Iran’s Role in Yemen’s Civil War

Christopher Stille

Christopher Stille earned his Bachelor of Science in History and his Master of Arts in
History from Central Michigan University in 2009 and 2011 respectively. After
teaching world history and Middle Eastern history at Saginaw Valley State
University for four years, he enrolled in Boston University’s Frederick S. Pardee
School of Global Studies to pursue a Master of Arts in International Affairs. He
currently studies security matters in the Middle East and North Africa.

Abstract

This paper explores the ways in which Iran is contributing to the ongoing civil war in
Yemen and what the implications of said contributions are. In order to accomplish this
task, this article starts with a brief summary of the socio-economic and political conditions
that precipitated Yemen’s current civil war, as well as inspired the actors who feature
prominently in it. It then discusses the ways in which Iran interacted with Yemen prior to
this civil war. Using a variety of sources, this paper then enumerates and examines the
types of support that Iran has rendered unto al-Hirak and the Houthis. This work
concludes by listing several resultant analytical observations and deduces a couple of policy
implications.

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Introduction

Although news outlets often report on the proxy war between Saudi Arabia and
Iran that is playing out in Yemen, very little detail is ever provided as to what actions Iran
is actually taking. Therefore, this paper aims to discern the ways in which Iran is
contributing to the ongoing civil war in Yemen and what the implications of said
contributions are. In order to accomplish this task, this article will start with a brief
summary of the socio-economic and political conditions that precipitated Yemen’s current
civil war, as well as inspired the actors who feature prominently in it. It will then discuss
the ways in which Iran interacted with Yemen prior to this civil war. Using a variety of
sources, this paper will then enumerate and examine the types of support that Iran has
rendered unto al-Hirak and the Houthis. From this evidence, this work concludes that Iran
will likely continue supporting the Houthis for the foreseeable future, that the support that
Iran has provided to date has been relatively minimal but highly profitable, and that the
current level of support is likely insufficient to do anything more than prolong the war.
Lastly, this essay provides two policy suggestions: first, any efforts to change Iran’s
behavior will require forcing a drastic change to Iran’s cost-benefit calculus, and second,
any efforts to mitigate the suffering of the Yemeni people should start with a reevaluation
of the United States’ role in supplying ordinance to Saudi Arabia and its allies that have far
greater destructive capability than anything Iran is currently supplying to the Houthis.

Background of Yemen’s Civil War

Exploitation of the South and the Houthis

Yemen, as a single geographic entity, has spent more time politically disjointed
than unified.1 During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries alone, it suffered many years
of internecine conflict exacerbated by the meddling of foreign powers such as Britain,
Saudi Arabia, Egypt,2 and the Soviet Union.3 Indeed, throughout the nineteenth century,
the local Qasimi Imams (who were Zaydi Shiites), the Ottomans, and the British jockeyed
for influence and control in Yemen. This competition ultimately led to an agreement
establishing North and South Yemen as distinct political entities in 1904.4
While the Ottomans ceased being a factor following World War I, the
establishment of Saudi Arabia in 1932 heralded a new era of foreign interference, starting
with a border dispute that forced North Yemen’s Imam to finally confirm the 1904
borders.5 In 1962, dissident factions in the Yemeni armed forces, backed by Egypt’s Gamal
Abdel Nasser, declared North Yemen the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and undertook a
coup against the Imam, plunging Yemen into civil war. Fearing the spread of Nasser’s
secular nationalism, Saudi Arabia, along with Jordan, backed the escaped Imam’s forces

1 Brehony, “Yemen and the Huthis,” 232.
2 Phillips, Yemen’s Democracy Experiment, 44-45.
3 Cleveland and Bunton, Modern Middle East, 455.
4 Brehony, “Yemen and the Huthis,” 232-233.
5 Ibid., 233.

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financially and logistically. Despite this aid and the withdrawal of Egypt’s forces after its
crushing defeat in the June War, the YAR forces still emerged victorious in 1968.6
Additionally, soon after Britain granted independence to South Yemen, in late 1967, local
communists established the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). This new
state was also hostile to Saudi Arabia, advocating “the overthrow of all the traditional
monarchies in the Arabian Peninsula.”7
Accordingly, Saudi Arabia adopted a foreign policy toward the YAR that was in
turns conciliatory and destabilizing, designed to “foment discord between it and the
People’s Republic of the South.”8 This policy would prove highly successful during the
next couple of decades. Indeed, despite the fact that the YAR and PDRY signed a unity
agreement in 1979, Yemen did not coalesce into the modern nation-state of the Republic
of Yemen (RoY) until May 1990.9
This political unity, however, did not translate into religious and socio-economic
unity. Ali Abdullah Saleh, the former president of both the YAR and, eventually, the RoY,
and who retains a tremendous amount of influence in Yemen’s current government,10
established a system of control that relied on this division, which “still endures despite his
departure from the presidency.”11 This system essentially consisted of “networks of
politicians, military officers, tribal leaders and businessmen, many linked to Saleh’s family
and his Sanhan tribe,” and it “embraced local elites and groups willing to support him,”
while marginalizing “those that refused to be part of it.”12 Additionally, Saleh had further
undermined Yemen’s ability to effectively unify by using “Sunni and tribal Islamic militias
to counter the influence of Marxists” throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.13 However,
“When these became too powerful in the 1990s,” he enabled the political development of
“the Believing Youth, which later became the Huthi [sic] movement.”14
Beyond this system of “divide and rule,” Saleh maintained control over the levers
of power and established Yemen as a rentier state.15 He used Yemen’s oil revenues to
finance his regime and ensured that Yemen’s security and defense forces were firmly in his
control by putting them under the command of his close allies and relatives. Therefore,
Brehony notes that, “The Saleh regime functioned as long as there was enough money to
maintain the patronage networks and provide ordinary Yemenis with the hope, if not
reality, of a better life.”16
However, as oil revenues declined sharply following their peak in 2003, so did the
already inadequate living standards of the Yemeni citizenry. The people in the northern
Sa’ada Governorate, from whom would spring the Houthis, and the people of the former
PDRY were hit especially hard. This was particularly galling for the latter, who, under the
old PDRY, had been accustomed to “an effective and largely incorrupt administration able

6 Cleveland and Bunton, Modern Middle East, 314-315.
7 Ibid., 455.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., 494.
10 United Nations Security Council, Final Report, 19-21.
11 Brehony, “Yemen and the Huthis,” 234.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.

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to provide the rule of law and relatively good government services to most parts of the
country.”17 To make matters worse, “Aden was not made the economic capital of Yemen
as had been agreed in the unity deals.”18 Accordingly, not only were their oil and gas
resources exploited by the regime’s patronage system,19 but “tens of thousands of southern
military and security personnel were sacked, civil servants forcibly retired, state enterprises
privatized and state land given or sold cheaply to regime cronies.” 20 As such, many
southern Yemenis came to see Saleh’s government not as their own, but as the “northern
occupation.”21 It was this acute economic and political marginalization that inspired the
formation of and protests by the eventually secessionist southern movement al-Hirak.22

Prelude to the Current Civil War

This lack of national cohesion and political instability made Yemen particularly
vulnerable during the Arab Spring. Throughout 2011, mass protests and social unrest
continued to spread, making the prospect of another civil war ever more likely. Such a
crisis seemed to be averted, however, when on November 23, 2011, Saleh signed the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) Transition Deal, which stipulated that he would “resign in
exchange for immunity for him and his relatives.”23 Additionally, he would be allowed to
stay in Yemen and remain the head of his political party, the General People’s Congress
(GPC). This deal further established a transitional government under the presidency of
Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi, Saleh’s Vice President, as well as a National Dialogue
Conference (NDC) designed to make recommendations for a new constitution. It also
sought to reorganize the security and military forces in order “to break up the power and
the influence of the networks and make them accountable through professional leadership
to an elected government.”24 This elected government would consist of equal parts GPC
members and Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) members (a coalition formed in opposition to
Saleh’s GPC). Unfortunately, as Brehony notes, “The GCC deal was a bargain within the
elites of the Saleh regime” that “solved the immediate crisis but proved to be a flawed deal
that…marginalise the young activists of the Yemen Spring and gave Saleh the opportunity
to undermine the deal.”25 Therefore, while the NDC highlighted many of the problems and
contradictions facing Yemen, it did little to actually remedy them. Despite this, Hadi opted
to move forward with the federal structure that the NDC outlined in early 2015 even
though this model was unacceptable to many southern Yemenis and, particularly, the
Houthis. Indeed, the Houthis saw this “as merely the latest effort to marginalise them.”26
The situation in Yemen was further exacerbated by several additional factors. First,
the reorganization of the security and military was not entirely successful, and Saleh
retained strong allies amongst their ranks.27 Naturally, this diminished Hadi’s influence and

17 Ibid., 234-235.
18 Ibid., 237.
19 United Nations Security Council, Final Report, 46.
20 Brehony, “Yemen and the Huthis,” 236-237.
21 Ibid., 236.
22 Salisbury, “Yemen and the Saudi-Iranian ‘Cold War,’” 6.
23 Brehony, “Yemen and the Huthis,” 238.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., 239.
26 Ibid.
27 United Nations Security Council, Final Report, 33.

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authority over Yemen’s armed forces. Second, fear of misallocation and misuse led to
much of the promised foreign economic aid not actually being distributed to the suffering
Yemenis for whom it was intended, which allowed the Houthis “to exploit the discontent
and claim to stand up for the rights of people against foreign interference that brings little
tangible benefit.”28 Third, Saleh formed an alliance with the Houthis in order to thwart the
NDC and further destabilize the Hadi regime.29

The Houthis
The Houthis are Islamic revivalists who subscribe to the Zaydi branch of Shi’ism
and hail from the northern Sa’ada Governorate.30 Named after Badr al-Din al-Houthi, the
Houthis grew out of the Believing Youth revivalist movement that was founded by his son,
Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, in the mid-1990s.31 Following the capture and killing of
Hussein in 2004 by Saleh’s troops, the movement transformed into a guerilla fighting
force.32 This insurgency spanned six wars between the years of 2004 and 2010,33
precipitating the direct military intervention of Saudi Arabia in 2009.34 The Houthis
avoided defeat in all six of these wars and instead “gained fighting experience and captured
weapons from the Yemeni army.”35
Following these wars, the Houthis actively participated in the 2011 uprisings and
waited for the opportune time to spring into action. By taking advantage of the increasing
instability brought on by al-Hirak’s protests, the ongoing mass Yemeni demonstrations,
and the anti-government and anti-Shi’ite actions of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP), the Houthis were able to use “the period between 2011 and 2014 to organise
their military and political wings,” launching their military campaign in early 2014.36 They
quickly conquered several key cities, taking the city of Amran in July37 and Sana’a in
September.38 Sana’a remains the base of operations in Yemen’s ongoing civil war.39
Despite their religious identification as Shi’ites, their support from Iran, and their
sarkha (shout or cry) of “Death to America, Death to Israel, Damn the Jews, Victory to
Islam,”40 the Houthis’ focus is largely political41 and local in scope.42 Although the actions
and interference of external actors do have an effect on the Houthis’ calculations, the
“primary drivers of tension and conflict are local.”43 It is only recently that the Houthis
have morphed “into a broad national political movement.”44 Since resuming offensive

28 Brehony, “Yemen and the Huthis,” 240.
29 United Nations Security Council, Final Report, 5.
30 Salisbury, “Yemen and the Saudi-Iranian ‘Cold War,’” 2.
31 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery, 6.
32 Hubbard, “Plight of Houthi Rebels,” November 26, 2016.
33 Salisbury, “Yemen and the Saudi-Iranian ‘Cold War,’” 9.
34 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery, 1.
35 Brehony, “Yemen and the Huthis,” 238.
36 Ibid., 241.
37 Al-Yarisi, “Houthis take control of Amran city,” July 10, 2014.
38 “How Yemen’s capital seized,” September 27, 2014.
39 Hubbard, “Plight of Houthi Rebels,” November 26, 2016.
40 Salisbury, “Yemen and the Saudi-Iranian ‘Cold War,’” 5.
41 McGregor, “Shi’ite Insurgency In Yemen.”
42 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery, xv.
43 Salisbury, “Yemen and the Saudi-Iranian ‘Cold War,’” 2.
44 “Who Are the Houthis?,” January 20, 2015.

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operations in 2014, their political and military formidability has only grown.45 They not
only drove Hadi from Yemen’s capital in January 2015 but also from Yemen itself in
March 2015, prompting a Saudi-led coalition to intervene in Yemen militarily. Spending the
next six months in exile in Riyadh, Hadi was not able to return to Aden until September
2015, once Saudi forces had secured the city.46 The Houthis further demonstrated their
political clout on November 28, 2016, when, despite being constantly bombarded by Saudi
forces, they formed a new national Yemeni government with their allies, in direct
opposition to Hadi’s United Nations-recognized, and Saudi Arabia-backed, government.47

The History of Iran’s Relationship with Yemen

Following its Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran enjoyed friendly relations with the
PDRY. North Yemen maintained close ties to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and Saudi Arabia,
precluding cordial relations with Iran. Iran then demonstrated a willingness to involve itself
in Yemen’s politics when it supported a “hard-line Marxist faction” in South Yemen’s 1986
civil war, which was ultimately victorious. These friendly relations expanded to encompass
all of Yemen once Saleh assumed leadership in 1990 of a unified Yemen.48 In June 2009,
Yemen and Iran reached an agreement allowing Iran to station six warships along with
support vessels at Yemen’s port of Aden in order to combat maritime piracy in the
region.49 Additionally, Iran found a staunch ally in Yemen regarding its nuclear ambitions
as Saleh’s government voiced its support for Iran’s nuclear program no fewer than five
times between 2005 and 2008,50 with Saleh himself explicitly stating as much in early
2008.51
One consistent source of consternation, however, has been Iran’s suspected
support for the Houthis. Yemeni press outlets supportive of Saleh’s government frequently
accused Iran of being “a foreign state sponsor of the Huthi.”52 Moreover, during this time
Yemeni officials frequently complained, privately, about Iran’s support for the Houthis,
and “in 2007 Yemen withdrew its ambassador from Tehran for consultations, implying
Iranian support for the Huthis as the fourth war intensified.”53 The Yemeni criminations
of the Iranian government’s suspected support relented a little from 2007-2008, only to
resurface as the sixth war with the Houthis took off.54 This situation was exacerbated when
the Yemeni army “discovered six storehouses for weapons that belong to the Huthi rebels
and contain some Iranian-made weapons, including machine guns, short-range rockets and
ammunition.”55 Saleh responded to this incident in a television interview in mid-October,
claiming that Houthi “finances come from certain Iranian dignitaries,” though he added,
“But we do not accuse the government.”56 He pointed out that the Houthis’ combat

45 Salisbury, “Yemen and the Saudi-Iranian ‘Cold War,’” 2.
46 “Yemen crisis,” September 22, 2015.
47 Almosawa and Gladstone, “Surprise Move,” November 28, 2016.
48 Salisbury, “Yemen and the Saudi-Iranian ‘Cold War,’” 4.
49 “Iran Navy to fight pirates off Yemen,” June 27, 2009.
50 Fulton and Farrar-Wellman, “Yemen-Iran Foreign Relations,” August 10, 2011.
51 “President Saleh Nuclear Energy,” January 31, 2008.
52 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery, 170.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid., 179.
55 “Yemen seizes Iranian-made arms,” August 22, 2009.
56 “Iran funding Shiite rebels,” October 19, 2009.

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training bore many similarities to that of Lebanon’s Hezbollah, noting that he had received
reports that trainers from southern Lebanon were present in Houthi territory. Just nine
days later, the Yemeni Coast Guard intercepted a ship manned by Iranians and containing
anti-tank weaponry.57 Needless to say, Iran officially denied having knowledge of or
responsibility for any of these payloads.

Iran’s Participation in Yemen’s Civil War

Iran’s Support for al-Hirak

While it seems likely that Iran is providing some support to al-Hirak, the nature
and extent of this support remains unclear. Western and Yemeni officials have argued that
Iran enjoys a friendly relationship with al-Hirak’s leaders.58 They have accused “Ali Salem
al-Beidh, the former southern president who had backed unification but who then led the
1994 attempt at secession,” of maintaining “close ties with Iran.”59 Furthermore, the Wall
Street Journal wrote that, “Iran is training militants who are aligned with a separatist
movement in southern Yemen, while Iran’s Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah, is providing some
funding and media training to the group.”60 However, other experts on Hirak contend that
Iran has limited its aid to only key Hirak leaders, which may explain “why the Houthis have
been so successful and Hirak so ineffective.”61

Iran’s Support for the Houthis

Iran’s support for the Houthis, Tehran’s denials notwithstanding, is a bit clearer.
During the 2011-2014 break in hostilities, when the Houthis were training and regrouping,
they enjoyed “advice and support from Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah.”62 Indeed, the
Financial Times confirmed in May 2015 that Hezbollah and Houthi operatives had been
training together in Yemen and Lebanon for over ten years.63 Furthermore, in that same
month:

[Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps] Qods Force Deputy Commander Brigadier

General Esmail Ghani stated, ‘Each one who is with us comes under the banner
of the Islamic Republic, and this is our strength. The defenders of Yemen have
been trained under the banner of the Islamic Republic, and the enemies cannot
deal with Yemeni fighters.’

This suggests that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was actively training the
Houthis in country.64 Indeed, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) cited evidence

57 “Yemenis intercept ‘Iranian ship,’” October 27, 2009.
58 Salisbury, “Yemen and the Saudi-Iranian ‘Cold War,’” 2.
59 Ibid., 7.
60 Abi-Habib, “Fears Grow over Yemenis’ Ties to Iran,” June 20, 2013.
61 Salisbury, “Yemen and the Saudi-Iranian ‘Cold War,’” 8.
62 Brehony, “Yemen and the Huthis,” 241.
63 Solomon, “Lebanon’s Hizbollah,” May 8, 2015.
64 AEI Iran Tracker, “Iran News Round Up,” May 26, 2015.

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the year before that claimed that the IRGC had been training “Houthi forces on a small
island off the Eritrean coast” and that Iran had been “channelling weapons to Sa’ada.”65
Also, based on successful interdictions, it is clear that Iran’s arms shipments to the
Houthis have continued unabated. In January 2013, the Sa’ada-bound dhow Jihan was
intercepted “carrying Iranian-made arms and related materiel” that included:

16,723 blocks of C-4 explosives, 133 plastic containers of RDX powder

explosives, 10 man-portable air defence system type 9M32M, 62,040 rounds of
12.7-mm ammunition, 316,000 rounds of 7.62-mm ammunition, 100 rocket-
propelled grenades, 18 Katyousha rockets (122-mm), 17 aiming equipment, 1,615
boxes connected with improvised explosive devices and relevant electrical
equipment, 10 laser rangefinders LH80A, 48 night vision goggles, 5 long range
binoculars with mounts, 90 lensatic compasses, 66 silencers and 800 electric
detonators.66

Four more weapons shipments were intercepted between September 2015 and March 2016
(see Table I). In fact, it is possible that missiles from these shipments were used to fire
upon the U.S.S. Mason on October 9th and 12th, 2016.67 Rear Admiral John Kirby,
spokesperson for the U.S. Department of State, stated multiple times that the missiles the
Houthis fired on the 9th had been supplied by Iran.68 While a senior administration official
for the State Department was not able to confirm a few days later that the missiles fired at
the USS Mason on October 9th and 12th were indeed provided by Iran, the official was
able to confirm that the Houthis do normally receive missiles and radars from Iran.69
As noted before, Iran has maintained its innocence regarding providing logistical
support and materiel to the Houthis. However, “Upon the Houthi takeover of Sana’a on
21 September 2014, all the detainees reportedly related to the [Jihan] incident, including
eight Yemeni crew members, two Hezbollah members and three IRGC personnel, were
released on 25 September from a prison in Sana’a.”70 Thus, Iran’s protestations not only
rang hollow but also proved inadequate in dissuading Hadi from severing diplomatic ties
with Iran in October 2015.71 Saudi Arabia and many of its coalition allies followed suit
shortly thereafter, severing or downgrading their diplomatic relations with Iran.72

Iran’s Motives
Given the cost of Iran’s actions, be it in terms of money, weapons, manpower, or
diplomatic relations, it is worthwhile to discuss the reasons that Iran would involve itself at
all in Yemen. First and foremost is the threat that Iran perceives from Saudi Arabia. While
Iran and Saudi Arabia have, at times, enjoyed friendly relations, this has not been the case
as of late. The United States’ War on Terrorism (along with the power vacuum it brought
about by removing Iraq as a regional power), the instability caused by the Arab Spring, the

65 United Nations Security Council, Final Report, 15.
66 Ibid., 38.
67 LaGrone, “USS Mason,” October 12, 2016.
68 Kirby, Daily Press Briefing, October 11, 2016.
69 Senior Administration Officials on Yemen, October 14, 2016.
70 United Nations Security Council, Final Report, 38.
71 Mukhashaf and Aboudi, “Yemen severs diplomatic ties,” October 2, 2015.
72 Chappell, “Sudan And Bahrain,” January 4, 2016.

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P5+1/Iran Nuclear Deal, and the ever increasing sectarian divisions have engendered
intense suspicion of and competition for influence.73 Accordingly, “The principal sources
of friction are rooted in the countries’ national, political, religious, economic, and military
concerns.”74
Considering the proximity of Yemen to Saudi Arabia, as well as the latter’s history
of intervening in the affairs of the former, it makes sense that Saudi Arabia would wield a
tremendous amount of influence in Yemen. Part of this influence is military, but part of it
is religious, as Saudi Arabia distributed printed materials and funded the proselytization of
Wahhabism within Yemen. Furthermore, Saudi clerics engaged in missionary activity in
northern Yemen (where most Zaydiis live), and Saudi elites established patronage networks
favoring Wahhabis and Salafists.75 Indeed, the Houthis’ Zaydi revivalism is a direct
response against this proselytization of Wahhabism,76 and Houthi representatives regularly
“portray the movement as defending Yemeni sovereignty against foreign, Wahhabi-
inspired invasion.”77
This proliferation of Saudi influence is quite worrisome to Iran. Indeed, “In an
exception to the regime elite’s preference for implied criticism, the Iranian Joint Armed
Forces Chief of Staff Major General Hassan Firouzabadi referred to the Saudi involvement
as ‘state Wahhabi terrorism.’”78 Such rhetoric, which is not that uncommon in and of itself,
is indicative of Iran’s disdain for Saudi Arabia’s growing influence and power in the
region.79 Given that “Iran perceives itself as a regional hegemon and leader of the Muslim
world” and has long worked to augment its standing by supporting Muslim states and
organizations, it makes sense that Iran acknowledges the Houthis as a proxy in its network
designed “to ‘resist’ the U.S. and its regional allies, such as Saudi Arabia.”80 Additionally,
Iran views “the conflict in Yemen as a way to impede Saudi Arabia’s capability to project
power to other parts of the region,” thus rendering Saudi Arabia “unable to escalate in
Syria.”81
Iran’s second source of motivation flows somewhat from the first. Because “Iran,
being officially a Shia state, safeguards Shia Islam and acts as a reference point to many
Shia movements worldwide through funding programs or political support,” support for
“the Houthis, who are ideologically close to it,” is a priority for Iran.82 While Zaydism
remains distinct from Iran’s Twelver Shi’ism, Iran’s contact with and support of the
Houthis has led “a number of prominent Houthi supporters” to convert “to Twelver Shia
over the past two decades” and visit “Iran for religious instruction.”83 Thus, simply by
engaging with the Houthis, Iran is working toward its objective of enlarging the Middle
East’s so-called “Shi’ite Crescent.”84 To this end, various prominent Iranian figures and

73 Ighani, Managing the Saudi-Iran Rivalry, 2.
74 Ibid., 1.
75 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery, 89-90.
76 Ibid., 116.
77 Ibid., 276.
78 Ibid., 267.
79 Ibid., 268.
80 Bucala et al., “USS Mason,” October 19, 2016.
81 Ibid.
82 Hagood, “Tale of Two Media Covering.”
83 Salisbury, “Yemen and the Saudi-Iranian ‘Cold War,’” 6.
84 Trofimov, “Shiite Crescent,” September 29, 2016.

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officials have voiced diplomatic endorsements for the Houthis; these statements have
generally been carefully crafted so as not to admit to anything beyond rhetorical support.85
Finally, there are ancillary geopolitical benefits for Iran in supporting the Houthis.
Because the Houthis have the aforementioned history and religious affinity with Iran,
going all the way back to their movement’s founder,86 it seems probable that any of the
Houthis’ foreign policy positions that go beyond simply opposing Saudi ambitions will be
sympathetic to Iran’s. Salisbury cites a prominent Houthi activist who contended that, as
Houthi influence and power to govern in Yemen grows, the country’s foreign policy will
increasingly dovetail with Iran’s, becoming “more focused on the eradication of Sunni
extremist movements such as AQAP and IS, and on pushing aggressively for a solution on
the issue of Israel and Palestine.”87
As the Houthis consolidate their power, Iran is likely to enjoy benefits in Yemen
as well. The UNSC notes that, “The regional role of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its
impact on Yemeni politics cannot be discounted,” as demonstrated by the release of the
imprisoned crew members of the Jihan cited earlier.88 Furthermore, “The al Houthi-Saleh
forces’ positioning on the Red Sea also creates an opportunity for Iran to create or
exacerbate disruptive conditions in one of the world’s most important maritime
chokepoints, as demonstrated by the attacks against the U.S.S. Mason.”89 Now that the
Houthis have established a real national government,90 the value of having the Houthis as
allies has the potential to increase dramatically. Instead of merely having a sympathetic
insurgency that can frustrate Iran’s rivals’ ambitions, this relationship, if properly
cultivated, may lead to another Shi’ite state that will eventually be able to wield
internationally legitimate support on Iran’s behalf.

Conclusions and Implications

There are several interrelated conclusions that can be deduced from all of this.
First, given Iran’s long and persistent history of shipping weapons to the Houthis and,
possibly, al-Hirak, it seems unlikely, barring a drastic alteration of the status quo, that Iran
will discontinue this policy any time soon. This procurement of weapons continues despite
the consequences Iran has been subjected to date and in light of incidents such as with the
U.S.S. Mason. Indeed, it is clear that this policy has been immensely profitable for Iran thus
far and has the potential to be significantly more so, considering how limited Iran’s
support has been91 compared to how much more robust and expensive Saudi Arabia’s
investment has been.92 However, the viability of the Houthis was undoubtedly enhanced
by their alliance with Saleh, thus allowing them to take advantage of his vast influence and

85 Bucala et al., “USS Mason,” October 19, 2016.
86 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery, 170-171.
87 Salisbury, “Yemen and the Saudi-Iranian ‘Cold War,’” 11-12.
88 United Nations Security Council, Final Report, 15.
89 Bucala et al., “USS Mason,” October 19, 2016.
90 Almosawa and Gladstone, “Surprise Move,” November 28, 2016.
91 Bucala et al., “USS Mason,” October 19, 2016.
92 Quinlan, “The Yemeni Conundrum.”

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connections.93 As such, it remains unclear whether Iran’s investment in the Houthis would
have been as fruitful or even sufficient without Saleh’s power. Regardless, if the political
prospects of the Houthis continue to improve, the Houthis’ value to Iran will only increase
while minimum investment required from Iran will only decrease.
Second, considering the relatively limited support Iran is providing to the Houthis,
it does appear that up to this point, Yemen has been less of a priority for Iran than other
theaters, such as Syria.94 Thus far, it seems as though Iran has been willing to commit only
as many resources as it takes to disrupt and frustrate Saudi Arabia’s designs. As some
analysts have surmised, Iran’s “limited assistance to the al Houthi-Saleh faction probably
reflects the regime’s assessment that it does not need to invest heavily to embroil Saudi
Arabia in the Yemeni conflict,” and thus, “Iran calibrates and times its support for the al
Houthi-Saleh faction in order to enable a partner that can threaten and pressure Saudi
Arabia.”95 Of course, as the Houthis’ capabilities and prospects increase, Iran may choose
to increase its investment. Likewise, if the issue in Syria gets resolved or Iran is able to
cleanly disengage, Iran may choose to redirect those newly available resources to Yemen in
order to ensure the survival of a Houthi-Saleh regime.
Third, given the success of the Houthis thus far despite being subjected to the
punishing, if sometimes indiscriminate, actions of the Saudi-led coalition96 and enjoying
only limited support from Iran, it seems clear that this war has the potential to drag on.
The utter devastation in Yemen97 also suggests that any hope for a sustainable solution will
require all parties to come to the table, which seems unlikely in the near future.98
From these conclusions, one can deduce a couple of policy implications. First,
given how profitable the Houthis have been for Iran, it seems clear that the only way to
compel Iran to end its support for them would be to ply it with additional, significant
inducements (punitive or compensatory). One suspects that the reason Iran insists on its
innocence and parses its words so carefully vis-à-vis supporting the Houthis is to avoid
greater punitive measures, being forced to directly confront either Saudi Arabia or the
United States, or an intensification of the conflict, potentially disrupting the careful
cost/benefit balance Iran has struck. Therefore, one may find an effective inducement
amongst these scenarios, though all three run the risk of leading to more bloodshed and
chaos rather than less.
Second, given how limited Iran’s support has been, it is clear that the lion’s share
of the destruction has been wrought by Saudi Arabia and its allies. Therefore, if there is a
desire to minimize the suffering of Yemen’s general population in the short term, a
reevaluation of the United States’ role in supplying weapons to Saudi Arabia and its allies
may be in order. Moreover, it seems only prudent that this reassessment precede any
meaningful condemnation or censuring of Iran.

93 United Nations Security Council, Final Report, 12.
94 Blair, “Preserve Bashar al-Assad,” May 10, 2016.
95 Bucala et al., “USS Mason,” October 19, 2016.
96 Hubbard, “U.S. Fingerprints,” November 13, 2016.
97 “Yemen conflict: humanitarian crisis?,” December 6, 2016.
98 Farrukh and Fayed, Yemen Crisis Situation Report, November 22, 2016.

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Christopher Stille

APPENDIX A: Table I

TABLE I. WEAPONS SMUGGLING INTERDICTIONS IN THE GULF OF ADEN

SEPTEMBER 2015 – MARCH 201699
Crew
Number and
Origin Destination* Weapons
Nationality

o 18 anti-armor Concourse
shells
o 54 anti-tank BGM17 shells
September o 15 shell battery kits
14 Iranian Iran Yemen
25, 2015 o 4 firing guidance systems
o 5 binocular batteries
o 3 launchers
o 1 launcher holder
o 3 batteries

18 “various” o 1989 AK-47 assault rifles

o 100 rocket-propelled
U.S. Navy grenade launchers
February Yemen o 49 PKM general purpose
assessed in Iran
27, 2016 machine guns
email to NBC
that the crew o 39 PKM spare barrels
were Iranian. o 20 60mm mortar tubes

o Almost 2,000 AK-47

March 20, 10 (nationality assault rifles
Iran Yemen
2016 not released) o 64 Dragunov sniper rifles
o 9 anti-tank missiles

o 1,500 AK-47 assault rifles

o 200 rocket-propelled
March 28, Yemen grenade launchers
(not released) Iran
2016 o 21 .50 caliber machine
guns

* Assessment reported by U.S. navy officials.

99 Zimmerman, “Signaling Saudi Arabia,” April 15, 2016.

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 Iran’s Role in Yemen’s Civil War

APPENDIX B: Map I – Suspected Materiel Shipping Routes

Source: http://www.thenational.ae/assets/multimedia/interactives/flat-graphics/houthi-
arms-pipeline.png

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