II.

OWNERSHIP:

A. Ownership in General (Arts. 427 – 439);

1. Who may exercise Property Rights (Natural Persons, Juridical Persons, Public
Corporations);

2. Definition;

3. Kinds;

4. Characteristics;

5. Limitations;

6. Torrens Title;

7. Rights of an Owner;

Cases:
SANDEJAS vs. ROBLES, 81 PHIL 421;

CHING vs. CA, 181 SCRA 9;.

Facts:
· Alfredo Ching is the legitimate son of Ching Leng;
· Ching Leng bought a property from Sps. Nofuente and the former registered the property
in her name on September 18, 1961, her postal address was in Pasay City;
· Ching Leng died in Boston and his legitimate son was appointed as administrator of her
estate;
· 13 years after the death of Ching Leng, a suit was commenced on December 27, 1978 by
private respondent Pedro Asedillo against Ching Leng for the reconveyance of said property;
· An amended complaint was made by private respondent alleging “that on account of the
fact that the defendant has been residing abroad up to the present, and it is not known
whether the defendant is still alive or dead, he or his estate may be served by summons and
other processes only by publication.”
· Summons by publication was made through “Economic Monitor”, newspaper of general
circulation in Province of Rizal, Pasay City. Since no responsive pleading was filed after the
lapse of 60 days, judgment on the merits in favor of private respondents was made.
· Consequently, the title of Ching Leng was cancelled and transferred to private respondent
who sold the same to Villa Esperanza Dev., Inc.
· Petitioner learned of the decision, and so he filed a petition to set it aside as null and void
for lack of jurisdiction;

Lower court decision:

 RTC: At first, granted the verified petition to set aside as null and void the prior order of the
RTC; however, on motion by private respondent, the same was set aside. So, petitioner filed
for reconsideration but was denied.
*the case was elevated directly to SC

Issue: WON reconveyance and cancellation of title is in personam which cannot give
jurisdiction to the court by service of summons by publication.
(Note: private respondents argue that they are quasi in rem)

Ruling: Yes, reconveyance and cancellation of title are acts in personam.

Actions in personam and actions in rem differ in that the former are directed against specific
persons and seek personal judgments, while the latter are directed against the thing or
property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole
world.

An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it
binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing.

Private respondent’s action for reconveyance and cancellation of title being in personam, the
judgment in question is null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased
defendant Ching Leng. Verily, the action was commenced thirteen (13) years after the latter’s
death.

According to Dumlao v. Quality plastic products, the decision of the lower court insofar as the
deceased is concerned is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could
not have been validly served with summons. He had no more civil personality, that its fitness
to be subject of legal relations was lost through death.

Ching Leng is an innocent purchaser for value as shown by the evidence adduced in his behalf
by petitioner herein, tracking back the roots of his title since 1960, from the time the decree
of registration was issued.

The sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another’s name after one year from the date of the decree is not to set aside
the decree but respecting it and to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for
damages if the property has transferred to an innocent purchaser for value.

HERNANDEZ vs. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, 71 SCRA 290;

Facts:
· Petitioner was an employee of defendant in its Legal Department for 21 years until his
retirement due to illness;
· Petitioner was awarded a lot (810 sq-m, type E) in respondent’s Housing Project in Quezon
City;
· However, more than a week thereafter, the Chief Accountant and Comptroller of the private
respondent returned to the petitioner the checks he has paid pursuant to such award and
informed him that the private respondent, through its Committee on Organization, Personnel
and Facilities, had cancelled the award of the lot and hour previously awarded on the ground
that:
(a) He has already retired;
(b) He has only an option to purchase said house and lot;
(c) There are a big number of employees who have no houses or lots;
(d) He has been given his retirement gratuity; that the awarding of the aforementioned house
and lot in his favor would subserve the purpose;
· Petitioner protested the cancellation and so filed a complaint in the CFI of Batangas, seeking
annulment of the cancellation of the award of the lot and house in his favor and the restoration
of all his rights thereto;
· He contends that it is illegal and unwarranted because he has already a vested right thereto
because of the award;
· Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss based on improper venue, contending that
since the petitioner’s action affects the title to a house and lot in Quezon city, the same should
have been commenced in the CFI of Quezon City where the real property is located.

Lower court ruling:

CFI of Batangas: sustained the motion to dismiss based on improper venue.

*Case immediately elevated to the SC

Issue: WON the action of petitioner was improperly laid in the CFI of Batangas

Ruling: No, the case was not improperly filed in the CFI of Batangas.

The venue of actions or, more appropriately, the county where the action is triable depends
to a great extent on the nature of the action to be filed, whether it is real or personal.

Real action is one brought for the specific recovery of land, tenements, or hereditaments. A
personal action is one brought for recovery of personal property, for the enforcement of some
contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of damages for the
commission of an injury to the person or property.

The court agrees that petitioner’s action is not a real but a personal action. As correctly
insisted by petitioner, his action is one to declare null and void the cancellation of the lot and
house in his favor which does not involve title and ownership over said properties but seeks
to compel respondent to recognize that the award is a valid and subsisting one which cannot
arbitrarily and unilaterally cancel and accordingly to accept the proffered payment in full which
it had rejected and returned to petitioner.

Such an action is a personal action which may be properly brought by petitioner in his
residence.

The dismissal is overturned and the suit is remanded for further proceedings.

DOMAGAS vs. JENSEN, 448 SCRA 663;

FACTS: Petitioner FilomenaDomagas filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent
Vivian Jensen before the MTC alleging that the respondent by means of force, strategy and
stealth, gained entry into the petitioner’s property by excavating a portion thereof and
thereafter constructing a fence thereon depriving the petitioner of a 68-square meter portion
of her property along the boundary line.

The summons and the complaint were not served on the respondent because the latter was
apparently out of the country. The Sheriff left the summons and complaint with Oscar Layno
(respondent's brother), who received the same.
The court rendered judgment against the respondent.The respondent failed to appeal the
decision. Consequently, a writ of execution was issued.

The respondent then filed a complaint against the petitioner before the RTC for the annulment
of the decision of the MTC on the ground that due to the Sheriff’s failure to serve the complaint
and summons on her because she was in Oslo, Norway, the MTC never acquired jurisdiction
over her person. Respondent claimed she was a resident of Oslo, Norway and although she
owned the house where Oscar Layno received the summons and the complaint, she had then
leased it to Eduardo Gonzales. She avers further that Oscar Layno was never authorized to
receive the summons and the complaint for and in her behalf.

In her answer to the complaint, the petitioner alleged that the respondent was a resident of
Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan and was the owner of the subject premises where
Oscar Layno was when the Sheriff served the summons and complaint; that the service of the
complaint and summons by substituted service on the respondent was proper since her
brother Oscar Layno, a resident and registered voter of Barangay. Buenlag, Calasiao,
Pangasinan, received the complaint and summons for and in her behalf.

After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondent. The trial court
declared that there was no valid service of the complaint and summons on the respondent
considering that she left the Philippines for Oslo, Norway, and her brother Oscar Layno was
never authorized to receive the said complaint and summons for and in her behalf.

The petitioner appealed the decision to the CA which affirmed the appealed decision with
modifications. The CA ruled that the complaint was one for ejectment, which is an action quasi
in rem. The appellate court ruled that since the defendant therein was temporarily out of the
country, the summons and the complaint should have been served via extraterritorial service
under Section 15 in relation to Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which likewise
requires prior leave of court. Considering that there was no prior leave of court and none of
the modes of service prescribed by the Rules of Court was followed by the petitioner, the CA
concluded that there was really no valid service of summons and complaint upon the
respondent, the defendant in Civil Case No. 879.

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES:
Whether or not there was a valid service of the summons and complaint on the respondent.
Whether or not the action of the petitioner in the MTC against the respondent herein is an
action in personam or quasi in rem.

HELD:
The ruling of the CA that the petitioner’s complaint for forcible entry of the petitioner against
the respondent is an action quasi in rem, is erroneous. The action of the petitioner for forcible
entry is a real action and one in personam because the plaintiff seeks to enforce a personal
obligation or liability on the defendant under Article 539 of the New Civil Code, for the latter
to vacate the property subject of the action, restore physical possession thereof to the
plaintiff, and pay actual damages by way of reasonable compensation for his use or occupation
of the property.
The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a
proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its
nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce
personal rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of
the person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific
property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of
the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment of a
court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this
character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten
a pecuniary liability on him. An action in personam is said to be one which has for its object
a judgment against the person, as distinguished from a judgment against the propriety to
determine its state. It has been held that an action in personam is a proceeding to enforce
personal rights or obligations; such action is brought against the person. As far as suits for
injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-settled that it is an injunctive act in personam. In
Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that proceedings to enforce personal rights and
obligations and in which personal judgments are rendered adjusting the rights and obligations
between the affected parties is in personam. Actions for recovery of real property are in
personam.

On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to
subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. In an action
quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to
subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in
rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended
to operate on these questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and
not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants. The judgments
therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.

On the issue of whether the respondent was validly served with the summons and complaint
by the Sheriff:

In Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals , the Court had the occasion to state:

In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the
court to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant
who does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal service of summons as
provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot be personally served
with summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be made in accordance with
Section 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of
service may be resorted to: (a) substituted service set forth in Section 8; (2) personal service
outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court;
or (4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.

Thus, any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
is null and void.

In the present case, the records show that the respondent, before and after his marriage to
Jarl Jensen on August 23, 1987, remained a resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao,
Pangasinan. Considering that the respondent was in Oslo, Norway, having left the Philippines
on February 17, 1999, the summons and complaint in Civil Case No. 879 may only be validly
served on her through substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court,
which reads:
SEC. 7. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within
a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

Strict compliance with the mode of service is required in order that the court may acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The statutory requirement of substituted service
must be followed faithfully and strictly and any substituted service other than that authorized
by the statute is rendered ineffective. As the Court held in Hamilton v. Levy :

… The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated
in the proof of service or Officer’s Return; otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of
personal service cannot be upheld. This is necessary because substituted service is in
derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character and hence
may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. Here, no such
explanation was made. Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements
of substituted service renders said service ineffective.

In Keister v. Narcereo, the Court held that the term "dwelling house" or "residence" are
generally held to refer to the time of service; hence, it is not sufficient to leave the summons
at the former’s dwelling house, residence or place of abode, as the case may be. Dwelling
house or residence refers to the place where the person named in the summons is living at
the time when the service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at
the time. It is, thus, the service of the summons intended for the defendant that must be left
with the person of suitable age and discretion residing in the house of the defendant.
Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much important as the
issue of due process as of jurisdiction.

As gleaned from the service return, there is no showing that the house where the Sheriff
found Oscar Layno was the latter’s residence or that of the respondent herein. Neither is there
any showing that the Sheriff tried to ascertain where the residence of the respondent was on
the said date. It turned out that the occupant of the house was a lessor, Eduardo Gonzales,
and that Oscar Layno was in the premises only to collect the rentals from him. The service of
the summons on a person at a place where he was a visitor is not considered to have been
left at the residence or place or abode, where he has another place at which he ordinarily
stays and to which he intends to return.

The Voter’s Registration Record of Oscar Layno wherein he declared that he was a resident of
No. 572 Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, as well as the Joint Affidavit of Vicenta
Peralta and OrlandoMacasalda cannot prevail over the Contract of Lease the respondent had
executed in favor of Eduardo Gonzales showing that the latter had resided and occupied the
house of the respondent as lessee since November 24, 1997, and the affidavit of Eduardo
Gonzales that Oscar Layno was not residing in the said house.

In sum, then, the respondent was not validly served with summons and the complaint in Civil
Case No. 879 on April 5, 1999, by substituted service. Hence, the MTC failed to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent; as such, the decision of the MTC in Civil Case
No. 879 is null and void.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.
8. Doctrine of Self-Help and other rights to Protection and Enforcement (Legal Action – Art.
428, Quieting of Title-Arts. 476 – 481, Recovery of Pessession – Art. 434, Reconveyance,
Replevin and Damages);

Cases:

HEIRS OF OLVIGA vs. CA, 227 SCRA 330;

FACTS: In 1950, then twelve-year-old Eutiquio Pureza and his father cleared and cultivated
Lot 13, Pls-84 of Guinayangan Public Land Subdivision which measured more or less 54,406
sq.m. They introduced in 1954 improvements such as trees of coconut, jackfruit, mangoes,
avocado and bananas. Upon the land's release for disposition, the Bureau of Lands surveyed
it in Eutiquio Pureza's name.

Godofredo (Jose Olviga's son and brother of petitioners Virgilio and Lolita Olviga-Olila)
protested the survey but without respect to the half-a-hectare portion "sa dakong panulukan
ng Amihanan-Silanganan" which he claimed. Godofredo's protest is of public record in the
Bureau of Lands and it stated that he admitted the lot belonged to Eutiquio except for the
half-a-hectare portion included in the survey.

Eutiquio filed a homestead application in 1960 for Lot 13, but since no action was done on his
application, he transferred his rights to the lot in 1961 to Cornelio Glor, Sr.. The Bureau of
Lands' records did not disclose why there was no action for Eutiquio's homestead application
and the proposed transfer of rights to the land to Cornelio, Sr. The elder Cornelio was sickly
and since his wife Angelita was unschooled, she and her children failed to follow up Eutiquio's
homestead application in the cadastral proceedings held at the Municipal Court of
Guinayangan Public Land Subdivision. Angelita testified that she was never notified about the
outcome of said proceedings. The non-posting of the hearing of cadastral proceedings was
confirmed by Virgilio.

The Olvigas were Glors' neighbors. Jose claimed on the other hand adjoining lands Lot 12 and
13 in the cadastral proceeding. He falsely omitted that there were persons claiming possession
and adverse interests in Lot 13 and Eutiquio's sale of rights to Cornelio Sr. in 1961. Thus in
1967, the lands were awarded without contest to Jose Olviga and subsequently registered
under Original Certificate of Title No. 0-12713. Jose requested later in 1971 that the land be
splitted into two separate lots with separate titles. TCT Nos. T-103823 and T-103824 were
subsequently issued to Lots 12 and 13 respectively, and he later on transferred Lot 13 to his
daughter Lolita and her husband Jaime Olila.

Cornelio's widow Angelita filed in the Regional Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon an action against
the heirs of Jose Olviga to reconvey that parcel of land to her and her heirs. The RTC rendered
judgment in Angelita's favor after due trial, and it ordered the Olvigas' to reconvey the land
and pay attorney's fees.

Jose Olviga's heirs appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals, but it affirmed
the trial court's judgment in its 13 January 1992 decision (CA-G.R. CV No. 30542). It also
found that spouses Jaime and Lolita Olviga-Olila were not in possession of the disputed land
nor innocent purchasers for value and that the Glors and their predecessor-in-interest Eutiquio
Pureza were the possessors.

ISSUES ADDRESSED BY THE SUPREME COURT: The Olviga heirs asked for petition for
review of the CA's decision and the following issues were raised,
1. Whether or not plaintiffs' action is for quieting of title that does not prescribe, and assuming
their demand is for reconveyance of the land being based on implied trust, prescribes in ten
(10) years?

The Supreme Court held that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied
or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years, the point of reference being the date of
registration of the deed of the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property.
But this rule applies only when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property, since if a
person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to
seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe.

2. Whether the Glors' cause of action accrued not in 1967 but in 1988, and as mere homestead
transferees, cannot maintain an action for reconveyance?

It was also held that the Glors and their predecessors-in-interest Cornelio Glor, Sr. and
Eutiquio Pureza were in actual possession of the property since 1950. Their undisturbed
possession gave them continuing right to seek aid of a court of equity to determine nature of
Olviga's adverse claim, who in 1988, disturbed their possession. Thus, the right to quiet the
property's title which seeks reconveyance and annulment of any certificate of title, accrues
only from the time the possessor was made aware of the adverse claim and it is only from
that time that the statutory period of prescription commences to run against him/her. It also
stated that the actual possessor of a piece of land claiming to be its owner may wait until
disturbance of his/her possession or the attack of his/her title before taking steps in
vindication of his/her right because his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right
to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim
of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is
in possession.

PINGOL vs. CA, 225 SCRA 118;

FACTS: In 1969, Pingol, the owner of a lot (Lot No. 3223) in Caloocan City, executed a DEED
OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-HALF OF AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF [his] PARCEL OF LAND in
favor of Donasco (private respondent), payable in 6 years.

In 1984, Donasco died and was only able to pay P8,369 plus P2,000 downpayment, leaving
a balance of P10,161. The heirs of Donasco remained in possession of such lot and offered to
settle the balance with Pingol. However, Pingol refused to accept the offer and demanded a
larger amount. Thus, the heirs of Donasco filed an action for specific performance (with Prayer
for Writ of Prelim. Injunction, because Pingol were encroaching upon Donasco’s lot). Pingol
averred that the sale and transfer of title was conditional upon the full payment of Donasco
(contract to sell, not contract of sale). With Donasco’s breach of the contract in 1976 and
death in 1984, the sale was deemed cancelled, and the heirs’ continuous occupancy was only
being tolerated by Pingol.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Pingol can refuse to transfer title to Donasco
(2) Whether or not Donasco has the right to quiet title

HELD:
(1) No. The contract between Pingol and Donasco is a contract of sale and not a contract to
sell. The acts of the parties, contemporaneous and subsequent to the contract, clearly show
that the parties intended an absolute deed of sale; the ownership of the lot was transferred
to the Donasco upon its actual (upon Donasco’s possession and construction of the house)
and constructive delivery (upon execution of the contract). The delivery of the lot divested
Pingol of his ownership and he cannot recover the title unless the contract is resolved or
rescinded under Art. 1592 of NCC. It states that the vendee may pay even after the expiration
of the period stipulated as long as no demand for rescission has been made upon him either
judicially or by notarial act. Pingol neither did so. Hence, Donasco has equitable title over the
property.

(2) Although the complaint filed by the Donascos was an action for specific performance, it
was actually an action to quiet title. A cloud has been cast on the title, since despite the fact
that the title had been transferred to them by the execution of the deed of sale and the
delivery of the object of the contract, Pingol adamantly refused to accept the payment by
Donascos and insisted that they no longer had the obligation to transfer the title.

Donasco, who had made partial payments and improvements upon the property, is entitled
to bring suit to clear his title against Pingol who refused to transfer title to him. It is not
necessary that Donasco should have an absolute title, an equitable title being sufficient to
clothe him with personality to bring an action to quiet title.

Prescription cannot also be invoked against the Donascos because an action to quiet title to
property in ONE’s POSSESSION is imprescriptible.

TITONG vs. CA, 287 SCRA 102;

FACTS: A 20,592 square meter parcel of land located at Barrio Titiong, Masbate is the subject
property being disputed in this case. The property is being claimed by 2 contestants, however
legal title over the property can only be given to one of them.

The case originated from an action for quieting of title filed by petitioner Mario Titong. The
RTC of Masbate decided in favor of private respondents, Vicente Laurio and Angeles Laurio as
the true and lawful owners of the disputed land. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Titong asserts that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel of land with an area of 3.2800
hectares and declared for taxation purposes. He claims that on three separate occasions,
private resps, with their hired laborers, forcibly entered a portion of the land containing an
approximate area of 2 hectares and began plowing the same under pretext of ownership. On
the other hand, private resps denied the claim and said that the subject land formed part of
the 5.5 hectare agricultural land which they had purchased from their predecessor-in-interest,
Pablo Espinosa.

Titong identified Espinosa as the his adjoining owner asserting that no controversy had
sprouted between them for 20 years until the latter sold lot 3749 to V. Laurio. The boundary
between the land sold to Espinosa and what remained of Titong’s property was the old
Bugsayon river. When Titong employed Lerit as his tenant, he instructed the latter to change
the course of the old river and direct the flow of water to the lowland at the southern portion
of Titong’s property, thus converting the old river into a Riceland.

Private resps, on the other hand, denied claim of Titong’s, saying that the area and boundaries
of disputed land remained unaltered during the series of conveyances prior to its coming into
his hands. Accdg to him, Titong first declared land for taxation purposes which showed that
the land had an area of 5.5 hectares and was bounded on the north by the B. River; on the
east by property under ownership by Zaragoza, and on the west by property owned by De la
Cruz. He also alleges that Titong sold property to Verano. The latter reacquired the property
pursuant to mutual agreement to repurchase the same.
However, the property remained in Titong’s hands only for 4 days because he sold it to
Espinosa. It then became a part of the estate of Espinosa’s wife, late Segundina Espinosa.
Later on, her heirs executed an “Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Simultaneous Sale”
whereby the 5.5 hectares was sold to Laurio for 5,000 pesos. In all these conveyances, the
area and boundaries of the property remained exactly the same as those appearing in the
name of Titong’s.

The court found out that 2 surveys were made of the property. First survey was made by
Titong, while the second was the relocation survey ordered by the lower court. Because of
which, certain discrepancies surfaced. Contrary to Titong’s allegation, he was actually claiming
5.9789 hectares, the total areas of lot nos 3918, 3918-A and 3606. The lot 3479 pertaining
to Espinosa’s was left with only an area of 4.1841 hectares instead of the 5.5 hectares sold
by Titong to him.

Apprised of the discrepancy, private resps filed a protest before Bureau of Lands against 1st
survey, and filing a case for alteration of boundaries before the MTC, proceedings of which
were suspended because of instant case.

Private resps. Avers that Titong is one of the four heirs of his mother, Leonida Zaragoza. In
the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale of Estate of late Zaragoza, the heirs adjudicated unto
themselves the 3.6 hectares property of the deceased. The property was bounded by the
north by Verano, on the east by Bernardo Titong, on the south by the Bugsayon River and on
the west by Benigno Titong.
Instead of reflecting only .9000 hectares as his rightful share in the extrajud settlement,
Titong’s share bloated to 2.4 hectares. It then appeared to Laurio that Titong encroached
upon his property and declared it as part of his inheritance.

The boundaries were likewise altered so that it was bounded on the north by Verano, on the
east by B. Titong, on the south by Espinosa and on the west by Adolfo Titong. Laurio also
denied that Titong diverted course of the B. river after he had repurchased the land from
Verano because land was immediately sold to Espinosa thereafter.

ISSUE: W/N Titong is the rightful owner of the subject property?

HELD:
No, The remedy for quieting of title may be availed of under the circumstances mentioned in
Art 476 of the NCC wherein it says that action to quiet title may be made as a remedial or
preventive measure. Under 476, a claimant must show that there is an instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding which casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon
owner’s title to or interest in real property. The ground for filing a complaint for quieting title
must be “instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding.”
In the case at bar, Titong failed to allege that there was an instrument, claim etc be clouded
over his property. Through his allegations, what Titong imagined as clouds cast on his title
were Laurio’s alleged acts of physical intrusion into his purported property. The grounds
mentioned are for action for forcible entry and not quieting title.

In addition, the case was considered to be a boundary dispute. The RTC and CA correctly held
that when Titong sold the 5.5 hectare land to Espinosa, his rights and possession ceased and
were transferred to Laurio upon its sale to the latter.
Thus, it is now a contract of sale wherein it is a contract transferring dominion and other real
rights in the thing sold. Titong also cannot rely on the claim of prescription as ordinary
acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for the time fixed
by law.

SPS. PORTIC vs. CRISTOBAL, 496 PHIL 456;

FACTS: In 1968, spouses Ricardo and Ferma Portic acquired a parcel of land with a 3 door
apartment from spouses Alcantara even though they’re aware that the land was mortgaged
to the SSS. Portic defaulted in paying SSS. The Portics then executed a contract with
Anastacia Cristobal and the latter agreed to buy the said property for P200k. Cristobal’s down
payment was P45k and she also agreed to pay SSS. The contract between them states:
That while the balance of P155,000.00 has not yet been fully paid the FIRST PARTY OWNERS
shall retain the ownership of the above described parcel of land together with its
improvements but the SECOND PARTY BUYER shall have the right to collect the monthly
rentals due on the first door (13-A) of the said apartment; (payment is due 22 May 1985, if
Cristobal will not be able to pay Portic will reimburse)
A transfer certificate was executed in favor of Cristobal. Cristobal was not able to pay on the
due date. A suit ensued to lift the cloud on the title.
ISSUE: Who is the rightful owner of the parcel of land?
HELD: The Portics insofar as there was no contract of sale. What transpired between the
parties was a contract to sell. The provision of the contract characterizes the agreement
between the parties as a contract to sell, not a contract of sale. Ownership is retained by the
vendors, the Portics; it will not be passed to the vendee, the Cristobals, until the full payment
of the purchase price. Such payment is a positive suspensive condition, and failure to comply
with it is not a breach of obligation; it is merely an event that prevents the effectivity of the
obligation of the vendor to convey the title. In short, until the full price is paid, the vendor
retains ownership.
The mere issuance of the Certificate of Title in favor of Cristobal did not vest ownership in
her. Neither did it validate the alleged absolute purchase of the lot. Registration does not
vest, but merely serves as evidence of, title. Our land registration laws do not give the holders
any better title than that which they actually have prior to registration.
Under Article 1544 of the Civil Code, mere registration is not enough to acquire a new
title. Good faith must concur. Clearly, Cristobal has not yet fully paid the purchase
price. Hence, as long as it remains unpaid, she cannot feign good faith. She is also precluded
from asserting ownership against the Portics. The CA’s finding that she had a valid title to
the property must be set aside.