263,858.24 50,644,415.98 40,632,576.96 45,128,129.52 49,147,990.37 55,001,217.97
LONG-TERM LIABILITIES
Retirement Benefit Fund Payable 50,000.00 100,000.00
Land Bank of the Philippines 21,854,837.61 14,794,027.31 11,640,419.45 6,969,093.68
Metro South Cooperative Bank 9,997,862.11 10,165,838.58 3,317,154.95 6,531,635.53
Others 4,200,000.00 3,211,915.41 2,000,000.00
Less: Current portion of loan (32,052,699.72) (25,171,781.30) (14,957,574.40) (12,500,729.21)
Total Long-Term Payable 4,000,000.00 3,000,000.00 2,000,000.00 1,000,000.00 50,000.00 100,000.00
OTHER LIABILITIES
Mutual Benefits Fund Payable 1,702,524.53 2,048,565.71 2,336,075.68 2,712,523.06
Livelihood Fund Payable 77,880.08 69,485.96
Damayan Trust Fund 901,929.83 719,944.84 551,487.85 286,267.17
Other Fund 22,800.00
Total Other Liabilities 2,627,254.36 2,768,510.55 2,965,443.61 3,068,276.19
TOTAL LIABILITIES 59,263,858.24 53,644,415.98 45,259,831.32 48,896,640.07 52,163,433.98 58,169,494.16
EQUITY (599.70)
MEMBERS' EQUITY
Subscribed and Paid up Share Capital 35,542,345.95 40,773,707.02 44,244,799.01 44,642,024.03 47,032,664.86 50,627,624.82
Stock Dividend 1,129,300.00 1,129,300.00 1,129,300.00
Total Members' Equity 35,542,345.95 40,773,707.02 44,244,799.01 45,771,324.03 48,161,964.86 51,756,924.82
STATUTORY FUNDS
Reserve Fund 1,279,055.35 1,389,769.59 1,613,350.24 1,897,219.10 2,201,068.05 2,472,321.20
Loan guarantee fund 1,107,009.74 1,367,858.25
Damayan Fund 748,140.51 1,151,109.86
Education and Training Fund 603,031.51 496,705.74 184,929.58 199,295.64 151,633.90 120,292.22
OptionalFund 986,127.60 306,995.89 403,738.75 610,666.38 770,250.91 931,210.40
Reserve for annotation 20,750.00 -
Total Statutory Funds 4,744,114.71 4,712,439.33 2,202,018.57 2,707,181.12 3,122,952.86 3,523,823.82
TOTAL EQUITY 42,086,460.66 47,686,146.35 48,946,817.58 51,678,505.15 54,484,917.72 58,480,748.64
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND EQUITY 101,350,318.90 101,330,562.33 94,206,648.90 100,575,145.22 106,648,351.70 116,650,242.80
INCOME
Interest and service fees 14,913,436.72 15,365,789.99 11,927,182.43 11,840,914.22 12,130,044.23 12,649,470.52
Income from Sales 1,807,318.77 1,456,452.67 328,633.35 -
Fines, Penalties and surcharges 1,917,591.69 1,052,940.38 955,489.31 773,685.43
Miscellaneous 799,817.31 508,207.90
NET SURPLUS FOR DISTRIBUTION 3,141,104.14 2,689,411.67 1,922,072.29 2,531,891.26 2,243,316.26 2,325,745.45 -
DISTRIBUTION
Cooperative guarantee fund 175,205.72
Education and training fund 296,589.84 268,940.87 192,207.23 253,189.13 265,682.53 234,659.24
General reserve fund 296,589.84 268,940.87 192,207.23 253,189.13 265,682.52 234,659.24
Optional fund 296,589.84 268,940.87 192,207.23 253,189.13 265,682.53 234,659.24
Interest and patronage refunds payable 2,076,128.90 1,882,586.06 1,345,450.60 1,772,323.88 1,859,777.69 1,642,614.65