Consti Atul
Consti Atul
Consti Atul
APRIL, 2018
SESSION 2015-2020
PATNA
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DECLARATION PAGE
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT PAGE
I am highly elated to have worked on my research topic “LEGAL OBLIGATION” under the
guidelines of DR. MANORANJAN KUMAR (FAULTY OFJURISPRUDENCE-II). I am very
grateful to him for his proper guidance.
I would like to take this opportunity to express my profound gratitude and deep regard
tohimfor his exemplary guidance, valuable feedback and constant encouragement
throughout the duration of the project.
His perceptive criticism kept me working to make this project in a much better way.
Working under him was an extremely knowledgeable experience for me.
I would also like to thank all my friends and my seniors. Apart from all these I would like to
give special regard to the librarian of my university who made a relevant effort regarding
to provide the materials to my topic and also assisting me.
Finally I would like to thank my parents and brother for their immense support and
presence during this whole project work.
AVINASH PRASAD
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CONTENTS
NAME OF CHAPTERS PAGE NUMBER
DECLARATION …………….……………………………………………………………………………………………….1
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT…………………………………………………………………………………………………..2
INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………………………………………………4-5
OBJECT OF THE STUDY…………………………………………………………………………………………….......5
HYPOTHESIS………………………………………………………………………………………………………………...5
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY………………………………………………………………………………………….5
SOURCES OF DATA…………………………………………………………………………………………………….…5
LIMITATIONS OF STUDY…………………………………………………………………………………………..……5
CHAPTERISATION:-
1. INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………………..………………….…6-8
2. OBLIGATION AND LAW………………………………………..…………………………………….………..9-11
3. KINDS AND SOURCES OF OBLIGATION……………….………………………………………….……12-13
4. SOLIDARY OBLIGATION………………….….……………………….……………………………….………14-15
5. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION…………….…………………………………………………………..…….16
BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………………………………….……17
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INTRODUCTION
The word originally derives from the latin term "obligare" which comes from the root "lig" which
suggests being bound.1 In its more general acceptation, the word "obligation" means something
that the law or morals command a person to do, a command that is made effective by the
imposition of a sanction if the person fails to obey or comply. 2 In a general sense, the term
‘obligation’ is considered to be a synonym for duty. For example, all members of a particular
organized community are under an obligation to pay taxes. In another sense, the word obligation
may refer to an instrument in writing. So, under commercial law, for example, it may refer to a
negotiable instrument. Because of this reference, it is a source of confusion and requires
clarification. We say that we feel obliged, or are under an obligation, to express our sense that the
claims of morality are claims on us.3Thus, we can say that obligation is a widely used term and is
ambiguous in nature.
If we consider obligation in a legal sense, it is derived from Roman law and differs from duty in
many ways. Firstly, obligations are merely a class of duties, namely, those which are the
correlatives of right in personam. It can be said, in this perspective, that every obligation contains a
duty as a necessary element, but that not every duty amounts to an obligation. Secondly, in law,
obligation not only refers to duty but also denotes the legal relation of a correlative right. From this
point of view, an obligation is a right (with respect to the person entitled). Lastly, all obligations
pertain to the sphere of proprietary rights. They form part of the estate of him who is entitled to
them. An obligation, therefore, may be defined as a proprietary right in personam or a duty which
corresponds to such a right.4 Under Roman law, the person entitled to benefit was known as
creditor and the person bound was called debtor. Any obligation is vested in a creditor and avails
against the debtor.
1
Zimmermann, Reinhard. “The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition” (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1996)
2
SaúlLitvinoff, “The law of obligations”, available at: http://faculty.law.lsu.edu/jrtrahan/obligations-general_principles-
llitvinoff.pdf, accessed on April 23rd, 2017.
3
Kant's Analysis of Obligation: The Argument of Foundations I, available
at:http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~korsgaar/CMK.Analysis.Obligation.pdf, accessed on April 23rd, 2017.
4
P J Fitzgerald, Salmond on Jurisprudence, (Universal Law Publishing Co., 12th Edition, 1966).
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We can say that every obligation has four essential requisites otherwise known as the elements of
obligation. They are:
1. the obligor: obligant duty-bound to fulfill the obligation; he who has a duty.
2. theobligee: obligant entitled to demand the fulfilment of the obligation; he who has a right.
4. a legal bond, the vinculum juris: the cause that binds or connects the obligants to the
prestation.
An obligation thus imposes on the obligor a duty to perform, and simultaneously creates a
corresponding right to demand performance by the obligee to whom performance is to be rendered.
According to Holland, an obligation is a tie, whereby one person is bound to perform some act for
the benefit of another. Savigny says that an obligation is the control over another person, yet not
over this person in all respects, but over single acts of his which must be conceived or subtracted
from his free will and subjected to our will. Paton says that an obligation is that part of the law
which creates right in personam.
The term ‘chose in action’ is a technical synonym for obligation. It means proprietary right in
personam. Under English law, it is an actionable claim. For example, a debt, a share in a company,
or a claim for damages for a tort.
Chose in possession is opposed to chose in action. It has been said by Salmond that all proprietary
rights (except proprietary right in personam which is chose in action) are choses in possession. For
example, a car or a house which can be possessed by person is a chose in possession.
Difference: The difference between these two terms can be traced if we regard the matter
historically. Originally, a chose in possession was any thing or right which was accompanied by
possession and a chose in action was any thing or right of which the claimant has no possession but
which, he must obtain, if need be, by way of an action of law. For example, the money which a
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person has in purse is a chose in possession whereas the money which a debtor owes to him is a
chose in action.5
HYPOTHESIS.
The researcher believes that there is no decisive linguistic marker for the determination the obligation-
imposing laws.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The researcher will go for doctrinal method of research. The researcher will depend on existing materials
like books, case laws, journals.
SOURCES OF DATA
There are two sources of data mainly, primary and secondary. Primary data is one which one can claim of
its own. Secondary data is all the work done on primary source. The researcher will go for secondary
sources of data for completion of project.
The researcher will face time limitation to complete this study. The researcher will also face monetary
limitation.
5
Dr. Avtar Singh and Dr, HarpreetKaur, Introduction to Jurisprudence, (LexisNexis, 4th Edition, 2013).
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CHAPTER-1
It cannot be denied that every legal system contains obligation-imposing laws. Legal systems
recognize, create and enforce obligations. But, it is not necessary in each case that a law uses the
term ‘obligation’ or its near synonym ‘duty’. This means that these laws create obligations follows
not from the language in which they are expressed. Bentham said that ‘what is common in every
article of law is that it commands and by doing so it creates duties or, what is another word for the
same thing, obligations’. The thinking here is that analyzing laws this way reveals what legislators
or subjects most need to know and under what conditions the coercive power of law will ultimately
be met. At a minimum, we can say that it does seem clear that whether or not all laws impose
obligations, they can only be fully understood through their relations to those that do.
Legal obligations are legal requirements with which law's subjects are bound to conform. An
obligatory act or omission is something the law renders non-optional. Since people plainly can
violate their legal obligations, non-optional does not mean that they are physically compelled to
perform, nor even that law leaves them without any eligible alternative. On the contrary, people
often calculate whether or not to perform their legal duties.6 It isn’t that obligations are simply
weighty reasons to perform, even if sometimes neglected or outweighed. This cannot be a
sufficient condition. For example, High Courts have important reasons not to reverse themselves
too frequently, but no legal obligation to refrain.
It was stated by Hart that while sanctions might mark circumstances in which people are obliged to
conform, they have an obligation only when subject to a practiced social rule required an act or
omission. The fact that subjects use it as a rule marks it as normative. Further, three features
distinguish obligation-imposing rules. Firstly, they must be reinforced by serious or insistent
pressure to conform. Secondly, they must be believed important to social life or to some valued
aspect of it. Lastly, their requirements may conflict with the interests and goals of the subject. This
account of the nature of obligations is not an account of their validity. Hart didn’t say that a legal
6
Leslie Green, "Legal Obligation and Authority", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,available at:
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/legal-obligation/, accessed on April 24th, 2017.
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duty is binding whenever there is a willingness todeploy serious pressure in its support, etc. He
held that a duty is legally valid if it forms a part of the legal system (i.e., if it is certified as such by
the tests for law in that system), and a legal duty is morally valid only if there are sound moral
reasons to comply with it. Thus, we can say that although every legal system contains obligation-
imposing laws but there is no decisive linguistic marker determining which these are.
An obligation can be enforced by law only if it is a legal obligation. If from the contents of the
statute, it can be concluded that a particular act or omission comes within the scope of obligation,
then only a legal action can be taken against it in case of violation. A legal obligation is an
obligation that outside parties are prepared to enforce in a regular way, using publicly available
procedures to determine the fact of violation and the way violations will be handled. The paradigm
is the obligation arising from a promise. This is surely a moral obligation, but it becomes a legal
obligation as well when courts indicate that they stand ready to enforce obligations of this kind.
For example, if X borrows a book from his friend Y and promises to return it a week later. Here,
no legal action can be taken against X if he fails to return the book after a week. This is because
the obligation was merely moral in nature and there was no legal element here to enforce the return
of book within specified time or take any action in case of failure by X.
Again, for instance, if one sees a stranger drowning in a pool, no legal duty exists for that witness
to rescue the potential drowning victim. However, if that same individual takes some action to
assist the victim, but without good reason withdraws from such effort, duty may now attach if the
victim has been placed in a worse position because of the withdrawn efforts. For example, this
would result if another witness would have assisted but held back because of the other’s efforts.
Therefore, no legal obligation exists to attempt to rescue a drowning child, but society’s
attachment of a moral duty will make an adult swimmer a pariah if he or she does not attempt a
rescue.
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CHAPTER-3
On the basis of sources or modes of origin, we can classify obligations into four classes:
1.Contractual (obligation ex contractu): They refer to obligations arising from contracts. They
are considered to be the most important class of obligations. Such an obligation creates right in
personam between the parties to it. For example, contract of a sale or purchase. The rights so
created are proprietary in nature but sometimes they may not be in personam such as promise of
marriage, which falls within the law of status and not within the law of obligations. 7 Damage for
breach of contract can be included in the contract either as a sum to be paid in case of a breach of
contract or any stipulation by way of penalty. The stipulation of reimbursement is not by way of
penalty. It is neither punitive nor vindictive. Therefore, the clause of reimbursement or repayment
in the event of delayed delivery or non-delivery is not to be regarded as damages.8
Under Indian law, Sec. 2(a) of Indian Contract Act defines contract as an agreement enforceable by
law. Under Sec. 2(c), agreement is defined and every promise and every set of promises forming
the consideration for each other. Promise is defined under Sec. 2(b) as accepted proposal. So, there
is proposal from one side and its acceptance from other side. Further, Sec. 10 of the Act lays down
the condition for enforceability. According to it, an agreement is a contract when it is made for
consideration between parties who are competent with their free consent and for a lawful object.
So, every contract is an agreement but the converse is not true.
2.Delictual (obligation ex delicto): They are the obligations arising from torts. According to
Salmond, a tort may be defined as a civil wrong for which the remedy is an action for damages and
which is not solely the breach of contract or breach of trust or other merely equitable obligation.
Further, he says that by an obligation of this kind is meant the duty of making pecuniary
satisfaction for that species of wrong which is known in English law as atort.9Etymologically, this
7
Prof. NomitaAggarwal, Jurisprudence (Legal Theory), (Central Law Publications, 10th Edition, 2014).
8
Dr. Avtar Singh and Dr, HarpreetKaur, Introduction to Jurisprudence, (LexisNexis, 4th Edition, 2013).
9
P J Fitzgerald, Salmond on Jurisprudence, (Universal Law Publishing Co., 12th Edition, 1966).
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term is merely the French equivalent of the English wrong tort (tortum), being that which is
twisted, crooked or wrong. According to Salmond, this detinition contains four essential elements,
there being four kinds of wrongs excluded by it from the sphere of tort:
(i) A tort is a civil wrong, crimes are wrongs, but arc not in themselves torts.
(ii) Even a civil wrong is not a tort, unless the appropriate remedy for it is an action for damages.
There are several other forms of civil remedy beside this, for example, injunctions, specific
restitution of property, and the payment of liquidated sums of money by way of penalty or
otherwise.
(iii) No civil wrong is a tort, if it is exclusively the breach of a contract. It may well happen,
however, that the same act is both a tort and a breach of contract and this is so in at least two
classes of cases:
(a) The first and simplest of these is that in which a man undertakes by contract the
performance of a duty which lies on him already, independently of any contract.
(b) In certain instances the breach of a contract made with one person creates liability towards
another person, who is no party to the contract. It is a fundamental principle, indeed, that no
person can sue on an obligatio ex contractu, except a party to the contract, nevertheless it
sometimes happens that one person can sue ex delicto for the breach of a contract which
was not made with him, but from the breach of which he has suffered unlawful damage.
(iv) The fourth and last class of wrongs which are not torts consists of breaches of trusts or other
equitable obligations.10
3.Quasi-contractual (obligations quasi ex contractu): Such obligations arise from quasi
contracts. They are obligations which in reality are not contractual but are treated by the law as if
they are contractual. Salmond called them by the name of contracts implied in law. So, we can say
that they are obligations to perform an act which do not arise from agreement but have
nevertheless been treated procedurally as if they did. Hence, they are contractual in law but not
contractual in fact. Quasi-contractual obligations are enforced by the law on the principles of
equity.
10
Ibid.
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According to Dr. Winfield, a quasi-contractual obligation signifies liability, not exclusively
referable to any other head of law, imposed upon a particular person to pay money to another
particular person on the ground of unjust benefit.11
Also, as observed by Blackstone, a judgment for a money decree creates a debt, which though non-
contractual, the law by implication treats within the sphere of the contract. An obligation to pay
money received by a person under mistake or obtained by fraud is an illustration of quasi-
contractual obligation. Quasi-contractual obligations also include those obligations which are in
fact not contractual but delictual or tortious. It depends upon the desire of the person wronged as
he may treat them as contractual and sue the wrongdoer for a breach of contract.
For example, if A wrongfully sells the goods to B, B can sue him for damages in tort. However, B
may elect to waive the tort and sue A instead on a fictitious contract. B can demand from A the
payment of money received by him as if he were the agent of B. Here, the law presumes that there
exists a contract and an implied term to pay. In the same way, if A obtains money from B by
deceitful means, in such a case, B can sue A either in tort for damages for the deceit or on a
fictitious contract for the return of the money.
Under Indian Contract Act, Sec. 68 to 72 deal specifically with quasi contracts which are not
founded on actual promises but where the law presumes a contract between the parties. The Indian
Contract Act recognizes following five types of quasi contracts:
Claim for necessaries supplied to person incapable of contracting: If a person is incapable of
entering into a contract, or anyone whom he is legally bound to support is provided by another
person with necessaries suited to his condition in life, the supplier is entitled to recover the price
from the property of such incapable persons.12 For example, X supplies the wife and children of Y,
a lunatic with necessaries suitable to their conditions in life. X is entitled to be reimbursed from
Y’s property. b. Reimbursement of person paying money due by another, in payment of which he
is interested: A person who is interested in the payment of money which another is bound by law
to pay, and who therefore pays it is entitled to be reimbursed by the other.13
c.Obligation to pay for non-gratuitous act: Where a person lawfully does anything for another
person, or delivers anything to him, not intending to do so gratuitously and such other persons
11
Dr. Avtar Singh and Dr, HarpreetKaur, Introduction to Jurisprudence, (LexisNexis, 4th Edition, 2013).
12
Section 68 , The Indian Contract Act, 1872.
13
Section 69, The Indian Contract Act, 1872.
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enjoys the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make compensation to the former in expect of or to
restore the thing so done or delivered.14 For example, X, a tradesman, leaves goods at Y’s house by
mistake; Y treats the goods as his own. He is bound to pay X for them.
d.Responsibility of finder of goods: A person who finds goods belonging to another and takes them
into his custody is subject to the same responsibility as a bailee. So, in eyes of law, the finder is
treated as a bailee in respect of those goods and certain rights and liabilities flow from this legal
fiction.15
e.Liability for money paid or things delivered by mistake or under coercion: It provides that a
person to whom money has been paid or anything delivered by mistake or under coercion must
repay or return it.16 For example, a railway company refuses to deliver certain goods to the
consignee, except upon the payment of illegal charge for carriage. The consignee pays the sum
charged to obtain the goods to he is estimated recover so much of the charges as was illegal
excessive.
14
Section 70, The Indian Contract Act, 1872.
15
Section 71, The Indian Contract Act, 1872.
16
Section 72, The Indian Contract Act, 1872.
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the consent of the owner, who was not present at the time when such a voluntary obligation was
made and to give his consent to the same. For example, if A, by mistake leaves goods at the door
of X and X takes them and appropriates them, X would be liable to pay a reasonable compensation
equivalent to the value of the goods appropriated by him.17
iv. Official Obligation: An official obligation means an obligation or services rendered by public
servants, who are bound to help the members of the public who need their help on certain
occasions. Such obligations arise by virtue of their office and are, therefore, called official
obligations. For example, members of fire brigade, police officers etc.
4. Innominate Obligations: An innominate obligation is a residuary obligation i.e. an obligation
which is not contractual, quasi-contractual or delictual may be called as innominate. Under Roman
law, contracts without any specific name were known as ‘contractus innominate’. For example, the
obligation of a trustee towards a beneficiary, guardian towards the ward and other equitable
obligations are the species of innominate obligations though they form part of the law of property
in modern legal systems.
17
Dr. Avtar Singh and Dr, HarpreetKaur, Introduction to Jurisprudence, (LexisNexis, 4th Edition, 2013).
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CHAPTER-4
SOLIDARY OBLIGATIONS
In a literal sense, the term ‘solidary’ means existing jointly and severally. In the normal type of
obligation, there is one debtor and one creditor. However there exist circumstances under which
there are two or more creditors entitled to the same obligation, or two or more debtors under the
same liability. Here, we need to emphasise upon the case of two or more debtors. We may define
solidary obligation as one in which two or more debtors owe the same thing to the same creditor.
For example, if 3 partners, A, B and C, owe debt of Rs. 3000 to X, it does not mean that debt of
Rs. 1000 is owed by A, Rs. 1000 by B, and the remaining Rs. 1000 by C. Rather, it is a case of
single debt of Rs. 3000 owing by each of them in such a way that each of them may be compelled
to pay the whole amount of Rs. 3000. Further, when it is paid by either of them, the remaining
persons are also discharged from the debt.
Obligations of this kind are called solidary obligations because in the language of Roman law, each
of the debtors is bound in solidum instead of pro parte that means each of the debtors is bound for
the whole and not for the proportionate part only. 18
Under English law, there are three distinct kinds of solidary obligation. They are:
1.Several: Solidary Obligations are several when, although the thing owed is the same in each
case, there are as many distinct obligations and causes of action as there are debtors. Each debtor is
bound to the creditor by a distinct and independent vinculum juris (legal bond), the only
connection between them being that in each case subject matter of the obligation is the same, so
that the performance by one of the debtors necessarily discharges all the others also. 19
2.Joint: In this case, though there are two or more debtors, there is only one debt or other cause of
action, as well as only one thing owed. Also, though it binds several debtors to the same creditor,
18
Ibid.
19
P J Fitzgerald, Salmond on Jurisprudence, (Universal Law Publishing Co., 12th Edition, 1966).
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the vinculum juris is single. The most prominent effect of this is that all the debtors are discharged
by anything which discharges any one of them. So, we can say that once the vinculum juris has
been severed as to any one of them, it has been severed as to all of them.
3.Joint and several: Midway between several and joint obligations comes the joint and several
obligation. So, they are the product of a compromise between two competing principles. For some
purposes, law treats them as joint and for some purposes they are treated several by the law. So, in
this case, each debtor is separately liable for the full debt and all the debtors are also jointly liable
for the full debt. Here, the question arises that on what criteria the law determines that to which
class a solidary obligation belongs. For this, we can say that such obligations are several when
although they have the same subject matter, they are distinct in their origin. On the other hand, we
can say that such obligations are joint when along with the same subject matter, they have the same
source i.e. origin.
For example, in case of partners, liabilities of those who commit a tort or a breach of trust are joint
as well as several. Also, in case of joint promisors, under the Indian contract Act, the liability of
each promisor is joint and several, unless there is an agreement to the contrary. Therefore, if four
persons, A, B, C and D make a promise to X, X may at his option sue either any of them or any two or
any three or all of them.
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CHATPER-5
The researcher concludes that in its more general acceptation, the word obligation means
something that the law or morals command a person to do, a command that is made effective by
the imposition of a sanction if the person fails to obey or comply. On the other hand, in its legal
sense, an obligation may be defined as a proprietary right in personam or a duty which corresponds
to such a right. Each obligation forms a part of duty but the converse is not true as despite being
considered a synonym of duty, an obligation and a duty differ in many aspects.
Also, it cannot be denied that every legal system contains obligation-imposing laws. Though legal
systems recognize, create and enforce obligations but, it is not necessary in each case that a law
uses the term ‘obligation’ or its near synonym ‘duty’. Although every legal system contains
obligation-imposing laws, there is no decisive linguistic marker determining which these are.
Hence, the hypothesis of the researcher is proved to be true.
An obligation can be enforced by law only if it is a legal obligation. A moral obligation may
become a legal obligation as well when courts indicate that they stand ready to enforce obligations
of this kind. In the normal type of obligation, there is one debtor and one creditor. However there
exist circumstances under which there are two or more creditors entitled to the same obligation, or
two or more debtors under the same liability. Solidary obligation is the one in which two or more
debtors owe the same thing to the same creditor. Further, on the basis of sources or modes of
origin, obligations have been classified into four classes: contractual, delictual, quasi-contractual,
innominate.
Since individuals constitute society, they form the units of society. As a member (or unit) of
society or the state a man must behave in a way which is good for all and which is helpful in
promoting the welfare of society. Society calls upon the individuals to follow certain norms. These
consist of obligations and duties. If the state guarantees the enjoyment of certain rights to us, the
state, at the same time, wants us to perform certain duties also. Otherwise, we are punished. We
have certain moral duties to perform and certain legal duties which we are bound to perform. A
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duty is an obligation. As a member of society or state, the individual has to observe these
obligations of society.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books:
Websites
i. https://www.abyssinialaw.com/study-on-line/item/416-the-concept-of-obligation
ii. http://legalaspects.ph/267/sources-of-obligations/
iii. https://www.utu.fi/en/units/law/research/disciplines/Pages/Law-of-Obligations.aspx
iv. http://www.iuscommune.eu/school.aspx?type=PPrivaat&context=4&language=English
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