EPRI Field Guide For Boiler Tube Failures PDF

Power Case Study: Major gas-fired power station, UK
Assessing risk in occupied

buildings
ABB helps a major gas-fired

power station to reduce the
risks of injury to personnel
onsite.
The client’s power station was commissioned in 1999 as Solution

a 400 MW gas-fired station. As part of a wider initiative ABB carried out a risk assessment and produced a set
within their company, there was a requirement for a better of specific recommendations that would reduce the risk
understanding of the risks to the occupants of buildings on exposure in the occupied buildings to an acceptable level.
the site and practical options to reduce these to tolerable
levels. The assessment followed the guidance published by the
Chemical Industries Association (CIA) in relation to occupied
The client engaged ABB to carry out an occupied buildings buildings on sites handling hazardous materials.
risk assessment on the site to identify the risk to the
occupants of buildings on the site from hazards associated The methodology comprised the following steps:
with the site’s operations.
1. Identifying the buildings where people could be present
Benefits and confirming that they are ‘occupied’ within the terms of
The benefits that ABB’s work provided to client included: the CIA guidance:
−− 7 buildings were identified as being occupied; an office
− − An understanding of where risk levels could be further building, security gatehouse, control room, workshop
reduced store room, boiler laboratory, contractor cabin(s) and a
− − An understanding of the specific actions that could be scaffolders’ cabin.
taken to reduce risk 2. Identifying the hazardous events to which the occupants
− − Compliance with recognised good practice of the buildings may be exposed, and assessing the
− − Meeting the expectations of the competent authority severity of these events:
− − Demonstrating that employees are exposed only to risks − − Hazardous events with the potential to cause
that are as low as reasonably practical (ALARP) explosion overpressure, thermal radiation or toxic gas
−− Focussed risk reduction and allocation of resources effects on the occupied buildings were identified by
examination of the site’s own hazard identification
studies, an examination of the major accident hazard
map constructed by the site and a site inspection.
In addition, the potential for electrical exposure from
HV equipment impacting on occupied buildings was
identified.
− − Potential hazardous events that were identified
included:
−− Explosion in a gas compressor house
− − Fire or explosion on high pressure natural gas lines
− − Fire in diesel storage tank
− − Explosion following gas release in the turbine hall
− − High pressure steam release in the turbine hall
3. Assessing the effects of these hazardous events.
− − All potentially hazardous events were modelled, using
DNV’s Phast software, which is one of the most widely-
used consequence assessment tools. For electrical
CAS078b/10/12
explosions, hazard radii were estimated based on
published sources. The modelling work ‘mapped’ the
potential exposure across the site to over pressure, fire
and toxic releases.
4. Carrying out consequence screening.
− − The consequence maps for each hazardous event were For further information please contact:
©ABB Limited 2012

used to find which occupied buildings could be subject
to unacceptable consequences if the event occurred. ABB Consulting
The remaining occupied buildings were screened out Daresbury Park
and no further action was taken. Daresbury
5. For those occupied buildings not screened out, a more Warrington
detailed assessment was carried out. Cheshire, WA4 4BT
− − This involved a building inspection and, where United Kingdom
necessary, the calculation of event likelihoods to gain Phone: +44 (0)1925 741111
a more detailed understanding of the risks and thereby Fax: +44 (0)1925 741212
Process safety
determine whether they are ALARP. E-Mail: contact@gb.abb.com
6. D rawing up a list of remedial actions to improve the
www.abb.com/consulting
building performance or reduce the hazard level to ALARP
levels.
− − For those buildings for which the risks were determined ABB Consulting provides technical and engineering services
not to be ALARP, a range of building and process to improve performance in the areas of compliance,
improvement options were identified. These included: operations and engineering to customers in the chemical,
− − Extending the blast wall around a generator petrochemical, oil & gas, power, pharmaceuticals, metals
transformer and consumer industries worldwide.
− − Removing the windows from a control room
− − Installing anti-shatter film on the widows and glass
doors of an office building
− − Relocation of an accommodation cabin
− − Ensuring that an inspection regime is in place
to demonstrate the integrity of the fuel gas line
underneath a culvert

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Power Case Study: Major gas-fired power station, UK

Assessing risk in occupied

ABB helps a major gas-fired

The client’s power station was commissioned in 1999 as Solution

©ABB Limited 2012

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