Lambino Vs COMELEC

7/16/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 505
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lambino vs. Commission on Elections
*
G.R. No. 174153. October 25, 2006.
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER

WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, petitioners, vs. THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., intervenor.
ONEVOICE, INC., CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN,

MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN
V. OPLE, and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., intervenors.
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, intervenor.
BAYAN represented by its Chairperson Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-

Araullo, BAYAN MUNA represented by its Chairperson Dr.
Reynaldo Lesaca, KILUSANG MAYO UNO represented by its
Secretary General Joel Maglunsod, HEAD represented by its
Secretary General Dr. Gene Alzona Nisperos, ECUMENICAL
BISHOPS FORUM represented by Fr. Dionito Cabillas,
MIGRANTE represented by its Chairperson Concepcion Bragas-
Regalado, GABRIELA represented by its Secretary General
Emerenciana de Jesus, GABRIELA WOMEN’S PARTY represented
by Sec. Gen. Cristina Palabay, ANAKBAYAN represented by
Chairperson Eleanor de Guzman, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS represented by Chair Vencer Crisostomo Palabay,
JOJO PINEDA of the League of Concerned Professionals and
Businessmen, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO of the Solidarity of Health
Against
_______________
* EN BANC.
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Charter Change, DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS of Health Action for

Human Rights, intervenors.
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA

THERESA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, intervenors.
LUWALHATI RIACASA ANTONINO, intervenor.
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, intervenor.
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor.
LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO, intervenor.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA),

CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M.
TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR.,
FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG,
intervenors.
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, and

RUELO BAYA, intervenors.
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS

ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and MR. VICTORINO F. BALAIS,
intervenors.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President,

MANUEL VILLAR, JR., intervenor.
SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.,

intervenor.
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA

KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO L. SALVADOR, and RANDALL
TABAYOYONG, intervenors.
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CITY AND

CEBU PROVINCE CHAPTERS, intervenors.
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.

and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMEÑA III, JAMBY MADRIGAL,
JING-
162

GOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO LACSON,

intervenors.
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG

PILIPINO, intervenors.
G.R. No. 174299. October 25, 2006.*
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and

RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS,
SR., and Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA,
FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE
V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, and John Doe and
Peter Doe, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Amendments and Revisions of the Constitution;

People’s Initiative; The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its
face is a petition by the people—first, the people must author and thus sign
the entire proposal, and, second, as an initiative upon a petition, the
proposal must be embodied in a petition; The full text of the proposed
amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to
it, and if so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment.—
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a
petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present.
First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a
petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition. These essential
elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first
shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete
proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is “directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign on a
petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. The full
text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the
petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of
such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions
of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed
amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given
the time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of signatories had
seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.
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Same; Same; Same; The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed

the concept of people’s initiative from the United States where various State
constitutions incorporate an initiative clause; A signature requirement
would be meaningless if the person supplying the signature has not first seen
what it is that he or she is signing.—The framers of the Constitution directly
borrowed the concept of people’s initiative from the United States where
various State constitutions incorporate an initiative clause. In almost all
States which allow initiative petitions, the unbending requirement is that
the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments
before they sign to signify their assent, and that the people must sign on
an initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments. The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly
explained in several decisions of various courts. Thus, in Capezzuto v. State
Ballot Commission, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, affirmed by the
First Circuit Court of Appeals, declared: [A] signature requirement would
be meaningless if the person supplying the signature has not first seen
what it is that he or she is signing. Further, and more importantly, loose
interpretation of the subscription requirement can pose a significant
potential for fraud. A person permitted to describe orally the contents of an
initiative petition to a potential signer, without the signer having actually
examined the petition, could easily mislead the signer by, for example,
omitting, downplaying, or even flatly misrepresenting, portions of the
petition that might not be to the signer’s liking. This danger seems
particularly acute when, in this case, the person giving the description is
the drafter of the petition, who obviously has a vested interest in seeing
that it gets the requisite signatures to qualify for the ballot.
Same; Same; Same; While the Constitution does not expressly state
that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments, the
deliberations of the framers of the Constitution clearly show that the
framers intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people’s
initiative.— Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly
state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed
amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution
clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the relevant American
jurisprudence on people’s initiative. In particular, the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that

the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments
before they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing
such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative
and Referendum Act that
164
the Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires that the people must sign the
“petition x x x as signatories.”
Same; Same; Same; There is no presumption that the proponents

observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures—the
proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures, i.e., that the petition
contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed
amendments.—The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from
the people. The proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity
and not as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who
can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed
amendments to the people. The proponents present favorably their proposal
to the people and do not present the arguments against their proposal. The
proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear
the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures—that the petition contained, or
incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.
Same; Same; Same; It is basic in American jurisprudence that the

proposed amendment must be incorporated with, or attached to, the
initiative petition signed by the people; The Lambino Group’s citation of
Corpus Juris Secundum pulls the rug from under their feet.—The Lambino
Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating that “a signer who
did not read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot
question his signature on the ground that he did not understand the nature of
the act.” The Lambino Group quotes an authority that cites a proposed
change attached to the petition signed by the people. Even the authority
the Lambino Group quotes requires that the proposed change must be
attached to the petition. The same authority the Lambino Group quotes
requires the people to sign on the petition itself. Indeed, it is basic in
American jurisprudence that the proposed amendment must be incorporated
with, or attached to, the initiative petition signed by the people. In the
present initiative, the Lambino Group’s proposed changes were not
incorporated with, or attached to, the signature sheets. The Lambino
Group’s citation of Corpus Juris Secundum pulls the rug from under their
feet.
Same; Same; Same; Logrolling; There is logrolling when the initiative

petition incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same petition;
Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire
proposi-
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tion and not only the unrelated subject matter.—The Lambino Group’s
initiative springs another surprise on the people who signed the signature
sheets. The proposed changes mandate the interim Parliament to make
further amendments or revisions to the Constitution. The proposed Section
4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, provides: Section 4(4). Within
forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim
Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this
Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy,
decentralization and a strong bureaucracy. During the oral arguments, Atty.
Lambino stated that this provision is a “surplusage” and the Court and the
people should simply ignore it. Far from being a surplusage, this provision
invalidates the Lambino Group’s initiative. Section 4(4) is a subject matter
totally unrelated to the shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the
Unicameral-Parliamentary system. American jurisprudence on initiatives
outlaws this as logrolling—when the initiative petition incorporates an
unrelated subject matter in the same petition. This puts the people in a
dilemma since they can answer only either yes or no to the entire
proposition, forcing them to sign a petition that effectively contains two
propositions, one of which they may find unacceptable. Under American
jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire proposition
and not only the unrelated subject matter.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Logrolling confuses and even deceives the
people.—Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air
Alaska v. McAlpine, 698 P.2d 1173, 1184 (1985), the Supreme Court of
Alaska warned against “inadvertence, stealth and fraud” in logrolling:
Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of the
problems that the single-subject rule was enacted to prevent are exacerbated.
There is a greater danger of logrolling, or the deliberate intermingling of
issues to increase the likelihood of an initiative’s passage, and there is a
greater opportunity for “inadvertence, stealth and fraud” in the
enactment-by-initiative process. The drafters of an initiative operate
independently of any structured or supervised process. They often
emphasize particular provisions of their proposition, while remaining silent
on other (more complex or less appealing) provisions, when communicating
to the public. x x x Indeed, initiative promoters typically use simplistic
advertising to present their initiative to potential petition-signers and

eventual voters. Many voters will never read the full text of the initiative
before the election. More importantly, there is no process for amending or
splitting the several provisions in an initiative proposal. These difficulties
clearly distinguish the initiative from the legislative process.
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Same; Same; Same; An initiative that gathers signatures from the

people without first showing to the people the full text of the proposed
amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud
on the people.—The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination
against the Senators. The 6.3 million people who signed the signature
sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to
discriminate against the Senators. They could not have known that
their signatures would be used to limit, after 30 June 2010, the interim
Parliament’s choice of Prime Minister only to members of the existing
House of Representatives. An initiative that gathers signatures from the
people without first showing to the people the full text of the proposed
amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud
on the people. That is why the Constitution requires that an initiative must
be “directly proposed by the people x x x in a petition”—meaning that
the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nation’s fundamental law,
the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from
the people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed,
faceless, and unelected individuals. The Constitution entrusts to the people
the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. This Court
trusts the wisdom of the people even if the members of this Court do not
personally know the people who sign the petition. However, this trust
emanates from a fundamental assumption: the full text of the proposed
amendment is first shown to the people before they sign the petition, not
after they have signed the petition.
Same; Same; Same; “Amendment” and “Revision,” Distinguished;

Words and Phrases; The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a
clear distinction between “amendment” and “revision” of the Constitution.
—There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution
intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between “amendment” and
“revision” of the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that only
Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to the
Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a people’s initiative
may propose only amendments to the Constitution. Where the intent and
language of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power to
propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions
even as they are empowered to propose amendments.
Same; Same; Same; A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million
signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes prescribed in
the
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Constitution itself.—Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute

that a people’s initiative can only propose amendments to the Constitution
since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments. There can be
no deviation from the constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the
Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million signatures,
cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes prescribed in the
Constitution itself.
Same; Same; Same; Revision broadly implies a change that alters a

basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of separation
of powers or the system of checks-and-balances, and there is also revision if
the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the
change affects substantial provisions of the constitution; Amendment
broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the
basic principle involved; Revision generally affects several provisions of the
constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision
being amended.—Courts have long recognized the distinction between an
amendment and a revision of a constitution. One of the earliest cases that
recognized the distinction described the fundamental difference in this
manner: [T]he very term “constitution” implies an instrument of a
permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions contained therein for its
revision indicate the will of the people that the underlying principles
upon which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the instrument,
shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the
significance of the term “amendment” implies such an addition or change
within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or
better carry out the purpose for which it was framed. (Emphasis supplied)
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the
constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the
system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters
the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects
substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment
broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering
the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions
of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific
provision being amended.
Same; Same; Same; The quantitative test asks whether the proposed
change is “so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the
‘substantial entirety’ of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of
numerous existing provisions”—the court examines only the number of

provisions affected and
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does not consider the degree of change; The qualitative test inquires into the
qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution—the main
inquiry is whether the change will “accomplish such far reaching changes
in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision.”—
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not
revisions to the constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have
developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The
quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is “so extensive in its
provisions as to change directly the ‘substantial entirety’ of the constitution
by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions.” The court
examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the
degree of the change. The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects
of the proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the
change will “accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our
basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision.” Whether there is an
alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus,
“a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan” includes change in
its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches.” A
change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes
that “jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check
and balances.”
Same; Same; Same; Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests,
the Lambino Group’s initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment;
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as
when the three great co-equal branches of government in the present
Constitution is reduced into two; A shift from the present Bicameral-
Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of
the Constitution—merging the legislative and executive branches is a
radical change in the structure of the government.—Under both the
quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group’s initiative is a
revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino
Group’s proposed changes overhaul two articles—Article VI on the
Legislature and Article VII on the Executive—affecting a total of 105
provisions in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes
alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to
parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. A change in
the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the
three great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are
reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the
Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a

Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merg-
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ing the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure
of government.
Same; Same; Same; By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a
shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system,
involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one
chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment.—
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive
Power alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the
Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress
alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and
constitutes a revision of the Constitution. By any legal test and under any
jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President
and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision,
not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the Lambino Group’s proposed
changes, it is readily apparent that the changes will radically alter the
framework of government as set forth in the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; The express intent of the framers and the plain
language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino Group’s theory—any
theory advocating that a proposed change involving a radical structural
change in government does not constitute a revision justly deserves
rejection.—The express intent of the framers and the plain language of
the Constitution contradict the Lambino Group’s theory. Where the intent
of the framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly
stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and language. Any
theory espousing a construction contrary to such intent and language
deserves scant consideration. More so, if such theory wreaks havoc by
creating inconsistencies in the form of government established in the
Constitution. Such a theory, devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and
inviting inconsistencies in the Constitution, only exposes the flimsiness of
the Lambino Group’s position. Any theory advocating that a proposed
change involving a radical structural change in government does not
constitute a revision justly deserves rejection.
Same; Same; Same; Where the proposed change applies only to a

specific provision of the Constitution without affecting any other section or
article, the change may generally be considered an amendment and not a
revision.—We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one
end green for amendments and at the other end red for revisions. Towards
the middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties arise in determining
whether there is an amendment or revision. The present initiative is
indisputably located at
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the far end of the red spectrum where revision begins. The present initiative
seeks a radical overhaul of the existing separation of powers among the
three co-equal departments of government, requiring far-reaching
amendments in several sections and articles of the Constitution. Where the
proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution
without affecting any other section or article, the change may generally be
considered an amendment and not a revision. For example, a change
reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years is an amendment and not
a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media
companies from 100 percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not a
revision. Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional
qualification for election to the Presidency is an amendment and not a
revision.
Same; Same; Same; There can be no fixed rule on whether a change is

an amendment or a revision—a change in a single word of one sentence of
the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment.—There can be
no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change
in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and
not an amendment. For example, the substitution of the word “republican”
with “monarchic” or “theocratic” in Section 1, Article II of the Constitution
radically overhauls the entire structure of government and the fundamental
ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have to
be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions, as
well as how it affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted
system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the
existing Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Since a revision of a constitution affects basic

principles, or several provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body with
recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision.—Since a
revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a
constitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited
to undertake a revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several
provisions, but also the altered principles with those that remain unaltered.
Thus, constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent
assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the
other hand, constitutions allow people’s initiatives, which do not have fixed
and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake
only amendments and not revisions.
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Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The basic rule in statutory

construction is that if a later law is irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior
law, the later law prevails.—In the present initiative, the Lambino Group’s
proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions states: Section 2. Upon the
expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with
the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which
shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and
renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are
inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of government, in which
case, they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral
parliamentary form of government; x x x x (Emphasis supplied) The
basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is irreconcilably
inconsistent with a prior law, the later law prevails. This rule also applies to
construction of constitutions. However, the Lambino Group’s draft of
Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions turns on its head this rule of
construction by stating that in case of such irreconcilable inconsistency, the
earlier provision “shall be amended to conform with a unicameral
parliamentary form of government.” The effect is to freeze the two
irreconcilable provisions until the earlier one “shall be amended,” which
requires a future separate constitutional amendment.
Same; Same; Same; A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential to

a Unicameral-Parliamentary system requires harmonizing several
provisions in many articles of the Constitution; Revision of the Constitution
through a people’s initiative will only result in gross absurdities in the
Constitution.— Now, what “unicameral parliamentary form of
government” do the Lambino Group’s proposed changes refer to—the
Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand models, which are
among the few countries with unicameral parliaments? The proposed
changes could not possibly refer to the traditional and well-known
parliamentary forms of government—the British, French, Spanish, German,
Italian, Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian models, which have all
bicameral parliaments. Did the people who signed the signature sheets
realize that they were adopting the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or
New Zealand parliamentary form of government? This drives home the
point that the people’s initiative is not meant for revisions of the
Constitution but only for amendments. A shift from the present Bicameral-
Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system requires harmonizing
several provisions in many articles of the Constitution. Revision of the
Constitution through a people’s initiative will only result in gross absurdities
in the Constitution.
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Same; Same; Same; Initiative and Referendum Act (R.A. No. 6735);
Judicial Review; There is no need to revisit the Court’s ruling in Santiago v.
Commission on Elections, 270 SCRA 106 (1997), declaring R.A. No. 6735
“incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to
cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution—an affirmation or
reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition; The
Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a
statute if the case before the Court can be resolved on some other grounds.
—The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the
basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the
conduct and scope of a people’s initiative to amend the Constitution. There
is no need to revisit this Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
“incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to
cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or
reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition.
Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled
that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to
implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution. This
Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a
statute if the case before the Court can be resolved on some other grounds.
Such avoidance is a logical consequence of the well-settled doctrine that
courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be
resolved on some other grounds.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the
people must sign the petition as signatories.—Even then, the present
initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which requires that the “petition
for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per
centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories.”
Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the people must sign the “petition x x
x as signatories.” The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25
August 2006 or the amended petition of 30 August 2006 filed with the
COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato, and
Atty. Alberto C. Agra signed the petition and amended petition as
counsels for “Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners.”
In the COMELEC the Lambino Group, claiming to act “together with” the
6.3 million signatories, merely attached the signature sheets to the petition
and amended petition. Thus, the petition and amended petition filed with the
COMELEC did not even comply with the basic requirement of RA 6735
that the Lambino Group claims as valid.
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Same; Same; Same; Same; The Lambino Group’s logrolling initiative

also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, “No petition embracing more
than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; x x x.”—The
Lambino Group’s logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA
6735 stating, “No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be
submitted to the electorate; x x x.” The proposed Section 4(4) of the
Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to propose further
amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter totally
unrelated to the shift in the form of government. Since the present initiative
embraces more than one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits submission of
the initiative petition to the electorate. Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid, the
Lambino Group’s initiative will still fail.
Same; Same; Same; Certiorari; Commission on Elections; For

following the Court’s ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to
the COMELEC.—In dismissing the Lambino Group’s initiative petition, the
COMELEC en banc merely followed this Court’s ruling in Santiago and
People’s Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v.
COMELEC. For following this Court’s ruling, no grave abuse of discretion
is attributable to the COMELEC. On this ground alone, the present petition
warrants outright dismissal. Thus, this Court should reiterate its unanimous
ruling in PIRMA: The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave
abuse of discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC
in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only
complied with the dispositions in the Decisions of this Court in G.R. No.
127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10,
1997.
Same; Same; Same; A revolving-door constitution does not augur well

for the rule of law in the country.—The Constitution, as the fundamental
law of the land, deserves the utmost respect and obedience of all the citizens
of this nation. No one can trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly amending
or revising it in blatant violation of the clearly specified modes of
amendment and revision laid down in the Constitution itself. To allow such
change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution in unchartered
waters, to be tossed and turned by every dominant political group of the day.
If this Court allows today a cavalier change in the Constitution outside the
constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow the new dominant political
group that comes will demand its own set of changes in the same cavalier
and unconstitutional fashion. A revolving-door constitution does not augur
well for the rule of law in this country.
174
Same; Same; Same; Incantations of “people’s voice,” “people’s

sovereign will,” or “let the people decide” cannot override the specific
modes of changing the Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution itself.
—No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures
gathered by the Lambino Group, can change our Constitution contrary to the
specific modes that the people, in their sovereign capacity, prescribed when
they ratified the Constitution. The alternative is an extra-constitutional
change, which means subverting the people’s sovereign will and
discarding the Constitution. This is one act the Court cannot and should
never do. As the ultimate guardian of the Constitution, this Court is sworn to
perform its solemn duty to defend and protect the Constitution, which
embodies the real sovereign will of the people. Incantations of “people’s
voice,” “people’s sovereign will,” or “let the people decide” cannot override
the specific modes of changing the Constitution as prescribed in the
Constitution itself. Otherwise, the Constitution—the people’s fundamental
covenant that provides enduring stability to our society—becomes easily
susceptible to manipulative changes by political groups gathering signatures
through false promises. Then, the Constitution ceases to be the bedrock of
the nation’s stability.
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Separate Concurring Opinion:

People’s Initiative; Initiative and Referendum Act (R.A. No. 6735);
Certiorari; Commission on Elections; Even assuming arguendo that
Comelec erred in ruling on a very difficult and unsettled question of law, the
Supreme Court still cannot attribute grave abuse of discretion to the poll
body with respect to that action.—The Comelec did not violate the
Constitution, the laws or any jurisprudence. Neither can whim, caprice,
arbitrariness or personal bias be attributed to the Commission. Quite
the contrary, it prudently followed this Court’s jurisprudence in Santiago
and PIRMA. Even assuming arguendo that Comelec erred in ruling on a
very difficult and unsettled question of law, this Court still cannot attribute
grave abuse of discretion to the poll body with respect to that action.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Until and unless Santiago v.
Commission on Elections, 270 SCRA 106 (1997), is revisited and changed
by this Court or the legal moorings of the exercise of the right are
substantially changed, the Comelec cannot be faulted for acting in accord
with the Supreme Court’s pronouncements.—Until and unless Santiago is
revisited and changed by this Court or the legal moorings of the exercise of
the right are substantially changed, the Comelec cannot be faulted for
acting in accord with this Court’s pronouncements. Respondent
Commission has no discre-
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tion, under any guise, to refuse enforcement of any final decision of this
Court. The refusal of the poll body to act on the Lambino Petition was its
only recourse. Any other mode of action would appear not only
presumptuous, but also contemptuous. It would have constituted defiance of
the Court and would have surely been struck down as grave abuse of
discretion and contumacious disregard of the supremacy of this Court as the
final arbiter of justiciable controversies.
PUNO, J., Dissenting Opinion:

People’s Initiative; Pleadings and Practice; Parties; There is no need for
the more than six (6) million signatories to execute separate documents to
authorize petitioners to file the petition for initiative in their behalf.—
Oppositors-intervenors contend that petitioners Lambino and Aumentado
are not the proper parties to file the instant petition as they were not
authorized by the signatories in the petition for initiative. The argument
deserves scant attention. The Constitution requires that the petition for
initiative should be filed by at least twelve per cent (12%) of all registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per cent (3%) of all the registered voters therein. The petition for
initiative filed by Lambino and Aumentado before the COMELEC was
accompanied by voluminous signature sheets which prima facie show the
intent of the signatories to support the filing of said petition. Stated above
their signatures in the signature sheets is the following: x x x My signature
herein which shall form part of the petition for initiative to amend the
Constitution signifies my support for the filing thereof. There is thus no need
for the more than six (6) million signatories to execute separate documents
to authorize petitioners to file the petition for initiative in their behalf.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Any person aggrieved by the act or
inaction of the respondent tribunal, board or officer may file a petition for
certiorari or mandamus before the appropriate court.—Neither is it
necessary for said signatories to authorize Lambino and Aumentado to file
the petition for certiorari and mandamus before this Court. Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides who may file a petition for certiorari
and mandamus. Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 65 read: SECTION 1. Petition for
certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a
176
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court x x
x x. SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station x x x and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court x x x x. Thus, any person aggrieved by the act
or inaction of the respondent tribunal, board or officer may file a petition for
certiorari or mandamus before the appropriate court. Certainly, Lambino and
Aumentado, as among the proponents of the petition for initiative dismissed
by the COMELEC, have the standing to file the petition at bar.
Judgments; Stare Decisis; Words and Phrases; The latin phrase stare
decisis et non quieta movere means “stand by the thing and do not disturb
the calm”; The doctrine of stare decisis started with the English Courts and
later migrated to the United States.—The latin phrase stare decisis et non
quieta movere means “stand by the thing and do not disturb the calm.” The
doctrine started with the English Courts. Blackstone observed that at the
beginning of the 18th century, “it is an established rule to abide by former
precedents where the same points come again in litigation.” As the rule
evolved, early limits to its application were recognized: (1) it would not
be followed if it were “plainly unreasonable”; (2) where courts of equal
authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the
decision was the “actual principle or principles necessary for the decision;
not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision.” The doctrine
migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers of the U.S.
Constitution. According to Hamilton, “strict rules and precedents” are
necessary to prevent “arbitrary discretion in the courts.” Madison agreed
but stressed that “x x x once the precedent ventures into the realm of
altering or repealing the law, it should be rejected.” Prof. Consovoy well
noted that Hamilton and Madison “disagree about the countervailing policy
considerations that would allow a judge to abandon a precedent.” He added
that their ideas “reveal a deep internal conflict between the concreteness
required by the rule of law and the flexibility demanded in error correction.
It is this internal conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to deal
with for over two centuries.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Two strains of stare
decisis have been isolated by legal scholars—the first, known as vertical
stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the
higher
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courts to cases involving the same facts, and the second, known as
horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts must follow their own
precedents; Vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while
horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but
not a command.— Two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof.
Consovoy’s observation although stare decisis developed its own life in the
United States. Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by legal
scholars. The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of
lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving
the same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires that
high courts must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly
observes that vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while
horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but
not a command. Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the precepts set in stone
in our Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is also instructive to

distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis—constitutional stare
decisis and statutory stare decisis—the distinction being important for
courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in
constitutional litigations.—It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds
of horizontal stare decisis—constitutional stare decisis and statutory
stare decisis. Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations
of the Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of
statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy more flexibility in
refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice
Brandeis’ view on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional
litigations still holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: “Stare
decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable command. The rule of stare
decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is a
question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again called
upon to consider a question once decided.” In the same vein, the venerable
Justice Frankfurter opined: “the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is
the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it.” In contrast,
the application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is more
inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: “after a statute has been construed,
either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other federal
judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the
judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself.” This stance reflects
both respect for Congress’ role and the need to preserve the courts’ limited
resources.
178
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Reasons for Following
and Refusing the Stare Decisis Rule.—In general, courts follow the stare
decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial

institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for
predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis
rule where (1) its application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional
holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate changing social and political
understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law
solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the
policy for future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck
agreeing with them.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An examination of

decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that courts are
agreed on the factors that should be considered before overturning prior
rulings, viz., workability, reliance, intervening developments in the law and
changes in fact, aside from the fact that courts put in the balance the
following determinants—closeness of the voting, age of the prior decision
and its merits.—An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major
countries will show that courts are agreed on the factors that should be
considered before overturning prior rulings. These are workability,
reliance, intervening developments in the law and changes in fact. In
addition, courts put in the balance the following determinants:
closeness of the voting, age of the prior decision and its merits. The
leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule
in constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It established a
4-pronged test. The court should (1) determine whether the rule has proved
to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; (2) consider
whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special
hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of
repudiation; (3) determine whether related principles of law have so far
developed as to have the old rule no more than a remnant of an abandoned
doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed or come to be
seen differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or
justification.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In enacting R.A. 6735, it is daylight

luminous that Congress intended the said law to implement the right of the
people, thru initiative, to propose amendments to the Constitution by direct
action.— Let us reexamine the validity of the view of the six (6) justices
that R.A. 6735 is insufficient to implement Section 2, Article XVII of the
1987 Constitution allowing amendments to the Constitution to be directly
proposed by the people through initiative. When laws are challenged as
unconstitu-
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tional, courts are counseled to give life to the intent of legislators. In

enacting R.A. 6735, it is daylight luminous that Congress intended the said
law to implement the right of the people, thru initiative, to propose
amendments to the Constitution by direct action.
Same; Same; Same; Same; R.A. 6735 clearly expressed the legislative
policy for the people to propose amendments to the Constitution by direct
action, and the fact that the legislature may have omitted certain details in
implementing the people’s initiative in R.A. 6735, does not justify the
conclusion that, ergo, the law is insufficient—what were omitted were mere
details and not fundamental policies which Congress alone can and has
determined.—The tragedy is that while conceding this intent, the six (6)
justices, nevertheless, ruled that “x x x R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative
on amendments to the Constitution is concerned” for the following reasons:
(1) Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the
Constitution; (2) the Act does not provide for the contents of the petition
for initiative on the Constitution; and (3) while the Act provides subtitles for
National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and
Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the
Constitution. To say the least, these alleged omissions are too weak a reason
to throttle the right of the sovereign people to amend the Constitution
through initiative. R.A. 6735 clearly expressed the legislative policy for the
people to propose amendments to the Constitution by direct action. The fact
that the legislature may have omitted certain details in implementing the
people’s initiative in R.A. 6735, does not justify the conclusion that, ergo,
the law is insufficient. What were omitted were mere details and not
fundamental policies which Congress alone can and has determined.
Implementing details of a law can be delegated to the COMELEC and can
be the subject of its rule-making power. Under Section 2(1), Article IX-C of
the Constitution, the COMELEC has the power to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of initiatives. Its rule-making
power has long been recognized by this Court. In ruling R.A. 6735
insufficient but without striking it down as unconstitutional, the six (6)
justices failed to give due recognition to the indefeasible right of the
sovereign people to amend the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; “Amendment” and “Revision,”

Distinguished; Words and Phrases; The words “simple” and “substantial”
are not subject to any accurate quantitative or qualitative test; We stand on
unsafe ground if we use simple arithmetic to determine whether the
proposed changes are “simple”
180
or “substantial.”—The words “simple” and “substantial” are not subject to

any accurate quantitative or qualitative test. Obviously, relying on the
quantitative test, oppositors-intervenors assert that the amendments will
result in some one hundred (100) changes in the Constitution. Using the
same test, however, it is also arguable that petitioners seek to change
basically only two (2) out of the eighteen (18) articles of the 1987
Constitution, i.e. Article VI (Legislative Department) and Article VII
(Executive Department), together with the complementary provisions for a
smooth transition from a presidential bicameral system to a parliamentary
unicameral structure. The big bulk of the 1987 Constitution will not be
affected including Articles I (National Territory), II (Declaration of
Principles and State Policies), III (Bill of Rights), IV (Citizenship), V
(Suffrage), VIII (Judicial Department), IX (Constitutional Commissions), X
(Local Government), XI (Accountability of Public Officers), XII (National
Economy and Patrimony), XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights), XIV
(Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports), XV (The
Family), XVI (General Provisions), and even XVII (Amendments or
Revisions). In fine, we stand on unsafe ground if we use simple
arithmetic to determine whether the proposed changes are “simple” or
“substantial.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The proposed changes will not
change the fundamental nature of our state as “a democratic and
republican state.”— Nor can this Court be surefooted if it applies the
qualitative test to determine whether the said changes are “simple” or
“substantial” as to amount to a revision of the Constitution. The well-
regarded political scientist, Garner, says that a good constitution should
contain at least three (3) sets of provisions: the constitution of liberty
which sets forth the fundamental rights of the people and imposes certain
limitations on the powers of the government as a means of securing the
enjoyment of these rights; the constitution of government which deals with
the framework of government and its powers, laying down certain rules for
its administration and defining the electorate; and, the constitution of
sovereignty which prescribes the mode or procedure for amending or
revising the constitution. It is plain that the proposed changes will
basically affect only the constitution of government. The constitutions of
liberty and sovereignty remain unaffected. Indeed, the proposed changes
will not change the fundamental nature of our state as “x x x a
democratic and republican state.” It is self-evident that a unicameral-
parliamentary form of government will not make our State any less
democratic or any less republican in character. Hence, neither will the use
of the qualitative test resolve the issue of whether the proposed changes
are “simple” or “substantial.”
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VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 181
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Our Constitutions carried the

traditional distinction between “amendment” and “revision,” i.e.,
“amendment” means change, including complex changes while “revision”
means complete change, including the adoption of an entirely new covenant.
—Our Constitutions did not adopt any quantitative or qualitative test
to determine whether an “amendment” is “simple” or “substantial.”
Nor did they provide that “substantial” amendments are beyond the
power of the people to propose to change the Constitution. Instead, our
Constitutions carried the traditional distinction between “amendment”
and “revision,” i.e., “amendment” means change, including complex
changes while “revision” means complete change, including the adoption
of an entirely new covenant. The legal dictionaries express this traditional
difference between “amendment” and “revision.” Black’s Law Dictionary
defines “amendment” as “[a] formal revision or addition proposed or made
to a statute, constitution, pleading, order, or other instrument; specifically, a
change made by addition, deletion, or correction.” Black’s also refers to
“amendment” as “the process of making such a revision.” Revision, on the
other hand, is defined as “[a] reexamination or careful review for correction
or improvement.” In parliamentary law, it is described as “[a] general and
thorough rewriting of a governing document, in which the entire document
is open to amendment.” Similarly, Ballentine’s Law Dictionary defines
“amendment”—as “[a] correction or revision of a writing to correct errors
or better to state its intended purpose” and “amendment of constitution” as
“[a] process of proposing, passing, and ratifying amendments to the x x x
constitution.” In contrast, “revision,” when applied to a statute (or
constitution), “contemplates the re-examination of the same subject matter
contained in the statute (or constitution), and the substitution of a new, and
what is believed to be, a still more perfect rule.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; It is familiar

learning, however, that opinions in a constitutional convention, especially if
inconclusive of an issue, are of very limited value as explaining doubtful
phrases, and are an unsafe guide (to the intent of the people) since the
constitution derives its force as a fundamental law, not from the action of the
convention but from the powers (of the people) who have ratified and
adopted it.— The oppositors-intervenors who peddle the above proposition
rely on the opinions of some Commissioners expressed in the course of the
debate on how to frame the amendment/revision provisions of the 1987
Constitution. It is familiar learning, however, that opinions in a
constitutional convention, especially if inconclusive of an issue, are of
very limited value as explaining doubtful phrases, and are an unsafe guide
(to the intent of the peo-
182
ple) since the constitution derives its force as a fundamental law, not from
the action of the convention but from the powers (of the people) who have
ratified and adopted it. “Debates in the constitutional convention ‘are of
value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the
reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the
large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow
citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of
fundamental law.’” Indeed, a careful perusal of the debates of the
Constitutional Commissioners can likewise lead to the conclusion that
there was no abandonment of the traditional distinction between
“amendment” and “revision.” For during the debates, some of the
commissioners referred to the concurring opinion of former Justice Felix Q.
Antonio in Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, that stressed the
traditional distinction between amendment and revision.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is arguable that when the
framers of the 1987 Constitution used the word “revision,” they had in mind
the “rewriting of the whole Constitution,” or the “total overhaul of the
Constitution”—anything less is an “amendment” or just “a change of
specific provisions only.”—It is arguable that when the framers of the 1987
Constitution used the word “revision,” they had in mind the “rewriting of
the whole Constitution,” or the “total overhaul of the Constitution.”
Anything less is an “amendment” or just “a change of specific provisions
only,” the intention being “not the change of the entire Constitution, but
only the improvement of specific parts or the addition of provisions deemed
essential as a consequence of new conditions or the elimination of parts
already considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of the times.”
Under this view, “substantial” amendments are still “amendments” and thus
can be proposed by the people via an initiative.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The constitution does not
derive its force from the convention which framed it, but from the people
who ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is that of the people, and it is not
to be supposed that they have looked for any dark or abstruse meaning in
the words employed, but rather that they have accepted them in the sense
most obvious to the common understanding, and ratified the instrument in
the belief that that was the sense designed to be conveyed; A constitution is
not to be interpreted on narrow or technical principles, but liberally and on
broad general lines, to accomplish the object of its establishment and carry
out the great principles of government—not to defeat them.—As we cannot
be guided with certainty by the inconclusive opinions of the
Commissioners on the difference
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between “simple” and “substantial” amendments or whether “substantial”

amendments amounting to revision are covered by people’s initiative, it
behooves us to follow the cardinal rule in interpreting Constitutions, i.e.,
construe them to give effect to the intention of the people who adopted it.
The illustrious Cooley explains its rationale well, viz.: x x x the constitution
does not derive its force from the convention which framed it, but from the
people who ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is that of the people, and it
is not to be supposed that they have looked for any dark or abstruse meaning
in the words employed, but rather that they have accepted them in the sense
most obvious to the common understanding, and ratified the instrument in
the belief that that was the sense designed to be conveyed. These
proceedings therefore are less conclusive of the proper construction of the
instrument than are legislative proceedings of the proper construction of a
statute; since in the latter case it is the intent of the legislature we seek,
while in the former we are endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the people
through the discussion and deliberations of their representatives. The history
of the calling of the convention, the causes which led to it, and the
discussions and issues before the people at the time of the election of the
delegates, will sometimes be quite as instructive and satisfactory as anything
to be gathered form the proceedings of the convention. Corollarily, a
constitution is not to be interpreted on narrow or technical principles, but
liberally and on broad general lines, to accomplish the object of its
establishment and carry out the great principles of government—not to
defeat them. One of these great principles is the sovereignty of the people.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The argument that the people
through initiative cannot propose substantial amendments to change the
Constitution turns sovereignty on its head.—The end result is Section 2,
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution which expressed the right of the
sovereign people to propose amendments to the Constitution by direct
action or through initiative. To that extent, the delegated power of
Congress to amend or revise the Constitution has to be adjusted
downward. Thus, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution has to be
reminted and now provides: “The legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum.” Prescinding from these baseline
premises, the argument that the people through initiative cannot
propose substantial amendments to change the Constitution turns
sovereignty on its head. At the very least, the submission constricts the
democratic space for the exercise of the direct sovereignty of the people. It
also denigrates the
184
sovereign people who they claim can only be trusted with the power to
propose “simple” but not “substantial” amendments to the Constitution.
According to Sinco, the concept of sovereignty should be strictly
understood in its legal meaning as it was originally developed in law. Legal
sovereignty, he explained, is “the possession of unlimited power to make
laws. Its possessor is the legal sovereign. It implies the absence of any other
party endowed with legally superior powers and privileges. It is not subject
to law ‘for it is the author and source of law.’ Legal sovereignty is thus
the equivalent of legal omnipotence.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Sovereignty or popular

sovereignty, emphasizes the supremacy of the people’s will over the state
which they themselves have created.—Sovereignty or popular sovereignty,
emphasizes the supremacy of the people’s will over the state which they
themselves have created. The state is created by and subject to the will of
the people, who are the source of all political power. Rightly, we have ruled
that “the sovereignty of our people is not a kabalistic principle whose
dimensions are buried in mysticism. Its metes and bounds are familiar to the
framers of our Constitutions. They knew that in its broadest sense,
sovereignty is meant to be supreme, the jus summi imperu, the absolute right
to govern.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; Judgments; COMELEC’s

reliance on Santiago v. Commission on Elections, 336 Phil. 848 (1997),
constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction—the
Santiago case did not establish the firm doctrine that R.A. 6735 is not a
sufficient law to implement the constitutional provision allowing people’s
initiative to amend the Constitution.—I respectfully submit that
COMELEC’s reliance on Santiago constitutes grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Santiago case did not establish the
firm doctrine that R.A. 6735 is not a sufficient law to implement the
constitutional provision allowing people’s initiative to amend the
Constitution. To recapitulate, the records show that in the original decision,
eight (8) justices voted that R.A. 6735 was not a sufficient law; five (5)
justices voted that said law was sufficient; and one (1) justice abstained
from voting on the issue holding that unless and until a proper initiatory
pleading is filed, the said issue is not ripe for adjudication. Within the
reglementary period, the respondents filed their motion for reconsideration.
On June 10, 1997, the Court denied the motion. Only thirteen (13) justices
resolved the motion for Justice Torres inhibited himself. Of the original
majority of eight (8) justices, only six (6) reiterated their ruling that
R.A. 6735 was an insufficient law. Justice Hermosisima, originally part of
the majority of eight (8) justices, changed his vote and
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joined the minority of five (5) justices. He opined without any equivocation
that R.A. 6735 was a sufficient law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Under any alchemy of law, a
deadlocked vote of six (6) is not a majority and a non-majority cannot write
a rule with precedential value.—It ought to be beyond debate that the six (6)
justices who voted that R.A. 6735 is an insufficient law failed to establish a
doctrine that could serve as a precedent. Under any alchemy of law, a
deadlocked vote of six (6) is not a majority and a non-majority cannot write
a rule with precedential value.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In the United States, an

affirmance in the Federal Supreme Court upon equal division of opinion is
not an authority for the determination of other cases, either in that Court or
in the inferior federal courts.—The jurisprudence that an equally divided
Court can never set a precedent is well-settled. Thus, in the United States,
an affirmance in the Federal Supreme Court upon equal division of
opinion is not an authority for the determination of other cases, either in
that Court or in the inferior federal courts. In Neil v. Biggers, which was a
habeas corpus state proceeding by a state prisoner, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that its equally divided affirmance of petitioner’s state court
conviction was not an “actual adjudication” barring subsequent
consideration by the district court on habeas corpus. In discussing the non-
binding effect of an equal division ruling, the Court reviewed the history
of cases explicating the disposition “affirmed by an equally divided Court:”
In this light, we review our cases explicating the disposition “affirmed by an
equally divided Court.” On what was apparently the first occasion of an
equal division, The Antelope, 10 Wheat, 66, 6 L. Ed. 268 (1825), the
Court simply affirmed on the point of division without much discussion. Id.,
at 126-127. Faced with a similar division during the next Term, the Court
again affirmed, Chief Justice Marshall explaining that “the principles of law
which have been argued, cannot be settled; but the judgment is affirmed, the
court being divided in opinion upon it.” Etting v. Bank of United States, 11
Wheat. 59, 78, 6 L. Ed. 419 (1826). As was later elaborated in such cases,
it is the appellant or petitioner who asks the Court to overturn a lower
court’s decree. “If the judges are divided, the reversal cannot be had, for no
order can be made. The judgment of the court below, therefore, stands in
full force. It is indeed, the settled practice in such case to enter a judgment
of affirmance; but this is only the most convenient mode of expressing the
fact that the cause is finally disposed of in conformity with the action of the
court below, and that that court can proceed to enforce its judgment. The
legal effect would be the same
186
if the appeal, or writ of error, were dismissed.” Durant v. Essex Co., 7 Wall.
107, 112, 19 L. Ed. 154 (1869). Nor is an affirmance by an equally divided
Court entitled to precedential weight. Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S.
263, 264, 80 S. Ct. 1463, 1464, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1708 (1960). x x x” This
doctrine established in Neil has not been overturned and has been cited with
approval in a number of subsequent cases, and has been applied in various
state jurisdictions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The prevailing doctrine
is that, the affirmance by an equally divided court merely disposes of the
present controversy as between the parties and settles no issue of law—the
affirmance leaves unsettled the principle of law presented by the case and is
not entitled to precedential weight or value.—After a tour of these cases, we
can safely conclude that the prevailing doctrine is that, the affirmance by
an equally divided court merely disposes of the present controversy as
between the parties and settles no issue of law; the affirmance leaves
unsettled the principle of law presented by the case and is not entitled to
precedential weight or value. In other words, the decision only has res
judicata and not stare decisis effect. It is not conclusive and binding upon
other parties as respects the controversies in other actions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Republicanism; Stripped of its abstractions,

democracy is all about who has the sovereign right to make decisions for
the people and our Constitution clearly and categorically says it is no other
than the people themselves from whom all government authority emanates—
this right of the people to make decisions is the essence of sovereignty, and
it cannot receive any minimalist interpretation from this Court.—The first
principle enthroned by blood in our Constitution is the sovereignty of the
people. We ought to be concerned with this first principle, i.e., the inherent
right of the sovereign people to decide whether to amend the Constitution.
Stripped of its abstractions, democracy is all about who has the sovereign
right to make decisions for the people and our Constitution clearly and
categorically says it is no other than the people themselves from whom all
government authority emanates. This right of the people to make
decisions is the essence of sovereignty, and it cannot receive any
minimalist interpretation from this Court. If there is any principle in the
Constitution that cannot be diluted and is non-negotiable, it is this sovereign
right of the people to decide.
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QUISUMBING, J., Separate Opinion:

People’s Initiative; Clearly, by the power of popular initiative, the people
have the sovereign right to change the present Constitution.—It must be
stressed that no less than the present Constitution itself empowers the people
to “directly” propose amendments through their own “initiative.” The

subject of the instant petition is by way of exercising that initiative in order
to change our form of government from presidential to parliamentary. Much
has been written about the fulsome powers of the people in a democracy.
But the most basic concerns the idea that sovereignty resides in the people
and that all government authority emanates from them. Clearly, by the
power of popular initiative, the people have the sovereign right to change
the present Constitution. Whether the initial moves are done by a
Constitutional Convention, a Constitutional Assembly, or a People’s
Initiative, in the end every amendment—however insubstantial or radical—
must be submitted to a plebiscite. Thus, it is the ultimate will of the people
expressed in the ballot, that matters.
Now that we have revisited the Santiago v. COMELEC, 336 Phil. 848
(1997), decision, there is only one clear task for COMELEC—in my view,
the only doable option left for the COMELEC, once factual issues are heard
and resolved, is to give due course to the petition for the initiative to amend
our Constitution so that the sovereign people can vote on whether a
parliamentary system of government should replace the present presidential
system.—I see no objection to the remand to the COMELEC of the petition
of Messrs. Lambino and Aumentado and 6.327 million voters, for further
examination of the factual requisites before a plebiscite is conducted. On
page 4 of the assailed Resolution of the respondent dated August 31, 2006,
the COMELEC tentatively expressed its view that “even if the signatures in
the instant Petition appear to meet the required minimum per centum of the
total number of registered voters,” the COMELEC could not give the
Petition due course because of our view that R.A. No. 6735 was inadequate.
That, however, is now refuted by Mr. Justice Puno’s scholarly ponencia.
Now that we have revisited the Santiago v. COMELEC decision, there is
only one clear task for COMELEC. In my view, the only doable option left
for the COMELEC, once factual issues are heard and resolved, is to give
due course to the petition for the initiative to amend our Constitution so that
the sovereign people can vote on whether a parliamentary system of
government should replace the present presidential system.
188

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Separate Opinion:

People’s Initiative; Evidently, for the people to propose amendments to the
Constitution, they must, in the first instance, know exactly what they are
proposing—it is not enough that they merely possess a general idea of the
proposed changes, as the Constitution speaks of a “direct” proposal by the
people.—The necessity of setting forth the text of the proposed
constitutional changes in the petition for initiative to be signed by the people
cannot be seriously disputed. To begin with, Article XVII, Section 2 of the
Constitution unequivocally states that “[a]mendments to this Constitution

may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum of the registered voters therein.” Evidently, for the people
to propose amendments to the Constitution, they must, in the first instance,
know exactly what they are proposing. It is not enough that they merely
possess a general idea of the proposed changes, as the Constitution speaks
of a “direct” proposal by the people.
Same; Same; Same; The requirement of setting forth the complete text
of the proposed changes in the petition for initiative is a safeguard against
fraud and deception.—The requirement of setting forth the complete text of
the proposed changes in the petition for initiative is a safeguard against
fraud and deception. If the whole text of the proposed changes is contained
in or attached to the petition, intercalations and riders may be duly avoided.
Only then can we be assured that the proposed changes are truly of the
people and that the signatories have been fully apprised of its implications.
If a statutory provision is essential to guard against fraud, corruption or
deception in the initiative and referendum process, such provision must be
viewed as an indispensable requirement and failure to substantially comply
therewith is fatal. The failure of petitioners in this case to comply with the
full text requirement resultantly rendered their petition for initiative fatally
defective.
Same; Same; Same; Logrolling; One-Subject One-Title Rule; The one

subject rule, as relating to an initiative to amend the Constitution, has the
same object and purpose as the one subject-one bill rule embodied in
Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution; As applied to the initiative
process, the one subject rule is essentially designed to prevent surprise and
fraud on the electorate.—The petition for initiative is likewise irretrievably
infirm because it violates the one subject rule under Section 10(a) of R.A.
6735: SEC. 10. Prohibited Measures.—The following cannot be the subject
of an initiative or
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referendum petition: (a) No petition embracing more than one subject shall
be submitted to the electorate; x x x The one subject rule, as relating to an
initiative to amend the Constitution, has the same object and purpose as the
one subject-one bill rule embodied in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the
Constitution. To elaborate, the one subject-one bill rule was designed to do
away with the practice of inserting two or more unrelated provisions in one
bill, so that those favoring one provision would be compelled to adopt the
others. By this process of log-rolling, the adoption of both provisions could
be accomplished and ensured, when neither, if standing alone, could
succeed on its own merits. As applied to the initiative process, the one
subject rule is essentially designed to prevent surprise and fraud on the
electorate. It is meant to safeguard the integrity of the initiative process by
ensuring that no unrelated riders are concealed within the terms of the
proposed amendment. This in turn guarantees that the signatories are fully
aware of the nature, scope and purpose of the proposed amendment.
Same; Same; Same; It is not difficult to see that while the proposed
changes appear to relate only to a shift in the form of government, it
actually seeks to affect other subjects that are not reasonably germane to
the constitutional alteration that is purportedly sought.—The proposed
changes to the Constitution cover other subjects that are beyond the main
proposal espoused by the petitioners. Apart from a shift from the
presidential to a parliamentary form of government, the proposed changes
include the abolition of one House of Congress, and the convening of a
constituent assembly to propose additional amendments to the Constitution.
Also included within its terms is an omnibus declaration that those
constitutional provisions under Articles VI and VII, which are inconsistent
with the unicameral-parliamentary form of government, shall be deemed
amended to conform thereto. It is not difficult to see that while the proposed
changes appear to relate only to a shift in the form of government, it actually
seeks to affect other subjects that are not reasonably germane to the
constitutional alteration that is purportedly sought. For one, a shift to a
parliamentary system of government does not necessarily result in the
adoption of a unicameral legislature. A parliamentary system can exist in
many different “hybrid” forms of government, which may or may not
embrace unicameralism. In other words, the shift from presidential to
parliamentary structure and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature is
neither the cause nor effect of the other.
Same; Same; Same; The distinction between the two terms

—”amendment” and “revision”—is not as significant in the context of the
past constitutions, as it should be now under the 1987 Constitution since
under the
190
past constitutions, it was Congress alone, acting either as a constituent

assembly or by calling out a constitutional convention, that exercised
authority to either amend or revise the Constitution through the procedures
therein described.—The foregoing traditional exposition of the difference
between amendment and revision has indeed guided us throughout our
constitutional history. However, the distinction between the two terms is not,
to my mind, as significant in the context of our past constitutions, as it
should be now under the 1987 Constitution. The reason for this is apparent.
Under our past constitutions, it was Congress alone, acting either as a
constituent assembly or by calling out a constitutional convention, that

exercised authority to either amend or revise the Constitution through the
procedures therein described. Although the distinction between the two
terms was theoretically recognized under both the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, the need to highlight the difference was not as material
because it was only Congress that could effect constitutional changes by
choosing between the two modalities. However, it is different now under the
1987 Constitution. Apart from providing for the two modes of either
Congress constituting itself as a constituent assembly or calling out for a
constitutional convention, a third mode was introduced for proposing
changes to the Constitution. This mode refers to the people’s right to
propose amendments to the fundamental law through the filing of a petition
for initiative.
Same; Same; Same; The proposed changes will have serious

qualitative consequences on the Constitution.—It may thus be conceded
that, quantitatively, the changes espoused by the proponents in this case will
affect only two (2) out of the eighteen (18) articles of the 1987 Constitution,
namely, Article VI (Legislative Department) and Article VII (Executive
Department), as well as provisions that will ensure the smooth transition
from a presidential-bicameral system to a parliamentary-unicameral
structure of government. The quantitative effect of the proposed changes is
neither broad nor extensive and will not affect the substantial entirety of the
1987 Constitution. However, it is my opinion that the proposed changes will
have serious qualitative consequences on the Constitution. The initiative
petition, if successful, will undoubtedly alter, not only our basic
governmental plan, but also redefine our rights as citizens in relation to
government. The proposed changes will set into motion a ripple effect that
will strike at the very foundation of our basic constitutional plan. It is
therefore an impermissible constitutional revision that may not be effected
through a people’s initiative.
Same; Same; Same; The shift from presidential to parliamentary form

of government cannot be regarded as anything but a drastic change. It will
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VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 191
require a total overhaul of our governmental structure and involve a

reorientation in the cardinal doctrines that govern our constitutional set-up.
—In the proposed parliamentary system, there is an obvious lack of formal
institutional checks on the legislative and executive powers of the state,
since both the Prime Minister and the members of his cabinet are drawn
from parliament. There are no effective limits to what the Prime Minister
and parliament can do, except the will of the parliamentary majority. This
goes against the central principle of our present constitutional scheme that
distributes the powers of government and provides for counteraction among
the three branches. Although both the presidential and parliamentary

systems are theoretically consistent with constitutional democracy, the
underlying tenets and resulting governmental framework are nonetheless
radically different. Consequently, the shift from presidential to
parliamentary form of government cannot be regarded as anything but a
drastic change. It will require a total overhaul of our governmental structure
and involve a reorientation in the cardinal doctrines that govern our
constitutional set-up. As explained by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a switch
from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision
because of its over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure. It
cannot, by any standard, be deemed as a mere constitutional amendment.
Same; Same; Same; The inclusion of a proposal to convene a

constituent assembly likewise shows the intention of the proponents to effect
even more farreaching changes in our fundamental law; The proposal to
convene a constituent assembly, which by its terms is mandatory, will
practically jeopardize the future of the entire Constitution and place it on
shaky grounds.—The inclusion of a proposal to convene a constituent
assembly likewise shows the intention of the proponents to effect even more
far-reaching changes in our fundamental law. If the original intent were to
simply shift the form of government to the parliamentary system, then there
would have been no need for the calling out of a constituent assembly to
propose further amendments to the Constitution. It should be noted that,
once convened, a constituent assembly can do away and replace any
constitutional provision which may not even have a bearing on the shift to a
parliamentary system of government. The inclusion of such a proposal
reveals the proponents’ plan to consider all provisions of the constitution,
either to determine which of its provisions should be altered or suppressed
or whether the whole document should be replaced with an entirely new
one. Consequently, it is not true that only Articles VI and VII are covered by
the alleged people’s initiative. The proposal to convene a constituent
assembly, which by its terms is mandatory, will practically jeopardize the
future of the entire Constitution and
192
place it on shaky grounds. The plan of the proponents, as reflected in their

proposed changes, goes beyond the shifting of government from the
presidential to the parliamentary system. Indeed, it could even extend to the
“fundamental nature of our state as a democratic and republican state.”
Same; Same; Same; The voice and will of our people cannot be any
clearer when they limited people’s initiative to mere amendments of the
fundamental law and excluded revisions in its scope; Article XVII on
amendments and revisions is called a “constitution of sovereignty” because
it defines the constitutional meaning of “sovereignty of the people”—it is
through these provisions that the sovereign people have allowed the
expression of their sovereign will and have canalized their powers which
would otherwise be plenary.—Our people too have spoken when they
overwhelmingly ratified the 1987 Constitution, with the provisions on
amendments and revisions under Article XVII. The voice and will of our
people cannot be any clearer when they limited people’s initiative to mere
amendments of the fundamental law and excluded revisions in its scope. In
this regard, the task of the Court is to give effect to the people’s voice, as
expressed unequivocally through the Constitution. Article XVII on
amendments and revisions is called a “constitution of sovereignty” because
it defines the constitutional meaning of “sovereignty of the people.” It is
through these provisions that the sovereign people have allowed the
expression of their sovereign will and have canalized their powers which
would otherwise be plenary. By approving these provisions, the sovereign
people have decided to limit themselves and future generations in the
exercise of their sovereign power. They are thus bound by the constitution
and are powerless, whatever their numbers, to change or thwart its
mandates, except through the means prescribed by the Constitution itself.
Same; Same; Same; While Section 1 of Article XVII may be considered

as a provision delegating the sovereign powers of amendment and revision
to Congress, Section 2, in contrast, is a self-limitation on that sovereign
power; In choosing to exercise self-limitation, there is no absence or lack of
even a fraction of the sovereign power of the people since self-limitation
itself is an expression of that sovereign power.—It is thus misplaced to argue
that the people may propose revisions to the Constitution through people’s
initiative because their representatives, whose power is merely delegated,
may do so. While Section 1 of Article XVII may be considered as a
provision delegating the sovereign powers of amendment and revision to
Congress, Section 2, in contrast, is a self-limitation on that sovereign
power. In the words of Cooley: x x x Although by their constitutions the
people have delegated the exercise of sovereign powers to the several de-
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VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 193
partments, they have not thereby divested themselves of the sovereignty.

They retain in their own hands, so far as they have thought it needful to do
so, a power to control the governments they create, and the three
departments are responsible to and subject to be ordered, directed, changed
or abolished by them. But this control and direction must be exercised in the
legitimate mode previously agreed upon. The voice of the people, acting in
their sovereign capacity, can be of legal force only when expressed at the
times and under the conditions which they themselves have prescribed and
pointed out by the Constitution, or which, consistently with the Constitution,
have been prescribed and pointed out for them by statute; and if by any
portion of the people, however large, an attempt should be made to interfere
with the regular working of the agencies of government at any other time or
in any other mode than as allowed by existing law, either constitutional or
statutory, it would be revolutionary in character, and must be resisted and
repressed by the officers who, for the time being, represent legitimate
government. (Italics supplied) Consequently, there is here no case of “the
spring rising above its source.” Nor is it one where the people’s sovereign
power has been relegated to a lesser plane than that of Congress. In
choosing to exercise self-limitation, there is no absence or lack of even a
fraction of the sovereign power of the people since self-limitation itself is
an expression of that sovereign power. The people have chosen to
delegate and limit their sovereign power by virtue of the Constitution and
are bound by the parameters that they themselves have ordained. Otherwise,
if the people choose to defy their self-imposed constitutional restraints, we
will be faced with a revolutionary situation.
Same; Same; Same; Even as we affirm, however, that aspect of direct

democracy, we should not forget that, first and foremost, we are a
constitutional democracy.—It has repeatedly been emphasized that ours is a
democratic and republican state. Even as we affirm, however, that aspect of
direct democracy, we should not forget that, first and foremost, we are a
constitutional democracy. To uphold direct democracy at the expense of the
fundamental law is to sanction, not a constitutional, but an extra-
constitutional recourse. This is clearly beyond the powers of the Court who,
by sovereign mandate, is the guardian and keeper of the Constitution.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., Dissenting Opinion:

People’s Initiative; Republicanism; Caution should be exercised in choosing
one’s battlecry, lest it does more harm than good to one’s cause.—Vox
populi
194
vox Dei—the voice of the people is the voice of God. Caution should be
exercised in choosing one’s battlecry, lest it does more harm than good to
one’s cause. In its original context, the complete version of this Latin phrase
means exactly the opposite of what it is frequently taken to mean. It
originated from a holy man, the monk Alcuin, who advised Charlemagne,
“nec audiendi qui solent dicere vox populi vox Dei quum tumultuositas
vulgi semper insaniae proxima sit,” meaning, “And those people should
not be listened to who keep on saying, ‘The voice of the people is the
voice of God,’ since the riotousness of the crowd is always very close to
madness.” Perhaps, it is by providence that the true meaning of the Latin
phrase is revealed upon petitioners and their allies—that they may reflect
upon the sincerity and authenticity of their “people’s initiative.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; History has been a witness to countless

iniquities committed in the name of God; After a thorough consideration of
the petitions, I have come to realize that man, with his ingenuity and
arrogance, has perfected the craft of imitating the voice of God.—History
has been a witness to countless iniquities committed in the name of God.
Wars were waged, despotism tolerated and oppressions justified—all these
transpired as man boasted of God’s imprimatur. Today, petitioners and their
allies hum the same rallying call, convincing this Court that the people’s
initiative is the “voice of the people” and, therefore, the “voice of God.”
After a thorough consideration of the petitions, I have come to realize that
man, with his ingenuity and arrogance, has perfected the craft of imitating
the voice of God. It is against this kind of genius that the Court must guard
itself.
Same; Same; Same; Judicial Review; The Resolution of respondent

COMELEC denying due course to the petition for initiative on the basis of a
case (Santiago) decided by this Court cannot, in any way, be characterized
as “capricious or whimsical,” “patent and gross,” or “arbitrary and
despotic.”— Jurisprudence teaches that an act of a court or tribunal may
only be considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same
was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment. The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility. The Resolution of respondent COMELEC denying due
course to the petition for initiative on the basis of a case (Santiago) decided
by this Court cannot, in any way, be characterized as “capricious or
whimsical,” “patent and gross,” or “arbitrary and despotic.” On the
contrary, it was the most pru-
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dent course to take. It must be stressed that in Santiago, this Court

permanently enjoins respondent COMELEC “from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted.” It
being a fact that Congress has not enacted a sufficient law, respondent
COMELEC has no alternative but to adhere to Santiago. Otherwise, it is
vulnerable to a citation for contempt.
Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; Judgments; Stare Decisis; There

is considerable literature about whether this doctrine of stare decisis is a
good or bad one, but the doctrine is usually justified by arguments which
focus on the desirability of stability and certainty in the law and also by
notions of justice and fairness.—The maxim stare decisis et non quieta
movere translates “stand by the decisions and disturb not what is

settled.” As used in our jurisprudence, it means that “once this Court has
laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it
would adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which
the facts are substantially the same as in the earlier controversy.” There
is considerable literature about whether this doctrine of stare decisis is a
good or bad one, but the doctrine is usually justified by arguments which
focus on the desirability of stability and certainty in the law and also by
notions of justice and fairness. Justice Benjamin Cardozo in his treatise,
The Nature of the Judicial Process stated: It will not do to decide the same
question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way between
another. ‘If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect
the same decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases
on opposite principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday when
I was a defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I am
plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling of resentment and
wrong in my breast; it would be an infringement, material and moral,
of my rights.’ Adherence to precedent must then be the rule rather than the
exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed administration of
justice in the courts.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is fundamental

jurisprudential policy that prior applicable precedent usually must be
followed even though the case, if considered anew, might be decided
differently by the current justices, and this policy is based on the assumption
that certainty, predictability and stability in the law are the major objectives
of the legal system, i.e., that parties should be able to regulate their conduct
and enter into relationships with reasonable assurance of the governing
rules of law.—Although
196
the doctrine of stare decisis does not prevent re-examining and, if need be,
overruling prior decisions, “It is x x x a fundamental jurisprudential policy
that prior applicable precedent usually must be followed even though the
case, if considered anew, might be decided differently by the current
justices. This policy x x x ‘is based on the assumption that certainty,
predictability and stability in the law are the major objectives of the
legal system; i.e., that parties should be able to regulate their conduct
and enter into relationships with reasonable assurance of the governing
rules of law. Accordingly, a party urging overruling a precedent faces a
rightly onerous task, the difficulty of which is roughly proportional to a
number of factors, including the age of the precedent, the nature and
extent of public and private reliance on it, and its consistency or
inconsistency with other related rules of law. Here, petitioners failed to
discharge their task.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Santiago v. COMELEC, 270

SCRA 106 (1997), was decided by this Court on March 19, 1997 or more
than nine (9) years ago, and during that span of time, the Filipino people,
specifically the law practitioners, law professors, law students, the entire
judiciary and litigants have recognized this Court’s Decision as a precedent.
—Santiago v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106 (1997), was decided by this
Court on March 19, 1997 or more than nine (9) years ago. During that span
of time, the Filipino people, specifically the law practitioners, law
professors, law students, the entire judiciary and litigants have recognized
this Court’s Decision as a precedent. In fact, the Santiago doctrine was
applied by this Court in the subsequent case of PIRMA. Even the legislature
has relied on said Decision, thus, several bills have been introduced in both
Houses of Congress to cure the deficiency. I cannot fathom why it should be
overturned or set aside merely on the basis of the petition of Lambino, et al.
Indeed, this Court’s conclusion in Santiago that R.A. No. 6735 is
incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar
as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned remains a
precedent and must be upheld.

Words and Phrases; Both “revision” and “amendment” connote change—
any distinction between the two must be based upon the degree of change
contemplated.— Both “revision” and amendment” connote change; any
distinction between the two must be based upon the degree of change
contemplated. In Kelly v. Laing, 242 N.W. 891 259 Mich 212, the Supreme
Court of Michigan made the follow-ing comparison of the two terms:
“Revision” and “amendment” have the common characteristics of working
changes in the charter, and are sometimes
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used in exactly the same sense but there is an essential difference between
them. “Revision” implies a reexamination of the whole law and a redraft
without obligation to maintain the form, scheme, or structure of the old.
As applied to fundamental law, such as a constitution or charter, it suggests
a convention to examine the whole subject and to prepare and submit a new
instrument whether the desired changes from the old are few or many.
Amendment implies continuance of the general plan and purpose of the
law, with corrections to better accomplish its purpose. Basically, revision
suggests fundamental change, while amendment is a correction of detail.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Although, at first glance, petitioners’

proposed changes appear to cover isolated and specific provisions only,
however, upon careful scrutiny, it becomes clear that the proposed changes
will alter the very structure of our government and create multifarious
ramifications—the proposed changes will have a “domino effect” or, more
appropriately, “ripple effect” on other provisions of the Constitution.—In

summary, it would seem that any major change in governmental form and
scheme would probably be interpreted as a “revision” and should be
achieved through the more thorough process of deliberation. Although, at
first glance, petitioners’ proposed changes appear to cover isolated and
specific provisions only, however, upon careful scrutiny, it becomes clear
that the proposed changes will alter the very structure of our
government and create multifarious ramifications. In other words, the
proposed changes will have a “domino effect” or, more appropriately,
“ripple effect” on other provisions of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; The doctrine of

separation of powers is so interwoven in the fabric of our Constitution that
any change affecting such doctrine must necessarily be a revision.—A shift
from a presidential to a parliamentary form of government affects the well-
enshrined doctrine of separation of powers of government, embodied in our
Constitution, by providing for an Executive, Legislative and Judiciary
Branches. In a Parliamentary form of government, the Executive Branch is
to a certain degree, dependent on the direct or indirect support of the
Parliament, as expressed through a “vote of confidence.” To my mind, this
doctrine of separation of powers is so interwoven in the fabric of our
Constitution, that any change affecting such doctrine must necessarily
be a revision.
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R.A. No. 6735 is not the enabling law contemplated by the Constitution.—
R.A. No. 6735 does not specify the procedure how initiative on the
Constitution may be accomplished. This is not the enabling law
contemplated by the Constitution. As pointed out by oppositor-intervenor
Alternative Law Groups Inc., since the promulgation of the Decision in
Santiago, various bills have been introduced in both Houses of Congress
providing for a complete and adequate process for people’s initiative.
Same; Same; Same; The phrase “directly proposed by the people”

excludes any person acting as representative or agent of the 12% of the total
number of registered voters; The plea that the Court should “hear” and
“heed” the people’s voice is baseless and misleading—there is no people’s
voice to be heard and heeded as the petition for initiative is not truly theirs,
but only of petitioners Lambino and Aumentado and their allies.—
Petitioners Lambino and Aumentado have no authority whatsoever to file
the petition “as representatives” of the alleged 6.3 million registered
voters. Such act of representation is constitutionally proscribed. To
repeat, Section 2 strictly requires that amendments to the Constitution shall
be “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of
at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters.”

Obviously, the phrase “directly proposed by the people” excludes any
person acting as representative or agent of the 12% of the total number of
registered voters. The Constitution has bestowed upon the people the right
to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Such right cannot be
usurped by anyone under the guise of being the people’s representative.
Simply put, Section 2 does not recognize acts of representation. For it is
only “the people” (comprising the minimum of 12% of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by
at least three per centum of the registered voters therein) who are the proper
parties to initiate a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution.
Verily, the petition filed with the COMELEC by herein petitioners Lambino
and Aumentado is not a people’s initiative. Necessarily, it must fail.
Corollarily, the plea that this Court should “hear” and “heed” “the people’s
voice” is baseless and misleading. There is no people’s voice to be heard
and heeded as this petition for initiative is not truly theirs, but only of
petitioners Lambino and Aumentado and their allies.
Same; Same; Same; Considering the political scenario in our country

today, it is my view that the so-called people’s initiative to amend our
Constitution from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary is
actually not
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an initiative of the people, but an initiative of some of our politicians.—In

fine, considering the political scenario in our country today, it is my view
that the so-called people’s initiative to amend our Constitution from
bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary is actually not an
initiative of the people, but an initiative of some of our politicians. It has not
been shown by petitioners, during the oral arguments in this case, that the
6.3 million registered voters who affixed their signatures understood what
they signed. In fact, petitioners admitted that the Constitutional provisions
sought to be amended and the proposed amendments were not explained to
all those registered voters. Indeed, there will be no means of knowing, to the
point of judicial certainty, whether they really understood what petitioners
and their group asked them to sign.
Same; Same; Same; Let us not repeat the mistake committed by this
Court in Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30 (1973). The
Court then ruled that “This being the vote of the majority, there is no further
judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and
effect,” although it had notice that the Constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified by the people in
accordance with the 1935 Constitution.—Let us not repeat the mistake
committed by this Court in Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA
30 (1973). The Court then ruled that “This being the vote of the majority,
there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered
in force and effect,” although it had notice that the Constitution proposed by
the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified by the people in
accordance with the 1935 Constitution. The Court concluded, among others,
that the viva voce voting in the Citizens’ Assemblies “was and is null and
void ab initio.” That was during martial law when perhaps majority of the
justices were scared of the dictator. Luckily at present, we are not under a
martial law regime. There is, therefore, no reason why this Court should
allow itself to be used as a legitimizing authority by the so-called people’s
initiative for those who want to perpetuate themselves in power.
CORONA, J., Dissenting Opinion:

People’s Initiative; Supreme Court; Judgments; Res Judicata; There is no
identity of parties in Santiago v. Commission on Elections, 270 SCRA 106
(1997) and the instant case.—Res judicata is the rule that a final judgment
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as
to the rights of the parties and their privies and, as to them, constitutes an
absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or
200
cause of action. It has the following requisites: (1) the former judgment or
order must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties; (3) it must be a
judgment or order on the merits and (4) there must be identity of parties, of
subject matter, and of cause of action between the first and second actions.
There is no identity of parties in Santiago and the instant case. While the
COMELEC was also the respondent in Santiago, the petitioners in that case
and those in this case are different. More significantly, there is no identity of
causes of action in the two cases. Santiago involved amendments to
Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII and Section 8 of
Article X of the Constitution while the present petition seeks to amend
Sections 1to 7 of Article VI and Sections 1 to 4 of the 1987 Constitution.
Clearly, therefore, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
when it ruled that the present petition for initiative was barred by Santiago
and, on that ground, dismissed the petition.
Same; Same; Same; The Court cannot unnecessarily and unreasonably

restrain the people’s right to directly propose changes to the Constitution by
declaring a law inadequate simply for lack of a sub-heading and other
grammatical but insignificant omissions.—While the legislature is
authorized to establish procedures for determining the validity and
sufficiency of a petition to amend the constitution, that procedure cannot
unnecessarily restrict the initiative privilege. In the same vein, this Court
cannot unnecessarily and unreasonably restrain the people’s right to directly
propose changes to the Constitution by declaring a law inadequate simply
for lack of a sub-heading and other grammatical but insignificant omissions.
Otherwise, the constitutional intent to empower the people will be severely
emasculated, if not rendered illusory.
Same; Same; Same; Republicanism; If Congress and a constitutional

convention, both of which are mere representative bodies, can propose
changes to the Constitution, there is no reason why the supreme body politic
itself—the people—may not do so directly.—If Congress and a constitutional
convention, both of which are mere representative bodies, can propose
changes to the Constitution, there is no reason why the supreme body politic
itself—the people—may not do so directly. Resort to initiative to amend the
constitution or enact a statute is an exercise of “direct democracy” as
opposed to “representative democracy.” The system of initiative allows
citizens to directly propose constitutional amendments for the general
electorate to adopt or reject at the polls, particularly in a plebiscite. While
representative government was envisioned to “refine and enlarge the public
views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens,
whose wisdom may
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best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love
of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial
considerations,” the exercise of “direct democracy” through initiative
reserves direct lawmaking power to the people by providing them a method
to make new laws via the constitution, or alternatively by enacting statutes.
Efforts of the represented to control their representatives through initiative
have been described as curing the problems of democracy with more
democracy.
CALLEJO, SR., J., Separate Concurring Opinion:

People’s Initiative; Judicial Review; Certiorari; It is a travesty for the Court
to declare the act of the COMELEC in denying due course to the petition for
initiative as “capricious, despotic, oppressive or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.”—In the present case, it
appears from the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC that it denied the
petition for initiative solely in obedience to the mandate of this Court in
Santiago v. Commission on Elections. In said case, the Court En Banc
permanently enjoined the COMELEC from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution
until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system. When the COMELEC denied the petition for
initiative, there was as yet no valid law enacted by Congress to provide for
the implementation of the system. It is a travesty for the Court to declare the
act of the COMELEC in denying due course to the petition for initiative as
“capricious, despotic, oppressive or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.” In fact, in so doing, the COMELEC
merely followed or applied, as it ought to do, the Court’s ruling in Santiago
to the effect that Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the system
of initiative is a non self-executory provision and requires an enabling law
for its implementation. In relation thereto, RA 6735 was found by the Court
to be “incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions”
to implement the constitutional provision on initiative. Consequently, the
COMELEC was “permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to
provide for the implementation of the system.” The decision of the Court
En Banc interpreting RA 6735 forms part of the legal system of the
Philippines. And no doctrine or principle laid down by the Court En Banc
may be modified or reversed except by the Court En Banc, certainly not by
the COMELEC. Until the Court En Banc modifies or reverses its decision,
the COMELEC is bound to follow the same.
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Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; Judgments; To get to the true

intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be
resorted to but the same must be considered in its entirety—a resolution or
ruling may and does appear in other parts of the decision and not merely in
the fallo thereof.— In the present case, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) takes the side of petitioners and argues that the COMELEC should
not have applied the ruling in Santiago to the petition for initiative because
the permanent injunction therein referred only to the Delfin petition. The
OSG buttresses this argument by pointing out that the Temporary
Restraining Order dated December 18, 1996 that was made permanent in the
dispositive portion referred only to the Delfin petition. The OSG’s attempt
to isolate the dispositive portion from the body of the Court’s decision in
Santiago is futile. It bears stressing that the dispositive portion must not be
read separately but in connection with the other portions of the decision of
which it forms a part. To get to the true intent and meaning of a decision, no
specific portion thereof should be resorted to but the same must be
considered in its entirety. Hence, a resolution or ruling may and does appear
in other parts of the decision and not merely in the fallo thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Given that a clear majority of the
members of the Court, eight Justices, concurred in the decision in Santiago
v. Commission on Elections, 270 SCRA 106 (1997), the pronouncement
therein that RA 6735 is “incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential
terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution

is concerned” constitutes a definitive ruling on the matter.—Santiago was
concurred in, without any reservation, by eight Justices, or the majority of
the members of the Court, who actually took part in the deliberations
thereon. On the other hand, five Justices, while voting for the dismissal of
the Delfin petition on the ground of insufficiency, dissented from the
majority opinion as they maintained the view that RA 6735 was sufficient to
implement the system of initiative. Given that a clear majority of the
members of the Court, eight Justices, concurred in the decision in Santiago,
the pronouncement therein that RA 6735 is “incomplete, inadequate, or
wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned” constitutes a definitive ruling
on the matter. In the Resolution dated June 10, 1997, the motions for
reconsideration of the Santiago decision were denied with finality as only
six Justices, or less than the majority, voted to grant the same. The
Resolution expressly stated that the motion for reconsideration failed “to
persuade the requisite majority of the Court to modify or reverse the
Decision of 19 March 1977.” In fine, the pronouncement in Santi-
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ago as embodied in the Decision of March 19, 1997 remains the definitive
ruling on the matter.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Stare Decisis; Ten (10) years after
Santiago and absent the occurrence of any compelling supervening event,
i.e., passage of a law to implement the system of initiative under Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution, that would warrant the re-examination of
the ruling therein, it behooves the Court to apply to the present case the
salutary and well-recognized doctrine of stare decisis.—The respective
explanatory notes of the said Senate and House bills uniformly recognize
that there is, to date, no law to govern the process by which constitutional
amendments are introduced by the people directly through the system of
initiative. Ten (10) years after Santiago and absent the occurrence of any
compelling supervening event, i.e., passage of a law to implement the
system of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, that
would warrant the reexamination of the ruling therein, it behooves the Court
to apply to the present case the salutary and well-recognized doctrine of
stare decisis. As earlier shown, Congress and other government agencies
have, in fact, abided by Santiago. The Court can do no less with respect to
its own ruling.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Parties should not be

encouraged to seek re-examination of determined principles and speculate
on fluctuation of the law with every change in the expounders of it.—
Contrary to the stance taken by petitioners, the validity or constitutionality
of a law cannot be made to depend on the individual opinions of the

members who compose it—the Supreme Court, as an institution, has already
determined RA 6735 to be “incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential
terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution
is concerned” and therefore the same remains to be so regardless of any
change in the Court’s composition. Indeed, it is vital that there be stability in
the courts in adhering to decisions deliberately made after ample
consideration. Parties should not be encouraged to seek re-examination of
determined principles and speculate on fluctuation of the law with every
change in the expounders of it.
Same; Same; Same; The Constitution received its force from the
express will of the people, and in expressing that will, the Filipino people
have incorporated therein the method and manner by which the same can be
amended and revised, and when the electorate have incorporated into the
fundamental law the particular manner in which the same may be altered or
changed, then any course which disregards that express will is a direct
violation of the fundamental law.—The Constitution is the fundamental law
of the state, containing the principles upon which the government is
founded, and regulating
204
the division of sovereign powers, directing to what persons each of those

powers is to be confided and the manner in which it is to be exercised. The
Philippines has followed the American constitutional legal system in the
sense that the term constitution is given a more restricted meaning, i.e., as a
written organic instrument, under which governmental powers are both
conferred and circumscribed. The Constitution received its force from the
express will of the people. An overwhelming 16,622,111, out of
21,785,216 votes cast during the plebiscite, or 76.30% ratified the
present Constitution on February 2, 1987. In expressing that will, the
Filipino people have incorporated therein the method and manner by which
the same can be amended and revised, and when the electorate have
incorporated into the fundamental law the particular manner in which the
same may be altered or changed, then any course which disregards that
express will is a direct violation of the fundamental law.

Words and Phrases; Considering the encompassing scope and depth of the
changes that would be effected, not to mention that the Constitution’s basic
plan and substance of a tripartite system of government and the principle of
separation of powers underlying the same would be altered, if not entirely
destroyed, there can be no other conclusion than that the proposition of
petitioners Lambino, et al. would constitute a revision of the Constitution
rather than an amendment.—Considering the encompassing scope and
depth of the changes that would be effected, not to mention that the
Constitution’s basic plan and substance of a tripartite system of government
and the principle of separation of powers underlying the same would be
altered, if not entirely destroyed, there can be no other conclusion than that
the proposition of petitioners Lambino, et al. would constitute a revision of
the Constitution rather than an amendment or “such an addition or change
within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement or
better carry out the purpose for which it was framed.” As has been shown,
the effect of the adoption of the petitioners’ proposition, rather than to
“within the lines of the original instrument” constitute “an improvement or
better carry out the purpose for which it was framed,” is to “substantially
alter the purpose and to attain objectives clearly beyond the lines of the
Constitution as now cast.”
Delegation of Power; The law mandates upon the election registrar to
personally verify the signatures, a solemn and important duty imposed on
the election registrar which he cannot delegate to any other person, even to
barangay officials.—The law mandates upon the election registrar to
personally verify
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the signatures. This is a solemn and important duty imposed on the election
registrar which he cannot delegate to any other person, even to barangay
officials. Hence, a verification of signatures made by persons other than the
election registrars has no legal effect. In patent violation of the law, several
certifications submitted by petitioners showed that the verification of
signatures was made, not by the election registrars, but by barangay
officials.
Same; Same; Same; Same; There is nothing in RA 6735, as well as in

COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, granting that it is valid to implement the
former statute, that authorizes the COMELEC to conduct any kind of
hearing, whether full-blown or trial-type hearing, summary hearing or
administrative hearing, on a petition for initiative.—According to the
dissenting opinion, the sufficiency of the petition for initiative and its
compliance with the requirements of RA 6735 on initiative and its
implementing rules is a question that should be resolved by the COMELEC
at the first instance. It thus remands the case to the COMELEC for further
proceedings. To my mind, the remand of the case to the COMELEC is not
warranted. There is nothing in RA 6735, as well as in COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, granting that it is valid to implement the former
statute, that authorizes the COMELEC to conduct any kind of hearing,
whether full-blown or trial-type hearing, summary hearing or administrative
hearing, on a petition for initiative.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The remand of the case to the COMELEC
for reception of evidence of the parties on the contentious factual issues is,
in effect, an amendment of the abovequoted rules of the COMELEC by this
Court which the Court is not empowered to do.—Clearly, following the
foregoing procedural rules, the COMELEC is not authorized to conduct any
kind of hearing to receive any evidence for or against the sufficiency of the
petition for initiative. Rather, the foregoing rules require of the COMELEC
to determine the sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative on
its face. And it has already been shown, by the annexes submitted by the
petitioners themselves, their petition is, on its face, insufficient in form and
substance. The remand of the case to the COMELEC for reception of
evidence of the parties on the contentious factual issues is, in effect, an
amendment of the abovequoted rules of the COMELEC by this Court which
the Court is not empowered to do.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Political Questions; Even if the present

petition involves the act, not of a governmental body, but of purportedly
more than six million registered voters who have signified their assent to the
proposal to amend the Constitution, the same still constitutes a justiciable
controversy, hence, a non-political question.—Even if the present petition
involves the act,
206
not of a governmental body, but of purportedly more than six million

registered voters who have signified their assent to the proposal to amend
the Constitution, the same still constitutes a justiciable controversy, hence, a
non-political question. There is no doubt that the Constitution, under Article
XVII, has explicitly provided for the manner or method to effect
amendments thereto, or revision thereof. The question, therefore, of whether
there has been compliance with the terms of the Constitution is for the Court
to pass upon.
Same; Same; Same; Same; I strongly take exception to the view that the
people, in their sovereign capacity, can disregard the Constitution
altogether.—There is no denying that “the Philippines is a democratic and
republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them.” However, I find to be tenuous the
asseveration that “the argument that the people through initiative cannot
propose substantial amendments to change the Constitution turns
sovereignty in its head. At the very least, the submission constricts the
democratic space for the exercise of the direct sovereignty of the people.” In
effect, it is theorized that despite the unambiguous text of Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution withholding the power to revise it from the system
of initiative, the people, in their sovereign capacity, can conveniently
disregard the said provision. I strongly take exception to the view that the
people, in their sovereign capacity, can disregard the Constitution altogether.

Such a view directly contravenes the fundamental constitutional theory that
while indeed “the ultimate sovereignty is in the people, from whom springs
all legitimate authority”; nonetheless, “by the Constitution which they
establish, they not only tie up the hands of their official agencies, but their
own hands as well; and neither the officers of the state, nor the whole people
as an aggregate body, are at liberty to take action in opposition to this
fundamental law.” The Constitution, it should be remembered, “is the
protector of the people, placed on guard by them to save the rights of the
people against injury by the people.” This is the essence of
constitutionalism: Through constitutionalism we placed limits on both our
political institutions and ourselves, hoping that democracies, historically
always turbulent, chaotic and even despotic, might now become restrained,
principled, thoughtful and just. So we bound ourselves over to a law that we
made and promised to keep. And though a government of laws did not
displace governance by men, it did mean that now men, democratic men,
would try to live by their word.
Same; Same; Same; It is for the protection of minorities that

constitutions are framed—sometimes constitutions must be interposed for
the protection of majorities even against themselves.—Indisputably, the
issues posed in
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the present case are of transcendental importance. Accordingly, I have

approached and grappled with them with full appreciation of the
responsibilities involved in the present case, and have given to its
consideration the earnest attention which its importance demands. I have
sought to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution at whatever hazard. I
share the concern of Chief Justice Day in Koehler v. Hill: “it is for the
protection of minorities that constitutions are framed. Sometimes
constitutions must be interposed for the protection of majorities even against
themselves. Constitutions are adopted in times of public repose, when sober
reason holds her citadel, and are designed to check the surging passions in
times of popular excitement. But if courts could be coerced by popular
majorities into a disregard of their provisions, constitutions would become
mere ‘ropes of sand,’ and there would be an end of social security and of
constitutional freedom. The cause of temperance can sustain no injury from
the loss of this amendment which would be at all comparable to the injury to
republican institutions which a violation of the constitution would inflict.
That large and respectable class of moral reformers which so justly demands
the observance and enforcement of law, cannot afford to take its first
reformatory step by a violation of the constitution. How can it consistently
demand of others obedience to a constitution which it violates itself? The
people can in a short time re-enact the amendment. In the manner of a great
moral reform, the loss of a few years is nothing. The constitution is the
palladium of republican freedom. The young men coming forward upon the
stage of political action must be educated to venerate it; those already upon
the stage must be taught to obey it. Whatever interest may be advanced or
may suffer, whoever or whatever may be ‘voted up or voted down,’ no
sacrilegious hand must be laid upon the constitution.”
AZCUNA, J., Separate Opinion:

People’s Initiative; Constituent Powers; When Congress acts under Article
XVII, which is the Constitution of Sovereignty, it acts not as a legislature
exercising legislative powers but as a constituent body exercising
constituent powers.—Constitutions have three parts—the Constitution of
Liberty, which states the fundamental rights of the people; the Constitution
of Government, which establishes the structure of government, its branches
and their operation; and the Constitution of Sovereignty, which provides
how the Constitution may be changed. Article XVII is the Constitution of
Sovereignty. As a result, the powers therein provided are called constituent
powers. So when Congress acts under this provision, it acts not as a
legislature exercising legislative powers. It acts as a constituent body
exercising constituent pow-
208
ers. The rules, therefore, governing the exercise of legislative powers do not
apply, or do not apply strictly, to the actions taken under Article XVII.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Initiative and Referendum Act (R.A. No.
6735); Since Article XVII states that Congress shall provide for the
implementation of the exercise of the people’s right directly to propose
amendments to the Constitution through initiative, the act of Congress
pursuant thereto is not strictly a legislative action but partakes of a
constituent act; The provisions of Republic Act No. 6735 relating to the
procedure for proposing amendments to the Constitution, can and should be
upheld, despite shortcomings perhaps in legislative headings and standards.
—Accordingly, since Article XVII states that Congress shall provide for the
implementation of the exercise of the people’s right directly to propose
amendments to the Constitution through initiative, the act of Congress
pursuant thereto is not strictly a legislative action but partakes of a
constituent act. As a result, Republic Act No. 6735, the act that provides for
the exercise of the people of the right to propose a law or amendments to the
Constitution is, with respect to the right to propose amendments to the
Constitution, a constituent measure, not a mere legislative one. The
consequence of this special character of the enactment, insofar as it relates
to proposing amendments to the Constitution, is that the requirements for
statutory enactments, such as sufficiency of standards and the like, do not

and should not strictly apply. As long as there is a sufficient and clear intent
to provide for the implementation of the exercise of the right, it should be
sustained, as it is simply a compliance of the mandate placed on Congress
by the Constitution. Seen in this light, the provisions of Republic Act No.
6735 relating to the procedure for proposing amendments to the
Constitution, can and should be upheld, despite shortcomings perhaps in
legislative headings and standards.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; I concur in the view that Santiago v.
Commission on Elections, 270 SCRA 106 (1997), should be re-examined
and, after doing so, that the pronouncement therein regarding the
insufficiency or inadequacy of the measure to sustain a people’s initiative to
amend the Constitution should be reconsidered in favor of allowing the
exercise of this sovereign right.—For this reason, I concur in the view that
Santiago v. Comelec should be re-examined and, after doing so, that the
pronouncement therein regarding the insufficiency or inadequacy of the
measure to sustain a people’s initiative to amend the Constitution should be
reconsidered in favor of allowing the exercise of this sovereign right. And
applying the doctrine stated in Senarillos v. Hermosisima, penned by Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, in relation to Article 8 of the Civil Code, that a decision of
this Court interpreting a law
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forms part of the law interpreted as of the time of its enactment, Republic
Act No. 6735 should be deemed sufficient and adequate from the start.
Same; Same; Same; The reason why revisions are not allowed through
direct proposals by the people through initiative is a practical one, namely,
there is no one to draft such extensive changes, since 6.3 million people
cannot conceivably come up with a single extensive document through a
direct proposal from each of them.—Revisions are changes that affect the
entire Constitution and not mere parts of it. The reason why revisions are
not allowed through direct proposals by the people through initiative is a
practical one, namely, there is no one to draft such extensive changes, since
6.3 million people cannot conceivably come up with a single extensive
document through a direct proposal from each of them. Someone would
have to draft it and that is not authorized as it would not be a direct proposal
from the people. Such indirect proposals can only take the form of
proposals from Congress as a Constituent Assembly under Article XVII, or
a Constitutional Convention created under the same provision. Furthermore,
there is a need for such deliberative bodies for revisions because their
proceedings and debates are duly and officially recorded, so that future
cases of interpretations can be properly aided by resort to the record of their
proceedings.
Same; Same; Same; Article VIII on Judicial Department cannot stand

as is, in a parliamentary system, for under such a system, the Parliament is
supreme, and thus the Court’s power to declare its act a grave abuse of
discretion and thus void would be an anomaly.—Even a cursory reading of
the proposed changes contained in the petition for initiative herein involved
will show on its face that the proposed changes constitute a revision of the
Constitution. The proposal is to change the system of government from that
which is bicameral-presidential to one that is unicameral-parliamentary.
While purportedly only Articles VI, VII, and XVIII are involved, the fact is,
as the petition and text of the proposed changes themselves state, every
provision of the Constitution will have to be examined to see if they
conform to the nature of a unicameral-parliamentary form of government
and changed accordingly if they do not so conform to it. For example,
Article VIII on Judicial Department cannot stand as is, in a parliamentary
system, for under such a system, the Parliament is supreme, and thus the
Court’s power to declare its act a grave abuse of discretion and thus void
would be an anomaly.
Same; Same; Same; For the proposed changes can be separated and
are, in my view, separable in nature, a unicameral legislature is one, and a
parliamentary form of government is another—the first is a mere
amendment and
210
contains only one subject matter while the second is clearly a revision that
affects every article and every provision in the Constitution to an extent not
even the proponents could at present fully articulate.—Neither does it
comply with Republic Act No. 6735, which states in Section 10 that not
more than one subject shall be proposed as an amendment or amendments to
the Constitution. The petition herein would propose at the very least two
subjects—a unicameral legislature and a parliamentary form of government.
Again, for this clear and patent violation of the very act that provides for the
exercise of the power, the proposed initiative cannot lie. This does not
mean, however, that all is lost for petitioners. For the proposed changes can
be separated and are, in my view, separable in nature—a unicameral
legislature is one; a parliamentary form of government is another. The first
is a mere amendment and contains only one subject matter. The second is
clearly a revision that affects every article and every provision in the
Constitution to an extent not even the proponents could at present fully
articulate. Petitioners Lambino, et al. thus go about proposing changes the
nature and extent of which they do not as yet know exactly what. The
proposal, therefore, contained in the petition for initiative, regarding a
change in the legislature from a bicameral or two-chamber body to that of a
unicameral or one-chamber body, is sustainable. The text of the changes
needed to carry it out are perfunctory and ministerial in nature. Once it is
limited to this proposal, the changes are simply one of deletion and
insertions, the wordings of which are practically automatic and non-
discretionary.
TINGA, J., Separate Opinion:

People’s Initiative; Supreme Court; Judgments; The Court has long been
mindful of the rule that it necessitates a majority, and not merely a plurality,
in order that a decision can stand as precedent.—I agree with Justice Puno
that Santiago v. COMELEC and PIRMA v. COMELEC had not acquired
value as precedent and should be reversed in any case. I add that the Court
has long been mindful of the rule that it necessitates a majority, and not
merely a plurality, in order that a decision can stand as precedent. That
principle has informed the members of this Court as they deliberated and
voted upon contentious petitions, even if this consideration is not ultimately
reflected on the final draft released for promulgation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The curious twist to Santiago v.

COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106 (1997), and PIRMA v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
129754, 23 September 1997, is that for all the denigration heaped upon
Rep. Act No. 6735 in those cases, the Court did not invalidate any provision
of the
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VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 211
statute—even if R.A. No. 6735 is truly “inadequate,” the Court in Santiago

should not have simply let the insufficiency stand given that it was not
minded to invalidate the law itself.—The curious twist to Santiago and
PIRMA is that for all the denigration heaped upon Rep. Act No. 6735 in
those cases, the Court did not invalidate any provision of the statute. All the
Court said then was that the law was “inadequate”. Since this “inadequate”
law was not annulled by the Court, or repealed by Congress, it remained
part of the statute books. I maintain that even if Rep. Act No. 6735 is truly
“inadequate,” the Court in Santiago should not have simply let the
insufficiency stand given that it was not minded to invalidate the law itself.
Article 9 of the Civil Code provides that “[n]o judge or court shall decline to
render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the
laws.” As explained by the Court recently in Reyes v. Lim, “[Article 9] calls
for the application of equity, which[, in the revered Justice Cardozo’s
words,] ‘fills the open spaces in the law.’ ” Certainly, any court that refuses
to rule on an action premised on Rep. Act No. 6735 on the ground that the
law is “inadequate” would have been found in grave abuse of discretion.
The previous failure by the Court to “fill the open spaces” in Santiago
further highlights that decision’s status as an unfortunate aberration.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The ruling in Santiago is erroneous,

illogical, and should not be perpetuated.—Santiago established a tenet that
the Supreme Court may affirm a law as constitutional, yet declare its
provisions as inadequate to accomplish the legislative purpose, then barred
the enforcement of the law. That ruling is erroneous, illogical, and should
not be perpetuated.
Same; Same; Same; Certiorari; Commission on Elections; By any

measure, the COMELEC’s failure to perform its executive and
administrative functions under Rep. Act No. 6735 constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.—Rep. Act No. 6735 is a law relative to the conduct of a
plebiscite. The primary task of the COMELEC under Rep. Act No. 6735 is
to enforce and administer the said law, functions that are essentially
executive and administrative in nature. Even the subsequent duty of the
COMELEC of determining the sufficiency of the petitions after they have
been filed is administrative in character. By any measure, the COMELEC’s
failure to perform its executive and administrative functions under Rep. Act
No. 6735 constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Same; Same; Same; Statutes; One-Subject, One-Title Rule; For as long

as it can be established that an initiative petition embraces a single general
subject, the petition may be allowed no matter the number of constitutional
provisions proposed for amendment if the amendments are germane to the
212
subject of the petition.—The precedents governing the one-subject, one-title

rule under the Constitution should apply as well in the interpretation of
Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735. For as long as it can be established that an
initiative petition embraces a single general subject, the petition may be
allowed no matter the number of constitutional provisions proposed for
amendment if the amendments are germane to the subject of the petition.
Both the Sigaw ng Bayan and the Lambino initiative petitions expressly
propose the changing of the form of government from bicameral-
presidential to unicameral-parliamentary. Such a proposal may strike as
comprehensive, necessitating as it will the reorganization of the executive
and legislative branches of government, nevertheless it ineluctably
encompasses only a single general subject still.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Congress may not restrict the right to
initiative on grounds that are not provided for in the Constitution.—I am not
even entirely comfortable with the theoretical underpinnings of Section 10.
The Constitution indubitably grants the people the right to seek amendment
of the charter through initiative, and mandates Congress to “provide for the
implementation of the exercise of this right.” In doing so, Congress may not
restrict the right to initiative on grounds that are not provided for in the
Constitution. If for example the implementing law also provides that certain
provisions of the Constitution may not be amended through initiative, that
prohibition should not be sustained. Congress is tasked with the
implementation, and not the restriction of the right to initiative.
Same; Same; Same; If the absence of a record of deliberations stands

as so serious a flaw as to invalidate or constrict processes which change a
constitution or its provisions, then the entire initiative process authorized by
the Constitution should be scarlet-marked as well.—During the hearing on
the petitions, the argument was raised that provisions of the Constitution
amended through initiative would not have the benefit of a reference source
from the record of a deliberative body such as Congress or a constitutional
convention. It was submitted that this consideration influenced the
Constitutional Commission as it drafted Section 2, Article XVII, which
expressly provided that only amendments, and not revisions, may be the
subject of initiative petitions. This argument clearly proceeds from a
premise that accords supreme value to the record of deliberations of a
constitutional convention or commission in the interpretation of the charter.
Yet if the absence of a record of deliberations stands as so serious a flaw as
to invalidate or constrict processes which change a constitution or its
provisions, then the entire initiative process authorized by the Constitution
should be scarlet-marked as well.
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Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The proper interpretation

of a constitution depends more on how it was understood by the people
adopting it than the framers’ understanding thereof—the constitutional
record is hardly the Rosetta Stone that unlocks the meaning of the
Constitution.—Even if there is need to refer to extrinsic sources in aid of
constitutional interpretation, the constitutional record does not provide the
exclusive or definitive answer on how to interpret the provision. The intent
of a constitutional convention is not controlling by itself, and while the
historical discussion on the floor of the constitutional convention is
valuable, it is not necessarily decisive. The Court has even held in Vera v.
Avelino that “the proceedings of the [constitutional] convention are less
conclusive of the proper construction of the fundamental law than are
legislative proceedings of the proper construction of a statute, since in the
latter case it is the intent of the legislature that courts seek, while in the
former courts are endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the people through
the discussions and deliberations of their representatives.” The proper
interpretation of a constitution depends more on how it was understood by
the people adopting it than the framers’ understanding thereof. If there is
fear in the absence of a constitutional record as guide for interpretation of
any amendments adopted via initiative, such absence would not preclude the
courts from interpreting such amendments in a manner consistent with how
courts generally construe the Constitution. For example, reliance will be
placed on the other provisions of the Constitution to arrive at a harmonized

and holistic constitutional framework. The constitutional record is hardly
the Rosetta Stone that unlocks the meaning of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; The initiative process involves participatory

democracy at its most elemental—wherein the consequential debate would
not be confined to the august halls of Congress or the hallowed chambers of
this Court, as it would spill over to the public squares and town halls, the
academic yards and the Internet blogosphere, the dining areas in the homes
of the affluent and the impoverished alike.—And even should the
COMELEC find the initiative petitions sufficient, the matter of whether the
Constitution should be amended would still depend on the choice of the
electorate. The oppositors are clearly queasy about some of the amendments
proposed, or the imputed motives behind the amendments. A referendum,
should the COMELEC find the petitions as sufficient, would allow them to
convey their uneasiness to the public at large, as well as for the proponents
of the amendment to defend their proposal. The campaign period alone
would allow the public to be involved in the significant deliberation on the
course our nation should take, with the ensuing net benefit of a more
informed, more politically aware populace. And of course, the choice on
whether the Constitution should
214
be amended would lie directly with the people. The initiative process
involves participatory democracy at its most elemental; wherein the
consequential debate would not be confined to the august halls of Congress
or the hallowed chambers of this Court, as it would spill over to the public
squares and town halls, the academic yards and the Internet blogosphere, the
dining areas in the homes of the affluent and the impoverished alike.
Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; The biases we should enforce as

magistrates are those of the Constitution and the elements of democracy on
which our rule of law is founded—direct democracy, as embodied in the
initiative process, is but a culmination of the evolution over the centuries of
democratic rights of choice and self-governance.—The biases we should
enforce as magistrates are those of the Constitution and the elements of
democracy on which our rule of law is founded. Direct democracy, as
embodied in the initiative process, is but a culmination of the evolution over
the centuries of democratic rights of choice and self-governance. The
reemergence of the Athenian democratic ideal after centuries of tyrannical
rules arrived very slowly, the benefits parceled out at first only to favored
classes. The Magna Carta granted limited rights to self-determination and
self-governance only to a few English nobles; the American Constitution
was originally intended to give a meaningful voice only to free men, mostly
Caucasian, who met the property-holding requirements set by the states for
voting.
Same; Same; Same; The initiative process should be acknowledged as

the purest implement of democratic rule under law.—By allowing the
sovereign people to directly propose and enact constitutional amendments,
the initiative process should be acknowledged as the purest implement of
democratic rule under law. This right granted to over sixty million Filipinos
cannot be denied by the votes of less than eight magistrates for reasons that
bear no cogitation on the Constitution.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J., Dissenting Opinion:

People’s Initiative; While it is but proper to accord great respect and
reverence to the Philippine Constitution of 1987 for being the supreme law
of the land, we should not lose sight of the truth that there is an ultimate
authority to which the Constitution is also subordinate—the will of the
people; If the Constitution is the expression of the will of the sovereign
people, then, in the event that the people change their will, so must the
Constitution be revised or amended to reflect such change.—While it is but
proper to accord great re-
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VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 215
spect and reverence to the Philippine Constitution of 1987 for being the
supreme law of the land, we should not lose sight of the truth that there is an
ultimate authority to which the Constitution is also subordinate—the will of
the people. No less than its very first paragraph, the Preamble, expressly
recognizes that the Constitution came to be because it was ordained and
promulgated by the sovereign Filipino people. It is a principle reiterated yet
again in Article II, Section 1, of the Constitution, which explicitly declares
that “[t]he Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.”
Thus, the resolution of the issues and controversies raised by the instant
Petition should be guided accordingly by the foregoing principle. If the
Constitution is the expression of the will of the sovereign people, then, in
the event that the people change their will, so must the Constitution be
revised or amended to reflect such change. Resultantly, the right to revise or
amend the Constitution inherently resides in the sovereign people whose
will it is supposed to express and embody. The Constitution itself, under
Article XVII, provides for the means by which the revision or amendment
of the Constitution may be proposed and ratified.
Same; Same; Same; The right of the sovereign people to directly

propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative is more superior
than the power they delegated to Congress or to a constitutional convention

to amend or revise the Constitution.—It is my earnest opinion that the right
of the sovereign people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through initiative is more superior than the power they delegated to
Congress or to a constitutional convention to amend or revise the
Constitution. The initiative process gives the sovereign people the voice to
express their collective will, and when the people speak, we must be ready
to listen. Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution recognizes and
guarantees the sovereign people’s right to initiative, rather than limits it. The
enabling law which Congress has been tasked to enact must give life to the
said provision and make the exercise of the right to initiative possible, not
regulate, limit, or restrict it in any way that would render the people’s option
of resorting to initiative to amend the Constitution more stringent, difficult,
and less feasible, as compared to the other constitutional means to amend or
revise the Constitution. In fact, it is worth recalling that under Article VI,
Section 1 of the Constitution, the legislative power of Congress is limited to
the extent reserved to the people by the provisions on initiative and
referendum.
Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; Judgments; After a careful

reading of Santiago v. Commission on Elections, 270 SCRA 106 (1997), I
believe in earnest that the permanent injunction actually issued by this
Court against
216
the COMELEC pertains only to the petition for initiative filed by Jesus S.
Delfin, and not to all subsequent petitions for initiative to amend the
Constitution.—The COMELEC had indeed committed grave abuse of
discretion when it summarily dismissed Lambino and Aumentado’s petition
for initiative entirely on the basis of the Santiago case which, allegedly,
permanently enjoined it from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
petition for initiative to amend the Constitution in the absence of a sufficient
law. After a careful reading, however, of the Santiago case, I believe in
earnest that the permanent injunction actually issued by this Court against
the COMELEC pertains only to the petition for initiative filed by Jesus S.
Delfin, and not to all subsequent petitions for initiative to amend the
Constitution.
The declaration of the Court that Republic Act No. 6735 is insufficient or
inadequate actually gave rise to more questions rather than answers, due to
the fact that there has never been a judicial precedent wherein the Court
invalidated a law for insufficiency or inadequacy.—The declaration of the
Court that Republic Act No. 6735 is insufficient or inadequate actually gave
rise to more questions rather than answers, due to the fact that there has
never been a judicial precedent wherein the Court invalidated a law for
insufficiency or inadequacy. The confusion over such a declaration thereby
impelled former Chief Justice Davide, Jr., the ponente in the Santiago case,
to provide the following clarification in his separate opinion to the
Resolution in the PIRMA case, thus—Simply put, Santiago did, in reality,
declare as unconstitutional that portion of R.A. No. 6735 relating to
Constitutional initiatives for failure to comply with the “completeness and
sufficient standard tests” with respect to permissible delegation of legislative
power or subordinate legislation. However petitioners attempt to twist the
language in Santiago, the conclusion is inevitable; the portion of R.A. No.
6735 was held to be unconstitutional. It is important to note, however, that
while the Decision in the Santiago case pronounced repeatedly that
Republic Act No. 6735 was insufficient and inadequate, there is no
categorical declaration therein that the said statute was unconstitutional. The
express finding that Republic Act No. 6735 is unconstitutional can only be
found in the separate opinion of former Chief Justice Davide to the
Resolution in the PIRMA case, which was not concurred in by the other
members of the Court.
VELASCO, JR., J., Separate Opinion:

People’s Initiative; Initiative and Referendum Act (R.A. No. 6735); In
Santiago v. Commission on Elections, 270 SCRA 106 (1997), the Court
focused on what D
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VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 217
RA 6735 was not, and lost sight of what RA 6735 was.—The decision in
Santiago focused on what it perceived to be fatal flaws in the drafting of the
law, in the failings of the way the law was structured, to come to the
conclusion that the law was inadequate. The Court itself recognized the
legislators’ intent, but disregarded this intent. The law was found wanting.
The Court then saw the inclusion of the Constitution in RA 6735 as an
afterthought. However, it was included, and it should not be excluded by the
Court via a strained analysis of the law. The difficult construction of the law
should not serve to frustrate the intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution: to give the people the power to propose amendments as they
saw fit. It is a basic precept in statutory construction that the intent of the
legislature is the controlling factor in the interpretation of a statute. The
intent of the legislature was clear, and yet RA 6735 was declared
inadequate. It was not specifically struck down or declared unconstitutional,
merely incomplete. The Court focused on what RA 6735 was not, and lost
sight of what RA 6735 was.
Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; Judgments; A judgment must be

distinguished from an opinion—the latter is an informal expression of the
views of the court and cannot prevail against its final order or decision—
and while the two may be combined in one instrument, the opinion forms no
part of the judgment; We often encounter in judicial decisions lapses,
findings, loose statements and generalities which do not bear on the issues
or are apparently opposed to the otherwise sound and considered result
reached by the court as expressed in the dispositive part, so called, of the
decision.—A judgment must be distinguished from an opinion. The latter is
an informal expression of the views of the court and cannot prevail against
its final order or decision. While the two may be combined in one
instrument, the opinion forms no part of the judgment. So there is a
distinction between the findings and conclusions of a court and its
Judgment. While they may constitute its decision and amount to the
rendition of a judgment, they are not the judgment itself. It is not infrequent
that the grounds of a decision fail to reflect the exact views of the court,
especially those of concurring justices in a collegiate court. We often
encounter in judicial decisions lapses, findings, loose statements and
generalities which do not bear on the issues or are apparently opposed to the
otherwise sound and considered result reached by the court as expressed in
the dispositive part, so called, of the decision.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; When there are gray areas
in legislation, especially in matters that pertain to the sovereign people’s
political rights, courts must lean more towards a more liberal interpretation
favoring the people’s right to exercise their sovereign power.—In this case,
the Lambino petition is not concerned with rewriting the entire Constitution.
It
218
was never its intention to revise the whole Constitution. It merely concerns
itself with amending a few provisions in our fundamental charter. When
there are gray areas in legislation, especially in matters that pertain to the
sovereign people’s political rights, courts must lean more towards a more
liberal interpretation favoring the people’s right to exercise their sovereign
power.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Demosthenes B. Donato co-counsel for petitioner.
R.A.V. Saguisag for petitioners in G.R. No. 174299.
Alberto C. Agra for petitioner Erico B. Aumentado.
Arnel Z. Dolendo and Ocampo, Arciaga-Santos, Nuñez,
Lomangaya and Ribao for petitioner-intervenor.
Topacio Law Office co-counsel for petitioner-intervenor.
Seno, Mendoza & Associates Law Office for intervenor TUCP.

Neri Javier Colmenares and Marvic M.V.F. Leonen for
intervenors-oppositors Bayan, Bayan Muna, Kilusang Mayo Uno,
HEAD, Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante, Gabriela, Gabriela
Women’s Party, Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students, League of
Concerned Professionals and Businessmen, Solidarity of Health
Against Charter Change and Health Action for Human Rights.
Pete Quirino-Quadra for and in his own behalf.
Carlos P. Medina, Amparita S. Sta. Maria, Gilbert V.
Sembrano, Melencio S. Sta. Maria, Giovanni F. Vallente, Ray Paulo
J. Santiago and Ma. Ngina Teresa V. Chan-Gonzaga for oppositors
One Voice, et al.
Marlon J. Manuel for movant-intervenor Alternative Law
Groups, Inc.
Ibarra M. Gutierrez III and Rosselynn Jaye G. De la Cruz for
intervenors Loreta Ann P. Rosales, et al.
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VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 219

M.M. Lazaro & Associates for intervenors Philconsa and Estrella.

Ongkiko, Kalaw, Manhit & Acorda Law Offices for
intervenors Philconsa, Toledo and Bacungan.
Reynaldo Y. Maulit for intervenors Tajon, Venus, Aguas and
Gat Inciong.
Pablo P. Garcia for intervenor-oppositors.
Rufus B. Rodriguez for intervenors.
Aquilino L. Pimentel III for movant respondents-intervenors.
Janijay B. Alonzo for movants R. Adamat, R.M. Rivera and R.
Baya.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August

2006 of the Commission on Elections (“COMELEC”) denying due
course to an initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution.
Antecedent Facts
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul

L. Lambino 1 and Erico B. Aumentado (“Lambino Group”), with
other groups and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for
an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August
2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to
hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section
2
5(b) and (c)
_______________
1 Including Sigaw ng Bayan and Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines

(ULAP).
2 This provision states: “Requirements.—x x x x
(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve
per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least
220

3
and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and
Referendum Act (“RA 6735”).
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of
6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%)
of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by
at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino
Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified
the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987
Constitution 4by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative
Department)
_______________
three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution
may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the1987
Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or

rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;
c.2. the proposition;
c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which
shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.”
3 This provision states: “Verification of Signatures.—The Election Registrar shall

verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters’ affidavits and
voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.”
4 Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI will be changed thus:
Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be vested in a unicameral Parliament
which shall be composed of as many members as may be provided by law, to be apportioned
among the provinces, representative districts, and cities in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, with at least three hundred thousand inhabitants per district, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Each district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory, and each province must have at least one member.
221
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 221

5
and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) 6 and by
adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These
proposed
_______________
(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least
twenty-five years old on the day of the election, a resident of his district for at least one year
prior thereto, and shall be elected by the qualified voters of his district for a term of five years
without limitation as to the number thereof, except those under the party-list system which shall
be provided for by law and whose number shall be equal to twenty per centum of the total
membership coming from the parliamentary districts.
5 Sections 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Article VII will be changed thus:
Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of State. The executive power shall
be exercised by a Prime Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister shall
be elected by a majority of all the Members of Parliament from among themselves. He shall be
responsible to the Parliament for the program of government.
6 Sections 1-5 of the Transitory Provisions read:
Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President shall serve until the expiration of
their term at noon on the thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall continue to exercise their powers
under the 1987 Constitution unless impeached by a vote of two thirds of all the members of the
interim parliament.
(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of the
incumbent President, the incumbent Vice President shall succeed as President. In case of death,
permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of both the incumbent President and
Vice President, the interim Prime Minister shall assume all the powers and responsibilities of
Prime Minister under Article VII as amended.
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President,
with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other
sections of Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim
up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of government, in which
case, they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government;
provided, however, that any and all references therein to “Congress,” “Senate,” “House of
Representatives” and “Houses of Congress”
222

changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a

Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino
Group
_______________
shall be changed to read “Parliament”; that any and all references therein to “Member[s] of
Congress,” “Senator[s]” or “Member[s] of the House of Representatives” shall be changed to
read as “Member[s] of Parliament” and any and all references to the “President” and or “Acting
President” shall be changed to read “Prime Minister.”
Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President,
with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are
hereby amended and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which are hereby deleted, all other Sections
of Article VII shall be retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14,
unless they shall be inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed
amended so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary System of government; provided
however that any and all references therein to “Congress,” “Senate,” “House of
Representatives” and “Houses of Congress” shall be changed to read “Parliament”; that any
and all references therein to “Member[s] of Congress,” “Senator[s]” or “Member[s] of the
House of Representatives” shall be changed to read as “Member[s] of Parliament” and any and
all references to the “President” and or “Acting President” shall be changed to read “Prime
Minister.”
Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of these amendments, an interim
Parliament which shall continue until the Members of the regular Parliament shall have been
elected and shall have qualified. It shall be composed of the incumbent Members of the Senate
and the House of Representatives and the incumbent Members of the Cabinet who are heads of
executive departments.
(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a Member of Parliament until noon
of the thirtieth day of June 2010. He shall also be a member of the cabinet and shall head a
ministry. He shall initially convene the interim Parliament and shall preside over its sessions for
the election of the interim Prime Minister and until the Speaker shall have been elected by a
majority vote of all the members of the interim Parliament from among themselves.
(3) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament
shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the
principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.
223
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 223

prayed that after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC

should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the
voters’ ratification:
“DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII

OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF
GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL
TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING
ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY
SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?”
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition

with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the 7
proposed
Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.
_______________
Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief Executive, shall nominate, from
among the members of the interim Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who shall be elected
by a majority vote of the members thereof. The interim Prime Minister shall oversee the
various ministries and shall perform such powers and responsibilities as may be delegated to
him by the incumbent President.
(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament,
which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local government
officials. Thereafter, the Vice President, as Member of Parliament, shall immediately convene
the Parliament and shall initially preside over its session for the purpose of electing the Prime
Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of all its members, from among themselves.
The duly elected Prime Minister shall continue to exercise and perform the powers, duties and
responsibilities of the interim Prime Minister until the expiration of the term of incumbent
President and Vice President.
7 As revised, Article XVIII contained a new paragraph in Section 4 (paragraph 3)

and a modified paragraph 2, Section 5, thus:
Section 4. x x x x
(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be Members of Parliament until noon
of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
xxxx
Section 5. x x x x
224

The Ruling of the COMELEC
On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying

due course to the Lambino Group’s petition for lack of an enabling
law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The
COMELEC invoked8
this Court’s ruling in Santiago v. Commission
on Elections declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement 9
the
initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.
_______________
(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of
Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of
all local government officials. The duly elected Prime Minister shall continue to
exercise and perform the powers, duties and responsibilities of the interim Prime
Minister until the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice
President.
8 336 Phil. 848; 270 SCRA 106 (1997); Resolution dated 10 June 1997.
9 The COMELEC held:
“We agree with the Petitioners that this Commission has the solemn Constitutional duty to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of, as in this case,
initiative.
This mandate, however, should be read in relation to the other provisions of the Constitution
particularly on initiative.
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative, upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x
x x.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
The afore-quoted provision of the Constitution being a non self-executory provision needed
an enabling law for its implementation. Thus, in order to breathe life into the constitutional
right of the people under a system of initiative to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in
whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolution, Congress enacted Republic
Act No. 6735.
However, the Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Santiago vs. Commission on Elections
struck down the said law for being incom-
225
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 225

In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of
the writs of certiorari and mandamus to set aside the COMELEC
Resolution of 31 August 2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give
due course to their initiative petition. The Lambino Group contends
that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
due course to their petition since Santiago is not a binding
precedent. Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims that Santiago
binds only the parties to that case, and their petition deserves
cognizance as an expression of the “will of the sovereign people.”
In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners (“Binay Group”) pray that the
Court require respondent COMELEC Commissioners to show cause
why they should not be cited in contempt for the COMELEC’s
verification of signatures and for “entertaining” the Lambino
Group’s peti-
_______________
plete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on

amendments to the Constitution is concerned.
The Supreme Court likewise declared that this Commission should be permanently enjoined
from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system.
Thus, even if the signatures in the instant Petition appear to meet the required minimum per
centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district is
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein, still the Petition cannot
be given due course since the Supreme Court categorically declared R.A. No. 6735 as
inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
This Commission is not unmindful of the transcendental importance of the right of the
people under a system of initiative. However, neither can we turn a blind eye to the
pronouncement of the High Court that in the absence of a valid enabling law, this right of the
people remains nothing but an “empty right,” and that this Commission is permanently
enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to
the Constitution.
Considering the foregoing, We are therefore constrained not to entertain or give

due course to the instant Petition.”
226

tion despite the permanent injunction in Santiago. The Court treated

the Binay Group’s petition as an opposition-in-intervention.
In his Comment to the Lambino Group’s petition, the Solicitor
General joined causes with the petitioners, urging the Court to grant
the petition despite the Santiago ruling. The Solicitor General
proposed that the Court treat RA 6735 and its implementing rules
“as temporary devises to implement the system of initiative.”
Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing
pleadings supporting or opposing the Lambino Group’s petition. The
10
supporting intervenors uniformly hold the view that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in 11 relying on
Santiago. On the other hand, the opposing intervenors hold the
contrary view and maintain that Santiago is a binding precedent.
The opposing intervenors also challenged (1) the Lambino Group’s
standing to file the petition; (2) the validity of the signature
gathering and verification process; (3) the Lambino Group’s
compliance with the minimum requirement for the percentage of
voters supporting an initiative peti-
_______________
10 Arturo M. De Castro; Ronald L. Adamat, Rolando Manuel Rivera, Ruelo Baya;

Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization (PTGWO); Trade Union
Congress of the Philippines; Sulong Bayan Movement Foundation, Inc.
11 Onevoice, Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L. Quezon III,
Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr., Susan V. Ople and Carlos P. Medina, Jr.; Alternative Law
Groups, Inc.; Atty. Pete Quirino Quadra; Bayan, Bayan Muna, Kilusang Mayo Uno,
Head, Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante, Gabriela, Gabriela Women’s Party,
Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students, Jojo Pineda, Dr. Darby Santiago, Dr.
Reginald Pamugas; Loreta Ann P. Rosales, and Mario Joyo Aguja, Ana Theresa
Hontiveros-Baraquel, Luwalhati Ricasa Antonino; Philippine Constitution
(PHILCONSA), Conrado F. Estrella, Tomas C. Toledo, Mariano M. Tajon, Froilan M.
Bacungan, Joaquin T. Venus, Jr., Fortunato P. Aguas, and Amado Gat Inciong; Senate
of the Philippines; Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat,
Antonio L. Salvador and Randall C. Tabayoyong, Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Cebu City and Cebu Province Chapters; Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr., and Senators Sergio R. Osmeña III, Jamby Madrigal, Jinggoy Estrada,
Alfredo S. Lim and Panfilo Lacson; Joseph Ejercito Estrada and Pwersa ng Masang
Pilipino.
227
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 227

12
tion under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; (4) the
nature of the proposed changes as revisions and not mere
amendments as provided under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution; and (5) the Lambino Group’s compliance with the
requirement in Section 10(a) of RA 6735 limiting initiative petitions
to only one subject.
The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on
26 September 2006. After receiving the parties’ memoranda, the
Court considered the case submitted for resolution.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies

with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
amendments to the Constitution through a people’s
initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago
declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative
clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and
3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Group’s
petition.
The Ruling of the Court
There is no merit to the petition.

The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic
requirements of the Constitution for conducting a people’s initiative.
_______________
12 This provision states: “Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be

directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve
per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No
amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the
ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years.”
228

Thus, there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as the present

petition warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino Group’s
glaring failure to comply with the basic requirements of the
Constitution. For following the Court’s ruling in Santiago, no grave
abuse of discretion is attributable to the Commission on Elections.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2,Article

XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing
constitutional provision that allows a people’s initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
“Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly

proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters therein. x x x x” (Emphasis supplied)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain

the meaning of an amendment “directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition,” thus:
MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some

voters want to propose a constitutional amendment. Is the draft
of the proposed constitutional amendment ready to be shown to
the people when they are asked to sign?
MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed, Madam
President.
MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready
and shown to them before they sign. Now, who prepares the
draft?
MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they sign there is already a
draft shown to them and they are asked whether or not they
want to propose this constitutional amendment.
229
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 229

MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino

13
can prepare that
proposal and pass it around for signature. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of

the proposed constitutional amendment” should be “ready and
shown” to the people “before” they sign such proposal. The framers
plainly stated that “before they sign there is already a draft shown
to them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the people should sign
on the proposal itself because the proponents must “prepare that
proposal and pass it around for signature.”
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on
its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential
elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus
sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their
behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be
embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the
proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their
assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an
amendment is “directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign on a petition
that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written
on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the
petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance
that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition
had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.
Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to
prove that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full
text of the proposed amendments before signing.
_______________
13 I RECORD, pp. 387-388.
230

14
The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed the concept of
people’s initiative from the United States where various State 15
constitutions incorporate an initiative clause. In almost all States
which allow initiative petitions, the unbending requirement is that
the people must first see the full text of the proposed
amendments before they sign to signify their assent, and that the
people must sign on an initiative16petition that contains the full
text of the proposed amendments.
_______________
14 During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Rene
V. Sarmiento made the following report (I RECORD 389):
MR. SARMIENTO: Madam President, I am happy that the Committee on
Amendments and Transitory Provisions decided to retain the system of initiative as a
mode of amending the Constitution. I made a survey of American constitutions and I
discovered that 13 States provide for a system of initiative as a mode of amending the
Constitution—Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma and Oregon. The
initiative for ordinary laws only is used in Idaho, Maine, Montana and South Dakota.
So, I am happy that this was accepted or retained by the Committee.
xxxx
The Americans in turn copied the concept of initiatives from the Swiss beginning
in 1898 when South Dakota adopted the initiative in its constitution. The Swiss
cantons experimented with initiatives in the 1830s. In 1891, the Swiss incorporated
the initiative as a mode of amending their national constitution. Initiatives promote
“direct democracy” by allowing the people to directly propose amendments to the
constitution. In contrast, the traditional mode of changing the constitution is known as
“indirect democracy” because the amendments are referred to the voters by the
legislature or the constitutional convention.
15 Florida requires only that the title and summary of the proposed amendment are
“printed in clear and unambiguous language.” Advisory Opinion to the Attorney
General RE Right of Citizens to Choose Health Care Providers, No. 90160, 22
January 1998, Supreme Court of Florida.
16 State ex. rel Patton v. Myers, 127 Ohio St. 95, 186 N.E. 872 (1933); Whitman v.
Moore, 59 Ariz. 211, 125 P.2d 445 (1942); Heidtman v. City of Shaker Heights, 99
Ohio App. 415, 119 N.E. 2d 644 (1954); Christen v. Baker, 138 Colo. 27, 328 P.2d
951 (1958); Stop the Pay Hike Committee v. Town Council of Town of Irvington, 166
N.J. Super. 197, 399 A.2d 336 (1979); State
231
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 231

The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in

several decisions of various courts. Thus, in Capezzuto v. State
Ballot Commission, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, affirmed
by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, declared:
“[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the person

supplying the signature has not first seen what it is that he or she is
signing. Further, and more importantly, loose interpretation of the
subscription requirement can pose a significant potential for fraud. A person
permitted to describe orally the contents of an initiative petition to a
potential signer, without the signer having actually examined the petition,
could easily mislead the signer by, for example, omitting, downplaying, or
even flatly misrepresenting, portions of the petition that might not be to the
signer’s liking. This danger seems particularly acute when, in this case,
the person giving the description is the drafter of the petition, who
obviously has a vested interest in seeing that it gets the requisite
17
signatures to qualify for the ballot.” (Boldfacing and italics supplied)
18
18
Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury, the Court of Appeals of Oregon
explained:
“The purposes of “full text” provisions that apply to amendments by

initiative commonly are described in similar terms. x x x (The purpose of
the full text requirement is to provide sufficient information so that
registered voters can intelligently evaluate whether to sign the initiative
petition.”); x x x (publication of full text of amended constitutional
provision required because it is “essential for the elector to have x x x the
section which is proposed to be added to or subtracted from. If he is to vote
intelligently, he must have this knowledge. Otherwise in many instances he
would be required to vote in the dark.)” (Emphasis supplied)
_______________
ex rel Evans v. Blackwell, Slip copy, 2006 WL 1102804 (Ohio App. 10 Dist.),
2006-Ohio-2076.
17 407 Mass. 949, 955 (1990). Affirmed by the District Court of Massachusetts in
Henry v. Conolly, 743 F. Supp. 922 (1990) and by the Court of Appeals, First Circuit,
in Henry v. Conolly, 9109 F. 2d. 1000 (1990), and cited in Marino v. Town Council of
Southbridge, 13 Mass.L.Rptr. 14 (2001).
18 89 P.3d 1227, 1235 (2004).
232

Moreover, “an initiative signer must be informed at the time of

signing of the nature and effect of that which is proposed” and
failure to do so19
is “deceptive and misleading” which renders the
initiative void.
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly
state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed
amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our
Constitution clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the
relevant American jurisprudence on people’s initiative. In particular,
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal
that the framers intended that the people must first see the full text
of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the
people must sign on a petition containing such full text. Indeed,
Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and
Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires
that the people must sign the “petition x x x as signatories.”
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the
people. The proponents secure the signatures in their private
capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not
disinterested parties who can impartially explain the advantages and
disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people. The
proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do not
present the arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or
their supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the

constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The
proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures—that the
petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text
of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with
this Court a copy of the paper that the people signed as their
initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a
copy of a
_______________
19 Stumpf v. Law, 839 P. 2d 120, 124 (1992).
233
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 233

20
signature sheet after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006
when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006. The
signature sheet with this
21
Court during the oral arguments was the
signature sheet attached to the opposition in intervention filed on 7
September 2006 by intervenor Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra.
The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadra’s opposition and the
signature sheet attached to the Lambino Group’s Memorandum are
the same. We reproduce below the signature sheet in full:
Province: City/Municipality: No. of Verified Signatures:

Legislative Barangay:
District:
PROPOSITION: “DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF

ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING
THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-
PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM
OF GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE GREATER
EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT; AND
PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR
THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?”
I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987 Constitution.
My signature herein which shall form part of the petition for initiative to
amend the Constitution signifies my support for the filing thereof
Precinct Name Address Birthdate Signature Verification

Number Last MM/DD/YY
Name,
First
Name,
M.I.
Precinct Name Address Birthdate Signature Verification

Number Last MM/DD/YY
Name,
First
Name,
M.I.
1
_______________
20 Exhibit “B” of the Lambino Group’s Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006.

21 Annex “B” of the Comment/Opposition in Intervention of Atty. Pete Quirino-
Quadra filed on 7 September 2006.
234

2

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
_______________ _______________ _______________

Barangay Official Witness Witness
(Print Name and (Print Name and (Print Name and
Sign) Sign) Sign)
There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the

Lambino Group’s proposed changes in the signature sheet.
Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the
proposed changes is attached to it. Petitioner Atty. Raul Lambino
admitted this during the oral arguments before this Court on 26
September 2006.
The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people
approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-
Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not
show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they
are asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is
not the “petition” that the framers of the Constitution envisioned
when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII

of the Constitution.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the
signature-gathering from February to August 2006, the Lambino
Group circulated, together with the signature sheets, printed copies
of the Lambino Group’s draft petition which they later filed on 25
August 2006 with the COMELEC. When asked if his group also
circulated the draft of their amended petition filed on 30 August
2006 with the COMELEC, Atty. Lambino initially replied that they
circulated both. However, Atty. Lambino changed his answer and
stated that what
235
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 235

his group circulated was the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended
petition, not the draft of the 25 August 2006 petition.
The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they
prepared the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition almost
seven months earlier in February 2006 when they started
gathering signatures. Petitioner Erico B. Aumentado’s
“Verification/Certification” of the 25 August 2006 petition, as well
as of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the
COMELEC, states as follows:
“I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended] Petition in my

personal capacity as a registered voter, for and on behalf of the Union of
Local Authorities of the Philippines, as shown by ULAP Resolution No.
2006-02 hereto attached, and as representative of the mass of signatories
hereto.” (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution No.

2006-02 to the present petition. However, the “Official
22
Website of
the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines” has posted the
full text of Resolution No. 2006-02, which provides:
RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02
RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE PEOPLE’S

CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH
PEOPLE’S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF
AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local Authorities of the
Philippines (ULAP) to adopt a common stand on the approach to support
the proposals of the People’s Consultative Commission; on Charter Change;
_______________
22 www.ulap.gov.ph.
236

WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her

Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms as
embodied in the ULAP Joint Declaration for Constitutional Reforms signed
by the members of the ULAP and the majority coalition of the House of
Representatives in Manila Hotel sometime in October 2005;
WHEREAS, the People’s Consultative Commission on Charter Change
created by Her Excellency to recommend amendments to the 1987
Constitution has submitted its final report sometime in December 2005;
WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political developments
in Congress which militates against the use of the expeditious form of
amending the 1987 Constitution;
WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional members and
the failure of Congress to amend the Constitution as a constituent assembly,
ULAP has unanimously agreed to pursue the constitutional reform agenda
through People’s Initiative and Referendum without prejudice to other
pragmatic means to pursue the same;
WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY
RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE MEMBER-LEAGUES OF THE UNION
OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ULAP)
SUPPORT THE PORPOSALS (SIC) OF THE PEOPLE’S
CONSULATATIVE (SIC) COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE
THROUGH PEOPLE’S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A
MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;
DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special meeting
23
held on 14 January 2006 at the Century Park Hotel, Manila.” (Italics
supplied)
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner

Aumentado to prepare the 25 August 2006 petition, or the 30 August
2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC. ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02 “support(s) the porposals (sic) of the
Consulatative (sic) Commission on Charter Change through
people’s initiative and referendum as a mode of amending the 241987
Constitution.” The proposals of the Consultative Commission are
vastly different
_______________
23 www.ulap.gov.ph/reso2006-02.html.
24 The full text of the proposals of the Consultative Commission on Charter
Change can be downloaded at its official website at www.concom.ph.
237
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 237

from the proposed changes of the Lambino Group in the 25 August

2006 petition or 30 August 2006 amended petition filed with the
COMELEC.
For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative
Commission affect all provisions of the existing Constitution, from
the Preamble to the Transitory Provisions. The proposed
revisions have profound impact on the Judiciary and the National
Patrimony provisions of the existing Constitution, provisions that
the Lambino Group’s proposed changes do not touch. The Lambino
Group’s proposed changes purport to affect only Articles VI and VII
of the existing Constitution, including the introduction of new
Transitory Provisions.
The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January 2006
or more than six months before the filing of the 25 August 2006
petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the
COMELEC. However, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not
establish that ULAP or the Lambino Group caused the circulation of
the draft petition, together with the signature sheets, six months
before the filing with the COMELEC. On the contrary, ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02 casts grave doubt on the Lambino Group’s
claim that they circulated the draft petition together with the
signature sheets. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not refer at
all to the draft petition or to the Lambino Group’s proposed
changes.
In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before
the COMELEC, the Lambino Group declared:
“After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized that the proposed
amendments alleged in the Petition, more specifically, paragraph 3 of
Section 4 and paragraph 2 of Section 5 of the Transitory Provisions were
inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed
amendments.”
The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the
petition because the amended petition was what they had shown to
the people during the February to August 2006 signature-gathering.
Instead, the Lambino Group alleged that the petition of 25 August
2006 “inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their
proposed amendments.”
238

The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition

or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC that
they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the
signature sheets. Likewise, the Lambino Group did not allege in
their present petition before this Court that they circulated printed
copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets. The
signature sheets do not also contain any indication that the draft
petition is attached to, or circulated with, the signature sheets.
It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-
Interventions that the Lambino Group first claimed that they
circulated the “petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC,”
thus:
“[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that “(w)here there is not (sic)
fraud, a signer who did not read the measure attached to a referendum
petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he did not
understand the nature of the act.” [82 CJS. S128h. Mo. State v. Sullivan,
224, S.W. 327, 283 Mo. 546.] Thus, the registered voters who signed the
signature sheets circulated together with the petition for initiative filed
with the COMELEC below, are presumed to voters who signed the
signature sheets circulated together with the petition for initiative filed
with the COMELEC below, are presumed to have understood the
proposition contained in the petition.” (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group’s statement that they circulated to the people

“the petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC” appears an
afterthought, made after the intervenor Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (Cebu City Chapter and Cebu Province Chapters) and
Atty. Quadra had pointed out that the signature sheets did not
contain the text of the proposed changes. In their Consolidated
Reply, the Lambino Group alleged that they circulated “the petition
for initiative” but failed to mention the amended petition. This
contradicts what Atty. Lambino finally stated during the oral
arguments that what they circulated was the draft of the amended
petition of 30 August 2006.
The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum,
stating that “a signer who did not read the measure attached to a
referendum petition cannot question his signature on the ground
that he did not understand the nature of the act.” The Lambino
239
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 239

Group quotes an authority that cites a proposed change attached to

the petition signed by the people. Even the authority the Lambino
Group quotes requires that the proposed change must be attached to
the petition. The same authority the Lambino Group quotes requires
the people to sign on the petition itself.
Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed
amendment must be incorporated with, or attached to, the initiative
petition signed by the people. In the present initiative, the Lambino
Group’s proposed changes were not incorporated with, or attached
to, the signature sheets. The Lambino Group’s citation of Corpus
Juris Secundum pulls the rug from under their feet.
It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared,
printed, circulated, from February to August 2006 during the
signature-gathering period, the draft of the petition or amended

petition they filed later with the COMELEC. The Lambino Group
are less than candid with this Court in their belated claim that they
printed and circulated, together with the signature sheets, the
petition or amended petition. Nevertheless, even assuming the
Lambino Group circulated the amended petition during the
signature-gathering period, the Lambino Group admitted
circulating only very limited copies of the petition.
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted
that they printed only 100,000 copies of the draft petition they
filed more than six months later with the COMELEC. Atty.
Lambino added that he also asked other supporters to print
additional copies of the draft petition but he could not state with
certainty how many additional copies the other supporters printed.
Atty. Lambino could only assure this Court of the printing of
100,000 copies because he himself caused the printing of these
100,000 copies.
Likewise, in the Lambino Group’s Memorandum filed on 11
October 2006, the Lambino Group expressly admit that
“petitioner Lambino initiated the printing and reproduction 25
of
100,000 copies of the petition for initiative x x x.” This
admission
_______________
25 The Lambino Group’s Memorandum, p. 5.
240

binds the Lambino Group and establishes beyond any doubt

that the Lambino Group failed to show the full text of the
proposed changes to the great majority of the people who signed
the signature sheets.
Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories
could have received with certainty one copy each of the petition,
assuming a 100 percent distribution with no wastage. If Atty.
Lambino and company attached one copy of the petition to each
signature sheet, only 100,000 signature sheets could have circulated
with the petition. Each signature sheet contains space for ten
signatures. Assuming ten people signed each of these 100,000
signature sheets with the attached petition, the maximum number of
people who saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets
would not exceed 1,000,000.
With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be
physically impossible for all or a great majority of the 6.3 million
signatories to have seen the petition before they signed the signature
sheets. The inescapable conclusion is that the Lambino Group
failed to show to the 6.3 million signatories the full text of the
proposed changes. If ever, not more than one million signatories

saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets.
In any event, the Lambino Group’s signature sheets do not
contain the full text of the proposed changes, either on the face of
the signature sheets, or as attachment with an indication in the
signature sheet of such attachment. Petitioner Atty. Lambino
admitted this during the oral arguments, and this admission
binds the Lambino Group. This fact is also obvious from a mere
reading of the signature sheet. This omission is fatal. The failure
to so include the text of the proposed changes in the signature sheets
renders the initiative void for non-compliance with the constitutional
requirement that the amendment must be “directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition.” The signature sheet is
not the “petition” envisioned in the initiative clause of the
Constitution.
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed
the signature sheets did not see the fall text of the proposed changes
241
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 241

before signing. They could not have known the nature and effect of
the proposed changes, among which are:
1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be

lifted and thus
26
members of Parliament can be re-elected
indefinitely;
2, The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely
until its members, who are almost all the present members
of Congress, decide to call for new parliamentary elections.
Thus, the members of the interim Parliament 27will
determine the expiration of their own term of office;
3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed
changes, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose28
further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.
These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in

the Lambino Group’s signature sheets. The people who signed the
signature sheets had no idea that they were proposing these
amendments. These three proposed changes are highly controversial.
The people could not have inferred or divined these proposed
changes merely from a reading or rereading of the contents of the
signature sheets.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that
he and his group assured the people during the
signaturegathering that the elections for the regular Parliament
would
_______________
26 Under the proposed Section 1(2), Article VI of the Constitution, members of
Parliament shall be elected for a term of five years “without limitation as to the
number thereof.”
27 Under the proposed Section 4(1), Article XVIII, Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution, the interim Parliament “shall continue until the Members of the regular
Parliament shall have been elected and shall have qualified.” Also, under the
proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII, of the same Transitory Provisions, the interim
Parliament “shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament.”
28 Under the proposed Section 4(3), Article XVIII, Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution, the interim Parliament, within 45 days from ratification of the proposed
changes, “shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution.”
242

be held during the 2007 local elections if the proposed changes

were ratified before the 2007 local elections. However, the text of
the proposed changes belies this.
The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory
Provisions, as found in the amended petition, states:
“Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the
members of Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held
simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. x x x
x” (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular
Parliament will be held simultaneously with the 2007 local elections.
This section merely requires that the elections for the regular
Parliament shall be held simultaneously with the local elections
without specifying the year.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal drafter
of the proposed changes, could have easily written the word “next”
before the phrase “election of all local government officials.” This
would have insured that the elections for the regular Parliament
would be held in the next local elections following the ratification of
the proposed changes. However, the absence of the word “next”
allows the interim Parliament to schedule the elections for the
regular Parliament simultaneously with any future local elections.
Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the
expiration of their own term of office. This allows incumbent
members of the House of Representatives to hold office beyond their
current three-year term of office, and possibly even beyond the five-
year term of office of regular members of the Parliament. Certainly,
this is contrary to the representations of Atty. Lambino and his
group to the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets.
Atty. Lambino and his group deceived the 6.3 million
signatories, and even the entire nation.
This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an
initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments to avoid fraud or misrepresentation. In the present

initiative, the 6.3 million signatories had to rely on the verbal
representa-
243
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 243

tions of Atty. Lambino and his group because the signature sheets
did not contain the full text of the proposed changes. The result is a
grand deception on the 6.3 million signatories who were led to
believe that the proposed changes would require the holding in 2007
of elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with the local
elections.
The Lambino Group’s initiative springs another surprise on the
people who signed the signature sheets. The proposed changes
mandate the interim Parliament to make further amendments or
revisions to the Constitution. The proposed Section 4(4), Article
XVIII on Transitory Provisions, provides:
“Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments,

the interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or
revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of local
autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.” (Emphasis supplied)
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision
is a “surplusage” and the Court and the people should simply ignore
it. Far from being a surplusage, this provision invalidates the
Lambino Group’s initiative.
Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift
from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary
system. American jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this as
logrolling—when the initiative petition incorporates an unrelated
subject matter in the same petition. This puts the people in a
dilemma since they can answer only either yes or no to the entire
proposition, forcing them to sign a petition that effectively contains
two propositions, one of which they may find unacceptable.
Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to
nullify the entire proposition and not only the unrelated subject
29
matter. Thus, in Fine v. Firestone, the Supreme Court of Florida
declared:
_______________
29 448 So.2d 984, 994 (1984), internal citations omitted.
244

“Combining multiple propositions into one proposal constitutes

“logrolling,” which, if our judicial responsibility is to mean anything,
we cannot permit. The very broadness of the proposed amendment
amounts to logrolling because the electorate cannot know what it is voting
on—the amendment’s proponents’ simplistic explanation reveals only the
tip of the iceberg, x x x x The ballot must give the electorate fair notice of
the proposed amendment being voted on. x x x x The ballot language in the
instant case fails to do that. The very broadness of the proposal makes it
impossible to state what it will affect and effect and violates the requirement
that proposed amendments embrace only one subject.” (Emphasis supplied)
Logrolling confuses 30and even deceives the people. In Yute Air

Alaska v. McAlpine, the Supreme Court of Alaska warned against
“inadvertence, stealth and fraud” in logrolling:
“Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of the
problems that the single-subject rule was enacted to prevent are exacerbated.
There is a greater danger of logrolling, or the deliberate intermingling of
issues to increase the likelihood of an initiative’s passage, and there is a
greater opportunity for “inadvertence, stealth and fraud” in the
enactment-by-initiative process. The drafters of an initiative operate
independently of any structured or supervised process. They often
emphasize particular provisions of their proposition, while remaining silent
on other (more complex or less appealing) provisions, when communicating
to the public. x x x Indeed, initiative promoters typically use simplistic
advertising to present their initiative to potential petition-signers and
eventual voters. Many voters will never read the full text of the initiative
before the election. More importantly, there is no process for amending or
splitting the several provisions in an initiative proposal. These difficulties
clearly distinguish the initiative from the legislative process.” (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for

further amendments or revisions to be undertaken by the interim
Parliament as a constituent assembly. The people who signed the
signature sheets could not have known that their signatures would be
used to propose an amendment mandating the interim Parliament to
propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.
_______________
30 698 P.2d 1173, 1184 (1985).
245
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 245

Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4)

to compel the interim Parliament to amend or revise again’ the
Constitution within 45 days from ratification of the proposed
changes, or before the May 2007 elections. In the absence of the
proposed Section 4(4), the interim Parliament has the discretion

whether to amend or revise again the Constitution. With the
proposed Section 4(4), the initiative proponents want the interim
Parliament mandated to immediately amend or revise again the
Constitution.
However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this
rush in amending or revising again so soon the Constitution. The
signature sheets do not also explain what specific amendments or
revisions the initiative proponents want the interim Parliament to
make, and why there is a need for such further amendments or
revisions. The people are again left in the dark to fathom the
nature and effect of the proposed changes. Certainly, such an
initiative is not “directly proposed by the people” because the people
do not even know the nature and effect of the proposed changes.
There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino
Group’s amended petition of 30 August 2006. The proposed Section
4(3) of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be members
of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as
member of Parliament if the interim Parliament does not schedule
elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010. However, there
is no counterpart provision for the present members of the House of
Representatives even if their term of office will all end on 30 June
2007, three years earlier than that of half of the present Senators.
Thus, all the present members of the House will remain members of
the interim Parliament after 30 June 2010.
The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010.
Thereafter, the Prime Minister exercises all the powers of the
President. If the interim Parliament does not schedule elections for
the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010, the Prime Minister will
come
246

only from the present members of the House of Representatives to

the exclusion of the present Senators.
The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against
the Senators. The 6.3 million people who signed the signature
sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used
to discriminate against the Senators. They could not have known
that their signatures would be used to limit, after 30 June 2010,
the interim Parliament’s choice of Prime Minister only to
members of the existing House of Representatives.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first
showing to the people the full text of the proposed amendments is
most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the
people. That is why the Constitution requires that an initiative must

be “directly proposed by the people x x x in a petition”—meaning
that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of
the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the
nation’s fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed
amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a general or
special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected
individuals.
The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution. This Court trusts the
wisdom of the people even if the members of this Court do not
personally know the people who sign the petition. However, this
trust emanates from a fundamental assumption: the full text of
the proposed amendment is first shown to the people before they
sign the petition, not after they have signed the petition.
In short, the Lambino Group’s initiative is void and
unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply with the
requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the
initiative must be “directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition.”
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the

Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives
247
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 247

A people’s initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an

amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast,
Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both
amendments and revisions to the Constitution. Article XVII of the
Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
“Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be

proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or

(2) A constitutional convention.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly

proposed by the people through initiative x x x.” (Emphasis supplied)
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending

the Constitution. The first mode is through Congress upon three-
fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is through a
constitutional convention. The third mode is through a people’s
initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second

modes, applies to “[A]ny amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution.” In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the
third mode, applies only to “[A]mendments to this Constitution.”
This distinction was intentional as shown by the following
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
“MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.

May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that
pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a
complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision
governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete
committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose
amendments to this Consti-
248

tution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This
proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about
because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the
traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The
committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to
amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the
entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the
proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x x
xxxx
MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as
a separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to
accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph
(c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as if it were a
self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago,
this process of initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not
expand into a revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution.
That was the sense that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish
the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision;
whereas, the process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would
only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the
Committee.
MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam President.
xxxx
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner Davide’s proposed
amendment on line 1 refers to “amendments.” Does it not cover the word
“revision” as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction

between the words “amendments” and “revision”?
249
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 249

MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because “amendments” and “revision” should be
covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to
“amendments” not “revision.”
31
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you. (Emphasis supplied)
There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution

intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between “amendment” and
“revision” of the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote,
that only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose
revisions to the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that
a people’s initiative may propose only amendments to the
Constitution. Where the intent and language of the Constitution
clearly withhold from the people the power to propose revisions to
the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they
are empowered to propose amendments.
This has been the consistent ruling of state 32
supreme courts in the
United States. Thus, in McFadden v. Jordan, the Supreme Court
of California ruled:
“The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to the

Constitution x x x applies only to the proposing and the adopting or
rejecting of ‘laws and amendments to the Constitution’ and does not
purport to extend to a constitutional revision. x x x x It is thus clear that a
revision of the Constitution may be accomplished only through ratification
by the people of a revised constitution proposed by a convention called for
that purpose as outlined hereinabove. Consequently if the scope of the
proposed initiative measure (hereinafter termed ‘the measure’) now before
us is so broad that if such measure became law a substantial revision of our
present state Constitution would be effected, then the measure may not
properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon
by a constitutional convention, and the writ sought by petitioner should
issue. x x x x” (Emphasis supplied)
_______________
31 I RECORD 386, 392, 402-403.

32 196 P.2d 787, 790 (1948). See also Lowe v. Keisling, 130 Or.App. 1, 882 P.2d 91
(1994).
250

Likewise,33 the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v.

Appling:
It is well established that when a constitution specifies the manner in which

it may be amended or revised, it can be altered by those who favor
amendments, revision, or other change only through the use of one of the
specified means. The constitution itself recognizes that there is a difference
between an amendment and a revision; and it is obvious from an
examination of the measure here in question that it is not an amendment as
that term is generally understood and as it is used in Article IV, Section 1.
The document appears to be based in large part on the revision of the
constitution drafted by the ‘Commission for Constitutional Revision’
authorized by the 1961 Legislative Assembly, x x x and submitted to the
1963 Legislative Assembly. It failed to receive in the Assembly the two-
third’s majority vote of both houses required by Article XVII, Section 2, and
hence failed of adoption, x x x.
While differing from that document in material respects, the measure
sponsored by the plaintiffs is, nevertheless, a thorough overhauling of the
present constitution x x x.
To call it an amendment is a misnomer.
Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such a measure as
can be submitted to the people through the initiative. If a revision, it is
subject to the requirements of Article XVII, Section 2(1); if a new
constitution, it can only be proposed at a convention called in the manner
provided in Article XVII, Section 1. x x x x
Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people’s

initiative can only propose amendments to the Constitution since the
Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments. There can be no
deviation from the constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the
Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million
signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes
prescribed in the Constitution itself.
As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative
34
Petition No. 364:
_______________
33 392 P.2d 636, 638 (1964).

34 930 P.2d 186, 196 (1996), internal citations omitted.
251
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 251

It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only be revised or

amended in the manner prescribed by the instrument itself, and that
any attempt to revise a constitution in a manner other than the one
provided in the instrument is almost invariably treated as extra-
constitutional and revolutionary. x x x x “While it is universally conceded
that the people are sovereign and that they have power to adopt a
constitution and to change their own work at will, they must, in doing so, act
in an orderly manner and according to the settled principles of constitutional
law. And where the people, in adopting a constitution, have prescribed the
method by which the people may alter or amend it, an attempt to change the
fundamental law in violation of the self-imposed restrictions, is
unconstitutional.” x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the
Constitution, cannot shirk from its solemn oath and duty to insure
compliance with the clear command of the Constitution—that a
people’s initiative may only amend, never revise, the Constitution.
The question is, does the Lambino Group’s initiative constitute
an amendment or revision of the Constitution? If the Lambino
Group’s initiative constitutes a revision, then the present petition
should be dismissed for being outside the scope of Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an
amendment and a revision of a constitution. One of the earliest cases
that recognized the distinction described the fundamental difference
in this manner:
“[T]he very term “constitution” implies an instrument of a permanent and

abiding nature, and the provisions contained therein for its revision
indicate the will of the people that the underlying principles upon which
it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a
like permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the significance of the
term “amendment” implies such an addition or change within the lines of
the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the
35
purpose for which it was framed.” (Emphasis supplied)
_______________
35 Livermore v. Waite, 102 Cal. 113, 118-119 (1894).
252

Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in

the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers
or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the
change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when
the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On
the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds,
reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved.
Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution,
while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being
amended.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but
not revisions to the constitution just like in our Constitution, courts
have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the
qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed

change is “so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the
‘substantial entirety’ of the constitution
36
by the deletion or alteration
of numerous existing provisions.” The court examines only the
number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of
the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the
proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the
change will “accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of
37
our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision.” Whether
there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper
subject of inquiry. Thus, “a change in the nature of [the] basic
governmental plan” includes change in its 38fundamental framework
or the fundamental powers of its Branches.” A change in the nature
of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that
“jeopardize the traditional
39
form of government and the system of
check and balances.”
_______________
36 Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Board of Equalization,
583 P.2d 1281, 1286 (1978).
37 Id.
38 Legislature of the State of California v. EU, 54 Cal.3d 492, 509 (1991).
39 California Association of Retail Tobacconists v. State, 109 Cal. App.4th 792,
836 (2003).
253
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 253

Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino

Group’s initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment.
Quantitatively, the Lambino Group’s proposed changes overhaul two
articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the
Executive—affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire
40
Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially
the basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary,
and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the
Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches of
government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This
alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from
the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the
legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure
of government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of
Executive Power alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes
a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one
chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances

within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a
Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system,
involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the
abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision,
not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the Lambino Group’s
proposed changes, it is readily apparent that the changes will
radically alter the framework of government as set forth in the
Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the
Constitutional Commission, writes:
“An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and

separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to
improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet
new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obso-
_______________
40 See note 44, infra.
254

lete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding

original intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire
document, or of provisions of the document which have over-all
implications for the entire document, to determine how and to what extent
they should be altered. Thus, for instance a switch from the presidential
system to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of its
over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a switch
from a bicameral system to a unicameral system be because of its effect
41
on other important provisions of the Constitution.” (Emphasis supplied)
42
In Adams v. Gunter an initiative petition proposed the amendment
of the Florida State constitution to shift from a bicameral to a
unicameral legislature. The issue turned on whether the initiative
“was defective and unauthorized where [the] proposed amendment
would x x x affect several other provisions of [the] Constitution.”
The Supreme Court of Florida, striking down the initiative as
outside the scope of the initiative clause, ruled as follows:
“The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the 1968

Constitution to provide for a Unicameral Legislature affects not only many
other provisions of the Constitution but provides for a change in the
form of the legislative branch of government, which has been in existence
in the United States Congress and in all of the states of the nation, except
one, since the earliest days. It would be difficult to visualize a more
revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a Senate is basic in the
American form of government. It would not only radically change the
whole pattern of government in this state and tear apart the whole
fabric of the Constitution, but would even affect the physical facilities
necessary to carry on government.
xxxx
We conclude with the observation that if such proposed amendment were
adopted by the people at the General Election and if the Legislature at its
next session should fail to submit further amendments to revise and clarify
the numerous inconsistencies and conflicts which would result, or if after
_______________
41 Joaquin Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A

Commentary, p. 1294 (2003).
42 238 So.2d 824 (1970).
255
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 255

submission of appropriate amendments the people should refuse to adopt

them, simple chaos would prevail in the government of this State. The same
result would obtain from an amendment, for instance, of Section 1 of Article
V, to provide for only a Supreme Court and Circuit Courts-and there could
be other examples too numerous to detail. These examples point unerringly
to the answer.
The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds of men and
women and many sessions of the Legislature in bringing about the
Constitution of 1968 was to eliminate inconsistencies and conflicts and to
give the State a workable, accordant, homogenous and up-to-date document.
All of this could disappear very quickly if we were to hold that it could be
43
amended in the manner proposed in the initiative petition here.” (Emphasis
supplied)
The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater force to the
present petition. The Lambino Group’s initiative not only seeks a
shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature, it also seeks to
merge the executive and legislative departments. The initiative in
Adams did not even touch the executive department.
In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18 sections
of the Florida Constitution that would be affected by the shift from a
bicameral to a unicameral legislature. In the Lambino Group’s
present initiative, no less than 105 provisions of the Constitution
would be affected
44
based on the count of Associate Justice Romeo J.
Callejo, Sr. There is no doubt that the Lambino Group’s present
initiative seeks far more radical changes in the structure of
government than the initiative in Adams.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between
“amendment” and “revision” is only one of procedure, not of
substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body
drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive changes
are called “revisions” because members of the deliberative body
work full-time on the changes. However, the same substantive

changes, when proposed through an initiative, are called “amend-
_______________
43 Id., at pp. 830-832.

44 As stated by Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. during the 26 September
2006 oral arguments.
256

ments” because the changes are made by ordinary people who do

not make an “occupation, profession, or vocation” out of such
endeavor.
Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of
their theory in their Memorandum:
“99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the constitutional provisions
expressly provide for both “amendment” and “revision” when it speaks of
legislators and constitutional delegates, while the same provisions expressly
provide only for “amendment” when it speaks of the people. It would seem
that the apparent distinction is based on the actual experience of the people,
that on one hand the common people in general are not expected to work
full-time on the matter of correcting the constitution because that is not their
occupation, profession or vocation; while on the other hand, the legislators
and constitutional convention delegates are expected to work fulltime on the
same matter because that is their occupation, profession or vocation. Thus,
the difference between the words “revision” and “amendment” pertain
only to the process or procedure of coming up with the corrections, for
purposes of interpreting the constitutional provisions.
100. Stated otherwise, the difference between “amendment” and
“revision” cannot reasonably be in the substance or extent of the
correction. x x x x” (Underlining in the original; boldfacing supplied)
The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a

constitutional convention had drafted the same proposed changes
that the Lambino Group wrote in the present initiative, the changes
would constitute a revision of the Constitution. Thus, the Lambino
Group concedes that the proposed changes in the present
initiative constitute a revision if Congress or a constitutional
convention had drafted the changes. However, since the Lambino
Group as private individuals drafted the proposed changes, the
changes are merely amendments to the Constitution. The Lambino
Group trivializes the serious matter of changing the fundamental law
of the land.
The express intent of the framers and the plain language of
the Constitution contradict the Lambino Group’s theory. Where the
intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution are clear
and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent
257
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 257

45
and language. Any theory espousing a construction contrary to
such intent and language deserves scant consideration. More so, if
such theory wreaks havoc by creating inconsistencies in the form of
government established in the Constitution. Such a theory, devoid of
any jurisprudential mooring and inviting inconsistencies in the
Constitution, only exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino Group’s
position. Any theory advocating that a proposed change involving a
radical structural change in government does not constitute a
revision justly deserves rejection.
The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative
proponents in American jurisdictions have 46
attempted to advance
without any success. In Lowe v. Keisling, the Supreme Court of
Oregon rejected this theory, thus:
“Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to changes to the
constitution proposed by initiative. His theory is that Article XVII, section
2 merely provides a procedure by which the legislature can propose a
revision of the constitution, but it does not affect proposed revisions
initiated by the people.
Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes a wholesale
change to the constitution that cannot be enacted through the initiative
process. They assert that the distinction between amendment and revision is
determined by reviewing the scope and subject matter of the proposed
enactment, and that revisions are not limited to “a formal overhauling of the
con-stitution.” They argue that this ballot measure proposes far reaching
changes outside the lines of the original instrument, including profound
impacts on existing fundamental rights and radical restructuring of the
government’s relationship with a defined group of citizens. Plaintiffs assert
that, because the proposed ballot measure “will refashion the most basic
principles of Oregon constitutional law,” the trial court correctly held that it
violated Article XVII, section 2, and cannot appear on the ballot without the
prior approval of the legislature.
_______________
45 Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, 10 November

2003, 415 SCRA 44; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 142
Phil. 393; 31 SCRA 413 (1970); Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Rodriguez, 66
Phil. 259 (1938).
46 882 P.2d 91, 96-97 (1994). On the merits, the Court in Lowe v. Keisling found
the amendment in question was not a revision.
258

We first address Mabon’s argument that Article XVII, section 2(1), does not
prohibit revisions instituted by initiative. In Holmes v. Appling, x x x, the
Supreme Court concluded that a revision of the constitution may not be
accomplished by initiative, because of the provisions of Article XVII,
section 2. After reviewing Article XVII, section 1, relating to proposed
amendments, the court said:
“From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1, authorizes the use of the
initiative as a means of amending the Oregon Constitution, but it contains no similar
sanction for its use as a means of revising the constitution.” x x x x
It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating to revisions, and said:

“It is the only section of the constitution which provides the means for
constitutional revision and it excludes the idea that an individual, through
the initiative, may place such a measure before the electorate.” x x x x
Accordingly, we reject Mabon’s argument that Article XVII, section
2, does not apply to constitutional revisions proposed by initiative.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Group’s theory which
negates the express intent of the framers and the plain language of
the Constitution.
We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one
end green for amendments and at the other end red for revisions.
Towards the middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties arise
in determining whether there is an amendment or revision. The
present initiative is indisputably located at the far end of the red
spectrum where revision begins. The present initiative seeks a
radical overhaul of the existing separation of powers among the
three co-equal departments of government, requiring far-reaching
amendments in several sections and articles of the Constitution.
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision
of the Constitution without affecting any other section or article, the
change may generally be considered an amendment and not a
revision. For example,
47
a change reducing the voting age from 18
years to 15 years is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a
change
_______________
47 Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
259
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 259

reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 48

100
percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not a revision. Also, a
change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for
49
election to the Presidency is an amendment and not a revision.
The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of

sections or articles of the Constitution other than the specific
provision being amended. These changes do not also affect the
structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances
among or within the three branches. These three examples are
located at the far green end of the spectrum, opposite the far red end
where the revision sought by the present petition is located.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an
amendment or a revision. A change in a single word of one sentence
of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For
example, the substitution of the word “republican” 50
with
“monarchic” or “theocratic” in Section 1, Article II of the
Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government
and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus,
each specific change will have to be examined case-by-case,
depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it
affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted system of
checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the
existing Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or
several provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body with
recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A
revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also
the altered principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus,
constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent
assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On
the other hand, constitutions allow people’s initiatives, which do not
have fixed and
_______________
48 Section 11(1), Article XVI of the Constitution.

49 Section 2, Article VII of the Constitution.
50 This section provides: “The Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.”
260

identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to

undertake only amendments and not revisions.
In the present initiative, the Lambino Group’s proposed Section 2
of the Transitory Provisions states:
“Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and
Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and
Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI
are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim
up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of
government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform with a

unicameral parliamentary form of government; x x x x” (Emphasis
supplied)
The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is

irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law, the later law prevails.
This rule also applies to construction of constitutions. However, the
Lambino Group’s draft of Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions
turns on its head this rule of construction by stating that in case of
such irreconcilable inconsistency, the earlier provision “shall be
amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of
government.” The effect is to freeze the two irreconcilable
provisions until the earlier one “shall be amended,” which requires a
future separate constitutional amendment.
Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment,
petitioner Atty. Lambino readily conceded during the oral arguments
that the requirement of a future amendment is a “surplusage.” In
short, Atty. Lambino wants to reinstate the rule of statutory
construction so that the later provision automatically prevails in case
of irreconcilable inconsistency. However, it is not as simple as that.
The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed
Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions is not between a provision in
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and a provision in the proposed
changes. The inconsistency is between a provision in Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution and the “Parliamentary system of
government,” and the
261
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 261

inconsistency shall be resolved in favor of a “unicameral

parliamentary form of government.”
Now, what “unicameral parliamentary form of government” do
the Lambino Group’s proposed changes refer to—the Bangladeshi,
Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand models, which are among the
few countries with unicameral parliaments? The proposed changes
could not possibly refer to the traditional and well-known
parliamentary forms of government—the British, French, Spanish,
German, Italian, Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian models, which
have all bicameral parliaments. Did the people who signed the
signature sheets realize that they were adopting the Bangladeshi,
Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand parliamentary form of
government?
This drives home the point that the people’s initiative is not
meant for revisions of the Constitution but only for amendments. A
shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system requires harmonizing several provisions in
many articles of the Constitution. Revision of the Constitution
through a people’s initiative will only result in gross absurdities in

the Constitution.
In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group’s
initiative is a revision and not an amendment. Thus, the present
initiative is void and unconstitutional because it violates Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution limiting the scope of a people’s
initiative to “[A]mendments to this Constitution.”
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with
the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on the conduct and scope of a people’s initiative to amend the
Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court’s ruling in
Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions” to cover the system of initiative to
amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will
not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court
must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA
6735 does not com-
262

ply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the

initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.
This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the
constitutionality of a statute if the case before the Court can be
resolved on some other grounds. Such avoidance is a logical
consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts will not pass
upon the constitutionality
51
of a statute if the case can be resolved on
some other grounds.
Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement
the constitutional provision on initiatives to amend the Constitution,
this will not change the result here because the present petition
violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. To be a valid
initiative, the present initiative must first comply with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution even before complying with RA
6735.
Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735
which requires that the “petition for an initiative on the 1987
Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total
number of registered voters as signatories.” Section 5(b) of RA
6735 requires that the people must sign the “petition x x x as
signatories.”
The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August
2006 or the amended petition of 30 August 2006 filed with the
COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato,
and Atty. Alberto C. Agra signed the petition and amended
petition as counsels for “Raul L. Lambino and Erico B.
Aumentado, Petitioners.” In the COMELEC the Lambino Group,

claiming to act “together with” the 6.3 million signatories, merely
attached the signature sheets to the petition and amended petition.
Thus, the petition and amended petition filed with the COMELEC
did not even comply with the basic requirement of RA 6735 that the
Lambino Group claims as valid.
The Lambino Group’s logrolling initiative also violates Section
10(a) of RA 6735 stating, “No petition embracing more than one
_______________
51 Spouses Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 760; 351 SCRA 44 (2001); Intia,
Jr. v. Commission on Audit, 366 Phil. 273; 306 SCRA 593 (1999).
263
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 263

(1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; x x x.” The

proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, mandating the
interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to
the Constitution, is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in
the form of government. Since the present initiative embraces more
than one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits submission of the
initiative petition to the electorate. Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid,
the Lambino Group’s initiative will still fail.
4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in

Dismissing the Lambino Group’s Initiative
In dismissing the Lambino Group’s initiative petition, the
COMELEC en banc merely followed this Court’s ruling in Santiago
and People’s Initiative52 for Reform, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA) v. COMELEC. For following this Court’s ruling, no grave
abuse of discretion is attributable to the COMELEC. On this ground
alone, the present petition warrants outright dismissal. Thus, this
Court should reiterate its unanimous ruling in PIRMA:
“The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of

discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in
dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only
complied with the dispositions in the Decisions of this Court in G.R. No.
127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10,
1997.”
5. Conclusion
The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the
utmost respect and obedience of all the citizens of this nation. No
one can trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly amending or
revising it in blatant violation of the clearly specified modes of
amendment and revision laid down in the Constitution itself.
To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the

Constitution in unchartered waters, to be tossed and turned by every
dominant political group of the day. If this Court allows today a
cava-
_______________
52 G.R. No. 129754, Resolution dated 23 September 1997.
264

lier change in the Constitution outside the constitutionally prescribed

modes, tomorrow the new dominant political group that comes will
demand its own set of changes in the same cavalier and
unconstitutional fashion. A revolving-door constitution does not
augur well for the rule of law in this country.
An overwhelming majority—16,622,111
53
voters comprising 76.3
percent of the total votes cast —approved our Constitution in a
national plebiscite held on 11 February 1987. That approval is the
unmistakable voice of the people, the full expression of the
people’s sovereign will. That approval included the prescribed
modes for amending or revising the Constitution.
No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million
signatures gathered by the Lambino Group, can change our
Constitution contrary to the specific modes that the people, in their
sovereign capacity, prescribed when they ratified the Constitution.
The alternative is an extra-constitutional change, which means
subverting the people’s sovereign will and discarding the
Constitution. This is one act the Court cannot and should never do.
As the ultimate guardian of the Constitution, this Court is sworn to
perform its solemn duty to defend and protect the Constitution,
which embodies the real sovereign will of the people.
Incantations of “people’s voice,” “people’s sovereign will,” or
“let the people decide” cannot override the specific modes of
changing the Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution itself.
Otherwise, the Constitution—the people’s fundamental covenant
that provides enduring stability to our society—becomes easily
susceptible to manipulative changes by political groups gathering
signatures through false promises. Then, the Constitution ceases to
be the bedrock of the nation’s stability.
The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the “people’s
voice.” However, the Lambino Group unabashedly states in ULAP
_______________
53 Presidential Proclamation No. 58 dated February 11, 1987, entitled

“Proclaiming the Ratification of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
Adopted by the Constitutional Commission of 1986, including the Ordinance

Appended thereto.”
265
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 265

Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the

COMELEC, that “ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the
agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for
constitutional reforms.” The Lambino Group thus admits that their
“people’s” initiative is an “unqualified support to the agenda” of
the incumbent President to change the Constitution. This forewarns
the Court to be wary of incantations of “people’s voice” or
“sovereign will” in the present initiative.
This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and
protect the Constitution. The Constitution, which embodies the
people’s sovereign will, is the bible of this Court. This Court exists
to defend and protect the Constitution. To allow this
constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by deceptively gathered
signatures, to alter basic principles in the Constitution is to allow a
desecration of the Constitution. To allow such alteration and
desecration is to lose this Court’s raison d’etre.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio-Morales, J., concur.

Panganiban (C.J.), See Separate Concurring Opinion.
Puno, J., Pls. see Dissent.
Quisumbing and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., Pls. See Separate
Opinions.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., Pls. see my Concurring Opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J., I also concur with Justice Callejo.
Corona, J., See Dissenting Opinion.
Callejo, Sr., J., Please see Concurring Opinion.
Azcuna, J., I concur in Separate Opinion.
Tinga, J., See Separate Opinion.
266

Chico-Nazario, J., I join the Dissenting Opinion of J. Puno

—Please see Separate Opinion.
Garcia, J., I join the Dissenting Opinion of J. Puno.
Velasco, Jr., J., I join the Dissent of J. Puno.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
PANGANIBAN, C.J.:
Without the rule of law, there can be no

lasting prosperity and certainly no liberty.
1
Beverley McLachlin
Chief Justice of Canada
After a deep reflection on the issues raised and a careful evaluation

of the parties’ respective arguments—both oral and written—as well
as the enlightened and enlightening Opinions submitted by my
esteemed colleagues, I am fully convinced that the present Petition
must be dismissed.
I write, however, to show that my present disposition is
completely consistent with my previous Opinions and votes on the
two extant Supreme Court cases involving an initiative to change the
Constitution. 2
In my Separate Opinion in Santiago v. Comelec, I opined “that
taken together and interpreted properly and liberally, the Constitu-
_______________
1 Chief Justice McLachlin spoke on “Liberty, Prosperity and the Rule of Law” in
her speech before the Global Forum on Liberty and Prosperity held on October 18-20,
2006 in Manila. She further stated: “Without the rule of law, government officials are
not bound by standards of conduct. Without the rule of law, the dignity and equality
of all people is not affirmed and their ability to seek redress for grievances and
societal commitments is limited. Without the rule of law, we have no means of
ensuring meaningful participation by people in formulating and enacting the norms
and standards which organize the kinds of societies in which we want to live.”
2 G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 336 Phil. 848; 270 SCRA 106. For ease of
reference, my Separate Opinion is reproduced in full:
267
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 267

tion (particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), Republic Act 6735 and
Comelec Resolution 2300 provide more than sufficient authority to
implement,
_______________
“Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing for the majority, holds
that:
‘(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
entertaining the ‘initiatory’ Delfin Petition.
‘(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to ‘be directly proposed by the people
through initiative,’ there is no implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is
‘incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.’
‘(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2300, ‘insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void.’
“I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory petition can show the
required number of signatures—in this case, 12% of all the registered voters in the Philippines
with at least 3% in every legislative district—no public funds may be spent and no government
resources may be used in an initiative to amend the Constitution. Verily, the Comelec cannot
even entertain any petition absent such signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully from
the majority’s two other rulings. Let me explain.
“Under the above restrictive holdings espoused by the Court’s majority, the Constitution
cannot be amended at all through a people’s initiative. Not by Delfin, not by PIRMA, not by
anyone, not even by all the voters of the country acting together. This decision will effectively
but unnecessarily curtail, nullify, abrogate and render inutile the people’s right to change the
basic law. At the very least, the majority holds the right hostage to congressional discretion on
whether to pass a new law to implement it, when there is already one existing at present. This
right to amend through initiative, it bears stressing, is guaranteed by Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution, as follows:
‘SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by
268

effectuate and realize our people’s power to amend the

Constitution.”
_______________
at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five
years thereafter.’
“With all due respect, I find the majority’s position all too sweeping and all too extremist. It is
equivalent to burning the whole house to exterminate the rats, and to killing the patient to
relieve him of pain. What Citizen Delfin wants the Comelec to do we should reject. But we
should not thereby preempt any future effort to exercise the right of initiative correctly and
judiciously. The fact that the Delfin Petition proposes a misuse of initiative does not justify a
ban against its proper use. Indeed, there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time and
for the right reason.
Taken Together and Interpreted Properly, the Constitution, R.A. 6735 and Comelec
Resolution 2300 Are Sufficient to Implement Constitutional Initiatives
“While R.A. 6735 may not be a perfect law, it was—as the majority openly concedes—
intended by the legislature to cover and, I respectfully submit, it contains enough provisions to
effectuate an initiative on the Constitution. I completely agree with the inspired and inspiring
opinions of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno and Mr. Justice Ricardo J. Francisco that RA 6735, the
Roco law on initiative, sufficiently implements the right of the people to initiate amendments to
the Constitution. Such views, which I shall no longer repeat nor elaborate on, are thoroughly
consistent with this Court’s unanimous en banc rulings in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs.
Commission on Elections, that “provisions for initiative . . . are (to be) liberally construed to
effectuate their purposes, to facilitate and not hamper the exercise by the voters of the rights
granted thereby”; and in Garcia vs. Comelec, that any “effort to trivialize the effectiveness of
people’s initiatives ought to be rejected.”
“No law can completely and absolutely cover all administrative details. In recognition of
this, R.A. 6735 wisely empowered the Commission on Election “to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.” And pursuant thereto,
the Comelec issued its Resolution 2300 on 16 January 1991.
269
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 269

Six months after, in my Separate Opinion in People’s Initiative for

Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. Comelec, I joined the
_______________
Such Resolution, by its very words, was promulgated “to govern the conduct of initiative on the
Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws,” not by the incumbent
Commission on Elections but by one then composed of Acting Chairperson Haydee B. Yorac,
Comms. Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr., Leopoldo L. Africa, Andres R. Flores, Dario C. Rama and
Magdara B. Dimaampao. All of these Commissioners who signed Resolution 2300 have retired
from the Commission, and thus we cannot ascribe any vile motive unto them, other than an
honest, sincere and exemplary effort to give life to a cherished right of our people.
“The majority argues that while Resolution 2300 is valid in regard to national laws and local
legislations, it is void in reference to constitutional amendments. There is no basis for such
differentiation. The source of and authority for the Resolution is the same law, R.A. 6735.
“I respectfully submit that taken together and interpreted properly and liberally, the
Constitution (particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), R.A. 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide
more than sufficient authority to implement, effectuate and realize our people’s power to amend
the Constitution.
Petitioner Delfin and the Pedrosa Spouses Should Not Be Muzzled
“I am glad the majority decided to heed our plea to lift the temporary restraining order
issued by this Court on 18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibited Petitioner Delfin and the
Spouses Pedrosa from exercising their right of initiative. In fact, I believe that such restraining
order as against private respondents should not have been issued, in the first place. While I
agree that the Comelec should be stopped from using public funds and government resources to
help them gather signatures, I firmly believe that this Court has no power to restrain them from
exercising their right of initiative. The right to propose amendments to the Constitution is really
a species of the right of free speech and free assembly. And certainly, it would be tyrannical
and despotic to stop anyone from speaking freely and persuading others to conform to his/her
beliefs. As the eminent Voltaire once said, ‘I may disagree with what you say, but I will defend
to the death your right to say it.’ After
270

3
Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. Comelec, I joined
the
_______________
all, freedom is not really for the thought we agree with, but as Justice Holmes wrote, ‘freedom
for the thought that we hate.’
Epilogue
“By way of epilogue, let me stress the guiding tenet of my Separate Opinion. Initiative, like
referendum and recall, is a new and treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional system. All
three are institutionalized legacies of the world-admired EDSA people power. Like elections
and plebiscites, they are hallowed expressions of popular sovereignty. They are sacred
democratic rights of our people to be used as their final weapons against political excesses,
opportunism, inaction, oppression and misgovernance; as well as their reserved instruments to
exact transparency, accountability and faithfulness from their chosen leaders. While on the one
hand, their misuse and abuse must be resolutely struck down, on the other, their legitimate
exercise should be carefully nurtured and zealously protected.
“WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition of Sen. Miriam D. Santiago, et al. and to
DIRECT Respondent Commission on Elections to DISMISS the Delfin Petition on the ground
of prematurity, but not on the other grounds relied upon by the majority. I also vote to LIFT the
temporary restraining order issued on 18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibits Jesus Delfin,
Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa from exercising their right to free speech in proposing
amendments to the Constitution.”
3 G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997 (still unpublished in the Philip-pine
Reports or in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated). Again, for ease of reference, I
reproduce my Separate Opinion in full:
“Petitioners assail the July 8, 1997 Resolution of Respondent Commission dismissing their
petition for a people’s initiative to amend the Constitution. Said petition before the Comelec
(henceforth, PIRMA petition) was backed up by nearly six (6) million signatures constituting
about 16% of the registered voters of the country with at least 3% in each legislative district.
The petition now before us presents two grounds:
“1. In refusing to act on the PIRMA petition, the Comelec allegedly acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
271
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 271

rest of the members of the Court in ruling “by a unanimous vote,

that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the Comelec
in
_______________
“2. In declaring R.A. 6735 “inadequate to cover its system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution” and “declaring void those parts of Resolution 2300 of the Commission on
Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of [an] initiative [on] amendments to
the Constitution,” the Supreme Court’s Decision in G.R. No. 127325 entitled Miriam Defensor
Santiago vs. Commission on Elections (hereafter referred to as Santiago) should be reexamined
because said Decision is allegedly “unconstitutional,” and because, in any event, the Supreme
Court itself, in reconsidering the said issue per its June 10, 1997 Resolution, was deadlocked at
six votes one each side.
“The following in my position on each of these two issues:
First Issue:
No Grave Abuse of Discretion
in Comelec’s Refusal to Act
“The Respondent Commission’s refusal to act on the “prayers” of the PIRMA petition
cannot in any wise be branded as “grave abuse of discretion.” Be it remembered that the
Court’s Decision in Santiago permanently enjoined the Comelec “from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution x x x.” While
concededly, petitioners in this case were not direct parties in Santiago, nonetheless the Court’s
injunction against the Comelec covered ANY petition, not just the Delfin petition which was
the immediate subject of said case. As a dissenter in Santiago, I believed, and still do, that
the majority gravely erred in rendering such a sweeping injunction, but I cannot fault the
Comelec for complying with the ruling even if it, too, disagreed with said decision’s ratio
decidendi. Respondent Comelec was directly enjoined by the highest Court of the land. It
had no choice but to obey. Its obedience cannot constitute grave abuse of discretion.
Refusal to act on the PIRMA petition was the only recourse open to the Comelec. Any other
mode of action would have constituted defiance of the Court and would have been struck down
as grave abuse of discretion and contumacious disregard of this Court’s supremacy as the final
arbiter of justiciable controversies.
272

dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein,” since the

Commission had “only complied” with the Santiago Decision.
_______________
Second Issue:
Sufficiency of RA 6735
“I repeat my firm legal position that RA 6735 is adequate to cover initiatives on the
Constitution, and that whatever administrative details may have been omitted in said law
are satisfactorily provided by Comelec Resolution 2300. The promulgation of Resolution
2300 is sanctioned by Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, which vests upon the
Comelec the power to “enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.” The Omnibus Election Code
likewise empowers the electoral body to “promulgate rules and regulations implementing the
provisions of this Code or other laws which the Commission is required to enforce and
administer x x x.” Finally and most relevantly, Section 20 of RA 6735 specifically authorizes
Comelec “to promulgate rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of
this Act.”
“In my dissent in Santiago, I wrote that “there is a right way to do the right thing at the
right time and for the right reason.” Let me explain further.
The Right Thing
“A people’s initiative is direct democracy in action. It is the right thing that citizens may
avail themselves of to articulate their will. It is a new and treasured feature of the Filipino
constitutional system. Even the majority implicitly conceded its value and worth in our legal
firmament when it implored Congress “not to tarry any longer in complying with the
constitutional mandate to provide for implementation of the right (of initiative) of the people x
x x.” Hence, in the en banc case of Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Comelec, [G.R. No.
125416, September 26, 1996, 262 SCRA 492], this Court unanimously held that “(l)ike
elections, initiative and referendum are powerful and valuable modes of expressing popular
sovereignty. And this Court as a matter of policy and doctrine will exert every effort to nurture,
protect and promote their legitimate exercise.”
273
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 273

I added “that my position upholding the adequacy of RA 6735 and

the validity of Comelec Resolution 2300 will not ipso facto validate
_______________
The Right Way
“From the outset, I have already maintained the view that “taken together and interpreted
properly and liberally, the Constitution (particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), RA 6735 and Comelec
Resolution 2300 provide more than sufficient authority to implement, effectuate and realize our
people’s power to amend the Constitution.” Let me now demonstrate the adequacy of RA 6735
by outlining, in concrete terms, the steps to be taken—the right way—to amend the
Constitution through a people’s initiative.
“Pursuant to Section 3(f) of the law, the Comelec shall prescribe the form of the petition
which shall contain the proposition and the required number of signatories. Under Sec. 5(c)
thereof, the petition shall state the following:
‘c.1 contents or text of the [provision or provisions] sought to be x x x amended, x x x;

c.2 the proposition [in full text];
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor [fully and clearly explained];
c.4 that it is not one of exceptions provided herein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition in not more than one hundred (100) words which
shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.’
“Section 8(f) of Comelec Resolution 2300 additionally requires that the petition include a
formal designation of the duly authorized representatives of the signatories.
“Being a constitutional requirement, the number of signatures becomes a condition
precedent to the filing of the petition, and is jurisdictional. Without such requisite signatures,
the Commission shall motu proprio reject the petition.
“Where the initiators have substantially complied with the above requirements, they may
thence file the petition with the Comelec which is tasked to determine the sufficiency thereof
and to verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters’ affidavits and
voters’ identification cards. In deciding whether the petition is suffi-
274

the PIRMA petition and automatically lead to a plebiscite to amend
_______________
cient, the Comelec shall also determine if the proposition is proper for an initiative, i.e., if it
consists of an amendment, not a revision, of the Constitution. Any decision of the electoral
body may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from notice.
“Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, and after the determination of its
sufficiency, the Comelec shall publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice in
newspapers of general and local circulation, and set the date of the plebiscite. The conduct of
the plebiscite should not be earlier than sixty (60) days, but not later than ninety (90) days after
certification by the Comelec of the sufficiency of the petition. The proposition, if approved by a
majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite, becomes effective as of the day of the plebiscite.
“From the foregoing, it should be clear that my position upholding the adequacy of RA
6735 and the validity of Comelec Resolution 2300 will not ipso facto validate the PIRMA
petition and automatically lead to a plebiscite to amend the Constitution. Far from it. Among
others, PIRMA must still satisfactorily hurdle the following searching issues:
1. Does the proposed change—the lifting of the term limits of elective officials—
constitute a mere amendment and not a revision of the Constitution?
2. Which registry of voters will be used to verify the signatures in the petition? This
question is relevant considering that under RA 8189, the old registry of voters used in
the 1995 national elections was voided after the barangay elect

Lambino Vs COMELEC

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7/16/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 505

160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER

ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., intervenor.

ONEVOICE, INC., CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN,

ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, intervenor.

BAYAN represented by its Chairperson Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-

VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 161

Lambino vs. Commission on Elections

Charter Change, DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS of Health Action for

LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA

LUWALHATI RIACASA ANTONINO, intervenor.

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, intervenor.

TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor.

LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO, intervenor.

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA),

RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, and

PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President,

SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.,

JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CITY AND

SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.

162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

GOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO LACSON,

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG

G.R. No. 174299. October 25, 2006.*

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and

Constitutional Law; Amendments and Revisions of the Constitution;

VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 163

Lambino vs. Commission on Elections

Same; Same; Same; The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed

Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that

164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lambino vs. Commission on Elections

Same; Same; Same; There is no presumption that the proponents

Same; Same; Same; It is basic in American jurisprudence that the

Same; Same; Same; Logrolling; There is logrolling when the initiative

VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 165

Lambino vs. Commission on Elections

advertising to present their initiative to potential petition-signers and

166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lambino vs. Commission on Elections

Same; Same; Same; An initiative that gathers signatures from the

Same; Same; Same; “Amendment” and “Revision,” Distinguished;

VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 167

Lambino vs. Commission on Elections

Constitution itself.—Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute

Same; Same; Same; Revision broadly implies a change that alters a

numerous existing provisions”—the court examines only the number of

168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lambino vs. Commission on Elections

Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a

VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006 169

Lambino vs. Commission on Elections

Same; Same; Same; Where the proposed change applies only to a

170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED